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
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Volume

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CONTENTS

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ALPHABETICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

THEMATIC TABLE OF CONTENTS

INSTITUTIONS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES

INTEREST GROUPS AND LOBBIES

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICS AND SOCIETY

NATION AND STATE

POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

POLITICAL THEORY

POLITICS AND SOCIETY

QUALITATIVE/QUANTITATIVE METHODS

RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLITICS

RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLITICS

WAR, PEACE, AND TERRORISM

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EDITOR IN CHIEF

George Thomas Kurian is founder and president of the Encyclopedia Society. Born in India, he emigrated to the United States in 1968. Over the past twenty years, he has produced more than twenty-three encyclopedias and thirty-one other reference books, including atlases, dictionaries, almanacs, annuals, chronologies, desk references, and anthologies.

ASSOCIATE EDITORS

James E. Alt is Frank G. Thomson Professor of Government at Harvard University. He is author, coauthor, or coeditor of *The Politics of Economic Decline* (Cambridge University Press, 1979), *Political Economics* (University of California Press, 1983), *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy* (Cambridge University Press, 1990), *Competition and Cooperation* (Russell Sage, 1999), and *Positive Changes in Political Science* (University of Michigan Press, 2007). He also has published numerous articles in scholarly journals. He is the founding director of Harvard's Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences (now the Institute for Quantitative Social Science). He is or has been a member of the editorial boards of the *American Journal of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, Political Studies, American Political Science Review,* and other journals and is a former member of the Political Science panel of the National Science Foundation. He was a Guggenheim fellow (1997–1998) and is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Simone Chambers is a professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto. She is author of *Reasonable Democracy: Jurgen Habermas and the Politics of Discourse* (Cornell University Press, 1996) and the coeditor of *Deliberation, Democracy, and the Media* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2000) and *Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society* (Princeton University Press, 2001). Chambers has published articles on deliberative democracy, the Frankfurt School, constitutional theory, civil society, rhetoric and the public sphere in such journals as *Political Theory, Journal of Political Philosophy, Constellations,* and *Perspectives on Politics.* She teaches the history of political thought, critical theory, democratic theory, continental thought, and public law.

Geoffrey Garrett is founding CEO of the United States Studies Centre and professor of political science at the University of Sydney. He was previously president of the Pacific Council on International Policy in Los Angeles and before

that dean of the International Institute at the University of California, Los Angeles. He has served on the faculties of Oxford, Stanford, and Yale universities and the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Garrett is author of *Partisan Politics in the Global Economy* and editor of *The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy,* both published by Cambridge University Press, and he has published more than fifty articles in the world's leading social science journals on the politics of globalization and European integration.

Margaret Levi is Jere L. Bacharach Professor of International Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Washington, Seattle and, jointly, chair in politics, United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. She is director of the CHAOS (Comparative Historical Analysis of Organizations and States) Center and formerly the Harry Bridges Chair and Director of the Harry Bridges Center for Labor Studies. She served as president of the American Political Science Association (2004–2005) and was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2001. She was a Guggenheim fellow (2002–2003) and a Phi Beta Kappa Visiting Scholar (2006–2007). Levi's many publications include *Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism* (1997), *Of Rule and Revenue* (1988), and the multi-authored *Analytic Narratives* (1998) and *Cooperation Without Trust* (2005). In 1997 she became the co–general editor of the Trust series for Russell Sage Foundation Press, in 1999 the general editor of *Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics,* and in 2006 the general editor of the *Annual Review of Political Science.*

Paula D. McClain is professor of political science, public policy, and African American studies at Duke University. She is codirector of the Center for the Study of Race, Ethnicity and Gender in the Social Sciences at Duke. She directs the American Political Science Association's Ralph Bunche Summer Institute hosted by Duke University and funded by the National Science Foundation and Duke University. Her primary research interests are in racial minority group politics, particularly interminority political and social competition, and urban politics, especially public policy and urban crime. Her articles have appeared in numerous journals, most recently the *Journal of Politics, American Political Science Review, Urban Affairs Review,* and the *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race.*

CONTENT EDITORS

Micah Altman is senior research scientist in the Institute for Quantitative Social Science in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University, archival director of the Henry A. Murray Research Archive, and nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Kevin G. Barnhurst is a professor in the Department of Communication at the University of Illinois at Chicago and chair of the Political Communication Division of the International Communication Association.

Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier is the Vernal Riffe Professor of Political Science, courtesy professor of sociology, and director of the program in statistical methodology at Ohio State University.

Susan Burgess is professor of political science and women's and gender studies at Ohio University.

Ladislav Cabada is the Jean Monnet Chair and Associate Professor in the Department for Politics and International Relations and also is on the faculty of philosophy and arts at the University of West Bohemia in Pilsen, Czech Republic.

Tihomir Cipek is professor of political science at the University of Zagreb in Croatia and former president of the Croatian Political Science Association.

Louis DeSipio is associate professor of political science and chair of Chicano/Latino studies at the University of California, Irvine.

Joyce Gelb is professor emerita of political science at the City University of New York.

Michael T. Gibbons is associate professor of political science in government and international affairs at the University of South Florida.

Michael Gilligan is associate professor of politics at New York University.

Michael Goodhart is associate professor of political science and women's studies at the University of Pittsburgh.

Sean Q. Kelly is professor of political science at California State University, Channel Islands in Camarillo, California.

Joseph L. Klesner is professor of political science and associate provost at Kenyon College.

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Andrew Murphy is associate professor of political science at Rutgers University, New Brunswick.

J. Mitchell Pickerill is coeditor of "The State of American Federalism" annual issue of *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* and an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Washington State University.

Peter Rutland is the Colin and Nancy Campbell Professor in Global Issues and Democratic Thought, professor of government, and professor of Russian and Eastern European studies at Wesleyan University in Middletown, Connecticut.

Reeta Tremblay is vice president (academic) pro tempore at Memorial University of Newfoundland and president-elect of the Canadian Political Science Association. Beginning January 1, 2011, she will be vice president (academic) and provost at the University of Victoria.

Gul Gunver Turan is professor of economics (retired) in the faculty of economics at Istanbul University.

Ilter Turan is a professor of political science in the Department of International Relations at Istanbul Bilgi University in Turkey.

James J. Wirtz is dean of the School of International Graduate Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

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Isabel David
*Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais
e Políticas–Technical University of Lisbon*

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National University of Ireland, Maynooth

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*School of Humanity and Social Sciences,
University of East London*

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IFSH, Universität Hamburg

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*University of North Carolina
at Asheville*

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*St. John's College, University of
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Westminster College

Eytan Gilboa
Bar-Ilan University

Itzhak Gilboa
Bar-Ilan University and University of Southern California

J. Ramon Gil-Garcia
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Mexico

Anthony Gill
University of Washington

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Duke University

Bruce Gilley
Portland State University

Ryan R. Gladwin
University of Edinburgh

Marlies Glasius
Universiteit van Amsterdam

Andrew Glencross
University of Aberdeen

Christian Göbel
Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies, Lund University

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Bradley University

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Senior Acquisitions Editor, CQ Press

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University of Chicago

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University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Jack A. Goldstone
School of Public Policy, George Mason University

Michael Goodhart
University of Pittsburgh

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Western Kentucky University

Norbert Götz
Institute of Contemporary History, Södertörn University

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University of San Diego

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Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University

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Catholic University of America

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New School for Social Research

Ramona June Grey
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John G. Gunnell
Distinguished Professor, Emeritus, State University of New York at Albany; Research

Associate, Affiliated Faculty, Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis

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Oakland University

Mirjam Künkler
Princeton University

George Thomas Kurian
President, Encyclopedia Society

Yves Laberge
Independent Scholar, Quebec City

Gladys Lang
University of Washington

Kurt Lang
University of Washington

Margaret Meek Lange
Independent Scholar

Stephen J. Lange
Morehead State University

George R. La Noue
University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Tom Lansford
University of Southern Mississippi

Jeffrey Larsen
Science Applications International Application; Larsen Consulting Group LLC

Jennifer L. Lawless
Women and Politics Institute, American University

Regina G. Lawrence
Manship School of Mass Communication, Louisiana State University

David L. Leal
University of Texas at Austin

J. Wesley Leckrone
Widener University

André Lecours
University of Ottawa

Theresa Man Ling Lee
University Of Guelph

Fabrice Lehoucq
University of North Carolina at Greensboro

Gary Lehring
Smith College

Stephan Leibfried
Bremen University

Julia Leininger
German Development Institute

Yphtach Lelkes
Stanford University

Howard H. Lentner
City University of New York

Eric K. Leonard
Shenandoah University

Eduardo Leoni
IBGE—Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics

Paul Lermack
Bradley University

David Levi-Faur
Hebrew University

Alan Levine
American University

Daniel C. Lewis
University of New Orleans

Mark Irving Lichbach
University of Maryland

Joel A. Lieske
Cleveland State University

Mary Liston
Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia

Baodong Liu
University of Utah

Gerhard Loewenberg
University of Iowa

Joseph Losco
Ball State University

Todd R. Lowery
University of Maryland

Robert C. Lowry
University of Texas, Dallas

Cyanne E. Loyle
University of Maryland

Thorsten Luhde
Federal Ministry of Finance (Germany)

Sander Luitwieler
Erasmus University Rotterdam

Arthur Lupia
University of Michigan

Michael Lusztig
Southern Methodist University

Willem Maas
York University

David MacDonald
University of Guelph

Eric MacGilvray
Ohio State University

Scott MacLeod
Simon Fraser University

Allan MacNeill
Webster University

James Magee
University of Delaware

Lars Magnusson
Uppsala University

Deanna Malatesta
Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis

Laura Mamo
San Francisco State University

Cecilia G. Manrique
University of Wisconsin–La Crosse

Joseph R. Marbach
La Salle University

Raffaele Marchetti
LUISS Guido Carli University

Lee Marsden
University of East Anglia

Cathie Jo Martin
Boston University

Guy Martin
Winston-Salem State University

Janet M. Martin
Bowdoin College

Sherry L. Martin
Cornell University

Andrew D. Mason
University of Southampton

Geoffroy Matagne
University of Liege

Lawrence C. Mayer
Texas Tech University

Sebastián Mazzuca
Harvard University

Erin McAdams
College of Charleston

Keally McBride
University of San Francisco

Michael McCann
University of Washington

James M. McCormick
Iowa State University

Rose McDermott
Brown University

Tony McGann
University of California, Irvine and University of Essex

James W. McGuire
Wesleyan University

Iain McLean
Nuffield College, Oxford University

Michael McNamara
Cape Breton University

Peter McNamara
Utah State University

Richard J. Meagher
Randolph-Macon College

John Medearis
University of California, Riverside

Jérôme Melançon
University of Alberta, Augustana Campus

Jiri S. Melich
Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics, and Strategic Research (KIMEP)

Raymond Mercado
Duke University

Jonathan Mercer
University of Washington

John M. Meyer
Humboldt State University

Ellen Mickiewicz
Duke University

Andrea Migone
Simon Fraser University

Mark C. Miller
Clark University

Maren Milligan
Oberlin College

Henry Milner
Université de Montréal

Fathali M. Moghaddam
Georgetown University

Benoit F. Monange
Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Grenoble

Philippe Mongin
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique & Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales

Michael Moran
School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester

Jo Moran-Ellis
Center for International Studies in Social Policy and Social Services, Bergische Universität Wuppertal

Luis Moreno
Spanish National Research Council (CSIC)

Irwin L. Morris
University of Maryland

Rebecca B. Morton
New York University

Michael Mosher
University of Tulsa

Jennifer E. Mosley
School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago

Gary Mucciaroni
Temple University

Gerardo L. Munck
School of International Relations, University of Southern California

Michael C. Munger
Duke University

Andrew Murphy
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

Fortunato Musella
University of Naples Federico II

Ella K. Myers
University of Utah

Todd Myers
Grossmont College

Amarjit S. Narang
Indira Gandhi National Open University

Wissam Nasr
Columbia University

Karl-Heinz Nassmacher
Institute of Social Sciences Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg

Pervaiz Nazir
University of Cambridge

Cary J. Nederman
Texas A&M University

Jorge Nef
University of Guelph

Eric Nelson
Missouri State University

Roderick P. Neumann
Florida International University

James Newman
Idaho State University

Kate Nicholls
National University of Singapore

Eric Novotny
U.S. Civilian Research & Development Foundation

J. M. Norton
University of Georgia

Hannu Nurmi
University of Turku

Adam W. Nye
Pennsylvania State University

Herbert Obinger
Bremen University

Edith Obinger-Gindulis
Bremen University

Aron Octavian
Central European University (Budapest)

Niall Ó Dochartaigh
School of Political Science and Sociology, National University of Ireland, Galway

Ismaila Odogba
University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point

Muhamad S. Olimat
University of South Florida, St. Petersburg

David M. Olson
University of North Carolina at Greensboro

Laura Olson
Clemson University

Barry O'Neill
University of California, Los Angeles

Susan Marie Opp
Colorado State University

Danny Osborne
University of California, Los Angeles

Jeffery L. Osgood Jr.
West Chester University of Pennsylvania

Diana Owen
Georgetown University

John E. Owens
University of Westminster

Isik Ozel
Sabanci University, Istanbul

Fania Oz-Salzberger
University of Haifa

Jan Pakulski
University of Tasmania

Kari Palonen
University of Jyväskylä

Niccole M. Pamphilis
Michigan State University

Joel Parker
University of Texas at Austin

Michael Parkin
Oberlin College

John M. Parrish
Loyola Marymount University

Rick Parrish
West Texas A&M University

Eleonora Pasotti
University of California, Santa Cruz

Juliano Pasqual
Fundacao Getulio Vargas

Benjamin J. Pauli
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

Bruce G. Peabody
Fairleigh Dickinson University

Colin D. Pearce
University of Guelph–Humber

Malte Pehl
College of Charleston

Riccardo Pelizzo
Griffith University

Daniel Pellerin
National University of Singapore

Glenn E. Perry
Indiana State University

Ravi Perry
Clark University

Leylâ Pervizat
Haliç University in Istanbul

Steven Peterson
Penn State University

Jon Pevehouse
University of Wisconsin

J. Mitchell Pickerill
Washington State University

Mark A. Pickup
Centre for Research Methods in the Social Sciences, University of Oxford and Simon Fraser University

Jean-Benoit Pilet
Université libre de Bruxelles

Pietro Pirani
University of Western Ontario

Wm. C. Plouffe Jr.
Independent Scholar

Andrew Poe
Amherst College

Jonathan T. Polk
University of Georgia

Mark A. Pollack
Temple University

Colin Provost
School of Public Policy, University College London

Sue Pryce
University of Nottingham

Hermann Pünder
Bucerius Law School (Hochschule für Rechtswissenschaft)

Elizabeth Rholetter Purdy
Independent Scholar

Kurt Pyle
Michigan State University

George H. Quester
University of Maryland

John Quigley
Michael E. Moritz College of Law, Ohio State University

Andrea Quinlan
University of Saskatchewan

Kirk A. Randazzo
University of South Carolina

Anthony L. Rappa
Singapore Institute of Management (SIM) University

Claire E. Rasmussen
University of Delaware

Dennis C. Rasmussen
Tufts University

Carsten Rauch
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt

Clyde Ray
Villanova University

David Rayside
University of Toronto

James H. Read
College of St. Benedict and St. John's University

Chad Rector
George Washington University

Robert B. Reich
University of California, Berkeley

Blanka Říchová
Charles University in Prague

Jean-Marc Rickli
Geneva University Strategic Studies Group

Valéry Ridde
Centre de recherche du CHUM, Université de Montréal

Steven C. Roach
University of South Florida

Ian Roberge
Glendon College, York University

Andrew Roberts
Northwestern University

Neil Robinson
University of Limerick

Stephen R. Rock
Vassar College

Joseph Romance
Drew University

Richard Rose
University of Aberdeen

Susan Rose-Ackerman
Yale University, Law School and Department of Political Science

Steven Rosefielde
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

David H. Rosenbloom
City University of Hong Kong

Bo Rothstein
University of Gothenburg

Thomas R. Rourke
Clarion University

Stephen R. Routh
California State University, Stanislaus

Paul S. Rowe
Trinity Western University

Molly Ruhlman
Temple University

Mark Rush
Williams School of Commerce, Economics and Politics, Washington and Lee University

Peter Rutland
Wesleyan University

Thomas Saalfeld
University of Bamberg

Filippo Sabetti
McGill University

Marcelo Saguier
Latin American School of Social Sciences

Joseph C. Santora
Thomas Edison State College

Austin Sarat
Amherst College

Meredith Reid Sarkees
American University

Larry Savage
Brock University

Marian Sawer
Australian National University

William C. Schaniel
University of West Georgia

Marc Schattenmann
Advisory Council, Das Progressive Zentrum, Berlin

Gary Schaub Jr.
Air War College

Kay Lehman Schlozman
Boston College

Vivien A. Schmidt
Boston University

Saundra K. Schneider
Michigan State University

Julian Schofield
Concordia University

David Schultz
Hamline University

Chris Matthew Sciabarra
New York University

Jason Scorza
Fairleigh Dickinson University

Kyle Scott
University of North Florida

David O. Sears
University of California, Los Angeles

Nicholas J. Seaton
*Public Opinion Research Laboratory,
University of North Florida*

Susan K. Sell
George Washington University

Jeffrey Shantz
Kwantlen Polytechnic University

Paul Sharp
University of Minnesota, Duluth

Steve Sheppard
University of Arkansas

Kenneth A. Shepsle
*Institute for Quantitative Social Science,
Harvard University*

David A. Shirk
University of San Diego

Gordon Shockley
*School of Community Resources and
Development, Arizona State University*

Carisa R. Showden
University of North Carolina at Greensboro

Peter M. Siavelis
Wake Forest University

Katri Sieberg
University of Tampere

Carlos Nunes Silva
*Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning,
University of Lisbon*

Marian Simms
Deakin University

J. P. Singh
Georgetown University

Henry B. Sirgo
McNeese State University

Richard M. Skinner
Rollins College

Jonathan Slapin
University of Houston

Brian Slocock
University of West of Scotland

Dennis Smith
Loughborough University

Martin J. Smith
University of Sheffield

Stephen Smith
University College London

T. C. Smith
Albright College

Anand E. Sokhey
Ohio State University

M. Scott Solomon
University of South Florida

Albert Somit
Southern Illinois University

Robert Speel
Penn State Erie, Behrend College

James H. Spencer
University of Hawai'i at Manoa

Clemens Spiess
Heidelberg University

Peter J. Spiro
Beasley School of Law, Temple University

Hendrik Spruyt
Northwestern University

Lavinia Stan
St Francis Xavier University

Lyndsey Stanfill
Ohio State University

Koen Stapelbroek
Erasmus University Rotterdam

Jennifer A. Steen
*Arizona State University, School of
Government, Politics and Global Studies*

Manfred B. Steger
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology

Peter J. Steinberger
Reed College

John Steinbruner
University of Maryland

Jennifer Sterling-Folker
University of Connecticut

Garth Stevenson
Brock University

Judith Hicks Stiehm
Florida International University

Brian Stipelman
Dowling University

Daniel Stockemer
University of Ottawa

Gregory W. Streich
University of Central Missouri

Heinz Sünker
*Center for International Studies in Social
Policy and Social Services, Bergische
Universität Wuppertal*

Thomas C. Sutton
Baldwin-Wallace College

Gert Tinggaard Svendsen
Aarhus University

Donald G. Tannenbaum
Gettysburg College

Gregory Tardi
*Institute of Parliamentary and
Political Law*

Shira Tarrant
California State University, Long Beach

Sidney Tarrow
Cornell University

Steven Tauber
University of South Florida

Rodrigo Tavares
United Nations University–Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS)

Sarah Taylor
New School for Social Research

Joanne Tetlow
Comptroller of Maryland

Göran Therborn
University of Cambridge

Michael Thom
Michigan State University

Aaron Thomas
University of California, Los Angeles

Michael J. Thompson
William Paterson University

Chris Thornhill
University of Glasgow

Paul W. Thurner
Department of Political Science, University of Munich (LMU)

Martina Topić
University of Zagreb, Croatia

Cirila Toplak
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia

Pier Domenico Tortola
University of Oxford

Lee Trepanier
Saginaw Valley State University

Lily L. Tsai
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Mark Tunick
Wilkes Honors College

Jack Turner
University of Washington

Nadia Urbinati
Columbia University

Jennifer (van Heerde) Hudson
University College London

Abigaile Marguerite VanHorn
Purdue University

Tatiana Vashchilko
University of Rochester

Francisco José Veiga
Universidade do Minho (Portugal)

Peter Vermeersch
University of Leuven

Matías Vernengo
University of Utah

Steven Vertovec
Max-Planck-Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity

John R. Vile
Middle Tennessee State University

Barbara Vis
VU University Amsterdam

Wim J. M. Voermans
Leiden University, the Netherlands

John von Heyking
University of Lethbridge

Matthew Voorhees
Hartwick College

F. Peter Wagner
University of Wisconsin–Whitewater

Amentahru Wahlrab
University of Texas at Tyler

Claire Wallace
University of Aberdeen

Jennifer E. Walsh
Azusa Pacific University

Henry Kiragu Wambuii
University of Central Missouri

Lena Wängnerud
University of Gothenburg

James F. Ward
University of Massachusetts, Boston

Andrew J. Waskey
Dalton State College

Georgina Waylen
University of Sheffield

Ronald Weed
University of New Brunswick

David L. Weeks
Azusa Pacific University

Gregory Weeks
University of North Carolina at Charlotte

David L. Weiden
Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis

Richard R. Weiner
Rhode Island College

Howard J. Wiarda
University of Georgia

Erik Wibbels
Duke University

Wesley W. Widmaier
Centre for Governance and Public Policy/ Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University

Nelson Wikstrom
Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs, Virginia Commonwealth University

Harold L. Wilensky
University of California, Berkeley

Brent M. Will
Temple University

Kenneth C. Williams
Michigan State University

Russell Alan Williams
Memorial University of Newfoundland

Graham K. Wilson
Boston University

Matthew S. Winters
University of Illinois

James J. Wirtz
Naval Postgraduate School

Christopher Wlezien
Temple University

Albert B. Wolf
University of California, Irvine

Kerri Woods
University of York

Kent Worcester
Marymount Manhattan College

Jeff Worsham
West Virginia University

Melike Wulfgramm
Bremen University

James S. Wunsch
Creighton University

Harald Wydra
St Catharine's College, University of Cambridge

Vineeta Yadav
University of Notre Dame

Richard M. Yon
U.S. Military Academy

Dannagal Goldthwaite Young
University of Delaware

Dana Zartner
Tulane University

Claudia Zilla
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Joseph F. Zimmerman
Rockefeller College, University at Albany

Roukayatou Zimmermann
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)

Catherine Zuckert
University of Notre Dame

Michael Zuckert
University of Notre Dame

Benjamin Zyla
University of Ottawa

PREFACE

Man is by nature a political animal.

—Aristotle

The Encyclopedia of Political Science (TEPS) is an ambitious survey of the world of politics at the beginning of the twenty-first century. TEPS, developed by the Encyclopedia Society and CQ Press with the assistance of the American Political Science Association (APSA), is an authoritative resource for political scientists and students of politics throughout the world. It assembles more than 1,500 signed articles by contributors from nearly forty countries, making it one of the largest encyclopedias on political science published to date.

Politics has many definitions, all of which are explored in this work. *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary* offers one of the classic and broadest definitions of politics as the quest for good government. Politics is thus one of the most consequential of collective human activities and, next to religion, possibly the oldest. The search for good government has engaged humans from the time they formed groups and communities; modern political science brings an unprecedented toolbox of conceptual and empirical instruments to this search. Hence, political science is one of the world's most interdisciplinary disciplines—there is scarcely any area of human life untouched by it. Political science impinges on and is influenced by public administration, electoral processes, economics, religion, legal systems, societal ethos, education, technology, science, and a host of other related activities and disciplines. Politics is about power: who wields it, how it should be used, and the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. Because politics determines the pathways to power, it also serves as the gateway to history: what is politics today is history tomorrow.

Every discipline requires a flagship resource that professionals, teachers, and students can use. TEPS is designed to be such a foundational resource for political science. It is primarily a synchronic encyclopedia that presents the state of the art by assembling and distilling ideas. This is the function defined by the old Latin term for encyclopedias, *Notitia*. TEPS is also a diachronic encyclopedia that presents the foundations and historic evolution of political ideas, concepts, and theories. This is the function defined by the Latin term *Summa*. Political science is driven by ideas and concepts, values and theories, as well as philosophers and thinkers. Politics represents the confluence of theory and praxis. On the one hand, ideologies form the bedrock of political science. But politics also exists as an empirical science, especially in the arena of government and elections. TEPS devotes a considerable number of entries both to the nomothetic, or abstract, side of political science and to the empirical side.

The appearance of TEPS at the beginning of the twenty-first century is significant because the end of the twentieth century brought enormous challenges to politics. Quantitatively, the universe of political science has expanded. The global electorate—the number of voters eligible to vote in free elections—is now 3.8 billion, compared to just 87 million at the beginning of the twentieth century. This means that more people have become stakeholders in the political process throughout the world. There are 193 sovereign nations in the world, compared to 35 at the beginning of the twentieth century, and more of them are democratic than ever before. There are 1.7 million political officeholders and elected officials in the world. The number of universities with political science departments has decupled and so has the number of political science scholars and political science media and associations.

The qualitative changes have been equally impressive. The world of politics is continually buffeted by remarkable events and transformed in unlikely ways. The sovereignty of the nation-state has been eroded by endogenous and exogenous forces, including the growing globalization of a borderless world from without and centrifugal ethnic, nationalist, religious, and linguistic forces from within. The very lexicon of politics has changed, and the sources of collective identity have been recast. New concerns and issues such as the environment have challenged the primacy of such older concerns as economic inequality. Solidarities animated by gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and language have challenged the old dichotomies based on the traditional Left/Right polarities. The Internet has transformed political communications and is competing with the ballot box as an agent of political change. *Vox Populi* has become *Twitter Populi*.

TEPS is not merely concerned with change. Although change forces us to view the world as a moving target, there are enduring themes in politics that remain as urgent in the twenty-first century as they did in Athens in the second century B.C. The institutional and constitutional bases of politics and the loci, exercise, and legitimacy of power confront political scientists as much today as they did in Aristotle's time. Political corruption and cronyism are as rampant today

as they were in ancient Rome. Politics is about power, and Lord Acton's dictum that power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely, holds true today. Other enduring themes include the rule of law, modernization, demography, revolution, reform and restoration, tradition, convergence, value systems, lifestyles, class and ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts, the homogenization of cultures, and the preservation of diversity. These colliding political ideas and movements have blurred the traditional tidy boundaries of political science and in some cases have caused them to disappear altogether. Political science, like politics itself, has become borderless. Political science now represents the union of law, economics, anthropology, media studies, women's studies, sociology, law, history, theology, international relations, statistics, technology, and philosophy. Political scientists import ideas from other disciplines and, in turn, export ideas to them, but, on balance, political science is a net importer of ideas. On an ideological level, the traditional and convenient binary divisions (Left/Right, North/South, domestic/international) that once constrained innovative scholarship have disappeared or no longer hold as much currency. TEPS thus maps the enlarged terrain of political science as we move into the twenty-first century.

There are large areas of political life and culture not covered or explained by political theory. These include the imponderable and unpredictable dilemmas, the problems and paradoxes, that make the study of politics a formidable undertaking. It is the task of political scientists in the twenty-first century to deal with these problems. Among them are:

Problem 1. Why does it appear that injustice persists even under the best legal systems and in the best governed nations and under the best constitutions? Do the foibles and frailties of human nature—including corruption, scandals, and blunders—make the quality of any political system no better than the quality of its politicians?

Problem 2. From whence comes the force of the status quo and inertia in political evolution, the almost pathological resistance to change in human nature?

Problem 3. Is it power alone that corrupts, or does powerlessness corrupt just as much?

Problem 4. Why does politics, like religion, seem to be a source of disunity as much or even more than of unity, and why are divisions in democracies perhaps even more prevalent than under other political systems?

Problem 6. Do the Eurocentric assumptions of political science about political beliefs and behavior, such as theories about sovereignty, nationalism, and political ethics, have relevance in the Third World, or do they actually contribute to failed and rogue states like Somalia in Africa and Afghanistan in the Middle East?

Problem 7. Why do class and ethnic groups radically diverge on their political ideologies and philosophical stances despite sharing a common political system? As Gilbert and Sullivan famously said, "Why are some men born Tory and others born Whig?"

Problem 8. How are conventional notions of civil rights, citizenship, and nationality scrambled and reassembled in the presence of large groups of undocumented immigrants in industrialized countries?

As in all social sciences, there are no absolutes in political science. Every political system, every form of government, and every method of determining the popular will ever devised by man is flawed—some more than others. In Plato's philosophy, all forms of government are only shadows of the ultimate ideal government in the unseen realm. The task of the political scientist is to bridge the gap between the shadows and the ideal.

Political science is not merely an academic discipline, and political scientists do not just study the anatomy of politics. Political science is renewed with every political administration and with every major political event and with every political leader. Influential political leaders construct their own -isms (Fidelism/Castroism, Maoism, Gandhism, Reaganism, and so on) so that the political philosophies and ideologies that undergird the discipline have to be reinvented constantly. Further, political science is arguably so important in the scheme of human knowledge because of its normative function. As problems emerge in the body politic, political science suggests remedies, probes into causes, and provides solutions. TEPS is designed to frame the issues, problems, and challenges and to provoke a polygonal effort to suggest solutions.

ARCHITECTURE

The value of an encyclopedia resides not merely in its contents but in what the French call *ordonnance*—the selection, classification, and arrangement of entries and the placement of navigational aids. TEPS is a strict A–Z encyclopedia that follows the principles of alphabetization in the *Chicago Manual of Style*. Each entry of more than five hundred words carries a bibliography that includes journal articles. Most entries carry cross references to related entries. Readers are also advised to consult the Thematic Table of Contents that appears in the frontmatter. This is a map of the entries in the book organized by subject matter or subfield. Within each theme, there are six classes of entries, each weighted and assigned a length based on its importance.

Class 1, Core Articles: These are wide-ranging articles that define a field or major analytic concerns and include commentary, discussion, interpretation, and comprehensive reviews of literature. They are designed as *tours d'horizon* to lay the groundwork for all other entries.

Class 2, Long Interpretive Essays: These delve substantively into key issues, concepts, ideas, and theories or develop a particular argument or thesis.

Class 3, Short Descriptive Essays: These deal with the less theoretical and programmatic aspects of the discipline but have no commentary.

Class 4, Breakout Articles: These are derivatives from core articles that examine and explore particular aspects of a topic.

Class 5, Lexical Entries: These are designed to provide useful definitions of unusual terms and concepts.

Class 6, Biographies: No biographies of living persons (with a few exceptions) are included in this category, but the nearly

three hundred biographies cover the seminal thinkers and figures in the formation of political science as it is today and will be in the coming century.

APSA ASSISTANCE

TEPS was produced and published with the assistance of the American Political Science Association (APSA), the world's largest professional organization for the study of politics and political science. It is a privilege the editorial board and publisher have taken seriously, and we have tried to meet the high standards of scholarship that such a collaboration demands. The APSA nominated the five members of the editorial board, and APSA's membership formed the principal source for contributors.

When I approached Michael Brintall, executive director of APSA, with the idea of producing the first major political science encyclopedia of the twenty-first century, he warmly embraced the vision and offered the full support of the organization. But for his positive response and unwavering commitment, TEPS would never have become a reality.

EDITORIAL ORGANIZATION

Three elements determine the strength and quality of an encyclopedia. The first is the credentials of the contributors—any encyclopedia is only as good as its contributors. We assembled one of the finest teams of political science scholars, based on the recommendations of the editorial board. The contributors were drawn from a host of disciplines in the social sciences and humanities as well as political science. All were chosen for the originality and importance of their contributions. They were also chosen from more than forty countries to ensure that the breadth and range of interpretations match the needs of a global information age. The selection of articles and the mix of authors represent an attempt to strike a balance among various schools of thought, regions of the world, gender identities, and ideological emphases.

The second element of strength in an encyclopedia is the editorial board. We had three levels in place. The principal, or working, editorial board consisted of five members nominated by the APSA: James E. Alt, Simone Chambers, Geoffrey Garrett, Margaret Levi, and Paula D. McClain. Core articles in TEPS bear the impress of their careful review and input. To bring such a vast work to completion, even more help was needed, and we are most grateful for all the work of the content editors who reviewed long and short essay entries. We also thank the larger seventy-two–member board of editorial consultants and advisers and the international board of editorial advisers, which was drawn from political science associations from around the world to assist the editor in chief in choosing contributors from outside the United States. Together, these boards shepherded the project and enlisted the best possible contributions from universities and associations across the globe. The full list of members of these three boards appears in the preceding pages.

The last element of strength is the publisher. CQ Press has remained for many decades the premier political science publisher in the United States, and its imprint guarantees the integrity of a work. Over the four years TEPS was in the making, I had the privilege of working with a number of veteran publishers and editors at CQ Press, including John Jenkins, the president; Andrea Pedolsky, editorial director; and Doug Goldenberg-Hart, acquisitions editor. Doug is an experienced reference book editor, and his editorial skills and dedication kept the project on track during its extended gestation. The development editing team was led initially by January Layman-Wood; followed by Nancy Matuszak, who helped to bring the project successfully to its home stretch; Andrea Cunningham; and John Martino. Finally, at the Encyclopedia Society, managing editor Sarah Claudine Day worked on the project from beginning to end.

Our collective mission for TEPS was not merely to create an encyclopedia that is original, accurate, and comprehensive but also one that conveys through its 1,500 entries some of the vitality and excitement of the world of political science and politics and offers vibrant cutting-edge interpretations and insights.

We welcome and earnestly solicit feedback in the form of comments, suggestions, and corrections for future editions. Please address them to me (gtkurian@aol.com) or to the publisher (iencypolisci@cqpress.com).

GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN
Editor in Chief
August 2010

INTRODUCTION

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The Encyclopedia of Political Science offers scholars and students easy access to the essential concepts in political science in the early twenty-first century. Organized by traditional subfields, such as political theory, comparative politics, international relations, and public policy, it also incorporates those fields that have emerged more recently, for example, race and ethnicity, gender studies, and political economy. In addition, the content reflects the blurring of boundaries increasingly prevalent in political science—whether this occurs in association with cultural studies, neurology, history, or economics. Biographical entries provide a sense of the history of the discipline, and methodological entries suggest the variety of approaches—sometimes used singly and sometimes in combination—available for studying politics. There is material that gives background on countries, theorists, and theories, and there are entries on terms that everyone should know and entries on terms only specialists require.

Diversity in practice characterizes political scientists in their research and teaching, and the editors of this text have tried to respect and illuminate this pluralism. We endeavored to be sensitive to controversies and disagreements over methods, approaches, and models of the world while providing access to what has become an increasingly specialized subject. We also paid attention throughout to enduring questions and topics, such as war and peace, democratization, political development, and ethnic conflict—topics that cut across the subfields of the discipline—while making room to cover some novel initiatives at the cutting edge of research in the field. We recognize that at any time such an encyclopedia as this is necessarily a snapshot, but we have tried to reflect the ways in which political science, like other fields of inquiry, is constantly evolving in reaction both to debates among scholars and to developments in the real world of politics.

DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND ITS CLASSICAL FIELDS

The introduction to *The Encyclopedia of Political Science* should contain a short history of the development of the discipline of political science. Yet one is not easy to construct, given the various views on what the discipline is. According to Farr (1988), if one understands political science as the "more-or-less empirical study of practical politics," then Aristotle is the beginning. If perceived as the study of *realpolitik,* then Machiavelli gets the nod. If focused on the character of the modern state,

then Hobbes is central. If one considers the study of politics a science, then Hume and others in the Scottish Enlightenment might be considered its "founders." Finally, if one thinks of it as an academic discipline with a school devoted to the study of politics, then John W. Burgess should be considered the founder of American political science, and "everything before the School of Political Science founded at Columbia University in 1880 will be 'pre-history'" (Farr 1988: 1178).

Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner (2002: 6) suggest that the many narratives of the development of the discipline "often overlook deep continuities that have made up political science during its first century as an organized discipline." They reiterate the familiar retelling of the history of political science—"[a]n early legal-formal constitutionally oriented discipline was supplanted by a more scientific, behavioral impulse" (p. 7). Later, behavioralism was replaced by a post-behavioral stage with multiple methods but with a view toward unification of the discipline through a method-specific research program. They argue that even these approaches to the history of the discipline "are both too simple and too complex." The simplicity results "from the tendency to overstate the internal consistency of a given period within and across subfields," while the complexity results "because their periodization tends to miss the manner in which American political science has been continuous across epochs" (p. 7). These historical narratives identify the study of the state with the first epoch, the study of power with the middle epoch, and the study of choice with the latest epoch (p. 7). This characterization of the growth of the discipline of political science nicely captures Anglo-Saxon approaches, particularly in the United States and Great Britain, but many of the themes and issues tend to occur, if in somewhat different forms and languages, throughout the world.

This particular orientation to the history of political science, based on the study of concepts, differs from that of Charles Merriam in his 1925 book, *New Aspects of Politics,* which viewed the development of the discipline through the lens of analytical methods. Merriam divided the development of political science into four periods—the a priori and deductive method (1850 and earlier); historical and comparative method (1850–1900); observation, survey, and measurement (1900–); and the beginnings of the psychological treatment of politics in the 1920s (Merriam 1925 as quoted in Farr 1988: 79).[1]

Merriam's construction of the discipline of political science prompted a response some years later from Bernard Crick. In *The American Science of Politics* (1959), Crick articulated the perspective of many British political scientists. He believed that American political science was trading in a false scientism "that seeks universally applicable general theories, a scientism that arguably masks its actual role as an American ideology" (Adcock and Bevir 2005). He argued that the increasing focus on scientism by American political scientists came at the expense of older modes of thought, for example, history and philosophy.

What this brief discussion suggests is the difficulty of providing a definitive history of the development of the discipline given the wide variety of perspectives about what political science is and should do. One attempt to create an overview is found in this encyclopedia's article, "Political Science, History of," by John G. Gunnell, who uses a democratic narrative as the overarching theme. Other approaches are equally plausible.

Yet despite the lack of consensus on the development of the discipline, some consensus can be reached on the classic subfields that developed over time, as reflected in the subfields offered by most political science departments (Kaufman-Osborn 2006). These classic subfields are:

1. The politics of a country or region. Whether this is British, French, Latin American, Chinese, or American depends on the location of relevant universities and practitioners. Each has its own distinctive history. We shall use as an example **American politics**, which incorporates the study of political behavior, public opinion, elections, electoral structure, institutions, political parties, and different levels of government—national, state, local, urban—in the United States. The subfield embraces writings from the founding and early development of the United States—The Federalist Papers (and some of the Anti-Federalist papers) and John Adams, Thomas Paine, and Alexis de Tocqueville, among others. Classic early academic texts include Woodrow Wilson's *Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics* (1885), James Bryce's *The American Commonwealth* (1888), and Arthur Bentley's *The Process of Government* (1908).

2. Comparative politics began as a field that encompassed two things: "area" studies of countries and regions other than one's own and comparisons of governmental institutions, including legislatures, electoral systems, and prime ministers versus presidents, among countries. Currently, the subfield focuses not only on the politics of countries around the globe but also on concepts and how they apply across countries, for example, democratization and tolerance, among others. The institutional and ideological foundations of the modern national state are central concerns of comparative politics (Boix and Stokes 2007). While Aristotle studied the development of constitutions and John Andrews published *A Comparative View of the French and English Nations, in Their Manners, Politics and Literature* in 1785, "modern" books incorporating "comparative politics" into their titles probably date from 1961 with the publication of *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings* by Bernard E. Brown and Roy C. Macridis.

3. International relations is the study of relations among nation-states (countries) and the organization of the international system via public, private, and nongovernmental institutions. The field originated in the early twentieth century as the United States expanded its influence around the world, but its intellectual origins date back far earlier to Thucydides and Clausewitz. Contemporary academic scholarship begins with such works as Alfred Zimmern's *The Study of International Relations* (1931) and Harold D. Lasswell's *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (1935).

4. Political theory is an interdisciplinary endeavor of theoretical inquiry and philosophical reflection on political interactions among humans whose center of gravity is at the humanities end of the discipline of political science. Political theory includes classical political philosophy and such contemporary theoretical concerns as postmodernism, critical theory, and constructivism. Until the mid-1970s political theory, as practiced within political science, was dominated by the exegetical study of classical texts in the history of Western political thought. Since the publication of John Rawl's *A Theory of Justice* (1971), however, political theory has increasingly turned to normative theory and ethical and moral concerns about politics. This move has seen issues of justice and equity, democracy, liberalism, secular and religious ways of life, identity and difference, and the good life take center stage. Classical texts, such as Plato's *Republic,* Hobbes's *Leviathan,* and John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty,* still make up the canon of political theory, and every specialist still needs to be conversant with this history, but contemporary research focuses heavily on moral and normative questions facing modern political communities. Will Kymlicka's *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction* (2002) is widely regarded as the best overall statement of the state of the field today.

5. Public administration (and, later, **public policy**), whose early boundaries were defined by Woodrow Wilson's famous 1887 essay, "The Study of Administration," studies the role of bureaucracy in society and the role of administrators in bureaucracies. Whereas Wilson, according to Donald Kettl (1993), is generally considered the father of the *study* of administration, Alexander Hamilton is identified as the person responsible for the *practice* of American public administration. From its roots in the reform and scientific management movements, the Institute of Public Administration (later to become Syracuse University's Maxwell School) introduced formal training in public administration. Over time, the subfield of public policy—with its emphasis on the interactions that produce outcomes rather than on the bureaucratic process per se—developed from its foundations in public administration. Public administration began as a subfield of political science, but in recent years, it and public policy are often housed in separate schools focused more on the practice of government than on the study of politics.

6. Public law and judicial politics consist of a number of areas of study with a mix of methodological approaches. Public law and constitutional law are associated with the study of the courts, beginning with the U.S. Supreme Court. Martin Shapiro (1993: 363) indicates that until the 1950s, "public law" was thought to contain three distinct entities—constitutional law, administrative law, and international law—linked, respectively, to American politics, public administration, and international relations. Classic constitutional texts include *John Marshall and the Constitution: A Chronicle of the Supreme Court* (1919) and *The Constitution and What It Means Today* (1920), both by Edwin S. Corwin. Behaviorism ushered in the study of judicial behavior/judicial politics, and the focus shifted away from the decisions made by the courts to the process and behavior of the judges and justices making those decisions.

Changes in the nature of politics and the dynamism of political science have led to the development of additional subfields, including race, ethnicity, and politics; gender and politics; and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered politics. These subfields are now quite robust, with intellectually stimulating research, and the concerns raised by scholars in these areas are increasingly incorporated into the more traditional subfields.

There has also been increasing attention paid to the subfield of methods, with a focus on how to study politics rather than on what to study. In addition, political economy, political psychology, and other subfields that emphasize cross-disciplinary approaches have become permanent features of many modern political science departments.

All of these developments, both the most recent and the longest past, reflect the evolution of the discipline to better respond to the enduring questions of politics, resolve the dissensus over how best to answer these questions, explore new frontiers in the study of politics, and reflect on real and pressing political and governmental issues of the day.

ENDURING QUESTIONS

Although political science as a modern discipline did not emerge until the second half of the nineteenth century, the study of politics is often thought to have started in ancient Greece and especially in Athens during the tumultuous years spanning the transition from Athenian city-state democracy to Alexander the Great's global empire. The grand themes of war and peace, dictatorship and democracy, wealth and poverty, and interests and values were taken up by such thinkers as Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle and studied in their own right, which is to say independent of cosmology, religion, and mysticism. Many of the questions and themes that engaged these ancient thinkers still occupy the contemporary agenda. This is not because no progress has been made since the ancient Greeks or because there is no cumulative knowledge in the social sciences. Far from it. A great deal more is known today than was known by the ancient Greeks both at the individual level of the citizen and the aggregate level of states. The enduring questions are enduring not because there are

not good answers to them; often there are. They are enduring because each and every political community has to confront and deal with them anew.

WAR AND PEACE

War is a constant in human history. Yet the questions that everyone wants answered are: Why do states go to war, and how do we achieve peace? The answers depend on the findings to related questions, chief among them how to understand and explain relations among states. As Carl von Clausewitz famously stated, war is a continuation of international politics by other, violent means.

Why do states act the way they do? Is the international system anarchic, and, if it is, is the anarchy governed by strategic logic? Or are there rules, written and unwritten, that work to effectively regulate the international sphere? The nature of the international order still poses the same enduring questions that puzzled Thucydides (why did the Peloponnesians go to war?), but an ever-changing set of circumstances poses new challenges to every generation of scholars attempting to solve the puzzle of war.

Chief among these different circumstances are the development of human rights and globalization. Human rights and their defense, codification, proliferation, and enforcement, as well as globalization of communication, markets, and politics, raise perennial issues concerning the relation of the macro and micro in human relations, interaction, and regulation. War and peace not only direct our gaze to the many questions concerning international relations but also to questions about inward-looking versus outward-looking state policy. In political science, whether to spend money and effort internationally or domestically is often referenced in shorthand as "guns or butter?" Why and under what circumstances do states invest in defense and security rather than welfare, infrastructure, and job training? To put it another way: What role and effect do security questions have on political decisions and domestic policy? How do national and international spheres interact on political grounds?

For a list of articles related to these topics, the reader should see the following Thematic Table of Contents headings: **Foreign Policy; Globalization and Politics; International Security and Arms Control**; and **War, Peace, and Terrorism.**

DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY

Plato and Aristotle were very interested in regime types and regime change. It would be an understatement to say that the choice of form of government has been central and still is central to political science. Classifying regimes and explaining how and why regimes crumble, are overthrown, explode into civil strife, stabilize, reform, stagnate, and evolve are core activities of modern political science. This is a rich and diverse area framed by an implicit (sometimes explicit) normative dichotomy between dictatorship as something to be avoided and democracy as something to be admired. Modern political science is a global phenomenon that thrives in democracies, and so it is unsurprising that this regime type has a special

place within the study of politics. Indeed, all of American politics as a subfield could in some sense be understood as the study of democracy.

From micro-level questions about why people vote the way they do to macro questions of why democracies do not seem to wage wars against each other, the role of the citizen in democracy is key. Voting and political participation are the most obvious arenas in which to study why and when democratic citizens act and with what consequences. However, these only touch the tip of questions, puzzles, and issues opened up by the question "What is a citizen?"

But as much as political science has been enthralled with democracy, it has also been fascinated by how democratization occurs and how democracies endure or break down. The question of regime transition moves beyond the citizen to the forces within which citizens move and which in turn move citizens—power, authority, legitimacy, and law are core political concepts without which the political world could not begin to be explained. They are also contested concepts, with scholars disagreeing about what they mean. More important, scholars disagree about how these forces work and behave in the empirical world. This disagreement has been hugely productive in political science, powering creative empirical research as well as theoretical insight.

For a list of articles related to these topics, the reader should see the following Thematic Table of Contents headings: **Comparative Politics; Democracy and Democratization; Nation and State**; and **Representation and Electoral Systems.**

WEALTH AND POVERTY

Aristotle noted that the most stable regimes almost always have a large middle class and hence a relatively egalitarian distribution of income and wealth. Since his time we have been trying to figure out in regard to both output and input how and in what ways economic questions connect to political ones. On the output side we ask about the impact of economic policy and, especially, the large role played by redistributive policies on the life and structure of the political community. All governments across the spectrum redistribute to some degree, but some redistribute to the rich and some to the poor. The forms and variation are enormous. Can we account for this variation? On the input side we want to know how different economic regimes and existing distributions of wealth affect, shape, and, indeed, determine politics. Harold Lasswell went so far as to argue that politics is the study of who gets what, when, and why—the causes and consequences of political decisions over the distribution of economic output.

While the distribution of economic output is an enduring theme in political science, gender, race, culture, ethnicity, and religion increasingly have also become significant categories in the analysis of social stratification and political choices over them. How interest and belief both shape and are shaped by politics and were always the subject of political study, as well as the attention to additional modes of stratification, raises new questions about the sources and effects of interests and beliefs.

For a list of articles related to these topics, the reader should see the following Thematic Table of Contents headings: **Gender and Politics; Political Economy; Politics and Society;** and **Politics of Oppression; Race, Ethnicity, and Politics**.

INTERESTS AND VALUES

Both output and input questions can be framed by general theoretical paradigms that place economic interest more or less at the center of analysis. The classic example of a configured economic interest lies in class analysis, and one alternative is contemporary rational choice, which emphasizes the individual as the key actor. Political science has thrived and developed in states that value freedom and equality as well as democracy. How such values are instantiated through politics is a common theme in modern political science. While specific interests are not necessarily opposed to certain values, how they interact and the weight we ought to give each in our explanations are perennial themes of political science.

For a list of articles related to these topics, the reader should see the following Thematic Table of Contents headings: **Ethics and Political Corruption; Ideologies; Interest Groups and Lobbies; Political Behavior;** and **Political Concepts**.

CONSENSUS AND DISSENSUS

While almost all political scientists believe that what they study should have consequences for understanding and possibly improving the world in which we live, there is nonetheless sharp disagreement about how to best promote such understanding. For some political science is a means to comment on contemporary events, but for most it provides a means for analyzing the enduring questions already discussed and the concepts implicated by those questions, for example, power, influence, conflict, and institutional design. The contestation over concepts and the disagreement over what kinds of interests—class, individual, or group identity—motivate action and how those interests interact with values have already been noted. Decisions in regard to concepts, interests, and values inform the kind of analysis used for the problem under investigation.

Probably one of the greatest and most long-lasting divides is among those who believe that analysis necessarily requires statistical methods and formal (that is, mathematical) theories and those who emphasize context, sensitivity, and nuance through fieldwork, archives, and the texts of great political thinkers. Increasingly, many young scholars are using all of these tools. Nevertheless, the way departments are organized, heated debates over appropriate qualifications to receive a doctorate, and the controversies that raged in the heyday of the "Perestroika" movement among political scientists (following the new openness of Gorbachev's Soviet Union)[2] all suggest a continuing qualitative/quantitative divide.

Beyond methodological disputes are enduring differences over substantive questions. Political science still can boast relatively few, if any, "laws of politics," which is understandable given that politics involves human interactions with its

multiplicity of actors, strategies, and issues. Barriers to agreement are created by the lack of appropriate data for arbitrating contradictory claims. For example, there is consensus that power is a key concept for political science, but still no one is clear about just what it is or how to study it. The "community power" debate that raged in the 1960s and 1970s still lacks resolution.[3] "Non–decision making," hegemony, and other—so far—nonobservable influences on what people believe it is possible to do make it difficult to empirically refute (if one is so inclined) Robert Dahl's pluralistic conception of power distribution. Yet, as noted below, there is beginning to be progress on the sources of preferences and beliefs, the key to understanding who has power and how power relations are maintained.

By limiting the focus to certain tractable aspects of power, such as minimum winning coalitions and agenda control in legislatures, there has been considerably more success in understanding who has power in given contexts and circumstances under particular sets of rules. Yet, while there are certainly findings in these domains, detractors object to the narrowing of the question and to the overreliance on technique. Increasing the science at the expense of the politics—and vice versa—remains the deep challenge for the discipline—and was one even before Bernard Crick raised the issue.

Political scientists largely share a consensus over the key issues in politics. It is the conceptualization and measurement of those issues that generate debate. What does it mean for citizens to trust government or for government to be trustworthy? We know government effectiveness rests at least in part on its capacity to deliver services and to obtain legitimacy. But how do we define, let alone measure, government capacity or legitimacy? Recent research is beginning to make headway on these issues as well as further illuminate solutions to the enduring questions and puzzles of political science. In the process, new political science questions are coming to the fore.

For a list of articles related to these topics, the reader should see the following Thematic Table of Contents headings: **Comparative Politics; Federalism and Local Politics; Institutions and Checks and Balances; Political Concepts; Political Theory;** and **Qualitative/Quantitative Methods.**

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICS

Before turning to the frontiers of political science research, there is one more divide we must address. As the previous subsection mentioned, one major source of discord in political science is the tension between its scientific ambitions and its political relevance. The "scientism," the rigorous scientific ambitions of many American political scientists, remains one of its enduring features from the invariably critical perspectives of political scientists in most other countries and by more policy-oriented students of politics in the United States.

Political science was publicly criticized in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, for being too concerned with the often esoteric debates within the discipline and for not focusing enough on generating and disseminating real–world relevant information and analysis that could better inform the public and improve policymaking. This followed a similar critique a decade earlier following the sudden and unpredicted collapse of communism that caught most political scientists, let alone the general public, off guard. In turn, these public criticisms struck many political scientists as ironic given the common feeling in the discipline that scholars of the Middle East and the former Soviet bloc have always been too close to policy issues and too far from disciplinary concerns.

Nonetheless, the visibility and trenchant nature of post–Cold War and post-9/11 attacks on political science laid bare an important tension inside the discipline between academic rigor and policy relevance. The leaders of the discipline invariably present a motherhood-and-apple-pie public face, saying that rigor and relevance are complementary, not conflicting, goals and that the discipline supports both in equal measure. There is little denying, however, that many political scientists, and the discipline as a profession, value academic rigor over policy relevance. This is born out in what gets published in the major journals and book series, who gets the best jobs and the biggest promotions in the political science job market, and, less formally, in who is held in the highest esteem by their peers.

The problem of relevance has its roots in a larger question of scholarship: the creation of knowledge and the contexts of discovery. It is not just a problem for disciplines that seek scientific rigor. It is a problem for all scholarly disciplines that want to push the knowledge envelope. What makes political science particular in this respect is not that it seeks rigor over relevance, it is that its topic is especially practical in the Aristotelian sense. Thus, the discipline's desire to be as scientific as possible—against a backdrop in which most people in the world feel they already have some understanding of the politics around them—creates a serious tension between rigor and relevance.

Political scientists are committed to generalization over specificity in the objects of their analysis and to explaining the broadest possible range of phenomena with the fewest possible explanatory variables. Put simply, parsimonious generalization is the discipline's gold standard. An example is Barrington Moore's infamous dictum (and, before him, Aristotle): no middle class, no democracy. This approach also necessarily entails focusing on independent variables—in this case, the presence or absence of an effective middle class—more than on dependent variables—whether or not a country transitions into a stable democracy.

The contrast with a discipline such as history that embraces the idiosyncratic and the fine-grained is stark. The general public is often fascinated by the works of historians precisely because of their complexity and subtlety but frustrated by the abstractions of political science.

Consider perhaps the closest political scientists have come to a scientific law of politics—Maurice Duverger's thesis that countries with winner-take-all election systems such as the United Kingdom and the United States will have only two political parties. The theoretical reasoning behind Duverger's law is elegant. Voters know that supporting third parties that cannot win an election means wasting their votes, so rational voters would not vote for third parties even if they more

closely match the voters' policy preferences than the existing two parties. Knowing this, politicians who might be tempted to form third parties do not do so, preferring to stay members of the existing parties and working to broaden their electoral appeal. In equilibrium, therefore, the United States and Great Britain should have only two major and enduring political parties—as has been the case for the preponderance of their histories as electoral democracies.

But there are some stunning exceptions to Duverger's law that have had major real-world consequences. Democrat Bill Clinton was elected U.S. president in 1992 because a third-party candidate, Ross Perot, ran and ran very well, winning almost 20 percent of the vote and taking more votes from Republican George H. W. Bush than from Clinton. This allowed Clinton to win the White House on not much more than 40 percent of the vote. In Great Britain, Margaret Thatcher won a land-slide re-election in 1983 on an even lower vote share because a new party, the Liberal Democrats (LibDems), won more than a quarter of the vote and took more votes from the Labour opposition than from Thatcher's Conservatives. Both elections not only violated Duverger's law, they also violated the normal understanding of majority rule. The elections also resulted in long-lived governments that had far-reaching consequences not only for the United Kingdom and United States but also for the world. Had George H.W. Bush been re-elected in 1992 or had Thatcher been defeated in 1983, the world we live in might be quite different today.

Do these exceptions, so important in the real world, make Duverger's law much less relevant if not invalidated? Journalists and historians might well say yes. They might also then ask rhetorically: If political science cannot deliver on its scientific aspirations here on the terrain the discipline itself considers most favorable, what hope does the science of politics have in explaining more complex phenomena such as political change in nondemocracies or decisions about war or terrorism?

Many political scientists would demur, however. They would say that the 1992 American and 1983 British elections are wholly consistent with Duverger's logic, exceptions that prove the rule. Third parties cannot hope to win in first-past-the-post elections. The folly of Perot and the Liberal Democrats was exposed, and third parties receded in subsequent elections (until 2010 in Britain, with the jury still out at the time of writing as to whether the country will revert back to hewing closer to two parties in the future or change the electoral system to accommodate third parties like the LibDems).

There are two lessons to learn from this simple example. First, it is actually not a fair criticism to say that political scientists do not concentrate on phenomena of real-world relevance. In fact, the most important work in the discipline is invariably focused on questions that historians, journalists, governments, and citizens would agree are the most important to the operation of the real world—how democracy works, how political transitions work, and how countries interact with each other.

Second, political scientists do tend to value parsimonious generalization more highly than do journalists and the public. As a discipline with scientific aspirations that are frequently quite high, it is entirely appropriate that political science seek to generate lawlike generalizations. It is equally important, however, that the discipline take seriously the exception as well as the rule—either to stimulate further scientific inquiry or to focus attention on important outcomes that do not rest easily within accepted theoretical models. Put differently, political scientists are right to analyze the most important political phenomena with the highest level of rigor they can apply with a view to achieving the highest degree of generalization they can. They just need to be aware that this is not the only way to study politics.

This leads to another general comment on the rigor-relevance debate. The closer political scientists get to the real world of politics, the less important developing lawlike generalization becomes and the more the political scientists come to resemble historians focused on specific outcomes and interested in explaining them as thoroughly as possible. This is clearest in the United States, the country with the world's largest collection of professional political scientists. Here there is a clear division of labor between academic teaching and research taking place in universities and colleges and policy-relevant analysis being done in think tanks. Political scientists in policy positions (including former U.S. secretaries of state Madeleine Albright and Condoleezza Rice) have become common enough to warrant a renewed attention to their role in the discipline, harking back to the debates over the origins of the discipline itself and to the concerns of a famous political scientist who became president: Woodrow Wilson.

Specialization is less feasible in smaller countries with fewer political scientists. As a result, the boundaries between academic political science and think tank political science tend to be more blurred outside the United States than within its borders. This, among other things, helps explain why there is less commitment to the "science" of politics outside the United States than in it. British governments, for example, still tend to draw heavily on Oxbridge and the University of London for policy advice, whereas U.S. administrations rely much more heavily on think tank expertise.

For a list of articles related to these topics, the reader should see the following Thematic Table of Contents headings: **Political Change**; **Public Policy;** and **Representation and Electoral Systems**.

FRONTIERS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

The rigor-relevance divide is a real one, but it is also true that some of the most politically and policy-relevant work in political science is being done as a result of recent methodological and analytical advances using new tools and data from multiple sources. Field experiments now inform the work of the World Bank and major foundations in their efforts to alleviate poverty. Game theory has long influenced security decisions, but in some of its new guises it may have useful consequences for a wider range of problems. Ethnographic, historical, and qualitative data more generally are being used to test major propositions in political science and enrich policymaking.

Solid research design requires reliance on appropriate concepts for the problem and subjection of propositions to tests that determine their validity, the scope of their generalizability, and the extent to which they can illuminate other problems and domains. Some of the most exciting contemporary political science research combines solid research design with substantively interesting questions. A casual overview of titles in recent issues of the *Annual Review of Political Science* (ARPS), which is a good source for recent developments in the study of politics, suggests that the subfield of international relations, for instance, is focused on enduring issues involving the causes and consequences of conflict and, more recently, on post-conflict reconstruction. Titles like "The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid," "Rationalist Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Resolution," "The Prosecution of Human Rights Violations," "Treaty Compliance and Violation," "Domestic Terrorism: The Hidden Side of Political Violence," and "Bargaining Failures and Civil War" make this clear.

Comparative politics emphasizes accountability, which spans a range of topics from the political economy of development and democratization to how electoral and political institutions affect the ability of voters to control politicians. Again, ARPS article titles suggest the richness of the field: "Parliamentary Control of Coalition Governments," "Representation and Accountability in Cities," "Accountability in Coalition Governments," "Political Order and One-Party Rule," "Legislative Obstructionism," "Variation in Institutional Strength," "Quality of Government: What You Get," "Democratization and Economic Globalization," "Redistricting: Reading Between the Lines," "Negative Campaigning," and "Elections Under Authoritarianism," to name a representative sample of work.

Within the field both the impacts of real-world developments like the recent rise in inequality in many nations ("Origins and Persistence of Economic Inequality," "The Politics of Inequality in America: A Political Economy Framework," and "The Institutional Origins of Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa") can be seen, as well as the impact of newly available tools to assist in, for instance, the analysis of geography ("The Geographic Distribution of Political Preferences," "Immigration and Social Policy in the United States," and "Regionalism"). Issues of race and gender also appear frequently, as do other subjects that reflect even newer developments in the discipline.

The frontier of political science research, however, is not wholly driven by substantive concerns. Progress also reflects the interdependent development of theory, evidence, and tools. Political science as a discipline has always been self-conscious about its methods, and the frontier includes both endless diversification and new forms of reintegration of the discipline's theoretical and methodological toolkit. Three articles from a recent *Annual Review of Political Science* (volume 13, 2010) illustrate how persistent methodological divides are being overcome at the same time that new sources of data are being used. In a piece on the new political history, Julien Zelizer emphasizes what political science can learn from the historical research on the nineteenth century or on the rise of conservatism. Evan Lieberman stresses explicit means to overcome the qualitative-quantitative divide by using historical data for purposes of testing political science theory. Lisa Wedeen, who relies on ethnographic field work, argues that "interpretive social science does not have to forswear generalizations or causal explanations" and that "ethnographic methods can be used in the service of establishing them."

Historical and ethnographic data and analysis are sweeping political science, but so are other types of information. William Butz and Barbara Toomey (2006) identify six areas of innovation in data and tools that are pushing at the frontiers of social sciences: laboratory and field experimentation, international replication, longitudinal data, improved statistical methods, and (beginning to cross disciplinary boundaries into political science) geographic information tools, and biosocial science.

For a list of articles related to these topics, the reader should see the following Thematic Table of Contents heading: **Qualitative/Quantitative Methods.**

The spread of experimental methods for examining causal effects is particularly noteworthy. Experiments are no longer just about game theory, risk and decision science, and social psychology, as Butz and Toomey put it, but now "the objects of inquiry span all the social sciences, including the origins and impacts of ethnic conflict, group and team behavior in organizations, and the nature and consequences of trust and reciprocity in interpersonal and international relations." Equally striking is the development of harmonized cross-sectional survey data, critical for distinguishing among local, regional, and universal phenomena. In political science such studies include the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and the World Values Survey, respectively, 43- and 81-country repeated compendiums of social and political issues and values, as well as several comparative election studies and the Luxembourg Income Study, with its exceptionally fine-grained household income and spending data. At the same time it has become more common to develop longitudinal surveys, which either collect information about the same persons (observations) over many years or many times over shorter periods. Such panel studies can document the importance of accumulated life experience as well as study things like campaigns in which individual responses, treatments (like campaigning), and controls (for example, polls) interact continuously over time.

These experimental and longitudinal developments are not independent of the growth of Internet surveys, which can reach around the world to seemingly endless respondents who want to participate. Of course, this creates new problems: statisticians face the challenge of dealing with possible bias from respondent self-selection. At the same time, these developments cross subfield boundaries. For example, worldwide data increase the integration of geographic information science with, for example, international relations, in which political geography affects international conflict and cooperation, globalization, international commerce, and democratization. These are just some of the ways in which political science is, as said earlier, both specialized and interactive and growing

and changing. Perhaps the online edition of this encyclopedia will increasingly have articles on the impact of biology and neuroscience, which could, as Butz and Toomey put it, "[A]lter understandings about sexual orientation, criminal responsibility, prospects for marriage as a social institution, and even the nature of moral obligation."

CONCLUSION

This short discussion of the discipline of political science—its history, its current subfields and methods, and its emerging subfields, modes of analysis, and testing procedures—reveals the wide range of questions and concerns that characterize the field. Transforming the huge number of concepts and terms into an encyclopedia is no easy task, especially given our desire to make it useful to students, specialists, and the interested policymaker, among others. By necessity, the most attention has been focused on core ideas and controversies, but, as this essay suggests, political science is ever evolving. It also is centrifugal. In an effort to become more like a science, some practitioners are on the cutting edge of research methods. In an effort to provide deeper understanding of enduring problems, some scholars merge political analysis with what can be learned from philosophy, history, anthropology, and psychology. In an effort to become relevant, some use the best tools at hand to focus on immediate political problems.

Although many of the frontier concerns of political science may seem over the horizon, this encyclopedia offers useful tools for becoming familiar with an increasingly dynamic field of political science. Its capacity to respond to change with its online edition marks it as useful well into the future.

JAMES E. ALT
SIMONE CHAMBERS
GEOFFREY GARRETT
MARGARET LEVI
PAULA D. MCCLAIN
Associate Editors

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NOTES

1. The initial interest took place in the decades between the first and second world wars, according to Deutsch and Kinnvall; for others its origins are in the 1940s. Serious psychological research did not occur until World War II, however.

2. This is the name of a movement in American political science to encourage more openness in response to what its members perceived as a hegemony of rational choice theory and a general narrowing of questions and scope in the discipline.

3. See, for example, Dahl 1961, Lukes 1974, and Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 1963.

Abortion and Politics

By the early twenty-first century, abortion has come to be one of the most heated political issues in the world. In many Western nations, abortion is a divisive issue between the political left and the political right, with those on the left supporting the rights of the mother to control her reproductive life. Abortion opponents, on the other hand, label abortion as murder, often insisting that the rights of the unborn child begin at the moment of conception. An estimated fifty million abortions are performed yearly in various parts of the world, and at least twenty million of those are considered illegal. Around one-half of all abortions are performed under conditions detrimental to the mother's health, and many lead to chronic health problems, loss of fertility, and a woman's loss of life. In countries where abortion laws are the most restrictive, approximately one-fourth of all pregnancies are illegally terminated.

HISTORY

Until the turn of the nineteenth century, abortion before quickening—the point at which the mother feels the baby move—was generally legal in the United States and Europe. Quickening was generally believed to occur around the twelfth week of pregnancy. The use of quickening as the point of viability could be traced back to the ancient Greeks and Romans. Historically, some abortions were performed with the assistance of friends, family members, midwives, doctors, or apothecaries. Self-induced abortions, which had a low success rate, were attempted through a variety of methods that included applications of herbs and ointments to the skin, vigorous internal or external massage, insertion of foreign objects, stomach binding, running, lifting, leaping, excessive exercise, starving, bleeding, blistering, hot and cold baths, emotional distress, fretting, excessive laughing, purging, and vomiting. If all other methods failed, women sometimes resorted to infanticide.

By the mid-nineteenth century, the male-dominated medical profession had co-opted the birthing process. In the United States, the American Medical Association, founded in 1847, led the campaign to make abortion illegal. The move sent desperate women underground, and the number of self-induced and "back alley" abortions increased. Over time, outlawing abortion evolved into outlawing all methods of birth control.

The issue of abortion returned to the front burner in the mid-twentieth century when scores of babies with massive deformities were born to mothers who had contracted German measles or taken the tranquilizer drug thalidomide. Consequently, many countries passed laws legalizing abortions. In 1994, the United Nations Conference on Population and Development signaled a global shift toward improving the quality of life for women and produced new policies on family planning and abortion around the world.

THE UNITED STATES

Birth control was outlawed in a number of states until the 1960s, when the second wave of the feminist movement swelled in response to the publication of Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique* in 1963, and the U.S. Supreme Court held in *Griswold v. Connecticut,* 381 U.S. 479 (1965), that a constitutional right to privacy guaranteed married couples access to birth control. This right was extended to single couples in *Eisenstadt v. Baird,* 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Building on the right to privacy, *Roe v. Wade,* 410 U.S. 113 (1973), confirmed the right to privacy. In *Roe,* Justice Harry Blackmun developed the trimester method of determining a timetable for legal abortions based on the development of the fetus. Abortions were generally legal in the first trimester but restricted in the second and third trimesters.

The rise of conservatism in the 1980s added heat to the abortion debate. Under presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, views on abortion became a litmus test for appointment to the Supreme Court. Congress began attaching abortion riders to unrelated bills and regularly renewed the Hyde Amendment of 1976, which banned Medicaid-financed abortions. This antiabortion stance had grave consequences for women in developing nations because Congress appropriated foreign aid with restrictions that limited access to family planning as well as to abortion. After a respite from abortion restrictions in foreign aid under Bill Clinton, George W. Bush renewed them in 2001. Although the Supreme Court has continued to narrowly uphold *Roe v. Wade,* states were given authority to limit access to abortion in *Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,* 492 U.S. 490 (1989), and *Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,* 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

One of the most controversial aspects of the abortion battle has been the conflict between abortionist opponents, who claim that the right to protest outside abortion clinics is guaranteed by the First Amendment, and prochoice advocates, who object to practices that limit entry to family planning

and abortion clinics. After an increase in violence and the murder of two abortion-providing physicians, the Supreme Court held in *NOW v. Scheidler,* 510 U.S. 249 (1994), that states could pass laws designed to deter violence with increased fines and punishment. As a result of violence and ongoing controversy, 87 percent of all counties in the United States have been left without abortion services. The appointment of John Roberts as chief justice of the Supreme Court in 2005 raised conservative hopes that *Roe v. Wade* would eventually be overturned.

ASIA

In countries such as China and India, abortion is viewed as an acceptable means of controlling exploding populations. Both countries have liberal abortion policies, and women are more likely to abort female fetuses. Most Chinese women are restricted by the government's one-child policy. As of 2005, the male to female birth ratio in China was 120 boys for every 100 girls, equating to an estimated thirty-two million more boy than girls. India's birth ratio as of 2001 was 108 boys for every 100 girls. In Asian cultures, males are traditionally perceived as more valuable because they are honor bound to take care of aging parents. Such traditional thinking lingers despite modern lifestyle changes.

Abortions are performed less often in developing countries than in developed countries because high infant mortality rates and a need for cheap labor in the agricultural sector result in high fertility rates. In East Timor, for example, the poorest country in the world, with a per capita income of only US$400, the infant mortality rate is 45.89 children per one thousand live births and the fertility rate is 7.8 children per woman. In comparison, the infant mortality rate in the United Kingdom is 4.85 per one thousand live births and the fertility rate is 1.9 births per woman. In Japan, the infant mortality rate is 2.79 children per one thousand live births, with a fertility rate of 1.34 per woman.

EUROPE

In the transition countries of eastern Europe, former Soviet bloc nations are struggling economically as they attempt to reinvent themselves. Abortion on demand was prevalent under socialism because it was believed to increase the productivity of women. However, some restrictions have now been instituted, in part because of the influence of the Catholic Church. In Poland, for instance, the church was successful in overturning liberal abortion laws and removing sex education from classrooms in 1993. Three years later sex education was reintroduced, and some restrictions on abortion were removed.

Antiabortion forces within the church have been most successful in Ireland, where all abortions are illegal. Conversely, in France, where more than 80 percent of the population is Catholic, abortion rights have been guaranteed since 1974. Elsewhere in Europe, abortions are legal up to the twelfth week of pregnancy in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Sweden, and Russia. Limited access to abortion is available in Britain, Finland, Hungary, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland.

AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

While Cape Verde, South Africa, and Tunisia allow unrestricted abortions, most other African nations retain restrictive and old colonial laws, as well as ineffective family planning, both of which contribute to high numbers of abortions. According to the World Health Organization, an estimated 4.2 million African women seek unsafe abortions each year, with thirty thousand maternal deaths resulting.

African women suffer disproportionately from unsafe abortion practices. While 10 percent of the world's abortions occur in Africa each year, its women comprise half of the resultant deaths. In countries where abortion is legal, maternal death rates are much smaller. For instance, South Africa's number of deaths due to unsafe abortions fell by 90 percent from 1984 to 2001, after that country legalized abortion.

Eighty percent of the countries in North Africa and the Middle East outlaw abortion in some fashion: 21 percent prohibit abortion under all circumstances, 55 percent prohibit abortion except to save the woman's life, and 24 percent allow abortion to preserve the woman's physical or mental health. The restrictive laws and, in many cases, lack of effective family planning programs contribute to the number of unsafe abortions and related deaths in this region.

In 1992, the Syrian Family Planning Association and International Planned Parenthood Federation's Arab World Regional Office hosted a regional conference on unsafe abortion and sexual health. The attendees agreed that unsafe abortion was a major public health problem throughout the region. They determined the need to review policies and provide better family planning.

Lack of effective family planning services, including the availability of contraception, contributes to higher rates of abortion. For instance, abortions in Turkey decreased as the availability of family planning programs increased. Similarly, Tunisia legalized abortion for all women in 1973. Since then, the number of unsafe abortions has drastically decreased, as have the number of maternal deaths. For every one thousand women of reproductive age in 1990, eleven received abortions. By 2003, this number had dropped to seven out of every one thousand women of reproductive years.

See also *Health Care Policy; Law and Society; Multiple Streams Theory, Privacy Rights; Social Policy.*

. . . . ELIZABETH RHOLETTER PURDY

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Absentee Voting

Absentee voting is a process that provides people the opportunity to cast a ballot even if they are unwilling or unable to appear at a polling station. Absentee voting is common in developed democracies, such as the United States, Japan, and the nations of western Europe. A variety of procedures can be used in absentee voting, including early voting, voting by mail, and casting ballots by fax or over the Internet. For instance, in the United States, members of the military who are deployed outside of their home regions are given absentee ballots that may be mailed without postage to their precincts, while in the United Kingdom, postal ballots are freely given on request. In addition, voters in countries that allow absentee balloting may cast their votes up to six weeks prior to an election. One of the principal challenges in absentee voting is ensuring the secrecy of the ballot and preventing fraud. Consequently, most countries require that the authenticity of absentee ballots be certified by witnesses or electoral officials. This form of voting is recognized as a means to increase voter turnout and prevent disenfranchisement of citizens who physically cannot appear at a polling station.

See also *Disenfranchisement; Voting Procedures; Voting Rights and Suffrage.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

Absolutism

Absolutism is a historical term for a form of government in which the ruler is an absolute authority, unrestricted by any other institution, such as churches, estates, a constitution, laws, or opposition.

The Reformation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries caused erosion of monarchical power and the rise of libertarian democratic sentiment in feudal Europe. Political philosophers of the period reacted by introducing concepts of the natural law or the divine right of kings. Although contradictory, both concepts claimed that unquestionable rule by a single person was the best form of government. According to Thomas Hobbes, human beings ceded authority to a ruler in exchange for security, which kept society together. Jacques–Benigne Bossuet argued that God vested the monarch with the right to rule in order to protect society and that rebelling against the monarch would mean challenging God.

Absolutism is characterized by the end of feudal partitioning, unification and centralization of the state, rise of professional standing armies and professional bureaucracies, and the codification of state laws. The general rise of state power was demonstrated by expensive lifestyles of absolute monarchs who identified with the state ("*L'État c'est moi*" claimed Louis XIV of France). Absolutist monarchs attempted to intervene personally in every area; welfare of the state was therefore determined by their (in)competence.

Absolutist monarchs held nobility under political control by keeping them permanently at luxurious courts and arbitrarily distributing payable honorary duties and titles, while noble estates were managed by exploitative officials. The enormous increase in state expenses was addressed by modernization of tax systems and mercantilism that favored the emerging bourgeoisie. Monarchs considered absolute rulers include Louis XIII (reigned 1610–1643) and Louis XIV of France (r. 1643–1715), Ivan the Terrible (r. 1547–1584) and Peter the Great of Russia (r. 1682–1725), Leopold I of Austria (r. as Holy Roman Emperor 1658–1705), and Charles XI (r. 1660–1697) and Charles XII of Sweden (r. 1697–1718).

Absolutism went through several historical stages, such as *early* absolutism, *confessional* absolutism, *court* absolutism, and *Enlightened* absolutism. Frederick I of Prussia (r. 1740–1786), the Hapsburg emperors of Austria (Marie-Therèse, r. 1740–1780, and her son Joseph II, r. 1780–1790), and Catherine the Great of Russia (r. 1762–1796) ruled as absolute monarchs in eastern Europe while implementing reforms based on Enlightenment ideas. Enlightened absolutism was commonly justified as a provider of better living conditions for its subjects.

Following bourgeois revolutions in America and France, absolutism and constitutionalism became principal opposing political concepts in the West. The Jacobin terror during the French Revolution (1789–1799) demonstrated that political freedom was threatened also by democratic absolutism. To early-nineteenth-century rightist political thinkers, the French Revolution, instead of abolishing absolutism, was therefore rather a struggle between the monarch and the people over sovereignty, and French *Republicanism*, Napoleon's *imperialism*, and *constitutionalism* were merely forms of absolutism.

Mid-nineteenth-century liberals considered the rising proletariat as another dangerous form of absolutism and argued against radicals' demand of universal suffrage. By 1848, a general consensus on constitutionalism was reached, and the method of its implementation became the principal matter of political controversy. While the term *absolutism* remained a commonly used pejorative, especially in France and England, in Germany the Hegelian Idealism relegated it to historiography from the 1830s on.

In the early twentieth century, research on absolutism as a historical concept was conceived in contemporary terms. Historians' views on the extent of absolutism among European

monarchs vary. Some argue that a considerable number of monarchs achieved absolutist control over their states. Others question the very existence of absolutism, arguing that most absolutist monarchs had comparable power over their subjects to any other rulers, and they point to the gap between the absolutist rhetoric and the reality, especially to many absolutist monarchs' incapability to successfully address their constant financial difficulties.

See also *Authority; Monarchy; Tyranny, Classical.*

. . . . CIRILA TOPLAK

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Academic Freedom

Academic freedom refers primarily to the rights of faculty and students to provide instruction and inquiry in academic institutions without restrictions on their analysis or fear of negative consequences. Although the term is more frequently applied to higher education, it is used also in public schooling, though it is often controversial in this context.

ORIGINS AND ESSENCE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM

Academic freedom developed in the Middle Ages with the maturation of European universities, which during this time experienced exceptional freedom because the philosopher, scholar, and student aimed to be consecrated to the service of truth, and such freedom was regarded as divine sanction. By the 1800s, the principles of *Lehrfreiheit* (freedom of inquiry), *Lernfreibeit* (freedom to learn), and *Freiheit der Wissenschaft* (conduct research) had arisen in German universities, which eventually influenced what constitutes a genuine research university in the United States.

Experienced in varying degrees worldwide, academic freedom has been based throughout its history on the belief that it is beneficial to society for truth to be pursued. Academic freedom means typically that faculty members of an institution possess the prerogative of communication, expression, inquiry, and study. In American higher education, for instance, it has been primarily professors who have defended the right to pursue—without concern about being dismissed from their position—knowledge and truth through their publications, research, and teaching. Throughout the world, this concept also has been extended to students who require the right to question faculty propositions without concerns of negative repercussion.

ENSHRINING FREEDOM IN ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS

Higher education institutions have defended their right to be the final arbitrators in making conclusive decisions concerning the content and method of both the research and teaching that engages students. Elementary and secondary teachers, too, have employed the term *academic freedom* for their particular rights, especially during the 1960s, to determine the content of courses taught and select departmental curricula. It is also common for educators and students to seek the freedom to engage in various political and social activities. Academic freedom for university professors necessitates the institutional component of tenure, the acknowledgement of the right of a teacher to an appointment based on demonstration of competence. The appointment is continuous unless incompetence, moral turpitude, or neglect is demonstrated, and is integral to the institution as a whole because it sustains the principles of "free search for truth and its free exposition" through professional experience (e.g., an educator may teach without fear of penalty for pursuing ideas that conflict with the institution or general society).

Although academic freedom is varied in practice and theory worldwide, it is the general expectation in Western society and is regarded positively in developing countries of Africa, the Far East, and the Middle East. For example, the German Constitution specifically grants academic freedom, as "art and science, research and teaching are free. Freedom of teaching does not absolve from loyalty to the constitution." The institutional component to academic freedom in the United States was famously expressed in 1957 when Justice Felix Frankfurter established a foundation for academic freedom in the United States. Based on a statement of the Open Universities in South Africa, Justice Frankfurter opined,

> It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment, and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university—to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study" (*Sweezy v. New Hampshire,* 354 U.S. 234 [1957]).

As the "common good" of the institution of higher learning "depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition," the individual component of academic freedom encompasses the entitlements of both teacher and student (although to a lesser extent for the latter).

IMPORTANT CHARTERS FOR ACADEMIC FREEDOM

"The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure" (drafted and approved by the Association of American Colleges and Universities) established three aspects of academic freedom for an institution to ensure in "fulfilling its obligations to its students and to society": (1) "the teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results," (2) "the teacher is entitled to freedom in the

classroom in discussing his/her subject," and (3) when a professor "writes as a citizen, he/she should be free from institutional censorship or discipline" (American Association of University Professors, 3). Essentially the institutional and individual components should function harmoniously, as institutions should provide an atmosphere of complete freedom for educators to conduct research and publish the conclusions, as long as their performance is sufficient in other academic responsibilities. While without this academic freedom it can be argued that educators are unable to fulfill their service of pursuing and communicating truth, teachers should, however, be careful to avoid discussion of controversial matters unrelated to the subject at hand.

"The 1940 Statement of Principles" did not demand religious institutions to implement this form of academic freedom, as "limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment." The statement is perhaps intentionally ambiguous in assuming that certain limitations would exist, seeking to regulate these limitations through the obligation of honest and immediate disclosure. As granted by the limitations clause, religious institutions would have liberty to implement their own principles of academic freedom. Religious institutions that require their faculty to sign statements of faith merely formalize a mode of voluntary association that develops naturally at other institutions where such requirements do not exist. Consequently, statements of faith intrinsically considered do not limit genuine academic freedom.

Such declarations of academic freedom are prevalent worldwide. For example, "The Magna Charta Universitatum" of 1988, signed by Rectors of European Universities, states that,

> [T]he university is an autonomous institution at the heart of societies differently organized because of geography and historical heritage; it produces, examines, appraises and hands down culture by research and teaching. To meet the needs of the world around it, its research and teach must be morally and intellectually independent of all political authority and economic power (1).

Originally signed by twenty-nine European countries, the 1999 Bologna Process reinforced the academic ideals laid out within the Magna Charta and has continued to gain popularity with forty-six participating countries.

See also *Education Policy; Education Policy, Higher; Freedom of Speech*.

. . . . RON J. BIGALKE JR.

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Accountability

In political science, the term *accountability* refers to an actor's acknowledgment and assumption of responsibilities specific to a role—including the responsibility to report and justify the consequences of actions taken within the scope of the role—and the existence of sanctions for failing to meet these responsibilities. A is therefore accountable to B when "A is obliged to inform B about A's (past and future) actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct," as political scientist Andreas Schedler noted in his 1999 article "Conceptualizing Accountability."

The concept of accountability thus entails monitoring of behavior, justification of behavior, and enforcement of good behavior. The monitoring and justification aspects of accountability constitute what is often referred to as *answerability*. Answerability involves the ability to ask actors about (1) *what* they have done and (2) *why* they have done so. In other words, there is an informational dimension as well as an argumentative dimension to answerability. Both dimensions of answerability require accurate information and are improved by transparency of actions.

Accountability requires not only answerability for behavior but also enforcement of good behavior. To have accountability as well as answerability, there must also be institutions for enforcing good behavior that fulfills official responsibilities. Without some way of punishing bad behavior, government agents that shirk their responsibilities cannot be held to account.

Political, public, or governmental accountability is the ability of citizens, societal actors, or other state actors to hold government officials and agents responsible for their actions in their official capacities. Successful institutions of governmental accountability specify the official duties of government agents, establish a sense of obligation in government agents to fulfill their responsibilities, and create incentives that motivate government officials to act in the public interest, punishing them when they pursue their own private interests at the expense of

the public interest and rewarding them to make pursuing the public interest in their own interests as well. Political accountability is, in essence, about the need and the ability to restrain the power of government.

Some define political accountability to include only relationships in which public officials have a legal obligation to answer to those holding them accountable, and those holding public officials accountable have a legal right to impose sanctions. Others note that actors are empowered by either formal institutions or informal rules to sanction and reward government agents for their activities or performance.

THEORIES OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Models of accountability are derived from two main bodies of theoretical literature: principal-agent theory and theories of moral responsibility. While the models highlight different factors in the process of holding actors accountable, they are not necessarily incompatible with each other.

Principal-agent models of accountability posit relationships in which the *principal* (such as an employer or a voter) selects an *agent* (an employee, for example, or a local official) to choose actions that benefit the principal's interest. The relationship between the principal and agent is conceptualized as a contractual relationship between two autonomous actors. Mutually agreed terms of the contract determine the responsibilities for which the principal holds the agent accountable. Whether the principal can actually hold the agent accountable depends on whether the principal has ways of enforcing the contract.

Scholars have applied agency theory to model the conditions under which government agents might increase accountability by making their actions more observable to constituents: the implications of accountability as an equilibrium state, as well as a set of mechanisms used when accountability as an equilibrium fails and the consequences of successfully functioning sanctioning mechanisms when citizens have incorrect information.

In contrast to principal-agent models of accountability that focus on issues of contract choice, information asymmetries, and mechanisms for dismissing and punishing agents, theories of moral responsibility and group solidarity focus on the ways in which groups and communities establish duties and obligations for their members. Expectations and standards established by the group determine the responsibilities for which groups hold members accountable. Moral responsibility models of accountability focus on internal feelings of obligation and duty that groups inculcate in their members. Accountability in these models conceptualizes actors as fulfilling their responsibilities in part because they feel duty-bound to do so. In addition to the negative social sanctions that groups can apply to discourage misbehavior, theories of moral responsibility also highlight positive external and internal rewards for fulfilling responsibilities, such as group expressions of gratitude to individuals, the awarding of social and moral standing, and internal feelings of pride and identification within individuals.

TYPES OF ACCOUNTABILITY

One way to distinguish between different types of political or governmental accountability is to look at the different things that government is held accountable for doing. For what kind of behavior are government actors being held accountable? *Performance accountability,* for example, refers to the ability of citizens, first, to observe whether the government is implementing its policies effectively and efficiently, and, second, to hold them to account for their behavior. *Policy-making accountability,* on the other hand, refers to the ability of citizens to ensure that government policies are representative and reflect the preferences of the population.

A distinction can be made also between accountability *for* something and accountability *to* someone. Government accountability in a democratic system, for example, can either be conceptualized as the responsibility of government officials for representing majority preferences and implementing the government's policies effectively, or conceptualized as the responsibility of government officials to answer for its behavior to citizens.

Accountability also can be typologized in terms of *who* holds government actors accountable. In *vertical* accountability, citizens and societal actors such as civic groups, voluntary associations, and mass media seek to hold the government officials above them accountable. In *horizontal* accountability, agencies and offices within the state, such as auditing agencies, oversight commissions, or the legislative branch, oversee other branches or offices within government. A relatively new body of literature also discusses *external* accountability, or the role of international institutions in helping to hold national governments accountable for their performance and representation of public interests. Organizations such as the European Union, for example, can establish institutions that help eastern European countries to consolidate democracy and build rule of law by insulating parts of a new democracy's weakly institutionalized legal system from domestic political interest groups.

Scholarly attention to the accountability of powerful, international nongovernmental political actors such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund also has been increasing. These organizations command vast political and economic resources and have an enormous influence on the policies and actions of governments that receive resources from them. Their accountability remains, however, a matter of both academic and political debate. Within this debate are questions such as whether these organizations are or should be accountable to the governments that provide funding for their projects, to the governments that receive funding for development, or to the citizens of recipient countries whom these projects are intended to help.

INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Principal-agent and moral responsibility models of governmental accountability identify several necessary functions for an effective system of accountability. Systems of governmental accountability should include instruments or mechanisms for all parties to agree upon and acknowledge the official responsibilities of government actors. It may also be important for these instruments to establish feelings of duty and

obligation among government officials. Systems of government accountability should also include ways for obtaining accurate information about the behavior and performance of government actors, as well as ways of rewarding and punishing their behavior.

Political systems vary widely in the type and strength of the institutions they have for ensuring governmental accountability. Institutions that are created to contribute to governmental accountability may not operate successfully or may function for purposes other than accountability. Elections, for example, are often considered a key element of accountability in democratic systems. Yet they may function as opportunities for citizens to choose a "good type" of political leader who feels morally responsible for fulfilling official duties, one who will act on behalf of voters regardless of incentives for reelection. Moreover, instruments and mechanisms for establishing obligation, providing information, and punishing misbehavior can contribute to systems of governmental accountability without being sufficient for ensuring accountability.

BUREAUCRATIC INSTITUTIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY

One category of institutions that contribute to accountability are bureaucratic or administrative institutions, such as performance targets and auditing offices, that enable one set of government actors to monitor and sanction another set. Institutions such as bureaucratic performance reviews at fixed intervals are formal, top-down mechanisms involving hierarchical authority. "Modern officialdom" is characterized by the "supervision of lower offices by the higher ones." Bureaucratic institutions of meritocratic selection and promotion, training programs, and selective recruitment from particular universities or elite social groups also can lead to informal bureaucratic norms emphasizing loyalty and collective identity, which help to foster a sense of duty among bureaucrats to put collective goals above individual ones.

Other administrative and bureaucratic institutions of accountability include institutions of horizontal accountability, which consist of state institutions that oversee and sanction public agencies and other branches of the government. One classic example of horizontal accountability is the checks-and-balances relationship between legislative, executive, and judiciary branches of government, which are supposed to constrain and monitor each other. Other examples include auditing agencies, anticorruption commissions, ombudsmen, central banks, and personnel departments. As part of the government itself, however, these institutions can find it difficult to establish legally authorized or actual autonomous oversight and sanctioning abilities.

DEMOCRATIC MECHANISMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Another category of institutions that contribute to government accountability involve an active role by citizens themselves. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, John Stuart Mill and other political philosophers came to the conclusion that representative democracy could provide "accountable and feasible government." In a democracy, citizens would be capable of and responsible for "controlling the business of government." In democratic models, citizens—rather than higher-level officials—become the "principals" supervising local officials. Democratic mechanisms and instruments of accountability include elections, constitutions and legislatures, and corporatism and other arrangements for incorporating citizen participation and oversight in the policy-making and policy implementation processes, and civil society institutions such as protections for free press and voluntary associations.

ELECTIONS

Elections that are free and fair enable citizens to elect officials they believe to be responsive and responsible. People who want to be officials have to communicate their positions and objectives to the public. An informed public can then sanction them for failing to meet their responsibilities and obligations by voting them out of office.

Although elections can in theory serve as an important mechanism for accountability, there is a difference between the existence of electoral democracy and a government that is actually accountable for the policies that it produces and implements. While a minimalist definition of electoral democracy simply requires competitive elections with broad suffrage where institutionalized political parties take turns in office, an accountable democratic government is closer to what Robert Dahl calls a "polyarchy"—an electoral democracy that also guarantees the existence of alternative information sources and civil liberties. These additional institutions ensure the ability of voters to obtain accurate information about official behavior and to sanction them appropriately.

Elections also have a number of shortcomings if used as the primary or only mechanism for accountability to citizens. They occur infrequently, so voters have little control over elected officials between elections. Voters can only vote entire parties or candidates out of office instead of exercising more finely tuned sanctions on party or candidate behavior or decisions on a specific issue.

CONSTITUTIONS AND LEGISLATURES

Even in consolidated democracies, bureaucratic officials are unelected and cannot be held accountable to voters through elections. Constitutions can authorize legislatures to hold unelected civil servants accountable by holding hearings and organizing investigations.

CORPORATISM AND CITIZEN OVERSIGHT OF BUREAUCRACY

Institutions such as public hearings, advisory councils, and consultation committees increase transparency of information to citizens and incorporate citizen participation and oversight over the making of bureaucratic regulations and administrative statutes. An ombudsman can provide information to voters or negotiate with the bureaucracy on behalf of citizens who register complaints about the behavior of bureaucrats.

It is often assumed that consolidated democracies with competitive elections are enough to ensure high levels of policy-making accountability, but because of the ambiguities

that always exist in laws and statutes, much policy making is often done in practice by the bureaucrats who are responsible for implementing the policy. As a result, policy-making accountability requires institutions that require bureaucrats to consult with citizens and interest groups who have relevant interests or special expertise such as corporatism before issuing administrative statutes to resolve gaps and ambiguities in legislation. Building these kinds of institutions to ensure policy-making accountability in new democracies such as countries in eastern Europe can often be far more difficult than setting up national elections and political parties.

This view, however, is controversial. In the past, the working assumption has been that the bureaucracy needs to be apolitical and professional in order to ensure a degree of state autonomy. Shielded from political considerations, bureaucrats should be able to implement policies and laws impersonally, fairly, and efficiently.

CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTIONS

Free press and citizen organizations also help to inform the public about the behavior of government actors and to sanction government actors for misconduct through influencing public opinion and voting. As providers of information, a free press and active civil society act as institutions that assist citizens in holding government actors accountable, but because government actors are legally obliged to answer to citizens rather than these societal actors, civil society organizations and the press are not necessarily considered agents of accountability.

DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY

Theories of decentralization posit that decentralization of fiscal, administrative, and political authority can increase democratic accountability. Local governments are thought to be more likely than higher levels to have better information about what citizens need and want. Decentralizing authority to local governments also should make it clear to citizens whom they should hold responsible for performance and economic development. Local autonomy over taxation and expenditures also may allow citizens to sanction local governments for poor fiscal performance and public goods provision. Local governments who have to compete for tax revenues from firms and individuals who move to the localities that provide the best policies and public services cannot afford to misuse public funds or run deficits that force them to raise taxes.

On the other hand, decentralization also can have negative effects on other outcomes that may be important to governmental performance and representativeness. Decentralization can result in the hijacking of local government by local elites. Local governments may not have sufficient resources or expertise to resolve complex problems that have causes external to the locality.

Moreover, decentralization in practice often reduces overall government accountability by obscuring how responsibilities are actually allocated among different levels of government and making government authority more complex.

FORMAL JUDICIAL OR LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY

In systems with rule of law, these institutions include constitutional tribunals that rule on the constitutionality of government actions and legislation. Court action and judicial review are also mechanisms that citizens can use to hold the government accountable.

INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY

In nondemocratic or transitional systems where formal institutions of accountability are weak, citizens may still be able to hold government officials accountable through informal institutions of accountability. Officials in these systems may not fear elections or sanctions from higher levels of the state, but they can become enmeshed in social obligations established by solidary communities such as ethnic groups, religious organizations, or nationalist movements.

Solidary groups, based on shared moral standards and obligations rather than simply shared interests, can offer moral standing as an incentive to officials for performing well and providing public goods and services responsibly. Their activities also can offer forums for government officials to publicize their good behavior and public praise for this behavior as a reward. Higher moral standing can be an important source of soft power for government officials. In contrast to formal institutions of accountability such as elections and performance contracts, which are officially authorized for the purpose of holding officials accountable, the norms and obligations provided by solidary groups that help to establish a sense of obligation, transmit information about the behavior of public officials, and sanction misbehavior are informal in the sense that they evolved or were created to maintain the solidarity of a social group. They are not officially authorized or intended to enable citizens to hold government officials accountable, but do so nevertheless.

EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS

Systems and institutions of accountability can have important effects on other significant political, economic, and social outcomes. Effective institutions of accountability can help to constrain corruption and the extent to which officials can deviate from the responsibilities of their office. Political systems with governmental accountability may experience more legitimacy, trust in government, and voluntary compliance from citizens with state demands such as tax collection and military draft. Institutions of accountability have been found to make financial crises less likely and affect economic output.

See also *Bureaucracy; Centralization, Deconcentration, and Decentralization; Checks and Balances; Civil Society; Principal-agent Theory; Rule of Law; Transparency.*

. . . .   LILY L. TSAI

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Addams, Jane

American social worker, educator, suffragist, and social and political activist and commentator, Jane Addams (1860–1935) was born in Illinois. She is best known for cofounding Hull House in 1889 with friend Ellen Gates Starr. This revolutionary settlement house was located in Chicago's predominantly immigrant area. Addams used her influence to fight for decreases in infant mortality, and for childhood immunizations; children's literacy; better sanitation; and the rights of women, factory workers, tenants, newsboys, railroad workers, and midwives. She waged protracted campaigns against disease, truancy, prostitution, drug use, and alcoholism. A staunch advocate for peace, she also helped to redefine roles for women of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

After leaving Women's Medical College of Philadelphia for health reasons, Addams traveled to Europe in 1893. In London, she visited Toynbee Hall, a settlement house that became the model for Hull House. Addams gathered a revolving group of her friends of both sexes at Hull House, which boasted day nurseries, a kindergarten, boys and girls clubs, a gym, public baths, and a swimming pool. Hull House brought theater, concerts, and extension courses on a range of subjects into the lives of Chicago's poor immigrants.

Addams became involved in local politics to promote her causes, engaging in direct battle with Chicago's political machine. She was named sanitation inspector and served on the Board of Education and various committees. She also served on a number of national committees and made history by nominating Theodore Roosevelt as presidential candidate for the Progressive Party in 1912. Addams soon became disillusioned with Roosevelt and supported Democrat Woodrow Wilson in 1916 because of his promise to keep the United States out of World War I (1914–1918). When Wilson was unable to fulfill that promise, Addams broke with the Democratic Party and voted for Socialist candidate Eugene Debs in 1920.

World War I changed the public's image of Addams. Her propeace stance during a time of world war and high national patriotism resulted in Addams, once one of the most admired women in the country, becoming one of the most reviled. In 1929, Addams was named president for life of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. In 1931, she shared the Nobel Peace Prize with fellow peace advocate Nicholas Murray Butler. Three years later, however, her reputation suffered again when she was identified as a dangerous radical by Elizabeth Patrick Delling in *The Red Network: A Who's Who and Handbook of Radicalism for Patriots.*

Jane Addams first became involved in politics to promote personal causes but made a national impact on social issues.

Addams' early written work appeared as essays to promote her views on social causes. Such was the case with *A Modern King Lear* (written in 1894 but not released publicly until 1912), a controversial essay about the 1894 Pullman strike. Her major works include *Democracy and Social Ethics* (1902), a commentary on the conflict between American democratic ideals and the realities of the Industrial Revolution, and *Newer Ideals of Peace* (1907), a rejection of Enlightenment theory, as well as the autobiography in *Twenty Years at Hull House* (1910), *The Second Twenty Years at Hull House* (1930), and numerous later works.

See also *Nobel Peace Prize; Progressiveism.*

. . . . ELIZABETH RHOLETTER PURDY

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Additional Member System

The additional member system is an electoral process that combines both constituency and proportional voting. Voters may cast two ballots, the first for a representative of their geographic region and the second for a political party. Individual representatives are elected in the traditional first-past-the-post method, while the party vote is used to allocate seats among party lists. The additional member system is common in western Europe for balloting for national or regional representative bodies. For instance, in the Scottish Parliament, seventy-three seats are elected through the first-past-the-post system and the remaining fifty-six are chosen through party lists. Variations of the system include the mixed-member proportional process, which allows additional seats to be awarded to the parties that gain the highest number of seats in the proportional voting. This offsets victories in individual constituencies and ensures that the composition of elected bodies is roughly proportional. The system is designed to ensure that small parties are better able to compete against larger and better-funded groupings. However, the use by some countries of minimum thresholds, as high as 5 percent of the vote, continues to prevent some smaller parties from gaining seats.

See also *Electoral Formulas; First Past the Post; Representative Systems.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Adjudication

Adjudication is a mechanism by which disputes or controversies are peacefully resolved. It is a method of conflict resolution wherein an official and formal declaration of a legal judgment or determination is rendered in a tribunal proceeding. Societies can resolve conflicts among parties in a variety of ways without recourse to formal adjudications: legislative statutory enactment of policies, mediation and arbitration in employment disputes or labor-management clashes, persuasion, compromising and negotiation among parties to a contract, marriage counseling, or even parental discipline. The diverse methods of conflict resolution can be classified according to two dimensions: the level of formality of the proceedings and the level of governmental involvement in the proceedings. The higher the level of each, the more the method displays the hallmarks of adjudication.

Both the courts and regulatory administrative agencies engage in formal adjudication. In terms of the raw numbers adjudications in the United States, agencies engage in far more than the courts do. Nevertheless, the archetypal adjudication is found in the court system, and adjudication procedures in administrative agencies increasingly resemble adjudication in the courts. The delivery of justice to aggrieved parties has been at the heart of adjudication from ancient times, but the contemporary era has developed a specific archetype of adjudication: a tribunal that establishes the facts in a dispute, assesses the relevant law and attendant guiding rules and principles,

and then applies the law to the facts. Claims of all parties to the dispute are duly weighed and considered, and there are avenues for appeal by the parties of the final decision. The presiding judge must be impartial and have no vested interest in the outcome.

In the American system, courts are organized into trial and appeals courts. Both types of courts engage in adjudication, albeit with different underlying dynamics. Trial courts possess original jurisdiction; that is, they are the initial courts to hear cases. There is much variation among different court jurisdictions and judicial systems in the rules of evidence that guide and structure the establishment of the facts in trial courts. Appeals courts have appellate jurisdiction; that is, they hear appeals from parties who lost in a trial court or in a lower appeals court. Appellate courts, which are composed of a multiple judge panel, do not reconsider the facts and do not retry the case; instead, they assess the fairness of trial court proceedings by ascertaining whether the law and legal procedures were followed properly. They review trial court procedures and rulings (for example, the admissibility of evidence) for congruence with statutory and constitutional obligations. In other words, they review previous court proceedings and assess whether those court proceedings were fair.

Trial and appellate courts hear and resolve both civil and criminal cases. Criminal adjudications revolve around murder, rape, robbery, assault, embezzlement, extortion, and other acts that bring harm to society and are violations of the penal code. In criminal adjudications the government brings the legal action against the defendant. Alternatively, civil cases revolve around disputes between private parties and potential violations of private rights—the state is typically not a party in such disputes. These private disputes typically are over personal welfare, property, or finances. Judicial responses in such cases involve a judge's declaration ordering certain actions be taken or some amount of pecuniary compensation to be awarded.

For a process of adjudication to proceed, two conditions must be met: the court must have the legal right to hear the case (jurisdiction) and the parties must have the right to bring the case before the court (standing). Jurisdictions for courts stem primarily from statutes and constitutions laying out what specific types of disputes or types of parties to a dispute fall under the purview of particular courts. The jurisdictional requirement reinforces the main function of the courts—to protect the rights of individuals. At the core of standing is that the plaintiff has suffered an actual injury or harm to a legally protected interest. Such a harm or injury must be clear and concrete and particularized to that plaintiff, and it also must be actual or immanent, not merely hypothetical or speculative. The standing requirement distinguishes the courts' role from the role of the legislature, which is to promote the public interest and society in general. In other words, adjudications by the courts focus on more individualized-level dispute resolution, whereas the public policy–making process as conducted by legislatures focuses on more generalized-level disputes. Nevertheless, class-action lawsuits, such as those brought against the tobacco industry because of its health effects, tend to blur the line between the two.

See also *Administrative Courts; Trial Courts.*

. . . . STEPHEN R. ROUTH

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Administration, International

See *International Administration.*

Administrative Courts

Administrative courts are judicial bodies that adjudicate cases involving disputes that arise under administrative law—that is to say, disputes over the government's exercise of its public authority. Administrative law regulates the exercise of authority by executive officials (administrative acts); it also lays out the correctives or remedies when public officials violate those rules. Administrative courts are distinct from general courts as they focus solely on these types of public law disputes, whereas general courts may deal with both private law disputes (conflicts between private citizens or private entities) and public law controversies. Administrative courts typically play a more prominent role in countries with a history of civil law systems that feature elaborate legal codes (such as France and other countries in continental Europe) than in nations with a common law tradition where many legal principles are taken from prior judicial rulings (such as Great Britain, some other nations in the British Commonwealth, and the United States).

A CLASH OF INTERESTS

At the heart of administrative court litigation is a clash involving the private interests of a citizen on one side and the public interest as advanced by organs of the state on the other. Ultimately a country's decision to have a specialized system of administrative courts is based on a policy decision about the best way to render and ensure justice and fairness in administration. Citizens or corporations unhappy with a governmental agency decision concerning, for example, welfare eligibility, old-age or disability entitlements, immigration status, level of tax liability, the granting of a broadcasting license, or the ability to develop a wetlands area, need a forum for resolving this type of conflict between their private interest and the public entity. Should there be a separate set of courts with specialized jurisdiction only on this type of case, or should general courts

with broader jurisdiction and less-specialized judges have this type of private-public dispute fall within their purview?

SEPARATIST VERSUS INTEGRATIONIST ORIENTATIONS

Liberal democracies have settled on two approaches for addressing this foundational question—the separatist and the integrationist. A leading example of the separatist orientation is found in France, which features a well-developed administrative courts arrangement. French administrative courts engage in close judicial oversight of public agency actions. All administrative decisions produced by executive officials may be subject to review by the Conseil d'État (Council of State), which sits at the apex of an administrative court system of lower tribunals and intermediate courts of appeals that adjudicate these public law disputes. This particular court possesses much authority, independence, and prestige in the French legal system, and there is no comparable analogue to it in either Great Britain or the United States. Through its myriad decisions, the Conseil d'État has developed abiding legal precedents and principles concerning administrative power as exercised by the state; its jurisprudence constitutes a viable check to executive power but also lends legitimacy to various state actions.

Proponents of the separatist approach point to these courts' specialization and expertise in administrative law (and specific administrative areas) as the major advantages over general courts. With the growth of the modern administrative state and regulation of more private sector activities (and the resultant heavier administrative caseload for general courts) these courts are well positioned to manage the caseload and clarify the legal principles shaping the relationship between the individual citizen and the authority of the state bureaucracy. However, critics argue that administrative courts are inherently adverse to long-established views of individual liberty and freedom, primarily because such courts may have a tendency to defer to the state using judicial criteria that favor of the exercise of executive power.

The integrationist model is typically found in Anglo-American countries with their accompanying common law systems. This approach posits that a nation only needs one kind of court to resolve disputes arising from both private and public law—legal rules and principles should be equally applicable to both realms without an artificial distinction between the two. Thus, there is no need for a second set of specialized courts; ordinary courts are completely adequate and proper in rendering administrative justice. Proponents of this approach also contend that having a separate apparatus of administrative courts ineluctably leads to jurisdictional confusion and procedural problems for judges and litigants in trying to determine in which court should litigation be situated. With only one group of courts, such "territorial" problems are not an issue and the judicial structure is helpfully simplified for all involved. Questions revolving around the appropriate scope of administrative discretion resist easy resolution; this uncertainty becomes even more acute when having another set of courts adjudicating administrative disputes. As well, at a more theoretical level, the integrationist model postulates the fundamental notion that both the government and the people should obey the same laws—both components of society must be held accountable to the law by the same set of judges, judicial standards, and legal principles.

CONVERGENCE

In practice, however, countries that have attempted to use just one set of courts to handle all disputes over time have dropped their conceptual purity and begin to use some specialized forms of administrative courts. Caseload burdens and the need for judicial expertise in substantive policy areas often work to increase the number of administrative courts. Whether the ordinary judicial system can accommodate these types of specialized administrative disputes is an important determinant of a state ultimately choosing to have this second structure of courts. A prime example of this is the United States, where several administrative courts in the federal government specifically handle litigation stemming from areas of patents, copyright, customs, and taxes. Most of these courts were created by the U.S. Congress under its powers under Article I of the Constitution, as opposed to the more familiar general federal court system established by Article III that constitute the judicial branch. The judges appointed by the president to these courts do not enjoy the lifetime tenure of Article III federal judges. The decisions of these courts, however, are reviewable on appeal to the Article III courts (i.e., the U.S. Courts of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court).

A derivative form of administrative courts can be found within some U.S. executive branch agencies that have their own internal administrative tribunals (conducted by ostensibly independent administrative law judges) to help more expeditiously resolve disputes over administrative decisions. Judicial review by appeal to an Article III court remains available to disputants after exhausting the appeals process through these administrative tribunals and agency appeal boards.

See also *Adjudication; Administrative Law; Administrative State; Conseil d'État; Regulation and Rulemaking; Trial Courts.*

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Administrative Law

Administrative law is the body of law that deals with the procedures, authority, and actions involved in public administration. It incorporates the various powers, responsibilities, duties, and functions of public agencies and agency officials in the attempted advancement of their respective missions, along with judicial decisions that help structure these exercises of authority. The expansion and progression of administrative law have been concomitant with the growth of the administrative state in the twentieth century as governmental bureaucracy has developed to deal with pressing social, economic, and political problems emanating from modern society. In other words, at its core, administrative law is the branch of law that regulates the exercise of authority by executive branch officials.

A focus of much of administrative law is on the protocols and procedures to which government agencies must adhere to take legal and constitutionally acceptable actions that affect private parties. Thus, it can be said that the corpus of administrative law is composed of efforts to ensure that governmental agencies effectively implement public policies designed to advance the public interest, and at the same time to guarantee that the liberty of private interests are safeguarded from possible and potential administrative infringements. Rephrased, administrative law is a fluid and ever-evolving area of law that endeavors to reconcile and synthesize public and private interests—agencies are in place to help government fulfill its mission, but they may not violate individual liberties.

In the American context at the federal level, there are four main sources of administrative law: the U.S. Constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA), particular agency enabling acts, and administrative common law. The APA is a federal law that directly lays out the procedures agencies must follow and creates the legal structure for review by the federal courts of agency actions. At the core of motivation behind the enactment of the APA was Congress's wish to not allow executive agencies so much leeway in the conduct of their duties that executive agents would be able to drift away from congressional intentions and desires in the law that the executive was implementing. The great and abrupt growth of the administrative state under President Franklin Roosevelt communicated to Congress the need for such structures as the APA to rein in and guide executive actions. Similar legislative concerns are manifested also in the drafting of agency enabling acts that set out the boundaries of agency authority and purpose and the use of the legislative veto. The actual, day-to-day implementation of public policy and enforcement of laws remains a continuing source of political and institutional tension between the executive branch and the Congress.

Agencies are the entities that actually execute the laws that the legislature has enacted, and they engage in several types of activities when enforcing these laws. These agency activities include the regulation of private conduct, the disbursement of entitlements, the management of governmental property, the granting of licenses and permits, engaging in investigations and gathering of information, and the making of public policy. The vast majority of what agency officials do ends up having important consequences on the lives of private parties, by preventing them or allowing them to engage in a particular action, or giving them or taking away some form of benefit. Two important sets of actions that agencies engage in when performing such activities are rulemaking and the issuance of an order after an adjudication of a dispute. Rulemaking is essentially where an agency promulgates a general rule or regulation that is filling in the details of statutory policy and that rule possesses the force of law. The issuance of an administrative order is more specifically tailored to a particular dispute in which a private party is required, after an administrative hearing, to conform to the law by doing or refraining from doing certain things.

There is variation among liberal democracies in their respective administrative law structures. For example, administrative law in France and Sweden is administered by a system of highly developed separate administrative courts that are distinct from ordinary courts in that they focus solely on public law disputes. Such administrative courts are more readily seen and stronger in countries with a history of civil law legal systems than in nations with a common law legal heritage (such as the United States and Great Britain). The purpose of these courts is to closely oversee public agency actions. In the French system, all administrative decisions produced by executive officials are subject to review by the Conseil d'État (Council of State), which sits at the apex of this system of administrative lower tribunals and intermediate courts of appeals. This particular court possesses much authority, independence, and prestige in the French legal system, and there is no comparable analogue to it in either the United States or Great Britain. Through its myriad decisions over the past two hundred years, the Conseil d'État has developed abiding legal precedents and principles concerning administrative power as exercised by the state. Thus, the leading administrative court in France constitutes a viable check to executive power, as well as lending legitimacy to various state actions. The judiciary's use of administrative law is a leading method by which bureaucrats can be held accountable and to ensure executive fidelity to the law and correct procedures.

Some controversy and ongoing questions revolve around agency activities and how administrative law has developed to deal with those concerns. A variety of nations have opted for an external watchdog of an ombudsman to help assist in scrutinizing potentially problematic actions taken by government administrators. The ombudsman is an appointed public official who has the authority to investigate accusations of corrupt, incompetent, or incorrect actions taken by bureaucrats. This oversight mechanism started in Scandinavia and has filtered out over time to other European democracies and to the European Union, but its full potential is yet to be seen.

In the United States, an important worry is that the scope of agency action has worked to undermine the separation-of-powers system—legislative, executive, and judicial—as laid out in the Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that it is constitutionally permissible for executive agencies to exert authority that one normally associates with the legislative and

judicial branches as long as judicial review of agency decisions is available to the affected parties and agencies operate only in areas that are clearly under their regulatory jurisdiction and expertise. Thus, this merging of governmental powers is constitutionally satisfactory as long as appropriate safeguards are kept in place.

Of special concern in these separation-of-powers considerations is the delegation doctrine. The delegation doctrine prohibits excessive delegation of discretionary powers by the Congress to federal agencies. The major question here is where exactly is the threshold when the U.S. Congress has delegated too much authority to an agency so that the agency is actually legislating the law, and not the Congress itself? From the 1940s to the present, the delegation doctrine has become essentially dormant in the federal courts and does not pose much of a constraint on Congress, with Congress giving healthy amounts of leeway to agencies in the implementation of federal law. As long as some type of intelligible principle is articulated in the relevant law to generally guide the implementing agency, the courts will uphold the agency action as meeting the requirements of the delegation doctrine and is thus constitutional.

See also *Administrative Courts; Delegation, Theories of; Regulation and Rulemaking.*

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Administrative State

The term *administrative state* denotes political systems in contemporary developed nations with rationally organized, technically oriented government agencies that play large, central, and powerful roles in the formulation of public policy and the implementation of government services, constraints, functions, and programs. The term came into common usage in political science with the publication of Dwight Waldo's classic 1948 book *The Administrative State.* The administrative state developed from a variety of historical causes including the rise of the twentieth century welfare-warfare state, market failures in capitalist economies, and socialist economic organization.

THE BUREAUCRACY

A chief characteristic of the administrative state is the development of a new and relatively independent power center in government, typically referred to as "the bureaucracy," that is difficult for chief executives, legislatures, and courts to control.

Independence develops from the selection of tenured administrative personnel based on technical expertise (merit), the scope of administrative tasks and the detailed knowledge they require, and the continuous operation of administrative units regardless of changes in their leadership and staff. Such units are difficult for legislators, elected and politically appointed executives, and courts to supervise and hold accountable due to their technical expertise, knowledge of and adherence to routine, scope of activity, and limited transparency.

The organization of administrative units in the administrative state is typically bureaucratic; that is, incorporating specialization, hierarchy, expertise, impersonality, and large size. Specialization of units is by jurisdiction and function. Ministries or departments are generally the largest units. Smaller units are called *agencies,* and subunits are called *bureaus.* Jurisdictional specialization is manifested in such units as Ministries or Departments of Labor, Commerce, Agriculture, and Interior, among others. Specialization by function forms the basis of units devoted to such matters as defense; national security; crime control; education; nuclear power; welfare; and economic, environmental, and social regulation, as well as for overhead administrative activities such as budgeting, procurement, and personnel administration.

These categories are not wholly distinct—overlaps are common and one person's regulation may be another's service, as in the case of measures for consumer protection. Hierarchy reaching upward through political appointees in the administrative units to the various offices of the chief executive and culminating with the president, premier, or prime minister promotes coordination of the administrative component as a whole. Expertise, sometimes referred to as "technorationality," results from specialization and the selection of administrative personnel based on merit. Impersonality, which contributes to procedural regularity and continuity of operations, is promoted by organizations based on positions rather than on persons (e.g., individual administrators), adherence to comprehensive procedural rules for decision making and other actions, and communication in writing. Large size is a function of the broad range of policies and activities dealt with by the administrative state.

SEPARATION OF POWERS VERSUS PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS

In separation-of-powers systems, the administrative state is at odds with the governmental design because administrative units combine all three functions of government: execution, legislation, and adjudication. Execution of legal mandates is the primary function of administrative units. However, they also legislate in a generic sense by enacting rules setting regulatory standards that have the force of law. Administrative units also adjudicate a wide variety of economic conflicts, such as whether a labor or advertising practice is fair. The collapse of the separation of functions into a modern nation's administrative component and its individual units is an inevitable outgrowth of expansion in the scope of governmental activity. Legislatures lack the capacity to draft laws with detailed standards for a host

of economic, social, and other activities and environmental and other conditions subject to governmental regulation. Similarly, court systems would require dramatic expansion to deal effectively with all the conflicts resolved through administrative adjudication. Because agencies exercise executive, legislative, and adjudicatory functions, they are apt to be subject to some degree of direction and oversight by each branch of government, sometimes dictating conflicting courses of action.

The administrative state in parliamentary systems is more in keeping with the governmental design because the legislative and executive functions are fused in the sense that the political executive is formally a creature of the legislature. Nevertheless, the elective governmental institutions and courts may lack the capacity to exercise close direction over the whole range of administrative operations.

See also *Bureaucracy; Bureaucratic Authoritarianism; State, Functions of the; State, The.*

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Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno (1903–1969) was a German music theorist, literary critic, philosopher, social psychologist, and sociologist. Born in Frankfurt to a family of musicians, Adorno started to write as a music critic at a very early age. His name is, however, primarily linked to the Frankfurt school, the group of intellectuals working within the framework of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, of which he is considered to be one of the central exponents. The essays he wrote in the 1930s in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung,* the main organ of the institute, combine formal music analysis with a sociological critique.

With Adolf Hitler's rise to power, Adorno, together with other members of the institute, migrated to the United States, first to New York and then to California. During these years Adorno collaborated with philosopher and sociologist Max Horkheimer, with whom he wrote the influential *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944). In this book, written after the advent of Nazism and their experience of American mass society, the

authors developed a harsh critique of Western rationality by arguing that the latter, far from realizing the Enlightenment's promise of emancipation, had turned into a radical form of domination. In so doing, they suggested that the entire Western Enlightenment was ultimately based on an instrumental concept of reason and domination over nature that could result in the opposite of reason—that is, myth and barbarism. Adorno returned to Frankfurt in 1949 and contributed to reopening the Institute for Social Research.

Although Adorno would try, in particular in his later *Negative Dialectics* (1966), to investigate the way in which rationality could escape the dialectic of Enlightenment, thus avoiding the nightmare of total domination, his work remained devoted to critiquing late capitalist societies. In particular, Adorno's writings on mass culture contain a powerful critique of the way in which culture and other everyday practices can become the vehicle of ideological forms of domination.

Adorno also promoted and took part in empirical studies, which was in line with the multidisciplinary character of the Frankfurt school research program. One of the most prominent works of Adorno's in this field is the collaborative *Authoritarian Personality* (1950). This study combines insights from psychoanalysis with sociological research in an attempt to provide an explanation for the rise of authoritarianism.

Due to the importance he gave to factors such as culture and psychology, Adorno, like other exponents of the Frankfurt school, exercised an important function in the renewal of Western Marxism, as well as in the opening of new fields of investigation into the sociology of culture.

See also *Enlightenment Political Thought; Frankfurt School; Horkheimer, Max; Marxism; Political Theory.*

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Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

Adverse selection and moral hazard are informational imperfections potentially presented in any activity or transaction because of asymmetric information about involved risks. *Adverse selection* is a possibility that actors undertake an activity or transaction based on actors' characteristics unobservable for others (these are informed actors because they know their own characteristics). If the decisions of informed actors adversely affect other uninformed actors participating

in the same activity or transaction, then adverse selection is present.

Moral hazard is a possibility that informed actors might undertake an activity or transaction more risky than uninformed actors' original belief. If such activity or transaction is undertaken, and uninformed actors cannot observe it, then moral hazard is present. For example, if a state borrows money from an international organization, then the state has more information about its own current and future risks than does the lender. Adverse selection arises from the possibility of using borrowed funds in the ways that would lead to difficulties in repaying the loan. Alternatively, moral hazard arises if that state, which had intended to use borrowed funds in a less risky way, experiences a change in government, and the new government uses the borrowed funds for riskier purposes.

See also *Ethics, Political.*

. . . .   TATIANA VASHCHILKO

Advertising, Political

Political advertising encompasses a broad array of strategies in which paid media is used to communicate political messages to the public. Although most commonly associated with candidates' campaign commercials, political advertising has developed into a massive industry in which various political actors (e.g., parties, advocacy groups) use a host of media such as radio, television, and the Internet to deliver carefully packaged messages directly to voters. Research has provided important insights into the use and effect of political ads, although some intriguing questions have yet to be fully resolved.

EARLY AMERICAN USAGE
Political advertising has developed considerably since its early use in the first American elections. Campaign advertisements were initially limited to handbills, newspaper ads, and, later, radio spots, but the advent of television significantly enhanced the ability of candidates to make direct appeals to the public. The 1952 U.S. presidential election featured the first series of televised candidate commercials which, although relatively simple, signaled a new era in political advertising. Over time, television spots became more ubiquitous, increasingly sophisticated, and, in some cases, more alarming. U.S. presidential candidate Lyndon B. Johnson's 1964 "Daisy" ad, for example, shocked many with contrasting images of a little girl and an atomic mushroom cloud—so much so that, although it only ran once, the media replayed it multiple times on evening newscasts. Since then, there have been many notable spots, including presidential candidate Ronald Reagan's 1984 "Morning in America" ad, which used positive imagery to inspire voters, and his "Bear in the Woods" ad, which invoked fears of a foreign enemy—both themes that would be reused in subsequent campaigns. In 1988 the "Willie Horton" ad promoting the campaign of U.S. presidential candidate George H. W. Bush stirred controversy by allegedly including implicit racial cues, and, in 2000, an ad in which the word *rats* flashed briefly across the television screen during a voiceover

regarding U.S. presidential candidate Al Gore's prescription drug plan raised questions about the possible use of subliminal techniques in political advertising.

The American political advertising industry has expanded beyond presidential candidates to include a host of other political actors. It is now common for many candidates across all levels of elected office to spend large portions of their budgets on creating and airing ever more sophisticated advertising campaigns. In terms of buying air time, estimates show that congressional and gubernatorial candidates spent nearly $2 billion during the 2006 campaign alone. Political advertising has further expanded to include advocacy groups who now routinely sponsor "issue ads" that promote a policy—often implicitly tied to a candidate—without explicitly offering an endorsement. Candidates benefit from the issue being promoted without having to pay for the ad or being held accountable for what is said.

NEW VENUES
Political advertising also has expanded to new venues. Campaigns are now using the Internet to create somewhat unorthodox pieces, such as animated spots or comedic skits that are intended to be distributed through a viral network of supporters. Individual citizens also have started producing their own Web-based political ads, some of which have gained considerable attention on the Internet. In addition, the 2004 U.S. presidential candidates pioneered a technique called "phantom advertising" in which they created ads that, rather than being aired, were sent to media outlets in the hopes that they would be included in stories about the campaign. American political advertising is an expanding enterprise that appears to be on the cusp of another profound change.

These trends and practices have started to have some influence on political advertising in other Western democracies. Growing similarities are due, in part, to the fact that American political consultants have increasingly exported their strategies to parties and candidates in other countries. While this has raised concerns about the "Americanization" of campaigns in places like Britain, Canada, and France, differences in campaign spending laws, party systems, and political culture have kept political advertising in these countries from completely replicating the American model.

RESEARCH ON ADVERTISING EFFECTS
Scholarly interest in political advertising has produced valuable insights into the nature and strategic use of ads as well as their effect on the public. Political ads have been usefully categorized based on their tone (e.g., positive, negative), approach (e.g., attack, contrast), and substance (e.g., issue, image). This work, along with massive collection and cataloging efforts, has provided the necessary foundation for understanding various aspects of political advertising.

One such area of research concerns the motivations that drive political actors in their strategic use of advertisements. Research has shown, for example, that candidates are more likely to use attack ads when they are involved in a tight race. Otherwise, they are inclined to promote their candidacy with contrasting or positive messages. However, challengers

As part of a its advertising campaign, the Maryland Republican Party issued a letter to its members linking then-governor Michael Dukakis with murderer Willie Horton in an effort to discredit Dukakis.

SOURCE: AP Images

are generally more likely than incumbents to run negative ads because challengers need to make the case for replacing the incumbent. Furthermore, although previous research suggested that candidates avoid discussing issues "owned" by—significantly identified with—their opponent's party, more contemporary work suggests that candidates may, at times, use ads to engage in issue dialogue, particularly when races are close.

The effect of negative advertising has received considerable scholarly attention. Initially, attack ads were thought to depress voter turnout by decreasing feelings of political efficacy and satisfaction with the electoral process. Subsequent research has argued, however, that negative political ads can actually stimulate participation by providing salient and compelling information while motivating people to act against the concerns raised in the ad. This tension in the literature may be explained, at least in part, by the possibility that low levels of negativity spur participation while a saturation of negative ads drives it down. Furthermore, researchers have shown that the effects of negative advertising likely are conditioned by factors including the source of the negativity and the individual characteristics of voters, such as gender and race.

Researchers also have explored how voters are affected by political advertising more generally. Although most people claim to dislike political ads, a number of studies have shown that ads can be significantly informative. In fact, voters seem to learn more about candidates and issues from political ads than they do from newspaper or television coverage. This is because ads are succinct, shown repeatedly, and designed to be memorable, thus enhancing their reception, particularly among those who may be less interested in other forms of campaign news. However, while people may learn from political ads, the evidence suggests that ads do more to activate and reconfirm political beliefs than they do to persuade people to vote one way or another. This does not mean that political ads have little strategic value. In fact, this solidifying of beliefs seems to be quite important, as evidenced by the finding that, in general, advertising expenditures are positively associated with levels of voter support. Unfortunately, research on the ultimate impact that advertising has on election outcomes has been plagued by difficulties in measuring exposure to ads and controlling other influences in the campaign environment. So, while it is clear that political ads can have some effect on voters, questions remain about their overall role in determining electoral outcomes.

See also *Advocacy Groups; Campaigns; Public Opinion.*

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Advise and Consent

The U.S. Constitution, in Article II, Section 2, mandates that the Senate engage in advice and consent with presidential appointments to the executive and judicial branches. This constitutional provision is notably brief and vague pertaining to this Senate responsibility, and this has led to a variety of conflicts between presidents and senators over what constitutes the proper manner of fulfilling this congressional task. The Constitution states that it is the president who formally chooses and nominates appointees to fill vacancies to

important posts in the federal government, and it is the Senate's duty to confirm or reject such nominations after reviewing them. Advice and consent is a prime example of the constitutional framework of the separation of powers among the three branches of the federal government being layered over with checks and balances. These checks and balances result ultimately in a sharing of power at times between the executive and legislative branches—in this instance, the president has the sole power of appointment, but the Senate can check that authority with its power to reject those nominations.

Working from the original phrasing in the Constitution and subsequent enactments by the Congress, the Senate must consent to presidential appointments to the following types of offices: Supreme Court justices, all other lower federal judges, Cabinet secretaries, subcabinet executive branch posts, ambassadors, and other upper-tier governmental positions. In the twenty-first century, the Senate annually receives roughly twenty thousand such nominations. The great majority of these votes are on military promotions or civilian appointments to executive branch agencies (e.g., the Public Health Service) and these are routinely approved with no challenge or controversy and minimal Senate attention. There are about one to two thousand nominations to higher-level posts that do have more significant policy implications associated with them (i.e., the position has some manner of policy-making authority), and the probability of senatorial opposition increases. That being said, the Senate still usually approves them with little difficulty.

To be confirmed and to legally take office, a nominee must receive a vote of approval by a majority of senators present and voting. Almost all nominees are approved in the Senate by unanimous consent, typically a voice vote, with little to no debate. A recorded roll call vote where it is clear how a particular senator voted on a nomination constitutes only a small percentage of all of these confirmation votes.

Some types of offices usually garner greater levels of Senate opposition than others wherein senators wish to have their preferences accounted for by the president. Judicial appointments, particularly to the Supreme Court, with their lifetime tenure and increasingly prominent policy implications of federal court decisions, have been shown to ratchet up senators' willingness to reject a nominee. The inverse is generally true for executive branch vacancies where appointees only serve for the time that their appointing president is in power—more deference is shown by senators to those selections of the president. Many senators consider it appropriate for the president to be given the greatest leeway in picking executive branch appointments, especially his Cabinet secretaries.

The onus is on opponents of a nomination to advance why the nominee should be rejected—opponents must establish the grounds for opposition to a nomination. There historically have been four primary grounds of opposition. The first three concern the nominee's personal character—competence and qualifications for the position to which the nominee has been appointed, potential conflicts of interest, and ethics. The fourth focuses on the nominee's policy views and ideology. The legitimacy of policy-based and ideological opposition to a nominee

remains a source of continuing controversy. The first three are generally considered to be valid or acceptable reasons, the fourth less so. Resistance to a nomination commonly emanates from senators who are members of the opposition party and who are ideologically distant from the appointing president.

From the 1960s onward, the greater frequency of divided government and expanded organized interest group mobilization with these appointments has worked to reinforce and increase the institutional tensions between the Senate and the White House with this advice and consent duty. When a controversy erupts over a nomination, overt hostility between these two branches has become the current norm. A strategy now more readily seen in the contemporary era compared to the past is senators' greater willingness to obstruct presidential appointments by keeping nominees from ever receiving a confirmation floor vote. Commonly seen tactics as part of this general strategy include the relevant Senate committee not holding hearings nor considering a nomination at all (a necessary step before a floor vote can occur) and the use of holds and filibusters on specific nominees by individual senators that directly prevent a floor vote.

See also *Cabinets and Cabinet Formation; Checks and Balances; Executive, The; Judicial Selection and Nomination; Supreme Court.*

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Advocacy Coalition Networks

Advocacy coalition networks, as conceptualized by Paul A. Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith (1993), consist of groups of people who share a common belief system and participate in nontrivial, coordinated activities to transform their beliefs into public policy. Similar to iron triangles or policy whirlpools, advocacy coalition networks include organized interest groups, executive agencies, and members of relevant legislative committees. However, unlike the traditional conceptions of coalition groups, advocacy coalition networks recognize that many more participants are active in seeking to influence public policy, including members of the media, academic researchers, policy analysts, and comparable political actors at multiple levels of government. Advocacy coalition networks also differ from broader issue networks in that the participants of the coalition are united around shared core and secondary policy beliefs rather than a more encompassing focus on a particular policy area.

Advocacy coalition networks operate in wider policy subsystems that include all actors who are involved in a particular policy area. This includes active participants in advocacy coalitions, as well as potential *latent* actors who may be mobilized in the future. In addition to coalition participants, the policy subsystem may include *neutral* actors who become involved through technical expertise and knowledge, such as bureaucrats and academics. Policy subsystems usually include several (typically two to four) advocacy coalition networks that compete to influence policy makers, but some *quiescent* subsystems may only have a single coalition. Because coalitions are united by shared belief systems, they should be relatively stable over time, especially when the policy debate centers on core beliefs and values.

In 2002, Miles Burnett and Charles Davis provided a ready example from their analysis of the policy subsystem of U.S. national forest policy from 1960 to 1995. They identified three active coalitions. The first coalition was a commodity production coalition consisting of lumber firms, mill workers, some administrators in the U.S. Forest Service, local government officials, and members of Congress from districts economically affected by timber policy. The second coalition, pursuing conservation and environmental protection, consisted of environmental groups, water quality agencies, state and local fish and game departments, some U.S. Forest Service employees, and members of Congress who support conservation policies. The final coalition, formed around the principles of multiple use and sustained yield, includes forestry associations, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management, and some U.S. Forest Service employees. Each coalition utilized varying strategies, from venue shopping to using policy information to attract media attention, all aimed at influencing policy outcomes affecting national forests.

ADVOCACY COALITION NETWORKS IN THE POLICY PROCESS

Advocacy coalition networks play a central role in Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's framework of the policy process, the *advocacy coalition framework (ACF)*. The ACF was developed as an alternative to the traditional stages model, which was seen as too simplistic and linear to be an accurate description of the policy process, and too limited in its utility to show causal mechanisms and generate testable hypotheses. The ACF focuses on the roles of information and belief systems and tracks policy change advocacy coalition networks within policy subsystems over long periods (usually a decade or more).

Under the ACF, minor or secondary aspects of policy can change as coalitions compete within a policy subsystem to influence decisions of sovereign policy makers. Importantly, advocacy coalition networks engage in policy-oriented learning, processing both technical policy information and political feedback, to update their strategies as well as secondary aspects of their belief systems. Incremental change can result from this type of policy-oriented learning. Major, nonincremental policy changes are unlikely without significant shifts in factors external to the subsystem, like socioeconomic conditions, public

attitudes, governing coalitions, and constitutional structures. Still, significant external shocks do not necessitate major policy change. Rather, minority or nondominant coalitions must skillfully use these external perturbations to gain an advantage in the subsystem that would allow them to institute core policy changes that would not have been possible under the previously dominant coalition.

APPLICATIONS AND CRITIQUES OF THE ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK

Developed around environmental politics in the United States, most studies using the ACF have addressed policy subsystems such as auto pollution control, public lands policy, and water policy. However, it also has been applied successfully to other policy areas, including national security, education, and drug policy. Though it was developed with the U.S. political system in mind, it has been used to analyze policy change in international settings as well, including roads policy in Britain, water quality policy in the Netherlands, and gender discrimination policy in Australia.

Through these varied applications, several critiques and modifications to the original framework have been offered. A 1996 study of the education policy by Michael Mintrom and Sandra Vergari noted the difficulty in predicting when major policy change might occur because external shocks were, themselves, not a sufficient cause. Several studies have suggested also that more attention be paid to issues of collective action because the primary focus of the framework centers on coalitions of varied political actors. Several applications of the ACF have found less stable coalitions than the framework originally hypothesized, leading to a distinction between *nascent* and *mature* policy subsystems. In newly formed subsystems, coalitions may be much more fluid as the stakes of the policy area may be initially unclear. As more information is generated, coalitions should become more stable and entrenched.

Finally, although advocacy coalition networks have been conceptualized under the auspices of the ACF, similar concepts of coalitions and issue networks have been used also in other frameworks of the policy process. In the *multiple streams* framework of agenda setting, John Kingdon (1984) noted that "policy communities" made up of bureaucrats, congressional staffers, think-tank researchers, and academics centered around a single policy area play a crucial role in generating policy solutions and alternatives. Policy entrepreneurs, meanwhile, actively pursue policy change by matching these solutions to emerging problems and political conditions. In Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones's (1993) *punctuated equilibrium* framework, groups of interests compete to exert influence in a policy subsystem. These interests actively seek to structure the decision-making authority to give themselves a policy monopoly or dominant control that leads to incremental policy change. Major policy change results from minority interests successfully altering the policy image to give themselves control over the policy subsystem. Concepts similar to advocacy coalition networks are even prominent in policy innovation and diffusion models, where issue networks and

advocacy groups play a strong role in diffusing new ideas from one governmental entity to another.

See also *Coalition Formation; Interest Groups and Lobbies; Public Policy Development.*

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Advocacy Groups

In political science, advocacy groups form a subgroup of interest groups. Interest groups can represent the self-interest of their members or a broader public interest. Public interest groups also are called advocacy groups in that they seek to promote a common or collective good. But this definition is not universally shared. Some scholars, including Ross Stephens and Nelson Wikstrom (2007), assign the term *public interest groups* to lobbying organizations that represent the interest of governmental entities, such as the National League of Cities.

Another ambiguity involves the legitimacy of advocacy activities. Traditionally, scholars have accepted advocacy groups as essential components of pluralist democracy, while more recently issue advocacy has been associated with negative forms of political communication.

BRIEF HISTORY

Advocacy groups can trace their origin to political movements in the nineteenth century. Organizations with dedicated leaders and dues-paying members emerged to pursue a variety of political causes and seek fundamental constitutional changes, such as the abolition of slavery or suffrage for women. Improved literacy made it possible to print newspapers and pamphlets to mobilize supporters and educate the public.

Advocacy groups survived over time by adapting their goals and tactics to changing political conditions. The NAACP, for instance, was founded in 1909 to promote civil rights, as well as educational and economic opportunities, for people of color. After women obtained the right to vote in 1920, activists reconstituted themselves as the League of Women Voters to educate women about their new right, as well as to promote good government reforms.

Advocacy for animals, plants, and unique landscapes has its roots in the nineteenth century as well. The idea of conservation and the creation of national parks established a foundation for the contemporary environmental movement. Today, the high-tech revolution and new forms of communication have made the mobilization of supporters much easier, but also has facilitated the spread of misinformation.

SCOPE, PURPOSE, AND IRS RULES

The organizational structure of advocacy groups varies, depending on the cause they are championing. Some are international in scope, and they may have offices in major world cities. U.S. advocacy groups with a national focus tend to have their headquarters in the Washington, D.C., area, with chapters spread across the country. Quite a few groups promote statewide, regional, or local causes, and their geographical presence is limited accordingly.

The incorporation of advocacy groups is regulated by state law, while tax-exempt status comes under the purview of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The tax code makes two distinctions that delineate the limits imposed on lobbying and political involvements of advocacy groups. One is the distinction between section 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations.

Those 501(c)(3) entities, including foundations, have to be organized and operated for purposes such as religious, charitable, educational, scientific, or cultural objectives. Among tax-exempt organizations, 501(c)(3) groups enjoy the most favorable tax treatment. Not only are they exempt from the federal income tax, but they also can accept tax deductible donations.

In return for the favorable tax treatment, 501(c)(3) entitiess are limited in their advocacy work and lobbying. In 1934, new tax law stipulated that "no substantial part" of the organization's activities could be used to influence the legislative process. In 1976, Congress passed legislation that allowed 501(c)(3) organizations either to continue under the "no substantial part" clause or under new rules that set specific dollar amounts depending on the size of the organization. Congress and the IRS settled on generous limits to avoid violating First Amendment rights. The 501(c)(3) groups can work also within IRS rules by presenting their advocacy work as educational efforts and by using volunteers rather than paid lobbyists to speak to legislators. They also can create 501(c)(4) subsidiaries.

The appropriate Internal Revenue Code for tax-exempt organizations that want to make advocacy their major mission is section 501(c)(4). It covers entities that seek to promote general social welfare and civic improvements. The activities have to support a public-serving cause; they cannot be of a membership-serving nature. Financial support for 501(c)(4) comes in the form of dues and non-tax-deductible donations from members who believe in the cause. Major 501(c)(4) groups have foundations as affiliates, to which tax-deductible donations for educational and other appropriate purposes can be directed.

The second important distinction in the federal tax code is between (1) lobbying and seeking to influence the policy-making process versus (2) partisan political activities and electioneering. Neither 501(c)(3) nor 501(c)(4) organizations can

engage in election activities, by which the IRS means explicitly supporting or opposing candidates running for political office. However, for more direct electoral involvement, 501(c)(4) entities can create political organizations under section 527. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as amended, limits the amount of money section 527 entities can spend for or against candidates. However, FECA created new ambiguities, which the Supreme Court tried to resolve by distinguishing between *express advocacy*, such as mentioning a candidate, and *issue advocacy*, or focusing on a policy issue. The express form of political communication falls under FECA, but issue advocacy does not.

See also *Interest Groups and Lobbies; Political Action Committee (PAC); Public Interest Groups.*

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Affirmative Action

Redistribution of wealth and other benefits is a common function of government. Controversies over the extent of redistribution are the principal basis of politics in many countries. When this redistribution is based on characteristics acquired at birth, such as race, ethnicity, caste, or gender, controversy often increases because the redistribution may exacerbate group rivalries and be inconsistent with other values, such as equal protection of the law. Such redistribution is often called *affirmative action*. Economist Thomas Sowell, the principal scholar comparing such policies, has identified them in such diverse counties as India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and the United States. Additionally, more limited versions exist in Britain, Canada, France, New Zealand, and Pakistan.

The origins of affirmative action vary by country. In the United States, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and almost all civil rights laws prohibit discrimination and require governments and many private entities to treat all persons equally. As the civil rights movement changed from advocacy of race-blind equal opportunity programs to race-conscious programs, which some saw as necessary to achieve proportional representation, affirmative action became the preferred tool in the areas of employment, higher education, public education, and voting rights. Such policies are now deeply embedded in both the public and private sector of American life as a device to overcome the legacies of past discrimination, create diversity, and attract political support from under-represented groups. In India and Malaysia, affirmative action programs began under British colonial rule and have survived independence and expanded their coverage. In India, during the 1950s and 1960s free secondary school opportunities and, in some states, free books, supplies, and meals were offered to members of select castes and tribes. Later, university slots were preserved for them. Such actions helped to unite various Hindu castes behind Hindu political parties. In Malaysia, nationalist parties sought to reduce the influence of Chinese and Indians in that country by providing education and employment benefits to the native Malay and *bumipateras* or "sons of the soil" populations.

The controversy over affirmative action programs stems from several factors. First, most legal systems, including the United Nations (UN) Charter, proclaim the principle of equal treatment for all individuals. When affirmative action programs promote equal treatment or when they promote preferences, sometimes called *reverse discrimination*, has received careful study. Such studies are complex and often not welcomed by some stakeholders who often have strong association with group identities and politics.

Second, disagreements exist over which groups should benefit from affirmative action programs. In many countries, such as Britain and New Zealand, the policies benefit demographic minorities, but in some cases the number of beneficiaries has spread to encompass populations not envisioned at the programs' inception. In the United States, for example, the moral driver for affirmative action has been the more than three-hundred-year history of mistreatment of African Americans and Native Americans. The principal beneficiaries, however, often have been white women, as well as Asian Americans and Hispanic Americans, some of whom faced discrimination based on national origin or ancestry while others are more recent immigrants. In India and Malaysia, the majority of the population is entitled to preferences.

Third, affirmative action programs may be justified as temporary remedies, but in fact the inequalities that the programs are designed to address are difficult to eliminate. In the United States, judicial rulings require that governments (but not private organizations) must have a compelling interest to use racial classifications by making findings that they are remedying discrimination for which they are responsible. Affirmative action programs also must be narrowly tailored to remedy that discrimination, which may restrict the scope of beneficiary groups and benefits, but litigation to enforce those judicial principles is often lengthy and costly to undertake.

For all of these reasons, affirmative action programs remain controversial in the countries that have adopted them. Elites sometimes see affirmative action as a moral undertaking, but the preferences rarely threaten their status. Further, they see these

programs as useful symbolic policies adding to social stability or as marketing tools to obtain votes or to sell products. Beneficiary groups seek to expand the reach of affirmative action programs. As these programs become bureaucratically institutionalized, they develop infrastructures supported by government, corporate, foundation, and educational funds. Opponents are rarely so well organized or funded. They often have majority public opinion support, however, and can invoke with some sympathy in legal forums defending the principle of equal protection.

The global economy and the growing migration of peoples are likely to leave most countries increasingly multiethnic and multireligious. This will add to the difficulty of reconciling the political value of eliminating inequalities with the legal value of treating individuals equally. Whatever it may be called in the future and whatever form it takes, something like affirmative action programs will continue to be controversial in a number of countries worldwide.

See also *Caste System; Civil and Political Rights; Civil Rights Movement; Discrimination; Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; Positive Discrimination; Racial Discrimination; Reverse Discrimination; Segregation and Desegregation; Xenophobia.*

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Aflaq, Michel

A Greek Orthodox Christian Syrian, Michel Aflaq (1910–1989) became one of two founders, along with his Muslim countryman, Salah al-Din Bitar, of the Baath (Ba'th; "rebirth" or "resurrection") Party in the early 1940s. He was regarded as the party's leading thinker. Aflaq considered Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser to be a charismatic leader for the Arabs and, with the idea that Baathists could play a leading role in what he saw as the beginning of a pan-Arab state, lent his support to the formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958. However, Baathists were disappointed with their actual role in the UAR, leading some of them, not including Aflaq, to endorse its breakup in 1961. Aflaq participated in abortive attempts to form another UAR in 1963, following Baathist coups in both Iraq and Syria.

He gave up his position as Secretary General of the National (i.e., pan-Arab) Command in 1965, and took refuge in Europe and Brazil after a radical military faction of the Baath, which he opposed, took power in Damascus in 1966. After the Baathist takeover in Iraq in 1968, Aflaq returned to the Middle East, at first living mainly in Beirut before moving to Baghdad, where he became Secretary General of the Iraqi-sponsored Baathist National Command (a bitter rival to the Syrian-backed National Command). The position was essentially symbolic. Aflaq allegedly converted to Islam late in life.

Aflaq was involved in politics from childhood, as his nationalist father suffered imprisonment both by the Ottomans, who ruled the country until 1918, and by France, to whom the League of Nations assigned Syria as a mandated territory. At age eighteen, he went to Paris to study history, philosophy, and literature at the Sorbonne, where he established an Arab student organization before returning home in 1932. Aflaq worked as a history teacher in secondary school for the next ten years. In Paris, he was influenced by Marxist ideas and even contributed to a communist periodical, but never joined the Communist Party, about which he apparently had reservations. Eventually, in his own words, he "became disenchanted and felt betrayed" when the Popular Front government of Leon Blum in France failed to end France's colonialist policies. This caused Aflaq to think instead of creating a synthesis of socialism and Arab nationalism.

His three attempts to win a seat in the Syrian parliament during the 1940s failed, apparently at least in part because of electoral fraud, resulting in Aflaq's disillusionment with the democratic route to change. His political activities led to imprisonment for short periods. Aflaq briefly held a cabinet position as minister of education in 1949, after which he decided to play the role of party philosopher rather than office holder. He published numerous essays and short stories portraying the ills of traditional Arab society and calling for change along socialist, democratic, and nationalist lines. Aflaq was not a dynamic speaker but he was effective in talking to small groups, with whom his interaction is said to have been much like that with students during his teaching days. He was noted for his "frugal" lifestyle and for refraining from using his influence for personal gain.

See also *Baathism; Middle Eastern Politics and Society; Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism.*

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Africa, Anglophone

See *Anglophone Africa.*

Africa, Francophone

See *Francophone Africa.*

Africa, Health Policy in

See *Multiple Streams Theory.*

Africa, Postindependence

See *Postindependent Africa, Politics and Governance in.*

African Political Economy

African political economy is a field of study within political science that analyzes the relationship between the state and the market in Africa. This field is generally geographically delimited to include only sub-Saharan Africa. The major preoccupation of scholarship in this discipline has been analyzing the role of the state in promoting economic growth and poverty alleviation.

THE FAILURE OF STATE-LED DEVELOPMENT

As sub-Saharan African countries gained independence (primarily in the 1950s and 1960s), policy makers and scholars alike emphasized the importance of the state in driving development in the new African countries. Due to the weakness of the indigenous capitalist classes in these countries, it was assumed the state would lead the development process. In both socialist countries, like Tanzania, and more market-oriented countries, like Nigeria, the state subsidized industries, manipulated exchange rates, and restricted international trade with the goal of encouraging industrialization.

However, by the early 1980s, the failures of the prevailing development strategy had become clear. Most countries in Africa were experiencing a decline in growth rates, an erosion of per capita income, and an increase in external debt. A World Bank investigation into the economic crisis laid the blame squarely on the interventionist policies adopted by African governments. The publication, which became known as the Berg Report (World Bank, 1981), argued that these policies had undermined the functioning of the market and had created bloated public sectors.

The major puzzle motivating academic research was why African governments had not abandoned these interventionist policies once it became obvious they were not stimulating growth. The key insight of the political economy literature was that governments often secured political gains from economic mismanagement. Robert Bates (1981) influentially argued that governments had incentives to distort the operation of the economy to secure cheap food for organizationally powerful urbanites at the expense of the rural population. Richard Sandbrook (1985) emphasized that African leaders depended on the disbursement of patronage to maintain political support, which resulted in poor policy choices and incompetent administration.

STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND EXTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY

In response to the recommendations of the Berg Report, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) decided to make future loans to African governments conditional on a reduction in state intervention in the economy. The structural adjustment programs (SAPs) countries were required to adopt in return for new loans involved cutting the fiscal deficit, devaluing exchange rates, and liberalizing trade policy. The prescribed policies were highly contentious within Africa. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa challenged the Berg Report's explanation for the economic crisis, instead blaming colonialism and Africa's subordinate position in the global economy. Many countries experienced "IMF riots" in which citizens protested against the austerity measures proscribed by the SAPs. However, in the face of balance-of-payments crises, most African countries eventually had little choice but to adopt SAPs.

The political science literature on structural adjustment focused on the interaction between regime type and economic reform. The initial consensus was that SAPs could only be implemented by authoritarian governments, because draconian measures were necessary to implement unpopular economic reforms. However, Nicolas van de Walle (2001) demonstrated that authoritarian governments were not any more successful in implementing reform than their democratic counterparts in Africa. He argued that both autocrats and democratically elected leaders depend on the allocation of patronage to remain in power. As a result, they have all resisted reducing public sector employment, even as they have cut educational and medical programming. Although a few countries, such as Ghana, have experienced sustained growth following economic reform, SAPs have brought limited benefits overall.

STATE CAPACITY AND PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT

In the aftermath of structural adjustment, the new consensus was that African governments needed to play a greater constructive role in fostering development; they could not simply engage in fewer negative interventions. Governments must—at a minimum—provide basic law and order if they are to encourage their citizens to be economically productive. In addition, economic development requires public investment

in infrastructure, education, and health. Both academics and policy makers emphasized the need to build the capacity of African states to deliver basic goods and services to their citizens. This view corresponded with the United Nations' development of the Millennium Development Goals, which commit member states to increasing access to primary education and basic health care.

Furthermore, in contrast to the earlier consensus that citizen participation would hinder economic reform, the new argument was that citizens should drive the development process because they had an interest in ensuring economic improvement and poverty alleviation. International agencies adopted the mantra of "participatory development" in the hope that domestic pressure would be more successful than external pressure in encouraging economic development.

As a result, many observers were optimistic about the reintroduction of multiparty elections and the decentralization of government in Africa during the 1990s. Democratization and decentralization were thought to increase citizens' ability to demand development. In a similar vein, the proliferation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society associations was encouraged as means of delivering development.

Later studies have been more uncertain about the developmental impact of democracy and participation. David Stasavage (2005) demonstrates that democratization is associated with increased government spending on primary education. However, many scholars have argued that elections and NGOs simply provide new venues for preexisting political practices; established politicians will stay in power by disbursing patronage to their supporters, rather than providing programming with broad welfare benefits.

Certainly, neither donor conditionality nor domestic participation has initiated a quick recovery of African economies. In contrast, recent research has found that structural factors, such as ethnic diversity and geography, explain a significant component of African governments' poor performance in providing public goods. A longer view of the development process may be necessary, given the importance of historical factors in explaining Africa's weak economic performance.

See also *African Union; Authoritarianism, African; Political Economy; Postindependent Africa, Politics and Governance in.*

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African Political Thought

Modern African political thought refers to the political theories and ideologies enunciated in the speeches, autobiographies, writings, and policy statements of African statesmen and scholars. It varies according to historical circumstances and constantly changing African and world political environments. Political theory and political practice are inextricably linked, which makes for six distinctive periods of African history, each with its own dominant theories: indigenous Africa; imperial Africa; colonial Africa; and (early, middle, and late) modern or postcolonial Africa.

EARLY MODERN AFRICAN NATIONALISM

Early modern African nationalism was developed in the late nineteenth century by British-educated elites in West Africa. In Sierra Leone, James Africanus B. Horton, a doctor of medicine, challenged racist theories and argued that Africans were as capable of achieving "civilization" as Europeans, both biologically and psychologically. He advocated the development of "modern" states in Africa. In Liberia, Edward Wilmot Blyden, politician, writer, and diplomat, developed an ideology of racial pride and nonacculturation and advocated African development through an authentic indigenous Africa, based on an African personality, history, and culture. He also called for the establishment of a West African state. In the Gold Coast [Ghana], Joseph E. Casely Hayford, a lawyer, advocated modernization from indigenous African roots. He believed that African nations, civilization, and political institutions could be revived and modernized to cater to modern needs in an "African way." He also called for the creation of a West African nation.

PAN-AFRICANISM

The next major movement in African political thought, pan-Africanism, was prominently promoted by the African Diaspora—scholars and activists of African descent living in other nations. Pan-Africanism is a political and cultural ideal and movement born in the 1900s aimed at regrouping and mobilizing Africans in Africa and in the Diaspora against foreign domination, oppression, and discrimination. Political pan-Africanism is linked to African nationalism (i.e., the struggle for independence), while economic pan-Africanism is linked to the struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism. The major proponents of pan-Africanism in North America were W. E. B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Paul L. Robeson, and George Padmore. The so-called back

to Africa movement (i.e., the return of the African slaves to their continent of origin) mainly advocated by Garvey, led to the creation of Sierra Leone in 1801 and Liberia in 1817. Cultural pan-Africanism was expressed through *Négritude,* a cultural movement reasserting African culture, values, and traditions as part of the common heritage of mankind. Négritude emerged in France in the 1930s among African and Afro-Caribbean elites, notably Aimé Césaire, Léon-Gontran Damas, and Léopold Sédar Senghor.

MODERN AFRICAN NATIONALISM

Modern African nationalism is a political ideal and movement aimed a liberating Africans from European colonial political domination, cultural oppression, social exclusion, and economic exploitation. The goal was to achieve political independence as a prelude to economic independence. In Kwame Nkrumah's words, "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else will be added unto you." The challenge of African nationalism was to build viable nations out of more than fifty artificially created states, most of which attained independence in the 1960s.

AFRICAN SOCIALISM

African socialism is a radical form of African nationalism. Influenced by Marxism-Leninism (though officially non-Marxist), African socialism rejects capitalism as being alien to African culture and traditions. Instead, it is based on the African tradition of *communalism,* according to which the group takes precedence over the individual. The socialist model of development includes a state-led development strategy based on planning, land reform, industrialization, and the nationalization of the economy. The foreign policy of African Socialist states is pan-Africanist. The African countries (and leaders) who adopted this ideology between 1960 and 1970 were Algeria (Ahmed Ben Bella); Ghana (Kwame Nkrumah, 1962); Guinea (Ahmed Sékou Touré); Mali (Modibo Keïta), and Tanzania (Julius K. Nyerere, 1968). Senegal (Léopold Senghor) and Kenya (Jomo Kenyatta) paid lip service to African socialism but did not actually implement it.

AFRICAN THEORIES OF REVOLUTION

Frantz Fanon, a French-born psychiatrist from Martinique who joined the Algerian revolution, posits that under the guidance of revolutionary intellectuals, the peasantry is a revolutionary force in Africa. He argues that it is only through violence that the colonized people can achieve their freedom. For Fanon (1968), decolonization is a violent revolution that destroys the social and political structures of the colonial regime, liberates consciousness, and creates a new man. He argues that violence is a cleansing force, but that it must be accompanied by political education if it is to be truly emancipatory.

Amilcar Cabral, an agronomist and leader of the liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau, sees culture as a form of resistance to foreign domination. Cabral (1972) argues that culture is a weapon against the imperialist power; it becomes the instrument through which people reclaim their history. For him, the main goal of the liberation movement is not only national independence and the defeat of colonialism, but also the economic,

social, and cultural progress of the people. This can occur only when foreign domination has been totally eliminated.

AFRICAN MARXIST REGIMES

The period 1969 to 1975 saw the emergence of African Marxist regimes—many of them military—which adopted Marxism-Leninism as the state ideology. However, in general, the self-proclaimed "Marxist" African leaders did not genuinely believe in this ideology but simply used it an instrument of political domination and control of the people. The African countries (and leaders) who adopted this ideology were Angola (Agostinho Neto and José Eduardo dos Santos); Benin (Mathieu Kérékou); Congo-Brazzaville (Marien Ngouabi, Joachim Yhombi-Opango, and Denis Sassou-Nguesso); Ethiopia (Mengistu Haile Mariam); Guinea-Bissau (Luís Cabral and João Bernardo Vieira); Madagascar (Didier Ratsiraka); Mozambique (Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano); Namibia (Sam Nujoma); Somalia (Mohammed Siad Barre); and Zimbabwe (Robert Mugabe), 1980–1995. Marxism as a state ideology was officially abandoned everywhere in Africa by 1996.

AFRICAN POPULIST REGIMES

Emerging in the early 1980s, African populism borrows elements of both African socialism and Marxism-Leninism, and places the people at the center of democracy and development in Africa. Its main policy is to satisfy the basic needs of the peasantry, the largest and poorest social class in Africa. African populist regimes advocate popular democracy and people-centered development. African populist regimes include Burkina Faso (Thomas Sankara); Ghana (Jerry Rawlings); Libya (Muammar Qaddafi) since 1977; and Zimbabwe (Robert Mugabe) since 1995.

AFRICAN THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT

Three African scholars (Claude Ake, Daniel Osabu-Kle, and Mueni wa Muiu) have recently developed Africa-centered theories of democracy and development.

Nigerian scholar-activist Claude Ake notes that in the postindependence era, the African elites have privatized the African state for their own benefit, leading to the marginalization of the African people. Ake (1996, 1) argues that "the problem is not so much that development has failed as that it was never really on the agenda in the first place." Like the populists, he advocates popular development (in which people are the end, agent, and means of development), and popular democracy (which emphasizes political, social, and economic rights).

Ghanaian scholar Daniel Osabu-Kle (2000) starts from the assumptions that indigenous African political culture was essentially democratic and consensual, based on the accountability of the rulers to the people. He argues that only a democracy compatible with the African cultural environment (i.e., a modernized form of Africa's indigenous democracy) is capable of achieving the political conditions for successful development in Africa.

Mueni wa Muiu introduces a new paradigm to study the African state. According to *A New Paradigm of the African State: Fundi wa Afrika* (2009), the current African predicament may

be explained by the systematic destruction of African states and the dispossession, exploitation, and marginalization of African people through successive historical processes (from the trans-Atlantic slave trade to globalization). Muiu argues that a new, viable, and modern African state based on five political entities—the Federation of African States—should be built on the functional remnants of indigenous African political systems and institutions and be based on African values, traditions, and culture.

See also *African Union; Pan-Africanism; Postindependent Africa, Politics and Governance in.*

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African Politics and Society

Throughout this entry, *Africa* refers to sub-Saharan Africa, the region south of the Saharan Desert that is bounded in the north and west by Mauritania; in the east by Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia; and in the south by the Republic of South Africa.

The contemporary political history of Africa is marked by imperialism, the expulsion of foreign powers and settler elites, and the postindependence travails of its roughly fifty states.

IMPERIALISM

Africa was among the last regions of the globe to be subject to imperial rule. In the so-called scramble for Africa, as described by Thomas Pakenham in his 1991 book of that title, the British and French seized major portions of the continent; Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain seized lesser holdings as well. During the imperial era, most of Africa's people were subject to the rule of bureaucrats in London, Lisbon, and Paris rather than being ruled by leaders they themselves had chosen. Two states in Africa had long been independent: Ethiopia from time immemorial and Liberia since 1847. In 1910, the settlers of South Africa succeeded in securing independence from British bureaucrats.

European immigrants settled in several territories: Kenya in the east, the Rhodesias in the center, and portions of southern Africa. Conflicts between the settler populations and colonial bureaucrats characterized the politics of the colonial era, as white settlers strove to control the colonial governments of these colonies and to dominate their native populations.

While Africa's peoples fought against the seizure of their territories, they lacked the wealth, organization, and weaponry to prevail. The situation changed, however, during World War I (1914–1918) and World War II (1939–1945). The wars eroded the capacity and will of Europeans to occupy foreign lands, while economic development increased the capacity and desire of Africa's people to end European rule.

During World War II, the allied powers maintained important bases in Africa, some poised to support campaigns in the Mediterranean and others to backstop armies fighting in Asia. After World War II, the colonial powers promoted the development of African export industries, seeking thereby to earn funds to repay loans contracted with the United States to finance the war. The increase in exports led to the creation of a class of prosperous farmers and the rise of merchants and lawyers who provided services to the export industries. As World War II gave way to the cold war, the United States began to stockpile precious metals and invested in expanding Africa's mines, refining its ores, and transporting its precious metals overseas. That Africa's economic expansion took place at the time of Europe's decline prepared the field for its political liberation. The one was prospering while the other was not, and their relative power shifted accordingly.

NATIONALIST REVOLT

Among the first Africans to rally against European rule were urban elites, whose aspirations were almost immediately checked by resident officials of the colonial powers. Workers who staffed the ports and railways that tied local producers to foreign markets soon joined them. In the rural areas, peasants rallied to the struggle against colonial rule, some protesting intensified demands for labor and the use of coercion rather than wage payment to secure it. Among the primary targets of the rural population were the chiefs, who had been tasked by colonial rulers with taxing the profits of farmers and regulating the use of their lands. Thus did the Kenya Africa Union support dock strikes in Mombasa and the intimidation of chiefs in the native reserves. Similarly, the Convention Peoples' Party backed strikes in the Gold Coast (now Ghana) port cities of Tema and Takoradi, while seeking to "destool" chiefs inland.

Adding to the rise of nationalist protest was global inflation. Reconstruction in Europe and rearmament in the United States ran up against shortages of materials and higher prices in global markets. Throughout Africa and the developing world, consumers rallied to protest against these increases, tending to blame them on European monopolies—such as in Ghana, where the people focused their anger on the United Africa Company—or local trading communities—such as the Indian merchants in Kenya or Lebanese traders in Sierra Leone.

After its independence, Kwame Nkrumah (second from right) became prime minister of Ghana. Within a few years, he amassed substantial power before being toppled by a military coup in 1966.

The economic development of Africa thus transformed the social composition and political preferences of its people. It was in the postwar period, however, that independence was achieved by the vast majority of Africa's people. At first, political liberty arrived in a trickle—to the Sudan in 1956 and Ghana in 1957. Soon thereafter independence came as a flood, with twenty-nine French- and English-speaking states securing independence from 1960 to 1965, the Portuguese territories in the mid-1970s, and the settler redoubts of southern Africa in the last decades of the twentieth century.

THE POSTINDEPENDENCE PERIOD

The optimism of the nationalist period very quickly gave way to pessimism, as governments that had seized power turned authoritarian or were displaced by military regimes. Ghana's experience was emblematic of this early postindependence trend. Ghana had been among the first African countries to attain self-governance (1954) and then independence (1957). Both events were celebrated not only in Africa but throughout the globe. In 1960, a change in the constitution gave Kwame Nkrumah, as head of state, the power to dismiss civil servants, judges, and military officers without the authorization of parliament. In 1963, the president acquired the power to detain persons charged with political crimes and to try their cases in special courts. When, in 1964, Nkrumah proclaimed the ruling party the sole legal party in Ghana, he both followed and gave impetus to the trend toward single-party rule on the continent. When, in 1966, Ghana's military toppled the Nkrumah regime, Ghana joined Sudan, Benin, Togo, and the Central African Republic—all states in which the national military had overthrown a civilian regime (in 1958, 1962, 1963, and 1965 respectively). Following the military's overthrow of Nkrumah's government in Ghana, armed forces drove civilian governments from power in Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Burundi in 1966, and Congo in 1968. By the mid-1970s, the military held power in one-third of the nations of sub-Saharan Africa.

By the mid-1970s, the politics of Africa had turned authoritarian. Only four states in Africa—Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, and Senegal—retained multiparty systems. Figure 1 captures this turn to authoritarianism in postindependence Africa.

LATE-CENTURY POLITICS

The politics of late-century Africa was marked by two major trends. The first was the return to multiparty politics;

FIGURE 1: MILITARY GOVERNMENTS MAKE UP THE MAJORITY OF THE NO-PARTY STATES.

Party System by Period

Military governments make up the majority of the no-party states.

the second, an increase in political violence. These trends had common origins in global political and economic crises.

Beginning with the rise in oil prices following the Yom Kippur war of 1973, the economies of the advanced industrial nations fell into deep recession. As a result of declining growth in these nations, Africa's export earnings declined. Private income fell, and so too did government revenues.

Some economies initially eluded economic decline: those that produced oil, of course, and others that produced crops, such as coffee, whose prices rose when frost and war drove two major exporters from global markets. Those countries blessed with rich natural endowments—Zambia, with its copper deposits, or Zaire, with copper, cobalt, and gold— could borrow and thus postpone cuts in spending. In the mid-1980s, their incomes also collapsed. In the early 1980s, the U.S. Federal Reserve had precipitously increased the rate of interest, sharpening the level of recession. The subsequent collapse of the Mexican peso led to an end of private lending to developing economies. When in 1986 Arab countries increased oil production in an effort to revive the growth of the industrial economies, Africa's oil exporters experienced a decline in earnings. With this last blow, virtually all the economies of the continent fell into recession.

In the recession, Africa's citizens experienced increased poverty; so too did their governments. The result was a decline

in the quality of public services. Most African governments secured their revenues from taxes on trade. Given the decline in exports, they could respond to the fall in revenues either by freezing salaries and cutting their payrolls or by running deficits, which lowered the real earnings of public servants by increasing prices. Children attended schools that lacked text books. Teachers were often absent, seeking to supplement their salaries with earnings from private trade. In clinics and hospitals, patients suffered from the lack of medicines and the absence of staff. Soldiers went unpaid.

In response, the citizens of Africa began to turn against their governments. Parents and children protested the decline in the quality of schools, hospitals, and clinics. Business owners targeted the erratic supply of water and electricity and the crumbling systems of transport and communications. Discontent with the decline in public services was heightened by the disparity in fortunes between those with power and those without. High-ranking officials could send their children to schools abroad or secure medical treatment in London, Washington, or Paris. The political elite could recruit and pay their own security services, purchase private generators, and maintain private means of transport. In general, those who ruled could escape the misery that befell others. As the economies of African states collapsed, citizens increasingly called for reform, particularly the restoration of multiparty politics and

an increase in the power of the masses relative to the power of those who governed.

Opposition to Africa's authoritarian regimes also mounted from abroad. Governments had fallen into debt, and foreign creditors increasingly demanded that the governments adopt reform policies aimed at reigniting economic growth on the continent. Governments that were accountable to their people, the creditors argued, would be less likely to prey upon private assets, distort private markets, and favor public firms over private enterprises. Led by officials of the World Bank, economic technocrats began to join with local activists in demanding political reform.

In the later decades of the twentieth century, Africa's political elites thus faced challenges from home and abroad. To a remarkable degree, military and single-party regimes proved able to hold onto power until a second global shock—the fall of communism—destabilized many African regimes. Western governments had tolerated repressive practices in Africa nations in exchange for support in the cold war, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western governments no longer urged their economic technocrats to release loans to repressive governments. They were willing to let fall those African elites whose services they no longer required.

In response to increased pressures from home and abroad, some governments reformed. As shown in Figure 1, whereas more than 80 percent of Africa's governments had been no party (largely military) or single-party systems in the mid-1980s, by the mid-1990s, multiparty systems prevailed in nearly one-half of African countries. Other governments, however, reacted by intensifying the level of repression. In Togo, the armies of President Gnassingbé Eyadéma fired on civilians who had gathered in the streets of Lomé, the national capital, to protest his rule. In Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, thugs hired by the governing parties harassed and harried those who sought to displace them. In Burundi, the military, once displaced from power, slaughtered the civilians who had seized it, while in neighboring Rwanda, the government unleashed a program of mass killing, seeking to eradicate those who opposed it.

Since the late twentieth century, military coups have become rare, and multiparty elections the norm in Africa. In addition, the continent has become more peaceful, with civil wars ending in Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, and, less certainly, Congo. In the mid-1990s, economic growth returned for the first time since the 1980s, apparently sparked by the increased demand for primary products resulting from economic growth in China and India, as well as the return of private investment, much by companies from South Africa. When measured in terms of peace and prosperity, however, the nations of Africa still occupy the lower rungs of the global community. For the first time in several decades, there have been distinct signs of political and economic progress in the continent.

ETHNICITY

Some have attributed Africa's slow growth to ethnic diversity; others attribute its political instability to conflict among ethnic groupings. Many observers thus contend that ethnicity is at the roots of Africa's development crisis.

The evidence, however, suggests several flaws in this argument. Though some argue that ethnic diversity weakens the capacity of people to agree on the allocation of shared resources, others argue that ethnic groups mobilize resources in support of their communities by, for example, sponsoring the educations of promising young people, building schools and clinics, and conferring recognition on those who use their wealth in support of their communities. There are large literatures on the local funding of schools in Kenyan communities and of the funding of scholarships by Ibo communities in eastern Nigeria. In addition, while ethnic groups may compete for power, in most African nations this competition is peaceful. As in the urban centers of the advanced industrial countries, politics in Africa may pit one ethnic group against another, but these rivalries, while colorful, rarely lead to violence.

Recent research suggests the conditions under which conflicts among ethnic groups *can* become violent. One such condition occurs when small groups capture power and employ it to extract wealth from others. Such was the case in Burundi under the rule of Michel Micombero or in Liberia under Samuel Doe. To remain in power, such groups may have to rule by fear, thereby cowing or decimating their political opposition. In addition, when one ethnic group is sufficiently large to form a political majority on its own, others may come to fear the prospect of political exclusion and so choose to revolt, as did the Tutsi in Rwanda and the Gio and Mano in Liberia. The statistical evidence for this phenomenon is not robust in cross-national data, but qualitative accounts and data on within country variation offer fairly consistent support for it.

In Africa, as elsewhere, normal politics involves the management of differences among ethnic groups. Only in special circumstances do political forces align so as to transform these rivalries into political violence.

See also *African Political Economy; Authoritarianism, African; Colonialism; Ethnocentrism; Imperialism; Nationalism; Party Systems, Comparative; Poverty.*

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African Union

The *African Union (AU)* is an intergovernmental, international organization created in 2002 with the purpose of securing democracy, human rights, and a sustainable economy in Africa, especially by bringing an end to intra-African conflict and creating an effective common market. The AU was formed as a successor of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The OAU, founded in 1963 on the principles of state sovereignty and noninterference, drew criticism throughout the 1990s for its lack of intervention as conflicts erupted in several African countries.

The idea of creating the AU emerged in the mid-1990s and resulted in the adoption of the Sirte Declaration by the OAU's heads of state and government. The declaration, issued in September 1999, called for the establishment of an African Union with a view to accelerating the process of integration on the continent. In the following year, the Constitutive Act of the African Union was signed in Lomé, Togo, and the organization was officially launched in Durban in July 2002. Fifty-three countries in Africa are members of the AU (all African countries but Morocco).

OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES

The AU is guided by fourteen objectives designed to enhance political cooperation and economic integration, ranging from greater unity and solidarity between the countries and peoples of Africa to promotion of democratic principles and good governance to protection of human rights to coordination and harmonization between the regional economic communities.

The attainment of these objectives is to be achieved through the observance of a number of fundamental principles, in accordance with which the AU shall function. Included among these principles are the participation of African people in the AU activities; the promotion of self-reliance within the AU's framework; the promotion of gender equality and of social justice; respect for the sanctity of human life; the prohibition of the threat of or use of force; the establishment of a common defense policy; and the condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government. Unlike its antecessor, the AU has recognized the right to intervene without consent in internal conflicts, in cases in which circumstances are grave, "namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity" (Constitutive Act, article 4-h). On February 3, 2003 this provision was amended to include "serious threats to legitimate order." Regarding the economic integration of Africa, the AU bases itself on the *Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community* (Abuja Treaty), signed in 1991 (came into effect in 1994). The treaty envisaged that the community must be established mainly through the coordination, harmonization, and progressive integration of the activities of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)—the subregions of Africa.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

According to the Constitutive Act of the AU (2002) and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU (2002), the organs of the organization are: (1) Assembly, comprised of heads of state. It meets at least once a year and is the AU's main decision-making body. Its members elect an AU chair, who holds office for one year. (2) Executive Council, comprised of foreign affairs ministers or other ministers designated by member states. The Executive Council is responsible to the Assembly. (3) Commission, composed by a chair, a deputy and the commissioners holding individual portfolios, which manages day-to-day tasks and implements AU policies. (4) Peace and Security Council (PSC), a body set up in 2004, which serves as a collective security and early warning arrangement to respond to conflict and crisis (through preventive diplomacy, early warning, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building, and humanitarian action). The PSC has fifteen member states, elected for two or three year terms, with equal voting rights;.(5) Pan-African Parliament, established in March 2004 to ensure the participation of African peoples in governance, development, and economic integration of the continent. This body debates continentwide issues and advises AU heads of state. It currently exercises oversight and has advisory and consultative powers only, but there are plans to grant it legislative powers in the future. (6) Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), established in 2005, which seeks to build partnerships between African governments and civil society. ECOSOCC includes

E U R O P E

ASIA

ATLANTIC OCEAN

Mediterranean Sea

★ Tunis
Algiers ★
TUNISIA
★ Rabat
MOROCCO
Tripoli ★
★ Cairo
Laâyoune ★
ALGERIA
LIBYA
EGYPT
SAHARAWI ARAB DEM. REP.

Nile

Red Sea

MAURITANIA
CAPE VERDE
★ Nouakchott
MALI
NIGER
Khartoum ★
ERITREA
★ Asmara
Praia ★
SENEGAL ★ Dakar
★ Banjul
Bamako ★ Ouagadougou ★
Niamey ★
CHAD
SUDAN
DJIBOUTI ★ Djibouti
THE GAMBIA
Bissau ★
GUINEA-BISSAU
GUINEA
BURKINA FASO
N'Djamena ★
Conakry ★
Freetown ★
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
GHANA
BENIN
NIGERIA
★ Abuja
Addis Ababa ★
ETHIOPIA
SIERRA LEONE
Monrovia ★
Yamoussoukro ★
Accra ★
Porto-Novo
Lomé ★
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
SOMALIA
LIBERIA
TOGO
Malabo ★
CAMEROON
Bangui ★
★ Mogadishu
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Yaoundé ★
Congo
UGANDA
KENYA
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE
São Tomé ★
Libreville ★
GABON
REP. OF THE CONGO
DEM. REP. OF THE CONGO
Kampala ★
★ Nairobi
Victoria ★
Kigali ★ RWANDA
SEYCHELLES
Brazzaville ★
Bujumbura ★ BURUNDI
Kinshasa ★
Dar es Salaam ★
Cabinda (ANGOLA)
TANZANIA
Luanda ★
★ Moroni
COMOROS
ANGOLA
MALAWI
Lilongwe ★
ZAMBIA
Lusaka ★
Antananarivo ★
MAURITIUS
Port Louis ★
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Harare ★
MOZAMBIQUE
NAMIBIA
ZIMBABWE
MADAGASCAR
Windhoek ★
BOTSWANA
Gaborone ★
Pretoria ★
Maputo ★
Mbabane ★
SWAZILAND
Maseru ★
SOUTH AFRICA
LESOTHO
Cape Town ★
INDIAN OCEAN

Mozambique Channel

African Union:
☐ Member country
▨ Non-member country

0 ___ 500 Mi
0 ___ 500 Km

Member states of the African Union focus on ending intra-African conflict and creating an effective common market.

African social groups, professional groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and cultural organizations. (7) African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which came about as the result of a merger between the regional African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the AU Court of Justice. The court is located in Arusha, Tanzania. And (8) financial institutions. The AU charter names three bodies: the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund, and the African Investment Bank.

Besides these key institutions, the AU's activities are supported as well by a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an AU Standby Force, a Peace Fund, and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). NEPAD is a comprehensive development plan that addresses key social, economic, and political priorities in a coherent and balanced manner. It was adopted at the thirty-seventh session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU in July 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia.

The AU has adopted various key documents establishing norms at the continental level to supplement those already in force when it was created. These include the African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003); the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003); the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defense Pact (2005); the African Youth Charter (2006); the Charter for African Cultural Renaissance (2006); the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (2007); and the African Charter on Statistics (2009).

For an organization that only became operational in 2002, and unlike the OAU, the AU has demonstrated a strong political willingness to engage with decisive issues such as conflict resolution and economic development. Its resource capacity is limited, however, which encourages dependency on foreign funds.

See also *African Political Economy; African Political Thought; African Politics and Society; Pan-Africanism; Regional Security.*

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Afro-Marxism

Afro-Marxism refers to the adoption by postcolonial governments in Africa of Marxist-style models of social and economic development supported through links with Communist Party–led governments such as the Soviet Union and Cuba. Afro-Marxism is characterized by centralized political decision making, typically within a one-party state, economic collectivization or nationalization of productive property and industry, and the direction of a national culture, often without regard for the cultures of ethnic minorities, by the ruling party. It is to be distinguished from *African socialism*, which refers to the perspective that traditional African communities exhibit characteristics, including social relations and sharing of resources, that reflect a form of indigenous socialism based on local communal organization and practices. African socialism offered an alternative to the "scientific" or authoritarian socialism of Afro-Marxism, which was based on models borrowed from Soviet or Maoist regimes.

For many Africans involved in liberation movements and struggles against colonialism, Marxism, especially the example of the Russian Revolution (1917), offered a model for the launching of economic and political revolutions. This revolutionary model, in which a seizure of national power provides a lever for rapid industrialization, held great appeal throughout the twentieth century within numerous newly liberated African countries. As postcolonial governments looked for means by which to "catch up" with the industrial might of the former colonial powers, the approach of socialism, especially statist socialism or Marxism, seemed to provide both a potentially effective political program and an ideological justification for statist reorganization of the economy. It seemed to offer a distinct alternative to the exploitative and oppressive political economic regimes of imperialist rule.

The history of such movements in Africa dates especially to the movements against colonialism from the middle or late twentieth century. Important examples of Afro-Marxist movements and systems include the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which took power in those former Portuguese colonies in 1975. Between 1974 and 1991 a socialist government under Lieutenant Colonel Haile Mengitsu ruled Ethiopia. In addition, numerous Marxist parties and organizations have been active in several African countries, including South Africa, where the South African Communist Party played a significant part in the downfall of the apartheid regime.

Among the most notable proponents of Afro-Marxism are Amilcar Cabral (Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde), Samora Machel (Mozambique), Michel Micombero (Burundi), Agostinho Neto (Angola), and Thomas Sankara (Burkina Faso). Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who took power in 1980 through an armed struggle movement deploying some elements of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has positioned himself as a defender of African autonomy from Western corporate interests while subjecting his population, especially the poor and his political opponents, to ongoing repression and punishment.

Afro-Marxism played an important part in bringing about the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Angolan (MPLA) forces, backed by Cuban troops along with forces of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), pushed back the South African forces that invaded Angola.

The stalemate forced the South African government to take part in negotiations that eventually led to the independence of Namibia and indeed played a major part in the collapse of the apartheid regime in 1994.

Afro-Marxism held out a promise of self-sufficiency, equality, economic development, and prosperity. In practice, most examples of Afro-Marxism failed to deliver much in any of these areas. Also, many leaders who had advocated the more moderate African socialism fell back on authoritarian forms of Soviet-style government when attempting to implement their policies. Economic development primarily directed wealth into the hands of the new elite, which consisted of leading members of the ruling party.

Western versions of socialism, especially Soviet-inspired systems, were often inapplicable to the specific social circumstances of less industrialized countries, whose labor base was often concentrated in agricultural or resource-extractive industries. Similarly, Afro-Marxism failed to draw on local governance practices to organize social and productive life and instead relied on the centralized statist models of Sovietism.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet systems in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, along with the passing of Maoism and China's embrace of capitalism by the late twentieth century, all dealt severe blows to Afro-Marxist regimes. The loss of aid and trade ties with the Soviet economies left Marxist governments in Africa desperate for aid from Western capitalist governments and international financial organizations like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. At the same time, China maintains aid and investment in many African countries and seeks to expand its influence on the continent. China's financial connections with the regime in Sudan has been highly criticized by human rights activists and commentators. While China has attempted to develop its influence, it has not supported or encouraged the development of communist regimes or parties as the Soviet Union did. Governments also became more vulnerable to the pressures of Western governments and institutions to accept structural adjustment programs, including the privatization of government works and lands.

See also *Apartheid; Communism; Marxism.*

. . . .   JEFFREY SHANTZ

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Agenda Control

Agenda control may be defined as the ability to affect the way in which alternatives enter collective decision making. While agenda control is important generally, it plays a special role in the rational-choice-based theory of democratic institutions (or the "new institutionalism"). It has two major but somewhat different roles. One is the ability to regulate what alternatives are allowed to be considered at all; the other is in controlling the manner in which alternatives are considered, such as the order of voting.

PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ABSENCE OF MAJORITY-RULE VOTING EQUILIBRIUM

A distinction may be drawn between when there is a majority-rule voting equilibrium—roughly speaking, an outcome that a majority in society prefers to all others—and when there is no such an equilibrium. The first case is the famous median voter result and its variants. The second case is when there is a majority cycle with no alternative that can win a majority over all others.

In the latter case, what wins depends on the order in which alternatives come up, as Charles R. Plott (1967) showed, and hence agenda control is exceedingly important. Richard McKelvey (1976) and Norman Schofield (1983) then demonstrated that there is a path of choices that makes it possible to get from any possible starting point to any logically possible policy imaginable; hence, the outcome is called *path dependent*. This massive extent of potential effects put agenda control at the center of inquiry for new institutionalist theories, for whoever controlled the agenda controlled the outcome, getting almost literally any outcome the controllers desired.

Plott's work also shows how agenda control of this form can matter. Plott, Cohen, and Levine (1978) were asked to devise a method for choosing among planes for a club for those who enjoy flying airplanes. Plott and Levine devised an agenda that secured Levine's most preferred outcome, even though a majority preferred something else. Plott, Cohen, and Levine (1978) then devised a series of game theoretic experiments to show this point in another way. By clever application of agenda control, they could induce the subjects in the experiment to choose any kind of pizza toppings the Plott and company desired, including "chocolate pizza" (which they used in the title of their article).

MAJORITY-RULE EQUILIBRIA VERSUS REVERSION POINTS

The most important positive result about majority rule is that it will select the ideal point of the median voter, because that it is the majority-rule equilibrium when a median exists. In Duncan Black's median voter theorem (1958), the agenda is assumed to be open, the median voter can therefore propose a preferred outcome at some point, and that alternative then will defeat any and every other proposal. Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal (1978) examined the case when an individual (or group) can select which alternatives may to be considered. They find that, at the extreme, agenda control power will pull the outcome away, sometimes substantially, from the median voter outcome.

For example, in many locales, the school board may propose a tax rate to pay for schools for the coming year. Voters then vote it up or down. Given this ability to limit the

choice set of the voters drastically, it is not surprising that the agenda controller can shape the outcome. It is not complete control, however, as in the case where there is no majority-rule equilibrium. The final result reflects, in effect, a balancing between the preferences of the median voter, the preferences of the agenda controller, and what is called the *reversion point*—what would happen if the proposal of the agenda controller is defeated. The reversion point is not always the status quo. To use the school board example, if the school board's new tax rate is rejected, the school budget may not revert to last year's budget—it may fall to zero. The prospect of essentially shutting down the schools would give the school board tremendous bargaining power as the agenda controller to obtain an outcome it desires. In general, the more extreme the reversion point, the greater the control held by the agenda controller.

WIDE APPLICATIONS

This relatively straightforward result has been applied in many settings. For example, committees in the U.S. Congress have "gatekeeping power" in their jurisdiction. That is, they have a set of policies that are granted to them, their policy jurisdiction. In many circumstances, they decide whether there will be any consideration of change to the status quo in their jurisdiction at all. By "keeping the gates closed"—that is, reporting out no proposal for new policy in that area—the Congress as a whole cannot change policy. (In reality, there are of course limits to this power.) Conversely, they can "open the gates" by reporting a bill out from committee to the floor. In some cases, the bill has a "closed" rule, which means that no amendments are permitted. Thus, in such cases, the committee has strong agenda control in the sense analyzed by Romer and Rosenthal. Shepsle (1979) developed a model of Congress along these lines.

Furthermore, when the two chambers in the U.S. Congress pass different forms of similar legislation, the bills are often referred to a conference committee to work out the differences. The bill designed by the conference committee then returns to the floor of both chambers for final consideration with no amendments permitted, another instance of such agenda control. In many parliaments, the government (that is, the party or parties that form the operative majority and appoint a cabinet of ministers) often reports bills from the cabinet to the legislature with no amendments permitted. Thus, this form of agenda control has many important applications to democratic institutions around the world.

See also *Agenda Setting; Equilibrium and Chaos; New Institutionalism; Voting Behavior.*

. . . .   JOHN H. ALDRICH

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Agenda Setting

Agenda-setting theory rests on the assumption that while most citizens depend on the news media for their political information, the media seem to have surprising little impact on actually altering voters' attitudes about a given issue. Instead, agenda-setting theory posits that the media's power of persuasion is indirect in nature. According to Bernard Cohen in his 1963 book, *The Press and Foreign Policy,* even though "the press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about" (13). That is, by covering certain issues and ignoring others, the news media create a political agenda (i.e., determine what issues are important and what issues are not), which the public then internalizes as its own set of priorities. Thus, the media's and the public's agendas merge into one, so that what the media find to be noteworthy and in turn promote as important through news coverage is eventually mirrored by citizens.

Sociologists Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang (1966), two of the pioneers of media effects research, put it this way: "The mass media force our attention onto certain issues by covering or promoting certain issues and individuals, which then suggests what we should think about, know about, have feelings about" (468). Or in the simplest of terms, try not to think about pink elephants after *Good Morning America,* the *NBC Nightly News, 20/20,* and *Nightline* all run news segments on them.

EARLY RESEARCH

Although over a century ago journalist Walter Lippman captured the essence of agenda setting with his phrase "the world outside, and the pictures in our heads" (referring to the fact that people are more responsive to the pseudo-environment of mental images created by the media than they are to reality), early communication research focused on assessing direct media effects, not the more subtle indirect ones. Therefore, empirical confirmation of agenda-setting effects did not occur

until the last few decades of the twentieth century. The classic agenda-setting study was conducted by Maxwell McCombs and Donald E. Shaw in 1972. McCombs and Shaw interviewed one hundred undecided voters in and around Chapel Hill, North Carolina, combining voters' attitudes about various policy concerns with a content analysis of television and the print media's coverage on those same issues. Though the authors found a strong correspondence between the media's and the voters' agendas, McCombs and Shaw could not fully support their conclusion that news coverage was shaping voters' policy agendas over an alternative explanation: that the news media were simply successful in tailoring news coverage to reflect the actual issue interests of audience members. More research was needed.

Using experimentation, Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder presented strong evidence that the news media set the public agenda. In a series of experiments described in their now classic book, *News That Matters* (1987), the researchers manipulated media content, thereby controlling which issues participants were exposed to. Participants in the experiments were shown what they believed were regular newscasts from the 6 o'clock evening news, when in fact the newscasts had been carefully edited to include or omit specific stories. The results indicate classic agenda-setting effects. For example, participants who were exposed to stories about the inadequacy of funding for the U.S. military were more likely to consider this issue to be important, even though prior to the study they were unconcerned about military spending. For participants in the control condition—those who did not view the military spending story—the importance they assigned to military funding remained unchanged.

AGENDA SETTING AND PRIMING

Agenda-setting effects are not limited to focusing the public's attention on particular problems; they also can change the measures that people use to evaluate those issues. Iyengar and Kinder found evidence of a *priming* effect; that is, issues that the media stress become the issues that voters use to later evaluate political candidates. For instance, exposure to television stories that linked the economic downturn in the 1980s to the president's performance primed viewers to use this standard of economic performance in their subsequent evaluations of the president. Thus, if the news media consistently suggest that an economic downturn is the result of poorly crafted presidential policy, the public will come to believe overwhelmingly that the president has caused that economic downturn. On the other hand, when television coverage discounts the president's role in the state of the economy, so will viewers.

Therefore, by deciding what issues to cover, the media set the public agenda, which in turn influences the importance citizens ascribe to the reported issues. By elevating certain issues over others or "priming" those issues, the media influence citizens' evaluations of political actors and alter the criteria by which political players are judged. That is, priming, as some political scientists use the term, causes a greater influential weight to be attached to an issue once it receives media coverage. Voters' prior attitudes toward these issues are then more likely to predict their political candidate evaluations if they have been primed by the media. For example, attitudes in support of the Nicaraguan contras were twice as important in determining President Ronald Reagan's popularity after media coverage of the Iran–Contra scandal than they were prior to coverage, as Jon Krosnick and Donald Kinder argued in 1990. Because the media emphasized the Iran-Contra affair, citizens' evaluations of President Reagan were more likely to be based on this issue than others. The first is an example of media *agenda setting;* the second is an example of media *priming.*

ROLE REVERSAL

While an overwhelming number of legitimate issues and ideas circulate at any one time, one of the major dilemmas journalists face is deciding what issues to cover and what not to cover, and how much coverage to devote to any given issue. As Michael Delli Carpini noted in 2005, "given the inherent constraints on covering everything of potential import, public journalists argue that citizens themselves, rather than (or in addition to) elites, should set the agenda." Thus, a reversal of agenda setting occurs when journalists listen to citizens to understand what aspects of the social and political world are important to them.

In a comprehensive study of Britain's 1997 general election campaign, Pippa Norris and her colleagues (1999) found that political parties, not citizens, set the agenda, thus limiting the power of the media to directly boost attention to an issue. A similar study by Heinz Brandenburg (2004) of the 2002 Irish election campaign found that political parties such as Fianna Fáil are the main agenda setters and that the media follow. Although media outlets such as *The Irish Times* also influenced party communications, these effects were small and infrequent. Thus, campaigns seem to foster different agenda-setting dynamics.

In conclusion, most research to date has focused on either documenting the actual phenomenon of agenda setting or exploring the psychology of agenda setting—that is, the media's impact on the public agenda and the subsequent consequences for citizens' attitudes and opinions. For the most part, thirty years and more than 200 studies later, Bernard Cohen's classic observation still holds true: "The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about" (1963, 13). And, to this we might add (in Cohen's words) "that by altering citizens' issue priorities and voters' subsequent policy and vote choices, the media indirectly reshape the political landscape and ultimately the democratic process."

See also *Media and Politics; Media Bias; Media Effect.*

. . . .   KAREN CALLAGHAN

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Agrarianism

Agrarianism is a political and philosophical orientation that emphasizes the purported moral virtue, practical wisdom, environmental sustainability, and political usefulness of agricultural pursuits, in particular when such pursuits are practiced by large numbers of people, preferably by their own labor on land they own or who at least exercise some authority over themselves. Many proponents of agrarianism do not embrace all or even most particulars of this orientation, seeing it instead as merely an appropriate label for those who see value in farming and a more rustic or "simple" rural life as opposed to more commercial or urban transactions and lifestyles. However, agrarianism as a broad challenge to various complex forms of economic and political organization has deep roots, extending back centuries to the writings of Roman landowners, as well as having played a particularly important role in developing approaches to modern republican thought in several nations.

AFFILIATION WITH CONSERVATISM, POPULISM, AND LOCALISM

By looking to rural living conditions and mostly self-sufficient economies—in particular those maintained by minimal technology and in accordance with traditional family and community practices—as a superior form of social organization, the one best able to inculcate in human beings the moral goods necessary for a fulfilled life, agrarianism seems closely associated with various forms of conservatism. Many of those who have expressed agrarian sentiments in the wake of the Industrial Revolution have consciously, and some very explicitly, presented themselves as conservatives. Agrarianism, in the writings of some, has invoked mostly lost premodern social structures, like the remnants of the feudal order long preserved—despite enclosure laws—in Great Britain, or the yeoman farmer/freeholder ideal treasured by early settlers in the English colonies, an ideal perpetuated in early-nineteenth-century America by republican thinkers like Thomas Jefferson and John Taylor of Caroline. Other, more recent agrarian thinkers have presented themselves as lamenters of a traditional, regional agrarian way of life lost in the midst of socio-economic growth and demographic and technological change. This would be the case in the United States of the "Vanderbilt" or "Southern Agrarians," including poets and authors like John Ransom, Allen Tate, and Robert Warren, who mourned and, to a degree, raged against the passing of the primarily agricultural "Old South" as President Roosevelt's responses to the Great Depression (1929–1939), such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, used federal power and dollars to bring industrial work in impoverished parts of the United States.

However, by looking to the capacity of individuals to own, work, and make a sustainable living off of land labored upon by themselves, agrarianism also is closely associated with populist revolts; for example, the People's or Populist Party in the United States from the 1880s through the early 1900s was overwhelmingly shaped by the hopes and demands of rural voters from the American South, Midwest, and Great Plains. Consequently, the agrarian orientation also may align with certain progressive demands from that era, including greater democratic control over banks, railroads, and other corporate institutions whose decisions greatly affect the ability of farmers to independently decide on their own economic actions. Hence, agrarianism is both radical and reactionary, and it has historically encouraged ambitious reforms aimed at limiting corporate power and distributing land, as well as rhetorical and political approaches to civic life that privilege the countryside, the "heartland," as more authentic, closer to historical virtues, and thus a better gauge of how people ought to use their freedom.

One common feature of both radical and reactionary ways of speaking of agrarianism, however, is its localism—its belief in the importance of keeping human affairs limited to a scale small enough that local knowledge will be sufficient to address the concerns of daily life. Such localism is usually expressed along with an anticorporate perspective, visible today in the frequent hostility to globalization and free trade felt by those who live in and represent the agricultural sectors of Europe, North America, and East Asia, and in particular to a distrust or at least an ambiguous relationship with agribusinesses and large, often corporate farm and ranch operations. While such industrial farms and feedlots in fact provide the great bulk of the food consumed in industrialized nations around the world, agrarian thinking usually sees the globalization of agriculture as undermining the real value of farming.

FOUR ASPECTS OF MODERN AGRARIAN CLAIMS

The specifics of modern agrarian claims usually include several particular elements:

First, morally, farming teaches an economy of limits, patience, shared work, and seasonal dependence, thus schooling those who are raised in agricultural environments in a perspective that will help them deal more respectfully with

others, be less demanding and less self-concerned in addressing problems, be more willing to share with others and form associations with them to accomplish goals, be more generous with their time and resources, and remain pious in the face of challenges to their faith.

Second, practically, rural life and agricultural work teach good physical and mental habits and instruct those who devote themselves to—or are at least raised in environments shaped by—farming in a multitude of practical skills that involve animal husbandry, nutrition, construction, and so forth.

Third, environmentally, agrarian occupations teach one about the needs of the planet and about nourishing soil, irrigation, crop rotation, and the like, and as such communicate ideas of stewardship between natural resources and human beings far more thoroughly than can those occupations that have no contact with agriculture, thus leaving those so employed to learn about the natural world through tourism or indirect education at best, or perhaps not at all.

Fourth, politically, being a landowner (the ideal agrarian arrangement) or a farm laborer teaches, through habituation, personal responsibility but also civic humility, keeping the mind focused on practical as opposed to abstract possibilities. It also teaches, through the experience of tending to one's stewardship and working visibly through the slow cycle of growing food and feeding oneself, independence of mind and an unwillingness to allow one's economic or social life to be controlled by powers over which the individual has direct say.

CONCLUSION

The environmental claims made on behalf of the agrarian orientation are for the most part a product of late-twentieth-century reflections on the nature of the natural world and the agricultural use of it. The three other sets of claims all have direct antecedents in the writings of Roman agrarians such as Cato the Elder, Cicero, Varro, Virgil, and others, all of whom associated the ownership and operation of a farm (though not, it should be noted, the life of the slaves who did most of the work on said farms) with economic independence, humility, a strong work ethic, physical heartiness, and a determination to resist tyranny. These varying points, echoed down the centuries, have been used in the history of many Western nations to suggest that the task of agricultural work must be preserved for the sake of the moral health, political liberty, and environmental resources of the nation. Jefferson famously claimed that "those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God." While relatively few advocates of agrarianism today would use Jefferson's exact words, his sentiments remain prevalent.

See also *Progressivism*.

. . . .   RUSSELL ARBEN FOX

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Agrarian Socialism

See *Lipset, Seymour Martin*.

AIDS, Politics of

From the discovery of a new epidemic disease among healthy young men in the United States in 1981, acquired immune deficiency syndrome, or AIDS, has been a very political disease. The new disease was first described as *gay-related immune deficiency,* an association that has affected the course of the disease ever since. The perception that AIDS was primarily a disease of promiscuous male homosexuals slowed government response in the United States and created considerable moral panic worldwide.

Today perhaps thirty-five million people are infected with human immunodeficiency virus or HIV, the cause of AIDS, a minority of whom has access to the complex antiretroviral drugs that can control, but not treat, the disease. In parts of southern Africa, the virus has infected more than a quarter of the young adult population, reducing life expectancy and creating enormous strains on social and health services. The long-term effects on social stability and development are not yet well understood, and it is not known how deaths from AIDS are a factor in ongoing instability in countries such as the Congo and Zimbabwe.

While the first major medical and governmental responses to HIV and AIDS came in developed countries where public health and gay movements were more established, it became apparent that AIDS was far more severe in some of the world's poorest countries, above all in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1986, the World Health Organization established the Global Program on AIDS, which in the early 1990s was replaced by UNAIDS, a program intended to promote coordination across all United Nations agencies. In 2000 there was a specific debate on the impact of AIDS on the peace and security in Africa in the UN Security Council, followed by two special sessions of the General Assembly to address the global crisis. A commitment to combating HIV is specifically mentioned in the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals as well.

Responses to the AIDS epidemic were strongest in countries that combined government commitment to fighting the disease with strong civil society organizations, and Brazil, Thailand, and Uganda are often cited as exemplars of good responses. However, the situation in Uganda has become far

more complex over recent years, as moralism has affected what was originally a very effective prevention program.

The politics around treatments and prevention are rather different. As antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) have become more effective, access to them has become a major concern, with considerable tension between major pharmaceutical companies and governments over supply and access to generic drugs. The provision of ARVs are testing international trade and property agreements, with a gradual acceptance that profits and intellectual property should not be barriers to providing lifesaving medicines.

Prevention, on the other hand, requires a change to intimate behaviors, mainly sexual but also drug-related and needle usage, which many governments are reluctant to acknowledge. Although intravenous drug and needle users and homosexual men are the most vulnerable demographics in many countries, especially in Asia, Latin America, and the former Soviet Union, programs directed to educate and assist these groups are often underfunded, as prevention is often hampered by laws and social stigma. For example, the money made available by the Bush administration through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief required an emphasis on abstinence education as a preventive measure instead of promoting safe sexual practices, and there is considerable controversy about the effectiveness of abstinence on stemming sexual disease.

The most controversial responses to the epidemic came in South Africa, where after years of dilatory response South African President Thabo Mbeki expressed skepticism about the role of HIV in causing AIDS and the effectiveness of ARVs. It is estimated that President Mbeki's denial resulted in more than three hundred thousand deaths that could have been prevented had the South African government made readily available drugs, which generated the most significant grassroots AIDS movement to date: the Treatments Action Campaign. AIDS policies started to change toward the end of Mbeki's term in office, but it remains an unfortunate reminder of the negative importance of government inaction and denial.

South African activism drew heavily on earlier examples of AIDS treatment and prevention from Western countries, especially the United States, which pioneered community mobilization in result to the epidemic and introduced global symbols such as the red ribbon and the label "People living with AIDS." The AIDS epidemic remains a case study of globalization, both in terms of the spread of discourses and treatment.

See also *Gender and Politics; Health Care Policy; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights; Mutiple Streams Theory.*

. . . . DENNIS ALTMAN

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Alienation, Political

Political alienation is an umbrella term that captures a set of negative attitudes about politics that are distributed in systematic ways across the mass public. Higher concentrations of alienated individuals are often located in socially subordinated, marginalized, and politically under-represented groups. Broadly defined as a loss of confidence in political actors and institutions, mass political alienation can lead citizens to challenge regime legitimacy and can compromise regime stability over the long term. This entry provides an overview of ongoing debates about how to define political alienation, what causes it, how it influences individual and mass political participation, the consequences for governance, and prescriptive measures to restore citizens' confidence in elected officials. Although levels of political alienation have varied historically and across different types of government, this entry focuses on advanced industrialized democracies in the post–World War II era.

Though political alienation has a long intellectual history and is particularly indebted to Marx, contemporary research interest in political alienation deepened with the second wave of democratization following World War II (1939–1945) as political scientists tried to forecast potential for long-term regime stability. The debate continued to flourish in the 1960s and 1970s as political scientists and political elites sought to understand the causes—and predict the long-term consequences—of the mass movements for social justice unfolding in Western democracies. Attributed to "culture shift," characterized by an increase in elite-challenging attitudes about government and more activist modes of political participation, these social justice movements became institutionalized in new policies and government agencies. Nevertheless, public confidence in government and voter turnout continued to decline with each ensuing decade.

DEFINING AND MEASURING POLITICAL ALIENATION AND SUPPORT

Ada Finifter's work is a common starting point for political scientists interested in political alienation. Finifter (1970) defined four separate attitudinal dimensions of political alienation—powerlessness, meaningless, normlessness, and isolation. Powerless citizens express the belief that political elites are not attentive to voters' concerns, and that there is little that they can do to influence political outcomes. Politics is meaningless when elite decision making is seen as senseless, unpredictable, and random. Citizens find that politics is normless when political elites break the rules of

the game. Normlessness also is referred to as political distrust or cynicism. Isolated individuals reject the norms and values of the dominant political culture.

National and cross-national surveys of mass political attitudes and behavior conducted over four decades commonly include items designed to measure each of these four dimensions. In their 2000 volume on disaffection in political life cross-nationally, Putnam, Pharr, and Dalton used *The Harris Poll* measures of individual respondents' disagreement or agreement with the following statements to establish a common framework that links how this concept is measured in North America to analogous efforts in the European and Japanese contexts: "The people running the country don't really care what happens to you"; "Most people with power try to take advantage of people like yourself"; "You're left out of things going on around you"; "The rich get richer and the poor get poorer"; "What you think doesn't count very much anymore" (9).

These basic survey questions have been used to probe how much citizens' perceptions of elites are an artifact of the institutions and specific political contexts that determine their range of action. Finifter's (1970) definition of political alienation captures both specific and diffuse (regime) support. *Specific support* refers to attitudes about particular politicians and parties; *diffuse support* captures attitudes about the political regime and political processes. Scholars debate how closely the two different types of support are related. Though correlated, specific and diffuse support can vary independently of one another; voters can distrust elected officials and still support democracy. David Easton (1965) has argued that lack of specific support, left unaddressed for a long period, could translate into a lack of regime support.

Governments that enjoy high levels of legitimacy and regime support enjoy greater ease in making and enforcing unpopular decisions in the short term that will be of long-term benefit to the common good. High levels of diffuse support accumulate over time to constitute a "reserve of goodwill" that is slow to exhaust and sustains regimes through times of political and economic crisis. Similarly, political losers who are confident in the knowledge that there will be political change in the long-run and can find alternative outlets for exercising political voice are more likely to remain engaged with politics.

DECLINING POLITICAL SUPPORT ACROSS ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES

Americans entered the twenty-first century with less confidence in all branches of government and political institutions (e.g., parties and elections) than in the late 1960s. Similar trends are evident cross-nationally in Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Sweden. This long decline in public confidence in politics has been correlated with a decline in voter turnout, a loosening of partisan identification and a corresponding increase in independent voters, and an increase in unconventional forms of political participation when political elites cannot be held accountable through the ballot box. The duration of these trends have led scholars to ask, "Are skeptical publics an enduring feature of democracy?" (Dalton

2006, 254). If so, understanding the roots of discontent may give guidance for improving how democracy works.

The increase in political alienation has been attributed to various reasons: widening disparities between voter preferences and policy outcomes; the inability of the state to maintain a fine balance between policies that protect workers while promoting an environment conducive to economic growth; corruption scandals that reveal collusion between government and business elites at the cost of the well-being of everyday voters; media coverage of political scandals; negative campaigning that focuses on personal attacks; the decline in civic engagement and a corresponding erosion of social capital; and changing public values. All of these factors predict change along one or more dimensions of political alienation to some degree.

Further complicating efforts to understand and respond to deepening public cynicism are the remaining unresolved questions from the 1960s and 1970s about theoretical and empirical links between politically alienated attitudes and the modes of political action that they produce among different social groups in different political contexts. Political alienation can produce a range of behaviors from apathy—or withdrawal from politics—to protest voting and, ultimately, rebellion. Conversely, political alienation also can deepen engagement when angry citizens mobilize for positive democratic change.

CONCLUSION

Research that attends to the behavioral outcomes of different attitudinal dimensions of political alienation has found that the demobilizing effects of powerless and meaninglessness, can be offset by the mobilizing potential of political cynicism. Russell J. Dalton (2006) finds that contemporary political cynics are also highly supportive of political rights and participatory norms. Similarly, Ronald Inglehart (1990) finds that when political alienation is characterized by a high level of political cynicism, it is correlated with elite-challenging attitudes that foster an increase in public demands for direct participation in democracy. Despite a decline in public confidence in politics, overwhelming majorities (90 percent) across established democracies agree that democracy is the best form of government. There is considerable evidence that alienated publics in established democracies counterbalance potentially corrosive effects of political distrust with mass actions that reinforce and deepen democratic norms. The politically alienated in democracies can take actions designed to hold officials publicly accountable while demanding greater citizen participation in making the decisions that govern them.

See also *Corruption and Other Political Pathologies; Democracies, Advanced Industrial; Democracy and Corruption; Mobilization, Political; Protests and Demonstrations.*

. . . .   SHERRY L. MARTIN

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Alighieri, Dante

Dante Alighieri (1265–1321), best known as a poet because of his *Divine Comedy,* was also an active participant and observer of late medieval Italian city-state politics and the writer of *Monarchy,* a substantial work on political theory.

Born in Florence, Dante embraced the active political life of his city. As a supporter of the White Guelf party, he served on several councils from 1295 and served in 1300 as one of six priors who constituted the executive body in Florence. In October 1301, Dante's active political life ended when the rival Black Guelf party seized power in Florence through a coup. Dante was banished from the city and never returned to Florence. During the final twenty years of his life, Dante abandoned the White Guelf party and instead became an observer of Italian political culture as he traveled throughout northern Italy. Both through his experience in Florence and his travels in the region, Dante witnessed firsthand the coercive effects of factional strife and outside meddling on public order in Italian cities. While the exact date of its composition is uncertain, *Monarchy,* his response to the instability of the political system in Italy, was most likely completed in the final years of his life and almost certainly after 1314.

The chief purpose of *Monarchy* was to provide a solution to the endemic political instability that Dante viewed as the key scourge of his time. While the subject matter was undoubtedly inspired by his personal experiences, the text itself focuses on first principles. In Book One, Dante argues that for human society to thrive it required the establishment of a world ruler whose authority was supreme over all other sovereigns. Only such a ruler could ensure the peace that was a prerequisite for mankind's fulfillment of God's plan for humanity. Book Two turns to history to show that ancient Rome served such a role for humankind in the past and was serving God's purpose at its height. The final book turns to the contemporary political system and makes the case that the Holy Roman Emperor's power came directly from God and was independent of the pope. In making this case, Dante examines and refutes the key arguments in favor of papal authority in secular affairs. At their core, the three books of *Monarchy* argue that the key to peace in the thirteenth century and ultimately mankind's ability to fulfill its role in God's cosmic order depended on the reestablishment of a universal supreme political power through the institution of the Holy Roman Emperor.

Scholars have criticized *Monarchy* as unrealistically utopian in an age when imperial authority was in decline and the text as repetitive. It certainly is medieval in organization and structure. Written in Latin, it draws heavily on Aristotelian thought and is permeated with biblical examples. In some ways *Monarchy* might best be seen as complementing Dante's better-known *Divine Comedy.* If *Divine Comedy* sought to provide readers with a path to salvation in the next life, *Monarchy* sought to provide readers with a model that would ensure peace in this life.

See also *Italian Political Thought; Political Theory.*

. . . .   ERIC NELSON

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Alker, Hayward R.

American scholar Hayward Alker (1937–2008) held the John A. McCone Chair in International Relations at the University of Southern California (USC), where he specialized in the history of international relations theory, computational research methodologies, conflict resolution, and world order studies. In his 1997 book, *The Future of International Relations,* international affairs expert Iver Neumann named Alker one of twelve most influential thinkers in international relations.

Alker was born in New York City in 1937 and raised in Greenwich, Connecticut. He earned his bachelor's degree in mathematics from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1959 and a doctorate in political science from Yale University in 1963. He stayed to teach at Yale and became a full professor at the age of twenty-nine. In 1968, Alker returned to MIT as a political science professor and remained there until joining USC in 1995. His career was marked also

by distinguished visiting professorships, including a 1989 appointment as the first Olaf Palme professor at the universities of Uppsala and Stockholm and a 1996 fellowship to study chaos theory at the Santa Fe Institute. Alker served as president of the International Studies Association from 1992–1993 and of the Institute of Defense and Disarmament Studies. He was also an adjunct faculty member of the Watson Institute.

Alker's wide-ranging contributions to his field include pioneering work on North-South dynamics within the United Nations, computational linguistics, mathematical modeling in the social sciences, the analysis of complex systems, social theory, and peace research. He was also responsible for pathbreaking work on bringing humanistic traditions back into the study of international relations. His many publications include *Mathematics and Politics* (1965), *Rediscoveries and Reformations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies* (1996), and the coauthored *Journeys through Conflict: Narrative and Lessons* (2001). He integrated mathematics and humanities into his investigations of artificial intelligence, globalism, and game theory. His last project, which he led at the Watson Institute, was on the dialectics of world orders.

See also *Conflict Resolution; International Relations; International Relations Theory.*

. . . .   GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN

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Allegiance

Allegiance, following Scottish philosopher David Hume, can be defined as loyalty and obedience to magistrates. Allegiance, however, can be owed not just to leaders and states, but to a range of institutions, ideals, and people. Examining the concept of allegiance raises questions such as to whom or what is allegiance owed; from what does allegiance derive; is allegiance absolute; can one have multiple allegiances or is there one that supersedes all others; and what happens if allegiances conflict? Once such questions are raised, it is clear that allegiance has a long history in Western and Eastern philosophies, religions, and politics. In the ancient world, questions of allegiance are examined and expressed in Sophocles' *Antigone,* the Confucian notion of filial piety, Plato's dialogues on the trial and death of Socrates, Diogenes the Cynic's declaration that he is a citizen of the world, and Jesus' edict to "render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God what are God's." In the modern era, questions of allegiance become intertwined with the social contract theory of English philosopher John Locke, which posits consent as the source of allegiance, and the contrasting views of Hume and English philosopher and statesman Edmund Burke, who suggest that one owes allegiance to one's state, customs, and traditions not because one promised but because they were inherited from previous generations and provide stability and continuity in the present. And in the contemporary era, themes of allegiance are explicit in debates surrounding nationalism, patriotism, civil disobedience, and conscientious objection.

TO WHOM OR TO WHAT IS ALLEGIANCE OWED?

Allegiance can be owed to institutions such as nation-states or churches, as well as to the ideals and principles, such as liberty, democracy, or a particular faith, that institutions embody and represent. Besides institutions, allegiance also can be owed to persons, such as political or religious leaders, or even to fellow compatriots, believers, ethnics, or to all of humanity. In addition to external entities, allegiance can be pledged internally to one's conscience which, in turn, may be guided by higher laws derived from nature, reason, or religion.

Like American philosopher Henry David Thoreau, pastor Martin Luther King Jr., Indian spiritual and political leader Mohandas Gandhi, and other conscientious objectors, one may ultimately decide to disobey civil laws and statutes if they violate one's deeply held sense of justice. As such, civil disobedience is an expression of allegiance to a higher law that transcends civil laws and ensures that one is not complicit in the injustice they oppose. Thus, allegiance to a state can conflict with allegiance to one's conscience, as well as to subnational units (e.g., a local community) or to supranational entities and ideals (e.g., diasporas or loyalty to humanity).

ON WHAT IS ALLEGIANCE FOUNDED?

Allegiance can be founded on chosen or unchosen sources, with classical and contemporary liberals defending the former and communitarians the latter. Chosen allegiance derives from consent (either express or tacit) that is central to social contract theory. Express consent, following Locke and English revolutionary Thomas Paine, is a promise one makes to grant authority to and obey a government provided that, in return, the government protects the liberties, rights, and common good of its citizens. Free will is a central element of express consent and can be found in the oath recited at naturalization ceremonies in the United States, in which new citizens pledge their allegiance to the Constitution and foreswear their former national allegiances. Tacit consent also produces allegiance, but does so indirectly, as in Socrates' explanation that he implicitly promised to obey the laws of Athens when he chose to live there and benefit from its protection. Tacit consent may be reinforced through socialization rituals, such as when millions of public schoolchildren in the United States begin their school day with the Pledge of Allegiance or when their French counterparts are prohibited from displays of religious identity in order to reinforce a secular national identity.

In 1778, George Washington signed an oath of allegiance to the Congress of the United States. Washington's express consent granted authority to and his obedience toward the new government.

Unchosen allegiance, in contrast, derives not from a promise but from social necessity, birth, and traditions. The traditions that form the community or nation into which one is born give that person predetermined identities and duties of allegiance prior to the exercise of free will. Upon maturing, communitarians allow that persons may continue to adhere to those identities, traditions, and allegiances or may modify them within limits, but they are likely to remain deeply constitutive of their identity. Some political and ethnoreligious identities and allegiances are passed on in this fashion. Politically, communitarians and conservatives often echo Burke's defense of custom, tradition, and the "little platoons" that give people their sense of history and social obligations. Ethnoreligiously, this can be found in allegiance to one's group that may be held in higher regard than allegiance to one's state, especially if the group is subject to persecution or discrimination by the state.

IS ALLEGIANCE SINGULAR OR PLURAL; HOW IS CONFLICT RESOLVED?

Contemporary liberal theorists generally suggest that loyalty to a state rests on adherence to a set of unifying civic principles and ideals that diverse people can consent to, but add that individuals can have a multiplicity of identities, social roles, groups, and institutions to which they owe allegiance.

Depending on the context, individuals can modify and alter the priority of these allegiances. Thus, multiple allegiances are not inherently problematic because this reflects the multiple identities of the self. If there is a conflict between two or three entities to which individuals owe allegiance (e.g., one's country, faith, or ethnic group), contemporary liberals generally allow individuals the freedom to choose which one is primary, and if necessary defend their right to engage in civil disobedience even in subtle forms such as abstaining from reciting the Pledge of Allegiance for religious reasons.

For communitarian and conservative theorists, individuals typically do not have unlimited freedom to decide which allegiance takes priority if their allegiance to the state conflicts with an allegiance to some other entity or belief. As a result, states are typically granted the authority to compel compliance with the laws or limit the rights of those who wish to engage in civil disobedience. Further, communitarian and conservative theorists generally suggest that loyalty to a state rests on a thicker set of shared moral values, and they add that individuals have a limited ability to modify their identities and allegiances. Because subnational or supranational allegiances are potentially disruptive, they must be subsumed under a unifying national allegiance. This is one reason why John F. Kennedy was asked whether his Roman Catholic faith would supersede

his allegiance to the Constitution if he were elected president of the United States. However, despite some tensions caused by plural allegiances, the federalist structure of Canada and the European Union allow subnational, national, and supranational allegiances to coexist.

See also *Authority; Burke, Edmund; Civic Engagement; Civil Society; Communitarianism; Hume, David; Liberal Theory; Locke, John; Nation; Nationalism; Social Contract; Socialization, Political; Tradition.*

. . . .   GREGORY W. STREICH

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Alliances

Alliances, or formal associations between two political bodies to further their common interests, are one of the most recurrent phenomena in the field of international politics. Most definitions of alliance focus on four basic elements: its *formal* nature (based on a treaty signed by states), its *cooperative* dimension (states agree to join forces to pursue some common goal), its *external* orientation (alliances are usually against states outside their own membership), and its *military* character (the content of cooperation is related to security). Overall, this conception is a correct one, albeit of a limited nature.

POWER AGGREGATION MODEL

Most scholars believe that underlying all alliances are the convergent interests of the individual member and that the interests in question are directly linked to *security,* broadly defined as protection against a powerful enemy. Thus an alliance is simply—or mostly—the union of the forces of those who, fearing that they are incapable of dealing with the enemy on their own, decide to cooperate with other states in the same situation. This is the essence of the *power aggregation* model, which is probably the most common interpretation of alliances. It should be pointed out that balance of power theory, and alliance theory, clearly overlap. As stated by Hans Morgenthau in 1973, alliances are nothing more than a means whereby states maintain an approximately equal distribution of power; as such, alliances are a particular manifestation of the more general state behavior known as "balancing." This classical view has been partly modified by noticing that the behaviour of states is not based on the need to balance power but to deal with *threats,* as described by Stephen Walt (1987): In deciding whether a given state represents a threat to our security, we need to take account not only of its aggregate power, but also of its geographical proximity, its offensive power, and its aggressive intentions.

BALANCING VERSUS BANDWAGONING

However, states do not always unite against a state that threatens them. Sometimes, on the contrary, they form alliances with the latter, thus adopting a policy known as *bandwagoning.* The dichotomy of balancing versus bandwagoning has been hotly debated, and there is no agreement on which represents the most common behavior, in empirical terms. To further complicate matters, scholars such as Randall Schweller (1994) argue that the term *bandwagoning* should be used to refer to alliance not with the state posing the threat, but simply with *strong* states. From this perspective, the most important factor affecting alignment is the compatibility of various different states' political objectives rather than the power (or threat) imbalance: If one state is satisfied with the status quo, it will join a conservative alliance, even if the latter is the strongest force. On the other hand, a revisionist state will be driven more by the desire for "profit" than by the desire for security, and thus will align itself with the strongest revisionist power in ascendance at the time.

TOOLS OF MANAGEMENT

All those views, despite their differences, share the same conception of alliances as aggregation of power. Yet, alliances also can be seen as something profoundly different; i.e., as *tools of management.* A rapid survey of the most important alliances from 1815 to 1945 led Paul Schroeder to conclude in 1976 that the wish to aggregate power against a threat is not always of vital importance for the creation of an alliance; that all alliances work, to a certain degree, restricting and controlling the actions of the allies themselves; and that certain alliances may be employed in order that even an adversary joins our side and is thereby constrained by the alliance itself. Those ideas have brought to the forefront the fundamental issue of interallied relations, shedding light on their ambiguous nature. Accordingly, some political scientists, such as Patricia Weitsman (2004), have expanded the role of threat in the creation and functioning of alliances to include threats posed by one's ally. Others, such as Jeremy Pressman (2008), have focused on how states use alliances to restrain their partners, thereby preventing war.

The most important contribution, however, comes from Glenn Snyder's (1997) *alliance security dilemma.* In every alliance, states tend to oscillate between two opposite fears—abandonment and entrapment. The former concern is that an ally abandons us, either directly (by abrogating a treaty, for example) or indirectly (by denying its diplomatic support during a crisis). The latter refers to the risk of being drawn into a war provoked by an intransigent or reckless ally. The common response to the fear of abandonment is to "get closer" to the ally; that is, to increase those incentives that may induce the ally into keeping its initial pledge. The usual response to the fear of entrapment is to "get away"; that is, to reduce one's obligations or threaten to withdraw one's support. If a state chooses to get closer, it reduces the risk of abandonment but increases the risk of entrapment; on the other hand, if a state chooses to get away, the opposite will be true. Thus, the policies adopted to prevent

abandonment make entrapment that much more likely, just as the policies designed to avoid entrapment make abandonment more likely.

A TYPOLOGY OF ALLIANCES

All this points at a striking variety of types of alliance, as can be seen not only in the degree to which the various members condition the behavior of the others, but also in the tone of their relations, which may vary from tense to cordial, and from a position of reciprocal support to one of mutual diffidence. One way of dealing with such a variety is by means of a typology of alliances, based on two dimensions, one internal and one external. The first allows one to distinguish between *symmetric* and *asymmetric* alliances, according to whether power relations between the allies are balanced or skewed in favor of one of them, respectively. In the second dimension, we have *homogeneous* and *heterogeneous* alliances, depending on whether members respond to converging constraints and opportunities, or on whether they react to diverging constraints and opportunities, respectively.

Combining these classes of alliance, four types are obtained. In the *aggregation* alliance (homogeneous and symmetric), decisions are taken by mutual consent, and both parties obtain reasons for satisfaction from their collaboration. In the *guarantee* alliance (homogeneous and asymmetric), although the weaker party's interests are safeguarded, the content of the agreements reflects first of all the major ally's preferences. In the *hegemonic* alliance (heterogeneous and asymmetric), the two parties are in divergent positions, and the imbalance in power relations allows the major ally to drag the other ally along, imposing solutions that are at least partially damaging for the latter. And in the *deadlocked* alliance (heterogeneous and symmetric), the members, who have equal bargaining power and hold positions that are difficult to reconcile, end up paralyzing each other.

See also *Autonomy; Balance of Power; Bandwagoning; Power.*

. . . .   MARCO CESA

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Almond, Gabriel

Born in Rock Island, Illinois, American political scientist Gabriel A. Almond (1911–2002) was one of the most influential scholars in comparative politics during the 1950s and 1960s, when he was the first chair of the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics. His work stood out as a pioneering attempt to achieve a truly comparative framework for the study of politics, one that encompassed non-Western countries and thus broke with the European focus of much prior research in comparative politics.

Almond received his PhD in political science in 1938 from the University of Chicago, where he studied with Charles Merriam and Harold Lasswell, two of the main representatives of what became known as the Chicago School of Political Science. After teaching at Brooklyn College (now part of City University of New York) and working for the U.S. government during World War II (1939–1945), Almond returned to academia and taught at Yale University (1946–1950, 1959–1963), Princeton University (1950–1959), and Stanford University (1963–1976).

Almond's most important work consisted of a series of publications, starting in the mid-1950s, in which he formulated a structural-functional approach to the study of political development. He saw the political system as comprised of *structures*, such as political parties, legislatures, and bureaucracies, which performed distinct *functions*, such as articulating and aggregating the preferences of citizens, making and implementing public policy, and maintaining overall political stability. Drawing on the distinction between structures and functions, he developed a broad typology of varieties of democratic and nondemocratic political systems. This framework was applied by many researchers to developing countries in Latin America and particularly to the countries of Asia and Africa that achieved independence following World War II.

Almond also wrote a pioneering book on political culture. *The Civic Culture* (1963), coauthored with Sidney Verba, was a pathbreaking work that demonstrated the potential of comparative studies using survey research. It distinguished three kinds of citizen orientation toward politics: parochial, subject, and participant. It argued that a civic culture, composed of a balanced mixture of individuals from all three orientations, was the most conducive to democracy.

Later in his career, in *Crisis, Choice, and Change* (1973), Almond sought to develop an integrated theory of political change by combining his structural-functional approach with other approaches that put more emphasis on the role of political leaders, choice, and contingency. The goal of this work, he wrote, was to connect the theory of statics provided by a structural-functional approach to a theory of dynamics.

Almond became a professor emeritus at Stanford in 1976 and continued to write and publish. His later research included works on the intellectual history of, and the ongoing debates within, political science and comparative politics. Almond's prolific career spanned seven decades, and his achievements were well recognized. Among other things, he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1961, served as president of the

American Political Science Association in 1965 to 1966, and was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 1977.

See also *Development, Economic; Politics, Comparative.*

. . . . GERARDO L. MUNCK

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Alternate Delegate

An *alternate delegate* is someone appointed or elected to act as a substitute if a delegate is absent or otherwise cannot fulfill the required duties at a political meeting, conference, or session. Alternate delegates are seated with their delegation and attend all meetings and functions. If they replace a delegate, alternates also engage in debate and vote on matters. In the U.S. political system, alternate delegates are chosen along with delegates to participate in party nominating conventions. Selection as an alternate delegate is generally considered an honor or a reward for contributions to the party. For instance, at the 2008 Republican National Convention, there were 2,380 delegates, with 2,227 alternates. Alternates may be selected by the delegate they replace, by the state delegation, or through a party election. Like delegates, alternates usually have to commit to a candidate prior to the convention (unless the candidate releases the delegates or unless they are formally classified as uncommitted). Requirements to be an alternate delegate vary from state to state, but generally candidates are required to be at least eighteen years old, a party member, and a resident of the district that they represent for a specified time prior to their selection.

See also *Candidate Selection; Political Participation.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Althusius, Johannes

Johannes Althusius (1557–1638) was born in Diedenshausen in Westphalia. After studying in Cologne, Paris, Geneva, and Basel, he took a doctorate in both civil and ecclesiastical law at Basel in 1586. In the same year he accepted a position on the law faculty at the Reformed Academy in Hebron. Upon the publication of his most famous work, *Politica,* in 1603, Althusius was offered the position of Syndic in Emden, East Frisia, where he guided the city until his death in 1638. Althusius had tremendous influence in this city for thirty-five years, a city that was one of the first in Germany to accept the Reformed articles of faith.

His appointment at Emden, and its association with the Reformation, reflect his intellectual debt to John Calvin. Like Calvin's *Institutes of the Christian Religion,* Althusius argued in *Politica* that all power and government come from God, and civil authorities cannot use their power to serve any ends other than God's. Thus, a citizen's first allegiance is to God. *Politica* was widely embraced by the Dutch, who saw it as a theoretical justification for their revolt against the Spanish. While not generally recognized in the modern canon, *Politica* was a divisive force during its time.

Althusius calls for a unifying covenant, a covenant that is quite different from the social contract of Thomas Hobbes or John Locke. The covenant must be agreed to by all who enter it. Althusius is accused of transforming all public law into private law with his idea of covenant. He preserves this distinction, but recognizes the connection and symbiotic relationship between the two.

Althusius finds the origins of his federal design, and understanding of covenant, in the Bible and bases the design on biblical lessons: (1) The federal design is based on a network of covenants beginning with the original covenant between God and man on which all others are based. (2) The classical biblical commonwealth was a federation of tribes tied to one another by covenant that functioned as a unifying set of laws between the tribes. (3) The Bible ends with a restoration of the tribal system on a global scale in which each nation is able to preserve its own integrity while supporting a common covenant. Althusius' biblical observations served as the inspiration for his theoretical work that confronted the problem of divisible sovereignty. For a federal system to work, sovereignty must be divided among the constituent parts while still binding the parts to the whole. Althusius addressed this problem by relying on a covenant that would bind the sovereign parts to a sovereign whole. This arrangement mirrors the symbiotic relationship that exists between private law and public law.

Althusius' work contributed to the intellectual reputation of the Reformation. He wrote in direct refutation of the theory of indivisible sovereignty as understood by Jean Bodin. The idea of a single sovereign and self-determination could not be reconciled until Althusius introduced his theory of federalism with the covenant as its central feature.

See also *Calvin, John; Protestant Political Thought; Reformation Political Thought.*

. . . . KYLE SCOTT

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Althusser, Louis

Louis Althusser (1918–1990) was a French philosopher who attempted to reconcile Marxism with structuralism. His works influenced Marxist thought in the West.

Althusser was born in Birmandries in French Algeria and was educated in Algiers, Marseilles, and Lyon, where he attended the Lycee du Parc. In 1939 he was admitted to the Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS), the French academy for teachers, but he was conscripted into the French Army. Althusser would later observe how Machiavelli thought conscription helped establish national identity. Althusser was captured and spent five years in a German concentration camp, most of that time in Stalag XA, located in Schleswig. After the war, he entered the ENS.

While at ENS, Althusser suffered from and was treated for clinical depression. In 1948, Althusser joined the Community Party and completed his master's thesis on the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Althusser became a tutor at ENS and spent his entire academic career there, eventually becoming a professor of philosophy.

Althusser rose to prominence in the mid-1960s through the publication of his works in which he attempts to reinterpret the ideas of philosopher Karl Marx. *For Marx* (1969) (first published as *Pour Marx* in 1965 by Francois Maspero, Paris) was a collection of articles that had been previously been published in *La Pen* and *La Nouvelle Critique* and was regarded as the seminal text in the school of structuralist Marxism. Althusser viewed Marxism as a revolutionary science. While Marx, in his writings, argued that all aspects of life were dependent on the superstructure of economic production (economic determinism), Althusser believed that the foundations of societies were based on one of three processes: economic practice, politico-legal practice, and ideological practice. In the 1970 essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes toward an Investigation," Althusser (2001) emphasizes the scientific aspects of Marxism, in particular its investigation of how societal structures determine lived experience. These *structures* determined history, but their importance and relationship to one another varied with circumstances. Therefore, at different times particular *practices* might be dominant. He also cited the existence of ideological state apparatuses, which include the family, mass media, religious institutions, and education. He suggested that these apparatuses are agents of repression and inevitable. Therefore, it is impossible to escape ideology.

Althusser contended that there were differences between the "young" and the "mature" Marx, that what he called an "epistemological break" had taken place in the 1840s, and that the mature Marx was more "scientific" than he had been as a younger writer. Althusser believed that Marx had been misunderstood because his work had been considered as a whole, rather than as the product of distinct intellectual periods. However, Althusser would later backtrack on the timing of this break in Marx's work. In his 1969 essay "Preface to Capital Volume One," Althusser (2001) concedes that the scientific approach is only found in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme,* which Marx wrote in 1875. Later, in 1976's "Elements of Self Criticism," Althusser suggested that this "break" was a process rather than a clearly defined event. Another work in a similar vein was *Lire le Capital,* a collection of essays by Althusser and some of his students published in 1965, based on a seminar about Marx's *Das Kapital* conducted by Althusser at the ENS.

Althusser's career essentially came to an end in 1980 when he murdered his wife, Helene. He was declared unfit to stand trial and was institutionalized until 1983. During the last years of his life, Athusser wrote two versions of his autobiography, *Les Faits* (*The Facts*) and *L'Avenir dure Longtemps* (*The Future Lasts a Long Time*), which were published posthumously in 1992 as a single volume: *The Future Lasts Forever: A Memoir.*

See also *Communism; Hegel, Georg W. F.; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Marxist Parties.*

. . . .   JEFFREY KRAUS

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Amendments, Constitutional

See *Constitutional Amendments.*

Americanization

The term *Americanization* refers to the perceived spread and absorption of presumed American values, practices, methods, beliefs, and symbols. This definition is important because some things taken to be American are not in fact of American origin. Further, critics of Americanization sometimes wrongly overestimate the spread of Americanization, the rate of absorption, and the American desire to promote presumed American things.

In 1835, sociologist Alexis de Tocqueville laid out the essence of American identity, comprising a combination of populism, egalitarianism, liberty, individualism, and laissez-faire. Equally important was a distrust of big government and a belief that

local power was more responsive to people's needs. These values have more recently been dubbed the "American Creed," based on a form of "dissenting Protestantism." The creed comprises five elements, which Samuel Huntington (2004) lists as individual rights, the people as the legitimate source of political power, government limited by law and the people, a belief in limited or small government, and private property.

DOMESTIC AMERICANIZATION

Americanization includes domestic and international variants. Domestically, the term refers to the socialization of immigrants to the United States. Philip Bell defines it as "a process by which an alien acquires our language, citizenship, customs, and ideals" (1998, 1). Acculturation, however, does not necessarily lead to assimilation, as studies of Jewish and other immigrants have shown. Americanization domestically is not as assimilatory as its founders originally suggested, and some states such as Florida, California, and Texas have informal policies of Spanish-English bilingualism. In 2000, some forty-seven million people, or 18 percent of the population, spoke a language other than English at home. Images of the melting pot have been replaced by the salad bowl or mixed salad, suggesting tolerance for cultural diversity and multiculturalism. Ideals of religious and cultural freedom can be seen as new forms of Americanization, where respect for difference is celebrated.

Americanization must be seen as a two-way street. It involves the assimilation of foreign cultures and peoples, the transformation of cultural products, and their export outside America's borders. The United States is a massive consumer of culture as well as a producer of it. Americans have been highly receptive to foreign influences and immigrants, which has affected the creation of new forms of culture, movies, food, fashions, architecture, science, and so on. As Richard Pells (2005) argues,

> It is precisely these foreign influences that have made America's culture so popular for so long in so many places. American culture spread throughout the world because it has habitually drawn on foreign styles and ideas. Americans have then reassembled and repackaged the cultural products they received from abroad, and retransmitted them to the rest of the planet. (190)

INTERNATIONAL AMERICANIZATION

Americanization also has international dimensions. American variants of democracy, trade liberalization, and culture are often seen as attractive outside America's borders, and perceived American practices are often spontaneously adopted and reinterpreted in different cultural contexts. Thus, America not only projects hard military power, as Joseph Nye (2008) has shown, but the soft power of cultural attraction and diplomacy as well. Historically, Americanization involved the spread of democratic institutions and the promotion of free trade. This began in the 1850s with America's opening of Japan for international trade, later culminating in its "open door" policies for the Asia-Pacific in the 1890s. It also coincided with the spread of Wilsonian liberal democracy after 1919. After World War II (1939–1945), the U.S. government promoted a mixture of democracy, free trade, international institutions to regulate trade, new international markets, opening of closed economic systems, currency convertibility, access to world markets and materials, and a reduction in domestic barriers to trade. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade all promoted an economic agenda favored by America and its allies.

In parts of Latin America and Central Europe, a form of economic Americanization was expressed in the 1990s through the Washington Consensus, a World Bank project that sought to reduce social spending and increase the level of privatization. *Americanization* is sometimes used as shorthand for large-scale industrialization or assembly-line manufacturing, like Fordism. As such, Americanization can figure as a stand-in for Westernization or globalization, even if in today's economic climate the majority of manufactured goods are produced outside of the United States. America's massive domestic market has enabled American industries to create products at home before trialing them abroad. This has further been facilitated by the fact that more than one billion people speak English, making the "American" language of business and culture a global language.

People outside the United States may pick and choose what elements of American culture they consume. For the most part, people are conditioned by their families, local cultures, and circumstances, which allows them to filter and select what they want and don't want. The success of Americanization often lies in the ability of corporate mass culture to adapt and change to suit local needs rather than forcing the same product on everyone. There is considerable variation in how American values, practices, methods, beliefs, and symbols are adopted. Some authors now reject the idea of American cultural imperialism, pointing instead to a more nuanced and complex model of reappropriation, negotiation, and creolization. One might therefore see Americanization as a "tool box," a series of resources that can be selected or rejected by cultural and national groups as they see fit, depending on what elements of Americanization suit their cultures. As such, it makes more sense to speak of Americanization as being polyvalent, comprising military, economic, cultural, and other characteristics, some of which may seem more attractive than others. Americanization as a process must also be seen as dynamic and in constant evolution. What *America* and *Americanization* mean is subject to continual discussion with each new generation of Americans.

See also *Assimilation; Globalization; Individualism.*

. . . .   DAVID MACDONALD

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Amicus Curiae Briefs

Amicus curiae is Latin, meaning "friend of the court." Amicus briefs are submitted to the Supreme Court by a party that is not directly involved in a case. The briefs offer support for a particular party to a case. An amicus curiae brief often will illustrate relevant legal matters that briefs submitted by those directly involved fail to address. These briefs can be submitted at two stages of the Supreme Court decision-making process: when the justices are deciding if they will hear a case and after the Court has decided to hear the case on merits. Usually, permission must be granted by either party, or the Supreme Court, for an amicus curiae brief to be submitted. Legal representatives of government, however, need not obtain permission to submit a brief. It is exceptionally rare for an amicus brief not to gain the permission of the party or of the Court. Most legal scholars believe that amicus briefs impact the Supreme Court's decisions. Research suggests that amicus briefs have a positive impact on the likelihood that a case will be selected for a decision on the merits. Additionally, arguments made in the accompanying briefs often are found in the opinions of the Court, suggesting that the justices are willing to adopt the reasoning suggested in amicus briefs.

See also *Supreme Court.*

. . . .   TOBIAS T. GIBSON

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Analytic Narrative

The expression *analytic narrative* sounds like an oxymoron. A narrative can be defined as a report of human actions and resulting events that makes the temporal order of these actions and events clear, with the primary purpose of making them intelligible to the public. There seems to be no concept of analysis that fits narratives; if anything, they are syntheses (of description and account, art and knowledge, entertainment and instruction). Still, analytic narrative has become a tag in today's social sciences, especially in the "political economy" literature that flourishes at the crossroads of economics, politics, and history. Usually, analytic narrative means little more than storytelling with significant theoretical underpinnings (for an example, see Dani Rodrick's 2003 publication *In Search for Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth*). A few users of the expression are keenly aware of the paradox it raises, and for them it means no less than a new approach to history, one that would be capable of reconciling the narrative mode of this discipline with the model-building activity of theoretical economics and politics. Prominent in this group are Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast, whose 1998 *Analytic Narratives* is the most sustained attempt to make sense of the tag, both in terms of methodological theorizing and concrete applications. This entry reviews this contribution before expanding on the issues more broadly.

CASE STUDIES: MEDIEVAL GENOA TO THE INTERNATIONAL COFFEE ORGANIZATION

During the Middle Ages, the city-state of Genoa underwent a succession of peaceful consulate system, civil war between the leading families, and civil peace under a new political system, the *podesteria.* Historians' best narratives fail to explain this sequence satisfactorily, and furthermore, to discern all the relevant questions. For instance, the first period was accompanied with a variable pattern of maritime activity in terms of raids and conquered possessions that also needs explaining. Avner Greif responds by constructing two extensive form games of perfect information involving the clans as strategic players. The first explores the clans' trade-off between maintaining mutual deterrence and participating in maritime operations. It accounts both for the variability within the first period and—using external threat as the variable parameter—its collapse into civil war. The second game, which the *podestà* enters as a player, rationalizes his stabilizing effect in the third period. Subgame perfect equilibrium is used to solve both games. Each period is first described in a pretheoretic narrative to clarify the open problems, second analyzed in a corresponding model, and third discussed and checked in another narrative that uses the theoretical language of the second stage.

The problem for a classic historian is understanding why France and England followed such different paces of institutional change in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: one country keeping the absolutist monarchy throughout while the other gradually established representative government. Jean-Laurent Rosenthal's answer emphasizes the two

countries' difference in fiscal structure. Given that the product of taxes was mostly spent on wars, Rosenthal investigated how a country's style of warfare relates to its political regime. His argument combines standard narrative parts with the use of an extensive form game that is formalized in an appendix. The two players, the king and the elite (an abstraction representing the French and English parliaments, and the provincial estates where they existed in France) enjoy separate fiscal resources and try to make the best of them in fighting profitable wars. The king alone has the power of launching a war, and if he exerts it, the elite decide whether to participate financially. Because most wars need joint funding, there is a free rider problem that is more acute when the fiscal resources are shared than when they are in one player's hands; when the prediction that wars are the more frequent, the higher the king's share of fiscal resources. For Rosenthal, France's absolutism was a case of sharing, whereas England's representative government was one of near control by the elite. Rosenthal's model can be tested on the two countries and, if confirmed, will illuminate the connection between their warfare and political regimes. However, it is unclear what it contributes to the initial question of their different paces of political change.

In the nineteenth century, there was a trend in the West to reform military service to more or less universal conscription. Standard histories emphasize democratization and military efficiency, but military efficiency is unclear, and against democratization, reforms took place either before (in Prussia) or later (in France and the United States) than universal suffrage prevailed. Starting from these objections, Margaret Levi narrates the changes in French and American regulations, attending not only to the chronological problem but also to the technical forms of buying out one's military duty (substitution, replacement, commutation). Her narrative is analytic to the extent that it relies on an informal model in the spirit of formal political economy. The main actors are the government, which strives to employ the population efficiently, the constituents, who are divided into social classes with distinctive preferences, and a pivotal legislator, who aligns himself on the coalition prevailing among the classes. Hypothesized changes in the preferences of the government and the middle classes account for the observed change in regulations that is sensitive to its fine-grained features.

Historians of the United States have long been puzzled by the relative stability of the federation of the states through the decades before the Civil War (1861–1865). Classical historians argue that slavery became a divisive issue only after a certain period, and that the Democratic Party following Andrew Jackson managed a successful coalition of Southern and Northern interests. Others put forward local political issues and changing economic conditions. Barry R. Weingast combines these factors into a narrative that stresses explicit political arrangements, especially the "rule of balance" between slave and free states (they should remain equal in number to preserve the South's veto power in the Senate). Crises typically occurred when a new state was admitted. The first newly admitted state brought about a compromise that helped resolve the second, but this did

not work with the third. To keep an effective balance despite the continuing expansion to the West, the slave economy should have developed beyond its feasible limits; this is why conflict became unavoidable. Weingast's explanatory narrative accommodates three formal models: one of the spatial brand of mathematical politics and the other two of the extensive form brand of game theory. These models fully clarify his claim that the rule of balance was necessary to maintain federal stability.

From 1962 to 1989, the International Coffee Organization (ICO) regulated coffee prices by setting export quotas to its members, notably Brazil and Colombia, which were the main producers. The birth of the ICO raises strategic issues that Robert H. Bates addresses in an original format of narrative. He recounts the same event three times: Brazil and Colombia unsuccessfully tried to gather other coffee producers; they brandished the communist threat to trap the United States, their main consumer, into their cartel organization; despite congressional reservations, the United States accepted the deal when Brazil and Colombia's large coffee-selling companies supported it. Each partial narrative is followed by a formal argument—not an actual proper model—that supports it but leaves an explanatory residual that motivates the next narrative step. Bates's discussion of the operations of ICO involves the same alternation.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES AMONG CASE STUDIES

There is much common ground between the previous five studies: Each begins with a set of historical problems that generally emerge from a critique of the extant literature (only the ICO case is too recent for such a reflective start). The problems often concern fine temporal patterns and variations that previous scholarship simply took for granted. A clear answer is finally given, which a modeling effort has contributed to shape, and the authors' methodology emphasizes not only explanation but also empirical testing. This is because their explanatory hypotheses, especially when they are duly formalized, deductively entail more than just the chosen explanandum. There is room for independent testing, ideally by varying parameters such as Rosenthal's fiscal sharing ratio, but also less formally as when Greif supports his account of *podesteria* in Genoa by discussing the form it took elsewhere. It is evident from the authors' related contributions that they believe to have uncovered theoretical patterns that can be transferred successfully. For an example, see Greif's (2004) "A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change" in which he highlights Genoa as a particular case. Still, it is dubious that the studies rely on genuine lawlike regularities, and *Analytic Narratives* (Bates et al. 1998) explicitly distances them from Carl Hempel's 1965 *Aspects of Scientific Explanation*. An unresolved methodological issue is to locate the new genre between this extreme construal and its alternatives, or put more simply, to decide of what the generality of the suggested explanations really consists.

The dissimilarities between the studies in *Analytic Narratives* (Bates et al. 1998) are no less striking, as they relate to the very concept that supposedly unites them. Greif and Bates develop

a clear scheme of alternation between narration and analysis, with a ternary rhythm in Greif and more iterations in Bates (and correspondingly, more modeling in the former than the latter). In this conception, *analytic narrative* cannot mean a narrative that is also analytic but a dual genre in which narratives and analyses cooperate for a common explanatory purpose while keeping their distinct identities. The two components exchange positions—the problems stemming sometimes from one, sometimes from the other, and similarly with the solutions—and influence each other linguistically but are never blurred. What conceptions the other contributors promote is not so explicit. Levi and Rosenthal introduce their technical concepts and hypotheses before proceeding to the narrative, whose foremost function seems to provide empirical evidence to check the hypotheses. Faithful to this hypothesis-testing conception, Levi carefully states the historical facts separately from the explanation they contribute to, but Rosenthal blurs the limits between the two, as if he were after the integrated form that Greif and Bates precisely exclude, i.e., a narrative-made analytic. Exemplifying still another conception, Weingast introduces his hypotheses at the outset, but without technicalities, and his later models serve only to clarify part of them. In a sense, they confirm the narrative rather than the other way round.

IDEAL TYPES AND GAME THEORY

From this overview, one can distinguish four ideal-types of analytic narratives: alternation, hybridation, hypothesis-testing, and supplementation. This classification is new to the methodology of analytic narratives and is conceptually unrelated to, and arguably more significant than, the form and intensity of the modeling effort, which are also quite variable in *Analytical Narratives.* As comparisons across the book show, the formalized model may be solved to variable degrees of detail, depending on its inner complexity and, more subtly, the way it is used. The mathematical demands are not the same if the account is targeted at one or more historical situations and at a few or many selected features of these situations. Also the model may be constructed for the purpose, as in Greif, Rosenthal, and Weingast, or borrowed from the shelf, as in Bates. Levi's study does not involve a formal modeling stage, and critics like Jon Elster (2000) have complained that such borderline cases were little more than standard narratives. Arguably, only modeling in principle and not actual modeling—this proposed distinction parallels a classic one in the philosophy of explanation—is essential to analytic narratives. In politics, international relations, and military strategy, the new genre was predated by heuristic sketches rather than mathematical applications. Many of these sketches can be filled out, and it would seem arbitrary to keep them outside the door. Some topics have already gone through two stages of technicalities. Thus, the 1914 diplomatic crisis was analyzed strategically first at a semiformal level by Jack Levy (1990/91) and second within a full-fledged model by Frank Zagare (2009).

To return to the *Analytical Narratives* contributors (Bates et al. 1998), their most obvious common ground is perhaps their involvement with game theory. Granting the plan of subjecting history to some theoretical framework, this one recommended itself to Greif, Levi, Weingast, and Rosenthal, given their chosen cases. Empirical existence can be claimed for the collectives—clans, states, countries, social classes, or interests—they deal with. Furthermore, in the historical circumstances, these collectives could plausibly be endowed with feasible sets of actions, preferences, and strategic calculations. Game theory was perhaps not so appropriate for Rosenthal's wide-ranging explananda; he can employ it only after lumping together—e.g., in the "elite"—a large number of very different actors. Within game theory, *Analytical Narratives* claims a special status for extensive forms of perfect information and subgame perfection. Granting that the latter is a powerful equilibrium concept for the former, the two contentious issues are how analytic narrators would solve extensive forms under imperfect information and why they should not sometimes employ normal forms. To see these alternative forms at work, take O. G. Haywood's (1954) penetrating analysis of World War II (1939–1945) battles in terms of two-person zero-sum games—the first application ever made of a game-theoretic technique to history.

The *Analytical Narratives* contributors make occasional use of social choice theory, and they could have resorted more to decision theory, at least in the basic form of an expected utility apparatus. These two blocks are integral parts of the mathematical corpus of rational choice theory (RCT), so it is appropriate that the debate over analytic narratives has centered on their association with the compound rather than just game theory. Elster (2000) claims that *Analytical Narratives* fails because the standard already-telling objections to RCT become absolutely irresistible in the contributors' case. For instance, the problem of checking for the actors' motivations, given that they are not observed but conjectured from overt behavior, is dramatized by the information lacunae that are the historians' lot. Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, and Weingast respond both by defending RCT for lack of better alternatives and arguing that their applications do not worsen its case.

Some academics do agree with Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, and Weingast but would emphasize more than they do the relativity of success and failure. In social sciences generally, RCT has preferential explananda: human actions and their proximate consequences, when the actors are individuals or can be regarded as such, perform some deliberation or calculation, and their desires can be disentangled from their beliefs. The closer its case stands to this ideal point, the more promising the analytic narrative, and conversely, cases that depart on too many dimensions are bound to failure. A paradoxical consequence is that analytic narratives perform well in those areas in which ordinary narratives already do; this is because RCT and ordinary narratives share roughly the same preferential explananda.

These are the objective conditions, as it were, and there are others relative to the intellectual context. A convincing analytic narrative needs rooting into traditional history. There should be a problem neglected by the historians, but this problem, once brought to light, should attract them, and their inadequate records should be adequate enough for the solution arrived

at analytically to be double-checked. This is a knife's edge, and there could be few candidates that survive in the end.

CONCLUSION

Philippe Mongin's 2009 analytic narrative of the Waterloo campaign in June 1815 in "A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Waterloo Campaign and Some Comments on the Analytic Narrative Project" is meant to provide a decently favorable case along these stringent lines. (Campaign narratives and military applications generally appear to be a fertile area for the new genre.) Mongin starts from a gap in the extant narratives: They do not properly explain why Napoleon weakened himself before his decisive battle against Wellington by sending Grouchy's detachment against Blücher. This failure at answering a major historical question by ordinary means suggests a RCT model. Beside the contextual condition, the objective conditions are met paradigmatically—the explanandum being a single man's action, taken deliberately in a limited context of uncertainty to achieve a seemingly transparent objective of victory. Mongin introduces a zero-sum game of incomplete information in normal form. At the unique equilibrium, Napoleon's strategy consists in dividing his army, sending out Grouchy to prevent Blücher from joining Wellington. Eventually, nature played against Napoleon, and Grouchy messed up the orders, so the ex post failure is compatible with ex ante rationality. This is the claim of the pro-Napoleonic literature but rejuvenated by the technical apparatus. Here, the analytic narrative plays an arbitration role between historians, but elsewhere, it will provide them with new conclusions and, most importantly, new explananda to consider.

See also *Discourse Analysis; Event History and Duration Modeling; Hierarchical Modeling; Historical Method, Comparative.*

. . . .   PHILIPPE MONGIN

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Anarchism

The term *anarchism* comes to us from the Greek *anarkhos,* defined as "without a ruler." While seemingly uncomplicated, the question of whether and how societies might live peacefully without a ruler is at the core of anarchist theory and practice.

HISTORICAL ROOTS

Until French writer Pierre-Joseph Proudhon embraced them in his 1840 book *What Is Property?,* the words *anarchy* and *anarchism* were pejorative terms for the chaotic and conflictual condition said to result from the absence of a ruler. While Proudhon was the first self-proclaimed anarchist, the political theory of anarchism is conventionally traced back to William Godwin's *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice,* published in 1793. Although never using the label, Godwin rejected the artificial and coercive authority of the state in favor of a natural, egalitarian society. Anarchist thought can then be traced through a number of European and American writers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Benjamin Tucker, and Emma Goldman.

Anarchism is much more, however, than the creation of these individuals. Kropotkin himself argues that "[a]narchy does not draw its origin from . . . any system of philosophy" but represents one of "two currents of thought and action [that] have been in conflict in . . . [all] human societies . . . from all times there have been Anarchists and Statists" (Horowitz 1964, 145–147).

AN ANARCHIST ORIENTATION

Understood in this way, anarchism is less an intellectual tradition than it is a distinctive spirit, or an *orientation,* defined by antipathy to domination and coercion—especially, but not solely, by the state—and a vision of an alternative free of domination. This understanding casts a wide net, drawing together not only avowed anarchists, but many earlier thinkers, activists, and movements. Various interpreters and historians have characterized Lao Tzu, Aristippus, Zeno, Diogenes, Jesus, and the Anabaptists, for example, as sharing an anarchist orientation. It is also reflected in many literary and cultural works. Perhaps surprisingly, this understanding also expands the scope of contemporary anarchism. While there has been a notable reemergence of self-proclaimed anarchists in recent

years, the pejorative connotation of anarchy as "chaos" remains influential. As a consequence, many in the alternative globalization, antiwar, indigenous autonomy, radical environmental, and radical feminist movements share an anarchist orientation, yet eschew the label—often describing themselves as *antiauthoritarian* instead.

In contrast to the artificial, coercive power of the state and other institutions that they reject, anarchists counterpoise a more natural and informal basis—Kropotkin calls it "mutual aid"—for social harmony and agreement. Although anarchists characterize this alternative vision in diverse ways, its role is vital. As a consequence, while some who are truly anarchists do not identify themselves using with the label, others who do promote the term are not properly understood as anarchists. Philosopher Robert Paul Wolff's widely read *In Defense of Anarchism* offers a prominent example of this. Wolff unequivocally rejects the legitimacy of the state, arguing that it conflicts with individual moral autonomy, which he takes to be "the fundamental assumption of moral philosophy" (Wolff 1970, 12). Yet Wolff makes no actual defense of anarchism; he offers no sense of how a society might be sustained without the state. As a result, he makes no argument for dismantling or overthrowing states or rulers, despite their avowed illegitimacy.

INDIVIDUAL VERSUS COMMUNITY?

If, as Emma Goldman has argued, anarchism stands for both "the sovereignty of the individual" and "social harmony," anarchists both past and present can be differentiated by their relative emphasis on the individual or community. Often this reflects differences in their views of property and capitalist economic organization. At one end of the spectrum, individualist anarchists regard private property as the basis for a noncoercive society. At the other, anarchist communists reject capitalism and private property as a central form of domination in modern society. Other differences exist. While the historical preoccupation of anarchism has been the abolition of state rule, many contemporary anarchists have sought to expand the rejection of "rule" to hierarchies of race, gender, and species.

ANARCHISM'S INFLUENCE AND RELEVANCE

The legacy and contemporary relevance of anarchism depends on the viewpoint from which it is assessed. As a comprehensive theory and revolutionary movement, anarchism can be understood literally as *utopian*—it exists nowhere—and has been unsuccessful in reconstructing any large-scale society in its image. Moreover, such an anarchist theory relies on a dichotomy: On one side is the coercive power of the state and other rejected forms of rule; on the other are social sanctions and other informal sources of power acceptable with a liberated society. Yet theorists from Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill to Michel Foucault have argued that the latter can be at least as domineering as the former. If so, both normative and empirical bases for such a dichotomy become questionable.

By contrast, the influence of an anarchist orientation has been widespread. Bakunin and other nineteenth-century anarchists offered a remarkably prescient critique of the perils of the proletarian state envisioned by Marx. During the twentieth century, anarchists have been a fount of energy and inspiration to labor organizing and the creation of cooperative institutions, to resistance during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), and to education reform movements. In recent decades, as Uri Gordon has argued, an anarchist orientation has been central to many grassroots political movements, opposing domination in a wide variety of forms. It also has promoted an ethos of *direct action* rather than attempting to influence policy makers and other institutional actors.

Rather than condemning anarchism to the dustbin of history, the inability to truly liberate society has continued to nurture anarchists' critical and reconstructive vision. In this sense, paraphrasing Kropotkin, there will *always* be anarchists.

See also *Anarchy; Authority; Bakunin, Mikhail; Goldman, Emma; Kropotkin, Peter.*

. . . . JOHN M. MEYER

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Anarchy

The term *anarchy* derives from ancient Greek where it originally meant "absence of a leader." In current usage we can distinguish between two main meanings: anarchy in the strict sense means absence of a chief or a government, while in the broader sense it denotes a condition of disorder and chaos.

THE DEFINITION: ABSENCE OF GOVERNMENT OR DISORDER?

Although the two meanings of the term *anarchy* are often intermingled in common language, it is important to distinguish between them at the conceptual level. In technical usage, it would be better to limit the usage to the strict meaning. While the term *anarchy* in the sense of disorder is

superfluous (other possible words for it being *chaos, mess,* and *disarray*), the strict meaning is necessary because we otherwise lack a single word to denote the third possibility between the existence of a government and pure chaos. In other words, *anarchy* is needed to denote the fact that order is possible even in absence of an orderer.

This definition has three main corollaries. First, most scholars agree that anarchy does not mean lack of organization, although disputes may arise as to the degree of centralization that is compatible with anarchy (e.g., for some a noncoercive form of government is compatible with anarchy). This is very clear in primitive acephalous (literally, "headless") societies and in the case of the society of sovereign states: In both cases, we have anarchical societies that display a high degree of organization even in the absence of a common government.

Second, anarchy does not only mean absence of the state. Anarchy means absence of coercive and centralized governments, of which the state is only one of the possible forms (other examples being empires or hierarchically ordered tribes). The reason why anarchy came to mean hostility to the state is that, since its rise, the modern sovereign state appeared as the culminating point of political life, the alternative to it being anarchy. This is clear in social contract theories that counterpoise the civil society to a hypothetical anarchical state of nature, thus supporting the passage from the denotation of absence of government to its frequent connotation of disorder. Such an opposition is however more a normative and therefore disputable model of social order than a description of the actual origins of the state.

Third, anarchy is both a descriptive and a prescriptive concept. In the first sense, it denotes a state of things, such as the condition of the acephalous societies mentioned above, while, in the second, it means an ideal that must be pursued. The anarchic ideal is characterized by the central emphasis it puts on the concept of freedom, so much so that some have claimed that this word summarizes the sense of the entire anarchic doctrine.

FORMS OF ANARCHY: THE ANARCHIC IDEAL

Although the anarchic ideal is recurrent in different cultures and epochs, it is in the nineteenth and twentieth century when a number of revolutionary movements emerged in many Western countries that Western anarchism as a distinct political doctrine emerged. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon is usually recognized as the first to have defined himself as an anarchist, which led many to consider him the father of modern anarchism.

Anarchists are united by their refusal of coercive forms of authority, be they political or religious, and their plea for voluntary and spontaneous forms of organizations that follow a bottom-up logic. Yet, many different and variegated forms of anarchism exist, and they can be grouped according to the different ends and means of their political proposals. With regards to the *ends,* there is a broad distinction between individualist

and social approaches. The usual example of a strict individualist credo is the theory of the German philosopher Max Stirner, who argued that freedom can have no other principle and end than the self and its egoism. Individualist anarchism developed mainly in the United States, where anarchism has often been coupled with the free market (an example being the so-called *anarcho-capitalism*).

On the opposite side stand those approaches that see the realization of the self as possible only within and through the society. Distinct approaches among these are communists, such as the Russian Peter Kropotkin, and collectivists, such as Michael Bakunin, who favored a form of communism of production but recognized some space for the individual enjoyment of the fruits of labor. Behind the different forms of anarchism stand radically different conceptions of freedom: The idea that freedom is to be realized individually (Stirner) or that it can only be achieved in common because, as Bakunin observed, one cannot be free in a society of slaves because their slavery prevents the full realization of one's own freedom.

With regards to the *means* through which anarchy is to be realized, most anarchists agree that they must be homogenous to the ends: If the aim is freedom, it can only be realized through free means. Differences emerge as to the way in which they must be conceived: (1) Some favored forms of rebellion or revolution, (2) others valued more nonviolent means such as education, while (3) others, taking an intermediate route, looked for an alliance with workers' organizations such as trade unions, which can both educate the masses and provide the infrastructures for the reorganization of society (see in particular the French and Spanish anarcho-syndicalism).

Among the first, there must be a further distinction between those who trust the spontaneity of revolution and others who believe in the "propaganda by the deeds"; that is, either local rebellions that could stimulate masses elsewhere toward a general revolution or single individual acts of violence, like assassination of political leaders. While the recourse to violence is very much controversial among anarchists, most of them agree on the importance of education for the creation of an anarchical society. Among those who emphasized education are antiviolence writers such as the Russian Leo Tolstoy or contemporary pacifist and ecological movements.

In the decades surrounding the turn of the twenty-first century, political and technological transformations have lead to a resurgence of interest in anarchism. On the one hand, the decline in popularity of Marxism in the 1990s created a sort of vacuum in the radical left. This is linked also to the fact that the collapse of the Soviet Union showed that the anarchists were right in their critique of Marxists: a workers' state cannot but reproduce the same logic of every state, where a minority of state bureaucrats rule over the majority of people. Nevertheless, the main reason for the resurgence of interest in anarchism is linked to the technological developments of the past few decades, which are usually referred to as globalization. The rise of network forms of social, economic, and political organizations, in particular through the World Wide Web and

associated technologies, have somehow proved what modern political theory has always been reluctant to recognize: order is possible without an orderer.

See also *Anarchism; Authority; Freedom; Social Contract; Tyranny, Classical.*

. . . . CHIARA BOTTICI

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Anglophone Africa

Anglophone Africa refers primarily to sub-Sahara African states colonized by the British Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. English is the most widely spoken language in independent Africa, and twenty of Africa's fifty-three countries use English as their official lingua franca. With the exceptions of South Africa (1700s–1910—dates for colonization) and the island nation of Mauritius (1810–1968), the British colonies scattered on the Western Coast of Africa are the earliest: the Gambia (1664–1965), Sierra Leone (1787–1961), and Nigeria (1861–1960), the largest country by population in Africa, along with Ghana (1874–1957). Lesotho, entirely landlocked within South Africa, was also an earlier colony (1867–1966).

The later wave of colonization, following the Berlin Conference of 1885 (also referred to as the "Scramble for Africa"), includes the southern countries of Botswana (1885–1966), Zimbabwe (1890–1980), Malawi (1891–1964), Zambia (1891–1964), and Swaziland (1902–1968). The largest countries by population, besides Nigeria, are all in east Africa: Kenya (1885–1963), Uganda (1885–1965), and Tanzania (1918–1964), while the largest by land area is the Sudan (1899–1956). Of these sixteen countries, only Tanzania, the Sudan, and Zimbabwae are not among the member states of the British Commonwealth.

Other countries may be included in Anglophone Africa either due to their use of English or their colonial heritage. Liberia is an English-speaking African country that was not colonized by the British but was purchased by the American colonization society to act as a homeland for freed African American slaves. The northern portion of Somalia (though not internationally recognized as the Republic of Somaliland) was colonized by the British from 1884 to 1960. Egypt is also a formerly British-colonized African country but is Arabic-speaking. Namibia is an English-speaking, formerly German-colonized country; Cameroon is a Francophone African country whose Northeastern region uses English as its lingua franca due to joint British colonial administration with Nigeria (1916–1961). Both Cameroon and Namibia belong to the present-day Commonwealth, as do English-speaking Sierra Leone and Rwanda.

DECOLONIZATION AND QUICK DEMOCRATIC REVERSAL

During the decolonization period (primarily the 1960s), Britain created local government councils and national legislative council institutions in its former colonies to use as vehicles for influencing the eventual shape of the independent democratic governments. Established as liberal democracies at independence, most countries reformed the British Westminster parliamentary system to evolve presidential hybrid systems. Since the early 1970s, with the exception of Botswana, the Gambia, and Mauritius, Anglophone Africa's liberal democracies have suffered democratic reversals, beginning with the constriction of multiparty regimes into one-party states and continuing with the ousting of democratic governments by military regimes. Examples include,

- *Tanzania:* The leadership of the first prime minister, Julius Nyerere, paved the way for the 1965 referendum that transitioned the Westminster parliamentary system into the self-styled, Ujaama one-party "democracy."
- *Kenya:* By 1966, federalism was discontinued and transformed into a one-party regime by the first majority party, the Kenyan African Nationalist Union (KANU).
- *Nigeria:* A tripartite federalist, Westminster parliamentary regime was ousted by a military coup in 1966 after just seven years, despite the notable leadership of its first president, Nnamdi Azikiwe; first prime minister, Sir Tafewa Balewa; and western region premier, Obafemi Awolowo.
- *Ghana:* One of the continent's first independent democracies in 1957, its liberal democratic regime was ousted in a coup in 1968 after a metamorphosis toward one-party socialism under the the pan-Africanist leadership of West Africa's first independence nationalist, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, and his populist Congress Peoples Party (CPP).
- *The Sudan:* A Westminster parliamentary regime from 1956 until 1969 gave way to the single-party military regime of Jafar Numeiri (1969–1985) due to war, instability, and the dominance of the northern Muslim Sudanese to the exclusion of the non-Muslim South.
- *Uganda:* A democratic regime led by President Milton Obote was overthrown in a 1971 coup by General Idi Amin.

THIRD WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION

By the end of the cold war in the 1990s, what political scientist Samuel Huntington has called the "Third

EUROPE

ATLANTIC
OCEAN

ASIA

Mediterranean Sea

TUNISIA

MOROCCO

ALGERIA

LIBYA

EGYPT

Nile

Red Sea

SAHARAWI ARAB
DEM. REP.

MAURITANIA

MALI

NIGER

CHAD

Khartoum

ERITREA

★Asmara

CAPE
VERDE

SUDAN

DJIBOUTI

SENEGAL

Banjul

Addis
Ababa

THE GAMBIA

★

GUINEA-BISSAU

GUINEA

BURKINA
FASO

ETHIOPIA

SOMALIA

Freetown ★

SIERRA LEONE

Monrovia ★

LIBERIA

CÔTE
D'IVOIRE

GHANA

BENIN

NIGERIA

★Abuja

CENTRAL
AFRICAN
REPUBLIC

Accra

TOGO

CAMEROON

UGANDA

KENYA

Congo

Kampala

Nairobi

EQUATORIAL
GUINEA

GABON

DEM. REP. OF
THE CONGO

★

Victoria

★

SAO TOME &
PRINCIPE

RWANDA
BURUNDI

SEYCHELLES

REP. OF THE
CONGO
Cabinda
(ANGOLA)

TANZANIA

Dar es Salaam

ATLANTIC

OCEAN

ANGOLA

COMOROS

Lilongwe MALAWI

ZAMBIA

★

Lusaka★

Harare

Mozambique Channel

MAURITIUS

Port Louis ★

ZIMBABWE

MADAGASCAR

NAMIBIA

BOTSWANA

Windhoek ★

Gaborone

Pretoria

Maputo

Mbabane

SWAZILAND

Maseru

SOUTH
AFRICA

LESOTHO

Cape Town ★

INDIAN

OCEAN

| | Anglophone country |

0   500 Mi

0   500 Km

The term "Anglophone Africa" refers to English-speaking African nations influenced by British colonialism.

Wave of Democratization" spread to Anglophone Africa. Zambia's 1990–1991 prodemocracy Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) in 1991 was first to reestablish democracy through the leadership of former union leader Fredrick Chiluba, who replaced Kenneth Kaunda's UNIP one-party regime. Kenya formally restored multiparty elections in 1992 under President Daniel Arap Moi, but only in 2001 did the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) finally oust KANU regime dominance and usher in a genuine democratic transition. Nigeria underwent a redemocratization period between 1979 and 1983, and another in 1993, but did not truly reachieve democracy until its 1999 military-led elections that resulted in its fourth republic, the Obasanjo regime. In the midst of these transitions, the Gambia underwent a military coup in 1994, but soon reestablished multiparty elections in 1997.

South Africa's transition to democracy was significant in both African and world politics. The country's 1948 establishment of a multiparty democracy for white settlers led by National Party (NP) dominance and the establishment of formal white minority rule was not truly a democracy, as it excluded most of the nation's population. Although the African National Congress (ANC) was founded in 1912 to embark upon (black) majority rule, only in 1990, under the new leadership of President F. W De Klerk, did a pact between the NP and the ANC's Nelson Mandela result in the first full-suffrage election. The 1994 election was an ANC electoral victory, installing Nelson Mandela as the first black African president, and completing South Africa's democratic transition.

LEVELS OF DEMOCRACY IN ANGLOPHONE AFRICA

Only a few Anglophone African countries are classified as *free* democracies with the highest political rights and civil liberties. These countries have established liberal democratic institutions and play more than nominal reference to human rights. The domains of power reserved for the military or other actors not accountable to the electorate are absent, and government systems in these democracies have achieved both vertical and horizontal accountability that constrain executive power and protect constitutionality, legality, and the democratic process. The regimes extend provisions for political and civic pluralism, as well as individual and group freedoms, as individuals are able to frequently exercise their rights to citizenship in obtaining unfettered and just access to the democratic system. Examples include,

- *Botswana's* Botswana Democratic Party's (BDP) continuous democracy
- *Ghana's* recent turnover electoral victory by President Attah-Mills's National Democratic Coalition (NDC) party
- *South Africa's* 1994 liberal democratic constitution (CODESA) that extends rights to gays and lesbians
- *Mauritius's* ethnically plural consensus democracy
- *Lesotho's* experiments in proportional representation to extend voting rights more fully to minorities,

These are all characteristics of the substantive democratic deepening among these countries.

Several of Africa's largest Anglophone countries remain only partially free, including Nigeria, Kenya, and Tanzania, whose large, multiethnic, complexly forged socioeconomic contexts foster certain limitations in fully consolidating liberal democracy. The Sudan and Zimbabwe, on the other hand, are infamously known for their "not-free" statuses with the worst political rights and civil liberty regimes on the African continent. Sudan ended its thirty-year war with the non-Muslim south in a bifederal unity government in 2004, but then emerged the Darfur crisis, during which the Sudanese militarized regime (National Islamic Front—NIF) chose a military option to subvert the Darfuran militant resistance. The effect on Sudanese democracy of an April 2009 ICC indictment of President Omar Bashir for human rights abuses against Sudanese citizens remains to be seen. Zimbabwe also is considered a not-free democracy due to party dominance and the exclusion of opposition by President Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) regime. A February 2009 government of national unity coalition between ZANU and the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), led by Prime Minister Morgan Tzviringirai, held promise and hope for the consolidation of democracy in Zimbabwe.

See also *Democracy and Democratization; Francophone Africa; Lusophone Africa; Postindependent Africa, Politics and Governance in.*

. . . . RITA KIKI EDOZIE

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Animal Rights

The idea that animals have rights develops almost solely within Western intellectual traditions. Vegetarianism based on respect for animals in non-Western cultures was almost always based on religious asceticism. Philosophical vegetarianism seems first to have appeared in classical Greek thought with the quasi-theological work of Pythagoras and the neo-Platonists, Plutarch, and Porphyry. Throughout ancient antiquity and the Middle Ages, however, Western philosophy and theology, under the influence of Aristotle and the Bible, assumed that animals existed for the convenience of humanity. Although heretical sects like the Jewish Christians in the early church and several Manichean movements in late antiquity and the Middle Ages were vegetarian, they sought purification of the human soul rather than the welfare of animals. The Protestant Reformation gave greater recognition to the earthly suffering and future resurrection of animals, especially in the more radical sects, which were particularly strong in

England. This new sensitivity to animals, along with Enlightenment humanitarianism and Romantic naturalism, prepared the animal welfare movements of the nineteenth century.

Bernard Mandeville, Frances Hutcheson, David Hume, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and other figures of the Enlightenment advanced the ideas of compassion and sympathy that brought them close to animal rights. Indeed English philosopher Jeremy Bentham, counting only aggregates of pain and pleasure, famously said ". . . the question is not, Can they reason?, nor Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?" But like all the major writers of this period, Bentham the radical was too much a prisoner of deeply embedded custom and tradition to carry thoughts like this through to a logical conclusion (i.e., principled vegetarianism). In the nineteenth century, some transcendentalists such as Henry David Thoreau moved to principled vegetarianism and a more general respect for animals and nature.

The modern theory of animal rights, as well as the movement to secure them, really begins with the 1975 publication of *Animal Liberation* by Peter Singer. Singer, himself a utilitarian, systematically worked out the full implications of Bentham's thought on animals: If every sentient individual is to count as one, then the suffering of a nonhuman animal counts no less than that of a human. The interests of animals must thus be accorded equal respect. Not to do so is *specieism,* a term that Singer popularized, holding that the modern movement for liberation focused until then on racism and sexism should extend also to the liberation of animals from specieism. Singer reviewed at length the horrors of factory farming and the torments of animals in biomedical research, all but a tiny fraction of which he showed to be pointless, repetitious, or misleading. For factory farming, Singer's remedy is vegetarianism. For the evils of research, limit animal testing to what is truly urgent. His test for urgency is whether the experimenters would be willing to take human infants of six months or younger and mentally defective adults as the subjects of their experiments. Such entities, Singer holds, have no more preference for life than animals.

The great alternative to Singer and utilitarianism is the rights approach, the classic text for which is Tom Regan's *The Case for Animal Rights* (1983). Regan begins by observing that no responsible thinker has ever held that we may treat animals in any way we please and then elaborates on the full meaning of that common intuition. He dismisses as inadequate the idea that cruelty is to be ruled out merely because of its alleged "indirect effect" in hardening human hearts in their treatment of each other. Utilitarianism is excluded also because it treats individual sentient beings as mere receptacles for units of utility, which may then be abstracted and aggregated and can thus sacrifice justice to individuals to maximize an aggregate. Respect for animals as individuals requires taking each subject-of-a-life as a locus of "inherent value" or subjectivity and recognizing that this inherent value is equal for every subject-of-a-life. This rights approach goes beyond Singer's utilitarianism in admitting no exceptions to vegetarianism and condemning all experimentation on animals as inherently wrong and unnecessary in the long run. Although Regan confines full subjectivity to mammals of a year or more in age, he

admits that the circle of rights may be extended, and other theorists have done so.

More recently Christine M. Korsgaard has argued that humans cannot value their own sensible nature without valuing that of animals as well. Julian H. Franklin has deepened the foundations of the rights position by showing that Kant's categorical imperative logically includes all sentient beings among its beneficiaries, not only humans, even though rational beings alone are subject to its obligations.

See also *Children's Rights; Enlightenment Political Thought; Kant, Immanuel; Utilitarianism.*

. . . .   JULIAN H. FRANKLIN

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Annexation

See *Occupation and Annexation*.

Anthems, National

See *National Anthems.*

Anthony, Susan Brownell

American political reformer and "Napoleon of the women's rights movement," Susan B. Anthony (1820–1906) was born in Massachusetts. Over the course of a sixty-year career as a reformer, Anthony traveled an average of thirteen thousand miles (twenty-one thousand kilometers) a year to garner support for women's causes. Her reformist nature was nurtured from an early age by her activist Baptist mother and her abolitionist father, a liberal Quaker who had been run out of the local meeting house for allowing young people to hold dancing lessons in his attic.

At age fifteen, Anthony began teaching in her father's school during summer breaks. The part-time job turned into a full-time profession three years later when her father became impoverished during a financial recession. In 1848, Anthony's career as a reformer was launched when she joined the local chapter of the Daughters of Temperance. She also became an ardent abolitionist, expressing her support for the controversial John Brown. She did not, however, take part in the first women's rights convention held in Seneca Falls, New York, in 1848 under the leadership of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott. Although her interest in women's rights was ignited after her parents and sister returned from Seneca Falls, it was not until reformer Amelia Bloomer introduced her to suffragists Stanton and Lucy Stone in 1851 that Anthony became actively involved in the fledgling movement.

Anthony and Stanton became lifelong friends and colleagues, actively lobbying for women's suffrage, abolition, and equal rights for women and African Americans, often under the auspices of the American Equal Rights Association, which they cofounded. To promote their views, they published the radical newspaper, *The Revolution,* from 1868 to 1870.

The women's movement split amid the furor over the Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870, which guaranteed suffrage to black men but not to women. Anthony and Stanton formed the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA) in 1869. The breech among the women's groups was healed over the next two decades. In 1890, NWSA merged with the American Woman Suffrage Association, which under the leadership of Lucy Stone had supported the Fifteenth Amendment, to create the National American Woman's Suffrage Association. It was not until the 1960s that the women's movement and civil rights movement again supported one another's struggle for equal rights.

Anthony wrote a number of articles and speeches, most notably *The True Woman* (1859) and the *Declaration of the Rights of Woman* (1876) with Stanton and Matilda Jocelyn Gage. Anthony's most significant work was her contribution to the multiauthored six-volume *History of Woman's Suffrage* published between 1881 and 1922. In 1896, with Anthony's consent, Husted Harper authored a two-volume biography of her; a third volume was published after Anthony's death.

In 1872, Anthony challenged the ban on female suffrage by voting illegally. She was arrested and convicted. The decades-long collaboration of Anthony and Stanton culminated in 1920 when the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, known familiarly as the Susan B. Anthony Amendment, gave white women the right to vote. Neither woman lived to experience the success that had taken seventy-two years to accomplish.

See also *Women's Rights; Women's Suffrage.*

. . . . ELIZABETH RHOLETTER PURDY

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Anti- and Alter-globalization Movements

The anti-globalization movement is a social movement that opposes neoliberal corporate-led globalization as advanced by corporations, neoclassical economists, and key global institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The movement asserts that the current form of globalization, which is based on economic integration through trade, investment, and financial flows, is not beneficial to the majority of the world's population nor to the environment. Its goal is to ensure that globalization's burden does not fall on workers, communities, the environment, women, and other more marginalized sectors of society. This movement is part of what is known as *new social movements.* That is, movements that are cross-class—advocate a myriad of issues rather than being one-issue specific—and transnational in terms of demands, focus, and even organizational forms. This cross-borders movement first came to light and became known by the term *anti-globalization* movement after staging mass demonstrations in Seattle, Washington, in 1999. However, some scholars argue that the roots of this kind of cross-border citizens' activism against global economic trends can be found decades if not centuries earlier during European colonialism and antislavery movements. According to these scholars, there are several hundred years of movements that, with varying degrees of success, made international linkages on specific issues related to cross-borders economic integration.

The *alter-globalization* movement, which is a less-known term sometimes used interchangeably with *anti-globalization* to delineate the same thing, has a lot of commonalities with the latter. That is, both anti- and alter-globalization movements emphasize a shared conception of neoliberalism as a global project harmful to the majority of the world population and the environment. The terms were coined to distinguish a current of thought and activism that is not opposed to globalization as a multidimensional and often inevitable process linking people together; rather, it is to emphasize the need for a different form of globalization whereby this process and its different composites of telecommunication leaps, global governance, and economic logic work for the benefit of the majority of the world's population and not a minority of corporations. Many of the activists and groups involved in this movement are not necessarily against capitalism, rather they want to use to use it in a way that can enhance prosperity with better distribution of resources and opportunities. Initiatives such as *fair trade,* corporate codes of conduct, flexible migration laws, and free use of the Internet are examples of what this movement and its different groups work on.

For the contemporary anti-globalization and alter-globalization movements, three episodes have been seminal to putting it center stage within living-room discussions as much as academic and policy-making debates: the Seattle protests of 1999, the Genoa protests of 2001, and the antiwar demonstrations in 2003 in multiple cities. While other demonstrations targeting neoliberal global policies were organized earlier—during World Bank and IMF meetings (including Berlin in 1988 and Madrid in 1994)—and later (Washington, D.C., in 2000, G8 meetings in different European cities early in the new millennium), these three episodes were the largest and most confrontational. They stirred academic debate about the limitation of the nation-state both as an actor and as a target for contention, and the impact and potential of global civil society and transnational activism and movements. The movement adopted a discourse of unified neoliberalism as a master frame, and accordingly devised and

included a cultural framing process that universalizes its short-comings and alternatives to the movement itself.

ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS

Not only has the anti-globalization movement ushered in new concepts and cultural frames, but it also emphasized new forms of organization. Observers such as Carlos Azambuja (2003) describe the movement as:

> . . . [dis]organization that has no hierarchical structure or operational center, consisting of just "us," in whose interventions thousands of organizations come together horizontally to protest, in one way or another, the current world order. They can grow infinitely without anyone having to give up his individuality to any hierarchical structure. (1)

The movement has been conceptualized as a network. A network in this analysis is a wider concept that potentially includes social movements but also nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), professional unions, and the media. Networks make great use of information technology and are characterized by alliances forged between groups with disparate political and ideological affiliations, and by the great diversity in the backgrounds of their members. These loose horizontal forms of organization, the cross-class nature of the movement (intellectuals, students, workers, professionals), along with the diverse ideological leanings of participants and their demands (environmentalists, feminists, Marxists, anarchists, liberal-humanists) put it within the category of new social movements. Using changes in technology, innovative protest styles, information politics, and analytical advances, this movement created debates about the changing nature of contentious politics in the new millennium. The debates ranged from a post–nation-state era to global policing and the demise of political parties.

IMPACT

The anti-globalization movement marked a growing space for extraparliamentary politics and the rising number and diversified tactics of different movements that could be adopted and adapted by others, including the range of alliances, organizational forms, and framing dissent. The movement also gave rise to transnational or global civil society forums pioneered in the World Social Forum (WSF). The first WSF, held in 2001, convened in Porto Alegre, Brazil, with the intention to provide a counterevent to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Since then the social forums have been replicated on a regional level (European and Asian Social Forums). The forum is held under the slogan "Another World Is Possible," which summarizes the common outlook of the various participants advocating alternatives for the neoliberal model on different issues.

The WSF, which is attended by individual activists, social movement representatives, NGOs, and some leftist political parties, is meant to serve as a global rally against corporate-led globalization and a meeting point where delegates can exchange experiences and coordinate and plan campaigns.

For instance, the WSF was a rallying point for worldwide dissent against the U.S. invasion of Iraq, with protests held in different cities on February 15, 2003. Hence, what came to be called the *antiwar movement* since 2003 is in fact an extension of the anti-globalization movement in terms of participants, tactics, and aspired universality. Thus, the emergence of antiwar movement, which was the biggest campaign and most successful mobilization attempt (in terms of size at least) of the anti-globalization movement, has marked the retreat of the latter.

See also *Contentious Politics; Globalization; Globalization and Development; Modernization; Protests and Demonstrations.*

. . . .   RABAB EL-MAHDI

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Anticlericalism

Anticlericalism is an attribute of a political movement or ideology that refers to animosity or opposition to the established religious leadership, often associated with broad disapproval of the public role of religion. While secularism describes the dissociation of religion and public life, anticlericalism seeks the deliberate limitation and reversal of the influence of religious leaders through legal and behavioral constraints. Anticlericalism was a foundational premise of many of the revolutionary movements from the Protestant Reformation of the 1500s to the Iranian White Revolution of the 1960s and continuing in various forms to the present day.

Anticlericalism arose originally in European politics in response to the power of the Roman Catholic papacy and clergy in the Middle Ages. The Reformation challenged the power of the Roman Catholic Church as the sole interpreter of doctrine and practice, and it led parts of northern Europe to break with the church, sparking almost a century of warfare. For example, Martin Luther's major works beginning in 1520 directly challenged the authority and sanctity of the Roman Catholic priesthood and the papacy. As a result, the Peace of

Westphalia of 1648 committed the nations of Europe to refrain from attempting to enforce Roman Catholic orthodoxy and, more generally, introduced the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio,* under which the religion of the leader was made the religion of the people.

Nevertheless, the Roman Catholic Church remained a powerful force in Europe and colonial areas up to the modern age. In countries such as France, Italy, and Spain that had resisted the Reformation, the clergy was commonly associated with conservative and monarchical power, while radical and leftist forces typically espoused anticlerical attitudes as a form of opposition to the dominant classes.

Enlightenment Europe brought many new anticlerical forces to power. The Jacobin movement that inspired the French Revolution (1789–1799) was ardently opposed to the established power of the church in addition to its opposition to aristocracy and monarchy. Acts of the revolutionary National Assembly up to and including the 1790 Civil Constitution of the Clergy led to the confiscation of church property and dissolved religious orders.

Anticlericalism was equally a force in colonial resistance movements. For example, a persistent theme of Mexican politics has been the limitation of the power of the Roman Catholic clergy through deliberate anticlerical policies, such as article 27 of the 1917 Mexican constitution (since amended), which forbid the church from owning property. Early postcolonial constitutions specifically laid out restraints on the church, and church properties were held by the revolutionary governments with a view toward redistribution of these assets.

The totalitarian movements of the 1930s brooked no dissent from any societal force and the religious establishment was no exception. Marx's famous dictum that "religion is the opiate of the masses" inspired an antagonism toward religious authorities in most all communist states from the Soviet Union to Cuba. Fascist movements in Italy and Germany in the 1930s were more ambiguously anticlerical, combining a vague tolerance of religion with a desire to subordinate and persecute clergy should they present a strong philosophical challenge to chauvinistic nationalism. In non-Christian contexts, movements of both the left and the right have likewise pursued an anticlerical bent, from Maoist suppression of the Buddhist religion in China to the enforced secularism in Kemalist Turkey and Iran under Muhammad Reza Shah.

Anticlericalism remains a part of many modern and secularizing political movements and has had an important influence on many feminist and structuralist analyses. For example, leading feminist theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether has criticized traditional religion and the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church and the Vatican. Likewise in critical texts on colonialism such as that of Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth,* organized religion is castigated for its role in perpetuating relationships of dominance. The resurgence of religion as a militant force, beginning in the 1990s and demonstrated in the attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States, also has led many to argue that it is inherently regressive and should be subordinated to liberal norms.

See also *Reformation Political Thought; Religion and Politics; Roman Catholic Social Thought; Secularism.*

. . . . PAUL S. ROWE

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Anti-democratic Thought

The term *democracy* originated in classical Athens and combines the ancient Greek words *demos,* meaning "the people," and *kratein,* meaning "to rule." From that time, anti-democratic arguments have taken a variety of forms, though some commentators (e.g., Dahl 1989) maintain that all of them are reducible to knowledge claims, or the "idea of guardianship," according to which one person or group of people knows better than the rest how to maximize the interests of the community. This seems a rather simplistic way to characterize anti-democratic thought. A more subtle approach is to make use of the analytical categories developed by A. O. Hirschman in his study of "reactionary" thought (1991): *perversity, futility,* and *jeopardy.*

HISTORY

In classical Athens, where democracy originated, "the people" of necessity encompassed the poor and uneducated, and democracy was often identified with the rule of the mob or the rabble. Both Plato and Aristotle held it in contempt as a degenerate form of governance, subordinating reason to passion, polarizing rich and poor, and generating both instability and imprudence. Instead, Aristotle and other writers extolled the virtues of a "mixed constitution," in which rule by the many is balanced in some formal way by the influence of the wealthy and literate minority. This was the model of government that emerged from the ancient world, one where popular power was restricted by mutual checks and the rule of law. The word *democracy* fell into disuse, except as a synonym for internal dissension and majority tyranny. Even the framers of the American constitution drew a distinction between a *democracy*, which they feared, and a *republic*, another name for the "mixed" or "balanced" regime they favored.

The present vogue for democracy really dates from the French Revolution (1789–1799), whose more radical protagonists appealed to "the people" as an undiluted source of power. Democracy soon lost its toxic connotations and came to be associated with the classical republican tradition that had long challenged the monarchical institutions of Europe. In its new incarnation, democracy could no longer be dismissed as mob rule. It was now seen to include representative parliaments, the separation of powers, the rule of law, and civil

rights. Gradually, the idea of democracy became a dominant standard by which regimes were judged. But, despite the supposed taming of the democratic beast, the rehabilitation of democracy led to the revival of anti-democratic thought.

PERVERSITY THESIS

The *perversity thesis* holds that radical reformers likely will produce the exact opposite of what they intended. Society is seen as an infinitely complex system of causal chains, making the consequences of disruptive change entirely unpredictable. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, romantic conservatives such as Edmund Burke formulated a version of the perverse effect in their attacks on the revolution and its egalitarian pretensions. They saw society as an organic whole, more easily damaged than improved, and the divisive individualism, the incessant and ignorant questioning implicit in democracy, would—in their view—unleash chaos. But nature abhors a power vacuum. A demagogic elite, unrestrained by inherited customs, would seize power and rule with an iron fist. Democracy would transmute into tyranny, albeit one that might reflect the base and foolish preferences of the majority. The dream of liberation would become a nightmare of repression.

In the middle part of the nineteenth century, even liberals who were sympathetic to democracy fretted over its tyrannical potential. It was commonly believed that the multiple sources of authority in traditional society, which served to preserve a measure of pluralism and individual eccentricity, would eventually be swept aside by the growing power of the people, who would tolerate no activities that did not originate in popular mandate. Alexis de Tocqueville argued that this dissolution of the intermediate structure of authority could leave the individual isolated and vulnerable, unable to resist the ubiquitous and absolute power of the state.

FUTILITY THESIS

By the end of the century, the fear of democratic tyranny had receded, and a new type of critic emerged. Motivated more by cynicism than anxiety, the classical elitists (Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Michels) argued that the oppressive effects of democracy had not come to pass because democracy itself was impossible. No matter what the constitution says, the inherent dynamics of human interaction always will prevent the masses from exercising power. This was the *futility thesis.* Pareto used psychological factors to explain this "law" of oligarchy, while Mosca and Michels stressed organizational factors, but they all agreed on the existence of an immanent hierarchical order of things, which meant that so-called democratic institutions were, at best, exercises in futility, and, at worst, expressions of rank hypocrisy.

JEOPARDY THESIS

The elitists seemed to understand democracy in a "pure" sense, where all government decisions are presumed to emanate from some clearly defined popular will. That democracy in this sense could never exist was, to some observers, merely a statement of the obvious. Nevertheless, the inexorable extension of the franchise in the early part of the twentieth century convinced many people that democracy, even in diluted form, was still a threat, if not to liberty then to other values held dear. This is the *jeopardy thesis*—the idea that progressive reform always will incur a cost. While democracy may bring some benefits to the common people, it extinguishes cultural creativity and belittles heroic and noble deeds. It destroys economic efficiency and elevates mass appetites and prejudices above mental rigour. Such arguments were quite common before World War II (1939–1945) turned democracy into a "hurrah" word, signifying nothing but approbation.

Traditional conservatives such as the poet T. S. Eliot insisted that "high" culture was threatened by the vulgar tastes of the masses, who would use democratic mechanisms to impose their debased values. Social coherence also would suffer, as equality of opportunity, an inevitable concomitant of democracy, would create a society of strangers, devoid of historical memory. Thinkers on the radical right, especially fascists, were inspired by Nietzsche's diatribes against "slave-morality" and mass mediocrity. In their eyes, democracy was a complicated bundle of decadent values—individualism, pacifism, materialism, egalitarianism—which was eroding cultural vitality and the collective spirit.

CONCLUSION

The rising tide of democratization and democratic rhetoric that swept through the international community during the latter half of the twentieth century has left the remaining explicitly anti-democratic regimes marooned in global public disapproval. All of the reactionary criticisms that justify such regimes are rarely taken seriously by political scientists or indeed most educated people throughout the world. Nevertheless, some observers, in contemplating how the democratic ethos tends not toward excellence but rather toward the lowest common denominator, point out that the tradition of anti-democratic thought contains at least some grains of truth. After all, even the most beneficial changes entail loss. However, such is the power of the democratic idea that, nowadays, even neofascists feel obliged to claim affinity with it.

See also *Authority; Democracy; Democracy and Corruption; Democratic Theory; Greek Democracy, Classical; Tyranny of the Majority and Minority Rights.*

. . . . JOSEPH FEMIA

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Anti-Semitism

Semites are both Jews and Arabs who emerged from a common ancestral and geographical setting in the Middle East. However, *anti-Semitism* refers specifically to prejudice against Jews as a religious, ethnic, or racial body. It can include a wide range of attitudes and expressions, from individual hostility to legal discrimination and violence against Jews as a group.

Like so many stereotypes, anti-Semitism is based on a myth—one with the power to influence individual attitudes toward Jews and their place in society and, collectively, to impact the larger culture. It has no basis in fact or reason, but its acolytes make vague references to historical or pseudo-scientific genetic arguments in support of their prejudices. Accusations against Jews of two millennia ago, or toward some individual Jew today, are portrayed as the collective responsibility of all Jews as a people, who must be punished by strong measures, up to and including genocide.

Religious anti-Semitism attacks Jews as being responsible for the death of Jesus, and for practicing their minority faith, which is portrayed as the devil's product. It promises a cessation of persecution if Jews give up their faith and assimilate into an approved religion.

Racial anti-Semitism identifies Jews as a genetically distinct race. They are an innately subhuman race that can never assimilate with the superior culture but conspire to pollute the more advanced Aryan race and control the world, its government, and its economy. They must be stopped at all costs. A recent variant is geographic, based in opposition to Zionism and the existence of the state of Israel. Radical Islam and its allies use motifs from anti-Semitic Europe in pursuit of their political goals. All forms of anti-Semitism have been used to justify discrimination and persecution of Jews.

ORIGINS

The term *anti-Semitism* was concocted by German agitator Wilhelm Marr in about 1880 to indicate hatred of the Jews. Marr favored their forced expulsion from German soil. Jews had faced persecution, enslavement, and dispersion for their monotheism since ancient times. Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, and Alexandrine Greece were early conquerors. However, modern anti-Semitism had its origins in the Roman Empire. In protecting their rituals and beliefs from the Romans, the Jews raised several rebellions against Roman rule, which gave them the reputation of agitators who were threats to imperial stability. When the Romans finally defeated the Jews in 70 CE, their temple was razed, and they were dispersed throughout the empire.

Shortly before this, Jesus preached and died as a Jew living under Roman rule. He was tried in a Jewish court for blasphemy and turned over to the Romans for punishment, which the Roman governor decreed would be execution. By the fourth century the belief emerged among Christians that Jews who were not followers of Jesus were willful unbelievers in the truth, and responsible for his death. After the Emperor Constantine I began the process that made Christianity the official religion of the Roman Empire, this belief was translated into persecution.

During the Middle Ages, nontoleration became a cornerstone of religious policy, and Jews were increasingly identified as usurers and punished in many ways for their refusal to convert, culminating in the violence and murder committed by mobs against various Jewish communities during eight Crusades (intermittently from 1096–1273). In 1215, Pope Innocent III decreed that Jews were to wear a special badge to mark their inferior status whenever they went out. In 1242, Pope Gregory IX was persuaded by an investigating committee of Paris theologians to denounce the Talmud—a fourth-century commentary on rabbinic tradition, Jewish life, and law—as blasphemous and ordered all copies to be burned. Urban Jews were forced to live in special areas, or *ghettos,* and they were restricted in economic and social life; some of these restrictions lasted until the end of the nineteenth century. As early as 1144, charges were brought against Jews of blood libel, the supposed Jewish drinking of blood of murdered Christian children. When the Black Death swept Europe in the fourteenth century, rumors spread that the Jews were the cause of the plague, and many were massacred. During the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, German theologian and religious reformer Martin Luther, disappointed that the Jews would not convert to his religious views, denounced them as severely as he denounced medieval popes, calling for their property to be confiscated and for their expulsion.

LATER DEVELOPMENTS

Under Napoleonic rule, following the French Revolution (1789–1799), Jews were offered the opportunity to participate fully in European political, economic, and social life. The defeat of Napoleon in 1815 brought such advances to a temporary halt, but by 1870 many nations of western Europe granted full citizenship to all Jews. However, anti-Semitism lingered. In 1893 Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish captain in the French army, was falsely convicted of treason by a military court. The evidence against Dreyfus had been faked by two fellow officer, and his conviction was supported by leading French conservatives in the army, the Catholic Church, and anti-Semitic writers, such as Edouard Drumont. The efforts of the noted author, Émile Zola, played a central role in reversing Dreyfus' unjust conviction in 1899, although it took another seven years for him to be restored to the French army. If the Dreyfus affair indicated that anti-Semitism was not eradicated, it came at a time when the conditions of life for most Jews in western Europe had vastly improved.

Destruction of property and massacres of Jews, called *pogroms,* began in Russia in 1881. The pogroms were instigated by the government to divert the discontent of dissatisfied workers and peasants toward the usual convenient scapegoats, the Jews. Tsarist agents produced a notorious forgery, the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which purported to reveal a secret Jewish plot to dominate the world. This work emerged in the United States, where anti-Semitism was so strong in some powerful quarters that it became a factor in blocking the immigration of Jews from Europe to the United States, which

Nazi leader Adolf Hitler seemed willing to allow until shortly before World War II (1939–1945) began.

The most virulent and systematically organized form of government-sponsored racial anti-Semitism emerged in Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1945. Following a pattern of gradual escalation, the regime passed the Nuremberg Laws in 1935, which removed Jews from the protection of German law. Jews were excluded from German public life, including business and education, intermarriage with Germans was prohibited, their property was seized, and finally they were imprisoned and forced into slave labor or murdered outright in death camps. As Nazi forces conquered other nations, the Jews in the rest of Europe were doomed, and by 1945 an estimated six million Jews were massacred, executed, or starved to death.

CURRENT ANTI-SEMITISM

After the war, the exposure of the death camps led to the framing of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and a series of trials of former Nazis complicit in mass murder. Christian religious leaders also have made efforts to end religious anti-Semitism.

Still, the racial variety persists today, perpetuated by Holocaust deniers, small gangs, and tiny political parties in many parts of the non-Muslim world. In the Middle East, geographic anti-Semitism is encouraged by governments seeking the destruction of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. This is intertwined with the activities of Muslim extremists who denounce the Judeo-Christian West.

See also *Genocide; Holocaust; Zionism.*

. . . .   DONALD G. TANNENBAUM

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Antitrust Policy

Antitrust polices are government regulations prohibiting abusive monopolistic practices of market power. A significant number of countries have developed antitrust statutes and maintain an active program of antitrust enforcement. Countries based on a market economy generally enforce policies that prevent uncompetitive businesses and discourage dishonest policies within an industry, in addition to other policies that do not benefit the public. In various forms, these policies represent a vital means of regulating competition and form the basis of many public policies in regard to business.

The primary intent of competition policy is the general protection of the market economy. Antitrust policies in Europe were a primary focus of discussion following World War II (1939–1945) to restrict anticompetitive agreements and practices and some noncompetitive mergers. They were enforced through international agreements and national laws. The European Commission has filed thousands of decisions involving company agreements and practices for trade in the Common Market. The decisions of the European Commission are based on Articles 85 and 86 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which address typical competition restrictions. Article 85 provides a nonexhaustive listing of anticompetitive practices that will be automatically void for "companies aimed at fixing prices, sharing markets, or exchanging confidential information in defiance of the elementary rules of competition and of the interests of the citizens of the European Union." Whereas Article 85 has a provision for exemption if specific conditions are satisfied, Article 86 does not. Article 86 prohibits abuse of a dominant position (i.e., economic strength preventative of effective competition) that may affect trade between member states and provides a nonexhaustive listing of abusive practices, such as "unfair purchase or selling prices" and "limiting production markets or technical development to the prejudice of customers."

Governments in the European Union and the United States may intervene to restrict or dissolve a *monopoly* (a single firm that sells output for which no close substitute exists) because the unregulated profit-maximizing monopoly model demonstrates output reduction and increased market power. The argument against monopoly is based on efficiency; some monopolies are believed to create inefficient use of resources as compared to a competitive equilibrium.

To prevent an incipient monopoly, governments regulate mergers to avoid concentration of the market and to allow new competitors to enter into the market. The merger of two companies, or the acquisition of one company by another, may be proposed for two reasons. The merger may have the favorable outcome of creating lower prices, which would increase capital of the two companies and make the combined company a stronger competitor. Or the merger could reduce competition, giving the combined company an opportunity to sell at higher prices.

BACKGROUND OF TRUSTS

During the industrialization of the United States, the emergence of railroads afforded industries and individuals the ability to conduct business and travel in spite of distances that previously had prevented such efforts. As transportation competition increased, the railroad industry consolidated finances. In the late 1880s and early 1900s, powerful and influential

financiers, such as Jay Gould, Edward H. Harriman, James J. Hill, Leland Stanford, and Cornelius Vanderbilt, consolidated their corporations, as competition during the age of industrialization increased. The outcome essentially was a form of monopolization. When these trusts obtained a controlling share of an industry, they formed a monopoly that could dominate the industry, preventing other companies from competing against the monopoly. By 1890, the oil and railway industries in particular were restricting competition and establishing price controls, organizing their networks of businesses in trusts that concealed the extent of the monopoly.

U.S. ANTITRUST LEGISLATION

The U.S. government enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 against the large monopolistic trusts of the late nineteenth century. The law prohibited monopolization and trusts, as well as restrained trade. The vague language of the law ineffectively discouraged anticompetitive business practices. Furthermore, the act did not create an independent commission to investigate allegations of antitrust law abuses. U.S. presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft strictly enforced antitrust laws on the basis of the Sherman Act.

Congress later passed the Clayton Act of 1914 (a supplement to the Sherman Act) to assist the government in preventing monopolies. The Clayton Act listed specific illegal practices—several that were not prohibited specifically by the Sherman Act—such as the practice of *tying contracts,* which required a consumer to purchase another product before being able to purchase the desired product, and *price discrimination,* or selling the same product at different prices to different customers (though some industries, such as air travel, are allowed to practice price discrimination). Other prohibitions of the act included *exclusive dealing* (selling of a product if a consumer agrees not to buy from other producers of the same product) and *interlocking directorates,* in which at least one director serves on two boards of directors of competing companies.

The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 created a federal body whose purpose is to oversee markets, with the intent of enforcing antitrust laws. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has the power to block *horizontal mergers* (merging of firms that produce similar products or services) and *vertical mergers* (merging of firms that produce different products or services with an input-output relation in the production of one specific product. Input-output relation is a circular dependency of capital, entrepreneurship, labor, and land resources (input), and the sale of goods and services to consumers (output). The two 1914 acts established a solid foundation for modern antitrust law enforcement. The intent of antitrust legislation is to discourage abuse of the market economy through practices such as exclusive dealing arrangements, exclusive territories, predatory pricing, price discrimination, refusals to deal, resale price maintenance, and tie-in sales. Antitrust laws enforce competitive limitations upon firms for the benefit of the public (e.g., labor laws) and to be fair to consumers (e.g., regulating the sale of inferior products at higher prices) and potential competitors (such as small businesses).

DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. ANTITRUST POLICY

Not until the mid-1960s did antitrust economics undergo vast reform in the American postwar industrial economy. The conglomerate merger wave in the 1960s—the "Go-Go Years" of the stock market that inaugurated an era of company acquisitions beyond their central industries—involved firms that were entirely disparate in business activities. Many of these conglomerate firms were unsuccessful in managing companies within different countries and markets.

Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, there were substantial developments in antitrust enforcement and research into strategic business practices. New antitrust thinking emerged that countered the long-held idea that conglomerate firms were anticompetitive. Both England and the United States essentially witnessed a rebirth of laissez-faire philosophy regarding government regulations. An unprecedented number of merger and acquisition activities occurred in the 1980s, and they generally involved using debt capital to purchase a firm, then selling certain components of the firm to pay the debt. The outcome was a sudden increase of buyouts executed without consideration of corporate strategy and at a relatively high cost of capital, which in turn resulted in the early 1990s in widespread bankruptcies of companies unable to pay the inflated interest of high-leverage costs. The sectoral mergers of the 1990s primarily affected banking, defense, health care, and telecommunications. In the 1990s, government regulation demonstrated a more aggressive attitude against anticompetitive mergers and practices. The twenty-first century has been characterized by increased government regulation of the accounting, power utility, and security industries.

Governments enforce antitrust laws in the interest of maintaining an efficient society by ensuring competitive markets. Government enforcement of these laws necessitates identifying and banning those corporate practices that may discourage competition. The U.S. Department of Justice and the FTC, for instance, review all potential mergers of companies that may become monopolistic or anticompetitive; legal approval must be granted before the merger is completed. If the primary reason for a proposed merger is a favorable outcome of lower prices (as in the cases of XM and Sirius Radio), which will be efficient for society and fair to consumers and potential competitors, the merger will be granted legal approval. If the merger will result in less competition and an opportunity for the merging firms to increase prices, then it will not be granted legal approval. (An example of this is the proposed Staples and Office Depot merger, which was blocked by the FTC because it would allow the companies to control prices.) Antitrust laws grant the government power to ban anticompetitive practices, and even to divide a monopoly into two companies. Such decisions can be overturned by federal appeals court, sometimes with new stipulations (as was the case with Microsoft in 2001–2002).

See also *Economic Policy Formulation; Regulation and Rulemaking.*

. . . . RON J. BIGALKE JR.

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Apartheid

Apartheid is an Afrikaans word meaning "separateness." It was the official government policy in South Africa from 1948 until a negotiated transition that culminated in the first democratic elections in 1994. In 1976, the UN General Assembly recognized apartheid as a crime against humanity. The idea of racial segregation was not new; similar policies had been introduced in different parts of South Africa long before the Union of 1910.

KEY ASPECTS

Apartheid was adopted by the National Party (NP), which came to power in South Africa in 1948. It was built on the growth of Afrikaner nationalism and increasing economic hardship for parts of the Afrikaner population. A new intellectual elite known as the *Broederbond,* which at the time was a secret organization, was central to the promotion of Afrikaner nationalism. The main architect of apartheid policy was H. F. Verwoerd, who was Minister of Native Affairs during the early 1950s and later became prime minister. One of the central tenets of the apartheid system was the Population Registration Act introduced in 1950. This law required all citizens to have their racial group officially recorded. Decisions were clearly arbitrary in some cases and often were disputed. Race was determined by skin color, but other criteria, such as language and social status, were considered also.

Another of the major laws passed was the Group Areas Act in 1950. This clearly designated areas of land for each of the four racial groups (white, coloured, Indian, and native). The consequence of this law was that huge numbers of people were forcibly relocated. Africans were forced to travel for work and basic goods and services, but the pass law system ensured close regulation of such movements. Later this policy was extended to become the homelands approach. Residents of these "independent" homelands were no longer afforded South African citizenship.

The NP also played on white fears of *miscegenation*, which is the interbreeding of races. The Mixed Marriages Act (1949) and the Immorality Act (1950) outlawed marriage and extramarital sex between different races. The system became ever more pervasive with the introduction in 1953 of "*petty apartheid,*" which involved racial segregation in public places such as restaurants, lavatories, beaches, hotels, and public transport.

OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID

Opposition to apartheid was strongly organized within South Africa itself. During the 1950s, the African National Congress (ANC) forged an alliance with other organizations and adopted a policy of defiance. One peaceful demonstration against the pass law system resulted in the deaths of sixty-nine people in Sharpeville on March 21, 1960. The government reacted by banning all the major resistance groups in 1960. The ANC then formed *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation), which developed a guerrilla warfare strategy. Soon after, in 1963, many of the ANC's leaders, including Nelson Mandela, were arrested and tried for planning a violent revolution against the state.

There was also international pressure from the antiapartheid movement. However, key governments such as the United States and United Kingdom continued to see South Africa as an ally in the cold war. Moreover, many leading economies maintained their economic links with South Africa, and it was only during the 1980s that significant economic sanctions were imposed.

A SYSTEM UNDER PRESSURE

Apartheid came under strain during the 1970s due to domestic economic pressures and a renewal of resistance politics. There was a revival of black trade unionism, and the ideology of the black consciousness movement inspired a new generation of black South Africans. Demonstrations against the compulsory use of Afrikaans in black schools began in Soweto in June 1976 and spread across the country. Meanwhile, sections of the business community began to question the economic viability of the apartheid system given the restrictions on labor and inequality in education. As a result, in 1984 attempts at constitutional reform of the system were introduced, including the tricameral parliament. However, the idea of separate development was maintained, and the mass mobilization tactics of the United Democratic Front increased civil unrest.

NEGOTIATED TRANSITION

In 1989, F. W. de Klerk became the final apartheid-era president and began negotiating a settlement. In 1990, he released Mandela and the other political prisoners and unbanned all the liberation movements. Despite high levels of political violence, a period of negotiation ensued under the banner of The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA).

The ANC, NP, and a number of other, though not all, South African political organizations took part in CODESA. In April 1994, South Africa's first democratic elections were held, and Nelson Mandela was elected as president.

See also *Discrimination; Race and Racism; Segregation and Desegregation.*

. . . .   STEPHEN R. HURT

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Apparentement

Apparentement is the French term for an electoral procedure that is designed to increase the participation of small parties in countries that use proportional voting systems. Proportional electoral systems often have thresholds that require parties to gain a certain percentage of the vote to secure representation. Small parties may be unable to gain the necessary 3 to 5 percent. Apparentement permits minor parties to form electoral coalitions or groupings. The parties continue to be listed separately and generally campaign separately, but they combine their total votes. This increases the chances that the parties will gain representation. If the cartels win seats, those seats are allocated according to predetermined agreements or by proportionality, depending on the country. The system is used in continental Europe, including Switzerland and the Netherlands, some areas of Latin America, and Israel. In France, prior to electoral reforms in 1951, the system was used by centrist parties in an effort to prevent parties at either political extreme from gaining majorities in the Assembly. Studies reveal that apparentement typically reduces disproportionality in electoral systems. Nonetheless, apparentement coalitions are often unstable, especially if member parties find themselves excluded from representation in successive elections.

See also *Europe, Democracy in; European Parliament; European Political Thought; Political Parties.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

Appeasement

Appeasement is an influence strategy employed by states in relations with adversaries. Most students of appeasement define it as a policy of easing tensions and avoiding war by eliminating an opponent's grievances. Others, however, define it as a strategy of systematic concessions, and concessions are the means by which the strategy is implemented. Thus, terms frequently associated with appeasement include *inducements, positive sanctions, conciliation,* and *accommodation.* Appeasement may be considered a subcategory of *engagement.* The principal mechanism by which appeasement seeks to influence an opponent's behavior is satiation—satisfying its hunger for land, status, or something else it values. But policy makers may also intend for appeasement to work through *reassurance* (convincing an insecure adversary that one's own intentions are benign) or *socialization* (demonstrating the proper way to behave in international society).

Because it seeks to modify an adversary's behavior through promises and rewards, rather than threats and punishments, appeasement is often regarded as the antithesis of, and an alternative to, deterrence. However, scholars have long recognized that coercive and noncoercive approaches can, and perhaps should, be combined in mixed influence strategies.

WHY DO STATES PURSUE APPEASEMENT?

States pursue appeasement policies for a variety of reasons. In some cases, the objective may be short term or tactical—e.g., to conserve resources or buy time in order to rearm so that an adversary may be confronted more effectively. Appeasement may also serve to test the motives of a state whose intentions are ambiguous. In other cases, the goal may be strategic, such as to eliminate the possibility of war with an adversary, or even to transform a relationship from hostility to friendship. The pursuit of appeasement policies is frequently encouraged by the absence of a feasible alternative or by opposition to other options, domestically or internationally.

DOES APPEASEMENT WORK?

Appeasement is often regarded as being futile and dangerous. It is considered to be futile because, it is believed, an adversary cannot be placated through concessions. Indeed, concessions are commonly thought to increase the adversary's appetite for additional gains, leading it to make further demands. Appeasement is regarded as being dangerous because it allegedly undermines the credibility of deterrent threats. Accommodation of the adversary convinces it that the appeasing state is weak and irresolute. Should the state decide to stand firm and resist additional demands, its threats to defend its interests are not believed. Deterrence fails and war results. These concerns were central to the strategy of containment pursued by the United States during the cold war, motivating U.S. policy makers to vigorously counter efforts by the Soviet Union and other communist states to expand their influence.

The conventional wisdom regarding appeasement is derived mainly from the experience of Britain and France during the 1930s, when the leaders of those countries attempted unsuccessfully to avert a war with Nazi Germany. Many scholars have argued that Anglo-French conciliation of Germany—reflected particularly in the Munich Agreement of September 1938—caused Hitler to discount French and British promises to defend Poland, leading him to attack that country in September 1939. In a minority opinion, other scholars have disputed

this interpretation. Arguing that Hitler regarded the outcome at Munich as a crushing defeat in which he himself shrank from the prospect of war, they contend that he found Anglo-French threats to defend Poland credible but, determined not to back down again, he decided to attack anyway. In some cases, appeasement has succeeded. Perhaps the most notable instance involves British conciliation of the United States after 1895; within a period of roughly a decade, the government of Great Britain was able to fundamentally transform the relationship between the two countries, not merely eliminating the possibility of an Anglo-United States war, but also securing diplomatic and strategic cooperation from the United States.

The success or failure of any effort at appeasement must be evaluated in terms of its objectives. Frequently, an appeasement policy has both minimum and maximum aims. Some may be attained, while others may not, so that the policy may be a partial success and a partial failure. Britain and France failed to prevent war with Nazi Germany, but according to some scholars, they did succeed in buying time for Britain to rearm. American efforts to avoid war with the Soviet Union during the latter stages of World War II (1939–1945) secured that goal, although the cost—Soviet domination of large portions of eastern and central Europe—was high and the U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the postwar world so desired by U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt never materialized.

WHY DOES APPEASEMENT SUCCEED OR FAIL?

Factors important to determining whether appeasement succeeds or fails include the nature of the adversary, the inducements offered by the appeasing state and the adversary's perception of them, and the presence or absence of other reasons for the adversary to respond favorably to the policy. Generally speaking, appeasement is most likely to succeed when the adversary's aims are limited, when the adversary is motivated by insecurity rather than greed, when the concessions that are offered address the adversary's concerns directly and fully, and when there exist other reasons—for example, domestic political pressures—for the adversary to accept the concessions and modify its behavior.

See also *Containment; Deterrence.*

. . . . STEPHEN R. ROCK

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Appropriation

Appropriation is the actual legislative act of designating money. By constitutional design, the U.S. Congress must pass a law in order to spend money: "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law" (U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9). Appropriations can occur through an annual appropriations act accounting for discretionary spending or by permanent law accounting for direct spending. Approximately two-thirds of federal spending is direct spending that covers most federal entitlement programs. The remaining one-third is discretionary spending that must go through an authorization process before being funded. The House and Senate Committees on Appropriations have jurisdiction over the appropriation bills. Generally, there are three types of appropriations: regular, continuing, and supplemental. *Regular* appropriations are the annual budgetary appropriations (i.e., the setting of the annual budget) and cover most of the federal spending. *Continuing* appropriations are enacted if Congress cannot pass the regular appropriations bill in time and allow for government entities to continue functioning. *Supplemental* appropriations provide for additional funds at a later date that is not accounted for in the regular appropriations bills. The president also can exercise his power over appropriations by vetoing the appropriations law passed by Congress.

See also *Budgeting; Legislative Hearings; Monetary Policy.*

. . . . SUSAN MARIE OPP

Approval Voting

Approval voting is an electoral system that allows voters to indicate their preferences for multiple candidates in elections. All candidates are listed on a ballot, and voters may indicate their preference or vote for one or more of the candidates. Hence, in a contest with five candidates, a voter could vote for between one and five of the office seekers. The candidate who receives the majority of votes is the winner. The system was designed to provide a better means of indicating public sentiment in elections by alleviating concerns that individuals might waste their ballots by voting for a candidate that might not appear capable of winning. In addition, if two or more candidates appealed to the same group, voters could indicate their support for all of them. Proponents have argued that approval voting would reduce the impact of negative voting because voters are less likely to vote against a candidate. Advocates also assert that approval voting would more strongly encourage

candidates to reach across party or ideological lines. The system was first proposed in the 1970s, and has been used in some nongovernmental bodies, but it has not been used extensively at the governmental level.

See also *Voting Behavior; Voting Procedures.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Aprismo

Aprismo is a political philosophy developed by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, the dominant political figure of twentieth century Peru. Derived from his political party (APRA— *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana,* or Popular Revolutionary American Alliance), aprismo emerged in the 1920s and the 1930s as a response to both imperial capitalism and European Marxism. Haya argued that for "Indoamerica" (Latin America), imperialism had to be viewed as the first stage of capitalism, and that the feudal class persisted in alliance with imperial capitalism. Its strident anti-American tone emerged in its maximum goals, enunciated in 1928, and then modified as a minimal plan in 1932. Over the following decades, Haya developed extensive modifications to his theory.

To Haya de la Torre's followers, aprismo was a full-fledged political philosophy that brought together the best ideas of such disparate thinkers as Karl Marx, Albert Einstein, Arnold J. Toynbee, and many others. To his detractors, aprismo was little more than a hodgepodge of ideas that offered little to improve Peru. APRA's image as a party rigidly unwilling to compromise prevented it from winning a presidential election until 1985, after Haya de la Torre had died.

See also *Imperialism; Marxism.*

. . . . HENRY A. DIETZ

Aquinas, Thomas

See *Thomas Aquinas.*

Arab–Israeli Relations

The relationship between Arabs and Israel has been hostile not only since the birth of the Jewish state in 1948, but from the foundation of political Zionism in the 1890s. This resulted from a fundamental conflict over Palestine, where the Zionist movement aspired to establish Israel. Palestine had long been Arab territory, and Arabs saw their existence there threatened.

The United Nations plan for the partitioning of Palestine in 1947 led to civil war between the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine. When the British completed their withdrawal from Palestine in May 1948, Jewish forces already occupied part of the proposed Arab state, and about two hundred thousand Arabs had become refugees. Upon the declaration of the state of Israel, Egypt, Transjordan (Jordan), Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria sent troops into Palestine, purportedly to protect the Arab Palestinians. This First Arab-Israeli War (1948–1949) turned

into a disaster for the Arabs, leaving Israeli forces in control of 78 percent of Palestine and, due to the flight or expulsion of many Arab Palestinians, only a small Arab minority.

Although Israel and the adjoining Arab states concluded armistice agreements in 1949, violence continued. Further wars followed in 1956 (the Sinai War), 1967 (the Six-Day War), 1973 (the October War), and 1982 (the Lebanon War). Though not directly involving Arab states, Arab-Israeli warfare has been endemic in Lebanon since the 1970s. Guerrilla attacks by Hezbollah forced Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. An air and land war by the Israelis against Hezbollah in 2006 met fierce resistance and, some say, produced Israel's first military failure. In addition, Palestinian uprisings began in 1987 and, after subsiding in the mid-1990s, resumed more bloodily in 2000.

The 1967 War was a major turning point. Following an intense crisis, Israel quickly defeated its neighbors and occupied parts of Egypt (Sinai), the rest of mandatory Palestine (the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem), and southwestern Syria (the Golan Heights). Following this, Israel announced that it had no territorial aspirations, and the Arab states accepted the idea of peace in return for withdrawal. However, Israelis began to establish new Jewish settlements and then rejected calls for full withdrawal.

ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND THE CONFLICT

The role of Arab governments has always been complicated. With the Arab public opposing Israel, governments sought legitimacy by seeming to support this cause and by using the issue as a weapon against each other. They were rarely serious about confronting Israel, however. In 1948, what looked like an attempt to prevent Israel's emergence had more to do with Egyptian-Transjordanian rivalry. Transjordan had a secret arrangement with the Israelis to divide up the area of the proposed Arab state and, except in the Old City of Jerusalem, avoided combat with its apparent enemy. In 1967, popular sentiment forced King Husayn to go to war with his tacit ally and to lose part of his kingdom in order to save the rest. While publicly rejecting peace, Egypt responded favorably to mediation attempts during the 1950s. To dispel accusations of softness, Egypt allowed itself to be pulled into a crisis in 1967 by letting Israel attack. This is a prime example of what scholar Michael Barnett (1988) calls "impression management" and "symbolic entrapment," where one entity preempts a peaceful solution (that may make it appear weak) rather than an attack. While using the issue as a legitimacy resource, Arab regimes have not been willing to subordinate their own interests for the sake of the Palestinian cause. While Egypt and Syria went to war in 1973, this was to jump-start a peace settlement that would hopefully get their own territories back, not to liberate Palestine.

Significant changes in Arab-Israeli relationships have occurred in recent years. Egypt made peace with Israel in 1979 to obtain full Israeli withdrawal from its territory. The Oslo Accords of 1994 led to the establishment of a Palestinian Authority and the hope of a two-state solution to the Palestine problem. Although

the process broke down six years later, it provided King Husayn an opportunity to conclude formal peace with Israel. Under American pressure, Mauritania also established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1999. An Israeli trade office was set up in Qatar in 1996. Israeli offices established in Morocco, Oman, and Tunisia were closed in 2000. The Arab boycott of Israel, declared by the Arab League in 1945, has withered over time.

With militantly anti-Israel Islamist forces growing and non-Arab Iran taking the lead in opposing Israel, unstable Arab regimes have become desperate for a settlement in order to appease popular passions. Consequently, a Saudi initiative of 2002, adopted unanimously by an Arab League summit but rejected by Israel, articulates the willingness of all Arab states to establish normal diplomatic ties with Israel in return for full withdrawal and a Palestinian state. Many Israelis fear that continuing to rule Palestinians eventually will doom them as a Jewish state, and yet they want to keep much of the West Bank and to impose limits on the independence of any Arab Palestinian state. They are also unwilling to consider the return of a substantial number of Palestinian refugees to Israel.

See also *Arab League; Arab Political Thought; Islamic Political Thought; Jewish Political Thought; Palestine; Zionism.*

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Arab League

The Arab League, the full name of which is the League of Arab States, is a regional interstate organization headquartered in Cairo. Founded in 1945 by seven Arab states to strengthen their ties and preserve their independence, the League now has twenty-two members: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine (represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization), Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Three member states—Comoros, Somalia, and Djibouti—according to the usual criteria, are not Arab countries, although they

have cultural and historical connections to the Arab world. Normally the dominant member, Egypt was suspended from the organization from 1979 to 1989 because of its peace treaty with Israel, and the organization's headquarters moved to Tunis until 1990, when it returned to Cairo.

The Arab League grew out of popular demands for Arab unity. It also was a response to the rivalries of Arab leaders, as the British-allied Hashimite rulers of Transjordan (now Jordan) and Iraq hoped to form a larger entity in the Fertile Crescent and put another member of their family on the throne of Syria. British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden gave his government's go-ahead to the idea of Arab unity in 1941, and this was followed by Transjordanian and Iraqi proposals for Greater Syria and Fertile Crescent unions, respectively. Such ideas evoked opposition from other Arab states, particularly Egypt, which did not want a new rival to its primacy in the Arab world, and the Saudi ruling family, which had overthrown Hashimite rule in the Hijaz two decades earlier and feared a future attempt at restoration. Thus, in order to counter Hashimite proposals, Egyptian Prime Minister Mustafa al-Nahhas invited representatives of the Arab states to meet in Alexandria in 1944. The result was the conclusion of an Alexandria Protocol calling for the formation of a League of Arab States, which was accomplished with the signing of the pact (or covenant) of the organization at a meeting in Cairo in February of the following year. While the pact gave lip service to the possibility of "closer cooperation," the formation of the Arab League was in fact a victory for the principle of state sovereignty.

Each member of the League wields one vote in its main organ, the council. Meetings are held on the level of either

foreign ministers or heads of state. The principle of unanimity prevails, in that decisions made by a mere majority are not binding on members not voting for those decisions. A secretariat, headed by a Secretary-General (Amr Musa since 2001), is chosen by the council by a two-thirds vote, and an Economic and Social Council also exists. An Arab parliament, without legislative authority and of uncertain significance, was established in 2005.

The Arab League's goal of political and military cooperation, as in the case of the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation of 1950, has been hindered by persistent divisions among the organization's members. But the League has engaged in numerous mediation efforts and has organized peacekeeping forces, such as in Kuwait in 1961 and Lebanon in 1976. The League has established specialized agencies for cooperation in a variety of nonpolitical matters, including science and technology, administrative development, research, labor, agricultural development, satellite communications, broadcasting, and investment. It maintains information centers throughout the world.

See also *Middle Eastern Politics and Society; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism; Sovereignty.*

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Arab Political Economy

The Arab political economy revolves around three main axes: (1) economic growth and structural transformation (developments in different sectors of the economy), (2) state structures and economic policy, and (3) domestic socioeconomic actors. Beginning in the seventeenth century, the Arab world has been drawn into a global economy dominated by the European powers. The need of the Ottoman Empire (1299–1922) to raise revenues to support its administrative and military reforms resulted in the introduction of private property. As a result, over time local notables and tax collectors gained the rights to enough property to allow some to establish commercial estates equivalent to large commercially owned farms. These estates propelled agricultural export trade with Europe and the Arab world's subsequent integration into the global economy.

A series of Ottoman reforms in the 1800s, which were practiced in other Arab countries such as Morocco, further entrenched the institution of private property in the empire.

Tax collection and administration were reformed so that more revenues could be absorbed by the central state, and these reform efforts had as a direct consequence the rise of a propertied elite that was shaped by agricultural export growth. Agriculture also attracted large sums of foreign investment into the empire, making this sector the most important in shaping the political-economic landscape of the Arab world during this period.

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the colonial state was introduced into the Arab world, with repressive apparatuses strengthened by European support that allowed these states to enjoy relative autonomy in relation to society. These structures gave rise to further capitalist reforms throughout the Arab world. During colonialism, public education and public service were introduced into the Arab political-economic sphere. Owing to these reforms, in the 1930s a professional—but not propertied—middle class emerged. Thus the colonial state entrenched the interests of the landowning classes while introducing this new middle class.

The postcolonial state in the Arab world, emerging from independence movements in the 1950s and 1960s, featured dramatically altered political-economic patterns. A process of radical class restructuring occurred through which the historically marginalized groups—workers, farmers, and small landowners—were integrated into the postcolonial state's economic policy planning, while the historically advantaged groups—large land-owning elites—faced economic discrimination. Varying policies of agrarian reform and import substitution industrialization (ISI) benefited the formerly marginalized groups and shored up the new middle class though mass education and bureaucratic expansion. The postcolonial state, underpinned by ISI policies, created and absorbed the major productive, commercial, and financial assets of the countries into the state structure.

The introduction of oil revenues throughout much of the Arab world further concentrated political and economic power into the state, allowing the state to foster a new elite that would be dependent on the distribution of oil revenues. This also introduced the "Dutch Disease," the exploitation of natural resources at the expense of the development of a manufacturing sector. Taken together, these processes gave rise to the emergence of rentier states, states that derive a substantial amount of revenues from the rents of one resource, and this arrangement has shaped state-society relations since the 1960s. This form of corporatism has functioned to subordinate various socioeconomic groups to the state, precluding the potential for effective class-based political opposition. As a result, throughout the Arab world political and economic power remains concentrated in the hands of those actors that are embedded in the state's corporatist mosaic.

The gradual transition away from state-led development toward market-led growth has seen the rise of economic actors that have directly benefited from economic liberalization policies enacted since the 1990s. Contemporary political-economy landscapes are shaped by these liberalization policies and also by a number of socioeconomic challenges.

Demographically, the Arab world is one of the youngest regions in the world. As populations grow, urbanization rates are increasing rapidly. The collapse of state-led development and a growing, urbanized population has meant that unemployment is increasing throughout the region, particularly among youth. Additionally, the pressures of democratization are echoed both from within by domestic actors and from without by Western countries. Emerging sectors such as tourism and finance have begun to displace traditional export sectors in some countries, particularly the Gulf Arab countries. Finally, the challenges of regional and global integration will serve as the context in which future Arab political-economic landscapes will be shaped.

See also *Arab Political Thought; Economic Development, State-led; Economic Policy Formulation; Economic Systems, Comparative.*

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Arab Political Thought

Like all intellectual landscapes, the history and trajectory of Arab political thought must be contextualized within specific cultural, social, legal, and religious periods. Arab political thought has evolved against the backdrop of three dramatic settings: the rise of Islam and the eventual absorption of many Arab lands into the Ottoman Empire (1299–1922); the Western setting and the colonial experience; and the postcolonial setting and modern Arab statehood. The five phases of Arab political thought include the pre-Ottoman phase; the early Ottoman phase (1299–1798); the liberal phase (1789–1939); the nationalist phase (1940–1967); and the contemporary, postnationalist phase.

Pre-Ottoman Arab philosophers were heavily influenced by both the rise of Islam and the translation of Greek works into Arabic, and they were concerned with questions of political organization and the nature of sovereign power. Al-Farabi developed a theory of the state that was to be adopted in Europe more than seven centuries later. He argued that under unjust conditions, people would gather together and agree to renounce rights to a sovereign who served as a protector of the community. He also argued that to live peacefully, groups needed to be formed along recognizable bonds, such as geography, culture, or language. Al-Ghazali advanced these ideas and contended that the innate human need for belonging would naturally produce forms of social and political organization bound by laws and a sovereign power. More than a hundred years later, Ibn Jama'a wrote that a sovereign could only maintain power through force and that the people would only accept the rule of the sovereign if the sovereign could exercise this force. This period was characterized by concerns over questions of sovereignty, power, and political organization and, in particular, with how these questions could be reconciled with various schools of Islamic jurisprudence.

The early Ottoman phase was shaped by the influential Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldun. In his work, he related the rise of the state to that of society. According to Ibn Khaldun, as society developed throughout history it needed increasingly complex forms of organization. The state, he believed, was inseparable from society. Arab thought during this phase was predominantly concerned with questions of political and religious authority and the obligations of the sovereign to society. Sayyid Murtada al-Zabidi, for example, drew an important distinction between the legitimacy of the caliphate, which was earned by religious merit, and the sultanate, which was earned by force. Because the Ottoman empire was a Sunni Muslim state, questions concerning the application of Islamic law, the treatment of non-Muslim communities, and intra-Muslim relations with other non-Sunni sects dominated Arab political thought during this period.

The liberal phase witnessed the secularization of Arab political thought and reflected the Arab experience with European colonialism and modernity. This period was defined by the emergence of nationalist thought, which asserted that the commonalities of certain groups meant that they formed a political community. Three conceptions of political community are identifiable in this period: religious, territorial, and ethnolinguistic nationalism. This liberal phase served as the midwife to more complex forms of Arab nationalism that dominated Arab political thought until 1967. Arab nationalism articulated Arabs as a single cultural, social, ethnic, and linguistic community that should be brought under the organization of a central Arab state and drew on various ideological currents, including fascism and socialism.

The contemporary phase of Arab political thought is defined by three factors that emerged in the aftermath of the defeat of Arab armies by Israel in the 1967 war: the collapse of socialism as an ideological model; the discrediting of secular Arab nationalism that had emerged during the liberal phase; and the reintegration of religious discourse into mainstream Arab political thought. This contemporary phase, characterized by modern, independent Arab states, is further defined by growing social, economic, and geopolitical trends in the Arab world, including growing population rates, the presence of Israel, increasing Western encroachment, the rise of Islamism, and the persistence of authoritarianism.

See also *Al-Farabi; Islamic Political Thought; Middle-Eastern Politics and Society.*

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Arab Socialism

Arab socialism is the name given to an ideology that was particularly prevalent in the Arab world in the 1960s, combining Arab nationalism with policies designed to favor the less privileged segments of society—notably involving land reform, a planned economy, subsidized prices for necessities, and the nationalization, in whole or in part, of large business enterprises. It represented an attack both on economic underdevelopment and extreme inequality. The term *Arab socialism* emphasized the ideology's allegedly distinctive features in comparison with other kinds of socialism. Although socialist ideas appeared in the Arab world as early the late nineteenth century, the notion of a specifically Arab kind of socialism seems to have originated with the Baath Party and later was embraced by the regime of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt (after 1958, the United Arab Republic, UAR). The term also was applied in Arab countries such as Libya and Algeria that at that time were described as "progressive," or "liberated." It tended to be an expression of Arab nationalism and, with its rejection of capitalism and communism, of nonalignment in the cold war.

ORIGINS OF EGYPT'S ARAB SOCIALISM

Characterized by pragmatism, the Nasser regime gradually evolved from a vague emphasis on social justice and democracy and opposition to feudalism and monopoly and the domination of capital in 1952 to fully embracing Arab socialism in the early 1960s. A first step in this direction was the enactment in 1952 of an Agrarian Reform Act that limited ownership to two hundred faddans (slightly more than two hundred acres or eighty-one hectares) and providing small plots for previously landless peasants, but in the beginning the regime showed signs of favoring private enterprise. Then nationalization occurred in several specific circumstances, as in the case of the Suez Canal Company in 1956 and in 1960 some leading banks. By the late 1950, references to a "socialist, democratic, and cooperative society" abounded, and the first of a series of five-year plans went into effect in 1960.

Nationalization of large enterprises accelerated during 1961, thus completing the transition to Arab socialism. The state took possession of all banks, insurance companies, and forty-four companies involved in various sectors and acquired a 50 percent interest in eighty-six other enterprises. The maximum ownership in some companies was set at LE10,000 (US$1,825).

Other nationalization followed during subsequent months. Thus Egypt's economy became one of the most statist outside the communist world, although it left considerable room for small-scale private ownership, particularly in agriculture. The maximum salary was set at LE5,000 (US$912), and the tax on incomes more than LE10,000 (US$1,825) at 90 percent. Maximum land ownership per individual was reduced to one hundred faddans (forty hectares) and eventually to fifty faddans.

ARAB SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM

Emphasis was given to contrasts between Arab socialism and communism. Listing seven major differences between the two, Nasser's confidant, Mohamed Heikal (Muhammad Haykal), began by arguing that Arab socialism rejects the communist solution of "proletarian dictatorship" and the elimination of classes through violence in favor of giving the underprivileged their rightful share of property "within a framework of national unity" without resorting to bloodshed. Unlike the communist equation of property with exploitation, he described the Arab socialist belief in property earned through work, which indeed should be extended to as many people as possible.

Some observers have questioned the depths of Nasser's socialist transformation. As there was not enough land to go around, most peasants remained landless, and landholding families retained much of their property and dominated local politics. News of continuing "feudalism" in 1966 created a sensation, followed by steps to rectify this. Some explain this by pointing to a leadership that came disproportionately from the equivalent of the Russian kulak class or, in a few cases, from big landholding families. Marxists talked about the rise of a new class of privileged technocrats and a new "state bourgeoisie" and pointed to the evasion of progressive taxes.

SEEKING INDIGENOUS ROOTS

Arab socialists generally sought to establish that their ideology had indigenous roots. Islam in particular came to be interpreted by Arab socialists as having had socialist principles that had been disregarded in subsequent centuries. Nasser argued that all religions "call for social justice." For example, he maintained that gross inequality could not have emerged if the Islamic requirement of giving 2.5 percent of one's wealth each year to the poor had been followed.

DECLINE OF ARAB SOCIALISM

With Nasser's death in 1970 and succession by Anwar Sadat, Arab socialism gradually faded away. Sadat adopted the idea of *infitah* (opening) to capitalist investment. State controls over the economy have been removed slowly and land reform undone. Nasser's social revolution has largely been reversed.

See also *Arab Political Economy; Arab Political Thought; Communism; Ideologies, Political; Socialism.*

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Arbitration

Arbitration is a long-standing form of adjudication that seeks to provide more economical, less formal, quicker, and more expert trial proceedings. The process was recognized in the ancient world, mentioned in the Quran, and served as a model for rabbinical courts. George Washington referred to it in his will. Although it is meant to be an alternative to judicial litigation, arbitration more closely resembles court proceedings than structured negotiation mechanisms, like mediation. Under contemporary perceptions, arbitration is more than an ancillary form of adjudication. In *Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,* 417 U.S. 506 (1974), the U.S. Supreme Court deemed arbitration vital to international commerce; in *Rodriguez v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,* 490 U.S. 477 (1989), it proclaimed arbitration instrumental to fulfilling the promise of constitutional due process.

The improper operation of judicial processes has made arbitration necessary. As former Chief Justice Warren Burger stated, judicial litigation takes too long, costs too much, and can decimate human relationships. Ordinary legal rights fall by the wayside. Faced with dwindling social resources and political deadlock, the Supreme Court chose to advocate for privatized justice and the submission of civil disputes to arbitration.

Arbitration in the United States is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Enacted in 1925, the FAA contains provisions establishing the validity of arbitration agreements and enforceability of arbitral awards. The legislation embodies a "hospitable" federal policy on arbitration. The case law has added substantially to its content over the years. More than forty U.S. Supreme Court opinions establish that the federal law of arbitration preempts conflicting state laws (making the FAA the exclusive national law of arbitration); the act applies to the vast majority of employment arbitration agreements despite the exclusion in FAA § 1, and arbitral proceedings are the equal of judicial trials for litigating claims. Moreover, arbitrations are isolated events with no general impact. The court also has determined that statutory claims can be submitted to arbitration, thereby substantially increasing the jurisdictional range of arbitration. In *Penn Plaza v. Pyett,* 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009), for example, the Supreme Court ruled that arbitrators could decide civil rights claims.

In a word, arbitration thrives in U.S. law. It is greatly favored by courts and legal doctrine. The case law makes it exceedingly difficult to void arbitration agreements or nullify arbitral awards. California and neighboring states dissent from the general consensus by invalidating arbitration in adhesionary circumstances. The federal preemption doctrine, however, keeps the dissension in check by giving the federal support of arbitration its full doctrinal impact.

Arbitration is structurally resilient and adaptive. It seeks solutions and avoids impasse. Its ethic is pragmatic. Proposed congressional legislation, buttressed by some lobbying groups and a small minority of academic commentators, threatens the current practice by prohibiting arbitration in unilateral contracts. The wholesale invalidation of predispute arbitration agreements in adhesionary sectors could compromise the basic legitimacy of arbitration by creating the erroneous impression that arbitration is an abusive process that caters solely to the richest and most powerful parties. The U.S. Supreme Court's depiction is more accurate: Arbitration supplies meaningful access to an effective means of redressing grievances through third-party decision making.

Arbitration also has wide currency in global commerce. It recently expanded its reach to the mixed political-commercial issues of investment between developed and developing countries. European democracies, like France and England, have embraced arbitration particularly in matters of transborder commerce, giving it—for the time being—somewhat less play in the internal administration of justice. Arbitral adjudication has taken hold in Latin America and China. Despite some resistance and a few flaws, it is the most universal and effective extant adjudicatory process.

See also *Adjudication; Supreme Court.*

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Archives, National

See *National Archives.*

Arendt, Hannah

Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) was born in Hanover, Germany, to a secular Jewish middle-class family. Dedicated to study early on, Arendt completed a doctoral dissertation in 1929 at Heidelberg University. During this same period, Arendt became increasingly preoccupied with the issue of German Jewish identity in response to rising anti-Semitism. She began writing a biography of Rahel Varnhagen, who was a Jewish salon hostess in Berlin in the early 1800s. Although the work

During her career as a political thinker, Hannah Arendt capably blended historical analysis with philosophical reflection on topics including anti-Semitism and totalitarianism.

was not published until 1958, it marked the start of Arendt's lifelong career as a political thinker who showed a unique gift of blending historical analysis with philosophical reflection. In 1933, with the Nazis' rise to power, Arendt fled to Paris and worked in a number of Jewish refugee organizations. In 1940, Arendt and her second husband, Heinrich Blüche, left Paris as it fell under German control. They eventually made their way to New York in 1941, and Arendt became an American citizen in 1951. By then her academic career was taking off, and she became one of the most influential but controversial thinkers of the twentieth century.

Arendt's first major publication in English was *The Origins of Totalitarianism* in 1951. This large volume, which is divided into three parts, traces the historical conditions that set the stage for the rise of totalitarianism under the broad themes of anti-Semitism and imperialism. What made the book controversial at the time was the third part, which paints Nazism and Stalinism with the same stroke, which was totalitarianism. On this important point, Arendt based her argument on philosophical rather than historical grounds. Totalitarianism as such is characterized by "ideological thinking," which in essence is a form of radical idealism that is sustained by a closed system of logic. It is the mind working in singularity rather than in plurality. Hence totalitarianism can only thrive in societies where individuals are completely isolated from one another. This observation led her to write what many consider to be her most original contribution to political thought, *The Human Condition,* in 1958. In it Arendt put forth a concept of action as direct interaction between individuals without any intermediary. Speech is thus the quintessential action and is what makes us distinctly human. Freedom and human plurality are realized through action.

Yet it was Arendt's later analysis of a related subject that proved to be even more controversial. This was the question of individual responsibility in totalitarian movements and the occasion was the Eichmann trial in 1961. As its firsthand observer, Arendt concluded that the former Nazi henchman Adolf Eichmann was no Mephistopheles nor Faust. Rather, Arendt observed in her *Eichmann in Jerusalem,* "he *merely,* to put the matter colloquially, *never realized what he was doing* . . . It was sheer thoughtlessness . . . that predisposed him to become one of the greatest criminals of that period" (1964, 287–288). To some, this pronouncement understated the magnitude of Eichmann's crime. However, in Arendt's last but incomplete major work, which was published posthumously in 1978 as *Life of the Mind,* thinking is identified as an internal dialogue that everyone can and should have with oneself at all times and as such, it is a moral obligation that no one can evade. Eichmann's defense that he was a "mere functionary" following orders from above was therefore inexcusable.

Since the late 1980s, scholarship on Arendt has flourished significantly on both sides of the Atlantic and beyond. Her continued appeal may be related to the fact in her lifetime, she had never lent herself to the political cause of either the liberal or the communist camp. Arendt is thus seen by many to be particularly pertinent to the post–cold war world of our time, including a vision of participatory democracy that is not right-based.

See also *Stalinism; Totalitarianism.*

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Aristotle

Aristotle (384–322 BCE) was born in Stagira, in Northern Greece. His father, Nicomachus, was court physician to Amyntas III, king of Macedon, and Aristotle maintained close connections to the Macedonian regime throughout his life. At the age of seventeen, he traveled to Athens, to study in Plato's Academy, where he stayed for twenty years, until Plato's death in 347. After he left the Academy, Aristotle's travels included returning to Macedon to tutor the future Alexander the Great. He returned to Athens, in 336, to open his own school, the Lyceum, where he stayed until the death of Alexander the Great in 323.

The corpus of Aristotle's works that have come down to us are not finished products, prepared for publication, but were composed in connection with his school, most likely for use in lecturing. Aristotle also wrote dialogues, which were renowned for their literary qualities, but aside from fragments that have been recovered, these were all lost. Aristotle's works encompass an enormous range of subjects, including logic, scientific studies of the natural world, metaphysics, ethics, and politics. His *Politics* has a strong claim to being the first extant work of political science.

Aristotle's moral and political philosophy shows the strong influence of Plato, and he provides powerful, detailed answers to important questions that Plato raised. But Aristotle clearly broke with Plato in important respects, notably in rejecting the latter's conception of *forms* or *ideas* that exist apart from their instances in the material world. In *Politics,* Aristotle departs from Plato most significantly in detailed examination of existing political forms, which he is willing to consider more or less on their own terms. In Book II of the work, Aristotle presents a harsh—although frequently clearly misguided—critique of Plato's *Republic* and *Laws,* generally in regard to what he views as these works' excessive utopianism.

In *Politics,* Aristotle explores the *polis* in its entirety, including different kinds of *poleis* and their distinctive features, factors that lead to the stability and instability of different forms. He also subjects the *polis* to moral inquiry, including what it means for human beings to live in it, and how it contributes to their well-being. In addition to the *polis* as it exists, Aristotle considers ideal representatives at different levels, ranging between ideal states unconstrained by actual circumstances, to remedying defects in existing states. In Book IV of the work, he presents a powerful argument for a relative ideal, a state that achieves the important end of social-political stability, based on rule by the middle class—as opposed to the political instability occasioned by rule of either the rich or the poor.

In composing *Politics,* Aristotle drew on studies of 158 different Greek constitutions. One of these studies, a book-length analysis of the constitution of Athens, by either Aristotle or his students, is extant. Aristotle demonstrates impressive command of the history and workings of innumerable specific cases. The *polis* existed in myriad forms, while the Greek world was torn by constant tumult, revolution, and change.

His studies of different instances—primarily of democracies, oligarchies, and tyrannies—compared and contrasted across numerous dimensions, provide a wealth of empirical analysis perhaps unmatched until relatively recent times.

See also *Greek Political Thought, Ancient; Plato.*

. . . .   GEORGE KLOSKO

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Armenian Genocide

The Armenian Genocide is often cited as the first genocide of the twentieth century, carried out against the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire during World War I (1914–1918). Many in Turkey, however, dispute that the event should be considered genocide, and it remains a controversial topic both within Turkey and internationally.

ARMENIANS UNDER THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Armenians, a Christian people, had long lived in the territory of the Ottoman Empire in eastern Anatolia and in cities such as Istanbul. Until the late nineteenth century, Armenians were referred to as *millet-i sadıka* (loyal nation) by the Ottomans. Like other minorities, they were free to practice their religion and had their own courts, although they were also subject to heavy taxes and denied rights granted to Muslims. In the late 1800s, increasingly despotic rule by the Ottoman sultan combined with Russian claims to act as a protector of Christian peoples in the Ottoman Empire led some Armenians to clamor for independence. Armenian unrest was forcefully put down by the government, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths from 1894 to 1897.

In 1909, the Ottoman Empire came under the control of the Young Turks, a movement within the bureaucracy and military that advocated reform within the Ottoman Empire. However, by 1913 the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), a more militant and nationalistic faction among the Young Turks, gained control over the government. The CUP was led by Ismail Enver Pasha, Mehmed Talat Pasha, and Ahmed Djemal Pasha, all individuals who have been accused of being behind the Armenian genocide.

WORLD WAR I AND GENOCIDE

In 1914, the Ottoman Empire joined World War I and attacked Russian forces. The Russians defeated the Ottomans. Some Armenians who lived in the area—there were Armenians on both sides of the Ottoman-Russian border—assisted Russian forces. The Ottoman government, however, accused the

Armenians *en masse* of being in league with the Russians, making them an enemy of the state. This would provide the pretext for the genocide.

The genocide began in 1915. First, Armenians in the army were disarmed, placed into labor battalions, and then killed. On April 24, 1915, Armenian intellectuals in Istanbul were arrested and deported by the government. They were eventually executed. (April 24 thus serves as the day of commemoration by those who acknowledge the genocide.) This was followed in May 1915 by a Temporary Law on Deportation, which gave the government the right to deport anyone it deemed a threat to national security. Several months later, a Temporary Law of Expropriation and Confiscation was passed, giving the government the right to seize Armenian property. Throughout 1915, the Ottoman authorities expelled the Armenians in eastern Anatolia from their homes, told them they would be relocated, and then marched them off to concentration camps in the desert between Jerablus and Deir ez-Zor, where many would perish due to lack of food and water. In other cases, Armenians were drowned, raped, or simply shot on sight by local Turks and Kurds, who acted with impunity.

According to many sources, the CUP created an administrative unit (*Teshkilai Mahusuna*) and special "butcher battalions," manned by violent criminals released from prison, to ensure that actions against the Armenians were carried out. Estimates are that between one and one and a half-million (of the roughly two and a half million Armenians in the Ottoman Empire) perished. Official Turkish records, published in 2008, indicate that nearly a million Armenians disappeared between 1914 and 1918.

Hundreds of eyewitnesses, including American missionaries and German military advisers (who were on the Ottoman side during the war) documented various massacres. For example, the German ambassador wrote to Berlin in 1916 that the Ottoman government sought "to resolve its Armenian question by the destruction of the Armenian race" (Hovannisian, 1992, xii). U.S. Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire Henry Morgenthau wrote in 1915 that "deportation of and excesses against peaceful Armenians is increasing and from harrowing reports of eyewitnesses it appears that a campaign of race extermination is in progress under a pretext of reprisal against rebellion" (Winter, 2003, 150). The *New York Times* ran more than one hundred articles on the plight of the Armenians in 1915, and many prominent Americans, including former President Theodore Roosevelt and orator and politician William Jennings Bryan, spoke out against it.

The Ottoman government, when not denying the massacres, claimed that they were driven by the needs of the war. Some Ottoman officials who refused to comply with orders were dismissed, and Turks who protected Armenians risked death themselves. Survivors of the genocide would find refuge in Russia, the Middle East, and, eventually, in Europe, North America, Africa, and Australia, making Armenians one of the world's largest diaspora groups.

After the war, the Ottoman Empire was defeated, and its wartime leaders were put on trial, often *in absentia*. In 1919,

a Turkish court convicted many Ottoman officials for war crimes, claiming that "the disaster visiting the Armenians was not a local or isolated event. It was the result of a premeditated decision taken by a central body . . . and the immolations and excesses which took place were based on oral or written orders issued by that central body" (Balakian, 2003, 339). This court functioned while Turkey was still occupied by Western powers. Later, Turkish army officer Mustapha Kemal (later Ataturk) organized Turkish resistance to foreign occupation, creating the Republic of Turkey in 1923 and securing the release of war criminals held by the British.

CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES

The Armenian genocide remains a very sensitive issue. While Armenians have lobbied for international recognition of the crime committed against them, the Turkish government refuses to acknowledge that the actions taken against the Armenians consistute a genocide. In its view, the Armenian claims of more than a million dead are wildly inflated, and those deaths that did occur among Armenians, Kurds, and Turks were the result of localized activity carried out during the war due to civil conflict. In this interpretation, there was no systematic, centralized campaign to eliminate Armenians. Others, however, would seek to justify actions taken against Armenians as necessary for the Turkish war effort, as Armenians were deemed to be unreliable. Many individuals, such as the Nobel-prize winning Turkish author Orhan Pamuk, who have spoken of the Armenian genocide, have been brought before Turkish courts for "insulting Turkishness." Efforts within Turkey to examine the issue have been subjected to harassment by the government, although some Turkish scholars, such as Turkish historian Taner Akcam, are willing to acknowledge that a genocide against Armenians did occur. Internationally, Turkey's refusal to acknowledge the Armenian genocide is held up by some as a reason not to admit Turkey to the European Union.

See also *Genocide; Nationalism; War Crimes.*

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Arms, Freedom to Bear

See *Freedom to Bear Arms.*

Arms Control

Arms control is both a process and a result. On the one hand, it involves the conscious and dedicated effort by two or more parties (typically nation-states) to negotiate an improved security relationship. On the other, arms control is often manifested by an agreement to regulate some aspect of the participating states' military capabilities or potential. The agreement may apply to the location, amount, readiness, or types of military forces, weapons, or facilities, but always presupposes cooperation or joint action among the participants regarding their military programs.

While not as centrally important today as it was during the second half of the twentieth century, arms control, in its broadest definition that encompasses not only traditional negotiations and agreements but also nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and disarmament, still has a role in a globalizing world that has ongoing security concerns. Arms control and other cooperative security initiatives should be seen as part of a nation-state's foreign policy toolbox, available when necessary to enhance a state's security, but seldom the only tools available; they complement rather than substitute for diplomatic, economic, and coercive military actions.

Arms control was born during the cold war to stall the military conflict primarily between the former Soviet Union, and its satellite states, and the United States long enough for the West to win. With the end of the cold war in 1991, the world experienced a flush of optimism and arms control activity that reached its zenith in the mid-1990s as formal agreements and cooperative measures were signed and entered into force with astounding speed. Both sides codified lower numbers of forces to ensure that the cold war was really over, but eventually arms control found a place dealing with the new concerns of proliferation, regional instability, and economic and environmental security. The value of arms control appeared to be growing in the new world, as states attempted to stem the illegal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue nations or groups and to meet their security needs in a multipolar, more interdependent world.

By the late 1990s, arms control had lost its luster for the United States and had become less important to a national security stance that no longer recognized the importance of such policies in the globalizing post–cold war world. The arrival of President George W. Bush in 2001 and the attacks of September 11 put the country on a war footing against a dramatically different kind of enemy. Arms control, at least from an American perspective, seemed passé, if not dead, a stance the Bush administration encouraged.

With the 2008 election of President Barack Obama, however, the United States restored arms control to its formerly central place in American diplomacy, and the international security agenda facing the new president required renewed attention to this policy approach. The Obama administration also saw arms control as a good way to try to restore better relations with Russia after several years of increasing antagonism.

WHAT IS ARMS CONTROL?

Arms control can be defined as any agreement among states to regulate some aspect of their military capability or potential. Proponents of the concept believe that while the negotiating methods, regions of concern, and weapons involved may have changed, the underlying principles and objectives of arms control remain relevant today. The arms control process is intended to serve as a means of enhancing a state's national security; it should not be pursued as an end unto itself. Arms control also should be distinguished from disarmament, the rationale for which is that armaments have been the major cause of international instability and conflict, and only through reductions in the weaponry of all nations can the world achieve peace. Proponents of disarmament have an overall goal of reducing the size of military forces, budgets, explosive power, and other aggregate measures.

COOPERATIVE SECURITY

Arms control falls under the rubric of cooperative security, a concept that has been used to outline a more peaceful and idealistic approach to security. One commonly accepted definition of *cooperative security* is a commitment to regulate the size, technical composition, investment patterns, and operational practices of all military forces by mutual consent for mutual benefit. Cooperative security is slightly different in meaning than collective security or collective defense. *Collective security* is a political and legal obligation of member states to defend the integrity of individual states within a group of treaty signatories, whereas *collective defense* is more narrowly defined as a commitment of all states to defend each other from outside aggression. By contrast, cooperative security can include the introduction of measures that reduce the risk of war, measures that are not necessarily directed against any specific state or coalition, a definition that definitely includes arms control.

DISARMAMENT

The classical practices underlying disarmament can be found almost as far back as the beginnings of recorded Western history. Early practices were largely postconflict impositions of limitations on military force by the victor upon the vanquished. However, there were also examples of efforts to avoid conflict by cooperating to demilitarize likely regions of contact and restrict the use of new and destructive technologies. Efforts to impose some degree of order on interstate conflict focused on the advance of legal standards toward just war. Another series of efforts included demilitarizing colonial forces and avoiding distant conflicts. The period of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was marked by dramatic increases in the lethality of warfare and a parallel move toward bounding the employment of new weapons. Efforts were made to ban the use of certain systems and munitions, limit numbers of advanced systems deployed, and restrict the geographic employment of forces.

Traditionally then, *disarmament* was used to indicate the full range of endeavors to reduce and restrict military weapons and forces through a wide variety of means, from cooperation

Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev shake hands at the signing of the SALT II Treaty in Vienna, Austria. The treaty was part of a nuclear arms control effort between the United States and the Soviet Union.

SOURCE: © Bettmann/Corbis

to imposition. These efforts included the demilitarization or deconfliction of potential regions of conflict, postconflict limitations on state forces and weapons, as well as attempts to limit and eliminate new and destructive technologies. Efforts also included regulating the conduct of warfare, from determinations of noncombatant status to precepts of just and moral uses of armed force. Until the early 1960s, the concept of *disarmament* was broadly used as an umbrella under which all of these arrangements and means of implementation could reside.

ARMS CONTROL

Arms control belongs to a group of closely related views whose common theme is peace through the manipulation of force, and is but one of a series of alternative approaches to achieving international security through military strategies.

The centrality of the concept of disarmament was supplanted by the term *arms control* early in the nuclear age. World War II (1939–1945) saw the introduction of what many

described as the "ultimate weapon," or the atomic bomb, as well as near-global technologies of delivery. With the failure of early proposals to either eliminate or internationalize control over atomic weapons, the focus shifted toward limiting their development and spread and controlling their use and effects. Western academics and policy analysts soon realized that disarmament in the literal sense of eliminating nuclear weapons was not going to happen; these weapons had become a long-term reality of the international system. Thus, as they began examining these weapons and nuclear strategy, they adopted a preference for terminology that directly captured efforts to come to grips with "controlling" these weapons.

In the mid-1950s, policy makers began rethinking an approach that had emphasized general and complete disarmament and considered instead limited, partial measures that would gradually enhance confidence in cooperative security arrangements. Thus, more modest goals under the rubric of arms control came to replace the propaganda-laden disarmament efforts of the late

1940s and early 1950s. International security specialists began using the term *arms control* in place of *disarmament*, which they felt lacked precision and smacked of utopianism. The seminal books on the subject published in the early 1960s all preferred *arms control* as a more comprehensive term. Austrian scholar Hedley Bull differentiated the two as follows: disarmament is the reduction or abolition of armaments, while arms control is restraint internationally exercised upon armaments policy—not only the number of weapons, but also their character, development, and use.

The concept and theory of arms control was developed by a small number of academic study groups in the United States and Great Britain, who published the three seminal works on arms control in 1961. *Strategy and Arms Control,* by Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, reflected the findings of a 1960 summer study group organized under the auspices of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The basic premise of this book was that cooperative arrangements with adversaries could have the same objectives as sensible military policies in reducing the likelihood of war. The authors were influenced by the work of another member of the summer study, Donald G. Brennan, who served as editor of *Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security.* Similarly, *The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age,* by Hedley Bull, was based on a series of symposia held at Oxford University in 1960. These three works form the essential basis for understanding modern arms control theory.

The arms control perspective was perhaps best expressed by Schelling and Halperin when they framed the arms control construct as follows:

> We believe that arms control is a promising . . . enlargement of the scope of our military strategy. It rests essentially on the recognition that our military relation with potential enemies is not one of pure conflict and opposition, but involves strong elements of mutual interest in the avoidance of a war that neither side wants, in minimizing the costs and risks of the arms competition, and in curtailing the scope and violence of war in the event it occurs. (1)

Arms control in the nuclear age was framed as a component part of an overall military and national security strategy—an instrument of policy and an adjunct to force posture, not a utopian or moral crusade. It captured the more cooperative side of policy, focusing not on imposition but on negotiation and compromise, recognizing the shared interest in avoiding nuclear conflict.

ARMS CONTROL IN THE COLD WAR

EARLY COLD WAR MULTILATERAL EFFORTS

Multilateral efforts early in the cold war sought to affect the control of nuclear weapons by limiting the physical scope of the weapons, their testing, and their further technological development and proliferation. Multilateral agreements prior to the 1970s banned placing nuclear weapons in Antarctica, outer space, or the earth's seabed. Regional nuclear-weapon-free zones also were established during this period in Latin America and later in the South Pacific, Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia. Early restrictions on atmospheric testing were supplemented by efforts to ban all atmospheric tests and eventually all weapons test explosions, even underground. The early multilateral efforts were capped by the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) that sought to prevent future additions to the nuclear club by establishing a framework for additional multilateral efforts extending to biological and chemical weapons and other arenas of arms control. The NPT also paid service to its disarmament heritage by containing a clause calling on all nuclear weapons states to seek the eventual elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

With the establishment of the NPT regime, the primary focus of arms control focus during the second half of the cold war centered on bilateral strategic controls between the United States and the Soviet Union. The meaning of arms control subsequently narrowed to a focus on the formal negotiating process, characterized by staged, multipart negotiation, implementation, and verification phases.

THE SALT ERA

The first effort of the bilateral U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control process led to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and three treaties—an Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons and Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty (both signed in 1972, together called SALT I), and the 1979 SALT II treaty. Cold war tensions and a dangerous and expensive nuclear arms race, whose potential ramifications had been made evident by the Cuban Missile Crisis, spurred both the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1960s into a series of cooperative measures and steps toward bilateral cooperation to limit future strategic systems. With the development of sufficient capabilities in national technical means of unilateral verification, formal bilateral negotiations on SALT began in 1969. SALT I froze the total number of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles on both sides and limited the total number of maritime strategic systems that could be deployed. It also limited the development and deployment of future antiballistic missile systems and restricted defense technologies. The two sides agreed on the outline of a follow-on agreement at the Vladivostok Summit in 1974. Subsequent negotiations led to SALT II, which placed an aggregate limit on deployed strategic launch vehicles and also limited the number of systems that could be equipped with multiple warheads.

THE START ERA

The second series of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union addressed force reductions through the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), leading to the START I and START II treaties and the elimination of an entire class of weapons through the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Beginning simultaneously with the SALT talks, a broader series of East-West efforts had addressed the reduction of tensions between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. By 1987, the INF treaty negotiations came to fruition, and both sides' intermediate-range missiles were withdrawn and destroyed. A key legacy of this agreement, in addition to its

precedent for elimination of an entire category of weapon systems, was its reliance on on-site inspection teams to verify missile removal and destruction on the other side's territory.

The START talks began in 1982 and proceeded alongside an extensive series of nuclear confidence-building measures addressing risk reduction and data sharing. The 1992 START I Treaty required measured reductions in both nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, with intrusive verification provisions to ensure compliance. The bilateral nuclear arms control process was so firmly established that even with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the two sides were still able to quickly negotiate the 1993 START II Treaty, in which both sides agreed to further reduce their nuclear arsenals. In addition, cooperative efforts succeeded in consolidating control of Soviet nuclear systems in the Russian Republic and initiating a broad effort known as *cooperative threat reduction measures* to reduce the chances of proliferation from the former Soviet Union. At the 1997 Helsinki summit meeting, both countries committed themselves to continue the strategic arms reduction process to even lower levels of nuclear warheads through a START III round, but this plan was obviated by the 2002 Moscow Treaty (officially the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or SORT).

THE MOSCOW TREATY AND BEYOND

The Moscow Treaty called for continued reductions in both sides' arsenals of deployed strategic warheads, but with no formal verification measures to ensure compliance. Given that START was scheduled to expire in December 2009, and SORT in December 2012, the two states began negotiations on a replacement strategic agreement in earnest after Barack Obama became president of the United States in 2009.

MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL SUCCESSES

Arms control has not been solely focused on bilateral U.S.-Soviet strategic issues since the 1970s. There have been parallel efforts under way in multiple other fields, often led by the United Nations Conference on Disarmament. These multilateral discussions were not as highly charged politically as the bilateral efforts, but they did achieve several notable accomplishments. For example, in 1972 the world agreed to ban the production, stockpiling, and use of biological and toxin weapons (the Biological Weapons Convention), and in 1993 it agreed to a similar treaty on chemical weapons (the Chemical Weapons Convention). NATO and the Warsaw Pact came to an agreement on conventional force levels, composition, and disposition in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty in 1990. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was signed in Geneva in 1996 (although it has not yet entered into force), and discussions are still ongoing regarding a global Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty. A series of nuclear-weapon-free zones has essentially denuclearized the entire Southern Hemisphere. A coalition of states and nongovernmental organizations led the effort to ban landmines in 1997 (the Ottawa Convention), and several informal groupings of states were created to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technologies through organizations such as the Zangger Committee, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT TODAY

The agenda of existing, active efforts in the arena of arms control and disarmament remains extensive. The potential for nuclear proliferation—whether materials, components, systems, weapons, or expertise—keeps nuclear arms control on the agenda. Small arms and light weapons remain outside of any effective controls. Other weapons with catastrophic potential—particularly biological and chemical—while subject to international controls and even bans, remain a threat due to further development and possible proliferation. Far-reaching technological developments have opened up entire new arenas of potential and actual military development in areas such as information technology and outer space. Ongoing arms control efforts—unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral, formal and informal, between nations and non-state parties in some cases—are addressing this wide agenda.

The U.S.-Russian strategic arms control implementation process will take decades to complete. This is a massive, difficult, expensive, and often contentious process, and it will be compounded with each new increment of cuts. The added factor of dealing with strategic defenses will complicate this bilateral endgame, at least in the short term, but it also holds the potential—at least to some observers—of being the only route to the continued safe drawdown of the two strategic nuclear arsenals. In addition, the United States and Russia have yet to address the additional nonstrategic nuclear weapons that are included in their arsenals, which will even further complicate bilateral arms controls. Similar cooperative efforts to dismantle, control, and destroy former Soviet chemical and biological weapons and capabilities extend the scope and horizons of the bilateral strategic arms control effort. The highly formal cold war bilateral arms control process will certainly be altered, but it is far from over.

We also can expect a continuation of multilateral arms control and disarmament efforts, particularly toward halting and reversing the proliferation and development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Work remains to be done in fully implementing the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and in improving the implementation of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions.

Regional arms control and disarmament efforts are just emerging. Europe has long addressed security cooperation, confidence-building, and conventional arms control issues, and that effort will persist as the region continues to stake out its future course. Other regions have adopted nuclear-weapon-free zones, and some have established regional cooperative programs on a range of economic, political, and security issues. New and emerging arenas for arms control and disarmament include existing efforts among some states and nonstate actors to address controls or bans on small arms, at least academic discussion of controls on advanced conventional weapons, and emerging venues of military interest—and thus arms control interest—in space and cyberspace. All of these efforts are only in their infancy.

Humankind has a long legacy of attempts to limit the potential and destructive results of warfare. Today, as modern

technologies threaten massive destruction and suffering, nations will continue to strive for humane and measured applications of force. As long as weapons remain tools of international relations, citizens of those nations will be involved in arms control and disarmament. For nearly three generations, policy development and intellectual advancement in the field of international relations have focused on the role of arms control and used the specialized language developed for that purpose. This field of international policy will remain viable and vital into the foreseeable future.

See also *Arms Race; Conflict Resolution; Nuclear Club; Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation; Weapons of Mass Destruction.*

. . . .   JEFFREY LARSEN

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Arms Race

An *arms race* is generally understood as a process of competitive acquisition of weaponry. The domestic and international forces driving an arms race may be as era-defining as global ideological rivalry or as idiosyncratic as the preferences of an admiral's spouse, but evidence of hostility between the racers is a definitional requirement, usually including an assertion on each side that the buildups are necessary because of the growing arsenal of the opponent.

Arms racers are often pairs of nation-states, but interactive arming may occur also between alliances, within nation-states, between armed services, within armed services, or among nonstate actors. One example of complex interactions among more than two nation-states is trilateral arming among China, the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war era. Arms racing may precede war, substitute for war, or grow out of unresolved issues following war, but as a rule, weapons production during wartime is not considered arms racing.

Races are identified by the names of the participants (e.g., U.S.-Soviet Arms Race) as well as by the nature of the weaponry (e.g., the nuclear arms race). Arms races also may be distinguished according to whether they are essentially qualitative or quantitative. Qualitative arms racing means that participants compete to develop higher *quality, more effective* arsenals. Qualitative races are characterized by weapons whose accuracy, range, and lethality change quickly and by rapid research and development of new weapons technologies. Quantitative racing is competition in *numbers* of existing weaponry. Arms control specialists find that quantitative races are easier to limit by agreement than qualitative races. Rapidly moving qualitative races also facilitate agreement, but only in obsolescent technologies.

CONCEPTUALIZATIONS

Arms races are conceptualized in several ways. One view is that arms racing can be understood as a mechanistic process like the

motion of billiard balls but capable of generating unanticipated and undesired effects such as World War I (1914–1918), or a nuclear war catalyzed by a crisis. Other analysts see arms racing as tacit but intelligent communication, in which acquisition of weapons systems becomes a coded conversation. This view assumes that adversaries know and understand each other's political goals and that new weaponry becomes reasonably well known on both sides, perhaps by open testing.

A policy instrument conceptualization views arms racing as a device to achieve political-economic goals, foreign and domestic, deliberately and rationally. Arms racing also may be conceived as a less rational result of internal bureaucratic forces: domestic political and economic bargaining, competition among military services, incremental decision making, and failure to discard old programs, such as the U.S. horse cavalry. In this view the arms buildup is a result of a military-industrial complex grafted onto the legislature. Large-scale weapons systems are seen as fruit of a patronage system and may have little to do with the outside world. Choice of adversary is then mostly a historical accident and may be altered to meet domestic political, including electoral, needs.

Some scholars, such as Brian Eslea (1985), understand arms racing in part or in whole as an aberrant consequence of psychological pressures on decision making, so that racing is propelled by misperception, genuine psychopathology, or imperatives of gender on decision making. Larger theoretical arguments about interstate conflict dynamics have posited a role for competitive armaments processes in catastrophe theory, in the intersection of competition for resources and political alliances as well as in escalation of disputes to crises and thence to war. The fact that arms races often originate in or precipitate territorial disputes leads to the inclusion of contiguity (close proximity, usually understood as a shared border) and geostrategic data in many explanations.

EXAMPLES OF ARMS RACES

Soviet Union-United States, 1948–1989

Israel-rejectionist states, various dates; e.g., 1957–1966

India-Pakistan, various; 1957–1964

Chile-Peru, 1868–1879

England-Germany, 1898–1914

ARE ARMS RACES RISKY?

Under what circumstances is arms racing dangerous? When is it stabilizing? Deterrence theorists assert that some arms races contribute to conflict stabilization, hence to peace (deterrence stability). Intriligator and Brito argue (1984) that for some constellations of weaponry, racing leads to peace. Power equilibrium hypotheses and power transition arguments also can be developed in which military power is used to restore balance and order. Similar arguments apply to horizontal proliferation as potentially stabilizing. Racing also may preserve peace at least temporarily by substituting another arena for competition.

However, arms races may be deterrence-stable (in the sense that ratios of weapons remain constant while the arsenals grow),

while being neither mechanically stable, nor crisis-stable. Arms races may then be war precursors in the long term because mechanical instability can occur within deterrence stability or other forms of stability.

Some types of arms races are probably more hazardous than others. Observers cannot avoid the conclusion that racing in weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological—is inherently dangerous. Arms racing in nuclear weapons is risky even if tightly controlled, simply because of the inevitable environmental contamination before, during, and after the arms race, and because of the risks of accidental detonation, loss, theft, and diversion. As weapons proliferate, into whose hands they may devolve becomes a more urgent question. The specter of the "terrorist" use of WMD looms large, but it should not obscure the risk that status quo powers themselves may not be reasonable users of WMD.

Does arms racing itself risk interstate war? Arms racing may be perilous because it can be a method of maximizing arsenals before initiating a war (risk of a long and severe war). Alternatively, arms racing may be misunderstood by a potential adversary as signaling imminent attack when none is intended (risk of an accidental war). Arms racing from a position of notable inferiority may even invite preemptive attack (deterrence failure).

Arms racing is not typical nation-state behavior. Scholars come to contrasting conclusions about the political consequences of arms racing, depending on variations in their original assumptions, definitions of terms, conceptualizations, and initial political conditions. Outcomes are affected by dynamic factors such as power transitions and the type and form of the race and by specifics such as the nature of the weaponry, as well as the risks taken in deployment, such as instituting automatic launch-on-warning mechanisms. On balance, the risk posed by arms racing in general cannot be given a single answer.

The social science term *arms racing,* understood as unstable escalatory processes, is now established in the natural sciences as well, especially in the context of evolutionary theory. In biology, arms racing is understood as an interactive process of adaptive defense and offense, against pathogens, parasites or predators. For instance, in a predator-prey pair, racing prey animals evolve resistance to predator toxins, while predators evolve more effective poisons, capturing the social science concepts of dyadic relationships and action-reaction spirals.

See also *Arms Control; Cold War; Nuclear Club; Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation.*

·   T. C. SMITH

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Arnold, Thurman Wesley

Thurman Arnold (1891–1969) was a lawyer, judge, law professor, political theorist, and assistant attorney general in charge of antitrust initiative in the Roosevelt administration. His two principal books are *The Symbols of Government* (1935) and *The Folklore of Capitalism* (1937).

Arnold contends that humans are primarily irrational, governed not by reason but by the need to tell stories and cast people into familiar roles in order to make sense of the world. Successful political action requires discovering the folklore of a people (including ideas, symbols, and ceremonial action) and advocating change within its context, to make new ideas seem like the fulfillment of old promises. Arnold's work is devoted to exposing the folklore that governed American life during the Great Depression (1929–1939), to pave the way for a new folklore that justified an American welfare state.

Arnold's theory focuses on the relationship between ideas and organizations. He argues that theory has no meaning apart from its attachment to organizations and that the primary purpose of theory is not to reflect truth but to provide morale. No organization can function for long without the legitimacy (and attendant morale) provided by its folklore. The ability of an organization to respond effectively to changing circumstances depends on the flexibility of that folklore to respond to tensions between original purposes and new obligations. Sometimes the tension is reconciled through elaborate ceremonies (Arnold's most famous detailed analysis of this is a look at the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890) or the creation of sub-rosa institutions to meet needs not legitimated under the dominant folklore (e.g., bootlegging during Prohibition in the 1920s). Substantive change is possible only in times of institutional collapse, and even then innovation must account for the existential authority of the old folklore.

Arnold's principal works analyze the folklore behind political governance (the U.S. Constitution) and economic governance (capitalism). In *The Folklore of Capitalism,* generally regarded as his most important work, Arnold's central goal is to expose the business corporation in the United States as essentially a form of feudal government, a fact obscured by capitalist folklore. He accomplishes this through systematic analyses of the symbols of taxation, the personification of the corporation, and the nature of U.S. antitrust and corporate reorganization laws. Ultimately, Arnold attempts to justify an active welfare state and a regulatory apparatus that forces corporations to recognize their public obligations.

Folklore paved the way for Arnold's appointment in 1938 as assistant attorney general, in charge of the antitrust division. Arnold revolutionized the division, introducing new legal tactics and new ways of thinking about the role of trusts in American economic life. His goal was not to attack the size of corporations per se but the restraints of trade created by them that negated competition and harmed the consumer. Arnold enjoyed considerable success until the defense buildup during World War II (1939–1945) ended the political support for his initiatives. He resigned in 1943 and after a brief judgeship went on to found the law firm Arnold, Fortas & Porter.

See also *Antitrust Policy; New Deal.*

. . . .   BRIAN STIPELMAN

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Aron, Raymond

Raymond-Claude-Ferdinand Aron (1905–1983) was a French scholar and journalist who, in postwar France, opposed the intellectual left.

Aron, the son of Gustave Aron, a Jewish law professor, studied at the Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS), the French academy for teachers, from 1924 to 1928. In 1928 Aron had the highest score on the aggregation in philosophy (a competitive civil service examination offered in France). He was awarded a doctorate in 1930.

In 1930, Aron went to Germany, where he was a lecturer at the University of Cologne until 1931 and a researcher from 1931 to 1933 at the Maison Academique in Berlin. He married Suzanne

Gauchon in 1933. Aron was awarded his doctorate during this time, completing his thesis on the philosophy of history.

With the rise of Adolph Hitler and anti-Semitism in Germany, Aron returned to France. He became a philosophy professor at the Lycee of Le Havre. He returned to Paris in 1934, becoming the secretary at the Center of Social Documentation at the ENS.

In 1939, Aron began teaching social philosophy at the University of Toulouse, but left to join the French Air Force when World War II (1939–1945) began. Following the fall of France in 1940, Aron escaped to London, where he became part of the Free French movement and the editor of their newspaper, *La France Libre.* He edited the paper until 1944.

Following the liberation, Aron returned to France to teach sociology at the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA) and the Paris Institute of Political Studies. In 1955 he became a professor of political science as a member of the Faculty of Letters at the Sorbonne, a post he held until 1968. He was an opponent of the French student movement of May 1968. In 1970 he became a professor of sociology at the College de France.

In addition to his teaching, Aron became a columnist in 1947 for *Le Figaro,* a conservative daily newspaper. He wrote for the paper for thirty years, becoming one of the nation's leading columnists. When the paper was purchased by Robert Hersant, a conservative newspaper publisher allied with French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Aron resigned. He moved to *L'Express,* a weekly news magazine, where he wrote columns from 1977 until his death.

Aron's scholarship was in the fields of economics, philosophy, political science, and sociology. He wrote more than forty books during his lifetime, in which he supported the classical liberal tradition of freedom and private property, challenging the views of those on the ideological left, especially those of his classmate at the ENS, Jean-Paul Sartre.

In *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (published as *L'opium des intellectuels* in 1957), Aron's thesis was that Marxism is a "mental opium" and was based on false myths. In particular he noted the Marxist belief that history was progressive and liberating, although the Marx-inspired Soviet regime was based on totalitarian controls. The second Marxist myth he challenged was the role that philosopher Karl Marx assigned to the proletariat—that of the saviors of humanity; Aron contended that all most workers wanted was a middle class (bourgeoisie) standard of living.

Scholar Reed Davis notes that, in international relations, Aron subscribed to what he called "the idea of reason, an image of society that would truly be humanized." Aron hoped that the possibility of nuclear war would lead to an end to power politics.

See also *French Political Thought; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Sartre, Jean-Paul.*

. . . .   JEFFREY KRAUS

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Arrow's Paradox

See *Voting Cycles and Arrow's Paradox.*

Articles of Confederation

The Articles of Confederation were the original constitution of the United States and were developed and adopted during the conflict with Great Britain. In 1776, the delegates of the thirteen colonies met as a Continental Congress to adopt the Declaration of Independence and plan the Revolutionary War (1776–1783). Led by John Dickinson of Delaware and Pennsylvania, the Congress formed a committee to draft the articles that would guide the new nation.

The document was ratified July 9, 1778, by ten of the original thirteen colonies. New Jersey later ratified the Articles of Confederation on November 26, 1778, and Delaware followed on February 23, 1779. Maryland ratified them two years later on March 1, 1781, after seeking concessions from several large states, including any claims on lands to Maryland's west. With the Revolutionary War's resolution in April 1783, numerous interest groups began to call for revision of the Articles.

Article II included the foundational principle of the document: "Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." The Articles, thus, granted the national government limited powers and made it fiscally dependent on the former colonies, now states, which also controlled the militia.

The Articles constituted the U.S. Congress as a single branch of government, and each state selected congressional delegates, who voted as states, not as individuals. Measures needed nine of thirteen votes to pass Congress, but any fundamental alterations in national policy or changes to the Articles required a unanimous vote. Several attempts to change the Articles prior to the adoption of the new Constitution were prevented by a single state.

The weak central government created under the Articles contributed to significant financial trouble for the new nation because states could not be compelled to pay their debts. Without necessary resources, the government could not address economic and military challenges—from the encroachments of the British on the borders set by the Treaty of Paris (1783) to those of the Spanish on the southern borders of the United States and raids by Native Americans on the western frontier. The United States also possessed only limited power to

regulate commerce and resolve tariff wars between the states. Inflation and an economic depression after the Revolutionary War led to new efforts to revise the Articles.

In January 1786, Virginia called for a meeting of the states in Annapolis to discuss modifying the Articles, but only five states attended. In 1787, the Congress convened in Philadelphia to draft amendments. Only Rhode Island did not attend. After determining that the Articles of Confederation were insufficient for guiding the new nation, the Philadelphia convention proposed a new constitution, and a protracted struggle between Federalists and Anti-Federalists erupted. Ratification presented an early constitutional crisis for the new republic, but after extensive debate, the U.S. Constitution was adopted in 1787.

See also *Checks and Balances; Constitutions and Constitutionalism.*

. . . .   MICHAEL W. HAIL

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Asian American Identity and Groups

The term *Asian American* originated as a political statement. Inspired by other social movements of the era, activists of the late 1960s and early 1970s coined the term to reflect a new identity. An example of what Michael Omi and Howard Winant, in their 2007 work *Racial Formation in the New Millennium,* have labeled a racial formation, this Asian American identity was a declaration of self-determination and part of an effort to overcome oppression. The story of that identity is an ongoing one that can relay much about the power of race in the United States.

THE EMERGENCE OF AN ASIAN AMERICAN IDENTITY

Americans with ancestral roots in Asia had often been called *orientals,* but there was little sense of a common—a panethnic—identity among them before the 1960s. In some cases, there had even been concerted efforts at ethnic "disidentification." For instance, many Japanese Americans worked to disassociate themselves from Chinese Americans during intense anti-Chinese campaigns in the late nineteenth century, and many Chinese Americans returned the favor when public hatred of the Japanese reached a fever pitch during the 1940s. These efforts were to little avail, however. Although the initial restrictive immigration laws, such as the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) had originally named specific nationalities, over time, all Americans of Asian ancestry found themselves the targets of discriminatory treatment.

Realizing this, 1960s activists began to call themselves Asian Americans. Because there had been little immigration from Asia for more than three decades, young adults were usually the grandchildren of immigrants, and for these third-generation youth, similarities between subgroups greatly overshadowed the differences. While those differences had been important to their immigrant grandparents, the younger generation had a very different frame of reference. For them, the "homeland" was the United States, where they experienced prejudice that did not distinguish between Asian subgroups. Japanese Americans, for example, subject to the derogatory term *chinks* (a slur at the Chinese) recognized that bigots cared little for ethnic distinctions. Many came to believe that Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and others of Asian ancestry should emphasize a common, *panethnic* identity: Asian American.

Superficially, *Asian American* resembled the older *oriental* category, but the differences were substantial. *Oriental* was little more than a descriptive category and had not served as a unifying idea that could draw individuals of different ancestries together. *Asian American,* on the other hand, was explicitly promoted as a collective identity, emphasizing the shared experiences and geographical roots experiences of all Asian-ancestry Americans. To proclaim an Asian American identity was to assert the power to define oneself, which many activists emphasized by calling theirs a "yellow power" movement. Although *yellow power* faded as a rallying cry, an Asian American identity spread rapidly.

THE NEW IMMIGRATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF ASIAN AMERICA

As this new identity was growing, dramatic changes in immigration created new challenges. In 1965, the Hart-Celler Act repealed the national origins quotas that had greatly favored western and northern Europeans, replacing them with family reunification preferences that ended an era in which race served as a central component to immigration policy. This created much greater opportunity for Asian immigration, much of it coming from areas that had not previously sent large numbers to the United States. Wars in Korea and Southeast Asia also created connections through which increasing numbers of newcomers would move to the United States. The result was rapid growth and diversification of the Asian American population, so that by 2000, Japanese Americans, who had been the largest subgroup in 1970, had been surpassed by Chinese, Filipino, (Asian) Indian, Korean, and Vietnamese Americans. Asian Americans as a group had grown from less than 1 percent in 1970 to a little over 4 percent of the total population by 2000.

Immigration also brought great socioeconomic diversity. From 50 to 60 percent of Cambodian, Hmong, and Laotian Americans had less than a high school diploma in 2000, while more than 40 percent of Chinese, Filipino, Indian, Japanese, and Korean Americans had a bachelor's degree or higher, with the percentage reaching a stunning 64 percent for Asian Indians (in all cases, figures are for individuals twenty-five or older).

Perhaps most importantly, immigration transformed the Asian American population into one that was predominantly

foreign-born—almost two-thirds, according to Census 2000. Thus, for a substantial number of Asian Americans, their sense of identity was likely to be shaped by experiences in another country. Third-generation Asian Americans, who were the driving force behind the creation of an Asian American identity, were by the mid-2000s a distinct minority. Can a panethnic identity survive in a population that does not have the shared experiences that characterized Asian America in the mid-1960s?

THE FUTURE OF AN ASIAN AMERICAN IDENTITY

A common identity may survive, but not unchanged. The Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS) found that half or more of each Asian subgroup surveyed identified panethnically at times, but immigrants and their children were more likely to identify first in ethnic terms—such as being a Korean or a Vietnamese American. But, although they usually identified primarily in ethnic terms, around half of all PNAAPS respondents expressed a sense of linked fate—meaning what happens to other Asian American groups would affect them as well—and felt that Asian Americans shared a common culture.

This sense of interconnected fates creates bonds that strengthen panethnic identification. Common problems can be more effectively combated when Asian American subgroups form a coalition, and a panethnic identity can make coalition-building easier. Subgroups will not always coexist peacefully, but they sometimes will find it in their interest to join together.

If the children and grandchildren of immigrants find growing acceptance in society, however, an Asian American identity may not take deep root. The more that Asian Americans can move into all ranks of society, the more likely it is that their ethnic or panethnic identity will recede in importance and become an option that they will exercise or ignore as they wish.

If Asian Americans continue to be viewed as foreigners, however—even when their families have lived in the United States for three or more generations—they would have little choice but to embrace a separate identity. A strengthening Asian American panethnicity would be evidence that racial distinctions continue to carve deep divisions within American society.

See also *Coalition Formation; Identity, Politics of; Immigration, Effects on Intergroup Relations; Pan-ethnicity; Racial Discrimination.*

. . . . ANDREW L. AOKI

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Asian Political Thought

Asian political thought is political thought produced, shaped, and adapted to explain, justify, or reform political conditions within the cultures throughout Asia. These highly diverse traditions of political thought are contrasted with the rights-based political thought associated with the traditions of classical and modern liberal thought that has its geographical center in western Europe and North America. Whereas the rights-based traditions of the Atlantic community tend to emphasize the individual, democracy, and economic liberty, Asian political thought is viewed to favor the community, rulership and guidance by spiritual or political elites, and social purposes over economic rights.

The richness of both the Asian and Atlantic traditions makes these generalizations the target of scholarly and political criticism, but some political elites and political scientists have found these generalizations useful for political, research, or explanatory purposes. An understanding of what Asian political thought means for modern political science can be gathered by exploring the approach Western scholarship has taken to Asian political thought, surveying the religious traditions behind Asian political thought, examining the encounter of Asia with the West and the impact of Western dominance on Asian political thought, chronicling the Asian reaction to Western imperialism and decolonization, and assessing the impact of globalization on Asian political thought.

WESTERN ORIENTALISM

Greek historian Herodotus made the first known mention of the continent of Asia in his writings. The Persians, the first Asians by this reckoning, were characterized as loving freedom too little in comparison with the Greeks. The general tone of Herodotus' reflections would later reverberate throughout Western scholarship on Asia. The most notable thinkers who focused on Asia as a place lacking freedom were German philosophers Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel and Karl Marx. Hegel viewed Asia as the place where only the despot was free. Marx identified the Asiatic mode of production as being a mode of production that differed from feudalism based on the centralized control of the modes of production associated with irrigation agriculture. German American historian Karl Auguste Wittfogel built upon Marx's theory. Wittfogel argued that the bureaucracies that were essential to Asia's irrigation works and managing large hydraulic works crushed civil society and resulted in a mode of government he called "oriental despotism." He contended that modern communist societies followed the model of oriental despotism and would be even more repressive.

Not all European understandings of Asian culture were so negative. Jesuit missionaries found much that was admirable in Chinese and Japanese society and tried to reconcile the secular religion of Confucianism with Christianity. The Vatican rejected these attempts; the Magisterium, the governing body of the Catholic Church, found ancestor worship to be incompatible with Christianity. The Catholic condemnation

of Confucianism commended Confucianism to freethinking Enlightenment intellectuals such as German philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Leibniz and French writer Voltaire as a nontheocratic source of ethical behavior and social order. French physician and writer Francois Bernier found within the Chinese tradition a model of an ethically justifiable and practical absolutist government that resonated with the European practice of absolute monarchy exemplified by Louis XIV. Interestingly, Bernier, who spent time in the Mughal Empire, characterized India as a plurality of what would today be described as kleptocracies.

Palestinian American literary critic Edward Said's concept of *orientalism* addressed the tendency to idealize or demonize Asian societies. Said, a scholar focusing on western Asia, identified Western images of the Orient to be tools in an imperialistic project of domination. Owing much to French postmodernist philosopher Michel Foucault, Said saw the process of knowledge production as intimately related to the quest for power. The image of the other, from this perspective, may have very little to do with the reality of the other, but is instead a reflection of needs of the one creating the image. According to this view, the accumulation of knowledge of Western societies about Asia may tell us less about Asian political realities than the role Asia played for Western societies as an enemy or an idealized other.

Bernard Lewis, a prominent scholar of western Asia who has been criticized as a practitioner of orientalism by Said, argues that Said is overblown in his characterization of Western efforts to produce knowledge about Asia as aiding and abetting imperialism. Instead of being rooted in the project of imperialism, the quest for knowledge about Asia is rooted in the project of humanism. A rejection of religious dogma lay at the foundation of humanism and opened the way to explore other cultures. Lewis characterizes Said's efforts to bring into question the efforts of Westerners to understand other cultures as a form of *intellectual protectionism* that would reserve discourse about a culture to those within the boundaries of that culture alone.

Some political science scholars such as Lucian Pye and Samuel Huntington have tried to use political culture as a means of explaining political behavior. These efforts have roots in the Western social science tradition beginning with German sociologist and political economist Max Weber's analysis of how different religious belief systems would either hinder or facilitate the development of capitalism. Weber found both Hinduism and Confucianism to contain aspects that worked against the rationalization process necessary for the development of capitalism.

From Weber and his intellectual heirs' perspective, the ideas of a culture manifest themselves in the social psychology of a society and have serious impact on political and economic outcomes. For example, Pye has worked on a nuanced exploration of theories of power and authority to uncover how a preference for authoritarian government interacts with different family structures in various Asian cultures. From a similar perspective emphasizing culture, Huntington has attempted to develop a theory of global politics with civilizations at the center of managing world order. Huntington's thesis brings into doubt the universal validity of Western conceptions of human rights and democratic governance. Concerns about limited government and individual liberty are construed to be the product of a unique Western political heritage.

In contrast to the line of reasoning pursued by the scholars mentioned above, Amartya Sen, an Indian Nobel Prize winner in economics, has been highly critical of the narratives that have associated Asian values with authoritarianism and Western civilization with freedom. He insists that a more careful examination of history will reveal lines of reasoning amicable with a universal value of freedom in Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, and Islamic traditions. For Sen, universal values are possible, and Asian political thought is diverse enough that it is a misguided enterprise to characterize it as radically different from the political traditions of the West. Instead, Sen would have us seek the foundations of a universal ethic in the human quest for freedom.

THE ROOTS OF ASIAN ORDER

Sen's search for a universal ethic needs to contend with the great diversity of ontological and political assumptions contained within the traditions of Asian political thought. The briefest examinations of east, south, and west Asian thought reveal substantial differences in worldviews.

Many scholars, such as Roger Ames and David Hall, view Chinese political thought as being radically immanent. This approach to politics puts a premium on maximizing the value of the constituent parts of a political community without a transcendent source of order or appraisal, such as a God separate from the cosmos. *Confucianism, Taoism,* and *Legalism* represent different ways of achieving political order within this radically immanent context.

Confucianism emphasized rituals, relationships, and humanity as the source of social harmony and contended that the sage must widen the cosmos by realizing humanity through creative actions. Taoism took a critical stance toward the artificial order proposed by the Confucians and taught that a path of not-knowing and not-doing would better preserve a harmonious social balance. The legalists approached the problem of order from a less subtle approach to social harmony and argued for the judicious use of punishments and rewards to secure political order.

Throughout Chinese history, a hybrid of Confucian and legalist principles dominated the massive bureaucracy put in place to administer the empire. Mandarins, scholarly elites selected through a competitive testing process, filled the positions of this bureaucracy from the Han Dynasty (206 BCE to 220 CE) down through the end of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912). The Confucian ideology also made inroads into Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, forming an important part of the intellectual superstructure of those societies up to the present.

If the Chinese worldview is radically immanent, *Hinduism* can be appropriately classified as a radically transcendent worldview with some important consequences for the sociopolitical world. The Hindu faith focuses on the ultimate

L. K. Advani, president of India's Bharatiya Party, sits below a poster of the influential Bhagavad Gita. The ancient Hindu text serves as a foundation for political authority in Asian political thought, with its insistence that a ruler follow his or her duty wherever it leads.

SOURCE: AP Images

purpose of human life as being the achievement of *moksha,* or liberation from an endless cycle of rebirths. Rebirths are caused by *karma* that will bring one either closer or farther away from this ultimate goal. Following the *dharma* (law) of one's *varna* (caste)—whether *Brahmins* (priests), *Kshastriyas* (warriors and rulers), *Vaishyas* (merchants, artisans, and cultivators), or *Sudras* (workers)—is essential to making progress toward liberation.

This transcendently grounded vision of Hinduism allowed for a highly realistic, power-centered approach to politics to emerge, exemplified by the political thinker Kautilya, the alleged author of the *Arthashastra* and adviser to Chandragupta, the founder of the Mauryan dynasty (322–185 BCE). Contemporaneous texts, such as the *Bhagavad Gita,* strengthened this bias by making it clear that a ruler must follow his duty wherever it leads him. This Hindu understanding of rulership spread

throughout Southeast Asia only to be blended with Buddhist and Islamic worldviews as a foundation for political authority.

Buddhism, a reform movement within Hinduism that minimized the importance of the caste system and focused more intently on achieving liberation from suffering through enhancing awareness, was the vehicle by which Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Southeast Asian, and Tibetan civilizations were exposed to a radically transcendent vision of liberation. The Chinese would prove to be exceptionally adept at adapting this transcendent message for the purposes of meeting the demands of the immanent world through the Mahayana variation of the Buddha's path. This tradition, unlike Theravada Buddhism that became prominent in Southeast Asia, down-played the other worldly aspects of Buddhism along with monasticism as the sole source of enlightenment and emphasized finding enlightenment in the here and now through living ordinary life. The Buddhist message proved to be attractive and found wide acceptance in Japan and Korea. By providing a comprehensive approach to deal with the suffering of individuals, Buddhism in its various guises played a powerful role as a tool for quelling the discontent that could cause social disorder.

Unlike the Buddha's path of liberation, an act of submission to a revealed authority grounds Islam. Muhammad, the seal of the prophets, disclosed through his actions, sayings, and recitation of God's word revealed in the Quran, God's will regarding the order of human community. The *sharia,* or Islamic law, spread itself through the swords and trade networks of the faithful. Revelation and the intimacy of God's rulership of his followers offered clarity of insight into the divine will. This insight into the divine will made conflict with idolatrous communities a religious duty rather than a simple question of political and economic gain. The interpretation of God's law is the core of Islamic political thought.

The faith of Islam spread to South Asia and, through its encounter with the unyielding infidels, the Hindus, Islam learned a tolerance uncharacteristic of a purist application of God's word. This tolerance facilitated the spread of Islam throughout Southeast Asia mostly through trade networks as opposed to the sword. Threats to Islamic and Hindu identities would result in a revival of conflicts as elites attempted to reassert their group's cohesion.

The interactions of Asian belief systems demonstrate both plasticity and form. The dynamism of this process makes it difficult to assess the potential of a thought system's ability to yield solutions to any set of emerging political problems and makes the study of the political effects of these traditions highly dependent upon context. Sometimes a lack of attractive institutional structures opened the door for another worldview to expand its influence as the earlier Buddhist communities did against a relatively ossified Hinduism. Sometimes the failure to adjust to a changing environment resulted in the elimination of a political community and worldview, as was the case of the Buddhist community in India during the Islamic invasions. Authority, community, and creative responses to challenges were central to the spread and survival of Asian political traditions.

ENCOUNTER WITH THE WEST AND WESTERN DOMINANCE

As the European states reached out to Asia in the sixteenth century, they encountered a world of greater wealth, population, and resources than the world from which they came. Trading outposts and missionaries would play an important role in giving Europeans access to the markets of China, India, Japan, and Southeast Asia, and thereby to the center of global power at that time, even as the core civilizations of the region looked upon the Europeans as barbarians from the sea.

Fragmented political organization allowed the Europeans to establish footholds throughout Asia, taking advantage of local rivalries as best they could. The Dutch established themselves in Indonesia; the Spanish established themselves in the Philippines; and the English, French, and Portuguese battled for influence in India. Dutch, English, and Portuguese interests initially penetrated Japan, but in response to a perceived threat from foreign powers, the Tokugawa Shogunate closed off contact with the European world with the exception of limited access for the Dutch. China's great centralized bureaucracy effectively managed European relations on its own terms.

By 1800, European states had substantial influence over 35 percent of the globe. By the beginning of the twentieth century, European powers had gained control of 85 percent of the globe, with only Ethiopia, Iran, Japan, Siam, Turkey, and the nations of North and South America retaining independence. Political and religious divisions within India eventually enabled the British to incorporate it into the British Empire by the time Queen Victoria became Empress of India in 1858. The French gained a dominant foothold in Indo-China by 1857. China's defeat by the British in the Opium Wars (1839–1842 and 1856–1860) and the establishment of a series of unequal treaties combined with a series of internal crises such as the Taiping, Muslim, and Bandit rebellions weakened the Qing dynasty so substantially that the dynasty collapsed by 1911. In 1854, Japan was opened up to Western trade by the Black Ships of Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States and began a path of modernization that would enable it to join the European powers in the game of imperialism.

REACTION TO THE WEST AND THE SEARCH FOR A MODERN IDENTITY

China's reaction to the challenge of the West was slow. Traditional Confucian teachings prevailed through the 1860s. Success in subduing the major rebellions threatening the Qing dynasty supported a belief in the effectiveness and vitality of the received tradition. From the 1860s to the 1890s, China embraced a *ti–yung* reformism that emphasized preserving the essence (*ti*) of Chinese culture while using the contrivances (*yung*) of Western culture to strengthen the dynasty by building arsenals and railroads. The defeat by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) led to a movement focused on reinterpreting Chinese essence. Reformers such as Kang Youwei and his student, Liang Qichao, argued that the essence of Confucianism was the ability to manage change.

They led efforts to help China evolve into a constitutional monarchy, but an alliance of the empress dowager and a variety of conservative forces across the nation stopped these reform efforts.

The revolution of 1911 overthrew the Qing Dynasty and ushered in an era that would reject Confucianism completely in favor of Western ideas. The writings of Lu Xun, which characterized Confucianism as a form of cannibalism and embraced an evolutionary metaphor, capture the rejection of tradition. In his political thought, revolutionary Chinese leader Sun Yat-sen attempted to implement principles of government based on such influences as Charles Darwin, the British Fabians, Alexander Hamilton, Henry George, Abraham Lincoln, Marxism, and a variety of other Western and non-Western resources as a means of resisting Western imperialism. A decidedly nonliberal view played a more important role in formulating the ideology that dominated China's future. Marxist–Leninist thinkers such as Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu played an important role in formulating this ideology.

Japan embraced Western ideas more quickly than China. This embrace had much to do with the quick overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the restoration of the Emperor Meiji as the center of the Japanese state. Thinkers such as Fukuzawa Yukichi laid the foundation of Western learning, but practical political leaders would imitate Western constitutional, industrial, and military institutions to set Japan on the path of modernization.

The Japanese defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 signaled to the colonized people of Asia that the Europeans were not invincible. Japan's experiment with constitutional government wrestled unsuccessfully with military and industrial forces, setting the country on an ultranationalistic path. Kita Ikki, Okakura Kakuzo, and Shumei Okawa, as well as philosophers associated with the Kyoto school, framed this imperial path in terms of a Pan-Asian crusade against Western colonial powers. Japan's efforts to build an Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, a regional order with Japan replacing the European powers as the center of authority, ultimately failed as a function of its own colonial mismanagement and the superior industrial and military strength of its enemies. A constitution of American design implemented with a Japanese sensibility replaced the emperor system that blended the Japanese traditions of Confucianism, Shinto, and Zen, with extreme nationalism.

English dominance of South Asia spawned a nationalist movement seeking to return to a genuinely Hindu identity. Figures in this movement included a wide range of political thinkers and actors such Vivekananda, Sri Aurobindo, Savarkar, Rabindranath Tagore, and Mohandas Gandhi. The nature of this identity varied according to its interpreter. Savarkar focused on the revival of the warrior spirit. Rabindranath Tagore advocated a cosmopolitanism rejecting all nationalisms. Gandhi embraced the doctrine of *satyagraha,* a nonviolent approach to overcoming injustice. Gandhi's philosophy played a central role in securing India its independence from Great Britain.

The separation from Great Britain did not separate South Asia from the political thought dominating Western political

discourse at that time. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India, embraced liberalism and socialism as a means of finding a way for his society to make progress. A commitment to humanism and science molded the secular state that Nehru played such an important role in constructing. Socialist theory similarly influenced the Muslim majority areas of South Asia, but Pakistan embraced firmly its Islamic identity instead of secularism. Islamic countries in Southeast Asia followed similar paths.

Socialism had influence throughout the emancipating colonial world, but the more revolutionary ideology of Marxism-Leninism took center stage in various civil wars and wars of liberation. The victory of the communists in the Chinese civil war (1945–1949) empowered Mao Zedong to become a leading Asian Marxist theorist. Mao embraced a political pragmatism that enabled him to move from a Stalinist approach to heavy industrialization to an anarchistic decentralization during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Revolutionaries such as Cambodia's Pol Pot, North Korea's Kim Il Sung, and Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh would wield Marxist concepts in a similarly creative fashion. These Marxist experiments to build new worlds had incredibly high human costs.

Academic theorists throughout Asia embraced more nuanced Marxist lenses to examine the problem of underdevelopment in the non-Western world. Japanese scholars such as Otsuka Hisao and Uno Kozo developed the foundations of world systems theory independently and simultaneously with the Western scholars Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein. Economic and political events weakened the intellectual attractiveness of Marxist thought throughout Asia.

The economic success of states such as Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, which embraced relatively liberal economic regimes, and the collapse of the socialist block in Europe raised serious questions about the effectiveness of socialism or Marxism to help developing countries to modernize. China and states in Southeast Asia began to experiment with market liberalization with positive effect. Though some of these states embraced democratization, China and Singapore, as well as others, remained skeptical about the value of the full range of civil liberties for social well-being.

GLOBALIZATION AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

The end of the cold war opened up the world to greater economic, social, and political integration underneath the emerging liberal international order. Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992) argued that the triumph of liberal democracy had ended the search for a comprehensive political ideology and, with that end, ushered in the final universal ideology. Doubts about the desirability of Western-style liberal democracy are the beginning of modern Asian political thought.

Asian leaders such as Singapore's first prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew; longtime Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad; Singapore scholar and diplomat Kishore Mahbubani; and others critiqued Western cultures as being disrespectful of authority, destructive to the family, too contentious, too concerned about individual civil liberties and not concerned enough about the rights of the community, and too dismissive of the role of elites in creating the conditions that would serve the economic and cultural needs of the community. These critics believed Asian values could cure these Western maladies. The economic success of the East Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan), Japan, Thailand, and Malaysia made many in the West find much to admire in these Asian values.

The Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 revealed some of the weaknesses of the authority/family/community-based paradigm previously credited for the strength of Asian societies and economies. Concerns about cronyism, the stifling of innovation, and the inability of economies to respond to market conditions replaced previous admiration for social order, family values, and harmony.

In recent years, strong economic growth rates in India and China and the need to provide social stability in the midst of economic development have led some to look to the traditional cultures of Asia as an anchor in a storm. China's call for a "harmonious society" and its own "peaceful rise" in the global community most clearly owe a great deal to the traditional values of Confucianism. The role of Hindu nationalism in India, Buddhist nonviolence and social activism in Bhutan, Myanmar, Tibet, Thailand, and other historically Buddhist countries, and Islamic fundamentalism and the traditional and modern response to this phenomenon throughout Southeast Asia, just to name a few examples, make it evident that Asian political thought will continue to be an important and dynamic part of the Asian political landscape.

It is also important to note that Western scholars are mining the political traditions of Asia for materials to deal with contemporary political problems. Roger Ames and David Hall find common ground between the Confucian tradition and the thought of the American pragmatist and progressive John Dewey to help further a universal democratic project. Peter Hershock looks inside the Buddhist tradition and demonstrates the relevance of the conceptions of karma and emptiness for a full spectrum of public policy problems. Daniel Bell explores the different meanings of human rights in a Western and east Asian context. Richard Nisbett examines the foundations for how Westerners and east Asians perceive the world differently. His work lends scientific credibility to those who discern profoundly different approaches to political and social problems in the various cultural regions—even as he affirms the possibility of the convergence of Western and Eastern values.

Asian critics of the Asian values thesis, such as former South Korean president Kim Dae Jung and former Taiwan president, Lee Teng-hui, give credence to Nisbett's hypothesis about convergence. These advocates of democracy perceive the Asian values argument as a means of attacking fundamental human rights and perceive these rights to exist in the broader intellectual heritages of their respective civilizations. Coming into this debate at the liberal end of liberal democracy, Chinese political

scientist Liu Junning perceives parallels between the Chinese philosophical tradition of Taoism and the Western classical liberal tradition. A growing classical liberal think-tank movement throughout the Asia Pacific region demonstrates the practical basis for such theoretical endeavors. Just as classical liberal ideas have Asian allies and advocates, progressive strains of Western thought focused on environmentalism and global justice find resonance among local activists such as Thai activist Sulak Sivaraksa, who argues that Buddhist ethical teachings require advocacy for the rights of indigenous peoples that are in alignment with these broader social movements. If the present multicultural intellectual climate is preserved, the cross-fertilization of political ideas likely will yield regionally interesting hybrids of Western and Asian political thought, even if it fails to produce a homogenous political thought grounded in a universal conception of human rights.

See also *Asia Pacific Region Politics and Society; Buddhist Political Thought; Chinese Political Thought; Confucian Political Thought; Gandhism; Hindu Political Thought; Islamic Political Thought; Kautilya; Kita Ikki; Lu Xun; Oriental Despotism; Pye, Lucian; Satyagraha; Uno Kozo; Weber, Max.*

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Asia Pacific Region Politics and Society

Scholars have recognized that, despite free elections, leaders in new democracies may not be accountable to their citizens. One reason for this is that the state apparatus is difficult to control. Authoritarian rulers use bureaucracies to pursue their objectives. In doing so they create complex institutional structures that are not necessarily brought to heel once elections occur and new governments are in place. The transition to democracy thus also involves a complex struggle over controlling the state apparatus and thereby enhancing accountability.

In posttransition Asia, politicians have chosen to pursue two primary types of proaccountability mechanisms, or reform paths: formalized/institutional and informal/social. The institutional mechanisms include laws such as Administrative Procedure Acts (APAs) that constrain the bureaucracy with various requirements when making policy, legislative oversight, and judiciaries. The social, societal, or informational mechanisms, in turn, include independent agencies, civil society organizations, and the media.

At their core, each of these mechanisms is about *sanctions.* National legislatures in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, for example, have passed APAs to open up central bureaucracies and their policy-making processes by legalizing and formalizing accountability measures. In each case, in addition to APAs, the judiciary also plays a crucial role, as politicians can decentralize monitoring of the bureaucracy by using judicial review of administrative actions (i.e., giving citizens the right to sue).

Another path that governments can take is increasing citizen participation through informal or social accountability mechanisms, through which citizens function as watchdogs, impose sanctions, and can even activate institutionalized punishment mechanisms. Interestingly, international organizations (IOs) such as the World Bank or foreign aid agencies such as U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have often supported such measures, which coincide with general decentralization efforts.

This entry presents the different ways that politicians try to restructure the state with the aim of increasing accountability. First the range of major mechanisms of control available to politicians, as discussed in the literature, is reviewed. Next comes

discussion of the trends in their use in Asia during the past two decades. Then the disparate research programs that constitute the literature on state accountability and democratization are synthesized into a more coherent framework. The goal is to clarify the relationships between the actors and link them to the types of control mechanisms chosen to increase accountability.

THE ASIAN EXPERIENCE

Given the two main types of proaccountability measures—formalized/institutional and informal/social—where does Asia fit in? Asia is a fruitful region to study questions of accountability because the region includes states facing common problems unfolding within differing political institutional contexts. South Korea, for instance, had a large developmental state that had supported the maturation of the private sector, but at the expense of other concerns. Taiwan was similar to South Korea but with policies favoring a particular partisan constituent: the Kuomintang (KMT, the dominant party in Taiwan for fifty years until recently). The Philippines is somewhat different from either of these countries; even though its bureaucracy had been a source of patronage prior to transition, the executives continue to rely on it as a means of controlling their agents posttransition. What these three countries share in common is that leaders following democratic transitions faced a governance dilemma: how to rein in a central bureaucracy that had long favored a restricted set of interests? In all these cases, and as one can imagine in many other posttransition states, politicians face a similar problem of reorienting an entrenched bureaucracy. Thus, holding free and fair elections, while critical, only addresses the *representation* aspect of democracy but not necessarily the *responsiveness* aspect. After all, central bureaucracies are responsible for implementing laws that elected members of the legislature pass.

From the recent experiences of states in Asia, it is apparent that some states have more options than others. The choice of which reform path to follow appears to rest on two factors: capacity and institutional openness. Tom Ginsburg (2001) observes that states with significant preexisting bureaucratic capacity, such as Japan and Korea, face a choice concerning the degree to which they want to open the bureaucracy. States without strong bureaucratic systems—that is, those lacking high-capacity bureaucracies—seem to have opted for decentralization. This option appears especially popular in assuaging fears of corruption and carryover from autocratic regimes, because it physically moves the location of much of the bureaucratic interaction. Additionally, states pursuing decentralization are able to exploit international organization involvement—especially the World Bank—to help with decentralization and increasing social accountability.

The key cases of formal or institutional adopters are Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. South Korea and Taiwan opened up their bureaucracies significantly, while Japan did so more modestly as a result of institutional constraints. The political tradeoff that these three states faced between more or less openness in an APA or Administrative Procedure Law (APL)

is very different from the challenges facing newly democratizing states such as the Indonesia and the Philippines. These states are more concerned with general governance issues. In cases like these, note Jose Edgardo Campos and Joel Hellman (2005), "the decision to decentralize is sparked by strong reactions to a prolonged period of highly authoritarian rule" (238).

But what specific measures have states adopted? Table 1 summarizes the key example countries for each of the major categories. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan represent cases of formal, institutionalized accountability measures (or "vertical" accountability). South Korea and Taiwan have formally opened their bureaucracies much more extensively than Japan, which has used the APL primarily to delegate some monitoring functions to the courts. Indonesia and the Philippines have both followed a path of decentralization and increasing social accountability measures, largely with the aid of the World Bank. The Philippines is further down this path, given the length of time since transition, but Indonesia appears to be following suit.

It should be noted that in none of these cases are such measures fully effective at preventing politicians or bureaucrats from evading their intent. Perhaps it is inevitable that these measures will never live up to their full potential, but the amount of slack given and accepted is nonetheless noteworthy.

MINI COUNTRY REVIEWS

The remainder of this entry briefly looks at the various mechanisms used in posttransition Asia to increase accountability. As noted, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are the three best examples of heavily institutionalized mechanisms of control, whereas Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as India, to some extent, have followed a more decentralized, social accountability route, often with the help of organizations such as the World Bank. That said, it is important to bear in mind that even with laws on the books, some scholars remain skeptical about full implementation or full closure in all of these countries.

THE PHILIPPINES

The Philippines is a good example of the range and variety of measures leaders may undertake. The overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986 led to a major push for decentralization of Filipino politics. In 1991, the state undertook massive decentralization aimed at moving government downward—to create "responsive and accountable local governance structures." The government was not only responding to internal pressures for decentralization. The USAID also was pushing for decentralization in the Philippines, arguing that movement toward the local level is good for democracy. The World Bank also has been involved in supporting the use of the Citizen Report Card, as well as in promoting interaction and aid at the local level. It has identified local capacity building and performance monitoring as two areas of priority for its work at the local level.

In addition to these shifts, the Filipino government has implemented informal/social accountability mechanisms at all

TABLE 1: MAJOR EXAMPLES OF TYPES OF ACCOUNTABILITY MEASURES IN ASIA

FORMAL AND MORE OPEN	FORMAL AND LESS OPEN	DECENTRALIZED AND SOCIAL
South Korea, Taiwan	Japan	Philippines (early) Indonesia (late)

levels. Ombudsmen were introduced in 1994 and now exist at every level of local government. The key document in the Philippines is the Local Government Code of 1991. The intent of this document was to "break the self-perpetuating nature of centralized power" particularly after Marcos, notes Malcolm Russell-Einhorn (2007). Key formal accountability measures now include "right to information" provisions, rights of initiative and referendum, public hearings for key decisions, establishment of village development councils, and the right to petition to prioritize debate of legislation.

Despite sweeping reforms—both formal and informal attempts to increase the informational mechanisms—follow-through has been incomplete. The statute is vague about how public hearings should be conducted and contains no provisions for notice of hearings. Local governments are not required to release information.

In fact, many APAs fail to specify public notice and comment requirements. Russell-Einhorn (2007) writes that there are "local special bodies that serve as critical advisory groups on particular issues, including those dealing with health, public safety, education, infrastructure procurement, or local development. . . . These groups can propose, not approve or monitor initiatives or compel information" (217).

That said, it is noteworthy that some scholars see "bureaucratic tradition" as limiting accountability throughout the region (including in Thailand and Indonesia). Like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, opening up the bureaucracy—particularly after a nondemocratic regime shored it up—is one of the key challenges in creating long-term accountability in many of new democracies, including the Philippines.

INDONESIA

Indonesia has followed a similar, if more gradual, path as the Philippines. Emerging from authoritarian rule, it has sought to increase accountability by decentralizing. "Big Bang" decentralization began in 2001. This first round of decentralization included shifting control over civil servants to the local rather than central government. The World Bank has had a strong role in these efforts, particularly in promoting local and district involvement. For example, the World Bank is exploring a Justice for the Poor initiative, which is a decentralized, community participation approach, according to John Ackerman (2005, 44).

Formal administrative procedures reform also has made headway recently in Indonesia. In April 2008, an expanded Freedom of Information Act passed and will be fully implemented by 2010. This law requires that bureaucratic institutions

make at least biannual public updates and promptly disseminate information relating to public order or services. The World Bank lobbied for this bill along with Indonesian civil society organizations.

Other measures of note include anticorruption laws that, since 1998, have provided access to information and freedom of the press. As with the Philippines, there are active advocacy campaigns supported by IOs, but they are not yet as well developed, given the relatively short time since transition.

THAILAND

Like many other states in Southeast Asia, Thailand had a long history of military authoritarianism. Observers saw the 1997 constitution as a chance to implement progressive reforms. Civil society groups played a role in drafting it, and accordingly constitutional provisions included seven new proaccountability institutions. These include creation of a National Counter Corruption Commission, independent electoral commission, ombudsman, constitutional court, administrative court, environmental review board, and consumer review board. Formal accountability measures include "right to information" provisions—sections 58 and 59 of the 1997 constitution.

In addition to the 1997 changes, a Thai decentralization law passed in 1999. Although the government has been slow to implement this law, it formally calls for local collection of taxes, a major new provision. There are also questions about the potential vague or contradictory provisions of such local government laws, further hindering effective decentralized governance and accountability. While the hallmarks of the decentralized, social, and informational accountability-oriented reform path are present in Thailand, as in the Philippines and Indonesia, bureaucratic traditions have proved difficult to break.

INDIA

Like the Philippines, India's accountability measures have been largely of the social and informational variety. Formal accountability measures include "right to information" provisions. Additionally, the Indian government has implemented accountability measures in a highly decentralized way. In 1992 and 1993, the Indian constitution was amended to create more levels of government, including at the federal, state, and municipal levels. Civil society groups have used this massive decentralization to bring government, as well as accountability measures, closer to the people.

This said, there has been a major push within India to promote local and community involvement in policy as well as to work with nongovernmental organizations at those levels. Additionally, India is experimenting in some cities with using a World Bank Citizen Report Card. The initial city-level experiment involved Bangalore in 1994. Other accountability measures vary by state or even municipality. For example, Kerala has a program designed to empower local councils, based on highly participatory village-based planning, while Goa has adopted a much more liberal Right to Information Act.

JAPAN

Japan's accountability measures have been largely formal in nature. Japan recodified its APL in 1995 and 1997. This set up an Administrative Appeals Commission under the prime minister to handle nonjudicial appeals. These courts can revoke or alter administrative depositions but have rarely done so in practice. While a Japanese Freedom of Information Act exists, it has many loopholes and has thus proved largely "toothless," observes Ginsburg (2002, 253–254).

The Japanese case represents a very formalized system, but one that is used only at the behest of a strong ruling party. The dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has provided little incentive to open up the policy-making process through open provisions as seen in the South Korean case or other, more decentralized regimes. Ginsburg (2001) finds that the Japanese bureaucracy after the APL has kept the policy-making process relatively closed but has lightened monitoring and control mechanisms by involving the courts more extensively. However, it appears that the courts see only the cases that are relatively less important to politicians.

IO involvement in Japan is relatively limited in relation to its more decentralized neighbors (there are antibribery reports issued on Japan and South Korea by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). This institutional reality—centralized LDP dominance—makes Japan a special case of formal accountability measures, in which politicians with unusually long time horizons do not see any advantage to opening up the bureaucracy or even to protecting themselves in times when they are out of office.

SOUTH KOREA

Opening up South Korean bureaucracy and increasing accountability have followed a similar path as in Japan. Ginsburg (2001) notes that these reforms are seen partly as resulting from Japanese influence in general, and its recently adopted APL in particular, but also as a result of democratization and a desire for the bureaucracy to be more responsive to a broader set of interests. Specifically, in transitions in which the executive's preferences are aligned with the status quo elements in the bureaucracy—as in South Korea and Taiwan initially—governments prefer continuity in structure and process and so opt for strengthening or maintaining executive control. But where the government is facing a bureaucracy with divergent preferences and has legislative support for reform, it chooses to attack these entrenched interests and achieve greater accountability with control mechanisms such as an APA. Unlike countries such as the Philippines and Thailand, South Korean reforms are primarily highly institutionalized, rather than being oriented toward decentralization and social accountability.

The core reform law was the 1994 APA (amended in 1997) that restricted the bureaucracy's discretion over the policy-making process. Administrative reform had been in the works for almost a decade, following a failed 1987 attempt at an APL. In 1994, South Korea passed a law creating an administrative appeals court. Then, in 1995, a reform to the 1994 law referred to the court all appeals against the government and empowered it to "revoke or alter administrative dispositions as necessary" (Administrative Appeals Act, Article 6–2, in Ginsburg, 2001, 606).

The South Korean APA requires advance public notice and comment, which opens up the policy process to those interests that have not been previously aligned with the ruling party. The 1996 Disclosure of Information Held by Public Authorities law, which is subject to judicial review, significantly opens up policy making. Through these and other related reforms, the South Korean bureaucracy and policy process have grown much more open and are subject to greater oversight by a wider range of actors, including courts and independent actors such as ombudsmen.

TAIWAN

Like South Korea, Taiwan's reforms have focused on formalizing institutional structures and processes for increasing accountability. Administrative reforms were driven by the need for the ruling party (the KMT) to change its image from one of entrenched corruption and favoritism toward wealthy private interests to one of "clean government." To do so, the party had to rein in the very bureaucracy that had long served as the cornerstone of its power.

Taiwan's 1999 APA requires public notice and comment of all proposed regulations and that agencies investigate administrative action appeals and notify all relevant parties of their decisions. A Freedom of Information provision is another major feature of Taiwan's APA. This requires that most agencies disclose information to the public upon request. The APA also allows formal adjudication, whereby parties have the right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses at an oral hearing. Additionally, the 1994 amendments to the Administrative Litigation Law established an administrative court. Taiwan's 1998 Administrative Litigation Act, in turn, allows judicial review of administrative actions.

CONCLUSION

There seem to be two primary paths for increasing accountability in the Asian experience during the past twenty years. One path—followed by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—is highly institutionalized, although there is significant variation between these three cases. The Japanese bureaucracy is still relatively insulated compared with South Korea and Taiwan, but these three countries nonetheless contrast sharply with the more decentralized systems of Indonesia and the Philippines. IOs, particularly the World Bank, appear much more willing and able to assist with these more decentralized paths.

The literature has tended to focus on one or the other path and variation within that path. Thus far largely unexplored are the equally important questions of why these appear to be substitutes and the conditions under which states select a particular set of tools. Are decentralization and social accountability chosen only out of necessity? Alternatively, if this proves to be a more common path outside of Asia, the question arises as to whether a "Japan" would ever choose such a path, and if so when? Is social accountability really a second choice, behind the more preferred alternative of an APA? Or is it more likely

that these states prefer to pursue these types of "good governance" building measures and in doing so sometimes conclude that IO assistance (particularly World Bank) will ease some of their burden? Determining the circumstances under which states will opt for administrative reform, the path they will follow if they do pursue such reforms, and the particular tools they will select under different conditions all represent potentially fruitful avenues for future research.

To some extent, time will tell about the progression of the decentralized cases. Accountability along the decentralization path appears to hinge on two factors: the effectiveness of decentralization and the strength of civil society groups, including those with IO assistance. Presumably increases in both of these should aid accountability, but in some countries this seems like a lot on which to hang one's hat.

See also *Accountability; Centralization, Deconcentration, and Decentralization; Institutionalism, Comparative; International Organization.*

. . . . JEEYANG RHEE BAUM

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Assassinations, Political

Political assassination involves the targeted killing of people, often but not always those who hold positions of political authority or political office. Typically, those who carry out such killings have a political or ideological motivation, although they range across the political spectrum, both right wing and left. While some assassination attempts have been carried out by individual sociopaths, the figure of the insane assassin has often been used to downplay or marginalize the larger political basis of the event. Political assassinations are directed or carried out also by members of states against civilians.

The term *assassin* has its origins in a militant Islamic secret society, Hashshashin, active in the Middle East between the eighth and fourteenth centuries. Motivated by religious and political reasons, this Shiite sect killed members of the Sunni elite. The first organized group to systematically use murder as a political weapon, they also were feared by invading Crusaders.

Assassination probably has always been a tool of politics. Among the earliest documented attempts is the attempted assassination of Chinese Emperor Qin Shi Huang around 210 BCE. The assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 BCE stands as one of the most famous early recorded assassinations. The number of political assassinations grew with the emergence and development of the modern nation-state. In the early modern period in Russia, four emperors—Ivan VI, Peter III, Paul I, and Alexander II—were killed in a span of less two hundred years. Democratic regimes have experienced political assassinations as well as totalitarian regimes. In the United States, assassins killed four presidents—Abraham Lincoln, James Garfield, William McKinley, and John F. Kennedy—and made attempts to kill others. Political assassinations are often tactics used by insurgent groups that lack the means to challenge a state's military apparatus. Groups that have used assassination as a tool in larger sociopolitical struggles in the late twentieth century include, the Provisional IRA (Irish Republican Army)

since 1969, the leftist Red Brigades in Italy in the 1970s and 1980s, and Hezbollah.

With the internationalization of politics, assassinations carried out for local reasons have had wide-ranging impacts. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip in 1914 is generally viewed as the spark that set off World War I (1914–1918). The assassination of Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira, the Hutu president of Burundi, in 1994, their airplane shot down as it prepared to land in Kigali, is identified as the incident that launched the genocide in Rwanda.

Activists also have been targets for political assassination. Human rights activist and philosopher of nonviolence, Mohandas Gandhi, was shot on January 30, 1948, by Nathuram Godse for seeking peace between Hindus and Muslims in India. Civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. was killed in 1968 by James Earl Ray while in Memphis to assist striking sanitation workers. King's assassination, which was widely viewed as an attack on the civil rights movement as a whole, set off waves of rioting in several major American cities. During the 1970s, U.S. Senate hearings revealed that political assassinations against leftist and black power activists had been carried out by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as part of their counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO).

Critics of state violence point out that more people have been killed through state actions than have been killed by nonstate assassins. Critics of states are certainly not lacking when it comes to martyrs. The Haymarket martyrs, Joe Hill, Frank Little, Gustav Landauer, Sacco and Vanzetti, the Kronstadt sailors, and the Maknovists of Ukraine are only a few of the poor and working-class victims of state violence. The administrations of U.S. presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have sanctioned political assassinations, including against elected political leaders such as Mullah Omar. State-sanctioned assassinations have been cloaked in euphemisms such as targeted strikes or extrajudicial executions. Recent assassinations carried out by the U.S. government include the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Sheikh Abd-al-Rahman by guided bombs against a so-called safe house outside of Baghdad.

Assassinations have long been advocated by political theorists, including those whose works are still highly regarded. Sun Tzu argued, on military grounds, for the use of assassinations in his book *The Art of War.* In his classic of political theory, *The Prince,* Niccolò Machiavelli argued the utility of assassination.

One of the most notorious treatises on political assassination comes from the anarchist Sergei Nechaev in his pamphlet *Catechism of the Revolutionist.* Nechaev's work inspired Bolshevik leader Vladimr Lenin. Anarchism stands as the political philosophy most associated with advocacy of political assassination in part because of the theory of "propaganda of the deed" in which some anarchists proposed assassinations as means to inspire the exploited to mobilize against elites. Figures like Ravachol and Emile Henry during the nineteenth century and Leon Czolgosz, who assassinated President McKinley in 1901, are among the most famous anarchist assassins. In fact few

anarchists have even advocated violence. The characterization stems largely from the startling bombings and assassinations that arose from the despair of the 1890s. Many anarchists, such as Leo Tolstoy, have argued that political assassinations primarily serve to strengthen the state and provide a potent excuse for the state to increase repression and control of the population. Political assassinations, for Tolstoy, do little to inspire the people and represent little more than cutting off one of the hydra's heads. A new leader always emerges to take the place of the one assassinated.

See also *Anarchy; Coup d'Etat; **Machiavelli, Niccolò; Nonviolence; Tolstoy, Leo.*

. . . .   JEFFREY SHANTZ

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Assembly, Freedom of

See *Freedom of Assembly.*

Assimilation

Assimilation is the name of a process in which cultural minorities change their practices, values, or behavior in order to become more like members of the majority or dominant group among which they live. Assimilation may occur in the absence of state intervention, as the result of choices made by individual members of minority groups (albeit in a context where there are often benefits that accompany assimilation and that provide incentives to make that choice), or it may be a product of state policies that are specifically designed to bring it about; for example, when a state forbids the speaking of a minority language in schools.

Assimilationist policies are often distinguished from integrationist policies or practices. Sometimes assimilation is regarded as a process in which minority cultural groups abandon *all* of their distinctive values and practices, in effect relinquishing their particular identities, while *integration* involves members of these groups merely giving up *some* of their particular values and practices to become more like members of the dominant group. Alternatively, integration may be viewed as a two-way process that, unlike assimilation, requires change on both sides. Whereas assimilation requires minority cultural groups to change their values, practices, or behaviors to fit in with those of the dominant group, integration involves a process of *mutual* adjustment.

An integrated society is in turn often contrasted with one in which different cultural groups lead parallel lives in the same society. So understood, integration requires members of different groups to come into meaningful contact with each other, to lead more of their lives together. This is sometimes an effort to promote community cohesion and greater trust between groups.

A powerful argument in favor of assimilationist policies is that such policies may be required to foster a single, shared culture, and that a single, shared culture is either necessary for, or at least conducive to, the stability of a state. Theorists of nationalism have sometimes appealed to this idea to justify policies that are designed to promote a shared national identity among citizens and even to restrict immigration to prevent that identity from being eroded. Those on the left of the political spectrum also may have reason to value a shared national identity, for it has been argued that such an identity is important to secure widespread support for redistribution on grounds of social justice.

Alternatively, a powerful argument against assimilationist policies is that they are either oppressive or counterproductive. Political theorist Iris Young (1990), for example, claims that assimilated groups suffer from cultural imperialism. When a policy of assimilation is pursued, the dominant cultural group will see themselves as objectively superior and cultural minorities will internalize a sense of inferiority. This argument may not always be successful, however. Assimilationist policies can be directed toward practices that are themselves oppressive, such as forced marriage and female genital mutilation. A policy of assimilation, however, need not be premised or implemented on the idea that the dominant culture is superior, and may be pursued through a range of initiatives that are not clearly oppressive. Examples include requiring immigrants to learn the language in which public affairs are conducted or requiring that state schools focus on the history, geography, and literature of the dominant group.

See also *Individual and Society; Segregation and Desegregation; Xenophobia; Young, Iris Marion.*

. . . .   ANDREW D. MASON

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Association, Freedom of

See *Freedom of Association.*

Astell, Mary

English philosopher, educator, and theologian, Mary Astell (1666–1713) was born in Newcastle, England, but moved to London when she was orphaned by the age of 18. When she was 23, William and Mary were crowned in England after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Astell had been educated by her uncle, Ralph Astell, who influenced her royalist beliefs, and she remained a loyal Tory.

In London, Astell embarked on a career as a commissioned pamphleteer. Her entire body of work was condensed into an eleven-year period. Her early works are strongly polemical, expressing contempt for democracy, religious toleration, separation of church and state, and patriarchy. Astell has been identified as the "first English feminist," one of her most quoted lines being "If all Men are born free, how is it that all Women are born slaves?"

Astell believed that individuals of all classes should be educated beyond basic skills and that women need to find their own voices. Although critical of the theories of John Locke and leading Enlightenment figures who dominated the political thought of Europe, Astell extended those theories to women. She contended that women, like men, were both intelligent and rational and deserved the benefits of education.

Astell's views on the roles of women was highly influenced by the French *salonnieres,* particularly Madeleine de Scudery, and by French philosopher René Descartes. Believing that education was a viable alternative to what was doomed to be unhappy marriages, Astell argued that females should be trained to support themselves. In 1694, Astell articulated her evolving views in *A Serious Proposal to the Ladies for the Advancement of the True and Greatest Interest by a Lover of Her Sex.* The book presented Astell's radical proposal that her wealthy friends finance the founding of a college for women.

In 1697 she wrote *A Serious Proposal to the Ladies for the Advancement of Their True Greatest Interest,* recommending a religious order where women could retire to study and support one another without the permanent commitment of a nunnery. British writer Daniel Defoe was so taken with Astell's proposal that he demanded that Parliament make it a felony for men to solicit women in these secluded areas.

Astell's proposal for higher education for women was received with skepticism, and she turned her attention to the Chelsea Charity School, created to educate the daughters of English veterans. She was particularly interested in educating orphans who needed to support themselves. Her involvement in this project continued until 1724.

Astell was a devout Anglican. Her correspondence with John Norris, a prominent Platonic philosopher, was published in 1695 as *Letters Concerning the Love of God.* Astell and Norris both criticized what they viewed as John Locke's rejection of religion. Astell's theological views were further articulated in 1705 in *The Christian Religion, As Profess'd by a Daughter of the Church of England.*

In 1700, *Some Reflections upon Marriage, Occasion'd by the Duke and Duchess of Mazarine's Case* was published. Astell was interested not only in justifying the Duchess's decision to leave her cruel and jealous husband but in pointing out that marriage was inherently unequal. Astell did not, however, exonerate women. She insisted that both sexes shared the blame for perpetuating the inequities.

See also *Education Policy; Enlightenment Political Thought; Feminism; Women's Representation; Women's Rights*

. . . .   ELIZABETH RHOLETTER PURDY

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Asylum Rights

Asylum is protection offered by a government to persons who face persecution in their home country for reasons including race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. It is possible to separate discussion of asylum rights from the question of international refugee protection. Such a distinction is, however, unhelpful, and modern analysis of asylum rights should be framed in the context of wider global refugee debates. The treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers has become a defining feature of the modern age. The protection and promotion of human rights have particular significance for these groups. While the concept of asylum has ancient origins, the right to seek asylum gained international recognition in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. Article 14(1) provides that "everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." The concept gained further acknowledgement in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 1948, the American Convention on Human Rights 1969, the Organisation for African Unity Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 1969, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 1981, the Arab Charter on Human Rights 1984, and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights 2000. The right to seek asylum is to be found in a range of international instruments; the challenge is establishing whether refuge is in fact being provided. Possessing a right to seek asylum, or even a right to leave your country of origin, is important, but states remain firmly wedded to notion that granting entry is a foundational sovereign "right" of the state.

The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees are the legal instruments that have gained widespread acceptance in the international community. Provision is made for the definition of *refugee*, as well as protections and guarantees that attach to that status. The definition contains several elements. First, the person must be outside the country of origin and be unable or unwilling to avail of state protection. Those displaced within their own countries are therefore not refugees for convention purposes. Internally displaced persons can be particularly vulnerable (and are more numerous globally), yet in international legal terms they are not refugees. Second, the person must have a "well-founded fear of being persecuted." This test combines the objective (well-founded) and the subjective (fear) with the prospective "being persecuted." Many refugee determination systems are therefore concerned with establishing what might happen to the person upon return to the country of origin. This is not enough to establish a claim to refugee status. The person must also demonstrate a fear of being persecuted for a reason stated in the convention: race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. Debate continues on these grounds, as well as how inclusively they should be interpreted. The 1951 Convention provides protections ranging from legal status and employment to housing and social security. The guarantee of particular significance is that of *nonrefoulement,* the prohibition of expulsion or return (Article 33(1)). The principal objective of refugees is not to be returned to face persecution, and this legal obligation is intended to reflect that fact. The obligation contained in the convention is not absolute and contains an exception that relates to security and those who have committed serious crimes.

The 1951 Convention remains the cornerstone of international refugee protection. In terms of institutional protection, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) operates as the international "guardian" of refugee protection. UNHCR figures reveal 10.5 million refugees of concern to that organization, with more than 50 percent in Asia and 20 percent in Africa. The number of internally displaced persons is approximately double that, standing at twenty-six million in 2008 (UNHCR 2010).

International human rights law, with its focus on the person, is of significance. Although the guarantees do not often refer expressly to this group, by implication they are applicable as *human* rights. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 contain important guarantees of relevance to any discussion of asylum rights. At the regional level, in Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 is notable. For example, Article 3 has evolved into an important guarantee against return of those who can show substantial grounds to believe there is a real risk they will be tortured or subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. National constitutional protections also will be of relevance in determining the rights asylum-seekers might avail of.

The rights of refugees and asylum-seekers are now well-established in international law. The reality of refugee protection and asylum rights is often markedly different. The problem of effective implementation and enforcement remains, and negotiating the politics of asylum and human displacement is one of the most pressing challenges of our time.

See also *Ethnic Cleansing; Refugees; Religious Persecution.*

. . . . .COLIN HARVEY

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Asymmetric Wars

Asymmetric wars are historically armed conflicts in which one actor has significantly more power, usually a larger military or navy, which subsequently compels a weaker opponent to undertake unconventional strategies or tactics to overcome the quantitative or qualitative power deficit. Asymmetric wars were typically guerilla conflicts that emphasized the use of insurgent attacks to disrupt supply lines and weaken an enemy's morale. Small groups would use the weapons or materials at hand to attempt to inflict the maximum political and military damage. Consequently, asymmetric warfare involves the use of limited resources to result in attacks or impacts that are largely out of proportion to the weapons used. In contemporary military doctrine, asymmetric warfare is defined as any conflict in which an actor seeks to exploit the weaknesses of an opponent by concentrating resources or weapons against vulnerabilities.

THE HISTORY OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Throughout history, people have reacted to invasion and occupation by powerful actors by engaging in armed insurrections and attacking outposts or by small deployments in battles in which the rebels could gain numeric equality, or even superiority. Such maneuvers came to be known as "hit-and-run" tactics. While asymmetric warfare is not synonymous with guerilla campaigns, insurgency groups typically used these tactics against occupying powers or domestic governments.

Chinese author Sun Tzu wrote in the sixth century BCE about asymmetric wars in his classic treatise on military conflict, *The Art of War.* In the second century BCE, the Parthians used asymmetric warfare against the Seleucid Empire (and later the Romans). During the Middle Ages, Scottish knight and resistance leader William Wallace effectively combined guerilla tactics with conventional warfare against the English. After the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), nation-states gained a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and the customs and rules of military conflict became increasingly formalized. Native Americans used asymmetric warfare against the better-armed European colonial forces, and their tactics were subsequently used by both sides during the French and Indian War (1754–1763) and by the Americans during the Revolutionary War (1775–1783). In the Napoleonic Wars (1795–1815), small units of Anglo-Spanish forces conducted raids and attacks on French posts during the Peninsula Campaign, prompting the deployment of ever-larger numbers of troops.

Through the imperial era of the 1800s, colonial forces endeavored to counter hit-and-run tactics by indigenous fighters through superior weapons, scorched-earth policies, and attrition. During the Second Boer War (1899–1902), the Boer conventional troops were initially defeated by the British, but then launched a guerilla campaign with between twenty thousand and thirty thousand fighters, forcing the continued deployment of five hundred thousand imperial soldiers. Victory was achieved only through a ruthless strategy of concentration camps and destruction of crops. British adventurer, scholar, and soldier T. E. Lawrence popularized asymmetric war as a viable strategy against a conventional enemy during the Anglo-Arab campaign against the Ottoman Empire in World War I (1914–1918). The national liberation conflicts of the post–World War II era were mainly asymmetric wars, pitting insurgents using guerilla tactics against better armed and trained colonial conventional forces. Through the cold war, both superpowers supported subnational combatants in a series of proxy wars. During the Vietnam War (1961–1974), the U.S. military devoted considerable efforts to develop countermeasures against asymmetric tactics, with limited success. The Soviet Union likewise failed to counter an insurgency movement in Afghanistan during its occupation in the 1980s.

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AND TERRORISM

Terrorism evolved into the most substantial asymmetric threat in the 1990s and 2000s. A range of substate actors used political violence against civilian and military targets in low-intensity conflicts in areas such as Northern Ireland, Spain, and the Middle East. By the late 1990s, catastrophic attacks, including the 1998 twin bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, attested to the growing capability of terrorist groups to inflict substantial damage to civilian targets (and were an extension of the main point of asymmetric wars, the targeting of the enemy's greatest vulnerabilities). The September 11, 2001, al-Qaida attacks on the United States, which killed more than three thousand people, were the deadliest and most devastating strikes against the continental United States in recent history. The attacks demonstrated the ability of a small band to inflict major losses against a more powerful opponent by using materials often not perceived as weapons (hijackers turned aircraft into flying missiles that used the kinetic energy in the buildings to expand the devastation of the strikes).

In Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 and 2002, the U.S. military and its coalition partners used asymmetric warfare to defeat the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that had harbored the leadership of the al-Qaida network. Allied military forces used tactical air power and missile strikes, in combination with the indigenous anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, against the numerically superior Taliban conventional forces. The Taliban was overthrown after two months. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 employed a similar mix of precision-guided weaponry and an invasion force of 168,000 that was outnumbered by the defending Iraqi forces (more than 430,000 troops, including paramilitary forces, but not reserves). While the coalition quickly achieved a military victory, a widespread insurgency, combining both traditional hit-and-run tactics and terrorism, proved the continuing utility of asymmetric tactics against conventional forces. Other contemporary examples of asymmetric warfare include the tactics used by Hamas and Hezbollah against Israel or the attacks of Chechen rebels against Russian troops.

See also *Insurgency; Insurrection and Insurgency; Terrorism, Political.*

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Atlantic Charter

The Atlantic Charter was an agreement by U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill that set forth the two countries' war aims and laid out their vision of a post–World War II world. The charter was drafted at the Atlantic Conference, a secret meeting held August 9 through 12, 1941, aboard two warships (HMS *Prince of Wales* and USS *Augusta*) anchored in Ship Harbour, Newfoundland, Canada. The secrecy was due to fears that German submarines would target Roosevelt and Churchill.

The Atlantic Conference was the first of nine face-to-face meetings that the two leaders would have during World War II (1939–1945). Joining Roosevelt and Churchill were high-ranking government officials and military officers, who discussed military strategy and the challenges of supplying Great Britain under the Lend-Lease Act (Public Law 77–11). The law, enacted by Congress in March 1941, allowed the United States to transfer weapons to "any nation vital to the defense of the United States."

The Atlantic Charter was issued as a joint declaration by the two leaders on August 14, 1941, at a time when the British were fighting Nazi Germany and the United States was still neutral. A statement that accompanied the declaration noted that the leaders,

> have considered the dangers to world civilization arising from the policies of military domination by conquest upon which the Hitlerite government of Germany and other governments associated therewith have embarked, and have made clear the stress which their countries are respectively taking for their safety in the face of these dangers.

The two nations agreed to eight common principles: (1) the United States and United Kingdom would not seek territorial gains from the war; (2) territorial changes would not take place that were not in accord with the wishes of the people affected; (3) people have the right to choose their form of government, and national sovereignty should be restored to those from which it was taken forcibly; (4) the lowering of trade barriers for all nations; (5) global collaboration to secure improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security; (6) freedom from fear and want; (7) freedom of travel on the high seas; and (8) aggressor nations should be disarmed and a "permanent system of general security" should be established.

The principles were reminiscent of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and reflect the "four freedoms"—freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear—of President Roosevelt's 1941 State of the Union address.

In an August 21, 1941, message to Congress, Roosevelt asserted that "the declaration of principles at this time presents a goal which is worthwhile for our type of civilization to seek." The Axis powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan) saw the charter as a potential alliance between the two nations.

On September 24, 1941, the Soviet Union and the governments in exile of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Free French movement adopted the principles of the Atlantic Charter. In less than three months, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States entered the war.

The Atlantic Charter would serve as the basis for the establishment, after World War II, of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods agreements that created the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

See also *International Monetary Fund (IMF); United Nations (UN).*

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At-Large Elections

In *at-large elections,* members are chosen to represent an entire political unit, as opposed to a single district or ward. At-large elections are most commonly used in the United States in local or regional balloting. Proponents of at-large balloting contend the system allows members to take a broader view of policy and not become tied to the narrow interests of a single ward or district. The system emerged in Great Britain in the eighteenth century, but was replaced by the use of single district voting in the 1800s in response to concerns over the capacity of at-large representatives to respond to constituent needs in individual districts and wards. In the United States, the system became widespread in the late 1800s as a progressive reform to reduce the power of corrupt political bosses. Later, during the civil rights movement, at-large systems were implemented in the Southern

States in an effort to reduce the political power of minority groups. A series of civil rights court cases and national legislation have significantly reduced the use of at-large balloting in America, while the system never gained widespread use outside of Great Britain and the United States. Today, at-large elections are used by only about 6 percent of democratic countries.

See also *Electoral Reform; Minority Representation; Representative Systems; Voting Procedures.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Attorney General

The role of the attorney general is to provide legal expertise and support to the government. A number of nations, from Canada to Kenya, possess an office or ministry of the attorney general. The responsibilities and institutional constraints of these offices vary by country and political context. In some countries, the office is ministerial, dealing mainly with routine litigation, while in others it is much more politicized with a diverse array of functions.

Most nations formally under British rule established an office of attorney general. Some countries codified the office in their constitutions or by statute, while others did not. There are also differences in terms of which branch of government the office is located in and the appointment process. In the United States, the attorney general is appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. In contrast, the Canadian attorney general is a member of Parliament appointed by the prime minister.

The office of attorney general has a long history that has roots in medieval England, when the "king's attorney" represented the Crown's interests in court. In 1472, the title of attorney general was used for the first time with the appointment of William Hussee, and in 1673 the attorney general became an official member of parliament in England.

Before independence from Britain, each American colony had an attorney general who served as a liaison to the English attorney general. Their duties varied from colony to colony. The first recorded appointment to the office in America was Richard Lee of Virginia in 1643. The English established similar offices in other locations throughout the British Empire to serve the interests of the Crown.

The office of attorney general is not explicitly discussed in the U.S. Constitution. It was established by the Judiciary Act of 1789 as part of the executive branch. Early in U.S. history, the office of attorney general was informally structured, low paying, and undemanding. Over the years the responsibilities of the office slowly increased. It was not until 1870, however, that Congress established the Department of Justice. As head of the department, the attorney general could better coordinate legal policy by overseeing governmental litigation. In the twenty-first century, the U.S. attorney general administers the Department of Justice, represents the government, and offers advice on legal issues, as well as plays an important role consulting the president on judicial nominations.

The office of state attorney general in the United States is older than the national office. After independence, the office was incorporated into the new state governments. The state attorney general became the chief legal officer of the state, giving legal advice, drafting legislation, writing advisory opinions, and litigating causes that are in the public interest. Through multistate litigation and filing amicus curiae briefs in federal court, state attorneys general have been able to shape and refine national domestic policy. Also, the definition of what is in a state's interest has expanded significantly, allowing state attorneys general to influence policy on issues ranging from environmental pollution to consumer protection.

The office of attorney general, at both the state and national level, plays a critical role in the U.S. government. As the country has grown, the attorney general has been delegated more responsibilities and functions. In turn, these changes have increased the office's prominence and policy-making potential.

The policy-making potential of the office has become more salient in other countries as well. In some nations, individual attorneys general have begun to conceptualize their role more expansively. This may lead to a new public and scholarly interest in attorneys general as political actors.

See also *Law and Society; Legislature-court Relations; Rule of Law; Supreme Court.*

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Auditing

See *Program Evaluation and Auditing.*

Augustine of Hippo

Aurelius Augustine (354–430), or Saint Augustine, was a theologian and father of the Christian church. His autobiographical *Confessions* (c. 397) and *City of God against the Pagans* (413–427) shaped medieval European ideas about political order, freedom, soul, inner life, will, sin, evil, just war, history, time, religion, immortality, love, and God. His thought is influential across all Christian denominations, especially perhaps Calvinism, and extends into the contemporary age even among secular thinkers. Examples of his influence include French philosopher René Descartes' meditations, the

express imitation of Augustine used by French thinker Jean-Jacques Rousseau in formulating his own *Confessions* (1782), the Augustinian overtones in French political philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville's diagnosis of the democratic soul, and German–Jewish political theorist Hannah Arendt's understanding of the "banality of evil" and of natality.

Augustine was born in the North African town of Thagaste. At age sixteen he was sent to Carthage for a liberal arts education, which included rhetoric. At eighteen he read ancient Roman philosopher Marcus Tullius Cicero's now-lost work, *Hortensius,* and the evocation of wisdom contained in the text converted Augustine to philosophy. He joined the Manichean sect but eventually left them on account of their lack of philosophical rigor and their understanding of evil as a substance. Augustine famously argued evil is instead a deficient cause. He moved to Rome, Italy, where he embarked on a career teaching rhetoric. There he met Ambrose, the bishop of Milan, and discovered the books of the Platonists. Platonism enabled Augustine to understand scripture, as conveyed through Ambrose's sermons, in their allegorical as well as literal senses. He no longer considered scripture as simplistic and converted to Christianity in 386.

In 388 Augustine returned to North Africa and became bishop of Hippo in 395. During this time, civil wars convulsed the Roman Empire. Imperial authorities had been enforcing religious conformity as a means of preserving political unity since the Theodosian Code (a legal code) began to be compiled in 312. Augustine was drawn into a conflict between Christians and Donatists, a kind of Puritan sect, which frequently took violent form. He at first opposed banning the Donatists but in 411 changed his mind. Augustine's justification of the coercion of heretics has led many commentators to regard him as the Inquisition's first theorist, though more recent scholarship has shown that Augustine considered his decision a prudent response to an emergency situation in which the line between a religious sect and its violent political wing became blurred. In addition, Augustine thought only Donatist bishops should be arrested and that violence should be punished by beatings with wooden rods, the punishment that teachers of the day meted out to students, instead of the death penalty or beatings by iron rods as required by the Theodosian Code.

Alaric, the Visigoth king, entered Rome in 410, which prompted Roman aristocrats to blame Rome's collapse on Christians whose humility undermined the courage and allegiance to the fatherland. In response, Augustine argued in *City of God* that Christianity better protects civic virtue because of the importance it places on faith and justice, instead of the "noble lie" of antiquity. Politics not guided by genuine virtue, rooted in faith, is governed by the lust of domination (*libido dominandi*), which was the real cause of political ruin, including that of Rome. The contrast between faith and *libido dominandi* marks the difference between the symbols of the city of God and the earthly city. The theme of the two cities asks whether political society is something sacred, something profane, or some intermingling of the two. This is also the central question of contemporary politics when the appropriate relationship of religion and politics is considered, and the degree to which communities of faith can share the same political principles with those outside their communities.

See also *Arendt, Hannah; Cicero, Marcus Tullius; Just War Theory; Reformation Political Thought; Religion and Politics; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Thomas Aquinas; Tocqueville, Alexis de.*

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Australian Ballot

The Australian Ballot is one form of the *secret ballot,* a method of voting where the voter's choices are confidential. The purpose of the secret ballot is to ensure that voters will not be subjected to undue influence, as their vote will not be known to anyone else.

This voting method is known as the *Australian Ballot* because it originated in Australia during the 1850s. With this particular ballot, all candidate names are preprinted on a ballot provided by the government and given to the voter at the poll site. The voters then fill out their ballot in private.

In the United States, prior to the introduction of the Australian ballot, political parties and others would print ballots and distribute them to voters. In Great Britain and Australia, voters would hand in signed voting papers indicating their choice and their own name and address. The *open vote* made it possible to determine how voters cast their ballots, subjecting voters to bribery or intimidation.

INTRODUCTION OF THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT

The introduction of the secret ballot was influenced by Chartism, a British working–class movement that advocated secret ballot elections. John Basson Humffray, a native of Wales and a member of the Chartist movement, moved to Victoria in Australia, where he became the leader of the Ballarat Reform League, an organization established to protest the colonial government's treatment of gold miners. One of the league's demands was the introduction of the secret ballot. Following an armed rebellion, the demands of the miners, including the call for the secret ballot, would soon me met.

The secret ballot was first adopted in Victoria, Australia, in December 1855, when the colony's Legislative Council agreed to include the secret ballot in the new self-governing colony's

election law. Henry Samuel Chapman devised the system of the government-printed ballot, whose use spread across Australia over the next two decades.

The Australian ballot would be adopted in New Zealand (1870), Great Britain (1872), Canada (1874), and Belgium (1877). By 1896, all but four American states had introduced the Australian system (Brent 2005, 9).

See also *Ballot Design; Election Monitoring; Electoral Reform; Electoral Rules; Electoral Systems; Electronic Voting; Voting Machines and Technology.*

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Autarky

Autarky means self-sufficiency, or nonattachment, especially in relation to economics. In economic literature it refers to a closed economy. The term should not be confused with *autarchia*, which is the act of self-ruling. Autarky is understood both as a theoretical construct of comparative advantage and as economic self-sufficiency. Autarky is a foundational concept in the doctrine of comparative advantage. David Ricardo sought to enhance Adam Smith's theory of absolute advantage by means of the principle of comparative advantage and trade that Robert Torrens originated. Ricardo thereby introduced into economic literature the theory of comparative cost advantage in international trade. For the purpose of independence from international influence, autarkic countries should be self-sufficient and not engaged in international trade. Historical examples of autarky just prior to the beginning of World War II (1939–1945) include Fascist Italy when the League of Nations sanctioned an embargo, Hitler's expressed desire for Germany in the Hossbach Memorandum, and Spain following an Allied embargo subsequent to its civil war.

Autarky, however, is quite rare in the current age. China is an example of a country that pursued a policy of almost entire autarky until recently, and it was not until the 1970s that India began the process of eliminating powerful trade barriers. Even North Korea, which is perhaps the only current autarky, practices some trade with China and Japan. Modern countries that have pursued autarky through the substitution of domestic production for imports have reduced themselves to inefficiency and poverty, compared to those countries that are competitive in foreign trade. The population demand for production of a full range of goods at competitive prices is impossible to be achieved by any country. It is because trade is beneficial to society that higher commodity prices do not eliminate the doctrine of comparative advantage.

See also *Free Trade; Sanctions and Embargoes; Trade Diplomacy.*

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Authoritarianism, African

Authoritarianism is a form of political governance in which a ruler exercises absolute control over a state or group of people with the ultimate goal being preservation of power. In Africa, in addition to the elected presidents who have usurped power and turned themselves into presidents for life, military dictators are another category of authoritarians. Wherever military coups have occurred and a military oligarchy *(junta)* has taken power, a strong autocrat has always managed to emerge with the help of supportive military forces. Three such cases are those of President Muammar Qaddafi of Libya (1969 to present), former strongman Idi Amin Dada of Uganda (1971–1979), and former president Jerry Rawlings of Ghana (1979–2000). This prevailing style of autocracy has earned African authoritarianism the alternative title of *personal rule.*

While authoritarianism can take many different forms, African authoritarianism has three main characteristics. The first is a high level of violence and political intimidation against perceived opponents of the regime. Visible proof here is the openly meted police brutality against perceived opposition. A related element is the denial of government services and constitutionally guaranteed rights to those seen as opposing the regime.

The second distinctive feature is a high level of embedment in the existing social and cultural environment. The third is a remarkably low appeal to ideology. African authoritarian rulers have sought to portray themselves as cultural icons and to embed their governments in preexisting cultural structures.

At the height of his authoritarian rule, former president Daniel arap Moi of Kenya (1978–2002) sought to apply the "Nyayo" philosophy of peace, love, and unity as a tool for mobilization of the masses. Beyond rallying around the ruling KANU party however, what most legitimized his authority to the masses was his appeal to the African traditional custom of respect for elders. Posing as a traditional African elder, complete with the title *mzee* (Swahili for elder), Moi was able to put in place a formidable patron-client system that strongly legitimized his position and brought him support, even in the face of increasing international pressure and a budding political opposition to his rule. President Moi's predecessor, President Jomo Kenyatta, served for more than 14 years as a patron to various localized constituencies, including ethnic groups and

women's organizations. In Libya, Muammar Qaddafi has successfully appealed to his country's strong Islamic background and has held on to power by portraying himself as one of the respected Islamic prophets.

Although the development of authoritarianism in modern African states can partly be traced back to the colonial administrations that preceded them and whose structures they inherited, it can be argued that African authoritarianism preceded European colonialism. Precolonial Africa had a fair share of authoritarian rulers like Shaka, head of the Zulu people. In essence, what European colonialism did was to introduce more political structures to endow the practice of authoritarianism. Such emergent political structures include restrictive economic and political structures, easy to manipulate court systems, a rubber-stamping legislature essential for legitimizing the actions of an authoritarian leader, and even a structured bureaucracy that could be employed to enforce the whims of the authoritarian ruler.

Further, ensuing tribalism as a result of colonial divide-and-rule strategies helped enhance the role of modern African authoritarian rulers as defenders and all-able benefactors of their people, regardless of constitutional stipulations. Through a combination of hero worship, open nepotism, and corruption using the resources of the state, a formidable system of client-patron relationships has taken shape in many African states. In so doing, the authoritarian rulers have become strongly entrenched in government.

A distinct outcome of African authoritarianism in almost all cases has been the deterioration of African economies, given the state's incompetence and heightened corruption that breeds restrictive monopolies to benefit the elite. Despite the continent's abundance of natural resources, noticeably few African countries can claim a plausible takeoff in industrialization. African authoritarian rulers and their henchmen have repeatedly stolen their countries' resources and turned them into personal property, to the detriment of their people. A case in point is the late Mobutu Sésé Seko of the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) who presided over the historical looting of his country's natural resources and who became one of the richest men on the continent at a time when extreme poverty continued to ravage his country.

Agriculture, which is the backbone for many African economies, has suffered also due to neglect and exploitation of the mostly subsistent farmers based in the rural areas. With no reliable means of income, many in the continent have sunk to unprecedented levels of poverty. While President Robert Mugabe's country of Zimbabwe was once considered to be Africa's most successful agricultural state, more than twenty-eight years of Mugabe's authoritarian rule, and a no-holds-barred approach to preservation of his power by eliminating any source of organized opposition, has left the country dilapidated and scrounging for food, amid high levels of poverty.

See also African Political Thought; African Politics and Society: Postindependent Africa, Politics and Governence in.

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Authoritarianism, Bureaucratic

See *Bureaucratic Authoriatarianism.*

Authority

Defining political authority is a useful exercise for it raises the central problems of political theory. There is therefore no easy way to discuss authority without encountering important controversy. Rather than supply a settled definition of authority, what follows discusses the central questions that such an attempt inevitably raises.

DEFINING POLITICS

To understand political authority, it is necessary first to try to define *politics.* The most influential modern definition described the modern state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber 2004). Weber sought to define politics in a purely descriptive, value-free manner. Notice that the state has authority not just because it has a monopoly of violence, but because its monopoly is claimed, successfully, to be legitimate. There seems to be a difference, intuited by most, between genuine authority and mere force. Where genuine authority *obliges* us, force alone merely compels. But what adds legitimacy to force, and turns it into authority? What's the difference between authoritative force and merely successful force? Weber abstains from giving legitimacy value-content. Legitimacy may be viewed in many ways, but the state, as a state, is successful in advancing its claim to it, whatever that claim may be. Legitimate force is force that has succeeded in advancing its claim to legitimacy. This applies, therefore, to force that has merely succeeded in controlling minds as well as bodies. But this means that, in Weber's terms, authority is power, or rather, that there is no intelligible content to authority, if by *authority* we seek something other than power that has managed to mobilize or indoctrinate.

AUTHORITY AND JUSTICE

To understand authority beyond mere power, we enter the world of normative political theory. If we try to avoid normative issues by defining authority in terms of a political process, we are faced with having to ground our choice of process. Do we require that authority be legitimated by democratic, rather than nondemocratic processes? Why? We immediately find a value-judgment, a view of justice, operating as a hidden premise: Authority must be democratic, for democracy is just. Claims about what counts as genuine authority are conceptually inseparable from claims about justice.

To investigate authority is to investigate justice, about which there is a distinguished history of ideas. Rather than attempt a survey here, it may be useful to suggest, as a preview of such a survey, one point of comparison that sheds light on the question of authority. The following presentation is meant to be highly provisional, an invitation to first steps.

Arguments about justice, and therefore genuine authority, are often grounded in assertions about the purpose of government. Justice means accomplishing a particular end, which then defines the nature of authority and its limits. For example, the purpose of Socrates' utopian city in *The Republic* appears to be the greatest possible fulfillment of the basic human types consistent with the greatest possible harmony of the types with each other. To create and manage a city that accomplishes this, he argues, a ruler is needed who has the greatest possible wisdom about human types, their fulfillment and education, and their relations to each other. This ruler also needs tremendous power in the areas of education and procreation. True authority, then, has to combine these particular powers with this particular wisdom: a philosopher-king. Both his particular wisdom (about the human good) and these particular powers (to turn individuals into harmonious fellow citizens) are necessary to achieve the city's purpose, which defines justice. Only this union of power and wisdom then, embodied in a philosopher-king, has genuine authority. It is precisely in the avowed unlikelihood of such a union that Plato's subtle subversion of all actual political authority consists.

SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY

For social contract theorists, power becomes authority not only by virtue of the purpose it serves, but by virtue of its origin in consent. The premise of all social contract theory is natural equality, variously understood. For Hobbes, we are equally vulnerable to violent death, for example, while for Locke we are equal in our authority over ourselves, but in both cases equality means that no one has natural authority over others. Authority must be created, by agreement among equals, and this necessitates a social contract. Legitimate authority is merely conventional, but created on natural grounds (our equality), and for the sake of natural ends (our survival and prosperity, for example). A particular kind of convention, then, is necessary for power to have genuine authority.

Once the requirement of free consent has been satisfied, the scope and nature of authority is determined, again, by the purpose for which the contract was created. The purpose of government for Hobbes is safety; authority is created to impose peace on a violently competitive state of nature. The sovereign power can justly claim authority only if it can achieve its purpose, and the powers that are inherent to its authority are all those that are necessary for doing so. Hobbes's sovereign is justly absolute—just authority must be understood to be unlimited—for only absolute power can ensure the safety of the commonwealth. Safety is near the heart of Locke's view of the purpose of government—protection of life, liberty, and estate—but he argues that, given the dangers of tyranny, safety can only be ensured through limited government. Locke's

authority is justly limited, because the purpose of government makes such limits necessary. Should government overstep those limits, it oversteps its authority, because in overstepping its limits it vitiates the purpose for which it was created, in the name of which the citizens gave their consent. Early liberal thought is about further articulating those limits and their institutional consequences (e.g., separation of powers, Bill of Rights).

THE ANTI-LIBERAL CRITIQUE

For anti-liberal thinkers such as Marx (and to a lesser extent, Rousseau) it is the absence of a natural purpose for politics, and the injustice of its actual purposes, that destroys the claim to authority of modern regimes. For Marx, the state is the handmaiden of the exploiting class and can have no genuine authority. Politics is the appropriation of the monopoly of violence for class warfare. There can be no political justice, and therefore no political authority. Justice begins when class exploitation, and with it politics and the modern state, ends; the natural or authentic end of our species, species-being, is antithetical to the historical ends of politics. For Nietzsche, finally, there are no natural ends of any kind, therefore no justice or genuine authority, nor injustice or genuine oppression. There is only will to power. Power often masquerades as authority, and the struggle to define authority by defining justice is a principal arena of the struggle for power. In Nietzsche we see the fullest development of the implications hinted at in Weber, and expounded at length in Machiavelli, that authority is merely successful power.

See also *Justice and Injustice; Normative Theory; Politics; Social Contract.*

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Autocracy

Autocracy is a form of government in which a single person has unlimited authority to exercise power. The word comes from two ancient Greek words, *auto–* ("self") and *–cracy* ("rule" from *kratia*). Modern authors are more likely to use the term *authoritarian* than *autocracy,* which is commonly used by some to describe ancient regimes that prevailed in backward societies without legal and political institutions to protect individuals.

PREVALENCE OF AUTOCRACY IN HISTORY

Until the advent of modern government, beginning with the American Revolution (1776–1783), almost all governments were autocratic governments ruled by tribal chiefs, kings, or emperors, with the exception of the ancient Greek democracies. Autocratic rulers have usually been accepted as the sole source of legitimate power, unless a competing autocrat were accepted as more just or successful or legitimate. The autocrat is not limited by constitutional or popular restraints or by political opposition. If any opposition arises, it is usually not tolerated and is eliminated.

The ancient empires of the Assyrians, Babylonians, Egyptians, and Persians were fully autocratic. Various dynasties of ancient China were ruled by individuals in whom the power of their political system was centered. The Inca in Peru or various other empires around the world were without a doubt autocratic. Many autocracies were also theocracies because the exercise of power by the autocrat was based on some claim to divine right. The Buddhist theocracies or those of the Mayans were autocratic but also theocratic. It was mainly the Greek democracies that opposed autocratic government.

Even today autocratic governments exist in many places. Arab sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf region can be described as autocratic; although their rule often appears to be benign, it is still very strong. This can have administrative advantages because decisions can often be achieved without having to engage in exhausting battles with interest groups or opposition parties that exist in democratic states. Thus, a decision to adopt green technology can be made by the ruler even if other interests are hurt.

THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS OF AUTOCRACY: ARISTOTLE TO HOBBES

Aristotle in his discussions of the forms or constitutions of government in his books *Ethics, Rhetoric,* and *Politics* defined *monarchy* and *tyranny* as rule by a single individual. The difference between a monarch and a tyrant lay in the object of concern of the autocrat. It was the people in the case of the monarch but self-interest in the case of the tyrant. Because tyrants have often masked their political actions, it has been difficult at times to distinguish them from monarchs.

Niccolò Machiavelli supported *absolutism,* which was similar to autocracy. He wanted a centralizing power in the hands of an absolute ruler as a solution for the violent strife between the various city-states that was wracking Renaissance Italy. Without a firm hand there would be no peace, and in that regard he counseled an ethic of success in the exercise of power. However, even Machiavelli was like many in autocratic regimes. The more the society matures, the less willing many are to tolerate unrestrained power in a single ruler.

Jean Bodin, author of *Six Books of the Commonwealth* (*Les Six livres de la République*), defined *sovereignty* as the absolute and perpetual power vested in a commonwealth. For him, a prince who was sovereign was only accountable to God. This vision of the autocratic state found its fulfillment in King Louis XIV's reign (1643–1715), where the loss of liberty stimulated the quest of the Baron de Montesquieu for liberty (*Spirit of the Laws*), ending with federalism as an antidote. However, as Aristotle observed in *Politics,* autocracy tends to be unstable.

Thomas Hobbes was an advocate of an absolute monarchy. In *Leviathan* (1651), he used the idea of a social contract to place all power into the hands of a single sovereign who would keep the peace among men who would otherwise be in a "state of nature," which was "a war of all against all" with lives that were "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." His absolute sovereign, if not an autocrat, is described as one who functions like an autocrat even if the sovereign power is vested in a legislative body.

AUTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY IN MODERNITY

In more recent centuries, the tsars of Russia, the absolutist rulers of eighteenth-century Europe including the Sultan of Turkey, and many of the smaller kingdoms or dukedoms of Europe were autocrats. The Russian emperors employed the title *autocrat*. The title came from the Byzantine Empire as a translation of *imperator* (emperor). In modern times it has been used also as a title for the Emperor of Japan. Some monarchs have ruled in an autocratic fashion, but with diminished power due to growing restraints.

However, the rise of liberal democracy, a partial revival of elements of ancient Greek democracy, brought most of the hereditary forms of autocracy to an end. Replacing autocracy that placed power in the hands of a single individual have been forms of authoritarianism.

Authoritarianism is absolutist, but it rests on the principle that authority per se is legitimate and must be obeyed. Authoritarianism uses ideological elements to enlist the whole population of a state into its service. The rulers of such regimes then aspire to be autocrats or become autocrats. Adolph Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Joseph Stalin, and others used ideology and party to gather absolute power to become autocratic totalitarian rulers. Rulers like Idi Amin Dada of Uganda, Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya, and El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba of Gabon have used tribal power supported by their personal ideology to justify their autocratic rule. Some modern autocratic rulers have assumed the trappings of democratic legitimacy.

The rise of democratic government has not ended its competition with autocracy. In times of stress people may seek refuge in autocracy for the sake of peace and prosperity as both Machiavelli and Hobbes recognized. Or those with authoritarian personalities may trade freedom for autocratic rule.

Autocracy can appear in areas of life other than civil politics. Religious organizations, businesses, management styles (e.g., Theory X), or family life may be dominated by autocratic persons or groups.

See also *Bodin, Jean; Hobbes, Thomas; Machiavelli, Niccolò.*

. . . . ANDREW J. WASKEY

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Autogestion

Autogestion, a term used especially among French- and Spanish-language worker movements, refers to workers' self-management and workplace control. Forms of activity undertaken by autogestion movements include workers' cooperatives, workers' councils, and syndicalism or revolutionary unionism.

The notion of autogestion makes an early appearance in the works of the French anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon in the nineteenth century. Perhaps the most extensive expression of autogestion occurred in Barcelona under anarchist direction during the Spanish Revolution (1936–1939). In France during the 1960s and 1970s the writings of social theorist André Gorz were particularly influential in mobilizations over demands for workers' self-control. The 1973 worker occupation and self-management of the LIP clockwork factory in France was the most influential moment in the autogestion movement during the cold war period. It sparked international movements for libertarian socialism and anarchist communism, which advocated autogestion as a grassroots working-class alternative to party-led forms of socialism and communism.

During the twenty-first century, autogestion has become an important working-class response to the closure of factories in Argentina following the economic crisis of 2001. The recovered factory movement has involved the takeover of numerous workplaces, which have restarted production on a democratically controlled, cooperative basis by employees, after employers had abandoned them.

See also *Anarchism; Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph.*

. . . . JEFFREY SHANTZ

Autogolpe

Autogolpe is a Spanish term translated as "self-coup." An autogolpe occurs when a seated president seizes power, often with the assistance of the military, and shuts down the legislature and other branches of government so as to govern with no opposition. It is not the same as a *golpe de estado* (coup d'etat), which generally involves a military overthrowing a president and taking power for itself.

Autogolpes are not common events. The best-known took place in Peru in April 1992, when President Alberto Fujimori (elected in 1990) took power with the backing of the military and closed the Peruvian congress and the judicial system. His seizure of power was preceded by acrimonious relations with the congress over congressional attempts to limit Fujimori's power, debates over economic policy, and ongoing problems with the judiciary. Fujimori was a minority president; his party held only 32 of the 175 seats in the legislature. In his address that announced the autogolpe, Fujimori recited a list of grievances as justifying the coup; a poll carried out a day or two after the coup found that 80 percent of the populace supportedit.

See also *Bureuacratic Authoritarianism; Coup d'Etat.*

. . . . HENRY A. DIETZ

Autonomy

Autonomy, or self-government, is an ancient term that seems to have gained wide currency only in the second half of the twentieth century. It derives from the Greek word *autonomia,* which combines the words for self (*auto*) and law (*nomos*). To be autonomous, then, is to live according to laws one gives to oneself.

In both ancient Greek and in contemporary usage, *autonomy* figures in two different kinds of political discussions. In the first kind, autonomy may be a property of political units, such as cities, counties, provinces, or states. This was apparently the dominant usage of the term among the Greeks, who were concerned with the autonomy of the *polis*—the self-governing city-state. This usage persists, but is probably less common now than the second, which takes autonomy to be a possible and perhaps desirable feature of the individual person's life. In this case, autonomy is of particular interest to political philosophers, who often explore the relationship between personal autonomy and government. They may ask, for instance, whether government is more likely to promote individual autonomy by leaving people alone or by taking steps to help them become (more) autonomous.

POLITICAL AUTONOMY

Autonomy of the first kind—the autonomy of the self-governing political unit—was closely related in Greek thought to the concept of autarky (from *autarkeia*), or self-sufficiency. For a *polis* or state to be self-governing, according to the usual argument, it must be free to chart its own course, independent of the will of other political units. If it is to be truly independent, however, it will have to meet all, or almost all, of its own material needs; otherwise it will find itself dependent on those who provide it with food and other vital resources. Such a *polis* will be autonomous in name only.

Contemporary discussions of political autonomy sometimes touch on this connection between autonomy and autarky, but

they are more likely to concentrate on the relations of political units and subunits. In some cases the question is how much control over its own affairs a sovereign state can or should surrender, yet remain autonomous, when it joins an entity such as the United Nations or the European Union. In other cases, political autonomy is primarily a problem of the relations between a region or subunit and the overarching political unit in which it finds itself. Familiar examples include Quebec's relationship with Canada, the Kurds' relationship with Iraq, and the place of Scotland and Wales within the United Kingdom. Often the region or subunit wants full autonomy, to be achieved by secession, but sometimes arrangements are made to keep it within the larger political unit while granting it control over local matters that directly concern those who inhabit the subunit. Arrangements of this kind recognize what is often called *regional* or *provincial* autonomy.

PERSONAL AUTONOMY

Autonomy as a property of political units may have been the primary sense in which ancient writers used the term, but there is at least one important reference to personal autonomy in Greek literature. This occurs in Sophocles' tragedy *Antigone,* when the Chorus refers to the title character as *autonomos:* "true to your own laws" (Sophocles 2001, 36). This concept seems not to have played a major part in Western philosophy, however, until the eighteenth century. French Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau did not use the term, but his brief discussion of "moral liberty" has overtones of autonomy, as when he proclaims that "the impulse of appetite alone is slavery, and obedience to the law one has prescribed for oneself is freedom" (Rousseau 1978). Rousseau's admirer, German philosopher Immanuel Kant, developed this assertion into a distinction between autonomy and *heteronomy,* or being ruled by others—including rule by one's own irrational desires.

Whether autonomy is necessarily a good thing—and what exactly it is—has been the subject of much discussion and debate in the past fifty years or so. The point of departure for these debates is often British philosopher Isaiah Berlin's lecture, "Two Concepts of Liberty." There Berlin connects the desire for autonomy to the "retreat to the inner citadel" (Berlin 1969, 135)—that is, the desire for self-mastery that is achieved by withdrawing into isolation and self-denial. Most other writers, however, take a more positive view of autonomy. In Stanley Benn's account, for example, autonomy is a character ideal that leads the individual to try to form a consistent and coherent set of beliefs, albeit a set that must continually be adjusted in light of critical reflection.

Personal autonomy is frequently taken to be an ideal of the liberal tradition. Autonomy is certainly at home within liberalism, which greatly values individual liberty, but it is by no means clear that it is an exclusively liberal ideal. Nevertheless, some critics of liberalism, including some feminists, have complained that autonomy is an individualistic concept that deflects attention from the importance of community and social relations, especially caring relations. Parents, for example, should be less concerned with their autonomy than with the needs of their dependent children.

In response, supporters of autonomy as an ideal agree that it is an individualistic concept, but they deny that it is the kind of individualism that ignores or even erodes important social relations. Personal autonomy is something that individuals *exercise,* but they can exercise it only when their capacity for self-government has been sufficiently *developed*. Yet developing that capacity is something that no one can do alone. In other words, no person can *be* autonomous unless others help that person to *become* autonomous. One of the things the autonomous person should realize, then, is the importance of protecting and nurturing those relationships—and the other conditions—that protect and promote autonomy. What the role of government should be in this attempt to further autonomy has become one of the principal concerns of political philosophers.

See also *Autarky; Berlin, Isaiah; Greek Political Thought, Ancient; Individual and Society; Kant, Immanuel; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Self-determination; Sovereignty.*

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Baathism

The starting point for understanding the ideology of the Arab Baath (also Ba'ath or Ba'th; Arabic for "resurrection" or "renaissance") Socialist Party, is its slogan, "Unity, Freedom, Socialism." Generally known as the *Baath,* it emerged in the early 1940s in Syria, but sometimes is considered a successor to another Syrian organization, the League of National Action, which dates back to 1932. The party spread to other Arab countries, particularly in the Fertile Crescent region. Its ideology represents an articulation of Arab nationalist and anticolonial thinking then ubiquitous in the area, especially among young educated people of modest origin.

The precise date of the founding of the party is subject to some controversy, as two separate groups, largely made up of high school students, appeared almost simultaneously under the name Arab Baath Party. One of these soon disappeared, with its members joining the group led by two Syrian high school teachers, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar. The party added the word *socialist* to its name when it merged with the Arab Socialist Party of Akram Hourani, a prominent agitator for peasants' rights in the Hama district of Syria (who broke away from that party in 1962). A national convention adopted a constitution for the Baath Party, which later changed its name to Socialist Baath Party, in 1947.

The Baath eventually gained influence in electoral politics in Syria during the mid-1950s and later became the ruling party of Syria following a Baathist coup in 1963. Baathists also took power in Iraq in 1963, only to be overthrown later in the same year. Another coup in 1968 ushered in a period of Baathist rule in Iraq that endured until the American invasion of 2003, when the party was banned. Baathists (or ex-Baathists) apparently have played a significant role in the anti-American insurgency in the country since then. The Baath had considerable support in Jordan during the 1950s, particularly among the Palestinian population, but declined as a result of the regime's repressiveness and its own factionalism.

ONE ARAB NATION

Placing the word *unity* first in its slogan served to stress the idea, widely shared with others, of the Arabs as a nation with an "eternal mission"—distinct but not superior to other nations—that must unite. Party terminology stresses the oneness of the Arab nation by having a pan-Arab *National Command*, while each country-level subdivision is known as a *Regional Command*. Dedication to this idea, together with threats from communists and "reactionaries," led Baathists in 1958 to seek union with Egypt, whose leader, President Gamal Abdul Nasser, recently had gained heroic stature among Arab nationalists after his nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and subsequent survival of an invasion by Israel, Britain, and France. Baathists also hoped to provide the ideology and leadership for the new United Arab Republic (UAR), but soon were disillusioned by being left on the sidelines, leading many of them to support its breakup in 1961.

The Arabs' relationship to Islam remained an important part of their national identity, sometimes even for Christian Arabs, during the ascendancy of secular Arab nationalism. But while a connection between Islam and the Arab "spirit" was recognized, the Baathist concept of unity stresses the equality of Arabs without distinction of religion. Consequently, it has sometimes had a strong appeal to minority religious sects. In Syria, this led to a strong influx of the small, previously disadvantaged Alawi sect into the party's ranks and the emergence of a Baathist regime in which it is dominant. In Iraq, the Sunni Baathists who took power made considerable progress in bringing Shiites into the party. And yet the tendency of those in power to rely on cronies and blood relatives, especially when faced with threats, resulted ironically in regimes with a highly sectarian character. In Iraq, in particular, Iran's Islamic Revolution (1979) inspired many Shiites and put the loyalty of others in question, thus undermining the idea of nonsectarianism. As Shiite revolts were brutally suppressed, this accentuated the equation of Baathism with the Sunni Arab in a way that belied the nonsectarian nature of the ideology.

FREEDOM

The word *freedom* in Baath Party usage carries multiple implications. It connotes freedom from the colonialism that dominated much of the Arab world when the party first emerged, as well as from continuing subordination to outside powers (that is, the freedom of the nation). Baathists have been committed to the slogan of nonalignment while cooperating pragmatically with particular big powers.

Freedom also seemed to refer originally to freedom for the individual. Baathists gave strong support for such democratic principles as the direct election of members to the Syrian parliament and female suffrage in the late 1940s. But Baathist

regimes have come to power through military coups in both Syria and Iraq, and each regime has been highly authoritarian. Although the Syrian and Iraqi Baathist regimes established fronts in which some other parties were allowed to participate, those have had no real power. In effect, both Syria and Iraq have been single-party regimes, with the Baath organized along Leninist lines of "democratic centralism" (from cells at the bottom to a secretary general at the top). In reality, the power structure has been personalistic, with informal networks of cronies and relatives more important than any political party.

SOCIALISM

Socialism always was subordinate to unity in the hierarchy of Baathist goals. Baathist socialist ideology, like other versions of *Arab socialism,* stresses the need to end exploitation and promote social justice. It advocates nationalization of big enterprises while leaving much of the economy in the hands of small owners. It calls for limits on ownership of agricultural land. The party's constitution, adopted in 1947, declares "property and inheritance" to be "natural rights . . . protected within the limits of the national interest." In practice, the Baathist regimes of Syria and Iraq brought formerly underprivileged people to power and established relatively statist economies, although both implemented some economic liberalization in the 1980s.

Although Baathist regimes generally received much backing from communist countries, the Baath Party was always anticommunist, due to the Baathists' ideology and their unwillingness to tolerate other political groups in their countries. They sometimes collaborated with Western powers against communism, as in the case of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's 1963 help in bringing the Baath to power in Iraq and implementing an anticommunist pogrom. Like other proponents of socialism, both Baathist regimes pursued policies of land reform and nationalization but never attempted to abolish all private ownership.

FROM BAATH TO BAATHS

Factionalism, based on both personal rivalries and ideological differences, has plagued the Baath. The period of Syrian-Egyptian unity brought several splits, as Bitar and Hourani, but not Aflaq, endorsed secession from the UAR in 1961. With the Baath coming to power in Syria in 1963, factionalism remained rampant. A leftist military faction of the party (sometimes called the *Neo-Baath* and tending to come from the countryside), much influenced by Marxism and pursuing a particularly militant anti-Israel policy, carried out a coup against the existing Baathist regime in 1966. This was overthrown by a pragmatic, "corrective movement" under Hafiz al-Asad in 1970, during which Asad, also a Baathist, took power. The Baathist group that came to power in Iraq in 1968 became a rival to the Syrian regime, leading to the emergence of two rival National Commands and of rival Regional Commands in some countries, analogous to the competition between pro-Moscow and pro-Beijing communist parties. This rivalry seems basically to represent personal and geopolitical conflicts more than any disagreement over ideology or policy. Enmity between Baathist Syria and Baathist Iraq became so intense that the former supported Iraq's enemy in the Iraq-Iran War (1980–1988) and then joined the anti-Iraqi coalition in 1991.

The Baath seems largely to belong to the past. By the early twenty-first century, both socialism and the goal of pan-Arab unification lost their former widespread appeal, as had secularism. The Syrian Baathist regime in 2009 was more a personalistic than a party dictatorship. Considering anti-Baathist attitudes of the now-empowered Shiite majority in Iraq, the restoration of the Baath there seems unthinkable. Only minor Baathist parties exist in other Arab countries, such as Yemen, Bahrain, Lebanon, Sudan, and Mauritania.

See also *Arab Socialism; Middle Eastern Politics and Society; Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism.*

. . . .   GLENN E. PERRY

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Bachrach, Peter

Peter Bachrach (1918–2007) was a political scientist and a prominent analyst of participatory democracy.

Born in Winnetka, Illinois, Bachrach earned his bachelor's degree from Reed College in Portland, Oregon, and a PhD in political science from Harvard University in 1951. He joined the faculty of Bryn Mawr College in 1946. In 1968, he moved to Temple University, where he remained until his retirement in 1988. In 1980, he was a visiting professor at the Graduate School of the City University of New York.

Bachrach is best known for his 1962 article, "Two Faces of Power," which he coauthored with Morton S. Baratz. Published in the *American Political Science Review,* it is the most widely cited article in the discipline of political science. In their article, Bachrach and Baratz argued that a lack of controversy may reflect latent power conflicts.

According to Bachrach, prevailing institutions and political processes could limit the decision-making abilities and the

formation and articulation of concerns among disenfranchised groups in society. While most power theorists of the time studied decisions, Bachrach contended that power also could be reflected in "nondecisions." That is, that some actors had so much influence in the political process that they could block decisions that would be adverse to their interests from even being considered. According to Bachrach and Baratz, "power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A" (948). They asserted that this power meant that demands for change can be suffocated before they are even voiced. Non-decision-making, therefore, constituted a "second face" of power.

See also *Elite Theory; Power.*

. . . .   JEFFREY KRAUS

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Bagehot, Walter

Walter Bagehot (1826–1877) was an economist and political journalist and one of the most influential writers on the British constitution until recent times. Bagehot is so important that other commentators have treated his doctrines, published in 1867, as if they were part of the unwritten constitution itself.

Bagehot was born into a banking family in Somerset in southwestern England. Bored by banking, he turned to journalism and edited *The Economist* from 1861 until his death. His main legacy is a pair of books: *The English Constitution* (1865) and *Lombard Street* (1873), a study of the role of the central bank. Bagehot's writing is clear and persuasive, and his influence is still apparent today: the United Kingdom's politics correspondent for the modern *Economist* writes under the penname "Bagehot" (pronounced *badge-ot*).

In *The English Constitution,* Bagehot's target is political philosopher Charles-Louis Montesquieu's claim that the United Kingdom's liberty is due to a separation of powers. He argues that Montesquieu (and perhaps the American Federalists) got England completely wrong. (Like many Victorians, Bagehot failed to distinguish between England and the United Kingdom and was thus insensitive to Scotland and Ireland.) The "efficient secret" of the English constitution was the cabinet, a "buckle" that joined the "dignified" (the formal institutions

of governance: church, Parliament, and above all the monarchy) to the "efficient" part of the constitution. According to Montesquieu and the Federalists, the key to liberty lies with the separation of powers. According to Bagehot, it lies with concealing the efficient part of government (the cabinet operating through its control of the House of Commons) behind the dignified façade of crown and establishment. Power was fused, not separated. The executive ran the country through its control of both the permanent officials and (normally) the majority of seats in the House of Commons. Because of the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, whereby statutes trump all other forms of law, the judiciary also occupied a subordinate role. There was no judicial review of either legislation or executive acts in Bagehot's constitution.

Bagehot was contemptuous of the monarch and her heir, calling them "a retired widow and an unemployed youth." But he thought that having an ordinary family at the head of state was advantageous to social order. People would, he believed, follow the lives of the retired widow and the unemployed youth with interest, and not concern themselves with the efficient part of government, which could be left to competent statesmen.

Curiously, successive British monarchs have learned their constitution from Bagehot, despite his evident contempt for the royal family's intelligence. Even more curiously, so have most subsequent constitutional commentators. Though a liberal free trader, Bagehot was a profound anti-democrat. His constitutional doctrine may be summarized as this: The royalty and the aristocracy are too stupid to rule—"It is as great a difficulty to learn business in a palace as it is to learn agriculture in a park" (Bagehot 2008, 107)—as are the working and lower-middle class. Government should therefore remain in the hands of educated people who are well-informed on current events and politics.

See also *British Political Thought; Enlightenment Political Thought; Monarchy; Montesquieu, Charles-Louis.*

. . . .   IAIN MCLEAN

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Bahro, Rudolf

Rudolf Bahro (1935–1997) is principally known as a green politician and thinker, and particularly as an advocate of eco-socialism and of a spiritual and psychological path to political transformation. He was born in 1935 in Bad Flinsberg, Lower Silesia, now part of Poland. He grew up in East Germany, and lost his mother, sister, and brother in World War II (1939–1945). As a youth he joined the East German Democrat Party and studied at Humboldt University in Berlin. He then worked as a journalist and as an official of the Union of Scientific Employees, a post from which he was dismissed in 1967 for publishing an article that was critical of the party.

On the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968, Bahro wrote what would be published in 1977 as *The Alternative in Eastern Europe,* in which he presented a critique of East European communism, particularly its materialism and its destructive growth-based economic aims, which mirrored those of Western Europe. He was arrested and imprisoned for this publication, causing an international outcry and campaign for his release.

In 1979 he was deported to West Germany, where he joined the German Greens (*Die Gruen*). He argued for a synthesis of red and green political and economic principles, but he rejected many traditional Marxist ideas. His argument is best articulated in his 1984 book *From Red to Green,* arguably his best-known work.

Although associated with the green political movement, Bahro was deeply critical of the "realist" sections of the green movement that sought electoral victory within the existing political system rather than pursuing more wholesale change. He argued that change at the spiritual and psychological level was necessary to overturn the ecologically destructive patterns of living accepted in the postindustrial West. Like Arne Naess, the founder of *deep ecology,* Bahro worked from an uncompromising biocentric viewpoint and was interested in the spiritual dimensions of green thinking. In 1985, after increasing frustration with the party's strategy, he left the Die Gruen over a dispute about policy on animal testing: Bahro and his partner Christine Schröter would not accept the party's compromise position that called for a ban on animal testing but allowed for exceptions in the field of medical research.

In the years after his split with Die Gruen, Bahro further developed his ideas on the spiritual and psychological dimensions of social ecology, moving further from traditional democratic politics. From 1990, he was professor of social ecology at Humboldt University. His thought tended increasingly toward an authoritarian approach as the only viable practical solution to environmental problems, to the dismay of many on the left of the green movement. This approach is evident in his last book, *Avoiding Social and Ecological Disaster: The Politics of World Transformation* (1994).

Bahro was diagnosed with cancer in 1995 and died two years later.

See also *Environmental Political Theory; Green Parties.*

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Bakunin, Mikhail

Russian revolutionary Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876), who popularized the term *anarchy* and whose work was instrumental in the early development of the anarchist movement, was born in Tver, Russia, to an established noble family. He was primarily a person of action who participated in numerous uprisings in Europe, most notably the Lyon uprising of 1870. A proponent of pan-Slavism in his youth, Bakunin turned to anarchism through his contact with the working-class movements.

In his writings, Bakunin argues that external legislation and authority lead to the enslavement of society. All civic and political organizations are founded on violence exercised from the top down as systematized exploitation. Political law is understood by Bakunin, who served many years in prison and exile, as an expression of privilege. He rejects all legislation, convinced that it must turn to the advantage of powerful minorities against the interests of subjected majorities. Laws, inasmuch as they impose an external will, must be despotic in character. For Bakunin, political rights and democratic states are flagrant contradictions in terms. States and laws only denote power and domination, presupposing inequality. Where all govern, he once suggested, no one is governed. Where all equally enjoy human rights, the need for political rights dissolves. In such instances the state as such becomes nonexistent.

Like Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Bakunin envisions future social organizations as economic rather than political. He sees society as organized around free federations of producers, both rural and urban. Any coordination of efforts must be voluntary and reasoned. For example, Bakunin viewed trade unions not merely as economic institutions but as the "embryo of the administration of the future," and he argued that workers should pursue cooperatives rather than strikes. Recognizing the impossibility of competing with capitalist enterprises, he called for the pooling of all private property as the collective property of freely federated workers' associations. These ideas would serve as the intellectual impetus for anarcho-syndicalism and its vision of the industrial syndicate as the seed of the future society.

Bakunin's famous disagreements with Karl Marx over the role of the state in the transition to socialism initiated a rift within the International Working Men's Association (IWMA), or First International, which led to the eventual expulsion of the anarchists and IWMA's dissolution by Marx's supporters, partly as a means to keep it out of anarchist hands. Bakunin's central conflict with Marx was that an authoritarian revolutionary movement, as Marx espoused, would inevitably initiate an authoritarian society after the revolution. For Bakunin, if the new society is to be nonauthoritarian, then it can only be founded upon the experience of nonauthoritarian social relations. During his battle with Marx in 1871, Bakunin's supporters in the IWMA asked, How can an egalitarian and free society be expected to emerge from an authoritarian organization? His concerns were vindicated by the direction taken decades later following the Russian Revolution (1917).

Bakunin's tireless work within the First International laid the groundwork for the development of flourishing anarchist movements in Italy, Spain, and several countries of Latin America, including the syndicalist movements that contributed to the Spanish Revolution (1936).

See also *Anarchism; Marx, Karl; Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph.*

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Balance of Power

Balance of power in international relations refers to the effort by states, in the face of a threat to security projected by a hostile, powerful third state, to offset aggression through association. The balance of power operates most effectively in a central system of three to five member states—neither too few nor too many—and roughly equal power, so that each state possesses enough weight to count in the balance. Small or weak states bandwagon because they cannot balance larger states. Historically, in a system of virtually perpetual warfare among states, as occurred in the seventeenth century, any increase in power would trigger a new balance. Modern conditions, where peace usually prevails, require an increase in both threat and power to trigger the formation of a new balance. Powerful Germany is no threat to Belgium; Belgium does not need to balance Germany and does not try. Nor does Canada seek to balance the United States, which is ten times its size in terms of gross national product or population.

Why do alliances form within a balance-of-power framework? Conservative-realists argue that alliances form to counter a common external threat. Liberal-idealists argue that alliances form among like-minded governments with a similar cultural and institutional outlook. Stressing instead the role of institutions such as the United Nations, liberals, like post-modernists, tend to emphasize the shortcomings and contradictions of the balance of power to the point of rejection. Constructivists replace interest with identity, making balance-of-power calculations difficult.

Neorealism subscribes to the idea of anarchy or independence among states, thus permitting a balance of power to operate. But more recent theories of hegemony require that the notion of hierarchy replace anarchy as a core concept; one state is dominant, the others are subordinate. In terms of assumption and operation, hegemony and balance of power are incompatible.

When force is used to preserve security, peace may be undercut. Critiques of the shortcomings of the balance of power fail to distinguish its separate impact on security and peace. Although the balance of power probably has deterred many aggressors, it admittedly has failed to stop all wars. But it has preserved the security of the major states, such as in the alliance of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in World War II (1939–1945). It also has preserved the decentralized nation-state system from military takeover.

When facing rising and declining power in the system, the balance of power gives off the wrong signals. Rising power internal to the state can never be halted; declining power can never be permanently bolstered. Prior to World War I (1914–1918), rising Germany should not have been isolated and encircled; the war arose from an attempt by the system to constrain Germany's power rather than accommodate Germany's rise with legitimate role adjustment before it was too late, that is, before the "bounds of the system" shattered its expectations of continued rise and future opportunity for role gratification. Prior to World War II, declining Germany should have been balanced immediately; it had no role deficit, and Hitler's territorial demands were inherently aggressive. While preserving security, such a dynamic equilibrium requires a strategy of adaptation to cope with the legitimate role aspirations of rising power, and a strategy of opposition and balance to deal with potentially expansionist behavior. Democracies can use balance and dynamic equilibrium to their advantage, but, as Henry Kissinger has noted, such thinking does not come easily to the democratic mind.

See also *Alliances; Coalition Formation; Foreign Policy Role; Power; Power Cycle Theory.*

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Balkans

The term *Balkans* is typically used to refer to the peninsula in southeastern Europe that includes the present-day countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and the lands of the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia). Once referred to as European Turkey or Rumeli, the present appellation comes from the Balkan mountains of Bulgaria, which were mistakenly believed to divide the entire peninsula from continental Europe. Besides its geographical meaning, the Balkans has, since the mid-nineteenth century, carried secondary connotations of violence, savagery, and primitivism that have led some scholars to prefer the designation southeastern Europe.

THE TERRITORY AND ITS HISTORY

The lands of the Balkans are more than 70 percent mountainous, which has helped to produce two of its defining characteristics: its mixture of cultures and religions and its position as a relatively undeveloped borderland of empires. The Balkans have long been home to a variety of different cultures— Albanian, Greek, Roman, Slav, and Turkish, among others—and religions—Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, and Orthodox. The intermingling of these cultures and religions was the trait that most distinguished the region to later visitors from mainland Europe.

The region began to assume its modern form as a border-land of the Ottoman Empire, which became the main regional power in the fifteenth century and was only gradually pushed out over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A distinctive characteristic of Ottoman rule was its millet system, which granted a degree of self-government to religious groups even as all state offices were held by Muslims. One consequence of the millet system was the preservation of the region's multiculturalism, as well as the creation of a significant Muslim minority made up largely of ethnic Slavs and Albanians who converted.

In the nineteenth century, local intellectuals picked up European concepts of the nation and nationalism and began to apply them to the region. Though they initially encountered difficulties in creating Croat, Greek, or Serb identities from predominantly peasant and religious cultures, ultimately they managed to cobble together the official cultures, languages, and histories of the lands that exist today and at the same time extinguish many of the microcultures that existed up until then (e.g., Morlachs, Vlachs). These nationalists began to lead increasingly successful revolts against the deteriorating Ottoman Empire, producing the independent states of Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Serbia, while the territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia were subsumed into the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The meeting of nationalist ambitions with the diversity of cultures and the difficulty of classifying residents as members of one or another national group led to frequent inter-Balkan conflicts. As the great powers attempted to resolve these conflicts, they became entangled, and it was the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo by a Slav nationalist that helped to ignite World War I (1914–1918).

The end of the war led to a clarification of the region's boundaries with the states of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania assuming near their modern forms, and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (or the South Slavs) being created out of Albanians, Bosniaks, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Serbs, with the Serbs playing the leading role. It was Yugoslavia that proved the most volatile of the Balkan states, and it broke apart during World War II (1939–1945). The war was marked by brutal score-settling, particularly between Serbs and Croats, and frequently exceeding rational war aims. The communist partisan leader Josip Broz Tito managed to restore Yugoslavia to more or less its prewar borders by promulgating a myth of national resistance to the Nazis and clamping down on nationalist sentiment.

THE WARS OF YUGOSLAV SUCCESSION

In contrast to the hard-line communist regimes that emerged after the war in neighboring Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania, postwar Yugoslavia pursued an independent course both in foreign policy (helping to form the nonaligned movement) and in domestic affairs, where it ultimately pioneered a unique form of worker self-management. This economic and political liberalization led many to expect the country to weather the fall of communism in 1989 better than other communist nations.

In fact, the transition unleashed the bloodiest fighting in Europe since World War II. Though the relatively homogeneous Slovenia managed to extract itself from Yugoslavia with minimal violence, moves by Croatia, and particularly Bosnia-Herzegovina, to declare their independence met resistance from Serb minorities in those republics. These Serbs were backed by the remnants of the Serb-controlled Yugoslav People's Army and paramilitary militias. Efforts to carve out territory by Serbs and Croats in Bosnia, egged on by ultra-nationalist leaders, led to ethnic cleansing and genocide, with Muslims bearing the brunt of atrocities. The massacre of eight thousand Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica in the presence of a UN peacekeeping force and the bombing of multiethnic Sarajevo by Serb forces focused world attention on the region.

Though Western powers had been quick to recognize the new independent republics, they were slow to react to the fighting. One reason was the attribution of the conflict to "ancient hatreds," a theory propounded by Croat and Serb nationalists and backed by many Western politicians. The theory, however, did not explain why the region had become multicultural in the first place, why much of its history was peaceful, nor the high rates of ethnic intermarriage in postwar Yugoslavia.

Public revulsion at the slaughter, however, ultimately prompted the Western powers to intervene against Serb aggression in Bosnia and force the three sides to sign the Dayton Agreement (1995) that ended the fighting and led to a UN-sponsored, NATO-led mission enforcing the peace in Bosnia. Hostilities, however, later resumed in Kosovo, with Kosovar Albanians turning to violent resistance against Serb oppression and then facing massive retaliation. Ultimately, NATO intervened through a bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999, which led to UN administration and ultimately independence for Kosovo.

AFTERMATH OF THE CONFLICT

The final balance of these wars was horrific. The death toll has been estimated at slightly more than one hundred thousand, and perhaps two million people were displaced from their homes. Mass rape, torture, and attempted genocide compounded the trauma, with Bosnian Muslims bearing the lion's share of the suffering. However, the effects of the war differed dramatically by territory. While Slovenia and, to a lesser extent, Croatia managed to reform their economies and turn themselves toward Europe, the other republics have faced rockier paths. Serbia democratized in 2000, but its economy remains marked by the entangling of the security forces and organized crime, its politics by significant ultranationalist forces, and its integrity by the secession of both Montenegro and Kosovo. Bosnia continues under international administration and is de facto divided into ethnic zones with efforts at resettlement and interethnic cooperation meeting scant success. Though successful in attaining its independence, Kosovo still has not been recognized by several major powers and faces an economy in shambles.

There have been significant and productive debates in political science about the causes of these wars and what could have been done to prevent them. A key issue has been who is

to blame. On one side stand those who single out volitional individuals or groups, especially the Serb leader Slobodan Milošević and the Croatian leader Franjo Tuđman and their allies who stirred up ethnic hatred. Some have rather pointed blame at the Slovenes or even the international community (either for recognizing the independent republics too soon or not intervening early enough).

On the other side are those who point to structural forces. Susan Woodward, for example, emphasizes how persistent economic decline and state weakness left citizens dependent on national groups for security guarantees. Still others have focused on the structure of communist-era federalism and the military, the improper sequencing of regional and national elections, the dangers of democratization without prior liberalization, and even the clash of civilizations.

There also have been enlightening debates about the justice and practicality of international involvement in civil wars and genocides. Particular attention has been devoted to the proper deployment of international peacemaking and peacekeeping operations, given the failures of a UN force without robust engagement policies and the apparent successes of more forceful interventions by NATO. The formation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which saw the first indictment of a sitting head of state and was a precedent for the International Criminal Court, also spawned a large literature on the efficacy of trials for war criminals. Critics argue that it has engaged in selective and politically inspired prosecutions, while supporters argue that it did provide justice for the victims of the war and removed important obstacles to democratization. Finally, there have been fierce debates about the normative desirability of international support for secession and state breakup versus respect for state sovereignty, both with respect to the start of the war and as a precedent for other regions. What was a tragedy for the people of Yugoslavia has led to a flourishing literature in political science.

See also *Clash of Civilizations; Democracy and Democratization; European Politics and Society; Genocide; Humanitarian Intervention; International Criminal Court (ICC) (ICC); Transitional Regimes; Transitology.*

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Ballot Design

Ballot design generally refers to the ways in which candidates and contests are arranged on electoral ballots of various types. Ballot design first received widespread attention in 2000, when the U.S. presidential election was decided in part by contested results in a county that used a *butterfly ballot* of

allegedly poor design. Two groups in the United States that have paid particular attention to ballot design are Design for Democracy (an initiative of AIGA, the professional association for design) and the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law. On an international level, the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network (www.aceproject.org), begun in 1998, seeks to expand transparency of elections and increase trust in their credibility. Affiliated with the United Nations and the International Institute for Democracy and Elections Assistance, the ACE Project compiles information about election processes and tries to identify best practices.

U.S.-style democracies may be more susceptible to ballot design issues for a variety of reasons. Responsibility for ballot design is usually not centralized and is often assigned to partisan officials who lack design expertise. Further, frequent changes in election regulations and technology create opportunities for new mistakes in design.

BALLOT DESIGN ISSUES IN THE UNITED STATES

In the United States, voters elect officeholders from the president to the county coroner, and may vote also in contests tied to their residence in school or water districts that cross various jurisdictional lines. Ballot challenges may make ballot design a moving target until shortly before election day. Further, ballots must be adjusted for each new election, which will have different categories of contests, numbers of contestants, and ballot styles. Best practices in design recommend that ballots be tested with users before elections, but timing considerations may make testing difficult.

Ballot design may affect electoral results in two ways. First, design flaws can mislead voters and cause them to miscast votes or fail to cast votes in certain contests. Second, every choice mechanism, even if perfectly designed, favors one choice over another. As Thaler and Sunstein (2008) have noted, there is no such thing as a neutral choice mechanism. The consequences of this reality are often called *primacy effect* or *position bias,* but perhaps a better term is *position impact,* because any effect on the vote is not necessarily the result of conscious or unconscious prejudice.

DESIGN FLAWS

Design flaws may lead voters to skip a contest or to vote for the wrong candidate. In a 2006 congressional contest in Florida, ballot designers placed the two-candidate congressional race on the same screen as a six-candidate gubernatorial contest. Norden et al. (2008) reported that 13.9 percent of the voters did not vote in the contest, compared to only 2.5 percent of voters who voted in the same contest on different ballots. Similarly, many King County, Washington, voters skipped a 2009 referendum contest that appeared at the bottom of a column of voting instructions.

A ballot that requires voters to behave in a counterintuitive way may mislead voters, despite the presence of accurate instructions. Most voters obey their intuitive, "automatic systems" instead of reading directions. This kind of problem can be exacerbated by overly complex voting technologies such as

Paper ballots have been used in elections for much of the twentieth century. Voters first used pull-lever machines and, later, punch card methods to cast their ballot.

An Indonesian official holds up a checked presidential election ballot in 2009 bearing the faces of the candidates. While electronic ballots are growing in use in the twenty-first century, a variety of ballot styles remain in use.

POSITION IMPACT

It is axiomatic that for every contest on every ballot, one candidate's name—usually the top name on the list—will be the first name that the voter sees. Scholars theorize that seeing a candidate's name first may cause a voter to think of that candidate in a more positive light or to make that candidate the standard against which all others are judged. Krosnick and others (2004) have argued that this effect can swing as much as 3 percent of the vote. Whether or not this psychological effect exists, it is a physical reality that on some ballots, the names of certain candidates will be in more conspicuous positions than the names of others.

Despite controversy as to the existence and effect of position impact, ballot regulations seem to take it into account. In some states, the law requires that candidate names rotate from precinct to precinct or district to district, so that each candidate's name appears in each position on approximately the same number of ballots. In other states, in contrast, the ballot rules seem to ensure that any possible position impact benefits the two dominant parties. In these states, candidates of lesser-known parties may be symbolically and literally moved to the fringe of the ballot. Voters who are distracted from or who cannot find their original choice may vote for a different candidate or not vote in a particular contest at all.

Position impact is less likely to affect a voter in a presidential election or other significant contest. But when voters reach the less-significant, or *down-ticket,* contests, they may be unwilling to expend the time and energy needed to give all candidates equal consideration, or to search diligently for the candidate they had originally planned to select. These voters consciously choose the candidates they select—or consciously choose not to vote in a particular contest—but that conscious choice may have been influenced by the positions of the various candidates

punch-card ballots. The most infamous example of this kind of problem is the so-called *butterfly ballot,* which was used in Palm Beach County, Florida, in 2000.

in the contest. Because small differences can change the outcome of an election, position impact has almost certainly affected the results of some elections.

INTERNATIONAL BALLOT DESIGN ISSUES

Ballot design varies from country to country and from electoral system to electoral system. In some parliamentary elections, a ballot paper may be a single preprinted sheet on which the voter selects the party of choice; in others, the voter casts two votes: one for a particular candidate, and one for the preferred party. In countries with lower literacy rates, elections officials may use pictures of candidates or party symbols to help make it easier for voters to identify their choices.

Andrew Reynolds and Marco Steenbergen (2006) report that Latin American countries tend to include symbols, colors, and photographs on their ballots and that party and candidate symbols may be found on ballots in southern Europe and in former British colonies of Asia and the Caribbean. They argue that seemingly innocuous symbols assigned to candidates can have a direct impact on voters. They report that in Tanzanian elections, candidates who were randomly assigned the symbol of a gardening hoe seemed to receive a significant benefit compared to candidates who were randomly assigned the symbol of a Western-style house. Some theorize that anti-Western, proagrarian attitudes aided the "hoe" candidates and hurt the "house" candidates. Eventually, the symbols were abandoned after allegations that the house symbol was being deliberately assigned to candidates of the nonruling party.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Design for Democracy, the Brennan Center, the ACE Project, and others have recommended best practices to avoid design flaws, including reducing visual clutter, using plain language in voting instructions, and following design principles that recognize how voters intuitively move through documents. For example, electronic ballots should include only one contest on each computer screen. On a paper ballot, candidates in a single contest should be listed in a single column. The ACE Project specifically recommends using party symbols in all environments and using photographs on ballots in societies with lower literacy rates and where party affiliations frequently change. Most importantly, best practices include conducting usability testing to verify the effectiveness of the ballot design. Rotation of candidate names, while not yet widely recommended, can help to mitigate position impact, as well as the impact of some design flaws.

Perfect ballots cannot be guaranteed, but elections officials who follow best practices can greatly reduce the number of design flaws and increase the effectiveness of and confidence in voting systems.

See also *Absentee Voting; Campaigns; Election Monitoring; Electronic Voting; Voting Behavior; Voting Machines and Technology; Voting Procedures.*

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Baltic States

The term *Baltic states* refers to the countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Formerly republics in the Soviet Union, each became independent in 1991. Unlike most other former Soviet states, they established liberal democracies and market economies, and they are unequivocally pro-Western in their orientation. In 2004, all three states joined the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

These countries are frequently grouped together because of their geographic proximity on the southern shores of the Baltic Sea, their common history under Soviet rule, and their small size. Lithuania, about the size of West Virginia and with

The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were once republics in the former Soviet Union.

a population of 3.4 million people, is the largest of the three. Latvia has 2.3 million people; Estonia's population is only 1.3 million. However, the titular peoples of the Baltic states are ethnically distinct and have different national histories. Lithuanians and Latvians speak Indo-European Baltic languages, but they are not mutually intelligible. Estonians speak a Finno-Urgic language that is closely related to Finnish. Lithuanians, as part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569–1795), ruled over most of the region in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and are overwhelmingly Catholic. Estonia and large parts of Latvia are primarily Lutheran, a reflection of their connections to the Hanseatic League and the Danish and Swedish empires. By the early nineteenth century, however, all three peoples fell under Russian domination.

BALTIC STATES DURING THE WORLD WARS

After World War I (1914–1918), all three Baltic states declared themselves independent and successfully fought independence wars against both Germans and Bolshevik (Soviet) authorities. Although they tried to establish democratic governments in the interwar period, these did not take root. Political paralysis led to a coup in Lithuania in 1926, and economic problems led to the rise of extreme nationalist groups in Estonia and Latvia. These groups, aided by paramilitary forces, in these two states seized power in bloodless coups in 1934, overturning weak but democratically elected governments. Foreign threats, emanating from Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union, also were invoked by some to justify the creation of more powerful governments.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania lost their independence in June 1940 as a consequence of Soviet invasion. Afterward, the Soviets rigged elections in all three countries, after which communist authorities in each government formally applied to join the Soviet Union. They became republics within the formally federal Soviet state. However, this takeover was deemed illegitimate both internationally and by large segments of the local population. In 1941, all were conquered by invading German forces, and most of their sizeable Jewish populations (especially in Lithuania and Latvia) perished in the Holocaust. In 1944, when Soviet authorities (re)invaded as they pushed the Germans back, many Balts fought against the Red Army; some were still combating Soviet authorities into the early 1950s.

RISE AND FALL OF SOVIET RULE

Soviet rule was harsh in the Baltic states, particularly in Estonia and Latvia, where tens of thousands of people were deported to other parts of the Soviet Union. In turn, large numbers of ethnic Russians emigrated to the region, particularly to Latvia and Estonia. For example, by 1989 ethnic Estonians comprised only 61 percent of Estonia's population; ethnic Latvians were a bare majority, 52 percent, in their republic. Many feared that they would lose their culture and language because of Soviet (Russian) control. However, thanks to their previous development and relatively skilled population, the Baltic republics were the most prosperous region in the Soviet Union.

Lithuania's new President Dalia Grybauskaite, second from right, stands with her predecessor, Valdas Adamkus, second from left, during her 2009 inauguration ceremony in Vilnius, Lithuania. Once a Soviet republic, Lithuania obtained its independence in 1991.

SOURCE: AP Images

When Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev launched his reforms of glasnost and democratization in the late 1980s, it allowed people to discuss their history and form independent political groups. Peoples in the Baltic states began to demand an accounting for the past and political changes for the future. They pointed to their forceful and (in their view) illegal incorporation into the Soviet Union, threats to their language and culture, and environmental damage caused by Soviet rule. In an unprecedented display of civic activism under the Soviet Union, more than two million people from all three countries formed a 400-mile (640-kilometer) human chain in August 1989 to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, which had facilitated the Soviet takeover.

By spring 1990, in order to win local elections, even local communist leaders were agitating for independence from the Soviet Union. Over the course of the next year, these states issued declarations of sovereignty and eventually independence, and independence referendums were overwhelmingly approved by voters. There was, however, some violence in

Latvia and Lithuania in January 1991, which was instigated by Soviet troops stationed in the Baltics. The example of the Baltics would encourage other Soviet peoples to demand their independence as well, making the Baltic republics crucial actors in the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Ultimately, Gorbachev refused to endorse major military operations to squash the independence movements. By September 1991, Moscow recognized their independence, which Baltic leaders asserted was a rightful restoration of their status as sovereign states.

INDEPENDENT BALTIC STATES

Since gaining independence, the Baltic states rank as the most successful of the former Soviet states in terms of consolidating democratic governments and creating vibrant, market-oriented economies. After protracted negotiations, Russian troops pulled out of the region in 1994. By the mid-1990s, all three states had well-functioning parliamentary democracies, with tensions over citizenship and language status for Russian-speaking minorities resolved, due largely to international mediation and pressure. After a period of economic hardship in the early 1990s, governments in the Baltic states implemented market-based economic reforms and reoriented their economies westward. By the late 1990s, their economies began to rebound, with Estonia, thanks to its ties to Finland, becoming a high-tech leader for all the postcommunist world. In 2004, all three joined the EU and NATO, which they considered important both for economic reasons and for protection against any political or military threat from Russia.

See also *Europe, Democracy in; European Politics and Society; Glasnost; Soviet Union, Former.*

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Banana Republic

In his 1904 novel, *Cabbages and Kings,* the author O. Henry first referred to a "banana republic," and the resulting image of a corrupt, fruit-dependent country came from his own impressions of Honduras at the turn of the twentieth century. Over time, however, the term has transcended its specific historical, temporal, and geographical origins. It now typically refers to a small and poor country (generally, but not exclusively, Central American or Caribbean) that is deemed backward, weak, and unequal, and is ruled by a corrupt elite closely tied to foreign interests. Those foreign investors, in turn, show a proclivity to appeal to their home government (especially the United States) to intervene if their investments seem at risk.

The reference to bananas reflected (and in many cases, continues to reflect) the dominance of a limited number of agricultural exports, particularly the fruit industry, and the political influence of foreign investors. The most prominent example was the United Fruit Company, which wielded tremendous power over a number of governments in the first half of the twentieth century in countries like Guatemala and Honduras. All national leaders, elected or not, were faced with a company that was the largest single land owner, employer, and tax payer, which had built its own infrastructure, encouraged the crushing of internal dissent and bought off or intimidated government officials at all levels, thus severely limiting any efforts at social, political, or economic change.

See also *Corruption and Other Political Pathologies; Corruption, Political; Elites, Political; Trade Diplomacy.*

. . . . GREGORY WEEKS

Bandwagoning

In electoral politics, *bandwagoning* refers to supporting a candidacy or political position because it is already popular. This *bandwagon effect* can occur because the popularity of a preference is seen as evidence for its rightness. Individuals who "join the bandwagon" often free-ride by sharing the benefits of the victory without having shared the costs to accomplish it.

In foreign policy, bandwagoning is a strategy in which states seek to increase their security or prosperity by aligning with a strong regional or global power, whether through official alliance agreements or more informally through increased economic and political ties. A term popularized by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 *Theory of International Politics,* bandwagoning is often presented as the opposite of *balancing,* which can be defined as a strategy of increasing national security by siding against the dominant actors in the system.

Bandwagoning (in the foreign policy sense) may be undertaken for a number of reasons, ranging from self-preservation in a crisis to an opportunistic desire to free-ride on the success of others. Historically, bandwagoning is more likely to be undertaken by smaller and less powerful actors, which explains why theories of great and middle powers focus on balancing behavior. Bandwagoning is also more likely to occur near the end of major wars, when the winning alliance has nearly secured its victory. Traditionally, fear of bandwagoning and attempts to thwart it have influenced foreign policy far more than the actual practice of bandwagoning. Superpower relations during the cold war, for instance, were shaped in part by a fear of falling geostrategic dominoes at their periphery.

See also *Alliances; Balance of Power.*

. . . . VSEVOLOD GUNITSKIY

Banfield, Edward C.

Edward C. Banfield (1916–1999) was a political scientist who is best known for three books: *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (1958), *The Unheavenly City* (1970), and *The Unheavenly City Revisited* (1974).

Banfield grew up on a farm in Bloomfield, Connecticut. He attended the Connecticut State College at Storrs (now the University of Connecticut) and received a bachelor's degree in English in 1938. Following graduation, Banfield held a variety of government jobs. He began with the U.S. Forest Service, then moved to the New Hampshire Farm Bureau in 1939. From 1940 to 1947, Banfield worked in public relations for the U.S. Farm Security Administration (FSA), a New Deal era agency.

During his time at the FSA, Banfield was admitted to the University of Chicago, where he studied planning and cities. He received his PhD in political science in 1952 from the University of Chicago and then joined its faculty. He remained there until 1959, when he moved to Harvard University. Banfield remained at Harvard until his retirement, except for a four-year stint (1972–1976) at the University of Pennsylvania.

While initially a supporter of Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal, Banfield increasingly became skeptical of government's growing social welfare role. Reviewing his experience with the FSA, he concluded that assistance to the poor had not improved the lives of the recipients, and in some cases had made their lives worse.

He was critical of liberal ideas, especially the use of federal aid to relieve urban poverty. He argued that culture was the cause of urban poverty, and that federal aid would ultimately fail because it targeted the wrong problem. Indeed, he suggested that federal assistance could make the problems of urban poverty worse. His work was often criticized as "blaming the victim" for their situation.

With scholar Martin Meyerson, Banfield challenged the proliferation of high-rise public housing projects in Chicago and other cities around the country, warning that they would have the unintended consequence of racially isolating the urban poor. His point of view would be vindicated during the 1990s, as public housing authorities around the country began demolishing these high-rises, replacing them with less dense-packed garden apartments and town houses.

Banfield's *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* is about a poor village of Chiramonte in southern Italy. In explaining why the village was poor, Banfield coined the term, *amoral familism,* a phenomenon that he described as families in the village distrusting one another to the point where they could not cooperate. He compared this town with Gunlock, Utah, a small Mormon town he had studied in the early 1950s. In contrast to Chiramonte, Gunlock prospered because the farmers of the town cooperated with one another. This led Banfield to conclude that culture, not the absence of financial support, explained why the Italian town did not prosper.

In *The Unheavenly City,* he contended that the so-called urban crisis of the time was misunderstood. He suggested that many aspects of the crisis were not problems, and that some problems (traffic congestion) could be managed easily, while others (crime and racism) would be difficult to manage. While acknowledging that racism was a problem, he contended that urban poverty was more a case of class prejudice than race prejudice.

Banfield's influence was extensive, with several future leading conservative scholars among his students: Christopher DeMuth, Bruce Kovner, Thomas Sowell, and James Q. Wilson. Banfield also served as an advisor to President Richard M. Nixon, heading the Presidential Task Force on Model Cities.

See also *New Deal; Urban Economic Development; Urban Housing; Urban Inequality and Poverty.*

. . . . JEFFREY KRAUS

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Banks, Jeffrey S.

Jeffrey Scot Banks (1958–2000) was a scholar who made wide-ranging contributions to economics and political science. He received his BA in political science from the University of California Los Angeles in 1982 and his PhD in social science from the California Institute of Technology in 1986. Banks began his career at the University of Rochester and was promoted to full professor of economics and political science in just five years. He left Rochester in 1997 to join the faculty at the California Institute of Technology, where he remained until his death due to complications from the treatment of leukemia. Banks' productivity as an academic was prodigious: At the time of his death, he had published forty-three articles and two books—with an additional book and eight additional articles published posthumously.

Banks' work had an impact in a large number of fields, including game theory, social choice theory, economic theory, international relations, experimental economics, and political economy. In game theory, his work with Joel Sobel produced the concept of divine equilibrium, used to sharpen theoretical predictions in mathematical models of strategic interaction. In social choice, Banks characterized the outcomes possible as a result of varying the order in which bills are considered

(this is now known as the "Banks set"); he contributed to the understanding of the conditions under which majority voting leads to stable outcomes; and with David Austen-Smith, he authored a two-volume book that has provided students and researchers with much-improved access to the cutting edge of the field. In economic theory, his work with Rangarajan Sundaram expanded our knowledge of optimal decision rules when faced with a set of choices with uncertain outcomes. In international relations, Banks established general results on the probability of war, importing the techniques from the literature on mechanism design in economics. In experimental economics, Banks and coauthors John Ledyard and David Porter analyzed the performance of markets in the face of uncertain demand or supply. Perhaps the largest impact of Banks' work was in the field of political economy. With David Austen-Smith, Banks made seminal contributions to our understanding of elections and government formation in parliamentary systems and of the effect of strategic voting on the probability that majority voting leads to the "correct" outcome. With John Duggan, Banks established foundational results for general legislative bargaining games. On the topic of elections, Banks (by himself and with various coauthors) elucidated the effect of small costs due to deviations from campaign platforms, the impact of uncertainty about voting behavior on candidate positions, and the influence of future elections on political outcomes in the present.

See also *Economic Theories of the State; Game Theory; International Relations Theory; Political Economy; Social Choice Theory.*

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Bargaining

See *Negotiations and Bargaining.*

Barker, Ernest

Sir Ernest Barker (1874–1960) was a British scholar of the early twentieth century and a noted authority on classical political philosophy. Barker was the oldest of seven children born to a farm family in rural England. He was noted for his hard work and exceptional intellect. Barker received his PhD from Oxford University, where he was fellow of several colleges and served on the history faculty for twenty-one years. Barker was principal of Kings College, London; held the first Rockefeller funded chair in political science; and was fellow of Peterhouse at Cambridge University from 1928 until his retirement in 1939. Barker was knighted in 1944 for his contribution to the Books Commission of the Allied Ministers of Education.

Barker's most noted work, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle,* was published when he was thirty-two years old and became an enduring foundational work in classical political philosophy. Barker produced exceptional quality work throughout his life. Forty years after *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle,* Barker published his translation of Aristotle's *Politics,* which remains a classic in the field and is still widely read today. By the close of his career, his work was published in canonical collections of current political thought, alongside Peter Kropotkin, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Bertrand Russell.

Barker, as underscored by Professor Jean Stapleton, "lectured on the social and political ideas of European civilization in historical perspective" and notably did so in a lecture commemorating the 700th anniversary of Albertus Magnus' first lectures on Aristotle in a European university. Barker's works on *The Character of England* and *Traditions of Civility* continue to reflect his European outlook on civilization, which he held with ever greater conviction throughout his life. The European perspective was the shared cultural foundation of the West and, was fundamentally combined, for Barker, with a sense of Englishness. Barker was not only an English patriot, but a Burkean intellectual whose politics were those of the Liberal Party, though with a qualified conservatism. The foundation of Barker's thought should be understood as being twofold, first in his Platonism and second in his perspective on Christendom.

As Barker noted in his introduction to Aristotle's *Politics,* "the translation has been a labour of love, and a permanent consolidation of such leisure as was left to the writer, from the autumn of 1940 to the spring of 1945, among the anxiety and duties of war." Barker credits Sir Richard Livingston for the encouragement for his translation of *Politics,* and Barker acknowledged the debt to Merton College by dedicating the work to the Warden and Fellows of Merton College, for it was they who "gave him the opportunity of a scholar's life, when it elected him to a Prize Fellowship in Classics in 1898."

Barker is a foundational writer in the tradition of English political thought. Barker's work on classical political philosophy makes him a seminal authority in the discipline, but his work on Western civilization and English political culture

make him indispensable for understanding the clash of civilizations that defines our present time.

See also *Aristotle; British Political Thought; Hegel, Georg W. F.: Kropotkin, Peter; Plato; Russell, Bertrand.*

. . . .   MICHAEL W. HAIL

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Barrès, Maurice

Maurice Barrès (1862–1923), French novelist and nationalist politician whose eclectic career exerted a major influence on his generation, was born in Charmes sur Moselle, France, in a traditionalist family. His father was a member of the Napoleonic imperial guard.

Barrès began legal studies at the faculty of Nancy (Lorraine) before continuing his academic training in Paris in 1883. His work as a journalist in *Jeune France* (Young France) allowed him to frequent the symbolist artistic circles of Paris. In 1888, he published *Sous l'oeil des barbares,* the first volume of his trilogy *Le culte du moi* (The Cult of the Self), followed by *Un homme libre* (1889) and *Le jardin de Bérénice* (1891). He was considered the leading authority of the individualist, exalting the quest of new sensations and the satisfaction of senses.

In parallel to his literary activity, Barrès was elected as a deputy of Nancy at the French National Assembly in 1889 and retained his seat in the legislature until 1893. Rebelling against the establishment, he became a member of the nationalist-populist party of Georges Boulanger. This political involvement was one of the expressions of his ideological evolution toward patriotism and traditionalism. The lyrical transcendence of the ego by "historical roots" and "the land and the deaths" was visible also in his new literary trilogy *Le roman de l'énergie nationale* (*Les déracinés,* 1897; *L'appel au soldat,* 1900; *Leurs figures,* 1902) and in *La cocarde,* the short-lived newspaper he launched in 1894.

During the Dreyfus Affair—in which a French Jewish military officer Alfred Dreyfus was accused of being a German spy in 1894 and deported to Guyana—Barrès became one of the leading authorities of the *anti-Dreyfusards.* He joined the ultranationalist *Ligue des patriotes* (League of Patriots) created by Paul Déroulède and wrote a series of violent anti-Semitic articles.

In 1906, Barrès was elected to the *Académie française* (French Academy) and as deputy of Paris. In parliament, he opposed Jean Jaurès, founder of the French Socialist Party, by refusing to allow burial of the writer Émile Zola, a defender of Dreyfus, at the *Panthéon.* Despite their political differences, Barrès was one of the first to show his respect at Jaurès's tomb after his assassination by a French nationalist because of Jaurès opposition to a new war against Germany.

Succeeding Déroulède as head of the *Ligue* in 1914, Barrès became an important figure in World War I (1914–1918), emphasizing the importance of revenge against the pan-Germanist policy of the Kaiser. Such propaganda provoked harsh debates with pacifists, although the majority of French opinion was in favor of war. Barrès's private notebooks, however, revealed he was very circumspect about the outcome of the war.

Diverging from Charles Maurras, the monarchist leader of the antiparliamentarist *Action française* (*French Action*), Barrès revised some of his earlier assumptions after the war by reincluding French Jews as one of four components of the French national essence, alongside traditionalists, Protestants, and socialists.

See also *Anti-Semitism; French Political Thought.*

. . . .   JEAN-BAPTISTE HARGUINDÉGUY

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Bartholomew of Lucca

See *Ptolemy of Lucca.*

Basque Separatism

The Basque region (País Vasco) lies in the northern part of Spain on the border with France. Basque separatism reflects the Basques' desire to establish an independent state that encompasses four Spanish regions—Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, Álava (together País Vasco), and Navarra—plus three French regions—Labourdi, Basse-Navarre, and Soule. The father of Basque separatism is Sabino Arana, founder of the Basque Nationalist Party.

Several arguments are made for the creation of an independent Basque state. Supporters note that Basques are the oldest European nation, constituting an independent ethnic group that has historically inhabited four Spanish regions. Some point to their unique language of unknown origin that lacks any clear link to other languages.

In the Basque language, the name of their country is Euskal Herria (the people of Euskare), the language is Euskara, and one who speaks Basque is Euskaldun. What is not Euskara is Erdara, and one who does not speak Euskara is Erdaldun.

The Basque language is one of the most powerful means of enforcing separatism in the Basque region. For example, ETA

(Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), the armed face of Basque separatism, rejected race as a reason for separatism but took the language instead. The region also has formal autonomy (following the Statutory of Autonomy from 1979 and the law enforcing Euskara from 1982). The region is divided into two parts: the Autonomous Community of Basque, in which the Basque language is equal to Spanish, and Navarra, where Basque is the second official language after Spanish. In French regions inhabited by Basques, the language is not officially recognized because the French consider France to be one country with one language and one nation.

One of the foundations of Basque separatism lies in the legacy of the *fueros* (an organization with traditional laws, administering life inside the *fuero*), which emerged in the eighteenth century from Aragon, Cataluña, Mallorca, and Valencía, but not from Basque. Fueros established relations with internal institutions functioning inside the fueros, such as the General Assembly (Juntas Generales). In Navarra, these councils established executive committees that played a role similar to the executive position of modern government.

Difficulties in maintaining autonomy in the form of fueros were encountered, and in 1839 the fueros were terminated. From that year until the civil war in 1936, Basques engaged in a national movement. With the emergence of the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera (1923–1930), the establishment of the Republic in 1931, and the civil war in 1936, the Basque Provinces (Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, and Álava) achieved autonomy. Navarra remained a separate autonomous province due to its mixed inhabitants, a situation which continues today.

General Francisco Franco Bahamonde (known as General Franco) persecuted and oppressed Basque nationalists along with Republicans. He did not recognize any national identity other than Spanish, and he sentenced Basque opponents to death. The oppression of Franco's regime led to the creation of ETA in 1958. ETA is primarily a separatist organization, but it is often perceived as a terrorist network because it directly attacks the authorities. Its primary target is not civilians, but civilians have become victims. Franco's death in 1975 brought a return to democracy and autonomy for the Basques (with general elections in 1977, confirmation of the constitution in 1978, and the Statutory on the Autonomy of the Basque in 1979). ETA, however, continues to fight for independence, with the goal of establishing an independent Basque state.

See also *Nation; Nationalist Parties; Terrorism, Political.*

. . . .   MARTINA TOPIĆ

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Bassett, Reginald

Reginald Bassett (1901–1962) was an English political scientist who started out on the left, being a member of the Independent Labour Party in his youth. He turned to the right in 1931, when Labour Prime Minister J. Ramsay MacDonald became head of a coalition government dependent on the votes of conservatives and cutting public expenditure in the face of the Great Depression (1929–1939). This political progression made Bassett's writings critical of the prevailing Marxist-inspired criticisms of parliamentary government put forth by British political theorists Harold Laski; G. D. H. Cole; and Sir Oswald Mosley, who led the British Union of Fascists from 1932 to 1940.

Bassett left school young to work as an office clerk, and at the age of twenty-five he won a scholarship to study at Oxford. After graduation he spent fifteen years as an Oxford extramural tutor. In 1945 he became a tutor for trade union studies at the London School of Economics. In 1950 he received a tenured post in the Department of Government and was a professor there at the time of his death.

In *The Essentials of Parliamentary Democracy* (1935), Bassett endorsed the value of parliamentary tradition of government by discussion and consent. He interpreted parties as offering contrasting alternatives for policy, which were then resolved by compromises around a central position. Bassett offered a dynamic interpretation of how parties and politicians adapted to events rather than following ideologies to potentially revolutionary or counter-revolutionary extremes. The result was that while policies altered, a cross–party political consensus was maintained.

The victory in World War II (1939–1945) revived respect for established institutions of democracy among British academics. By the early twenty-first century, much of Bassett's book appeared consistent with mainstream political science, just as it was with Whiggish nineteenth century British views. It shows its age in not allowing for the prospect of Parliament turning into an arena in which parties competed for votes by rancorously attacking their adversaries rather than deliberating about policies and party leaders, and television becoming more important than Parliament as the chief sphere of politics. At the time of its publication, *Essentials of Parliamentary Democracy* was an overt challenge to class conflict theories of British government and to Britons who sympathized with undemocratic forms of government in the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or fascist Italy. No attention is given in the book to the New Deal, the domestic reform program instituted by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Bassett continued with his revisionist approach to contemporary history with studies of the absence of League of Nations action against Japan when it annexed Manchuria (*Democracy and Foreign Policy,* 1952) and of the events that led

to Ramsay MacDonald resigning as the Labour prime minister and reassuming office as a National Government prime minister (*Nineteen Thirty-One: Political Crisis,* 1958). Bassett's papers are deposited in the London School of Economics archive.

See also *British Political Thought; Cole, George Douglas Howard; Laski, Harold Joseph; Parliamentary Democracy.*

. . . . RICHARD ROSE

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Baudrillard, Jean

Jean Baudrillard (1929–2007) was a French social, cultural, and political theorist; a philosopher; and a sociologist. Even though he has usually been presented as a representative for French postmodern theory and sometimes associated with poststructuralism, post-Marxism, and other contemporary schools of thought, Baudrillard was able to develop a very particular frame of analysis, characterized throughout his large collection of writings by a sharp and provocative critique of the impact of consumerism, the media, and other technologies in the social and political arenas.

Baudrillard was born in Reims, France. After concluding his thesis in sociology, *Le Système des objets* (*The System of Objects*), he joined the faculty of the Université de Paris–X Nanterre, which was considered one of the most radically oriented French institutions during the 1960s. Baudrillard aligned with colleagues and students in the buildup of the May 1968 events, which led to an unprecedented general strike that brought the French government to the verge of collapse. He remained at Nanterre until 1986, when he transferred to Institut de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Économique (IRIS) at the Université de Paris-IX Dauphine. Distancing himself from academic orthodoxy, his works became increasingly popular and reached a wide international readership.

Beginning with his early works, Baudrillard took on the structuralist semiotic tradition, further developing and applying the notion of *self-referentiality.* However, as he considered objects could never be fully comprehended, they would produce a form of delusion (or seduction) among subjects seeking absolute knowledge. As a consequence, individuals and societies would fall into a form of simulated reality or *hyperreality* driven by a showcase of images, codes, information, and entertainment. This simulation shapes human behavior, providing an experience of such intensity that "actual" life is shadowed. In addition to explaining consumer dynamics (the acquisition of symbols) and the associated reification of the self, Baudrillard applied this framework to political analysis. The cold war (*The Illusion of the End,* 1992), the Gulf War (*The Gulf War Never Happened,* 1995) and the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States (*The Spirit of Terrorism,* 2002) were examined in three of his most controversial essays.

In these three works, politics and history are presented as sheer illusions. In Baudrillard's view, in the same way the system of nuclear deterrence made it impossible for the cold war to actually take place, halting historical progress, the Gulf War also was viewed as a "weak event," a media creation closer to a video game than to a genuine war. He presented this simulated kind of warfare as, as he stated in *The Spirit of Terrorism,* "the continuation of the absence of politics by other means" (34). The September 11 attacks would be a gruesome example of a *strong* or *absolute* event, a symbolic inversion of the rules of the game (with the sole aim of disrupting it), brought about as a violent reaction to the expansion of the post–cold war New World Order.

Baudrillard's rhetoric received considerable criticism, which was often stimulated by his provocative and at times exaggerated style. Critics have argued that some of Baudrillard's works actually provide grounds for justifying terrorism. Others have seen his denial of reality as a form of instant revisionism or cynical skepticism. Nevertheless, his views generated a large following and led to the creation of the *International Journal of Baudrillard Studies* in 2004.

See also *Consumer Society; French Political Thought.*

. . . . JOÁM EVANS PIM

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Bauer, Otto

Otto Bauer (1881–1938) was one of Austria's most prominent twentieth-century social-democratic statesmen. Born in Vienna, Austria-Hungary, he was expected to take over his father's textile business but instead dedicated himself to the cause of Marxism.

Bauer was both a brilliant theoretician and a man deeply engaged in real-world politics. He earned a doctorate in law from the University of Vienna in January 1906 and in the following year became secretary of the social-democratic faction in parliament. He was editor of the social-democratic *Arbeiterzeitung* (*Workers' Newspaper*), for which he also regularly wrote articles, and helped found the influential Austro-Marxist journal *Der Kampf* (*The Struggle*). His first major work, *The Nationalities Question and Social Democracy* (1907), is considered a classic Marxist study of the dual forces of socialism and nationalism. He viewed modern nations as communities of character (*Charaktergemeinschaften*) that emerged out of communities of fate (*Schicksalsgemeinschaften*) and argued that conflict among the dozen nations comprising the Austro-Hungarian Empire was due primarily to class struggle.

Bauer fought in World War I (1914–1918), was captured on the eastern front by the Russians, and survived three years as a prisoner of war. Upon his return to Austria after the war, he resumed activity in the Social Democratic Party and served from 1918 to 1919 as foreign minister in the first revolutionary Austrian government. In this official capacity, he advocated Austrian unification with Germany and even signed a secret annexation agreement because, like many socialists at the time, he believed it would lead to greater solidarity among the proletariat. The Allies, however, subsequently forbade unification in the 1919 Treaty of Saint-Germain.

Among Bauer's collected works, *The Austrian Revolution* (1923) stands out as a particularly insightful and detailed analysis of the role of class in Austria's transition from multinational empire to modern nation-state. Always a fierce defender of the working class, Bauer and others in the left wing of the Social Democratic Party declared in the 1926 Socialist Declaration of Linz that, should social democracy not be realized through peaceful and democratic means, they would not rule out "defensive violence" to achieve their ends. In addition to being the intellectual leader of the Social Democratic Party, he served from 1929 until 1934 as a representative in parliament.

Following a brief civil war in February 1934, in which the leadership of the Social Democratic Party was arrested and imprisoned, Bauer fled to Czechoslovakia. Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss subsequently banned the Social Democratic Party and its trade unions and suspended constitutional democracy. A failed Nazi attempt to overthrow the government that resulted in Dollfuss's assassination in July 1934 marked the end of the First Austrian Republic and the beginning of the ignominious period of authoritarian government known as Austrofascism. Bauer did not live to see the rebirth of social democracy in the Second Austrian Republic after World War II (1939–1945). He died in exile in Paris, France, on July 4, 1938, four months after Austria had been annexed by Nazi Germany, with Europe headed toward a catastrophic war and much of what he had worked for torn asunder.

See also *Marxism; Social Democracy.*

. . . .   ELIOT DICKINSON

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Bayesian Analysis

Bayesian analysis generally refers to statistical analysis that relies on Bayes' theorem. *Bayes' theorem* provides a solution to the general problem of induction, explaining how to rationally update prior beliefs in light of evidence so as to yield posterior beliefs. In statistical inference, if θ is a parameter of interest, then Bayes' theorem implies that if $p(\theta)$ is the researcher's a priori probability density over θ (or a priori mass function, in the case of a discrete parameter), and $p(\gamma|\theta)$ is the likelihood function for some data γ, then the posterior probability density $p(\theta|\gamma)$ is proportional to the likelihood multiplied by the prior density. Bayesian statistical inference consists of computing, summarizing, and communicating features of the posterior density. Once considered controversial because of the subjectivism implicit in specifying a prior density, Bayesian analysis has become popular in recent years via the widespread availability of relatively powerful computers and algorithms (e.g., Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithms) that generate arbitrarily precise characterizations of posterior densities, making Bayesian analysis feasible for statistical models with large numbers of parameters or nonstandard probability distributions. Examples in political science include the analysis of roll-call data, hierarchical models, and multinomial choice models.

See also *Hierarchical Modeling; Quantitative Analysis; Roll-call Analysis; Statistical Analysis.*

. . . .   SIMON JACKMAN

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Beard, Charles A.

Charles A. Beard (1874–1948), born to a prosperous family in Indiana and educated at DePauw University, was one the most important historians of the twentieth century. He was influential among scholars, a sought-after public speaker, and a writer for the nonacademic world. Beard is probably most famous for his ability to align significant academic research with a progressive concern about politics. His most famous work, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (1913), looked past high-minded political theory or simple hagiography of the Founders to assert that economic interests best explain the drafting of the U.S. Constitution and its ratification. Indeed, throughout his life, Beard was insistent on exploring the economic forces that could explain American history. This often made him controversial among the public audience that he sought. Although many later historians repudiated his ideas, he remains an important historian who influenced generations of readers to think more realistically about American history and the men and women who shaped it.

Beard traveled to England and was a founder in 1899 of the progressive Ruskin House at Oxford, which dealt with labor education. Throughout his life, he remained concerned with public affairs and maintained a progressive desire to end injustice. He eventually became a distinguished and popular professor of history at Columbia University. His resignation from Columbia, in protest over the treatment of antiwar faculty in

1917, added to his fame. Later he was involved in the founding of the New School for Social Research in New York.

Beard, who always had a lively interest in politics, was elected president of the American Political Science Association in 1926 and the American Historical Association in 1933. He continued to write, often with his wife Mary Beard, popular histories of the United States. These include the two-volume *The Rise of American Civilization* (1927) and its two sequels *America in Midpassage* (1939) and *The American Spirit* (1943), as well as the *Basic History of the United States* (1944). In the late 1940s he developed a strong isolationist streak and wrote highly critical books about Franklin Roosevelt and what he believed were Roosevelt's authoritarianism and duplicitous efforts to force the United States into World War II (1939–1945). Even though these views are largely rejected, they reveal a man who was always critical in the best sense of that word. Beard never accepted the conventional wisdom and kept a skeptic's eye on the world.

Although many of Beard's judgments have been subjected to rigorous subsequent research that, in the end, undermines his conclusion, Beard remains a vital figure in American history and student of politics. His efforts to bring economic questions to the forefront of political thought are now an accepted way of approaching U.S. history. Even his critics recognize the worth of the questions he asked and the answers he sought. Beard will always be remembered as a writer who sought to balance objective historical research with a progressive's desire for social justice.

See also *Economic Theories of the State.*

. . . . JOSEPH ROMANCE

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Beauvoir, Simone de

French novelist and political activist and critic, Simone Ernestine Lucie Marie Bertrand de Beauvoir (1908–1986) was born in Paris into a bourgeois family. She is best known for her nonfiction work, *The Second Sex* (1949), in which she argued that women had become "the other" after centuries of being compared with the male norm. Like Mary Wollstonecraft before her, Beauvoir observed that women were bullied into viewing themselves as inferior beings dependent on the males around them, and she proclaimed that women were not born as such but became so through socialization. Her declaration has remained controversial as feminists and other scholars debate the issue of nature versus nurture.

Published during the "feminist wasteland" that followed the grant of women's suffrage in Western democracies in the

Simone de Beauvoir's controversial work *The Second Sex* asserted that women were made to feel inferior to and dependent on men through socialization.

SOURCE: Getty Images

early twentieth century, *The Second Sex* issued a wake-up call to women around the world. The book combined with Beauvoir's lectures in the United States to provide the foundation for the second wave of American feminism that began with the publication of Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique* in 1963. By the 1970s, Beauvoir had revaluated earlier political positions and endorsed the right to reproductive freedom and lobbied for laws to protect women from domestic violence.

Rebelling against her Catholic upbringing, Beauvoir's body of work endorsed *existentialism,* the notion that individuals are responsible for their own fate. She did not believe in God and rejected the rationalist concepts of classical liberalism that had been dominant in Western political thought since the Enlightenment. Beauvoir refused to accept the notion that human nature was formed by either society or the mode of production, arguing that individuals form their own nature.

Beauvoir received attention for her nontraditional decades-long relationship with fellow writer Jean Paul Sartre, her mentor, friend, and lover, whom she met as a student at the Sorbonne in 1926. Despite her commitment to Sartre, Beauvoir refused to marry or to give birth. In addition to Sartre, Beauvoir's worldview was heavily influenced by philosophers G. W. F. Hegel, Edmund Husserl, Karl Marx, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and by the groundbreaking work of psychiatrist Sigmund Freud.

In 1945, Beauvoir and Sartre joined fellow existentialist writer Maurice Merleau-Ponty in founding the highly respected French political journal, *Les Temps Moderne.* Beauvoir's

first novel, *She Came to Stay* (1943), was followed by *Ethics of Ambiguity* (1948), which was a critique of Hegel's views on the individual. In 1951, Beauvoir published a scathing criticism of the Marquis de Sade, *Must We Burn Sade?* and continued the critique in *Djamila Boupacha* (1962). Repudiating monogamy, Beauvoir had a tempestuous affair with American novelist Nelson Algren and penned a fictionalized version of the affair in *The Mandarins* (1954).

Beauvoir was a prolific writer for more than forty years. Among her many works, she addressed the issue of death both personally and philosophically in *All Men Are Mortal* (1946), *A Very Easy Death* (1966), and *A Farewell to Sartre* (1984) and dealt with the realities of aging in *Coming of Age* (1972).

See also *Feminism; Feminist Movement; French Political Thought; Wollstonecraft, Mary; Women's Suffrage.*

. . . . ELIZABETH RHOLETTER PURDY

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Beccaria, Cesare

Cesare Beccaria (1738–1794), a key figure of the Italian Enlightenment, established his reputation as a political writer with *On Crimes and Punishments,* published anonymously in 1764. Widely read in the eighteenth century, the pamphlet was prominent in debates on penal reform in Europe and colonial America.

Born in Milan, Beccaria was sent, at the age of eight, to a Jesuit school in Parma, where his "sentiments of humanity" were "stifled by eight years of fanatical and servile education" (Beccaria 2008, xvii) as he later recalled. After studying law at the University of Pavia from 1754 to 1758, he returned to Milan and frequented the city's literary salons. There he befriended Pietro Verri, a writer and intellectual who founded his own circle in 1761, bringing Beccaria with him.

Beccaria traced his "conversion to philosophy" to this milieu with readings of, among others, Charles-Louis de Secondat Montesquieu's *Persian Letters* (1721) and Claude-Adrien Helvétius' *De l'esprit* (*On the Mind,* 1759). Beccaria's first work, a study of currency problems in the Milanese state published in 1762, grew out of this experience. His writings, like others of the coterie, aimed to influence a receptive Habsburg administration in Lombardy.

In *On Crimes and Punishments,* Beccaria combined social contract theories with utilitarianism to criticize existing criminal jurisprudence, which he held to be unnecessarily cruel, ineffective, arbitrary, and too often muddled with religious notions such as the expiation of sin. For Beccaria, laws sometimes unfairly protected the particular interests of class

and clergy, in part through the "terrible and perhaps unnecessary right" (2008, 43) to property. A more just social order, he argued, would craft laws to achieve "the greatest happiness shared among the greatest number" (9).

In Beccaria's view, laws should be written clearly and enforced by impartial judges. Trials should be public and by a jury of one's peers, and punishments prompt and proportional to the crimes committed. Beccaria argued that detentions prior to trial must be made on the basis of law rather than at the sovereign's whim and that torture should be eliminated because it was unreliable in securing accurate information and constituted a punishment prior to the determination of guilt. Long prison sentences and hard labor were to be used for serious crimes. The death penalty was to be abolished as an ineffective deterrent and gross spectacle that was illegitimate under the very terms of the social contract.

In Italy, *On Crimes and Punishments* was attacked by a Benedictine friar, Ferdinando Facchinei, who denounced its contractualist postulates and branded Beccaria a socialist. Nonetheless, the pamphlet saw several editions in the span of two years. Parisian *philosophes* championed the text, praised Beccaria as a "defender of humanity," and invited him to Paris in 1766. A French translation appeared in 1765, followed shortly by editions in other European languages. A substantial commentary by Voltaire further raised the book's visibility.

Catherine II sought Beccaria's guidance in reforming Russia's criminal codes, but his shyness forced him to retreat from the public spotlight. He taught economics in Milan for two years, wrote briefly on aesthetics, and took various positions in the Lombard administration, for which he wrote numerous policy recommendations. In a 1792 report, Beccaria reaffirmed the ineffectiveness of capital punishment and added a further reason for its abolition: namely, its irrevocability in the event of an erroneous execution.

See also *Bentham, Jeremy; Capital Punishment; Social Contract; Utilitarianism.*

. . . . AARON THOMAS

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Beer, Samuel Hutchison

Samuel Hutchison Beer (1911–2009) was an Eaton professor of the science of government at Harvard University and one of America's most distinguished political scientists, especially

renowned for his writings on British politics and American federalism.

Beer received his undergraduate education at the University of Michigan, graduating with a bachelor of arts in 1932, and was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University from 1932 to 1935. After working as an occasional speech writer for Franklin Roosevelt from 1935 to 1936, Beer became a reporter for the *New York Post* in 1936 and worked as a writer at *Fortune* magazine from 1937 to 1938.

Beer's long career at Harvard University, begun as a graduate student in 1938, was interrupted by his service as a captain in the American military during World War II (1939–1945). After finally receiving his PhD from Harvard in 1943, he returned to the university after the war, teaching there until his retirement in 1981. For more than thirty years his lecture course, Western Thought and Institutions, the longest-running of Harvard's famous postwar general education courses, was an inspiration to thousands of students, among them such notables as Henry Kissinger and William Rehnquist.

Beer published his Harvard dissertation as *The City of Reason* (1949), a work of political theory drawing on the philosophy of A.N. Whitehead and defending liberalism against the totalitarian threat. His *Treasury Control: The Co-ordination of Financial and Economic Policy in Great Britain* (1956) was a penetrating look into what had previously been the secretive workings of a key institution of the British cabinet. In 1965 his masterful study of British political parties and reigning ideologies, *Modern British Politics: A Study of Parties and Pressure Groups* (the first American edition was titled *British Politics in the Collectivist Age*) appeared. Arguing, among other things, that great moral ideas continue to shape political conflict in the age of interest groups, it is considered one of the most influential studies of British politics ever written, winning the Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award in 1966. Subsequent publications include *The British Political System* (1974) and *Britain against Itself: Political Contradictions of Collectivism* (1982). The latter traces the self-defeating pluralism, political overload, and "scramble for benefits" of 1970s British politics to the end of an inherited culture of deference and the erosion of class as a basis for party support. In 1993 Beer published *To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism,* in which he argued that the historical origins of American federalism do not support the conservative or "states' rights" view of the system.

While teaching and publishing, Beer continued to be active in American politics, serving as national chair of Americans for Democratic Action from 1959 to 1962. He was elected president of the American Political Science Association (APSA) in 1977. During congressional deliberations on the impeachment of President Bill Clinton in 1998, Beer testified before the House Committee on the Judiciary, arguing against the use of impeachment as a partisan political weapon.

Intellectually vigorous and productive until his death in 2009 at age 97, Beer devoted his later research and writings to the search for an American public philosophy adequate to challenges of governance in the twenty-first century.

See also *British Political Thought; Federalism; Political Theory; States' Rights.*

. . . . STEPHEN HOLMES

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Behavior, Political

See *Political Attitudes and Behavior.*

Behavioral Game Theory

Behavioral game theory is a recent approach that adapts game theory to explain and accommodate experimental results that violate typical game theoretic predictions. Game theory applies mathematical analysis to understand human behavior. In particular, game theory assumes that individuals will attempt to form best response strategies to what they believe a partner or opponent will do. The analysis relies on some assumptions, including that individuals are self-interested actors who plan ahead and maximize their expected utility (try to obtain the best possible outcome, given constraints).

One limitation to testing game theory is that many of its predictions are based on variables that are difficult or impossible to observe empirically: personal costs, preferences, strategies, and information. The use of experimental economics allows experimenters to specify these factors and to vary them systematically or to hold them constant in order to observe whether the predicted effects occur. Results from laboratory experiments have frequently been in conflict with game theoretic predictions. These disparities occur in a number of dimensions—all of which call into question key assumptions in game theory. Larry Samuelson argues that the role of experimental results that challenge existing theory is to indicate how to make improvements. Behavioral game theory generalizes the theory by relaxing assumptions that experiments highlight as questionable to incorporate these findings.

Laboratory experiments reveal that instead of being purely self-interested, additional considerations often affect strategies and decisions. *Other-regarding behavior,* or a concern for fairness, is frequently apparent. Subjects often offer too much in ultimatum bargaining games—games in which a player proposes a share of an amount of money to another who can either accept the proposal or reject it, leaving nothing for either player. This tendency has been seen as a concern for

fairness either in terms of a desire for equality or in guessing that the responder will reject an unfair offer.

Experiments also reveal that people do not engage in as much backward induction as game theory would predict. Most players will go no further than two steps of iterated reasoning. Theorists have argued that we should not expect to see subgame-perfect game theoretic behavior, as economists themselves have to work to derive the "proper" proposals in bargaining games. Others note that as a player doubts that an opponent is selecting best response strategies, that player's choice of strategy can vary also. Behavioral game theory has a number of ways to account for these tendencies. Behavioral game theory extends game theory to incorporate the bounded rationality and learning that are seen in the laboratory. Quantal response analysis depicts a form of bounded rationality in which players use decision rules where probabilities for choices of action are positively, but imperfectly, related to payoffs. Players can form beliefs about the probability that an opponent will play any given strategy. If a player is completely random, not responsive to expected payoffs, we should expect a wide distribution of results. When players are completely responsive to payoffs, the results converge to the Nash equilibria. This type of extension allows understanding and analysis of behavior that should not occur according to standard game theoretic results.

See also *Game Theory.*

. . . . KATRI SIEBERG

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Bellarmine, Robert

Cardinal and Doctor of the Church, Jesuit Robert Bellarmine (1542–1621) became a leading Catholic theologian and controversialist who is best known for his defense of Catholic doctrine and for his theory of indirect papal authority in temporal affairs. Born in Montepulciano, Italy, Bellarmine made his first vow as a Jesuit in 1560. After studying Aristotelian philosophy and Thomistic theology, Bellarmine was sent by the Jesuit Father General to Louvain, where his focus on the defense of Catholic doctrines took shape as he taught theology in a university city on the front line of the Catholic response to Reformers.

In 1576, Bellarmine returned to Rome to teach English and German Catholic missionaries. He continued in this position until 1588, and it was during this period that he published *Disputationes de Controversiis Christianae Fidei adversus hujus temporis haereticos* (1586–1593). This examination of Protestant theology was an unusually balanced assessment for the time designed to better equip Catholic missionaries in disputes rather than score rhetorical points in polemical exchanges. The work also was wide ranging and, in conjunction with his *De translatione Imperii Romani* (1584), provided the first clear statement of his ideas about the nature of papal authority.

In the 1590s, Bellarmine was appointed to important positions first within the Society of Jesus and then within the papal court, culminating in his being named cardinal in 1599 by Clement VIII (1592–1605). Under Pope Paul V (1605–1621), Bellarmine became a leading advocate for the church in a series of controversies concerning papal authority, especially a dispute caused by James I of England's requirement of an oath of allegiance from all his subjects in 1607. The issues at stake in these disputes ultimately resulted in Bellarmine fully articulating his theory of papal authority, perhaps best expressed in his *Tractus de potestate Summi Pontificis in rebus temporalibus adversus Gulielmum Barclaeum* (1610), written in response to Scottish royalist and Catholic William Barclay's assertions in support of absolute royal authority. In *Tractus,* Bellarmine advocated a sophisticated theory of papal authority that granted the pontiff indirect power in temporal affairs. Bellarmine defined papal authority within narrow limits. He granted the pope sovereign jurisdiction over all Christians and over all temporal matters when they affected spiritual matters, but he carefully distinguished between ordinary and direct jurisdiction and the extraordinary jurisdiction that the pope possessed over secular rulers. According to Bellarmine, the pope possessed temporal authority over secular rulers only to protect the souls of the faithful and only after he had exhausted all other remedies. Even then the pope's power remained indirect: he could admonish, excommunicate, and, if all else failed, remove subjects from their obligations to their secular ruler, but under

no circumstances could a pope work to remove a ruler from power. In an age of uncompromising polemical exchanges between promoters of papal and secular authority, Bellarmine's was a carefully balanced theory that ultimately pleased neither group. Bellarmine died in 1621 but was canonized as a defender of the church only in 1930.

See also *Papacy; Roman Catholic Social Thought.*

. . . .   ERIC NELSON

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Bentham, Jeremy

Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), inventor of the term *international,* was one of the greatest political and legal philosophers of his time. As the founder of utilitarianism, he has remained a controversial figure in the history of political thought, subject to much praise and criticism at once. His greatest follower, John Stuart Mill, described him as a "one-eyed man who offered philosophy a new method of analysis," while his most notable critic, Karl Marx, referred to him as an "insipid, pedantic, leather-tongued oracle of the commonplace bourgeois intelligence of the nineteenth century." Whether or not they approved of his views, none of the influential political thinkers of the last two centuries could afford to ignore this great philosopher.

Born in London, Bentham was the son of a wealthy lawyer. He too studied law but never practiced it, preferring instead to focus on law "as it ought to be." He remained a committed advocate of judicial and political reform throughout his life. His Panopticon project, for example, is among the most innovative prison reform proposals of all time. His persistent criticism of and elaboration on "political fallacies" was intended to pave the way for meaningful political reform. Bentham's normative views were distinctively secular on the one hand and grounded on an exploration of existing practice on the other. During the American and French revolutions, he rejected the idea of natural rights. Bentham's thought is frequently associated with legal positivism.

Bentham is most famous (and notorious) for his concept of "utility" aimed at calculating and, by implication, manipulating human motivations. For him, it is possible to rank order the motives for human action according to their preeminence. "Purely social" motives are morally best, followed by semisocial, asocial, and dissocial motives. Asocial motives (i.e., self-interest) are the most common, uniform, and powerful, followed by semisocial, purely social, and dissocial motives. Every human action, in Bentham's view, is ultimately motivated by a desire to gain pleasure and avoid pain. Even when one acts benevolently toward another, one does so because one finds pleasure in helping the other person. Ultimately, for Bentham, the degree of pleasure is calculable through the use of such variables as intensity, duration, or extent—a

Jeremy Bentham, founder of utilitarianism, believed that the motivation behind every human action was to gain pleasure and avoid pain.

SOURCE: Getty Images

principle known as *felicific calculus.* Taken together, these ideas led Bentham to systematize his famous normative agenda: "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."

Bentham published his most well-known concise treatment of utility, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,* in 1789. He was a prolific yet somewhat disorganized writer, with a crowded intellectual agenda. He never married and reportedly lived an eccentric life. When he died in London in 1832, he left behind some seventy thousand unpublished manuscript pages contained in some eighty wooden boxes. The first comprehensive collection of Bentham's works was published posthumously by John Bowring in eleven volumes in 1843. The organization and editing of his original work still continues today under the auspices of the University College London's Bentham Project.

See also *Mill, John Stuart; Natural Rights; Utilitarianism.*

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Bentley, Arthur Fisher

Arthur Fisher Bentley (1870–1957) was an American political scientist and philosopher who worked in the fields of epistemology, logic, and linguistics. Along with his colleague, philosopher and psychologist John Dewey, Bentley also contributed to the development of a behavioral methodology of political science. Bentley, however, did not gain wide recognition in the field until forty years after the publication of his most noted work, *The Process of Government* (1908). This book laid the foundation of the study of groups by breaking with the pre–World War I (1914–1918) traditions of political science research.

Bentley also influenced the Chicago school in the development of value-free, objective analyses. His idea that process-based behavioralism is a basic feature of contemporary pluralist and interest groups later became central to political science. He held that interactions of groups are the basis of political life and rejected statist abstractions. Bentley asserted that group activity was the fundamental datum available to describe and understand the social behavior of people. He sought an end to reliance on all prior ideas, ideals, and concepts, and what he derisively called "mind stuff." He believed that what groups were, what they did, and what they sought should not be distorted through biased observation and description or through anticipatory conceptual frameworks or limiting paradigms. Government in its various forms was one such group activity manifested publicly.

Bentley's concern was to outline methods, not to obtain results, and his method was only a research protocol, not a philosophical system. The term *Bentleyan* was added to the political science lexicon as a description of activity free of "mind stuff" but with purposes and goals contained in the activity and stated in its description. The key to Bentley's analysis was his use of the term *activity* as a synonym for interest. Bentley himself was against definitions, which he held to be limiting.

Bentley found the thought of German philosopher Karl Marx too rigid and abstract, although he was interested in economics and the economic life. Like Austrian scholar Ludwig Gumplowicz, whom he admired, Bentley found that the only possible solution of the social question lay in a harmonious cooperation of the social groups as far as that was possible. Bentley was a reformer despite his stubborn skepticism. He relied on American progressivism and the constitutional rules that helped to make government benign and curbed the striving for dominance by any one group. He viewed government as extending beyond formal governing institutions to include associations and corporations, and he urged the elimination of notions of sovereignty and the state from political investigation.

None of Bentley's later works focused on politics, government, or economics, with the exception of *Relativity in Man and Society* (1926), in which he argued that social scientists should apply a space-time approach and relativism in their investigations. All human action needed to be placed in the social context of its period. His last book was *Knowing and the Known* (1949), a collaboration with John Dewey.

Bentley was honored in 1953 by the American Political Science Association. In 1954 the American Humanist Association voted him Humanist of the Year.

See also *Dewey, John; Group Relations; Group Theory.*

. . . .   GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN

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Berelson, Bernard R.

Bernard R. Berelson (1912–1979) was an American behavioral scientist who made significant contributions to communication research, voting studies, and population policy. Born in Spokane, Washington, on June 2, 1912, Berelson graduated from Whitman College in 1936 and received a PhD from the University of Chicago in 1941. In 1944 he became a project director at the Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social Research. In 1951 he joined the Ford Foundation in California and popularized behavioral sciences as a director. Berelson also guided the establishment of the Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University in California in 1952.

Berelson wrote or edited twelve books in social and behavioral sciences, including *The People's Choice* (1944; coauthored with Paul E. Lazarsfeld and Hazel Gaudet), and published more than ninety articles. He contributed a very important chapter on the meaning of the voting process in a democracy in *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign* (1986), which he coauthored with Lazarsfeld and William McPhee. He highlighted the fact that most voters are not acquainted with political reality and respond to irrelevant social influences. He stated that "a democracy sets different requirements for different individuals and an electoral system must achieve a balance between various segments of society."

Berelson was highly organized and goal-oriented. He preferred writing in a direct and jargon-free style. He was greatly concerned about the practical, ethical, and value implications of scientific research. For example, in his last publication, he dealt with various ethical issues involved in government efforts toward influencing fertility. He showed great respect for the rights of the people in studies such as *Paths to Fertility Reduction: The Policy Cube* (1977) and *The Condition of Fertility Decline in Developing Countries, 1965–75* (1978). He held the firm belief that rapid population growth suppressed social and economic development and, therefore, all efforts should be made to lower population growth in global interest.

Berelson was convinced that well-researched and evidence-based findings could make a significant practical difference in knowledge-based societies. He encouraged collaboration between research scientists and policy makers. For instance, he evaluated various family planning interventions in Bangladesh, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand and sought to convince the governments of these countries that such interventions also could be politically and socially acceptable. He even established a journal called *Studies in Family Planning*. He played a pioneer role in promoting *World Leaders Declaration on Population*, which was presented at the United Nations in 1967.

Berelson served as a member of the U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future. He excelled at summarizing important scientific works. Fourteen of his articles were published posthumously in a volume edited by John A. Ross and W. Parker Mauldin in 1988. This volume also included Berelson's full bibliography. Berelson remained the president of the Population Council until 1974, when he resigned due to disagreements with John D. Rockefeller III—the founder and chair of the council. However, Berelson continued as a senior fellow until his death in 1979.

See also *Lazarsfeld, Paul F.; Voting Behavior.*

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Berle, Adolf Augustus

Adolf Augustus Berle (1895–1971) was an American corporate lawyer, political advisor, diplomat, academic educator, and scholar. Berle's astonishingly wide-ranging and prestigious career began after his completion of a law degree at the age of twenty-one at Harvard University. Already cast into public life at the age of twenty-four, Berle joined Woodrow Wilson as a representative of the American delegation at the Treaty of Versailles (1919). In a moment of characteristic political intuitiveness, Berle eventually resigned in protest of the Versailles settlement, warning that the treaty would serve as the cause to further wars as opposed to a lasting peace.

After establishing himself as a successful corporate lawyer in New York, Berle then turned to academia, eventually earning a professorship in corporate law at Columbia University in 1927, a post he would hold until his retirement in 1963. The remainder of Berle's time in academia would be balanced with a series of high-profile government appointments. The most important of these include various positions as a political advisor to presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy, in addition to serving as assistant secretary of state (1938–1944) and ambassador to Brazil (1945–1946).

Berle's diverse career is reflected in the broad scope of his scholarly interests, which include extensive writing on political economy, Latin American affairs, and New York State politics. His most influential and important contribution has been his work on American capitalism, particularly in the realm of corporate governance. Coauthored with economic historian Gardiner Means, Berle's *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (1932) still stands as the central reference point in studies of the relations between key actors within the joint stock company. The main argument of this study is that the historical rise of the corporation from the middle of the nineteenth century has transformed American capitalism by gradually separating ownership from control and power from private property.

Berle's work on corporate governance was interested in changes that had taken place that led to an empowerment of a managerial class separate from labor and capital, its position bolstered by the growing concentration of wealth in the corporate sector and the increasing dispersion of stock ownership across society. Concerned with the implications of managerial power and uncertainties over whose interests it was meant to serve, Berle recommended that certain legal limits be placed on management so that its power should be exercised in the interests of those subjected to its growing influence, including shareholders, employees, and civil society. Through the advancement of the proper legal framework, Berle believed that a culture of corporate responsibility could be instilled that directed managerial power toward the benefit of public interest and society as a whole. In his unique position as architect and practitioner of *corporate liberalism,* a form of capitalism that purports to be a middle way between the unbridled free market and state socialism, Berle stands as one of the most important political and academic figures of his era.

See also *Capitalism and Democracy; Political Economy; Property Rights.*

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Berlin, Isaiah

Born in the Latvian capital of Riga, Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997) was a leading liberal political theorist and historian of ideas. Focusing on themes of liberty and pluralism, Berlin contends that because human life is characterized by incompatible but equally legitimate goals, a just political order will embrace the natural diversity of human choices rather than imposing one fixed ethical system.

In 1917, Berlin's family moved to Petrograd during the Russian Revolution. They returned to Riga in 1920 and emigrated to London in 1921. Berlin attended Corpus Christi College, Oxford, and was appointed a lecturer at New College in 1932. That same year he received a Prize Fellowship at All Souls, the first Jew to receive such a high honor. During World War II (1932–1945), Berlin worked for the British government in New York (1940–1942), Washington, D.C. (1942–1945); and Moscow (1945–1946), but he remained at Oxford throughout his academic career.

Berlin was knighted in 1957, the same year he was elected Chichele professor of social and political theory at Oxford. In 1966 he became the founding president of Wolfson College, Oxford, and from 1974 to 1978 served as president of the British Academy. He retired from Oxford in 1975. During his life, Berlin also received the prestigious Order of Merit, as well as the Agnelli, Erasmus, Lippincott, and Jerusalem prizes.

Berlin's most well-known work of political theory is his essay "Two Concepts of Liberty" (1958), in which he distinguishes between positive and negative liberty. He defines negative liberty as the absence of external constraints on one's behavior and positive liberty as the capacity for self-determination. Although these two concepts may appear similar, negative liberty is characterized by the absence of external obstacles, whereas positive liberty requires the presence of a self-determining rational will.

According to Berlin, positive liberty carries a danger of totalitarianism because its advocates are "monists" who contend that there is only one way of acting authentically human and those who behave otherwise are slaves to their passions or ignorance. This provides a justification for those who consider themselves wise to oppress those they perceive to be enslaved to their own appetitive impulses. When the enlightened have overcome the irrational empirical selves of these misguided individuals, their real selves finally will emerge to pursue their true interests, which inevitably will harmonize with those of their enlightened educators. Tracing the history of this positive liberty, Berlin shows how dictators of all ideologies, from Plato's philosopher-kings to the Nazis, have used this notion to justify the suppression of diversity in the name of their monistic conceptions of the good life.

Berlin sees negative libertarians as pluralists who maintain that there is a range of ways to act authentically human and that persons should be as free as possible from external constraints to pursue their own ideas of the good life. Many of the choices required may be incommensurable, yet for Berlin the ability to decide for oneself from among these competing values is the core of human dignity. Even so, Berlin argues that the pursuit of negative liberty also may become oppressive, as when a pure free market allows some actors to dominate others economically.

See also *Liberal Theory; Libertarianism.*

. . . .   RICK PARRISH

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Bernstein, Eduard

Born in Berlin, Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932) was a leading German social-democratic politician and theorist. His life is a microcosmic reflection of the first century of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Like the German labor movement itself, Bernstein started out as a socialist eclectic, then "converted" to Marxist orthodoxy, only to return to an eclectic position that espoused a nonrevolutionary, democratic socialism that recognized Marxism as only one among several important theoretical sources.

Bernstein grew up in Berlin in modest circumstances. After a short career as a bank clerk, he joined the SPD in 1872 as a campaign speaker and pamphleteer. Expelled from Germany in 1878 as a result of German Chancellor Bismarck's repressive antisocialist laws, Bernstein settled in Zurich, Switzerland, from where he edited *Der Sozialdemokrat,* the rallying point of the underground SPD press. After his expulsion from Switzerland, Bernstein continued the periodical from London, where he cultivated close contacts with Friedrich Engels and leaders of the British socialist Fabian Society. When Engels died, Bernstein served as his literary executor and was widely regarded as one of the leading Marxist voices in Europe.

Thus, it came as a shock to his party comrades when Bernstein launched a series of tough criticisms against Marxist theory. In several articles and books between 1896 and 1900, Bernstein rejected the central Marxist dogma of the inevitable collapse of capitalist society and the ensuing revolutionary seizure of power by the working class. In his view, Marx and Engels had painted an unrealistic picture of a revolutionary "final goal." Bernstein advocated an "evolutionary" road to socialism through peaceful, parliamentary means centered on success at the ballot box and gradual democratic reforms. Stressing the tight connection between means and ends, he insisted that the extension of democracy required democratic methods. He argued that the SPD ought to broaden its narrow working-class base and appeal to the middle class as well, becoming a genuine people's party. Finally, rejecting the Marxist view that liberalism and socialism constituted diametrically opposed worldviews, Bernstein urged socialists to consider themselves the legitimate heirs of liberalism and embrace the

Enlightenment language of citizenship, human rights, rule of law, and universal ethics.

Although Bernstein's views became the cornerstones of modern European social democracy after World War II (1939–1945), they were severely condemned by various European Marxists, including Vladimir Lenin in Russia and Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Kautsky in Germany. When the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia in 1917, Bernstein emerged as one of their earliest and fiercest critics, warning that Lenin's brand of Soviet communism was based on the erroneous belief in the "omnipotence of brute force." He predicted, correctly as it turned out, that the Soviet regime represented an odd repetition of the old despotism of the tsars that would lead Russia into a "social and economic abyss." Bernstein held high political posts in the German Weimar Republic (1918–1933), including as undersecretary of the treasury. During his parliamentary tenure (1920–1928), he concentrated on matters of taxation and foreign affairs while maintaining his busy journalistic schedule.

See also *Democratic Socialism; German Political Thought, Foundations of.*

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Bicameralism

See *Unicameralism and Bicameralism.*

Bill of Rights

A *bill of rights* is a list of legally protected rights or immunities enjoyed by citizens or holders of public office. The English Bill of Rights (1689) was drawn up during the Glorious Revolution of 1688 that ended repressive Stuart rule and brought William and Mary to the English throne. It lists such protections as the right to trial by jury, freedom of speech (for members of Parliament only), the right to keep and bear arms (for Protestants only), and other limited rights and immunities.

A century later, a more sweeping and inclusive Bill of Rights was added to the United States Constitution in 1791, as the first ten amendments to the Constitution. These amendments were added as an afterthought, for the Founders who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 did not believe that a bill of rights needed to be included in the newly drafted document. This view was, however, hotly disputed during the course of the ratification debate of 1787 and 1788.

Most Anti-Federalist opponents of the proposed constitution, and some strong Federalist supporters of the new constitution, including Thomas Jefferson, decried the absence of a bill of rights in the document drafted in Philadelphia. The Anti-Federalists hammered the point home: Without a bill of rights, the new constitution created a system that is republican in name only. A bill of rights would serve as a reminder to rulers and citizens alike that the government's authority is limited by its citizens' inviolable liberties. Didn't England's Glorious Revolution result in a bill of rights to which King William agreed to abide? Didn't the American Revolution of 1776 deserve no less a guarantee? For what was the revolution fought, if not to preserve American rights and liberties? The Anti-Federalists believed that if rights and liberties are to be properly protected, the nature and extent of those liberties must be fixed from the outset. The goodwill or solicitude of rulers or representatives was not to be relied on for very long, if at all. Unless checked by the law and an active and vigilant citizenry, those to whom power is entrusted will abuse it sooner or later. Without an explicit "declaration of rights" to protect "the democratical part" of the citizenry, wrote the pseudonymous Anti-Federalist pamphleteer Brutus (thought by most to be Robert Yates), "the plan is radically defective in a fundamental principle, which ought to be found in every free government" (Brutus 2003, 453–454). Because the arguments in favor of such a declaration are so clear and compelling, its omission is an ominous portent, revealing the malign designs of the Federalists: "so clear a point is this," Brutus added, "that I cannot help suspecting, that persons who attempt to persuade people, that such reservations were less necessary under this constitution, than under those of the states, are willfully endeavoring to deceive, and to lead you into an absolute state of vassalage" (453).

Anti-Federalist objections to the absence of a bill of rights grew louder over the course of the ratification debate. Writing as "Publius" in *The Federalist,* Alexander Hamilton first derided these objections as confused and incoherent (No. 38). Later, in *Federalist* (No. 84), he felt obliged to respond, albeit reluctantly and under the heading of "miscellaneous points." Hamilton wrote, "The most considerable of these remaining objections is that the plan of the convention contains no bill of rights." He replied by noting that several state constitutions, including New York's, are also without bills of rights. Acknowledging the force of the Anti-Federalists' answer to this objection—namely, that no separate bill of rights is needed because provisions for protecting those rights are incorporated into the texts of the state constitutions—Hamilton asserted that the same is true of the new federal constitution as well. "The truth is, after all the declamation we have heard, that the constitution is itself in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS." Yet the bill of rights that Hamilton tried to tease out of the text is a motley assortment of legal guarantees, prohibitions, and definitions. The "privileges" of *habeas corpus* and jury trials are affirmed (although there is no requirement that the jury be composed of one's peers), and the prohibition of titles of nobility (Art. I, sec. 9) Hamilton offered as positive proof of the rights-respecting character of the new constitution. But,

in any event, Hamilton added, a bill of rights is out of place in a republican constitution. Harking back to Magna Carta (1215) and the 1689 English Bill of Rights, Hamilton said that "bills of rights are in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects," and therefore have no place in a truly republican constitution.

Hamilton's argument fell on deaf ears. Although the proposed constitution was eventually ratified by all thirteen states, several did so on the condition that a bill of rights be added as soon as possible. The bill of rights drafted by James Madison and adopted in 1791 explicitly enumerated the rights to freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly, and other protections.

By no means a static and unchanging enumeration of rights, the 1791 Bill of Rights—like the Constitution to which it is attached—has been subjected to repeated reinterpretation. The original (or originally intended) meanings of free speech, due process, "takings," and a host of other rights have been modified in the course of American legal and political history. Successive U.S. Supreme Court cases have expanded the scope and range of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. The First Amendment, in particular, has been the object of interpretive dispute and controversy. For example, freedom of speech and the press has been expanded to mean freedom of expression of various sorts, including artistic and other nonverbal forms of expression. And the Second Amendment, which originally appeared to apply only to members of militias, was in 2008 reinterpreted by the Supreme Court to apply to all law-abiding adult citizens.

See also *Constitutional Amendments; Freedom of the Press; Freedom of Religion; Freedom of Speech.*

. . . . TERENCE BALL

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Bill of Rights, International

See *International Bill of Rights.*

Binomial Electoral System

The binomial electoral system is a unique legislative electoral system used in Chile. The system is part of the comprehensive reform of the Chilean political system imposed by Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship, which was defeated in a popular plebiscite in 1988. The binomial system remains the military government's primary and most controversial institutional legacy.

In designing the binomial system, the military government sought to transform Chile's historic multiparty system by reducing the number of political parties, diminish the power of the left, and provide electoral benefits for the right. Reformers assumed that a small-magnitude (i.e., seats per district) system would reduce the number of political parties, purportedly enhancing stability; however, they knew a single-member district system would shut the right out of congress. Reformers opted for the binomial system to balance the transformational and electoral interests of the military and rightist parties.

Under the binomial electoral system, each party or coalition can present two candidates in each of the sixty Chamber of Deputies and nineteen Senate districts. The system uses open lists, where voters indicate a single preference from one of the two-seat lists. Though preference votes are candidate-centered, list votes are first pooled together to determine how many seats each list wins. Seats are then awarded to individual candidates based on their rank order using the D'hondt counting method, which means that the first-place list in a district can only win both seats if it more than doubles the vote total of the second-place list. If it does not, each of the top two lists wins a single seat. In most districts the two largest coalitions (the center-left Concertación and the right-wing Alianza) split the seats, because the only way for a leading coalition to win both is to outpoll its nearest competitor by two to one.

The binomial system failed its initial goal of reducing the number of political parties. Rather, parties now compete as multiparty coalitions but maintain separate identities and electoral bases. The system has provided disproportionate benefits for the right. Because the Concertación would require a supermajority in most districts to double the electoral power of the right, and the Concertación's level of electoral support has hovered around 55 percent and the Alianza's at around 40 percent, in functional terms the coalitions simply divide seats in most districts, providing an electoral bonus for the right. The system also has succeeded in marginalizing the non–Concertación left, or any small party that fails or refuses to strike an electoral bargain with one of the two major coalitions.

Although the first four postauthoritarian Chilean presidents proposed reform of the system, opposition from rightist parties stymied reforms. Proponents of the system contend that it has brought stability and governability to Chile, arguing that small magnitudes have helped transform the historically

fractious party system by providing incentives for the formation of two long-standing multiparty coalitions. Critics argue that it provides a lock on power for the two main coalitions, excludes small parties, and limits representation and accountability, given its tendency to concentrate the power over candidate selection in the hands of elites.

See also *Candidate Selection; Electoral Reform; Electoral Systems.*

. . . . PETER M. SIAVELIS

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Bioethics and Politics

The ethics of scientific technologies and medical practices have always been controversial, and society as a whole has largely decided that a modicum of collective control of science and medicine should be enforced. Debates about this control have come to be generally called *bioethical* debates, but clarity requires distinctions between three distinct subdebates. The first is *clinical bioethics,* which is the microapplication of government and institutional policy to the evaluation of the ethics of human experimentation and the treatment of patients in hospitals. For example, every university that conducts research on humans has an institutional review board that applies government ethics policy to individual research proposals, and every hospital must have a bioethicist (or equivalent) on call to resolve ethical dilemmas. A second is *regulatory bioethics,* wherein groups of professionals make ethical recommendations to government officials on issues outside those considered by clinical ethics. Most influential in this category have been various government bioethics commissions over the years, which have made ethical recommendations to elected and unelected government officials about issues such as reproductive cloning, the definition of death, and the treatment of the subjects of medical research. A third category is *cultural bioethics.* Here, the debate is not necessarily about policies that should be enacted, but rather about how the society should morally evaluate developments in science and medicine. For example, there is a bioethics debate that takes place in the media over whether genetically enhancing children should be considered morally licit.

These three bioethical debates are differently political. Clinical ethics is fairly apolitical, in that the ethics required by the government has not been challenged by any group.

Regulatory bioethics has until recently been fairly apolitical, largely because people with views not in concert with scientific or medical interests were marginalized from participation in these forums. For example, it has been claimed that not a single member of U.S. president Bill Clinton's federal bioethics commission was opposed to the destruction of embryos, which certainly required making sure that not all views available in society were represented in the commission. With the advent of the George W. Bush administration, a different group of scholars were put in charge of the federal bioethics commission, more of whom were opposed to destroying embryos. The result is that what was once a fairly technocratic enterprise of advising the bureaucratic state from a "neutral" ethical perspective became challenged by social movements in the public sphere, particularly on beginning and end-of-life issues. For instance, the appointment of the commissioners to these once obscure commissions has been the subject of press releases, petitions, and challenges.

Cultural bioethics was always political in the broader sense of debate in the public sphere that results in consensus formation. While the issues at stake and the professions involved in shaping this debate have changed since the 1960s, its "politicization" has been constant. For example, whether reproductive cloning is moral is political, and all sorts of social movements, interest groups, and academics are involved in trying to convince the public to accept one position or another.

Bioethical debate is not old enough for consensus to have developed on terminology. However, most scholars would say that there are bioethical *issues* (e.g., reproductive cloning) that can be the subject of political activity, such as campaigns to enact legislation, but that *bioethics* and *bioethical debate* refer to the activity of professionals, not ordinary citizens. Moreover, while members of many different professions participate in the three distinct bioethical debates, there is widely acknowledged to be a distinct and dominant profession named *bioethics,* made up of *bioethicists* who exclusively participate in these debates. The general ethical approach of the bioethics profession—in contrast to other professions in the debate, such as theology—is to embody liberal democratic procedural ideals. Typically bioethicists claim to not be trying to promote their own values in these debates, but rather are trying to help patients clarify their own values (clinical ethics), or to clarify and utilize what they take to be the common moral principles of Western civilization (regulatory ethics.) Unlike other experts whose expertise is thought to give them an appropriate voice in politics, like climatologists, the very notion that there are ethical experts has always been controversial.

See also *Biology and Political Science; Science Policy; Science, Technology, and Politics.*

. . . . JOHN H. EVANS

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Biology and Political Science

Almost from its inception, mainstream political science has insisted that, for all practical purposes, human nature, and, hence, political behavior, is shaped by culture. This basic tenet carries with it three corollaries: (1) humans have no innate political tendencies; (2) our political behavior is solely the product of learning and socialization (in short, of *nurture*); (3) human nature (and, thus, human political behavior) is malleable. This is traditionally referred to as the *standard social science model*.

Starting in the mid-1960s, this long-dominant paradigm has been challenged by a more biologically oriented approach, usually termed *biopolitics*. (While others have used the term *biopolitics* with variant meanings, such as Michel Foucault or Morley Roberts, this entry will use the term in its more restricted sense, to describe the current interest in the relationship between the life sciences and the study of politics, beginning, as is generally accepted, in the 1960s.) Yes, culture is important, its advocates agree, but so are the genetically transmitted behavioral inclinations our species has evolved, as social primates, over literally millions of years. Consequently, they insist, *both* nature *and* nurture must be taken into consideration.

From this disagreement on first principles there flow important differences as to how political scientists can most fruitfully study and understand political behavior. A concise examination of these differences may be the most effective way of familiarizing the reader with the key premises on which the biopolitical approach is based. The most important include the following.

GENETIC FACTORS AS BEHAVIORAL INFLUENCES

As mentioned above, mainstream political science dismisses these entirely. From an evolutionary, biopolitical perspective, however, we share quite a few behavioral traits with other social primate species. Among the most politically important of these are: a proclivity for hierarchical social and political structures characterized by dominance and submission (and unequal access to the good things of life); status seeking; aggression; xenophobia; and nepotistic favoritism.

HISTORICAL EVIDENCE AS A BASIS FOR PREDICTING FUTURE BEHAVIOR

Standard evolutionary theory holds that, barring mutation or some profound environmental change, the behaviors a species has evolved are likely to remain largely unchanged over lengthy periods. Thus, as those in biopolitics see it, when efforts to alter or even prohibit "undesirable" social and political behaviors have been consistently unsuccessful in the past, similar attempts are not likely to be any more effective in the future. They see trying to "change human nature" as analogous to asking a leopard to change its spots.

Having greater faith in the malleability of human nature, mainstream political science is more likely to discount past behavioral patterns. Conceivably, this time the leopard might be induced—or compelled—to alter its coloration. Why, then, not try?

USE OF PRIMATOLOGICAL DATA

If, according to the accepted wisdom, human behavior is shaped almost entirely by culture and socialization, knowledge about other species, no matter how akin to ours, serves no useful purpose. On the other hand, if our genetic legacy often meaningfully influences how we act, the study of closely related species becomes most relevant. For instance, primatologists have used their research on our nearest relatives in the animal kingdom to consider the evolutionary roots of human behavior, from aggression to altruism. Political scientists, for their part, have explicitly explored how an understanding of primates might inform our theorizing about human politics and ethics.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study of human behavior from an evolutionary perspective emerged from ethology, a discipline guided by the dictum that, to understand how and why an organism acts as it does, we must study its actual behavior in its natural setting. Both mainstream political science and biopolitics accept experiments as a valid means of inquiry. The latter, however, insists the experiment should mirror, to the extent possible, the challenges and environment the subject(s) would encounter under real-life conditions. For this reason, it is skeptical about the validity of experiments in which subjects, human or other, are placed in a patently artificial setting and are asked to perform tasks that lack meaningful consequences. Biopolitics, with its ethologically derived emphasis on actual behavior, sees survey research, by and large, as a research instrument of last resort.

THE FORMULATION OF PUBLIC POLICY

Here, some examples illustrate how a biological perspective might inform policy choices. Evolutionary change almost always entails a tradeoff. Greater size requires greater caloric intake; speed comes at the cost of endurance; a massive protective carapace or shell leads to lessened mobility. Given their neo-Darwinian orientation, those in biopolitics tend to think less in terms of a "solution" to problems like human "vices" and more in terms of what is to be gained and lost by a particular policy. These trade-offs have not been adequately considered, for example, in the ill-fated Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (which prohibited the sale of alcohol); in the interminible "war on drugs"; or in the consistently futile efforts, literally over the centuries, to prohibit prostitution.

To elaborate on the last example, Michael McGuire and Margaret Gruter examine the almost certain failure of anti-prostitution laws. McGuire and Gruter note the value of an evolutionary inquiry:

> Both sexes have dispositional tendencies to reproduce, and reproduction-related behavior (e.g., flirting, experimentation with one's and other's bodies) begins during adolescence. . . . In effect, both sexes are predisposed and well prepared to engage in sexual behavior. It follows that attempts to control sexual behavior will be only partially successful, a point to which the high frequency of teenage sexual encounters, abortions, and adult extra-marital affairs attests. (2003, 35)

Given this, what policy suggestions follow? Because prostitution is unlikely to be completely suppressed given human impulses, then limited legalization may make the most sense. This would call for registration of sex workers, making sure that sexually transmitted diseases are controlled, reducing criminal involvement, bringing the workers into the recognized workforce. Of course, some aspects of prostitution would remain outside the law—such as human trafficking and child prostitution. The authors cite Holland and Nevada as localities where successful regulation has taken place.

TOWARD THE FUTURE

Launched, as noted above, in the mid-1960s, the biology-and-politics enterprise received official recognition from the International Political Science Association in 1973 with the creation of the eponymous Research Committee #12. After considerable debate over the wisdom of a separate professional organization, the Association for Politics and the Life Sciences was established in 1980, and the first issue of its journal, *Politics and the Life Sciences,* was published in 1982.

As yet, to be sure, a sizable majority of political scientists continues to see political behavior as fundamentally, if not exclusively, the product of culture, socialization, and individual experience. Over the past decade or so, however, a neo-Darwinian approach has been fostering a steadily growing amount of research in anthropology, psychology, social psychology, sociology and, most recently, economics. Conceivably, this may eventually be the case in political science, historically quite susceptible to intellectual trends in its sister social sciences.

See also *Bioethics and Politics; Foucault, Michel Paul; Political Ecology; Sociobiology and Politics.*

. . . . ALBERT SOMIT AND STEVEN PETERSON

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Bisexual Movement

See *Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Movement, Comparative.*

Blackstone, William

Sir William Blackstone (1723–1780) was an English jurist and legal scholar whose exposition of English common law continues to resonate in courtrooms in the early twenty-first century. His *Commentaries on the Laws of England,* published over four volumes beginning in 1765, was a comprehensive yet accessible treatise on the history of common law that proved critical to jurists in both England and the colonies of America. Blackstone's *Commentaries* is still cited in American courts of law as one of the foremost influences on the American Founders and a cornerstone of the U.S. Constitution.

Born in London, Blackstone studied at Oxford before being admitted to the bar in 1746. He both practiced and taught law to little major public acclaim until the 1756 publication of his *An Analysis of the Laws of England,* a work comprising many of his lectures at Oxford. In 1761 he was appointed as a counsel to the Crown and was elected to the House of Commons, where he exhibited a mostly Tory ideology. He was knighted in 1770 and appointed as a justice to the Court of Common Pleas, the last formal position he would hold.

Many of these appointments can be traced to the fame Blackstone experienced as a result of the success of his collected lectures. His *Commentaries* was well received in Europe, where it was translated into many languages, and in America, where its first publication in 1771 met with widespread acclaim for its utility in summarizing the legal tradition of England and how it might be applied to a new political landscape. The work was divided into four legal subjects: the "Rights of Persons" (or individuals), the "Rights of Things" (or property law), "Private Wrongs," and "Public Wrongs." Taken together, the volumes encompass an able introduction to the common law tradition for the aspiring lawyers Blackstone instructed and a ready framework for the American Founders in justifying the Declaration of Independence and, later, the construction of the Constitution. While luminaries such as British philosopher John Locke, American founding father Thomas Paine, and other Enlightenment thinkers provided abstract justifications for the natural rights of the colonists, the *Commentaries* offered a crucial practical vindication of and design for an independent legal system in America.

While Blackstone's influence has waned in the realm of contemporary legal thought, there can be little doubt concerning the pivotal role he played during the debates during and after the American constitutional convention of 1787, during which his work was frequently invoked for both Federalist and anti-Federalist causes. Furthermore, the *Commentaries* acted as a layman's barricade for the tradition of English common law against encroaching parliamentary legislation, just when such a defense was most needed. These twin contributions alone enshrine Blackstone as a pillar of legal theory, earning him praise and criticism from later philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham and John Austin.

See also *Common Law; Constitutional Law; Law and Society; Locke, John; Paine, Thomas; Political Law.*

. . . .   CLYDE RAY

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Blame Management

See *Scandals and Blame Management, Political.*

Blanqui, Louis-Auguste

Louis-Auguste Blanqui (1805–1881) was a French republican activist and legendary revolutionary conspirator. Intellectually precocious as a youth, he studied law and medicine at the University of Paris, though he never earned a degree. Coming of age during the repressive Bourbon restoration, he abandoned his studies in favor of the secret societies of the republican underground, sealing his commitment to abet popular insurrections against all conservative governmental regimes. Despite repeated arrests, trials, and lengthening prison sentences for his subversive activities, Blanqui managed to participate in all of the major Parisian popular uprisings of the early nineteenth century—those of 1830, 1832, 1839, and 1848. By mid-century he had become widely known as an insurgent leader willing to sacrifice himself for the republican cause.

Blanqui's subversive political activism was a quasi-religious vocation. As a professional revolutionary, he promoted not only an egalitarian republic, but also a society free of religious obscurantism that perpetuated social injustice. His politics drew on the moral implications of his radical atheism: the value of righteous struggle against oppression now, whatever the odds. Sympathetic to a vaguely conceived notion of a social republic, he had little interest in the theory of collectivism then gaining ground in Europe, and he kept his distance from the First Workingmen's International Association, whose practical projects to advance the labor movement threatened to displace the activist style of confrontation and revolt on which the revolutionary tradition had relied.

Blanqui's reputation among left-wing militants was compromised toward mid-century, when a former comrade in arms publicly accused him of having betrayed his coconspirators to the police in the abortive uprising of 1839. Blanqui recovered his stature during the Second Empire among radical republican youth, who looked to him as a mentor. In this guise, the aging Blanqui initiated his young followers into the rites and rituals of the revolutionary tradition. Many of them would come to play leading roles in the Paris Commune of 1871. By then, Blanqui had been imprisoned once more. The refusal of the French provisional government to trade him for all the priests of Paris held hostage by the commune suggests the proportions his legend had by then assumed. Ironically, he was freed upon his election to the Chamber of Deputies in 1879 as the emblem of the campaign for the amnesty of the Communards in the name of national reconciliation. Revered across a broad spectrum of the political left, Blanqui returned to Paris to live in tranquility until his death on New Year's Day 1881.

In the twentieth century, Blanqui assumed a place in the pantheon of heroes of the French Communist Party as a founding father of its cause. His remarkable life elicited the interest of sympathetic historians and literary critics, who idealized his role in the revolutionary tradition. That portrait was challenged by a more critical biographer, Maurice Paz, who pointed to Blanqui's rigid authoritarianism and his psychological need for the adulation of his disciples.

See also *French Political Thought; Revolutions.*

. . . .   PATRICK H. HUTTON

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Bloc

A *bloc* is a coalition of individuals, groups, or parties in a democratic system. Electoral blocs are common in multiparty, parliamentary systems. Depending on the national political structure, a bloc may be formed prior to an election through a formal or informal agreement. The bloc then contests the balloting as a unified group in an effort to gain a majority in the legislature. Electoral blocs may be created for a single election, or they may be more stable and span multiple cycles. The membership of blocs can change from election to election. For instance, in Ukraine, the core of the Yulia Tymoshenko Electoral Bloc was the same two parties through three rounds of parliamentary elections between 2002 and 2008, although other members of the bloc joined other groupings. Parliamentary blocs also

may be formed through formal accords whereby parties and individual legislators agree to support each other. Such coalitions are often necessary in parliamentary systems in which no single party gains a majority of seats in the legislature. Informal blocs may form to advance an issue or policy and then dissolve. In the United States, bipartisan blocs often emerge on regional or policy issues.

See also *Block Vote; Trade Blocs.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Bloch, Ernst

Ernst Bloch (1885–1977) was a German-Jewish Marxist political philosopher. His work can appear overly esoteric at times, infused as it is with what may be called a "messianic" political theology that sits uncomfortably with standard versions of Marxism and their dismissal of such "idealist" utopian dreaming. For Bloch, however, the limitless scope of the human imagination is the very keynote of human beings' continual striving to reshape and remake the world as it is into what it might yet be.

Bloch lived through the most tumultuous and bloody decades of the twentieth century, over the course of which he produced a vast body of work that has reached an arguably smaller readership than is deserved. His magnum opus and most famous work, the monumental three-volume study, *The Principle of Hope* (1954–1959), brings together a dizzying array of conceptual and thematic motifs discernable throughout the rest of his writings. Bloch's political philosophy can be broadly described as nondoctrinaire, thoroughly heterodox Marxism, but one richly textured by a messianic consciousness that absorbs and refines the apparently utopian possibilities glimpsed in the most everyday phenomena and the political conclusions that can be drawn from them.

Bloch's unorthodox and reflexive philosophy had a not unproblematic reception during his own lifetime. It was curiously and somewhat incongruously accommodated—temporarily at least—by the official state wisdom of East Germany. Bloch's actual political decisions sometimes were inconsistent as well, the most notorious of these being his defense of the Moscow Show Trials of 1937 (a series of staged trials of political opponents of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin) after his return from exile in the United States. In 1961 Bloch finally fell out with the German Democratic Republic for good, remaining in West Germany for the rest of his life.

Central to Bloch's political philosophy is his theory of the "not yet" (*noch-nicht*); that is, the persistent and recurrent critical consciousness that indicts its own time as falling short of the possibilities both real and imagined that could yet come into being. This emancipatory demand of the "not-yet-become," so frequently and easily dismissed as wishful thinking, is for Bloch an inescapable and elemental force throughout human history. In this and other regards Bloch shares a distinct affinity with German cultural critic Walter Benjamin's no less elusive messianic philosophy of hope. The time of the "not yet" is for Bloch anterior to the present; an advanced state of perceiving a future world yet to come while recognizing the existing shape of things to be neither infinite nor unchangeable. Such a total critique of existing society—indeed reality—cannot obviously be set out by or co-opted into any standard political program. Instead it can be expressed in theoretical reflection and culture on the one hand and popular social movements seeking to inaugurate widespread social and political change on the other.

Bloch offers a rich body of work linking seemingly disparate cultural and political fragments together into a unifying and consistent (but never doctrinaire) whole. Removed from the false certainties of orthodox Marxism, his philosophy of hope remains noncontemporaneous with both his time and the present day, and yet in spite of this—or indeed perhaps because of it—it is more illuminating than ever.

See also *German Political Thought; Marxism; Utopias and Politics.*

. . . . CHRISTIAN GARLAND

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Block Vote

Block voting is an electoral system used by multimember electoral wards or districts in which voters cast as many votes as there are seats in the area. In one form of the system, citizens may cast their votes for candidates irrespective of the party affiliation of the office seekers. In another form of block voting, voters cast ballots for a party, and representatives are chosen through proportionality. The system was developed to increase the representation of smaller political parties and reward groupings with effective organizations and popular candidates. However, several countries that used block voting discovered that the system weakened major parties and led to the proliferation of smaller groupings. It also had the opposite effect and tended to result in overwhelming and decisive electoral victories when voters concentrated their ballots on a single popular party. For instance, in multiple block voting elections in Mauritius, the winning party won every seat in parliament despite only winning about 65 percent of the vote. Consequently, during the twentieth century, countries such as Australia, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom either abandoned the method or created mixed systems that combined block voting with first-past-the-post elections.

See also *Electoral Systems; First Past the Post.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Blogs and Bloggers

The term *blog* is a contraction of the term *Weblog,* a page with numerous chunks of content arranged from newest to oldest. It is one of many forms of social media or networking available to people on the Internet since August 1998, which also includes Web forums, podcasts, YouTube, Facebook, and so on. A blog is found in what has come to be known as the *blogosphere*, a public sphere or space of opinions and discussions that is radically open to the voices of massive numbers of people. Thus a blog is any space on the Internet where one can voice opinions, thoughts, and ideas in a very open manner on any topic or subject matter. They are easily created and easily updated Web sites that allow an author or authors to publish instantly to a large audience from any Internet connection. The term *blog* may be used as a noun or as a verb.

A blogger is a person who engages in the act of blogging, which is the act of writing opinions, thoughts, and ideas in any public space on the Internet. This involves making posts, replying to posts, and providing various audio and video links within a Weblog page.

As a result of the pervasiveness of blogging, several new terms have entered the lexicon including *splog,* a fake blog that has no substantive content, just spam (unsolicited commercial messages); *splogsplosion,* an explosion of spam e-mails; Twitter, a free social networking *microblogging* service that allows the *twitterer* to send brief (140 character) notes to other Twitter members on the Internet and on other digital devices such as a cell phone; and *vlog,* a video-based or video-oriented blog.

CHARACTERISTICS

Blogs are the fastest growing sites on the Internet during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Technorati, the leading blog tracking and searching site, has reported that as of December 2007 they have counted the existence of 112 million blogs, with 120,000 new blogs being created every day. Over the three-year period for which data is available, the growth was from nine million in 2005 to thirty-two million in 2006 to eighty million in 2007. There are believed to be 1.2 million postings per day, which amounts to seventeen per second. The major languages of the blogosphere are Chinese, English, Farsi, and Japanese.

POSITIVE ASPECTS

The attention garnered by blogs and their sheer numbers signal their importance. Trend spotters listen to the "key conversations" among the informed and passionate writers and readers of these blogs. The viral aspect of the blog (the ease and speed at which posts zip around the Internet) shows the potential for such a tool in politics as well as in business communications.

Bloggers are some of the most cutting-edge content creators online at the beginning of the twenty-first century because they state their opinions without fear. The power of the blog comes from the ability to allow individuals to express themselves worldwide almost instantly. It is indeed the cheapest, quickest, and easiest way to gain a Web presence. Through blogs ordinary people have the (1) opportunity to share knowledge and experience, (2) potential to educate and entertain, (3) ability to quickly disseminate news and information to a mass readership, and (4) possibility of generating revenue.

As bloggers recount everyday experiences and exchange advice on familiar problems, they often incorporate outside sources, linking to interesting stories from both online and offline publications. What takes place in blogs is not just personal journaling but also thinking and learning. Blogs present a broad range of varied and contradictory opinions and a wealth of information about topics from the minutia of life to global issues. Activists use blogging as a means of fostering political awareness, including blogathons wherein users can blog for a good cause and for various charity events.

Other proponents of blogs see it as a great format for delivering up-to-the-minute news on constantly updated pages across the World Wide Web. The community of bloggers acts as a cadre of fast fact-checkers that quickly root out fraudulent claims. Bloggers can be faster than traditional media when posting accounts of natural disasters, terrorist attacks, or how well *American Idol* participants performed.

Some believe that blogs increase cultural diversity by allowing a wide variety of opinions to propagate and decreasing barriers to cultural and political participation. Blogs have a tendency to reflect our common humanity by showing us that we can assert our individuality and yet we are not alone.

NEGATIVE ASPECTS

For all the good that blogs may provide, there are problems associated with their constant use. With the millions of conversations taking place, information overload is inevitable. How does one sort through the chatter to find relevant, substantive, and trustworthy conversations? Beyond the sheer number, issues regarding the nature of the quality, reliability, and finality of data and information obtained from these blogs raise important questions. Their credibility, objectivity, and representativeness also have been questioned. As a result, calls to create guidelines or rules for blogging have been made, but to many, this amounts to censorship.

IMPACT ON POLITICAL NEWSMAKING

One of the major aspects of blogging deals with its impact on political newsmaking. For example, on December 5, 2002, at Strom Thurmond's 100th birthday party Trent Lott said,

> I want to say this about my state: When Strom Thurmond ran for president, we voted for him. We're proud of it. And if the rest of the country had followed our lead, we wouldn't have had all these problems over all these years, either.

Because Thurmond had explicitly supported racial segregation in that presidential campaign, the statement was widely interpreted to mean that Lott also supported racial segregation. The comment, initially broadcast on C-SPAN, was largely ignored by the mainstream media. However, when political blogs picked up on it, the mainstream media followed suit, leading to Lott's resignation from Republican Senate leadership.

Another example of blogs' impact on the media is blog swarming—the relentless criticism of bloggers on an individual or group that causes a change in action by the individual or group. Former CBS anchor Dan Rather was said to have been stung by blog exposure over his use of forged documents in a report about President George W. Bush's Air National Guard service, hastening Rather's retirement. The negative buzz about Supreme Court nominee Harriet Miers and her qualifications for the job caused her to withdraw her nomination. A blog swarm about the demonic-looking photo of Condoleeza Rice in *USA Today* in October 2005 caused the newspaper to remove the doctored photo.

OTHER ASPECTS

The world of the Internet is a ripe area for study, and attempts to harness it are often seen as a way of curtailing the entrepreneurial spirit. The legal system has had to develop rules for dealing with blogs—users must treat blog posts as business records that can be subpoenaed and, therefore, posts need to be saved, stored, and handed over to litigators in the event of legal action. However, the world of the blog to date is largely a free-for-all, with undefined rules and many players.

See also *Internet and Politics.*

. . . .   CECILIA G. MANRIQUE

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Bobbio, Norberto

Norberto Bobbio (1909–2004), a prominent legal and political philosopher, was instrumental in developing Italian legal positivism and made significant contributions to democratic theory. Committed to the rule of law, he was an important voice of the reformist and liberal-democratic left in Italy.

Born and educated in Turin, Bobbio obtained degrees in jurisprudence and philosophy in the early 1930s and taught law and political science from 1935 to 1984, the year in which he was nominated lifetime senator. Although raised in a middle-class environment that welcomed fascism against the perceived threat of socialist revolution, he associated with leading antifascist intellectuals and liberal socialists from the clandestine groups Justice and Liberty and the Action Party, helping to found the latter in 1942. He was jailed for brief periods in 1935 and 1943 for antifascist activities.

In early writings, Bobbio distanced himself from the predominant currents of idealism represented by Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile, briefly sketched phenomenological approaches to legal science and sociology, and elaborated a theory of social personalism aimed at transcending individualism and collectivism. In the 1940s he criticized existentialism as an apolitical and decadent philosophy, arguing that its tendency toward solipsism and antirationalism undercuts its own focus on action and individual responsibility, notions crucial in the democratic struggle against fascist dictatorship.

Upon fascism's demise, Bobbio engaged in debates over the shape of the new Italian political order. Increasingly influenced by Carlo Cattaneo's positivism, he argued for secular and tolerant politics, liberal democratic rights and institutions, economic and social rights, and domestic and international federalism. After an unsuccessful candidacy to the Constituent Assembly in 1946, he withdrew from politics to concentrate on research and teaching. He propounded a "neo-Enlightenment" rationalism that substituted theoretical rigor and empirical study for idealism's speculative abstractions. Against efforts to revive natural law theories, Bobbio launched Italian legal positivism in the 1950s through a synthesis of logical positivism and Hans Kelsen's pure theory of law—a perspective he supplemented in the 1970s with a sociological account of how law functions in advanced industrial societies.

Bobbio consistently defended liberal democracy against Marxist critics—such as Galvano Della Volpe and Palmiro Togliatti in the 1950s and Antonio Negri in the 1970s—who tended to denigrate citizenship rights as bourgeois ephemera and ignore concrete mechanisms of political rule. He advanced a "minimal" definition of democracy outlining certain "rules of the game" for arriving at collective decisions nonviolently, such as universal and equal suffrage, majority rule with minority rights, and the freedoms of expression and association. To redress democracy's many "broken promises," such as the persistence of oligarchies, Bobbio called for representative institutions to permeate civil society (bringing democratic principles to other domains where collective decisions are made) and an extension of welfare state protections.

With the development of nuclear weapons, Bobbio questioned conventional theories of "just war." Viewing state sovereignty as a primary cause of war, he urged the construction and democratization of international institutions such as the United Nations to safeguard human rights and resolve disputes nonviolently—a notion he termed *legal pacifism*.

Alarmed by increasing economic inequality and the persistence of authoritarian impulses in Italian politics, Bobbio argued in the 1990s for the continuing salience of the political distinction between left and right, and aligned himself with what he viewed as the left's long-standing project of realizing justice and liberty.

See also *Civil and Political Rights; Democratic Socialism; Democratic Theory; Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; Italian Political Thought; Just War Theory; Kelsen, Hans; Liberal Democracy; Positive Theory.*

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Bodin, Jean

One of the most influential French political thinkers of the sixteenth century, Jean Bodin (1529/1530–1596) was a product of his times. Born in Angers, France, he studied and then taught law at the University of Toulouse in the decade before the outbreak of the French Religious Wars (1559–1598). In the 1560s, as France descended into political and religious civil war, Bodin practiced law as an *avocat* in Paris. Two publications in the 1560s brought him public notoriety. The first, *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* (*Method for the Easy Comprehension of History,* 1566), advocated the comparative study of all legal codes in the search for the strongest on a specific topic. The second, *Response aux paradoxes de M. Malestroit* (*Response to the Paradoxes of Malestroit,* 1568), addressed the relatively new but pressing problem of price inflation.

In 1571, Bodin entered the household of the Duc d'Alençon, the king's brother, and in 1576 he took part in a meeting of the Estates General of France called by Henry III during a crisis point in the sectarian and political conflicts of the religious wars. In the same year he published his seminal work in political philosophy, *Les six livres de la république* (*Six Books of the Republic*), which advocated a political system that concentrated power in a hereditary monarch. In 1587, he became *procureur au roi* for the town of Laon and was an active participant in the Catholic League, which first rebelled against Henry III and then sought to thwart the accession of the Protestant Henry

IV to the throne of France. Despite his participation in the Catholic League, he wrote in 1588 the controversial *Colloquim Heptaplomeres,* which made the case for religious tolerance. The *Colloquim* only appeared in print posthumously in 1596.

Bodin's single most important contribution to political thought was his transformation of the study of public law through a new definition and demarcation of supreme power in his *Les six livres.* His basic premise was that sovereignty was indivisible. He was less concerned with the origins of this power than with its practice. Key to this idea was a theory of ruler sovereignty that entirely concentrated high power in one individual or group and rejected the idea that power could be shared or distributed among separate agents. Thus, Bodin argued that royal servants were delegated authority and possessed no power of their own. Indeed, royal power was only limited by customary law insomuch as prudence and good government made respect for custom and natural law advantageous to the sovereign. It should be noted, however, that Bodin chose to construct his powerful sovereign using the model of a patriarchal family rather than mystical theories of the royal persona upon which other French political thinkers drew. His ideas proved particularly influential in the half century after the first publication of the *Les Six livres* in 1576 and continued to influence thinkers like Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

See also *Absolutism; French Political Thought; Sovereignty.*

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Boff, Leonardo

Leonardo Boff (1938–) is a recognized Brazilian theologian, philosopher, ecologist, and social critic who has written more than sixty books. He is best known for being one of most outspoken and controversial pioneers of the Latin American Liberation Theology (LALT) movement, which argued that the focus of theology should be the direct relationship that exists between faith and liberating sociopolitical action. In *Salvation and Liberation* (1984), Leonardo and his brother Clodovis Boff posited that LALT is a novel way of approaching theology because it develops a rigorous theological discourse of social, political, and economic liberations. As such, for Boff and the LALT movement, social and political theory became an essential tool for theology, along with its more traditional dialogue partner, philosophy.

Boff was born in 1938 in Concórdia, Brazil. In 1959 he entered the Franciscan Order and in 1964 became an ordained priest. Subsequently, he went to Europe to continue his studies and received a doctorate in philosophy and theology from the

Ludwig-Maximilian University of Münich in 1970. He came to the forefront of the liberation theology movement with the publication of his *Jesus Christ Liberator: A Critical Christology for Our Time* (1978), in which he examines Christology through the historical Jesus and demonstrates the direct relationship between spirituality and political commitment to the poor. Following the arguments of Peruvian theologian Gustavo Gutiérrez in Gutiérrez's seminal 1973 *A Theology of Liberation,* Boff asserted repeatedly in his writings that the first step of the theological process is historical praxis, which is only then followed by a second step of reflection on praxis in light of faith. For this reason, he and other liberationists readily used political theory—Marxism, dependency theory, and critical theory—to interpret the sociopolitical setting, asserting that theology must reflect on orthopraxis (right practice) and not simply orthodoxy (right doctrine). While critics charged this method of politicizing the Christian faith and advocating communism, violent revolution, and atheism, Boff and other LALT adherents responded that all theology is implicitly political and that LALT, in contrast, simply speaks of politics explicitly.

Boff gained notoriety for applying the methods of LALT not only to the social situation but also to the institution of the church. In his *Ecclesiogenesis: The Base Communities Reinvent the Church* (1977), he argued that the grassroots base ecclesial communities movement was revolutionizing the church. However, in *Church, Charism, and Power: Liberation Theology and the Institutional Church* (1981), he directly critiqued the Roman Catholic Church's appropriation of political and symbolic power to control the masses, vehemently contending that this power needs to be decentralized. The Vatican responded in 1984 through the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, led by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI), by silencing Boff for ten months. Boff submitted, but when he was threatened with silencing again in 1992, he refused to abide and reluctantly left the priesthood. Undaunted, he continued to write and further developed arguments he had begun supporting feminism and the ordination of women in *The Maternal Face of God: The Feminine and Its Religious Expressions* (1979). He also discussed the application of LALT to ecological issues in *Ecology and Liberation* (1993) and *Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor* (1995).

Boff has taught at numerous universities in Brazil, been a visiting professor at Lisbon, Basel, Salamanca, Heidelberg, and Harvard universities, and served as an editor of numerous journals. He is currently professor emeritus of ethics, philosophy of religion, and ecology at the State University of Rio de Janeiro.

See also *Latin American Political Thought; Liberation Theology; Religion and Politics.*

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Bolshevism

Bolshevism refers to a movement for Marxist socialist revolution spearheaded by the Bolshevik Party in Russia. Its founder was Vladimir Lenin, and as a consequence, Bolshevism is often viewed as synonymous with *Leninism.* Leninism, however, has more of a theoretical component than Bolshevism and aspires to be a more complete political ideology.

Bolshevism was born at the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) in 1903. Lenin advocated a more active and committed party membership of professional revolutionaries, which stood in contrast to the trade union–based membership of other social democratic parties at that time. He forced a split in the party, and, after political maneuvering that assured his faction the majority of the seats in the RSDLP's leading bodies, he named his group the Bolsheviks (from the Russian word *bol'shinstvo,* meaning majority). They were opposed by the Mensheviks (from the Russian word *men'shinstvo,* meaning minority) led by, among others, Julius Martov and Grigorii Plekhanov. However, it was not until the Seventh Congress of the RSDLP in 1917 that the term *Bolshevik* officially appeared in the party title. In 1918 the party was renamed the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and in 1925, under the Soviet Union, became the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The term *Bolshevik* officially disappeared in 1952, when the party name was changed to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The basis of the Bolshevik position was a strategy that emphasized the role of a "vanguard party" of professional revolutionaries who were committed to a Marxist socialist revolution. Those who were inactive or not wholly committed to the movement were excluded from membership. The party committed itself to raising class consciousness among the working class and rejected the view that the Russian workers needed to cooperate with the middle class to bring political change to Russia. It professed to be a party of a "new type," based on democratic centralism. This means that members participate in the formation of policy and election of leaders, but after a policy has been decided, all party members are commanded to carry it out loyally. In power, the Bolsheviks aspired to create a "dictatorship of the proletariat," in which

the party would rule in the name of the working class and fer-ret out class enemies.

With the victory of the Bolshevik Party in the Russian Revolution of November 1917 and formation in Moscow of the Communist International in 1921, Bolshevism became the model for other communist parties. Later under Joseph Stalin, it was associated with his policies of rapid industrial-ization, collectivization of agriculture, socialism in one coun-try, and complete subordination of all other social groups to the interests of the party. Over time, Bolshevism became associated with the Soviet form of communism in which the state did not wither away, as Karl Marx predicted, but instead played a leading role in modernizing the economy and a repressive function in ensuring control over political and social life.

Many Marxist thinkers have been critical of Bolshevism. The Mensheviks argued for more evolutionary movement to communism and thought the Bolshevik idea of bringing developed socialism to agrarian Russia premature in Marx-ist terms and politically infeasible. Rosa Luxemburg opposed in principle the idea of a centralized party organization that would impede the independent activity of the working class. Leon Trotsky and, later, the Trotskyites of the Fourth Inter-national viewed Bolshevism as appropriated by Stalin and turned, into a degenerate form of communism. They argued for greater participation of the membership, more control over the leadership of the party, and more emphasis on the global scope for revolutionary action. While one could maintain that Bolshevism should not be equated with "true communism" as envisaged by Marx, the fact is that only parties based on Bol-shevik principles of organization have managed to seize power.

See also *Communism; Democratic Centralism; Leninism; Marxism.*

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Bonald, Louis-Gabriel-Ambroise, vicomte de

Louis-Gabriel-Ambroise, vicomte de Bonald (1754–1840) was a French counterrevolutionary writer, conservative polemicist, and statesman. He lived a quiet life in provincial obscurity until the French Revolution (1789–1799), when he fled into exile to join the Army of the Condé to fight against the armies of revolutionary France. During these years, Bonald lived in Heidelberg, Germany, where he wrote his first major theoretical work, *Théorie du pouvoir politique et religieux* (1796).

Following the Restoration of the monarchy in France with the defeat of emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, Bonald sat as a dep-uty for the Aveyron department in the French National Assem-bly, supporting the Ultra-Royalist faction (the Ultras). This was the majority faction in the assembly during the reign of the moderate, constitutional monarchy of Louis XVIII, who con-sidered the Ultras more royalist than he. Louis was succeeded as king in 1824 by his reactionary brother Charles X, who was himself an Ultra. Charles supported the enactment of many conservative laws during his reign, including the Anti-Sacrilege Act (1825), which provided for capital punishment for some acts of blasphemy and sacrilege against the Catholic Church. Bonald defended this law in the National Assembly, where he also defended laws restricting freedom of the press. He argued for the repeal of the French Revolutionary law that legalized divorce, a stance he defended in his essay *On Divorce* (*Du divorce,* 1801). Bonald was a supporter of capital punishment and was fiercely hostile to democracy, liberalism, and industrialization, against which he campaigned tirelessly as both a lawmaker and a writer. He was eventually appointed a minister of state and made a peer before retiring from politics in 1830 with the abdi-cation of Charles X. He died a decade later.

As a writer, Bonald sought to explain and justify philosoph-ically what he campaigned for politically as a member of the assembly. Conceptually, he started from a complete rejection of methodological individualism—the idea that fully-formed humans with reason and identity and agency pre-exist society, which has been created by humans to further their interests. Bonald believed that it was not individuals who constitute society, but society that constitutes individuals. Because the modern age has put the individual before society, it has insti-tuted a form of life fundamentally and dangerously incom-patible with society, as the events of the 1790s so graphically demonstrated. Unless the individual is wholly subordinated to and subsumed within society, social disintegration and political anarchy will be ever-present dangers.

Bonald also believed that just as men do not create societies, so they do not invent languages. This is because the creation of a language presupposes the existence of a language. From this Bonald drew the conclusion that only God could create lan-guage, and he implanted it humans. Given these views, it is not surprising how much Bonald's ideas were admired by French philosopher Auguste Comte, the so-called father of sociology, whose own "science of society" started from the same assump-tion of methodological holism.

See also *Comte, Auguste; French Political Thought.*

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Bookchin, Murray

Murray Bookchin (1921–2006) was perhaps the most significant and widely read English-language anarchist thinker of the post–World War II era. His work also made significant contributions to political thought in relation to a range of issues aside from anarchism, including radical ecology, the history of the 1936 Spanish Revolution, neo-Marxism, and urban studies. His writings influenced a variety of political movements and tendencies, including the New Left movement of the 1960s and 1970s, environmentalism, and municipalism.

Bookchin's most significant political contributions centered on his theoretical integration of ecological concerns with anarchist philosophy. He argued that environmental destruction was an outcome of authoritarian social relations and class hierarchies within capitalist societies that allowed for the massive exploitation of common resources to serve the ends of privately controlled profit. Ending ecological damage could not occur through statist reforms that left structures of exploitation intact, but required a fundamental rearrangement of social life along antiauthoritarian lines. Bookchin signaled this concern in his groundbreaking work *Our Synthetic Environment* (1952), which was largely overlooked because of its radical conclusions.

Bookchin's anarchist approach to radical ecology is termed *social ecology* and still provides an influential perspective within environmentalist circles. As a social ecologist, Bookchin argues that radical activism, to be dark green, must be informed most decisively by the moral considerations surrounding each manifestation of struggle. He argues that the capitalist mode of production and hierarchically rationalized workplaces have only negative consequences for workers as a class and for the environment. Bookchin's critique further engages a direct confrontation with productivist visions of ecological or socialist struggles that, still captivated by illusions of progress, accept industrialism and capitalist technique while rejecting the capitalist uses to which they are applied. The ecological conclusion reached by Bookchin is revealed in the assertion that the sources of conflicting interests in society must be confronted and overcome in a revolutionary manner. This means that the earth can no longer be owned and must become a shared commons. These statements represent crucial aspects of radical alliances between ecological and labor movements beyond a limited "jobs versus environment" construction. Bookchin offers social ecology as an alternative to notions of deep ecology that argued that humans as a species should be held accountable for ecological destruction. Deep ecologists seek a mystical transformation of individual consciousness in which people, without regard to social context, status, or opportunity, are called to abandon industrial civilization. Such an approach was anathema to Bookchin because it overlooked the structures of inequality within class societies, holding poor people as accountable for ecological damage as corporate executives and elites who consumed vastly greater resources.

During the 1990s, Bookchin became increasingly critical of anarchist movements. His book *Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism* (1996), which criticized anarchists for confining their activities to subcultural or countercultural enclaves, shocked anarchist communities of North America, becoming one of the most controversial books in a long line of controversial literature. For Bookchin, contemporary anarchists have forsaken the revolutionary tradition of anarchism, preferring to become, in his view, just another bohemian subculture with no interest in confronting the powers of state and capital. He suggested that contemporary anarchism represents a fatal retreat from the social concerns (and communal politics) of classical anarchism into episodic adventurism (confrontation with authorities) and a decadent egoism. This unfortunate transformation threatens to make anarchism irrelevant at precisely the moment when it is most needed as a counterforce to globalization and the social dislocations engendered by neoliberal policies.

Bookchin's distancing from anarchism grew over the last years of his life as he increasingly turned to his new theoretical innovation *libertarian municipalism.* Libertarian municipalism argued for a strategic shift in community organizing toward involvement in municipal politics as the most immediate and local venue for formal political engagement. Many anarchists viewed this as a retreat into reformism and came to disregard Bookchin as an anarchist.

See also *Anarchism; Anarchy; Environmental Political Theory.*

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Boundary Making and Boundary Disputes

Although marking and disputing territory date back to premodern tribes, the formal study of boundary making and boundary disputes came of age in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as the number of sovereign states and

colonial territorial possessions multiplied. With them came thousands of miles of new borders that had to be sorted out, affixed, defended, and policed. Lord Curzon—former viceroy of British colonial India, foreign minister, geographer, and explorer—reflected this urgency in a 1907 lecture in Oxford (later published as *Frontiers,* 1908) as he described the difficulties of affixing and policing the borders of Britain's colonial possessions against bandits, warlords, and rival empires. He lamented that substantive understanding of how to create stable, safe borders was in short supply. More than one hundred years later, geographers, historians, and political scientists are still attempting to make sense of the dynamics of interstate boundaries.

LOCATING A BOUNDARY

In its most technical form, boundary making consists of the delimitation and demarcation of a boundary. *Delimitation* refers to the definition of a boundary in a treaty, map, or other formal document. Improvements in survey techniques, printing, and longitude measurement in eighteenth-century Europe generated more detailed maps that proved essential for state makers wishing to craft precise boundaries between sovereign territories.

Demarcation refers to the physical marking of the boundary on the ground with signs, pyramids, posts, or fences. Engineers, diplomatic representatives, and local residents descend on the border with maps and survey tools in hand after delimitation is completed to physically mark where one state's sovereignty ends and another's begins. While good survey teams are essential to a proper demarcation, so too are knowledgeable locals familiar with topography and toponymy (place names). However, local populations aren't always happy to have a new border in their vicinity and may resist state makers' attempts to partition territory and restrict access to it. In the nineteenth century, locals along the newly delimited border between Greece and the Ottoman Empire conspired to provide the demarcation commission with false place names, with the result that clusters of villages wound up on the wrong side of the boundary.

Some borders are delimited but never complete demarcation. Many African state borders, for example, were affixed on maps and certified in treaties but have been marked only at official crossings.

While traditional approaches to boundary making focused on geographic factors and mapping techniques, subsequent approaches in political geography and political science shifted the focus to boundary maintenance—the processes and strategies states use to regulate and restrict territorial access.

BOUNDARIES AS INSTITUTIONS

Before moving on to define boundary disputes, it is prudent to note exactly what the term *boundary* means. Boundaries—or borders—have been defined as lines of separation or legally binding divisions between modern states. Yet, boundaries are also institutions of state authority. State authorities check passports at official crossings, collect customs taxes on imported goods, police against border jumping and illegal migration,

and take measures to suppress the flow of contraband. States may administer their side of a boundary unilaterally or they may pool their resources and coordinate their activities with their neighbor's border authorities. Some states may demilitarize boundaries as military threats from neighboring states decline, while intensifying border policing against nonstate actors such as traffickers, illegal migrants, and insurgents. For example, the United States and the European Union are investing in high-technology equipment and border barriers to prevent the entry of illegal migrant workers.

Given these dynamics, border disputes have two dimensions—functional and territorial. Functional disputes arise when one state perceives that its territory and security are being adversely affected by the administration of its neighbor's boundary. For instance, if border guards on one side neglect their duties, the entire boundary zone may attract smuggling and violent activity. Even though functional boundary disputes are relatively common, most research focuses on territorial disputes.

TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

Territorial disputes are defined as overlapping territorial claims by one or more states. Ongoing boundary disputes in this category include conflicting Indo-Pakistani claims over Kashmir and Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights taken from Syria in the 1967 Six-Day War. Territorial disputes are by no means confined to large territories. Between 1895 and 1963, U.S.-Mexican relations repeatedly soured because of the Chamizal, a disputed stretch of land along the Rio Grande barely the size of a few football fields.

The study of territorial disputes has rapidly expanded in recent years, particularly in political science. While there is no consensus on what causes or intensifies territorial disputes, a number of prominent explanations include the following variables: (1) the strategic value of territory (e.g., the British-Spanish dispute over Gibraltar); (2) resources contained by the territory (e.g., the multicountry dispute over the oil-rich Spratly Islands in the Pacific); (3) long-standing historical claims (e.g., Saddam Hussein once declared Kuwait to be Iraq's long-lost thirteenth province); (4) the correspondence between borders and ethnic-group boundaries (e.g., millions of ethnic Albanians reside near, but outside Albania's boundaries); (5) a ruler's likelihood of experiencing domestic backlash for the handling of a territorial dispute (e.g., Kyrgyz government officials resolved a territorial dispute with China but subsequently faced major political opposition and protest for "giving away" national territory).

Not all territorial disputes are indivisible, and some boundary disputes get resolved. In 1982, Israel handed back the Sinai to Egypt following a United States–brokered peace treaty. In the 1990s, the International Court of Justice adjudicated a long-standing dispute over the Aouzou Strip between Chad and Libya. In the beginning of the twenty-first century, China resolved border disputes with several neighboring states in order to improve the security situation in its outlying provinces.

Although boundary making and boundary disputes have conventionally been treated as separate categories, they are both contentious processes with overlapping dynamics.

See also *Political Geography; Regional Security.*

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Bourdieu, Pierre

Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) was a French sociologist who approached politics sociologically, outside of the perspective of politicians, in order to study the social conditions of its access.

Bourdieu's interest in politics and sociology began in the mid-1950s, during his military service in Algeria. During this time, he adopted a militant posture toward the necessity of Algerian independence. Neutrality was an impossible position for Bourdieu; he felt that it led to the defense and strengthening of the status quo. An example of his militant attitude is found in his book *The Weight of the World* (1993), which seeks at once to unveil the suffering of those who are excluded by society and to give them the possibility to understand and express themselves.

According to Bourdieu, sociology has its own *habitus* (set of physiological, psychological, and social habits) and

develops in relation to the position of the same individual in other fields of social life. The political field is one of many in the social world; it is shaped by political agents, individuals, and groups who can produce effects within it. These agents who claim to speak in the name of social groups share the sentiment (tied to their gender, education, and class) that they have the right and the competence to speak and be heard in political matters. This belief is central to their desire to act in the political field.

Bourdieu also found that those who lack political and post-secondary education tend to believe that they do not know enough about politics to have the right to have their voices heard and feel that they do not understand enough to make the right decisions. In this manner, social positions and ideas are reproduced by being defined, one generation after another, by a small group of individuals with the opposite belief.

Bourdieu argued that relations of antagonism and collaboration between representatives within the political field are more important in shaping their allegiances than their relations to the electorate. Politicians commonly confuse their attempts to maintain their influence and power with their attempts to act on behalf of those they can only represent by defending their own position. As a result, when members of social movements attempt to become political agents, they face the difficulty of being heard, but also often are affected by the attempt of their representatives to neutralize them because of the threat they represent to their position in the political field. Representation can then be seen as a form of usurpation of power.

Throughout the 1990s, Bourdieu attempted to give a voice to the social movements in Europe. He advocated for the creation of collectives of intellectuals, such as his own movement centered around the journal *Liber-Raisons d'agir.* His political interventions followed his suggestion that intellectuals should work together and with social movements to help them in developing a criticism of their situation, expressing their demands, giving them weapons to fight the dominant opinion (i.e., neoliberal ideology), and unveiling its contradictions and its violence. Bourdieu thus highlighted the interdependency of the freedom of intellectuals and of the freedom of all social agents.

See also *Social Movements; Social Movements, Comparative; Sociobiology and Politics.*

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Boycott

To *boycott* is to abstain from or act together in abstaining from using, buying, or dealing with as an expression of protest or disfavor or as a means of coercion. The term is derived from a campaign of ostracism on Captain Boycott, leveled by the Irish Land League in 1840. After refusing to lower tenant rents, the Irish Land League, whose mission was to ensure fair rents for all, organized all workers to cease granting services to Captain Boycott, such as selling goods in stores, delivering mail, and harvesting his land. This ultimately resulted in his isolation and forced him to leave his position in Ireland to return to England.

Boycotting continues to be seen by many as an effective strategy, and it is employed in many forms. Most forms of boycott are short term and used to rectify a single event of injustice. However, some forms of boycott are long term and are used as part of larger organizational or structural form of protest. Examples include systematic *disinvestment,* such as the international call for the withdrawal of businesses from South Africa during the Apartheid era and the call for consumers to purchase items based on fair trade.

See also *Collective Action and Mobilization; Trade Diplomacy.*

. . . . JEFFREY N. CARROLL

Brinkmanship

In international politics, *brinkmanship* refers to the calculated escalation of threats against adversaries to achieve foreign policy aims.

The term was introduced by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who advocated such a policy against the Soviet Union, defining it as "the ability to get to the verge [the brink] without getting into the war." It is a challenge in the form of a credible threat, whether real or perceived, designed to compel an adversary to back down or to deter it from pursuing an undesirable course of action. It also may involve a deliberately created crisis to generate political or military leverage over an opponent.

Brinkmanship is an important (if sometimes implicit) component of bargaining models of war, and has parallels to hostile bargaining models in economic theory, such as in the widely cited "ultimatum game." Soviet and U.S. nuclear policy during the early decades of the cold war, culminating in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, displayed elements of brinkmanship. Crises that never erupt into full-scale conflicts are often cited as instances of brinkmanship, although it is often difficult to separate the influence of actor choices (e.g., deliberate threat escalation) from other factors like the relative capability of the states involved.

See also *Cold War; Diplomacy; Negotiations and Bargaining.*

. . . . VSEVOLOD GUNITSKIY

King John signs the Magna Carta in 1215. The Magna Carta set a precedent for limited government and established the traditional rights of English subjects.

SOURCE: The Granger Collection

British Political Thought

The British tradition of political thought represents a complex puzzle of intellectual history. Admirers like the French political commentator Baron de Montesquieu praised the British monarchy and its system of checks and balances as the very pinnacle of freedom in his 1748 *Spirit of the Laws,* whereas less than a half-century later critics like British political writer and activist Thomas Paine and many of the American revolutionaries portrayed the British system as the abyss of tyranny. The irony, however, is that even those most vehemently critical of the British system of government have appealed to principles within the British tradition itself to justify their objections. Even so, these institutions and ideals have not been effortlessly achieved. They are the end products of centuries of struggles and settlements—religious and secular—that have shaped the contours of present-day Britain and left an indelible imprint on modern concepts of liberty, constitutionalism, and representative government. Both in terms of its practices as well as its principles, Britain is responsible for some of the greatest accomplishments in Western political theory.

MAGNA CARTA, CIVIL WAR, INTERREGNUM, AND RESTORATION

The notion of the traditional rights of English subjects dates at least back to Magna Carta in 1215, which secured from King John certain concessions for both the feudal barons and the people and set the precedent that the monarch's power is limited and the king himself subject to law. Although its principles were regularly violated and even forgotten altogether in the intervening centuries, Magna Carta nonetheless served as a reference point for later arguments on behalf of limited government, the rule of law, and fundamental rights retained by the people.

Magna Carta's precedent of limited government was in stark contrast to later absolutist theories like those espoused by James I (England) and VI (Scotland). His *The True Law of Free Monarchies* (1603) maintained that the powers of the monarch were unlimited because they descended from God by means of divine succession. These absolutist ideas were perpetuated by his son and successor, Charles I, and undoubtedly contributed to the latter's conflicts with Parliament and decades of religious and civil turmoil. The English Civil War (1642–1651) led to the defeat and execution of Charles I in 1651, the establishment of the Commonwealth, and, eventually, Oliver Cromwell's Protectorate (1653–1658). Although this protracted struggle between the British monarchs and Puritan-controlled parliaments was one of the bloodiest periods in English history, it was also one of the most intellectually fertile.

The defining work of this era was English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes's magisterial *Leviathan* (1651). Hobbes's pessimistic view of human nature and his suspicion of anarchy and civil war were undoubtedly colored by the experience of being driven into exile along with Charles II and many of his royalist supporters. While agnostic as to the question of who should ultimately be sovereign, *Leviathan* is the most influential statement of modern social contract theory and the natural rights thinking that shaped the British tradition for centuries to come.

According to Hobbes, sovereignty arises when individuals flee the vagaries of a state of nature and agree to alienate all of their liberties, save their right of self-preservation, to an impartial sovereign. Having authorized its power, they are bound to obey the law because the security provided by even the most tyrannical sovereign is still preferable to the state of nature's abominable "war of all against all." Hobbes begins his argument in *Leviathan* with liberal assumptions of individual natural rights but manages to turn these ideas into a defense of virtually unlimited sovereign power. For these reasons, as well as Hobbes's irreverent treatment of Christianity, *Leviathan* was condemned by both Puritan advocates of consent theory and royalist defenders of the divine right of kings.

Hobbes's writings were not the only influential political ideas during the Civil War and Interregnum. Consent theory came to the foreground in the Putney Debates (1647) between representatives of Cromwell's Army Council and more radical segments of the army influenced by the Protestant Levellers.

The Leveller's proposed constitution, an *Agreement for the People,* promised nearly universal male suffrage, reformed electoral districts, a parliament popularly elected every two years, religious freedom, and an end to debtor's prison. The majority of the regiments of the army were eventually persuaded to accept the more conservative *The Heads of the Proposals,* submitted by Henry Ireton for the Army Council, which secured property rights against redistribution and upheld traditional privileges.

JOHN LOCKE AND THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION

The Restoration of Charles II in 1660 brought an end to decades of civil war. Although Charles II continued his father's heavy-handed rule, as evidenced by the Clarendon Codes enforcing religious conformity and his dissolution of several parliaments that sought to pass Exclusion Acts forbidding a Catholic successor, his unpopularity never reached the level that had led to his father's execution. His brother James II, who succeeded him on the throne in 1685, was not so fortunate, however, and was dethroned in 1688 and replaced by the Protestant Mary II and William III in 1689. This Glorious Revolution and the settlement that produced it were milestones in the development of English liberty. William and Mary's assent to the principles of the 1689 Bill of Rights established Britain as a constitutional monarchy and formalized many of the personal liberties enshrined a century later in the American Bill of Rights.

English philosopher John Locke's (1632–1704) political writings were deeply intertwined with these events. Published in 1689, Locke's *First Treatise of Government* was nominally a refutation of Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha* (1680), disposing once and for all of the patriarchal idea that political authority derives from the right of dominion originally given to Adam by God. After dismissing the historical absurdity that latter-day monarchs hold their title from an unbroken line of succession, Locke more affirmatively stipulates in the *Second Treatise of Government* that government originates when individuals in the state of nature agree to surrender some of their rights to better secure their life, liberty, and property. Whenever governments become tyrannical—ruling in their own interest, rather than the public interest—individuals have a right of revolution to alter or abolish them. Contrary to Hobbes, Locke insists that allowing individuals this appeal to heaven does not lead to perpetual civil war because individuals are inclined to put up with many petty abuses before making a revolution, and that far from devolving back into a Hobbesian state of nature pitting individual against individual, the right of revolution merely restores sovereignty to the community as a whole, who might then form a new government more to their liking. In addition to Locke's liberal emphasis on the political value of individual consent, the *Second Treatise* also posits that our right to property is natural and inviolable because we have mixed our labor with the natural commons.

Although there remains some controversy about the actual date of composition of Locke's *Second Treatise,* the discovery

that it was in all likelihood written before the Glorious Revolution of 1688—rather than afterward as had always been assumed—gave credence to Locke's reputation as the apostle of revolutionary politics. While few of Locke's ideas were wholly original, his writings crystallized the theory of a social contract between sovereign and subjects from which the latter might extricate themselves based on the performance of the former, as well as the notion that individuals cannot be obligated without their consent. Locke's writings have become a bulwark of limited government premised on individual rights to life, liberty, and property, and they did much to influence the American Revolution (1776–1783), the Declaration of Independence, and the liberal tradition in America.

CLASSICAL REPUBLICANISM AND "COUNTRY" VERSUS "COURT"

With its doctrine of natural rights, a social contract, religious toleration, and the sanctity of private property, Lockean liberalism has been one of the most important strands of Anglo-American political thought. However, only belatedly have revisionist scholars come to appreciate that an older ideology of classical republicanism also may have shaped opposition to the arbitrary power of kings and courts. The republican James Harrington in the seventeenth century and neo-Harringtonian "Country" thinkers like Algernon Sidney, John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon in *Cato's Letters,* and Bolingbroke in the eighteenth century were all captivated by classical, Roman, and Florentine republican authors. According to this classical republican ideology, liberty is threatened by the corruption bred in the luxury of courts and by monarchs who rule through patronage, partisanship, standing armies, faction, and the promotion of moneyed interests. By way of contrast, liberty is maintained only by cultivating austere republican and participatory virtues that are easily corrupted by proximity to absolute power. Intellectual historians and political theorists continue to debate the relative influence in the Anglo-American tradition of "classical republican" or "civic humanist" political thinking vis-à-vis more familiar Lockean or Enlightenment notions of individuals endowed with natural rights.

THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT

The second half of the eighteenth century brought a flowering of commercial prosperity and intellectual life in the major urban centers of Scotland. The most influential thinker associated with this Scottish Enlightenment was David Hume, who challenged many of the basic assumptions of social contract thinking and the idea that governments could have arisen purely from the consent of subjects. For Hume, moral traditions, laws, and justice developed over time in response to particular circumstances and the overall utility of society. Private property, justice, and the rule of law arose because they maximized predictability and minimized uncertainty. Hume's *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding* (1748) and *Concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751), his *Essays Moral and Political* (1741–1742), as well as his multivolume *History of England* (1754–1762) were defining works of eighteenth-century philosophy.

Hume's protégé, Adam Smith, expanded on the idea of a moral sense that was implicit in Hume's writings. Smith's two great works of moral philosophy, *A Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) and *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776) describe the extended order of a market society that was the product of individual activity but not of deliberate design. The latter work in particular has had a tremendous influence on the social sciences, particularly among economists. Smith was a trenchant critic of mercantilism, protectionism, and monopoly. Smith's fundamental insight was that nations' wealth was created by free trade and the division of labor, rather than by their hoarding of bullion or specie. He contended that government should limit itself to the role of impartial arbiter between the various interests of society. Smith was an early defender of the policy of laissez-faire economics and the miracles of coordination accomplished by the "invisible hand" of the marketplace. Unlike many of his libertarian appropriators, however, Smith acknowledged that a market society was vulnerable to moral and intellectual deterioration among its citizenry and that governments might legitimately take steps to prevent this.

Hume, Smith, and later thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment held, first, that manners and institutions are best understood in terms of historical progress and, second, that commerce is the single most important driving force behind historical development. These ideas influenced Karl Marx's historical materialism. In addition, the Scottish *stadial* view of history gave way to the distinction between "civilized" commercial societies and "barbarous" premodern nations. While Hume and Smith saw development mainly in liberal, progressive terms, Scottish philosopher and historian Adam Ferguson was an outlier in voicing classical republican misgivings about the tendency of modern commercial societies to succumb to individualism, apathy, and self-interest. In *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767), Ferguson complains that commerce saps the martial spirit by which liberty is maintained and that commercial societies incline toward luxury, civic malaise, and decline.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN

The French Revolution of 1789 and ensuing turmoil on the continent left an imprint on the British tradition. While more radical English thinkers like Richard Price and Thomas Paine embraced the ideals of the French Revolution and argued for similar reforms to the British monarchy, the metaphysical natural rights espoused by the French revolutionaries provoked a backlash in more conservative circles. Despite his long-standing reputation as a leading figure among the Rockingham Whigs and his liberal stance on behalf of conciliation with the American colonies and the Irish and Indian questions, Edmund Burke, in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790), repudiated the French Revolution and the metaphysical doctrines of natural rights and social contractarianism upon which it rested.

Subsequent exchanges between Burke and Paine, whose *Rights of Man* (1791) was a trenchant critique of Burke's *Reflections,* get directly to the heart of one of the major tensions

within the British tradition, namely, a disagreement between the more empirical, institutional, or sociological understanding of liberty represented by thinkers like David Hume and Edmund Burke and the more radical social contractarian ideas that see liberty as grounded in natural law and natural rights. Neither Hume nor Burke denied the importance of the traditional liberties of British subjects. Nonetheless, both objected to the idea that one could appeal to reason or abstract natural laws to justify those liberties. For Burke especially, such universalistic appeals to reason and natural laws were liable to undermine the particular traditions on which true liberty depended. Likewise for Hume, the idea of an original contract was a logical and historical absurdity, and the only reliable guides in politics were the experience and moral practices of common life.

Another celebrated eighteenth-century exchange between British writer and philosopher Mary Wollstonecraft and Burke captures a different dimension of this tension. Faulting Burke for his defense of tradition and opposition to the French Revolution in her *Vindication of the Rights of Men* (1790), Wollstonecraft subsequently argued in *A Vindication of the Rights of Women* (1792) that all human beings—not just men—are deserving of their God-given rights and that the vast majority of societal conventions are invoked to infantilize women, to create false and unnatural distinctions, and to prevent women from acceding to their moral duties as citizens.

UTILITARIANISM AND REFORM

Arguably the single most influential thinker in nineteenth-century England was Jeremy Bentham, whose philosophical challenge to custom and inherited institutions gave rise to the various nineteenth-century reform movements that did so much to rationalize and democratize Britain's political system. Bentham's major philosophical contribution was the doctrine of utilitarianism. According to Bentham, public policy should aim to secure the greatest good for the greatest number as determined by aggregating the utility of the various parties. Utility afforded a superior benchmark for public policy than mere custom or tradition.

Benthamic philosophical radicalism marks a departure from two key assumptions of the British tradition. First, Bentham's emphasis on legal reform challenged the conviction that Britain's inherited traditions are reliable supports for liberty. Whereas many appealed to British liberties as originating in an ancient constitution or feudal law—and jurists like Edward Coke and William Blackstone had extolled the common law's congeniality for liberty—Bentham notably demurred. The common law was an "Augean stable" of anachronisms, fictions, and absurdities that needed to be purged and reestablished on more defensible rational grounds. Bentham's second major challenge was to the idea of individual liberties as grounded in metaphysical natural rights. The notion that individuals are endowed with natural rights by virtue of their common humanity was "nonsense upon stilts." To the contrary, as Hume, Burke, and other more empirically minded thinkers in the British tradition had argued earlier, liberties arise only from concrete political arrangements.

Both of these assumptions about liberty are shared by Bentham's most formidable nineteenth-century legatee, John Stuart Mill. Like Bentham, Mill tried to elucidate principles of representative government, law, opinion, and political economy on rationally defensible grounds. And again following Bentham, the ultimate appeal on these issues for Mill was utility, albeit in the somewhat broader sense of humankind's permanent interests as a group of progressive beings. As Mill argues in *On Liberty* (1859), although the state has a right to regulate activities that inflict concrete harms on others, it has no business interfering in matters such as speech, expression, opinion, or other actions that pertain only to individuals themselves. Liberty of thought and opinion is most conducive to the spontaneity and individuality that pull the human race forward.

The irony is that despite his theoretical and political efforts on behalf of democratizing reforms, Mill's arguments are in important respects anti-democratic. Indeed his thought is illustrative of the fundamental tension between liberty and democracy in nineteenth-century social and political thought. Inspired by the writings of the French social theorist Alexis de Tocqueville, whose *Democracy in America* Mill widely championed upon its publication in 1835, Mill feared the vapid conformity and collective mediocrity that arises in a democratic age. The greatest threat to liberty was no longer the overbearing influence of democratic majorities but the sociological dynamics of "tyrannical public opinion." Even if democratic individuals enjoy legal freedoms of speech or expression, they are still subject to the powerful coercion of society itself. Thus for Mill, true or effective freedom requires more than just the absence of legal coercion. While negative liberty is a necessary condition for cultivation, progress, and development, it is not a sufficient condition, and for this Mill looks to a stimulating diversity of social conditions. Mill's concept of liberty marks a decisive advance beyond Hobbesian or classical liberal definitions of freedom as nothing more or less than the absence of restraint.

Nineteenth- and twentieth-century liberalism by and large followed in the footsteps of Mill and other theorists of positive liberty, who believed that the state had an active and affirmative role in cultivating the freedom, autonomy, and development of modern citizens. The new liberalism of Thomas Hill Green and Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse, as well as various strands of Fabian socialism, are premised on similar assumptions that true freedom requires underlying power or capabilities in order to make good use of formal liberties.

CONCLUSION

While ideas of liberty and popular government are recurrent themes in the British tradition, there is enormous variation even within that tradition itself. Liberty is variously conceived as negative and positive, empirical and metaphysical, and as originating from sources as diverse as historical traditions and institutions, the common law, abstract natural laws and natural rights, and the participatory republican traditions of antiquity. Despite the social conflicts that gave birth to these ideals and practices, what can hardly be disputed is the profound influence that the British tradition as a whole has had on the

development of liberty, constitutionalism, participatory government, and human rights in the modern world.

See also *Bentham, Jeremy; Burke, Edmund; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Divine Right of Kings; Enlightenment Political Thought; Hobbes, Thomas; Hume, David; Locke, John; Magna Carta; Mill, John Stuart; Natural Rights; Paine, Thomas; Republicanism, Classical; Scottish Enlightenment; Smith, Adam; Utilitarianism.*

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Bryce, James

The career of British statesman and historian James Bryce (1832–1922) covered the reign of Queen Victoria, the American Civil War (1861–1865) and its aftermath, and extended until after the end of World War I (1914–1918). Bryce was born in Belfast, Northern Ireland; raised in Scotland; and educated at Glasgow, Heidelberg, and Oxford universities. His activities spanned the worlds of scholarship, politics, and diplomacy. He was a practicing lawyer, a professor of law at Oxford, a liberal member of the House of Commons (1880–1907), a member of the House of Lords as Viscount Bryce, and from 1907 to 1913 the British ambassador to the United States. In an era when travel was slow and imposed many obstacles, Bryce observed life and politics firsthand in many countries throughout the world and published articles and books about his travels.

Bryce's two-volume *The American Commonwealth* (1888) was a pioneering study for its time of the institutions of American politics, drawing on his travels there from the presidency of Ulysses S. Grant onward, as well as on written sources. Like French political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville, Bryce was attracted to study America because it was the leading example of democracy. As Bryce wryly noted, any European who wished to recommend or disparage democracy could point to the United States because it offered plenty of facts to warrant either praise or blame. Bryce's approach emphasized describing American politics without explicitly theorizing, as Tocqueville had done. Bryce was sympathetic but often critical, likening American political parties to two bottles with identical labels and both empty. He also wrote a chapter about why highly qualified men were never elected to the presidency.

Bryce believed that the best way to gain knowledge of political behavior was to become directly involved in politics and study one's colleagues. That knowledge could be amplified by studying history and institutions and using comparison to identify similarities and differences in political institutions and practices. These principles were applied in his last book, the two-volume *Modern Democracies* (1921). The geographical scope was limited to Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States, countries of which he had firsthand knowledge. Democracy was defined as a system in which the majority of qualified citizens ruled. In keeping with the thought of the time, Bryce did not regard restrictions of the voting franchise on the grounds of race or gender as a disqualification from calling a government democratic.

Bryce held government office from 1885 to 1906 under three different prime ministers. He also prepared reports for the British government on subjects as diverse as secondary education, World War I atrocities, and principles for founding a League of Nations. He also served on the International Court at the Hague. His term as ambassador to the United States overlapped with the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson. Bryce was also a president of the British Academy and a member of the Alpine Club.

See also *Democracy; Democratic Theory; Tocqueville, Alexis de.*

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Buddhist Political Thought

As the world's third largest religion (with an estimated 400 million adherents), Buddhism is an important political force from Sri Lanka through Southeast Asia to Taiwan and Japan. Theological differences, however, make Buddhist political thought quite different from that of either Christianity or Islam. Those religions demand that believers bring the material world into line with a supernatural truth, producing calls for a government to tailor its policies by divine commandments, for example, to ban birth control or regulate marriage. Buddhism argues that actions flow organically from a state of

being. Proper behavior is the result of being in harmony with the universe, not from consciously following a written code of laws.

THE CHARACTER OF THE RULER

Applied to the political realm, this belief suggests that the important questions are ones about the state of government, not about policy choice. If society is properly governed, then the government's policies will, by definition, be proper. To assess the state of government, Buddhist political thought focuses on two things: the character of the ruler and the relationship between the ruler and the *Sangha* (the community of monks).

The first of these must be seen in the context of Buddhism's long association with kingly rulers. While Guatama started the faith by rejecting his princely inheritance, the subsequent reign of King Ashoka (274–236 BCE) laid the foundations for Buddhist governance. Scriptures remember him for the way he ended his wars of conquest after converting to Buddhism and the respect he is said to have shown for his subjects. As the faith spread across Asia, other regions absorbed this model of society ruled by a devout and compassionate king as ideal.

In theory, this makes Buddhist political thought sympathetic to arguments for social justice and nonviolence, but in practice, Buddhist teachings are used to support a variety of contingent preferences. For example, scholars have struggled for decades to identify a coherent political agenda behind the Japanese political party *Komeito,* which was founded as an explicitly Buddhist party and advertises itself as promulgating a "middle way" in politics. Even the basic insistence on respecting all life is subject to change, as in the violent rhetoric of contemporary Sri Lankan Buddhism or the way Japanese Buddhist sects of the 1920s justified their country's militarism. Some Buddhist sects explicitly avoid any hint of politics, like the Compassionate Relief Society, one of Taiwan's most visible Buddhist sects. In other words, knowing an individual is Buddhist does not help us predict what policy preferences that person will carry into a voting booth.

THE *SANGHA* AND BUDDHIST NATIONALISM

Most Buddhist sects do not share the current Sri Lankan willingness to accept violence, but feelings of nationalism are widespread among Buddhists across Asia. This comes from the second component of Buddhist political thought, its call for a close relationship between ruler and the *Sangha*. After converting, King Ashoka patronized Buddhist temples extensively, paying for their establishment throughout his territory. In return, the monks he supported glorified his rule to the peasants in their communities. Not only did this meet the needs of both king and *Sangha,* it also resonates with Buddhist cosmology. A belief in karma and rebirth implies a society in which lay people improve their karma by supporting monks; the *Sangha,* in turn, guide the people by their progress toward enlightenment. In this schema, the king's responsibility is to ensure that both sides fulfill their roles: By collecting taxes and supporting religious institutions, he helps peasants do their duty, by keeping order in the *Sangha,* he prevents the disunity that robs the people of guidance.

Following this model, Buddhist organizations and the state evolved in symbiosis throughout Asia; the *Sangha* legitimized the state in prayer and sermon in return for support and protection from political rulers. Rulers co-opted Buddhist organizations with a mix of coercion and rewards, razing recalcitrant temples and subsidizing cooperative ones, offering them authority over the lay population and over rival monks. This bargain served both parties: The monks enjoyed financial support from the government and protection against the rise of competing temples, and their sermons legitimized rulers' places at the top of social hierarchies.

This integration of Buddhist thinkers into the state also roots their politics to a sense of place, strengthening its nationalist flavor. Monks in as diverse contexts as Nichiren in thirteenth-century Japan and Soma in the twentieth-century Sri Lanka have made parallel arguments that their nation is a chosen vehicle for embodying the "true" Buddhist path. Doing so, they argue, will cure the nation of its existing weaknesses and fend off foreign dangers.

This close relationship between Buddhists and the state is still true in the modern world. During the period of authoritarian rule in Taiwan, for example, the Nationalist Party co-opted Buddhist political activity by forcing temples to operate in the context of a state-created umbrella organization. When the government was considering the end of martial law (and incidentally allowing religious freedom), the official Buddhist association weighed in *against* the idea. The unsuccessful protest against state repression by Burmese monks, compared to the strength of Catholic liberation movements in Poland and Latin America or Islamic opposition to secular rule in the Middle East, is another example of how Buddhist political thought lacks external truths from which to sustain criticism of the state. Similarly, Buddhism remains a powerful force for government legitimization in Thailand and Cambodia. In short, while predicting individual policy preferences among Buddhists, it is possible to predict a willingness to support their rulers.

CONCLUSION

Buddhist political thought, however, has struggled with the emergence of democracy. Its conservative beliefs in hierarchy and support for the state offer little guidance to voters comparing the policy agendas of competing parties. In both Thailand and Sri Lanka, explicitly Buddhist political parties collapsed under a public backlash; the Japanese *Komeito* party officially disowned its religious heritage under public pressure in 1970. Strains of *engaged Buddhism,* which stress compassionate public service instead of withdrawal or obedience, are spreading across East Asia. If their growth continues, they may provide a new Buddhist perspective on politics, but that remains to be seen.

See also *Asian Political Thought; Religion and Politics.*

. . . .   GEORGE EHRHARDT

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Budgeting

The term *budgeting* refers to the process of allocating financial resources to serve public purposes. A government's budget is essentially a summary statement of all planned revenues and expenditures for the coming fiscal cycle. This statement enables the bureaucracy to collect and spend money. This brief definition alludes to two fields of research on public budgeting: political science and public administration.

Political science is interested in budgeting because a budget is a fundamental output of political systems and serves as a key indicator of governments' public policy commitments. Because the process of budgeting entails taking away money from some segments of society (taxation) and giving it to others (expenditures), budgets are contentious and the result of an often hard-fought political process. Broadly speaking, political scientists contend that the outcome of the budget process is determined by the choices of political actors involved in budgeting as well as the formal and informal rules governing the decision-making process.

In political science, the substantive focus of the vast literature concentrates on three major topics: (1) the size of the budget, especially in relation to the overall size of the economy (i.e., government expenditures as percentage of gross domestic product); (2) the balance of the budget: planned revenues (mostly originating from taxation) minus expenditures; and (3) the composition of public budgets: spending across governmental functions such as defense, social security, and health care.

Similarly, the field of public administration is fascinated by budgeting because of the formidable and complex task to formulate, implement, and monitor the execution of a budget. The technical process of administering a budget entails forecasting, accounting, reporting, and auditing of revenue and expenditures streams. The organization of budgeting is characterized by tremendously diverse and specialized programs and structures, as well as high technical demands. As a consequence of an interest in the technical aspects of budgeting, public administration generally focuses on specific budgeting systems or detailed budgeting problems. Public administration lags somewhat behind political science in developing a comparative and generalized theoretical framework of budgeting.

The public administration literature on public budgeting concentrates on two major research topics: (1) policy analysis and (2) the study of institutional arrangements that provide public services. Consequently, a substantial part of this literature attempts to fuse both topics and is concerned with devising appropriate and efficient budgetary systems. In the past decades, some of the major budgetary systems can be classified under the following labels: *program-based budgeting, zero-based budgeting,* and, more recently, *performance-based budgeting,* which attempts to bring businesslike practices, such as accrual budgeting, to public management. Moreover, a vast empirical literature, mostly generated by economists, is devoted to revenue forecasting; that is, the attempt to predict future revenues by identifying the consequences of future macroeconomic developments under existing laws (taxation). Forecasting serves as a tool for medium-term and long-term planning.

Because scholarly work on budgeting in political science and public administration overlap less and less, this entry concentrates on outlining core conceptual aspects and theoretical advances on the politics of budgeting. The main focus, as in much of the classic work on budgeting, is on the politics of public spending. Studies of the politics of budgeting move beyond a simple vision of budgeting as devising a document on how to collect and spend citizens' monies and instead recognizes that budgeting is a political endeavor. Budgeting is the allocation of a scarce resource—money. This process demands trade-offs among competing policy alternatives and political interests. The outcome of these trade-offs is a manifestation of a government's policy priorities, as well as a reflection of power among individual budget actors. Money spent according to the budget holds two broad societal consequences: It allows citizens to observe whether their preferences are fulfilled (accountability), and it fuels the economy. Given these features of budgeting, political scientists are interested in the decision-making process—the rules for confrontation and compromise—and in the actors who determine budget outcomes.

TERMINOLOGY

In general, a government's commitment to spend monies is outlined regularly (often annually) in one or a series of laws. While there is some variation on the exact terminology across countries, this commitment is a government output and called *appropriations*. For the United States, researchers also refer to *budget authority*—that is the authority granted per congressional vote and presidential approval to an agent of government to spend money. Once these commitments are honored and the money is actually spent, we speak of *outlays* or *expenditures* (i.e., outcomes). In general, fiscal policy, deficits, and surpluses are captured by expenditures.

Some governments separate their current operations and capital expenditures. A core function of this division is to identify how borrowing or current account surpluses are translated into investments in capital assets, such as physical infrastructure. By doing so, governments can show that public spending moves beyond simple consumption. While advocates of *capital budgeting* claim that this process encourages long-term planning, critics argue that capital budgets misstate governments' financial positions. Many developing countries and most American states employ capital budgeting. However, in practice, there is large variation on how the capital and operating budgets are related to each other.

Three more distinctions are noteworthy. Within a budget, one can draw a distinction between *entitlements* and *discretionary spending.* Based on authorizing legislation, entitlements mandate payments, often to eligible individuals, by an agency. Thus, outlays depend on exogenous circumstances, such as economic well-being, and are independent of the amount appropriated to a program in the previous budget. For example, unemployment benefits comprise of a series of set eligibility requirements, but the economic climate and the number of people claiming benefits determine the actual withdrawal of financial resources. As a consequence for budgeting, entitlement spending needs to be forecast for the coming fiscal year by government agencies. Moreover, an effective change in entitlement spending is not pursued in the budget itself but in separate legislation modifying existing eligibility requirements. In contrast to entitlements, discretionary spending is public expenditure over which budget makers decide by reoccurring (mostly annual) appropriations.

Second, a government's budget may be delineated along organizational units, such as ministries and departments, or across programmatic functions. Budget items are grouped programmatically when they are identified by government activities in relation to a specific set of policy objectives. Proper classification can be tricky. For example, should a nursing school operated by a public hospital be classified under health or education? To overcome these problems and generate internationally comparable standards, the United Nations, in corporation with the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the World Bank, developed a conceptual structure, the System of National Accounts, in 1993 to provide international standards for the measurement of the market economy. Specifically for budgets, classification of the functions of government (COFOG) categorizes activities according to socioeconomic objectives, such as defense, health, and public order.

Finally, an increasing number of countries, especially developed ones, have moved from *cash-based budgeting* to *accrual accounting* since the 1990s. Under the cash basis, a transaction is recorded at the time the payment or receipt occurs. Accrual accounting, on the other hand, records a transaction when an action producing revenues or spending takes place and not when this action is paid for. In short, accrual accounting records change in ownership, while cash-based budgeting tracks exchange of monies. Clearly, for large-scale governmental infrastructure projects, the time difference between both occurrences might be large, thus making a comparison between cash and accrual-based, or even mixed budgets, challenging.

POLITICS OF BUDGETING

In his famous call for a theory on government resource allocation, V. O. Key (1940) asked why government should allocate a certain amount of money to a specific government function over all others. While the normative element of this question was initially addressed by economists based on the principles of efficiency and equity—e.g., Paul Samuelson (1954)—a seminal theoretical response by a political scientist was Aaron Wildavsky's (1964) *The Politics of the Budgetary Process.*

Wildavsky argued that budgets and the programs within it change only incrementally over time. Incrementalism holds that budget makers respond to the remarkable complexity of distributing the shares of a budget across programs by making small corrections to the status quo. Given the financial, temporal, and cognitive constraints on bureaucrats and policy makers, the budgetary decision-making process is simplified by the concepts of *base* and *fair share.* Base essentials mean that previous allocation to a program are expected to be matched in the current year. Fair share denotes the idea that new funding should be distributed roughly equally across agencies and programs. In short, the current budget is largely determined by last year's size and content.

Incrementalism conceptualizes budgeting as a negotiation process among a regular set of political actors including bureaucrats, as well as policy makers from the executive and legislative branches. While entitlements and budget rules may contribute to incremental changes in budgets, bargaining within the expectations of base and fair share among political actors is identified as the key feature for composing a new budget. Because incrementalism builds on decision-making theory, the budgeting process is perceived as open, pluralist, and conflict-free.

Incrementalism has been challenged on empirical and theoretical grounds since the mid-1970s. First, scholars charged that incrementalism is too conceptually vague and too descriptive for providing insightful theoretical contributions. Second, scholars also discovered that large differences in the magnitude of budget changes at both the programmatic and the overall budget level occur. Some budgets rise and fall dramatically. Incrementalism cannot account for the empirical reality of large-scale changes in budgets.

Among the first to theorize on the occurrence of both incremental and nonincremental change was John Padgett (1980). He argued that budget decisions are made serially. Decision makers engage in an ordered search through a limited set of alternatives. They inquire sequentially through different budget options until they can match a solution reflecting both the merits of a program and the perception of the overall fiscal climate. In aggregate, his decision-making model suggests that most programs only change marginally in any given year, but on some occasions, policy makers radically alter the size of a program.

In public policy, Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner (2005) contend that incrementalism is one element of a more comprehensive model of budgeting based on punctuated equilibrium theory. Their core argument is that individuals as well as organizations possess a limited capacity to process information. As a consequence, policy makers only concentrate on and prioritize a small set of budgetary issues. Budget issues that receive disproportionate attention change dramatically because policy makers are prone to under- and over-respond to changes in the exogenous environment. Those unattended budget items, however, remain largely unchanged. Overall, their model predicts that budgetary changes are characterized by periods of stability that are occasionally interrupted by large-scale shifts in resources. In short, the punctuated equilibrium model of Baumgartner and Jones combines incrementalism and dramatic changes under a unified model of budgetary choice.

This model originated from insights on the American political system. Several other studies across a variety of advanced democracies and levels of government find strong empirical evidence that budgeting at the subnational and national level is predominantly highly incremental but sometimes interrupted by very large and often consequential budgetary changes. Jones and colleagues (2009) assess the accumulated evidence across several advanced industrialized democracies and assert that the punctuated nature of budgetary changes offers a strong empirical generalization. Taken together, these empirical verifications of the punctuated equilibrium model indicate the need for theorizing on processes generating extreme change in budgeting research.

A third approach studying the politics of budgeting emerges out of comparative political economy and rational choice institutionalism during the 1990s. The main focus of this literature is on budget balance, while incrementalism and public policy theories concentrate on spending patterns. Comparative political economists aim to identify rules generating balanced budgets and conceive budgeting along two problems: *principal-agent* and *common-pool*. In both cases, the literature identifies the self-interest of policy makers as the core problem of efficient and effective budgeting.

In the principal-agent framework, citizens (principal) delegate the authority to tax and spend to politicians (agent) and, after making their spending decisions, politicians (principal) delegate the implementation to bureaucrats (agent). In both principal-agent relationships (citizen-politician and politician-bureaucrat), the literature assumes that the preferences between principal and agent do not overlap. For example, voters may prefer more education spending while politicians and bureaucrats would rather spend money on nice offices. Principal-agent problems thus may lead to inefficient budgeting and more public spending.

In the common-pool resource problem, the common resource (money) is generated by general taxation of all citizens. However, policy makers are assumed to spend this money on specific purposes without regard to the depletion of the overall budget. For example, agricultural ministers are said to obtain and distribute as many agricultural subsidies as possible without considering the overall shape of the budget. Theoretically, the common-pool framework predicts that the aggregation of all individual excessive spending decisions lead to large government budgets, deficits, and debt increases.

The political economy literature on budgeting argues that both problems—principal-agent and common-pool—can be alleviated by constructing the appropriate fiscal rules and political institutions. Jürgen Von Hagen (2006) outlines three sets of rules: legislative and constitutional constraints on budgetary aggregates, political institutions fostering accountability, and procedural rules of the budgeting process.

Legislative and constitutional constraints on budgetary aggregates entail balanced budget constraints, debt and deficit limits, as well as taxation and spending restrictions. Large variation in the specifics and enforceability of these rules prevail across countries and subnational entities. While rare at the national level, among the most prominent and widely studied restrictions are those imposed by the European Monetary Union and American states. The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of these rules, however, is weak.

A significant amount of scholarly work considers the impact of political institutions, most prominently certain electoral rules of a political system, as a key influence on budgeting. This line of inquiry suggests that political competition and accountability allow voters to resolve the principal-agent problem of budgeting. When elections are competitive and personal, voters are able easily to identify and punish politicians and political parties who diverge from citizens' preferences. There is a lively theoretical and empirical debate on other consequences of electoral rules. To a large extent, the discourse concentrates on the distinction between majoritarian and proportional electoral systems.

Procedural rules of the budget process lay out the interactions within and between the legislative and executive branches of government. Budgeting generally proceeds along a tight time schedule of formulation, enactment, execution, and assessment (the budget cycle). With some exceptions (most notably the United States), the executive branch dominates all four stages of the budget process and often manages the process within its hierarchical structures. In presidential systems, as well as multiparty collation governments, budgets also are formulated and enacted either via negotiation or by reliance on established contracts, such as coalition agreements. Overall, the process of budgeting might be fairly fragmented, specialized, and opaque to the outside observer. It is a common call in the literature, as well as among international organizations, to make the budgeting process more transparent.

Taken together, the political economy literature on budgeting proposes the following institutional solutions to the principal-agent problem: increase the accountability of the agents and increase the transparency of the budget process. Greater accountability might be achieved through electoral institutions that bring candidates closer to voters or by policy makers screening viable candidates for the top bureaucratic positions. How well these solutions works is still in debate. This is partly due to the fact that cross-national data on budget

procedures and practices has been collected systematically only since the 1990s and for only a small group of countries.

Three solutions are delineated for the common-pool problem. First, a strong finance minister might be able to check excessive spending. Attributes of a strong finance minister include possessing the ability to propose a budget, being chief negotiator with individual spending ministers, and being able to unilaterally cut individual spending items. Second, a fiscal contract outlining targets might limit individual overindulgence. Third, a budget process that requires first settlement on overall spending and then considers the distribution of funds might limit government spending. While empirical evidence for advanced democracies is mixed so far, recent observations suggest that an increasing number of countries strengthened the role of the finance minister in the budget process.

DISCUSSION

It is helpful to contrast the three approaches to the study of budgeting—incrementalism, punctuated equilibrium, and political economy—in regard to their conception of actors, choice, and institutions. All three approaches ask how political actors engage with each other in various institutional settings in order to decide on a budget. Substantively, the first two approaches concentrate on appropriations, while political economy is more interested in outlays and deficits.

Theoretical approaches to budgeting based on political economy clearly name the actors in the budgeting process. Most commonly, a game theoretical model identifies an interaction between a pair of the following actors: voters, government, spending ministers, and the bureaucracy. In contrast, incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium scholarship relies on the amorphous group known as policy makers or focuses on the executive organization. The last two approaches often understand budgeting as a fairly open process with different actors providing diverse inputs at the various stages of the process. As a consequence of each approach, political economy might miss important actors in the budgeting process due to its restrictive assumptions, while the other two approaches' vagueness might hinder developing generalizable insights.

Political science's theoretical development in budgeting research is accommodated by two models of individual choice. Political economy relies on the postulates of rational choice theory and assigns preferences and expected utilities to individual budgeting actors. In contrast, incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium develop within bounded rationality and contend that, in budgeting, imperfect decision-making conditions produce imperfect solution searches and foster a reliance on temporally available heuristics. While its simplicity and the ability to generalize self-interested strategic behavior allow the political economy approach to develop a unified body of research, bounded rationality more accurately reflects on choices and actions of the actors in the budgeting process.

Finally, all three approaches also vary in their assessment of political institutions. The political economy approach attributes core causal effects to the macro-institutional setting, such as the system of government and electoral system. However, this approach is rightfully concerned with the possible endogeneity of institutions: governments can choose both budgets and the fiscal rules that outline the budgeting process. Incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium theories follow detailed fiscal rules more closely and often perceive institutions as part of the organizational features of the budgeting process. In all of the research on budgeting, political scientists and public administration scholars are searching for a budget process that produces efficient allocation and fair political representation.

See also *Incrementalism; Political Economy; Punctuated Equilibrium.*

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Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich

Russian Marxist theorist and revolutionary, Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin (1888–1938) was an important figure in the early history of the Soviet Union. He is most famously credited with the development of gradualist New Economic Policy (NEP) in the 1920s, but this policy was abandoned by Joseph Stalin, and Bukharin was eventually arrested and executed.

Bukharin joined the Bolshevik Party in 1906 as student, but his studies were interrupted by arrests and eventual exile. He settled in Austria and Switzerland, where he participated in activities with other exiled Russian Marxists, including

Vladimir Lenin. As a young man, Bukharin produced two major works, *The Economic Theory of the Leisure Class* (1914) and *The World Economy and Imperialism* (1915). The latter analyzed the clash between nation-states and the internationalization of capital, of which the latter, according to Bukharin, was producing networks of state capitalist trusts. Lenin wrote an approving introduction to the work and would become an important patron to Bukharin in his rise through the party's ranks.

Bukharin returned to Russia in 1917 and was elected to the Bolshevik Party's Central Committee three months before the Bolshevik Revolution (1917). He assumed many leadership positions, including editor of the party newspaper, *Pravda* (*Truth*), from 1917 to 1929, and head of the Communist International from 1926 to 1929.

In the first years of communist rule, he was more radical, clashing with Lenin on such issues as concluding a peace with Germany and defending the rapid move to a communist system under "war communism." He produced *The Economics of the Transition* (1920), which grappled with the issue of how to create a communist state.

By the early 1920s, Bukharin had moderated his position, joining with Stalin in favoring a more gradual and peaceful evolution to communism, which was to be known as the New Economic Policy (1921–1929). Lenin, prior to his death in 1924, praised Bukharin as one of the party's most brilliant thinkers. Bukharin defended NEP in *The Road to Socialism and the Worker Peasant Alliance* (1925). NEP foresaw a limited role for markets in an economy in which the "commanding heights" of industry would be dominated by the state. Bukharin hoped that socialism would gradually emerge through the NEP. However, by 1929, Stalin turned against the NEP as too gradual and too capitalist, and Bukharin lacked the political power to challenge Stalin successfully. He was gradually removed from positions of leadership and was expelled from the party altogether in 1937. After a show trial on charges of treason, he was executed in 1938.

After the tragedy of Stalinism, Bukharin's views were reevaluated in a more positive light by many on the political left in the West and reformers in the Soviet Union as the "road not taken," a possible means to produce a more humane communism. Ideas of the NEP influenced Mikhail Gorbachev, who, as the last Soviet leader (1985–1991), politically rehabilitated Bukharin in 1988.

See also *Bolshevism; Lenin, Vladimir Ilich; Marxism.*

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Bull, Hedley

Hedley Bull (1932–1985) was one of the major figures in the modern academic study of international relations and taught at the London School of Economics, The Australian National University, and Oxford University. One of the key figures in the English School of International Relations, he is best known for the idea that states form among themselves an "international society." Bull began his early work by analyzing the common framework of rules and institutions that developed within the anarchical society of the classical European state system. For Bull, this society was anarchical in that there was no common power to enforce law or to underwrite cooperation, but it was a society in so far as states were conscious of common rules and values, cooperated in the working of common institutions, and perceived common interests in observing these rules and working through these institutions. As against the realist emphasis on the material structures of the international system, Bull saw international society as built around a historically created, and evolving, structure of common understandings, rules, norms, and mutual expectations. But as against later liberal constructivists, he retained realism's concern with power and its emphasis on the central role of the balance of power.

Bull's approach in his most famous book, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (1977) involved three elements. There is an *analytical* approach (what is order, and what are the minimum conditions that would have to exist before any society could be meaningfully so described?); a *historical* approach (how far can one isolate and identify an acceptance of these conditions in the evolving practices of states?); and a *normative* approach (on which minimum conditions of coexistence might the holders of sharply conflicting values be able to agree?). The subsequent task was to map and explain the changing normative constitution of international society—in particular the move from a limited pluralist society of states built around coexistence to a liberal solidarist society of states united by denser institutional forms and by stronger moral and legal ties.

Bull also established a reputation as one of the most important early theorists of arms control. He was closely involved in the early years of the Institute for Strategic Studies in London and, in *The Control of the Arms Race* (1961), he attacked arguments for general and complete disarmament. He argued instead that the most important goal should be the stability of a strategic relationship rather than any particular level of armaments and that the greatest efforts should be devoted to stabilizing the structure of nuclear deterrence and agreeing on the methodologies, technologies, and shared understandings to produce that end.

Although his work on strategy was dominated by the cold war, Bull believed that the transition from a European to a global international society represented a more fundamental historical development. In his later work—especially *The Expansion of International Society* (1985)—he explored relations between the European and non-European world. He traced

five stages in what he called the "revolt against Western dominance"—the struggle for equal sovereignty, the anticolonial revolution, the struggle for racial equality, the fight for economic justice, and the struggle for cultural liberation—and he analyzed the impact of what had by then become known as the third world on the institutions of international society.

See also *Arms Control; Arms Race; European Political Thought; International Relations; International Relations Theory; International Relations: Worldviews and Frameworks.*

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Bunche, Ralph Johnson

Ralph Johnson Bunche (1903–1971) was an American political scientist and diplomat known for his work with the United Nations (UN). He was the first African American to earn a doctorate from Harvard University and to win the Nobel Peace Prize. He was awarded the Medal of Freedom, America's highest civilian honor, in 1963.

Bunche was born in Detroit, Michigan. He graduated summa cum laude from the University of California–Los Angeles in 1927 and then received his master's degree and doctorate in government and international relations from Harvard University. From 1936 to 1938, Bunche conducted postdoctoral research (as a Social Science Research Council Fellow) at the London School of Economics and at the University of Cape Town in South Africa. As a result of his research, he became known as a leading expert on colonialism.

While still a graduate student, Bunche joined the faculty at Howard University and taught there until 1942. He was appointed to Harvard University in 1950, but he resigned in 1952 having never actually taught there. In 1953 he was elected the president of the American Political Science Association.

Bunche joined the National Defense Program Office (later the Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency) as a senior analyst on Africa and Asia in 1941 and worked there until 1944. He then joined the U.S. Department of State and, in 1945, became the first African American to head a division of a federal agency when he became the acting chief of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs.

Bunche helped write the UN Charter and served as a member of the U.S. delegation to the first UN General Assembly in 1946. In 1947 he became the director of the UN's trusteeship division. Three years later Bunche received the Nobel Peace Prize for his work in negotiating the agreements that ended the 1948–1949 war between the newly established state

of Israel and its Arab neighbors. Over the next two decades, Bunche presided over the UN conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy and organized and directed UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, Lebanon, the Congo, Yemen, and Cyprus.

Bunche was an active scholar and participant in the civil rights movement. In 1931 he helped organize a protest against a segregated performance of *Porgy and Bess* at the National Theater in Washington, DC. His work as codirector of the Institute of Race Relations at Swarthmore College resulted in his writing *A World View of Race* (1936). In 1935 he organized a conference at Howard University on President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal domestic reform program and its impact on African Americans. In February 1936, Bunche cofounded the Negro National Congress, which held its first meeting in Chicago; Bunche would leave this organization in 1938 after it was taken over by the Communist Party. From 1938 to 1940, he worked with Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish sociologist, on his study of African Americans that culminated with Myrdal's *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (1944). In 1949 Bunche was awarded the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People's (NAACP) Spingarn Medal, the organization's highest honor. President Harry S. Truman offered Bunche the position of assistant secretary of state, but he declined because of the segregated life in Washington, DC. Bunche participated in the 1963 March on Washington, at which he introduced famed activist Martin Luther King Jr., and he helped to lead the 1965 civil rights march organized by King.

Bunche served as a member of the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation (1955–1971), as a member of the New York City Board of Education (1958–1964), and as a member of the Board of Overseers of Harvard University (1960–1965). Suffering from heart disease and diabetes, Bunche resigned as UN undersecretary-general on October 1, 1971. He died on December 9, 1971.

See also *Civil Rights Movement; Race and Racism; United Nations (UN); U.S. Politics and Society: African American Political Participation; U.S. Politics and Society: African American Social Movements.*

. . . . JEFFREY KRAUS

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Bureaucracy

Bureaucracy refers to an organization or a set of organizations designed to carry out a specialized set of tasks, often on a massive scale. In political science, as well as the general public discourse, the term generally refers to the characteristics and workings of government organizations, although studies on bureaucracies have borrowed generously from research on economics and business organization.

Bureaucrats are people who work in bureaucracies. Tasks that are entrusted to bureaucrats range from simple administrative ones, such as typing or photocopying, to the implementation of complex policy goals, such as reducing air pollution or maintaining national defense. Thus, the subjects of studies of bureaucracy have ranged from street-level bureaucrats, such as doctors, teachers, soldiers, and social workers, to very powerful bureaucrats, such as army generals, monetary policy regulators, and attorneys general.

While executive and legislative bodies are responsible for making policy and judicial bodies are responsible for interpreting policy, bureaucracies are generally responsible for the implementation of policy. Studies of policy implementation examine how bureaucratic decision making is influenced by policy-making preferences, as well as political, economic, and social institutions. Within political science, such studies are typically part of the subfield discipline known as *public administration,* although the term *public management* has been used as well. However, some scholars have suggested that the term *public management* applies more specifically to studies of how to make public agencies more efficient and market oriented.

Although bureaucracies have been endemic throughout history, the origin of their analysis in the social sciences is generally traced back to the work of German social theorist Max Weber. Weber stated in 1946 that the use of bureaucratic organizations had grown over time because of their technical superiority over any other form of organization. According to Weber, several organizational features of bureaucracies ensured their technical superiority, most notably the consistent application of rules and the placement of appointed officials with expertise within a hierarchical structure. Most modern bureaucracies contain these features, but each feature receives different emphasis, according to each country and bureaucratic culture.

THE APPLICATION OF RULES

Bureaucratic organizations apply rules and deliver services efficiently because they do so according to sets of rules and without regard to the varying concerns of individual people, argued Weber. When bureaucracies begin to treat each client according to criteria other than specific rules, such as the person's socioeconomic status, resources are wasted on determining outcomes for each client. Additionally, erratic application of the rules also diminishes the credibility of the agency itself, as people will learn over time that particular clients are favored over others. In *The Politics of Bureaucracy* (1995)*,* political science scholar B. Guy Peters argues that many non-Western societies have been unable to implement a consistent interpretation of rules within public bureaucracies because clients expect to barter, to some extent, over final decisions or to use their status in society as leverage.

However, while a consistent application of the rules is generally a desired result, this does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats always will know precisely how to behave and do their job. According to James Q. Wilson in *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It* (1989), most government agencies have goals that they want to accomplish, but the more vague these stated goals are and the less easily they are translated into tasks, the more the behavior of bureaucrats will come to depend on other factors. For example, the collective goals of a police department might be to "protect the public" and "uphold the law," but people will have different interpretations as to how to achieve these rather broad goals. Additionally, these goals do not necessarily dictate how a police officer should deal with, for example, a belligerent panhandler on the street. Thus, the particular circumstances will be important as the officer attempts to bring the situation under control. Herbert Simon, in his 1947 book *Administrative Behavior,* argued that the uncertainty of such situations is precisely what causes bureaucrats to follow rules and routines. According to Simon, because policy outcomes arising out of bureaucratic action are often difficult to determine or observe, structured and organized behavior helps to reduce uncertainty and preserve stability within the organization.

Wilson also argues that when agency goals are unclear, behavior may come to depend on the professional training of the bureaucrats in question. In antitrust or competition law, economists tend to favor breaking up concentrations of market power when they are economically inefficient, whereas attorneys are more likely to favor such breakups when the law has been broken. Finally, when an agency has multiple constituencies with competing interests, bureaucrats may feel pulled in different directions. For example, an agency charged with regulating air pollution may have to weigh the benefits of clean air against the potential costs to business of pollution abatement. Dissatisfaction with agency actions may lead certain constituents to seek formal rule changes from the legislature overseeing the agency, in turn, sending conflicting signals to the bureaucrats themselves.

Several examples exist of administrative cultures that strongly emphasize an adherence to written laws and rules. Such systems have been characterized as following the Hegelian civil service, or *Rechtsstaat* model, a model that requires senior civil servants to be trained in law. Countries with such systems, such as France, Germany, and Italy, accord civil servants a high level of respect, and future civil servants are trained in administrative law in prestigious institutions, such as France's École Nationale d'Administration. Government scholar Christopher Hood has referred to civil servants in such systems as *trustees* of the government, acting in an autonomous fashion (2002). However, in contrast to the Weberian ideal of impartial expertise, French civil servants can be highly political, and many French politicians are former civil servants. Similarly, in Germany and Italy a lack of impartiality among civil servants may clash with the need to follow rules closely.

The Rechtsstaat model of civil service has been contrasted with the *public interest* model found in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In these countries, there is not the same emphasis on administrative law as in Rechtsstaat countries, and consequently, there is less adherence to the notion of rigidly following rules. According to Hood, public employees act more as "battle troops" to carry out the political will of the political incumbent. Despite this characterization, the degree to which the civil service is politicized varies considerably across these countries. For example, British civil servants have traditionally been considered to be neutral, working for the incumbent government, whereas in the United States, political appointees come and go with each presidency, and often are added or subtracted from particular agencies as presidents see fit.

SPECIALIZATION AND EXPERTISE

Weber observed that bureaucracies were made more efficient by the selection of people with technical expertise in the organization. This expertise enables bureaucrats to perform their tasks in a specialized fashion and to apply strict criteria to their decision-making processes. In addition to his observations, Weber also argued that bureaucratic organizations should recruit and select personnel based on merit and expertise in order to ensure an independent and consistent application of bureaucratic rules. Once granted some autonomy in action as well, bureaucrats could use their specialized knowledge, free from political interference. As Murray Horn argues in *The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector* (1995), legislatures often "tie their hands" by limiting their ability to interfere with the inner workings of bureaucracies, thus enhancing the credibility of both the politicians and the bureaucrats. Fabrizio Gilardi (2002) demonstrates that many western European nations created independent regulatory agencies with the purpose of overseeing newly privatized energy and telecommunication companies.

Weber's argument that bureaucrats should be selected according to merit has been echoed by other scholars, but historically, patronage concerns have often trumped merit concerns. In the United States in the 1830s, President Andrew Jackson implemented what became known as the *spoils system,* whereby loyal party workers were given high-ranking government jobs on a rotating basis. The system was created to eliminate what Jackson saw as a pattern of wealthy elites receiving the majority of federal appointments. This system of spoils or patronage enabled average party workers to obtain government jobs. While Weber's ideal bureaucrat held a fixed term so that employment could not be arbitrarily terminated by political executives, administration turnover in the spoils system meant wholesale personnel changes across bureaucratic agencies, as party workers were rewarded for their loyalty with government jobs. Office holders were generally accountable to the politicians they helped elect, but populists, progressives, and urban reformers viewed the spoils system as a corrupt method of giving plum jobs to unqualified representatives of special interests.

Along with this negative perception of the spoils system, several events in the late nineteenth century resulted in the slow conversion of the American federal bureaucracy to a merit-based system from a patronage system. First, Congress passed the Pendleton Act in 1883, which required that federal jobs gradually come to be filled according to merit and qualification. Second, in 1887, political science scholar and future president Woodrow Wilson claimed in "The Study of Administration," that it should be the job of American administrators to neutrally and faithfully implement the policy directives of politicians. Wilson's article supported the idea that bureaucrats could work free of political influence and that administration could be separated from politics. The U.S. Congress had Wilson's ideas in mind when it passed the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and established the Interstate Commerce Commission with the purported aim of independently regulating the nation's railroads. However, depleted resources, vague statutory goals, and competing constituent influence all indicated how difficult it could be to separate politics from administration in bureaucratic policy making.

Although the complete separation of policy implementation or administration from politics has been an elusive, if not an impossible, goal to achieve, policy makers and scholars agree that there are some areas of policy making, such as macroeconomic monetary policy, in which bureaucratic independence from politicians is a concern of paramount importance. Conventional wisdom suggests that if politicians had direct control over the money supply and interest rates, they would print more money to finance their projects and would lower interest rates to engineer economic booms. The main consequence of both activities would of course be soaring inflation, which would diminish the credibility of any political commitments toward stable monetary policy. The United States Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the Bundesbank are just a few of the major, formally independent central banks.

HIERARCHY

Finally, according to Weber, expert bureaucrats applying a rational-legal framework had to be placed in a hierarchical setting to function properly. In a hierarchical setting, bureaucrats would work in a disciplined fashion toward common objectives set forth by the head administrators. Any other setting might result in the failure of bureaucrats to work coherently toward the same goals.

Weber's observations caused other scholars to seek to explain why, over the course of history, hierarchies had emerged as the most common type of organizational structure. In his landmark 1937 article "The Nature of the Firm," British economist Ronald Coase posited that, for private firms, hierarchy was efficient because it limited the transaction costs that business entrepreneurs would have to incur otherwise. In the absence of a hierarchy, the business entrepreneur must negotiate contracts with others to purchase input products and labor. If extensive bargaining must take place to negotiate each contract, time and resources are wasted in the process.

A hierarchical structure eliminates the need for costly bargaining by setting rules and, in the words of political scientist Terry Moe in his 1984 article "The New Economics of Organization," "substitutes authority relations for market relations.

Although hierarchies serve to promote efficiency by reducing transaction costs, they also introduce into public and private organizations a new range of organizational dilemmas, known broadly as principal-agent problems. Moe states that

> the principal-agent model is an analytic expression of the agency relationship, in which one party, the principal, considers entering into a contractual agreement with another, the agent, in the expectation that the agent will subsequently choose actions that produce outcomes desired by the principal (756).

However, agents have an incentive to misrepresent their true skills, and the manager may find it difficult to select the best candidate. This is a problem of asymmetric information, known as *adverse selection*. Second, the degree to which a principal can monitor the work behavior of the hired agent varies considerably across jobs. For example, a police captain cannot monitor what uniformed officers actually do on the streets at all times, if at all. The less observable the agent's behavior, the more that agent can shirk the obligation to the principal. Additionally, when the principal hires an agent with specialized expertise to perform a complex task, the agent can exploit that information advantage to either shirk or perform the task in any preferred manner. This problem, known as *moral hazard,* is also a problem of asymmetric information.

The principal-agent framework has been employed broadly throughout political science and public administration research, particularly to depict the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats. William Niskanen, applying economic principles of utility maximization to bureaucrats, argued in his 1971 work *Bureaucracy and Representative Government* that information asymmetries between bureaucrats and legislatures were particularly problematic because knowledgeable bureaucrats could request exorbitant budgets from legislators, who, due to their lack of expertise, do not know the true cost of performing the bureaucratic tasks. Niskanen's work, although highly influential, was criticized by many scholars as overly broad and flawed. Patrick Dunleavy followed Niskanen by maintaining in *Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Public Choice* (1991) that, rather than pursuing budget maximization, decision makers in bureaucracies follow a bureau-shaping strategy, most notably by separating the service delivery functions of the agency—or *line agency functions*—from the policy-making aspects of the agency. As a result, over time the agency's core functions are more narrowly defined, and it actually faces fewer subsequent budget constraints. In turn, Dunleavy's research was criticized by David Marsh, Martin Smith, and David Richards in their 2000 article, "Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Reform in Whitehall: Analyzing the Bureau-shaping Model." Marsh, Smith, and Richards found that the bureau-shaping model did not explain the creation of many, highly specialized government agencies

in the United Kingdom, known as the *next-step agencies.* The authors argue that this effective hiving off of duties into other newly created agencies did not originate among bureaucrats, but was imposed by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her cabinet.

The research of Marsh, Smith, and Richards raises the question of how and why politicians attempt to control bureaucrats, a particularly salient question in a separation-of-powers system, such as the United States, where Congress, the president, and the courts vie for control over the direction of bureaucratic policy making. In *The Administrative Presidency* (1983) Richard Nathan emphasized how the president can influence bureaucratic outputs through the powers of appointment and reorganization; studies done by B. Dan Wood and Richard Waterman empirically demonstrate this (1994). Additionally, in a 2005 study, David Lewis found that presidents also manipulate the number of appointees and civil servants, particularly in agencies that clash with the president.

Much research also has been devoted to illustrating the U.S. Congress's alleged ability to steer bureaucratic behavior. Congress is responsible for crafting the legislation from which agencies are born and, as a result, it has significant authority over how agencies are designed. Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast (aka McNollgast) have stressed the importance of this function, arguing in a 1987 article that Congress embeds particular administrative procedures into agency design in order to ensure that bureaucratic behavior does not deviate too far from congressional intent. Since their influential work was written, several scholars (e.g., David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, 1996; Evan Ringquist, Jeff Worsham, and Marc Allen Eisner, 2003) have attempted to refine the work of McNollgast by showing that agency authority delegated by Congress also depends on the salience and complexity of the issue, the presence of divided government within Congress, and the ability of affected constituents to organize.

However, many scholars have focused also on the ability of American bureaucracies to be autonomous and to display greater independence of political control. In a 1976 study, Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman found through surveys that Nixon administration bureaucrats were suspicious of his domestic policy agenda, particularly those bureaucrats that administered social regulatory programs. In *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy* (1984), Francis Rourke argues that bureaucrats can develop knowledge and expertise that can then be used independently of political principals. Additionally, agencies with large or important constituencies may have enough political cover to act contrary to the wishes of the president or Congress. In *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy* (2001), Daniel Carpenter also emphasizes the ability of entrepreneurial agency heads to cultivate coalitions as the key to bureaucratic autonomy.

BUREAUCRATIC REFORMS

In the latter half of the twentieth century, public management reforms were driven by high levels of government debt,

but also by the conservative ideals of leaders such as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Many countries in Europe and elsewhere implemented changes to the structure of civil servant contracts and to budgeting decisions. These changes also represented a desire to bring free-market principles into government—greater flexibility was sought in civil servant contracts to reward and punish bureaucrats according to their performance. Thus, for example, countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom introduced programs whereby bureaucrats were hired according to performance-related contracts for a variable number of years, as opposed to being appointed for life. Moreover, budgeting procedures also were transformed in order to stimulate agency performance and enhance efficiency. Budgets are increasingly drawn up according to evaluations of agency performance, and many countries have instituted auditing procedures as well to monitor how money is spent once it is allocated. Finally, many countries passed legislation, such as the Government Performance and Results Act in the United States in 1993, to allow formal evaluation of bureaucratic behavior through the use of performance indicators and measurement.

In western Europe, the regulation of business gradually shifted away from direct control of nationalized industries by the executive to the creation of independent regulatory agencies. The shift to autonomous agencies represented a decision by governments to interfere less in markets while delegating important regulatory decisions to bureaucrats with specialized expertise. In his 1996 book *Regulating Europe,* Giandomenico Majone documented the proliferation of independent regulatory agencies as the European Union's emergence as a regulatory state. The creation of such agencies also represented a shift toward more market-oriented economies, as state-owned enterprises were jettisoned in favor of an arrangement whereby the new agencies oversee private utilities and energy companies. Similar changes occurred in the United States in the late 1970s, despite the long-standing prevalence there of independent regulatory agencies. Widespread deregulation in transportation and utilities sectors of business resulted in the dismantling of regulations that were considered favorable for existing large businesses, but destructive to competition and consumers.

While these elements of the *new public management* have been widespread throughout the industrialized world, they have been implemented to varying degrees across countries. What accounts for this variation? In *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis* (2004), Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert posit that in majoritarian and centralized (unitary) governments, public sector reforms tend to be implemented most rapidly and most broadly, while in consensual and decentralized (federal) governments, such reforms move more slowly and with more limited scope. First, because everyone's interests are represented in a consensual government, it is easier for those opposed to reforms to block their passage. Second, because power is dispersed from the federal government to regional governments in a federal system, it is more difficult for the executive in a federal system to impose nationwide reforms. Thus, majoritarian, centralized governments like New Zealand and the United Kingdom could implement far-reaching reforms. An oft-mentioned instance of such change occurred in the United Kingdom in 1986 when Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher responded to policy disagreements with the Greater London Council by simply abolishing it, along with several other county councils. On the other hand, more consensual and federal systems, such as Belgium and Germany, did not experience the same level of change. Additionally, countries like Belgium, France, and Italy are characterized as having risk-averse bureaucratic cultures in which attempts to introduce performance-related civil servant contracts are fiercely resisted by bureaucrats.

Public sector reforms such as privatization, contracting out, pay for performance, and performance measurement have helped some governments realize significant savings and improve government performance, but public management scholars also emphasize that these reforms can be difficult to implement and may yield mixed results. For example, it may be difficult to develop indicators that reliably assess public sector performance, which also makes it difficult to link salary and budgets to performance. To the extent that reliable indicators can be developed, close linkage with budget or salary may give bureaucrats incentives to manipulate their numbers or ignore other important indicators. Finally, as numerous public administration scholars have noted, the procedures of implementing public policy are often concerned with values other than efficiency, such as equity or fairness.

See also *Civil Service; Performance Management; Regulation and Rulemaking; Weber, Max.*

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Bureaucratic Authoritarianism

Bureaucratic authoritarianism is a type of authoritarian regime that features rule by an alliance of military leaders, civilians with technical expertise (especially in economic policy), and leading business sectors. These regimes are hypothesized to form under certain conditions where a nation is attempting to industrialize and faces popular agitation or unrest that makes it difficult for elites to maintain order. The original paradigms of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime were Latin American countries of the 1960s, Latin American regimes in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as East Asian countries that have provided the opportunity for political science to test the theories proposed about their development.

ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT

Guillermo O'Donnell coined the term *bureaucratic authoritarianism* in *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism* (1973), which examined the military regimes of South America that made economic performance a key component of their legitimation formulae. O'Donnell argued that the modern authoritarian regimes that came to power in Brazil (1964) and Argentina (1966) were supported by a coalition of military officers, civilian technocrats, and big business (especially multinational firms) that sought to move beyond the populist, distribution-oriented politics previously prevalent in those societies. The new regimes sought to replace distributional conflict with a more technocratic, bureaucratic approach to making economic policy.

Scholars using this concept criticized modernization theory for failing to predict the emergence of military regimes in some of the developing world's most advanced economies. Political development theorists following the modernization paradigm had associated higher levels of economic development with greater political pluralism and hence higher probabilities of democratic advancement. O'Donnell observed that Latin America's most economically advanced countries had fallen to nondemocratic rule in the 1960s and offered an alternative explanation that linked economic development with authoritarianism in late developers.

FEATURES OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITARIANISM

Specifically, he suggested that in late-developing countries following the *import-substituting industrialization (ISI)* model—which promoted economic development by protecting and subsidizing local production of manufactured goods previously imported from already industrialized countries—the political power of lower-class and middle-class urban groups (especially the urban working class) grew as their numbers increased and as populist politicians developed coalitions that relied on their support. As the market for consumer goods became saturated due to the success of the first, "horizontal" stage of ISI, those economies required "deepening" into the production of capital goods and consumer durables in order to further economic growth.

Such heavy industries required investments by foreign capital. International investors were discouraged from entering these economies, however, where populist politics, featuring popular sector agitation and economic nationalism, prevailed. O'Donnell identified an "elective affinity" between the military, concerned about the implications for domestic order in the face of popular sector mobilization, and civilian technocrats, who sought military support for the adoption of orthodox economic policies. From this affinity, coup coalitions were formed, leading to authoritarian regimes in which the military chose to rule as an institution (rather than via personalist rule by a single strongman), but brought civilian technocrats—especially economists and engineers—into key roles managing the nation's economic development.

This alliance of the military and civilian technocrats is the key characteristic of bureaucratic authoritarianism. O'Donnell's conceptualization of bureaucratic authoritarianism stresses political exclusion of the masses, a highly technocratic policy-making process shared by the military and civilian experts, and rule that benefits transnational business and permits the country to further engage in the global economy.

EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS

Originally developed to apply to Argentina and Brazil, the concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism was subsequently used by many scholars of Latin America to apply to military regimes that emerged in Chile and Uruguay in 1973 and to a second military regime that came to power in Argentina in 1976. As the Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay regimes, and the later military government of Argentina, evolved, attempts by scholars to refine the theory and to use it to predict the evolution of Latin American dictatorships produced valuable empirical

research on patterns of political development in Latin American but failed to extend the theory. Scholars paid substantial attention to the idea that the degree of threat posed to the coup coalition partners by popular sector agitation could predict the severity of repression, the commitment to economic orthodoxy, the country's economic performance, and the unity both of the military institution and the coup coalition after the seizure of power.

However, as Karen Remmer and Gilbert Merkx convincingly demonstrated, actual events in the four countries of South America's Southern Cone did not bear out these hypotheses. For example, Brazil's relatively low precoup threat levels were nevertheless associated with initial fiscal orthodoxy while relatively high threat levels in Argentina in the 1970s and in Uruguay were followed by unorthodox fiscal policies under the military regimes that seized power. High threat levels led to low initial military unity in Uruguay but high initial unity in post–1976 Argentina.

The concept of bureaucratic authoritarianism has been applied with modifications to industrializing economies in East Asia, particularly South Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia. As the model has been applied more broadly and critiqued by comparative politics scholars, the elements that have proven most useful remain two: (1) The prediction of modernization theory that democracy would result from economic development proved too optimistic, as many late industrializers opted for (often harsh) authoritarian rule during the initial phases of their heavy industrialization, and (2) when threatened by popular sector mobilization military officers, civilian technocrats, and business elites could agree on the merits of imposing a dictatorship that emphasized apparently rational, technical decision making based on objective criteria and the exclusion of the political interests of the broader public.

In the later evolution of regimes labeled as bureaucratic-authoritarian, this early unity of the coup partners typically dissolved, however, because politics did invade the decision-making process in the form of interservice rivalries within the military and suspicions of private sector investors that state enterprises operated by military and civilian technocrats threatened to crowd them out of the economy. Internal rivalries eventually led the Argentine military regime to attempt to forge unity by seizing the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands from the British, a failed venture that hastened the regime's downfall. Prominent critics of the Brazilian regime in the 1980s came to include industrialists concerned about the growing control of the economy by military and civilian technocrats at the head of state enterprises.

CONCLUSION

While the classic examples of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes have given way to renewed democracies, the concept has continued to be used as an "ideal-type" or a tendency toward which certain regimes gravitate. The *autogolpe* (self-coup) of Peru's president Alberto Fujimori in 1992 is seen by some as a variant on the bureaucratic-authoritarian tradition; others have targeted postcommunist Russia under Vladimir Putin as a regime whose democratic elections are in tension

with an alliance among politicians, business leaders, and secret police that tends toward bureaucratic authoritarianism.

See also *Autogolpe; Bureaucracy; Latin American Political Economy; Military Rule; Modernization; Newly Industrializing Countries (NIC).*

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Burke, Edmund

Irish statesman and philosopher Edmund Burke (1729–1797) was born in Dublin, Ireland, to a Catholic mother and Protestant father. After graduating from Trinity College, Dublin, and briefly studying law in London, Burke entered the British Parliament in 1756, where he served for several decades among the Rockingham branch of the Whig party.

Burke's purely philosophical writings range from *A Vindication of Natural Society* (1756), widely read at the time as a defense of anarchism, to his treatment of aesthetics in *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (1757). Although Burke's philosophical writings are worthy accomplishments, he is best remembered for his political speeches and writings in which he synthesized abstract questions of political philosophy with the details and exigencies of practical politics.

On the basis of his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790), Burke is widely considered to be the founder of Anglo-American conservatism. Even before the French Revolution (1789–1799) had devolved into the Reign of Terror (1793–1794), Burke indicted the zeal of the French revolutionaries and accurately predicted some of the revolution's later excesses. He objected to the French Revolution's irreligious character, its invocation of metaphysical doctrines of natural rights, and its hostility to custom or tradition. *Reflections* strikes

many readers as antidemocratic, as Burke not only complains about the leveling and disordering effects of the French Revolution but also defends aristocratic values such as chivalry, honor, and duty.

The conservative dimensions to Burke's *Reflections* have tended to overshadow his advocacy of other patently liberal causes. Burke defended a policy of conciliation toward the American colonies. Because the colonies had evolved a national identity distinct from Britain, it would be wrong to resist their efforts to separate themselves and pursue liberty in their own way. Likewise, Burke felt considerable sympathy for his native Ireland and argued for toleration of Irish Catholics. Burke led the impeachment of Warren Hastings, director of the British East India Company, whose maladministration and abuses of power threatened the lives and liberties of Britain's Indian subjects. In the case of the French Revolution, Burke defended himself against charges of inconsistency in his 1791 "Appeal from the Old to the New Whigs," identifying a consistent emphasis on the value of liberty running throughout all of his major speeches and writings.

Burke's "Speech to the Electors of Bristol" (1774) outlines what has come to be known as the Burkean theory of political representation. For Burke, the duty of a good representative is not just to mirror the interests and desires of constituents but to make disinterested decisions about the public good.

Mostly neglected in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Burke was rediscovered by American political theorists during the cold war. American conservatives like Russell Kirk rehabilitated Burke as a natural law thinker to anchor their defense of traditional American values against the irreligion and immorality of communist totalitarianism. More recently, however, Burke's liberal face has reemerged as many postcolonial political theorists have taken a fresh look at his criticism of the conduct of British imperialism in India.

See also *Conservatism; Imperialism.*

. . . .   RICHARD BOYD

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Burnham, James

American political theorist James Burnham (1905–1987) was one of the most influential anticommunist thinkers of the cold war era. Like many anticommunists, he started out as a Trotsky-ite, but eventually he moved away from Trotskyism and began a slow journey to the right. He became a mentor to American conservative political commentator William F. Buckley Jr. and a founding editor at the conservative *National Review,* where he remained until he was felled by a stroke in 1987. He has been described by Richard Brookhiser, an American journalist and historian, as the "first neoconservative."

Burnham was unique among conservative thinkers. Unlike other conservatives who based their theories on religion, tradition, or natural law, he was rigorously empirical and influenced by the so-called realist school of politics. He sought to discover universal laws of politics and apply them to foreign policy and cultural change. He was generally supportive of free enterprise and limited government. He was neither a member of the old right nor the neocon right and was not a doctrinaire believer in laissez-faire. Burnham's views on congressional supremacy; his partial support for Joseph McCarthy, a U.S. senator who made accusations that the U.S. government had been infiltrated by communists; and his views on race place him broadly on the paleoconservative spectrum.

From 1930 to 1934, Burnham and American philosopher Philip Wheelwright co-edited a review entitled *Symposium*. In 1932 he and Wheelwright published a textbook titled *Introduction to Philosophical Analysis.* At this time Burnham became acquainted with philosopher and Marxist Sidney Hook, his colleague at New York University. Burnham's articles in *Symposium* impressed Hook and Russian Marxist revolutionary Leon Trotsky. After The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, in which Germany and the Soviet Union agreed to settle any differences amicably without war, Burnham broke with the Socialist Workers Party.

Burnham's next intellectual phase began in 1941 with the publication of *The Managerial Revolution,* a study in which he theorized that the world was witnessing the emergence of a new ruling class, the managers, who would soon replace the capitalists and the communists. *The Managerial Revolution* was a political and socioeconomic work, but it was also Burnham's first foray into global geopolitics. In it he sketched that the world would become tripolar with three strategic centers: (1) North America; (2) north-central Europe; and (3) west Asia, North Africa, and East Asia, including Japan and China. He predicted that Russia would break up, the British Empire would be liquidated, and the United States would become a superpower. In 1943, as his ideas expanded, he published his first analysis of political science, *The Machiavellians.* Based on the study of Italian political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli, Burnham deduced that (1) all politics is a struggle for power among individuals and groups; (2) political analysis is concerned with things as they are, not what they ought to be; (3) there is a distinction between formal meaning and real meaning; (4) political person is driven by self-interest and instinct, not by logic; (5) political elites are concerned only with the aggrandizement of power and they hold power by force and fraud; (6) all societies are divided into the rulers and the ruled; and (7) the ruling classes shift over time in their membership and goals.

After World War II (1939–1945), Burnham became the chief critic of the policy of containment, which was devised

by advisor George Kennan for President Harry S. Truman's administration in an effort to curtail the spread of communism. Burnham criticized containment from the ideological right, arguing for a more aggressive strategy that called for the liberation of Eastern Europe to undermine Soviet power. Decades later President Ronald Reagan adopted Burnham's confrontational approach, which resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Empire and thus vindicated Burnham's views.

Burnham wrote *The Struggle for the World* (1947) and *The World We Are In* (1967), both of which were broad comprehensive analyses of the beginning of the cold war, the nature of the communist threat to the world, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's ambitions, and the strategy for a U.S. victory. He expanded his ideas in *The Coming Defeat of Communism* (1950) and *Containment or Liberation?* (1952). As early as 1962 he predicted a U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War (1959–1975). Burnham was also broadly pessimistic about the future of the West. In his *Suicide of the West* (1964), he argued that the West had passed the apex of its power and would decline soon.

See also *Communism; Containment; Hook, Sidney; Marxism; Political Theory; Trotsky, Leon.*

. . . .   GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN

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Business Cycles, Political

Political business cycles occur when political motivations induce politicians to take actions that cause macroeconomic fluctuations. Cycles may be *opportunistic,* as when pre-election stimulus enhances incumbents' reelection prospects, or *partisan,* as when incoming parties reverse the policies of predecessors.

OPPORTUNISTIC MODELS

Models of opportunistic political business cycles appeared in the 1970s. William Nordhaus (1975) argued that incumbent politicians manipulate the economy to enhance reelection prospects. Specifically, expansionary macroeconomic policies are used to stimulate the economy and lower the unemployment rate prior to an election, and myopic voters respond by voting for the incumbent party. Given the model's expectational Phillips curve, inflationary consequences of the pre-election expansion are largely delayed until after the election, when contractionary policies are used to reduce inflation.

The Nordhaus model generated much interest and research, but ultimately was a victim of the rational expectations revolution. Nordhaus had assumed adaptive expectations. In his model pre-election stimulus produced favorable outcomes only because it was not anticipated. In essence, voters were repeatedly tricked in successive electoral cycles.

In a second phase of the political business cycle literature, models incorporated rational expectations, which rule out systematic expectational errors. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) developed a rational opportunistic model in which asymmetric information replaced voter myopia in explaining electoral cycles in macroeconomic policy variables. Voters have rational expectations but are unsure of the "competence" of politicians. The model can produce an equilibrium in which incumbent politicians increase government spending in pre-election periods in an effort to signal competence (ability to produce a higher level of government services with a given revenue). Rogoff (1990) later developed a similar model where the incumbent strategically manipulates the composition of expenditures in pre-electoral years, by favoring items that are more visible to the electorate.

PARTISAN MODELS

In partisan models, political business cycles are due to party differences in ideology and economic goals. According to the pioneering work of Douglas Hibbs (1977), left-wing parties are relatively more concerned with unemployment than inflation, while the opposite is true for right-wing parties. These concerns reflect the preferences of the parties' core constituencies. Consequently, left-wing parties are expected to pursue more expansionary policies when in office. This results in a cycle in which the level of activity and inflation varies with the ideology of the incumbent.

The length of the cycle depends on the way expectations are modeled. Under adaptive expectations, the partisan effect can be long-lasting. But, under rational expectations, cycles are short-lived and depend on electoral surprises. In rational partisan models, business cycles are driven by partisan differences and uncertainty about electoral outcomes. For example, a left-wing policy maker whose election was not fully anticipated can stimulate the economy and reduce unemployment, but this effect will disappear once inflation expectations adjust. Thus, partisan cycles will be temporary, with the strongest impacts occurring after elections.

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

The empirical literature on political business cycles is quite extensive. Overall, there is little evidence of systematic opportunistic cycles in economic outcomes, such as unemployment and output, in developed countries. The evidence is stronger for policy instruments, especially fiscal aggregates, which favors models that adopt the rational expectations assumption. Results of tests of the partisan political business cycle for the United Sates and for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries also favor rational expectations models, but the effects are somewhat stronger for outcomes than for policy instruments.

The lack of empirical evidence of opportunistic cycles in economic outcomes induced a change in the focus of research toward political budget cycles; that is, cycles in some component of the government budget. Several studies find evidence of political budget cycles in both developed and, especially, in developing countries. According to Brender

and Drazen (2005), that finding is driven by the experience of "new democracies," where voters are inexperienced with electoral politics or lack the information required to detect fiscal manipulations. When only "established democracies" are considered, there is no evidence of political budget cycles. In contrast, Alt and Lassen (2006) show that, conditioning on fiscal transparency, electoral cycles are present also in a sample of nineteen OECD countries, all of which are old democracies. They identify a persistent pattern of political budget cycles in low(er) transparency countries, while no such cycles can be observed in high(er) transparency countries.

Analyzing the effects of political budget cycles on reelection prospects, Brender and Drazen (2008), conclude that election year deficits do not help the incumbent get reelected. Changing the composition of spending or targeting some voters at the expense of others may be more effective ways of increasing reelection prospects.

See also *Constituency; Incumbency; Political Economy; Political Economy, Comparative.*

. . . . FRANCISCO JOSÉ VEIGA

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Business Preference Formation

The scholarly literature on the formation of employers' preferences seeks to understand how managers conceptualize their interests in public policy. Three debates anchor this literature. First, scholars diverge on the relative importance of economic conditions and institutional constraints in guiding human action. A second debate concerns the level of analysis at which corporate preferences are formulated: Some believe that business interests are largely defined and acted on at the micro firm level, while others believe that preferences are formed in the collective deliberative processes of national employers associations. A third debate reflects on the appropriate causal agent in constructing preferences—employers may autonomously formulate their policy positions or they may follow the lead of government policy entrepreneurs.

These debates suggest four broad causal determinants of preference: economic characteristics of firms and sectors, firms' internal institutions for evaluating public policy, business associations (and other institutional vehicles for firm coordination), and government structures and agents that shape employers' positions on public policy.

First, some analyses derive employers' political preferences from the economic characteristics of the firm or structure of the industry to which it belongs. This economic model of preference underlies public choice and many pluralist theories, and assumes that individuals are motivated by readily apparent material circumstance.

Second, institutional analyses suggest that decision making almost always occurs under conditions of bounded rationality in which full information is not available. Institutional permutations within the firm deliver quite different competitive strategies, which, in turn, lead to very different preferences for public policy. Companies' positions on policy issues depend, in part, on the firms' organizational capabilities for gathering information; therefore, firms with in-house policy experts have different preferences from those firms without such experts. Company policy experts like Powell and DiMaggio (1991) bring ideas from the external community of policy makers back to others within the firms, a process called *boundary spanning.* Companies with government affairs offices also tend to be more supportive of government policies, because these units increase collaboration between business and government.

Third, some scholars highlight the importance of business organization to employers' preferences for economic and social policy outcomes. Corporatist employers' associations, for example, are more likely than pluralist associations to produce business positions that are supportive of social welfare spending. Corporatist associations bring employers together to discuss their broader, shared concerns and bind firms to negotiated outcomes; therefore, members will be more willing to commit to longer-term goals, even if these goals detract from shorter-term interests. Hall and Soskice (2001) argue that the institutional profiles of different "varieties of capitalism" also bring employers to assume quite different policy preferences across settings.

Finally, the state influences the formation of business preferences in both long-term structural and short-term strategic ways. Institutional structures of government (such as constitutional structure and veto points) shape the manner in which employers can press their claims on government; for example, separation of powers and federalism generally translate into greater business resistance to government, because these permit managers to try to influence successive veto points until they find a sympathetic hearing. Political entrepreneurs also may seek to mobilize business allies in support of specific pieces of legislation; in these cases, political leaders lead employers to form specific policy positions.

See also *Business Pressure in Politics; Constitutional Systems, Comparative; Lobbying.*

. . . . CATHIE JO MARTIN

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Business Pressure in Politics

In any capitalist system the issue of business pressure in politics is central to the viability of the market economy and to the viability of governments as institutions capable of making decisions in the public interest. The issue is particularly pressing in the most important political constellation in the modern world, capitalist democracy; that is, in social systems that claim to combine capitalist economics (allocation through the market and private ownership of productive resources) with democratic government. In capitalist democracy, if business pressure subverts the capacity of government to rule in the public interest, then the claim to democracy is hollow. Conversely, if democratic politics creates hostility to business, then the viability of the market order is endangered.

THREE VIEWS OF BUSINESS PRESSURE

Three views of the role of business pressure have dominated debate for more than a generation. First, a structural account of business power holds that the very existence of corporate property and business control of investment decisions means that democratic government is always powerfully constrained by corporate preferences. Business thus does not have to exert overt "pressure" to exercise great influence. The most powerful statement of this view comes from American political scientist Charles Lindblom (2002). Second, a view heavily influenced by the pluralist tradition holds that, while business can be powerful, to exercise this power, it must compete successfully with other interests, this success varies, and the effectiveness of business pressure thus varies, by historical period, sector, and issue. The most influential modern statement of this view comes from David Vogel (1989). Finally, a pessimistic view of the capacity of business to exercise influence in the market economy dates from the work of economic historian, Joseph Schumpeter, in his classic, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (1943). On this view, the rationalizing culture of democracy constantly undermines the legitimacy of business authority, surrounding it with critics and creating an increasingly hostile cultural environment.

CHANGING MODES OF BUSINESS LOBBYING

What is without doubt is that the modes of business pressure in politics have changed greatly in recent decades. Three developments are particularly important. First, business increasingly has to formally organize to exert pressure over the political process; informal elite lobbying through private, personal contact is much less important than it was a generation ago. This is reflected in the increasingly professional character of business lobby groups, such as the business roundtable in the United States, an organizational form now widely copied across the capitalist democracies. Second, business pressure has to be conducted under conditions of increasing formal regulation. The most striking instance is the growing regulation of business contributions to party and election finance. As business money has assumed increasing importance to campaigning politicians, the conditions under which it can be solicited have been subjected to more and more stringent formal controls. The third change in the last generation is the rise of the large, single corporation as a sophisticated political actor. The biggest corporations typically have interests that are too complex to be easily accommodated by traditional collectively organized forms of business pressure, such as trade associations. They also typically have the resources to build in-house expertise and lobbying capacity. The rise of public affairs or government relations departments within large firms is thus one of the most distinctive recent developments in the world of business pressure.

The rise of the giant firm as a political actor is connected to another development of the past generation: the multinational organization of business as a political actor. Business has long crossed national borders, but the surge of globalization in the past generation also has prompted a surge in the globalization of business pressure. The best known examples are multinational institutions designed to provide both a forum for business to identify its interests, and a means of turning the consciousness of common interests into political pressure. For example, the European Round Table of Industrialists now speaks for the business elite in the European Union. Dutch political economist Bastian Van Apeldoorn (2000) has shown that it was central to the creation of the common European currency, the euro. The Transatlantic Business Dialogue, more ambitiously still, organizes a group of the thirty or so of the largest U.S. and European corporations. And since 1971, the World Economic Forum has provided an even more ambitious setting for the global distillation of business interests. The forum is best known for its annual meeting in Davos, but its more important work is conducted in numerous working parties and meetings that join together the global business elite throughout the year.

THE PROBLEMS OF BUSINESS LOBBYING

Business pressure in the politics of capitalist democracies remains profoundly important—a statement to which even the most committed pluralist could assent. But business faces great problems, of which three are particularly pressing. First, it faces acute problems of collective action. Firms are simultaneously divided by the competitive pressures of a market economy and yet driven by the need to cooperate

for the purpose of exercising political pressure. The globalization of business life has made collective action both more necessary and more difficult and has made more acute the tension between global outlook and interests and national jurisdictions. Second, business faces numerous new competitors and critics in civil society: environmental and consumer organizations, critics of its employment practices, and intellectual critics of the very foundation of business life in parts of the media and the higher education system. Finally, the great global financial crisis that began in 2007 in the United States damaged the claims of key parts of the business order, in the financial sector, to be able to conduct its affairs prudently, greatly increased state control and ownership of many enterprises, and raised large questions about the scale of reward enjoyed by many in the business elite. For the first time in a generation, business has found itself on the defensive politically across much of the advanced capitalist world. Nevertheless, the largest business corporations have formidable resources to organize that defense.

See also *Business Preference Formation; Campaign Finance; Capitalism and Democracy.*

. . . .   MICHAEL MORAN

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By(e)-election

By-elections (also spelled *bye elections* and known as *special elections* in the United States) are used to fill legislative vacancies arising during a term and between regular elections. In general the vacancy transpires due to the death or resignation of the holder of a public office, but sometimes it may happen when incumbents are deemed ineligible to continue their public duties. By-elections also occur when the results of a general election are invalidated due to voter irregularities or recall. About sixty-four countries worldwide use by-elections for all legislative vacancies, and this list includes various types of political systems. Countries ranging from China to Poland, New Zealand to Malta, and South Africa to Iran all avail by-elections when needed.

Historically, by-elections played a crucial role. During the time of Charles II, members of parliament in England had no limit to their duration. For that reason, by-elections were the prime source of recruiting new members to the parliament.

To better comprehend the significance of by-elections, one has to acknowledge their functions for the political system. By-elections perform several purposes, extending beyond the apparent objective of filling vacant legislative seats. Voter turnout is usually low for most by-elections in comparison to general elections. Not all by-elections prove important, but some have consequences for the legislature, political parties, election campaigns, governance, and the media. By-elections can sometimes prove an important way of recruitment of new representatives; they have led to turnover of as much as 10 percent in some British parliaments. By-elections also have created a route for parties to bring back leading frontbenchers defeated in the previous general election. The political ramifications following key contests have had considerable impact on subsequent events—and indeed on subsequent by-elections. The special elections in the Unites States have a minor impact on the political system due to a range of factors, namely, (1) the U.S. system consists of periodic fixed-term elections; (2) particular outcomes do not effect the timings of the general elections; and (3) U.S. House of Representative elections for all members are held every two years, with one-third of the members of the Senate elected for six-year terms every two years. Additionally, the United States is a two-party system in which special elections do not typically promote the minority party.

In general, by-election results are unfavorable for the governing party. Though certain by-elections have proven to be critical tests for minor parties, increasing their legislative strength, shaping expectations about party fortunes, and increasing the credibility of challenges to the established two-party system. By-elections, in contrary to general elections, embolden citizens to vote for the other party—the less significant party—which they would not vote for in general elections when their vote might change the political party in power. By-election victories for the governing party boost its popularity and support, while a loss leads to the disheartening of party supporters and sometimes divisions in party lines. Nevertheless, by-elections can provide significant political consequences for the political parties as well as the political system.

See also *Electoral Rules; Electoral Systems; Representation and Representative; Representative Systems.*

. . . .   FARAH JAN

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Cabinets and Cabinet Formation

The British essayist Walter Bagehot, in *The English Constitution,* famously defined the cabinet as a "combining committee—a *hyphen* which joins, a *buckle* which fastens the legislative part of the State to the executive part of the State" (Bagehot, 1867, 68). As such, the concept does not travel far outside parliamentary systems of government, but one needs to amend it only slightly to give it wider applicability: It is the most senior constitutional body, politically responsible (to parliament or president or both, depending on the political system) for directing the state bureaucracy. The cabinet is part of the broader concept of the government; not all (junior) ministers are cabinet ministers. In the United Kingdom, for example, of over one hundred ministers, only about a quarter are in the cabinet.

CABINET STRUCTURE

With regard to the cabinet function, the constitutional conventions are for it to deliberate collectively and for each cabinet minister's voice to count equally. Together, collective decision making and ministerial collegiality form an ideal type of cabinet government, with existing cabinets often deviating from one or both of these norms. Both collectiveness (the arena of decision making) and collegiality (the distribution of power) are dimensions of the cabinet's structure.

Dutch coalition cabinets, for example, are still close to the ideal type, with a cabinet that meets at least weekly for several hours, during which proposals are actually debated and sometimes amended, and with a prime minister whose formal powers are constrained by being the leader of only one of the political parties in the governing coalition. In the United States, the experience is completely different in both respects: although there is a "Cabinet Room" in the White House, and most newly elected presidents promise to use it, the president primarily deals with individual department secretaries bilaterally, and the cabinet as such rarely meets to deliberate on government policy. In addition, since the president is not only the chair of this cabinet but also the person to whom secretaries answer, the president holds a very powerful position. In this way, the U.S. cabinet is probably closest to the seventeenth-century origins of the cabinet as a set of individual advisers to the (British) monarch. That collectiveness and collegiality are linked in the two examples above does not mean that the the two dimensions can be collapsed. A prime minister can be dominant but exercise powers within meetings of the full cabinet (as is the case in Swedish single-party cabinets); or the prime minister can really be simply "a first among equals" without the cabinet serving as the principal venue for deliberating and deciding government policy (as seems to be the case in the Swiss Federal Council, where the position of prime minister rotates and ministers enjoy considerable autonomy).

Both collectivity and collegiality were confused in the (primarily British) debate about prime ministerial versus cabinet government, which led to the inconclusiveness of that debate. Recently this debate has broadened into the hypothesis that most countries with parliamentary systems of government are witnessing a trend of "presidentialization." Presidentialization occurs when prime ministers become less dependent on their political parties, fight more personalized election campaigns, and have more power over other ministers within the cabinet. This last aspect of presidentialization need not be the result of the prime minister being given more formal powers or resources; a greater need for coordination within the government, the internationalization of political decision making with the prime minister attending international summit meetings, and the tendency of the media to personalize government are also contributing factors to presidentialization. Others have criticized the ill-defined nature of the presidentialization thesis and have found little evidence for it.

Table 1 illustrates the poles of the two dimensions, on both of which intermediate positions can be discerned. Between collective and fragmented cabinets, for example, are segmented cabinets in which cabinet committees play an important role, especially where cabinet committees enjoy some degree of autonomy from the full cabinet. With regard to the distribution of power within cabinets, the intermediate position between monocratic and collegial cabinets takes hold when an inner cabinet dominates decision making. During 1970s and 1980s, for example, Canadian cabinets had both strong cabinet committees, which were even allocated their own budget at times, and an inner cabinet in the form of the Operations Committee of the Priority and Planning Committee. In Canada, an inner cabinet was set up because the cabinet itself had

TABLE 1: TWO DIMENSIONS OF CABINET GOVERNMENT

DISTRIBUTION OF POWER	ARENA OF DECISION MAKING	
	Fragmented	Collective
Monocratic	e.g., U.S. presidential cabinets	e.g., Swedish single-party cabinets
Collegial	e.g., the Swiss cabinet	e.g., Dutch coalition cabinets

grown too large, but this need not be the only reason. Many coalition cabinets have an inner cabinet or coalition committee, bringing together the leaders of the governing parties to prevent intracoalition conflicts from threatening the survival of the government.

CABINET FORMATION

By convention, a new cabinet is said to take office with each parliamentary or presidential election, with a change of party composition, or with a change of the head of government. Although the latter two changes can occur without elections, this is rare and usually intended as an interim solution after a cabinet crisis, to take care of government until the next scheduled or early elections are held. If the cabinet is monocratic, the president or the prime minister of a single-party cabinet forms the cabinet without much interference from others. In practice, however, even such cabinets are often coalitions of sorts: prime ministers must unite their own party and appease rival factions by appointing rival-party leaders to cabinet positions; presidents in presidential systems often want to broaden support in the legislature to ease passage of their proposals by inviting politicians from outside their own party to join the cabinet.

Where cabinets are based on a coalition of parties, their formation usually involves intensive negotiations between party leaders. An extensive body of literature, primarily based on rational choice theory, seeks to explain the outcome of the formation process in terms of the cabinet's party composition. Much less attention has been given to the allocation of particular portfolios to coalition parties. In 1996, Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle argued that the cabinet's policies are determined by this portfolio allocation as each party sets the agenda for the government departments that are led by a minister from its own ranks, in fact assuming that all cabinets are both collegial and fragmented. Scholars who argue instead that collective decision making plays an important role in cabinets have recently drawn attention to the fact that, increasingly, the cabinet formation results in a written coalition agreement replacing the individual parties' election manifestos as the basis for policy making; in the 1940s, 33 percent of European coalition cabinets had such a document, compared with 81 percent of such cabinets in the 1990s. In some cases the documents are quite comprehensive, with the record set by a coalition agreement of 43,550 words in Belgium (Müller

and Strøm, 2008). Given the negotiations involved, the cabinet formation can take quite a long time. Forming monocratic cabinets and single-party cabinets takes less time, as does the formation of coalition cabinets with a fixed-party composition (the Swiss "magic formula") or those based on a preelectoral coalition. In other cases, the number of viable alternative combinations of parties may prolong the bargaining process and produce several failed attempts before a new cabinet can take office.

See also *Coalition Formation; Coalition Theory.*

. . . . RUDY B. ANDEWEG

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Caciquismo/Coronelismo

Caciquismo and *coronelismo* refer to informal political boss or chieftain systems in Latin America and Spain. The term *cacique* derives from a Caribbean indigenous word used at the time of the Spanish conquest. In Spain and Spanish-speaking Latin America, caciques are local bosses exercising power in informal and personalistic ways, often using violence or threats thereof to buttress their power. National officials often recognize the cacique's de facto authority in a locality and work through the cacique to distribute government largess. The officials rely on caciques to provide effective policing of the area the caciques control, which often leads to the determination that the political cost of challenging a cacique's authority would be excessive. Caciquismo has flourished in the larger Latin American nations, reflecting regionalism and the incapacity of

central states to consolidate their authority across the nation. Most caciques emerge out of their communities because they possess sources of power such as access to land, loans needed by poor peasants to survive, or political connections.

Coronelismo refers to the variant of caciquismo practiced in Brazil, especially its rural northeast. In colonial Brazil, *coronel* was the highest rank in the colonial militia, to which local bosses sought to attach their armed followers.

See also *Latin American Politics and Society; Latino Politics.*

. . . . JOSEPH L. KLESNER

Caesarism

Named after the first Roman Emperor Julius Caesar (100–44 BCE), Caesarism connotes absolute rule, dictatorship, and use of military force. It is believed François Auguste Romieu, in his *Ere des Césars* (1850), first coined the neologism. Caesarism is the phenomenon of a political ruler's assertion of great political and military force at a time of national crisis, uniting the populace while avoiding constitutional limitations on executive power. As a political concept, Caesarism came into being with the rise of mass democracy after the French Revolution (1789–1799). Opposed to representative institutions and mediating elements between ruler and ruled, Caesarism, as Oswald Spengler stated in *Decline of the West*, is a return to formlessness. As institutions are emptied of meaning, the personal power of the Caesarist ruler becomes fundamental to the existence of the nation. Spengler calls Caesarism the period of contending states when gigantic private wars are fought to promote democracy for states without form and a history. Caesarism characterizes the new modern politics of mass democracy where the private individual absorbed in money effaces the national identities of tradition, institutions, and culture. The strong ruler steps into the anarchical abyss of mass democracy and money appealing to the primitive instincts of religion, race, and blood. Politics becomes infused with mysticism and secular religious symbols expressed in the mythic figure of the leader representing the people.

See also *Authoritarianism, African; Charisma; Religion and Politics; West, Decline of the.*

. . . . JOANNE TETLOW

Calhoun, John

Leading American politician and theorist, John Caldwell Calhoun (1782–1850) served as a South Carolina state representative, U.S. representative, U.S. senator, secretary of war and of state, and vice president of the United States. Calhoun's political writings reflect his responses to the great political problems of nineteenth-century America: the conflict over the Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832, the slavery crisis, and the concentration of political power in the national government under President Andrew Jackson. All of these convinced Calhoun that America's constitutional foundations were in danger.

Calhoun addresses these dangers in his primary political writings. *A Disquisition on Government* (1851) looks at the nature of man and government in addition to expounding the doctrine of the concurrent majority—the right of significant interests to have a veto over the enactment or implementation of a public law. *A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States* (1851) traces the constitutional foundation for the concurrent majority within the American political tradition and argued for its restoration. By recognizing and incorporating natural social divisions into a coherent whole, Calhoun contended that the concurrent majority ameliorates social and political tensions through deliberation and compromise, distinguishing it from the numerical majority that deals with these tensions through force.

Calhoun believed that the numerical majority fails to consider a political community's natural diversity. As a result, it can only assess preference through overall electoral victory, which overrates the homogeneity of the political environment. Moreover, the majority system supposes that the apparatus of voting can resolve all conflict, even when no consensus of opinion exists. The numerical majority attempts to control government at any cost by emphasizing political party at the expense of constitutional principles, and the numerical majority's inability to assess the true preferences of the citizenry threatens to undermine the electoral and constitutional foundations of republican government.

Calhoun's critique has been interpreted as evidence of a lack of concern for popular rule. He is seen as the protector of particular interests, especially slaveholders, and his defense of slavery as a "positive good" instead of a necessary evil is thought to derail America's liberal tradition. Calhoun is seen as overthrowing America's Lockean origins through a purposeful rejection of James Madison's politics, especially the emphasis on natural rights. But his defense of slavery is neither the most important nor the most consuming aspect of his political thought.

Focusing on the relationship between the *Disquisition* and the *Discourse* shows that Calhoun's focus is on liberty, the nature of the American union, constitutionalism, and states' rights. British philosopher and political theorist John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) applauds Calhoun's understanding of federal representative government as a means of providing for greater participation while avoiding conflict. Calhoun also provides a disincentive to the growth of a corruptive central governing authority. Lord Acton (1834–1902), British historian and moralist, finds in Calhoun's presentation of an authentic constitutional tradition a defense of democratic theory and the American union. Calhoun's political thought is central to an understanding of America's constitutional tradition.

See also *Natural Rights; States' Rights.*

. . . . JORDON B. BARKALOW

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Calvin, John

John Calvin (1509–1564), the most systematic Protestant theologian of the Reformation, has, through his writings, influenced the nature and scope of secular authority and the right of Christians to resist their rulers. Born in Noyon, France, Calvin studied liberal arts in Paris, law at Orléans, and then a humanist curriculum at the Collège Royal in Paris. In 1534, he fled to Basel, Switzerland, because of his association with evangelical figures. In Basel in 1536, he published a compendium of the Reformed faith titled *Institutes of the Christian Religion,* a work that he would continue to revise and expand throughout his life.

The *Institute*'s success gained Calvin notoriety in evangelical circles, and he was recruited by Guillaume Farel (1489–1565) to help organize a Reformed church in Geneva. Enemies of Farel and Calvin secured their expulsion from Geneva in 1538, and Calvin moved to Strasbourg where he became leader of the French Reformed community and participated in religious dialogues among participants. In 1541, supporters in Geneva recalled Calvin who, using his practical experience heading a community in Strasbourg, created a new church ordinance and order of worship that became the basis of the Genevan reformation. He remained at the center of the Genevan church until his death.

Calvin's frequent revisions to his most important work, the *Institutes,* reveal an evolution in his political thought. In the first published edition in 1536, his views share much with those of the mature Martin Luther (1483–1546). Calvin offers a form of Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms when he asserts that the state is charged only with maintaining external righteousness by regulating such acts as blasphemy and should not interfere with a believer's personal relationship with God. Calvin also largely agreed with Luther that all subjects owe political obedience to the authorities and should offer only passive resistance to even tyrannical rulers because God places all rulers in power. However, again following Luther's line of thinking by the mid-1530s, he accepted that "popular magistrates" in some circumstances may collectively resist tyrants.

By the 1539 and 1543 editions of the *Institutes,* Calvin's thought had evolved, reflecting his experiences as a participant in the civil life of Strasbourg and Geneva. Calvin expanded several sections on church organization where he advocated an aristocratic or mixed form of government. This shift had an impact on his view of civil polity. For the first time, he fully articulated a preference for mixed government, arguing that the divinely ordained form for ecclesiastical government must provide the model for civil polity. He also shifted his views on secular authority. No longer did he advocate clearly separate secular and ecclesiastical spheres. Instead he presented the Christian polity as a single whole in which both secular and ecclesiastical institutions derived their authority directly from God and cooperated to govern a polity of like-minded believers. This conceptualization of the Christian polity came out of Calvin's experiences and offered an influential new theory of the relationship between ecclesiastical and civil authorities in Reformed communities.

See also *Luther, Martin; Reformation Political Thought.*

. . . .   ERIC NELSON

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Calvinism

See *Calvin, John.*

Cambridge School

The *Cambridge school* refers to that coterie of intellectual historians educated at Cambridge University, chief among whom were Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock, whose work emphasized the importance of various contexts to the study of political thought. They sought by their approach to offer a new interpretation of the history of political thought that would avoid the confusions to which, they alleged, prevailing texualist modes of interpretation, above all, were prone.

Recent accounts of the school's genesis identify the work of Cambridge historian Peter Laslett as seminal to its creation. Laslett, who in 1949 published an edition of Sir Robert Filmer's (1588–1653) *Patriarcha,* showed in his research that Filmer's *Patriarcha* had been composed perhaps as early as 1630 but only published in 1679 to 1680, whereas his other writings had appeared in 1648. Thus Laslett pointed to "three contexts," or historical moments, that had to be considered before the historian could comprehend "what [Filmer] had intended and how he had been understood" at the time. Laslett subsequently established, with the publication in 1960 of his critical edition of John Locke's (1632–1704) *Treatises on Government,* that the *Treatises* had been written perhaps as early as 1681, several years before Locke published them anonymously in 1689. The setting of this date called into question the thesis that Locke's intention in writing the *Treatises* had been to make a post hoc apology for the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and permitted historians to consider the possibility that he had intended to advocate rebellion in England from the outset.

The emphasis Laslett's work placed on context provided by certain historical moments strongly influenced J. G. A. Pocock, a New Zealand–born graduate student then at Cambridge University under the tutelage of historian Herbert Butterfield.

Pocock's dissertation, expanded and published as *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law* in 1957, declared itself to be an effort in the *history of historiography*, a term he would later apply to his life's work, but his best known and most influential contribution to the history of political thought would prove to be *The Machiavellian Moment*. First appearing in 1975, it argued for the existence of a continuity between the political thought of Machiavelli—seen as issuing in the revival of a "republican ideal" taken from Aristotle—and the "civic consciousness" of Puritan England and America during the Revolution. After holding teaching posts in New Zealand, Pocock emigrated to the United States, eventually settling at Johns Hopkins University, where in the mid-2000s he was the Harry C. Black Professor of History Emeritus.

Quentin Skinner, shortly after becoming a Fellow at Christ's Church College in Cambridge in 1962, published several articles on interpretive and methodological questions, the most important of which, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," became the "manifesto of an emerging method" and closely associated with the approach of the Cambridge school as a whole. In "Meaning and Understanding," Skinner attacked textualist approaches to the history of political thought for often issuing in anachronism through neglect of external evidence crucial to interpretation of texts. Thus, for example, scholars who ignored the fact that contemporaries of Thomas Hobbes and Pierre Bayle had understood their intention "to deal both ironically and destructively with the prevailing theological orthodoxies" were in danger of erecting mythologies rather than writing histories of political thought. Likewise, Skinner criticized contextualists for wrongly presuming their accounts of social contexts and conditions as sufficient to supply an understanding of authorial intent. Instead, he stressed the importance of attending to the manner in which a word or idea was used in a given context, believing such recourse to linguistic conventions would reveal whether and to what extent political theorists adhered to or departed from the regnant ideas of their time. Accordingly, in his 1978 *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, Skinner sought to "construct a general framework within which the writings of the more prominent theorists can then be situated" and more fully understood. In 1996, Skinner became the Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge University.

See also *Political Discourse; Political Thought, Foundations of.*

. . . .   RAYMOND MERCADO

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Campaign Advertising

Campaign advertising is the use of paid-for political ads to communicate a political party or candidate's message to the public, in an effort to influence decision making and win votes. Campaign ads provide the opportunity to send carefully crafted, unadulterated messages directly to the electorate and are an integral component of the information environment in an election campaign. While campaign advertising is primarily associated with American-style, candidate-centered campaigns, campaign advertising also features in-party–centered systems found across Europe. In recent years however, nonparty-based organizations have increased their use of paid-for political advertising to influence ballot measures resulting from initiative or referendum processes. For example, in November 2008 California voters passed Proposition 8, a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage, after record breaking spending on advertising funded largely by religious groups, including $20 million from the Mormon Church. Across Europe, campaign advertising for the European No Campaign on the European Union (EU) Constitution was managed outside traditional party organizations and funded primarily by wealthy individuals from member states.

THE POSTMODERN CAMPAIGN

Proposition 8 illustrates another key feature of campaign advertising—the move from the modern campaign, where advertising was based predominantly on broadcast television and radio advertising, to the postmodern campaign, characterized by the use of advertising mediums driven by advances in information and communication technologies (e.g., the Internet, mobile phones, and social networking sites) to target ads to voters based on their self-identified most important issue. Using sophisticated databases and mapping technology like GeoVote and Voter Vault, parties and candidates are able to microtarget messages to individual voters based on sociodemographic characteristics, consumer behavior, and values, thus maximizing the opportunity to get the right message to the right voter. The Obama campaign in the United States successfully targeted younger voters in battleground states using mobile phone technology, and in the United Kingdom, the Tories have used Spotify, a music streaming service, to target a message on debt to young people and encourage them to vote Conservative in the next election.

Advances in information and communication technology pose problems for campaign advertising, which has been subject to extensive regulation. In the United States, campaign advertising for federal (national) office is regulated by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and governed by key

Non-political party groups have become more active in political advertising, such as the campaign to pass Proposition 8 in California. Spending in support of the proposition to ban same-sex marriage far surpassed those against it, and voters passed the proposition into law.

SOURCE: AP Images

legislation including the Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA; 1971, 1974) and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA; 2002). The FEC is charged with maintaining transparency and accountability by regulating the source, disclosure, and sponsorship requirements of campaign advertisements. Since the BCRA, two standards are applied in regulating ads: express advocacy and electioneering communications. However, the electioneering communications standard only applies to campaign ads appearing on broadcast, cable, or satellite transmission, exempting many other advertising media: newspapers; direct mail; billboards or posters; and electronic media, including Internet websites, email, and social networking sites.

The regulatory focus on broadcast advertising stems from the growing number of, resources allocated to, and unintended consequences of (particularly) negative ads. The thirty-second television spot, the workhorse of campaign advertising, is the primary means by which citizens are exposed to campaign ads, and the use of spots for presidential and congressional elections has increased dramatically since 2000. Indeed, many critics claim the costs associated with the production and airtime required for television ads are largely responsible for the significant increases in campaign spending. This charge is not without merit: Fundraising for the 2008 election totaled over $3 billion for federal candidates, with fundraising in the presidential race alone up 80 percent from 2004. Presidential candidates Barack Obama and John McCain spent $440 million on national ads alone, producing some six hundred thousand airings.

Since 2000, the Wisconsin Advertising Project, using data from TNS Media Intelligence/Campaign Media Analysis Group, has made available data on the content, targeting, and frequency of political ads. This has helped provide some of the empirical evidence for perhaps the key debate surrounding campaign advertising: the increased use and consequences of negative ads. Scholars, politicians, pundits, and journalists have expressed concern for the (un)intended consequences of negative advertising on the health of representative democracy, and more specifically on voter learning, engagement, and turnout.

NEGATIVE ADS

While a dominant feature of recent U.S. elections, the use of negative ads is not a new phenomenon. In the 1964 presidential election, Lyndon Johnson's "Daisy Girl" television ad capitalized on Barry Goldwater's threat to use nuclear weapons in the ongoing U.S. conflict in Vietnam. The ad, which ran only once (bowing to Republican Party protest), contrasted a young girl playfully counting petals pulled from a flower in a field of daisies and a male voiceover counting down a nuclear launch; the girl was eventually subsumed in the blackened mushroom cloud. The controversial "Daisy Girl," former president George H. W. Bush's "Willie Horton" ad linking Michael Dukakis with murderer Willie Horton, and the 527 group's "Swift Boat Veterans" campaign ad attacking John Kerry's Vietnam service record are now classic examples of how negative ads can successfully influence the discourse, direction, and outcome of election campaigns.

However, there is some risk to negative advertising, because ads can backfire. In Britain, the Conservative Party's "Demon Eyes" ad aimed to reframe Tony Blair's broad smile and wide eyes, once considered positive attributes, to reveal his underlying insincerity and untrustworthiness. Whilst the Conservatives were censured by the Advertising Standards Agency for portraying Blair as sinister and dishonest, the ad also crystallized public opinion against the Tories, who, in the public's eyes, were seen as out of touch, unduly negative, and desperate.

Scholarly evidence from experimental and survey research on how negative ads impact mobilization and participation is mixed. Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar's (1995) benchmark study found that negative advertising suppresses turnout, particularly for the nonpartisan electorate, which may serve to incentivize candidates who benefit from low turnout to engage in this form of advertising. More recently, evidence suggests that negative advertising depresses the public mood, which has indirect and unequal effects on turnout. While the thirty-second spot has been vilified for increasing the perceived superficiality of the information environment and the so-called dumbing down of political discourse, a number of studies have found positive effects of negative advertising. With this, scholars have disputed the demobilization hypothesis with evidence suggesting that negative advertising can actually

differences in conceptualization and measurement of negative advertising may contribute to the ongoing empirical debate over their impact on representative democracy.

See also *Campaign Finance; Campaigns.*

. . . .   JENNIFER (VAN HEERDE) HUDSON

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Britain's Conservative Party issued this "demon eyes" ad to sway public opinion against Tony Blair and the Labour Party. It is one example of negative advertising, which can both sway voters and turn them off from voting.

SOURCE: AP Images

stimulate turnout. Furthermore, John Geer (2000, 2006) has shown that negative ads hold a higher information content than positive ads, are more issue than trait or value oriented, and are more likely to be supported by evidence.

Some of the disparity in the findings about the impact of negative advertising stems from the debate over defining negativity. Many have argued that negative ads have a legitimate place in campaigns and elections because they make genuine contrasts between candidates (parties) on policy, ideology or traits, whereas "attack" advertising serve no other purpose than to malign and assail the opposition. Thus, on normative grounds, there appears to be little justification for limiting the use of negative ads, as they serve an important role in transferring information from the candidate or party to the voter; however, a similar case cannot be made for attack ads that stretch the boundaries between truth and fiction and serve to obfuscate the actuality of party, policy, or personal realities. A number of studies have failed to make this distinction, relying on a two-category comparison of positive versus negative ads in lieu of more refined categorization demarcating positive versus negative, comparative, or contrast ads, or comparing positive ads to attack ads across trait or issue appeals. Thus,

Campaign Finance

Campaign finance refers to money that is spent for purposes of political competition. In modern liberal democracies, such funds are not necessarily devoted to election campaigns. When senior scholars James Pollock and Louise Overacker began analyzing the role of money in politics, they started in the United States, looking at the money spent to influence the outcome of a federal election. Their starting point has dominated perception of the subject ever after. "Campaign funds" is the subject heading under which the Library of Congress catalogs all books dealing with money in politics and the classification is the major target of any U.S. scholar who approaches the subject.

During the second half of the twentieth century, U.S. political scientist Alexander Heard tried to bridge the glaring gap of perception between U.S. and foreign scholars when he created the broader term, *costs of democracy.* Arnold Heidenheimer, a European researcher, added the term *party finance,*

and Europeans may have applauded this enlargement of perception. However, American author Delmer Dunn returned to the traditional trail and many others followed in the footprints of their forebears. To this day, for U.S. scholars, *campaign finance* is the name of the game.

Regulation of campaign funds varies among the democracies. Some (like the United States) regulate the flow of contributions into campaign coffers. Some limit candidate spending only, as the United Kingdom did between 1883 and 2000. Very rarely a political finance regime (like the Canadian system) stipulates rules for contributions and expenses, for candidates and parties. Currently, no democracy provides for full transparency of all campaign funds.

RAISING CAMPAIGN FUNDS

The financial support of policies, politicians, and parties is an expression of economic and political freedom, not necessarily the consequence of influence peddling or corrupt exchanges. Individual donations in small amounts provide about half of the total funds raised in the United States and Canada, much less of it in Germany and the United Kingdom. Only in the Netherlands and Switzerland, European politicians can collect a comparable share from signed-up party members. Even the traditional left-of-center mass-membership parties raise less than a quarter of their funds from this source.

Various alleys have been explored successfully to glean grassroots funding: recruiting party members, lotteries, direct mail drives, Internet or neighborhood solicitation, and social events at the local level. Whereas personal (door-to-door and peer) solicitation for political contributions was more frequent in the 1960s, it has been superseded by computerized mass mailings since the 1970s, and Internet appeals more recently. A public benefit program (preferably matching funds or tax credits) can ensure that political fundraising will not fall victim to competing nongovernmental organizations or charities. Because matching funds and tax credits require financial contributions by individual citizens, they are more suitable to participatory democracy than direct public subsidies (flat grants), which do not require specific efforts by parties or candidates.

Money from the business community (corporate donations) is no longer a real danger in most democracies. Both means of raising plutocratic funding (direct contributions as well as institutional fundraising) have declined, mostly because their proceeds have been substituted by public subsidies. Due to political action committee money and independent expenditures, the United States may be the most important exception to that rule.

A comparatively new source of political funding is public subsidies. As with any other kind of funding, specific problems accompany them (such as rules for access and distribution). However, in combination with other sources of revenue as well as rules to enforce fairness and legitimacy (e.g., the matching principle), according to Canadian scholar Khayyam Paltiel, state aid is a means of political funding that no modern democracy should forgo.

LEVELS AND ITEMS OF CAMPAIGN SPENDING

Knowledge of political spending has improved much during recent decades, but it is still limited to a few countries. In the two biggest democracies of our time (India and the United States), the bulk of all money spent for political purposes is deployed for campaigning. Any guess between 75 and 90 percent of the total funds available for political competition can be an adequate measure for the share of campaign funds. However, not even in Canada or the United Kingdom, two other important Anglo-Saxon democracies, do campaigns devour a comparable share of all political funds. In any *Parteienstaat, partitocrazia,* or party democracy of continental Western Europe (e.g., Germany, Italy, and Austria), most funds devoted to politics are used to pay for the routine operations of parties on the ground and in that nation's capital.

Many observers suggest that, over time, campaign spending has exploded. Paid television advertising, new campaign technology, and growing numbers of salaried experts are seen to have caused unavoidable financial needs. Political competitors may sink significant amounts of money into such items just because—thanks to citizens' generosity, public subsidies, or corrupt exchanges—they can afford to do so. Surprisingly enough, current levels of political spending fall short of earlier peaks. In gross domestic product adjusted terms, U.S. presidential campaigns cost less than 30 cents per citizen in the 1920s, in the 1950s, and in 2000; about 35 cents in the 1990s; some 50 cents in the Nixon years (1968–1972); and 80 to 95 cents for Franklin Roosevelt's reelection bids in 1936 and 1940. This supply-side theory of expenditure can be demonstrated for the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Japan, and Austria. In these countries, per capita expenses are now much lower than they used to be, due to shrinking revenue possibilities. This is quite in line with earlier observations made by Pollock, Overacker, and Heard.

SPEND AND WIN?

Journalists and scholars have frequently claimed that money wins elections. Clearly, people who spend more and more money on political competition expect that this will have some sort of impact. With the current commercial style of campaigning, money seems to be much more relevant today than in the times of mass parties and machine politics. Money buys access to communication (newspapers, radio, television, billboards, telephones, and mailings).

Statistical analysis in examining campaign finance has been greatly enhanced by the use of computers and the wealth of available data. For the 1979 Canadian election, Seymour Isenberg found evidence of a clear relationship between being first and spending the most, and he confirmed this for the 1980 election. Using more data and different modeling, Gary Jacobson also found "a clear connection between campaign spending and election results" in the United States. However, evaluating English constituencies, Ronald Johnston found no indication "that the level of spending is a major, let alone a dominant influence on the result."

Based on spending data and election results, spending is frequently analyzed as the cause of voting. However, it may well be that donating is a means of support and a bellwether of expected success, whereas spending is just a consequence of cash at hand, not the cause of success. Thus, a simple correlation between political money and electoral success is misleading. Campaign money is most productive when other factors make winning possible—and if so, it is definitely the voters' choice and not the politicians' cash that will decide the outcome of an election.

See also *Campaign Advertising; Campaigns; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Party Finance; Political Action Committee (PAC).*

. . . .   KARL-HEINZ NASSMACHER

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Campaigning, Negative

See *Negative Campaigning.*

Campaigns

A *campaign* is an effort on the part of a candidate or organized group to convince a segment of the population to reach a particular decision. Said differently, campaigns reflect competition over ideas. The goal of any political campaign is for a candidate to be elected so that candidate can advance specific policy goals or political ideals. In a democratic system, candidates interested in attaining political office find it necessary to campaign in order to appeal to their respective constituencies in the period preceding an election. In a presidential, congressional, statewide, or local campaign, for instance, that effort typically involves convincing registered or likely voters to support one party's political candidate over the alternative. Ultimately, those candidates who are elected are often said to have run an effective campaign, while those who lose are viewed as running an ineffective or less successful campaign.

In nearly all cases, the process is much more complicated than this simple dichotomy would suggest, but this can be a useful starting place for thinking about the campaigning process.

Although all campaigns for elective office are unique or different, there are certain similarities in political campaigns regardless of which office a candidate is trying to attain. In many respects, the most important feature of a campaign is finding effective and innovative ways of increasing one's name recognition with likely or potential voters. This can involve meeting with small groups of voters face-to-face; giving speeches to larger crowds; sending out mailers listing one's qualifications for office; and advertising on billboards, radio, or television. While some strategists might claim that any name recognition is a good thing, the most effective campaigns are designed specifically to elicit a favorable response among voters regarding the candidate. Essentially, the candidate tries to generate a positive "brand" name that will be remembered favorably by the voters when they go to their polling place on election day. In this respect, campaigning is not unlike creating a favorable image for a popular laundry detergent or brand of shampoo that shoppers will want to purchase.

Another essential aspect of a successful campaign is the ability to raise money. Creating a favorable brand name is not an inexpensive endeavor. It is costly both in terms of time and money. As such, candidates need to raise substantial sums of money in order to wage an effective campaign for any political office. Not surprisingly, the higher the stakes, the greater the amount of money needed to win an election. Presidential candidates, for instance, often find it necessary to raise enormous sums of money during the primary stage of the campaign and are still not assured the nomination for office. Congressional candidates, in contrast, spend millions of dollars in attempts to be reelected to either the House or Senate. Sending out mailings, hiring operatives to assist with campaign efforts, and advertising on both radio and television are very expensive, and require candidates for political office to constantly raise money during their campaigns.

A third important feature of a successful political campaign involves crafting a message that will resonate with the voters. Candidates running for political office against an incumbent (one who already holds political office) have to convince voters both why the incumbent should not be reelected and why the challenger represents a more viable alternative. As such, a carefully constructed message targeted to a specific subset of voters who will help the candidate win is crucial. The message a candidate employs can vary based on whether it is a statewide or national race, the economic nature of the times, or which party currently is in power in government. During the 2008 presidential campaign, for instance, Democratic candidate Barack Obama campaigned on a message or theme of change. On election day, his message of change resonated with nearly 53 percent of the American voters who were tired of eight years of control by the Bush administration. In a similar fashion, candidates for Congress or statewide legislators can run on a similar message of change. The classic notion of "throwing the bums out" is often invoked in legislative

campaigns to signify that the incumbents have lost touch with the voters and should be replaced with a new face—often one that represents change from the status quo.

While all of the above factors—name recognition, money, and a message that resonates with the voters—are necessary to win an election, they are not sufficient. In nearly all cases, the success of a candidate's campaign is also contingent upon the ability of staff, volunteers, and party activists to motivate people to turn out to vote on election day. Even candidates with a well-recognized name, lots of money, and a strong message are not guaranteed victory unless their supporters are encouraged to show up and vote. This is why voter registration efforts and get-out-the-vote drives are important components to a candidate's electoral success. Clearly, a candidate can do only so much in terms of motivating voters to participate in the election. Beyond that, it takes a well-organized and highly structured campaign staff as well as volunteers to encourage people to go to the polls. Since both party's candidates seek to maximize turnout, it is ultimately the candidate whose strategies and tactics are more effective who will be the victor at the end of the day.

PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS

In many respects, the presidential campaign has become the focal point of elections in the United States. Every four years, Americans focus their attention on the pomp and circumstance associated with the presidential campaign. There is probably no equivalent political event that generates as much attention and interest in this country and around the world. Candidates vying for the highest elective office in the land often are required to start their campaign relatively early to have a chance of earning the nomination during the primary stage of the campaign. In recent years, it has almost become the case that as soon as one presidential campaign ends, the next one begins. If a candidate is to have a chance at raising the hundreds of millions of dollars necessary to wage a successful campaign, securing the delegates necessary to capture the nomination, and increasing one's name recognition on a national level, it is not surprising that candidates need to begin campaigning as early as possible—in most cases, several years in advance.

Presidential campaigns occur in two stages. The first stage involves securing the party's nomination for president during the primary stage of the election, and the second stage pits both parties' nominees against one another in the general election. During the primary stage of the campaign, those starting early often have an advantage in terms of enhancing their name recognition, raising money, and securing commitments among delegates at the presidential conventions. It is at this stage of the process that candidates begin to craft a message for their campaign that will hopefully earn them the nomination. Although a frontrunner may emerge early on, there are often a number of potentially viable candidates seeking to earn the nomination during the primary campaign. Unlike the general election, the nomination stage is actually a series of elections. Thus, momentum plays a part in the primary process—winning a number of early contests can help propel a candidate to the nomination. As a result of limited resources, time, and other constraints, a

gradual winnowing process occurs the longer the primary campaign continues. Ultimately, the slate of candidates is reduced to two or three after the initial caucuses and primaries occur. With additional primaries and caucuses held on various days, eventually only one candidate from each party is left, and that candidate ends up earning the most delegates and the respective party's nomination.

Once the nomination for each candidate is secured at the party's national convention, the general election campaign begins. This usually takes place around early September, right after Labor Day. This is the stage of the process when each party's presidential candidate attempts to "seal the deal" with the American voters. This task is complicated by the fact that many voters have already made up their minds about who they intend to vote for well before the general election campaign begins. Some evidence suggests that nearly two-thirds of the American voters have already decided whom they will vote for before the final two months of the general election campaign. As such, both party's candidates use whatever opportunities are available to reach out to undecided voters or weak "leaners" who might be convinced to vote for the opposing party's candidate. It is during this stage of the campaign process that presidential candidates begin releasing television advertisements in, and traveling to, the competitive or battleground states in an attempt to secure a majority of electoral votes to eventually win the presidency.

The media plays an important role during both stages of the presidential campaign, as they are the main audience for much of what the candidates do when running for the presidency. Since media outlets want to attract as many readers or viewers as possible, they tend to focus on the "horserace" aspect of the presidential campaign. In other words, they focus much of their attention on which presidential candidate is currently in the lead, what presidential polls look like on a day-to-day basis, and what issues emphasized by the candidates seem to be resonating the most with likely or potential voters. Given the enormous costs of political advertising, presidential candidates value as much free media time as possible. If their actions are being covered by the media on a daily basis, that is less money that the candidates have to spend themselves in order to get their names out or to advertise their positions to voters. Nearly all presidential candidates travel with an entourage of press correspondents so they will be there when breaking news happens on the campaign trail. Despite the fact that their messages are being filtered through the media, candidates still value the access granted to them by various media outlets.

The presidential campaign has changed dramatically since the early days of the American republic. During much of the nineteenth century, presidential campaigns were carried out primarily by the party organizations. Presidential candidates were often said to wage what was known as a front-porch campaign—they would sit on their front porches throughout the fall greeting anyone who would come by to talk with them. However, they rarely if ever campaigned themselves. President Theodore Roosevelt was among the first to change this tradition as he traveled around the country by train during the 1904

presidential campaign. Several years later, Franklin Roosevelt was the first presidential candidate to appear in person when the Democratic Party nominated him at their convention in 1932. Since that time, the presidential campaign has steadily evolved into more of a candidate-centered system that is more familiar in the modern age. As such, candidates are largely responsible for selecting their own campaign staffs, paid consultants, and advisers with less support from the political party organizations than was the case during the nineteenth century.

CONGRESSIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL CAMPAIGNS

Not surprisingly, congressional, state, and local campaigns receive far less attention and coverage than presidential campaigns. With literally hundreds of races at these lower levels, it is difficult for any one race in particular to generate as much attention as the presidential campaign. Every four years, and wherever possible, congressional or statewide candidates seek to ride the coattails of the presidential candidates during the election campaign. For instance, candidates for congressional or statewide offices try to appear with their respective party's presidential candidates as much as they can during campaign visits to their district or state. Not only does this generate additional attention for their own campaigns, but it also offers a form of credible endorsement given that the presidential candidates are willing to appear on the same stage as the candidates running in these more localized races. Any type of "free" media coverage in this context is a good thing for statewide or congressional candidates since it reinforces the notion that they are both well-connected and important enough for the party's presidential nominee to spend time visiting with supporters in the local constituencies. These types of candidates can also benefit from the increase in turnout during presidential election years since voters tend to go to the polls in greater numbers every four years.

During off-year or midterm elections, congressional or statewide candidates have a more difficult time generating as much media attention as might occur during a presidential campaign. However, this is probably more reflective of the candidate-centered electoral system in the United States. As noted earlier for presidential campaigns, candidates for congressional, statewide, or local races often run individually due to the candidate-centered nature of U.S. campaigns. Political parties can offer valuable services, especially in terms of voter education campaigns and get-out-the-vote efforts, but the role of parties in these types of races is far more decentralized than it used to be. Although candidates for congressional or statewide offices run under one of the two party labels, they often formulate their own campaign messages and strategies and are not unified under one broad party platform. As such, congressional candidates may run as Democrats that are both moderate and more liberal just as Republican candidates may run who are both centrist and more conservative on the ideological spectrum.

DO CAMPAIGNS MATTER?

One question that repeatedly arises in the context of research on presidential elections is whether or not campaigns actually matter in terms of the overall election outcome. This is an important question that has been widely debated in the context of electoral politics in recent decades. To the casual observer, this question has a simple answer—of course campaigns matter. After all, why would politicians go to all the trouble of raising money, scheduling campaign visits, and debating their opponents if these activities had little or no impact on the outcome of the election? This is certainly a fair question. Time and resources are certainly scarce commodities for any candidate running for political office, and candidates do not want to waste them if they suspect they are not being allocated efficiently. Yet for all the logic underlying this inquiry, political scientists remain somewhat skeptical about whether campaigns matter for a variety of different reasons.

The main reason for this skepticism is the evidence from various forecasting models of presidential elections. Every four years, political scientists offer predictions about which party's presidential candidate will win the upcoming election through the use of a variety of forecasting models. While some of the models are relatively complex in terms of the number of explanatory variables, others are fairly simple and predictions are based on factors such as the current state of the economy and the overall approval level of the incumbent administration. As is often the case, these relatively straightforward models offer an accurate prediction of the election outcome to within one or two percentage points. Since these parsimonious models can often predict the outcome of the election without accounting for any specific campaign effects, the natural question that arises is how important can campaigns be in light of this highly suggestive evidence? Furthermore, there is considerable survey evidence suggesting that a large proportion of voters make up their minds about whom to vote for months before the election occurs, which casts additional doubt on the overall effectiveness of campaigns.

Although some scholars discount the importance of campaigns in light of the above findings, many others suggest that, in most cases, the effects of campaigns may simply be muted. For instance, it may be the case that campaigns matter, but that the effects of competing campaigns tend to cancel each other out over the course of the months preceding the election. Others suggest that campaigns matter, but the effects are felt only at the margins in close, competitive elections when the number of votes between the two candidates is relatively small. Still others believe that campaigns are very effective at helping undecided voters make up their minds, but that they have little effect on the early deciders or partisan leaners who rely almost exclusively on party affiliation as a cue for whom to vote for in the upcoming election. Regardless of the scholarly evidence, it would likely be difficult to find candidates willing to forgo their campaign efforts on the off chance that the efforts might actually make a difference in terms of predicting who would go on to win the election.

See also *Democracy; Political Parties; Primaries; Republic; Voter Registration Drive; Voting Behavior.*

. . . .   JAMIE L. CARSON

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Campbell, Albert Angus

Albert Angus Campbell (1910–1980) is considered by many as the father of modern political behavior and survey research in the social sciences. His contributions extend from groundbreaking research in the early use of surveys, the establishment of the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center (SRC) after World War II (1939–1945), and the entrenchment of the National Election Studies (NES) as a national resource by the National Science Foundation. Campbell's impact in political science literature has been far-reaching, because of the methods and concepts developed and the standards set by his work, from the pathbreaking *The American Voter* to his final work, *The Sense of Well-Being in America.*

Born in Indiana, Campbell was one of six children, the son of a school principal who had been educated in Latin and Greek at the University of Michigan. The family moved to Portland, Oregon, where Campbell later attended the University of Oregon, receiving a BA and an MA in psychology. At Stanford University, he obtained his doctorate in experimental psychology. His transition to social psychology came after a series of career developments, including a position teaching social psychology at Northwestern University, a research fellowship from the Social Science Research Council to study social anthropology at Cambridge, and research in the Virgin Islands on the culture and personality of the black population of St. Thomas.

During World War II, Campbell left Northwestern to join the Division of Program Surveys in the Department of Agriculture in Washington, D.C., conducting national sample surveys to determine American reactions to the war. It was here that Campbell developed his skills and interests in the survey techniques that he would later apply to his academic research program. After the war, he moved, with a number of his colleagues from the division, to the University of Michigan, becoming the first director of the SRC, where the techniques developed in the division were continued in the academic setting. It was in this context that a program for studies in political behavior was developed, in which the SRC conducted election studies during the national elections every two years. This research program led to the publication of *The American Voter* (1960), a collaborative project that set the foundation for the field of political behavior.

The American Voter put forth concepts that have become synonymous with the Michigan school approach to political behavior, an approach that centers upon the individual and the psychology of voting. As a result of Campbell and his research team's efforts, the NES has become entrenched in the social sciences and a model for election studies around the world, facilitating the development of a large comparative literature in the study of voting behavior and public opinion.

Campbell was also involved in a rich and diverse research program, in which he gave insight on partisanship, attitudes toward social change, political institutions, racial attitudes, and issues in methodology and measurement, culminating in his final publication, *The Sense of Well-Being in America: Recent Patterns and Trends* (1980). He has had a seminal influence on the establishment of political behavior as a discipline in political science, as a result of his commitment to the development and improvement of survey research and the scientific approach to the study of politics, and his willingness to tackle the tough questions in society.

See also *Political Psychology; Public Opinion; Survey Research; Voting Behavior.*

. . . .   AMANDA BITTNER

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Camus, Albert

One of the most important figures associated with French existentialism, the Algerian-born Frenchman Albert Camus (1913–1960) made significant contributions to literature, philosophy, political analysis, drama, and journalism. An important critic of the capital punishment and totalitarianism, Camus won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1957 and died in a car crash three years later.

In 1942 Camus published the novel *The Stranger* and the essay *The Myth of Sisyphus,* two classics associated with existentialism. The point of departure for both is that humans are often unable to make sense of the world. In the shadow of the death of God (and his surrogates), announced by German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche in the late nineteenth century, justifiable belief in absolute certainty has become virtually impossible, and the world exceeds the ability to make complete sense of it. Nevertheless, humans seek fundamental meaning, which, in what seems to be a fundamentally meaningless world, constitutes the relationship that Camus terms "the absurd" and also invites humankind to face. However, unable to face meaninglessness, some speculatively posit fundamental meaning, committing "philosophical suicide," while others worry that life without fundamental meaning is not worth living and so consider actual suicide. In both cases, the absurd relationship that constitutes human existence in the world is denied. The challenge is to face the truth and seek meaning even though humans must continually fail, like the mythical Sisyphus who had to roll a boulder up a hill every day, only to have it roll back down each evening.

In Camus's *The Rebel* (1951), the argument shifted from a critical rejection of suicide to one of political murder. The modern discovery of revolutionary meaning within the historical process suggests that the strategic removal of those who stand in the way of a better future for all is justified. However, all futures are speculative, and if humans are seduced by the utopian promise of the future, humankind will sacrifice real individuals to what may never be, which would amount to a failure to understand the meaning of revolt. Revolt is legitimate only insofar as it is the rejection of a transgression of the limits of endurable subjugation. The point at which subjugation becomes unendurable is the point at which an individual understands that no one should have to tolerate it. Thus, the rebel's rejection contains an affirmation of human solidarity—"I rebel, therefore we exist"—that is inconsistent with the utopian promise of "we shall be" and its violent expediencies. To kill anyone is to violate the very principle on which the rebel stands. The challenge is to preserve the principle by resisting oppression, not to violate it by becoming another oppressor.

During the cold war, there seemed to be no alternative between world capitalism and world communism. Camus was critical of the latter, and *The Rebel's* critique of strategic violence read like an assault on revolutionary communism and its sympathizers. This elicited a counterattack from Camus's friend and philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, and his colleagues, who continued to support communist possibilities against capitalist exploitation and imperialism. The ensuing debate, carried out in Sartre's journal *Les Temps modernes,* was very public and acrimonious, ending the friendship and dividing intellectuals throughout France and the world on essential issues of progressive politics and theory.

See also *Nietzsche, Friedrich; Sartre, Jean-Paul.*

. . . .   JOHN DUNCAN

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Candidate Recruitment

Candidate recruitment refers to the rules employed by political parties through which possible candidates for elected office appear on the official electoral ballots (be it in list as well as in nonlist systems). Thus, the term has a more precise meaning in political science than *recruitment to the legislature*, which includes parties' rules for drafting elections as well as other factors operating in accession to parliamentary functions such as the legal rules governing eligibility or the electoral system. The recruitment of independent candidates, for instance, does not fall under candidate recruitment as political scientists study it.

Candidate recruitment is both a matter of who appoints candidates to run for elections and the effect of candidate recruitment procedures on who actually appears on the ticket. Within the former, political scientists analyze how many people are involved in the selection process and how much power the centralized authority wields. In respect to the latter, scholars have paid attention to two elements: the effect of candidate selection on the composition of parliaments, and its impact on the flourishing or wilting of party mobilization and cohesion, that is, on intraparty life.

INCLUSIVENESS AND POWER IN CANDIDATE RECRUITMENT

In recent political science literature, Reuven Hazan and Gideon Rahat propose the most comprehensive work on candidate recruitment in their 2001 work in *Party Politics.* The authors isolate two main questions to address when studying where lists are made within a party. The first element taken into account is the inclusiveness of the procedure, which distinguishes parties according to the number of persons involved in the candidate selection process. On that variable, parties may be ranged on a continuum going from very exclusive to totally inclusive (see Figure 1, p. 186).

The most exclusive way to select candidates is for the whole process to be controlled by one person, most of the time the party leader or the party president. Few examples of this logic can be found; it exists only in parties dominated by a charismatic and authoritarian leader, such as extreme-right parties (Front National in France, Vlaams Blok in Belgium). From that extreme point, procedures involve more and more participants. Slightly less exclusive is a system in which an oligarchy is in charge of drafting electoral ballots. Making the procedure more inclusive, candidates may be selected by party delegates designated by party members. More rarely, party members may also be directly involved, as in the recently founded Italian Democratic Party. Finally, the most inclusive

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FIGURE 1: INCLUSIVENESS OF CANDIDATE SELECTION

Exclusive   **Inclusive**

$\longleftrightarrow$

One person   Oligarchy   Party delegates   Party members

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
system associates the electorate to the procedure, as is the case in the United States with primary elections. In Western democracies, the most frequent procedure to select candidates is to have party delegates in charge of candidate selection.

The recent dominant trend is to open the procedure to party members. In all Western democracies, there is growing pressure for more transparency and participation. Political parties are facing this demand and are adapting through opening their procedures, and in particular by making the way they select their leaders and their candidates more open. Many parties have, for example, abandoned recruiting candidates via selected party agencies and opted for full members' vote systems, or at least for giving their members a bigger say. Examples include the French *Parti Socialiste* or the British Labour Party. The impact of the democratization of candidate recruitment procedures is still unclear.

Apart from the degree of inclusiveness, the second element relevant to the study of candidate recruitment is the level of power wielded by those in charge of drafting electoral ballots. For this variable, one extreme is a system entirely controlled by the national party organs who select the candidates running in each constituency. Canadian parties function very much like this; the national party leader imposes some candidates in constituencies that have a chance to be won. On the other extreme, the party in the district with no veto power for national organs recruits the candidates. Between the two extremes are systems that have various rules involving both levels of power and differ on which level has the final word. In practice, in most Western parties, decentralized bodies usually dominate candidate selection; the national party organs usually have only a consultative role.

COMPOSITION OF PARLIAMENTS AND PARTY HEALTH

Numerous studies about candidate selection have demonstrated that electoral ballots are still far from being mirrors of society. Candidate recruitment is not equally open to all citizens. Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh's 1988 study, *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics*, made clear that some members of certain categories have greater chances to become candidates and to enter parliament than others, beginning with incumbents who are more likely to be renominated than first-time candidates. Furthermore, candidates tend to have a stronger educational background and to be wealthier than the average. Thirdly, in lists systems only, parties usually try to have geographically balanced lists covering the whole constituency. Finally, ethnic

minorities and women are underrepresented on electoral lists. The recent trend toward a more open system of candidate selection has, in this respect, not proven able to unlock the access to parliamentary mandates. On the contrary, a more open system has even reinforced some bias, in favor of incumbents and of men. This trend is balanced, however, in some countries due to mandatory gender equality (e.g., French law imposes gender parity among candidates).

Some scholars have explored the impact of reforming candidate selection on intraparty life. The major line of interest on this issue splits into two opposing camps. Some contend that more inclusive procedures are potential sources of internal divisions. Others believe that more inclusive rules allow national leaders to enhance their control of party candidates and, as a consequence, the cohesion of their party. The first thesis is supported, among others, by Hazan, who judges in his 2002 work "Candidate Selection" that "candidates who are chosen by inclusive selectorate owe their loyalty to their voters in the candidate selection process, and not only to their party. [. . .] Democratizing candidate selection thus produces dual sources of legitimacy for candidates—party legitimacy and selectorate legitimacy" (119). As a result, intraparty discipline becomes weaker; party leaders lose control over their ministers of parliament and their potential candidates by transferring candidate selection to party members. By contrast, Richard Katz and Peter Mair believe democratizing candidate selection increases leaders' control. In their cartel party model, the top of the party could enhance its autonomy through the empowerment of the party basis. The core idea in their reflection is that party members are less ideological and more controllable than party activists. In that respect, attributing candidate selection to party members has not resulted in reducing the control of party leaders. On the contrary, it even strengthens their command by setting party activists aside.

CONCLUSION

Candidate recruitment has evolved significantly in the last twenty years. Since the early 1990s, political parties in established democracy have decided to open up the procedures for deciding who is going to stand for the party on the electoral ballot. Party members in particular have gained influence in the process, and in some cases voters have also been involved through open primaries copying the U.S. primary system. The change would be trivial if it was not expected to impact the quality of democracy and representation. Recent studies have shown that these changes have slightly affected the profile of candidates. Incumbents and well-known figures from

outside politics have been more successful in convincing party members to select them. Party leaders have lost their ability to impose new faces on the ballot. Yet the party leadership is adapting quickly, and the changes provoked by democratizing candidate recruitment should not be overestimated.

See also *Candidate Selection; Party Discipline; Party Membership; Party Systems, Comparative.*

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Candidate Selection

Candidate selection is one of the first things political parties must do before an election. Those who are eventually elected to office are the successful candidates whom the parties previously selected, and the ones who will subsequently determine what the party looks like and does. Because it is relatively easy for parties to alter, changes in candidate selection will affect politics inside both the party and the legislature, in expected and unexpected ways.

Candidate selection takes place almost entirely within parties. There are very few countries (e.g., Germany, Finland, Norway) where the legal system specifies criteria for candidate selection, and only in the United States does the system regulate the process. In most countries, the parties themselves determine the rules for the selection of candidates.

CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION

In any analysis of candidate selection methods, the unit of analysis is a single party in a particular country at a specific time. Classification is based on four criteria: the selectorate, candidacy, decentralization, and voting versus appointment.

The selectorate is the body that selects the candidates and is classified according to its inclusiveness. At one extreme, the selectorate is the most inclusive (i.e., the entire electorate); at the other extreme, the selectorate is the most exclusive (i.e., a nominating entity of one leader). The middle of the continuum is when the selectorate consists of party delegates, such as a party convention. Candidacy defines who can present oneself as the candidate of a party. At the inclusive pole, every voter is eligible to stand as a candidate. As one moves toward the exclusive pole, one encounters a series of restrictive conditions, such as minimum length of membership. Party selection methods can be decentralized in two senses: *territorial,* that is, local selectorates nominate candidates; and *social,* that is, representation for such groups as women and minorities. Usually candidates are appointed in the exclusive selectorates, whereas inclusive selectorates vote to choose their candidates (see Figure 1, below).

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

Different candidate selection methods produce different consequences. For example, parties that use appointment methods balance representation better than parties that use voting systems. Territorial decentralization could lead to increased responsiveness of representatives to the demands of their particular constituencies. Concerning candidacy, parties can influence the composition of their party by adopting term limits. The selectorate, however, determines the most significant and far-reaching consequences. The political consequences of the

FIGURE 1: PARTY SELECTORATES

| voters | party members | party delegates | party elite | single leader |

Inclusive ←—————————————————————————————→ Exclusive

SOURCE: Hazan, Reuven Y., and Gideon Rahat. *Democracy Within Parties: Candidate Selection Methods and Their Political Consequences,* p. 35. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

inclusiveness of the selectorate are assessed according to four important aspects of democracy: participation, representation, competition, and responsiveness.

There is a difference between the quantity of participants and the quality of their participation. In terms of quantity, the more inclusive selectorates are the more participatory ones. The picture becomes less clear when analyzing the quality of membership. Although citizens perceive the adoption of more inclusive selectorates positively, most do not join parties. In addition, many of those who do join do not participate in their party's candidate selection process and are not affiliated for more than a short period.

Smaller, exclusive selectorates can balance representation. When selection is controlled by a party elite who appoints candidates—and to a lesser extent, when it takes place between party delegates who can be coordinated—there are more chances that ideological and social groups within the party will be allocated safe positions on the party list, or safe seats.

Party delegates are more competitive than primaries because of the shorter "distance" between candidates and their selectors. The party elite is expected to be even more competitive, but suffers from a lack of popular legitimacy and, to justify decisions, the party elite often presents a list largely composed of incumbents. A nonlinear relationship results between inclusiveness and competition: The most inclusive selectorates are moderately competitive, party delegates are the most competitive, and the more exclusive selectorates are the least competitive.

Inclusiveness also influences responsiveness. Legislators who are selected by a small selectorate, composed of party leaders, owe their positions to the party leaders and the legislators are likely to be party players. Legislators selected by larger party agencies are often party players but are also attuned to the interests of their power base. Legislators selected in primaries need to reach a massive, fluid audience and will behave more like individuals than team players.

CONCLUSION

The study of candidate selection reveals that more intraparty democracy does not necessarily lead to better democracy. For example, parties that select their candidates through primaries enjoy high levels of participation but have trouble balancing representation, fostering competition, or maintaining cohesion. Candidate selection can thus affect the essence of modern democratic politics.

See also *Electoral Rules; Political Participation; Political Parties; Selectorate.*

. . . .   REUVEN Y. HAZAN

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Capitalism and Democracy

Capitalism is a system of exchange that depends on the economic freedoms to own private property and to buy, sell, and invest the property as one wishes. Unless people can own and exchange property without worrying that a central authority will confiscate it, they will have little incentive to save and invest. Unless they can keep most of the fruits of their labors, they will also have little incentive to work hard.

Democracy is a system of governance that depends on the political freedoms to vote, speak one's mind and practice one's beliefs, assemble with others, and live without fear of arbitrary searches or punishment. Unless people feel secure in exercising these freedoms, they will be reluctant to criticize or oppose a government or its policies or to seek political change.

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY

Capitalism and democracy are closely aligned. Capitalism emerged in Europe in the fourteenth century, and democracy emerged in the sixteenth century. With the collapse of Soviet communism, starting with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, capitalism emerged as the dominant form of economic organization in most nations of the world, and democracy emerged as the dominant form of political organization. By the start of the twenty-first century, most major nations protected both the economic and the political freedoms of their citizens. As such, they exemplified *democratic capitalism*.

However, capitalism and democracy do not necessarily coexist. Capitalism is almost certainly a precondition for democracy, and economic freedom does seem to require political freedom. This is because the exercise of political rights requires that citizens possess a degree of economic dependence. When people have no choice but to depend on government for their sustenance, they are likely to be wary of dissenting from official orthodoxy out of fear that government could retaliate by taking away their livelihoods. No democracy in the world exists today that is not also capitalist.

Yet democracy may not be essential to capitalism. As China illustrates, economic freedom does not always require political freedom. Although China does not officially call itself capitalist,

by the start of the twenty-first century, the country had emerged as the world's second largest capitalist nation after the United States. China's economic success stems in part from the economic freedoms it protects. However, China has not given its people political freedom.

DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM VERSUS AUTHORITARIAN CAPITALISM

Some observers believe that capitalist nations inevitably become democratic over time because they generate middle classes that eventually demand a say in how they are governed. The history of capitalist development in England and the United States between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries lends some support to this theory. As economic freedom and wealth spread first to major landholders, then to gentlemen farmers, and then to an emerging class of businessmen, these groups demanded ever-greater political freedom. Much the same pattern can be seen elsewhere around the world since then. Starting in the 1980s, as both Taiwan and South Korea gained wealth through trade and investment, their middle classes grew to the point that they sought political rights. By 2010, both nations were robust democracies.

Some believe on this basis that China will move toward democratic capitalism. But it seems just as likely that China's emerging middle class will not want to risk political instability that may threaten its economic gains, and will continue to support a leadership that is technically competent and committed to continued growth. China may thereby represent a new kind of system, *authoritarian capitalism*, that offers economic freedom without political freedom. The contest for the dominant form of economic and political organization in this century may be between democratic capitalism and authoritarian capitalism, just as it was between capitalism and communism during the latter half of the twentieth century.

Democratic capitalism appears to be in the lead. More nations than ever before call themselves "democracies." While in 1970 only about a third of the world's nations held free elections, by 2010 that number was closer to two-thirds. While in the 1970s fewer than fifty countries possessed the sort of civil liberties now associated with democracy, by the start of the twenty-first century nearly ninety did. Yet some of the places that call themselves democracies, such as Russia, are encumbered by endemic corruption, dominance by small elites, or one-party rule. Other putative democracies, such as Iran, are actually theocracies whose clergy make most important decisions.

TWO SCENARIOS OF THE FUTURE

Some observers believe that capitalism may ultimately threaten democracy even in strong democracies such as the United States, as intensifying competition among corporations spills over into politics. By this view, firms and industries seek competitive advantage over one another through laws and regulations that favor them over their rivals. They employ ever-increasing numbers of lobbyists, mounting campaign contributions, and costly media campaigns. This escalating arms race drowns out the voices of average citizens. It overwhelms political parties, voluntary associations, and nonprofit groups on which citizens previously depended to communicate their views to elected officials. Under this scenario, politics comes to represent the interests of companies and financial institutions and their executives and investors, more than the interests of ordinary people.

A more optimistic scenario holds that democracy will be enhanced by the instant-communication technologies of twenty-first century capitalism, such as the Internet, cell phones, blogs, text messaging, and social networking sites. These offer inexpensive means of connecting large numbers of people free from state control—allowing them to confer with one another, criticize political leaders, report abuses, mobilize opposition, and monitor vote rigging. Many observers attributed the surprise victory, in June 2008, of Lebanon's pro-Western March 14 movement over the pro-Iranian Hezbollah coalition to the widening use of new communication technologies, especially among younger people. Protests following Iran's election, soon thereafter, were similarly facilitated by new technologies. On the other hand, such technologies may give authoritarian states greater capacity to control their people.

It is impossible to know whether capitalism will overwhelm or strengthen democracy. What's certain is that the two systems interact in important ways and should be understood together.

See also *Business Pressure in Politics; Campaign Advertising; Democracies, Advanced Industrial; Democracy; Democracy, Future of; Democracy and Development; Emerging Democracies; Empire and Democracy; Interest Groups and Lobbies; Liberal Democracy; State Capitalism.*

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Capitalist Development

See *Development, Economic.*

Capital Punishment

The state's levy and administration of the penalty of death for criminal actions or conviction is called *capital punishment*. Capital punishment follows from regular legal procedures under due process of law, elements which distinguish it from extrajudicial executions. Capital punishment is generally on the decline around the globe, either because of a state's abolition or growing tendency to constrict its use.

Despite international criticism, the United States continues to allow capital punishment in states that have not outlawed it. A group in Columbia, South Carolina, demonstrates their support just prior to an execution.

SOURCE: © Bettmann/Corbis

supporters of capital punishment hesitate to cite states like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, or North Korea as examples of countries where the capital punishment is still applied. However, there is at least one more industrialized democracy, Japan, and several either democratic, or economically prosperous, countries such as India, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, in which capital punishment still is part of the penal code. In the territory of Russia and the former Soviet States in central Asia, Turkmenistan alone has abolished the death penalty completely, although Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have moratoria in place. Africa presents a mixed picture, with eight fully and thirteen de facto abolitionist states, and twenty-six states that retain the death penalty. Most Asian nations retain the death penalty and no country in the Middle East—except the de facto abolitionist Israel—has decided to abandon judicially authorized state killing.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AROUND THE WORLD

The United States remains committed to the death penalty in the face of increasing criticism in the international arena and long after most other democratic nations have abandoned it. It is now a commonplace to note that the United States is alone among Western industrialized nations in executing its citizens. Today, Europe proclaims itself to be "death penalty free" and has succeeded in talking, and sometimes coercing, almost the whole of Eastern Europe into abolitionism. Abolitionists in Europe like to point out that the death penalty is unacceptable in a "civilized society." In addition, the Council of Europe in 1999 expressed its "firm conviction that capital punishment, therefore, has no place in civilised, democratic societies governed by the rule of law" (Council of Europe and Wohlwend). Further, in *Soering v. United Kingdom* (1989), European Court of Human Rights justice de Meyer put it simply when he said that capital punishment "is not consistent with the present state of European civilisation." Some believe that the civilizing process leads inexorably to rejection of legalized state killing. Europe, in this view, is a step ahead of the United States, which, along with the rest of the world, sooner or later will catch up.

From a global perspective, however, the United States does not seem that exceptional. While 111 nations have formally abolished or stopped using the death penalty, little more than one-fourth of the world's population lives in countries that have completely abolished it. Many

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND AMERICAN POLITICS

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, capital punishment continues to have an important place in U.S. politics and practice. Despite the recent reawakening of abolitionist activity, a majority of Americans in opinion polls say they favor capital punishment for persons convicted of murder. Yet capital punishment is perhaps less of a national phenomenon than it is a reflection of the distinctive history and politics of the American states in the so-called death belt, states such as Texas, Virginia, Oklahoma, Missouri, and Florida that together account for approximately two-thirds of all executions in the United States. Indeed, executions have become so commonplace that in some states, such as Texas and Virginia, it is difficult for abolitionist groups to mount a visible presence for every execution.

Motivations such as vengeance, retribution, and the simple justice of an eye-for-an-eye sort provide the basis for much of this popular support. This may reflect "a growing sense that capital punishment no longer needs to be defended in terms of its social utility. . . . The current invocation of vengeance reflects . . . a sense of entitlement to the death penalty as a satisfying personal experience for victims and a satisfying gesture for the rest of the community" (Simon, 1997, 13). Yet, as legal historian Stuart Banner rightly observes in Austin Sarat's book, *When the State Kills: Capital Punishment and the American Condition*,

Capital punishment . . . presents several puzzles. It gets more attention than any other issue of criminal justice,

yet it is a minuscule part of our criminal justice system. It is very popular despite well-known shortcomings—it does not deter crime, it is inflicted in a systematically biased manner, it is sometimes imposed on the innocent, and it is quite expensive to administer. . . . It is often justified in simple retributive terms, as the worst punishment for the worst crime, but it is not hard to conceive of worse punishments, such as torture. . . . While capital punishment is intended to deter others, we inflict it in private, and allow prospective criminals to learn very little about it. (12)

It is not clear whether and when the United States will abolish capital punishment. This is, in part, a function of some distinctive aspects of the U.S. political system. Thus, Franklin Zimring, Gordon Hawkins, and Sam Kamin argue in their 2001 publication *Punishment and Democracy* that the more democratic penal policy making is, the more prone it is to be driven by punitivism, and the irrational and emotional motives often attributed to death penalty supporters. Their empirical case is the so-called "three strikes and you're out" legislation in California, but their hypothesis can be extended to capital punishment. To be sure, one has to be careful not to confuse "democracy" with "public participation in penal policy making." Throughout history, most authoritarian states, including socialist states, have used the death penalty liberally. This is not surprising since penal policy is a domain especially suitable for symbolic politics. Being "tough on crime" can be popular in any regime type.

Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin also refer to popular participation in the penal policy-making process. The comparison between the United States and Europe, in this regard, is instructive. Observers have pointed out that American institutions are more "porous" and open to popular demands than European political structures. American institutions also expose many officials, particularly judges, to direct electoral competition which are, in Europe, staffed by career bureaucrats or disciplined party politicians. Additionally, American states allow penal policy to be made through referenda, such as the Californian three-strikes initiative, which would be unthinkable in most of Europe. As Joshua Micah Marshall puts it, "Basically, Europe doesn't have the death penalty because its political systems are less democratic, or at least more insulated from populist impulses, than the U.S. government" (12–15).

In spite of America's criminal justice populism, the last several years have seen a dramatic decline in both the number of people being sentenced to death and the number of executions administered in the United States. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, there were 276 death sentences handed down and 98 executions across the country in 1999; by 2005, the number of death sentences had declined to 125, and the number of executions shrunk to 60. These changes are, to some extent, a function of growing national concern about the possibility of executing the innocent. DNA-prompted exonerations have galvanized public attention and raised new doubts about the way the death penalty is administered.

Still, capital punishment remains a key part of American political life. It is caught up in, and sustained by, a series of contradictions in U.S. social and political attitudes. The power of the victims' rights movement in the United States arises, in part, from increasing distrust of governmental and legal institutions, yet it is to those very institutions that the families of victims must turn as they seek to ensure an adequate response to capital crimes. This same contradiction sometimes is revealed when jurors decide to impose the death penalty. Some jurors do so because they doubt that a life sentence will actually mean life, yet they can express this doubt by imposing a death sentence because they believe that appellate courts will ensure that state killing is used with great scrupulousness.

TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO STUDYING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Much of the available research on the death penalty centers on the United States, which permits the federal government and state governments to use death as a punishment for homicide. Research traditionally focuses on three topics: (1) whether the death penalty deters, (2) whether it is compatible with contemporary standards of decency, and (3) whether it has been administered in a racially neutral or in a discriminatory manner.

DETERRENCE

Until relatively recently, the settled wisdom was that the death penalty did not produce a greater deterrent effect than life imprisonment. However, recent research has reignited the debate about deterrence. Hashem Dezhbakhsh and his colleagues suggest that each execution prevents approximately eighteen murders, while similar research by H. N. Macon and R. K. Gittings and Joanna Shepherd purports to show similar deterrent effects. In response, John Donohue and Justin Wolfers compare execution rates with homicide rates and contrasted U.S. trends to Canadian trends and conclude that there is considerable doubt about whether the death penalty has any deterrence effect at all.

Deterrence studies traditionally have used many different methodologies. Some examine murder rates before and after well-publicized executions; others compare murder rates in adjoining states, one with capital punishment, and the other without. In the 1970s, the economist Isaac Ehrlich conducted controversial research on the deterrent effect of capital punishment. It shows statistically significant deterrent effects and uses sophisticated statistical techniques to control for confounding variables. If Ehrlich is correct, execution did indeed save lives. He claims in his 1975 article "The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment," "On the average the trade-off between the execution of an offender and the potential victims it might have saved was on the order of magnitude of 1 to 8 for the period 1933–67 in the United States" (398). Ehrlich's research has been the object of sustained and rather persuasive criticism, such as that by Lawrence Klein and Richard Lempert, most of which focuses on the particular statistical techniques used. Today's controversy has reignited the effort to determine if the death penalty has distinct and discernible deterrent effects.

RETRIBUTION

The most powerful alternative justification suggests that even if the death penalty does not deter, one may justify it on retributive grounds or as a way of expressing a society's legitimate moral condemnation of heinous criminality. Researchers such as Neil Vidmar and Phoebe Ellsworth have conducted research on public opinion to determine whether this retributive attitude, and the death penalty that it supports, are compatible with contemporary standards of decency.

In deciding whether the American public supports the death penalty, social scientists have repeatedly documented strong support for capital punishment, which highly correlates with retributive attitudes. This suggests that it is a particular view of justice, rather than the death penalty's utility, that explains its persistence in the United States. However, research also demonstrates the malleability of this public embrace of capital punishment and its retributive justification.

In 1976, Austin Sarat and Neil Vidmar followed a hypothesis first advanced by Justice Marshall in *Furman v. Georgia* (1972) that found the more people know about the death penalty, how it works, and the evidence on deterrence, the less they support it. In 1993, William Bowers discovered that public support for capital punishment decreased dramatically when he presented survey respondents with alternative forms of punishment and asked them to choose which they preferred. Bowers found that people tend to accept the death penalty because they believe that currently available alternatives are insufficiently harsh. However, when people were asked whether they preferred the death penalty or life without parole combined with a restitution requirement, the expressed support for the death penalty fell considerably.

FAIR PROCESS AND NONDISCRIMINATION

The final traditional interest of scholars studying capital punishment is in the compatibility of capital punishment with democratic values. These researchers ask whether the state administers capital punishment fairly and, more particularly, in a racially nondiscriminatory manner. Efforts to answer this question often focus on the race of the offender. Scholars documented in rape and homicide cases, for example, that between 1930 and 1967 almost 50 percent of those executed for murder were black. However, this early research was unable to disentangle the impact of race from other supposedly legitimate factors on capital sentencing. Merely showing that the death penalty was more likely to be imposed on black defendants could not, in itself, establish that that difference was the result of racial discrimination.

In the mid-1980s, David Baldus and his colleagues undertook research designed to remedy this defect. Using sophisticated multiple regression techniques and a large data set, they aimed to isolate the effect of race on capital sentencing. First, they found no evidence of discrimination against black defendants because of their race in the period after *Furman v. Georgia* (1972). Second, they found strong effects for the victim's race. Taking over two hundred variables into account, Baldus and colleagues concluded that someone who killed a white victim was 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty than if the victim was black. Even after the sustained efforts by the Supreme Court to prevent arbitrariness or racial discrimination in capital sentencing, juries seemed to still value the lives of white Americans more highly than the lives of African Americans and were, as a result, more likely to sentence some killers to die on the basis of illegitimate racial considerations.

The Baldus study was the highpoint of policy-relevant, empirically rigorous social science research on capital punishment; it spoke directly to issues that the U.S. Supreme Court had put at the heart of its death penalty jurisprudence and the study used the best social science methods. However, it did not persuade the Court. While the Court accepted the validity of the Baldus study, it concluded in *McCleskey v. Kemp* (1987) that such statistical evidence could not prove discrimination in any individual case. This rejection stunned those who believed that social science could help shape policy in the area of capital sentencing.

EMERGING RESEARCH TRENDS

Following *McCleskey v. Kemp* (1987), the U.S. Supreme Court became more conservative, unreservedly embracing the death penalty and rejecting what in earlier years seemed to be persuasive challenges rooted in social science research. Frank Munger, in a 1993 issue of *Law and Society Review,* asserts that after twenty years of research intent on influencing the Court's death penalty rulings, the *McKleskey* decision "has forced scholars to chart new courses. . . . Scholars have responded with research that is more deeply critical, more theoretically informed, and more broadly concerned about the culture and politics of the death penalty" (6).

Some of this new research focuses on analyzing the processing of capital cases, with special attention to how and why actors in the death penalty process behave as they do. Among the most important of these actors are jurors—ordinary citizens who must decide not only questions of guilt or innocence but also whether those found guilty of murder should be sentenced to life in prison or execution. Juror research, such as that done by Theodore Eisenberg and Martin Wells, Craig Haney and Mona Lynch, along with William Bowers and Benjamin Steiner, examined how jurors process the information provided to them, how they understand their responsibilities in capital cases, how they function in an atmosphere surrounded by the portrayal of violence, and how they balance their folk knowledge with the legal requirements of capital cases. In addition, Austin Sarat conducted research on lawyers and the lawyering process in capital cases, with special attention on the use of stories as persuasive devices and other narrative strategies. He also examined capital trials as events in which law attempts to put violence into discourse, and to differentiate state violence from the extralegal violence that it opposes.

David Garland's 1991 argument about the cultural impact of punishment has influenced other scholars. "Punishment," Garland contends, "helps shape the overarching culture and contribute to the generation and regeneration of its terms" (193). Punishment, he additionally notes, is a set of signifying practices with pedagogical effect that "teaches, clarifies, dramatizes, and authoritatively enacts some of the most basic

moral–political categories and distinctions which help shape our symbolic universe" (195). Punishment teaches people how to think about categories like intention, responsibility, and injury, and it models the socially appropriate ways of responding to injury. What is true of punishment in general is particularly true for the death penalty. Scholars such as Émile Durkheim and George Herbert Mead, among others, contend that it is through practices of punishment that cultural boundaries are drawn, and solidarity is created through acts of marking difference between self and other, through disidentification as much as imagined connection.

The cultural politics of state killing has played a key role in shoring up distinctions of status and distinguishing particular ways of life from others. As a result, it is not surprising today the death penalty in the United States marks an important fault line in contemporary culture wars. Execution itself, the moment of state killing, is still today in the United States and some other nations an occasion for rich symbolization, for the production of public images of evil or of an unruly freedom whose only containment is in a state-imposed death.

See also *Beccaria, Cesare; Bonald, Louis Gabriel-Ambroise de; Crime Policy; Right to Life; Rule of Law; Sentencing Policy.*

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Caribbean

The *Caribbean* is a geographical region of the Americas consisting of the Caribbean Sea, its islands, and the surroundings coasts. Politically, the Caribbean consists of thirty-four territories, including sovereign states, departments, and dependencies. The total population of the region is about 37 million, with about 90 percent of the population situated in the region's sovereign states. While the countries of the Caribbean demonstrate a great deal of social, ethnic, and cultural diversity, they also share many common economic and political features that have defined their contemporary struggle for development. These features include a common history as plantation and slave societies, a shared dependence on agriculture (especially

The Caribbean is a diverse region comprised of sovereign states, departments, and dependencies, with influences from colonizers Spain, England, France, and the Netherlands.

sugar), a relatively similar population and market size, and a long and difficult struggle for independence.

SETTLEMENT

By the late sixteenth century, Spain, England, France, and the Dutch had colonized most islands in the Caribbean. The temperate climate of the new colonies was particularly conducive to the development of lucrative agricultural exports, such as sugar. Thus, by the late seventeenth century, a lucrative plantation economy had developed in the region. As the European demand for Caribbean sugar exports increased over time, the demand for new sources of cheap plantation labor in the Caribbean also increased. In order to meet these demands, the colonizers turned to the slave trade in the eighteenth century. Massive numbers of African slaves were imported and sent to work on Caribbean plantations. Although slave revolts were common during this period, most were quickly suppressed. By the nineteenth century, most Caribbean territories had abandoned slavery as a practice. However, the legacy of African slavery continues to shape contemporary life and politics in the Caribbean.

SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE

Nationalism emerged in the Caribbean during the late nineteenth century. After a long and protracted struggle, all of the former Spanish colonies in the Caribbean had achieved independence by the year 1900, although Puerto Rico remains a self-governing unincorporated territory of the United States. As citizens of a self-governing territory, Puerto Ricans have U.S. citizenship, are entitled to vote at the federal level, and are subject to U.S. federal law. While Puerto Rico enjoys administrative autonomy similar to that of a U.S. state, it is not a state of the American union and has no voting representative in the U.S. Congress.

Suriname is the only Dutch colony to achieve independence as of 2007. The Netherlands's other former colonies, namely Aruba and the islands comprising the Netherlands Antilles (Saint Maarten, Curacao, Saba, Bonaire, and Saint Eustatius) are part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Aruba's governor is appointed by the Dutch monarch and serves as the de facto head of state. However, real executive authority in Aruba

rests with the prime minister and parliament, which consists of twenty-one members elected by direct, popular vote. The Netherlands Antilles is a decentralized unitary state consisting of a governor and an elected Council of Ministers, headed by a prime minister. As a unified political entity, the Netherlands Antilles was scheduled to dissolve in 2008. However, dissolution of the Antilles has been postponed pending further negotiation regarding the future status of the territories.

Haiti, a former French colony, was the first country in the Caribbean to achieve independence in 1791 through a slave revolt led by Toussaint L'Ouverture. In a cruel twist of irony, it is the only French colony to achieve independence to date and it was already the poorest of all Caribbean countries when a 2010 earthquake devestated the capital Port au Prince and the surrounding area, killing hundreds of thousands.

The British case varies, with Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados, and Guyana achieving independence in the mid-twentieth century. Today, several islands remain British Overseas Territories, including Anguilla, Montserrat, the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, and Turks and Caicos. These territories are under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom, but do not form part of the United Kingdom itself. Inhabitants have British citizenship, and the monarch appoints a governor to serve as de facto head of state for each territory, but the governor exercises little power over local affairs, which are governed instead by an elected parliament.

Like Haiti, many of the Caribbean islands that achieved independence, such as Guyana and Suriname, are also amongst the poorest in the region. In contrast, British Overseas Territories, such as the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands, along with Aruba, boast the highest per capita incomes and account for 56 percent of the region's income. This trend has discouraged some islands from seeking total independence.

THE ECONOMY

A significant economic challenge for most Caribbean states and territories has been to break their dependence on primary agricultural exports, most notably sugar. Traditionally, Caribbean countries have relied heavily on a system of preferential access to European markets for export commodities such as sugar and bananas. Reliance on this export sector has limited financial returns, wages, industrialization, and regional competitiveness in global markets to the extent that, today, most Caribbean countries have large and persistent trade deficits. However, some countries have successfully diversified their markets. Curacao, Aruba, and Trinidad and Tobago have begun producing or refining oil. Guyana, Suriname, and Jamaica have developed their mining sectors. Puerto Rico is developing its manufacturing sector. The Cayman Islands, Aruba, and Curacao have developed a lucrative offshore banking sector, and almost all countries and territories in the Caribbean have developed tourism as a major industry, some to the virtual exclusion of almost any other economic activity. The economic result of this effort is mixed. Some countries, such as Trinidad and Tobago and Grenada, experienced significant economic growth during the late 1990s and early part of 2000. Others, like Jamaica and Haiti, continued to experience negative growth during this same period.

POLITICAL UPHEAVAL AND U.S. INTERVENTION

The twentieth century represented a long and difficult period of political struggle in the Caribbean. By the 1930s, most countries in the region experienced major political upheavals as labor leaders, trade unions, and students demanded social reform and greater participation in the political process. Charismatic and, at times, authoritarian leaders emerged from the movements, many of whom led their country to independence or dictatorship and ruin. These leaders include Alexander Bustamante and Norman Manley in Jamaica, Luis Muñoz Marín in Puerto Rico, Aimé Césaire in Martinique, Fidel Castro in Cuba, François Duvalier in Haiti, Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, and Maurice Bishop in Grenada.

Most of the Caribbean's experiments with political and social change, whether attempted through elections (as in Jamaica and Haiti), military coups (as in Grenada and the Dominican Republic), or open revolution (Cuba), elicited the attention of the United States, often in the form of direct or indirect military intervention. Since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the United States has maintained a strong interest in the Caribbean and, at times, has claimed and executed a right to intervene in its affairs. U.S. influence was particularly evident in 1899, when the United States intervened on the side of the Cubans in the Spanish-American War. In negotiating the subsequent terms of Cuban independence, the United States drafted the Platt Amendment to the newly formed Cuban constitution, which constitutionally enabled the United States to intervene in Cuban economic and political affairs. Following a prolonged period of civil war, political deadlock, and instability in the Dominican Republic, the United States invaded and occupied the country in 1916. In 1960, the United States began recruiting and training Cuban exiles to invade Cuba and overthrow the newly victorious revolutionary government of Fidel Castro. Launched in April 1961, the Bay of Pigs invasion proved disastrous for the United States when the invading force it supported was defeated by the Cuban National Guard in less than three days.

In 1965, U.S. troops were again deployed in the Dominican Republic to quell an uprising against dictatorial rule. In 1983, the United States invaded Grenada to remove left-wing leader Maurice Bishop. In 1994, and again in 2004, the United States invaded Haiti. Many Haitians accused the United States of arranging a coup d'état to remove democratically elected leader Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

REGIONAL INTEGRATION

By the 1990s, most countries of the Caribbean had attained political stability, with most countries transferring power through democratic elections (the notable exceptions being Haiti and Cuba). Except for a few cases, Caribbean countries have also experienced continuous economic growth, declining inflation rates, and climbing human development indexes. The region also continues to make positive steps forward through the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which came into effect in 1973. CARICOM establishes a common market for member states. Currently, the organization

boasts fourteen full members, and five associate members. In addition to establishing free trade and a common market in the Caribbean, CARICOM members have recently begun issuing CARICOM passports. CARICOM recently entered into *Petrocaribe,* an oil alliance with Venezuela that permits CARICOM members to purchase oil on conditions of preferential payments. Despite these significant political and economic achievements, more than one-third of the Caribbean's population continues to live below the poverty line. Unemployment rates remain high, and many countries continue to suffer under the weight of foreign debt.

See also *Colonialism; Latin American Political Economy; Monroe Doctrine; Poverty; Slavery; Trade Blocs.*

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Carr, E. H.

Edward Hallett ("Ted") Carr (1892–1982) was a British political scientist and historian noted for his contributions to international relations theory. A graduate of Cambridge, Carr had a varied career that included service in the Foreign Office for more than twenty years and experience as a writer and assistant editor for *The Times.* He held several academic appointments and was the Woodrow Wilson Professor of International Relations at the University College of Wales and a fellow at Balliol College, Oxford.

Carr was a prolific author and his diplomatic experience colored his writing. He served as foreign officer in Riga, Latvia, after World War I (1914–1918) and the Russian Revolution of 1917 had a significant impact on his academic work. He emerged as one of Britain's foremost experts on Russian, and later Soviet, history. Among his earlier significant works were biographies of Russian writer Fyodor Dostoevsky, German philosopher Karl Marx, and Russian revolutionary Michael Bakunin, published between 1931 and 1937, each of which received critical praise.

Although Carr's opinion of the Russian Revolution was generally favorable, the Great Depression (1929) affirmed his growing distrust of liberal capitalism because of the social and economic inequalities apparent during it. In 1939, he published *The Twenty Years' Crisis,* an overview of international relations between 1919 and 1939. In it Carr expanded on the work of earlier theorists such as Thucydides and Niccolò Machiavelli and helped define the main tenets of classical realism within international relations theory by differentiating between realism and utopianism (idealism). Central to Carr's analysis was the significance of power in the development of global norms and ethics. He condemned idealism for its failure to incorporate the realities of contemporary international relations in visions of a utopia or ideal world. He further asserted that systemic war or revolution was often a necessary catalyst for significant social change, a contention rejected by his critics. However, he also initially advocated appeasement toward Nazi Germany, a position he revised in later editions of the book.

Carr's other significant works on international relations include *The Future of Nations: Independence or Interdependence?* (1941) and *International Relations Between the Two World Wars* (1955). In 1946, he began work on what turned out to be the seminal fourteen-volume *A History of the Soviet Union,* published over the next thirty-two years. Carr was criticized for minimizing the brutality and totalitarianism of successive Soviet regimes and for overemphasizing the progressive features of Soviet communism. Nonetheless, his work was one of the most comprehensive overviews of the rise of the country to superpower status, beginning with the revolution through World War II (1939–1945).

A series of Carr's Cambridge lectures were published in 1961 as *What is History?* In the essays, Carr analyzed the major contemporary schools of historiography. He argued against empiricism and instead contended that all historians employ a degree of subjectivity caused by their surroundings and the influences of the time period in which they live. Consequently, contemporary events and mores typically colored historians' perceptions of the past, a trend Carr warned strongly against. The book proved highly influential and shaped historiography for the next twenty years.

See also *International Relations; International Relations Theory; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Marx, Karl; Thucydides.*

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Carter, Gwendolen M.

Gwendolen M. Carter (1906–1991) was a teacher, writer, and Africanist scholar best known for her work on South African politics. For over forty years, she was a pathbreaking authority on the politics and economy of southern Africa.

Carter received her doctorate from Harvard University in 1938 and taught at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada (1932–1935), Wellesley College (1938–1941), and Tufts University (1942–1943) before joining Smith College (1943–1964), Northwestern University (1964–1974), and the University of Florida (1984–1987). She was the president of the African Studies Association (1958–1959) and vice president of the American Political Science Association (1963–1964). She was also a trustee of the African-American Institute for over twenty years.

Carter's early work focused on European governance, but her attention shifted to Africa following a trip to South Africa

in 1948. From then on, she was instrumental in bringing the study of Africa into the mainstream of comparative politics. She was one of the founders of African studies in the United States. Her work covered a critical period when apartheid had become institutionalized in South Africa and was unchallenged even in the West. Carter made many trips to South Africa, resulting in numerous publications, including the *Politics of Inequality: South Africa Since 1948* (1958), *Independence for Africa* (1960), *South Africa's Transkei: The Politics of Domestic Colonialism* (1967), and *Which Way Is South Africa Going?* (1980). She also edited several works on Africa, including the four-volume *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882–1964* (1972–1977), which chronicled the rise of nationalism and the struggle for equality in South Africa. The South African government subsequently canceled her permanent entry rights to the country.

In addition to her work on Africa, earlier in her career, Carter published a number of studies on international relations and politics. Her first book was *The British Commonwealth and International Security* (1947). She also coauthored (with John Herz) a textbook on *Major Foreign Powers* (1972) and wrote a series of books on governments, beginning with *Government and Politics in the 20th Century* (1961).

See also *African Political Economy; Apartheid.*

. . . .   GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN

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Cartoons, Political

Political caricatures have a long tradition—the Egyptian pharaoh Akhnaton is often considered the first monarch caricatured, approximately thirty-three hundred years ago. Throughout their history, political cartoons have raised awareness and controversy, parodying important figures and bringing issues to the attention of the public.

POLITICAL CARTOONS IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES

Perhaps the most famous political cartoon from the colonial era, "Join or Die," was created by Benjamin Franklin and published in the *Pennsylvania Gazette* on May 9, 1754. It shows a snake divided into eight pieces, symbolizing the isolation of the North American colonies' governments from the British monarchy an ocean away in Europe. In France, political cartoons became common in newspapers during the French Revolution (1789–1799), and have been common features in periodicals worldwide ever since.

German-born painter Thomas Nast (1840–1902) is often considered the "father of American caricature" because of politically provoking cartoons, many illustrating his opposition to U.S. president Andrew Johnson. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, his cartoons, published in *Harper's Weekly,*

skewered government corruption at the local, state, and national level. Nast also was the first to represent the Democratic Party with a donkey in 1870 and the Republican Party with an elephant in 1874, symbols still used to represents these parties in the twenty-first century.

In Canada, the most representative political cartoonist was Jean-Baptiste Côté (1832–1907), who opposed the Canadian Confederation and published satirical caricatures in the publication *La Scie.*

POLITICAL CARTOONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

In Belgium, cartoonist George Rémi (under the pseudonym Hergé) drew illustrated stories with a political background that are similar to political cartoons. Featuring teenaged hero Tintin, the first story pits his hero against the Stalinist regime and initially appeared in 1929 in a Belgian weekly paper supplement under the title "Tintin au pays des Soviets" ("The Adventures of Tintin, reporter for 'Le Petit Vingtième' in the Land of the Soviets"). The compiled album of the comic strips of this story was officially released in Belgium in 1973.

During the German occupation of Belgium during World War II (1939–1945), Hergé continued his illustrated stories in the Brussels daily *Le Soir.* His story "Le Secret de la Licorne" ("The Adventures of Tintin: Secret of the Unicorn") contained references to rationing and the black market in Brussels in 1942. Fascinated with the universe of Hergé, U.S. filmmaker Steven Spielberg produced a free adaptation of this story in 2010. Since their first publication, the stories of Tintin have sold hundreds of millions of copies and have been translated into sixty languages and dialects.

In France, comic heroes in children's magazines, such as the weekly *Journal Pilote,* often promoted a political or satirical message. The champion of these stories, Astérix, was a Gaul character created in 1959 by René Goscinny and Albert Uderzo. Although the action is set in Gaul in the year 50 BCE, there are countless references to contemporary French history and political culture, with such themes as occupation by a foreign army, in which the Roman army symbolizes the Nazis, and many inside jokes referencing modern French politicians. In the book *Le Combat des Chefs* (1966), a character adopting the famous pose of Napoleon (with his hand partly hidden inside his shirt) is considered a fool by the old Gaul druids because no one around him can figure out whom the character was trying to impersonate. Like Tintin's tales, the stories of Astérix have sold hundreds of millions of copies and have been translated into thirty languages.

In Chile in 1971, two young scholars—Ariel Dorfman of the United States and Armand Mattelart of Belgium—analyzed and decoded the hidden capitalist and imperialist ideologies in Disney comic strips published in Chilean newspapers, especially Donald Duck. The original Spanish version of their book, *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic,* was considered so subversive that it was banned after the Pinochet coup d'état in 1973; the two authors later reported that five thousand copies were thrown into the Pacific Ocean near Valparaiso.

Scott Adams created the comic strip character Dilbert in 1989. The character and his officemates illustrate the consequences of uncontrolled stewardship when poor leaders gain too much power, and its stories symbolize the absurdity and the contradictions of the bureaucracy in modern offices, like those Adams himself witnessed in Silicon Valley during the 1980s. Adams's insights are so thought provoking that several books on management have subsequently used his comic strips to exemplify specific management dos and don'ts. As of the early twenty-first century, Dilbert still appears in hundreds of newspapers and the cartoons are translated into a dozen languages.

POLITICAL CARTOONS AND CONTROVERSY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

In Denmark, on September 30, 2005, an international and interreligious controversy exploded when twelve cartoons depicting the Muslim prophet Muhammad as a Taliban-like terrorist with a black beard and a bomb inside his turban were published by the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*. Created by Kurt Westergaard, the cartoons were perceived as a provocation by many Muslims worldwide, and the immediate, violent reaction of some of these protesters was interpreted by Western observers as a sign of intolerance and fanaticism. As other newspapers around the globe reproduced these cartoons, the indignation and anger of protesters increased, and as a result, some European politicians asked newspapers not to mention or reproduce the cartoons, going against the normally respected freedom of the press.

Observers and scholars should be aware that while political caricatures can be seen as a sign of a healthy press and freedom of speech in democracies, they also frequently rely on clichés, common sense (in a sociological perspective), and sometimes prejudice, these cartoons can reinforce the usual clichés of "corrupt politicians" and "lazy bureaucrats."

ANIMATED FILMS AND ILLUSTRATED TEXTS

An essential part of popular culture, animated movies began as early as the first experiments in moving pictures, notably with Charles-Émile Reynaud, who invented the "praxinoscope" in 1876. Since then, many cartoon characters from comic strips have been transposed to film. Animated films have always enjoyed a large and durable circulation in movie theatres, from the golden age of cinema, when animated shorts were an integral part of the movie-going experience, to full-length films and television programs featuring popular animated characters.

During World War II, popular animated characters like Bugs Bunny and Daffy Duck appeared in films made for propaganda purposes. Among these animated shorts is the Warner Brothers's *Herr Meets Hare*, in which Bugs Bunny defies Nazi officer Hermann Goering. A decade later, the cold war stimulated countless cartoons and television series in the United States and elsewhere.

A less-studied genre in popular culture, some illustrated novels, especially those created by women, are meant to be subversive and politically engaging. The autobiographical book series *Persepolis* by Iranian writer Marjane Satrapi is a strong critique of the conservative interpretation of Islamic law found in Iran since 1978. First published in 2001, her books have been translated into many languages, and a critically acclaimed animated feature film of the same name was released in 2007.

See also *Censorship; Disinformation; Ideologies, Political; Media, Political Commentary in the; Media and Politics; Politics, Literature, and Film; Propaganda; Public Opinion; Television and Politics.*

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Case Studies

A *case study* is one of several ways to conduct social and political science research. The term has several meanings in the research literature. Case study can be used to describe a unit of analysis (e.g., for an organization, a country, an event, or a person); a research method (generally as a qualitative inquiry); or a research strategy that investigates single or multiple cases using participant observations, interviews, surveys, and statistical data.

Some researchers have described the case study as an umbrella term for a group of research methods that focus an inquiry around a specific context. In this regard, for example, single or multiple case studies can include quantitative evidence based on multiple sources of evidence. Robert Yin, one of the prominent scholars who conceptualizes the term, points out that case studies should not be confused with qualitative research. He indicates that a case study can be based on any mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence, including experiments, surveys, and archival information. This definition is also supported by Siegfried Lamnek: "The case study is a research approach, situated between concrete data taking techniques and methodological paradigms." Case studies clearly address "what" (what happened) and "who" (who did it), and they also (descriptively) address the "how much" question. In some cases, instead of analyzing cause-effect relationships or generalizable truth within the study, researchers focus on the exploration and description of the situation. In other words, holistic understanding of the situation is more important in case studies. This type of research is multifaceted because it commonly involves analysis of data from multiple sources, with researchers examining single or multiple cases within a study.

Researchers from many disciplines, including social and natural sciences, use the case study method. Political science researchers use this method to describe or explain a situation or a phenomenon, explore an event, generate a new theory, test a theory in a certain environment, challenge a theory, or find applicable solutions for social problems. One of the major advantages of the case study method is its relation to everyday practices and applicability to real-life situations.

In case studies, the researcher can apply many theories in the research design but most commonly used theories are individual, organizational, and social. Individual theories, which focus on the personality, cognitive behavior, individual development, and interactions of a particular subject, can be applicable to political science research, especially the political psychology field. Organizational theories focusing on institutions, bureaucracies, organizational structure, and performance are commonly used in public policy and administration research in political science. Social theories that address urban development, group behavior, and cultural institutions are also applicable for political science research.

In terms of its history, the case study is not a new form of research. In fact, sociology and anthropology are credited with shaping the term as it is now conceptualized. However, case study research has its roots in a number of other areas as well: the clinical methods of medical doctors; the methods of journalists, historians, and anthropologists; and the qualitative descriptions provided by quantitative researchers such as Robert E. Park, Chicago sociologist and former newspaper reporter. Park was one of the most prominent scholars in shaping sociological case studies at the University of Chicago in the 1920s.

The debate between proqualitative and proquantitative became quite intense over the years, and the case study method has received many criticisms. In fact, when compared to statistics, case studies were considered to be unscientific by some scholars due to the rise of positivism and quantitative methods in social science research. The underlying philosophical assumptions in these case studies are exploration and description, which are considered a subjective issue by many. This type of comprehensive understanding involves an in-depth explanation of an entity, people, community, or a country that produces much more detailed information than a statistical analysis.

See also *Qualitative Methodologies; Quantitative Analysis.*

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Caste System

The Indian caste system is primarily a division of human endeavor, yet the caste system also profoundly impacts Hinduism. A four-tiered system, the main castes of birth into the Hindu social system include: Brahmin (priestly class), Kshatriya (administrative class), Vaishya (mercantile class), Shudra (worker class), and Dalit (untouchables). Karma determines birth into one of the main castes, which means all of humanity is created unequal. Dalits are India's "hidden apartheid" and constitute approximately 20 percent (three hundred million) of India's population. The exploitation and oppression of the Dalits causes this population to occupy a position of perpetual economic and physical vulnerability, and condemnation of the Dalits varies from social ostracism to punitive violence.

However, many people have rallied to give Dalits the same rights as other Indians. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar was born an "untouchable" and became one of the most outspoken advocates for granting mutual rights to Dalits. He eventually advocated conversion to other religions, and in 1956, he and thousands of his followers converted to Buddhism as a rejection of Hinduism and its caste system. Udit Raj was also born an "untouchable," and he converted to Buddhism and labored against the social injustice of the Dalits. Although he was born Kshatriya, even Buddha condemned the caste system, as illustrated when he said, "Not by birth does one become an outcast . . . by deeds one becomes an outcast." Christian missionaries have been active in outreach ministries to the Dalits, and many Dalits converted to Christianity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Shortly after India's independence from Great Britain in 1947, it technically became illegal to discriminate on the basis of the caste system; however, such discrimination is not uncommon in modern India. Today, the caste system has a prevailing influence both economically and socially, especially in rural areas. In urban areas, the caste system is still defended but is less observable. The Buddhist religion, which began approximately 552 BCE, is a consequence of Hinduism, and therefore, some aspects of the caste system are practiced in Buddhist countries like Japan, Sri Lanka, and Tibet.

The caste system associated with Hinduism is not only the world's oldest social hierarchy; it is also an example of a traditional economy. Caste, custom, and heredity primarily determine allocation and ownership of available resources in this economy. According to the Hindu caste system, one should not attempt to alter one's destiny, but to commit life to one's current degree or estate in a way that is similar to the European feudal system. As an economic structure, the caste system is oppressive in restricting any opportunity to change one's occupational or social status.

According to Hinduism, people strive to achieve release from *samsara,* the cyclical process of death and rebirth, and consequently, the notion of *karma,* which is the law of cause and effect. The law of karma necessitates inevitable consequences in subsequent lives and is intimately associated with

the social and economic structure of India. The original socio-religious system of India was Varnashrama Dharma, which did not restrict change in one's occupational or social status. However, the caste system is based upon *jati,* or birth, and identifies status in a rigid and hereditary manner.

The Varnashrama Dharma was not intended to be rigid, which is evident in the *Bhagavad-Gita* 4, a sacred Hindu scripture. Krishna, a Hindu deity, explained that he "established the four castes, which correspond to the different types of guna [quality] and karma." The class and stage divisions were established as the most effective means of engagement in eternal religious principles because they are based upon action and inaction in the material world. Ability, proclivity, and labor will control a person—not birth—and these qualities will be judged to determine social class. Social class will determine *dharma,* or moral duty, which is an essential doctrine of Hinduism. However, the distinguishing characteristic of Varnashrama Dharma and the contemporary caste system is the consideration of birth to determine social class, which is why Varnashrama Dharma is the historical basis for the modern caste system.

See also *Buddhist Political Thought; Gandhism; Hindu Political Thought; Indian Ocean Region.*

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Castoriadis, Cornelius

Cornelius Castoriadis (1922–1997) was a French economist, psychoanalyst, and philosopher. A member of the Trotsky-ist Internationalist Communist Party at the end of World War II (1939–1945), Castoriadis broke away from the Fourth International due to its defence of the Soviet Union in 1948. Castoriadis's name is linked to the journal *Socialism or Barbarism*, which he cofounded with Claude Lefort. The journal was published between 1949 and 1965 and attracted activists and intellectuals such as Jean-François Lyotard. In those years, Castoriadis worked as an economist for the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, later to become the OECD) and often wrote under pseudonyms such as Paul Cardan and Pierre Chaulieu.

The main contribution of *Socialism or Barbarism* was its critique of the Soviet Union as a form of state bureaucratic capitalism and of traditional Marxism for its ideological stiffness in its reading of advanced capitalist and bureaucratic societies. The unorthodox antiauthoritarian Marxist critique (sustaining at times a view close to council communism) developed by the journal exercised a deep influence on the social movements of May 1968 in France. The common thread of Castoriadis's political and intellectual life was indeed his unconditional defence of the *project of autonomy*.

The originality of Castoriadis's thinking lies in the combination of a theory of autonomy with a radical view of the social imaginary. In 1970, Castoriadis left his position in the OECD. In 1974 he became a practicing psychoanalyst, and in 1979 he was elected Director of Studies at Paris's École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales.

By autonomy, Castoriadis meant not only the possibility to give oneself one's own law, but more radically, the possibility to be at the origin of what will be and to know oneself as such. The project of autonomy is very difficult to realize, both at the individual and at the social level, because every society tends to mythologize the fact of being self-produced by attributing its origins to extrasocial sources such as gods and heroes. When a society recognizes that it is responsible for its own origins, that society accepts the possibility of chaos. This is why almost all known societies are heteronymous societies—societies that attribute their origins to something other.

Drawing insights from psychoanalysis, Castoriadis argued that the psyche is monadic since it is pure representational, affective, or unintentional flux; indeterminate; and, in principle, unmasterable. It is only through a process of socialization beginning with the first encounters with language that a social individual is created. If it is true that no society could ever exist without the single concrete individuals that sustain it, it is equally true that no individual could exist outside of the imaginary significations of the society to which the individual has been socialized.

If the individual depends on the imaginary significations of society, then a full realization of the project of autonomy needs to be pursued at the social level. Although this is very difficult to accomplish, the possibility always remains for a society and for the individuals that compose it to radically question the imaginary significations in which they live. Imagination is radical because it is at the origin of reality itself, but also because it can always potentially question its own products. Among the known societies that have been able to attain such an ideal, Castoriadis looked to ancient Greece, to which he attributed both the discovery of philosophy and politics.

See also *Lyotard, Jean-Francois; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Trotsky, Leon.*

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Casus Belli

Casus belli (Latin for "case for war" or "occasion for war") is the specific event, policy, or action that a state cites to justify going to war. Countries use a public justification for war in order to gain international support and to rally domestic support. Philosopher Hugo Grotius helped popularize the need to officially articulate a rationale prior to the start of hostilities as part of the development of just war theory (*jus ad bellum*). The existence of a casus belli, however, does not necessitate armed conflict; nations may still resolve disputes through peaceful means.

Traditional examples of widely accepted justifications for war include self-defense or the defense of an ally. For instance, Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was the casus belli for U.S. entry into World War II (1939–1945). The use of force on behalf of an international body such as the League of Nations or the United Nations is also widely now regarded as a legitimate casus belli.

Nations may promulgate a false or questionable casus belli in an attempt to gain global backing for military action. For example, critics of the 2003 U.S–led invasion of Iraq assert that the administration of President George W. Bush manipulated intelligence reports in order to make the regime of Saddam Hussein appear more of a threat.

See also *Grotius, Hugo; Just War Theory; Legitimate Violence; Statecraft; Strategy, Military.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Catlin, George Edward Gordon

Although a native of England, George Edward Gordon Catlin (1896–1979) was a principal contributor to the transformation of American political science that took place during the 1920s.

At the beginning of World War I (1914–1918), Catlin left New College, Oxford, to join the London Rifle Brigade and serve in France. After his return to Oxford, his prize essay on Thomas Hobbes was published as a book in 1922. Although he was offered opportunities to remain in England, he chose, in 1924, to complete his graduate work in the United States at Cornell University, where he was instrumental in creating the political science department and was also offered a faculty position. A short time later, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Social Science Research Council invited him to go to New York City and study the issue of prohibition. He eventually published *Liquor Control* in 1931, a book that contributed

to the movement to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment. While conducting this research, he met Charles E. Merriam and Harold Dwight Lasswell, prominent members of the Chicago school of political science. He subsequently became deeply involved with many American political scientists who were dedicated to propagating a new science of politics and whose perspective was linked to a commitment to practical application, which Catlin believed had been lacking in the English curriculum and its devotion to history and the traditional study of the state.

What in part attracted Catlin to the American scene was the growing emphasis on empirical research as well as the normative theory of democratic pluralism, which was becoming a central dimension of political science. His 1927 book, *The Science and Method of Politics,* advanced a conception of a rigorous science of politics, which, although ultimately dedicated to serving practical concerns, should distinguish between factual and ethical claims. It was also one of the first works to urge the application of economic theory to the analysis of political behavior. In 1930, Catlin published *A Study of the Principles of Politics,* which again emphasized the need to turn away from typical studies of political philosophy and the humanities and toward the development of a naturalistic interdisciplinary science of society. He continued, however, to argue—for example, in *Systematic Politics* (1962) and *Political and Sociological Theory and Its Applications* (1964)—that such a science should be devoted to the utilitarian goal of social change.

Catlin left Cornell to return to England in 1935, but he subsequently was a visitor at many colleges in the United States and elsewhere, including two years in Canada at McGill University. He published many scholarly articles and political essays and more than fifteen books, but much of his later life was devoted to practical politics and to causes such as peace and world government, the Atlantic community, the European market, and Indian independence. He was both a candidate for the Labour party in England and an adviser to Wendell Wilkie during the 1940 election in the United States. Catlin was knighted in 1970, and in 1972 he published his autobiography, *For God's Sake, Go!*

See also *British Political Thought; Lasswell, Harold Dwight; Merriam, Charles E.*

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Caucus

A *caucus* is a general meeting of a political party or group. Within political science, the term has two distinct meanings. First, a caucus may refer to a party convention to select candidates or establish consensus on issues. Second, a caucus can be a policy- or issue-specific parliamentary grouping that exists either within a broader party or that often crosses party lines based on issue positions.

The term was first used in the United States to apply to the regular meetings of political parties at the local and state levels. At these sessions, party members would choose candidates and adopt common stances on policy matters. Caucuses provided a means for the party hierarchy to control candidate selection since political bosses typically handpicked the delegates. The use of primary elections to choose candidates was a progressive reform designed to open the system to greater public participation, and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries many states replaced caucuses with primaries. In the United States, fourteen states still use some form of the caucus system to choose candidates. Caucuses have become more open and are held at the ward or district level. In addition, they are typically open to all registered members of a party. Attendees divide themselves according to their candidate preference and then engage in alternating periods of debate and voting until a winner emerges. The Iowa caucuses traditionally launch the U.S. presidential nomination process. Delegates are elected from all 1,784 precincts. Those delegates then meet at ninety-nine different county conventions (one for each county in the state) to choose the party's candidates for the presidency and Congress.

Within legislative bodies, caucuses are collective groups of individual representatives or political parties that organize themselves to advance specific interests and expand their influence. Sometimes known alternately as conferences, these groupings allow party members to organize around specific interests. Among countries that utilize the Westminster system, caucuses can be the collective membership of a party. These groupings are responsible for electing leaders, establishing rules, developing party positions on issues, and group discipline, especially on voting matters. For instance, in Canada the party caucus has the authority to elect the party leader, while in New Zealand the caucus even elects the members of the cabinet from a particular party. In the U.S. Congress and many state legislatures there is a caucus for each party. Congressional caucuses typically meet in closed-door sessions to chose leaders and formulate or debate policy positions. They further provide a means for organized ideological diversity in congressional parties. For example, conservatives within the Republican Party in the House of Representatives may join the Republican Study Committee while conservative Democrats have the Blue Dog Coalition. There are also a number of smaller caucuses based on policy issues. These caucuses can be bipartisan and may be open to members of both chambers such as the Congressional Czech Caucus or the Congressional Steel Caucus. Caucuses may be based on race or gender, including the Congressional Black Caucus and the Women's Caucus.

See also *Candidate Recruitment; Interest Groups and Lobbies; Party and Social Structure; Party Organization; Party Systems, Comparative; Westminster Model.*

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Causal Inference

The modern scientific approach is based upon the search for answers to what causes observed phenomena. For instance, by establishing the causes of a given problem (low voter turnout), it is possible to seek answers for how to deal with or cure that problem (lower the barriers to voting). Research that establishes that one factor directly, or in combination with other factors, leads to observed effects is known as *causal inference.*

Causal inference is established through the construction and testing of hypotheses. A testable hypothesis may come from a theory seeking to explain why one variable (A) would have an effect upon a second variable (B). If the theory is sound, it will be supported by repeated observations where A causes B because changes in A cause changes in B (known as *covariation*). Causal inference is not equivalent to theory testing; for example, results from a randomized experiment may provide strong evidence that a medical treatment causes an effect, even in the absence of any underlying theory, but such controlled experiments are rare in political science. Without a solid theory, the simple observation that A and B change in tandem is an insufficient explanation and would be considered mere correlation.

For example, voter records may indicate that individuals in a particular constituency are relatively less likely to vote. In order to explain this phenomenon, political scientists would develop a possible causal hypothesis (e.g., people in this constituency are poorer or less educated and therefore are less likely to engage in registration and voting) and then test it using a data set. A causal relationship between income or levels of educational achievement and the act of voting are plausible in only one direction; the act of voting logically should have no causal effect on income or level of education.

See also *Causation and Correlation; Correlation; Experimental Design; Inference; Survey Techniques and Design.*

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Causation and Correlation

Political scientists are rarely content to simply describe political phenomena; they seek to explain them. These explanations are built upon correlation and causation between variables of interest. Two variables are *correlated* if certain values of one variable coincide with certain values of the other variable, or put differently, if change in one variable is associated with change in the other variable. Yet observing a correlation between two variables does not in itself mean that one causes the other. *Causality* means that values of one variable produce values of the other variable. In other words, an independent

variable exerts causal influence on the dependent variable. To demonstrate a causal relationship between independent and dependent variables, one must show (1) that the two variables are correlated, (2) that the independent variable precedes the dependent variable in time, and (3) that the relationship is not *spurious*—the observed relationship between the two variables is not due to the influence of a third variable. Making a case for causality depends on strong theory that spells out how variables are related and anticipates possible spurious relationships. Careful research design is also important, especially in trying to account for time order of key variables.

. . . .   JULIO BORQUEZ

See also *Causal Inference; Correlation; Experimental Design; Inference; Survey Techniques and Design.*

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Censorship

Censorship is the process of controlling or evaluating the content of books, films, newspapers, or art in an attempt to comply with social norms. It is usually overseen by a political, religious, or familial authority and sometimes results in the banning of content. It does not evolve with time; rather, this process adjusts itself according to the norms and consensus of a society. Often viewed as a negative, it is not necessarily bad; for instance, society as a whole generally agrees that pornography should not be accessible to minors.

How a society reaches consensus in determining what should be controlled or banned is a much discussed topic. Who should draw the line and determine what is or is not moral? Throughout the centuries, there have been leaders and governments that have controlled the dissemination of information, art, and correspondence, but scholars such as Noam Chomsky believe that even in democratic systems, pressure from well-funded and vocal groups can affect what is communicated in the public sphere.

THE DEFINITIONS OF CENSORSHIP

Censorship as a concept exists in such disciplines as psychoanalysis, law, political science, sociology, ethics, and media studies. Typically, it is defined as either (1) controlling or evaluating the contents of, for instance, a book or movie to be sure it's appropriate for the relevant audiences, or (2) forbidding or banning information considered by an authorized censor to be subversive, offensive, obscene, heretic, or against the official (often dominant) ideology.

The history of censorship is quite long, and the conditions surrounding its application have changed over time and as countries have evolved culturally. This is why censorship is a social and political issue as much as an ethical one. In a sense, censorship implicitly reveals the moral norms of, and limits set by, a society by banning specific images, words, and representations of situations and events deemed unacceptable to the public. Censorship issues also relate to the various distinctions between the public sphere and private life.

Those who seek total freedom of speech or lack confidence in governmental or religious institutions often contest censorship. Sometimes the media offer examples of censorship that appear to be abusive, unjustified, or the result of a lack of intelligence or artistic sensibility by the local authorities; for example, a movie may be forbidden in a country or a work of art may be refused as part of a gallery exhibit.

Societies exist in part on a foundation of unified thought and belief that allows individuals to live together in general harmony; however, at times, governments or law enforcement may feel the need to enforce that unity against ideas that may cause discontent or protest. To do so, these authorities may decide for the general population whether something is "good" or "bad" for it. Such actions illustrate the differences in taboos and acceptable levels of free speech, expression, and dissent among different governments, cultures, and societies. Government officials or other leaders in a particular society may feel that allowing access to some materials is too dangerous to their regimes or to the continued harmony of a locale, and too inflammatory in its content or in the reactions that it may inspire in the general populace. These officials may believe that the general population is not mentally mature enough or psychologically capable of being exposed to the content without incurring moral or psychological harm, or inciting dissent from a society's generally accepted rules and norms.

MOTION PICTURES

Motion pictures have faced censorship to varying degree since their beginnings in the late nineteenth century, but for the most part this existed at the local or state level. In the United States, the Motion Picture Production Code, better known as the Hays Code after its creator William H. Hays, was the first nationwide set of guidelines enumerating what was and was not acceptable material for a motion picture. The self-instituted rules were an attempt by the industry to hold off federal oversight and regulation following the Supreme Court ruling in *Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio* (1915). The justices determined that films were a business and not an art form and, therefore, were not protected under the First Amendment, and local and state censorship bans proliferated in response. The guidelines were in place from 1930 until 1968 and mandated that films could not contain, among other things, any nakedness, interracial marriages, or depictions of homosexuality.

BOOK BURNING

One of the oldest forms of censorship is book burning. According to author Judith Kohl, the earliest case of book burning involved the Greek philosopher Anaxagoras, whose scientific works were considered heretical to the established religion of the time and were put to the torch around 450 BCE. This practice intensified with the invention of the printing press in 1435, and books became easily and quickly available to the general public.

In Nazi Germany of the early 1930s, minister of propaganda Josef Goebbels organized public book burnings that included works by Jewish authors such as Albert Einstein, Sigmund Freud, and Marcel Proust. In *Censorship: A World Encyclopedia,* Kohl writes that during the Nazi regime, "The works of many non-Jewish but liberal or communist authors were also consumed, including those of Thomas and Heinrich Mann, Arnold and Stefan Zweig, Havelock Ellis, Jack London, Upton Sinclair, and Émile Zola."

The Nazis were not the last to organize public book burnings. Kohl writes, "The Islamic revolution in Iran (1979) included the destruction of more than 5 million books." On February 14, 1989, Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a *fatwa,* a kind of death warrant, after novelist Salman Rushdie wrote in his *Satanic Verses* that he no longer believed in Islam. Many Muslim communities around the world held public rallies at which copies of the book were burned. It was banned in South Africa and in Rushdie's native India, and copies were destroyed in many public libraries worldwide. In Berkeley at the University of California, a bookstore that carried the book was firebombed. The events parallel those of Ray Bradbury's novel *Fahrenheit 451,* first published in 1953, which depicts systematic book burning in a futuristic, totalitarian society.

PURPOSE OF CENSORSHIP

Could society exist without some form of censorship? Would values be protected without any form of control? Some family values groups are concerned about how prevalent violence and obscenity are in the media, and some of the key issues surrounding censorship in the early twenty-first century involve the Internet, where pornography and extremists sites proliferate.

The debate wages internationally. Journalism professor Hussein Amin writes about the situation in Egypt and Arab countries: "Overt censorship and self-censorship are commonplace in the Arab news media today and journalism education programs, just as the media themselves have, in fact, been recruited into a national enterprise for the production of propaganda." *Freedom of the press* as defined by most Westerners is not a universal value. According to international freedom-of-the-press advocate Reporters Without Borders, Burma, Cuba, the Maldives, the Seychelles, Tunisia, Vietnam, China, Pakistan, and Iran are among the most restrictive in regard to freedom of press.

CENSORSHIP AFTER 9/11

The events of September 11, 2001, on the U.S. East Coast were seen live worldwide, and had ripple effects across the globe. For instance, in the Gaza Strip, on September 14, Palestinian officials confiscated a videotape filmed by a U.S. camera operator covering a march of more than a thousand Palestinians celebrating the event while burning an Israeli flag and showing a poster of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. The videotape was returned to the Associated Press two days later with portions erased. Also, in the United States, some video game–makers changed the contents of games involving plane crashes and skyscrapers in flames following 9/11 in what may be seen as a form of economic self-censorship, in that they realized the buying public was less likely to buy their products if this content remained.

See also *Family Values; Freedom of the Press; Freedom of Speech; Journalism, Political; Media Bias; Media, Political Commentary in the; Media and Politics; News, Construction of; Propaganda; Talk Radio; Television and Politics.*

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Censure

Censure is the act of formally reprimanding a public official because of unethical or illegal conduct. In most democratic nations, censure is a legislative act, passed by majority vote to express a body's displeasure with a member or other public official. Censure is stronger than a rebuke, but is one step short of impeachment or removal from office. In some systems, censure may be enacted by simple majority vote, while others require a supermajority. The censure process may be specifically detailed in a nation's constitution, as is the case in Canada, or it may have its roots in tradition or the acquired powers of a legislature, as is true with the United States. In the U.S. Constitution, there is no explicit power to censure, but Congress does have the ability to approve nonbinding resolutions and establish rules of conduct and punish members. If a member of Congress is censured, they are removed from any leadership positions, including leadership of committees or subcommittees. In 1834, the Senate, under the control of the opposition Whigs, censured President Andrew Jackson, over his removal of deposits from the Bank of the United States.

However, three years later, the Democrat-controlled Senate voted to remove the censure.

See also *Impeachment.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Center-periphery Relations (Federalism)

The center-periphery relations of interdependence are of the utmost importance for the understanding of politics in modern social life. This relationship not only refers to local and national contexts but extends to the international level as well. There is a center, or central zone, that impinges in various ways on those who live within the ecological domain in which the society exists. According to this *diffusionist* approach, the relationship to this central zone constitutes membership in society.

Such a relationship ought to be analyzed from the double perspective of centralization and peripheral accentuation. Center and periphery have often been considered in terms of subordination of the latter to the former. Likewise, a double dimension between horizontal and vertical relationships has been drawn when referring either to the strict geographical dimension or to a system of functional interaction. In the latter, a set of key decision-making powers form the center and the periphery is composed of participants in the interaction system who have the least influence on the central group and on the decision making. The relations of dominance and dependence are not restricted to their political forms but can also affect economic and social dimensions.

Theories of ethnocentrism and internal colonialism have stressed those abilities of state cores to implement programs of national assimilation over peripheral areas. William Graham Sumner coined *ethnocentrism* as the technical name for which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled down and rated with reference to it. Applied to territorial politics, ethnocentrism manifests in the disregard shown by the state core toward the economic development of the periphery.

Internal colonialism is viewed as a structure of social relations based on domination and exploitation among culturally heterogeneous groups within the state. Accordingly, the superordinate, or center, seeks to stabilize and monopolize its advantage over the subordinate, or periphery, by means of policies aimed at the institutionalization of a stratification system (e.g., developmental priorities given to cities to the detriment of resource-extractive rural areas). This is labeled as *cultural division of labor* and produces a reaction heightening cultural or ethnoterritorial distinctiveness in both core and periphery.

Modernization theory has pointed out that both processes of state formation and nation-building were accelerated by the development of industrial capitalism in Europe and North America in the nineteenth century. The enforcement of one central authority on peripheral regions or subordinated political groups, often socially and culturally different, seemed to be necessary. But, contrary to what was originally suggested, such centralization has often provoked a periphery accentuation and a subnational mobilization in quest for local autonomy.

In some industrial advanced democracies, political entrepreneurialism and clientelism in center-periphery relations have aimed at consolidating the territorial bases of power distribution and the preservation of channels of influence between central and local elites (e.g., Italy's First Republic until 1992). Often such power arrangements have been articulated by means of informal and "behind-the-door" arrangements, whereby subnational political actors have sought to secure their resources by means of sustaining political elites and parties at the central level. These exchange mechanisms have come increasingly under pressure to comply with the democratic principle of accountability in the intergovernmental relations between the central administration, the regions, and the local authorities. Multilevel governance is, therefore, increasingly shaped by the formalization of administrative arrangements, aimed at a more efficient planning and policy making, particularly in decentralized polities. The polycentric nature of many states and supranational political entities, such as the European Union, has provoked apparently divergent developments. Thus, if new economic policies have allowed for monetary centralization and a growing harmonization of single-market policies, the quest for policy decentralization also claims a political redistribution of powers according to the subsidiarity principle (decisions to be taken supranationally only if local, regional, or national levels cannot perform better).

At the international level, Immanuel Wallerstein has put forward the world-system approach that emphasizes a global rather that a state-centric perspective. It has been argued that since the sixteenth century, a capitalist world system was gradually formed having some European nations as core countries while other countries became subordinated and provided cheap labor and raw materials. Later on, other semiperipheral countries (e.g., the postcolonial United States) achieved some degree of industrialization and were less dominated by the economies of the core. This world-system approach has been criticized by its overriding analytical focus on the market and its emphasis on the overdetermination of the economic upon other political and social factors.

See also *Accountability; Autonomy; Centralization, Deconcentration, and Decentralization; Elites, Political; Ethnocentrism; Globalization; Governance; Intergovernmental Relations; Internal Colonialism; Modernization; Nation-building; Postcolonial Theory; State Formation; Subsidiarity; Sumner, William Graham.*

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Central Bank

Central banks are government or quasi-governmental agencies with a long history. For example, the Bank of England was chartered in the seventeenth century. But the prevalence and extensive policy-making authority of modern central banks is a post–World War II (1939–1945) phenomenon. While modern central banks vary in their institutional relationships with elected officials, their policy responsibilities typically include the development and implementation of monetary policy and regulation of the banking and, sometimes, the broader financial industry.

Monetary policy focuses on currency management. Monetary policy instruments available to central banks vary, but they may include authority over reserve requirements for commercial banks; the ability to lend directly to banks and, in some cases, other financial institutions; and the capacity to participate in open market operations (the purchase and sale of government securities). These responsibilities often include serving as a lender of last resort. Each policy tool is designed to influence the extent to which cash is available to commercial markets. Central banks manage the availability of financial resources in an effort to achieve their statutory policy goals. These goals often include stable prices, high employment, and economic growth.

POLITICS OF CENTRAL BANKING

The cross-national variation in central banks mirrors the cross-national variation in governmental systems. Some central banks have federal structures (such as the German *Bundesbank* or the American Federal Reserve System). Other central banks, like the Bank of England, have a centralized organizational structure. Finally, at least one central bank, the European Central Bank, is a multinational financial institution. Central banks also vary in the extent to which elected officials may manipulate or control them. In some cases, such as the case of the Federal Reserve, there is a considerable degree of both formal and actual independence. Federal Reserve governors are appointed for long terms (fourteen years), and neither Congress nor the president can remove a Federal Reserve governor before the end of the term without cause. Also, the Federal Reserve does not depend upon an annual budgetary allocation from Congress to cover its operating expenses. Not all central banks have these sorts of institutional protections against the encroachment of elected officials.

Central bank independence from the influence of elected officials is not trivial, nor is it an easy concept to measure. Political economists have long argued that politicians have strong electoral incentives to manipulate monetary policy. Some argue that politicians use monetary policy to boost economic growth near elections; others contend that politicians manipulate monetary policy to achieve partisan goals. Political economists also argue that the political manipulation of monetary policy tends to induce inflation without producing significant long-term increases in income or employment. Substantial empirical evidence supports the presence of an inverse relationship between central bank independence and inflation, the variability of inflation, and the variability of interest rates. There is, however, little evidence of a strong relationship between central bank independence and real variables such as employment or income growth.

CENTRAL BANKS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Research on the implications of central bank independence (CBI) flowed out of a time (and scholarly literature) focused on a highly inflationary economic environment (from the stagflation of the mid-1970s to hyperinflation in various countries during the final twenty-five years of the twentieth century). The deflationary pressures of the dramatic economic decline since 2008 are uncharted territory for central banks. The evidence for the macroeconomic significance of the relationship between elected officials and central banks is based on era in which significant inflation was widely common. It is not clear, for example, that actual CBI is positively associated with *deflation,* but in an economic era in which deflationary pressures may be far more significant—during or immediately after a global recession—the political and economic implications of CBI remain to be seen.

Also significant, the political and economic research on central banks has focused overwhelmingly on traditional monetary policy making. The extent to which an understanding of the political economy of central banking extends to contexts in which central banks take on increasing policy responsibilities—from additional oversight duties to increased lending to financial concerns besides commercial banks—remains to be seen.

See also *Economic Policy Formulation; International Monetary Fund (IMF); Macroeconomics; Monetary Policy; World Bank.*

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Centralization, Deconcentration, and Decentralization

Centralization, deconcentration, and decentralization are concepts that describe different forms of administrative organization. Administrative deconcentration is the transfer of competences, or administrative powers, within the same institution; administrative decentralization is the transfer of competences between institutions with political and administrative autonomy. While *centralization,* or the concentration of power within the central government, answers the need of national unity, deconcentration and decentralization are two different ways to address sociogeographical diversity inside the country.

Most state structures include one or more subnational levels of administration, but states differ from each other in the way administrative powers are organized and in the degree of centralization of decision making. In recent decades, in most parts of the world, the move from traditional hierarchical forms of administration to forms of administration through the networks of alternative public and private organizations has reinforced previous trends towards deconcentration and decentralization.

DECONCENTRATION

Deconcentration is the transfer of competences or administrative powers between organizations inside the same entity, such as the state or municipalities. Taking the example of the state, deconcentration is the transfer of competences from central government entities or departments—those that have a jurisdiction over the entire national territory—to peripheral government entities, which have jurisdiction only over a part of the national territory. The central level retains the most important keys in the decision-making process, but its organs in the lower tiers may make decisions on less important issues. This is the case, for example, of central government departments in charge of the road network. They are responsible for the overall strategy and main decisions concerning planning and construction, while its regional departments are only in charge of road maintenance and implementation of decisions taken by the central department. Deconcentration only concerns entities inside the state. The state's aim with deconcentration is to bring public services closer to citizens without losing control of the decisions and resources applied by regional or local state departments.

In some cases, deconcentration can be used as a first step in a decentralization process, for example, when the state creates a regional tier where it didn't exist before. In such a case, the strategy can be to gradually deconcentrate those powers and resources—intended for transfer to the future regional self-government—to the regional departments of central government. In a second step, the new administrative tier is created and elections are held for its boards. In addition, other central government departments may also deconcentrate to peripheral regional departments; their competences will not be decentralized to the newly created regional government, for example, but will have advantages in being geographically organized according to the same area and boundaries. Any central government department can be in this situation. Part of their competences will be transferred to the newly created form of regional government and part of the remaining competences can be deconcentrated to its regional offices.

DECENTRALIZATION

Decentralization is the transference of competences between different entities. It connotes the transfer of responsibilities, powers, and resources, from higher to lower level units of self-government and the direct management of local affairs by local populations through their elected local or regional representatives. The reasons to decentralize, the degree of decentralization, the number of administrative competences, and the amount of public resources assigned to local and regional governments vary from country to country. In most countries, administrative decentralization is done for a combination of political, economic, and social reasons—different from case to case. In some cases, the need to recognize and to respect political and cultural differences can lead to adopting forms of administrative or political decentralization (e.g., the creation of autonomous regions in Spain). In other cases, the specific geographical situation may require adopting these forms of decentralization (e.g., the case of islands or metropolitan areas).

Decentralization increases the opportunities for citizens to participate in local or regional public affairs, offering new conditions for participation and for public-private partnership, therefore reinforcing the involvement of local civil society in the management of its own affairs. With increased participation and with direct election of local or regional representatives, decentralization improves political accountability and increases transparency in public-policy decision making. Decentralization tends to increase institutional capacity and local empowerment, making local governments and local communities more competent to deal with their own affairs. As a consequence, administrative decentralization is thought to increase public service efficiency and responsiveness, and to achieve a better adjustment between citizens' preferences and public services. However, the number of administrative units or institutional fragmentation affect efficiency and responsiveness, since, for example, an excessive number of small units can be detrimental for the achievement of scale economies. On the other hand, large units may affect the relation between citizens and administrators and therefore the responsiveness of the regional government. Finally, decentralization may also allow local communities to counterweight decisions taken by the central government on issues likely to affect their local or regional well-being.

Decentralization processes may also have negative consequences. For example, decentralization can be responsible, in specific contexts, for macroeconomic instability, since the efforts made by the central government to reduce public sector expenditures or to increase public revenues may not be followed by similar efforts at the regional and local levels of self-government. Decentralization can also produce inequity in the amount and quality of public services delivered, according to the area of

residence, in comparison with a situation in which the same services are delivered by central government based on common standards independent from the geographical location.

CONCLUSION

Centralization and decentralization have alternated as political and administrative models for the vertical organization of the state throughout the history of public administration. In the three decades after the end of World War II (1939–1945), administrative deconcentration prevailed in most industrialized countries as the preferred mechanism for the vertical organization of the state. In that period, there was strong state intervention with little or no delegation of powers and resources to entities outside the direct control of central government departments. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, the renewal and the dominance of the free market ideology on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as political demands for more public participation in decision making, led to reforms in the vertical organization of the state, which in part explains the general move toward political and administrative decentralization. Political changes from the 1990s onward consolidated political and administrative decentralization as the model for the organization of democratic states. Decentralization was seen, at the same time, as the best way for public administration to deal with the emerging forms of multilevel and multiactor governance, as the example of several member states of the European Union illustrates well.

See also *Centrally Planned Economy; Democratic Centralism; Local Politics; Public-private Dichotomy; Regions and Regional Government.*

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Centrally Planned Economy

In a centrally planned economy, the government decides which goods are produced, the quantity of the goods produced, the price at which the goods are sold, and the wages paid to laborers. The bureaucratic authority in a centrally planned economy takes responsibility for determining the maximal output for particular products. The bureaucracy orders manufacturers to produce at a given level and then manages the distribution network for those products. In a pure centrally planned economy, there is no private property and the government owns all of the physical assets in an economy such as factories, industrial machinery, land, and all facets of production. Workers in such an economy are paid a flat rate, set by the government, and buy goods at government-fixed prices. The same goods can be purchased from any state-run distribution center. Ideally, each good would available to each consumer.

THEORETICAL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES

Proponents of centrally planned economies argue that planned economies can allocate raw materials and other industrial inputs to producers more efficiently than market economies. Some of the wastes of a market economy are evidently absent due to central planning; competitive advertising, for instance, is relatively unnecessary. Another potential advantage of centrally planned economies is the ability of the state to correct what economists call *externalities*, which are socially undesirable outcomes arising from each individual and firm pursuing their own self-interest in the market. Since the government controls the economy, it can pursue environmental policies, achieve full employment, or prevent income disparities. These are all goals pursued by governments in market economies, but they have much less control than centrally planned economies. Finally, a centrally planned economy should, in theory, be able to avoid market shocks. A central planner may maintain full employment even when the economy is failing, because employment is decided by the state. Moreover, if disaster strikes, the state has the infrastructure in place to effectively redistribute food or raw materials as needed.

The criticism of centrally planned economies, however, is widespread, especially among economists. Some, like F. A. Hayek, argue on ideological grounds that removing decision making from producers and consumers is an affront to human freedom. More typically, critics have identified many practical problems with centrally planned economies. Proponents of free markets argue that no bureaucracy can match the ability of free markets to meet consumer demand. Individuals, pursuing their own self-interest, will seek the most efficient way to produce and purchase goods. Firms will seek the most efficient way to produce and distribute their goods in order to compete in the market.

Productivity growth is a driving force for economic growth, but centrally planned economies give little incentive for workers to increase their own efficiency. If workers are paid the same wage regardless of their output, they have no reason to work harder. Further, workers may seek to reduce their

production to a minimum: workers or firms that consistently meet their quotas might be forced to produce more. The quality of industrial work often suffers because quota standards in centrally planed economies are typically quantitative, and thereby irresponsive to the market's demand for quality products. In market economies, consumers seek a balance between quality and quantity, and are free to choose between products.

The incentive structure of centrally planned economies not only stifles efficiency growth and quality; it also stifles innovation. First, innovation only happens in government institutions, not only because the government owns all the research and development institutions, but also because there is little incentive for individuals to invent or refine products. Second, there is a conflict of interest between innovators and manufacturers. Manufacturers must meet government-ordered quotas, and retooling due to research advances may slow production. Further, such advancements also cause governments to seek new or different resources, complicating chains of production and supply. Because of these production problems, critics frequently claim centrally planned economies lack the flexibility of efficient market economies.

OBSERVATIONS FROM HISTORICAL CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES

The two most prominent centrally planned economies in the twentieth century were the Soviet Union (roughly from 1928–1991) and China (1950s–late 1970s). During the cold war era, both states created public firms and severely limited privately owned property. Their bureaucracies assumed the responsibility for all significant manufacturing and agricultural output. Many critics of the Soviet Union blame its eventual economic collapse on the faults of the centrally planned economy. Its central planning proved inefficient in meeting consumer needs; rationing, shortages, and inferior quality were common and helped erode support for the regime. Peasants and workers responded by creating a robust black market to trade luxury, imported, or otherwise scarce goods, as they have in other centrally planned economies.

At the same time, the theoretical advantages of centrally planned economies were not observed. Waste in the Soviet Union far outstripped the wastefulness of its contemporary market economies. The central planners focused on heavy industry to achieve military goals and fulfill different social goals, but responded slowly to advances in light industry and consumer technology. Environmental quality deteriorated more quickly than in market economies. Despite the socialist rhetoric of equality, party officials and bureaucrats became an elite, which directed resources to themselves rather than the public good. If central planning allowed for the redistribution of food in famines, it also allowed for the creation of artificial famine as a political tool, most especially in the Ukraine from 1932 to 1933 when Josef Stalin required such a high quota of grain exports from the region that millions of Ukrainians starved.

CONCLUSION

In the early twenty-first century, pure central planning economies are rare; the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and China has gradually shifted from a planned to a mixed economy, beginning in earnest in the late 1970s. Nevertheless, most states engage in some economic planning. Typically, popularly elected governments have mandates to achieve high rates of employment. Governments may coordinate incentives for firms and individuals to produce different goods. In other states, firms cooperate with governments to set research and production levels in order to construct a home-country champion industry and compete against other international firms. Developing states may also pursue forms of central planning in order to limit imports, strengthen exporting firms, or otherwise achieve economic goals. Economies often combine elements of state planning with free markets to secure certain objectives. Thus, while the pure centrally planned economy is now rare, contemporary mixed economies reflect many of its elements.

See also *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism; Democratic Centralism; Dirigisme; Soviet Union, Former.*

. . . .   RYAN GIBB

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Chamberlain, Houston Stewart

Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855–1927) is widely regarded as an important contributor to German nationalist thought and anti–Semitic racism, and he had a direct influence on Adolf Hitler. His writings depict Jews as destroyers of civilization who represent absolute evil and Germans as a chosen people with a mission to defeat the Jews and rescue civilization.

Chamberlain was born in England. His mother died before he was a year old, and relatives in France raised him. His father, a rear admiral in the British navy, wanted him to follow a military career, but the young Chamberlain rejected this path. He was influenced by his Prussian private tutor to favor all things German: history, literature, and philosophy, and, later, the music of Richard Wagner. His formal university studies led to a degree in science, but he chose a career as an author.

Chamberlain's writings express his mission to save the world from the menace of Semitic materialism. Even his writings on Kant (1905) and Goethe (1912) reflect this perspective. The major thrust of his principal work first published in 1899, *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century,* is that race dominates history. Nations are political entities that create the context for the historical expression of a race. In his view, racial character

determines the history of a people. At the center of world history through the ages is the clash between the Aryan or Germanic culture and the Semitic perspective, which Chamberlain regarded as materialistic and without cultural value.

The superiority of Western civilization stems largely from the positive influence of the Germanic races on history. For Chamberlain, these races included, inexplicably, Slavs, Celts, Greeks, and Latins as well as Germans—all heirs to ancient Greece and Rome. Semitic races, particularly the Jews, and institutions influenced by them, such as the Catholic Church, have typically acted to undermine Germanic superiority, as they once subverted the Roman Empire. Chamberlain uses spurious conjecture to conclude that Jesus was not a Jew, and he thinks that the Catholic Church diverted Christianity from its true path, a mistake not corrected until the Germanic influence of thinkers like Martin Luther emerged.

After England entered World War I (1914–1918) as an ally of those nations opposing Germany, Chamberlain accused his native country of treason to the Germanic ideal, and during the war he wrote a series of propaganda pieces favorable to the German cause. For this work he was awarded an Iron Cross, and the following year (1916) he became a German citizen.

In 1923, five years after Germany's defeat in World War I, Chamberlain met with Hitler, who was then head of the fledgling Nazi party. Chamberlain considered Hitler to be the promised leader he had earlier prophesied would reinfuse Germany with the spirit needed to reemerge as a world power. Later, in *Mein Kampf,* Hitler expressed his high regard for Chamberlain's views. In addition to Hitler, other leaders of Nazi Germany who claimed to have been influenced by Chamberlain include Hess, Goebbels, Himmler, and Rosenberg.

See also *Anti-Semitism.*

. . . .   DONALD G. TANNENBAUM

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Chancellor

Chancellor is a term used in some countries for a government minister or official. The chancellor is the head of government in Austria and Germany, having powers akin to a prime minister in a parliamentary system, but in other cases, the term is reserved for a lesser, more specialized official.

In ancient Rome, the chancellors, or *cancellarii*, sat in the courts of law at the *cancelli*, or lattice work screens, that separated the judge and council from the audience. Societies that trace their history back to Roman times frequently employ the term chancellor for ministers or judicial officials; however, the term is also employed anachronistically to high-ranking officials in the ancient Chinese and Egyptian empires.

The most powerful chancellors are those in Austria and Germany, where they are known as *bundeskanzler*, or federal chancellors. When Germany was first united under Chancellor Otto van Bismarck in 1871, the chancellor was appointed by the kaiser, or emperor, but after World War I (1914–1918), the chancellor was appointed by the German president. Then, after World War II (1939–1945), the introduction of democracy meant that the German chancellor would be selected by the *bundestag*, the lower house of parliament. In Austria, the president technically appoints the chancellor, but because government ministers must have the support of the National Council, the lower house of parliament, the president traditionally names the head of the largest party in the *Nationalrat* to be chancellor. In both countries, the chancellor is the head of government and exercises more political power than any other official. German and Austrian chancellors have similar powers to prime ministers in other parliamentary systems, such as that of Great Britain or Spain, meaning they appoint the cabinet, are responsible for submitting proposals to the parliament, and have the power to dismiss parliament and call for early elections. However, they are accountable to parliament, which means they can be removed if the parliament passes a vote of no confidence.

Elsewhere, chancellors serve a more subordinate role in government. In Switzerland, the federal chancellor is elected by the Swiss parliament, and heads the federal chancellery, the general staff of the seven-member executive Federal Council that makes up the Swiss government. This is more of an administrative position than a political position, as the Swiss chancellor participates in the meetings of the federal councilors with only a consultative vote and the primary responsibility is to prepare policy and activity reports. In the United Kingdom, the lord chancellor serves as the head of the English judiciary and the Department for Constitutional Affairs, and was, until 2006, speaker of the House of Lords. The chancellor of the exchequer is the minister responsible for the treasury, the equivalent to a minister of finance, and a very prominent official in British government. In Finland, the chancellor of justice supervises the legality of actions taken by government, and in Sweden, the chancellor of justice serves as the solicitor general. In several Latin American countries, the term chancellor is reserved for the minister or secretary in charge of foreign affairs. Chancellors also served as high-ranking state officials in the kingdoms of France, Denmark and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and in imperial Russia, chancellor was the highest rank in the civil service.

In the United States, the only national-level office with such a title is the chancellor of the Smithsonian Institution, a ceremonial office held by the chief justice of the United States. Some states have a court of chancery who oversee equity cases, and the judges on these courts are known as chancellors. The term chancellor is also often employed as a title for a university academic official or the head of state departments of education.

See also *Parliamentary Government; Prime Minister (Head of Government).*

. . . .   PAUL JAMES KUBICEK

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Chaos

See *Equilibrium and Chaos.*

Charisma

Charisma is an exceptional quality that makes the very few people who possess it able to influence others by attracting their admiration and obedience. The term derives from ancient Greek and originally meant "gift." From Christian theology, where it designates a special gift given by God's grace, the concept has entered the political vocabulary through the reflection of German sociologist Max Weber. Weber appropriated the term to mean a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which the individual is set apart from ordinary human beings and treated as being endowed with exceptional powers.

Weber distinguished between three forms of authority according to the different sources of their legitimacy: (1) the *rational* authority is based on the belief in the legality of its commands, (2) the *traditional* authority rests on credence given to the sacredness of traditions, and, finally, (3) the *charismatic* authority stems from the faith in the extraordinary quality of a person. Whilst both the rational and traditional authorities are ordinary, because they can be subsumed under, respectively, discursively or historically grounded rules, charismatic authority goes beyond rules as it is based on the extraordinary gestures and qualities of the leader.

Examples of charismatic figures include Indian nationalist Mahatma Gandhi, Russian Communist leader Vladimir Lenin, British prime minister Winston Churchill, French president Charles de Gaulle, and Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser.

See also *Authority; Caesarism; Cult of Personality; Leadership; Weber, Max.*

. . . . CHIARA BOTTICI

Chartism

Chartism was a democratic reform movement that emerged in Britain in the second third of the nineteenth century. The Chartists (those who advocated the Chartist program of reform) derive their name from the People's Charter, a document produced on May 8, 1838. The expressed purpose of this charter was the compulsion of the lower house of the British parliament toward political change and improvement through a restructuring of the constitution and citizens' rights. Historically, Chartism represents an important effort to increase and transform political representation through suffrage, thereby repairing the ills of a society disabled by low enfranchisement. As an ideology, Chartism was the conscious democratic struggle for improving of the lives of citizens in an industrialized economy.

ORIGINS

Chartism emerged in the context of widespread economic depression and political isolation of citizens outside the landed class. In 1831, the British electorate was composed of roughly half a million voters, as compared to a national population of nearly fourteen million. Landed elites maintained control of both economic development (even as Britain transitioned towards an industrial economy), as well as political power, through structuring districts and limiting the franchise. By means of such legislation as the Importation Act of 1815 (informally known as the Corn Laws), these elites maintained control over agricultural prices at the sacrifice of workers' wages and the balance of the economy writ large. A significant percentage of the British people were legally excluded from the development and execution of acts of state, leaving their interests underrepresented and creating conditions for abuse and class conflict.

The success of reformist Whigs in the general election of 1831 opened the possibility to alleviate these tensions. With the enactment of the Representation of the People Act of 1832 (the Reform Act), the British parliament ushered in transformations to the institutional arrangement of the political process. The new franchise extended political representation to the burgeoning business class, while, in addition, reducing the number of districts represented in the House of Commons. Such reforms disabled the institutional parameters that had encouraged the landed elites' sustained political power.

THE NEW POOR LAW AND THE PEOPLE'S CHARTER

Under these conditions, the political movement of Chartism emerged. While not yet a sustained national movement, local political activists (both trade unionists and middle-class reformers who were still excluded from the extension of the franchise) began to coalesce around the need for even further institutional reforms, perceiving universal suffrage as a means to enact these changes. These activists sought even wider-reaching reforms than most Whig party members were willing to endorse. Parliament responded to pressures for further reforms with the passage of the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 (the New Poor Law). And, while this New Poor Law did further extend the franchise to the middle class, it did not extend this right to the working class. Such political actions were perceived as creating incentives for class divisions through a restructuring of poor relief and workhouses, infringing on workers' rights and ignoring general demands for complete (adult male) suffrage.

Activists, following on a long tradition of democratic dissidence, responded by convening a parallel parliament (thus evoking both British and French democratic histories). Delegates to this convention would eventually produce what was known as the People's Charter. The charter consisted of six points of reform: complete adult (over age twenty-one) male suffrage,

annual elections, secret ballots, abolition of property require-
ments for parliamentary service, pay allowances for all members
of Parliament, and equal districts. Chartists argued that these
transformations would correct the limitations of recent legis-
lation, such as the First Reform Act and the New Poor Law,
rectifying social inequalities produced by the then unrepresenta-
tive electorate. They claimed that such reforms would help to
further the democratization of Britain, extending suffrage that
was protected by transparent electoral institutions, and allowing
all Britains representation in the House of Commons.

FRACTURE AND DECLINE

Initially, Chartism was not a reactive movement. Instead,
Chartists conceived of themselves as engaging in traditional
British politics, acting with a similar ethos as the Whig
reformers, and aimed at the high ideals of repairing economic
and political inequalities. Chartist leaders hoped to capitalize
on the spirit of reform that had already begun to transform
Britain's institutional structure. However, the conditions that
encouraged a broad-based reform movement did not persist
long. (Their demands, along with a petition of 1,280,000 sign-
ers, were rejected by the British parliament on July 12, 1839,
by a 235–46 vote.) Growing class tensions between groups
who had previously found common political ground began
to limit the movement's success. Economic and health condi-
tions worsened in metropolitan centers in the early 1840s, and
divisions between the working and middle classes became
magnified by the costs of depression (in combinations with
the threats the New Poor Law imposed on the working class).
In response, the remaining Chartist elites (those who, fol-
lowing parliamentary reaction, had not yet been imprisoned)
transformed their tactics; some employed workers' strikes,
others later encouraged armed uprisings. As these uprisings
became more violent, and the British army began to confront
rioters, the strength of the movement waned further. By 1848,
while violent revolutions and political instability threatened
much of Europe, tensions in Britain were already declining,
without much hope for the successful implementation of
Chartists's reforms.

HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE

While Chartists ultimately failed to meet their own political
goals, the movement itself was successful in furthering the use
of political channels for engaging in reformist—as opposed to
revolutionary—action. Moreover, the demands for universal
suffrage helped further conditions for democratization that
extended beyond the movement itself.

The Chartist ideology is perhaps best known as an impor-
tant early example of the expression of working-class con-
sciousness attempting improvement and political change.
Socialists and Marxists would later point to Chartism as evi-
dence of sociological and world-historical transformations
that signaled the decline of capitalism. However, the distinc-
tion between Chartism as social reform guided by humanitar-
ian concerns for the costs of low representation, versus one
of economic reform for worker's rights, only emerged as the
national movement began to lose coherence and economic

conditions created differing incentives for classes that had pre-
viously been unified under the early banner of reform.

See also *British Political Thought; Capitalism and Democracy;
Electoral Reform; Radicalism; Socialism; Voting Rights and Suffrage.*

. . . .   ANDREW POE

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Chauvinism

Chauvinism is extreme nationalism or excessive pride in an
individual's group. The term originated with Nicolas Chauvin,
a French soldier who exhibited a fanatical devotion to Napo-
leon Bonaparte and the French Empire. Initially the term
referred to extreme pride in militarism, but through the 1800s,
it became increasingly synonymous with patriotism and belief
in the superiority of one's group or place. The ultranationalism
of the 1800s among European states helped fuel imperialism
by building on the social Darwinism of the era to create pub-
lic support for expansion and colonialism. Chauvinism also
contributed to the jingoism of the United States and other
nations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
This period of chauvinism culminated in the cult of offense
prior to World War I (1914–1918). During the cold war, politi-
cal chauvinism developed an ideological component and was
a tertiary factor in the struggle between Soviet-style commu-
nism and U.S. free market capitalism. Chauvinism increasingly
has come to be used to describe extreme pride in one's race,
ethnicity, or gender. During the women's rights movement of
the 1960s and 1970s, male chauvinism was used to connote the
sense of male superiority and entitlement. The term chauvin-
ism became increasingly linked to genderism or other forms of
discrimination toward women.

See also *Cold War; Colonialism; Misogyny; Nationalism.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

Checks and Balances

James Madison famously wrote in *Federalist* No. 10 that
there are two ways to ward against the "dangerous vice" of
political faction: "the one, by removing its causes; the other,
by controlling its effects." The first of these options would
require either destroying the liberty that allows factions to

grow, an outcome Madison said is worse than the factions themselves, or requiring all citizens to have the same opinions and interests, a virtual impossibility. Because the underlying causes of factions cannot be removed, Madison argued for a political system—the U.S. Constitution—capable of controlling them. Even before Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay wrote in support of the Constitution's separation of powers, and Montesquieu claimed that liberty is best protected through the construction of checks and balances. The division of the legislature into two chambers and the balancing of the presidency against the legislative branch mean that no one faction is likely to control the entire governing apparatus. In addition, federalism balances power of the states against the power of the central government and independent courts adjudicate disputes that arise between the various branches of government. Divided government, defined as no single party controlling all branches of government, demonstrates, as the norm in the United States, how well the Founders's ideas about government work.

The U.S. political system was designed to prevent one particular ideological faction from gaining control of the entire system of government, a situation that the Founders believed would lead to despotism. However, the checks and balances inherent in the U.S. system also create the possibility of gridlock. Because each branch of government must agree with all other branches for a bill to become a law, lawmaking is more difficult than it would be in a system with fewer checks and balances. This has led some to argue that a democratic system with fewer checks, such as Westminster parliamentary democracy, is superior. While normative arguments both in favor of and against checks and balances can and have been made, it is also possible to examine checks and balances from a positive perspective. Indeed, most political science literature of the last several decades has taken a positive, rather than normative, approach to checks and balances.

VETOES AND SUPERMAJORITIES

The ability of one branch of government to act as a check on another branch depends upon the power granted to it within the political system. Perhaps the strongest form of check is veto power, or the ability to block a bill from becoming law. George Tsebelis refers to actors with veto power as "veto players." He defines a *veto player* as any actor (individual or collective) in a political system whose assent is necessary to change the policy status quo. In the United States, the House, Senate, and the president are all veto players because no bill can pass without the support of all three. Tsebelis argues that as the number veto players within a political system grows, and as their preferences over policy become more ideologically diverse, it becomes more difficult to make new policy. In other words, the policy status quo becomes more difficult to change, and, therefore, more stable.

Veto power arises from two different sources. In some instances, actors such as the House, Senate, and president have constitutionally defined veto rights. Separation of powers systems, in which the president and the legislature are elected

in different elections, and the president is not accountable to the legislature through a vote of confidence, by definition have several constitutionally defined, or institutional, veto players. In other political systems, veto rights emerge as part of the political process. In parliamentary democracies, where the government is elected by, and serves at the behest of, the lower house of parliament, there may be only one institutional veto player—formally the parliament itself (assuming there is no upper legislative chamber with veto power)—but numerous partisan veto players. In parliamentary democracies with multiparty systems, coalition governments are the norm. If no single party controls a majority of the seats in parliament, a coalition is likely necessary to pass laws. Each party in the governing coalition has the ability to block legislation by informing its members of parliament to vote against the bill. Tsebelis refers to these parties as partisan veto players, because the political system generates veto rights for parties through governing coalitions, despite the fact that the constitution does not provide them with a formal veto rights.

When examining checks and balances within a political system, it is necessary to consider both types of veto players. Federal separation-of-powers systems, such as the United States or Brazil, have several constitutionally defined veto players, while unitary parliamentary countries with multiparty coalition governments, such as the Netherlands and Israel, have many partisan veto players. The separation-of-powers systems have institutionalized checks and balances, while other systems generate checks through partisan coalitions. The effects, however, are the same. All else equal, the more actors with veto power, the more difficult it is to produce policy change.

In some instances, supermajority requirements can generate additional checks by making it easier for actors to veto legislation. In the U.S. Senate, for example, the filibuster rule means that a supermajority of sixty senators is required to pass important bills. Because Senate rules require sixty votes to cut off debate and hold a vote, forty senators can effectively block legislation. In the other cases, supermajorities are sometimes sufficient to overcome checks, thereby weakening them. Two-thirds supermajorities in the House and Senate can also override a presidential veto, meaning the president cannot block a bill when two-thirds of both houses desire to pass it. Similar veto override provisions exist in many presidential systems.

AGENDA SETTING AND PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT

By definition, veto players are all alike in their ability to block legislation, but their powers may vary with regard to agenda setting. Although the term *agenda setting* may have a variety of meanings in everyday language, in works of formal theory it means something very specific: the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to another actor. Agenda setting, under this definition, is captured very nicely by the saying, "Congress proposes, the president disposes." In the American system, Congress is the agenda setter, meaning it can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the president. The president has no formal power to amend a bill that Congress has sent, and can

only sign the bill into law or veto it. If the president wishes to make amendments to a bill, it would require a veto of the bill, then to find a member of Congress willing to reintroduce a new version of the bill in Congress, and subsequently hope the amendments survive the congressional process. The last part of this process is the least likely.

The opposite is true in a parliamentary democracy. In parliamentary systems, such as the United Kingdom, the government drafts legislation and makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to the parliament. Although a parliament can debate the merits of bills, there is usually little room for substantive amendments. Governments in parliamentary systems tend to get their way, leaving parliaments to complain that they are rubber stamps.

Agenda-setting rights grant an actor a great deal of power. Exactly how much power, though, depends upon precise decision-making rules as well as the ideological alignment of veto players. Agenda setters have more power when all veto players consider the status quo to be unsatisfactory. If everyone agrees that the current policy is inferior and that particular direction requires change, the actor possessing agenda-setting authority can simply propose the preferred policy. The other actors are then forced to compare the new proposal to the inferior status quo. In this instance, they agree to go along with the agenda setter's proposal. When there are one or more veto players whose preference is relatively close to the status quo policy, the power of the agenda setter diminishes. Assuming the agenda setter prefers a substantial change, the agenda setter will not be able to propose the preferred policy because the veto player close to the status quo will veto it. Instead, the agenda setter must propose a policy preferred by all veto players over the current policy.

The precise nature of formal agenda-setting authority varies greatly both within and across countries. For example, while it is generally the case that the U.S. Congress has formal agenda-setting authority, the president can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the Senate when appointing cabinet members and judges. The president makes appointments, but the Senate has the power to scrutinize and veto the appointees. The president, though, can temporarily bypass the requirement of Senate approval by making an appointment while the Senate is in recess. Likewise, the U.S. president has formal agenda-setting authority when negotiating foreign treaties. The president may negotiate a treaty with other countries, but the treaty must then be approved by a two-thirds vote in the Senate. The Senate cannot, however, amend the treaty.

In other countries, presidents have more formal powers to amend legislation than the American president, thereby reducing the agenda-setting power of the legislature. The Argentinean and Brazilian presidents, for example, can pass into law the sections of a bill they approve, and veto the sections they do not. In the United States, this procedure is referred to as a line-item veto, and it was briefly granted to President Clinton before the Supreme Court deemed it to be unconstitutional. In some countries, such as Brazil, the president has the right to initiate the budget, while in the United States all revenue bills must originate in the House.

In parliamentary systems, legislatures generally have fewer agenda-setting rights as the vast majority of bills come from the executive branch. However, there is significant variation in the powers of parliaments as well. Some parliaments, such as the Norwegian *Storting* and German *Bundestag,* have numerous permanent, specialized committees that participate in the drafting of legislation. In the United Kingdom, committees in the House of Commons, on the other hand, tend to be set up on an ad hoc basis and have significantly fewer powers. Parliaments and their committees also vary in their ability to oversee the executive. The European Affairs Committee of the Danish *Folketing* is often noted for its exceptionally high degree of oversight in the area of European Union affairs. While oversight committees in the United Kingdom tend to be weaker, question time in the House of Commons provides Parliament members of an opportunity for government oversight in a very public forum.

FEDERALISM AND BICAMERALISM

When discussing checks and balances, federalism and bicameralism are two political institutions that warrant special attention. *Federalism* is an arrangement that divides power among a federal government and its constituent states. Each level of government must have certain powers delegated to it, and these powers must be constitutionally protected. Federal bargains, by their nature, create checks on government authority. Some scholars have suggested that the checks and balances inherent in a federal system provide economic benefits by creating competition among states. Barry Weingast has argued that federalism helps preserve market economies by preventing government interference in the market. Others, like Daniel Triesman, however, have pointed to problems associated with decentralization. Regardless, when states have the ability to block legislation, they become another veto player in the political system and they may make policy change more difficult.

Bicameralism closely relates to federalism and can greatly impact policy making as well. States often have their interests represented through an upper chamber of a bicameral legislature, where they collectively have veto rights. This was case in the United States prior to the direct election of senators in 1913. Even though U.S. senators today represent citizens directly, rather than state governments, the states receive equal representation regardless of size in the Senate. In Germany, state representatives in the German upper house, the *Bundesrat,* have the ability to veto certain types of legislation passed by the lower house of parliament, the *Bundestag.* When the upper chamber can veto legislation and has policy preferences that differ from the lower chamber, policy stability becomes more likely due to the presence of an additional institutional veto player. Regardless of their effects on economic growth, federalism and bicameralism are likely to make policy change more difficult.

BUREAUCRATS AND JUDGES

After legislation has been written, bureaucrats must implement the law and judges may interpret it. The degree of

freedom that judges and bureaucrats have with regard to interpretation and implementation relates to the checks and balances present within the political system. In systems with a greater number of checks and balances (more veto players), judges and bureaucrats have more discretion to interpret and implement the law. This is because politicians have limited ability to overturn what judges and bureaucrats do through the political process.

Judges, through their ability to interpret law, and bureaucrats, through their ability to implement policy, can influence policy outcomes. The delegation of powers to judges and bureaucrats creates a principal-agent problem for politicians. On the one hand, politicians rely upon these actors. Judges are needed to ensure that the law is followed, and they are required to interpret the law when situations arise that lawmakers did not originally anticipate. Bureaucrats are required for their policy expertise in particular areas. Legislators do not have the time or knowledge required to implement the laws that they write themselves. On the other hand, politicians cannot be sure that judges and bureaucrats desire the same policy outcomes they do. When judges and bureaucrats have different policy preferences than the politicians in power, the judges and bureaucrats may have some ability to reshape policy outcomes after the legislative process has been completed. This is known as *shirking.*

Politicians, though, are not completely powerless to prevent shirking. They have an arsenal of tools at their disposal to control judges and bureaucrats: Politicians can write more specific, detailed legislation *ex ante,* or they can monitor and punish shirking *ex post*. However, these tools are only effective to the degree that politicians can agree on how to use them. When there are fewer veto players, it is easier for politicians to enforce the policy outcome. Moreover, politicians are better able to overrule adverse judicial interpretations through the political process, something of great concern to judges who typically fear having their decisions overturned. The judiciary is also less independent when interpreting the law, and bureaucrats have less leeway when implementing it as the number of veto players and the ideological distance between them decreases.

GOVERNMENT AND REGIME STABILITY

Because the number of checks and balances present in a political system affects the ability of that system to produce new legislation, it also impacts a government's ability to handle crises. A political system with fewer checks can better respond to external crises than a system with many checks. When there are many veto players, they may not be able to agree on the best way to handle a crisis. This, in turn, may impact upon government stability. In parliamentary systems with coalition governments, a crisis may lead parties in a governing coalition to disagree, causing the government to collapse. This leads to the formation of a new government, and the possible dissolution of parliament and new elections. Therefore, in parliamentary systems, more veto players should mean less government stability.

In presidential systems, it is not possible to remove a president during the middle of a term for ideological reasons, although the possibility of impeachment for criminal activities does provide the legislature with some form of check. While parliamentary systems provide a constitutional mechanism to remove ineffective governments during a term, presidential systems do not. When a crisis arises in a presidential system with a great number of veto players, the system may be rendered immobile. This could potentially lead some to seek extraconstitutional means for change in the form of coups or revolution. Therefore, while high numbers of veto players in parliamentary democracy may lead to government instability, high numbers of veto players in presidential systems are likely to lead to regime instability and a greater likelihood of reversion to authoritarian regimes.

While there is little doubt today that parliamentary democracies are less likely to revert to authoritarian rule than presidential systems, there is still some debate about why. Some scholars believe that the features of presidential systems make them more susceptible to democratic breakdown, as the logic laid out here would suggest. Others, however, point out that it is difficult to know what leads to regime collapse because most presidential democracies also suffer from other maladies that increase the likelihood of authoritarian reversals, such as poverty, poor economic growth, and a history of previous military rule. Presidentialism tends to exist in countries where all forms of democracy are likely to fail, making it difficult to sort out the effects of presidentialism from these other variables. However, recent scholarship finds that while poor economic growth and, specifically, economic crises such as recessions are the primary cause of reversals to authoritarian rule, presidential systems are much less likely to undergo the process of democratic consolidation, leaving them much more vulnerable to shocks associated with economic crises than parliamentary systems. High numbers of veto players leads to policy gridlock in both parliamentary and presidential regimes; however, parliamentary systems offer a constitutional escape from the gridlock through the possibility of government collapse and the ability to call for new elections. Presidential systems do not offer such a release valve, and therefore presidential countries do not consolidate as democracies, leaving them more vulnerable to authoritarian reversal during times of crisis.

SUMMARY

The number of checks and balances in a political system has a tremendous impact on the policy-making process, which in turn affects other aspects of the political system, including the independence of judges and the ability of bureaucrats to implement policy. Lastly, checks and balances even impact the likelihood of government collapse and regime stability. In some circumstances, such as periods of strong economic growth, policy stability may be desirable; at other times, it may not be. Rather than constructing a normative argument about whether checks and balances are either inherently good or bad for democratic government, political science today often takes a positive approach to analysis of checks and balances, examining the underlying institutional sources of policy stability.

See also *Checks and Balances; Constitutional Systems, Comparative; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Divided Government; Federalism; Parliamentary Democracy; Parliamentary Government; Westminster Model.*

. . . . JONATHAN SLAPIN

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Children's Rights

Children's rights have become enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Adopted in 1989, this declaration sought both to establish a concept of rights specific to children (ages seventeen and under) and to elaborate on that concept with regard to the specific rights that should be conferred on children by the state or society in which they live.

Although the principles underpinning these rights, and the specification of some of them, have been strongly contested at times, the UNCRC has nevertheless been adopted by most nations—only the United States and Somalia have not yet ratified the convention—and the UNCRC has acquired force through legislative expression in a number of countries. The United States is opposed to the convention because it fears that ratification could weaken national sovereignty and override parental rights. The points of contestation have emerged out of different cultural values, with some criticism that the UNCRC promulgates a Western, universal conceptualization of the child and of the place of the child in society. Further criticism orientates to a tension within the set of rights as established between protectionist and liberationist approaches to the matter of child rights. Finally, challenges stem from whether children need a specific set of rights or whether they should simply have extended to them the same human and civil rights to which adults can lay claim under the processes of the European Court of Human Rights and other supranational juridical institutions.

The specific provision for children reflects a duality of constructions: on the one hand, children as individual citizens with all the protections that brings, and on the other hand, children as dependents with the implications that carries for children's relationship to adults and to the state. The UNCRC has moved forward from the highly protectionist provisions of earlier formulations for children's rights such as that contained in the League of Nations in 1924 and the United Nations in 1959. A general characterization of the current UNCRC is that it addresses child rights in terms of the "3 Ps"—protection, participation, and provision. Under the protection rubric, children are assigned rights to protection *from* various harms that can be enacted by the state or which the state may fail to prevent (e.g., a right to freedom from violence and from abuse). What can be brought to the fore here is the approach of the "new" childhood studies and its view of the agency of the child in all dimensions of life against the "old" view dealing with the subordination of the child under parental interests. The provision rubric draws together those aspects of a child's life that are essential for a decent life: the right to health care, education, and a home. Finally, rights that relate to participation are those that seek to enable children's voices to be heard in processes of decision making and democratic participation. This new relationalization of protection, provision, and participation reflects the move from the socialization paradigm in childhood research to the new childhood studies in which the child is repositioned as a social actor and not as parents' property.

Consideration of the rights of children is highly relevant to questions concerning political socialization and political education, the theory and practice of democracy, and the politics of childhood. The UNCRC invites thoughts about the exercise of democracy not as something to be acquired at an age of majority but as something to be interwoven throughout the lifeworlds of all citizens across their lifetimes. Consequently, questions of how people become political, and are political, need to set aside assumptions of an apolitical status in childhood. This links to the issue of childhood politics. Childhood is itself a political construction and a political arena, and therefore a contested terrain. A rights perspective demands that children be afforded space, within that construction and arena,

to be visible and heard by those with the power to affect daily and national life. Finally, the notion of political education then becomes one of education for political participation, not *about* democracy as a process reserved for adult engagement only.

See also *Universal Declaration of Human Rights.*

. . . . HEINZ SÜNKER AND JO MORAN-ELLIS

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Chinese Political Thought

Political thought has been an abiding concern of China's rich philosophical tradition for over twenty-five hundred years. Of course, much changed over this time span, including the nature of the Chinese polity along with relations to other peoples and other intellectual traditions. The twentieth century witnessed some of the most dramatic changes in all of China's history. Nonetheless, certain debates seem perennial, and various ideas continue to resurface. One example is the question of authoritative leaders versus authoritative standards or institutions. For many traditional thinkers in China, rule by a sage–king is an achievable and appropriate goal for politics, and it should result in harmonious flourishing for all. Objective standards play varying roles, but even in the twentieth century, it is rare to find a thinker who views standards merely procedurally, and countenances deep-seated pluralism, dissonance, or conflict: harmony or even uniformity are still widely sought. While twenty-first-century Chinese political thought is sure to undergo many changes—as Chinese thinkers reflect both on dramatic developments in Chinese society and their ongoing interactions with various foreign political philosophies—in all likelihood, political thought will also continue to be concerned with harmony, perfectionism, and similar ideas. As such, it may yet lead to new types of political institutions and political theories that will challenge the global hegemony of liberal democracy.

CLASSICAL POLITICAL THOUGHT

Classical Chinese political thought (pre-221 BCE) revolved around three sets of questions: (1) How should a state be organized and governed? In particular, who or what should the people be expected to take as authoritative? (2) What are the proper goals of governance? Which goals are most fundamental? (3) How are the answers to the previous questions justified? What renders the means and ends of governance legitimate?

Two types of answers dominate efforts for addressing the first question. First are those emphasizing adherence to some sort of objective standard (*fa*). Historians have labeled some but not all of the thinkers taking this approach as belonging to the school of standards (*fajia*), an older and misleading translation of which is "legalism." According to early chapters of the *Guanzi* (a collection of philosophical and other essays, begun in the early fourth century BCE and compiled around 26 BCE), for instance, if the people are well fed and put to work at tasks well suited to them, they are likely to accord with propriety and moderation. Yet, the author adds that rulers must "make clear the road to certain death," by which the author means "severe punishments" must be in place for those who go astray. In another chapter of the text, possibly by the same author, it states, "Those who shepherd the people desire them to be controllable. Since they desire them to be controllable, they must pay serious attention to standards (*fa*)." These standards are then enumerated, and include honoring ranks and ceremonial dress, giving salaries and rewards to the deserving, granting offices, and applying punishments. Standards, in short, mean objective criteria for punishment and reward. Legal codes are one sort of standard, but the *Guanzi* and many other texts make it clear that *fa* is understood more broadly than mere penal codes.

The main alternative to an emphasis on standards is the Confucian focus on virtuous rule and moral transformation. In the *Analects* (a collection of the sayings of Confucius and his school, begun shortly after 500 BCE), the dynamic of people identifying with and modeling themselves on the ruler permeates the text's understanding of governance. When asked whether a ruler should kill those who fail to follow the way (*dao*), Confucius responds, "You are there to govern; what use have you for killing? If you desire the good, the people will be good. The virtue of the gentleman is the wind; the virtue of the little people is the grass. The wind on the grass will surely bend it" (12:19). Unlike the emphasis put on punishments as one kind of standard in the *Guanzi,* the *Analects* here minimizes the importance of killing. This point is reinforced in perhaps the most famous saying in the text about governance: "Lead them with government and regulate them by punishments, and the people will evade them with no sense of shame. Lead them with virtue and regulate them by ritual, and they will acquire a sense of shame—and moreover, they will be orderly" (2:3).

These contrasting emphases—objective standards opposed to virtuous rule—can be found to varying degrees in all subsequent treatments of political thought. A related, and important, distinction is that between harmony (*he*) and uniformity (*tong*). Texts that stress objective standards tend also to demand strict uniformity with those standards and to leave little, if any, room for complaint or remonstrance. (One partial exception is the *Mozi,* a collection of essays by the philosopher Mozi and his school, begun in the late fifth century BCE. In one plausible reading, its objective standard of benefit is readily accessible to

all, and thus could ground criticism of a leader who does not follow it.) Confucian texts, in contrast, emphasize individual judgment—at least among the cultivated—and despise uniformity. Drawing on the metaphors of balanced flavors in a soup or the blending of different notes in music, Confucians argue that harmony depends on situationally apt judgment. This enables the whole (of which one is a part) to flourish more than before. Confucian standards for judgment tend to be internal and based on virtue. While ritual propriety is important, Confucius makes clear that without an inner, emotional commitment, an external show of ritual is next to worthless.

There are various answers to the question of what grounds the objective standards found in texts like *Guanzi* and *Mozi,* as well as in two other famous collections of realist ideas from the classical period, *Shangjun Shu* and *Hanfeizi.* Especially in *Mozi,* one apparent answer is heaven (*tian*). This, however, is somewhat complicated. While *tian* once clearly referred to a religious entity, it eventually comes to be understood in more naturalistic terms. For the most part, classical philosophers of governance do not appeal to supernatural standards to justify their claims. Even in the *Mozi,* other chapters record that just as carpenters can use a compass to determine what is circular, so an understanding of the "will of heaven" leads one to reliably judge what is right. The striking thing about a compass is that no special knowledge is needed to use it: It is a public, objective standard for circles. If the will of heaven is to be analogous, then there must be a public, objective standard for right. Mysterious knowledge of the will of a deity does not sound like a good candidate for such a public, objective standard. The text offers an alternative, though, when it regularly speaks of maximally benefitting (*li*) the people as a standard. A neat way of resolving all these loose ends, then, is to conclude that the will of heaven is a metaphorical reference to the standard of benefit. Proper Mohist governance thus would ultimately be a matter of utilitarian judgment.

Along somewhat similar lines, the *Shangjun Shu* argues that "the greatest benefit to the people is order [*zhi*]," which is to implicitly accept that benefit is the standard by which theories of governance are judged. At the same time, it places particular stress on the collective character of benefit. In a war-torn world, the text relays, only when the state is strong can its inhabitants flourish. Those who act for their own interests rather than for the benefit of the state, therefore, are to be punished. One result of the fuzziness surrounding the idea of benefitting the people is that if clearer criteria can plausibly be seen as necessary conditions for benefitting the people, these criteria take center stage. A prime example is order. Disorder, it is natural to assume, is incompatible with the people's well-being, so rulers could concentrate on order and allow benefit to follow in its wake. Especially when combined with the idea that the people tend to be selfish and not understand what is really good for them, though, a focus on order can rapidly lead to tyranny. It is perhaps with this in mind that another early Confucian, *Xunzi,* maintained that "there is only governance by men, not governance by standards" (*Xunzi* 8). Just claiming to be virtuous is not enough, of course; in fact, Mencius famously asserted

that rulers who abandon their virtuous commitments can be treated like bandits and slain (*Mencius* 1B:8). Indeed, others saw that the doctrine of rule by virtue is by no means a panacea. The *Hanfeizi* argues that while objective standards and their attendant institutions will make no difference if the ruler is supremely good or supremely bad, for the vast majority of rulers, such institutions are critical (*Hanfeizi* 40).

POSTCLASSICAL THOUGHT

The general shape of political thought in the postclassical period (221 BCE–1911 CE) followed on the foundations classical political thought. Scholars have used the term *imperial Confucianism* to describe the philosophy-cum-state ideology that emerged. There was enormous institutional innovation, partly because of great social changes, but the mainstream Confucian discourse continued to see institutions and standards with secondary importance, compared to the cultivation of virtuous individuals. The language of *sage ruler* was regularly applied to emperors—not least by the emperors themselves—and rulers efforts to educate or transform their subjects sometimes led to horrific excesses. The idea that people were beholden to a standard of personal moral judgment was fleshed out; the source and justification of the judgment came to be seen as the underlying harmonious coherence (*li*) (also sometimes translated as "principle") of the cosmos.

One critical episode in this lengthy period was the failure of an ambitious program of top-down institutional reforms advocated by Wang Anshi (1021–1086), which led many subsequent Confucians to stress local institutions and local autonomy. A related trend, which both supported and was supported by the flourishing commercial economy of the sixteenth century and thereafter, was the increasing emphasis on legitimate personal (*si*) desires. A range of thinkers came to make explicit the importance of a legitimate sphere of personal concern, and this trend was one significant source of subsequent Chinese reflection about rights. Indeed, the Chinese term that came to be accepted as a translation of rights meant, to nineteenth-century Confucian thinkers, something close to "legitimate powers and interests."

Among the most significant political texts of the entire period was the trenchant manifesto *Waiting for the Dawn,* completed in 1663 by Huang Zongxi. Huang argues that a healthy polity is based on well-designed institutions (using *fa,* or standard, in a broad sense) like schools, property regimes, and ceremonies that train people to be social citizens, rather than selfish egoists. Huang contrasts these institutions with those promoted by recent rulers, which he characterizes as "anti-institutional institutions" (*fa* that are not *fa*): In this case, the educational system, property regime, and ceremonies are designed solely to glorify the one family who happens to occupy the throne—whether the family deserves it or not. Huang then famously asserts, "Should it be said that 'There is only governance by men, not governance by institutions [*fa*],' my reply is that only if there is governance by institutions can there by governance by men." He goes on to explain, "If the institutions of the early kings were still in effect, there would

be a spirit among men that went beyond the institutions. If men were of the right kind, all of their intentions could be realized; and even if they were not of this kind, they could not slash deep or do widespread damage." Huang's argument may bring to mind the similar-sounding argument of Han Feizi, cited earlier, although for the most part Huang's institutions are designed to nurture people's good natures, rather than impose objective punishments along Han Feizi's lines. In any event, the tension between relying on virtuous rulers, and seeking to provide some sort of objective guidance or institution, clearly continued throughout the imperial period.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

A flourishing of political thought, under the twin stimuli of domestic challenges and encounters with foreign political philosophies, marked the last years of the Qing dynasty, which collapsed in 1911. The Russian Revolution of 1917 added further fuel to the fire, at a time when the nascent Republic of China was struggling with both internal and external threats. The nature and sources of political authority once again were topics of debate. Many now took it for granted that the goal was some sort of democracy in which the people were (at least in principle) sovereign. But who counted as "the people," how they were to be led or represented, and how collective versus individual goals were to be balanced, all were up for grabs. At a broader level, there was a debate between those who felt the answer could be in one or another "ism"—that is, an all-encompassing ideology like Marxism—and those who favored working more pragmatically, via institution building, on one problem at a time. A few decades later, after the founding of the People's Republic, similar issues were addressed in the contrast between "Red" (ideologically and morally pure) and "expert" (possessing technical expertise). In various ways, these twentieth-century debates resonated with classical rule-by-virtue versus rule-by-standards contention. Were morally advanced individuals the key to an ideal society? Or should objective standards of success, coupled with objective institutions, be society's political foundation? In cases of conflict, which had priority?

There was certainly no single answer offered to these questions by any of the groups constituting twentieth-century China's political landscape, ranging from *new Confucians* to nationalists to liberals to Marxists. However, the "isms" approach won out through much of the century, and Thomas Metzger has shown that Chinese political thinkers of all camps tended toward what he calls *epistemological optimism*, which is a confidence that the one, universally applicable moral and political truth is knowable, and so great that authority should be vested in those gifted individuals able to perceive this truth. Another way to put this would be to say that there is a strong utopian strand in much twentieth-century Chinese political thought, which has both pushed toward radical solutions and led to dissatisfaction with continued dissonance or piecemeal progress. Even Chinese liberals have, in many cases, envisioned harmonious societies in which individual self-realization goes hand-in-hand with the realization of the larger collectivity, which they

often called the larger self (*dawo*). From a Western perspective, they have leaned more towards the ideas of French Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau than toward those of British utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill.

Twentieth-century China was home to a number of creative Marxist political thinkers, the most famous of whom was Mao Zedong (1893–1976). Mao was instrumental in redefining the Marxist revolution so that peasants rather than urban workers were its foundation—a shift that was facilitated by the fact that the Chinese translation for *proletariat* literally meant "the class without property [*wuchan jieji*]." In philosophical essays like "On Practice" and "On Contradiction," Mao elaborated an understanding of knowledge and of political progress that emphasized the roles of experience and ongoing process, rather than abstract principles. Marxist theory certainly had a role, but pride of place went to individuals who are able to negotiate the dialectical relations between theory and concrete experience. The end result is a framework that allows leaders to claim authority to institute radical policies and even "permanent revolution"; neither objective standards nor rule of law could resist the claims to experiential insight on the part of individuals.

Some philosophers in the twentieth century have been more aware than others of the problems with utopianism. Mou Zongsan (1909–1995), a leader of the new Confucian movement, was not only aware of these problems, but also offered a particularly creative way out of the recurrent tension between personal virtue (or morality) and public standards (or politics). Mou's insight is that the relation between morality and politics is "dialectical." Rather than seeing a leader's political virtue as a direct extension of the leader's personal moral virtue, Mou argues that there needs to be an indirect relation between them. Politics and political virtue must develop out of morality, but nonetheless have an independent, objective existence. This means that human rights, for example, must have a basis in morality, but come to be measured by standards that are separate from moral standards. The converse is also true: Full moral virtue requires that which partly "negates its essential nature [*ziwo kanxian*]," namely objective structure (Mou, 59). Objective structures (like laws) are fundamentally different from the subjectively felt, internalized morality for which all should all individually strive. The concrete implication of this is that no matter what one's level of moral accomplishment, "insofar as one's virtue is manifested in politics, one cannot override the relevant limits (that is, the highest principles of the political world), and in fact must devote one's august character to the realization of these limits" (128). In short, sages cannot break the law or violate the constitution. Politics thus has its independence from morality.

Philosophers have differed in their evaluations of Mou's argument, but it can stand as an instance of the continuing creativity to be found in contemporary Chinese political thinking. China's dynamic society offers a crucible within which new ideas and new political forms may be forged and tested in coming years. To be sure, genuinely novel and intellectually challenging ideas do not form the majority of contemporary Chinese political discourse, but they are there on all sides of

the spectrum. It remains to be seen whether robust political values and institutions will emerge as alternatives to more familiar models of Western political theory, just as the role is unforeseen for the Marxist, Confucian, liberal, and other traditions in future Chinese political thinking. Concerns with harmony and virtue are unlikely to disappear, but (as Mou's example shows) this by no means limits the future interest of whatever political institutions and theories emerge in China.

See also *Asian Political Thought; Confucian Political Thought; Maoism; Marxism; Political Culture; Social Order.*

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Christian Democratic Parties

Christian democracy is a label that has not been accurately defined, and it sometimes includes the more recent protestant parties of Scandinavia and Christen Demokratisch Appel (CDA) of the Netherlands, but this family of parties is usually assumed to be those of Catholic sensibility. As such, Christian democracy constitutes an influential group of parties with outliers in Latin America and in Asia (the Philippines). However, its heartland is the Old World: One of the main conservative movements in Western Europe at the end of World War II (1939–1945) was Christian democracy. This was not a sudden eruption onto the European stage, but the product of a long gestation and a slow acceptance of representative institutions by the Catholic Church as well as a current of thought that had roots in Catholic social teaching and in *papal encyclicals* (doctrinal briefs). Christian Democratic parties are not confessional parties, and they are probusiness. However, they are all located on the center left of the political spectrum and claim to be inspired by Catholic social teaching; consequently, they emphasize human dignity for all classes of people.

ROOTS OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

After the French Revolution (1789–1799), the Church of Rome found itself in opposition to the radical parties and to the revolutionaries of the left. However, the papacy recognized the plight of the new class of factory workers and, in the encyclical *Humanum genus*, rebuked the Western governments for stripping the workers of the protection given them by corporations and exposing them to the blast of the free market. These themes were developed, as were those of social Catholicism, by the encyclical from Pope Leo XIII in 1891, *Rerum Novarum*—seen as the founding document of the Christian Democrat movement, although it is differently interpreted. *Rerum Novarum* reiterated the Catholic Church's opposition to revolution, to socialism (which promoted rancor and resentment and attacked property), and to free market ideology. The capitalism attacked was of the sort propounded by J. S. Mill and Spencer that idealized the free market and regarded greed and avarice (akin to *usury* in Catholic thought) as the central motive in society. This encyclical promoted social welfare and trade-union protection for the workers and developed a positive view of the state. In Catholic political thought, the state had a big role in the way a community's interests can be legitimately defended and promoted. This encyclical also encouraged the development of Catholic social organizations, such as trade unions, and participation in secular Western institutions.

EARLY PARTIES

The impact of the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* was not immediate or dramatic, but it did inspire a number of movements, and the process of party-building, that was to come to fruition in the mid-century, was under way. Early experiments in Catholic Democratic Parties included Marc Sagnier's Sillon (founded in 1899) in France and the Zentrum in Germany (which

polled 16.4 percent in 1914). In Italy, the Catholic dispute with the papacy prevented progress, and the pope condemned the Sillon in France in an authoritarian turn of policy that saw democracy and the nation as a threat in many cases.

French Christian democracy was not a force after the World War I (1914–1918), but the Zentrum emerged as one of the major governing parties of Weimar Germany, and in Italy, Don Luigi Sturzo founded the Partito Populare Italiano (PPI). Don Sturzo's PPI was influential in its teaching, and it polled 20 percent in 1919. In 1920, the PPI supported Mussolini before moving into opposition and being dissolved in 1926. Perhaps the most successful electorally was the Belgian *Parti catholique*, which polled 37 percent before World War II and was the major party in the country. In much of Europe, however, the main conservative or center-right perception was of a threat from communism and atheistic movements.

POST–WORLD WAR II SUCCESS AND CONTEMPORARY DECLINE

Many Catholics found themselves in resistance movements during the war, and the Vatican itself retreated from direct political involvement after 1945. During the reconstruction of Europe, the Christian Democrats emerged as a distinct force and as mass parties with a popular base. They were the main parties in France (*Mouvement républicain populaire* or MRP), Germany (*Christlich Demokratische Union* or CDU), Italy (*Democrazia Cristiana*), and Austria (*Österreichische Volkspartei*). One reason for this success is that they were seen as a bulwark against communism (Pius XII excommunicated Communist voters), but they also embraced the Atlantic Alliance and NATO as well as supporting the European welfare states and social protection. Christian Democratic ideas of the social market economy were influential and the slogan, "yes to a market economy, no to a market society" (often thought to be socialist in origin) sums up their outlook. Three Christian Democrats, Alcide de Gasperi of Italy, Konrad Adenauer of Germany, and Robert Schuman of France were seen as the founding fathers of European institutions (although others, notably the socialists, were equally involved). Although the MRP in France foundered under the impact of competition from de Gaulle's movements, it was one of the governing parties of the Fourth Republic contributing ministers to most governments. In Italy, the Christian Democrats were the principal governing party until 1992, and in Germany the CDU was in government from 1949 to 1998 (1969–1982 excepted). Likewise, in Benelux countries, Christian Democrats participated in governments from 1945 onward and in Austria, the Christian Democrats were the first party for most of the postwar period. There has, however, been a decline is support for Christian Democratic parties in Europe since the 1990. In Italy in 1993 to 1994, the Christian Democrats split four ways after successive party funding scandals and there is only a small center-left remnant. CDA has declined in the Netherlands, as have the Belgian French and Dutch-speaking Christian Democrats, although in France, the tradition is maintained within François Bayrou's small MoDem Party. No Christian

Democrats emerged as forces in Portugal or Spain after the fall of the dictatorships, and there is no Irish Party (although Fine Gael is affiliated). Christian Democrats are the dominant force in the European People's Party, and there is a Christian Democratic World Union movement (the Centrist Democrat International) with almost as many affiliates as the Socialist International. However, the movement is not homogenous and has decidedly different orientations on left-right issues in separate countries with the strongly Catholic countries being relatively conservative in inclination but with family and "church" issues, although generally conservative, also being prioritized differently. *Rerum Novarum* was celebrated by Pope John Paul II, who published the encyclical *Centisimus annus* in 1991, reiterating many of the same themes.

See also *Christian Socialism; Confessional Parties; Papacy; Religion and Politics; Religious Parties; Roman Catholic Political Thought.*

. . . .   DAVID S. BELL

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Christian Socialism

Christian socialism is an ideological perspective that believes that socialist political and economic policies—if not necessarily a fully socialist community or economy—are essential to living a Christian life. For Christian socialists, the message of Christianity is strongly egalitarian, encouraging all human beings to see themselves as brothers and sisters, condemning economic differences that allow the rich to exploit the poor, and generally disdaining the "profit mentality" and the principles of self-interest that are central to most defenses of free market economy. Hence, they see socialism, or at least some form of social democracy, as a natural concomitant to the Christian message. Similarly, they believe that being a member of a capitalist environment potentially implicates one in un-Christian practices; thus, an active resistance to certain elements of the liberal capitalist state, and attempts to reform those same elements, is the duty of every Christian.

Christian socialist movements or individual Christian socialist leaders, writers, or thinkers will occasionally explicitly link the practices of the original Christianity community formed following the death of Jesus with socialist teachings

(e.g., by citing Acts 2:44–45: "All the believers agreed to hold everything in common: they began to sell their property and possessions and distribute to everyone according to his need;" (Revised English Bible). They will also sometimes associate Christian socialism as a whole with numerous egalitarian Christian communalist reforms and movements that have been attempted by different Christian churches, monastic orders, and dissident groups over the centuries (the Franciscans, the Mennonites, the Diggers during the English Civil War [1642–1651], the United Order practiced by the Mormons in nineteenth-century America, the Hopedale Community founded by Adin Ballou). For the most part, however, Christian socialist beliefs have of their roots in late-nineteenth-century Protestant social gospel teachings and, most particularly, the papal encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (On New Things). More than any other single writing, *Rerum Novarum* provided the foundation for numerous Christian democratic and Christian socialist parties throughout Europe.

Of course, these same sources also played an important role in the rise of progressivism in the United States and social solidarity and trade union movements through all the Western world, and have been embraced by numerous liberal, democratic, and egalitarian groups and parties. As such, Christian socialism has historically not been usually understood as a distinct, separate voice calling explicitly for a socialist revolution, but rather as a perspective aligned with other ideologies in seeking a gradualist or evolutionary (though occasionally necessarily confrontational) approach to securing progressive and ameliorative ends. Some Christian socialists hope to see those ends eventually result in a fully socialized economic environment and consider the liberal redistribution of wealth to be insufficient, whereas others see the Christian socialist perspective simply as one that can be realized in any sufficiently egalitarian economy (e.g., a capitalist society with strong welfare policies and key public goods—like transportation, education, and medical care—made accessible and affordable, or free, to all).

Various Christian socialist individuals and organizations have been closely entwined with major political parties throughout Western Europe (such as the Fabian Society and Labour Party in Great Britain, among others). The same holds for the mostly Catholic nations of Central and South America, although liberation theology, which has had its greatest impact in Latin America, is much more explicitly Marxist and revolutionary in its aims, despite being usually considered a branch of Christian socialist thought. Christian socialism has, like socialism in general, had a much smaller impact in the United States. Marx himself, it should be noted, was highly critical of Christian justifications for socialist reforms, calling Christian socialism "the holy water by which the priest consecrates the heart-burnings of the aristocrat."

See also *Capitalism and Democracy; Social Democracy; Socialism.*

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Church and State

Church and state refers to the institutional interaction between religious organizations and the formal governance within a country. As a topic of discussion, *church and state* differs from *religion and politics*. The latter deals with how individual or group beliefs, values, and norms influence power relations and policy outcomes within a polity. Church and state focuses on how official rules and secular-authority structures impact the operation of churches, and, conversely, how the institutional interests of church officials affect the operation of secular government.

DEFINING CHURCH AND STATE

A church is the institutional embodiment of a religious denomination, and as such, delineates the leadership roles and rules for governing behavior within the faith. A church should be considered analytically distinct from a religion, although each religion typically gives rise to a corresponding church. The term *church* typically has Christian connotations, referring primarily to the Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant traditions. Most Western scholarship on church and state has focused on the Christian world, primarily Europe and the United States. Scholars studying non-Christian faith traditions sometimes prefer to use terms such as *mosque and state* (for Islam) or *temple and state* (for Eastern religions or Judaism).

State as defined in church-state studies, refers to the institutional and authoritative arrangements of a governing body within a nation. Following nineteenth-century German sociologist Max Weber's definition, a state typically maintains a monopoly over the use of coercion, which gives the state the ability to create and enforce rules and regulations within society. This power has significant consequences for religious organizations, and forms the basis for church-state relations. A state can craft rules that permit a limited number of official churches, making all other churches illegal. The state can also use its coercive powers to collect taxes to finance a church or demand a say in the appointment of church leaders or making of church policy. Alternatively, the state can impose various regulatory barriers to make it difficult for any church to operate within a country. Determining which churches, if any, receive special status and subsidization from the state is perhaps the central issue in church-state relations.

CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIP IN ERA OF "CHRISTENDOM"

The granting of official status, collection of religious taxes, and prohibitions on nonsanctioned churches have been the historical norm in European Christianity since the Edict of Milan in 312 CE. This edict provided Christianity with state financial support equal to that of traditional Roman pagan temples. As financial support for pagan religions dried up, Christianity effectively became the official state church of the Roman Empire. Upon the collapse of the Roman Empire and throughout the duration of the medieval era, the Christian Church (in both its Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox branches) relied, in part, upon financial support from various kings and nobles. In exchange for this much-needed support, the church would either sell leadership positions (bishoprics) to the nobility or allow kings to choose the leaders for these positions. Such control sometimes gave secular leaders veto power over official church proclamations, such as papal bulls. The Catholic Church also found ways to finance itself through a variety of other mechanisms when state authority was too weak to provide financial assistance.

One of the major disadvantages of state control over the church was that the church became corrupted for purposes of political power and secular financial gain, with some individuals gaining access to key church leadership positions without ever having read the Bible. Such corruption frequently gave rise to schismatic movements (e.g., Lollards, Hussites) that often required state force to crush.

The most successful and decisive schismatic movement in Christian history was Martin Luther's Protestant Reformation in the early 1500s. Initially, nobles simply chose between Catholicism and Lutheranism and imposed that particular religion on their citizenry. Thus, Lutheranism developed into a state church like its Catholic counterpart. The principal question relating to church-state relations in the sixteenth century became which religion a monarch would endorse and impose on their population.

The larger historical significance of Luther's Reformation (and the subsequent English Reformation in 1533) for church-state relations was that it gave legitimacy to a myriad of new denominations (e.g., Calvinists, Anabaptists) and created a burgeoning of religious pluralism in Europe. Religious pluralism initially gave rise to domestic and international conflict, such as the French Religious Wars (1562–1598) and the Thirty Years War (1618–1648). However, religious pluralism eventually pushed many European states to tolerate minority churches even while they formally endorsed a single religious establishment. France's Edict of Nantes (1589) and England's Acts of Toleration (1689) represented the initial movement toward religious liberty, although the former was repealed in 1685.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND TOLERATION

Religious liberty is a form of church-state relation wherein multiple denominations are allowed to exist under government authority. A government may still maintain a state church, but other churches are granted some minimal level of freedom to own property and proselytize. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution took the concept of religious toleration to its logical conclusion by prohibiting the establishment of any official state religion at the federal level. While intense debate still surrounds what constitutes official government promotion of religion in the United States, the First Amendment created a model of church and state that eventually became the standard of religious freedom in the Christian world.

Despite an increasing trend toward religious freedom and toleration in the Western world, a number of states in Europe continue to maintain established churches either through official endorsement or via governmental subsidization. For example, Sweden recently ended the "state church" status of the Reformed Church but the state continues to heavily subsidize the daily operations of the church. The German government collects tithes (taxes) directly for the Lutheran Church and the Catholic Church. While Britain has reduced the amount of its financial subsidies to the Church of England, the archbishop of Canterbury, the head of the church, is still appointed by the monarch with input from Parliament. Low levels of church attendance in Europe have made relations between church and state a relatively moot policy issue. Despite the low salience of church-state policy in the public discourse, European governments continue to protect their state churches by making it legally difficult for various missionary movements (typically from the United States) to create a presence in the region. This is often done by prohibiting the construction of church buildings or making it difficult to gain tax-exempt status.

THE PROBLEM OF ISLAM AND NON-WESTERN RELIGIONS

An increasingly controversial phenomenon in European church-state relations concerns the growing presence of Islam. Given that Islam is a decentralized religion with no formal hierarchy, European governments have had difficulty accommodating Muslims in traditional church-state alliances, as there is no single voice to speak for Islam. Muslims have found it difficult to receive funding equivalent to that of other state-funded religions for their religious schools or programs in several countries. They have also faced difficulty in gaining recognition for their spiritual customs. The prohibition on headscarves in public schools in France represents a primary example of this. The U.S. model of a "wall of separation" between church and state—effectively meaning that the government does not endorse or publicly finance any specific church—has proved to be less difficult for Muslims, as they are treated similarly to Christian denominations in matters of public policy.

The concept of church and state is more ambiguous in non-Western contexts. Islam and many Eastern religions, such as Buddhism, do not share the hierarchical structure of Christianity, thus relations between church (mosque or temple) and state are more complex. For example, a diffusion of leadership within Islam makes it more difficult for the state to easily

interact with the Muslim clergy, as there is not one unique point of contact (such as a pope or bishop). In many Islamic countries, the state will decree Islam to be the official religion and prohibit proselytization by non-Muslims. In some instances (such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia), the state will officially subsidize the Muslim clergy, mosques, or other important Islamic institutions even though many Muslim clergy and organizations exist without official state endorsement or subsidization. A similar situation exists in societies dominated by Eastern religions; while some governments may endorse various historical faith traditions, the decentralized nature of these religions makes it difficult for governments to strictly regulate every practitioner of that faith. The lack of formal religious hierarchies within these faith traditions has meant less scholarship on church and state as compared to religion and politics.

See also *Clericalism; Confessional Parties; Freedom of Religion; Laicite; Papacy; Protestant Political Thought; Reformation Political Thought; Religion and Politics; State Church; Theocracy; Toleration.*

. . . . ANTHONY GILL

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Cicero, Marcus Tullius

Politician, philosopher, orator, lawyer, and poet, Cicero Marcus Tullius (106–43 BCE) is arguably the most important Roman political thinker.

Born in the Italian town of Arpinum, Cicero lived through the Social War, warfare between Marius and Sulla, and Sulla's dictatorship. The young Cicero studied law and encountered Stoicism, Skepticism, as well as academic philosophy. A brilliant orator, Cicero rapidly worked his way up the Roman *cursus honorum,* or course of magistracies, serving as consul in 63 BCE. While consul, Cicero suppressed Catiline's plot to overthrow the republic, putting to death several conspirators. In 58 BCE, he was exiled for executing Roman citizens; he returned in 57 BCE and favored Pompey in his increasingly violent political rivalry with Caesar. Following Caesar's invasion, Cicero fled Rome in 49 BCE, returning the following year after Caesar's victory at Pharsalus. Cicero helped lead

Influential Roman philosopher Cicero defined the republic as an affair of the people bound by right and advantage.

Source: The Granger Collection, New York

senatorial opposition to Marc Antony after Caesar's assassination, delivering his famous *Philippics* against him in 44 BCE. Though Cicero hoped to play Caesar's adopted son, Octavian, against Antony, he was killed December 7, 43 BCE, following their reconciliation.

Cicero wrote many philosophical works dealing with a wide range of issues; his most important political works are the fragmentary *On the Republic* and *On the Laws,* and *On Duties.* In *On the Republic,* Cicero argues that the Roman constitution, mixing monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, was the ideal constitution, and he famously defined the republic (*res publica*) as the *res populi,* or affair of the people bound by right and advantage; its defense against corruption lay in civic virtue and leadership. In *On the Laws,* Cicero describes the laws of his ideal republic, articulating a conception of natural law rooted in human and divine reason. In *On Duties,* Cicero discusses the three problems of ethics: the honorable, the expedient, and conflicts between the two. Cicero argues that the truly honorable is expedient; hence, there is no conflict between the two.

Cicero greatly influenced subsequent thought. Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE) claimed that Cicero's *Hortensius* turned him toward philosophy and referenced *On the Republic* in *City*

of God; the "Dream of Scipio," also from *On the Republic,* was of special influence in the Middle Ages. Cicero was a key figure in humanistic thought from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, *On Duties* being especially influential. His writings would also inspire seventeenth-century English writers such as James Harrington and John Locke, and draw Thomas Hobbes's criticism in *Leviathan.* He influenced numerous eighteenth-century thinkers, including Francois-Marie Voltaire, David Hume, Edmund Burke, and Thomas Jefferson. Although his influence waned after the eighteenth century, Cicero now draws renewed attention due to interest in republicanism and civic virtue.

See also *Civic Humanism; Natural Law; Republic; Republicanism, Classical; Virtue Theory*

. . . .   DANIEL KAPUST

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Citizen Knowledge

Political knowledge is the factual information—and the skills for interpreting it—needed to act as an effective member of the *polis* or political community. From Plato to John Stuart Mill, political theorists have viewed political knowledge as a precondition for exercising citizenship—for taking part in community decision making. Since modern democracies extend citizenship to all adults, there is an expectation that they possess the necessary information and skills. Minimally, for representative democracy to function properly, those entitled to select representatives (i.e., voters in elections) need to have sufficient information and skill to evaluate leaders' performance, to compare parties' commitments against their own preferences, and to weigh the credibility of the commitments in light of their record in government.

TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVES
Fulfilling the underlying principle of democracy, political equality thus becomes more than the right to vote and take part in politics; political equality requires being able to exercise the right knowledgeably. Traditionally, democratic theory has been concerned mainly with the effects of the distribution of power on political equality: knowledge focused on the manipulation of information by elites. As a result, political institutions and state policies are critically analyzed in terms of whether and how they block or distort—rather than foster—the dissemination of political knowledge. Concern with such dissemination was limited to policies and institutions involved with the political socialization of children and adolescents, through schools in particular, and their role in fostering support for democratic institutions.

THE RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACH
A different approach can be identified with the rational choice perspective. In his seminal 1957 volume, Anthony Downs pointed to "information asymmetries" resulting from the costs of acquiring needed information being inversely related to a person's economic resources. But rational choice thinkers have tended to view absence of political knowledge as an expression of "rational ignorance," rather than a public policy issue. Only recently has the presence or absence of knowledgeable democratic adult citizens been perceived as worthy of significant attention in research and public policy. The last two decades have produced important contributions to the understanding of a phenomenon termed political awareness, political sophistication, political information, and political literacy, as well as political knowledge. The main impetus has come from the accumulation of data showing that, despite rising levels of education, average levels of political knowledge are lower than that needed to meet the minimal expectations of universal adult citizenship—and declining. Already in 1964, Philip Converse observed that the average American citizen exhibited a low level of knowledge, lack of consistency between attitudes, attitude instability, and vacuous answers to open-ended questions. Thirty years later, Larry Bartels concluded that "the political ignorance of the American voter is one of the best documented data in political science."

There is no consensus, however, on what to make of this state of affairs, and the differences give rise to several different research agendas. The most profound debate centers on whether political ignorance matters. Downs noted that while citizens may act as rational consumers of information in a political market, their ignorance results in a "paradox" since they lose out on the benefits to be gained from an informed electorate. Some observers contest the ill effects of this voters' paradox, arguing that politically uninformed people follow social cues and rules of thumb to arrive at decisions; these decisions result in outcomes similar to those that would have been attained through the participation of informed people. Arend Lijphart disputes the premise that the views of those nonvoting out of ignorance do not differ substantially from those of voters, arguing that polled nonvoters have given the issues less thought than they would have if they had been mobilized to vote.

Evidence of such differences emerges from deliberative polls. Comparing the results of surveys conducted before and after participants are provided with relevant information in well over twenty deliberative polls conducted in North America, Europe, and Australia, James Fishkin and Robert Luskin report that deliberation almost always produces significant factual information gains and, often, changes in opinions. Underlying this approach is a critique over public opinion polling. On many issues, survey designers assume a level of knowledge that many respondents lack. Hence, the supposed reflection of popular opinion that polls provide is distorted because they are inaccurate, since poorly informed respondents, who are also

generally poorer, will give answers they think are expected of them, and unrepresentative, since they are more likely not to answer.

POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

A related literature has emerged examining the effects of political knowledge and how it serves as intermediary between opinions and voting. In particular, researchers have investigated differences between well-informed and poorly informed voters in the stability of their preferences when confronted with new information about candidates. As a rule, the more people are knowledgeable about politics, the more their expressed policy preferences will be consistent with their political values, and the more those who identify with a party, the more they will articulate policy preferences in line with those of the party.

A question addressed in the literature concerns how political knowledge is operationalized. One popular classification identifies three types of questions: Factual questions survey the processes of government, surveillance questions cover current office holders, and textbook questions get at historical and constitutional aspects. But some question this kind of typology. A school of thought has emerged taking a more subjective perspective on the "political." From this perspective, the widespread portrait of a politically uninformed and inattentive youth miss the "good news," namely attitudes about human relations and the environment which young people define as political. But there are problems with using attitudinal—as opposed to knowledge based—indicators, since they costlessly invite respondents to place themselves in a positive light.

Underlying this debate is an intensifying interest in the relationship between political knowledge and political participation. A great deal of empirical data link low levels of political knowledge to declining voter turnout, lack of party membership and identification, and distrust of politicians. Numerous studies show that more informed people are more likely to vote and engage in various forms of conventional, and even unconventional, political activity.

Such findings buttress calls for improved civic education, but tell us little about the effects of specific institutions. Electoral institutions, in particular, influence the accessibility, intelligibility, and usefulness of political information, and countries higher in civic literacy (the proportion of those with the knowledge to be effective citizens) tend to be high in electoral participation. Missing is the aggregate data to link specific institutional arrangements and levels of political knowledge. Cross-national survey questionnaires generally limit political knowledge questions to international events and processes. The contemporary challenge is to devise a battery of questions about government processes, office holders, and issues to be used in cross-national research.

See also *Citizenship; Civic Education; Mill, John Stuart; Voting Behavior*

. . . . HENRY MILNER

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Citizenship

Defining *citizenship* has preoccupied social scientists for millennia. "It is clear that the first thing that must be sought is the citizen," wrote Aristotle, "for the city is a certain multitude of citizens. Thus what ought to be called a citizen and what the citizen is must be investigated" (Aristotle, 3:1). Like the *polis* of Aristotle's time, a modern state is a collection of citizens, defining citizenship requires investigation, and it is not always easy to determine what or who ought to be called a *citizen*. According to more recent commentary, there is "no notion more central in politics than citizenship, and none more variable in history, or contested in theory" (Shklar, 1).

DEFINITION

In its most fundamental sense, citizenship refers to membership within a political community. Today, this membership is most often expressed as a relationship between an individual and a sovereign state; for example, an individual can be a citizen of Canada or Brazil, but not a citizen within a company or private organization. Symbols such as a passport, or other identification documents issued by relevant state authorities, often represent citizenship as a form of state membership. Most people acquire citizenship in a particular state, at birth through the operation of nationality law. This means individuals are either commonly granted the nationality of the state in which they are born or granted citizenship based upon their father or mother's nationality. In the instance of individuals who do not acquire citizenship of the state in which they were physically born, such as immigrants, these persons may eventually acquire this state's citizenship through a process of naturalization, in which they are often required to have spent a minimum time period in the state, take an oath of allegiance, and potentially renounce a previously held foreign citizenship through denaturalization. Thus, the term citizenship, by these definitions, is a legal relationship between an individual and a political community (i.e., a state).

A related meaning of citizenship, going beyond the strictly legal relationship between an individual and a sovereign state, refers to the rights and duties that accompany a person's membership in a political community. This second meaning focuses on the political obligations of the citizen, since it refers to the individual not only obeying the state's law but also participating in the political process. For Aristotle, citizenship meant not only being ruled but also sharing in the ruling—a notion denouncing the proponents of absolute monarchy. For centuries, there have been debates about the distinction between citizens and subjects. Today the term *citizenship* is generally accepted in this political sense as restricted to individuals who are citizens of democratic regimes, in which they are considered to be active participants in their own state's political process. Essentially, while a person may be a legal citizen in a nondemocratic state retaining the proper passport proclaiming such legal citizenship, these citizens do not typically have the degree of influence or powers to exact political change within their states as practiced in democracies.

Theoretical work on defining citizenship is varied and voluminous; however, many authors distinguish between two strands captured under the terms *republican,* which is occasionally conflated with communitarian, and *liberal.* The republican concept of citizenship embraces Aristotle's views on political participation and civic self-rule. Italian Renaissance political philosopher Niccoló Machiavelli's description of Italian city-states encouraging national unity and open political engagement and debate, as well as 18th-century philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau's advocacy of the public's collective will to provide for the common good, also fall under the republican concept. By contrast, the liberal view of citizenship emphasizes an individual's adherence to the state's rule of law and the individual's liberty from state interference, thus a status rather than an activity.

Both versions are subject to the criticism that the distinction between public and private citizenship is artificial. They also fall prey to a multicultural critique that promotes differential rights for immigrants, minorities, or constituent nations; the possibility of group rights inherent in aboriginal self-government also arises. Such critiques question the extent to which citizenship, albeit a unitary status or a shared engagement, can operate within pluralist societies in which there is no singular entity with the ability to solely dictate the political or socioeconomic climate.

THE RISE OF CITIZENSHIP

DETERMINING CITIZENSHIP

Prior to any discussion of the rights that citizenship entails, it is common to discuss and determine the attribution of citizenship, and in particular the question of who has the power to grant or take away one's citizenship. Since the development of modern citizenship has been intimately connected with the development of sovereignty, the traditional view attributed citizenship to flow solely from state authority. In this vein, the 1930 Hague Convention specified that it "is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals."

However, during the next fifteen years, millions of individuals, not only in Germany but throughout Europe, were stripped of their citizenship as consequence of World War II (1939–1945). Due to the postwar large-scale European denaturalizations, the United Nations agreed, in the aftermath of the war, to limit sovereignty by specifying, in Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that everyone is entitled to a citizenship and citizens cannot be arbitrarily deprived of their citizenship or denied the right to change it. Within such broad parameters of international law, however, individual state policies on the attribution of citizenship continue to differ substantially. All states employ some combination of *jus sanguinis* (attribution on the basis of descent) and *jus soli* (attribution on the basis of place of birth), but some are more restrictive while others more liberal. States frequently revise their laws and policies concerning such issues as dual nationality, immigration, and naturalization, all of which help determine who can acquire citizenship and who cannot.

Alongside varying policies on citizenship itself, the individual rights that comprise citizenship also change as state policies change. Thus, the meaning of the social rights tied to citizenship shifted in many states during the 1980s, away from concrete redistributive entitlements toward a simple emphasis on social inclusion and equal opportunity. Such changes altered the long-held perception that a state's duty was to provide basic economic entitlements to its citizens. Additionally, if shared citizenship implies an obligation to redistribute resources to fellow citizens, then the term citizenship is continuously transformed as the nature of welfare entitlements evolves.

EXAMINING THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS

The rising interest in citizenship may be attributed to the term's common association with guaranteed rights and justices within a political community. T. H. Marshall's influential post–World War II definition of citizenship describes its development in terms of three distinct phases, with each phase characterized by individuals acquiring certain rights from the state. In this definition, *civil* rights (e.g., equality before the law, the right to own property and sign binding contracts, freedom of religion and of speech) led to an individual's *political* rights (e.g., the right to vote and run for office), which in turn led to *social* rights guaranteeing the right to a minimal level of social and economic welfare. Tension between the growth of individual entitlement, known as rights, and the demands of membership within particular communities, namely communal duties or shared obligations, often characterize contemporary democracies.

Authors focusing on the rise of globalization during the late 20th century complicate Marshall's model arguing that, due to the significant increases in foreign travel and immigration, the international human rights regime, rather than states, now guarantees civil rights to persons worldwide, and furthermore, many states grant social rights to individuals on the basis of residence rather than citizenship. Thus, some states appear to be extending civil and social rights to individuals within

their community, regardless if they possess the political rights associated with citizenship.

However, contemporary developments in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century have, at times, contradicted this postnational thesis, at least in terms of social rights, as some states have restricted social rights to noncitizens and legal citizens—possibly as a means to limit transnational migration or reduce state expenditure and costs. Some states have excluded noncitizens from automatic access to education, nonemergency health care, or social benefit funding. Since the mid-twentieth and into the twenty-first century, certain states within the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa are significantly and frequently affected by cross-border refugee flows and internally displaced persons seeking to evade ongoing armed conflicts, ethnic violence, and insurgencies devastating their home states. Rising global refugee rates challenge host governments to abide by international standards but limit natural citizen rights. This challenge is heightened in many developing nations that cannot accommodate incoming immigrants or refugees with social rights, especially since most developing countries continue to struggle with supplying the basic, social, and political rights for their own legal citizen population.

Conversely, even legal citizens have lost some of their perceived or promised rights associated with their state's definition of citizenship or the international community's list of unalienable rights. Many state governments have privatized major institutions, adopting market fundamentalism, or an absolute reliance on a free market economy; this can interfere with a citizen's promise of equal and effective rights, as many persons cannot financially compete with private sector costs for health care or education. As such, while basic civil rights may still be protected for individuals, it appears more common for citizens of a wealthy or powerful state to fare better in retaining their social rights than those citizens residing in a poor or weak state. Indeed, citizenship of a wealthy and powerful state can be viewed as a valuable commodity.

Common to both Marshall's definition of citizenship and its postnational critiques is the premise that citizenship is a collection of rights. By these interpretations, citizenship is undeniably being challenged by the unbundling of rights accelerated by the processes of globalization. Individuals can increasingly choose services from different governments or pursue alternatives, rather than be constrained to accept government dictates in the regions where they have citizenship or reside. In the end, the tension between the universalist claims of human rights and the particularism of local identities and affiliations may be irreconcilable: The operation of every political community, short of a global one, involves processes of inclusion but also of exclusion.

DIFFERENT TRAJECTORIES OF CITIZENSHIP

In terms of citizen attribution rules and the rights associated with citizenship, the historical trajectories of citizenship among different states demonstrate significant variances. Such variation reflects the differences in historical processes of state- and nation-building and the rise and transformation of sovereignty.

CASE STUDY: U.S. CITIZENSHIP

In the United States, citizenship evolved in response to a range of factors, including efforts to restrict rights on the basis of race, ethnicity, and gender. Americans "long struggled over whether state or national citizenship is or should be primary. Many thought that question was settled by the Civil War or the New Deal, but it has resurfaced in recent political and legal debates" (Smith, 1997, 5). The early United States was far from a homogeneous body of citizens, and the states controlled citizenship until the Naturalization Acts of 1792 and 1795 established federal control. Even then, American citizenship meant a "double allegiance" to both state and nation. The naturalization acts made naturalization a federal responsibility, but the states continued to control voting rights and the extent of religious and racial discrimination. In some states, women and poor men could vote; in others, they could not. Some states permitted slavery, while others did not. Thomas Jefferson's claim that the U.S. Constitution established a "compact of independent nations" may be exaggerated, but it correctly described the differences in citizenship equality.

The U.S. Articles of Confederation established an under-developed central government, without a mechanism for enforcing its laws or collecting taxes, dependent on voluntary compliance by the states. The Constitution created a system of shared sovereignty between the federal government and the states, with the powers of the central government limited to those enumerated in the constitution and the states retaining sovereignty in all other areas. Over time, the federal government's authority grew primarily through expansive interpretations of the interstate commerce clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, which was a direct reversal of the U.S. Supreme Court's *Dred Scott* decision of 1857. The decision helped spark the American Civil War (1861–1865) by ruling that African Americans "are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States." The *Dred Scott* ruling continued, "we must not confound the rights of citizenship which a State may confer within its own limits, and the rights of citizenship as a member of the Union. It does not by any means follow, because he has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of the United States." The decision was thus a decisive ruling against common national citizenship.

The Fourteenth Amendment was passed after the Civil War, in 1868, to guarantee all individual's born or naturalized in the United States with rights in all states, particularly the states in which slavery had just been abolished that were least likely to accept slaves as U.S. citizens. Though the amendment privileged national citizenship over state citizenship, the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in the *Slaughterhouse Cases* (1873), the *Civil Rights Cases* (1883), and related rulings limited the

amendment's impact. As the federal government abdicated its responsibility to protect rights, the Fourteenth Amendment's implementation and oversight reverted to the individual states. Racial policy, in particular, continued to be determined by separate states rather than the federal government. It was not until the 1920s that the Supreme Court reversed its restrictive doctrine and extended the range of citizenship rights for a wide range of civil rights and liberties—extensions prompted by social struggles for inclusion in the right to vote and right to employment.

Presently, citizenship questions and struggles for specific rights remain throughout the United States. Many social movements, including those pushing for equality on the basis of sexual orientation, continue to frame demands referencing the laws and definitions surrounding the term citizenship. Other inconsistencies include Puerto Rico since most Puerto Rican residents are U.S. citizens, but do not have full political rights, and nor do residents of Washington D.C. or several other U.S. territories. Comparable anomalies exist worldwide, highlighting the difficult nature of citizenship as a reflection of sovereignty. At the same time, the United States, like other federations, faces continuing tension between the ideal of equal citizenship and the reality of differential rights and privileges (e.g., lower tuition fees for local residents, or waiting times for access to health care or other benefits for citizens moving from another jurisdiction) accruing to members of its constituent jurisdictions.

CASE STUDY: EU CITIZENSHIP

The most dramatic development in the evolution of citizenship in postwar Europe has been the creation and growth of supranational rights captured under the concept of European Union (EU) citizenship. Citizens of EU's twenty-seven member states now hold EU citizenship as well as their own member state's national citizenship. Member states may no longer discriminate between their own citizens and those of other EU member states, who have acquired wide-ranging civic, political, and social rights throughout the territory of the European Union. Though treaties specify EU citizenship will not replace national citizenship, the European Court of Justice, in a series of judgments, has ruled, "Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of Member States."

In contrast to U.S. citizenship, or indeed the citizenship of most contemporary states, the rise of EU citizenship is far more recent, motivated by economic integration coupled with a commitment to building a supranational political community. Proponents of further European integration actively promote the concept of an EU citizenship that supersedes member state nationality. Whereas member state citizenship remains primary in the European Union, in federal states such as the United States, state or provincial citizenship long ago ceased to dominate. The meaning of citizenship is far from uniform across Europe, however. Within national contexts, various views of citizenship and political community were important in developing the specific forms that national citizenship takes when it is translated into policies and institutions. Citizenship rights in most states generally evolved through a long process of political contestation between governments and citizens. Yet the rights that now comprise Union citizenship were simply introduced by treaties and bargaining among governments.

There are parallels between the rise of EU citizenship and the growth, in the nineteenth century, of a national layer of citizenship over existing municipal or regional versions. Before the French Revolution (1789–1799), which promoted the notion of popular sovereignty and spurred the creation of national citizenry, many of the rights characterizing today's citizens were provided by local municipalities; these included the rights of residence and employment, civil rights such as trial in local courts, and rights to participate in the political process. Notably, in German, the word for citizenship, *Bürgerschaft,* is the same term used to identify the parliaments of German cities, Bremen and Hamburg. Many municipalities even provided social rights. Establishing a "thin" EU citizenship over those same nation-state citizenships echoes the initially "thin" layer of nation-state citizenship rights over the existing structure of preexisting "thick" municipal citizenships. This parallels the development of federal citizenship in the United States.

RECONSIDERING THE MEANING OF CITIZENSHIP

Defining who has the right to have rights is a necessary first step for any political community. Rights need not be restricted to citizens; for example, every person enjoys human rights regardless of citizenship status, and in many states individuals enjoy rights even if they are not citizens. Nevertheless, full rights are restricted to citizens who, in a democracy, are the only ones authorized to change their rights.

The historical variability and theoretical contestation over citizenship has led to the concept being stretched far beyond its strict legal meaning, and even its broader political definition. Describing an emerging view of citizenship as relational, cultural, historical, and continent on socially constructed categories such as gender, race, or nationality, Charles Tilly defines citizenship as a continuing series of transactions between persons and agents of a state. Rights and obligations are enforceable uniquely by virtue of the person's membership in an exclusive category (the native born plus the naturalized) and the agent's relation to the state rather than any other authority. Meanwhile the journal, *Citizenship Studies,* states in its aims the desire to "move beyond conventional notions of citizenship, and treat citizenship as a strategic concept that is central in the analysis of identity, participation, empowerment, human rights and the public interest."

When conventional accounts of citizenship developed, it appeared relatively easy to distinguish between insiders and outsiders, and hence between candidates for citizenship and foreigners. Migrations were assumed to be permanent as immigrants moved to their destination country, became naturalized citizens, and broke ties with their country of origin. Increasingly, however, previously territorially fixed groups and

individuals have gained access to various forms of mobility. In addition to the borderless movements of capital, goods, and ideas, people too move around to a much greater extent and with greater ease than was generally true in the past. Large groups of expatriate communities have been established, and members participate in the politics of their country of residence while at the same time sustaining connections to their country of origin. Such individuals maintain ties with more than one political community, and in many cases have access to dual citizenship, with full legal recognition as members of more than one political community.

In a world in which transnational moral and political obligations gain in importance and individuals claim membership and participate in multiple political communities, the view that territorially bounded sovereign states are the only source of civil society may become untenable. By its very nature, migration upsets the balance between insiders and outsiders, as newcomers seek to enter the political community. Despite universal or cosmopolitan hopes for a global citizenship, presently, achieving the legal status of citizen of the state remains important for immigrants, because only then do they enjoy full access to rights. More broadly, despite aspirations on the part of some for nation-states to wither away, it appears likely that for the foreseeable future the nation-state will remain the primary locus of citizenship.

See also *Citizen Knowledge; Dual Citizenship and Dual Nationality; Immigration Policy; Migration; Naturalization.*

. . . . WILLEM MAAS

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City-republic

The city, from which the notion of citizenship derives, is the most basic form of political community. In ancient, medieval, and early modern times, an array of self-governing city-republics existed where the vote of a broad electorate made many collective decisions. Most city-republics shared the following defining characteristics: small size in terms of both territory and population; relatively high degrees of internal harmony, as defined by the economic and ethnic characteristics of the members; and simple and soft forms of government based on the ease with which citizens could form a social majority supporting collective, enforceable decisions. The better-known cases can be found in Mesopotamia, the poleis of Greece, the German and Swiss territories, as well as a number of medieval Italian communes that have existed since the late Middle Ages.

The typical medieval city was formed by private associations of households organized to provide public goods such as the maintenance of a food supply, the administration of justice, and military defense. Local autonomy was a Roman tradition in some southern European towns, but it was also created by the privileges given to certain communes by their lords.

MEDIEVAL SELF-GOVERNED CITIES
One of the earliest meetings recorded of a representative assembly in Europe was in 1064, in Barcelona, Catalonia, for the approval by consensus and acclamation of public laws later compiled in the celebrated customs of the city (*Usatges*). Throughout the twelfth century, towns in northern Italy, led by their consuls, became autonomous from the emperor and church authorities. Bologna, Genoa, Pavia, Pisa, Siena, and many other communes organized themselves around an assembly of all the citizens, or harangue (*arengo*); these were open, inclusive, and popular events, allowing decisions by broad social consensus, as well as an occasion for public spectacle, processions, and festivities. Citizens approved the appointment of the consulate by acclamation or by indirect election. Regular elections to numerous offices were also held with the participation of most adult men.

In the case of Venice, the election of the *doge* (duke) by the entire population dates from 697 CE. For almost five hundred years, the assembly, or harangue, elected powerful doges. Beginning in 1172, the people's general assembly indirectly elected the great council (usually attended by about one thousand to fifteen hundred men, age thirty or older), which became the supreme authority, and the senate. From the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, the people's assembly had to ratify the council's election of the doge. Other elected offices, from the thirteenth century until 1789, included magistrates, procurators, advocates, and a high chancellor.

The citizens of Florence elected their rulers by broad popular suffrage for almost one hundred and fifty years, from 1291 on, as well as during shorter periods in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The council of the people (with three hundred members) and the council of the commune (with

two hundred members) were selected by a mixed procedure of people's election and appointment. The standard-bearer of justice, or *Gonfaloniere*, and the nine members of the lordship, or *Signoria*, were elected by a mixed system of voting and lots. Representatives of the sixteen quarters of the city, as well as by many other elected officers, formed the administration. Most adult men (over the age of twenty-five) voted and most voters were eligible for the administration.

While Geneva's liberties were codified by its bishop in 1387, the general council rejected papal authority, and in 1542 adopted a new institutional framework that lasted for more than two hundred years. The general council exerted legislative powers, including the ability to make laws, levy taxes, and make declarations of war and peace, as well as the power to annually elect, and hold accountable, the four syndics and other magistrates of the city. Approximately fifteen hundred to four thousand heads of family formed the general council, and most adult men were eligible to participate. In parallel, and increasingly in conflict with the former, the grand council (with two hundred members) and the petit council, which were controlled by a few traditional families, developed legislative initiative and nominated candidates for elected offices.

People's assemblies also governed many French municipalities in the late thirteenth century. Especially in the southern region of Languedoc, and more famously in towns like Montpelier and Nimes, among others, all heads of households (including widows), if they were natives or long-standing residents, attended "general assemblies of inhabitants." Attendance was commonly regarded as an obligation rather than a right. The assemblies elected proctors or syndics, as well as the collective consulate usually called the town body (*corps de ville*). Municipal offices were held for short terms of about two years.

MODERN COMPLEXITY AND DECLINE

The end of the republican regimes in the Italian communes has been attributed to frequent violence, disorder, and instability provoked by political factionalism, family feuds, and class conflicts. As new economic interests developed, the traditional predominance of artisans' guilds was defied, and the pattern of relatively peaceful fusion of old and new elements in society weakened. However, unregulated assemblies were replaced with more sophisticated rules. New institutional procedures were designed to accommodate varied social demands.

For example, for the election of their doge, the Venetians adopted an increasingly complicated procedure with up to nine stages of approval ballots and lots, which was conceived to ward off insincere voting and manipulative strategies. In Florence, an extremely complex procedure of elections was designed to prevent the fraudulent manipulation of the electoral process and to avert a few of the city's powerful families from domination over the commune. In many cities, some restrictions regarding reelection and office accumulation promoted openness and circulation of the appointees. Rulers and those in office stayed in their posts for short periods of only six months or a year.

Procedures like these aimed to promote the rotation of rulers, making manipulative strategies unviable and disallowing the concentration of power into a single group. However, in some cities, the association between popular participation in increasingly complex communities and rising instability was inescapable. Elections, factions or parties, and institutional stability became a difficult combination. Factionalism, family feuds, and class conflicts weakened republican self-government, as appropriate rules for consensus making were lacking. Northern Italian cities, deprived of protection by the fading Italian Empire, entered into frequent conflicts among themselves and with more powerful neighbors, including the duchy of Milan, and the papacy and kingdom of Naples. In most late medieval and early modern cities, the republican form of government was replaced with authoritarian, aristocratic rules, which eventually became supports for building new large and centralized states.

See also *Citizenship; Greek Democracy, Classical.*

. . . .   JOSEP M. COLOMER

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Civic Education

Civic education aims to promote and shape civic engagement by developing citizens' competencies (e.g., attitudes, skills, and knowledge) needed for participation in community, government, and politics.

CLASSIC CIVIC EDUCATION THEORIES

Theories of civic education can be traced back to ancient Greece, where Plato argued on behalf of the systematic moral education of young people for citizenship. In *The Republic,* Plato famously advocates the use of censorship and propaganda as instruments of civic education. In particular, he urges the elimination of most common myths (including those found with Homer, Hesiod, and the tragic poets) because of their portrayal of the gods and heroes as cruel, capricious, unjust, violent, deceitful, and vicious. He also recommends the use of "noble lies," such as the myth of metals, to accustom citizens to their proper roles in the highly hierarchical society he depicts.

Aristotle believed that civic education must be designed to match particular political constitutions, because the values and virtues required by citizens living under a despotic regime, for example, are very different from those required by citizens living under a democracy. Aristotle describes a scheme of civic education conceived to prepare the male children of citizens (not females or the male children of slaves or foreigners) for life under a mixed constitution in which citizens take turns ruling and being ruled according to law. In other words, they were to be prepared for lives of civic equality, sharing a capacity for moral excellence and sharing a responsibility for promoting the common good, rather than their own self-interests.

Civic education was given a more democratic slant in the eighteenth century by French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who argued that teaching people how to be good citizens is a major role of government. A government fulfills this role by educating citizens regarding their civic duties and by teaching them how to discern the common good when they act in their capacity as sovereign people (i.e., when they make the laws under which they will be governed). Additionally, according to Rousseau, the government must make the laws beloved and respected by the people and must take care to correct and improve the mores, manners, customs, and morals of the people, so they will always love liberty and not become corrupt or slothful. Finally, Rousseau argues, government must take special care to manage the education of children, for respect for the law and the common good must be instilled from a very young age.

French writer and politician Alexis de Tocqueville, in the nineteenth century, takes a radically different view from previous theorists, arguing that the most effective form of civic education may be found not in formal schooling but through direct involvement in political life and the civic associations of one's community, such as religious congregations, clubs, and other voluntary organizations. In contrast with formal instruction in schools, which cultivates attitudes, knowledge, and skills that are not necessarily directly relevant to the learning context, participation in political life and civic associations informally cultivates the particular mores and attitudes directly needed by citizens in those contexts.

In the twentieth century, American philosopher, psychologist, and educator John Dewey reimagined schools themselves as experiential learning contexts that would help students develop practical experience in democratic problem solving. Schools would provide opportunities for the direct expression of democratic virtues and norms, and young citizens also would learn a scientific method of social inquiry that would allow them, later in life, to participate in broader discussions of public values and policies. Dewey's philosophy of civic education has one primary objective: to encourage and develop a culture of free inquiry that engenders and supports citizens as self-confident political and moral actors, both within and outside of formal academic institutions.

CIVIC EDUCATION TODAY

Methods of civic education employed today include, but are not limited to, study of government institutions and political processes, study of local and national history, instruction in civic character and values, and experiential or service learning activities. Contemporary educators, however, disagree about what methods of civic education should be employed by democracies and, indeed, whether civic education of any sort amounts to indoctrination or coercion.

Since the 1960s, numerous educators have embraced the importance of experiential learning and have argued for some form of mandatory community service or service learning as a form of civic education. Some critics have charged that such methods amount to requiring volunteerism. Theorists like Benjamin R. Barber and William Galston, however, do not recommend service as a form of do-goodism. Rather, their purpose is to prepare citizens for responsible membership in a community of interdependent equals through experiential learning, allowing the community itself to serve as a context for direct civic learning.

Although civic education can be distinguished conceptually from patriotic education, which is concerned primarily with promoting loyalty to a nation or state rather than active political participation, civic education often includes an element of patriotic education. Galston, for example, recommends a measure of patriotic indoctrination, moralizing, and the teaching of sentimental views of history, in order to strengthen the political order and develop individuals who can function effectively in, and actively support, their political community. Other thinkers, including Amy Gutmann and Jack Crittenden, reject this approach, and argue that young citizens must learn to participate in democratic deliberation in a pluralistic society and to stand apart, critically, from their own communities. They do not go so far, however, as to argue that civic education should promote full-fledged autonomy, as educational theorist Eamonn Callan does.

Some theorists, including Judith Shklar and Richard Flathman, have concluded that the character of individual citizens should be off-limits to government, thereby ruling out most forms of civic education. However, a decision not to provide formal civic education may itself be a kind of civic education, teaching young people that citizenship is not very important and ensuring the continued depreciation of the practice of citizenship. If civic values and virtues do not teach themselves, as Tocqueville argued, then perhaps, as political theorist Stephen Macedo insists, democracies must overcome their squeamishness about intervening in the character of citizens in order to protect themselves from antidemocratic adversaries.

See also *Citizenship; Civic Engagement; Dewey, John; Education Policy; Greek Political Thought, Ancient; Plato; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Tocqueville, Alexis de; Virtue Theory.*

. . . .   JASON SCORZA

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Civic Engagement

Civic engagement, as a concept, combines diverse forms of involvement, ranging from political to leisure activities, under one notion. The concept stresses activity oriented toward or originating from society. It emerged in the 1990s when it was used to refer to involvement in public affairs that creates network relations among citizens. Yet, despite its increased application, it lacks conceptual clarity. A narrow definition equates civic engagement with political participation. As a distinct concept, however, it is more useful when it more broadly refers to voluntary, public activities that are oriented toward society and carried out without the intention of profit.

In the Middle Ages, the notion of engagement referred to an oral commitment to a contract. Later, it was used when contracting artists, waging war, and purchasing stocks. In social sciences, it emerged in the context of the civil society discourse with the prefix "civic" indicating a commitment to public, nonviolent, self-organized, discursive, and pluralistic activities.

MODES AND FIELDS

Civic engagement is usually associated with citizen organizations active in the fields of politics, human services, culture, education, religion, sports, environment, development, or emergency aid. But it also occurs in informal groups, networks, and social movements that are more difficult to research and are often overlooked. In recent decades, a reflexive form of engagement has emerged that is characterized by choice, a biographical match in one's life, and the recognition of own aims, instead of tradition, life-long commitment, and determination by organizational needs. Further, semiprofessionalization substitutes lay experience, and the expectation of reciprocity includes the compensation of expenses.

RESEARCH AGENDA

Research typically focuses on the positive effects of civic engagement. Robert D. Putnam refers to networks of civic engagement as sources of social capital that promote good governance and economic development. Other possible outcomes are the production of social services and, as a by-product, the promotion of social integration. More sociologically oriented streams of research try to understand the occurrence of civic engagement and use surveys and register data to explain individual motives and societal structures. Policy research deals with infrastructures and policy measures that advance civic engagement.

PROBLEMS

The lack of conceptual clarity leads to problems with measurement and comparability. There is no conceptual study that links civic engagement to related concepts like volunteering, nonprofit associations, or civic activism. Second, reference to the common good accounts for much of the attraction the concept enjoys, but it also blurs its meaning because it combines commitment with moral standards. What constitutes the common good remains highly contested in plural societies. For example, nongovernmental organizations are sometimes seen as particularistic interest groups and other times as advancing the public interest. Third, whether civic engagement should be evaluated according to the deontological ethics of "well-meaning" or the consequential logics of "good results" remains unclear. Finally, the negative effects of civic engagement are often overlooked. Even well-meant engagement can increase the power difference between social groups, degrade the human object of engagement, or sacrifice the activist.

See also *Civic Education; Civic Humanism; Collective Action and Mobilization; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Political Participation; Political Participation; U.S. Politics and Society: African American Political Participation; U.S. Politics and Society: Latino Political Participation; U.S. Politics and Society: Women, Political Participation of; Voting Behavior.*

. . . .   PETER HILGER

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Civic Humanism

Civic humanism is a political and philosophical orientation emphasizing the value and importance of the practical and moral virtues that may be inculcated in and passed along by citizens through their active participation in the political life of their polity. Its central aim is to defend and promote the qualities believed as necessary for communities to effectively, responsibly, and independently govern themselves; those qualities include the virtues of patience, tolerance, patriotism, self-sacrifice, duty, a commitment to the law, and forgiveness.

Civic humanism is closely entwined with ideals of education and moral formation that are most often associated with the humanist beliefs of Renaissance thinkers, as well as with the classical republican ideas of ancient Greece and Rome. In fact, *civic humanism* and *classical republicanism* are sometimes used interchangeably, as each are taken to refer to a view of public life that celebrates the role of, and places great seriousness upon, the duties and activities of citizenship. A variety of communitarian ideologies use civic humanist arguments extensively in advancing their beliefs.

DEBATE OVER ORIGINS

It is often claimed that civic humanism took shape as an intellectual orientation in Florence during the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. It is certainly correct that, during these years, new translations of Greek and Roman philosophical and literary classics inspired many to reject the scholastic model of education that had become standard throughout much of Western Europe during the Middle Ages. As a result, a new model developed, the *studia humanitatis,* which connected the Christian improvement of oneself and one's community with the spread of knowledge of languages, grammar, rhetoric, philosophy, and history.

However, it is historically questionable as to what degree this movement involved a specific "civic humanist" orientation as a political and philosophical expression of its own. Both civic humanism and classical republicanism, as they are understood and used today, emerged through historiographic reconstruction: German and English scholars throughout the twentieth century (including Hans Baron, J. G. A. Pocock, Quentin Skinner, and Bernard Bailyn) looked to the traditions and behaviors of Renaissance Italy as a way to tie together a wide variety of political aspirations and philosophical convictions that, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, periodically revived to inspire, guide, or frustrate different political actors. Civic humanism as an orientation, then, is a well-understood descriptive term uniting such figures across history as Francesco Petrarch, Thomas More, James Harrington, Giambattista Vico, and Baron de Montesquieu, not to mention many leaders of the American Revolution; yet, as a historical matter, the label itself probably owes more to the modern desire to assemble a genealogy of communitarian and republican thinkers. This modern assemblage aims more to support various attacks upon increasingly dominant liberal and individualist orientations than to align with anything that was actually expressed historically.

MODERN INTERPRETATIONS

Those who advocate civic humanism today most often to do so in conjunction with a push for educational as opposed to political reforms, thus grounding the orientation more firmly in its purported origin in the classic learning of the Renaissance. (Classical republicanism, by contrast, is usually, when the two terms are distinguished at least, more explicitly used as a tool of political critique.) The civic humanist argument generally asserts that human flourishing and happiness are most likely to be realized through autonomous (though not necessarily individualistic) moral action; yet, human beings are generally incapable of such responsible and independent moral choices without training in the language and worldview of classical authors. In addition, people need practical opportunities to see the value of those classical teachings in their own lives and the lives of others, and perhaps to put them into effect themselves. This would suggest the vital importance of an education in moral ideas, and similarly the importance of bringing those ideas to bear through direct service to and participation in political life. Both of these implications resonate with broadly communitarian perspectives: First, human beings are most likely to find fulfillment through participation in their respective groups, communities, or polities. Second, effective and responsible participation is most likely to occur when citizens are familiar with the history and traditions of their own communities.

Civic humanism may be linked to civic education of one sort or another, the reigning notion being that schools are, among other things, sites of character formation, and that if one assumes—as most advocates of civic humanism do—that responsible self-government depends upon, among other things, forming the necessary character attributes amongst the citizens, then clearly there must be a civic component to the education of the community members (and presumably future participating citizens). Interestingly, in the United States, the close identification of the civic humanism tradition with America's founding has made the label, in the minds of some, a more conservative project. This attaches to protecting the sort of traditional political and social arrangements, and divisions, that existed in eighteenth-century American life; as such, a traditional civic humanism may be hostile to more inclusive or progressive educational projects. As a result, civic education advocates who sympathize with liberal, democratic, or egalitarian goals rarely use the civic humanist label. On the other hand, those who often reject modern public schooling in favor of educating their children at home or through private religious schools, believing that the necessary character formation will be more likely to take place in those environments than others, closely embrace the label. Either way, however, both sides of the divide carry the essence of the civic humanist ideal forward: being a citizen in a free society requires a willingness to be involved in democratic discussion, to be tolerant of decisions one disagrees with, and to patriotically support one's country and its laws.

See also *Civic Education; Civic Engagement; Communitarianism; Republicanism, Classical.*

. . . .   RUSSELL ARBEN FOX

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Civic Virtue

See *Virtue Theory.*

Civil and Political Rights

Modern societies and governments proclaim freedom as the foundation of their respective political and legal systems. However, some societies and governments are more free than others, and even the most free societies and governments have some laws that regulate the citizenry. The question centers upon what basis the citizenry can not only assert, but compel, the government to respect their theoretical freedoms. The answer is through civil and political rights.

A right, in its broadest sense, is a power, privilege, or protection granted or recognized by a legitimate authority, law, or usage. Power means the actual ability or authority to perform a certain act. An example of a power is the U.S. president's power to command the military forces. Privilege means a particular benefit or advantage that may be claimed or exercised. An example of a privilege is a permit for a handicapped person to park in a designated handicapped-parking place. Protection refers to an immunity or a shield from certain duties, responsibilities, or acts of others. An example of a protection is the right to receive a trial after being arrested for a crime.

A legitimate authority, law, or usage recognizes the source of rights. It is indisputable that the law can be a legitimate source of rights. *Usage* refers to the continued social recognition of a right. Once a particular right is commonly accepted and practiced in a society over a period of time, it is frequently considered binding. This is how the common law of ancient England developed over time. Common practices, frequently called *norms,* became accepted over time and eventually were considered to be law. The term *authority* refers to other sources of rights besides law or usage. The two most widely recognized sources in this sense are philosophy and religion. In philosophy, natural law is considered to be idealized expression of the morally correct way to act. It is a theoretical concept recognized by the mind as opposed to a written law created by a legislature. In religion, divine commands or laws, sometimes identified with natural law, are considered the source of rights.

What is fundamentally important about rights, as recognized by philosopher Ronald Dworkin, is that they are enforceable against the government or any other entity violating those rights. For example, many nations possess laws regulating voting, defining the requirements of who is eligible to vote. If a voter is mistreated in regard to these laws, the individual's rights have been violated and legal redress can be sought. Thinkers in the *human rights* or *natural rights* traditions may assert that individuals have certain inalienable rights by virtue of their humanity, but these rights are yet not civil or political rights and can be understood more as aspirations for those protections to become civil rights protected by law.

A civil right can be defined in many different ways. By the term *civil,* the right is usually meant to apply to all of the members of that society or political entity. However, some nations provide greater civil rights to their own citizens than they do to foreign nationals. The use of the term *civil* usually distinguishes civil law from criminal law. Although it can be argued that a civil right differs from a criminal right, in practice, in many countries, a right that protects a person from abuse in the criminal justice system is, nonetheless, referred to as a *civil right.* This is true in the criminal justice system of the United States. Although the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments in the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution address certain protections for persons charged with a crime, these rights are still called civil rights. Another aspect of civil rights is that such rights can usually be enforced in a nation's civil courts.

In contrast, political rights are usually considered a subcategory of civil rights. The term *political rights* generally refers to those activities related to the formation or creation of a political or legal system and the participation in the political process. The most frequently acknowledged political rights are the right to national self-determination, the right of citizenship, the right to free speech, the right to vote, the right to hold political office, and the right to petition.

Civil and political rights are also recognized internationally, as in the United Nations Charter, in Articles 1, 62, 68, and 76. Although many of the provisions of the UN Charter are considered merely aspirational and not binding, most of the world's nations have signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (a part of the International Bill of Rights), and this is considered binding under international law.

Civil and political rights are the mechanism by which people can attempt to ensure their basic freedoms and obtain fair treatment from their respective governments. However, if these civil and political rights lack any enforcement power, any civil or political rights usually become, as Chief Justice Earl Warren of the U.S. Supreme Court stated, a mere form of words and without meaning or substance. Some violations of internationally recognized civil and political rights, such as genocide, can be prosecuted in the International Criminal Court and limited international tribunals are sometimes established to enforce violations concerning specific situations.

See also *Asylum Rights; Bill of Rights; Children's Rights; Citizenship; Civil Rights Movement; Cultural Rights; Disability Rights; Human Rights; Intellectual Property Rights; International Bill of Rights; Natural Law; Natural Rights; Privacy Rights; Property Rights; Reproductive Rights; Right to Die; Right to Life; Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Voting Rights and Suffrage; Welfare Rights; Workers' Rights.*

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Civil Disobedience

Civil disobedience involves a conscientious, nonviolent, and public violation of law or government policy with the intent of affecting social change. Since acts of civil obedience involve nonviolence and publicness, they are distinguished from illegal acts, and therefore, easier to defend. The motivation for civil disobedience is conscientious, as opposed to considerations that are merely pragmatic or prudential. The decision to participate in such an act is typically for the benefit of society, such as causing attention or interest to be directed toward injustice, which thereby stimulates moral consciousness and initiates the vigorous activity of social change.

The concept of civil disobedience traces to antiquity. Socrates chose death rather than cease pursing truth and wisdom. Addressing his countrymen, he declared, "I shall obey God rather than you." Even the Bible provides lucid examples for civil disobedience. The Hebrew midwives refused the command of Pharaoh to violate the sanctity of life (Exod 1:15–22). Although the authority of a government may be vast, a Christian understanding of human authority is that none is absolute. Romans (13:1–12) teaches that the legal ordinances and statutes of the state must be obeyed because God ordains the powers. However, it would appear that Paul was referring to legitimate governments and just laws. There are illegitimate governments and unjust laws so that obedience to corrupt or immoral practices is not an option. Obedience to the law of God may require participation in civil disobedience, and those who engage in such acts must be willing to accept the consequences of disobedience from the authority of the state.

Although there are ancient and biblical examples of civil disobedience, the first modern exposition of such obligations is written by Henry David Thoreau in his famous essay of 1849, "Resistance to Civil Government." Thoreau refused to pay his poll tax as a protest against slavery and the United States–Mexico War (1848). He compared government to a machine and the problems of government to friction. When injustice is the major characteristic of government and people are forced to follow injustice, thereby becoming "the agent of injustice," then principled people must let their "life be a counter friction to stop the machine." Thoreau's act of civil disobedience was not the first in nineteenth-century America. During the years 1829 to 1839, missionaries to the Cherokee Indians were confronted with a Georgia state law that demanded an oath of allegiance to reside in the Cherokee territory of the state. The legislation against the missionaries required them to obtain a special permit from the governor, which would express their support of Indian territory forfeiture and removal of the Indians from their lands. The missionaries disobeyed the state law and were imprisoned. The concept of civil disobedience was later renewed in America as a result of groups that organized to nullify the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. Also significant, the notion of a conscientious minority who could "clog the machine" of an unjust government was a tremendous influence upon Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. in the twentieth century.

Civil disobedience contrasts with revolution. For instance, the colonial revolutionaries disobeyed English laws. As a development of the limited view of government advanced by the Protestant Reformers, John Locke's *Second Treatise of Government* (1690) provided intellectual justification for revolution. Revolution occurs suddenly and violently in sociopolitical processes, with the goal to defeat and seize control of government power. Revolution, then, is directed toward the complete overthrow of an existing government power. The first criterion for participation in revolution would be whether it is a just cause; revolution must not be engaged because of burden or inconvenience, or even for the benefit of a narrowly minded ideology. A just revolution should always consider the best interests of society as a whole (i.e., it should not serve the special interests of a private group). As such, it would be appropriate in defense of basic human rights, such as individual and religious liberties. However, a peaceful revolution must always be acted first, with violent means being only the final option. Another criterion rests on existence of evidence that the revolution will be successful. Considering the potential for loss of life and civil unrest, it would be foolish and irresponsible to engage in a revolution that has no hope for victory or that might make matters worse. Revolution must also be justly engaged through the use of just means. Though revolution may be justly engaged, there is never any rationale for unjust means, such as mutilation or torture. The essential requirements of justice must be a greater priority than the normal inclination for nonviolence and social constancy.

See also *Locke, John; Revolutions; Thoreau, Henry David.*

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Civilizations, Clash of

See *Clash of Civilizations.*

Civil Law

There are two primary meanings for the term *civil law.* The first definition refers to that branch of law within the legal systems of common-law states such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, which centers on the noncriminal fields of law. Civil-law cases address disputes between individuals, rather than disputes involving the state. Examples of civil law in this context include torts, wills, property disputes, and contract disputes. The second meaning attributed to civil law, and the focus here, is as a legal tradition within the field of comparative law. Civil law in this instance describes the dominant legal family in the world—one historically tied to the Roman and Canon law, built on Enlightenment principles—that relies on written law and codification rather than judicial decision as its primary form of law.

There are more countries with civil-law systems around the world than any other system. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and most of the countries of Western Europe maintain civil-law systems. Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and most of the countries of South America also maintain civil-law systems. There are also many states that have adopted civil-law systems and mixed them with other legal traditions. These include Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, the states of French West Africa, Russia, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The widespread adoption of civil law as the legal tradition is largely the result of the civil law's unique characteristics, including its extensive, written form; minimal reliance on judge-made law; and ties to Roman and Canon law, which facilitated its early prevalence. Unlike the common law, which can be difficult to disseminate due to its reliance on judge-made law, empires and colonizers from Europe easily spread the civil-law tradition around the world. The written form of the civil-law tradition makes it much more portable and much more adaptable to different countries and different cultures. Today, it is estimated that approximately 154 states maintain, either in whole or in part, elements of the civil-law tradition (as opposed to 96 states with elements of the common-law tradition and 36 states with elements of the Islamic-law tradition).

HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS

The civil-law tradition dates to the time of the Roman Empire and the *Corpus Juris Civilis,* and has three main periods of influence: Roman law, Canon law, and the *jus commune.* Compiled by the Emperor Justinian in the sixth century CE, the Corpus Juris Civilis was a comprehensive compilation of Roman law into a single, codified written form. This is the foundation from which the core of the civil-law tradition—written law and codification—originated. After the disintegration of the Roman Empire, much of Europe entered into the Dark Ages—a period in which legal systems were largely absent and law was predominantly customary. The rise to power of the Catholic Church, however, kept the Roman writings on law alive and scholars such as Augustine and Aquinas even added to these laws, updating and refining the legal rules, while at the same time incorporating elements of morality and a communal purpose into the largely secular Roman laws. Seeking to impose more significant order to facilitate the rise in commercial transactions as the Middle Ages ended, the University of Bologna, in the eleventh century, began to revive the study of law. A group of scholars, known as the glossators, began to lecture on Justinian's codes, and more significantly, they began to recodify the law in a manner which made it applicable to Renaissance Europe. The new law was called the *jus commune* because it was to be a law that was common to all of Europe. This was possible because scholars from all over Europe came to study law at Bologna, and when they left they took the jus commune with them, incorporating it into their own legal systems.

Modern civil-law systems maintain significant ties to this historical development, and many states' legal systems are even further linked as a result of one of Napoleon's primary accomplishments, which was to consolidate French laws into a number of comprehensive codes. Known as the Napoleonic codes, the foremost of these was the Napoleonic civil code, which addresses issues of personal status and property. Napoleon also directed the creation of a penal code, a code of civil procedure, a commercial code, and a code of criminal procedure. The goal of these codes, which codified all existing laws and legal customs, was to ensure the clarity of the law for all French citizens.

As the foundation of the civil-law tradition, codes are designed to be all-encompassing, providing not just a list of legal obligations, rights, punishments, and remedies, but also an overall guide for people on how to conduct their daily lives.

CIVIL LAW AND THE COURTROOM

This reliance on codes as the primary source of law precipitates what is perhaps the greatest difference between the states of the common law and the states of the civil law. Unlike common law, under the civil-law tradition, judges play a minimal role in the creation of law. Judicial review and judicial activism are generally minimized as the courts are not seen so much as an arena for creating new laws; they are instead simply a venue for resolving disputes based on preexisting code provisions. Judges within the civil-law tradition are often responsible for applying the law as written, and there is much less room for judicial creativity.

The judiciary role also influences the style of proceedings in the civil-law tradition. In the context of civil law, trials are

conducted in an inquisitorial fashion, as opposed to the adversarial fashion of the common law. In an inquisitorial proceeding, the judge and two parties work more closely together to achieve a desirable outcome, with the judge often playing the role of lawyer, judge, and jury. These characteristics have led to the development of a legal tradition based on written law, in which the legislature is responsible for making legal rules, and the judiciary is responsible for enforcing them.

See also *Common Law; Roman Catholic Political Thought.*

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Civil-military Relations

Civil-military relations concern the interaction of the military and the state or, more broadly, between armed forces and society. The relationship between civil authority and the military has evolved along with the nature of states, societies, war, and the military profession, but the basic dilemma remains the same: ensuring protection *by and from* the armed forces.

THE MILITARY AND THE STATE

Modern polities are governed by states, which possess a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within a defined territory to enforce its edicts on the population. The armed forces embody that monopoly and serve three primary purposes: external defense, internal security, and promotion of patriotism through indoctrination and provision of public goods.

Because states interact in a system in which one may use organized violence against another, external defense is the primary mission of the military. It is operated, trained, and equipped primarily for this purpose. In some states, the military also is used to maintain internal order, although this function tends to be assigned to other institutions as governments mature. Service of the population in the armed forces indirectly contributes to internal order as members are indoctrinated to serve the state. Goods provided to society by the military—including security, employment, and infrastructure—further promote the legitimacy of the state.

Yet, control over the means of coercion by a subset of the population poses a danger to the rest of the polity. The military may endanger the polity directly through predation upon society or indirectly by seizing control of civil authority, influencing civil authorities to provide more resources than required for external defense and internal security, or initiating conflict contrary to the interests of the state or polity as a whole. Imperial Japan saw the military directly control the government from 1926 to 1945, leading their state to conquest in Asia and ruin against the United States. Therefore, controlling the military is *the* central dilemma of civil-military relations, and most other issues, from institutional design to recruitment of personnel, derive from it.

CONTROLLING THE MILITARY

States have developed a number of solutions to address this dilemma of military control by reducing the ability or the desire of the military to threaten the polity. With regard to reducing its ability, states have established institutions that divide or dilute the military's powers, including multiple services, internal security forces, parallel chains of command, a cadre-reserve structure, and reliance on citizen soldiers. The United States has utilized all of these to ensure civil control over the military. States have also forgone training and educating their military personnel in ways that would increase the military's ability to threaten or influence the polity, such as training in urban warfare or education in matters of governance. Finally, some polities have emulated ancient Rome and physically separated military forces from political centers so as to limit opportunities to influence civil authority.

States also reduce the military's desire to endanger the polity. Many states have ensured that their militaries are well resourced and the leadership well paid and accorded status among the state's elites. Most states have also established procedures that encourage convergent preferences between civil authority and the military. Primary among these has been indoctrination to ensure loyalty to the political system or government. This task has been eased over time by the prevalence of nationalism and patriotism in modern societies, which inculcate general loyalty to the society and state respectively among the citizenry, including those who enter military service. States have also used selection criteria to guarantee a convergence of interests between the political leadership and military personnel, particularly the officer corps. Historically, accession has been based on class membership, religious beliefs, political views, and merit with criteria varying with the nature of the polity's elite. Throughout modern Europe, only nobles could serve as officers until Prussia eliminated this requirement in 1808, beginning the process of professionalization in Western militaries.

CIVIL CONTROL AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION

The professionalization of the military deserves special attention, as it has been a key determinant of the quality of civil-military relations. As states have matured, their constituent institutions have become more professional: merit-based entry and promotion, specialized work, bureaucratized organization,

and the impersonal performance of duties. The military, the officer corps especially, has been at the forefront of this trend. Military members can make a career of their service, are given a degree of autonomy to perfect their expertise in the application and management of organized violence, share a corporate identity, and inculcate a self-image of apolitical service to the polity. These qualities have significantly shaped civil–military relations. At times, professional militaries have implemented ruinous civilian policies, as in Nazi Germany. In states such as Turkey and Pakistan, the military is professional but political and intervenes regularly in civil affairs, delimiting the policies that can be pursued, while in yet others, such as Honduras or Thailand, the military intervenes occasionally to remove civilian leaders it deems corrupt or inept.

The delegation of authority from the state's leadership to the military requires monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to guard against insubordinate behavior. The extent of oversight and enforcement should vary with the congruence of preferences between the civil authority and the military. It is generally argued that a professional military will inherently comply with the preferences of civil authorities and requires minimal oversight. Moreover, it is argued that civilian involvement in the military's sphere, in terms of monitoring or providing guidance below the level of policy, degrades military effectiveness and provides incentives for military involvement in politics.

Unfortunately, delineating the military's sphere is precisely the issue. Advances in the means of warfare that have increased the distance, speed, and lethality with which violence can be applied drove the development of the military profession and have expanded the areas in which military professionals must be proficient to include national security policy, diplomacy, state-building, and governance associated with military operations. But this expansion goes both ways. It has been argued that civilian involvement is required at all levels of activity to integrate military means with political purposes even with a professional military. Thus changes in warfare have resulted in friction between civil and military authorities on substantive and process issues, including who should make what decisions, and suggests that the parameters of the relationship will continue to evolve.

Finally, a recent challenge to the military's sphere has been the trend toward utilizing private armed forces in lieu of the military to perform tasks central to achieving state ends. It suggests that civil authorities are redefining the forms that its monopoly over the legitimate use of force may take—potentially to the detriment of the military.

Civil–military relations are central to the stability and quality of governance in polities, their propensity to utilize force internationally and domestically, the quality of the military strategies pursued to achieve diplomatic ends, and ultimately the nature and stability of international relations.

See also *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism; Class and Politics; Coup d'État; Military Rule; National Security Policy; Nationalism; Principal-agent Theory.*

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Civil Religion

Civil religion has been a political and theological problem of enduring concern across the centuries and has become a topic of renewed interest among social scientists in the last fifty years.

There is a rich heritage of philosophical, theological, and political reflection on the problem that extends at least as far back as Plato's *Laws.* There are at least two prominent views of civil religion that characterize this heritage. According to one view, civil religion is a civic ethos that recognizes and cultivates beliefs supporting a society's moral-political commitments. This version of civil religion employs the force of religious symbols, images, and language to garner political strength. This view of civil religion is manifested in some works of Plato, Baruch Spinoza, Francis Bacon, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

Another view of civil religion presents it as a civic ethos that is driven by more explicitly theological beliefs, though it gains power by political means and maintains itself through political forms. This version of civil religion arises from an overlapping theological consensus within a society and promotes a wider recognition of its bond with God and his providence, typically appealing to the language of national destiny and sacred purpose. Some features of this view occur in certain ancient Roman and medieval thinkers, while its other features manifest variously in later figures such as Niccolò Machiavelli, Georg Wilhem Friedrich Hegel, and certain American Puritan writers.

The past fifty years have seen numerous scholarly studies on civil religion. Sociologists, historians, religious studies scholars, theologians, and political scientists have conducted most of this work. Scholars have sought to define and explain the phenomena of civil religion according to the contours of these respective disciplines. For example, Robert Bellah has been one of the most influential analysts and has invited a very welcome reconsideration of civil religion as a phenomenon, especially in its American historical and cultural context. One characteristic feature of his work as a sociologist has been his attention to the complexities and internal logic of religious and political associations across the political and religious spectrum. Bellah's supporters and critics alike recognize how well he classifies and

interprets the attitudes and behavior of such groups without reducing their motivations to merely economic or class considerations nor inflating their religious and political dimensions to the exclusion of other factors. He also recognizes the limitations of secularization theory, prominent among sociologists, that predict religion to become increasingly private and individualistic as society becomes more secular.

Among religious studies scholars, Martin Marty offers perceptive analyses of civil religion that capture some important religious and political features of the phenomena. For example, he distinguishes priestly and prophetic strains of civil religion. His prophetic variety of civil religion appropriates the religious language of prophecy to highlight the progress of social and political change toward a future of greater peace and justice. He associates a priestly version of civil religion with a religious language that promotes and preserves "American values."

Political scientists have tended to focus on particular institutions of government, including the constitution and the presidency. Representative examples of this can be seen in Richard Pierard and Robert Linder's book, *Civil Religion and the Presidency*, and in Sanford Levinson's *Constitutional Faith*. These are detailed studies of particular institutions as they are altered by civil religious phenomena. There are a number of illuminating studies of civil religion through particular figures in the history of political philosophy. Some good examples of such work include Michael Zuckert's essay on "Locke and the Problem of Civil Religion," Sanford Kessler's book *Tocqueville's Civil Religion: American Christianity and the Prospects for Freedom,* and Ronald Beiner's essay "Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau on Civil Religion."

While civil religion is often associated with premodern and presecular societies, it has been a recurring phenomenon in the modern period and occasioned considerable reflection in modern and contemporary thought.

See also *Hegel, Georg W. F.; Locke, John; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Plato; Religion and Politics; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Spinoza, Baruch.*

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Civil Rights Movement

Civil rights is a broad phrase that is used in several different contexts. Its most common usage refers to race discrimination, but in its broadest sense, a civil right is a power, privilege, or protection granted or recognized by a legitimate authority, law, or usage. Civil rights protect individual people and groups of people from discrimination or mistreatment. Civil rights, in modern times, also include, but are not limited to, protection against gender discrimination, disability discrimination, and religious discrimination. Civil rights can be contrasted with human rights, which are asserted to belong to individuals independent of legal recognition. Human rights imply that individuals *deserve* certain protections; civil rights are delineated in law so that individuals or groups actually *receive* these protections.

THE ADVENT OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT

The *civil rights movement* is typically the term used in the United States to refer to the struggle of African Americans to obtain equal protection under the law. However, the term can also be used generally for any struggle for legal protection that has occurred since one group of people was first subjected to the rule of another.

Nevertheless, at the end of the eighteenth century, the American Revolution (1776–1783) and French Revolution (1789–1799)—influenced by Enlightenment thinkers like John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Montesquieu—essentially marked the beginning of the modern civil rights movement. The U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights and the French National Assembly's Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, both issued in 1789, were watersheds in turning Enlightenment ideas of individual rights into law. (The French Declaration only came into force in a revised version in 1793, following the Revolution.) With these revolutions, the concept of civil rights was formally recognized and placed into practice, albeit incompletely, as illustrated by the struggles that followed in the United States.

EXTENDING CIVIL RIGHTS

Despite the high ideals of such documents as the Bill of Rights, civil rights were not available to many sectors of society, especially for African Americans and women. During the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865), in 1863, President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, proclaiming the freedom of slaves, but only in rebellious territories. Despite the Emancipation Proclamation's limited scope, it tolled the death knell for slavery in the United States, but not for racial discrimination.

After the war, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were enacted to the U.S. Constitution, prohibiting slavery, guaranteeing equal rights and due process under

state laws, and guaranteeing the right to vote for African American males (women would not receive the vote until the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920). Regardless, through nonenforcement and selective interpretation of these rights, problems of racial discrimination persisted, as illustrated by the infamous case of *Plessey v. Ferguson* (1896), which approved a "separate but equal" doctrine despite the manifest inequality in society.

THE FLOWERING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT

The early 1900s saw the founding of African American rights organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in 1909. Still, not until 1954, following *Brown v. Board of Education* (banning segregation in public schools) were significant inroads made against racial discrimination. In the late 1950s, resistance to racial discrimination increased, headlined by the 1955 Montgomery bus boycott, as the African American community showed that they had power and demanded change. Subsequently, the 1960s witnessed the flowering of the civil rights movement in America. In response to the movement, African Americans were granted significant civil rights with the 1964 Civil Rights Act (mandating desegregation), the 1965 Equal Voting Rights Act (eliminating hindrances to voting), and the 1968 Civil Rights Act (banning discrimination in housing).

After these public policy victories and Martin Luther King Jr.'s 1968 assassination, the African American civil rights movement splintered into a sometimes violent black power movement and more prosaic legal and individual struggles to consolidate the gains of the 1960s. Political scientists continue to analyze the factors which contributed to the success of the civil rights movement from a variety of perspectives (critical race theory, social movement theory, etc.), but one main factor is undeniable: the broader civil rights movement began with the U.S. Constitution, to which the African American civil rights movement was able to appeal to draw support from the country. If the American civil rights movement is considered by many a completed period in U.S. history, the broader civil rights movement is an ongoing struggle throughout the world, as other minorities vie for the powers, privileges, and protections they believe are due them.

See also *Bill of Rights; Civil and Political Rights; International Bill of Rights; Jim Crow; Race and Racism; Segregation and Desegregation; Slavery; U.S. Politics and Society: African American Political Participation; U.S. Politics and Society: African American Social Movements; U.S. Politics and Society: Minority Interest Groups; White Supremacy; Women's Rights.*

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Civil Service

Civil service systems are composed of individuals who attain their positions by virtue of their performance on competitive examinations or by holding of specific qualifications such as a bachelor's degree. In contrast to elected officials who are expected to be policy advocates, civil servants are expected to embody expertise and neutral competence. Typical citizens rarely come into direct contact with their elected officials—one reason for this is the often brief tenure of these officials. In contrast, typical citizens have a good chance of frequently personally encountering the multitudes of civil servants who carry out government policies. Civil servants are present at the national, state, and local levels and may hold their positions for long periods of time. While the size of the U.S. civil service has been stable for the past fifty years, and has declined as a percentage of the total U.S. workforce, the growth of state and local civil service workforces has been steady.

Government service was originally understood to be the domain of the educated gentry. Then in 1829, with the age of President Andrew Jackson, as the U.S. government vastly expanded and political parties took their largely present-day composition, the *spoils system* flourished. In such a system, the supporters of the winning political party receive government jobs or other material rewards such as government contracts. Anyone could do a government job, so the reasoning went, and the United States should have a representative bureaucracy that mirrors the people it serves. Many a U.S. president has lamented the performance of individuals whom he put in office. Harlan Hahn wrote, "Several years after he left the presidency, William Howard Taft endorsed the familiar political maxim that the distribution of patronage often breeds 'one ingrate and ten enemies'" (368).

The term civil service itself came into common usage in the United States following the assassination of President James Garfield by Charles Guiteau. Guiteau, a Stalwart Republican, was seeking a government post in Paris, and he believed that if he killed Garfield, a Mugwump Republican, Chester Arthur (Garfield's successor and a fellow Stalwart) would appoint Guiteau to his desired position. Instead, Guiteau was executed for his offense, and the spoils system was condemned with the cry, "Spoils equals murder." President Chester Arthur signed the Civil Service Reform Act of 1883, which was authored by U.S. senator George H. Pendleton (D-Ohio). Three months later, Democratic governor Grover Cleveland of New York signed into law a bill authored by Republican representative Theodore Roosevelt, which established the first state civil service system. Roosevelt would go on to serve as a U.S. civil service commissioner from 1889 to 1895, his tenure overlapping with the second administration of President Grover Cleveland.

The enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1883, also known as the Pendleton Act, meant that loyalty to particular politicians or political parties would no longer be a prerequisite for government employment. The act prohibited mandatory campaign contributions and outlawed campaign and political party assessments of U.S. government employees. It established the bipartisan, three-member Civil

Service Commission vested with rule–making and investigatory authority. Members required nomination by the president and confirmation by the U.S. Senate in order to serve. The legislation institutionalized the competitive entrance examination as the standard requirement for individuals who aspired to become government bureaucrats.

Competitive examinations for civil service positions also have a long history in China and Korea. The National Museum of Korea exhibits detailed elaborations on the nature of examinations that were administered more than a millennia ago. Indeed, opponents of Pendleton's legislation denigrated its Chinese antecedents.

The civil service system has gradually expanded, in part because many presidents have converted political positions into civil service ones prior to leaving office. This ensures that officials whose policy views and implementation strategies reflect a president's own preferences can exercise power potentially for years after an administration has ended. President Jimmy Carter, who had campaigned vigorously for the presidency on his record of executive branch reorganization and innovation during his tenure as governor of Georgia, brought major changes to the civil service with his signing of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. This act abolished the Civil Service Commission and replaced it with the Office of Personnel Management and the Merit System Protection Board. It also established the Senior Executive Service in order to reward outstanding performance and facilitate appropriate lateral transfers between agencies. The Office of Personnel Management is tasked with recruiting the most capable person for each position, while the Merit System Protection Board protects the due process rights of government employees.

The Hatch Act, passed in 1939, placed limitations on the political activities of U.S. civil servants. The following year, further legislation extended these prohibitions to many state and local government employees whose agencies were recipients of federal grants-in-aid. Proponents of the Hatch Acts argue that these limitations promote the ideal of a neutral bureaucracy, whose employees are not subject to manipulation by public officeholders. Those opposed to the Hatch Acts counter that one should not have to surrender fundamental rights of citizenship in order to be a civil servant.

A major contemporary issue concerning the civil service is the extent to which it should be supplanted in favor of contracting out government services to private entities. Proponents of the increased contracting of government services typically tout its efficiency, while its opponents are skeptical about such purported savings and decry the reduced accountability that this practice fosters.

See also *Bureaucracy; Patronage; Spoils System.*

. . . .   HENRY SIRGO

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Civil Society

Having been dormant as a social science concept for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the term *civil society* emerged in the 1990s as almost as fashionable a buzzword as *globalization.* Yet there is nothing even resembling a commonly agreed definition of the concept. Scholars at the Centre for Civil Society, London School of Economics reflect some of these ambiguities in a cautiously worded "initial working definition." They define civil society as

> "the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values," but then go on to make a distinction between its theoretical separation from state, family and market and the blurred and negotiated boundaries between these spheres in practice. (Centre for Civil Society)

A nonexhaustive list of the sort of actors who populate this sphere may be a less contested way to describe the concept than a theoretical definition: Civil society is generally agreed to comprise nongovernmental organizations, community groups, faith-based institutions, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, academics, and activists. Following the genealogy of the concept of civil society and its recent resurgence, a problematic conceptualization of the "civility" of civil society emerged; civil society also relates to democracy and democratization and to capitalism, with modern the debates relating to the existence and nature of a global civil society.

HISTORY OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY CONCEPT

The term civil society has a direct equivalent in Latin (*societas civilis*), and a close equivalent in ancient Greek (*politike koinona*). These terms denoted the polity, with active citizens shaping its institutions and policies. The terms also represented unequivocally bounded concepts, implying exclusion of noncitizens. As such, translated as *société civil* or commonwealth, the terms were attractive to the contractarian thinkers who sought to explain and justify the emergence of modern nation-states in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Preoccupations ranged from the bleak requirement of complete subjection of Thomas Hobbes, to the liberal individualism of John Locke, to the equivocation over the benefits of nature versus civilization in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, to the emphasis on civic virtue by Adam Ferguson. But for all of them, civil

society denoted the social contract between citizens, providing for a nonviolent social space that facilitated the development of commercial, civic, and political activity by the (male, white, propertied) contracting citizens.

Ferguson was widely translated, and Immanuel Kant and Georg Hegel were among his readers. Kant holds a special place in the genealogy of civil society since he was the first to posit it as unbounded, and realizable only in a universal (or, today, global) form. Hegel's conception of civil society is not easily penetrable, and impossible to summarize, but one key aspect was that he saw civil society as something separate from, although symbiotic with, the state. Civil society, for Hegel, concerned men trading and interacting socially, but civil society was separate from government and purely public activity. For Karl Marx, civil society, in its German translation *BΝrgerliche Gesellschaft*, is narrowed to only economic life, in which everyone pursues individual selfish interests and becomes alienated from one's own human potential and one's fellow people.

At the same time as Marx was developing this bleak interpretation of Hegel's concept, French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville became the first theoretical proponent of *associationalism*. During his extensive visit to the United States (1831–1833), Tocqueville was struck by the American habit of founding associations for all manner of political and public purposes, and came to the conclusion that this was the foundation stone for the successful functioning of democracy in America.

In the early twentieth century, Antonio Gramsci, general secretary of the Italian Communist Party, grappled with a theoretical question of vital practical concern: Why, under what Marx had identified as ideal conditions (advanced industrialization, frequent economic and political crises) was the revolution not occurring in Italy? Going back from Marx to Hegel, Gramsci then divorced the notion of civil society, as cultural superstructure, from economic interactions as material base, founding a long line of scholarship on the manufacture of consent for practices of domination. This consent is generated in the institutions of civil society, notably the church, but also in schools, associations, trade unions, media, and other cultural institutions. Gramsci primarily emphasized how it was through this cultural superstructure that the bourgeois class imposed its hegemony, weathering even economic and political crises. However, Gramsci has been widely read as implying that civil society is therefore also the site where a counterhegemony can be built, as a kind of wedge between the state and the class-structured economy, which has the revolutionary potential of dislodging the bourgeoisie.

After Gramsci, the term and indeed the concept of civil society very nearly died out in Western political thought. When the term resurfaced, it was with dissidents against the authoritarian state both in Latin America and Eastern Europe.

In Latin America, the situation of left-wing intellectuals of the 1970s and 1980s was very similar to Gramsci's, fighting fascist dictatorships, where capitalists were by and large colluding with the state, but where the state did not exercise complete control over everyday life. Latin American thinkers, first of all in Brazil, appear to have been attracted to the idea of civil society because it was a term that could unify entrepreneurs, church groups, and labor movements in their opposition to the regime. As a force in society, civil society also could be distinguished from political parties, which many felt had been discredited, as well as from the kind of populist mobilization that had been endemic in various Latin American countries. Most important, civil society appealed to these Latin American groups because it was associated with nonviolence.

With the self-styled central Europeans, the concept of civil society was somewhat different. While state terrorism was more spectacular in Latin America, with military regimes behind the "disappearing" of thousands of people in each country in a matter of months, civil society in the Gramscian sense may have been snuffed out more successfully by the longer rule and more totalitarian aspirations of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In a totalitarian state, where the distinction between the interests of the people and the interests of the state is categorically denied (hence people's republics), central European dissidents began to believe that conceiving a civil society, as an association between people away from the tentacles of the state, was the way to begin resisting the state. Intellectuals in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland during the mid-1980s, such as Adam Michnik, Gyorgi Konrad, and Vaclav Havel revived the term to mean autonomous spaces independent of the state; their understanding may owe as much to Tocqueville's as to Gramsci's, although they do not explicitly acknowledge either.

The central European and the Latin American thinkers had several things in common. They emphasized the values of solidarity, public truth telling, ideological plurality, and nonviolence as characteristics of civil society. The way in which they conceived of civil society, also, was not a means to achieve an overthrow of their regimes. They were more interested in reclaiming space that the authoritarian state had encroached upon than in taking over the reigns of power. This space had to be kept open and alive as a necessary complement to a healthy democracy—an antidote to narrow party politics and a bulwark against future threats to democracy. Based on the insight that modern authoritarianism requires ostensible adherence to legal norms, the central European and Latin American intellectuals made much use of appeals to the law, whether it be national law or international human rights standards, as a strategy of legitimate resistance. Finally, while demonstrating a vivid awareness of the world beyond their state, these groups firmly believed that democratization must come from within.

Also in the 1990s, Robert Putnam published his influential work on Italy, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy,* inspired by the more Tocquevillean tradition of civil society as associationalism, accumulating social capital in communities, and buttressing the functioning of democracy.

From then on, the civil society idea caught on like wildfire. It was apparently considered useful by prodemocracy activists in the Philippines, South Korea, and South Africa. But it also obtained a new lease of life, both in political theory and in

policy practice, in entrenched democracies in Western Europe and North America as well as India. This related both to concern over the erosion of democracy through the apathy and disillusionment of the electorate, and to the end of the grand ideologies. The civil society idea was seen as a way of revitalizing democracy when both the socialist great hopes of the all-powerful, all-providing state, and the neoliberal belief that market logic delivers benefits to all, had lost appeal. For the developing world, there is also a rather more cynical explanation for the concept of civil society's sudden and ubiquitous popularity: Since donors adopted the dogma that strengthening civil society was good for democracy and development, using the language of civil society was good for funding applications.

With these usages, there was a tendency to conflation between Enlightenment, Gramscian, and Tocquevillean meanings of civil society as well conflation of an empirical category, which is often referred to as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or the nonprofit or voluntary sector, with various political projects of liberalization, democratization, or resistance.

THE CIVILITY OF CIVIL SOCIETY

As evidenced in the roots of the civil society idea, the Enlightenment concept of civil society is deeply imbued with a sense of the superior civility of European polities. While not very precisely defined, the term *civility* appears associated with nonviolence, good manners, and at a stretch, tolerance for others within one's own society. But this internal civilization process had a necessary corollary in war, or at least the threat of war, with others. Moreover, from Napoleonic times onwards, colonial projects were increasingly justified in terms of "civilizing" the natives, even as the methods of subjugation were allowed to be "uncivil" because the population in question was not yet within the "civil" realm of those who can be expected to understand and respect the modern rule of law. This historical baggage makes any reflection on the meaning of the "civil" in civil society, and what might constitute uncivility, politically loaded. Some authors, like John and Jean Comaroff, reject any substantive use of civil as having racist connotations.

Nonetheless, the disillusionment following earlier expectations of civil society's contribution to a liberal-democratic end of history has spawned recent debates about the term *uncivil society*. It has come to be used for manifestations of civil society that challenge liberal-democratic values. Violence is most often singled out as its characteristic, but exclusivist or dogmatic ideologies, predatory practices, and general rule breaking are also mentioned. The use of the term uncivil society is also not confined to any particular region. Scholarly articles apply the term to civil society manifestations in Africa, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the Arab world, and Latin America, as well as globally. After 9/11, the term has been used increasingly to denote "illiberal" reactions to neoliberal globalization, such as the al-Qaida network.

The main academic argument in relation to uncivil society turns on whether uncivil society should be included in or excluded from a definition of civil society. Some political theorists exclude the uncivil: they insist on acting within the

rules, respect for others, or willingness to compromise as elements of civil society. A majority of the literature takes the opposite view, however, insisting on an empirical definition of civil society that includes uncivil society as a tendency within it. Kopecky and Mudde, in their 2003 work, *Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe*, give the most extensive attention to this issue, adducing no less than five interrelated arguments for eschewing the exclusion of uncivil society from civil society. In summary,

1. To some extent, all civil society manifestations are exclusivist in that they claim the moral high ground for their own position in opposition to all others.
2. Civility towards the uncivil has historically been limited and hypocritical.
3. Adherence to liberal democratic goals does not necessarily equate with internal democracy, or vice versa. Uncivil movements may have civil outcomes and vice versa.
4. Adherence to legal or even societal norms is far from desirable in nondemocratic societies and proscribes challenges to the status quo even in democratic ones.
5. Finally, "narrow conceptions of civil society screen off potentially vital ingredients of associational life and democratic politics." Inclusion is therefore necessary to progress in empirical knowledge.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY

Much of the civil society literature of the last decade is devoted to critiques of the idea, so dominant in policy making in the 1990s, that strengthening civil society contributes to democratization. This idea, partly considered to have come out of the "1989 experience" in Eastern Europe, and partly attributed to Robert Putnam's influential work on Italy, requires civil society to be imbued with both democratic and liberal values, and for it to be easily distinguishable from "uncivil society" which lacks these values. The critiques of the *mutual strengthening theory*, based on numerous empirical studies from a variety of regions, make four counterpoints.

First, having a vibrant civil society is not to be conflated with having a "civil" civil society. This argument is most persuasively pursued in a historical article by Berman, which shows that Germans in the Weimar Republic, having lost confidence in the state, were "addicted to associating" in much the same way as Tocqueville observed of early Americans, but that these dense associational networks were rapidly and successfully infiltrated and captured by Nazi organizers, accelerating and buttressing the Nazi seizure of power "from below."

Second, religious or nationalist movements often have a democratic base, and sometimes seek the overthrow of a nondemocratic government, but their values are not necessarily democratic and certainly not liberal. Segments of civil society imbued with liberal, Western values on the other hand do not necessarily have democratic legitimacy in the form of a grassroots base.

Third, democracy in Western nations developed in the context of a global system that exploited and repressed other

parts of the world. It is not surprising therefore that populations and civil society actors in these other parts sometimes have a more cynical, even hostile conception of the liberal democracy; they see the liberal democracy as being offered or even forced upon them by Western institutions in a continuing context of inequality.

Finally, the quality of civil society and the quality of the state and market are interdependent. Hence, civil society can only be as civil as the circumstances allow. Leonardo Avritzer (53–60), for instance, develops "uncivil society," as the prototype of civil society most likely to emerge when the state is too weak to guarantee either physical or material security: the market economy exists only in clientelist form, and political society is nonexistent or fragmented to the point of destruction. He cites Peru and Colombia as Latin American prototypes of this situation, whilst acknowledging that elements of it can be found in all Latin American countries. The challenge in these situations is "whether civil society can produce civility in spite of the state and the market."

CIVIL SOCIETY AND CAPITALISM

The classical theorists made no distinction between civil society and the market. For Locke, the civility of civil society consisted precisely in providing sufficient physical security for the individual so that one could, through one's industry and ingenuity, amass property. Hegel, on the other hand, has described particularly vividly the dynamic nature of what he called *Buergerliche Gesellschaft*—what we would nowadays call the *capitalist system*—but he did not at all believe it to be civil. Without checks and balances provided by the state, the system neglects or exploits the poor who cannot help themselves. Similarly, Marx thought of civil society as bourgeois society, a necessary stage in history, but inherently exploitative.

Since then, through the detour of Gramsci's insistence on dividing material base from cultural superstructure, civil society has come to mean the nonstate, nonmarket realm of society. However, capitalism is now generally accepted as the global background setting in which civil society operates. Recent work has begun to take into account the problematic relationship between civil society and capitalism both at the national level and globally, but this relation is as yet much less theorized than that between civil society and democracy.

TRANSNATIONAL OR GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY

While until recently, civil society was primarily thought of as a national concept, the reality of cross-border networking of nonprofit associations and social movements is much older, especially if we include forms of organization associated with the Catholic Church and organized Islam. The nineteenth century saw peace movements, antislavery campaigns, women's suffrage, and labor movements having continuous correspondence and international meetings, spawning intellectual and strategic cross-fertilization.

The last two decades, building on these earlier links, are qualitatively different, however. The intensity with which people network and link up across borders has exploded. But this is not just an empirical shift. In stark contrast to the Enlightenment concept, the discourses and identities of civil society actors have become more transnational and even global. Human rights defenders used a legal universalist frame to combat national injustices, peace groups challenged national security policies with concepts of solidarity across conflict divides, and environmentalists initiated talk of one world and global solutions. More recently, normative cosmopolitan concepts of global civil society have been opposed to ethnic nationalism and religious fundamentalism, as well as a counterforce against predatory globalization. At the same time, some of the most common forms of uncivil society in the twenty-first century may be based on what Manuel Castells has called a "resistance identity," based solely on being against various (perceived) aspects of globalization rather than on a positive project for society.

See also *Colonialism; Democracy and Democratization; Globalization; Gramsci, Antonio; Hegel, Georg W. F.; Kant, Immanuel; Latin American Politics and Society; Locke, John; Marx, Karl; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Soviet Union, Former; Tocqueville, Alexis de.*

. . . .   MARLIES GLASIUS

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Civil Wars

In the debate over defining civil wars, factors taken into account include the territory where the conflict occurs, the parties involved, and the casualty rates. According to James D. Fearon, a *civil war* is a violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups aiming to take power at the center or in a region, or to change government policies. According to Fearon, if the threshold for a conflict to be labeled a civil war is at least one thousand killed during the fighting, approximately 125 civil wars had occurred by 2007 since the end of World War II (1939–1945). Scholars such as Nicolas Sambanis identify other criteria. This can make it difficult to examine why such conflicts occur, and to identify the best resolution methods and hopefully prevent them. It can also cause controversy over the legitimacy of international intervention.

OCCURRENCE OF CIVIL WARS

Civil wars have occurred around the world but have been more common in some regions. From 1950 to 2001, developing Asia (South and East Asia and Oceania) experienced a persistently high incidence of war. Latin America experienced much conflict in the 1980s, as did the former Soviet bloc in the 1990s, although most of these conflicts were short. The Middle East and North Africa have had a stable and high incidence of civil war since the late 1960s; moreover, the incidence of violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa has increased. Until the 1980s, Africa had a below-average incidence, whereas now it is comparable to Asia and the Middle East and much higher than Latin America. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, sixteen major armed conflicts were active internationally in 2008. For the fifth consecutive year, all of the conflicts were intrastate, though troops from another state aided one of the parties in four conflicts.

Widespread casualties and violation of human rights are common features of civil wars. Casualties are particularly common among the civilian population and those most vulnerable, such as women, children (who are often recruited as fighters), and the elderly. Moreover, fleeing refugees are vulnerable to attack, disease, and malnourishment. Human rights are frequently violated as social mores against such crimes are weakened and law and order break down. This breakdown can provide the opportunity for violations to occur unhindered and without fear of punishment. Human rights may also be systematically violated, as terror and brutality are used as another means to win dominance and ensure the population's compliance. The violation of human rights is graphically shown by the war in the former Yugoslavia and conflict in Rwanda during the 1990s. The disastrous impact of civil war continues to be felt long after the fighting has subsided or ended. Higher rates of mortality often remain, for it takes time to rebuild the country's damaged infrastructure and the economy. War remnants such as mines also continue to cause casualties, as in Cambodia where conflict occurred from 1970 to the 1990s.

There is debate over whether the conflict in Iraq since the 2003 overthrow of President Saddam Hussein by U.S.-led coalition forces is a civil war, but there clearly have been widespread casualties and human rights violations. Fearon has defined the conflict as a civil war, and a January 2007 *U.S. National Intelligence Estimate* said that the term accurately described key elements of the conflict, including the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities, changes in the character of violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population displacements. This debate continues, as does the violence; two bombs struck Baghdad in October 2009, killing at least 155 people, the deadliest attack in over two years. The Iraq Body Count, a nongovernmental organization with a public database including deaths caused by U.S.-led coalition forces and paramilitary or criminal attacks by others, estimated that as of February 4, 2010, there had been a minimum of 95,412 civilian deaths since U.S.-led coalition forces entered Iraq. As of February 16, 2010, there had been 4,697 coalition deaths. Overall though, violence had declined since peaking in early 2007.

Many groups have committed human rights abuses in Iraq. Basic rights to food and shelter have been threatened too, with many people forced to live in very poor conditions. Although there have been some positive developments, such as provincial elections in February 2009 followed by July 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections in the Kurdistan region, there is fear as to future stability and the protection of human rights after the United States withdraws.

EXPLAINING CIVIL WARS

Various factors can contribute to the outbreak of war. Scholars such as Barbara F. Walter have examined the recurrent nature of civil war. Once a country has experienced civil war, the threat of more conflict is elevated. One reason for this is that the same factors causing the initial war often remain. Indeed, these factors might have become stronger as a result of the war's destruction and casualties. The threat of ongoing conflict is illustrated in Angola where continuous conflict has occurred since independence in 1975. The presence of key political institutions that provide adequate and appropriate avenues to exercise rights, express opinions, and address grievances is vital in reducing the likelihood of war. Similarly, a central government that can adequately provide the basics of good governance is needed. However, this is not the case in many countries. The term *failed nation-state* indicates a dangerous post–cold war development—the breakdown of law, order, and basic services in a number of multiethnic states. This phenomenon is often accompanied by conflict, as in Somalia.

The issue of ownership of resources often arises when the resources are spread unevenly, and this can cause conflict. According to Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, the plundering of natural resources can finance opportunistic rebellions, and resources can motivate conflict. In particular, various scholars, including Paivi Lujala, have examined the link between diamonds and civil war. In addition, divisions such as those based on ethnicity, region, and religion can cause tension and, ultimately, conflict if the different groups clash and cannot resolve

differences peacefully. The potentially destructive nature of ethnic divisions is illustrated by the conflict in Nigeria from 1967 to 1970. More recently, there has been fighting between the Shiites and Sunnis in post–Saddam Hussein Iraq. State and insurgency leaders alike can inflame and exacerbate tensions that lead to war. The key role of a leader in the outbreak and continuation of war is shown by the influential role taken by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in the conflict that engulfed the former Yugoslavia's during the 1990s. Finally, assistance to factions from external actors can exacerbate conflict. External involvement frequently occurred during the cold war when it was used as a tool by the superpowers and their allies to promote their rival strategic interests, as shown by Afghanistan's experiences in the late 1970s and 1980s.

See also *Ethnic Cleansing; Human Rights; War Crimes.*

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Clash of Civilizations

"The Clash of Civilizations" (1993) is the well-known work of Samuel P. Huntington, the late Harvard professor of political science, who argued that the primary cause of violent and nonviolent conflicts in the post–cold war period will be civilizational differences.

Huntington defined *civilization* as the "highest cultural grouping of people." While civilizations are dynamic entities and redefined with changes in the self-identification of people, they also involve objective attributes, such as language, history, customs, institutions, and especially religion, which make their differences "real." Based on this premise, Huntington identified eight civilizations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and "possibly" African. He predicted that the conflicts in the post–cold war era would erupt "along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another."

According to Huntington, the underlying reasons behind civilizational conflicts are manifold. First, cultural and religious differences are more fundamental than ideological or political ones. An individual can switch ideologies in a day, as happened after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but "Azeris cannot become Armenians." He also underlined that ethnic attachments lead to the kin-country syndrome, which is influential in determining states' sides especially in the post–cold war conflicts: Russia behind Serbia against Bosnia, Turkey behind Azerbaijan against Armenia, and the United States behind Israel against Syria and Iran. Furthermore, ethnic differences are likely to have implications on immigration and human rights policies.

Second, globalization brings nations closer, which does not necessarily lead to greater cooperation but potentially to a reaction against the Western economic and military dominance. Accordingly, Huntington has argued, religious fundamentalism is spreading especially among the young, educated, middle-class people beyond national boundaries but within civilizations. In this regard, the tension between the West and Islam is likely to be the most conflictive one due to the American influence in the Middle East.

Finally, Huntington envisaged the rise of regional, rather than global, economic cooperation, which would reinforce civilizational consciousness. Consequently, he predicted that the European Union (EU) would be consolidated not only around economic interests but also around the common culture, which will inevitably leave Turkey outside. Another implication of his thesis is a growing economic cooperation in East Asia that would center on China rather than on Japan.

Since its suggestion, the clash of civilizations has become a thesis that many academics and political figures have disagreed with but not ignored. Amartya Sen criticized it for disregarding diversity within civilizations. Bruce Russett and coauthors examined militarized interstate disputes in the period from 1952 to 1992 and found that relative power and regime type have greater explanatory power than civilizational differences on the incidence of interstate conflict. A more recent study by Andrej Tusicisny examined the same relationship in the period from 1946 to 2001 and found that civilizational fault lines are not more prone to conflict than any other place. The United Nations has put forward initiatives like the Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations (2001) and the Alliance of Civilizations (2005), which aim to investigate and address the causes of contemporary polarization between cultures.

Despite strong criticisms, theories embedded in the clash of civilizations are still alive today, and not for bad reasons. First, the empirical studies that have refuted the thesis suffer from multiple deficiencies. They either cover a short period of time in the post–cold war era; do not include post-9/11 conflicts, such as the U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and against al-Qaida; or disregard nonviolent cultural conflicts, such as the cartoon crisis in Denmark or the increasing resistance in Europe to Turkey's membership in the European Union. Second, recent studies by Alan Krueger and Marc Sageman have found that the popular explanations for international terrorism, such as poverty and lack of education, have no empirical basis as terrorists tend to come from well-educated, middle-class or high-income families; target people of a different religion in suicide attacks; and are motivated by the sufferings of Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq, and other places. Overall, the jihad of al-Qaida; discourses like President George W. Bush's "crusade"; and the rise of right-wing, anti-immigrant political parties in Western Europe, among other developments, seem to have kept Huntington's thesis at least partly valid in the post–cold war period.

See also *Al-Qaida; Conflict Resolution; Culture Wars; Huntington, Samuel.*

. . . . HOWARD J. WIARDA AND MURAT BAYAR

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Class and Politics

Class is one way individuals organize to effect political change. Political scientists also use class to explain political phenomena. The long history of examining the relationship between class and politics in political science dates back to the ancient Greeks. However, explaining what class as a concept means, and how it affects political phenomena, has changed over time. Debates over the meaning of class are torn between notions of the term sourced either in the work of German political philosopher Karl Marx and the Marxist tradition or that by German sociologist Max Weber.

CLASS IN ANCIENT GREEK, ROMAN, AND MEDIEVAL TIMES

The earliest uses of the concept of class date back to the ancient Greek political theorists. Plato's *Republic* uses the concept to explain the tripart division of labor that he constructs

for his idealized polis. In this community, he distinguishes among classes of individuals—the philosopher kings, guardians, and the artisans—as the three groups that would inhabit the republic. For Plato, class refers to a type of intrinsic quality of individuals.

In Plato's *Republic*, the intrinsic distinctions among the three classes of individuals are revealed in an extensive educational process that breaks up families in order to determine who will be part of what class. The educational process, open to both men and women, determines which individuals have what aptitudes to do what in the republic. Thus, social class or roles are ultimately premised upon natural innate talents to reason and obtain true knowledge, and a just society is one where all individuals perform the functions for which they are best suited. In the *Republic* and his other writings, Plato also distinguishes among monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, with each defined by which class rules. Overall, Plato's writings draw linkages among class, social roles, aptitudes, and political power, setting the stage for subsequent analysis of the concept.

Aristotle's *Politics* employs a class analysis when it comes to politics. Aristotle adopts Plato's conception of different types of governments, viewing monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies as types of polities governed by the one, the few, or the many. Aristotle's typology of governments rests upon a class analysis in terms of who rules. Yet unlike Plato, who clearly linked class to intrinsic talents, virtue, or knowledge, Aristotle connects the term to economics. In fact, his concept of a middle class appears modern, defining it as those who are economically well off and deeming its stability as critical to a well-run polity.

During the Roman Republic and Empire era (extending roughly from 264 BCE–476 CE), class continued to be an important concept. The division of Roman society into patricians and plebeians (rulers and subjects) was a common distinction made by Roman writers and seen in the practical politics of the day. In *On the Commonwealth* and *On Laws* Roman philosopher and statesman Cicero devises his ideal republic, which consists of classes of individuals. Drawing upon Plato, Cicero describes some individuals or magistrates as more fit to rule than others, with fitness resting in the natural aptitudes of individuals as revealed through education. In his writings, Cicero draws upon the tripart monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy distinction, describing them and their perversions (tyranny, oligarchy, and mob rule) in terms of which class rules. This sixfold distinction would remain tremendously influential throughout the Middle Ages as political thinkers employed it to explain political authority.

CLASS IN MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT

The beginning of more modern conceptions of class begins with eighteenth-century French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In his *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality,* he implicitly criticizes the social contract tradition of seventeenth-century English philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke to explain the origins and legitimacy of political society.

Instead of seeing society resting upon the voluntary consent of individuals, either to protect themselves against the threat of anarchy (as with Hobbes), or to defend their natural rights against the inconveniences of the state of nature (Locke), Rousseau contends that political society finds its origins in private property and in the rich tricking the poor into believing that joining a political community would be to their advantage. Rousseau set the stage for describing political society as divided by class in economic terms, with the state serving the interests of the rich against the poor.

German philosopher Georg Friedrich Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* (1820) describes the state in class terms, seeing it as a mediator of class conflict. However, his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) takes class analysis another step further, with self-consciousness becoming an important concept. Here, in his famous battle for supremacy between master and slave, each seeks to have the other recognize his superiority. It is not until the slave realizes that he is capable of seeing his own work as the source of his alienated existence that he becomes self-consciously aware of his role in society. This realization occurs as a result of his struggle with his master. Through struggle, in Hegel's view, one becomes aware of one's own existence, and with this self-consciousness, the slave can eventually subdue the master and reverse their roles.

Both Rousseau and Hegel argued that class underlines political divisions and that through struggle one group, the lower class, will acquire the knowledge or awareness of their servitude or subjection, paving the way for some liberation or revolution to free them. This is how Karl Marx came to understand the significance of the writings of Rousseau and Hegel.

MARX AND CLASS
Modern conceptions of class analysis really emerge with Marx. Near the beginning of his 1848 *Communist Manifesto,* Marx states that the "history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles" (Tucker, 1978, 473). Here, as well as in the *German Ideology,* Marx develops a theory of history and politics rooted in class conflict, particularly analyzing such relations within an industrial capitalist society. In Marx's model of society, material economic forces of production are the driving force of history. Changing modes of production lead to new forms of class alignments, dominant ideologies, and political structures. Consistent with Hegel's master-slave struggle, Marx argues that class struggles produce dominant groups and ideologies. In capitalism, two classes have emerged—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Bourgeois society sprouted from feudal society and the bourgeoisie from its burghers. Capitalism had produced the proletariat.

In his *Grundrisse,* Marx argues that, in capitalism, class can be understood relationally. The bourgeoisie own the means of production whereas the proletariat, as Marx states in *Wage, Labor, and Capital,* sells its labor power for wages. Class thus is an objective term that can be defined via one's relationship to the ownership of the means of production. If, as Marx states in the *Manifesto,* the "history of all past society has consisted in the development of class antagonisms, antagonisms that

assumed different forms at different epochs," then class conflict in a capitalist society emerges in several ways. First, Marx asserts that the state serves class interests. The job of the state is to enforce bourgeois authority. Workers battle the bourgeoisie for state control. Second, the battle between workers and the owners of the means of production replicates Hegel's master-slave dialectic, with capitalism producing the seeds of its own destruction (i.e., proletarian class consciousness).

In Marx's view, the bourgeoisie seek profit maximization by purchasing the labor power of workers, extracting the surplus value from them for their profits. For Marx, surplus value is the difference between the value the bourgeoisie pay the workers for their labor power and what it is really worth. The competitive drive for profits forces owners constantly to revolutionize the modes of production. Capitalists replace workers with machines and other labor–saving devices. But as capitalism matures, the drive for profit accelerates, and there is a need to replace organic or human capital with machines. This process results in an increasing loss of jobs, producing increased misery and poverty among workers. The decline in the use of human labor power also leads to a falling rate of profit because surplus value cannot be extracted from machines in the same way it can be from workers. To offset declining profits, even more machines must be employed.

According to Marx, the displacement and resulting misery of workers encourages the demise of capitalism. It forces ownership into fewer and fewer hands, thereby negating the concept of private property. The development of monopolies undermines market competition. Finally, the struggle with the proletariat will cause the workers, who have developed consciousness of their class, to organize as a party. At some point, the proletariat, with the Communist Party to lead them, will develop the revolutionary self-awareness as a class and use their political power to take political power from the bourgeoisie. This final battle between the workers and owners results in a victory for the former, with socialism and eventually communism structuring the new, classless society.

Class struggle is the heart of a Marxist analysis of political society. In Marx's works, the economic struggle between workers and the owners of the means of production seems to produce the requisite class consciousness for revolution, but while Marx believed consciousness would emerge out of struggles and the changing modes of production, his use of the concept of class was more a tool of analysis than an iron law that history would follow. In the political views of Friedrich Engels, Marx's chief collaborator, there is more determinism as to how class antagonisms would lead to a revolution. Engels viewed Marx's claims about class struggles almost as if they were scientific laws that had to be followed. In his analysis, the class struggle of capitalism would necessarily produce a communist revolution.

CLASS AND THE MARXIST TRADITION AFTER MARX
After Marx, Marxists such as Karl Kautsky, Eduard Bernstein, and Rosa Luxembourg expressed differing views over

Workers in Tbilisi, Georgia, gather in 1986 before portraits of, from left, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Vladimir Lenin. Marx, Engels, and Lenin held class struggle at the heart of their political theories.

SOURCE: © John Van Hasselt/Sygma/Corbis

whether parliamentary politics or revolution was the direction of class conflict. Yet among Marxists, Russian Communist leader Vladimir Lenin is among the most important.

Lenin describes class struggle as a theoretical, political, and practical economic battle. In "What Is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement," Lenin contends that the development of class consciousness is not automatic as Marx, or at least Engels, suggest. Without outside intervention, class consciousness may never rise beyond a level of trade union consciousness, and it was the role of party to become the dialectic of change to bring class consciousness to workers. Class consciousness can be brought to workers only from outside the economic struggle (economism). In "Two Tactics of Social Democracy," Lenin proposes a role for the Communist Party: to transform the bourgeois revolution against the tzar into a proletarian revolution. This involved workers taking over the battle and changing it into one that first fells the tzar and then the bourgeoisie. Leon Trotsky, in his *Permanent Revolution,* makes similar arguments.

In "State and Revolution," Lenin contends that the state is the product and manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. State power is used to oppress classes. The vote is not enough to destroy capitalism; violent revolution is needed. The Communist Party, upon seizing control, would need to institute a dictatorship of the proletariat to suppress bourgeois relations and power. Finally, Lenin's *Imperialism* depicts a new stage of international capitalism. The struggles for class control were not simply to be fought in one state at a time. If capitalism was to become international, so too would class battles.

Lenin's employment of Marxism was critical for class analysis. It justified the development of a vanguard to lead the workers to revolution, and beyond, after victory over the capitalists had succeeded. Second, it emphasized revolution over parliamentary tactics. Third, it saw class battles as international, even though the establishment of the Soviet Union demonstrated that socialism would or could be built one country at a time. While the First and Second Internationals demonstrated a class solidarity in terms of workers across national boundaries, such unity ended with the nationalism of World War I (1914–1918).

After Lenin, Marxists continued to use class as a basis of their analysis of politics and society, often disagreeing over how, exactly, class consciousness emerges. Italian political leader and political theorist Antonio Gramsci, between 1929 and 1935, wrote in his *Prison Notebooks* that the state is the entire ensemble of relations and activities by which the ruling class maintains power and control. The state itself cannot simply achieve consent with force, but must convince workers to obey its rules. The state represents an unstable equilibrium of power among classes, with the ruling class achieving a hegemony in civil society via its laws. Class battles are also over ideas in an effort to capture control of the state. Georgy Lukács, in his 1920 influential *History and Class Consciousness,* also sought to understand what it would take for workers to be moved to revolutionary activity. He asserts that once workers have developed consciousness for themselves, they will act.

Lukács states, "For a class to be ripe for hegemony means that its interests and consciousness enable it to organize the whole of society in accordance with those interests." Which class possesses consciousness at the decisive moment? This is the major question that determines who will secure political power. Theorist Nico Poulantzas asserts that social classes are not simply the product of the modes of production. They are part of superstructure along with the state. Only classes have power (ability to objectively realize self), and the state gets its power from classes. In the view of Poulantzas, the state is a power center, much like Gramsci asserts, and it represents the political interests of dominant class. The significance of these arguments by Gramsci, Lukács, and Poulantzas was not to deny class as a dominant force of conflict in politics, but instead to assert and analyze various ways this form of class conflict manifested and could be fought in capitalism. Specifically, class battles could be fought out ideologically, in the press and popular culture, and in other venues such as the arts or sporting events between the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies.

MAX WEBER AND CLASS AS SOCIAL STATUS

While the concept of class in politics came to be dominated by a Marxist analysis from the middle of the nineteenth century, another conception of this term also emerged in writings of sociologists such as Émile Durkheim and Max Weber. Their use of class produced an analysis that conveyed more about life chances or social status than political action.

Max Weber's discussion in his 1924 work "Class, Status, and Party" offers the strongest and most powerful contrast to the Marxist conceptions of class. Weber defines *class* as a number of people who have in common a specific causal component of life chances, defined exclusively by economic interests under the conditions of the commodity or labor markets. Class is still defined in relation to the market, but class is about status. It is about the overall prospects one has for life success, regardless of whether one works or owns the means of production. Class is about one's social economic status (SES), which may include income, education, and other measures of status in a society.

Marx and Weber agreed that class was based in unequal distributions of economic power, but for Weber economics was not enough. Weber linked class to status and honor to produce a status group. Moreover, Weber rejected the concept of class interest and of Marxists who argued that individuals may be wrong about interests. Weber also was critical of the notion of a class struggle, particularly the idea that all in the same class will react the same way. A similar SES does not necessarily produce the same outlook in life. The implications of a Weberian in contrast to a Marxist class analysis are significant. For Marxists, class is a structural institution that divides and organizes political power and individuals. For Weberians, class is potentially one variable, along with gender, race, or religion, that describes society and provides insights into individual attitudes.

CLASS IN A POSTCOMMUNIST AND POSTMODERN ERA

In addition to facing competition from Weberians, Marxist notions of class were threatened by three events after World War II (1939–1945): the emergence of identity politics, the collapse of Soviet Marxism, and the rise of postmodernism.

The civil rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s in the United States and around the world brought new and renewed attention to racism and sexual domination. While Marxists depicted class as the primary form of conflict in society, others began to analyze ways to reconcile class with gender, race, and other forms of discrimination and exploitation. Iris Young and other feminists saw patriarchy as a problem in capitalism and did not find class analysis sufficient in discussions regarding sexual exploitation and the market. Feminist theorist Sandra Harding went further in claiming that perhaps Marxism was blind to sexism. Both asked if sexual exploitation was inherent to capitalism, not for reasons that class could explain, but for others. Efforts to merge Marxism with feminism thus produced new lines of inquiry that suggested possible inadequacies in traditional Marxist analysis. Scholars who analyzed race, and eventually those examining sexual orientation, made similar criticisms.

Political events in the 1980s and 1990s also damaged class analysis. First, British and American voting based on class declined in the era of British prime minister Margaret Thatcher and U.S. president Ronald Reagan. Second, the imposition of martial law in Poland to suppress the solidarity labor movement in the early 1980s demonstrated to many that class had not disappeared within socialist countries. Third, and conversely, the collapse of Soviet Marxism and the end of the cold war in the early 1990s dealt a serious blow to Marxist class analysis. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union suggested that Marx was wrong, and therefore his entire method of inquiry, including class analysis, was incorrect.

The rise of identity politics and the collapse of Soviet Marxism fed into supporting postmodern claims that grand narratives such as the analysis of class were dead. Postmodernism denied the objectivity of class interests and instead argued that the economy does not automatically produce this type of conflict. In *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy,* Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe argue that politics constitute and determine the type of conflicts and interests that will be given at any time. Thus, the antagonisms of capitalism do not necessarily give rise to class conflict. According to Laclau and Mouffe, Marxists were confused in that not all antagonisms are contradictions: Antagonisms are external to society, not internal as are contradictions. Social or political antagonisms, such as racism or sexism, are limits on society, dictating the types of struggles that will or can occur. Moreover, the political struggles in late capitalism differ from those of the nineteenth century. Past successes in addressing some of the worst economic problems of capitalism have made the struggle against capitalism less popular. There is no longer a center for political struggle but, instead, many points of conflict beyond class, including the new antagonisms of race and gender identity. Radical or progressive politics must reorient around numerous struggles and not simply class if they are to remain relevant to the lives of the oppressed at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries.

Contemporary conceptions of class are closer to Weberian than Marxist notions of the term. UK sociologist Gordon Marshall contends that class is no longer a political concept in the Marxist sense, but it is still used as an explanatory variable. In the use of class as a research program, there is no Marxist theory of history, class exploitation, class-based collective action, and no reductionist theory of political action based on a theory of class interests. Class is employed in a far more limited fashion that examines its connections to mobility, education, and political partisanship. In research by scholars such as J. H. Goldthorpe, one now finds differentiation of classes based on market positions similar to classifications of occupations. Class thus remains a useful concept in political analysis but it is used far more in terms of SES than as a structural force dividing society.

See also *Class Consciousness, Envy, and Conflict; Communism; Communism, Fall of, and End of History; Engels, Friedrich; Feminist Political Theory; Gramsci, Antonio; Hegel, Georg W. F.; Lenin,*

Vladimir Illich; Leninism; Lukács, Gyorgy; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Postmodernism; Poulantzas, Nicos; Proletariat; Socialism; Weber, Max.

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Class Consciousness, Envy, and Conflict

Throughout the twentieth century, class played a central role in the politics of the advanced capitalist democracies. The accommodation of an increasingly conscious working class was a major preoccupation of national politics, and the development of class compromises largely conditioned the development of the welfare state and industrial regulations. Industrial states sought to contain class conflict, which are ultimately distributive conflicts, in the political sphere to head off more revolutionary politics. Thus, the extent of working class mobilization and organization influences the development of welfare and regulative institutions.

MARX'S CLASS CONFLICT THEORY

Considerable debate exists over what constitutes a class, what class interests are, and what causes class conflicts to occur. The most well-known theory to advance a central role for class consciousness and conflict in politics is that of Karl Marx. Marx defines classes in terms of the nature of their relations to the means of production, leading to a two-part class structure. The bourgeoisie is the class that owns and controls the means of production, making it the class of capitalists. On the other hand, there is the proletariat, which consists of those who don't own capital and who are dependent on the sale of their labor for survival. The conflict between these two classes arises from the fact that the bourgeoisie depends on the exploitation of the proletariat for its income. Exploitation is understood here in the technical sense of extracting labor from the proletariat.

In the Marxist picture, class conflict will result from the proletariat's development of class consciousness. This occurs when the proletariat becomes aware of the objective interest rooted in its material position due to a worsening of its condition. The objective interest of the proletariat is to end its exploitation, which is due to their nonownership of the means of production, and to therefore abolish private property. For Marx, the development of class consciousness is a necessary aspect of capitalist logic and development that compels the increasing immiseration of the proletariat. Class conflict does not concern the distribution of wealth—which Marx considers false consciousness—but concerns the nature of the property regime itself. Thus, envy plays a small motivational role in Marxist class theory because the disadvantaged class does not crave what the advantaged class has, but wants to end its exploitation and create an *egalitarian* system of ownership. Marxist class conflict cannot be contained in the democratic politics of the liberal state. It is, rather, revolutionary in nature, compelling the overthrow of the capitalist state and property regime.

However, Marxist class theory failed to predict many of the dynamics of class consciousness and conflict working against class revolution. The working class did not mobilize on the basis of an interest regarding its relationship to the means of production but rather on the basis of its distributive share and treatment. As such, it did not lead to revolutionary politics but to a distributive conflict contained in democratic politics. Moreover, capitalist development in the twentieth century did not lead to the steady immiseration of the proletariat but instead to the uneven improvement of its material condition. The narrow definition of a class is at the heart of Marxism's problems in predicting and accounting for the nature of class consciousness or conflict. Its concept of class lacked a connection between class position and the actual life chances and experiences of its members. Defining class on the basis of relationships to the means of production cannot account for the

interests of, for example, the salaried white-collar classes or for those of the industrial middle class.

WEBERIAN CLASS THEORY

The second major approach to class consciousness and conflict, that of Max Weber and neo-Weberians, attempts to make up for deficiencies in Marxist class theory. For Weber, ownership of capital—or lack of it—is one of a number of *market capacities* that determine individuals' class position, which also includes skills and education. The possession of market capacities constitutes one's market situation so that one's class position is "determined by the amount and kind of power, or lack of such, to dispose of goods or skills for the sake of income in a given economic order." For Weber, class positions are defined by an overlap of the objective features of individuals' class situations, life chances or "the typical chance for a supply of goods, external living conditions, and personal life experiences."

For Weber, class conflict arises on the basis of growing class consciousness. *Class structure* refers to objective positional categories based on the distribution of life chances—shared class situations. The class structure is the "raw material" of class interests rather than the conscious understanding of interests by a group of similarly situated people. *Class formation* refers to the processes in which subjective experience and awareness of the fatefulness of positions within the class structure come to be shared by its members. Class formation is, thus, the creation of a collective identity based on a mutually perceived interest in altering the class structure. *Class conflict* occurs through class formation and concerns the distribution of market capacities and life chances. Unlike Marx's theory of class conflict, Weberian class conflict can be contained in the liberal democratic state given because it does not concern relationships to the means of production and the distribution of life chances generated by the market and the capitalist state.

See also Class and Politics; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Poverty; Weber, Max.

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Clericalism

Clericalism is generally used as a pejorative term to describe the position of church hierarchy in society and the attitude of clerics toward the laity. It often denotes undue influence in worldly affairs on the part of ordained religious functionaries, but most commonly—especially in contemporary usage—indicates an overemphasis on the status, privileges, and special

role of religious officials, with an eye to the failings and abuses stemming therefrom. While this perception of church institutions and leadership has existed in various manifestations and with varying intensity across the centuries, the term itself did not arise until the second half of the nineteenth century, in juxtaposition to the similarly modern neologism *anticlericalism*. Its association with church critics is reflected in its most famous invocation, French politician Léon Gambetta's claim that "Le cléricalisme—voilà l'ennemi!" (Clericalism is the enemy!)

The concept of clericalism implies a distinction between ordained religious officials, or clergy, and nonordained members of the faith, or laity. Such a distinction is found to different degrees in many religions, though the Roman Catholic Church has been the principle target for the charge of clericalism. While some might identify the distinction between clergy and laity itself as the fundamental problem, the pejorative use of the term clericalism generally suggests that the clergy has overstepped or corrupted a theoretically legitimate role, usually at the expense of active lay participation in communal religious life.

Clericalism indicates excessive focus on ritual, hierarchy, and deference to clerical opinion, which is seen as fostering a conservative, self-seeking mentality on the part of clergy that distances them from the problems of everyday life, renders them hostile to human progress, and interferes with their responsibility to serve the religious community and ability to champion secular reform. Among those who are more sympathetic to the church, use of he term may imply a contrast between a somewhat idealized early church, closely attuned to the lifestyle and needs of the laity, and the subsequent abasement brought on by the accumulation of power and overly defensive reactions to the major secular and religious developments of the modern world. In recent times, clericalism has received renewed attention following the sex scandal within the Catholic Church and the evident lack of accountability facilitated by clerical status.

See also Anticlericalism; Confessional Parties; Laicite; Secularism; Theocracy.

. . . .   BENJAMIN PAULI

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Clientelism

Clientelism is a form of political organization based on informal dyadic relationships between patrons and clients. The asymmetric relationship between patrons and clients has both instrumental and affective dimensions. In instrumental terms, patrons, typically powerful and wealthy, provide their relatively weaker and poorer clients with material benefits, protection, or both in exchange for political loyalty, personal

services, or both. Political loyalty frequently means votes for the patron or the patron's chosen candidate; personal services can include labor. Besides security, patrons may offer clients access to public or party resources, ranging from jobs and scholarships to gifts of food.

Many scholars have argued that clientelism also rests on affective ties between patrons and clients, although American anthropologist and historian Eric Wolf has described clientelism as clearly a "lopsided friendship." Clientelist relations are highly personal; a critical norm in the relationship is loyalty. Clientelism can be contrasted to bureaucratic universalism and market rationality as forms of social organization, and hence is often found in areas of lesser socioeconomic development or in polities with weak states unable to provide protection and public service to ordinary people. In modern democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes, however, political machines practice clientelism in both urban and rural areas.

See also *Clientelistic Parties in Latin America; Latin American Politics and Society.*

. . . . JOSEPH L. KLESNER

Clientelistic Parties in Latin America

Clientelism is a pervasive feature of Latin American politics and is exhibited in varying degrees by most parties. Douglas Chalmers notes that clientelistic networks in Latin America are vertically organized from top to bottom and rely on the presence of *brokers*, political operatives who aggregate demands from their communities and distribute the benefits provided by the center. Although clientelism has been traditionally associated with face-to-face interactions, these brokers enable clientelistic parties to develop links with a broader segment of the population without establishing personal contact. After all, as Herbert Kitschelt argues, these face-to-face interactions are only one extreme of the patron–client relationship continuum; anonymous party machines provide the other extreme. In both cases, however, communities rich in votes but poor in resources receive selective material incentives in exchange for their votes. Clientelistic parties, Kitschelt contends, build multilevel political machines that go from the top of the political center down to remote municipalities. These parties do not purse specific political or ideological agendas (what Kitschelt calls "programmatic linkages") but instead rely on the provision of selective incentives to garner electoral support.

The best representative of clientelistic parties in Latin America is Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI (its Spanish initials). Founded in 1928 under a different name, the PRI became the official party of the revolution and established a one-party rule regime that lasted until 2000. The PRI successfully combined clientelism with a corporatist mode of interest representation by incorporating many labor and civil society organizations into the party, thus turning them into de facto state organizations. The PRI used its governmental monopoly to dispense favors to key constituents groups including labor, peasant, and state employee unions. *Caciques*, local brokers with strong influence in their communities, became crucial to the longevity of PRI rule. But caciques were not total instruments of the party higher-ups as they retained significant sources of local power. Other examples of parties that built powerful clientelistic networks based on their access to state resources include Venezuela's *Acción Democrática,* Costa Rica's *Partido Liberación Nacional,* and the *Peronist* party in Argentina.

Many populist leaders created clientelistic parties as a result of their efforts to build durable electoral support. Some of these parties achieved a small degree of organizational consistency and managed to survive the death of their leaders. In other cases, the parties had no organizational structure and failed to outlast their founders. In Brazil, for instance, Getulio Vargas, a populist leader, created organizations that achieved some life of their own. In 1945, after leaving office, Vargas founded two parties (the *Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro* and the *Partido Social Democrático*) that relied largely on the clientelistic networks he developed during his *Estado Novo* (1937–1945) regime. In Ecuador, by contrast, José María Velasco Ibarra, populist leader *par excellence,* created vast clientelistic networks that supported his five successful bids for the presidency but failed to create a party of his own. His followers, known as *Velasquistas,* worked in alliance with different parties that offered electoral support to their leader at different points in time. Also in Ecuador, a more structured clientelistic party was founded in 1949 by a local caudillo in the city of Guayaquil under the name of *Concentración de Fuerzas Populares.*

The dramatic changes that the region has undergone in recent decades have weakened but not eliminated clientelism or clientelistic parties. In the 1990s, neopopulist leaders resorted to clientelistic practices in an effort to gain political support in a time of painful economic restructuration. In an ironic twist, radical market reforms implemented to reduce the role of the state in the economy then provided governments with the opportunity to establish state-funded food and job programs that turned into vast clientelistic operations. In Mexico and Peru, PRONASOL and FENDECODES, respectively, became the best-known examples of state clientelism in the neoliberal era, working in close association with the PRI in Mexico and Alberto Fujimori's electoral vehicles in Peru. The practices were not clientelistic in *all* communities, yet, especially when cash transfers were involved, clearly were clientelistic in some of them. They were clientelistic to the extent that they provided selective incentives (scholarships, credit, granaries, livestock, and minor consumption goods) to some rather than to all of the community members. In the Peruvian case, Norbert Schady shows that clientelistic practices became more prevalent as opposition to the Fujimori regime mounted. More recently, Hugo Chávez replicated this model in Venezuela. His social programs, known as the *Misiones,* resorted to clientelistic practices aiming to shore up his electoral support as he confronted a tough recall election in 2004.

The well-documented demise of political parties in the region has not eliminated clientelism; it has only decentralized

the sources of patronage. Brokers now find it more convenient to establish their own political organizations, or strike alliances with other regional brokers, rather than to pledge allegiance to declining national parties. Even when they do link up with national parties, many of these brokers act as independent operators, sharing only a party label with other brokers. An extreme case of this frequent occurrence is found in Colombia with their Liberal Party.

See also *Latin American Political Thought; Latin American Politics and Society.*

. . . .   JULIO F. CARRIÓN

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Climate Change Conferences, United Nations

The involvement of the United Nations in the issue of climate change began through its specialized agency, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) that, in 1969, called for a global network for monitoring pollutants suspected of contributing to climate change. Increasing international scientific attention to climate change and severe, decadal drought in the Sahel region of Africa led the WMO to convene the First World Climate Conference in 1979. The conference statement called for international cooperation to advance understanding of climate and climate change and established the World Climate Program to collect data and coordinate climate change research at the domestic level. This served as an impetus for a number of countries to develop national climate research programs.

GROWING MOMENTUM IN 1980S

There were a number of smaller international meetings in the 1980s, the most important of which was held in Villach, Austria, in 1985. Sponsored by the WMO, United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and the International Council of Scientific Unions, the conference is seen as a major turning point in climate change science and policy as it provided international scientific consensus as to the magnitude of the issue, potential social and economic consequences, and urged states to take action to develop policy recommendations to mitigate climate change.

A group of scientists emerging from the Villach conference became active in developing a science and policy network that was instrumental in organizing the 1988 World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere in Toronto, sponsored by the Government of Canada, WMO, and UNEP. The Toronto conference was the first with an explicit political dimension and a strong conference declaration; this included a proposal that governments cut the 1988 level of carbon dioxide emissions by 20 percent by 2005, and that eventually emissions would need to be stabilized at 50 percent of existing levels.

What is notable about these first climate conferences is that they were by invitation only and were predominantly attended by scientists. The attendees were not official delegates of their respective countries and the conference statements, while calls to action, were neither negotiated nor agreed to by the participants' home states, nor were they binding. Nevertheless, the Toronto recommendations are cited as the basis for Germany's 25 to 30 percent carbon dioxide reduction goal affirmed in 1990, a key factor in generating concern for climate change in Canada, and triggered congressional action in the Untied States.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE

Recognizing the need for climate change policies and recommendations to go through diplomatic processes, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was formed through a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution after the Toronto Conference in 1988. Its goals were to organize scientific information, evaluate risk from climate change, and consider mitigation strategies to inform treaty negotiations in establishing a convention on climate change. Governments had much greater control over the IPCC, as they selected experts and placed high-ranking foreign ministry officials in key positions.

Subsequent to the release of the first IPCC report, the Second World Conference on Climate Change was held in 1990. This meeting had both scientific and diplomatic components, with declarations reflecting the two groups' positions. The scientific, or technical, declaration was a strong call for action. While the ministerial declaration advocated action, it did not set time frames as more formal treaty negotiating process had been scheduled by the time the conference was held. In December 1990, the UNGA established the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to negotiate the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The convention was opened for signature at the Rio United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development Earth Summit in June 1992, where it received 155 signatures.

TABLE 1: MAJOR UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCES, 1995 TO 2009

YEAR	COP	LOCATION	OUTCOME
1995	COP1	Berlin	Berlin Mandate established a two-year period to analyze and evaluate a suite of policy instruments from which member countries could choose initiatives to suit their needs and capabilities.
1996	COP2	Geneva	Parties endorsed the IPCC second assessment, agreed to flexible rather than harmonized solutions, and called for medium-term targets.
1997	COP3	Kyoto	Kyoto Protocol negotiated, and binding targets established through 2012.
1998	COP4	Buenos Aires	Talks fell short of addressing unresolved issues from Kyoto Protocol, yet established two-year Buenos Aires Plan of Action to develop implementation mechanisms.
1999	COP5	Bonn	Largely technical discussions surrounded implementation mechanisms.
2000	COP6	The Hague	Negotiations broke down over including areas as carbon sinks and appropriate sanctions. Meeting reconvened six months later in Bonn.
2001	COP6, resumed	Bonn	Agreement reached in significant areas: (1) carbon sinks including reforestation and cropland management; (2) sanctions for not attaining carbon reduction goals; (3) flexibility mechanisms, including emissions trading, joint implementation and clean development mechanisms.
2001	COP7	Marrakech	Marrakech Accords included operational rules for the Kyoto Protocol and set the stage for ratification.
2002	COP8	New Deli	Attempts by EU countries to increase obligations of parties to UNFCCC were unsuccessful.
2003	COP9	Milan	Primary focus was on technical details of the Kyoto Protocol.
2004	COP10	Buenos Aires	Technical details dominated, and discussions of post-Kyoto actions began.
2005	COP11/CMP1	Montreal	Kyoto Protocol came into force; first Meeting of the Parties (CMP) follows COP11. Parties to UNFCCC who had not ratified Kyoto Protocol were given observer status. Montreal Action Plan was developed, focusing on deeper cuts to emissions and what to do after Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012.
2006	COP12/CMP2	Nairobi	Final technical details of Kyoto Protocol were decided. Progress for post-Kyoto strategy continued.
2007	COP13/CMP3	Bali	Bali Action Plan was adopted, setting stage for negotiations for COP15 in Copenhagen where new agreement was to be negotiated.
2008	COP14/CMP4	Poznań	Agreements reached for work program and meeting plan for Copenhagen.
2009	COP15/CMP5	Copenhagen	Key elements of nonbinding Copenhagen Accord included: capping temperature rise to 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 F), verification procedures, US$10 billion/year transfer from richer countries to poorer countries for adaptation and mitigation strategies, rising to US$100 billion by 2020.

CONFERENCES OF THE PARTIES

Since coming into force, the parties to the UNFCCC have met annually at the Conference of the Parties (COP) to negotiate binding commitments, assess progress, and establish principles and mechanisms for addressing climate change (see Table 1). The relative success and impacts of these meetings have varied substantially over time. The outcome of third conference (COP3), the Kyoto Protocol, was perhaps the most significant as it established binding targets through 2012 to Annex 1 (industrialized) countries. However, the world's largest greenhouse gas emitter, the United States, failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and it did not include commitments for major developing countries such as China and India.

With the Kyoto Protocol nearing expiration, the stage was set for a new round of negotiations at Copenhagen in 2009. The Copenhagen Accord fell short of expectations with a nonbinding agreement lacking firm targets for reductions in greenhouse gases. The accord was negotiated by the United States, Brazil, South Africa, India, and China on the final day of the conference and was "taken note of," not "adopted," by the parties to the UNFCCC. Blame for the failure of the negotiations has been attributed to the United States for continuing its stance of not agreeing to binding targets, to China and India for frustrating the process so as to not thwart economic growth, and to the nontransparent process that took place among a limited number of countries in drafting the accord.

See also *Environmental Policy; Environmental Political Theory; Kyoto Protocol; United Nations (UN).*

. . . .   BETSI BEEM

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Cloture

Cloture is a legislative procedure used to stop debate on a motion or bill and force a vote. It was developed in France in order to counter the *filibuster,* a parliamentary tactic used to prevent passage of legislation through continued debate that precludes a final vote. Cloture was introduced into the British parliament in 1882 and requires a vote of at least one hundred members to invoke it. However, the speaker has the authority to disregard cloture. Within parliamentary systems, a restriction on the length of time, or number of sittings, in which a bill can be considered or debated is known as a *guillotine.* Program motions that establish legislative timetables for bills have increasingly replaced guillotines. In the United States, cloture was first used in 1919 and applied only to the Senate, since debate on a bill or motion can be limited in the House of Representatives by the Speaker of the House or the House Rules Committee. In the Senate, cloture initially required a two-thirds majority, or sixty-seven senators, but the rules were changed in 1975 to reduce the required majority to a three-fifths majority vote, or sixty senators. Once cloture is invoked in the Senate, a vote must be taken on the measure within thirty hours.

See also *Filibuster; Question Time; Rules of Order.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Coalition Formation

Coalition formation occupies a central place in the study of party politics and behavior, as well as the formation of governments. Coalition formation in this context is understood as the result of the process of bargaining between political parties (and their leaders), either before or after elections, to form alliances in order to attain and preserve power.

Early scholarship adopted rational choice theory as its framework of reference to account for why and how coalitions form. A key concern appeared to be the importance of size in the formation of coalitions, with later studies shifting attention to the coalition's internal bargaining process. In this regard, *office-seeking* and *policy-seeking* theories have defined classical research on coalition formation from the postwar period to the early 1980s. In both approaches, the focus lies on who (or how many) will form the coalition and how long this will last.

The most influential office-seeking theories are the minimal-winning coalition theory, the minimum-winning coalition theory, and the bargaining proposition theory. According to John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's minimal-winning coalition theory, a coalition is expected to form at the minimal level below which the coalition government would fail if any of its members were to defect from the coalition itself. Building on the minimal-winning coalition theory, William Riker's minimum-winning coalition theory contends that parties would enter a coalition commanding just over 50 percent of legislative seats to secure office. In Michael Leiserson's bargain proposition theory, efficient coalitions would be those where only the smallest number of parties join the coalition.

Policy-seeking coalition theories have contributed a greater predictive and explanatory power to coalition formation scholarship. Robert Axelrod's minimal connected winning theory (MCW) showed how coalitions would be formed by those actors whose party of affiliation is minimally connected on a single ideological dimension; this kind of coalition would show greater durability, reducing the potential for conflict between the coalition members. Abram De Swaan's closed coalition theory builds on the MCW and highlights how coalitions would form between parties showing the smallest ideological distance.

Two main theoretical innovations have contributed to the growth of coalition formation scholarship in recent years. First, since the 1980s a neoinstitutionalist critique to the dominance of rational choice theory in the study of coalition formation has emphasised that coalition bargaining power is constrained by institutions, including cabinet formation and operation rules, legislative and party rules, and external veto players. Institutions influence the behavior of political actors in their bargaining or decision-making procedures when they form coalitions and allocate portfolios. According to Wolfgang Müller and Kaare Strøm, institutions such as investiture rules or other parliamentary rules have an effect on coalition formation and size.

In addition, multidimensional coalition formation models have moved beyond the traditional single dimension—left-to-right scale—and propose that coalitions would form among parties located within the smallest distance in multiple policies dimensions. According to the core theory, parties stay in the core area of two dimensional policy spaces, and policies can be predicted by observing the behavior of the core party. Ian Budge and Hans Keman contend that if the core party or parties are structurally stable, the coalition government would be able to remain longer in office; unstable core parties would otherwise generate short-lived coalitions and fluctuating policies. Seeking to identify the ideal points among parties' policy preferences in multidimensional policy spaces, Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle argue that the ideal point of the median voter is the only point where the majority of voters converge on a given policy issue.

Although the literature has traditionally paid attention to the formation of coalition governments in parliamentary systems, scholars have recently also begun to include the study of coalitions in presidential and semi-presidential systems. One of the central assumptions in coalition formation studies (that political parties be viewed as unitary actors) has also come under criticism due to its neglect of intraparty processes.

Empirically, attention is now being paid to systems outside the traditional geographic areas of interest (Western Europe and the United States). Since the advent of the third wave of democratization, coalition formation has become a tool for political parties to achieve electoral success in East Central Europe, East Asia, and Latin America, resulting in the creation of new empirical data and fresh theoretical insights into the study of why and how coalitions form.

See also *Cabinets and Cabinet Formation; Coalition Theory; Riker, William.*

. . . . YOUNGMI KIM

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Laver, Michael, and Kenneth Shepsle. *Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislature in Parliamentary Democracies.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Müller, Wolfgang, and Kaare Strøm. *Coalition Governments in Western Europe.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Coalition Theory

Coalitions are "governments in which different parties commit themselves to serving together in the same cabinet and sharing the portfolios that control of the chief executive affords them," according to Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman, editors of the 2008 *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe.* Between 1945 and 2003, nearly five-sixths of all cabinets in Europe's parliamentary and semi-presidential systems constituted such multiparty governments, usually formed in cases where elections did not result in an overall parliamentary majority for a single party.

Coalition theories are a body of propositions designed to explain the dynamics of interparty cooperation in making, running, and breaking multiparty governments. Most theoretical literature on coalitions focuses on their partisan composition; the distribution of executive offices between the participating parties, or *portfolio allocation*; and variations in their duration. Some of this scholarship has been inductive and empirical, often influenced by normative concerns, such as government stability and performance in representative democracies. The more influential tradition has been a deductive and formal one, usually based on game theory, a rationalist theory derived from mathematics focusing on interactive decision making involving at least two actors.

COALITION FORMATION

The key concerns of game-theoretic models of coalition formation have traditionally been (1) the partisan composition of the coalition formed after negotiations between the parties, and (2) the allocation of portfolios. Game theorists have usually modeled political parties in coalition bargaining as unitary actors, either seeking to maximize the number of top executive offices they hold in government, or to get this government to adopt their preferred policies. Assuming politicians to be office seekers first and foremost, William I. Riker, in his 1962 work *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, predicted the number of parties likely to be included in the government: "In *n*-person, zero-sum games, where side payments are permitted, where players are rational, and they have perfect information, only minimal winning coalitions occur" (32). In other words, in any situation where three or more actors (n-persons) bargain over the formation over a coalition and where one actor's gains (e.g., seats in the cabinet) are exactly balanced by the losses of the other "players," only coalitions will form that control an overall majority of the parliamentary seats, but do not share the spoils of government office with more parties than necessary. The German coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats formed in 2005 under Chancellor Angela Merkel is a minimum-winning coalition: Had only one coalition party withdrawn its support, the government would have lost its parliamentary majority. Although Riker acknowledges that "oversized" coalitions may be formed as an "insurance policy" where the parties operate in an uncertain environment, the "minimal-winning criterion" has remained an influential concept.

Empirical and theoretical critiques of Riker's perspective led to the addition of a policy dimension to many game-theoretic models. In his 1970 book *Conflict of Interest,* Robert Axelrod predicted the formation of *minimal-connected-winning coalitions*, that is, minimal-winning coalitions formed of ideologically adjacent parties. The Italian government formed in 2008 by Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, for example, was composed of ideologically "connected" parties of the political right and center right. Later work based on spatial notions of "median" or (ideologically) "central" parties as well as "strong" or "very strong" parties (e.g., Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle's 1996 *Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies*) demonstrated how sufficiently large parties could form and sustain even minority cabinets, if they occupied a pivotal position in the policy space. The social democratic Labor Parties of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden occupied such a pivotal position for most of the time since the 1930s. Such models reflected a shift of emphasis from office-seeking assumptions to models focusing on policy preferences as well as office motivations. While especially earlier models analyze patterns of interparty cooperation (e.g., coalitions) and competition in one ideological dimension—usually focusing on the ideological differences between the parties in economic policy—authors such as Norman Schofield made considerable progress in constructing models of coalition politics in two or more dimensions. Although the formation of stable coalitions becomes far more difficult if political competition includes more than one dimension, Schofield demonstrates in the 1995 article, "Coalition Politics," that such a situation does not necessarily lead to theoretical predictions of legislative chaos. Coalitions (and even minority governments) can be stable under such conditions, if there is a *core*—a point representing acceptable compromise policies

for all winning coalitions—in the multidimensional ideological space, which the largest or dominant party prefers. Other models sought to add institutional and electoral variables to game-theoretic explanations without losing rigor and generality. Strøm, in *Minority Government and Majority Rule*, for example, demonstrated that the toleration of minority cabinets may be an alternative to direct government participation, if rational parties are modeled as policy-seeking actors, the institutional environment allows minorities to influence policy making, and government participation involves likely electoral costs.

PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION

Like the literature on cabinet composition, early work on portfolio allocation was based on the assumption that political parties can be modeled as motivated by the pursuit of government office, neglecting the possibility of differential values of different portfolios to different parties and possible trade-offs between policy and office benefits. Empirical studies generally confirmed William A. Gamson's 1961 law of proportionality: members of a coalition are predicted to receive cabinet portfolios in proportion to their contribution to the government's parliamentary majority. Models such as Laver and Shepsle's portfolio allocation model sought to overcome the limitations of purely quantitative, office-driven models. For them, parties are driven by policy as well as office motivations. Their model predicts that cabinets will form in equilibrium consisting of parties controlling the median legislator on the most important policy dimensions. These parties will be allocated the relevant portfolio(s), giving their ministers control of policy making in that particular area.

COALITION DURATION

Beyond questions of government membership and portfolio allocation, coalition theories have focused on the decisions of political leaders to continue coalitions to the end of their "natural" term (usually the next election) or, alternatively, to terminate them earlier by changing the coalition's partisan composition, or the person of the prime minister, or by bringing the election date forward, known as strategic parliamentary dissolutions. Early research largely followed the empirical tradition and attempted to identify the main sources of variations in coalition durability in the "structural attributes" of the coalitions themselves (e.g., number of parties or ideological disagreement between them), or in the coalitions' bargaining environment (e.g., the size and polarization of the party system). In the 1980s, influential work challenged this structural perspective, arguing that the duration of coalitions was largely a function of critical events such as crises or scandals. Since the 1990s, a number of game-theoretic models have sought to incorporate such "random shocks" to coalition government and explain variations in the duration of coalitions by modeling the party leaders' decisions to maintain or break coalitions as the result of strategic considerations, focusing on the utility of alternative opportunities of making or influencing policy, the opportunity cost of early terminations, the anticipated costs of early elections, and the anticipated transaction costs of alternative forms of government.

COALITION GOVERNANCE

Finally, there has been a growing body of scholarship in coalition governance since the 1990s, seeking rigorously to model the dynamics of coalition politics after cabinet formation. In such endeavors, ministers are not conceived of as "policy dictators" (as in Laver and Shepsle's model), nor do they have their hands entirely tied by coalition agreements between the parties in government. Their agenda powers may allow them some leeway to move the policy from the agreement initially reached in coalition bargaining towards their own preferred policy position. This potential for *agency loss* can be contained, depending on institutional constraints such as the prime minister's powers, the extent of ministerial autonomy enshrined in the constitution, and commitment and enforcement mechanisms agreed between the parties in coalition treaties (for a survey, see Strøm, Müller, and Bergman's *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, chapters 5 and 8).

Despite its very considerable advances since the 1960s, coalition theory faces a number of challenges. Most importantly, there remains a significant gap between theoretical advances and empirical work, the latter often lagging behind the former in terms of measurement and appropriate statistical estimation techniques. Other challenges include a number of implausible and restrictive assumptions on which some models are still based, for example, the modeling of parties as unitary actors.

See also *Behavioral Game Theory; Cabinets and Cabinet Formation; Coalition Formation; Political Thought, Foundations of.*

. . . .   THOMAS SAALFELD

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Strøm, Kaare, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman, eds. *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Cognitive Theory and Politics

Many models of psychology have been applied to political attitudes and behavior. Psychodynamic models predominated in the early work of scholars such as Harold Lasswell, who sought to apply psychology to politics, and in psychobiographies such

as the one conducted of Woodrow Wilson by Alexander and Juliette George. However, as such models were replaced in psychology by behaviorist and later humanist approaches, such analysis fell by the wayside. With the rise of cognitive psychology in the 1980s, new possibilities for application arose. The apex of cognitive theory reached its height in the early 1990s with the work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman on judgment and decision making. This work reflected a reaction against both behaviorist models that rejected a role for the cognitive processes of the mind, and humanist approaches that privileged affect over thought. The growth and development of such models was potentiated by rapid technological advances offering previously unprecedented ways of accessing mental processes through increasingly precise reaction time tests; electroencephalogram readings, which provided accurate temporal measurements of mental processes; and perhaps reaching their height with the widespread use of function magnetic resonance imaging, which afford tremendous spatial accuracy in brain topography. Ironically, the introduction of this technology served to begin a reintegration of affective models with previously more exclusively cognitive ones.

APPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE THEORY

Cognitive theories have been employed to help analyze and explain a variety of political phenomena. The most prominent of these have included models used to generate insight into problems related to framing, decision making, identity, and ideology. Cognitive theory has incorporated many elements, including work on memory, attention, perception, and abstract problem solving.

The work on judgment and decision making has proved most relevant to the central questions and problems posed by political scientists. The work on judgmental heuristics includes work on three kinds of biases that affect individuals' assessments of probability, frequency, and likelihood. By and large, these cognitive shortcuts work efficiently and effectively to help organize the world, yet they can also lead to systematic and predictable biases in judgment. Representativeness encourages people to make evaluations based on similarity between a person or an event and the particular category to which it belongs. Robert Jervis has conducted work examining the effect of representativeness in decision making on foreign policy. Arguing against the experimental results based on real-world cases, Jervis argued that decision makers rely on base rate probabilities in rendering judgments about the future because such assessments allow them to make causal arguments to help direct their choices. Such inferences support and encourage theory driven interpretation of events. A second judgmental heuristic, called *availability,* demonstrates how estimates of likelihood become skewed by accessibility, including salience and recency effects. Anchoring constitutes the third heuristic, documenting how people fail to adequately adjust from often irrelevant anchors in evaluating probabilistic outcomes. Nancy Kanwisher provided clear illustration of how these heuristics, along with others, can help account for systematic and recurrent fallacies in U.S. national security policy, including providing an explanation for

the domino theory and why policy makers incorrectly assume that deterrence entails matching forces. Kurt Weyland, applying these models in a comparative arena, has explored how heuristics affect policy diffusion in such areas as health care reform in Latin American countries.

COGNITIVE THEORY AND PROSPECT THEORY

Applications of cognitive theory to politics also include work on prospect theory, a psychological theory of decision making under conditions of risk. This model incorporates two phases. The first phases encompasses framing effects, which describe the way individuals shift the substance of their choices based on the order, method, or form of the presented options. This work has proved quite influential in analyses of survey research and investigations of the instability of question answers. The second phase of prospect theory relates to the way that people choose among options once these prospects have been framed; this work suggests that individuals prove more prone take risks when confronting losses than when facing gains. Prospect theory has most commonly been used in political applications to examine decision making in the realm of international relations, including explorations of the Iranian hostage rescue mission and the Cuban missile crisis. Additional work has also applied prospect theory in the arena of comparative politics to look at public policy choices among Latin American leaders under conditions of crisis.

COGNITIVE THEORY AND IDENTITY

Other applications of cognitive theory to politics include work on identity. Cognitive models form one of the bases for defining the content of identity, by providing ideas around which to structure expectations of behavior and preferences. Such cognitive models can provide a consensus around which actor expectations can converge by providing representative stereotypes for exemplar members to embody and represent. Scholars Michael Stone and Roblyn Young have used the content of belief systems to measure the nature of collective identities among Iraqi leaders. In this way, cognitive models can help define and measure the way individual choices among competing identities can aggregate into a cohesive sense of collective identity.

COGNITIVE THEORY AND IDEOLOGY

Cognitive models have also been employed to inform our understanding of ideology by examining the way voter beliefs, attitudes, and opinions can influence choice. Sometimes this work invokes demographics such as party identification, which can also incorporate an affective dimension. Cognitive theory can inform the mechanisms people use to adopt particular ideologies by examining the consistency between their beliefs and actions, as cognitive dissonance theory does; this model too assimilates a motivated component. Theories concerning right-wing authoritarianism, or other belief structures that can inform political ideology, often similarly depend on either implicit or explicit models of cognition.

As psychology has moved into a more integrated under-standing of the way the human brain processes political information and coalition politics, the bifurcation of cognitive and affective models in psychology will continue to diminish. As this occurs, the application of cognitive theory to politics should begin to reflect the intertwined nature of thought and feeling in driving political actions and decisions.

See also *George, Alexander L.; Heuristics; Judgment and Decision Making; Lasswell, Harold Dwight; Political Psychology; Prospect Theory; Social and Political Cognition.*

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Cohabitation

Cohabitation is an arrangement of split-executive government in semi-presidential systems where the directly elected president is forced to nominate the prime minister from the opposition party that holds the majority in the national assembly. Cohabitation strongly impacts the power of the president, as the parliamentary component is reinforced and the prime minister takes on far-reaching decision powers. This arrangement contrasts markedly with that of *unified government,* in which a de facto presidential logic prevails: The president is the undisputed head of government and the prime minister is the president's chief of staff. Rather, in cohabitation, both officials—the president and the prime minister—hold a formal and informal veto power, which leads to coalition-like politics based on compromise. Consequently, the system oscillates between the two poles of presidential and parliamentary regime features.

French political scientist Maurice Duverger introduced the term cohabitation in 1980 by to explain divided government in the Fifth French Republic (1958–present). In its history, cohabitation has occurred three times: from 1986 to 1988 and from 1993 to 1995, when socialist president Francois Mitterand was confronted with a center-right majority and had to respectively nominate Jacques Chirac and Eduard Balladur, and from 1997 to 2002, when Gaullist president Chirac had to nominate Lionel Jospin, the leader of the victorious Socialist Party, as prime minister.

See also *Coalition Theory; Dual Executive.*

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Cold War

The term *cold war* is often given to the period of rivalry and confrontation between the United States (and its allies) and the Soviet Union (and its allies) from the end of World War II (1939–1945) until relations thawed in the late 1980s, when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev undertook reforms. Writer George Orwell used the term cold war, and Bernard M. Baruch, an adviser of U.S. president Harry S. Truman, in April 1947 said, "Let us not be deceived—we are today in the midst of a cold war. Our enemies are to be found abroad and at home." Baruch himself credited the phrase to Herbert B. Swope, the former editor of the *New York World,* and that same year the writer and journalist Walter Lippman also used the term.

ORIGINS

There is debate over the cold war's precise start: Some scholars identify its origins as predating 1945, but the period's initial years are often associated with the immediate post–World War II period. By 1945, the United States and Soviet Union had emerged as the two leading powers (they were frequently called the *superpowers*), and by 1947 a general East (Soviet)-West (American) division of states was developing. The West believed the Soviets sought to undermine democracy and establish "puppet" communist regimes in Eastern Europe, thus increasing influence in their zone of occupation in Germany. The Soviets defended their actions in terms of establishing broadly based antifascist governments friendly towards them. Other conflicts emerged elsewhere, and both states increasingly denounced each other. Events symbolic of the cold war's early years include the Berlin blockade (1948–1949), when the Soviets blocked access to West Berlin, and the 1949 Communist victory in China over the American-supported Nationalist government.

INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS

Tensions continued in the 1950s, and their impact was felt globally. This was particularly the case as both countries had nuclear weapons—the United States from 1945 and Soviet Union from 1949—and built alliances. These included the West's North Atlantic Treaty Organization, established in 1949, and the Soviet-Communist European Warsaw Pact (1955–1991). The Korean War (1950–1953) began in June 1950 when Soviet-aligned North Korea sent forces across the 38th parallel of latitude dividing the Korean peninsula and invaded South Korea. This led to U.S. and United Nations deployment of forces and China's involvement. Fighting ultimately ended along the original 38th parallel with an armistice agreement in July 1953. Soviet domination over Eastern Europe during this time was graphically illustrated by the crushing of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.

The United States and the Soviet Union came the closest to direct confrontation in the cold war during the thirteen days of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet Union had established missile sites in Cuba in response to a U.S. presence in Turkey.

SOURCE: © Corbis

Tensions increased in the early 1960s. In 1961, the Soviets constructed the Berlin wall separating East Germany from West Germany, and the following year the Cuban missile crisis occurred. This is generally regarded as the cold war's most dangerous event, with the superpowers coming close to a nuclear war. In October 1962, a U.S. spy plane photographed missile sites being built by the Soviets in Cuba. U.S. president John F. Kennedy established a naval blockade to prevent the arrival of additional Soviet military supplies, demanding the removal of the missiles and the destruction of the sites. For thirteen highly tense days, there was uncertainty over how the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev would respond to the naval blockade and U.S. demands. Khrushchev ultimately ordered Soviet ships to turn back and agreed to dismantle the weapon sites; in return, the United States agreed not to invade Cuba. In a separate, unpublicized deal, the United States agreed to remove its nuclear missiles from Turkey.

Cold war tensions decreased after the Cuban missile crisis, with a period of détente emerging. In 1963 the *hot line* was installed to provide direct communications between the superpowers, and the Partial Test Ban Treaty outlawing nuclear testing in the atmosphere was concluded. Preliminary discussions to limit long-range missiles and bombers began in 1967, but ended after the Soviets suppressed the 1968 Czechoslovakian Revolution. In 1969, the discussion resumed under the name of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and concluded in 1972. The numbers of strategic launchers (missiles or bombers) were frozen for five years, although modernization and increases in the number of warheads carried by launchers were allowed. Relations between the United States and China improved, and in 1979, the SALT II Treaty, focusing on the total numbers and explosive power of warheads, was negotiated. Although it remained unratified after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the superpowers largely continued to

follow the treaty limits until the conclusion of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Despite these events, conflict between the superpowers continued, especially in Africa and the Middle East. Moreover, the United States was involved in the Vietnam War, beginning in 1959 and lasting until the 1975 fall of South Vietnam to the Communist North.

FINAL DECADE

The early 1980s witnessed increased cold war rivalry until tensions declined during the decade's later years. The invasion of Afghanistan, Polish martial law from 1981 to 1983, the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada, and the Soviet destruction of a Korean airliner the same year set the context of a renewed arms race. U.S. president Ronald Reagan and British prime minister Margaret Thatcher strongly denounced the Soviet Union. Tensions began to ease after Gorbachev took power in 1985 and undertook reforms. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty required the destruction of the parties' ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (approximately 310–3,818 miles), their launchers, and associated support structures and support equipment. The Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, and the first START talks concluded in 1991. These required reductions in each state's long-range launchers and warheads along with further limitations, especially on land-based missiles. During the late 1980s, Soviet domination over Eastern Europe fell, as symbolized by the 1989 fall of the Berlin wall. The Soviet Union itself collapsed in 1991.

There are various interpretations of the cold war, its origins, and why it ended. Factors often associated with the period include: the continuation of great power rivalry for domination and strategic advantage; the result of misperceptions of motives causing the alliance that defeated fascism to collapse and spur an arms race; events largely promoted by those standing to benefit from them, such as the military-industrial complex; and an ideologically driven conflict between capitalism and communism, or between democracy and totalitarianism.

See also *Communism; Russian Political Thought; Soviet Union, Former; U.S. Political Thought.*

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Cole, George Douglas Howard

George Douglas Howard Cole (1889–1959) was an English political theorist. As a libertarian socialist, his career was dedicated to advancing the cause of labor. He was a founding member of Fabian Society and a strong defender of the cooperative movement.

Cole became a Fabian while studying at Oxford and joined its executive under Sidney Webb. He became a principal proponent of guild socialism, a libertarian alternative to orthodox Marxism. He expounded his ideas in *New Age* and the weekly founded by Beatrice and Sidney Webb and George Bernard Shaw, *New Statesman*. He wrote, "I became a Socialist because only a society of equals can set free from the twin evils of riches and poverty, mastership and subjection. That is the only kind of society that is consistent with human dignity and decency." Cole envisioned a socialism that is decentralized and participatory, with basic units in the workplace and the community. Both British Labour prime ministers Hugh Gaitskell and Harold Wilson were his students.

In his 1920 work, *Social Theory,* he advanced the theoretical basis of guild socialism, drawing on the ideas of J. N. Figgis and others. Earlier, in *The World of Labour* (1913)*,* Cole argued for industrial democracy in which industry would be controlled by organized labor. On the principle that industrial power precedes political power, Cole said that direct action was more effective than winning elections and changing society through legislation. In his view, industry should be socialized, not nationalized, and production should be organized by national guilds and not by bureaucrats or technocrats. Each industry was to be a self-governing body, and interguild cooperation was to be channeled through coordinating agencies. Society was based on the principle of association and as a plurality of self-governing voluntary associations, and only through such associations could freedom be preserved. Any system in which a sovereign state regulated and administered every area of life was anathema to Cole.

By the mid-1920s, guild socialism fell out of favor. Cole spent the rest of his life rethinking his ideas. It was only at the end of the twentieth century that his ideas experienced a revival.

Cole was also a theorist of the cooperative movement and made a number of contributions to cooperative studies, cooperative economics, and cooperative history, including *Century of Co-operation* (1944) and *The British Co-operative Movement in a Socialist Society* (1951). His writings (over 130 books) may be divided into five broad and overlapping categories: guild socialism; history; biography; economic, political, and social analysis; and fiction. His strongest treatment of guild socialism was *Self-Government in Industry* (1917), a charter of the

romantic socialism that inspired Cole all his life. He revised his ideas in *The Case for Industrial Partnership* (1957). His historical works include the five-volume *History of Socialist Thought* (1953–1960). His biographies include *The Life of William Cobbett* (1924) and *The Life of Robert Owen* (1925). Many of his seminal ideas were distilled in *Principles of Economic Planning and An Intelligent Man's Guide to the Post-War World* (1947).

See also *Fabianism; Guild Socialism; Socialism.*

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Collapsed and Failed States

State collapse and failure appeared as a common feature of the international system after the end of the cold war, though it is not a new phenomenon. *The State Failure Task Force: Phase III Findings* (Goldstone et al. 2000) identified 135 cases of state failure beginning between 1955 and 1998. The rate of state failures surged in the 1960s and again in the early 1990s, periods when new states were born following the withdrawal of imperial powers (e.g., from Africa in the 1960s) or collapse of a superpower (the Soviet Union in 1991).

Based on the state failure data set, several events are identified as state failure in the State Failure Task Force report: revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, genocides, and politicides. Since the 1980s, events such as the Islamic revolutions in Iran and Afghanistan; ethnic wars in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia; the collapse of the Soviet Union, the genocide in Rwanda; and the complex combination of ethnic and revolutionary conflicts in such places as Sierra Leone, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo serve as examples of collapsed and failed states.

Today, many states are failing to provide security and public order, legitimate representation, and wealth or welfare services to their citizens. However, full-blown cases of state collapse, which involve the extreme disintegration of public authority and the metamorphosis of societies into a battlefield of all against all, remain relatively rare. The worst case of political disintegration is called a *collapsed state.* While a failed state can still have an official government, a fully collapsed state is characterized by a government's complete absence. Several features are central to a *failed state,* occurring when the state apparatus: is unable to uphold an effective monopoly of violence over its whole territory; lacks an effective judicial system and the rule of law; is unable or unwilling to fulfill international obligations, such as debt repayment; and cannot prevent various forms of transnational crime or the use of its territory for the perpetration of violence against other states in the international system. Generally, following the state failure, new local or regional governance structures are formed. The dynamics of governance structures emerge in the virtual or effective absence of a state.

WHY STATES FAIL OR COLLAPSE

There are several factors that cause states to fail and even collapse. *The Failed States Index 2007* applies twelve indicators of state vulnerability covering social, economic, and political factors that may trigger state failure: demographic pressures, massive movement of refugees and internally displaced peoples, a legacy of grievances among vengeance-seeking groups, chronic and sustained human flight, uneven economic development along group lines, sharp or severe economic decline, criminalization or delegitimization of the state, progressive deterioration of public services, widespread violation of human rights, the security apparatus functioning as a state within a state, the rise of factionalized elites, and the intervention of other states or external factors. The *Index* ranks states based on the total scores for these indicators on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest intensity (*most stable*) and 10 being the highest intensity (*least stable*). The objective of ranking the indicators is to measure a state's vulnerability to collapse or conflict, not to forecast when the state may experience violence or collapse.

Generally, states in early phases of state evolution come closest to the phenomenon of a failed state, since they are likely to face social and political problems that may trigger revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, regime changes, and even genocides. Rampant corruption, predatory elites who have long monopolized power, an absence of the rule of law, and severe ethnic or religious divisions can also cause state failure or collapse. For example, according to Transparency International, Burma (also known as Myanmar) and Haiti, which are on top of the most recent *Failed State Index,* are two of the most corrupt and repressive countries in the world. Burma's repressive junta persecutes ethnic minorities and subjects its population to forced resettlement, while Haiti experienced extreme poverty, lawlessness, and urban violence even before the 2010 earthquake destroyed the government's infrastructure and left over a million people homeless. On the other hand, Guinea, also one of the failed states according to the *Failed State Index,* has been experiencing some of the highest economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa, but the gap between the poor and rich is enormous. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the inability of the government to police its borders effectively or manage its vast mineral wealth has left the country dependent on foreign aid.

In *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (2004), Robert I. Rotberg and other contributors demonstrate that all failed states are by definition repressive, but not all repressive states have failed. The authors define several of the most repressive states as hollow states, failed but for the excessive security that prevents the state in question from being characterized as failed. No collapsed state can be repressive, because the apparatus of repression is by definition lacking.

State collapse does not occur spontaneously. It is likely that complex and conflict-ridden processes of deterioration,

decline, and erosion of state functions precede state collapse. Actual collapse is likely to constitute the final phase of this process and it occurs when a point of no return is passed.

COLLAPSED AND FAILED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

In today's increasingly interconnected world, collapsed and failed states pose an acute risk to global security. Various types of state failure have posed major challenges to policy makers seeking to stabilize democratic regimes, prevent genocides, and provide humanitarian assistance during conditions of violence and political crisis. Terrorism, narcotics trade, weapons proliferation, and other forms of organized crime can flourish when chaos prevails. Internal conflict is more likely to arise in countries suffering from poverty, highly unequal income distribution, recent decolonization, weak institutions, ineffective police and counterinsurgency forces, and difficult terrain conditions that allow local armed groups to operate. Valuable raw materials, such as diamonds or oil, also tend to spark internal conflict among competitors who want to seize control of the wealth. Warring groups may even control territory, giving them a base for launching attacks on the state, its citizens, or its neighbors. Other nonstate actors, including transnational terrorist organizations, can also take root in failed states, posing a threat to global security.

See also *Arms Control; Caesarism; Corruption and Other Political Pathologies; Regional Security; State Failure.*

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Collective Action

See *Collective Action and Mobilization.*

Collective Action, Theory of

Collective action theory attempts to address the problematic and uncertain character of individual participation in collective or collaborative efforts, especially those directed toward the provision of public goods such as social movements and political organizations. The foundational text of collective action theory is *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (1965) by economist Mancur Olson. Collective action theory radically transformed studies of collective behavior by shifting the emphasis away from notions of irrational group instincts, mass agitation, or emotional spontaneity and toward the rational decision-making processes of participants.

The fundamentals of neoclassical economics inform Olson's work. In Olson's view, social undertakings arise from the choices of rational individuals. Individuals decide to partake in collective action primarily to maximize personal benefits while minimizing personal costs.

One primary problem facing theorists of collective activity is that collective action poses costs for the actor. Even more problematic, however, is the fact that collectively gained rewards are not divisible. Thus, no direct correspondence exists between the individual costs that one might incur by engaging in collective activity and the rewards that one might receive as a result of such action. A worker who refuses to join a union in the workplace will still be rewarded by a wage increase won by the union, if that worker's job falls within the bargaining unit in question. Because the individual collective member receives the collective rewards gained by group action, even if contributing nothing personally to the effort, rational choice theory would suggest that one would be likely to free ride on the efforts of others. Thus, for collective action theory, the issue of the free rider, who accepts the rewards of group membership without taking any of the risks involved in winning those rewards, becomes central.

For Olson, individuals are encouraged to act collectively where groups control and distribute selective incentives. Those who do not join the collective effort or contribute actively to achieve collective interests can be treated differently from those who do.

This raises some important considerations for political organizers. It is not enough to appeal to collective interests, values, or group goals to encourage people to engage in collective activity. Mobilizing people on collective actions, such as social movements, requires that the movement organizations be in a position to control rewards and distribute them selectively on the basis of participation. Mobilization is unlikely to occur in the absence of selective incentives, even where common interests are present. At the same time, the danger of undemocratic practices emerges where a minority that comes to control a preponderance of selective incentives comes to dominate the group's majority.

Olson's publication also provided the starting point for resource mobilization (RM) theories that have become the dominant perspective on social movements within American sociology. RM theorists have modified Olson's approach to lessen the individualist emphasis in favor of an analysis of organizational decision making and repertoires of action. Contemporary RM theorists have also looked more closely at emotional and cultural, rather than simply material, aspects of collective action.

See also *Group Theory; Rational Choice Theory.*

. . . . JEFFREY SHANTZ

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Collective Action and Mobilization

"You would not be reading this essay," writes Elinor Ostrom, "if it were not for some of our ancestors learning how to undertake collective action to solve social dilemmas." By *collective action,* scholars mean any situation that requires people to act jointly. "The theory of collective action," Ostrom continues, "is *the* central subject of political science." Solving collective action problems entails overcoming the potential costs and risks of acting collectively, and the possibility that potential cooperators will defect or decline to cooperate. Collective action problems pervade everything from international relations to budgeting in legislatures, decision making in bureaucracies, voting, interest group formation, and citizen control of government. "If political scientists do not have an empirically grounded theory of collective action," Ostrom concludes, "then we are hand-waving at our central questions." She goes on to list a bibliographic battery of the many fields to which collective action theory has made central contributions in the last fifty years: from economist and social scientist Mancur Olson's (1965) pathbreaking book to recent work ranging from epoch-making events (e.g., revolutions) to trivial issues (e.g., how cheerleaders solve their collective action problems). Social dilemmas, Ostrom concludes, "are found it all aspects of life."

In her recent work, Ostrom strives to specify a number of structural variables that affect cooperative behavior. However, she correctly observes that structure isn't everything and that "a theory of boundedly rational, norm-based human behavior is a better foundation for explaining collective action than a model of maximizing material payoffs to self." She makes clear that individuals *can* solve their collective action problems. Indeed, Ostrom cites abundant evidence from empirical work that individuals achieve better results—results beyond being rational—in confronting social dilemmas by building conditions in which reciprocity, reputation, and trust help to overcome the strong temptations of short-run self-interest.

Yet, while collective action problems are part of just about everything, this is not to say that they *are* everything. In literature surrounding the tragedy of the commons, the external "other" could be nature. The work of scholars Arun Agrawal, Robert Ellickson, Ronald Herring, Subir Sinha, and Robert Wade reveals that property systems; decisions of landlords, middlemen, and consumers; changes in climate and rainfall; and informal understandings all mediate commons' situations. But even more fundamentally, how close does the "solution" to the collective action problem come to the solution of the problem of mobilization? The problem of mobilization, subsequently, can be defined as the increase in a contender's available resources for collectively making claims in relation to some external actor or system of actors. Once mobilization occurs in relation to external actors, then the importance of the collective action problem becomes less than "everything" and may actually be affected by mobilization.

The efforts of states to cooperate against the prospective threat of a hostile state is one example of collective action and mobilization; their cooperation problem depends, among other things, on the other state's resource base, its strategic calculations, its own collective action problems, and the positioning of third parties. A high probability of aggressive intentions on the part of that state is likely to have more influence on the propensity of potential cooperators to cooperate than their inherent capacity to achieve cooperation. Uncertainties are equally critical in decisions to mobilize: the French revolutionaries who launched wars on their neighbors were driven more by fear of their intentions than by their own ability to solve their collective action problems; indeed, the fear of invasion increased their ability to overcome these problems.

In the social movement field, the solution to the problem of achieving internal cooperation is even more deeply imbricated with external factors. Unlike states facing external opponents, movements are never unitary actors. They depend on external support or opposition that cannot be predicted in advance, and movements must respond to shifts in the opportunities and threats that they face outside the group. These three issues come together in the problem of mobilization.

Mobilization is a process drawing on internal resources to connect actors with significant others outside the group and with the rules and repertoires of systemic politics. For connecting groups to effectively make claims on others who are significant to their external environments, more must be learned about mobilization as the link between internal group problems and that group's external environment. This means connecting what have been, until now, largely distinct traditions of research: research on collective action in the tradition from Olson to Ostrom and research on contentious politics from Charles Tilly to Doug McAdam.

COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY

Olson made social movement scholars aware that there is such a thing as a collective action problem and that it could be used to explain the finding that actors who "should" act collectively often don't. Olson's work converges with the growing observation that grievances alone cannot explain mobilization because, if they did, social conflict and mobilization would be constant. Olson posits that, on average, no more than 5 percent of a given population could be expected to mobilize. Olson forced scholars of social movements to wrestle with the puzzle of the free rider. While Gerald Marwell and Pam Oliver focused on the critical mass that would enable collective action to mount, Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer extended the theory into hypotheses

about the relations within groups; Samuel Popkin showed how revolutionary organization could combat the free-rider problem; Mark Lichbach shaped it into the "rebel's dilemma"; and Dennis Chong used it as the central puzzle in his work on the civil rights movement.

While influential, Olson's integration into the study of movements was slow and uneven because he wanted to explain why collective action was unlikely during a decade when contentious politics buzzed and bloomed. Empirically oriented economists, like Albert Hirschman, were quick to point to this paradox. Sociologists including William Gamson and his collaborators used quasi-experiments to examine the conditions in which the collective action problem is "solved"; they focused on the perception of the authorities' injustice. Others observed that the collective action problem is less intense for what they called "conscience constituents" than for self-oriented materialists. Finally, although he named his theory *collective action*, Olson had little to say beyond the aggregation of individual motivations. He gave little attention to the political and institutional contexts within which collective action episodes are launched, and the historical and cultural traditions that link actors to one another and guide their expectations. How could collective action theory be reconciled with the buzzing and blooming movement cycle of the 1960s?

Answers to this paradox were proposed, first, by Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Oren Young and then by John McCarthy and Mayer Zald. The former argued that the collective action problem could be attacked successfully when someone (e.g., a political entrepreneur) finds it profitable to set up an organization (or make use of some existing organization), collect resources, and supply the goods in question. If the sum of resources collected is smaller than the value of the collective good to all recipients, yet larger than the entrepreneur's cost in supplying it, the collective action serves the interest of the entrepreneur as well as the collective interest. Similarly, while McCarthy and Zald agreed with Olson that the collective action problem was real, they argued that the expanded personal resources, professionalization, financial support, and organizations available to citizens in modern societies provide an answer to the dilemma—professional movement organizations.

This work led to three decades of productive theorizing and research on the organizational foundations of social movement organizations, but it also produced a cottage industry of criticism. First, like Frohlich and colleagues, McCarthy and Zald used the language of microeconomics (e.g., they wrote of movement entrepreneurs, movement industries, movement sectors), offending scholars who had come to social movement research from activist careers; second, they ignored the self-production of grassroots organizations in the process of mobilization. Soon, an alternative model, emphasizing informal participation and internal democracy, arose. The virtue of that approach was to show that mobilization can produce second-order organizations that continue after the initial impetus or threat has evaporated. This in turn led to the theory of cycles of contention that produce externalities that encourage collective action.

THREE FORMS OF MOBILIZATION

From both perspectives, attention centered on the process of mobilization, and this quickly bifurcated into three streams. They can be called *micromobilization, mesomobilization,* and *macromobilization.*

MICROMOBILIZATION

In their emphasis on organization as the solution to the collective action problem, McCarthy and Zald deflected attention from how individuals make the decision to adhere to a social movement. Dutch social psychologist Bert Klandermans tried to specify the process of adherence around both the propensity to participate and the probability of success. He eventually proposed a funnel of causation in which movement entrepreneurs look for support from within a broad but inert protest potential. This is through what Klandermans called "consensus mobilization," and it narrows by "action mobilization"; collective action then mounts with the support of a subset of the potential participants who were originally targeted.

MESOMOBILIZATION

But who is more likely to mobilize, and whose protest potential remains inert? This depends on more than individual propensities; it also depends on the individual's location in society. Social movement scholars soon observed that those who decide to engage in collective action do not do so as isolated individuals but from within networks of friends, family, roommates, and workmates. These scholars moved beyond the determined individualism of Olson and his followers to look at how groups themselves induce mobilization. Even in high-risk situations—like French insurrections, freedom summer during the civil rights movement, and the Tiananmen Square protests—participants embedding in social networks encouraged mobilization. For network scholars, the group, rather than being a source of collective action problems, actually helps to move individuals from inertia to mobilization.

MACROMOBILIZATION

Just as McCarthy and Zald, Klandermans, and the social network theorists were moving beyond Olson from the bottom, other theorists were building downward from a structuralist perspective. Social movement theory emerged in dialogue with Marxism, for which individuals mobilize as the outcome of impersonal macrostructural processes: exploitation, proletarianization, and concentration. States hovered on the margins of these processes, entering abstractly as the "executive committee of the capitalist class" or concretely as the agent of repression. From this mechanical Marxism, historians like E. P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm eventually departed, but it took a historically trained sociologist, Charles Tilly, to specify a number of mechanisms—organization, repression, facilitation, opportunity, threat, and mobilization—to connect the interests of a group with its collective action. A brief comment on each of Tilly's mechanisms is useful in placing work on the political process alongside the collective action tradition.

Tilly argued that any collective action begins with the interest of a group in acting collectively, which he defined as

"the shared advantages or disadvantages likely to accrue to the population in question" as a result of "various possible interactions with other populations." But interest was just the beginning of Tilly's model. It continued with organization. More broadly than Olson, Tilly defined *organization* as "an increase in common identity and/or unifying structure." Unlike McCarthy and Zald, organization was not the single solution to the collective action problem—once participants left the precincts of the group, organizers encountered other actors, opponents, and the state. They encountered the environment through *repression,* defined as "any action by another group which raises the contender's cost of collective action." But other actors could also facilitate their actions via *facilitation,* which is "an action which lowers the contender's cost." Political repression and political facilitation relate to the relationship between contenders and governments. Repression and facilitation were specific forms of more general encounters, which Tilly summarized with the concepts of opportunity and threat: "the relationship between the population's interactions with other populations which favour/disfavour its interests in relation to those of others."

THE POLITICAL PROCESS TRADITION

Tilly's model launched an entire new stream of social movement research that focused more on the relations between a challenging group and its environment than on the group's particular grievances or its internal relations. Mobilization was at the center of this new paradigm. In contrast to collective action theorists who focused on the problem of internal cooperation, political process theorists emphasized a group's interaction with the constraints and resources it found in its external environment. If these constraints and resources could be successfully navigated, mobilization resulted, and in Tilly's terms, "an increase in the resources or in the degree of collective control."

The most fundamental difference between the political process approach and that of Olson and the post-Olsonians is that in this tradition, it is not the problem of cooperation within a group that is central to mobilization, but the relationship between members of that group and the outside environment. These relationships are channelled through a contender who, on the one hand, seeks to gain control of its internal resources, and, on the other, maneuvers in the external environment to effectively represent the interests of the group. To put this spatially: if the problem of mobilization for Olson and those who followed him was to overcome the obstacle to horizontal cooperation, for Tilly and the political process theorists it was the problem of achieving vertical control of the groups resources by a contender who uses these resources in facing external groups and institutions. In this way, the process of mobilization shifts from an internal process to one that connects the group to its environment as it makes claims on other actors, opponents, and the state.

The nub of the problem lies in how Tilly was interested in all kinds of contentious interactions, and the political process approach that grew out of his work came to focus almost exclusively on the mobilization of one kind of group—social movements—and has largely forsaken the problem of collective action within the group. Except for a few prominent outliers like Samuel Popkin and Dennis Chong, this has led to an increasing gap between the study of collective action internal to groups and the study of the encounter between groups and their external environments. The problem is to blend the insights of the relatively apolitical Olson approach with the more political approaches of political process or contentious politics. Only by doing so can the field interface with the core concerns of comparative politics.

A first step in bridging the two traditions would be for scholars of collective action to be reintroduced to one another. In Ostrom's otherwise wide-ranging review of collective action in the 1998 American Political Science Association presidential address, there was no recognition of the work on social movements that was simultaneously flowering in the political process tradition. Similarly, in the definitive *Blackwell Companion to Social Movements,* Olson is cited exactly twice in the index to this 754-page book, Ostrom is never cited, and the collective action problem is not even mentioned.

A second step would be to better specify the mechanisms in the mobilization process that are common to both traditions. Some of these, such as resource transfer from members of a group to the contender that seeks to represent it, are familiar from the collective action tradition but are also recognizable in the work of Klandermans, Tilly, and others. Other mechanisms—including the brokerage of a group's claims to represent its interests to third parties, allies, and opponents— developed in the contentious politics tradition, but are close to the concept of political entrepreneurship from the work of Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young. Still others, such as the way movement contenders frame the formation of claims, derive from the constructivist perspective on social movements, but are compatible with both perspectives.

A third step would be to try to build outward from the political process tradition's single-minded focus on social movements and inward from the collective action tradition's tendency to seek collective action solutions to everything, and thus form a bridge between the two traditions. The political process scholars have largely ignored other forms of collective action beyond social movements, like those we encounter in the collective action tradition. In contrast, collective action scholars seek general laws or necessary and sufficient conditions in which solutions to the collective action problems are sought, regardless of the site or the surrounding environment of the population being examined.

There are exceptions to the mutual indifference between collective action theorists and the political process tradition with respect to mobilization. The most prominent is found in the work of Mark Lichbach. In his monumental study *The Rebel's Dilemma,* Lichbach deduces four mechanisms of mobilization growing beyond the collective action tradition: market mechanisms, community mechanisms, contractual mechanisms, and hierarchical mechanisms. In a series of articles, he comes closer than any collective action theorist to building a

bridge to what he calls "synthetic political opportunity theory." A second approach, starting from the political process side, is the contentious politics approach, which reaches beyond social movements to study the mechanisms of mobilization in revolutions, strike waves, nationalist episodes, and democratization. While this work does not seek to provide a theory of everything (indeed it deliberately excludes social movements that are not oriented toward public politics), like Lichbach, its proponents seek to identify mechanisms that are present across a range of forms of contention.

These are but the first steps in constructing a theory unifying mobilization and collective action.

See also *Mobilization, Political; Olson, Mancur; Social Movements.*

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Collectivization

Collectivization, a policy pursued in the Soviet Union and most other communist countries, refers to a process whereby private agricultural lands were seized by the state and transferred either to collective farms (*kolkhoz* in Russian) or state farms (*sovkhoz*). The policy was unpopular with farmers and was accompanied by violence. It also contributed to lower agricultural output. Nonetheless, politically it helped consolidate communist authority in the countryside.

RATIONALE

Collectivization had both an ideological and a practical purpose. Its ideological justification can be found in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels's *Communist Manifesto* (1848), in which they argue that farmers, like factory workers, should be organized into large-scale collectives to eliminate private property and this, in their view, would lead to more efficient agricultural output. Collective farms would also foster the socialist ethos upon which communist society could be built. Privately owned farms and the emergence of a "richer peasant" class were seen as incompatible with communism.

The practical goals of collectivization were threefold. First, Soviet authorities wanted to ensure a steady supply of food to burgeoning cities. Experiments with partially market-based agriculture in the 1920s under the New Economic Policy had led to increases in agricultural output, but the supply of food depended on the willingness of Russian peasants to sell grain at prices set by the state. A serious crisis in 1928 in securing peasant cooperation compelled Soviet leaders to search for alternatives, including forced seizures of food supplies. Second, the Soviets wanted to launch a program of rapid industrialization but had little available resources to pay for such a program. Exporting food to pay for capital imports thus became a central plank in the Soviet industrialization program. Third, the Russian countryside traditionally had been the basis for revolts against central authority. Soviet authorities therefore wanted to ensure that they had political control over the rural population, which in the 1920s constituted the vast majority of the Soviet people.

COLLECTIVIZATION UNDER STALIN

In 1929, Soviet authorities embarked on a nationwide program of collectivization. Although collectivization had been encouraged, only 2 percent of peasants had voluntarily entered collective farms. Peasants did not like collectivization because it meant being forced to produce food at minimal prices set by the state and give up their land. Whereas production was organized around family households prior to collectivization, peasants in collective farms would have to join large production brigades working under the direction of farm managers. Collectivization therefore had to be pursued with rigorous force and violence. Those who refused to move into the collective farms were accused of sabotaging grain collection and labeled *kulaks.* Millions of kulaks were sent off to brutal labor camps, where many died. Frequently, peasants slaughtered their animals rather than transfer them to collective ownership, resulting in a massive drop in the supply of meat, milk, and eggs. The drastic impact of the program led Soviet leader Joseph Stalin to announce in 1930 that officials overseeing collectivization were "dizzy with success" and needed to rein in some of their efforts. Collectivization, however, was quickly pursued with renewed vigor. From 1932 to 1933, Soviet authorities forcibly seized grain from peasants in Ukraine, Russia, and Kazakhstan, resulting in the death by starvation of up to ten million people, an act labeled a genocide by many Ukrainians. At the same time its citizens were starving, the Soviet government was exporting grain to pay for industrialization. By 1936, 90 percent of Soviet agriculture was collectivized.

ECONOMIC IMPACT

Collective and state farms were far larger than small private holdings, and Soviet authorities brought in tractors and machinery to increase efficiency. Stalin predicted that the Soviet Union would become the world's leading producer of grain. However, because of poor infrastructure and distribution and lack of incentive for collective farm workers, grain production never met expectations. The numbers of livestock were still lower in 1950 than in 1928. Soviet authorities, in an ideological and practical concession, allowed collective farmers to cultivate small private plots of land, which produced a disproportionate amount of the Soviet total of fruits, vegetables, and milk. By the 1960s, the Soviets were compelled to import grain from the United States, and bread lines remained a constant in Soviet life. Although collectivization was a failure in economic terms, it was unquestioned on ideological grounds and did establish communist authority throughout the Soviet Union.

LEGACY

Collectivization became a key feature of the Soviet communist model and was pursued in many communist states, including most of Eastern Europe (except Yugoslavia and Poland), China, Vietnam, and Cambodia. As in the Soviet case, it was often resisted by farmers and was accompanied by violence.

China's economic reforms started in the 1970s by offering market-based incentives to collective farmers to increase food output. After the collapse of communism, land was eventually privatized in most postcommunist states, including Russia, although turning collective farm workers into successful independent farmers has proven difficult and most Russian farmers continue to work in large agricultural cooperatives.

See also *Communism; Communism, Fall of, and End of History; Marxism; Russian Political Thought; Stalinism.*

. . . . PAUL JAMES KUBICEK

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Colonialism

Colonialism is a particular relationship of domination between states, involving a wide range of interrelated strategies, including territorial occupation, population settlement, and extraction of economic resources by the colonizing state. Historically, colonialism also depended upon legal, cultural, and political justifications of the colonial project in the metropole and the colonized state. While colonialism and imperialism share many of these characteristics, colonialism involved significant amounts of settlement of citizens from the colonial center in the colonized territory, as well as formal relationships of law and governance between colonial states and their subjects. Variations in the colonizing power; the period and region of colonization; local conditions of polity, economy, society, religion, and culture; and global circumstances all contributed to enormous variations amongst and within colonies and colonial projects.

The term *colony* has a long history and has been applied to a wide range of state arrangements, beginning with the extension of the legal status of Roman citizens to the conquered territories they settled. It was later applied in the sixteenth century to refer to the conquest by competing European powers—initially Portugal and Spain, and in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries the Dutch, French, English, and Germans—of territories in Africa, the Americas, India, and Asia. The era of formal colonialism is widely understood to have ended by the mid-twentieth century with waves of decolonization leading to independent nation states. However, the term has more recently been used to refer to informal relations of domination and economic exploitation by former colonial powers of previous colonies, and to the assertion of economic, military, and cultural dominance by ascendant global powers, the United States paramount among these.

While the practice of colonialism was undertaken by many powers at many times, including the Persians, Chinese, Mongols, Russians, Ottomans, and Japanese, scholarship and critique of colonialism has tended to focus on modern European

In this cartoon, English king Edward VII and French politician Theophile Delcasse negotiate their colonial holdings in Africa.

colonial powers and the settlement and exploitation of non-European territories and subjects. Scholars of world systems, colonialism, and state formation have sought in recent years to decenter Europe and formal state visions of colonization, by focusing on colonialism as a system whose local components, state and nonstate, were shaped by transnational processes and affected these processes in turn.

COMPONENTS AND GOALS

Early colonial settlement as practiced by the Greeks and Romans in the Mediterranean region involved the establishment of independent and self-governing city-states with close ties to the central colonial power. Their major functions included the facilitation of trade and economic growth and the securing of conquests. Beginning in the early modern period and reaching their apogee in the nineteenth century, changes in technological capacity allowed large-scale maritime trade and expansion, warfare, and migration. Later types of large-scale settler colonialism—as of the Spanish in South America; the British in North America and Australia; and other European powers in parts of South America, the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia—involved multiple modes of intervention, governance, and rule.

Another variant of colonialism, labeled *exploitation* colonialism because its major objectives were seen to be economic extraction rather than settlement, can further be divided into direct and indirect colonialism. The major distinguishing feature of direct colonialism was government and administration by colonial officials, such as the British in the American colonies. *Indirect* colonialism, by contrast, preserved (or constructed) some local governmental institutions and incorporated some local elites into colonial administrations, as in the princely states of British India, parts of Malaya, and Africa. For colonial administrations like the British in Africa, where a small amount of colonial manpower was extended over large territories and populations, indirect rule presented important advantages: Military, tax, and external relations were undertaken by British personnel, and all other areas of governance left, at least in name, to compliant local elites.

These categories of colonialism were never fully separate, and often overlapped across and within colonial territories, changed with time and with policy, and featured important exceptions. Even in indirectly ruled colonies, the areas left to the governance of local elites became part of the colonial project in critical ways, such as reorganizing regimes of land, labor and social life, religion and custom, as well as law and order. Some colonial powers, even though they exercised control over particular territories, worked in the shadow of more powerful imperial powers, such as Portugal's colonization of Brazil in the eighteenth century, dependent on British treaties for economic gain and British military protection in warfare.

The fundamental goal of modern European colonialism was economic gain—colonial possessions provided the raw materials (spices, cotton, silk, tea, opium) for trade and industry as well as markets into which goods produced from these materials would be sold. Competition and growth in the economies of empire fueled large flows of global exchange, precious metals for spices and textiles between Europe and Asia, but also interregional trade in Asia, and the development and extension of technologies of transport, manufacturing, and markets. Imperial economic organization included the ceding of territory and, in some cases, sovereignty, to merchant companies such as the British East India Company and the Dutch East India Company, who were granted particularly favorable rights and exemptions from their governments to conduct trade.

Companies were at times also given the right to exercise some of the functions of government such as war and treaty making, the establishment of colonies, the coining of currency and collection of taxes, as had the Dutch East India Company in Southeast Asia and South Africa in the seventeenth century—or the mandate to govern, as the British East India Company ruled in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa from 1757 to 1858. When these companies faltered, due to economic and political problems at home and in the colonies, their territories became part of the colonial possessions of the home country (e.g., in the creation of the British raj in India, between 1858 and 1947).

LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

Law played a critical role in the establishment, justification, and control of colonies, supplying the institutional and discursive mechanisms by which subject territories would be governed, their populations ordered, and their economic resources extracted. The reorganization of local land, labor, and production to achieve the economic aims of colonization took place through means of law, policing, and administrative ordering: Land title systems, inheritance and transfer of property, social and family organization, taxation, policing, criminality, order, and the differential rights and privileges of colonizer and colonized were constructed through law.

Law and legal institutions also provided one means by which the actions and aspirations of colonial settlers and agents could be limited, and provided one means, albeit limited, for colonized subjects to make claims against the colonial state. The provision of customary, personal status, and religious law based upon perceived or constructed traditional practices of native societies was a common feature of colonial governance, especially within British and French rule. These native legal forms were often placed within a hierarchical colonial legal system with laws, institutions, and legal personnel imported from the colonial metropole, interpreted within the overarching system of the colonial state, and transformed by both colonial actors and local elites for multiple ends.

IDEOLOGIES AND EFFECTS OF COLONIALISM

Ideologies of colonialism varied, depending on the specific colonial relationship; the interests and assumptions of multiple parties in the colonial project and outside it; and larger contemporary intellectual, philosophical, and political debates. One characteristic feature of the colony was the establishment of a distinct cultural group within the colonized territories, and the valorization of that group's difference from

the "natives" along racial, moral, biological, and civilizational lines. A prominent justification of European colonization was that it represented the oversight by a stronger, advanced civilization over a weaker, backward people, for whom the introduction of stable institutions of government, rationalized economic relations, moral tutelage, and cultural example would result in increased civilizational maturity.

Other rationales included imperial competition amongst the great powers of Europe, social and cultural reformism, the spread of Christianity, and the achievement of more targeted objectives, such as the abolition of slavery, sexual purity, moral reform, education, health and hygiene, temperance, law, and order. This ideological orientation defined both the colonizing and the colonized society, established a moral justification for multiple interventions as well as rationalized their methods, and posited difference (racial and cultural) along developmental and historical lines.

The violence of colonialism was multiple, and an indispensable part of the colonial project. This included warfare conducted on behalf of the colonial state against its subjects, local opponents, and imperial competitors; the arming and support of some local elites against others; forced labor, collective punishment and later aerial bombardment; and the application of new techniques of biopower and knowledge. Brute force was both a component of state strength, controlling subjects and territories by superior force, and a symptom of its weakness, reflecting the failures of administrative and cultural discipline.

Colonial power was never total, and colonialism itself never a completed project; within the colonial center and in the colonies themselves, colonization had its opponents. Within European intellectual and moral debates, Christian theologians lent moral strength to imperialism by casting it as a conduit for Christianization, but also cast doubt upon the colonial impulse through theologies of natural law and universal humanity. Enlightenment figures such as Adam Smith, Denis Diderot, and Immanuel Kant opposed imperialism based upon ideas of justice, pluralism, and human nature. Local actors deployed varied strategies to resist, oppose, deflect, limit, and transform colonial efforts. Anticolonial struggles and nationalist movements advocated a range of approaches, including preemptive modernization and westernization; deeper religious, ethnic, and national commitments among colonized peoples; and appeals to ideals such as natural justice, democracy, and popular sovereignty. Anticolonial figures such as Frantz Fanon advocated uprising and violent resistance, arguing that the violence of colonialism was systemic, its effects both physical and psychological, and that its overthrow required anticolonial recruitment in the population least dependent on colonial resources.

The effects of colonialism extended to the colonial metropole and the global system as well as to colonized states and subjects. Efforts required to maintain empire, and attain the rewards—economic, political and moral—of colonial interventions were part of the domestic governing apparatus of European colonial states. The efforts allowed establishment of hierarchies of citizens and subjects, applying policies and experiences at home that were initially developed in the colony, and vice versa,

percolating into the self-perceptions, culture, and politics of the colonizing state as well as the colonized. The costs of maintaining colonial ambitions also had effects on the structure of the economies of colonial powers, investing heavily in some sectors and neglecting others, further increasing disparities between regions and sectors in the colonizing state itself.

In colonized states, these effects were even more pronounced, and reached into all areas of life—economy and administration, but also internal political dynamics, education, urban and rural divides, religious institutions and doctrines, language and culture, health and infrastructure, and education. Settler colonialism in the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa had a particularly dire impact on the numbers of native peoples, and at times their continued existence, reducing populations through disease, warfare, resettlement, and forced integration. Indirect rule had particularly enduring effects on local power structures and institutions because colonial resources and policies were often passed down through certain local elites. These effects continued into postcolonial states in varied ways. They impacted governmental structures; long-term diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations; immigration; and national consciousness—and the effects have had enduring consequences.

THEORIES OF COLONIALISM

The study of colonialism has itself undergone multiple shifts over time, and also evolved as more scholarship has been produced by, or been based on, the former subjects of colonial rule. Political science, along with other social science and humanities disciplines, has studied, facilitated, and critiqued colonialism, while more recent scholarship like that by Edward Said has been acutely aware of the manner in which the production of knowledge is implicated in relationships of power. However, current theories of colonialism continue to occupy and draw from a wide range of philosophical, political, and empirical sources.

Developmental theories of colonialism have in common a sense that colonization was part of a historical progress from one form of statehood and subjectivity to another. Early studies of colonialism were produced as part of the European colonial project, and worked to justify, assess, compare, and improve colonial administration and policy, as well as communicate its experience to European readers. Many early scholars of colonialism, such as John Stuart Mill, were themselves employees of colonial companies (Mill of the British East India Company) or colonial officials. For thinkers like Mill—who combined a liberal view of individuals as capable and deserving of rational self-government with a belief in history as a progression along increasing levels of civilization—colonialism provided an essential bridge between the civilized and the savage subject, and the despotism of colonization the historical conduit from the uncivilized state to one capable of self-government.

Modernization theorists, including Marxist-Leninists, while they may reject the more paternalistic overtones of earlier developmentalists, have tended to see colonization as a part of the modernization process, through its integration

of colonized states into the world economy; the extension of governmental administration, control, and bureaucracy over large areas of territory; and the regularization of systems and institutions. World-systems theorists see the extension of colonial divisions on a global scale, in which economic and political relations of dependency and coercion between core states and periphery states benefit the interests of core states, themselves colonial powers.

The progression from colonized states to independent nations, largely occurring after the end of World War II and into the 1950s and 1960s, has been seen as the end of the period of formal colonialism. However, scholars like Frederick Cooper question neat delineations between empire and nation, arguing instead for the overlap of political forms, institutional continuities, and discourses. France only became a nation-state after the end of rule in Algeria in 1962, for example, and many previously colonial states continue to have dependencies and territories; the Eurasian Habsburg, Ottoman, and Romanov empires persisted into the twentieth century, and panimperial identity became part of the repertoire of nationalist movements in these territories.

Postcolonial theory shifted the emphasis in the study of colonization and its effects from economy and diplomacy to the interrelationship between knowledge, culture, and power. Scholarship about, and knowledge of, the colonized subject and colonial societies, in which the cultural superiority of Europeans was assumed, and the casting of the "oriental" as radically different, as other, became part of the justification for colonial domination. Other postcolonial scholars like Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha have emphasized language and discourses of identity, authenticity, and tradition as themselves implicated in colonial legacies.

The end of the cold war and further shifts in global power politics have given rise to academic reflections on the relationship between new forms of power, exercised primarily by the United States, and older patterns of colonialism. U.S. involvement in Hawaii and Puerto Rico, and more recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, have been cited as examples of U.S. colonial projects, at different times, for different reasons, and different regions. Another widely discussed target of U.S. colonial power, albeit an informal and ambiguous form of colonial power, is the global system itself, control over which is exerted by allied nation states, international organizations and global capital. Scholarly treatments of U.S. colonialism occupy all the theoretical positions described here, with some distinct features including the following characteristics: informal rather than formal relations of economic, military, cultural, and diplomatic power; deeper ambiguities in jurisdiction, sovereignty, and control; and comparisons with Roman and other ancient imperial states.

See also *Colonial Wars; Empire and Democracy; Globalization; Hegemony; Imperialism; Internal Colonialism; International System; Mill, John Stuart; Nation-building; Postcolonial Theory; South (Third World); Transnationalism.*

. . . .   IZA HUSSIN

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Colonialism, Internal

See *Internal Colonialism.*

Colonial Wars

The term *colonial war* is used to refer to conflicts fought to determine the future status of potential colonies, or currently held colonies, that generate at least one thousand battlefield casualties per year. This definition may be applied to two distinct categories of conflict: wars fought between great powers over a (potential) colony, and wars fought between a great power and a colony over its future status, otherwise referred to as asymmetric conflicts.

TRENDS IN THE LITERATURE
The political science literature on colonial wars concentrates on asymmetric conflicts. This literature focuses upon the causes of colonial wars and their outcome, with an emphasis upon great powers' losses to smaller powers, building upon Andrew Mack's balance-of-interests theory. Influenced by France's failed attempts to maintain its colonies in Indochina and Algeria, as well as the U.S. experience in Vietnam, Mack argues that the resolve of participants in asymmetric conflicts inversely relates to their relative capabilities. Weak powers have more to lose when fighting great powers and thus "fight harder," while great powers have fewer interests at stake in

an asymmetric conflict, making domestic veto players more sensitive to losses.

Other authors have observed that explanations of asymmetric conflict such as Mack's cannot account for why and when great powers win small wars. Two theories based on strategic interaction have been put forward to account for why great powers win and lose asymmetric conflicts. One theory, advanced by Ivan Arreguín-Toft, argues that the outcome of asymmetric outcomes is contingent upon interaction between the strategies of great and lesser powers: "Every strategy has ideal counterstrategy" (104). Great powers lose when they choose the wrong counterstrategy. Patricia Sullivan argues that outcomes in asymmetric conflicts result from the war aims of great powers. Great powers are forced to terminate their participation in asymmetric conflicts when the "costs of victory exceed a state's prewar expectations" (Sullivan, 497). The costs of securing victory are determined by whether a great power's war aims require that its target comply with its demands; these costs are lower when the great power pursues conquest rather than compliance.

PROBLEMS WITH THE COLONIAL WAR CONCEPT

In response to the literature on colonial wars, there have been salient critiques of the very concept of a singular colonial war. First, this term conflates war with (one of) the issues or motivations responsible for its outbreak.

Second, in practice, it is difficult to distinguish between certain colonial wars and great power wars. The literature on colonial wars implicitly focuses on wars fought over territories located in the third world. However, there is little real distinction between wars fought by great powers to acquire or maintain colonial possessions in the third world and wars fought by great powers to either acquire or maintain territory within their locales. Wars fought by great powers to maintain or acquire additional territory only differ from colonial wars in that they are more likely to bring about war with other great powers. For example, efforts by great powers to attain regional dominance, such as Meiji Japan's pursuit of hegemony in Asia at the beginning of the twentieth century, may be indistinguishable from attempts to acquire colonies.

Third, war widening, along with the expansion of war aims, further blur the distinction between colonial and great power wars. Some conflicts that begin as disputes over extraregional territories may escalate and become hegemonic wars (i.e., a war that redistributes the overall international balance of power). One example is the transformation of the French and Indian War (1754–1763) into the Seven Years' War (1756–1763). Other conflicts may begin as wars between great powers, but the fighting may spread to great powers' extraregional territories. World War I (1914–1918) began in Europe, but the fighting spread to parts of the European powers' colonies in Africa.

A radical means to clarify the conceptual confusion now proposed is to abandon the term *colonial war.* Instead, the study of conflicts fought for control of territory would distinguish

between the motivations that lead to the outbreak of war and the participants involved, allowing international relations theorists to focus upon the imperial motivation for war. This refers to states' utility for maintaining or acquiring additional territory. Rather than studying wars between great powers and wars between great and lesser powers under the same conceptual rubric, the strength of the imperial motivation for war could be studied across *symmetrical* (wars between great powers) and *asymmetrical* (war between a great and a lesser power) conflicts. It remains to be seen, however, whether this critique will become dominant in political science.

See also *Asymmetric Wars; Colonialism; Insurgency; Insurrection and Insurgency; Wars of Independence.*

. . . . ALBERT B. WOLF

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Commerce Clause

Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution lists the powers of the U.S. Congress. Under the original design of the Constitution, the Framers attempted to achieve the paradoxical objective of a *strong* government of *limited* powers by limiting the range of powers of the new legislative branch to those "enumerated powers" listed in Article I, Section 8, and then granting plenary power over that list by giving Congress the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers."

From the beginning, one of the most important of the enumerated powers granted to Congress was the commerce clause, which grants Congress the power "To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." Prior to the ratification of the Constitution, the national government did not have the legal authority under the Articles of Confederation to regulate commercial activity, thus causing state governments to engage in trade wars by placing tariffs and other taxes on out-of-state goods, and some states conducted their own trade policies with foreign nations. By granting the power to the federal government, the Framers apparently intended to facilitate a national economy and to minimize barriers to interstate commercial activity. Undoubtedly, the commerce power has turned out to be one the most important sources for the expansion of federal power over time.

Nonetheless, the exact scope of the commerce clause has long been a subject of debate and even controversy. In *Gibbons v. Ogden* (1824), Chief Justice John Marshall sided with the federal government over the issue of licensing navigation. Marshall found that Congress had the authority to regulate

navigation between states pursuant to its commerce power, and the federal license trumped attempts by states to regulate in the same waters. By the time of the industrial revolution in the late nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century, the reach of the commerce power was again called into question. For example, the Supreme Court upheld the regulation of meat dealers and stockyards in *Swift & Co. v. Swift* (1905) and *Stafford v. Wallace* (1922), the shipment of lottery tickets in *Champion v. Ames* (1903), and the regulation of prostitution in *Hoke v. United States* (1913), as permissible legislation regulating items placed in the "current of commerce." However, the Supreme Court drew the line between purely local activities and those involving interstate commerce, and held that there exists an important distinction between "manufacturing" and commerce. For instance, the Court held that Congress could regulate neither the monopoly over the manufacturing of sugar in *United States. v. E.C. Knight & Co.* (1895) nor child labor in *Hammer v. Dagenhart* (1918) because manufacturing and labor are purely local activities outside the reach of the commerce clause. This period has been characterized as one of *judicial dualism* in which the Court allowed Congress to expand federal power over social or economic activity in some areas, but not others.

The debate over Congress's commerce power came to a head during the New Deal period in the 1930s. The Court initially struck down numerous statutes involving labor and other economic policies that it considered purely local activities outside the purview of the commerce clause. However, the Court eventually relented and upheld the regulation of manufacturing, labor, and similar activities that could be viewed has having a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce in *NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.* (1937), *United States v. Darby* (1941), and *Wickard v. Filburn* (1942). While those decisions upheld and legitimized key New Deal legislation, the logic was used by Congress to support the passage of provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, regarding discrimination in places of "public accommodation," which were upheld by the Court under the commerce clause in *Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States* (1964), and *Katzenbach v. McClung* (1964). By the 1980s, Congress had built a large portion of the regulatory state—including forays into environmental policy and criminal law—on the back of its broad commerce power, and it was widely assumed that the Supreme Court would not attempt to draw lines around the commerce power.

But in the 1990s, the Supreme Court did find limits to Congress's commerce power. Applying the "substantial effects" test, the Court determined that Congress could not, pursuant to its commerce power, criminalize the possession of guns on school grounds in *United States v. Lopez* (1995) or provide a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence in *United States v. Morrison* (2000). The Rehnquist Court's resurrection of judicially enforceable limits on Congress's commerce power has sparked a debate over the proper role of the Court in these and other federalism cases. Some have argued that the Court's recent decisions are proper and long overdue, and that only the Court can enforce the constitutional federalism structures intended to place real limits on the scope of the national legislative powers. Others argue that Congress has the authority and means to engage in fact finding, policy evaluation, and constitutional deliberation; Congress also should not be subjected to judicial review over an area in which Congress has plenary powers.

See also *Checks and Balances; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; New Deal.*

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Common Goods

The term *common good,* or the term *commons,* both refer to resources as well as to property rights institutions that govern the appropriation, alienation, and management of the resource. Analytically, however, it is important to differentiate between the two concepts. A *common-pool resource* (natural or human constructed) is available for appropriation to multiple users. When one consumer uses a unit of these goods, this unit is no longer available to other users—a characteristic commonly referred to as *jointness* or *rivalry* in consumption. At the same time, it is difficult (or costly) to prevent other users from appropriating these goods—a characteristic commonly referred to as *nonexcludability.* Given its rivalry in use coupled with non-excludability, these resources are often overused and degraded. In contrast, *common-property institutions* are rules regarding how members of a community may access a resource, how much they may appropriate or alienate the jointly owned resource, and how they can devise new rules regulating its use. Common-pool resources and their physical characteristics influence institutions devised to govern and manage them. Subsequently, common-property institutions have been devised to successfully protect many common-pool resources.

COMMON-POOL RESOURCES

While some may view common-pool resources as small scale, local resource systems and common-property institutions as archaic arrangements, the truth cannot be further from this notion. Though common-pool resources include prototypic local, natural resources such as village pastures and fish harvesting areas, large-scale resources such as the oceans, the gene pool, and the atmosphere all exhibit the characteristics of common-pool resources as well. Further, humans create new types of common-pool resources. Many urban families reside in condominiums—a combination of private and common

property. Internet servers, with a finite storage capacity, exhibit the characteristics of common-pool resources because it is costly to prevent users from using a server, while, at the same time, an excessive number of users at a given time can result in the collapse of the server. Airport landing slots can be viewed as common-pool resources: The challenges faced by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration in allocating these slots illustrate the complexities in managing common-pool resources, given that the demand for slots tends to exceed their availability.

Analytically, common-pool resources can be viewed as goods that exhibit rivalry in appropriation, akin to private goods, but low excludability in appropriation, akin to public goods. Several consumers can appropriate a given unit of a nonrival good (e.g., national defense), whereas only a single actor can appropriate a unit of a rival good. The loads of fish or mass of water withdrawn by one user are no longer available to others, hence rivalry in appropriation, or *consumption*. Similarly, the absorptive capacities of airsheds and watersheds decrease when one user emits pollutants into the air or water. Scholar Garrett Hardin suggested the race to appropriate first will lead to resource degradation, therefore the *tragedy of the commons.*

The second analytical characteristic of common-pool resources is their low levels of excludability. This implies that it is physically, institutionally, or economically difficult or costly to exclude users from appropriating the benefits of the good. The challenge is to devise and enforce institutions that assure resource users that others will not appropriate the resource first (i.e., they will not suffer the "sucker's payoff"). When institutions enforce excludability and limit access to the resource, the race to appropriate first can be thwarted. Consequently, the resource can be exploited in a sustainable manner. Indeed, overconsumption of a common-pool resource or the tragedy of the commons is not inevitable. In many ways, Hardin incorrectly equated open access resources, which do not have institutions to enforce excludability, with common-pool resources. Indeed, Hardin's famous pastures often have intricate institutions—often invisible to observers not familiar with the local culture—to govern resource appropriation.

While sharing the analytical attributes of rivalry and nonexcludability, common-pool resources differ on other attributes such as their size, boundary stability, negative externalities, complexity of the system in which the resource is located, uniformity in resource flows, and levels of resource use. Thus, any analysis of the governance of common-pool goods needs to take into account their analytical similarities and their differences. Some characteristics tend to be conducive to their successful governance. These characteristics are small-sized, stable, and well-delineated resource boundaries; small levels of negative externalities resulting from resource use; moderate levels of complexity so that the resource users can monitor resource stocks and flows at low cost; and resource users' solid understanding of the dynamics of the resource.

Common-pool resources of smaller size tend to support the establishment and maintenance of resource governance institutions. Researchers usually group common-pool resources into local, regional, and global resources. It is not clear, however, how the size alone affects institutional evolution and design. Rather, size may interact with other variables. Even though it is more difficult to design and enforce institutions to manage regional and global resources, several have been managed and protected. At this point, there are about two hundred international regimes addressing global common-pool resources. While some have been effective in curbing resource overuse—for example, the Montreal Protocol to protect the stratospheric ozone—the jury is out on others, such as the protection of biodiversity or the global atmosphere. The size of the resource tends to correlate with heterogeneity of resource users. Arguably, higher levels of heterogeneity impede the successful governance and management of common-pool resources as in the case of the global atmosphere, which is used as a sink for greenhouse gases.

Common-pool resources with well-delineated and stable boundaries are more conducive to the emergence and sustenance of institutions for managing these resources. If boundaries of the resource are understood and do not change over time, then it is easier to determine the users of the resource and the extent of their resource withdrawal. Inability to determine these characteristics is a fundamental problem that has led to overuse and degradation of many resources, including fisheries, watersheds, and airsheds. This problem is especially challenging when the common-pool resource is not extracted, but used as a sink for pollutants, leading to problems like acid rain, ozone hole, poor local air quality, low oxygen levels in watersheds, and others.

Externalities are the negative or positive effects of actions experienced by those not involved in the transaction. As a result, the social costs and benefits of a transaction differ from its private costs and benefits. For example, in fisheries, withdrawals by one user create negative externalities for other users. Withdrawing one unit of a resource reduces the number of resource units available to other resource users, thereby increasing the withdrawal costs. Resources with negative externalities tend to be overproduced or overappropriated, and those with positive externalities tend to be underproduced or underappropriated. Appropriation of common-pool resources associated with small levels of negative externalities is easier to manage.

The complexity of the system in which the resource is located creates challenges for devising institutions to manage the resource. Complexity may manifest in various ways such as levels of interconnectedness among various resources within a system, or the time lag after which the affects of resource appropriation can be observed, akin to information asymmetries in postexperience goods leading to market failures. For example, a harvest level of one fish species may affect levels of harvest of other species. Reducing the number of predator species may increase the stock of a given species; reducing the amount of species that constitute an important link in the food chain of the given species may reduce the stocks of this species. Further, the quality of the water may affect fish stock levels, and this is a function of the use of water as a pollution sink. In this case, multiple institutions must be devised, linked or nested, regulating multiple species or even ecosystems.

Resources that have nonuniform impacts of flows on the stocks are difficult to manage. For example, the impact of air pollutant emissions on pollution concentration is frequently nonuniform, dependent on airflows and topography. A unit of deposited air pollutant in one area may have more detrimental effects on the resource stocks than a unit deposited in other areas. Research on use of the atmosphere as a sink for air pollutants suggests this was a major problem in devising rules for maintaining air quality, especially for pollutants that remain in the close proximity of the emission point (e.g., nitrous oxides or lead).

Common-pool resources tend to be better managed when resource users can understand the dynamics of the resource flow and availability. Resources with time-dependent stocks are more difficult to manage than the resources that exhibit small levels of time dependence. Empirical research suggests that users of renewable resources pay close attention to the withdrawal rate and replacement rate. They are more likely to devise institutions to manage common-pool resources if they estimate that such institutions are necessary (i.e., replacement rate is not much higher than the resource withdrawal rate) and that they will be productive (i.e., the withdrawal rate is not much higher than the replacement rate). These relationships, however, are not stable. Replacement rates may change due to factors external to the institutional design. For example, replacement of a fish stock may drastically decline due to water pollution, or an introduction of a new predator or deposition of an air pollutant may skyrocket with a new technology (e.g., depletion of the ozone layer and global warming). If those changes are not monitored, the common-pool resource may be overconsumed. For resources that exhibit high uncertainty in these environmental factors, institutions have to be accordingly flexible.

INSTITUTIONS GOVERNING COMMON-POOL RESOURCES

Common-pool resources have the analytical attribute of nonexcludability. If users cannot be excluded, they have little incentives to defray the cost of maintaining and governing the resource. As economist and social scientist Mancur Olson pointed out, free riding impedes the supply of collective action. When nonexcludability couples with rivalry (e.g., "if I get the resource, you cannot"), it creates incentives to overharvest rapidly—a type of race to the overappropriation. For example, why would countries unilaterally incur costs to protect a global common-pool resource, the global atmosphere, from being overused as a sink for greenhouse gasses? Given its physical characteristics, users in other jurisdictions cannot be prevented from appropriating the benefits of this global pollution sink, a condition ripe for free riding. Thus, to manage common-pool resources, institutions (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol to mitigate global climate change) must be put in place to enforce exclusion. Indeed, as the rich literature on this subject attests, resource users at various scales, local to global, have sought to create institutions with varying levels of success to enforce excludability (i.e., regulate resource use), and thereby support resource governance.

As carefully documented by Nobel Prize-winning economist Elinor Ostrom in her book *Governing the Commons* as well as in several other volumes surveying common-pool resources, such as *The Questions of the Commons* edited by Bonnie McCay and James Acheson or in the *Drama of the Commons,* a volume edited by Elinor Ostrom and colleagues appropriate institutions can and have altered actors' incentives in the ways that they practice forbearance and appropriate resources sustainably. Communities across the world have devised rule systems to sustainably use communal pastures and forests for hundred of years; just because some these local institutions might have less visible, nontraditional features—such as a reliance on informal norms or cultural practices to encourage forbearance and regulate resource exploitation—external observers should not view them as open access resources.

Crafted institutions can increase the efficiency and sustainability of common-pool resource use over time. They can be thought of as the dos and don'ts that are commonly understood in regard to the entry, harvesting, and management of a resource, and how individuals acquire or transfer rights to use a resource. Three broad forms of ownership could be used to govern common-pool resources: government-, private-, or common-property ownership. There is no consistent evidence that any one of these ownership types is best suited for all types of common-pool resources, even though considerable debate about the relative advantages exists in the academic literature.

National governments have established a variety of institutions using government and private property ownership. Governments can decide to manage the resource on behalf of citizens in their jurisdictions. In the United States, federal, state, and city governments have established national parks, national forests, state forests, and city forests. Further, governments have regulated the use of common-pool resources by prescribing technologies users must employ either to withdraw the resource from the pool (e.g., fishing) or to deposit pollution in commons (e.g., emission filters and scrubbers to clean up exhausts). In addition, governments have adopted other instruments to influence responsible resource use. For example, governments have required for-profit organizations to provide information to consumers regarding the impact of their production processes and products on common-pool resources. Various labeling initiatives as well as pollution registries, such as the Toxics Release Inventory Program established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, are examples of such initiatives. The idea behind such information-based regulation is that informed consumers will vote with their dollars and informed stakeholders will bestow goodwill benefits on firms that minimize use of environmental common-pool resources. Finally, governments have developed market incentives, such as taxes and fees to increase the cost of common-pool resource withdrawal. For some common-pool resources—such as fisheries, water bodies, and the air—governments have sought to partition the resource use and impose an upper limit to each user's overall appropriation by devising and allocating quantified rights to the use of this resource. The latter approach has drawn much attention, especially in the context of the ongoing global climate change debate.

One frequently recommended solution to the tragedy of the commons is to privatize the resource, as stated in John Dales's 1968 *Pollution, Property, and Prices:* "If it is feasible to establish a market to implement a policy, no policy maker can afford to do without one. Unless I am very much mistaken, markets *can* be used to implement any anti-pollution policy that you or I can dream up" (100). However, empirical analyses of individual common-pool resources suggest that this broad endorsement of privatization is somewhat optimistic. Tradable permit markets have been found to be thin and with high transaction costs. Data problems have impeded monitoring and enforcement of trading rules. Scholars question whether tradable permit systems stimulate innovation and have the ability to respond to sudden and substantial changes in the market. About thirty years after the implementation of the first tradable permit market in the United States, researchers are more careful in endorsing the tradable permit markets as a universal approach to solve the commons problem. As noted by A. Denny Ellerman and colleagues in *Markets for Clean Air,* "All of our analysis suggests one final observation: Experience with and lessons learned from the Acid Rain Program must be applied with care to other environmental objectives" (321). Instead of a one-size-fits-all approach across common-pool resources, the challenge is to devise institutional designs that ensure sustainability and efficiency in managing resources with specific characteristics located in given external legal and regulatory environments. The transfer of institutional designs across resources, regions, or scales must be undertaken with caution.

Globalization processes create additional challenges in devising institutions for common-pool resources. Globalization—the increased connectedness of markets and the increased levels of flows of goods, services, and factors of production across borders—can influence appropriation levels of common-pool resources. A local resource user might seek to appropriate a common-pool resource not only for individual use but to sell it to the world market. Farmers may shift from cultivation of traditional species, which are not, for instance, water intensive, to cash crops, which might be water intensive. This thereby potentially increases the pressure on the water table. The consequence of globalization is that the resource institutions that encouraged forbearance in resource use come under pressure. The opportunity and cost of complying with local norms seems to increase, sometimes dominate, in relation to the gains from violating the norms. Further, increased, low-cost access to world markets increases differentiation between those who have the resources (e.g., labor) to produce products and those who do not. This might put strain on traditional relationships, which were predicated on wealth and income equality and also sustained the resource use norms.

On the other hand, access to world markets can strengthen resource institutions by providing resource users the access to new technologies and providing them financial capital to regenerate common-pool resources. Also, globalization is not only about trade and investment; it is also associated with the global spread of common norms and ideas. With the diffusion of environmental and postmaterial values, globalization may provide users of common-pool resources in developing countries with a market for a sustainably harvested resource, if appropriately certified. For example, markets may develop for nuts from a tropical rainforest or for shade-grown coffee. Thus, globalization is both a blessing and a curse for the management of common-pool resources. Much depends on how actors can disrupt the traditional modes of social organization by making use of the opportunities and devising new ways to protect their institutions from the challenges of globalization.

With globalization, international donor agencies have become more involved in developing countries' resource use. Common-property institutions in developing countries can benefit from funds available from national and international donor agencies. In some cases, common-property institutions are even initiated by these donors. This brings a set of important new actors and dynamics that all pose challenges for the governance of common-pool resources. In particular, external funders might follow different time frames and operate on a much shorter cycle than required for the adaptive development of successful institutions. When common-property regimes are initiated with external donors' funding, a danger exists that the devised rules will not correspond to the social customs, norms, and value orientations. Further, the community may not be given authority to change the rules governing the resource; rather, this authority may be vested in the donor or national government of the country hosting the project. On the other hand, involvement of powerful international donors may bring legitimacy to communities that would otherwise, due to the local power structure, not be given the authority to govern the resource.

Finally, the subject of institutional change is particularly challenging for traditional common-pool resources. What if a particular institution is failing to stem resource overuse? How easily can a new one replace the former institution? One can seldom begin with an empty slate, since most traditional common-pool resources are likely to already have institutions in place. The challenge is to devise more effective institutions without becoming unduly distracted by path dependencies, while also responding to distributional consequences. Eventually, like any other governance systems, common-pool regimes need to have an economic and political logic to create incentive from their resource users.

See also *Environmental Policy; Environmental Political Theory; Globalization; Governability; International Cooperation; International Norms; Kyoto Protocol; New Institutionalism; Tragedy of the Commons.*

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Common Law

Common law developed not at a single moment by the proclamation of a single individual, but as a result of accumulated traditions and laws over many centuries. The first statement of common-law principles can be found in the Magna Carta. Embodied in these rules was protection of subjects from rulers by preserving the rule of law via a system of due process. It took nearly four centuries for Sir Edward Coke, who became lord chief justice of England, to create a theoretical understanding of the common law and place the courts at the center of the common-law system. Following Coke was Sir William Blackstone, author of *Commentaries on the Laws of England,* who made modifications in Coke's philosophy but stayed faithful nonetheless. American iterations of the common law were professed most famously by American jurist and Supreme Court justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who stated that the common law is judge-made law. However, this definition departs from the original conception of the common law. The role of judges within the original conception of the common law was to decide law in accordance with existing statements of the law. Common-law judges had to balance canon law, parliamentary law, and precedent. In the absence of a clear and authoritative statement of the law, judges would hand down decisions that filled in the gaps by interpreting the existing law. In addition to precedent, a number of institutional arrangements and legal principles characterize the common law, and these differentiate common-law legal systems from other legal systems.

COMMON FEATURES OF COMMON-LAW SYSTEMS

Common-law legal systems are generally found in those countries that were territories or colonies of the British Empire. They are adversarial systems in which an attorney represents the accused and another attorney represents the accuser. Each side presents their case to a judge and jury to determine fact, guilt, and sentence. The most identifiable feature of the common-law system is the use of jury trials. It is the presence of juries that creates a buffer between the state and the citizen as juries are made up of one's peers. In common-law systems, judges and attorneys are selected from the bar in order to provide a certain level of professionalization. The professionalization of the judiciary is necessary for the common-law court to function effectively since the judges must determine the relevancy of evidence in order to ensure that the evidence presented is relevant to the case at hand. Furthermore, in order to have a system in which judges are granted a great deal of latitude, the judges must be properly trained and have a firm grasp of the law as it has developed through precedent. In making their decisions, precedent guides judges in the common-law system. *Stare decisis* is another term for precedent that is used to reflect a judicial ruling that is binding in future cases.

CRITICISMS

The common-law system is often criticized for being wrought with procedural strictness that becomes burdensome to all

involved. One of these features is the separation between courts of law and courts of equity. Charles Dickens's novel *Bleak House* criticized this cumbersome feature of the common-law system. Courts of law apply the law as established to a particular case. In some instances, the law may provide a remedy that is inadequate for a particular situation. When such an instance arises, then one of the party's may take the suit to be heard in an equity court, sometimes referred to as *courts of chancery.* Equity courts can exercise more latitude in granting rewards to the victim. Until 1873, England maintained separate courts of law and equity. The federal judiciary in the United States ended such a formal distinction with the ratification of the Constitution. Until 1937, with the passage of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in which law and equity were combined into one form of action, the courts of the U.S. federal judiciary maintained a distinction between law and equity in one court. This reform came one year before the landmark decision in *Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins,* in which the Supreme Court stated there is no federal general common law.

CODIFICATION AND EVOLUTION OF COMMON LAW

In the United States, most of the common law has been codified. Codification is the process by which common-law principles are turned into statutes. Examples of federal codification include the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Uniform Commercial Code, and the Federal Rules of Evidence. The change at the national level was the result of a similar change at the state level. The codification movement, inspired by English philosopher and legal theorist Jeremy Bentham, was put into action by nineteenth-century American lawyer David Dudley Field, whose field codes were implemented in New York. Nearly all states followed suit by codifying former common-law principles. Louisiana is the only state without a common-law background. Instead, its system of law is based on the Napoleonic Code, with France having first colonized the region.

The common law is a constantly evolving system of law. It is a body of general rules that prescribe social conduct. In the common law, the law is supreme and is placed above all institutions and actors. At its center is a judiciary who does not make law, but discovers law through a long and laborious study of the statutory law, tradition, and precedent. Judicial decisions, *stare decisis,* guide future decisions. Developing out of actual legal controversies, the common law is identified by its use of precedents, jury trials, adversarial proceedings, a professionalized bench and lawyers drawn from the bar, and the protection of individual rights. James Stoner, *Common-Law Liberty: Rethinking American Constitutionalism,* writes, "Common law emphasizes assent rather than domination, the community rather than the state, moral authority rather than physical power" (Stoner, 5).

See also *Civil Law; Due Process; Judicial Systems, Comparative; Precedent; Trial Courts.*

. . . . KYLE SCOTT

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Commonwealth

Dating from the fifteenth century, the phrase *common wealth* reflects the old meaning of well-being; hence commonwealth, as often used by seventeenth-century writers, meant an organized political community governed for the common good, on occasion implying an interest, or say, for all members. The term has evolved to denote a polity that is law-based, contractual, and consensually united with supreme authority vested in the populace; especially capitalized, it can also designate an association of sovereign states more or less loosely associated in a common *allegiance,* or an autonomous political unit voluntarily associated with another. Used most prominently at the international level today, a few cases of national and subnational commonwealths remain.

HISTORICAL COMMONWEALTHS

In various parts of the world, historical cases of commonwealths, to some extent, foreshadow their modern counterparts in displaying elements of contractual self-government. These cases include:

- The medieval Icelandic Commonwealth or Free State (930–1262), which ended with a pledge of fealty to the Norwegian king;
- The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569–1791), one of the largest and most populous polities in seventeenth-century Europe, which, as a semifederal republic centered on a gentry-controlled parliament and an elected, contract-bound monarch, can be considered a precursor to modern concepts of constitutional monarchy and federation;
- The Commonwealth of England, which replaced the kingdoms of England and Scotland in the period of the English Interregnum (1649–1660) after the Civil War. Formally the first republic in the English-speaking world, under the rule of "Lord Protectors" Oliver and Richard Cromwell, the Commonwealth of England effectively amounted to military rule in the name of parliamentary supremacy;
- The Commonwealth of the Philippines (1935–1946), a transitional, self-governing political entity in free association with the United States, created in preparation for the Philippines's independence.

INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

The Commonwealth of Nations is the voluntary confederation of former parts of the British Empire (plus Mozambique), a group of fifty-three sovereign states and their dependencies linked by common objectives and interests. Members include both republics and monarchies, and in 2010 the (appointed,

not hereditary) head of the Commonwealth of Nations is Queen Elizabeth II, who is also reigning monarch in the commonwealth realms, notably the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.

The roots of the modern commonwealth lie in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when certain colonies—Canada (1867), followed by Australia (1900), New Zealand (1907), South Africa (1910), and the Irish Free State (1921)—became self-governing dominions, a newly constituted status implying equality with Britain. After World War I (1914–1918), the dominions' relationship with Britain was developed further, and in 1926 the Imperial Conference defined them as autonomous and equal communities within the British Empire, united by common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. After World War II (1939–1945), decolonization led to the London Declaration of 1949, which, in order to enable newly independent republics like India to join, dropped "allegiance to the Crown" as a requirement for membership as well as the designation "British." From the late 1950s, new members from the Mediterranean, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific joined, extending the community's spectrum of activities, and in 1965 the establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat in London furnished the organization with an independent civil service. The Commonwealth Foundation (1966), the Singapore Declaration of Commonwealth Principles (which, in 1971, introduced a formal code of ethics and a commitment to human rights, racial, and economic justice), and the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation completed the modern Commonwealth of Nations. Its biannual summits are the association's ultimate policy- and decision-making forum, at which it reviews international developments, issues positions, and decides on any action, particularly in terms of priorities and programs for development cooperation. These summits, held in a different member state each time, are also considered an opportunity to strengthen the idea of the Commonwealth of Nations as an association providing friendship, business partnership, and stabilization for its members.

The creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) signaled the end of the Soviet Union in December 1991. A loose confederation of twelve of the fifteen former Soviet Republics on the basis of "sovereign equality," it has evolved from its initial purpose of facilitating their "civilized divorce" into a forum for economic, foreign policy, and defense cooperation, coordinated through an array of CIS institutions. Various institutional steps have been aimed at deepening integration among some of its members. In 1993, the CIS created an Economic Union modeled on the European Union's Common Market, notably also aiming for the coordination of tax and price policy. In 1995, Russia and Belarus agreed to form the Commonwealth of Sovereign Republics and to deepen integration in the humanitarian and economic fields with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan with an interstate council, which later also included Tajikistan. In 2000, these five formed the Eurasian Economic Community, with which some other CIS members have associated themselves to various degrees.

In 2003, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine created a common economic space. Unlike the Commonwealth of Nations, then, the CIS has been characterized by a certain incoherence due to members' strongly varying ambitions in terms of the desired levels of integration.

NATIONAL LEVEL

The Commonwealth of Australia was formed in 1901 with the federation of six states under a single constitution. After the first Europeans had begun exploration in the seventeenth century, Captain James Cook took possession for Great Britain in 1770, and subsequently, six colonies—New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia—were created. Early efforts at federation in the 1850s and 1860s, also involving Fiji and New Zealand who later decided to opt out, lacked popular support. The 1901 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act created a federal system dividing power between the national government and the six former colonies, designating Australia a constitutional monarchy where a governor-general represents the royal head of state at the federal level, and six governors represent at the state level.

Other national commonwealths include the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, which adopted the title upon independence from Britain in 1973 and also remains a commonwealth realm within the Commonwealth of Nations; and, since 1970, the Commonwealth of Dominica, after it obtained associated statehood (virtual independence from Britain) in 1968.

SUBNATIONAL LEVEL

The United States of America contains four commonwealths: Kentucky, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. While not used in common parlance, the designation, which has no constitutional effect, emphasizes their government "based on the common consent of the people," as opposed to one legitimized through their earlier royal British colony status. In addition, commonwealth is also used to describe the political relationship between the United States and its unincorporated, self-governing overseas territories of Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands, indicating their consensual association as well as their status outside of the federal hierarchy.

In general, use of the term commonwealth has tended to underline the voluntary and consensual nature of a political community or an association among political entities; in some cases, it has additionally been used to indicate that such an association, while more than an alliance, constituted less than a confederation or federation.

See also *Allegiance; Federalism; Federation and Confederation.*

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Communalism

Communalism refers to a range of diverse perspectives, theories, and movements in which social change is founded in the redevelopment of community as a site of close, personal, face-to-face relationships as opposed to the anonymity and impersonal character of industrial capitalist society. One of the most influential early notions of communalism can be found in the works of German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, who presented the community as an alternative to the cold calculation of market-based society (*Gesellschaft*) that was replacing the close ties of rural life (*Gemeinschaft*).

The term communalism became increasingly popular in the late twentieth century, especially among progressive activists and leftists seeking an alternative discourse on communal societies beyond the discredited forms of authoritarian Communism, Marxism, Sovietism, and Leninism. It has become particularly popular among contemporary anarchists, notably those influenced by American anarchist philosopher Murray Bookchin's writings on social ecology and libertarian municipalism. Bookchin saw communalism not only as the development of a new public sphere that might oppose the state and capital, but also an alternative to the anticollectivist emphasis on individualism and personal autonomy in libertarianism and much of contemporary anarchism.

For communalism, social life is organized primarily in small communes where community decisions are based on consensus and participatory democracy in face-to-face meetings involving all members. In place of a national state—a central decision-making body consisting of professional governors who make decisions for communities they do not belong to—under communalism, local communes come together in a confederal association of recallable delegates to address issues of mutual interest and concern, such as trade.

Communalist movements have included communal living arrangements in urban centers, "back-to-the land" movements such as the hippie movement that began in the United States in the 1960s, utopian communities such as Scotland's New Lanark, and present-day land trusts, in which property is owned collectivity.

Anarchists view communalist arrangements as a precursor to a large-scale transformation of society, as the idea of a confederation of communes—the "commune of communes"—comes to pose an alternative to the state for a growing number of people. Eventually, having been rendered obsolete, the state will wither away.

Communalism has also gained popularity as a perspective within conservatism in North America. For conservatives, communalism offers an alternative to the cultural diversity, social fragmentation, and liberalization of contemporary society. Conservative communalists argue for what they view as a return to "traditional" community life, based on the neighborhood and often resting on a patriarchal view of the family, as an answer to broad social problems. Some conservative communalists point to the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, especially those espousing feminism, black power, and gay and lesbian rights, as causes of a perceived breakdown of "traditional" community values. Among the most influential proponents of conservative communalism is German-Israeli-American sociologist Amitai Etzioni. In some areas of South Asia, including contemporary India, communalism refers to sectarian conflicts between religious communities and between people of the same religion but different regions.

See also *Anarchism; Bookchin, Murray; Communism; Community; Conservatism; Social Movements.*

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Commune

In its most technical sense, the term *commune* refers to a local level of social organization that became rooted in the administration of many European nations, especially France, where it represents the lowest level of government. When used in this sense, it is roughly equivalent to a township, civil parish, or municipality. In its more familiar usage, the term describes a voluntary association of people who seek to realize a common end through cooperative communal living.

Communes as vehicles of low-level social coordination flourished in medieval Europe, most notably in northern Italy. These communities initially banded together principally for the sake of common defense. Modern conceptions of commune reflect this notion of unity around a common end, though in more recent centuries this common end has tended to be spiritual or ideological rather than defensive. Consequently, modern communes are often referred to as *intentional communities* where "intent" implies not only the conscious design of living arrangements, but also a commitment to adopt a particular way of life; typically, this involves the pooling of property and consensus decision making. Usually communes are established and overseen by the grassroots initiative of a core group and supported by the like-minded consent of their membership, though occasionally the establishment has been imposed from above (like the Maoist "people's communes").

The vast majority of communes are short-lived, although in some instances, like the *kibbutzim* in Israel, they have proven extremely resilient.

The nineteenth century is often seen as the heyday of religious communes underpinned by shared faith, especially in the United States, where groups like the Shakers and the Hutterites established durable and influential settlements with thousands of members. The nineteenth century was also a time of secular social experimentation, however, spawning communal enterprises inspired by the works of Charles Fourier, Robert Owen, and Etienne Cabet, and informed by socialism and utopianism. In the twentieth century, the 1960s are particularly notable for the explosion of communal activity that took place in the context of the radical counterculture. The communes that were formed in this era often reflected, on one hand, the desire to "drop out" of mainstream society (like the hippie commune "Drop City") and, on the other hand, more self-conscious attempts to realize alternative lifestyles and provide models intended to influence future social arrangements.

When commune appears with a capital *C,* the intended reference is generally the Paris Commune of 1871, the most famous historical example of a commune, itself inspired by the commune that controlled Paris from 1792 until 1794 following the French Revolution. The Paris Commune was an administrative unit overseen by revolutionaries who sought autonomy from the national government of Adolphe Thiers, which ultimately suppressed the communards militarily.

See also *Communism; Social Movements; Utopias and Politics.*

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Communication, Two-step Flow of

According to the two-step flow of communication theory, the mass media do not directly influence political behavior. Instead, opinion leaders—people in the community with more knowledge and expertise in politics and whom average citizens trust—take in information about politics in the media and share that information with others in the community. As such, mass-mediated information has little direct influence on most citizens, but interpretations of media messages provided by opinion leaders, who filter mass-mediated information along with other information available about politics, do influence the opinions of citizens. This theory is based on

Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet's 1948 Columbia University studies, *The People's Choice,* which found that the media have no real influence on vote choice. These findings were the beginning of the "era of minimal effects" in which political science researchers largely ignored the role of the mass media in political decision making. The Columbia findings have been criticized for exploring the effects of the media on a very narrow part of politics—vote choice in presidential elections—and for focusing on a homogeneous community. Subsequent research has demonstrated that the media do have direct, but subtle, effects on political behavior.

See also *Lazarsfeld, Paul F.; Media and Politics; Media Effect; Political Communication; Public Opinion.*

. . . . JANET L. DONAVAN

Communism

Communism (from the Latin *communis,* meaning "shared" or "common") advocates public ownership and communal control of the major means of production, distribution, transportation, and communication.

ORIGINS AND HISTORY

Although modern communism is associated with ideas advanced by German political philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and Russian Communist leader and theorist Vladimir I. Lenin, its intellectual roots are as old as Plato's *Republic* in the fourth century BCE. The vast disparities of wealth produced by the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries supplied the impetus and inspiration for modern communist theorizing, which consisted of (1) a critique of capitalism and (2) its replacement by an alternative social and economic system—communism.

THE CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM

In *The Communist Manifesto* (1848) and other works, Marx (1818–1883) and Engels (1820–1895) criticized capitalism for alienating and exploiting workers (the proletariat), enriching capitalists (the bourgeoisie), and ensuring the rule of the latter over the former. All of human history, they wrote, is the history of struggles between classes—between slaves and masters; serfs and lords; and now, proletarians and capitalists. This epic struggle will be the final chapter in the story of class struggle. Out of it will emerge an egalitarian, just, and classless communist society.

Marx and Engels viewed capitalism as a historically necessary stage of development that had brought about remarkable scientific and technological changes—changes that greatly increased humankind's power over nature. Capitalism had also greatly increased aggregate wealth. In these respects, capitalism had been a positive and progressive force. The problem, in their view, was that wealth—and the political power and life chances that go with it—was unevenly and unfairly distributed. Workers are paid a pittance for long hours of hard labor. Moreover, it is they, not the capitalists, who are the creators of wealth. According to the labor theory of value, the worth of a commodity is determined by the amount of labor

required to produce it. Under capitalism, workers are not paid fully or fairly for their labor. This enables capitalists to siphon off a portion that Marx calls "surplus value," the difference between what the workers are paid and the price paid by buyers of the product. This surplus is invested to yield even greater returns. This in turn enables the bourgeoisie to amass enormous wealth, while the proletariat falls further into poverty. The capitalist ruling class passes laws that benefit its members and disadvantage the proletariat. The state thus becomes an instrument for doing the bidding of the wealthy and powerful.

The exploitation of one class by another remains hidden, however, by a system or set of ideas that Marx and Engels call "ideology." "The ruling ideas of every epoch," they write in *The Communist Manifesto,* "are the ideas of the ruling class." That is, the conventional or mainstream ideas taught in classrooms, preached from pulpits, and communicated through the mass media are ideas that serve the interests of the dominant class and disserve those of the subordinate class.

THE COMING OF COMMUNIST SOCIETY

Marx predicted that a series of ever-worsening economic crises will produce ever-greater unemployment, lower wages, and increasing misery among the industrial proletariat. The proletariat will come to see that its interests are implacably opposed to the interests of the ruling bourgeoisie. Increasingly "immiserated" and motivated by "revolutionary class consciousness," the proletariat will seize state power and establish its own interim socialist state that Marx calls "the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat." That is, the proletariat will, as the bourgeoisie did before, rule in its own class interest in order to prevent a counter-revolution by the defeated bourgeoisie. Once this threat has passed there is no need for a state, and the state will "wither away" and make way for the emergence of a classless communist society.

Marx's vision of a communist society is remarkably (and perhaps intentionally) vague and sketchy. Unlike earlier "utopian socialists," whom he derided as unscientific and impractical, Marx did not produce detailed blueprints for a future society. Some features that he did describe, such as free public education for all and a graduated income tax (both considered radical in his day), are now commonplace. Other features—such as public ownership and control of the major means of production, and distribution of goods and services according to the principle in the 1875 "Critique of the Gotha Program," which states, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need"—are anything but commonplace. Marx believed that the institutions of a future communist society should be designed and decided democratically by future people; it was not his task to "write recipes for the kitchens of the future" (preface to *Capital,* vol. 1). If Marx was reluctant to write such recipes, many of his followers were not. Among these was the Russian revolutionary Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

COMMUNISM AFTER MARX

Lenin (1870–1924) made two important departures from the theory and practice of communism as Marx had envisioned it. The first is Lenin's view that communist revolution would not begin in advanced capitalist countries, as Marx had predicted, because workers there were imbued with reform-minded "trade union consciousness" instead of "revolutionary class consciousness." This led them to organize unions and workers' political parties to press for an ever-larger slice of the exploitative capitalist pie. Such workers had no interest in revolution. Communist revolution would begin instead in economically backward nations such as Russia and in the oppressed and exploited colonial countries of the capitalist periphery (now called the third world). This, Lenin argued, was because the scene of the most direct and brutal exploitation of workers had shifted from the first world to the third. Capitalists reaped "superprofits" from the cheap raw materials and labor available in the third world and were thus able to "bribe" workers at home with slightly higher wages, a shorter work week, and other reforms. Thus, contrary to Marx's expectation, it was not the industrial proletariat but the agricultural peasantry, directed by the Communist "vanguard," that was to make communist revolution.

A second major change is Lenin's view that revolution could not and should not be made "spontaneously" by the industrial proletariat—as Marx had held—but by the peasantry directed by an elite "vanguard party" composed of radicalized middle-class intellectuals like himself. Secretive, tightly organized, and highly disciplined, the Communist Party would educate, guide, and direct the masses. This was necessary, Lenin claimed, because the masses, suffering from "false consciousness" and unable to discern their true interests, could not yet be trusted to govern themselves.

In the bloody and violent revolution and its repressive aftermath there was, Lenin believed, no place for moral scruples. "You cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs," he was said to have remarked, meaning: you cannot make a revolution without breaking heads, or breaking promises: "Promises are like pie crusts—made to be broken." Immoral acts were justified in the name of a higher "socialist" morality, which held that the ultimate end—a classless communist society—justifies almost any means used to achieve it.

Marx's hopeful vision of a classless communist society in the nineteenth century turned toxic in the twentieth as a "new class" of party functionaries and bureaucrats rose to prominence. Regimes ruled by Josef Stalin (1879–1953) in the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong (1893–1976) in China, far from liberating workers, further exploited them.

See also *Capitalism and Democracy; Class and Politics; Communism, Fall of, and End of History; Engels, Friedrich; Ideologies, Political; Lenin, Vladimir Ilich; Leninism; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Proletariat.*

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Communism, Fall of, and End of History

During the summer of 1989, Francis Fukuyama published the now famous essay "The End of History?" in the conservative journal *The National Interest.* He argued that, with the end of the cold war, ideology had outlived its usefulness. Liberalism and capitalism had been victorious not only over the ideology of communism, but over ideology itself, and the phrase "the end of history" soon became part of the political lexicon. Fukuyama followed up with a book, The End of History and the Last Man, which contained a lengthy philosophical and historical expansion of his argument; as of the early twenty-first century, it had been translated into twenty languages.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IDEOLOGY

The term *ideology* arose during the French Revolution (1789–1799), and ideologies became central to European political life in the course of the nineteenth century. Ideologies incorporated the mobilized masses of urban industrial workers into the social fabric. They offered their adherents both a rational explanation of how the world works and an emotional-psychological sense of identity and meaning. The political and economic contradictions of liberalism gave birth to three rival ideologies—Soviet Communism on liberalism's left and Italian Fascism and German Nazism on its right. World War II (1939–1945) eliminated institutionalized Fascism, but Soviet Communism continued to battle liberalism for the next half-century in what came to be known as the cold war.

During the postwar decades, representative democracy and the market economy found a solution in the developed countries of the West (including Japan) to the problem of social cohesion that had dogged them over the previous century, in the form of the welfare state. In 1960, Daniel Bell published *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties,* which made the case for the shift from ideology to pragmatism with regard to domestic politics in the United States. Political parties were no longer motivated by grand principles, and they had become shifting coalitions of interests. Shortly after the publication of Bell's book, there was the explosion of social mobilization and political idealism in the 1960s, including the civil rights movement, the antiwar movement, feminism, environmentalism, and gay rights. Bell's argument was discredited before the ink was dry.

At the same time Bell was declaring the death of ideology within the United States, the country was engaged in a struggle with Soviet communism. Even though democratic capitalism had sunk firm roots in the West, it was not clear that it would succeed in the newly independent former colonies of Africa and Asia. The Soviet model seemed to have worked in Russia, raising that country to the first rank of the world's industrial and military powers in less than a century. However, Soviet rule was deeply unpopular in the occupied countries of Eastern Europe. For example, as part of the Solidarity movement in Poland in 1980, industrial workers rose up against Communist rule. The invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 discredited the Soviet Union in the eyes of the third world. Within the Soviet Union itself, the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary in 1985 and his campaign of media openness, or *glasnost,* revealed that economic inefficiency, corruption, and ideological decay had undermined the foundations of Soviet power.

FUKUYAMA'S "END OF HISTORY"

Writing in the spring of 1989, Fukuyama read these events as showing that the end of communism was nigh. In his article he wrote about the "end of history," meaning the end of "History" in the Hegelian sense—as an integrated, rationally intelligible process with a beginning, a middle, and an end. In the United States, this translates into a familiar narrative of the founding of the Republic, the onward march of progress, and the American dream. For Marxists, it meant dialectical conflict and struggle, with the working classes ultimately persevering over the bourgeoisie, and culminating in the victory of communism—and the end of history.

In his conclusion, Fukuyama makes clear that the end of history "does not by any means imply the end of international conflict per se. . . . There would still be a high and perhaps rising level of ethnic and nationalist violence. . . ." While this implies that terrorism and wars of national liberation will continue to be an important item on the international agenda, Fukuyama also contended that "the end of history will be a very sad time." He wrote, "The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands" (18).

CRITICS OF FUKUYAMA'S THESIS

Fukuyama's work attracted worldwide attention at the time of publication but does have its detractors. In 1993 Fukuyama's former professor, Samuel Huntington, published "Clash of Civilizations?" in *Foreign Affairs,* in which he argued that far from disappearing, history seemed to be returning with a

vengeance. Religious divides from the premodern era were fueling new violent social movements. Robert Kaplan, in the 2000 book *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post–Cold War,* made similar arguments.

However, Fukuyama's analysis does seem to fit developments in Europe and most postsocialist societies, including China. In this context, ideology really does seem to have come to an end. In Eastern Europe, Communist parties have renamed themselves, shelved their millenarian rhetoric, and donned business suits. Nationalist parties have been established but rarely poll more than 10 percent of the vote—roughly what they get in Austria, France, or Italy. Elsewhere in the world, only a small number of rulers in the early twenty-first century directly challenged the idea that the market is the most efficient generator of wealth or that democracy is the best form of rule.

See also *Clash of Civilizations; Communism; Huntington, Samuel; Leninism; Postcommunism.*

. . . .   PETER RUTLAND

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Communitarianism

Communitarianism, like many political terms, has both a general and a specific meaning. In the general sense, a communitarian is anyone who believes that community is so vital to a worthwhile individual life that it must be protected against threatening trends and tendencies of the modern world. In the specific sense that emerged from the so-called liberal-communitarian debate of the 1980s and 1990s, a communitarian is someone who maintains that the excessively abstract and individualistic theories of liberal philosophers have been among the most threatening of these trends. This specific sense seems to be what most writers have in mind when they now refer to communitarianism.

A BRIEF HISTORY

The word *communitarian* first appeared in English in the early 1840s, when it was roughly synonymous with *socialism* and *communism.* These other words acquired more precise meanings in the ideological battles of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but communitarianism remained a vague term, signifying little more than a desire to defend the traditional rural community or small town from the supposedly isolating and corrosive influences of capitalism, bureaucracy, and urban life. While socialists and communists came to be identified with the political left, communitarians were as likely to be to the right as the left of center.

According to one line of thought that developed in the late nineteenth century, the primary threat to community is the centrifugal force of modern life. Ferdinand Tönnies's distinction between two types of society, *gemeinschaft* (community) and *gesellschaft* (association or civil society), was especially influential in this regard, with gemeinschaft identified with the warmth of intimate, natural, and traditional life in contrast to the cold, calculating, and rational gesellschaft.

Concern for community took another direction in the twentieth century, as some saw the centripetal force of the modern state as the principal threat to community. In 1932, José Ortega y Gasset warned in *The Revolt of the Masses* against "the gravest danger that today threatens civilization: State intervention; the absorption of all spontaneous social effort by the State" (120). Less dramatically, Robert Nisbet argued in his 1953 book *The Quest for Community* that the free, spontaneous, and healthy life of community is increasingly difficult to sustain under the pressure of the modern state, with its impulses toward centralized power and bureaucratic regulation.

THE LIBERAL-COMMUNITARIAN DEBATE

These two themes persist in the writings of the communitarian political theorists of recent years, but they take the specific form of a series of objections to the community-dissolving tendencies of liberal individualism. Four books published in the early 1980s marked the emergence of this philosophical communitarianism: Alisdair MacIntyre's *After Virtue* (1981), Michael Sandel's *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (1982), Michael Walzer's *Spheres of Justice* (1983), and Charles Taylor's *Philosophical Papers* (1985). In general, the complaint was that liberal theories of justice and rights, such as those from John Rawls, have been too abstract and universalistic. Walzer thus called for a "radically particularist" approach that attends to "history, culture, and membership" by asking not what "rational individuals . . . under universalizing conditions of such-and-such a sort" (xiv) would choose, but what would "individuals like us choose . . . who share a culture and are determined to go on sharing it?" (5).

Communitarians have also complained that contemporary liberals rely on an atomistic conception of the self—an "unencumbered self," in Sandel's terms—that is supposedly prior to or independent of attachments to family, tradition, and community. This conception is both false and pernicious, communitarians claim, because individual selves are largely constituted by the communities that nurture them. Liberal theories of justice and rights thus contribute to the withdrawal into private life and the intransigent insistence on one's rights against others that threaten to undermine liberal democracies. There is little sense of a common good or even a common ground on which citizens can meet. As MacIntyre says, politics now "is civil war carried on by other means" (253).

The liberal–communitarian debate has not been clear-cut because some of those labeled communitarian have seen themselves as liberals trying to correct an atomistic tendency within liberalism (e.g., Taylor). Moreover, those who seemed the most severe critics of liberalism, MacIntyre and Sandel, have either forsaken communitarianism in favor of republicanism, like Sandel, or denied ever being a communitarian, like MacIntyre. Communitarianism in the specific sense survives, however, although it most often takes the form of a political communitarianism, less concerned with philosophical criticism of liberalism than with attempts to revive and defend community by calling attention to shared values, encouraging participation in civic life, and reinvigorating politics at the local level.

See also *Communism; Individualism; Socialism.*

. . . .   RICHARD DAGGER

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Community

Community usually refers to an integrated set of human relationships generally based on close ties, kinship, or ethical solidarities. These are often contrasted with the impersonal relations of modern society. *Political community* refers to ideas of political deliberation, solidarity, civic attachment, and common norms; political community also often rests upon ethical community.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

For Aristotle, political community was the highest goal of human activity. Community was rooted in human nature, and the ends of human nature were determined by the order of the cosmos. Political community rested on an ethos that guided practical activity, and aimed at more than mere protection or peaceful association. It required a deliberative community guided by reason. Political justice existed between these free and equal beings who sought self-sufficiency. For Plato, the citizen was not only a political animal by nature; the citizen was a member of an ongoing and historical community, not an independent individual.

Thomas Aquinas followed Aristotle in stressing the importance of community. Human's essentially social nature, however, included a variety of associations beyond the political, with *ordo* connecting both the order of the universe and the orders of social life. Relativizing and subordinating political community to religious community, Aquinas regarded the latter as the most perfect and saw its quest for perfect happiness as limited.

Early modern works like Thomas More's *Utopia* and Tommaso Campanella's *City of the Sun* formulated utopian communities based on communistic ideals like peace and happiness for all. These Renaissance theorists rejected the division of labor and the drudgery of work for socially purposeful activity. Utopias were the first instance of a modern discourse in which society or the social represented a sphere of self-organization, the willful creation of human activity and not of god or nature, and could be subject to human control and direction. In the nineteenth century, utopian socialists like Charles Fourier and Robert Owen founded experimental communities based on utopian ideals.

In industrial society, the idea of the social was more closely equated with the market over community. Ferdinand Tönnies formulated the standard distinction between two types of human association: community and society, or *Gemienschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. These, however, are not definitions of society but ideal types, which are found in combination in all societies. Gemeinschaft is a form of association based on strong ties such as family and kinship. The latter possess, according to Tönnies, a unity of will, a characteristic that might also be found in national identity or other group identities. Gesellschaft, in contrast, designates marketlike relations based on calculating self-interest.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau identified the alienation typical of modern commercial society. It created a pervasive inequality, bound humans to repressive institutions, and created artificial egoistic needs. Though Rousseau never advocated a return to a "state of nature," he did think that commercial society was egoistic and fragmented, lacking in community. It alienated humans from the sympathy for the suffering of others that such association required. Rousseau sought a solution in a more direct form of republican democracy, which could only be realized in smaller and integral communities.

NINETEENTH-CENTURY IDEAS OF COMMUNITY

Romantics mounted a critique of Enlightenment rationalism, its abstract universalism, and its mechanical and lifeless spirit that separated humans from nature and communal solidarities. While romanticism looked to the past, especially the medieval era, for models of integrated community, it was not uniformly conservative or backward looking. Early German romantics embraced republican political theories supportive of the French revolution, believing individual creativity and community could

flourish through a renewed reason. Romantics also championed national identity. Johann Gottfried Herder, for example, saw national community as an integral unity based in a national language. Human nature, Herder argued, is historical, not an ideal of absolute, unchanging happiness. It is relative to linguistic, cultural, and social conditions. Early Marxist views can be seen as a variant of romanticism. Human alienation, which separated humans from their communal roots and the full development and expression of their creative powers, reached its greatest heights in industrial capitalism. The recovery of true community and creative human powers meant transcending the limits of nations for international communism.

Thinkers who rejected the achievements of French Revolution (1789–1799) looked to the failures of the terror as a caution against applying Enlightenment ideals to social life. Conservatives like Edmund Burke took a moderate path. Burke looked to the wisdom of tradition as source of gradual nonrevolutionary change. Tradition was the voice of history and community, which, while of human origin, was not a product of human will. Reactionary Joseph De Maistre saw the monarchy as the best form of association and rejected the Enlightenment idea of community as human artifice. God reveals constitutions, Maistre argued, according to god's plan. Others took the idea of national community in a less innocent direction believing that in the late nineteenth century, nationalism was linked to imperialism and power politics.

Developmental liberals such as John Stuart Mill, T. H. Green, and John Dewey recognized that the social conditions of modern freedom required not just civil rights but social rights. Rejecting the atomism of liberal theory, they argued that human life is essentially social and requires the guarantee of basic conditions such as education, social welfare, and protection from the fluctuations of the economy. While the latter aren't equivalent to the strong solidarities and moralities of the community, they are conditions that need to be in place for such communities to flourish.

Sociologist Émile Durkheim also sought to formulate a notion of community suitable for modern conditions. Mechanical solidarity was based on the similarity of tasks in older societies, while organic solidarity was the more complex integration of a modern division of labor and rested on pluralism. While not rejecting individualism, Durkheim held, like developmental liberals, that society needs to complete individualism. Political community, promoting a positive notion of liberty, differentiates from the state and community promotes a modernist sense of solidarity by integrating secondary groups (contra Rousseau) like the church, the family, labor, industry, and professions into the larger community. In contrast, anomie, in Durkheim's view, is a disconnection with community. Lacking in norms or attachments, Durkheim saw rootless, normless (largely urban) anomie as the main source of disorder and social disintegration.

CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITARIANS

The contemporary debate between communitarians and liberals has revived debate over the role community plays in political theory. Communitarians reject what they see as the atomism and abstract universalism of contemporary liberalism as exemplified by John Rawls. Communitarians, such as Michael Sandel, Alistair Macintyre, and Michael Walzer stress the idea that the good, rooted in specific political communities, takes priority over the right or claims of justice. Communitarians look to a prior community organized around the good life, with standards of morality and politics internal to community. Neither political order nor the identity of individuals, who are the bearers of rights, can be coherently conceived without reference to the constitutive conditions of community. American social theorists like Phillip Selznick and Amati Etzioni were also prominent in advocating a communitarian view of politics that balance individual rights and community responsibilities.

Multiculturalism has emerged as another element of the liberalism and communitarian debate. Charles Taylor, for example, has argued that cultural communities, such as those of the Quebecquois in Canada, are due cultural rights based on their character as linguistic communities. Reflecting the influence of Herder, Taylor holds that "the language I speak, the web which I can never fully dominate and oversee, can never be just my language, it is always our language." The integrity of language and culture precedes individual rights. This is not a matter of simply choosing a language but maintaining a community in which the language flourishes. Critics hold that Taylor views communities too holistically and his portrayal of liberalism is too narrow. Individuals are not simply members of unified language communities but of multiple and permeable social worlds. The "unified" self is constructed out of this plurality.

The central challenge for contemporary theories of political community remains to reconcile the forms of solidarity required by national and ethnic identities with the requirements of justice and universal human rights of cosmopolitan societies. This challenge examines how the local virtues of patriotism, civic virtue, and local theories of the good life are compatible with the plurality of value orientations—both within most cosmopolitan contemporary societies and as relations between nations and transnational associations.

See also *Communitarianism; Utopias and Politics.*

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Community Power

Community power addresses the question of whether, and to what extent, power is distributed, and how power should be measured within local communities.

In the United States, the debate on community power coincided with the debate between elitists and pluralists. Elitist scholars took a stratification theory of power as a point of departure, viewing power as subsidiary to the social structure in a community. Thus, according to Floyd Hunter in 1953, a small financial and economical elite ruled the city of Atlanta, Georgia, at that time. Hunter arrived at this conclusion by first asking organizations representing four domains of Atlanta to provide him with a list of leaders in their domain. Subsequently, fourteen judges were asked who, from their individual perspectives, were "top leaders" on each of the lists of 175 persons. This resulted in a list of forty top leaders.

Similarly, in 1956, C. Wright Mills detected a "power elite" in the American society of his time. According to Mills, several developments taking place during and after World War II (1939–1945) resulted in increasingly enlarged, centralized, and interlocking hierarchies in the economic, political, and military realm of the United States. The power elite consisted of persons occupying the top positions in these three hierarchies and, as such, made or failed to make decisions with more consequences for more people than ever before. The methods Hunter and Mills applied to measure power are known as the reputation method and position method, respectively.

Pluralist scholars, however, criticized these studies for measuring actor properties and thus only potential power instead of actual, exerted power. The elitists' findings would follow from the methods they applied. Robert Alan Dahl and Nelson W. Polsby argued that studying the contribution actors make to specific decisions on key issues in a community could measure the actual, exerted power. In his study of New Haven, Connecticut, Dahl examined, for several decisions in three issue areas, which of the participating actors had most frequently initiated proposals that were later adopted (without or despite opposition of the other actors) or vetoed proposals of other participants. Only three of the fifty persons meeting the test of successfully initiating or vetoing proposals did so in more than one issue area. Among the actors who successfully initiated or vetoed proposals more than once, only a few were social or economic "notables." Thus, there appeared no one ruling elite in New Haven, drawn from a single homogeneous stratum that exerted power on all decisions in all three issue areas. Instead, power appeared to be distributed pluralistically: different actors exerted power concerning different decisions in different issue areas.

NONDECISION MAKING

Dahl's method became known as the *decision method,* and in 1970 Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz upheld criticism for the method not providing an objective criterion to discriminate between important and unimportant issue areas. As the notables were not interested in two of the three issue areas Dahl had selected, it was not surprising that he ended up with pluralist rather than elitist conclusions. Bachrach and Baratz argued that power was exercised during the process of decision making, which they called the first face of power, and also during the process of nondecision making. This second face of power concerned setting the agenda of available options for decision making, where some issues become part of the agenda, whereas others—the nonissues—were kept from the agenda, resulting in nondecisions. Just as in case of the elitists, the pluralists' research method would thus predetermine their empirical findings.

In 1971, Matthew Crenson's comparative study of air pollution in American cities falsified the objection that nondecisions were nonevents and could thus not be empirically studied. His study examined two nearby urban areas with similar population characteristics and dirty air levels, and aimed at explaining why east Chicago's air pollution became an issue and resulted in local policy in 1949, whereas Gary, Indiana's, air pollution remained a nonissue, and no action was undertaken until 1962. Crenson argued that Gary was dominated by one steel company, U.S. Steel, and had a strong party organization, whereas east Chicago had several steel factories and no strong party organization. U.S. Steel managed to circumvent the dirty air issue, backed by its reputation for power, without having to do anything.

More recently, the debate on community power has been continued by regime theory scholars on the one hand, such as Davies and Imbroscio, and rational choice theory scholars on the other, such as Dowding and colleagues, from an increasingly integrative and comparative perspective.

See also *Elite Decision Making; Pluralism; Power; Power Indices; Rational Choice Theory; Regime; Regions and Regional Government; Relative Power.*

. . . .   SANDER LUITWIELER

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Compacts, Interstate

See *Interstate Compacts.*

Compulsory Voting

Compulsory voting is the legal obligation for registered eligible voters to participate in elections. It is estimated that some thirty countries in the world have, or have had, such a legal obligation, including Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Greece, and Italy. Especially in Latin America, systems of compulsory voting are widespread, but usually only weakly enforced. Strictly speaking, compulsory voting only applies to the act of appearing in the polling station, since the vote itself is secret. In countries with this system, this can lead to a substantial percentage of spoiled or invalid votes.

Evidence suggests that a strictly enforced system of compulsory voting raises turnout, and in countries such as Australia or Belgium, turnout remains stable at well over 90 percent. When the Netherlands abolished compulsory voting in 1971, voter turnout decreased by almost 15 percent. Some nations, therefore, have considered adopting compulsory voting in order to stem the trend toward declining voter turnout. In recent history, however, not a single country has introduced compulsory voting. In some countries where the system exists, it is the topic of political controversy. Policy makers hesitate to implement sanctions against those who do not show up, while on a normative level, it is questioned whether states are entitled to impose this obligation on their citizens.

See also *Voter Registration Drive; Voting Behavior; Voting Procedures; Voting Rights and Suffrage.*

. . . . MARC HOOGHE

Computational Modeling

In political economy, computational models simulate the behavior of institutions or individuals, allowing researchers to explore emergent patterns in individual and institutional behavior over time. Computational models complement mathematical models, and also serve as a form of independent theory construction in their own right. This distinguishes computational models from statistical computation for data analysis, because although statistical models may involve simulation of mathematical functions, they use simulation to approximate known statistical models that are difficult or impossible to analyze analytically.

Although some scholars used computers to model political behavior in the early 1960s, many of the fundamental ideas now used in computational political economy appeared much later. In particular, Thomas Schelling's pioneering work in 1978, *Micromotives and Macrobehavior,* which created microsimulations of individuals without computers, showed dramatically how complex and unexpected patterns of behavior could emerge from individuals acting with simple motives and simple rules of individual behavior. This directly influenced the first major work of computational political economy in 1981, Robert Axelrod's "The Evolution of Cooperation," illustrating how cooperative behavior can emerge from self-interested agents operating with simple heuristics.

Modern computational models that describe the behavior of individual actors are sometimes known as *agent-based* simulations. In most modern agent-based simulations, local interactions are important: Individuals are modeled as acting on locally available information and as interacting with other local agents. Also, in typical agent-based simulations, individuals are modeled as being boundedly rational: Agents use heuristics to make decisions rather than acting optimally (in the game-theoretic sense). Moreover, the institutional environment in which individuals act is characterized as both stochastic and dynamic—evolving with, or coevolving in reaction to, the behavior of individual agents.

Computational models do not require individuals as the modeling unit. For example, models of international conflict, in which nations are the fundamental actors, date back to the early 1950s. Although used less frequently in political economy, institutional-level models are common in macroeconomics and finance.

Although initially opposed by formal theorists as too imprecise, and by qualitative theorists as too impoverished, computational models have gained a share of acceptance in the last decade. As a complement to mathematical theory, computational models are most often advocated as a way to generate both examples and counterexamples with which to probe the robustness of the mathematical model for changes in assumptions. Computational models may also be used as a constructive form of theory building, independent of a formal mathematical model, as the basis for making predictions and for generating qualitative insights. As such, they are often justified as a middle ground between purely mathematical formal models and purely textual qualitative models. Because computational models are far easier to construct than formal mathematical models, the researcher can use them to obtain, in the happiest of circumstances, the precision of a formal model with the realism of a qualitative model.

Proponents of computational models argue further that dynamic computational models are better-fitted models for studying dynamic patterns than standard mathematical equilibrium models. (Using equilibrium models to study dynamic behavior is sometimes likened to trying to understand Niagara Falls by staring into a collection bucket.) Still, even ardent

proponents emphasize the need for caution in model building and interpretation. As in other forms of model building, seemingly innocuous assumptions may sometimes yield striking different patterns of outcomes. Thus, all models should be built with care, and researchers should actively seek cases in which competing models yield diverging predictions that may be directly compared.

See also *Simulation; Simultaneous Equation Modeling.*

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Comte, Auguste

Isidore Auguste Marie Francois-Xavier Comte (1798–1857) was a French philosopher credited as the founder of positivism and, by many standards, considered the father of sociology. In Europe, and especially in France during his early years, there were no sociologists; rather, philosophers were beginning to venture into scientific and empirical terrain. It was Comte who laid the foundation for sociology to become a scientific discipline firmly embedded in empirical and theoretical grounds.

Though no monarchist himself, Comte was nonetheless critical of the French Revolution (1789–1799), its intellectual figures such as author Voltaire and philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and the chaos it unleashed. He was equally critical of the Catholic Church—which could not prevent the revolution—and what he termed the "metaphysical age (of uncertainty)." Yet Comte himself is an Enlightenment figure. His "positive philosophy" details a hierarchy of sciences in which, ultimately, sociology will become the scientific discipline through which all other sciences can be integrated into one systematic body of knowledge.

The idea of progress and development is also evident in his so-called law of three stages, which is perhaps Compte's most famous formulation of societal change. Accordingly, all societies develop along a path that includes three stages. Presumably, all societies depart from the same stage—the theological stage—and, given the "right" (scientific-sociological knowledge), arrive at the same end point of history: The positive society, once the intermediate metaphysical stage, is overcome. Despite its simplicity and its evidently Eurocentric view of societal change and development, Comte's law of three stages does invite serious questions from both political science and sociology: How do societies change, and what are the major forces of change? Are these forces primarily

Influential French philosopher Auguste Comte is known as the father of sociology.

SOURCE: The Granger Collection, New York

internal (domestic) or external (international)? To Comte, theological-spiritual, philosophical-metaphysical, and scientific-technological ideas are no doubt not only worldviews each in its own right; they also constitute major institutions and, as such, exert strong influence over the division of labor and the structural makeup of every society.

Due to Comte's efforts, science and especially scientific inquiry made a major step forward. His scientific method included observation, experimentation, and comparison, all of which are important elements in any introductory methods course and certainly part of political science and sociology. Of particular interest is his comparative method, itself composed of three different types: comparisons of human and nonhuman societies, comparisons of human societies at presumably the same development level, and comparisons of societies at different development levels.

Comte also wrote on the family, the individual, and society. Among those influenced by his ideas are English social philosopher Herbert Spencer and French sociologist Émile Durkheim. Scholars continue to debate the degree that Comte's particular understanding of positivism (especially his view of sociology and his faith in the scientific method) represents an extreme form of determinism.

See also *Durkheim, Émile; Empiricism; Positive Theory; Social Order.*

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Concept Analysis

Concept analysis, or formal concept analysis, allows researchers to identify and visualize specific structures in information. This data analysis method utilizes algebra and order theory and can enhance statistics and modeling analysis. When modeling through concept analysis, representations of concepts within a particular domain are derived from object-property matrices by using data-clustering algorithms. These algorithms use established and hierarchically ordered patterns to expose clusters within a larger data set, but the different algorithms delineate clusters in various ways. Concept analysis may be used to create concept lattices (known as Galois lattices) that allow identification and display of relationships. These lattices may further be developed into classification systems.

German scholar Rudolf Willie developed concept analysis in 1982, but its use initially remained limited because of its highly technical nature. In the 1990s, the popularity of concept analysis increased dramatically as new computer applications were integrated with the approach. By the twenty-first century, there were a variety of concept analysis software packages and open source software available for research. Fields ranging from medicine and psychology, to software engineering and library information science, use concept analysis, and it is also increasingly used in social sciences such as anthropology and sociology. Intelligence agencies in the United States and Western Europe have also used concept analysis as a means to possibly identify terrorist sleeper cells or other security threats, based on attributes and patterns.

See also *Qualitative Analysis; Qualitative Methodologies; Quantitative Analysis.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

Concordat

A *concordat* is an agreement between ecclesiastical and civil powers. The popes have widely used concordats to obtain recognition and privileges for the Roman Catholic Church and, in order to secure the state's promise to refrain from encroachment upon religious life, to terminate dissension with national civil powers by foregoing some of the church's traditional privileges and immunities. The concordats cover spiritual and temporal matters such as the nomination of bishops, the establishment of parishes, religious instruction, religious marriage, and church property.

The first concordat was *Pactum Callixtinum* of 1122, allowing the church to control the investiture of priests in exchange for important concessions permitting the emperor to assist at Episcopal elections and to exact an oath of vassalage from bishops that greatly restricted the rights and liberties of the church. In the nineteenth century, concordats became a preferred tool of the Roman Catholic Church to regulate ecclesiastical affairs in different lands. While concordats have provided the church with important benefits, the 1933 concordat with Germany granted international recognition to dictator Adolph Hitler's regime.

Since 1965, over 115 agreements have been concluded between the Vatican and various countries. This proliferation, and the implicit recognition concordats bestow on sometimes undemocratic political regimes, came under fire in the early twenty-first century.

See also *Religion and Politics; Roman Catholic Political Thought.*

. . . .   LAVINIA STAN

Condorcet, Marquis de

Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794), was an influential French philosopher, mathematician, political activist, and political scientist. Condorcet is a typical representative of the French Enlightenment tradition, bringing scientific and rational arguments into political and philosophical debates. Educated as a mathematician, he tried to promote moral and political progress by approaching political debates from a scientific point of view. Especially with regard to education and elections, his work has been hugely influential. Condorcet worked as a senior administrator before the French Revolution (1789–1799) and was elected a member of parliament in 1791. In the assembly, he championed moderate and liberal causes, argued in favor of equal rights for women, for the abolishment of slavery, and for the advancement of general education in France. In October 1793, he was prosecuted for his opposition to the death penalty for the former King Louis XVI. In March 1794 he died in prison, leaving the young philosopher Sophie de Grouchy (1764–1822) as his widow. In 1989, Condorcet was symbolically reburied in the Pantheon in Paris, the burial place for the most important figures in French history.

Condorcet is best known for his work on elections. In particular, his *Jury Theorem* states that large juries are an ideal mechanism to arrive at right answers to policy questions. The larger the number of votes being cast (in a jury or in a general election), the higher the probability the assembly will arrive at the right decision. The mathematical evidence for this claim basically rests in large numbers: If every single juror has slightly better than 50 percent chance of arriving at the right decision, a high number of jurors makes it all the more likely that there will be a majority for the right decision within the assembly. As such, the theorem has been used to legitimize the use of juries in courts, or to advance general suffrage (thus maximizing the number of voters). Condorcet himself indicated some limitations to the jury theorem, asserting that if the same jury has to reach a series of decisions, there is no guarantee that there will be logical order in these decisions. *Condorcet's*

paradox claims that jury decisions are not necessarily transitive: If a jury prefers A over B, and B over C, it is still possible that in a third decision, C will be preferred over A. This caveat implies that in its pure form, the jury theorem only applies to single decisions, not to a series of decisions.

The same desire to use the cognitive possibilities of a large group led Condorcet to defend voting rights for women and general education for all children. His great hope was that if more people were introduced to logical reasoning, this would lead to a more humane society. In an ironic twist, Condorcet wrote his final work on the method to improve human moral progress while he was in hiding from his persecutors, just months before his death.

See also French Political Thought; Voting Rights and Suffrage.

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Confederation

See *Federation and Confederation.*

Confessional Parties

Confessional parties are parties organized around a shared religion. They can incorporate religious identity as an ethnic marker, socioeconomic agenda, or vehicle to advance an increased role for religion in the state. Although modernization theory predicted a decreasing relevance of religion, confessional parties continue to play an important role around the world. As a result, confessional parties are sometimes viewed as an anomaly and explained on an ad hoc basis, heavily emphasizing particular characteristics of faiths assumed to be resilient to reform (e.g., Catholicism and Islam). However, many recent scholars have instead treated confessional parties as explicable by a variety of social scientific theories—such as rational choice, social movement, and institutionalism—that apply to other aspects of sociopolitical life.

In Europe and Latin America, Christian Democratic parties are key actors; in South Asia, both Hindu and Islamic parties have eclipsed nationalist movements. In the Middle East, Islamic parties have participated extensively in the new electoral politics of the last two decades. Moreover, Lebanon and Iraq allocate political offices along sectarian lines, thus encouraging religious parties.

Since World War II (1939–1945), Christian Democratic parties have played a significant role in Europe, especially in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Historically holding a significant Catholic component, there are also now active Protestant elements in Christian Democratic parties. Generally speaking, the ideology of these parties is neither liberal nor socialist and instead focuses on solidarity based on a social reform agenda. Explanations of Christian Democracy range from primordialist accounts of a fixed Catholic identity to instrumentalist explanations that focus on the role of the Church or traditional elites, and to microeconomic rational choice explanations of party formation. In addition, Latin America (especially Chile, Venezuela, El Salvador, and Mexico) has Christian Democratic parties, although these are not as influential as in Europe.

Religious parties also play an important role in South Asia and the Middle East. In India's 1991 elections, the Hindu Nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) emerged as the largest opposition party in India and continued on a trajectory of electoral growth until it became the ruling party in 1999; it's electoral fortunes were reversed slightly in 2004 and 2009 when the Indian congress made a comeback and the BJP returned to opposition. Islamic activism has also grown in the Middle East, and several Islamic parties have successfully contested elections throughout the region, including the 1991 interrupted ascension of the Islamic Salvation Front Algeria abrogated by a coup, the Hamas victory in the Palestinian national elections in 2006, and the main Islamist parties in Morocco and Jordan that operated as "loyal opposition" to the monarchies. This increased role in politics has led to the growth of literature on Islam and democracy, along with social movement literature explaining the moderating effect of political participation and accounts focusing more on institutions.

However, Lebanon is perhaps the best example of confessional parties due to the confessional underpinnings of the overall political system. The confessional allocation of parliamentary seats was institutionalized as a result of the 1943 National Pact at a six to five Christian-Muslim ratio and revised to one to one by the 1989 Taif Accord that ended the civil war. As a result, parties are organized along sectarian lines. Before the civil war, a few parties were nominally cross-confessional drawing on different religions, such as the Communist Party (with a largely Shia base) and the Constitutional Bloc Party. However, the development of militias from existing party apparatuses further entrenched the confessional nature of political parties. As a result, today there are few cross-confessional parties. For example, the Progressive Socialist Party is largely Druze, and the Future Movement Party is mostly Sunni. General Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement, which originally professed an anticonfessional agenda, has become a vehicle for advocating a Christian (largely Maronite) agenda. In addition, there are competing parties for some confessions. Among Maronites, the Lebanese Forces rival the Kataib (or Phlangist) from which it split. Similarly, Hezbollah is increasingly eclipsing the Amal Movement as the preeminent Shia party. Along a similar trajectory, political parties are organizing confessionally in postwar Iraq.

See also *Middle Eastern Politics and Society; Religion and Politics; Religious Parties.*

. . . .   MAREN MILLIGAN

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Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution is the process of ending, changing, alleviating, or preventing conflict among different parties. In international politics, conflict is ever present in several forms, ranging from simple disagreement to outright genocide. Johan Galtung identified three components to conflict resolution: (1) peacemaking, (2) peacekeeping, and (3) peace building. According to William Zartman, conflict resolution depends upon "removing the causes as well as the manifestations of conflict between parties and eliminating the sources of incompatibility in their positions."

Because of the permanence of conflict in politics, conflict resolution specialists suggest that those engaged in a particular conflict must disconnect a given conflict from the concept of justice as well as accept that involved parties have legitimate concerns. Separating the legitimate concerns from the notion of justice is necessary because justice is subjective and sometimes clashes with the notion of peacemaking. Conflict resolution is a long-term prospect, and thus it can involve numerous methods such as mediation, negotiation, peacekeeping, and diplomacy. All of these methods have several prerequisites. First, the people engaged in conflict resolution need to recognize the legitimacy of claims of all parties involved in the conflict. Another prerequisite is for practitioners to recognize the impact of personalities, personal beliefs, and ideologies upon the conflict. Yet another prerequisite is to understand that conflicts can be transformed, albeit after the process of conflict resolution has started. Finally, people engaged in conflict resolution must recognize that third parties not directly involved in the conflict could be vital in the outcome of the resolution.

Various mediation strategies, according to Jacob Bergovich, can be grouped in the following categories. First, communication strategies include making contact with the parties, being neutral, gaining the trust and confidence of the parties, and clarifying the issues at stake. Second, formulation strategies include various protocol issues such as the time, place, and order of the meetings; controlling the physical environment; and establishing mutually accepted procedures. And third, manipulation strategies include altering the expectations held by the parties, manipulating the time, making the parties aware of the cost of nonagreement, promising resources for agreement, and threatening withdrawal.

Individuals comprise the first actor in conflict resolution by acting as mediators. For example, former president Jimmy Carter, on behalf of his Carter Center, has acted as a mediator in several conflicts, most recently in the Sudan. Groups such as the Quakers in the Cyprus dispute or organizations such as the International Negotiation Network (INN) can also provide assistance to the parties engaged in conflict resolution.

States are the most common actors in conflict resolution. States can be invited to become mediators in a given conflict such as former U.S. secretaries of state Warren Christopher and Cyrus Vance and former British foreign secretaries Peter Carrington and David Owen in Yugoslavia as well as several presidents of the United States in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Several world-renowned state mediated agreements have been reached, most famously the Camp David Accords, which led to the sharing of the Nobel Peace Prize by the leaders of Israel and Egypt.

Institutions and organizations can be engaged in conflict resolution, especially since some conflicts are complex and include several parties. International organizations have conducted conflict resolution negotiations, especially the United Nations (UN). Regional organizations have also played an active role in conflict resolution, such as the Organization for American States, which has been involved in conflict resolution between the United States and Venezuela, or the Arab League, which is involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Transnational organizations are also involved in conflict resolution; these include nongovernmental or quasi-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International, the International Committee of the Red Cross, or the INN. State sponsored organizations, such as regional or international courts, also conduct conflict resolution. For instance, the European Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice are entities that often help resolve conflicts after they have occurred by holding the perpetrators of human rights violations accountable.

Yet another group of theorists believe that war itself can be a tool of conflict resolution since the end of wars is ultimately peace. In his seminal work "Give War a Chance," Edward Luttwak argued that outside intervention to resolve conflicts usually tends to perpetuate war, not stop it. In Luttwak's opinion, most low intensity wars would run their normal course, ending in either capitulation on one side or the exhaustion of both and, thus, leading to a lasting peace. When the international community interrupts this, they basically allow the regrouping and rearming of warring factions and, thus, the war's continuation. Joseph Nye reached a similar conclusion, from a different perspective, in his call for the United States to scale down interventionism in small regional wars, which ultimately may not serve the U.S. "national interest." There is, however, serious disagreement on what constitutes a small war, and whether such wars pose a threat to the wider international community, as well as what constitutes national interest.

. . . . AKIS KALAITZIDIS

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Confucian Political Thought

The tradition of Confucian political thought began over twenty-five hundred years ago and focused on the importance of ritual, roles, and virtue in creating a harmonious social order. With the unification of China by the Qin dynasty (221–206 BCE), Confucianism was initially persecuted, but with the collapse of the Qin and the rise of the Han dynasty (202 BCE–220 CE), Confucianism became the official ideology of the various dynasties occupying China through the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911. Confucianism as a ruling ideology also penetrated Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, and continues to exert social and political influence throughout East Asia.

THE FOUNDER AND HIS TEACHINGS

Confucian political thought began with the extraordinary personality Kongfuzi, latinized as Confucius (551–479 BCE). Though Confucius may have served briefly in minor or major governmental posts, his aspiration for governmental service went largely unfulfilled. His greatest success was as a teacher of scholars and those seeking positions in public service. Confucius did not believe his teaching was an innovation, but instead a transmission of the wisdom of the past with particular focus on the rituals of the Zhou dynasty (1022–256 BCE). The importance of ritual propriety (*li*) and its role in harmonizing human relationships is the central teaching of Confucianism.

Ritual propriety requires that individuals of different rank and status act appropriately according to their role in a given relationship. Confucius identified five relationships at the core of this harmonious community, including ruler-minister, father-son, husband-wife, elder-younger brother, and friend-friend. The senior partners of these relationships are obliged to show care and concern, whereas the junior partners of these relationships are obliged to be obedient and respectful. Filial piety (*xiao*), obedience, and concern toward parents and loyalty (*zhong*) to the ruler or state is the key to social order for Confucius. The balancing of these loyalties required the virtues of

humaneness or benevolence (*ren*) and personal responsibility toward social organizations and groups of people (*yi*).

The virtues necessary for realizing a harmonious community were to be cultivated within a cultural elite of exemplary persons (*junzi*), who through their example would guide the common people (*min*) to moral behavior. Such individuals needed to be deferential to persons in high position, perceptive of the will of heaven (*tian*), and attentive to the words of sages (*shengren*), the extraordinary founders of dynasties that exemplified harmonious human community.

The education of exemplary persons consisted of training in the six traditional arts of the aristocracy as well as rhetoric, public administration, and ethics. Confucius's willingness to teach all who were willing and able to learn, and his identification of some of his socially disadvantaged students as exemplary persons, led H. G. Creel, an American sinologist, to argue that Confucius carried out a major revolution against the existing aristocracy by opening the doors for high office to merit.

Another important legacy of Confucius revolves around his relationship to the supernatural. Though it would be inaccurate to argue that Confucius lived in a secular world, Confucius's relative silence on the spirits and his conception of a relatively rationalized heaven (*tian*) have focused the Confucian tradition on pragmatic social and ethical action as opposed to metaphysical speculation. This focus has led Herbert Fingarette to characterize Confucius as a figure who has treated human community as a holy rite and elevated it to become an arena of ultimate concern.

EVOLUTION OF THE CONFUCIAN TRADITION

The Warring States era (476–221 BCE), a period of disunity, produced two thinkers of great importance for the Confucian tradition, Mengzi (372–289 BCE) and Xunzi (312–230 BCE). These thinkers explored the problem of human nature and came to radically different conclusions. Mengzi believed human nature was good, whereas Xunzi concluded that human nature was evil. Both preserved the tradition's emphasis on the importance of learning and ritual practice to either realize human potential or curb human evil.

Other Warring States philosophers trained by Xunzi followed the implications of his characterization of human nature as evil and focused on a realist approach to governance emphasizing punishments and rewards known as *Legalism*. Legalism became the guiding ideology of the Qin dynasty that united China and later persecuted the Confucians and burnt their books. With the fall of the Qin and the rise of the Han dynasty, Confucianism combined with elements of Legalism to become the hegemonic doctrine of governance of China's succeeding dynasties.

Taoism and later Buddhism offered critical and complementary perspectives to the Confucian tradition. Taoist thinkers such as Zhuangzi (370–301 BCE) argued that the Confucian attention to benevolence and the artifice of ritual were acts against nature, deepening the troubles of the world.

Instead of seeking to serve in public office, Taoists preferred the free and easy living afforded by following the way (*Tao*) of nature. Buddhism, coming to China 67 CE, contradicted the Confucian values of loyalty to the emperor and family with its emphasis on monasticism and an otherworldly liberation. These traditions had moments of political influence, but practical orientation of Confucianism and the guidance of the two traditions away from worldly affairs minimized political conflicts among these traditions.

Neo-Confucians integrated Taoist and Buddhist metaphysical curiosity into the Confucian tradition. Zhu Xi (1100–1200), a scholar during the Song dynasty (960–1279), crafted a metaphysical system that focused Confucian self-cultivation on understanding the underlying principle (*li*) that ordered matter and energy (*qi*) through the investigation of things (*gewu*). Zhu's method of interpretation and the four books he selected as Confucian classics came to form the basis of the bureaucratic examination system, selecting scholar-officials to administer governmental affairs for the last three dynasties to govern China.

Wang Yangming (1472–1529) of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) articulated a metaphysics that opposed Zhu's emphasis on the external world and focused the act of self-cultivation on internal experience and innate moral knowledge. He also argued that knowledge and action were unified, opposed to Zhu's conception that knowledge proceeded action. Thinkers who attacked existing social and gender hierarchies embraced Wang's metaphysics, leading to their own deaths and imprisonments, and his dangerous philosophical innovation to be declared unorthodox. The debate between followers of Zhu and Wang continues within Confucian circles even today.

THE CONFUCIAN TRADITION IN MODERN TIMES

The Qing dynasty (1644–1912), a dynasty founded by Manchu warriors from the north of China, like all other preceding dynasties, preserved the Confucian system. Yet, major disasters, internal rebellions of unprecedented scale, and invasion and impositions from colonial powers would break the ideology that had endured for over two thousand years. The resilience of the system may have been the factor that led the administrators of the empire to believe only minor adaptation of the contrivances (*yung*) of Western culture were necessary to respond to the crisis, while the essence (*ti*) of Chinese culture could still be preserved. The defeat by the Japanese, a culture previously looked down upon, in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) convinced many that fundamental reform was necessary.

Reformers such as Kang Youwei (1858–1927) advocated the transformation to a constitutional monarchy. Practical reform was rejected, and entrenched conservative forces remained in place even as those forces lost control of the country. The Chinese Revolution of 1911, and numerous attempts to restore the Confucian ideal of the emperor of all under heaven, failed to establish a stable and lasting order. Kang later embraced the vision of a establishing a world government to realize the Confucian utopian ideal of the great harmony (*Datong*).

During the twenties and the thirties, a new culture movement evolved that challenged the legitimacy of the old ways in name of nationalism, democracy, and science. Lu Xun (1881–1936) argued that the tradition was eating its children, and Confucianism should not be saved because it was unable to save the Chinese people. Lu's criticisms occurred as warlords, Nationalists, and Communists battled to govern the land. The Nationalists, under Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), loosely embraced the Confucian tradition through the New Life Movement in 1934, whereas the Communists were more sympathetic to the radicalism of Lu.

The end of World War II in 1945 and the breakdown of the united front of Communists and Nationalists against Japanese aggression that started in 1937 unleashed a civil war in China that would send the followers of Confucius to Taiwan and leave his critics in control of mainland China. Confucianism was most aggressively attacked on the mainland during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Mao Zedong (1893–1976), the chairman of the Communist Party and the founder and de facto political leader of the People's Republic of China, used Confucius as a symbolic stand-in for the forces that posed a political threat to him. Confucius was painted as desiring to return to the conditions of a feudal slave state, and his teachings and images were to be eradicated as emblems of counter-revolutionary forces.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The rejection of Confucianism in the land of its origins raised questions about the tradition's viability into the future. On the surface, Confucianism appeared too complacent in dealing with authority in its search for social harmony, slow to reform and adapt to changing circumstances, antidemocratic, antifeminist, and anticapitalist. This pessimism about the potential of Confucianism to contribute to the modern world was rooted in a Western social science that identified Confucianism as being particularly antagonistic to capitalist development, and the experience of East Asians who viewed Confucianism as an impediment to modernization. The unexpected economic success of East Asian societies in the 1980s led Western scholars such as Ezra Vogel, a professor of East Asian studies at Harvard, to reappraise the economic and social potential of the Confucian tradition.

The movement to justify Confucianism on economic grounds was preceded by an attempt to redeem the humanistic value of the tradition. In 1958, Mou Zongsan, a major exponent of the neo-Confucian tradition, and several of his intellectual peers issued "A Declaration to the World for Chinese Culture," agreeing that Chinese culture needed to learn science and democracy from the West but also arguing the West needed to learn "a more all encompassing wisdom" from China. Tu Wei-ming, a Harvard professor of Chinese studies, is a prominent advocate of this holistic and humane vision of the Confucian tradition.

Academic commentators on Confucianism such as Roger Ames, William Theodore de Bary, Daniel Bell, Hahm Chaibong, Joseph Chan, Herbert Fingarette, David Hall, Philip

Ivanhoe, Henry Rosemont, and many more argue for a progressive and pragmatic understanding of the Confucian tradition. These thinkers not only challenge the sexism, elitism, and authoritarianism of the tradition, but they have pioneered Confucian ways of thinking about property rights, democracy, human rights, welfare policy, environmentalism, and more. The creative search for harmony and the cocreation of a meaningful aesthetic order from the perspective of all the participants within a community is the core of the Confucian tradition that they accentuate. Though this trend toward viewing Confucianism as a socially progressive and creative means of affirming human values is a very important trend in academic circles, not all professing Confucians embrace this vision.

The most visible controversy involving Confucianism in recent history challenging this progressive vision centers around the Asian values debate that emerged as many societies in Asia began to resent what they perceived to be the general permissiveness and decadence of Western liberal societies. The debate emerged in the 1990s, and it revolved around the question of whether universal human rights as they were conceived in the West should be applied to all societies.

Lee Kwan Yew, prime minister of Singapore during the time of the controversy, argued that individualistic Western values caused great harm to society and Eastern traditions such as Confucianism were correct to place society's interests above the rights of individuals. The economic success of many East Asian societies that had limited civil liberties gave this argument some strength, however Lee Teng-hui, former president of the Republic of China; Kim Dae Jung, former president of the Republic of Korea; and Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize-winning economist, among others, have been very critical of this authoritarian ideological framework that diminishes individual rights.

Some Western scholars, such as Samuel Huntington, a former Harvard political scientist, have perceived a fundamental incompatibility between Confucianism and liberal democracy because of the tradition's emphasis on the rights of groups over individuals. Other Western scholars such as Francis Fukuyama, a George Mason political scientist, argue that the tradition's commitment to education makes Confucianism quite compatible with liberal democracy. These debates are not only academic given the recent interest in Confucianism in the People's Republic of China.

Economic and political reforms initiated in 1978 within the People's Republic of China have led the Chinese Communist Party to reassess its relationship to the Chinese past and particularly the country's Confucian heritage. The decline in value of Marxist ideology in its international and national prestige following the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have led China's top leaders to begin to rehabilitate Confucius as a source of the social values that will help them to manage a country experiencing rapid economic growth and development. Chinese president Hu Jintao quotes Confucius in his speeches emphasizing the value of harmonious relations, and the country's cultural outreach program to the rest of the world, the Confucius Institutes, bear the name

of the sage. Whether Confucianism will play an important role in the future governance of China and whether it will have an authoritarian or progressive form remain open questions.

See also *Chinese Political Thought; Communism.*

. . . . TODD MYERS

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Congress, Contempt of

The two houses of the U.S. Congress, much like the courts, possess the power to protect their proceedings by deeming a person in contempt for obstructive or disorderly conduct. The power to hold nonmembers in contempt of Congress is not addressed in the U.S. Constitution but is an inherent

congressional power, as recognized in 1821 by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Anderson v. Dunn*. (By contrast, each house's power to discipline its own members is expressly conferred by the Constitution.) A typical offense is the failure to provide testimony or documents requested by a congressional committee, but acts such as bribing or assaulting members have also been punished as contempts.

Although Congress has the power to impose contempt sanctions unilaterally—operating in effect as both prosecutor and judge—today Congress typically refers alleged contempts to federal prosecutors to pursue criminal proceedings in the courts under a federal contempt statute, which authorizes fines and imprisonment. Most persons charged with contempt of Congress are private citizens who refuse to cooperate with congressional investigations or hearings, but executive branch officials' reluctance to provide information to Congress sometimes results in threatened or actual contempt proceedings, especially in times of divided government.

See also *Parliamentary Privilege.*

. . . .   AARON-ANDREW P. BRUHL

Conscience, Freedom of

See *Freedom of Conscience.*

Conscientious Objection

See *Pacifism and Conscientious Objection.*

Conseil d'État

Conseil d'État (Council of State) is the supreme judicial body in France for matters of government and public administration. The Conseil d'État decides cases on administrative or legislative issues and offers advice to the government and French National Assembly on constitutional affairs. It also serves as an appellate court for cases brought against the government by citizens or groups, including disputes arising from local or regional elections. Members of the Conseil d'État are senior or distinguished jurists, and the body is divided into six administrative sections. There are thirty-seven regional courts that serve as trial courts, and eight appellate courts under the Conseil d'Etat. The origins of the body date to the 1300s, but its modern functions and organization were established in 1799, with major reforms in 1872. The prime minister and the minister of justice formally preside over the Conseil d'État, but an appointed vice president oversees its day-to-day operations. As part of its advisory function, the Conseil d'État issues annual reports on legal and political matters and reviews draft legislation, decrees, and certain government projects or policies. A range of other countries have a Conseil d'État, or similar body, including Belgium, Spain, and Turkey.

See also *Judicial Review; Judicial Systems, Comparative.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

Consensus

Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines *consensus* as "general agreement: unanimity," or "the judgment arrived at by most of those concerned." Consensus may be used broadly to describe decisions reached in a spirit of compromise, regardless of what process is followed. More significant for political science, consensus denotes a specific *decision rule* whereby all participating agents possess veto rights over the collective outcome; the purpose is to ensure decisions that are genuinely supported by all members of a community. Consensus decision is designed as an alternative to majority rule, which permits the views or interests of the majority to override those of minorities. Whether consensus decision rules in practice produce more just outcomes than majority rule is debated.

Small groups often decide informally by consensus; consensus decision is formalized in some religious communities, including the Quakers; in Anglo-American law, jury verdicts must be unanimous. The practice in some ancient republics of voting by acclamation created the appearance of unanimity while veiling real divisions. Some contemporary anarchists insist that anything short of unanimous consent by all individuals to collective decisions violates personal autonomy.

None of these are adequate models for consensus decision making in large modern territorial states or federations. Most consensus theorists reject individual veto rights as impractical in large political communities and instead allocate veto powers to a relatively small number of corporate agents. The veto-bearing agents might be organized economic interests; religious, linguistic, or ethnic communities; or, in a federal system, states or provinces with their own peculiar history and traditions.

The most thorough advocate of the consensus model of government was John C. Calhoun of South Carolina (1782–1850). In *A Disquisition on Government* (1851), Calhoun argued that over time majority rule will inevitably produce entrenched, geographically concentrated majorities and minorities, and that the majority would systematically violate the rights and interests of the minority. Calhoun's proposed solution was to arm each significant interest with veto rights: to "give to each division or interest . . . either a concurrent voice in making and executing the laws, or a veto on their execution." He denied that this would produce deadlock or anarchy, claiming instead that it would force all interests to cooperate in the common good. Calhoun's principal successor among twentieth–century political scientists is Arend Lijphart, whose theory of *consociational democracy* bears a close though not exact resemblance to Calhoun's model.

Institutions practicing consensus decision have existed in the past and continue to exist today. The U.S. Articles of Confederation (1781–1788) enabled a single state to block decisions supported by all others. The United Nations Security Council allocates permanent veto rights to a handful of privileged powers. The 1998 Northern Ireland settlement grants the two largest parliamentary groups, the Nationalists and the

Unionists, veto rights over decisions. Consensus decision was seriously advocated, though not implemented, for postapartheid South Africa. The European Union operates according to a complicated and shifting blend of unanimity requirements and qualified majority rule.

Advocates of consensus decision claim that it prevents majority tyranny while encouraging minorities to wield veto rights with restraint and in a spirit of accommodation. Critics of consensus decision contend that it risks deadlock on urgent matters, entails arbitrary definitions of who or what is entitled to veto rights, and favors groups privileged by the status quo over those with a stake in change.

See also *Coalition Formation; Coalition Theory; Consociational Democracy; Decision Theory, Foundations of.*

. . . .   JAMES H. READ

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Consent of the Governed

The *consent of the governed* traditionally refers to acts of consent that people have performed in regard to their government. During the late Middle Ages, consent was viewed as central to political legitimacy, while since roughly the seventeenth century, individuals' own consent has been believed to be the main reason they are morally required to obey government. The main thrust of the doctrine is to limit the power of government and to make sure its actions are consistent with what people can accept.

The consent of the governed emerged as an important political idea in medieval Europe, as rulers of different territories began to consult with notable members of their polities. For example the English "model parliament" met for the first time in 1295 and the French Estates-Generals in 1302. Actions approved by such bodies literally had the consent of the governed—although only a small slice of the overall population. In subsequent centuries, amidst struggles to limit royal authority, arguments were developed according to which power originated in the people and was transferred to the king (through the "social contract") conditionally. The people agreed to obey if the king ruled justly. Especially sophisticated statements were worked out in the church by "conciliar" theorists, attempting to limit the power of the pope, and during the religious and political turmoil of the Protestant Reformation. But in spite of the forcefulness of late medieval and sixteenth–century treatises, the theorists' views fell short of a modern conception. They conceive of the community as a whole consenting—through its representatives—opposed to the modern notion, which turns upon the consent of each individual.

The locus classicus for the modern view is John Locke's *Second Treatise of Government.* According to Locke, to avoid conflicts that arise in an otherwise relatively peaceful state of nature, people agree to common authority. Since individuals are naturally free, only their own consent can place them under political authority. They are not bound by agreements entered into by their forebears, such as an original contract at the founding of society. However, recognizing that most people have not "expressly" agreed to be governed, Locke turns to what he calls "tacit consent," which are other actions that constitute consent and thus capable of binding people. Most notable is simply remaining in a given territory. Although this would ground political obligations for virtually all inhabitants, in making consent accomplished so easily, Locke renders the need for actual acts of consent virtually insignificant. In spite of this and other problems, Locke's view was enormously influential, drawn upon, for example, in the preamble to the Declaration of Independence, which speaks of governments "deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."

David Hume, in his essay "Of the Original Contract," classically—and fatally—criticized Locke's view of consent on historical grounds. Like Locke, Hume believes that most people have not consented expressly to government, since they have no recollection of doing so. Yet he rejects Locke's view of tacit consent. Since most people lack the resources and ability to leave their territories, their presence cannot be said to constitute consent.

Since the time of Hume, theorists have attempted to identify other actions performed by all or most citizens that constitute consent. Notable examples are voting or serving in the military. But none of these bears scrutiny. Immanuel Kant was responsible for an important theoretical advance in viewing consent as purely hypothetical, rather than an actual historical occurrence. According to this line of argument, a government is legitimate only if people *would* consent to it if given the opportunity. But in spite of difficulties in identifying acts of consent that have actually been performed, the idea continues to epitomize people's right to governments they accept, and to withdraw their consent, with possibly revolutionary implications, when they find government no longer acceptable.

See also *Hume, David; Kant, Immanuel; Locke, John.*

. . . .   GEORGE KLOSKO

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Consequentialism

Consequentialism is a philosophy that an act must be assessed as either good or bad depending upon its results. Hence, consequentialism holds that policies are good or just depending on their consequences. Undergirding consequentialism is the notion that values precede morality and even without a moral code, some things would still be good and others bad. Pleasure is judged to be the ultimate good result, and pain the ultimate bad. The main political strand of consequentialism was utilitarianism, as developed by the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham and later refined by British economist and philosopher John Stuart Mill. *Utilitarianism* posits that acts are morally correct only if they maximize the greatest good for the largest number of people. A variety of other forms of consequentialism have also emerged. Consequentialism as refined by the British philosopher G. E. Moore added intrinsic notions, such as beauty, to what could be considered good. Moore's ideas were dubbed ideal utilitarianism. In the preference utilitarianism of English philosopher R. M. Hare, acts are considered to be good if they meet or enhance the preferences of individuals or groups, whatever those preferences may be. Total consequentialism is predicated on the premise that goodness is dependent on the overall good of the action (even if it causes pain or displeasure to subsets of a group).

See also *Bentham, Jeremy; Mill, John Stuart; Utilitarianism.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Conservatism

The disposition to preserve what one has attained, received, or inherited, and to defend against the losses that inevitably befall human beings in our time-bound existence, is undoubtedly observable universally in all times and places. This disposition to conserve, insofar as it is a natural response to contingent circumstances, is not conservatism. *Conservatism* is a self-conscious affirmation of this disposition with a self-conscious expression of resistance to the alternative, which welcomes change, by premeditated design, to the environment in which one finds oneself. Conservatism resists the readiness to explore, more or less adventurously, and the possibilities of an imagined, alternative future existence. Self-conscious conservatism theorizes the natural disposition to preserve, raising it to the level of a conscious affirmation that may lead to the formation of principles or rules that serve more or less as guides to one's conduct in personal life and political views and activities. A conservative disposition often manifests itself as considered points of view, even doctrines, engaging in debate or argument with opposing alternative self-conscious doctrines. Today, common terms of political discourse such as conservatism, liberalism, and radicalism, and many other *-isms*, only reinforce the acutely self-conscious character of the modern age, which suggests that to be without such a doctrine is to be directionless and in need of guidance—a conclusion about which conservatives remain ambivalent.

ORIGINS OF CONSERVATISM

Traditionally, in histories of the concept, it is said that conservatism begins with Irish statesman and political theorist, Edmund Burke (1729–1797), especially in his critique of the French Revolution (1789–1799) in his celebrated *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790). There is no doubt Burke's critique was both powerful and prophetic about many of the consequences that would follow from the revolution's upheaval in Europe, and his work figures centrally in the study of the development of conservatism. Alongside Burke, we recognize Alexis de Tocqueville's analysis of *Democracy in America* (1835–1840), and his penetrating analysis of the French Revolution, as central to our understanding of these conditions.

However, prior to the French Revolution and Burke's theories, conservatism was conceptualized parallel to Europe's transformation from the Middle Ages in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to the religious Reformation in the sixteenth century, to the birth of the Age of Enlightenment and the Industrialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These centuries saw the advent of a revolutionary era on every front, proceeding in varying forms in different regions and countries, but proceeding nonetheless to radically revise the reigning ideas of political order, symbolized profoundly in the emergence of the social contract theory with European philosophers, including Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and others.

Contractarian philosophy espoused a social order in which a community would be granted civil and social rights adhering to the rule of law of a political authority. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century social contract theories complemented and influenced Europe's emerging modern commercial society and free market economy in what Scottish philosopher, Adam Smith, its greatest theorist, called, in *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), the "system of natural liberty." Smith proposed for the free, equal, and independent individual; the value of individual liberty as a common commitment; and the commitment to progress in terms of ever-expanding economic growth, all of which were increasingly accepted concepts in eighteenth-century Europe and the newly established America.

While conservatives were historically receptive with the evolving social contract theories and subsequent free market economics originating in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, conservatives were—and remain—ambivalent on these economic concepts, given their historic affinity to the ancient and medieval ideas of virtue and noble character. Such modern propositions, stating wealth and virtue can be complementary, increasingly challenged the ancient prejudice that wealth and virtue conflict. Essentially, when an individual

or society's wealth accumulates, the individual's moral virtue decays. According to conservatives, although economic growth is good and required, materialism and ostentation threaten society's moral virtue. Further, with the onset of advances in modern science and technology incited by Europe's modernization, it became plausible human beings could begin to take their destiny into their own hands, causing persons to either reject old theological doctrines of God's providence, or become self-determining agents who will fulfill that providence through creative renovation of human existence on earth. Conservatives have been historically reserved about such topics pertaining to science and religion.

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were also witness to increasingly centralized political authority as the modern state came to be seen as the primary political agent of world history. The division between Catholics and Protestants undermined the traditionally independent authority of the medieval church, rendering claims to independent ecclesiastical authority ambiguous or suspect. The creation of the modern state was as revolutionary a development as any of the other events of the aforementioned periods. This modern state was established by the aggregation, centralization, and deployment of power, together with increasingly sophisticated bureaucratic management, to an extent unimaginable in the medieval world.

Given these revolutionary changes in a relatively limited time span, it is not surprising that, as historical and philosophical assessments of what was happening evolved, extraordinary efforts to theorize the significance of these transformations appeared, either embracing or lamenting the events. Regardless of the responses, the changes between the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries were irreversible, as the democratic age supplanted the aristocratic age in Europe, America, and the European colonies worldwide. The American Revolution (1876–1883) and the French Revolution are revelatory of the implications of what had been developing over a long time. Notably, it can be understood conservatism was a response to this modern age—not merely as a rejection of the modern age, but as a response to certain terms and concepts of the modern age. Therefore, conservatism is a distinctly modern intellectual and political phenomenon.

CONSERVATISM IN POLITICS
SELF-CONSCIOUS CONSERVATISM

Burke did not use the term *conservatism*, as the word first came into use around 1819 by French writer François-René de Chateaubriand, following the rise and fall of French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte. Burke does offer, however, a deliberate or self-consciously chosen view—affirming the intention to conserve and, while allowing for necessary adjustments as circumstances alter, to respect traditional ways—more commonly referred to as *self-conscious conservatism*. A primary theme of self-conscious conservatism is requiring prudential judgment; it cannot be merely antiquarian or simply set in its way since with all modern conditions, conservative ideals must deal with the need of adjustment and alteration as

one's environment and issues evolve. Conservatives must develop theoretical statements about what is to be preserved, or what it will mean to preserve something. Increasingly, it became difficult to be merely conservative in politics; one must be prepared to be "programmatically conservative." This indicates how the shape of modern life constrains what it can mean to be conservative, making it difficult to defend inherited practices without supplying arguments defending such inheritances, with the arguments themselves eliciting counterarguments.

CONSERVATISM AND GAUGING CENTRALIZED AUTHORITY

Conservatism as a political argument involves skepticism about the aggregation of power in governments, and a warning against diminishing the independence of traditional intermediate groups and influential organizations that soften or mitigate the power relation between the apparatus of the modern state and individuals and families who are subject to increasingly minute regulation from central governments. Further, conservatism involves respect, even veneration, for traditional manners and forms of living; an acceptance of the lives and the loyalties to groups and associations that were not created by, nor originally dependent on, the good will of the sovereign state; and to respect them simply because they are there and accepted by those who live in them. The enemy of this conserving attitude is the view that no practices or institutions should be accepted which are not thought through and given an independent rationale such that they could make sense even to those who have not lived within their terms. Such a rationale, of course, potentially undermines the independence of any entity in question because it is now eligible for assessment by those outside it as well as by those within. The age of acute self-consciousness demands to extend its self-consciousness to even more remote corners of human existence. A tradition's appeal cannot continue to rest solely on the fact that there are those who enjoy it. This stimulates what has been described as the "disenchantment" or "demythologization" of the modern world by such modern thinkers as Karl Marx, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber, T. S. Eliot, and Russell Kirk. Conservatives regret this obscuring of a sense of the transcendent or sacramental character of heritage, and so far as possible they wish to revivify that sense.

Politically speaking, a fundamental, recurrent conservative issue regarding modern political life has been, and continues to be, a debate over the scope of governmental power: What are governments supposed to do? Questioning the limits or scope of governmental power has become perennial and contentious. The social contract theory, in its numerous variations, has established itself as a primary device for testing the legitimacy of governments because it has taught us that political authority must rest on the consent of those over whom the authority will be exercised. No one, either by divine appointment or by natural authority, is entitled to rule. The revolutionary implication is that all governments not based on consent are

inherently illegitimate and must be rectified by revolution or gradual reform. In this sense, the "democratic principle" seeks universality and remains unsatisfied to the extent that it has not yet achieved universality. However, even if conservatives express agreement on the democratic principle as the basis of political legitimacy, there is far less agreement on the scope of power to be exercised even by legitimate governments. While democracies can limit the exercise of political power, democracies can also serve as a plebiscite to empower governments to act virtually without limit.

Conservatism is skeptical about expanding the scope of governmental power beyond what is minimally required to maintain law and order. Since there is no fixed definition of the limits to governmental power, hence modern political life evidences incessant debates on what the limits are, and, since these debates are central to the way in which modern people understand political life, there can be no conceivable end to them. Conservatism is thus a manner of participating in these debates, and not simply a fixed and settled doctrine, as at times mistakenly characterized. The question for conservatives is not necessarily whether change is desirable, but a question about the means employed to affect change, coupled with skepticism about exaggerated claims as to how much good will result from change. It is precisely because conservatives understand that change is inevitable—there is no static world—which explains why conservatives tend to refrain from excessive enthusiasm about change. The conservative is sensitive to loss as well as gain, and believes that whatever the gains, there will be loss as well.

VARYING DEGREES OF CONSERVATISM
CASE STUDY: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

To be conservative thus poses a choice either to opt out or to engage the modern game of politics with all of its uncertainties and open-endedness, and we see today that many conservatives are no less prone to reform and programmatic public policy than are their "liberal" and "radical" opponents. Today, in America the so-called *paleoconservatives* otherwise known as old-fashioned, antiquarian, and traditionalist tend to disdain the political scene; they criticize *movement conservatives*, or those who are oriented towards political success by gaining electoral office through compromises with their liberal opponents, and *neoconservatives*, proponents of an American welfare state, using U.S. resources to enforce improved social conditions globally. The latter term denotes, in America, reconstructed New Deal liberals, or former socialists, who take a more sober view of governmental power than they did in their earlier progressive days, who reject the left-wing of the Democratic Party especially on foreign policy issues, and who often have abandoned the Democratic Party for the Republican Party. How far conservatism can be identified with the Republican Party is itself a matter of debate among conservatives. There is in addition a divergence between those neoconservatives who focus on distrust of the growth of governmental power in domestic policy, and those who emphasize the projection of power in American foreign policy. To the degree that conservatism traditionally expressed skepticism about foreign involvement,

there is tension between traditional conservatives embracing isolationist policies and neoconservatives purporting foreign intervention.

Evolutionary conservatism is a profound feature of the American political tradition. It is also a source of intellectual controversy because there is a recurrent debate as to whether America even has a genuine conservative tradition at all. Such commentators as Louis Hartz, in *The Liberal Tradition in America* (1955), argued that there is in America no significant conservative tradition. However, Russell Kirk, in *The Conservative Mind* (1953), demonstrated such a tradition based on John Adams's American version of the Burkean idea and traced its path into the twentieth century. These are two classic expressions of the modern debate over the American political tradition. In addition, the word *tradition* can be, and is, appropriated by conservatives and liberals alike. Liberalism, too, has its traditions. One might conclude, then, with respect to America, there remains an amalgamation of traditional and enlightenment ideas such that America is both old and new, both conservative and liberal, at the same time.

EDMUND BURKE

Burke's conservatism, which was formed in the different conditions of the late eighteenth century in contrast to present times, was moderate in that he recognized the unavoidability of reform while seeking to keep it within limits. He was a reformer himself, not a "reactionary." For example, he acknowledged the legitimacy of the claims of the American revolutionaries as he rejected the aspirations of the French revolutionaries. While in Burke's view, the Americans appealed for their traditional rights as English citizens—and Burke respected this because he was devoted to defending liberty against the encroachments of governmental power—the French sought to remake the whole of society from the ground up, and this impelled their increasing use of greater force to overcome the natural resistance to wholesale change. Indeed, the American Revolution is often described as a "conservative" revolution precisely because it did not seek to reconstruct the whole of existing society, and in the framing of a new constitution in 1787, Americans preserved a certain skepticism about centralized government. This is most profoundly expressed in *The Federalist Papers* (1788–1789), especially those composed by James Madison, America's fourth President.

Burke's was not the only form of conservatism at his time. A variation on the theme is found in Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821), and in the romanticism of Chateaubriand (1768–1848). Here is conservatism as reaction against the transformation of modern Europe. Both embrace tradition in response to the upheavals of their time, but their emphasis differs from Burke's. Maistre and Chateaubriand regret the loss of the traditional forms of authority that accept a ruling elite and the authority of traditional, especially Catholic, religious figures.

Burke, in embracing traditional English liberties, for example, accepts the economic revolution that produced free markets and Adam Smith's system of natural liberty, rejecting government control of the economy as another perceived means

in which governmental power will exceed its justifiable authority. In this respect, Burke maintains a strong defense of limited government, and is more compatible with what developed as *classical liberalism* in the nineteenth century, with its emphasis on free markets and international free trade. Today there is a strong affinity between classical liberals who defend free markets as the principal safeguard of liberty, and conservatives who, while prone to attack materialism, nevertheless acknowledge the importance of civil society and its foundation in the rights of private property and self-determination.

There is also a greater degree of individualism in Burke, and, ultimately, an acceptance of the need to come to terms with the new world post-1789; he is not a nostalgic, longing for a return to a vanished world; he deals with the new without glorifying it. In this sense, Burke's counterparts are John Adams in America, Alexis de Tocqueville in France, and Winston Churchill in England.

CONSERVATISM AS PRAGMATISM

Conservatism combines discernible characteristics in varying ways, with varying emphases, by different exponents. Conservatism, in its political skepticism, reflects the Augustinian Christian notion of original sin, sometimes expressed in theological terms, and sometimes transposed into more secular terms. Religious and secular conservatives can agree on human limitations, even though they may disagree on the importance of religious belief for a well-ordered society. Conservatism exhibits a moral imagination which, implicitly or explicitly, acknowledges a transcendent reality that is beyond human control; thus, scientific and technological innovation is to be treated with restraint because conservatives know that we can initiate many things but we cannot know in advance what all the consequences will turn out to be, nor how much we will like the results even of our successes. Untested innovation should be approached with caution. Conservatives typically stress to enjoy the opportunities of the present moment, to diminish the anxieties that follow from obsessive concern for, or guilt about, the past and, in addition, to restrain anxiety about what the future may bring.

This bespeaks a certain disposition of gratitude for what they have—defying resentment, envy, or alienation. This further suggests either a capacity for enjoyment of life, or Stoic patience with the human condition, or elements of both at once. It is these very characteristics that are criticized or commonly misinterpreted as complacency, as indifference to the plight of others, or as an unmerited sense of superiority or self-righteousness.

However, in the conservative's opinion, this is, rather, to acknowledge that human action is never complete by design. Conservatives deny political action can be made entirely rational to all of its public-serving interests. Therefore, the goal of the conservative is neither to be deceived nor to engage in self-deception and wishful thinking. If, as a result, conservatives are sometimes perceived as too reticent about change, conservatives will defend their stance citing it is because their opponents are too enthusiastic about claims, which allege to

know more than they actually know or can potentially achieve. Abstracting parts of the past from the whole—unavoidable, perhaps, as a condition of arguments for reform and perfection—carries always, as the conservative sees it, an unreliable optimism, which the record of human history teaches us to treat with considerable suspicion.

POPULAR CONSERVATIVE BELIEFS

RIGHT TO PROPERTY

Conservatism also defends the right of private property as fundamental. Conservatives take private property to be a bulwark against centralized power and an essential factor in the defense of the individual right to make something of one's self. Conservatives are not ashamed to possess property and, in principle, they do not resent that others have property, indeed even more property than they themselves have. Conservatives, while believing in the universal dignity of human beings, tend to value liberty more highly than equality. In their view, a society of free individuals will inevitably produce mixed results from the efforts of individuals to live for themselves. There will be successes and failures, and inequalities in outcomes, and the price of liberty is to accept responsibility for oneself, and to mind one's own business.

ORGANIC ARISTOCRACY

For those like John Adams, there is a *natural aristocracy*. The natural aristocrat demonstrates excellence not by holding high rank in a hierarchical social order based on inherited status. Indeed, except by convention, a member of an aristocratic class may not be excellent at all. A natural aristocrat is an individual of talent and energy who might spring from any social location, and a good society is one in which there is opportunity to show one's self, and to be acknowledged and rewarded for proven accomplishments. This distinction between two ideas of the aristocrat shows also the essential modernity of the idea of natural aristocracy. Conservatism does not necessarily defend classes or hierarchies, but it does defend the rewards that derive from accomplishment, protecting liberty from an excessive and destructive preoccupation with egalitarianism. Conservatives resist *social leveling* as a recipe for mediocrity. Thus, conservatives tend to emphasize the republican form of government, which incorporates the principle of equality in consent in a system of representative government wherein the natural aristocracy has the opportunity to achieve office and govern. In contemporary terms, they support *liberal democracy,* which symbolizes the primacy of liberty tempered by democratic consent.

Conservatives also argue that, while the promotion of equality is not in and of itself undesirable, efforts to equalize the conditions of individuals risk involving more and more government intervention (i.e., expanding government scope), taking away from some individuals for the sake of others, and that this will finally produce, in the name of liberal reform, a nonliberal society. In modern times, the compromise of the moderate welfare state is the practical approach to reconcile the claims of liberty and equality. This may not appeal to

radical libertarians or to socialists, and it may irritate conservatives, but it is the meeting ground, wherein conservatives and modern liberals deal with each other—and it is the locus for the debate over the scope of governmental power, which is believed to be at the heart of modern politics.

ADVOCATING RULE OF LAW

Further, conservatives celebrate the rule of law and constitutional government. The rule of law is first and foremost a fundamental principle expressing a vision of how individuals should be formally organized in relation to each other. The principle suggests individuals should live in relation to each other as law-abiding citizens, free to enter into voluntary agreements with each other in pursuing their self-chosen lives. There need to be rules of this game. The rules are primarily procedural in character, as they do not tell individuals what to do; rather, they establish a set of limitations by informing individuals, whatever they are doing, to conduct themselves in a certain manner in the course of doing it. A classic and obvious example would be the rules of the road. The rules of the road do not tell one where to travel or, indeed, whether to travel at all. They do prescribe that, wherever one decides to go, one should observe basic procedures designed to facilitate getting there safely. All are equally subject to these rules; they do not favor one traveler over another, nor do they specify destinations.

As such, these rules are compatible and with a wide range of differing socioeconomic conditions among individuals, complementary to a modern world characterized by continuous diversity. These rules are practical implementations of the *idea* of the rule of law, meaning how individuals of widely differing backgrounds and interests may nevertheless interact with each other safely while pursuing what are often entirely different goals and aspirations. Adherence to the law is a fundamental idea in the conservative moral disposition.

For conservatives, the primary purpose of government will be to maintain the rule of law, to safeguard property rights, to provide a judicial structure for adjudicating disputes, and to provide a national defense. Of course, there must be an enforcement power to punish those who do not live up to the responsibility to be law-abiding. Law enforcement faculties are to focus on maintaining the rule of law, not to engage in imposing social changes deemed desirable by some, and not by all. As commonly associated with conservatism, the rule of law of the state should be strong but its scope limited and in contrast to the idea of the administrative state. An administrative state emphasizes the use of political power to renovate and perfect the social order, involving the supersession of rules by the exercise of discretionary judgment entrusted to bureaucratic agencies seeking to implement the goals of various policies in detail. For conservatives, this poses significant perils: first, forgetting or downplaying the limits to human wisdom and insight, and the danger of enabling specific persons to determine what is best for everyone else; and secondly, the aggregation of power to micromanage the manner in which individuals conduct their lives, compromising individual liberty for the potential but unlikely perfection of the social order.

See also *Burke, Edmund; Conservative Parties; Fiscal Conservatism; Neoconservatism; New Conservatism; Property Rights; Religious Right; Rule of Law; Social Conservatism; Social Order.*

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Conservative Parties

In the Western world, conservative parties are traditionally the parties of landed interest. They generally represent the preservation of traditional moral teaching and a belief in a transcendental order, a denial of uniformity and equalitarianism, an acceptance of the organic structure of society, and a subscription to evolutionary rather than revolutionary change in societies. In short, rather than being an ideology, conservatism represents a way of life or accumulation of values as opposed to those ideologies that emerged after the French Revolution (1989–1799) and Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

ORIGINS OF CONSERVATISM

The term *conservatism* is often used to describe tradition and traditional values, beliefs, and institutions. Although the origins of some conservative parties, such as the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, can be traced back to the seventeenth century, the term conservative is exclusively modern, having developed after the Enlightenment and the French Revolution with its reactionary tone to occurrences in rapidly industrializing Western societies.

Anglo-Irish statesman and theorist Edmund Burke developed a conservative view against the Enlightenment and its reason-based progressive, utopian, and inorganic views, insisting on the importance of inherited values and customs in the survival and continuation of any given society. According to Burke, the proper formulation of government does not come from abstract views or individually developed ideologies, but from time-honored development of the state, piecemeal progress through experiences, and continuation of important societal institutions such as family and the church. Accordingly, tradition is experienced and deeply rooted in a society and has much more value and importance than abstract metaphysical assertions because it is tested by time and various people's experiences. Reason, on the other hand, may be a mask for the preferences of certain people or the untested and unreliable wisdom of only one generation. Therefore, change should come via organic methods rather than revolutionary movements because, in this conservative understanding of society, human society is not an aggregation of atomized individuals—it is an organic unity.

In Western political theory, there have not been systematic treaties about conservatism similar to Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* or John Locke's *Two Treaties of Government,* or even Karl Marx's *Communist Manifesto.* Therefore, conservatism is considered to be less a political doctrine than a habit of mind, a way of living or a mode of feeling. Traditionally, conservatives strongly support the right of property. For example, as Burke famously declared, nothing was more sacred to eighteenth century Whigs than property rights.

CONSERVATIVE VARIANTS: CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS, AND FISCAL

Many contemporary parties also represent conservative views that may very well be informally referred to as conservative parties, even if they are not explicitly named so. These parties have conservative agendas but represent a variety of conservative views in association with their country's historical development and cultural background. For example, conservative parties in the Western world have more or less adopted the Enlightenment ideas of the separation of church and state, while conservative parties in the Islamic world, such as the ruling Justice and Development Party in Turkey and Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, proved to have problems with the Western notion of secularism. Conservative parties in the West also distinguish themselves from far-right ideologies and parties that often have a xenophobic and racist agenda. In Europe, conservative parties often ally with centrist and, in some cases, leftist parties rather than xenophobic far-right parties. However, some anti-immigration policies of the conservative parties in Europe often conflict with their free market economy views.

Among parties that do explicitly identify themselves as conservative, it is necessary to distinguish three different conservative approaches—cultural conservatives, religious conservatives, and fiscal conservatives—in order to understand the structures and contents of various conservative parties in the world. Instead of relying on universalistic moral codes, *cultural conservatives* rely on the moral values of their culture and argue that old institutions particular to place or culture should

persevere. However, *religious conservatives* may support or be supported by secular establishment, or they may find themselves at odds with the culture in which they live. In any case, their point of reference is mostly religious texts and people, and thus, unlike cultural conservatism, religious conservatism is not necessarily organic. Moreover, there is no clear-cut separation between these two conservative approaches, so they can intertwine, influencing conservative movements and parties accordingly. British prime minister John Major's back-to-the-basics campaign is an example of this. During the draft of the European Union's constitution, a conservative movement sought to imprint certain conservative values in the constitution.

Fiscal conservatism, on the other hand, reflects a prudent approach in government spending and debt. According to this approach, governments do not have the right to accumulate large debts and expect the public to pay them. Since this fiscal conservatism is an economic approach that has nothing to do with traditional values, beliefs, and institutions, a party can therefore be a fiscally conservative one that does not pursue a conservative agenda in its political action. However, from an economic perspective, many of today's conservative parties have adopted a neoliberal economic agenda. The term *liberal* often refers to free market policies outside the United States, and the term *liberal conservative* has become acceptable in the politics of many European countries. In fact, in today's era of globalization, conservative and neoliberal parties are allied against many common enemies, such as socialism.

THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND CONTEMPORARY CONSERVATISM

Many Enlightenment ideas and events, such as the French Revolution and Industrial Revolution, invariably affected many countries' traditional ways of living and thinking. Therefore, conservatism today cannot be considered an isolated approach immunized from the premises and approaches of other ideologies and modern movements. Accordingly, most conservative parties support the sovereign nation and patriotic values of duty and sacrifice, which are basically a result of the Enlightenment and subsequent events.

See also *Confessional Parties; Conservatism; Counter-Enlightenment Political Thought; Ethnic Parties; Family Values; Fascist Parties; Fiscal Conservatism; Liberal Parties; Nationalist Parties; Neoconservatism; New Conservatism; Political Parties; Religious Parties; Social Conservatism.*

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Consociational Democracy

Consociational democracy is an electoral and civil arrangement that attempts to incorporate and share power throughout the various politically salient subgroups within a given society. Constitution writers and politicians in deeply divided countries such as Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Cyprus, India, Lebanon, Malaysia, the Netherlands, South Africa, and Switzerland used consociational arrangements to deal with the fragmentation within their societies many years before scholarly interest in power-sharing democracies developed. Consociational arrangements were implemented as a means of addressing internal, enduring conflicts that had frequently erupted into violence. These cleavages often form along class, linguistic, religious, or race lines. For the states mentioned above, and other countries throughout the world, consociationalism represented an alternative to majority-rule democracy and a belief that pursuing policies of accommodation could best reduce the potential for conflict within a given society.

Consociational democracy rests on four principles: (1) grand coalition as a means of achieving broad representation in political decision making, particularly at the executive level; (2) segmental autonomy in matters of self-interest for the subgroups (e.g., schools and culture); (3) proportional representation in the legislature; and (4) veto rights for all subgroups on matters of substantial importance to the subgroup. Although the first modern researcher to use the term as it is understood today was the economist Sir Arthur Lewis (1965), Arend Lijphart and Gerhard Lehmbruch introduced consociational democracy to political science in 1967. Emphasizing the importance of institutional configurations, they broke with the dominant belief within the discipline that ethnic homogeneity was the most important element in societal stability. The early work of these scholars focused on the consociational practices of several smaller countries in Europe. To date, political science research on consociational democracy is still most readily associated with Lijphart.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

In Western Europe, the track record of consociational democracy has been largely successful (except perhaps in Belgium). Indeed, in several countries such as Austria, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg consociational arrangements proved so successful that the prominence of consociational democracy has receded as it has become less necessary to stem conflict. In other parts of the world, the record is mixed. While Colombian, Indian, Malaysian, and South African experiments with consociationalism can be seen as largely successful, Cyprus and Lebanon's consociational systems each ended in civil war. After shifting from consociational or semiconsociational systems to more majoritarian patterns of governance, Uruguay in 1973 and Suriname in 1980 each became subject to martial rule. In the case of Lebanon, outside factors brought extraordinary pressure to bear on the consociational system that had worked rather well up to that point. In Uruguay and Suriname, each country's movement toward majority rule complicates any attempt to point to consociationalism as having brought about failure.

A recent study concerning the ability of political institutions to promote state attachment in multiethnic societies has found that proportional electoral systems and federalism—each frequently a key component of consociational arrangements—have mixed effects, at best, as solutions to ethnic divisions. The mixed record of consociationalism outside of Europe raises the possibility that it works better in more developed countries than developing countries and that some combination of other factors such as literacy, strength of overall institutions, or level of development are a necessary precondition for deeply fissured societies to implement consociationalism properly.

Comparative research has uncovered several factors that facilitate the maintenance of consociational democracy. The two most important are the absence of a majority segment and the lack of large socioeconomic inequalities throughout the population. Other important factors include subgroups of roughly equal size, a small overall population size, foreign threats common to all subgroups, overarching loyalties to the state that counteract segmental loyalty, and preexisting traditions of consensus among elites.

CHANGING IDENTITIES OVER TIME

Critics fear that consociational arrangements carry a one-size-fits-all approach or that they risk segmenting identities to a dangerous extent. Lijphart, however, in his 2004 article "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," points to substantial variation in the means employed by different countries in achieving the core principles of consociationalism, and the incorporation of recent constructivist scholarship focusing on questions of identity in comparative research has begun to address the concerns surrounding identity. The salient dimensions of identity are much more subject to change over time than previous generations of scholars had suspected, and this information is relevant to those who study consociational democracy as well. Lijphart, in a 2001 work "Constructivism and Consociational Theory," suggests that his own ideas about the nature of ethnicity have changed over the span of his career, from a more primordial view to one more consistent with constructivism. His beliefs, however, were not changed so much by constructivist scholarship as by events on the ground in Lebanon and South Africa.

In Lebanon, the implementation of a consociational system that allocated political power along predetermined lines of cleavage, further calcified by a fixing of that proportion despite demographic change, proved highly unstable as Lebanese politics changed over time eventually ending in civil war. In South Africa, the intense and negative social engineering during apartheid made it very difficult and politically sensitive to predetermine the subgroups of society. Consociationalism implemented in such a way as to let the relevant groups self-select, and form of their own accord does not predetermine identity in a way that can form overly constraining permanent political cleavages, nor leaves a potential subgroup outside of power.

The Netherlands represents an example of consociationalism of the self-selecting variety. There, all groups receive equal

public funding to establish schools of their own, provided certain standards are met. Further, a very low threshold was established for representation in the legislature, which again allows for political parties to form of their own accord. Self-selecting consociationalism represents a potentially important innovation in the theory as it relates to the integration of newcomers, an issue of increasing importance in the industrialized democracies of the world, because it does not arbitrarily fix the predicted identities of subgroups. Groups are still most likely to form along the conventional lines of expected cleavages, but consociationalism has now opened itself up to accommodating the potentially changing nature of these identities within a given society over time. This is consistent with constructivist research on the nature of identity and an important institutional design in attempts to integrate newcomers.

See also *Coalition Formation; Federalism, Comparative; Identity, Politics of; Pillarization; Proportional Representation.*

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Constant de Rebeque, Henri-Benjamin

French politician and writer Henri-Benjamin Constant de Rebeque (1767–1830), born in Switzerland and educated in Scotland and Germany, was an important advocate of liberal politics in postrevolutionary France.

Although Constant was not in France during the French Revolution (1789–1799), he returned soon after the Reign of Terror and dove into political life. He opposed Napoleon Bonaparte strongly enough that the dictator ousted him from the government and exiled him for more than ten years. During his exile, Constant wrote some of his most important political theory (including *Principles of Politics* in 1810), as well as an influential romantic novel (*Adolphe* in 1816) and much of his lifelong project on the history of ancient religion (*De la religion* from 1824–1831). He also wrote a powerful critique of Napoleon's rule in 1814 that would strike a chord with twentieth-century readers contemplating the totalitarianisms of their time (*The Spirit of Conquest and Usurpation*). Despite his long opposition to Napoleon, he agreed to write a constitution for the new imperial regime when Napoleon returned to power briefly in 1815. Although never implemented, his plan influenced later constitutional experiments in France and elsewhere. Following the Bourbon restoration in 1814, Constant returned to politics, occupying a seat in the Chamber of Deputies from 1819 to 1822 and 1824 to 1830, where his spirited rhetoric helped to create a strong opposition and foster a partisan style of politics on the British model.

Constant was one of the first writers to use the word *liberal* to describe his political stance. Strongly influenced by the example of Britain's constitutional monarchy, he spoke out forcefully on behalf of limited government, a free press, and religious toleration. In his more theoretical writings, he followed Scottish thinkers David Hume and Adam Smith in praising commercial society, but he was more interested in the political challenges of instituting and governing such societies than these thinkers had been, and he explored questions about institutional design in more detail. He defended a system of representative government that would be resistant to the consolidation of authority and the arbitrary use of power. His institutional scheme included checks and balances between parts of government, a gradual expansion of suffrage in conjunction with a property requirement, a "neutral power" in the monarch to help adjudicate among the various active powers, and a new style of federalism that would leave decisions in the hands of local institutions whenever practicable. The July Revolution of 1830, just months before his death, finally realized some of the measures that he had advocated.

Among political theorists, Constant is best known for his 1819 lecture "On the Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns," which argued that modern peoples should not pursue the form of liberty associated with ancient Sparta and Rome. Instead of requiring constant involvement in politics, sacrifice for the public good, and warlike virtues,

modern nations should try to leave their citizens free to pursue private happiness and self-development. In other writings, he voiced anxiety about commercial society's tendency to foster utilitarianism and materialism, and he investigated the history of ancient religion, seeking insight into how religious feeling could escape the bonds of priestly and political authority and be made compatible with modern liberty.

See also *Liberalism, Classical; Liberal Theory.*

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Constituency

A *constituency* has two central meanings in the context of electoral systems. The first is also known as an electoral district, riding, or voting area. It refers to a geographical area of a country or region, or a local area, that is legislatively divided, usually for electoral purposes. Single-member districts elect one representative to a legislative body, while multimember districts elect more than one representative. The number of representatives elected per district is known as the *district magnitude.* The geographic size and number of representatives elected in each constituency are determined by the electoral system in place. Constituency boundaries, or electoral boundaries, are also often distributed and readjusted based on geographic and population considerations, including population parity or equality; regional population features; and in order to recognize community and diversity interests.

The second meaning of constituency refers to any particular group of electors, bound by a shared geography for the purposes of electoral districting, or bound by shared demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, ethnicity or nationality, culture, language, religion, or other attributes. Within this meaning, a *constituent* is a single individual who is part of the larger constituency, or group.

See also *District Magnitude; Districting; Electoral Geography; Gerrymandering.*

. . . . JENNIFER E. DALTON

Constituency Relations

When legislators are elected from specific geographic districts, significant resources are typically devoted to constituency relations—activity characterized by interaction between elected legislators and individual citizens or small groups of citizens. The nature of such interactions ranges from impersonal contact, mediated by legislative staff or conducted by correspondence, to direct encounters between representative and constituents.

REPRESENTATION

Constituency relations serve two distinct functions for a legislator. First, a legislator's interactions with constituents can facilitate representation by providing crucial information about the represented citizens. As political scientist Richard Fenno notes in his 1978 book *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts,* regarding constituents, it is critical for a member of Congress and, implicitly, a member of any representative body, to know "who they are, what they think, and what they want" (233). Constituency relations are an important way for legislators to gain such knowledge. Sometimes a legislator will gather information directly, meeting with constituents individually or in small groups.

When legislators are in their home districts, their schedules are filled with community events; for example, representatives often give speeches at graduation ceremonies, present awards for civic organizations, and hold town-hall-style meetings for the public. Such occasions give legislators ample opportunities to hear the views and concerns of the people they represent. They also offer opportunities to curry favor with the people they represent, thus serving a second purpose, helping legislators' reelection efforts.

CASEWORK AND REELECTION PROSPECTS

One significant form of constituency relations is known as *casework.* With casework, legislative aides receive and respond to particularized requests from individuals. Casework is thought to enhance legislators' reelection prospects in two ways: by creating satisfied customers who will support their representative out of a sense of gratitude and by giving the representative positive accomplishments to advertise. Notably, while studies of legislator attitudes provide ample evidence that representatives believe constituency service improves their reelection tallies, the actual effect of casework on reelection prospects has been quite difficult to pin down. Most recent studies, however, suggest that performing casework helps legislators win reelection.

The link between casework and representation is not quite as straightforward, as casework is generally divorced from ideological or policy content. The aggregation of citizens' requests, however, can provide representatives with important information about how the government is functioning (or malfunctioning) and thus facilitate the traditional legislative function of executive oversight. If a veterans' hospital is providing poor service, the representative from that district will hear about it from constituents seeking the representative's help. If the streets in a certain neighborhood are not regularly swept, residents will call their city counselor.

Members of the U.S. Congress consider service to be a core function of their congressional offices and make it

very easy for constituents to request help. Every member of Congress features a link or button on the gateways to their Web sites labeled "How can I help you?" or "constituent services" or something similar; these links lead to pages that generally include detailed instructions on the range of services the member offers. A sample of such services includes arranging a tour of the Capitol or White House, nominating a constituent to one of the service academies, and providing a letter to support federal grant applications. But the meat-and-potatoes of constituency relations consists of intervening with a government agency on behalf of a specific individual. Typical requests seek help with an agency that provides benefits and services, such as the Social Security Administration or the Veterans Administration, but members of Congress are willing and eager to help in more unusual circumstances too. An example that received wide attention in early 2010 involved an eight-year-old boy from New Jersey who had the same name as an individual on the federal government's "selectee" list of persons who receive extra security screening at U.S. airports. Each time he traveled, the boy's family endured long delays, and he himself was aggressively frisked. The family asked their representative, Rep. Bill Pascrell (D–N.J.) to intervene on their behalf with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). *The New York Times* reported Pascrell's response, arranging for a TSA agent to personally escort the family at Newark Airport. In this case, Pascrell's office earned the gratitude of an individual voter and attracted significant positive attention for Pascrell in a national news outlet.

While constituency relations are a key part of legislators' reelection efforts, two characteristics distinguish them from traditional campaign activity. First, constituency relations involve the conduct of official governmental business. Advertising one's positions on public issues or record of achievement, even when such achievement relates to helping individual constituents, is not an official act; intervening with a government agency on behalf of an individual, responding to constituents' inquiries about legislation, or appearing before a community group to discuss public issues are official acts. Second, constituency relations generally entail reciprocal communication, whereas campaign activity emphasizes the flow of information from legislator to constituency.

IMPORTANCE OF CONSTITUENCY RELATIONS

Emphasis on constituency relations varies across legislatures depending on the institutional context. The size of the constituency, in terms of both population and geography, the nature of the electoral system, and the availability of official resources are important factors determining a legislator's level of attention to constituency relations. For example, in the United States, members of the House emphasize constituency relations more than senators. Senators represent many more constituents than the House members (with a handful of exceptions). Their "districts" are geographically large and thus require more reliance on mass media. Furthermore, they are elected for longer terms and from two-member districts.

These factors all make constituency relations less important in the allocation of official resources. In electoral systems where parties play a stronger role, constituency relations are also less valuable to individual legislators, whose reelection prospects depend more on party label than on their individual appeal.

See also *Civic Engagement; Civil Service; Representation and Representative; Town Hall Meeting.*

. . . .   JENNIFER A. STEEN

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Constitutional Amendments

Article V of the U.S. Constitution provides two processes for proposing and two processes for ratifying amendments. Consistent with the role of the Constitution as a superior law designed to rein in legislative and other governmental powers, both processes are designed to be more difficult than the processes for ordinary legislation. Congress must either muster a two-thirds majority to propose amendments, or, in a still unused provision, two-thirds of the states can request Congress to call a convention to propose amendments. Three-fourths of the state legislatures, or special conventions within three-fourths of the states (a mechanism used only in the case of the amendment repealing national alcoholic prohibition), must subsequently approve them.

THE EARLY AMENDMENTS

During ratification debates over the Constitution, Federalist proponents of the document praised its amendment-making mechanisms as being superior to the process under the Articles of Confederation, which required congressional proposal and unanimous approval of the states. Federalist claims got an early test. Anti-Federalists had criticized the new Constitution for omitting a bill of rights to protect the people against the new national government. When James Madison, a prominent proponent of the new Constitution, agreed to work for a bill of rights, he hoped to protect individual rights, but he also wanted to ensure that amendments did not undo the work of the Constitutional Convention, which had provided for a more powerful national government. Madison fought a heroic and successful fight to get the first Congress to devote attention to

introducing such rights to calm Anti-Federalist fears at a time when many of his colleagues thought that there were more pressing issues at state. Ultimately, Congress proposed twelve amendments, ten of which the states ratified in 1791. Although Madison had favored integrating these amendments into the constitutional text, Roger Sherman succeeded in convincing Congress to add them to the end of the document, which now provides a trail of constitutional alterations throughout American history.

The Bill of Rights continues to represent some of the nation's most important ideals. The First Amendment protects freedoms of religion, speech, press, peaceable assembly (linked to freedom of association), and petition. The Second Amendment provides for the right to bear arms, and the Third Amendment limits the quartering of troops in private homes. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and requires probable cause for search warrants, and, in addition to providing for compensation for government takings, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments follow with a variety of rights for individuals accused of crimes or on trial for them. The Seventh Amendment provides for jury trials in civil cases, and the Eighth Amendment limits bail, fines, and prohibits cruel and usual punishments. The Ninth Amendment indicates that the list of rights is not exclusive, while the Tenth Amendment recognizes that states reserve some unspecified powers to themselves.

Congress proposed the Bill of Rights in 1789, which the states ratified in 1791. Similarly, states ratified the Eleventh Amendment in 1795, just two years after a Supreme Court decision in *Chisholm v. Georgia,* which had allowed out-of-state citizens to sue states without their consent and contrary to assurances that some Federalists had made during ratification debates.

Congress proposed the Twelfth Amendment in 1803, and the states ratified in 1804. Reacting both to presidential elections in which the president and vice president had been chosen from different parties and to the 1800 election in which Democratic and Republican presidential and vice presidential candidates tied, this amendment altered the electoral college mechanism so that electors began to cast separate votes for the top two offices.

POST–CIVIL WAR AMENDMENTS
The first twelve amendments suggested that the amending process was relatively easy, but subsequent experience proved otherwise. Despite rising tensions between the North and South, and numerous proposals for alterations that might head off conflict, Congress proposed only two amendments between 1803 and the Civil War (1861–1865), and both failed. The first would have disbarred individuals who accepted titles of nobility from citizenship, while the second would have exempted slavery from federal action.

The Civil War temporarily broke the amending logjam and resulted in the most consequential amendment in U.S. history. The Thirteenth Amendment (1865) prohibited involuntary servitude. The Fourteenth Amendment (1868) overturned the *Scott v. Sandford* (1857), by declaring that all persons,

including blacks, who were born or naturalized in the United States were citizens. It also guaranteed all such citizens the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens and protections of due process and equal protection. The Fifteenth Amendment (1868) further prohibited voting discrimination on the basis of race. Supreme Court decisions, culminating in the doctrine legitimizing "separate but equal" treatments in *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896), however, narrowed interpretations of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, while states embraced poll taxes, literacy tests, and other devices that limited African American voting rights.

PROGRESSIVE ERA AMENDMENTS
The years from 1868 to 1913 marked a period of amendment stalemate, followed by another period of reform associated with the Progressive Era. The Sixteenth Amendment overturned the Supreme Court decision in *Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.* (1895), and allowed for a national income tax, while the Seventeenth Amendment provided for direct election of U.S. senators (previously chosen by state legislatures). The Eighteenth Amendment (1919) inaugurated national alcoholic prohibition, while the Nineteenth (1920) prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex. Significantly, the Seneca Falls Convention had called for such a right, which both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments had ignored, in 1848.

MODERN AMENDMENTS
Subsequent amendments have been largely inconsequential by comparison. The Twentieth Amendment (1933) shortened the so-called lame-duck service of the president and members of Congress after new elections. The Twenty-first Amendment (1933) repealed the Eighteenth. The Twenty-second Amendment (1951), adopted in the wake of Franklin D. Roosevelt's unprecedented election to four terms, capped future presidential service at two full terms or no more than ten years. The Twenty-third Amendment (1961) provided for representation in the electoral college for the District of Columbia while the Twenty-fourth (1964) prohibited the poll tax in national elections. The Twenty-fifth Amendment (1967) made provision for presidential disability, the Twenty-sixth (1971) provided for national voting at age eighteen, thus effectively negating the Supreme Court decision in *Oregon v. Mitchell* (1970), which had ruled that Congress could only legislate on this matter relative to national elections. Finally, the Twenty-seventh amendment, originally proposed as part of the Bill of Rights and limiting the timing of congressional pay raises until after intervening elections, was putatively ratified in 1992.

MANY ARE CALLED, BUT FEW ARE CHOSEN
Members of Congress have introduced more than twelve thousand amending proposals, most of which have been redundant. Congress has only proposed thirty-three by the required majorities, and the states have ratified only twenty-seven. In addition to proposals discussed previously, states have failed to ratify an amendment relative to congressional representation proposed with the original bill of rights, a child labor amendment, an amendment that would have granted

the District of Columbia voting representation in Congress, and a proposed equal rights amendment for women.

After comparing the U.S. amending process to those in eleven democratic nations that use a system of legislative supremacy to adopt constitutional changes—those in nine nations that have legislative supremacy with an intervening election; those in five nations that allow for an amendment referendum to bypass the legislature; and those in seven nations, including the United States, that *require* such a referendum or its equivalent in complexity—political scientist Donald Lutz found that the U.S. system was the second most difficult in the world behind Australia. Because the Constitution is interpreted capaciously, however, institutions of government, especially the courts, have been able to render many decisions that have adapted the constitution to changing times, short of formal amendments.

See also *Articles of Confederation; Bill of Rights; Constitution Amending Procedures; Constitutions and Constitutionalism.*

. . . . JOHN R. VILE

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Constitutional Courts

Constitutional courts are judicial bodies that possess the authority to nullify or invalidate actions taken or laws enacted by governmental officials on the grounds that those actions or laws are violations of that country's constitution. This power of a court to authoritatively determine whether a legislative enactment or executive action is constitutional or unconstitutional is known as judicial review. The origin of judicial review is commonly considered to have come from the United States and the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark and politically critical decision in *Marbury v. Madison* (1803). It is in this case that Chief Justice John Marshall carved out this power of judicial review for the U.S. Supreme Court, even though the U.S. Constitution does not specifically enumerate this authority in the first place, nor does it attach such a power

as belonging to the federal courts or any other governmental actor. A variety of other nations have followed America's lead in placing this judicial check into their democratic governance structures, observed in the democratizing trends as manifested during the twentieth century—especially so after World War II (1939–1945) and in the post-1980s period.

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT STRUCTURES IN COMMON-LAW AND CIVIL-LAW COUNTRIES

The American orientation has been to give this function of constitutional adjudication to ordinary courts and to a supreme court—that is to say, they resolve disputes emanating from common law, statutory law, and the nation's constitution. However, the common practice seen in the contemporary era is for nations to construct special courts whose sole purpose and function is to engage in judicial review. These courts are called constitutional courts. Just under seventy nations now have such constitutional courts operating, and most of these nations make a point, unlike the United States, in directly establishing this authority of judicial review in their respective constitutions.

A clear pattern has emerged that shows that the U.S. form of judicial review—where ordinary courts possess judicial review authority; there are appellate courts in place to review lower court rulings; the supreme court serves as the court of last resort and final arbiter on these constitutional cases; and the dispute in question must be actual and concrete, not merely an hypothetical or abstract conflict—is often found in nations with common law backgrounds (e.g., Canada, Australia, Scandinavian countries, Pakistan, India, Burma, and a number of Latin American countries). Countries with a civil-law background are more likely to have a structure of constitutional courts separate from ordinary courts that decide constitutional cases and some of these countries allow these courts to produce advisory opinions on more abstract, less concrete disputes such as a proposed law in addition to resolving actual disputes arising from already enacted laws (e.g., Austria, France, Russia, Germany, Spain, and Italy).

DEBATE OVER THE PRIMARY PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS

In the European context of constitutional courts, the post–World War II constitutions of previously fascist states clearly stressed protections for fundamental human rights—constitutional courts would play a critical role in guaranteeing such rights and serving as a bulwark against the return of brutal autocrats. Thus, it has been argued that the overriding design of constitutional courts is to have them serve as inherently countermajoritarian institutions, working to ensure that the will of the majority would not and could not trample over basic liberties of the minority. In other words, the constitutional courts in their exercise of judicial review work to stabilize and temper forms of democratic governance. It is noteworthy that all of the postcommunist states in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s

ended up opting for a structure of constitutional courts, directly modeled from the German system.

A counterargument to this human rights protection contention is that constitutional courts have become popular due to the motivations of political elites and the accompanying incentive structures in their respective countries. As political actors in newly developing democracies deal with elections and the high probability that at some point they will not win an election and thus be out of power for a period of time, they are duly motivated to designate institutions (such as constitutional courts) to legitimately test, challenge, and potentially hinder public policy of the advantaged political opposition. In other words, constitutional courts are established instrumentally by political elites as they recognize and respond to the intrinsic electoral uncertainty associated with democratic procedures.

JUDICIAL SELECTION FOR CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS

The mechanisms used in the recruitment and selection of judges to serve on these constitutional courts varies. A common practice in these methods of appointment is to place some degree of insulation between these judges and external political influence, but at the same time try to provide a modicum of judicial accountability and responsiveness to the public. This captures one of the leading criticisms of constitutional courts: The appointment processes in place do not provide adequate levels of accountability for these judges. A variety of countries use methods that necessitate a sharing of this judicial appointment power between the executive and legislative branches, with the executive nominating the appointee and the legislature consenting or rejecting (a prime example of a checks and balances effort in the structure). Other more complex systems involve even more actors in selection process, such as all three branches (legislative, executive, and judicial) responsible for nominating a proportion of constitutional court judges. Additional recruitment iterations, albeit less common, involve a single entity, such as the chief executive, making the appointment. The typical normal tenure for a constitutional court judge is one nonrenewable term, commonly between six to nine years of service.

CONTROVERSIES

There are several inherent controversies with constitutional courts (as well as supreme courts) as they engage in judicial review. The first revolves around unelected, relatively politically unaccountable judges striking down and invalidating actions or measures taken by the people's elected representatives. With its judicial second-guessing, this antimajoritarian posture strikes some as problematically antidemocratic. The second controversy engages the challenging conundrum of how exactly these judges are supposed to go about interpreting their nation's constitution to help them decide whether a statute or governmental activity is truly unconstitutional. The ongoing debate between judicial activism and judicial restraint manifests directly in these types of questions. How much deference these judges should show the elected branches, and how close to the text of the constitution or to the specific intentions of the constitution's original writers these judges should cleave, remains uncertain.

See also *Constitutions and Constitutionalism*.

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Constitutional Democracy

A *constitutional democracy* is a form of representative, democratic governance, in which the constitution, or rule of law, is supreme. This type of democracy is premised on the doctrine of the separation of powers, resulting in a system of checks and balances. The separation of powers manifests through the constitutional authority that each branch of government exercises in checking and balancing the other branches of government. A constitutional democracy normally consists of three largely independent branches; the functions of each, however, do not operate in complete exclusivity. The executive branch is responsible for the administrative implementation of legislation; the legislature enacts and amends laws; and the judiciary interprets, and applies, the law based on precedence and legislative statutes. Each branch may be elected or appointed.

Constitutional democracies may be unitary, federal, or confederal, but most states are unitary. *Unitary states* are constitutionally governed as one single unit with authority stemming from a single legislature. In a unitary state, there may be subgovernmental units, but they are created and abolished by the central government. Any powers that subgovernmental units hold are granted and amended by the central government without the need for formal agreement from the subgovernmental units—a process known as *devolution*. A devolved state is unitary in nature, but the subgovernmental units have a great deal of autonomous decision-making authority, much like federal systems. Nevertheless, the subgovernmental units do not have any constitutional authority to override national legislation or to protect the powers they have been granted.

Federal governments consist of a central or national government alongside other autonomous legislatures, such as state

or provincial governments. These different levels of government are constitutionally recognized, with constitutionally enshrined legislative distribution of sovereignty. Areas of jurisdiction can be exclusive or concurrent, depending on the requirements laid out in the constitution. Classical federalism mandates that the levels of government are equal; there is no imbalance between the jurisdictional authorities of each level. In this way, the central government normally retains exclusive jurisdiction over matters that are of relevance to the nation as a whole, while the provincial or state governments deal with issues that are localized or regional in nature. However, this rarely occurs because federal constitutions are usually biased in favor of one level of government. *Confederal states* are rare and mirror federal governments quite closely in structure, albeit with most authority vested in peripheral government bodies, while the central government holds little power.

Centralization occurs when the majority of authority lies with the national government, whereas *decentralization* describes a system where the subnational legislative bodies hold significant jurisdictional powers. *Asymmetrical federalism* occurs when the different levels of government have imbalanced degrees of jurisdictional authority. *Fiscal federalism* stems from the devolution of power over revenue sources divided among the different levels of government, including management of any fiscal imbalances among governments.

If a legislative body acts outside of its jurisdictional authority, it is beyond the legal scope of the constitution, while legislation or statutes that are within jurisdiction are within this power. However, there are residual powers to consider in a federal system. These residual powers are areas of authority not explicitly assigned in the constitution, which are comprehensively granted to one level of government.

In federal systems, there may be additional orders of government, such as local governments, but these are usually not given explicit constitutional jurisdiction. Instead, they are often creatures of the subnational governments, serving the needs and interests of specific cities, communities, or neighborhoods. Powers may include taxation and other limited autonomy granted by the constitutionally recognized levels of government.

Some federations are multinational in scope, including national minority populations within the federation. Canada is an especially useful example of a multinational state, most notably with regard to its francophone and indigenous peoples. Very basically, in the provincial context of Quebec, extensive autonomous governing authority, rooted in historical and cultural distinctiveness, has been recognized and ensured to protect Francophone culture. While the same progress is not evident for indigenous peoples in Canada, there has been implied judicial and explicit governmental acknowledgment of Aboriginal governance. While the Canadian constitution does not explicitly lay out a third order of Aboriginal governance, as would have been the case had the 1992 Charlottetown Accord been successfully ratified by the Canadian public, several governance agreements have been implemented, or are currently being negotiated, including some jurisdictional authority for indigenous communities.

See also *Centralization, Deconcentration, and Decentralization; Checks and Balances; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Endangered Cultures; Federalism; Nationality; Rule of Law; Universal Jurisdiction.*

. . . .   JENNIFER E. DALTON

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Constitutional Law

From a formal point of view, constitutional law is a normative fountain from which all other secondary norms are derived. In a pure theory of law, a constitution is the fundamental norm of the state. It represents simply the basic authorizing norm of a legal system, being at the top of a coherent and hierarchical order, as described by legal philosopher and international jurist Hans Kelsen in his various works during the 1960s. Constitutional rules are often collected in a written chart, especially in countries with Roman legal tradition, characterized by a clear distinction between constitutional law and other branches of law. Yet, the presence of a code is not an essential element: As Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori observed in 1962, although most countries have a constitutional text, only a few of them have a form of constitutionalism.

To understand such a key point—and paradox—the formal interpretation of constitutional law is not enough. Turning to a functional perspective, only the idea of restriction of powers connotes the specific function of constitutional law. First, modern constitutions interpret the liberal aspiration to protect citizens against the arbitrariness of political powers: They limit political power by defining rules of its exercise, and according to Samuel E. Finer in *Five Constitutions*, regulate "the allocation of functions, power, and duties among the various agencies and offices of government, and define the relationships between these and the public" (15). Starting from the eighteenth century, the presence of a *garantiste* component characterizes constitutional law on the basis of its *telos:* the constitution "guarantees" itself to the citizens by providing a frame of government and the institutional devices that would structure its observance. Modern constitutionalism is new in the sense that in any state in which the will of the government has no check upon it from the constitution, there is in reality no constitution, and that state is in fact a despotism, as explained by Charles H. McIlwain in his 1940 book *Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern.*

Procedural conception of constitutional law has emphasized, especially in the new world, the definition of a system of separate institutions competing for powers. According to

the U.S. Founders, any bill of rights represents a question to be inserted in a moral treatise more than a constitutional concern—the most important part of a constitution has to be found in its organization of powers. The Framers tried to contrast centrifugal tendencies in American political structure by embracing ideas of separation of powers, picked from Scottish philosopher David Hume and French Enlightenment thinker Montesquieu, and connected with a new conception of federalism adapted for a wide-ranging republic. In their view, a constitution had to pursue two objectives: the first one was to draw up a structure of government that could serve to protect people from government—from the danger of a tyranny of the majority in legislature; the second one was to protect people from themselves.

Only after the eruption of masses in politics, the twentieth-century constitutions acquired more focus on democratic rights. As charters superior in rank to ordinary law, they have come to represent a framework of citizen rights and duties, asking what democratic states ought to be doing and how they should design political institutions to make legitimate choices. Such second-generation democratic constitutions seem to move away from a solely pragmatic constitutional vision by including more ample declaratory preambles stating a true political manifesto for democratic states. However, the marriage between constitutionalism and democracy has been considered one of the most delicate arrangements in the modern world. As Walter F. Murphy noted in a 2001 article, a union between constitutionalism and democracy constantly endures tension because it brings together the notion that the people should rule through their freely chosen representatives, with the prescription that if the people govern, they should not govern too much. Even according to some scholars, such as Jürgen Habermas and William Rehg, constitutional democracy denotes a paradoxical union of contradictory principles, as in the idea that a "rule of law" comes on the scene alongside and together with popular sovereignty.

Constitutionalism, then, is always a difficult balance between allocation of sovereignty and limits in absolute discretion—a delicate equilibrium since constitutions are not fixed and immutable. As historical products, they adapt to their environment and reflect shifts in political forces of the states to which they refer. Any constitutional charter contains emendatory rules that permit modification of its contents. Furthermore, in addition to standard emendatory procedures, constitutional law is modified in another and probably more relevant way. Many scholars, such as Italian constitutional law scholar Costantino Mortati in 1940, have referred to the concept of *living constitution* or *material constitution* to describe how sociopolitical actors may partly drift away from static constitutional norms with no formal changes. If a constitution limits and regulates powers, political forces continuously redefine rules by interacting with each other and interpreting their own times. So, another paradox joins the concept of constitutional law: If it serves to provide regularized, and predictable, restraints upon those who exercise political power, it may also be shaped by concrete dynamics of power.

See also *Checks and Balances; Constitution Amending Procedures; Constitutional Democracy; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Hume, David; Montesquieu, Charles-Louis.*

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Constitutional Monarchy

Constitutional monarchy is a type of government in which a sovereign can rule under the limits of a constitution. The text of the constitution or its principles limit the sovereign power, and subsequently, government ministers formulate parliamentary acts and assume responsibility for the government. However, the sovereign has to sign these acts, and constitutionally, they are considered to be acts of the sovereign, which is politically neutral authority. Aligned with the idea that "the king can do no wrong," in a constitutional monarchy, the sovereign still keeps some ceremonial and formal powers (e.g., nomination of a prime minister or dissolution of parliament), as well as prerogative powers. The most important of the sovereign's rights are the following: the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, and the right to warn (from Walter Bagehot's "trinity of rights").

ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY

Constitutional monarchy developed from ancient and medieval types of monarchy; according to Aristotle's classification

of states, the *monarchy* is "the good government by one." Generally, this type of governing is based on the premise of *paternalism,* the notion that a benevolent ruler is needed to care for the subjects of the kingdom. Monarchies have reflected the importance of conservatism and continuity in governance and in the institutions of a society and culture. In addition, monarchies have generally emphasized the importance of religion, with the monarch an agent of God, legitimized by the deity. Before the period of democratization, there were two types of European monarchies. The first was the *aristocratic monarchy* (e.g., feudal monarchy; it did not give the sovereign absolute power but only limited power regulated by the power of noblemen). The second was the *absolute monarchy,* which allowed kings to use nonregulated power. Absolute monarchy described, first, the European monarchies such as France and Spain from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries and later on included Prussia, Russia, and Austria. Nevertheless, none of these monarchies were really absolute; in all there were some limits to the king's power, mostly based on custom.

The division of powers characteristic of constitutional monarchy developed in connection with the emergence of the modern state in the seventeenth century in France (e.g., the centralized state with a well-defined territory and powerful governmental authority). In Britain, the absolute monarchy was introduced under the Tudor dynasty (Henry VIII and Elizabeth I); none of these monarchs were entirely absolute in authority, however, because they had "great regard for parliamentary conventions." During the English Civil War (1642–1651), the monarchy was abolished. Parliament technically ruled supreme, although, in reality, Oliver Cromwell ruled as the country's dictator. The monarchy was restored in 1660 after Cromwell's death, but the growing power of the king sparked the Glorious Revolution of 1688. From then on, under Britain's constitutional monarchy, the king was, and the sovereign still is, subordinated to the principles of a constitution (or constitutions, in other European monarchies). This means that Parliament, especially the House of Commons, shares the legislative power with the sovereign power and House of Lords.

With the development of the philosophy of rationalism, monarchy was justified by what was seen as its natural role as a governing institution, reflected in both history and tradition. This view was held until the period of democratization in the nineteenth century. According to Richard Rose and Dennis Kavanagh, there are two prerequisites that give monarchy a chance to function with democratic institutions: "the readiness" of the reigning family to withdraw from active politics (e.g., the willingness to self-impose these restraints) and, at the same time, "the repudiation" of its members from influence on politics without needing to reduce the symbolic role of the sovereign.

DEMOCRACY AND THE MONARCHY

In a democratic system with a hereditary monarch, the role of the king or queen is nonpolitical (e.g., it is symbolic and ceremonial; the sovereign is a head of the state, a symbol of national unity, continuity, and tradition). According to Vernon Bogdanor, during the twentieth century, the sovereign's constitutional power was reduced step by step in a number of areas critically important to the constitution, but the sovereign still kept a vast number of prerogative powers. The sovereign still holds a few formal executive powers that allow, for example, naming—but not choosing—the head of a cabinet who is not politically responsible to the sovereign but to the directly elected parliament. Nevertheless, decisions about government formation are left to politicians, so the sovereign plays no active role in them. The sovereign can use the granted power to appoint ministerial officeholders on the recommendation of the prime minister, too; the sovereign is politically nonresponsible but acts on the advice of the ministers, who are willing to assume responsibility for the sovereign's acts. The sovereign is inviolable, too, and can exercise influence by using, according to Bagehot, "the rights to be consulted"; for example, consultations were an important point of the political game in the United Kingdom during the second half of the twentieth century. The sovereign in all constitutional monarchies can dissolve the parliament (on request), and also has some power that can be used in a constitutional emergency. Other important powers of the sovereign include: nominating judges (in cooperation with the executive), directing the armed forces, declaring war, making treaties, and regulating the civil service.

Constitutional monarchy in democratic states can survive only when monarchs accept their limited powers based on the constitutional text. Currently, there are only a few democratic constitutional monarchies in Europe: the United Kingdom, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Liechtenstein; there are also a few outside Europe, such as Japan. The influence of sovereigns in these countries differs according to historical circumstances. For example, in Scandinavia the sovereigns and their families are very popular because they stress egalitarianism over many of the ancient symbols of royalty and wealth; Richard Rose mentions that they are popularly called "bicycling monarchs." Spain, on the other hand, is unique among contemporary constitutional monarchies: after Francisco Franco's death, new political leaders accepted the politically well-balanced role of Juan Carlos in transition to democracy and gave a way to restoring monarchy instead of introducing a republic. Another, rather specific case in the contemporary world is the British Commonwealth, an association of free, independent states (mostly republics) like Canada, Australia, and India. The nominal head of this postcolonial international association is the English sovereign, whose symbolic role was accepted by a free decision of democratically elected leaders of these previous British dominions, contrary to the hereditary character of this post in the United Kingdom.

See also *British Political Thought; Monarchy; Constitutional Systems, Comparative.*

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Constitutional Systems, Comparative

COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS

Most countries of the world have written constitutions establishing basic rights and regulating the relationships between public offices, and between these public offices and the public. During the late middle ages and early modern times, constitutions were mainly devices for establishing local, sectoral, or individual rights and limiting powers. But as those old powers to be limited were autocratic, constitutionalism almost naturally advanced with the expansion of suffrage rights and democratization. Nondemocratic constitutions are still relatively abundant in some parts of the world. As of 2005, of the 126 independent countries with information on their constitutional laws collected, only 62 percent were considered "electoral democracies"—and only 46 percent were called "free" countries, according to separate data lists provided by Axel Tschentscher and Freedom House. But the number of constitutional democracies rose enormously during the last quarter of the twentieth century, encompassing for first time a majority of total world population by 1996. (Major exceptions are China, the Arab region, and the Middle East.) Thus, constitutionalism has been increasingly linked to democratization.

MIXED CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY

A traditional constitutional model was a *mixed monarchy*, which united a one-person, nonelected monarch with executive powers and a multiple-person, elected assembly with legislative powers. This type of regime had already existed in certain medieval kingdoms in Europe in which an elected parliament limited the king's powers. It also existed in the German Empire, where the emperor was elected by the representative Diet, and in the Christian Church, where the pope shared powers with councils. The modern constitutional formulas of a mixed regime were formally shaped in England following the revolution of 1688 and in France by the constitution of 1791. They were replicated during the nineteenth century in monarchies such as those of Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Germany, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. In more recent times, similar formulas have been adopted in some Arab monarchies, such as Jordan and Morocco.

With broadening suffrage and democratization, the nonelected monarch's powers were reduced, while those of the elected assembly expanded, especially regarding the control of executive ministers, thus moving towards a parliamentary regime. The powers of the one-person monarch were largely transferred to the prime minister elected by the parliament. In recent times, there are parliamentary regimes in about half of the democratic countries in the world. Some of these regimes are British-style monarchical variants, such as Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. Others are of the republican variant, such as Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, and Switzerland.

CONSTITUTION WITH ELECTED CHIEF EXECUTIVE

In another democratic formula that originated with the 1787 constitution of the United States, it is not only the multiple-person legislative assembly that is popularly elected but also the one-person chief executive. In the United States, the nonelected English monarch ceased to be recognized and was replaced with an elected president with executive powers. (At the time, the monarch of England was actually already highly dependent on parliament's decisions.) This model of political regime implies separate elections for the chief executive and the legislative branch, divided powers, and checks and balances among the presidency, the House, the Senate, and the Supreme Court. The basic formulas of the U.S. Constitution have been replicated in a number of Asian countries under American influence, including Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan.

A variant usually called *presidentialism* emerged in almost all twenty republics in Latin American since the mid- or late nineteenth century. Some founding constitution makers in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela claimed to be imitating the U.S. Constitution, but they were also influenced by the presidential Second Republic and the Second Empire in France. Some of them looked farther back to the absolutist monarchies that preceded mixed regimes and division of powers and aimed at having "elected kings with the name of presidents" (in Simón Bolívar's words). Instead of checks and balances, most Latin American constitutions promoted or favored high concentration of power in the presidency. Similar features can be observed in a number of postcolonial republics in East and Southern Africa.

DUAL-EXECUTIVE REGIMES

After World War I (1914–1918), Finland and Germany experimented with a different variant of political regime with separate elections and divided powers—usually called a *semipresidential* or *dual-executive regime*. This variant was more consistently shaped with the 1958 constitution of France. With this formula, the presidency and the assembly are elected separately, as in a checks-and-balances regime, but it is the assembly that appoints and can dismiss a prime minister, as in

a parliamentary regime. The president and the prime minister share the executive powers in a *governmental diarchy*. Similar constitutional formulas have been more recently adopted in a few countries in Eastern Europe, including Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, as well as in a few countries in Africa.

RECENT TRENDS

Recent trends favor democratic constitutional formulas permitting relatively high levels of social inclusiveness, political pluralism, policy stability, and democracy endurance. Actually, almost no new democracy established in the world during the broad "third wave" of democratization starting in 1974 has adopted the British-style constitutional model of parliamentary regime with majoritarian electoral rules and single-party cabinets. Of the democratic countries with more than one million inhabitants, fewer than one-sixth use parliamentary constitutional formulas with a majoritarian electoral formula, while more than one-third are parliamentary regimes with proportional representation electoral rules and multiparty coalition cabinets, and about one half are checks–and–balances regimes or its presidentialist and semi-presidential variants.

See also *Checks and Balances; Constitutional Democracy; Constitutional Monarchy; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Dual Executive; Parliamentary Democracy; Presidencialismo; Prime Minister (Head of Government); Semi-presidential System.*

. . . .   JOSEP M. COLOMER

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Constitution Amending Procedures

From early Greek history, as scholar Melissa Schwartzberg has observed, democracies were associated with constant legal change. Like legislation, constitutions also require change as circumstances alter and as flaws reveal themselves.

TYPES OF AMENDING PROCESSES

Formal amending processes emerged in America with the birth of written constitutions. Although less than 4 percent of modern nations with written constitutions lack a constitutional amending process, the processes vary widely and require varying levels of difficulty. Donald Lutz divided such constitutions into four progressively more difficult categories. Parliamentary systems with written constitutions such as Austria, Botswana, Brazil, Germany, India, Kenya, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, and Samoa allow a single vote of the national legislature to enact such changes. Nations such as Argentina, Belgium, Columbia, Costa Rica, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, and Norway require at least two votes of the legislature with an intervening election. Chile, France, Italy, Spain, and Sweden permit bypassing the legislature through a referendum, whereas Australia, Denmark, Ireland, Japan, Switzerland, the United States, and Venezuela require a referendum or its equivalent. Lutz's research, on both national constitutions and on U.S. state constitutions, shows that longer documents are amended more frequently than shorter ones. Documents that are difficult to change also promote higher levels of judicial interpretation.

A convention of delegates from the states authored the U.S. Constitution. This distinguished the founding of United States from ancient states where laws had been created by a single lawgiver and were sometimes considered inviolate, and from those, like Great Britain, which traced its origins to a more continuous series of immemorial customs and usages that could be changed by new ones.

CONSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS

Amending processes seek to promote deliberation and reflect consensus; federal systems also provide input for national and subnational actors. In the United States, for example, these goals are reflected in the mechanisms that Article V of the U.S. Constitution established for proposing and ratifying amendments. Two-thirds of the state legislatures under the Constitution have never yet requested that Congress call a convention to propose amendments. Instead, two-thirds majorities in both houses of Congress have proposed all twenty-seven U.S. amendments. They have all been ratified by three-fourths of the states, acting in all cases but one through their legislatures.

ENTRENCHMENT CLAUSES

Some constitutions attempt to entrench certain institutions or values against regular alteration. Article V of the U.S. Constitution, for example, prohibits any state from being deprived of its equal representation in the U.S. Senate without its consent. The U.S. Constitution does not mention any other substantive limits on the process, but courts in some countries—India and Germany, for example—have struck down some proposed constitutional changes as inconsistent with the document as a whole, and hence "unconstitutional."

JUDICIAL DECISIONS RELATIVE TO THE AMENDING PROCESS

Kemal Gozler has observed that the Turkish constitutions of 1961 and 1982, the Chilean Constitution of 1980, and the Romanian Constitution of 1991 specifically empowered constitutional courts to review the content of constitutional amendments, whereas others are silent on the subject. The

U.S. Supreme Court has never invalidated an amendment on the basis of its substance, and since *Coleman v. Miller* in 1939, the Court has generally deferred to Congress in ascertaining whether amendments have been legitimately ratified.

See also *Bills of Rights; Constitutional Amendments; Constitutional Courts; Parliamentary Government.*

. . . . JOHN R. VILE

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Constitutions, Unwritten

An *unwritten constitution* is the body of legislation, rules, regulations, and common law recognized by legislators, executives, and courts as the binding laws that legitimize, guide, and limit a government's powers and authority as well as the public's rule of law. With an unwritten constitution, the body of laws are not enumerated within a single, formal document as witnessed in Israel, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Unlike a written constitution, an unwritten constitution is modified gradually, changing by accretion of new laws, often in response to the evolving needs and environment of its sovereign state. Of note, there are numerous statutes of an unwritten constitution that do exist in written form, causing some to prefer the term *uncodified constitution*, on the premise so much of these unwritten constitutions have been documented but not itemized. For example, the United Kingdom's Houses of Parliament have the ability to approve an act of Parliament, which is a specific primary written piece of legislature serving as an addendum to previous laws or establishment of an entirely new law.

A primary trait of the unwritten constitution is the flexibility by which these constitutions have to effectively adopt new statutes or modernize existing legislature addressing emerging political prerogatives. Governments ruled by unwritten constitutions do not typically have sovereign executives or legislators with constitutional supremacy; therefore, the political, legislative, and civic institutions grew up together as the result of continuous adaptation and accretion of customs rather than abiding to a deliberate, static set of limited powers. There is no singular institution designed specifically to control the principles and implementation of legislation as demonstrated by the U.S. Supreme Court, which not only is the highest appeals court but is responsible for upholding judicial review and the system of checks and balances on congressional and executive powers. Moreover, an evolutionary democratic system based on an unwritten constitution does not mean a flexible constitution equates to unstable governance as demonstrated by the United Kingdom. Stability prevails in this system by depending on the people's feeling about the fundamental political values the legal system ought to honor.

From a constitutional perspective, the U.K. unwritten constitution is a special case of combining legal and nonconventional rules that provide the framework of government and dictate the behavior of the main political institutions. Juridical supremacy is practiced among all the supreme powers of the state, to include the Crown, Parliament, and cabinet, which can modify or abrogate British constitutional institutions and rules. This parliamentary supremacy and sovereignty in lawmaking make it difficult to distinguish between laws considered to comprise the original unwritten constitution and those laws that have gradually become part of it. Many contemporary political scientists even question the possibility to enumerate the exact number of constitutional laws embodied in the British unwritten constitution.

CASE STUDY: UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EVOLUTION OF AN UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION

The historical and political genesis of the United Kingdom's unwritten constitution is based on a gradual development of British parliament. This legislative institution grew out of the king's council (*curia regis*), in which the monarch originally consulted with the great magnates of the realm and later with commoners who represented the boroughs and shires. The locus of power in the constitution shifted gradually as a result of changes in the political and interest groups whose consent the government required in order to be effective. Parliament was, and is, a place in which to debate specific issues of disagreement between the Crown, on the one hand, and Parliament (the House of Commons and the House of Lords), on the other. The conflicts were settled in Parliament so that its original main function was that of a court (the High Court of Parliament during the sixteenth century). During the eighteenth century, the powers of the government passed more and more into the hands of he king's first minister and his cabinet, all of whom were also members of one the houses of Parliament. According to Marshall's *British Constitution,* an evolution of the constitution occurred when the transfer of prerogative powers from the Crown was given to the Crown's ministers in a way in which the Crown acted on advice about its executive

functions. Today's parliamentary sovereignty originated from the powers of the king to make and approve law.

According to prevailing interpretations of the United Kingdom's unwritten constitution, the constitutional laws gradually incorporated significant and historical documents, including: Magna Carta Libertatum (1215), which is considered the founding step in evolution of parliamentary sovereignty; Petition of Right (1628); *Habeas Corpus* Act (1679); Bill of Rights (1689); electoral laws (1832, 1867, 1874, 1918, 1928, 1969); as well as laws transferring the power from the House of Lords to the House of Commons (1911 and 1949; the 1999 House of Lords Act eliminating Hereditary Peers for the House of Lords); and, recent devolution laws (considering Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland).

Moreover, this constitution embodies conventions that, according to Dicey's publication Introduction to the Study of *Law of the Constitution,* could be interpreted like "rules intended to regulate the exercise of the whole of the remaining discretionary powers of the Crown." However, the constitutional conventions do not have authoritative interpretations and the individual convention can be challenged by fresh arguments based on the interpretation of the precedence supporting them. Thus, the U.K. constitution includes the books of authority, for example Blackstone's *Commentaries on the Law of England*, which are commentaries and interpretation of the most prestigious jurists.

See also *British Political Thought; Common Law; Constitutional Monarchy; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Parliamentary Government.*

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Constitutions and Constitutionalism

A *constitution* is a set of basic rules for making collective decisions. Rules producing enforceable decisions can solve coordination and cooperation dilemmas, which may induce individuals to prefer constraining rules to settings in which every human interaction should be adjusted independently. However, different rules may favor different decisions with differently distributed benefits among individuals and groups.

TWO CATEGORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL RULES

Two categories of constitutional rules can be distinguished: (1) those to regulate the division of powers among the various branches of government, and (2) those to define the relationships between these branches and the public, which in democracy are based on elections. Regarding the first category, virtually all the political regimes in world history have been based on a one-person office combined with multiple-person offices. The rationale for this is that, while a one-person institution may be highly effective at decision making, a few person council may be more capable of collecting information and deliberating, and a large assembly can be representative of different interests and values in the society and able to organize consent and facilitate the enforcement of decisions.

In classical political theory (as elaborated most prominently by Aristotle), the distinction between the rule of one, the few, or the many was sufficient to define basic types of political regime, such as monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. In modern times, an analogous distinction can be made between dictatorship, semidemocratic regimes (typically holding multiple-candidate elections with restrictions on suffrage or on the offices submitted to electoral results), and democracy. Within democracy, the rules of one, the few, and the many—would correspond to the institutions of one-person prime minister or president, the few—member cabinet, and the many—member assembly. The relationships between these institutions define different types of democratic regime, as discussed in the following paragraphs.

The second category of constitutional rules mentioned above regulates the relationships between public officers and citizens by means of elections, which makes the classification of democratic regimes more complex. In particular, we can distinguish electoral systems based on simple plurality or absolute majority rule, which produce a single absolute winner and favor the concentration of power, and those using proportional representation rules, which are associated to multiparty systems and coalition governments.

TYPES OF CONSTITUTIONAL REGIME

PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUTIONAL REGIMES

The parliamentary regime resulted historically from the process of enhancing the role of the elected assembly and limiting the monarch's powers. According to the English or *Westminster model*, parliament became the sovereign institution, also assuming the power of appointing and dismissing ministers, while the monarch remained a ceremonial although nonaccountable figure. The Third French Republic established in the late nineteenth century was the first democratic republic with a parliamentary regime. This type of regime produces political congruence between the legislative and the executive and some "fusion" of institutional powers.

Specifically, in parliamentary regimes with majoritarian electoral rules, a single party, even with a minority electoral support, usually can find sufficient institutional levers to win an assembly majority, appoint the prime minister, and form a government. In these situations, power tends to concentrate in the hands of the prime minister, which led to an interpretation of the development of political parties as a force eroding

the central role of the parliament. In constitutional studies in the early twentieth century, the British model was provocatively labeled a "cabinet" of a "prime minister" regime, rather than "parliamentary." However, it has more recently been remarked that the growth of party was instrumental to reduce the influence of the monarch but not necessarily that of parliament. With the reduction of the monarch to a figurehead, the prime minister has indeed become the new one-person relevant figure, while the position of the cabinet has weakened. Still, the role of parliament has survived, and even, in a modest way, thrived.

The central role of parliament is more prominent in parliamentary regimes with proportional representation electoral rules, in which typically multiparty coalition governments are formed. The diffusion of power is wider in these than in regimes based on plurality or majority electoral rules. In contrast to electorally minority single-party governments, multiparty cabinets typically rely upon broad majority support both among parliamentarians and in the electorate. A multiparty coalition based on a majority of seats and popular votes is the typical government formula in most countries of continental Europe, including Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Minority cabinets with additional parliamentary support are also formed in a few cases, as in Denmark and Spain.

PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL REGIMES

The second basic type of political regime resulted from the replacement of the executive monarch with an elected president, which should exert power in parallel to a representative congress. This model thus implies separate elections and divided powers between the chief executive and the legislative branch. It is usually called, in a rather confusing term, a *presidential regime*. In the original U.S. version, it implies a complex system of *checks and balances*, or mutual controls among separately elected or appointed institutions (presidency, the House, Senate, the Supreme Court). Interinstitutional relations are subjected to rules including term limits for the president, limited presidential veto of congressional legislation, Senate rules permitting a qualified minority to block decisions, senatorial ratification of presidential appointments, congressional appointment of officers and control of administrative agencies, congressional impeachment of the president, and judicial revision of legislation.

These counterweighting mechanisms play in favor of power sharing between institutions. As they induce negotiations and agreements between offices with different political orientation, they are equivalent devices to supermajority rules for decision making. The obstacles introduced by the numerous institutional checks to innovative decision making may stabilize socially inefficient status-quo policies, but they also guarantee that most important decisions are made by broad majorities able to prevent the imposition of a small or minority group's will. With similar analytical insight but a different evaluation, other analyses have remarked that separate elections and divided governments create a "dual legitimacy" prone to "deadlock," that is, legislative paralysis and interinstitutional conflict.

A *unified government* can exist when the president's party controls a majority of seats in the assembly. In the United States, there has been a situation of unified government with the president's party having a majority in both houses of Congress during less than 60 percent of time from 1832 to 2008, while *divided government* was more frequent during the second half of the twentieth century. However, U.S. congressional rules have traditionally included the ability of 40 percent of senators to block any decision by filibustering, which has almost always made the president's party unable to impose its decisions by its own. This could explain why no significant differences in legislative performances between periods of unified and divided governments have been observed.

Presidential dominance has been attempted in other countries, especially in several republics in Latin America and Africa, by supplementing the president's veto power over legislation and his control of the army, which do exist in the United States, with other constitutional mechanisms favoring the concentration of power. They include long presidential terms and reelections, the president's unconstrained powers to appoint and remove members of cabinet and other high officers, legislative initiative, capacity to dictate legislative decrees, fiscal and administrative authority, discretionary emergency powers, suspension of constitutional guarantees and, in formally federal countries, the right to intervene in state affairs. The other side of this same coin is weak congresses, which are not usually given control over the cabinet and are frequently constrained by short session periods and lack of resources. However, in democratic periods in the ten countries of South America since 1945, the president's party has not had a majority in congress 65 percent of the time; in about half of these cases, multiparty presidential cabinets have been formed by means of postelectoral, congressional negotiations (a formula which always applies, for instance, in the case of Brazil).

SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL REGIMES

In another variant of regimes with division of powers, usually called *semi-presidentialism*, the presidency and the assembly are elected separately, like in a checks-and-balances regime, but it is the assembly that appoints and can dismiss a prime minister, like in a parliamentary regime. As a result, in parallel to the multiple-person assembly, two one-person offices, the president and the prime minister, share the executive powers in a *governmental dyarchy*, as in the current Fifth Republic of France.

At the beginning of the French experience, it was speculated that this constitutional model would produce an alternation between presidential and parliamentary phases, respectively favoring the president and the prime minister as a one-person dominant figure. The first phase of the alternation was indeed confirmed with presidents enjoying a compact party majority in the assembly. In these situations, the president becomes more powerful than in the classical presidential regimes, as well as more powerful than the British-style prime minister because the president accumulates the latter's powers plus those of the monarch. The second parliamentary phase was, in contrast, not confirmed, since, although in the so-called cohabitation experience the president faces a prime

minister, a cabinet and an assembly majority with a different political orientation, the president usually retains significant powers, including the dissolution of the assembly, as well as partial vetoes over legislation and executive appointments, among others, depending on specific rules in each country. This makes the president certainly more powerful than any monarch or republican president in a parliamentary regime. There can, thus, be indeed two phases, depending on whether the president's party has a majority in the assembly and can appoint the primer minister or not; however, the two phases are not properly presidential and parliamentary, but they rather produce an even higher concentration of power than in a presidential regime and a dual executive, respectively.

CENTRALIZATION OR FEDERALISM

In addition to horizontal relationships between institutions above discussed, vertical relationships can be distinguished as corresponding either to unitary states or to decentralized, federal-type large states and empires. In the unitary model, a single, central government holds all relevant powers. In decentralized polities, the party in the central government may control different proportions of regional or local governments. Analogously to what has been discussed for vertical interinstitutional relationships, the degree of coincidence between the parties in central government and those in smaller territorial governments can produce different levels of unified or divided government. In contrast to unitary states, where only those citizens whose preferences coincide with the statewide majority obtain political satisfaction, in vertically divided governments global minorities can become local majorities. In multilevel political regimes, the number of total losers is likely to be smaller than in a unitary state and the aggregate amount of social utility should, thus, be higher, only depending on the intensity of preferences given by the citizens to different policy issues associated with each governmental level.

Horizontally unified governments, such as those that are typical of parliamentary regimes with majoritarian electoral rules, do not suit well with vertical division of powers. If a single party controls the central government, but does not control most noncentral governments, it may try to increase the concentration of power by replacing the constitutional scheme of vertical division of powers with a unitary formula (as happened in Britain throughout the nineteenth century). In contrast, an effective vertical division of powers of federal type is more likely to exist and survive in the framework of a divided central government, whether in the form of multiparty coalition cabinets (like in Germany and Switzerland) or with coexistence of different party majorities in the presidency and the congress (like in the United States).

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES

The more direct political consequences of different constitutional formulas regard the type, party composition, and degree of stability of governments. The rest of political, economic, and social consequences from constitutions should be considered relatively remote, indirect and identifiable in terms of constraints, limits, and opportunities, rather than determining specific decisions or outcomes. They may affect economic and other public policy making, as well as the corresponding performance. Also, different constitutional formulas may help democracy to endure or facilitate its shortening.

Single-party governments in parliamentary regimes and unified government in regimes with constitutional separation of powers can be compared for their high degree of concentration of powers around a one-person institution. Likewise, multiparty coalition cabinets in parliamentary regimes with proportional representation can be considered to be a variant of divided government. However, the two basic forms of constitutional regime differ because in a parliamentary regime, the prime minister can dissolve the parliament and call anticipated elections, while regimes with separation of powers typically have fixed terms and electoral calendars. Thus, in parliamentary regimes, while single-party governments tend to be relatively consistent and durable, multiparty coalition or minority governments are more vulnerable to coalition splits, censure or confidence-lost motions, and other events and strategies provoking anticipated elections. In contrast, in separation of powers regimes, situations of divided government—if they do not lead to the formation of multiparty coalitions between the president's and other parties with a sufficient congressional majority—may produce legislative paralysis and deadlock.

Relatively stable single-party parliamentary governments, as well as presidential governments with a president's party majority in the assembly and fixed terms, tend to produce more changing and unstable policies than those relying upon the support of multiple parties or interinstitutional agreements. A parliamentary regime with majoritarian electoral rules creating single-party governments on the basis of a minority of popular votes is the classical scene of *adversarial politics*. This implies two major consequences. First, electorally minority governments with a social bias are more prone to be captured by minority interest groups and to implement redistributive and protectionist policies hurting broad social interests. Second, frequent alternation of socially and electorally minority parties in government produces policy reversal and instability (including changes in regulations of prices, the labor market, or taxes), which may depress investment incentives.

In contrast, in multiparty elections producing coalition cabinets, as well as in interinstitutional relations involving different political majorities, each party can focus on a different set of issues, globally enlarging the electoral agenda and the corresponding debate. In the further institutional process, certain issues (typically including major domains such as macroeconomic policy, interior, and foreign affairs) can be the subject of a broad multiparty or interinstitutional agreement around a moderate position. This precludes drastic changes and induces mid- or long-term policy stability. Other issues can be negotiated in a way that the minority with more intense preferences on each issue may see its preferred policy approved, whether through the distribution of cabinet portfolios to parties focusing on different domains (such as finances for liberals, education for Christian Democrats, social policy or labor for Social Democrats, etc.) or through logrolling among different groups

on different congressional issues. This second mechanism creates different but enduring political supports to decisions on each issue and also tends to produce relative policy stability.

A number of empirical studies show that parliamentary regimes with proportional representation perform better regarding electoral participation, low levels of politically motivated violence, women's representation, and social and environmental policies. They also appear to be associated to better growth-promoting policies, although they tend to imply relatively high taxes and public spending, which do not necessarily favor growth. Parliamentary regimes with proportional representation tend to develop broad programs benefiting a majority of the voters, including redistribution through social security and welfare policies, in contrast to narrower targets in both parliamentary regimes with majoritarian elections and presidential regimes. Other favorable conditions for economic growth include administrative effectiveness and an independent judiciary, which may be favored by a robust and pluralistic democratic regime. However, economic performance also depends on other factors, such as economic institutions (including those regulating property rights, contracts, and finances) and an educated population able to make technological innovation available and operational, which may not be directly associated with specific constitutional formulas.

Different constitutional alternatives have been linked to different rates of success in attempts of democratization and the duration of democratic regimes. Strategic choices of different constitutional formulas may be driven by actors' relative bargaining strength, electoral expectations, and attitudes to risk. Citizens and political leaders tend to support those formulas producing satisfactory results for themselves and reject those making them permanently excluded and defeated. As a consequence, those constitutional formulas producing widely distributed satisfactory outcomes can be more able to develop endogenous support and endure. Widely representative and effective political outcomes can feed social support for the corresponding institutions, while exclusionary, biased, arbitrary, or ineffective outcomes might foster citizens' and leaders' rejection of the institutions producing such results.

Generally, constitutional democracies favoring power sharing and inclusiveness should be able to obtain higher endogenous support and have greater longevity than those favoring the concentration of power. Empirical accounts show that democratic regimes are the most peaceful ones, while semi-democratic or transitional regimes are most prone to conflict, even more than exclusionary dictatorships (basically because the latter increase the costs of rebellion). Among democracies, parliamentary constitutional regimes are more resilient to crises and more able to endure than presidential ones. More specifically, parliamentary regimes with majoritarian electoral systems appear to be associated to higher frequency of ethnic and civil wars than presidential regimes, while parliamentary regimes with proportional representation are the most peaceful ones.

See also *Coalition Theory; Cohabitation; Constitutional Law; Constitutional Monarchy; Constitutional Systems, Comparative; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Divided Government; Dual Executive; Parliamentary Democracy; Proportional Representation; Unitary Government; Westminster Model; Winner-Take-All.*

. . . .   JOSEP M. COLOMER

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Constructivism

The term constructivism encompasses several schools of thought that emphasize the role of social constructions in the study and practice of politics. Social constructions are defined as shared interpretations or ideas on how the material world is or should be ordered. Constructions are neither objective, since they exist only by virtue of being agreed on by more or less extended groups of individuals, nor subjective, given their collective nature. Rather, they are *intersubjective.*

Social constructions operate at the epistemological as well as the ontological level. On the one hand, they provide

communities of scholars with common understandings of the reality they face; on the other hand, they are intersubjective structures influencing political life. While most, if not all, constructivists acknowledge the existence of both dimensions, they are divided as to which dimension should be assigned more weight in the analysis of political phenomena. This disagreement underlies the main cleavage in the constructivist camp—that between postmodern and modern constructivism.

POSTMODERN CONSTRUCTIVISM

The most radical of the two variants, postmodern constructivism, points to the role of constructions in the so-called scientific process to attack the positivist underpinnings of mainstream political science. Positivism asserts the existence of an objective political reality whose laws can be progressively discovered through the formulation and testing of theories. For postmodern constructivists, conversely, the presence of unobservable elements in any account of politics, and the need to replace these elements with assumptions and mental constructs, makes theory building necessarily a socially laden enterprise: one in which the formulation of hypotheses on the political world hinges to a large extent on the researcher's cultural, ideological, and political convictions. Empirical work, according to postmodern constructivists, can do very little to increase the objectivity of research. For one thing, the complexity of the sociopolitical reality, where perfect empirical tests are rare, and the ever-present possibility of formulating ad hoc explanations make it very hard, if not impossible, to disprove any theory. Second, and perhaps more important, most testing methods and procedures are themselves theory driven, and hence biased in favor of the hypotheses they are meant to evaluate.

The resulting view of science is very far from the positivist ideals of neutrality, universality, and progress. For postmodern constructivists, the subjects (i.e., researchers) and the objects of political research can never be fully separated. If there are dominant theories in certain historical periods, this is due less to their actual validity than to their consistency with prevailing cultures or professional orientations influencing scholars' interpretation of the political reality. To the extent that any meaningful political research can exist at all, the postmodern constructivists conclude that it can only be a theoretically and methodologically "anarchic" activity, in which no approach can be deemed more "scientific" than others and, ultimately, anything goes.

MODERN CONSTRUCTIVISM

Unlike their postmodern counterparts, modern constructivists do not take their concern with the intersubjectivity of the scientific process as far as rejecting positivism altogether. While partially constructed, they contend, competing accounts of the political world are not all the same, and careful empirical research, combined with theoretical debate, can help the scholarly community distinguish between plausible and untenable explanations. At least in the long run, in sum, positivist research methods can result in a faithful depiction of the sociopolitical reality.

Far more important than the constructions of the researcher are, for modern constructivists, those of the actors of domestic and international politics: voters, leaders, parties, bureaucracies, states, and so on. In contrast to rationalist approaches, which view political actors as constantly maximizing certain stable objectives (e.g., power, wealth, security, etc.), modern constructivism argues that the nature, identity, and preferences of individual and collective agents are not fixed and exogenously given, but formed through processes of socialization that shape their interpretation of the world, define appropriate behaviors and, ultimately, influence political action. The field of nuclear proliferation provides a good illustration of the differences between rationalists and constructivists: While rationalists focus on the material side of the issue and see weapons as, in principle, equally threatening regardless of who proliferates, for constructivists the consequences of nuclear armaments on international security cannot be assessed apart from the identity of the countries involved, the nature and history of their relations, and their perception of each other.

If social constructions influence the behavior of political actors, social interactions derive, by definition, from individual actions. So, while constructivism rejects individualism—the idea that the characteristics of society stem from those of the individual agents in it—it does not embrace its opposite, holism, entirely. Rather, constructivists posit the "mutual constitution" of intersubjective structures and sociopolitical agents, in which neither part logically precedes the other. As a result, the basic coordinates of politics are always subject to (more or less gradual) change.

So defined, constructivism is more of a "thin" theoretical framework than a substantive theory of politics: It draws attention to the role of social structures in the explanation of political behavior but is compatible with different specific sources of political agents' identities and preferences. Three such sources so far have received particular attention in the constructivist literature: culture, ideas, and institutions. Constructivists of the first branch emphasize the impact of consolidated cultural elements on the behavior of individuals, groups, and entire communities. Ideas, on the contrary, figure in many explanations of political change, which concentrate particularly on the ways in which cognitive and normative meanings are expressed and transmitted. Analyses focusing on institutions, finally, explain how certain social and political practices often acquire a self-reproductive character by shaping the worldviews and preferences of the actors involved.

Modern constructivism has acquired great popularity in Western academia in the past few decades, particularly in the subfields of comparative politics and international relations, where constructivists contribute to the main debates and have produced a substantial body of empirical work. Methodologically, constructivism is especially—though not exclusively—compatible with studies analyzing a few empirical observations (small-n studies) and inductive research strategies, which attempt to generalize from the examination of specific cases instead of using the latter to test previously formulated hypotheses. These methods allow constructivist researchers to

better capture the qualitative variables they work with and to trace specific processes of agent constitution. In addition, constructivists make large use of several tools and techniques originally developed in other disciplines, such as fieldwork, participant observation, and discourse analysis. These methodological preferences have provoked the criticism of many rationalist scholars, who accuse constructivism of being unable to produce truly general and falsifiable explanations. To these allegations, constructivists respond mainly by pointing out their peculiar logic of inquiry, one that does not deny or underestimate the existence of universal social dynamics, but that is nonetheless more interested in the different and the unique in each political situation, process, or phenomenon.

See also *Cognitive Theory and Politics; Empiricism; Positive Theory; Small-n and Case Study.*

. . . .   PIER DOMENICO TORTOLA

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Consultants, Political

Political consultants are professionals who assist candidates running for office by providing one or more specialized services. They work on an ad hoc basis, taking a different set of clients each election cycle. The work is typically done on a fee-for-service basis and confined to the specific election cycle. Consultants may work individually, or more typically, as part of a political consulting firm comprised of many professionals who provide the variety of service(s) the firm offers.

Consultants are fixtures in campaigns at all levels in modern American electoral politics. Presidential candidates have stables of consultants working for their campaigns, sometimes with multiple firms providing the same service. In addition, most congressional candidates also hire consultants, though how many varies depending on whether the candidate is an incumbent, challenger, or open-seat candidate, as well as the estimated competitiveness of the campaign. While no serious candidate for office at the federal level would proceed with the assistance of one or more political consultants, the use of such consultants has even spread to state legislative campaigns, mayoral races, and school board contests.

ORIGINS OF POLITICAL CONSULTING

Political consultants are nothing new to political campaigns, although there is some disagreement as to how political consulting originated. Some scholars state that consultants were not strictly an American phenomenon and date as far back as 63 BCE, when ancient Roman Quintus Tullius Cicero advised his brother, orator and philosopher Marcus Tullius Cicero in an election for the consulship of Rome. In the American context, however, some scholars point to the founding of and debate over the ratification of the U.S. Constitution when the Federalists and Anti-Federalists engaged in political tactics that are reminiscent of those used today. In a more modern context, many observers consider Clem Whitaker and Leone Baxter as the founders of the political consulting industry, as they were the first individuals to try and make a living by providing campaign services to clients through their formation of their firm, Campaigns Inc., in 1933.

The consulting industry developed slowly after Campaigns Inc., but was helped along with technological advancements like scientific polling and electronic media, such as radio and television. These advancements meant that campaigning was no longer only a political endeavor: Candidates would need help with the sophisticated and technical tools now at their disposal. In fact, many of the first media consultants were advertisers from Madison Avenue in New York who found new clients in the form of candidates running for office.

Technical advancements also spurred another important development in the consulting industry in the form of specialization. Before this, a single person or a small group of individuals could run the entire campaign, but as the tactics of campaigning became more and more sophisticated, specialization of the industry and skills needed for campaigning developed. Today, political consulting is a highly specialized industry, with thousands of individuals working in many different fields.

SERVICES PROVIDED AND EFFECTS MEASURED

There is a core group of services that define the political consulting industry and others that support or supplement the work of these central elements. The heart of political consulting is the creation and delivery of a candidate's message, or the short statement that gives voters the reasons they should vote for this candidate rather than the opponent. The consultants typically responsible for developing and disseminating the candidate's message include a pollster, a media consultant, a direct mail specialist, and a campaign manager or general

consultant. Additional consultants may include an opposition researcher, a fundraiser, and a field or get-out-the-vote specialist. Beyond this, other services that are not as central to the overall creation of the candidate's message, but are just as important to a modern political campaign, include Web site design, media buying, printing services, and culling data from voter files and other sources to help target voters. Individuals providing these services are sometimes called *vendors,* making the distinction between their role and true consultants. These specialists come together to provide candidates with all the information and assistance they need to run a sophisticated and modern campaign for office.

Political consultants produce tangible results for their candidates. Scholars have systematically examined consultants' presence in candidates' campaigns and found that candidates who hire consultants raise more money during their campaign and get more votes on election day than those candidates who do not hire professionals. In terms of fundraising, candidates who hire consultants raise more money from party committees, political action committees, and individual donors than do those candidates who run amateur campaigns. Scholars also believe that a candidate hiring one consultant or more signals to potential donors that their campaign is serious, viable, and worth the investment of a campaign contribution.

Consultants' impact on a candidate's vote share is slightly more complex. While Stephen Medvic, in his 2001 book *Political Consultants in U.S. Congressional Elections,* finds that both the presence of consultants as well as the actual number of consultants hired by a candidate impact the number of votes that challenger and open-seat candidates receive, the same relationship is not true for incumbents. Medvic also finds that the most valuable type of consultant challenger candidates can hire is the pollster, who provides the most bang for the campaign's buck. Again, however, the same is not true for incumbents. These results may seem to indicate that consultants are not as important for incumbent officeholders seeking reelection. While this may be true for safe incumbents, for embattled incumbents, there is another dynamic at work, as embattled incumbents worry only about winning and not about how many votes they get as long as they receive more than their opponent. For those incumbents who are in a difficult race, the impact of consultants may not be best measured in votes; it may be better measured in terms of simple victory.

See also *Campaign Advertising; Campaign Finance; Campaigns; Election Monitoring; Negative Campaigning.*

. . . .   DAVID A. DULIO

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Consumer Society

The term *consumer society* refers to modern capitalist societies that are organized around increasing levels of consumption. The key features generally include a culture dominated by fashion, advertising, and mass marketing; aspirations, lifestyles, and identities tied to conspicuous consumption; and a lack of traditional moral restraints on individual desires. While some scholars see the emergence of consumer societies as part of the natural trajectory of capitalist development, most who use the term critique what they see as the irrationality and wastefulness of consumer capitalism.

CRITICISMS OF THE CONSUMER SOCIETY

The *paradox of affluence*—the belief that accumulating more consumer goods does not make us better off—is one of the more prominent criticisms of a consumer society. Juliet Schor and Robert Frank depict a society caught in an endless cycle of emulation, in which attempts to raise our social status through increasing displays of wealth are constantly frustrated by our neighbors' efforts to match us. Consumption becomes a no-win situation, like trying to move forward by running on a treadmill. A study by Richard Easterlin, showing the residents of wealthy countries report being no happier than those from poorer countries, is frequently cited to provide empirical support for this position. More recently, some commentators have linked social pressures to increase consumption standards (even in the face of stagnant wages) to the explosion of personal debt that precipitated the global economic crisis of 2008.

The emulation perspective draws on Thorstein Veblen, an influential American social critic of the early twentieth century. Veblen dismissed the notion that optimizing individuals make consumer choices, and that these choices determine what capitalist firms produce, which economists call *consumer sovereignty*. He maintained that the bulk of what capitalist societies produced did not serve human needs but instead fueled "predatory" emulation. John Kenneth Galbraith adds to the critique by arguing that the advertising and marketing practices of large corporations largely determine consumer choices.

For environmentalists, ever-growing consumption creates ever-higher levels of pollution, waste, and resource depletion—to the point that continuing down this path becomes both

unsustainable and immoral. Many religious traditions have long been critical of the morality of consumer societies in which secular, materialist values of pleasure seeking and profligacy crowd out traditional values of restraint, spirituality, and charity. The effects of advertising and consumer culture on the family, particularly children who are subjected to thousands of messages promoting consumption and instant gratification every day, have also traditionally been areas of concern. These criticisms have inspired a small but growing number of anticonsumerist rebels to reject the consumer society—to "get off the treadmill"—and embrace *voluntary simplicity*.

More radical critics paint a darker picture. German philosopher-sociologists Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, seeking to understand why workers in capitalist nations were not revolutionary, found one answer in the ideological functions of consumer culture. In capitalist societies, the culture industry indoctrinates and manipulates consumers; creates false needs; and produces passive, alienated individuals who are incapable of critical thought or resistance. Taking the criticism to the next level, French sociologist Jean Baudrillard argues that consumer culture has imploded into every aspect of life to the extent that there are no longer true needs to be alienated from or manipulated.

REACTIONS

Theories of the consumer society have come under criticism from both the right and the left. For libertarians, these perspectives are elitist and paternalistic for asserting that consumers make choices that are not in their interest (i.e., if consumer goods do not make people happy, why do they buy them?), and moralistic for assuming that a simple life is superior to other freely chosen lifestyles. American sociologist Michael Schudson defends advertising from charges of manipulation by pointing out that many advertising campaigns are unsuccessful. These critics point to another paradox: If we are all manipulated by the forces of the consumer society, then how is it that an enlightened few have escaped its grasp, and can see how the rest of us are manipulated?

While the left largely accepts the critique of consumer capitalism, many are uncomfortable with what they see as the essentially conservative (or even puritanical) nature of perspectives that advocate simplicity and frugality. Others fear that the radical theories are fatalistic and disempowering, leaving little space for opposing the consumer society or constructing an alternative. Some feminists argue that the depiction of consumers is gendered—since women have historically been associated with consumption and have been stereotyped as irrational and easily manipulated.

See also *Critical Theory; Environmental Political Theory; Veblen, Thorstein.*

. . . . ALLAN MACNEILL

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Contagion of the Left

Political theorist Maurice Duverger argues that a right-wing party could change its organization and ideology to maintain its competitive position. Therefore, *contagion of the left* refers to those situations in which leftist oppositions force government to make policy decisions it otherwise would not make.

If all major political forces in a political system espouse identical policy alternatives, or all actors share political power through grand coalitions or consociational cases, then there is little or no room for policy contagion. If there is an ideologically polarized political conflict, there will be little chance for any policy influence or contagion of the left.

Considerable comprehensive and historical evidence exists to show that conditions of insecurity and socialist threat can lead political authorities to change their policies. In the late nineteenth century, Bismarck made comprehensive social reforms to undermine and ultimately destroy the popular appeal of the rising Social Democrats in imperial Germany. It was argued that fear of socialism was very real and profound for both the ruling classes and the bourgeoisie. Another example can be given from Britain. The reformist impulse labeled as "red toryism" within British conservatives materialized from the necessities of the emerging working class with their leftist political representatives.

. . . . SEZGIN S. CEBI

See also *Conservative Parties; Social Welfare; Welfare State.*

Containment

At the outset of the cold war, George F. Kennan developed the containment concept in a major formulation of how the United States should handle the threats posed by Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union. Kennan first discussed his ideas in "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," which he authored anonymously in 1947 under the name "X" in *Foreign Affairs.* In later years, there have been references to an American policy in the 1990s of a *dual containment* of both Iran and Iraq, as well as some debate about whether American policy toward China should amount to containment or to engagement.

Some interpreters of Kennan's formula vis-à-vis the Soviet Union might have seen this as nothing more than the traditional

need to maintain a balance against the geopolitical power that Moscow could accumulate from its position at the center of Eurasia, that is, as nothing new. But, on a more positive note, Kennan was contrasting the Soviet dictatorship with that of Nazi Germany, arguing that the United States did not need to anticipate a preemptive or preventive war against the Soviets, who were more bound by ideology and not as adventurous or aggressive as Adolf Hitler had been. If Americans patiently held the line of containment, this would disprove the ideology by which the advance of communism was inevitable, and it would in the long run undermine the Soviet system.

See also *Cold War; Communism, Fall of, and End of History; Domino Theory.*

. . . . GEORGE H. QUESTER

Contempt of Congress

See *Congress, Contempt of.*

Content Analysis

Content analysis refers to a method for classifying textual material that involves reducing it to more manageable, categorical, or quantitative data for use in comparative analysis. The basic goal of content analysis is to apply a set of explicit procedures to the analysis of texts to make systematic inferences possible about the text, the authors, or the intended recipients of the text. Content analysis differs from discourse analysis in that the latter typically focuses more on the qualitative interpretation of the meaning of language in texts, paying special attention to how context and conventions are represented through language. While *text* typically refers to written documents, it applies quite generally to recorded verbal behavior of almost any kind. Commonly analyzed examples include political speeches, media broadcasts, newspaper editorials, court decisions, business reports, psychological diaries, draft legislation, correspondence with companies, and the transcripts of customer service phone calls.

Content analysis is commonly used in the study of politics, media, business, law, psychology, and public administration. For instance, a political scientist might be interested in analyzing the policy positions of political parties and would turn to content analysis of the official political programs, known as *manifestos,* published by the parties. In fact, the long-standing Comparative Manifesto Project does just this, unitizing party manifestos into discrete *quasi-sentence* units and then assigning each quasi sentence a policy category from a predefined, fifty-six-category coding scheme.

See also *Discourse Analysis; Qualitative Methodologies.*

. . . . KENNETH BENOIT

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Contentious Politics

Contentious politics, in the context of political science, means episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when: (1) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims, and (2) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants or objects of claims. Roughly translated, the definition refers to collective political struggle.

Of course, each term in the definition cries out for further stipulations. The term *episodic,* for example, excludes regularly scheduled events such as votes, parliamentary elections, and associational meetings. The term *public* excludes claim making that occurs entirely within well-bounded organizations, including churches and firms. Contention, of course, occurs both inside and outside of public politics, but political contention involves government, however peripherally, and thereby increases the likelihood of intervening coercive agents such as police and, on the average, increases the stakes of the outcome.

Not all forms of politics are necessarily contentious. Much of politics consists of ceremony, consultation, bureaucratic process, collection of information, registration of events, educational activities, and the like; these actions usually involve little if any collective contention. This does not imply that all forms of contention conform to a single general model. Drawing upon definitions from Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow's *Contentious Politics* (2006), Tilly's *European Revolutions, 1492–1992* (1993), and Nicholas Sambanis's "What Is a Civil War?" (2004) the differences among three major forms of contention clarify this lack of a general model:

- *Social movements:* sustained challenges to power holders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of public displays of that population's worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment;
- *Civil wars:* sustained large-scale reciprocal armed conflict between two or more social actors in a population—however defined—over control of a state or over the demand of one of the actors to establish its own state;
- *Revolutions:* attempted transfers of power over a state in the course of which at least two distinct blocs of contenders make incompatible claims to control the state, and some significant portion of the population mobilizes on behalf of the claims of each bloc.

These forms of contention have different dynamics, involve different combinations of performances, and produce different levels of violence. Although they can overlap empirically and easily shift from one to another, they are best understood by examining what they have in common; they share contentious interaction between makers of claims and others who recognize that these claims bear on their interests and bring in government as mediator, target, or claimant. Considering the forms of contention in the same framework helps to understand three important properties of contentious politics: (1) the rapid formation and transformation of different forms of contention; (2) the interactions between actors that form

across institutional boundaries; and most important, (3) the common mechanisms and processes that underlie and drive contentious politics.

APPROACHES TO CONTENTIOUS POLITICS

Since the 1960s, the study of contentious politics has spawned a host of distinct topical literatures—on revolutions, social movements, industrial conflict, international war, civil war, interest group politics, nationalism, and democratization. Scholars in each group used different methodologies and mainly proceeded in cordial indifference to each other's findings. Yet different forms of contentious politics involve similar causal processes, such as mobilization, a central process in civil wars, revolutions, and social movements as well as in electoral campaigns, strikes, and warfare. As long as the same mechanisms and processes can be identified in different forms of contention, they should be studied together irrespective of the boundaries that scholars have established between these forms. Several general approaches to contentious politics have attempted to bring integration out of segmentation.

Until the late 1960s, the so-called *collective behavior approach* had dominated American studies of social movements. Best synthesized in the work of Neil Smelser in 1962, the approach emphasized the cognitive and emotional elements in collective action and focused heavily on grievances. In its extreme manifestations, it invited caricature by regarding collective action as the result of anomie, alienation, and even psychological disorder. But even more balanced proponents of the approach never solved the puzzle that there is no one-to-one relationship between the extent of people's grievances and their capacity and willingness to advance their claims. In the 1960s and after, the dominant approaches to contentious politics shifted from collective behavior to the structures that empower and constrain it.

STRUCTURAL APPROACHES

Structuralism took two forms: classical macrostructural models descended from Marx, in which major societal changes directly produce shifts in contention; and models of political structure focusing on the opportunities and threats, along with the facilitation and repression induced by political institutions and regimes. Macrostructural models were more popular in Europe, while political structural models developed in the United States, especially after the civil rights movement. But the *political process model* that resulted soon became the common property of Americans such as Doug McAdam and Europeans including Donatella della Porta, Dieter Rucht, and Hanspeter Kriesi.

Most scholars who focus on the political intermediation of contentious politics center on a cluster of variables called *political opportunity structure.* Opportunity structures are features of regimes that affect the likely outcomes of actors' possible claims. A reasonably consensual list of those features, noted by Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, include:

1. Multiplicity of independent centers of power within the regime.
2. The regime's openness to new actors.
3. Instability of current political alignments.
4. Availability of influential allies or supporters for challengers.
5. Extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim making.
6. Decisive changes in all of these features.

Threats are the converse of opportunities. But threats and opportunities occur simultaneously and most people engaging in contentious politics combine response to threat with seizing opportunities. Both threats and opportunities shift with fragmentation or concentration of power, changes in a regime's openness or closure, instability of alignments, and the availability of allies.

REPERTOIRES OF CONTENTION

The development of the political process approach was accompanied by systematic attention to the *repertoire* of contention—the sets of performances that people habitually use in mounting contention. Repertoires represent not only how people make claims, but also what they know about making claims and their reception by targets of their claims. Repertoires and performances evolved with the histories of industrialization and state-building. For example, the protest demonstration grew out of, and at first resembled, the religious procession to a place of worship. It turned contentious as demonstrators moved from a place of assembly to a site from which they could directly confront the targets of their claims. Later, the protest demonstration became the central form of action, mounted routinely to demonstrate a claim before the public. With the development of mass media, it could be staged to gain media attention. Change in social movement repertoires accelerated in the 1960s—as they do in any major wave of contention.

PROTEST EVENT ANALYSIS

After the 1960s, complementing the emphasis on repertoires, scholars developed a wide array of systematic methods and approaches to track the changes in the forms of contention in the public sphere. The systematic analysis of contentious events has become the closest thing to a core method for the study of contentious politics. Scholars enumerate and analyze the number of events, numbers and composition of participants, their targets and degree of violence, and the kinds of performances they involve. But in focusing on the *public politics* of contention, the new method ignored private forms of contention, such as the emotions in contentious politics, the construction of new collective actors (e.g., the new women's movement), and the study of motivations for collective action. These were the major starting points for new approaches in the 1980s and 1990s.

ALTERNATIVES TO STRUCTURALISM

In the 1980s, two alternative models began to challenge the hegemony of structuralism: a *culturalist model,* which focused on emotions, cognition, discourse, and the construction of collective action; and a *rationalist model* focusing on the dispositional microfoundations of collective action.

The culturalist model is part of the broader, cultural turn in the social sciences, but it also had social-psychological roots and led to a revived interest in Erving Goffmann's important 1974 book, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience.* Cultural factors were also important to scholars of contention in the global South, where the cultural grounding of Western social movements could not be assumed. By the turn of the century, the culturalist approach had developed into a wholesale critique of structuralism.

The rationalist model has in common with culturalism a focus on individual motivations for collective action, but it had in common with structuralism a focus on external inducements to collective action. Building on the earlier insights of Mancur Olson in 1965, rationalists observed that rational people might very well avoid taking action when they see that others are willing to act on their behalf. To solve this *free-rider problem*, rationalist-oriented scholars focused on the micro-foundations of collective action, on movement organizations, and on the social networks that underlie collective action. What remained obscure in both culturalism and rationalism were the specific links between individuals and their opposite numbers, significant third parties, and institutions. This led to an increased emphasis on relational models.

MECHANISM-AND-PROCESS APPROACHES

Mechanism-and-process-based accounts of contentious politics attempt to specify links among actors, their opponents, third parties, and institutions in studies of entire episodes of contention. Relevant mechanisms can be found in the general environment of the actors, in actors' dispositions toward significant others, or in their relations to significant others. Familiar environmental mechanisms include population shift or resource increase or depletion. Important dispositional mechanisms include the attribution of similarity (e.g., identification of another political actor as belonging to the same category as one's own, a key mechanism in coalition formation). Significant relational mechanisms include brokerage (e.g., the production of a new connection between previously unconnected or weakly connected sites). Processes can be either combinations of simultaneously developing mechanisms or regularly linked sequences of mechanisms.

Some combinations of mechanisms are fortuitous or idiosyncratic, but others combine regularly in robust processes that can be observed in a wide variety of contentious episodes. The most fundamental one is mobilization, or the shift of resources from individuals to collectivities through a combination of mechanisms.

MOVEMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS

In relating contentious politics to institutions, an earlier research tradition saw all political contention aimed against institutions. But properly seen, contention can occur outside of, within, and on the boundaries of institutions. Boundaries between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics are difficult to draw with precision. More important, the two sorts of politics involve similar causal processes. For example, the study of coalitions has almost always been operationalized within legislative institutions, but coalitions occur widely in the disruptions of rebellions, strikes, and social movements. As long as the same mechanisms and processes can be identified in institutional and noninstitutional politics, they can be studied together irrespective of institutional boundaries.

Of course, institutions both constrain and enable contentious politics, and, subsequently, different kinds of regimes produce different configurations of contention. These connections among contention, political power, and institutions appear in both turbulent periods and in the more routine politics of both authoritarian regimes and settled democracies. However, the more violent forms of contention are most likely to develop in weak authoritarian regimes, or *anocracies,* as termed by James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin in 2003.

LETHAL CONFLICTS

Civil wars and most revolutions involve large-scale lethal conflicts with special features that set them off from other forms of contentious politics. Two features in particular make

The police detain a man who attempted to confront protestors during a 2007 rally in Chechnya marking the anniversary of the death of Chechen rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov. The Chechen conflict represents a large-scale lethal conflict with high stakes.

SOURCE: AP Images

a difference. First, killing, wounding, and damaging affect the survival of participants well after the immediate struggle has ended. Second, creating and maintaining armed force requires extensive resources. Large-scale lethal conflicts include interstate wars, civil wars, revolutions, and genocides as well as a significant subset of struggles across religious, ethnic, linguistic, and regional boundaries. All of these involve high stakes and disciplined military organizations.

Yet there are significant commonalities between lethal conflicts and social movements. As in these more pacific conflicts, existing political opportunity structure interacts with established repertoires of contention to shape what sorts and degrees of large-scale violence occur within a given regime. When large-scale lethal contention is compared with social movements, similar mechanisms and processes emerge: environmental mechanisms, such as resource extraction or depletion; dispositional mechanisms, such as the hardening of boundaries between ethnic groups that formally lived together; and relational mechanisms, such as the brokerage of new connections between previously unconnected or weakly connected sites.

In contrast with social movements, which concentrate in high-capacity democratic or democratizing states, lethal conflicts concentrate in low-capacity authoritarian states. High-capacity states reduce the threat from challengers both by offering routine opportunities for making low-level claims and by making it difficult for anyone to create rival concentrations of coercive means within their territories. Low-capacity states fear that making concessions to low-level claims will trigger broader ones. They also more often face the threat that some rival actor will build up a major concentration of coercive means and use it to topple existing rulers.

OPEN QUESTIONS

As in any evolving field, a number of contested issues score the surface of the study of contentious politics. A brief sketch of the most important questions include:

- Do social movements that do not target the state fall outside the range of contentious politics?
- Are the major outcomes of contentious politics limited to the policy terrain, or do they also involve cultural change and biographical impacts?
- Do new forms of collective action—particularly Internet-based campaigns—challenge existing approaches to contentious politics, or will they eventually be absorbed into the repertoire of contention, much as the newspaper and television were?
- Does globalization shift the targets of contention from national states to something beyond the state, or does it simply add the possibility of "forum shopping" to claim-making strategies?

See also *Civil Wars; Collective Action, Theory of; Collective Action and Mobilization; Protests and Demonstrations; Olson, Mancur; Revolutions; Social Movements; Structuralism.*

. . . . SIDNEY TARROW

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Contractarianism

Contractarianism is a theory of the development of social institutions and political morality based on the consent of free and equal people. It is primarily associated with both the descriptive and prescriptive elements of liberal political theory. Descriptively, it aims to explain the origins of political authority and why people form political communities. Prescriptively, contractarianism provides an account of the legitimate functions of the state and the conditions of political obligations. Its most well-known historical exponents are Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Its contemporary adherents include John Rawls and David Gauthier.

Contractarianism is an egalitarian approach to political morality because all individual interests are taken into account in the bargaining process. It provides a conventional view of politics and justice in which the state is created to advance individual interests, and it contrasts with naturalistic or organic accounts of politics. Despite these foundations, contractualists differ significantly as to the legitimate functions of the state and the extent of one's obligations in political society. Contractarianism is also the subject of significant critical treatment, including pluralist, associative, and feminist theories of political morality.

Contractualists theorize social cooperation and political institutions as systems of mutual advantage because rational people can be expected to consent only to arrangements from which they benefit. According to Hobbes, life without political institutions is insecure, violent, and underdeveloped. Sovereign individuals pursuing their own interests will inevitably come into conflict with one another, and without a coercive third party, find themselves in a ceaseless "war of all against all." In time, their interests and rationality will lead them to form a contract among each other to mutually transfer their natural rights to self-preservation, creating the sovereign state charged with maintaining the conditions of social peace. For Hobbes, the contract is constitutive of society, politics, property, and justice; it is also the precondition of people's capacities to pursue any human goods beyond survival. However, Hobbes's theory is not fully liberal because the social contract creates an absolute state as opposed to a constitutionally limited state.

Locke's state of nature, in contrast to Hobbes, is a much more developed situation and comes to include a fully functioning market economy. It is only after time, as inequality deepens and property becomes less secure, that individuals enter a social contract to create political authority to avoid the inconveniences of the state of nature. However, because individuals enter into the social contract in unequal circumstances, the contract solidifies differences in advantages by protecting preexisting natural property rights. In this respect, contractarianism is widely criticized for unduly reflecting baseline inequalities in terms of social cooperation. It is seen as a mutually advantageous agreement between producers that leaves nonproducers and those lacking a threat capacity, such as the severely disabled, to the system of production outside the scope of political justice. However, not all contractualists understand the social contract in this way and seek to broaden its scope and transformative effects.

Rousseau's social contract criticizes the design of Locke's contract, which protects natural property rights and locks in initial advantage. Rousseau's contract is more deeply transformative. He argues that the social contract cannot attempt to preserve the freedom humans experienced in the state of nature as isolated and independent individuals, rather it must reconcile the "chains" of a coercive political society with a new sort of social freedom. To be free in society, people must subsume their individual wills to a common or general will, which is the outcome of a contract or an agreement among others. Sovereignty is created when people contract together to create a general will that concerns the common good. When a person disagrees with the general will, this individual is, in fact, mistaken and must be made to conform to its precepts. In reconciling social rules and coercion with individual liberty through the social contract, Rousseau famously suggests people can be "forced to be free."

John Rawls's version of the contract also seeks to eliminate initial bargaining advantages in shaping political agreement. Rawls's contract is explicitly hypothetical and imagines people seeking agreement on principles of justice in the "original position." In the original position, people deliberate behind a "veil of ignorance" such that they know nothing of their own personal traits, including their gender, ethnicity, capacities, or social class. This situation creates an equal baseline and compels impartial reasoning. From this contracting position, Rawls argues that people will agree on strong egalitarian and redistributive principles of justice.

See also *General Will; Hobbes, Thomas; Locke, John; Rawls, John; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Social Contract; State of Nature.*

. . . .   NEIL HIBBERT

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Convenience Voting

Convenience voting is the term used to describe the broad array of methods used in contemporary democracies to make it easier for citizens to cast ballots. Types of convenience

voting include absentee voting (and no-excuse absentee voting), early in-person voting, voting by mail, and various forms of electronic voting, such as voting by fax or Internet. An increasing number of countries also allow same-day voter registration. Convenience voting is perceived as a means to increase voter participation and reduce electoral costs. Opponents of convenience voting have raised concerns over the potential for voter fraud, and some studies have demonstrated no significant increase in turnout. Critics also contend that convenience voting disproportionately raises participation rates among the wealthier and better educated. Early voting also carries the risk that a major event or candidate problem could occur after citizens has cast their ballots but before the general election. Nonetheless, most developed democracies have adopted some form of convenience voting. For instance, Estonia utilized Internet voting in its 2007 parliamentary elections. Within the United States, most states utilize at least one form of convenience voting. For instance, following a 1998 referendum, Oregon initiated a system in which all elections are conducted by mail.

See also *Absentee Voting; E-governance, E-voting, E-Democracy, E-Politics; Electronic Voting; Voting Machines and Technology.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

Convergence Theory

The central questions for students of convergence begin with whether, after centuries of industrialization, currently rich countries become more alike in social structure, culture, and politics. If they converged, the specific ways that they became alike are then pondered, followed by explanations for deviations from the common patterns. In this theory, the driving force that moves modern societies toward common structures, values, and beliefs is continuing industrialization. *Industrialization* is defined as the increasing and widespread use of tools that multiply the effects of their initial applications of energy and inanimate sources of energy.

High-energy technology is similar to how a hoe increases the effects of human energy far more when digging a hole for planting than the stick that preceded it; how a horse-drawn plow continues to multiply the effects of the human hand; how the tractor continues the escalation of effects; and how an atomic bomb can move a mountain, or destroy a city, with a push of one finger. This idea also applies to recent information technology. The same fingers that operated the keyboard for a statistical report using the IBM mainframe of the 1950s can, with the same energy expenditure, now process gargantuan amounts of information—a continuous process of making smaller microprocessors do ever-increasing work. Before the early modern period, with inanimate sources of energy, perhaps 80 to 90 percent of the total energy consumed at any one time was derived from plants, animals, and humans—an intractable limit on their productivity.

The concept of industrialization is most attainable when confined to this technological idea. If all the correlates, along with organizational and demographic outcomes, of industrialization are encompassed in its definition, it cannot be invoked as a cause of the structures, cultures, and political patterns of interest; this is why so much of the early literature on industrialism, based on broader definitions, was tautological. For example, scholars have identified industrialism as including one or more of the following: high degrees of specialization, including the concomitant monetary system of exchange; complex organizations; mechanization; urbanization; extensive use of capital; frequent technological change; rational capital accounting; emergence of a working class; a reasonably predictable political order; demographic transition; and individual work ethics. There is no way to relate the underlying increases in high-energy technology and inanimate sources of power to these variable structures and values if they are all included in the concept. Most of the empirical studies of convergence therefore use the narrow definition, roughly measured by economic level, or gross national product or gross domestic product per capita.

The term *continuing industrialization* captures two essential facts about these technological-economic changes: They cover many centuries and, despite recurrent spurts of growth, they are continuous. A gong did not ring when the industrial revolution began; it was a long and gradual process, and as economic historians reiterate, it has continued since long before the nineteenth century. The High Middle Ages (ca. 1000–1350) saw substantial economic growth and much innovation (e.g., the inanimate power of windmills, invention in armaments, marine transportation and navigation, optics, the mechanical clock).

During the early modern period (ca. 1500–1800), imperial expansion and a global trade network, combined with the spread of literacy among craftsmen and the experimental method among the educated, increased standards of living in the West. Of course, the pace of technological change picked up in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in the period we label the Industrial Revolution, and accelerated markedly after about 1850 wherever science was applied to agriculture and industry.

Finally, convergent tendencies have threshold effects. The process and effects of early industrialization are not the same as the process and effects of later continuing and accelerating industrialization. The threshold for fully modern is about the level of economic development where roughly three-quarters of the modern labor force no longer work in agriculture—due to the extraordinary increases in agricultural productivity—and 40 or 50 percent of adult women work in nondomestic settings. In 1910, the United States still had almost one-third of its labor force in farming. This is about the level where France was in 1946, Japan in the 1950s, and the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s.

CONVERGENT TENDENCIES OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

Nine major structural and demographic shifts, all rooted in industrialization, characterize what is truly modern about modern—*advanced industrial*—society. However, as the range of per capita income from developing to developed countries

narrows, sheer levels of well-being fade as an explanation for national differences in structure, culture, politics, and policy. Types of political economy combining party ideology, power, and national bargaining arrangements among major economic interest groups and government explain persistent differences among equally modern nation-states that share these common trends. These convergent tendencies among the currently rich countries ignore differences in timing and concentrate on the amount, pace, and direction of change.

CHANGES IN FAMILY STRUCTURE

For over two centuries, there have been major changes in family size, composition, functions, and lifestyles; these have coincided with associated political demands and elite responses. By separating work from residence and changing the occupational and educational structure, industrialization increases mobility opportunity for both men and women, and inspires rising aspirations among parents for themselves and their children. Convergent tendencies also reduce the economic value of children and increase their cost, giving women both motive and opportunity to enter the nonagricultural labor force. This thereby increases their independence, reducing fertility rates, and increasing family breakup. Convergence also reduces the family's motivation and resources to care for aging parents and to meet the risks of invalidism, sickness, job injuries, and other shocks. The net effect is a dominant family type in industrial society—small and independent. The dramatic population response to rapid economic development, with birth rates and death rates both falling, has earned the label of *demographic transition*.

Declining birthrates and increased longevity are the product of public health measures—sanitation, control of epidemic diseases, better nutrition, and spacing of births—plus increasing access to medical care. The political responses to these structural changes include a mass demand for the welfare state, especially income and care for the aged; a family polity to help facilitate the balance between work and family; and finally, public policies that enhance gender equality. Rich democracies are moving toward the Swedish model, even Japan and Switzerland, the developed countries most resistant to gender equality.

MINORITIES' PUSH FOR EQUALITY ALONGSIDE GOVERNMENTS' INCREASING OPENNESS

Much change has occurred in equality for minorities over the last century, accelerating during and after World War II (1939–1945). Everywhere, discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, language, gender, sexual preference, and physical disability has declined. Despite the occasional resurgence of minority-group militancy, structural and cultural integration of minority groups is increasing, even those based on race. Two sources of long-term integration are increased opportunities for education and the work, with the consequent increase in intermarriage. These trends foster some merger of values and tastes.

A recent convergence in social heterogeneity, rooted in a revival of massive migration of economic and political refugees, moves all rich democracies toward the American multicultural model. Yet, as governments respond to the demand for gender equality, the rich democracies move toward models in Scandinavia, however varied their specific policies and speed of response. The increase in equality of educational opportunity facilitates the considerable achievement of minority-group equality and the great changes in women's roles and family structure.

INCREASING EQUALITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION OPPORTUNITIES

For more than a century, education has been the main channel for upward mobility in occupation, income, and social status. The ambivalent mass demand for some combination of absolute equality and equality of opportunity—which often takes the form of demands for affirmative action or quotas for those groups presumed to be deprived—has had little effect on the essential character of higher education. Colleges and universities remain meritocratic, very much attuned to the demands of the economy, and quite vocational in emphasis. Education for alert citizenship and critical thought—for making moral judgments, for the pursuit of wisdom, for the enhancement of capacities of appreciation and performance in the arts, and for broader understanding of the individual in society—all tend to take second place. In recent decades, the laggards in mass higher education have moved toward the leader, the United States, and in a few cases have surpassed it in enrollment ratios. Finally, in response to the intensified demand for skilled or professional labor and the great variety of people to be processed, all rich countries now share the twin trends toward universality, along with specialization of institutions and curricula in higher education.

MASS MEDIA ASCENDANCE

Leaving aside nondemocracies, the convergence of rich democracies toward the American model is evident not only in mass higher education but also in the increased influence of mass communication and entertainment media in politics and culture. Industrialization links to the spread of expensive media technology and organizational forms, and also to the increase in income and leisure that it provides the audience. Despite national differences in the control, financing, and organization of the media, which persisted for decades, there is an unmistakable—recent and swift—convergence toward the commercialization and privatization of public broadcasting with a concomitant but somewhat slower shift toward American style and content. The media is now increasingly competitive, frantic, sensational, negative, aggressively interpretive, and anti-institutional. This talk-show style has itself become dominant in American print and broadcasting media only in roughly the last thirty-five years. In political campaigns, however, convergence toward the American model is quite slow—counterpressures in Europe and Asia that make the United States still exceptional among rich democracies include strong parties; government-assured access to television and radio for parties and candidates; restrictions on ads and the length of campaigns; and the well-financed, year-round public broadcasting news coverage.

INCREASED PREVALENCE AND INFLUENCE OF INTELLECTUALS

Scholars who emphasize changes in the mentality of masses or elites suggest that modernization produces a transformation toward a secular, rational, skeptical outlook. Max Weber, in 1918, spoke of "the disenchantment of the world." With a touch of irony, Joseph Schumpeter in 1942 observed that the abundance of critical, independent intellectuals might undermine the very affluent capitalist order that supports them. Plainly, scientists and intellectuals are a double-edged sword: Modern society evidences not only rational secular bureaucratic tendencies, but also periodic resurgence of backlash movements and parties among the losers and their ideological leaders (e.g., the creationist movement in the United States or the Christian right and Southern takeover of the Republican Party and its associated think tanks). In almost all of the most developed countries, populist-right protest movements and parties—sectarian religious, ethnic linguistic, or nativist—abound. The question for research is whether their incidence and influence increase or remain peripheral and cyclical.

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND MOBILITY

Continuing industrialization shapes social stratification—the class structure—and mobility in several ways. It blurs older class lines and creates increasing social, cultural, and political heterogeneity within each social class; the internal differences within classes then become greater than differences between them. Continuing industrialization also fosters the emergence of a politically restive *middle mass*—in the upper-working class or lower-middle class—whose behavior, values, beliefs, and tastes increasingly differ from those of the privileged college-educated, upper-middle class, the very rich above them, and the poor below. Increasing mobility adds to the heterogeneity of social classes. At every level, the mobile population and those with mobility aspirations contrast sharply with the nonmobile population at the same socioeconomic status. Finally, the persistence and even slight growth in the urban self-employed portion of the labor force—people who live in a separate world—adds another source of heterogeneity within each class.

In short, convergence theory exceeds explanations based on social class, however measured. Convergence in mass education and occupational structures; related increases in mobility among all rich countries; and multiple ladders for achieving income, status, or power all allow explanations for the behavior of modern populations of almost any major source of social differentiation. Although all affluent countries share these trends in class structure, they differ greatly in the cross-class solidarity fostered by labor-left parties and groups, and in the percentage of working and nonworking poor.

THE ORGANIZATION OF WORK

With all its variety within and across nations, the technical and social organization of work is still an area of convergence. Continuing industrialization brought a steady decline in annual average hours of work from the late nineteenth century up to about 1960, with a divergence since then as the long annual-hours countries like Japan and the United States reduced hours only slightly, while the short-hours countries like Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway continued their penchant for leisure. Within nations, the uneven distribution of work increased in recent decades; the most educated groups intensified their labor, while the rest of the population typically continued to reduce average annual hours, or suffered forced leisure. There has recently been a gradual spread of nonstandard work schedules, especially among women; and a sizable, rapid growth of contingent labor—part-time, temporary, or subcontracted work—equating to a source of widespread insecurity.

As for modern society becoming a *high-tech* or *postindustrial society*, evaluation of occupational and industrial trends shows that the vast majority of modern populations work in low-tech or no-tech jobs and that almost all of the large and fastest growing occupations are anything but high-tech positions.

GROWTH OF THE WELFARE STATE

For more than a century, since Bismarck in Germany, there has been gradual institutionalization of the social and labor market programs comprising the welfare state. The essence of the welfare state is government-protected minimum standards of income, nutrition, health and safety, education, and housing assured to every citizen as social right, not as charity. In the abstract, this is an ideal embraced by both political leaders and the mass of people in every affluent country, but in practice it becomes expensive enough and evokes enough ambivalence to become the center of political combat about taxes, spending, and the proper role of government in the economy. Because the welfare state is about shared risks that cross generations, localities, classes, ethnic and racial groups, and educational levels, it is a major source of social integration in modern society. Because it lends a measure of stability to household incomes, it has been an important stabilizer of the economy in the downswings of the business cycle, especially since World War II. Developing and developed countries, whatever the type of regime or elite motives, all move in this direction.

CHANGES IN THE POLITY

At first glance, change in the polity is an area of least convergence; a high level of economic development may not be a decisive determinant of political systems. But the first eight areas of most convergence may well foster some convergence in polities. Among the most solid findings in the literature of comparative politics are that affluence brings a decline in civil violence, a decline in coercion as a means of rule, an increase in persuasion and manipulation, an increase in pluralism, and less surely, an increase in democracy. All democracies focus on the market, though all market-oriented political economies are not democracies.

Economic development at the level of the rich democracies brings a sharp decline in internal collective political violence, and even a decline in the intensity of peaceful demonstrations. The most extensive analysis of this relationship, carried out by Ted Robert Gurr and published in his 1979 article "Political

Protest and Rebellion in the 1960s," covers the extent and intensity of civil conflict at three levels of economic development in eighty-seven countries. The first finding is that the higher the standard of living, the less deadly and extensive is civil conflict, but there may be a curvilinear relationship between economic level and collective political violence. The twenty-nine most violent countries are poor but not the poorest; they have begun a process of industrialization. Somewhat less violent are countries at very low and medium levels of development, and the twenty-nine richest countries are by far the least violent. The old idea that political violence and militant labor protest intensifies during the painful transformation of early industrialization from rural to urban, and from peasant to dependent industrial or service worker, is confirmed.

The second finding is that at low levels of development, personal dictatorships and modernizing oligarchies alike provoke the most civil violence. In contrast, the twenty-one pluralist regimes and the eight formerly communist regimes at relatively high levels of economic development yield the very least civil violence. Three forces are at work among the richer countries. Pluralist and democratic systems channel mass grievances and group protest into electoral politics while delivering abundant material benefits; communist or other centrist authoritarian regimes could keep the lid on for decades by comprehensive agencies of political and social control, including one-party domination of secret police, armed forces, mass media, schools, and workplaces.

Students of comparative politics have established that all democracies have market economies. Historically, liberal constitutional systems—the United States, Britain, and France—were established mainly to win and protect private property, free enterprise, free contract, and residential and occupational choice against government restrictions, not to achieve broad popular participation in governance. In the development of the older democracies, this emphasis on liberty to engage in trade was more prominent than the idea of equality of participation in selecting leaders. The expansion of civil liberties, the suffrage, and the rule of law in these countries was preceded or at least accompanied by the expansion of institutions supporting free markets. Yet, again, all market economies are not democracies. For instance, in periods following World War II, South Korea, Taiwan, Chile, Yugoslavia, Spain, Portugal, and Argentina were authoritarian and market oriented. To say that all the currently rich democracies have market economies does not say much about convergence, because democracies relying on the market vary greatly in the institutions in which markets are embedded—in the legal, political, economic, and social context in which finance, industry, labor, the professions, agencies of the executive, the judiciary, and the legislative interact and shape market transactions.

The interplay between modernization, markets, and democracy is complex and does not reflect any straight-line trend. Historically, as Samuel Huntington notes, democracy advanced in waves from early nineteenth century until now, and each wave was followed by reversals and new gains. Sometimes the reversals were drastic. Thus, several of the worst cases

of totalitarian or fascist rule emerged in relatively advanced industrializing societies—Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's Italy, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hirohito's Japan. Happily, both for democratic values and convergence theory, each reversal did not undo all previous gains: The net number of democracies by Huntington's reckoning went from zero before 1828 to fifty-nine in 1990. They are not, though, all rich or near rich, because the number includes poor Bangladesh, India, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Botswana. It is clear, however, that the central tendency is for successfully industrializing countries to become more pluralistic and even more democratic as they become wealthier—for example, the cases of South Korea, Taiwan, Chile, Mexico, and South Africa. These countries may represent the threshold beyond which changing social structures rooted in industrialization strongly favor pluralism, and even some authoritarian regimes tolerate a few autonomous groups and limited cultural freedom. Among the relevant changes are the dominant convergent tendencies: growing middle- and upper-middle strata; accommodation of the minority-group thrust for equality; mobility out of the working class; rise of professionals and experts; growth of the welfare state; and the spread of commerce and industry, both of which require a rule of law.

Whatever the intermediate links between economic level and democracy, the two strongly correlate. Thus, the authoritarian countries that are mostly successful making the move to democracy were overwhelmingly middle income, moving toward upper-middle income. The strong causal relationship very likely runs from economic development to democracy, and not the other way round.

The level of economic development and its structural and demographic correlates help explain why democratic regimes in Greece, Portugal, and Spain by the 1980s, and the Czech Republic, the former East Germany, and Hungary by the late 1990s, successfully consolidated after their authoritarian regimes collapsed and why the transition to democracy has been so problematic in the less developed countries of Central and Latin America (except for Uruguay), and even worse in the poorer countries of Eastern Europe, including Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Serbia.

Ethnic warfare can further complicate the democratic transition, as it has in the former states of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, both of which also delivered drastic declines in standards of living. Consistent with convergence theory, however, it is the less developed countries in which ethnic conflict is most virulent and violent, especially where feeble authoritarian regimes face ethnonational rebellions, as in Bosnia, Georgia, Rwanda, and Haiti. In the early 1990s, there were about 120 shooting wars going on in the world, 90 of which involved states attempting to suppress ethnic minorities. None were among the rich democracies. In fact, economic development at above average levels and democratization together always channel such movements into nonviolent politics.

Rich democracies have both economic strength and a high degree of legitimacy—resources to use for any aspect of social peace. As Arend Lijphart suggests, dominant "majorities" do

this by sharing power (coalitions), dispersing power (bicameralism and multiparty systems), distributing power more fairly (proportional representation in its various forms), delegating power (federalism), and limiting power formally (minority veto). The mix of these electoral and constitutional arrangements varies, but all modern democracies have found ways toward minority and majority accommodation. Some form of affirmative action in assignment of jobs, political positions, or college admissions is also common, although specific government policies vary. Finally, an obvious and well-traveled road to social peace is expansion of the franchise and a well-developed, universalistic welfare state.

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH

Research on the breakdown, emergence, or consolidation of democracy is a growth industry. Among scholars analyzing lengthy lists of conditions favorable to the democratic transition, such as Huntington, all note the importance of economic level or material conditions for the emergence and the consolidation of democracy. However, they all offer a list of noneconomic determinants of uncertain relative importance. Major contributors to knowledge in this area include S. M. Lipset, Robert Dahl, John Stephens, Larry Diamond, and Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan.

Among social scientists, convergence or modernization theory was most popular in the 1940s through the mid-1960s when it went out of fashion. But it has recently been revived. The scholars who early articulated these ideas include Wilbert Moore; Daniel Lerner; Neil Smelser; Clark Kerr and colleagues; Samuel Huntington; and, on the social psychological correlates of economic development, Alex Inkeles. A chorus of criticism emerged in response. Students of the organization of work, such as Ronald Dore and Reinhard Bendix, emphasized the national and sectoral variations in authority relationships in the workplace and society. Many political critics, including André Gunder Frank, emphasized what they saw as the Eurocentric or North America–centric, or the conservative bias, of convergence theory. Emmanuel Wallerstein, in 1974, counterposed the idea of a world system dominated by a core of imperial capitalist states including the United States; others, like Peter Evans in 1979, accented the related theme of dependent development. A few critics allege that convergence theorists ignore politics; they forget that theorists and critics are not contending camps at war—economic determinists versus political or social determinists. In fact, the most systematic and creative work in this area deals with the interplay of markets and politics (political economy) or the social bases of politics (political sociology) or both. The trick is to learn how much of the explanation of outcomes is attributable to industrialization and how much to alternative theories, including variation in political and social organization. Using both quantitative and comparative historical methods, much recent research does exactly that, for example the less polemical students of varieties of capitalism, including Peter Hall and David Soskice. Indeed, many contemporary scholars such as Ruth and David Collier, John Stephens, and Harold Wilensky focus fruitfully on the interaction of economic and noneconomic forces shaping diverse paths of development among nations and regions of the world—a continuing challenge for researchers today.

See also *Democracies, Advanced Industrial; Democratic Transition; Equality and Inequality; Industrial Democracy; Postindustrial Society; Welfare State.*

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Cooperation, International

See *International Cooperation.*

Cooperative Security

The concept of *cooperative security* arose in the United States during the later stages of the cold war period as it became apparent that the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev was not as inclined to imperial aggression as had been earlier assumed. Although Soviet forces in East Central Europe were evidently configured to attempt to occupy Western Europe in the event of war, it was conceded that such a posture could reflect an underlying intention not to initiate war, but simply to defend Soviet territory in a manner informed by the experience of World War II (1939–1945). If so, then it might be possible to stabilize the situation by negotiating measures designed to prevent surprise attack. These were officially termed *confidence-building measures,* but the phrase *cooperative security* was used as an expression of the underlying principle, namely, that each side would cede the legitimacy of territorial defense and would cooperate to impose restraint on offensive operations.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its alliance system, the original focus of concern essentially disappeared. A combined arms assault was no longer possible on continental scale, and the engagement of nuclear weapons in such an event was no longer the potential trigger for global catastrophe it was once considered to be. Primary security concerns shifted to more localized forms of conflict and to the process of weapons proliferation. In particular, it was recognized that the Russian Federation as principal successor to the Soviet Union had inherited a nearly intractable set of security burdens—most notably, a contracting economy that could not support the remnants of Soviet conventional forces redeployed from East Central Europe, deterrent forces still actively engaged with the increasingly more capable American forces, and a fractured system for exercising managerial control over the massive arsenal of nuclear weapons the Soviet Union had assembled.

In this new context, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, a leading American foundation, initiated a special project to address the problems of nuclear weapons proliferation with the burdens of the Russian Federation specifically in mind. The initiative was inspired by the president of the foundation, David Hamburg, and by Sam Nunn, a U.S. senator from Georgia, with cooperative security explicitly advanced as the central concept of the project. The phrase connoted not merely a stabilization of residual confrontation but a fundamental transformation of security relationships whereby all governments, the Russian Federation and the United States in particular, would collaborate in assuring the legitimate defense of sovereign territory by measures designed to preclude attack, and in establishing higher standards of managerial control over the large arsenals of nuclear weapons and stockpiles of explosive isotopes that had accumulated during the cold war.

The practical effect of the Carnegie project was significant but more limited than the cooperative security concept envisaged. The project was directly instrumental in initiating and developing what came to be known as the Nunn-Lugar program through which the United States provided financial and technical assistance to the Russian Federation to secure some portion of the nuclear weapons, explosive materials, and delivery systems deactivated from the inherited Soviet arsenal. From 1991 to 2007 as the United States provided some $1.8 billion in financial assistance, approximately twenty-five hundred weapons delivery systems were jointly deactivated, and collaborative projects were undertaken at nearly all permanent installations involved in the operations of Russian nuclear forces. Originally administered by the U.S. Department of Defense, the scope of the effort grew to include programs managed by the Department of Energy, the Department of State, and other U.S. government agencies. The accomplishments of the program were nonetheless limited by the fact that fundamental security policy in both countries featured indefinite continuation of legacy deterrent practices, with decreasing emphasis in the United States on bilateral legal regulation and increasing emphasis on preemptive potential. Although the size of the U.S. deterrent force was reduced, it still preserved enough firepower on immediately available alert status to decimate the Russian Federation and to threaten the retaliatory capability of its deterrent forces. That operational fact preserved confrontation as the dominant security principle and limited the scope for direct cooperation.

In the academic literature, cooperative security was recognized as a departure from the self-styled realist perspective on security, which holds that national interests immutably conflict and can only be assured by superior military power—a perspective that appears to require the advantages that only the United States has recently enjoyed. With varying degrees of politeness, realist theorists rejected the cooperative security idea as indefinitely impractical in principle. In contrast, an emerging globalist perspective holds that the process of globalization has altered the scale and character of primary threat as well as fundamental interest. The contention is that the massive forms of aggression that have been the traditional concern are very unlikely to occur because no country has either the incentive or the capacity to undertake them. Instead,

the primary source of threat is said to come from civil violence and associated terrorism, apparently arising from conditions of endemic economic austerity. Those forms of violence, the argument holds, undermine basic legal order necessary to support global economic performance and thereby threaten the dominant common interest all countries have in assuring their own economic performance. If so, then cooperation for mutual protection can be expected to emerge as the primary imperative of security policy, even for the United States.

It may take some time before the viability and endurance of the cooperative security idea can be reliably judged. Both its conceptual and its practical standing appear to depend on the eventual fate of the realist and the globalist perspectives—a contest that, at least in the United States, is yet to be decided.

See also *Cold War; Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation; Soviet Union, Former.*

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Copyright

Copyright prohibits people from copying a wide range of works—music, books, movies photographs, computer code, and so on—without prior permission. By putting restrictions on use, copyright attempts to provide content creators with financial compensation in an effort to ensure they have an incentive and the means to continue creating work in the future. It also helps prompt investment in their works.

Copyright legislation creates intellectual property, which recognizes works as the expression of ideas; it is the physical manifestation that is protected through legislation—not the ideas themselves. The history of copyright is long and has been turbulent at times. The first copyright legislation was the United Kingdom's Statute of Anne passed in 1709, which gave authors control over the use of their work and took some power away from publishers.

INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT

Understanding copyright law is complicated as it varies from country to country. However, an international legal system exists to tackle disputes arising from differences in national legislation. International cooperation has been ongoing for more than two hundred years, starting, most notably, with the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in 1886. Today, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is tasked with administering international copyright agreements States belonging to the European Union are also subject to copyright regulations at the European level.

Two distinct attitudes toward copyright have emerged and are very much reflected in the evolution of legislation in different countries. On one hand, there is the view that once a work is made available for public consumption, people should have a certain freedom to use it as they please. According to this line of argument, copyright owners should receive only limited control over—and compensation for—use of their work. This view tends to underpin American and British attitudes and legislation toward copyright. On the other hand, there is the view that favors the natural, or moral, right of those who created a work to receive compensation for its every use, and such an attitude is often reflected in European legislation.

NEW CHALLENGES

While it was technological advancement that brought copyright into being, such advancements led to great challenges for owners of copyright. With technology like the printing press and the photocopier, exact copies of works could be reproduced relatively easily. Today, the Internet facilitates the ease of copying, lowering costs and making the process faster. As a result, the unauthorized copying of many works—or piracy—has been on the rise.

In spite of the challenges raised by technology and the concerns of copyright owners over piracy and loss of revenue, technological advancements have also contributed to ease when it comes to the management of copyright. Programs that allow for the legal downloading and purchasing of music not only make work easier to distribute, but also help to ensure that compensation is received when work is accessed. Growing attention has been paid to the development of digital rights management (DRM) strategies because many copyright owners look toward encryption as a means of protecting their work.

The protection of digital work has not been without controversy and complication. Critics claim that some DRM strategies undermine privacy and in some cases even compromise our personal property, as Sony BMG found out when its CDs were found to make computers vulnerable to viruses. DRM has also been frowned upon as it clashes with the fair use doctrine built into the copyright system that allows copyrighted material to be used for specific purposes such as teaching.

The challenges posed by new media prompted copyright owners to call for changes to copyright legislation, and WIPO responded with two Internet treaties in 1996: the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. Individual countries followed with legislative change to implement the measures outlined in the treaties. The United States, for example, passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998. As technology continues to evolve, we can anticipate further changes to ensure a balance among the rights of copyright owners, creators, and consumers.

See also *Digital Democracy; Intellectual Property Rights.*

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Corporation

Large corporations affect the lives and livelihoods of hundreds of millions of people around the world. They employ a large portion of the world's population, own the rights to most global technology patents, and yield tremendous influence over governments. The history of the modern corporation reflects a continued path towards greater wealth, influence, and international power—a power that critics contend is wielded with little regard to the social, environmental, or public local costs. As such, a variety of advocacy groups, watchdog organizations, and nongovernmental organizations have mobilized against large corporations' intent to force corporate reforms toward more socially and environmentally conscious ends. While for some, social pressures may foreshadow a new age of tempered capitalism and diffuse power, for others, corporate changes are regarded as superficial and do not limit their power or influence nor alter their profit-seeking goals.

BRIEF HISTORY

In many ways, the nature of the corporation parallels the evolving political relationship between the state and the market. In the days of monarchic rule, as seen in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, the state's economy and resources were regarded as extensions of the state's authority. During this period, a corporation would have to obtain permission from the state to come into existence. In an attempt to curry favor with the monarch to ensure passage of its charter, corporate founders would frame their mission as being in the service of the state while highlighting explicit benefits to the monarch. Describing the role of the corporation during mercantilist time, Frederick Maitland in *Political Theories of the Middle Ages* (1900) noted, "The corporation is, and must be, the creature of the State. Into its nostrils the State must breathe the breath of a fictitious life."

This relationship evolved with philosophical developments in political and economic theory in subsequent centuries. In the eighteenth century, the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher, Adam Smith, extolled the virtues of a self-organizing marketplace unrestricted by the intrusive power of the monarch. Individual liberty within the marketplace was now cast as the necessary component for not only the individual's but the state's greater economic prosperity. While Smith's classical economics did not explicitly extend this concept to corporations, since Smith perceived corporations as a potential risk to market competition, free market advocates and neoclassical economists after him often refer to Smith's ideas to advocate limited government interference within a free marketplace and specifically on corporations. Toward the middle of the nineteenth century, obtaining a corporate charter became a matter of bureaucratic formality no longer contingent on the approval of rulers, and therefore corporations were no longer obligated on serving a goal or public interest for the state.

OPPOSING THEORIES OF THE CORPORATE FIRM

The now dominant neoclassic economic theory has firmly transformed the original role of the corporation and its relationship to the state. The purpose of the firm, as theorized by economist Ronald Coase, is to integrate various production operations into one organization in order to minimize external transaction costs. This pervasive and purely economic view of the corporation has overtaken the originating concept in which the firm should serve the greater goals of society. A purely economic view places little restraint on a corporation's dedication to minimize costs and increase shareholder wealth, encouraging the unbridled expansion of these integral organs of capitalism. The largest global corporations have influence spanning the globe, extending beyond economic powers, but exert influence well into international and political spheres. Of the largest one hundred economies in the world, fifty-three are corporations. The largest corporation in 2000 had revenue greater than the GDP of more than 180 countries, according to M. Gabel and H. Bruner in *Global Inc.: An Atlas of the Multinational Corporation*.

Today the relationship between the state and the firm has been described as a special relationship of mutual interdependence. This interdependent relationship between governments and powerful corporations was made evident during the worldwide economic crises during 2008 and 2009, following the housing market collapse. Criticisms were hurled at the U.S. government for bailing out major banks; however, counterarguments stated the large financial institutions were the pillars of the global economy and, if allowed to fail, the United States as well as global markets would suffer greater collective losses. Whereas once the corporation remained solidly under the authority of the state, today's corporations wield tremendous influence among government policy makers and politicians; this causes many to fear these singularly profit-seeking entities are overriding the publicly interested goals of the state.

The controversy surrounding the role of corporations in society can be summarized in two opposing theories of the firm. First, the classical economic or shareholder view of the firm insists on the absolute primacy of profit maximization as the goal of corporations. The well-known quote by economist Milton Friedman in "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits" (1970) states, "The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits"—a claim he made in response to the rising tide of another theory of the firm. The competing stakeholder theory does not deny the necessary goal of profit seeking, but insists that beyond the sole interests of shareholders, firms must also consider the interests of every stakeholder group impacted by its operations. The list of stakeholders includes employees, customers, the community within which it operates, and the environment within which it is located.

While these two theories have caused significant debate among scholars, policy makers, and corporate managers as to the actual objectives of a corporation, a simple deduction shows the two theories considerably overlap. When enough people, consumers, and corporate managers believe firms should be sensitive to interests of all stakeholders, it creates an incentive for firms to comply with this normative standard. In other words, adopting the stakeholder theory of corporate behavior may in fact be the best way to meet the goals of the shareholder theory.

NEW HORIZONS

Today we observe the proliferation of corporations engaged in voluntary self-regulation, self-auditing, and various other programs of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Even with little empirical evidence of a direct link between profits and CSR, corporations continue to adopt these practices, according to David Vogel in *The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility* (2005). Benjamin Cashore, in his 2002 article "Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental Governance," states the emergence of nongovernmental organizations, advocacy groups, corporate watchdog organizations, and nonstate market based governance systems create an institutional network of interests aiming to shift, yet again, the relationship between the corporation and the state. This shift, however, is not identical to the role corporations held centuries earlier, in which they were compelled to serve a role more aligned with larger public interests. While corporations may engage in more social and environmental responsibility, it is not necessarily born out of pressure or negotiations with states, but rather to appease the variety of actors and civil society groups, some of which are active stakeholders.

See also *Business Pressure in Politics; Capitalism and Democracy; Economic Interdependence; Multinational Corporation (MNC).*

. . . .   RABIH HELOU

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Correlation

In political science, two variables are said to correlate when they tend to vary together. More precisely, correlation can be positive if the variables move in the same direction (they both increase or decrease at the same time), or negative if they move in opposite directions (when one variable increases, the other decreases).

In statistics, *correlation* is more specifically defined as a measure of the strength, or consistency, of the linear relationship between two variables in a population. Graphically, this statistic indicates how well the scatterplot obtained by representing the observations on a Cartesian plane with the two variables as dimensions fits along a straight line. Correlation is most commonly measured—or estimated, when only a sample is available—with the Pearson product-moment coefficient (ρ or r in statistical notation, respectively, for populations and samples), a standardized indicator whose value ranges between –1 (perfect negative correlation) and 1 (perfect positive correlation), and where 0 denotes the absence of correlation.

The correlation coefficient is an inadequate statistic when the relationship analyzed is believed to be nonlinear or when the variables of interest are nominal or ordinal. In these cases, alternative measures of association such as the chi-square, Spearman's ρ, or Kendall's τ might be more suitable.

See also *Causation and Correlation; Partial Least Squares; Regression with Categorical Data; Statistical Analysis.*

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Corruption

See *Democracy and Corruption*.

Corruption, Political

Most definitions of *corruption* emphasize the abuse of public power or resources for private benefit. Many basic terms of that definition, however, are themselves contested: Legal standards, public opinion or social values, or the public good may judge *abuse*. Terms such as *public, private, power,* and *benefit* may also be matters of dispute. Variations on the theme emphasize public office dimensions (duties, powers and their limits, process issues, accountability), market processes (using public power to extract rents, or allocating public goods on the basis of demand rather than need), and the public interest, among other factors, as defining characteristics. A continuing debate has to do with the role, if any, that cultural differences should play in defining corruption. Thus, there is no universally agreed upon definition of corruption.

As a concept, corruption has a long lineage. In classical times, it referred to a collective state of being. In this state, leaders forfeit, by their conduct, their claims to virtue and thus their right to lead; citizens or followers fail to play their roles in society; and the overall political order loses its moral structure and justifications. Modern conceptions of corruption originate not only in the works of thinkers like French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau but also out of political contention over accountability and the limits of power. These

conceptions tend to treat corruption as a property of a particular action or actor. An official might take bribes, for example, without corrupting the overall political order. While the modern conception dominates, classical ideas are still relevant. For example, citizens of many democracies perceive fundamental corruption in the process of financing campaigns, even where funds are raised and spent in legal, publicly disclosed ways. Corruption in that sense has less to do with rule breaking than with leaders and a political order made unresponsive and unaccountable—and citizen choices made meaningless—by factors such as money and favoritism. Whether or not analysts agree with such perceptions, they can pose a real problem for the vitality and credibility of democratic politics.

MODERN VIEWS OF CORRUPTION

Corruption was a significant issue among scholars and agencies concerned with development during the 1960s and 1970s, but received less attention between the mid-1970s and late 1980s. The reasons for that hiatus are unclear, but among them might be the reluctance of analysts to appear to blame developing countries for their own problems; resistance on the part of Western governments, international organizations, and businesses to the idea that their own activities might contain or encourage corruption; and the inability of analysts to devise effective reforms. Academic analysis during those early periods often *relativized* the issue—treating corruption and its consequences as matters of opinion, or as so diverse as to resist comparisons across societies—and focused on the *functionality* question—whether corruption might do more good than harm in developing societies despite its illegitimate status. Corrupt dealings occurring or originating within advanced societies often received insufficient attention. A related cultural critique held that corruption was a Western concept; and that some varieties, in developing societies, were extensions of longstanding acceptable social practices; and that corruption should not be viewed in negative terms.

The end of the cold war and economic globalization, however, brought corruption back to the fore. Governments and international lenders sought better results from aid and assistance, and corporations, faced with intensifying international competition, began to see corruption not as an overhead cost of doing business but as a deadweight loss. Research beginning during the 1990s led to new kinds of data, including a number of attempts to measure and compare levels of corruption internationally (usually based on perception surveys), and to much improved theory. As corruption is generally a clandestine phenomenon, however, any sort of measure will be imperfect. In his 2007 article, "What Have We Learned about the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?" Daniel Treisman reviewed the literature regarding studies of corruption. He concluded that mature liberal democracies and market-oriented societies are regarded as less corrupt, while fuel-exporting countries and those with intrusive regulation and unpredictable inflation tend to be seen as more corrupt. While higher development does cause lower perceived corruption, when income is taken into account many predictors of perceptions are only weakly related to individuals' reported experiences with corruption. Strong evidence that corruption delays, diverts, and distorts economic and political development superseded functionality arguments—that corruption is not "grease for the wheels," but rather "sand in the gears." To a striking extent, this line of research places relatively little emphasis on definitions.

REFORM SOLUTIONS

The past generation's policy recommendations and reforms have often been broadly consistent with the Washington *consensus* view, and neoliberal outlooks that revived the debate. The worldview that emerged, first of all, sees corruption primarily as bribery, and thus as a transaction that is quid pro quo and amenable to economic modeling. It holds that smaller governments, by reducing interference in the marketplace, will produce less corruption as well as more growth; that democratic politics is another, parallel sort of market; and that the state's proper functions, often termed *good governance*, should be primarily technical and administrative—in effect, a referee role in liberalized societies. Much theory and data support such views, particularly to the extent that we conceptualize corruption in terms of rent-seeking, regard public institutions more as obstructions to market processes than as foundations for them, and idealize the ways markets and governments would work in the absence of corruption. Indeed, evidence does suggest that where corruption is apparently more common, inspections, delays, and red tape are more extensive, and economic processes less vibrant, than in societies where it is less extensive, and that corruption is a major factor keeping poor people poor.

More recent research, while accepting the basic view of corruption as broadly harmful, has reemphasized the value of politics and public institutions. It suggests that the consensus view—and international corruption indices—overlook variations among and within societies and in the kinds of corruption problems they experience. Cultural variables resurfaced too, less as definitions than as clues to the origins of certain forms, and clues to the social significance, of corruption. Mediating cultural institutions such as *guanxi* in Chinese societies and *middlemen* in India, have major implications at those levels. Such arguments remind us that active markets and democratic politics require social and institutional foundations, rather than just liberalized processes, and that we have no way of knowing how real economies and governments would function without corruption.

In the United States, reform has been a long-running research and policy concern shaped by both the abolitionist movement and the struggle against machine bosses like William M. Tweed of New York's Tammany Hall. Both that struggle, and the Progressive Era more generally, gave rise to administrative and civil service reforms that undercut many corrupt practices; New Deal social services likewise weakened the power of machine politicians' petty favors and gifts. Critics see these reforms, however, as introducing fragmentation, rigidity, and new costs into government.

Contemporary research issues associated with corruption include the further elaboration of Principal–Agent–Client (P-A-C) models, and other conceptions of incentives and constraints often drawing upon economics theories; improved measurement, including assessing corruption indirectly using indicators of government performance; and the analysis of reforms. Most democratic societies have instituted political finance rules and, less commonly, subsidies; many are also scrutinizing corporate governance, accounting standards, and the transparency of markets with renewed vigor. On the international front, organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Organization for American States, and the United Nations have ratified anticorruption treaties and conventions, usually backed up by ambitious intergovernmental scrutiny and assistance schemes. At all levels, major themes in reform include accountability, transparency, and the responsibilities and strength of civil society.

See also *Accountability; Corruption and Other Political Pathologies; Principal-agent Theory; Relativism; Rent-Seeking; Transparency.*

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Corruption and Other Political Pathologies

In an ideal democracy, the polity faithfully maps the preferences of citizens into public choices. Protections for individual rights constitutionally limit the range of democratic choice, but within those constraints, citizens' preferences rule. In practice, real governments fail to measure up. Some of this divergence is the result of disagreements among citizens over policy; other difficulties arise from the nature of representative government. If preferences diverge, the state must aggregate preferences to make choices using methods that are subject to strategic manipulation and that produce winners and losers. This will happen even in a direct democracy lacking any of the institutions of the modern state beyond elections. Furthermore, most democratic states require representative institutions in order to function, and under these structures some will have more power than others because of their geographical locations or their strategic positions. These are not pathologies but are, instead, inherent in the structure of representative government.

Such difficulties, which need to be acknowledged and managed, are distinguishable from others that represent direct challenges to the legitimacy of governments, however democratic their nominal structure. The tendency of political systems to provide narrowly focused goods and services, *pork barrel* projects, is a familiar complaint about democracy, but it is not pathological. It is the inevitable result of a political system that elects representatives from single-member districts. These representatives will try to satisfy the local demands of their constituents as well as work for broader public goals. Two types of political pathologies are, however, of concern: *corruption* and *clientalism*. The former involves the illicit personal enrichment of public officials, often combined with excess profits for those who pay bribes. The latter is a more subtle phenomenon occurring when public officials provide benefits to their supporters in a way that undermines general public values. As Jana Kunicová and Susan Rose-Ackerman argue in their 2005 article, past work has too often conflated pork barrel politics, clientalism, and corruption. It is important, however, to analyze them as separate, if overlapping, phenomena. For example, structural reforms designed to limit pork barrel politics may lead to higher levels of illegal corruption that diverts public money and power to the private benefit of politicians and their corrupt supporters.

The focus here is on states that have not descended into chaos and anarchy. States where corruption, clientalism, and other political pathologies are endemic may, of course, eventually collapse, but sometimes such states are quite stable and long lasting. As Robert Rotberg argues, the system may be pathological in the sense of not reflecting the interests of most citizens and of not providing security, but it does endure.

The line between pathology and normal democratic politics is not always easy to draw. Extreme cases are easy to identify—Zaire under the thirty-two year presidency of Mobutu Sese Seko, Cambodia under Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot—but what should we make of democratic states where private wealth has a major impact on public choices? How much of this is the normal and predictable result of the fact that elections cost money, and when does the use of private funds to support political careers become corrupt or pathological? When is support for public works in one's home district an indication that a representative system is working well, and when does it tip over the line into dysfunctional clientalism?

In a political system that pays lip service to notions of public accountability and is, in fact, controlled by corrupt officials, the basic problem is the interaction between officials' venality and corrupt inducements offered by private groups and individuals. Alongside alternative models of corrupt public and private interactions, the more familiar case of a functioning democracy is, nevertheless, deeply influenced by clientelistic networks and concentrations of private wealth.

CORRUPTION

Corruption describes a relationship between the state and the private sector. Sometimes state officials are the dominant actors; in other cases, private actors are the most powerful forces. The relative bargaining power of these groups determines both the overall impact of corruption on society and the distribution of the gains between bribers and bribe payers. The nature of corruption depends not just on the organization of government but also on the organization and power of private actors. A critical issue is whether either the government or the private sector has monopoly power in dealing with the other.

In *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform* (1999), Susan Rose-Ackerman distinguishes between *kleptocracies,* where corruption is organized at the top of government, and other states, where bribery is the province of a large number of low-level officials. On the other side of the bribery "market," there is a difference between cases with a small number of major corrupt private actors and ones where the payment of bribes is decentralized across society. Table 1 from Rose-Ackerman's book illustrates four polar cases: kleptocracy, bilateral monopoly, mafia-dominated states, and competitive bribery.

KLEPTOCRACY

In the extreme case of a kleptocratic ruler who faces a large number of unorganized potential bribe payers, a powerful head of government can organize the political system to maximize its corrupt extraction possibilities. According to American economist and social scientist Mancur Olson in his 1993 article "Dictatorship, Democracy and Development," such a "stationary bandit" acts like a private monopolist, striving for productive efficiency, but restricting the output of the economy to maximize profits. The ruler sacrifices the benefits of patronage and petty favoritism to obtain the

profits generated by a well run monopoly. Under this model, high-level corruption is not as serious a problem as low-level corruption under which officials "overfish" a "commons," according to Olson, in their search for private gain. However, this claim ignores the fact that kleptocratic rulers have more power than lower level officials and may use this power to expand the resources under state control. Furthermore, even if they expand the state, kleptocrats frequently have a weak and disloyal civil service, a poor resource base, and a vague and confusing legal framework. Such kleptocrats, described as "official moguls" by Michael Johnston in *Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy* (2005), favor a bloated and inefficient state that maximizes corrupt possibilities.

Of course, some powerful rulers do manage to avoid inefficient policies. They enrich themselves and their families, but do not push rent-generating programs so far as to significantly undermine growth. Countries with a high degree of corruption that are politically secure and tightly controlled from the top may suffer from less inefficiency than those with an uncoordinated struggle for private gain. They have a long-run viewpoint and hence seek ways to constrain uncoordinated rent-seeking. This type of regime seems a rough approximation to some East Asian countries which have institutional mechanisms to cut back uncoordinated rent-seeking by both officials and private businesses. However, many corrupt rulers are not so secure. In fact, their very venality increases their insecurity. Furthermore, corruption at the top creates expectations among bureaucrats that they should share in the wealth and reduces the moral and psychological constraints on lower level officials.

BILATERAL MONOPOLIES AND MAFIA-DOMINATED STATES

The two cases where private interests exert power over the state differ depending upon whether or not the state is centrally organized to collect bribes. In the first, bilateral case, a corrupt ruler faces an organized oligarchy so that the rent extraction possibilities are shared between the oligarchs and the ruler. Their relative strength will determine the way gains are shared. Each side may seek to improve its own situation by making the other worse off through expropriating property, on the one hand, or engaging in violence, on the other.

In *The Sicilian Mafia* (1993), Diego Gambetta defines a *mafia* as an organized crime group that provides protective services that substitute for those provided by the state in ordinary societies. In some bilateral cases, the state and the mafia share the protection business and perhaps even have overlapping membership. Donatella della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, in *Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms of Political Corruption* (1999), provide examples from Italy. Louise I. Shelley highlights this feature in a 2001 article, "Corruption and Organized Crime in Mexico in the Post-PRI Transition," and Shelly and Svante E. Cornell, in a 2006 article, document state and mafia interpenetration in "The Drug Trade in Russia."

A powerful corrupt ruler extorts a share of the mafias' gains and has little interest in controlling criminal influence. If the

TABLE 1: TYPES OF CORRUPT GOVERNMENTS

	MULTIPLE BRIBERS	FEW BRIBERS
BRIBE RECIPIENTS CONCENTRATED AT TOP OF GOVERNMENT	Kleptocracy	Bilateral monopoly
MULTIPLE BRIBE RECIPIENTS AT LOW LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT	Competitive bribery with a possibility of spirals	Mafia-dominated state

mafias get the upper hand, they will enlist the state in limiting entry through threats of violence and the elimination of rivals. Furthermore, organized crime bosses who dominate business sectors may be more interested in quick profits through the export of a country's assets and raw materials than in the difficult task of building up a modern industrial base. The end result is the delegitimation of government and the undermining of capitalist institutions.

Criminal mafias are only the most extreme form of private domination. Some states are economically dependent on the export of one or two primary products. These countries may establish long-term relationships with a few multinational firms. Both rulers and firms favor productive efficiency and the control of violent private groups, but the business and government alliance may permit firms and rulers to share the nation's wealth at the expense of ordinary people. The division of gains will depend upon their relative bargaining power. If investors have the upper hand, there may not be much overt corruption, but the harm to ordinary citizens may, nevertheless, be severe. The size of the bribes is not the key variable. Instead, the economic distortions and the high costs of public projects measure the harm to citizens.

In the case when officials of a weak and disorganized state engage in freelance bribery but face concentrations of power in the private sector, the monopolist could be a domestic mafia, a single large corporation, or a close-knit oligarchy. Yet in each case, private power dominates the state, buying the cooperation of officials. The private actors are not powerful enough to take over the state and reorganize it into a unitary body, and the very disorganization of the state reduces the ability of the private group to purchase the benefits it wants. Making an agreement with one official will not discourage another from coming forward. Such a state is very dysfunctional as officials compete for corrupt handouts.

COMPETITIVE BRIBERY

In cases of competitive bribery, many low-level officials deal with large numbers of citizens and businesses. This could occur in a weak autocracy or in a democratic state with weak legal controls on corruption and poor public accountability. The competitive corruption case is not analogous to an efficient competitive market. A fundamental problem is the possibility of an upward spiral of corruption. The corruption of some encourages additional officials to accept bribes until all but the unreconstructed moralists are corrupt. Two equilibria are possible—one with pervasive corruption and another with very little corruption.

Reform requires systemic changes in expectations and in government behavior to move from a high corruption to a low corruption equilibrium. Unfortunately, the states that fall into this fourth category, such as many states in sub-Saharan Africa and in South and Southeast Asia, are precisely those that lack the centralized authority needed to carry out such reforms. The decentralized, competitive corrupt system is frequently well-entrenched, and no one has the power to administer the policy shock needed for reform.

CLIENTALISM, CAMPAIGN FUNDS, AND PRIVATE WEALTH

More subtle and difficult pathologies arise in democracies with well-established competitive electoral systems. Democratic processes are expensive. Because the state can provide targeted benefits, award procurement contracts, and impose regulatory and tax costs, private interests seek political influence. Even if they only do this within the law, those with wealth are likely to do better than others. Of course, more diffuse interests have an impact both through the ballot box and through grassroots protests, but the well-off often can either co-opt mass opinion or counteract it through their own actions.

What can wealthy interests bring to the table beyond more pay for lobbyists and lawyers? In functioning democracies, a key resource is the provision of campaign funds and in-kind benefits, ranging from free media exposure to free travel and trips for volunteer campaign workers. Skirting close to the corrupt edge are the conflicts of interest that arise when government officials are given favorable access to investment opportunities, are promised private sector jobs, or are themselves associated with prominent business families. Even when there is no direct quid pro quo that runs afoul of anticorruption laws, ongoing connections and past patterns of favors can distort choices.

Clientalism operates in the other direction, as demonstrated in Junichi Kawata's edited volume, *Comparing Political Corruption and Clientalism* (2006). Powerful politicians, sometimes in alliance with wealthy private interests, develop vertical ties that make ordinary citizens dependent on them for jobs; they also help with regulatory hurdles and access to public services. The state does not provide benefits to citizens as a right. Rather, its benefits are dispensed as favors, and costs are imposed on those who do not show proper deference. The clients may then provide help during electoral campaigns. Masaya Kobayashi, in the article "A Typology of Corrupt Networks" (2006), makes the useful distinction between the long-term reciprocal relations typical of clientalism and the specific purchase of services that characterizes bribery. Clientalism may be more deeply entrenched and harder to counteract than individual instances of corruption.

Restrictions on campaign finance are one response to both clientalism and corruption in established democracies. Solutions approach the problem from four dimensions. First, reducing the length of time for campaigns and limiting the methods available can reduce the costs of political campaigns. Second, stronger disclosure rules can be established. Disclosure permits citizens to vote against candidates who receive too much special interest money. In *Voting with Dollars* (2000), Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres, however, suggest the opposite strategy; they recommend that all donations should be anonymous so that no quid pro quo is possible. This idea invites donors to find ways to cheat, but if successful, it would likely discourage contributions from all but the most ideological donors.

Third, laws can limit both individual donations and candidates' spending. In the United States, such limits are in tension

with the constitutional protection of free speech. The basic issue, however, arises everywhere: To what extent can a democratic government interfere with citizens who wish to express their political interests through gifts to support political parties or individual candidates?

Fourth, alternative sources of funds can be found in the public sector. In the United States, the federal government provides funds for presidential candidates under certain conditions, and several American states provide public support for political campaigns. Also, a number of proposals have been made for more extensive public funding. One idea is to grant public funds to candidates who demonstrate substantial public support. Ackerman and Ayres, for example, argue that giving vouchers to voters to support the candidates of their choice could achieve this. This plan would combine public funding with an egalitarian system for allocating funds and, if combined with secrecy for private gifts, would reduce the influence of wealthy interests. If not well-monitored, however, it might increase illegal payments. Furthermore, their proposal does not respond to the pathologies of clientelistic systems where voters might still support entrenched incumbents who offer jobs and targeted services with little concern for broad public values.

CONCLUSIONS

All political systems fall short of the democratic ideal. Constitution writing and legislative drafting are pragmatic exercises requiring compromise and a realistic appreciation of the limits of institutions to control self-seeking behavior. Nevertheless, some political systems are worse than others. They have crossed the line into kleptocracy or into state capture—be it by mafias using intimidation and violence or by large business corporations leveraging their economic clout. Some states risk slipping into such pathologies and into outright failure, but one also needs to acknowledge the more subtle ways in which private wealth and public power can interact in more advanced systems. These interactions can undermine government legitimacy and divert the benefits of state action to narrow, unrepresentative groups. The policies required may not be as drastic and transformative as in kleptocratic or fully captured states, but they, nevertheless, require difficult confrontations with powerful vested interests both inside and outside of government.

See also *Accountability; Campaign Finance; Corruption, Political; Democracy and Corruption; Organized Crime and Mafia; Public Good; Public Interest Groups; Public-private Dichotomy.*

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Corwin, Edward Samuel

Edward S. Corwin (1878–1963) was a leading political scientist and constitutional law scholar during the first half of the twentieth century. He was widely recognized for his writings on a broad range of constitutional issues. Corwin also made significant contributions to the study of the U.S. Supreme Court and the presidency. Corwin's work has been referred to in U.S. Supreme Court opinions and continues to be cited in current academic scholarship.

Corwin completed his undergraduate studies at the University of Michigan in 1900, where he developed an interest in American constitutional thought. After spending two years teaching high school students, Corwin enrolled in the University of Pennsylvania and received his doctorate in early American history in 1905.

Corwin spent his entire academic career at Princeton. In 1911, at the age of thirty-three, he became a full professor. In 1918, he succeeded Woodrow Wilson as McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence. Corwin was also the first chair of Princeton's department of politics. He was active in the profession and became the president of the American Political Science Association (APSA) in 1931.

Corwin was a prolific writer and authored more than twenty books and over 150 scholarly articles. He is often noted for the advances he made by analyzing constitutional concepts in historical context. Many of his studies were considered landmark contributions when they were published and continue to be read today. For example, Corwin's book, *The*

Constitution and What It Means Today, was first published in 1920 and is now in its fourteenth edition.

One of Corwin's most famous essays is "The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law," which was published in 1928. In this article, he examines the intellectual roots of American constitutional thought and explanations relating to the Constitution's dominance. The importance of this article is underscored by the fact that scholars continue to debate its merits many years after its publication.

Corwin was a frequent commentator on public issues of the day. He was not shy about writing for the popular press or granting newspaper interviews. He advocated U.S. entry into World War I (1914–1918) and was a vocal supporter of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal.

Corwin provided guidance in different capacities to two presidents. The advice he gave to Woodrow Wilson was more informal and not always implemented. During Roosevelt's administration, Corwin served as an adviser to the Public Works Administration. Corwin then worked in a consulting capacity for the attorney general.

The most controversial aspect of Corwin's career was his defense of Roosevelt's court-packing plan, which included testifying before the Senate's Committee on Court Reorganization. He had difficulty defending his views before the committee because, earlier, he was quite critical of the plan. It has been suggested that Corwin's support of the court-packing plan and his lackluster Senate testimony ended any reasonable chance of him receiving an appointment to the Supreme Court. After these events, Corwin became more politically conservative and openly critical of Roosevelt.

Corwin retired from Princeton in 1946, but continued to pursue an active research agenda, publishing several books and a handful of articles. The APSA offers an annual award in his name for the best doctoral dissertation in public law.

See also *Constitutional Courts; Constitutional Law; New Deal; Supreme Court.*

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Cosmopolitan Democracy

See *Cosmopolitanism.*

Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism, a term derived from the Greek word *kosmopolitês* meaning "citizen of the world," is used to refer to a variety of beliefs and attitudes about the relationship between the individual and humanity (or the world) as a whole.

From a Stoic point of view, the citizen of the world is indifferent to particular places and detached from particularistic commitments. In other words, the citizen of the world is at home nowhere, except perhaps in the realm of ideas, where goodness in its purist form is to be found and where justice reigns unchallenged by the ignorance and selfishness of humankind. In this light, cosmopolitanism has less to do with the transcendence of national boundaries than it does with an allegiance to the *kosmos*—meaning, the intelligible realm of forms—above and beyond the visible world of endless cruelty and conflict. This may be what Plutarch means when he attributes to Socrates the designation of citizen of the world in his essay "On Banishment."

From a cultural point of view, the world citizen is world traveler who appreciates variety in culture, art, literature, cuisine, and so on, and who is open to different ideas and ways of life. From this perspective, articulated by Jeremy Waldron, the citizen of the world is at home everywhere, including the realm of contested truths and hybridized identity. Like Stoic cosmopolitanism, cultural cosmopolitanism requires a level of detachment from one's own culture and context. But unlike Stoic cosmopolitanism, the wider world exists both to be appreciated and to be learned from by the world citizen, not to be renounced in its entirety in favor of a higher level of existence.

What is generally meant by political cosmopolitanism is the recognition that the activities of one's own state affect the lives of people living in another state and the belief that these people are worthy of consideration and respect. It does not mean that an individual is devoted to all states (or peoples) equally or to the idea of a world state. Immanuel Kant, in "Perpetual Peace," looked to humanity's unsociable sociability as the engine that would drive the emergence of political cosmopolitan and an international federation of free nations. But there is nothing inevitable about the historical development of political cosmopolitanism—or cosmopolitanism of any kind, although imagining rationally self-interested states as the drivers of cosmopolitan change, as Kant did, does go against a utopian basis for such speculation.

Some contemporary philosophers, including Martha Nussbaum, argue that people should owe their primary allegiance to the world, not to any association more limited or local, while others, such as Kwame Anthony Appiah, have argued more modestly for a rooted cosmopolitanism that allows individuals to preserve a special or prior obligation to a local

or national community, rather than insisting on a potentially unlimited obligation to aid the worst off in the world. Another contemporary view of cosmopolitanism is offered by Seyla Benhabib, who recovers and expands upon the Kantian concept of hospitality, understood as a cosmopolitan right of individual members of a global civil society to be welcomed and protected by other nations. Since this right intersects with the sovereignty of states, Benhabib argues that citizens of democracies who are convinced of the validity of cosmopolitan norms must articulate it into positive law.

Critics of cosmopolitanism, including Richard Rorty, have argued that since the global moral community does not exist as an empirical reality, people cannot be morally attached to it or feel loyalty toward others as fellow members of it. Rorty goes further by arguing that cosmopolitan norms cannot emerge from anything like Kantian rationality, as Benhabib suggests, and that the only hope for the gradual emergence of a global moral community is for people to abandon the pretense of universality. Until that happens, citizens of more affluent, developed countries are unlikely to identify with or sacrifice their prosperity for the sake either of strangers living in a far corner of the world or strangers arriving on their shores.

See also *Greek Political Thought, Ancient; Kant, Immanuel.*

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Cost–benefit Analysis

Cost-benefit analysis is a technique to determine the best alternative out of many available options by comparing the expected costs and benefits. It can be applied to the analysis of almost any course of action characterized in terms of its benefits and costs, including opportunity costs. The comparison of one alternative course of action to another is based on their net present values. The net present value of an alternative is the difference between the sum of all future benefits brought by the course of action and the sum of all future costs resulted from that course of action. A discount rate must be chosen in order to calculate future costs and benefits in present terms. For actions with long-term consequences, this choice is controversial because it requires predicting financial market performance, and often evaluating the value of the welfare of future generations.

The cost-benefit analysis is used in many areas. In finance applications, the cost-benefit technique helps to determine the most profitable projects. In government policy applications, the cost-benefit tool is often used to judge the effectiveness of government regulations for preventing market failures. The international relations between countries are also based on cost-benefit calculations. For example, the choice of a certain foreign policy action takes into account the expected subsequent positive and negative reactions of other countries, which generate the benefits and costs. However, where perfect markets for the inputs to the analysis do not exist, deriving the required costs and benefits is controversial.

. . . .   TATIANA VASHCHILKO

Council, Constitutional

See *Constitutional Courts.*

Counter–Enlightenment Political Thought

Counter-Enlightenment political thought refers to a range of views that share the belief that the eighteenth century Age of Enlightenment in the West was fundamentally mistaken in ways that have seriously damaged religion, morals, and society. The Enlightenment was a period of reform when prominent and influential European and American philosophers, historians, economists, and politicians challenged many traditional beliefs and institutions in the name of reason, science, and progress. Critics of this movement's emphasis on the power and centrality of reason in human affairs have sought to depict it as both exaggerated and dangerous.

Over the past 250 years, the Enlightenment has attracted critics from across the ideological spectrum, ranging from devout conservative Catholics to radical feminists, from nineteenth-century romantic poets to twentieth-century neo-Marxists and even liberals. Most disagree on their interpretation of what the Enlightenment was; however, there is broad agreement among its adversaries that the period was socially and politically harmful, if not disastrous. There have been, and still are, many Counter-Enlightenments, from the eighteenth century to the present, covering not only a wide range of specific criticisms of the Enlightenment, but also many different, and sometimes incompatible, depictions of the Enlightenment by its critics, each of which suits their own beliefs, agendas, and interests.

EARLY CRITIQUES OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

The first serious, systematic critique of the Enlightenment came from the eighteenth-century Swiss writer Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who had been a friend and ally of many of its leading proponents such as the writer Denis Diderot and the philosopher and mathematician Jean d'Alembert. Yet in his *Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts* (1750) Rousseau praises ignorance and associates the acquisition of knowledge of the arts and sciences with decadence and moral depravity. Many philosophers were shocked by this stance, which they saw as

a betrayal of the ideals of the Enlightenment. D'Alembert sought to counter it in his *Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopédie* (1751), which became the French Enlightenment's unofficial manifesto. This early skirmish over the effects of the arts and sciences on morals soon escalated into an epic clash between Rousseau and the philosophers of the Enlightenment, which has continued without interruption ever since.

In the decades preceding the French Revolution (1789–1799), Enlightenment philosophers sparred constantly with orthodox religious writers such as the conservative Jesuit Guillaume-François Berthier, who assaulted the *Encyclopédie* for attacking Christianity and for its alleged corrosion of traditional morals and beliefs. After 1789, many writers blamed the violent excesses of the French Revolution on the Enlightenment which, it was widely believed, had systematically destroyed the legitimacy of monarchy and aristocracy in Europe and plunged the continent into decades of political chaos and bloodshed. The most eloquent proponent of this view was the conservative Savoyard Catholic Joseph de Maistre, whose *Considerations on France* (*Considérations sur la France,* 1796) depicts the events of the 1790s as divine punishment for the sins of the Enlightenment. Its most popular advocates were the Anglo-Irish statesman and philosopher Edmund Burke, author of the influential *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790), and the Abbé Augustin Barruel. Barruel's bestselling *Memoirs Illustrating the History of Jacobinism* (*Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire du Jacobinisme,* 1797) makes the case that a conspiracy of Enlightenment philosophers, Freemasons, and the secret Illuminati Order deliberately sought to overthrow established monarchs and governments in Europe in the name of reason and progress.

Many romantic writers at the end of the eigteenth century and early nineteenth century in France, Germany, and Britain condemned the Enlightenment as antireligious, although their own religious views were often far less orthodox than those of its earlier Enlightenment critics such as Berthier. The belief was widespread among these romantic poets and writers that the Enlightenment's allegedly narrow emphasis on reason at the expense of emotion and passion had led to a world devoid of beauty, imagination, and spirit. This is a central theme of François-René de Chateaubriand's enormously popular and influential book *The Genius of Christianity* (*Le Génie du Christianisme,* 1802), an aesthetic defense of Christianity that depicts the beauty and mystery of faith as a casualty of the Enlightenment's relentless assault on traditional religious beliefs in the name of reason. Many romantic writers shared the mistaken conviction of earlier religious opponents of the Enlightenment that the philosophers of the Enlightenment were mostly atheists; in fact, very few were.

TWENTIETH-CENTURY COUNTER–ENLIGHTENMENT THOUGHT

Attacks on the Enlightenment were common throughout the nineteenth century, most notably in the later works of the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, who associated it with the French Revolution as its earlier critics

had done. But it was not until the end of World War II (1939–1945) that Counter-Enlightenment thought became as widespread as it had been during and after the French Revolution. According to a generation of intellectuals born at the turn of the century, the Enlightenment played a central role in the emergence of twentieth-century totalitarianism, epitomized by Adolf Hitler's Germany and Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union. After World War II, German critical theorists Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno associated the Western conception of Enlightenment with a narrowly instrumental form of reason that was repressive and totalitarian in their very influential book *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1947). Cold–war liberals of the same generation, such as philosophers Jacob Talmon and Isaiah Berlin, saw the legacy of the Enlightenment as directly linked to twentieth-century communism. In addition, their conservative contemporaries Michael Oakeshott and Eric Voegelin restated earlier, orthodox attacks on Enlightenment rationalism for its disastrous political and spiritual effects.

Among later generations of thinkers, postmodernists have been the Enlightenment's most vociferous critics. Works such as *Madness and Civilization* (1961) and *Discipline and Punish* (1975), by French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault, chronicle the emergence in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries of a new disciplinary society that was liberal and humane in name and rhetoric but sinister and highly controlling in practice. Postmodern feminists such as Sandra Harding have attacked the Enlightenment for its supposedly pure conception of reason in which important gender differences are suppressed in the interests of men.

New forms of Counter-Enlightenment thought continue to proliferate today, for example, among some environmentalists critical of the modern West's faith in science and technology. Given that so many of the values, practices, and beliefs of modern Western civilization are rooted in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, it is certain that its assumptions and consequences will remain matters of deep and abiding contestation.

See also *Conservatism; Critical Theory; Enlightenment Political Thought; Foucault, Michel Paul; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Scottish Enlightenment.*

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Counterfactual

A *counterfactual,* also *contrafactual*, is a hypothetical situation usually created to examine what may have happened given a different course of events or set of conditions. Counterfactual experiments substitute variables of the historical context and analyze how these changes would have affected outcomes; for example, "If the United States had not gone to war against Iraq, it would have been able to fight terrorism worldwide more effectively." Counterfactual reasoning is used in any field in which researchers want to draw cause-effect conclusions but cannot perform controlled experiments in which they consider conditions that differ only in the presence or absence of the hypothesized cause. It is assumed that good counterfactuals should rest on multiple factuals, and, as sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) claimed, they "should make as few historical changes as possible." Counterfactuals are often crucial for theory building and interpretations, may provide analytical insight, help to acknowledge the role of chance, and can facilitate, in Philip Tetlock's words, "learning from history." Limitations of this method are associated with the inherently subjective process and the certainty-of-hindsight effect.

See also *Critical Juncture; Forecasting, Political; Path Dependencies; Politics, Comparative; Qualitative Methodologies.*

. . . .   JIRI S. MELICH

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Counterterrorism

See *Crime Policy.*

Coup d'État

A *coup d'état* involves the sudden, often violent, overthrow of an existing government by a small group. In contrast, revolutions are achieved by large numbers of people working for basic social economic and political change. In almost all cases, a coup d'état is essentially identical to military coup because it either replaces a civilian government with the military or one military group with another.

There are three kinds of coups. The first is a *breakthrough coup d'état* that occurs when a revolutionary group overthrows a civilian government and creates a new elite. Examples of this type of coup include China (1911), Egypt (1952), Greece (1967), and Liberia (1980). A *guardian coup d'état* takes place when a group comes to power to ostensibly improve public order, as occurred in Pakistan with Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's overthrow by Chief of Army Staff Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in 1979. Finally, a *veto coup d'état* occurs when the army vetoes democracy. The most famous example took place in Chile in 1973 when the military overthrew the elected socialist President Salvador Allende Gossens.

There is a question whether attempted plots and failed coups should be included in a study of the causes and effects of coups. Failed coups may have as large an effect as a successful coup. For instance, if a group were to attempt a coup and fail, the response of the regime that survived the attempt would likely not be much different from the actions of a group that succeeded; political repression is the common outcome. This, in turn, ferments resentful out-groups prone to violence that often lead to countercoups or civil war.

By way of illustration, Patrick McGowan breaks down the analysis of coups in sub–Saharan Africa into two periods, from 1958 to 1979 and 1980 to 2001. The causes of these coups across both periods are clustered along four explanations: the characteristic of the military, the level of political development, social mobilization, and the national political economy. But, there is disagreement on how these various causes positively or negatively affect change. For instance, does pluralism abate or accelerate coup d'états?

The centrality of the military is almost always a key cause, and related to this is the characteristic of the military, such as its ethnic composition. Countries with large militaries, particularly where they have strong ethic affinities, are strong candidates for a coup d'état. There is also broad agreement that poor economic performance is a powerful catalyst. Coups, of course, in turn have a negative impact on gross domestic product, which creates a viscous circle. In both cases, the causes of coups can be associated with the hollowing out of the state that eventually cripples it—a process that always precedes state collapse.

There is more debate on the association between pluralism and coups, and there are two important points here. First, whatever impact the level of pluralism has on coups, once a coup occurs, the possibility of a subsequent coup is high, and therefore the lack of political development and coups will have a high correlation. The relationship between pluralism and coups may also depend on the time period. For example, in Africa, the coups that took place between 1958 and 1975 occurred mostly in civilian regimes and those between 1976 and 1984 occurred mostly in military regimes. The effect here is key. A coup d'état that overthrows a military regime is much more likely to lead to military factionalism, which not only predicts further coups, but also plants the seeds for competing militias that characterize state collapse. The possibility of further violence heightens if the military splits after a coup, with each side supporting a different faction of elites. One way back to power is a countercoup.

Finally, one of the most commonly accepted effects of coup d'états is the contagion effect—it spreads to contiguous states. However, there is no conclusive explanation for this. Nonetheless, in Africa—and elsewhere—there is a geographic pattern to coups. Of the five major regions, west and central Africa seem to have been most prone to coups, while southern Africa has been remarkably free of coups.

See also *Assassinations, Political; Authoritarianism, African; Autogolpe; Civil-military Relations; Civil Wars; Political Change; Regime Change; Revolutions; Revolutions, Comparative.*

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Courts, Administrative

See *Administrative Courts.*

Courts, Constitutional

See *Constitutional Courts.*

Covenant

THE BIBLICAL COVENANT

The *biblical covenant* is a mutual and voluntary pledge between God and humankind for the attainment of the common good and justice. A congregation of equals (since people were created alike and in God's image) consents to a covenant; God does not force them to obey (Deuteronomy 4:1). A transcendent sovereign oversees the content of the covenant, and intervenes occasionally to ensure all act according to its terms. God submits to the same law he proposes for humans (Deuteronomy 7:12), limiting his omnipotence. Subsidiary covenants establish different sets of rights and obligations: between rulers and the ruled, under God's supervision (2 Samuel 5:3, Joshua 24), or international treaties (Genesis 21:27–32, Joshua 9).

Failure to comply with these stipulations leads to internal collapse, preceding the destruction of Israel by a foreign power. This causes the replacement of the original covenant (Jeremiah 31:31–32) and the introduction of a mediator between God and humankind, which warrants Christ, the new covenant in the New Testament (Hebrews 12:24). The new bond is anchored on grace and faith and sealed with baptism, which replaced circumcision.

COVENANT THEOLOGY IN THE REFORMED CHURCH

The Protestant theologians of the sixteenth century saw Reformed Christians as the new chosen people, a new Israel persecuted by a papal monarchy that identified them as "false teachers" (2 Peter 2:1). Reformation embodied the restoration of the covenant and the original purity of the religion of the patriarchs. The right to resistance to Catholic false idols and gods was therefore a religious obligation that extended to the civil domain through the duty to depose rulers who renounced true faith. The task was to govern according to God's will for the benefit of the population, which corresponded to a subsidiary double covenant between the people and the political leader and between the political leader and God. Violation of these conditions would lead to tyranny, which would contradict the biblical horizontal paradigm. This paradigm is based on a democratic republic moderated by the aristocracy of magistrates, such as Moses and pious kings. The Christian magistrate, a man of staunch faith answerable only before God, would adapt this model.

SECULAR VERSIONS

In the following two centuries, establishing a parallel between the biblical episodes prior to the covenant God made with Abraham and the condition without government, contractarians identified both with the state of nature. For Thomas Hobbes, this is a state of "war of one against the other" that can be overcome only by a covenant, through which people irreversibly deliver all rights to a sovereign whose powers are absolute. John Locke acknowledges the inconveniences of the state of nature, given the absence of a universally accepted law and coercive power. This creates a need to transfer certain rights to a sovereign with power that is conditional upon fulfillment of the compact with the people who can always depose the sovereign. For Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in the state of nature, humans were "noble savages" who were later corrupted by society. The social contract, signed by the people who collectively exercise sovereignty and obey no one but themselves, is the means to restore the freedom enjoyed in an idyllic state of nature.

AMERICAN SYNTHESIS

Religious and secular versions merged in the foundation of the early American Republic. The country was built by religious confessions—Puritans, Baptists, Presbyterians, Quakers, German Sectarians, Huguenots—in the name of liberty. The means to that end lay in the covenant paradigm; just as the Israelites had entered freely into a covenant with God, so did early Americans voluntarily agree to the creation of a church or a political society. That rationale was extended to all domains—labor unions, businesses, professional associations, towns, cities, states, the federal Union—through a network of secularized versions of the covenant. Saintly conduct—charity, interdependence, self-discipline, submission of the private interest to the community, obedience, virtue—ensured by influential churches, was translated in the political realm. This resulted in limited government, popular sovereignty, equity, and an equal share in the decision-making process.

See also *Contractarianism; Federalism; Protestant Political Thought; Reformation Political Thought; Social Contract; U.S. Political Thought.*

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Credibility

See *Trust and Credibility.*

Crime against Humanity

See *Human Rights.*

Crime Policy

Government response to crime begins first with defining what constitutes criminal behavior. In totalitarian regimes, *crime* is often defined as any behavior that threatens the authority of the state. In liberal democracies, crime often mirrors the public's judgment of right and wrong behavior. Although these judgments may vary from state to state, most democratic nations condemn behavior that threatens the life, liberty, and property of others.

LIMITATIONS ON CRIME PREVENTION POLICIES

Social scientists and philosophers actively debate what causes people to commit crime. Some experts adhere to a medical model of crime, which posits that crime is a symptom of individual or societal dysfunction. Other experts assert that crime is a choice made by rational actors who act as free moral agents. Over time, lawmakers have incorporated both perspectives in their attempts to prevent crime: Officials will commit public funds to improve living conditions, educational opportunities, and vocational resources for their citizens while at the same time enacting tough sentencing laws that communicate the consequences of bad behavior.

Although public officials are concerned about the problem of crime, they are limited in their ability to stop it since many of the influences that impact criminal behavior are beyond government control. For example, research has shown that individuals with absent or dysfunctional families, negative peer relationships, and inadequate moral or religious training are more likely to commit crime; yet policy makers are often precluded from intervening in these private spheres. Similarly, studies have found that individuals with poor self-control are at higher risk for engaging in criminal behavior, but government policies can do little to change individual character traits. Nonetheless, when crime rates rise, increased public concern puts pressure on lawmakers to take immediate action to reduce crime. Accordingly, policy makers enact policies that alter the role of police, adjust the prosecutorial response, or amend the punishment scheme.

ALTERING THE ROLE OF POLICE

In most jurisdictions, local police agencies are charged with enforcing criminal statutes and maintaining social order. In the United States, police agencies have been transformed from loosely structured partisan organizations to professionalized bureaucratic agencies. Urban unrest in the 1960s and 1970s prompted a renewed interest in creating a community service role for police officers. Instead of patrolling neighborhoods in police cars—a practice that created distance between officers and citizens—offers were reassigned to foot patrol to encourage a stronger affinity between police and community residents. This also allowed officers to implement the zero tolerance theory of policing, which required officers to address minor disturbances in order to keep more serious crime at bay.

On occasion, lawmakers have enacted policies that change the way police officers do their jobs. When civil rights advocates complained that officers were indifferent to domestic violence and other crimes against women, policy makers curtailed traditional police discretion by enacting mandatory arrest policies and requiring certain procedural protections for victims of sexual violence. Similarly, police organizations with a history of racial prejudice have been the subject of targeted reforms, particularly with regard to the hiring, training, and evaluation of police officers. In some jurisdictions, civilian oversight of police agencies remains a source of contention as police officers view such policies as being unnecessarily restrictive or overly meddlesome.

Since the start of the modern war on terror, counterterrorism efforts have increasingly involved local police agencies. Many policy makers believe that police agencies are better suited than the military for counterterrorist operations because officers are regularly trained to detect, apprehend, and interrogate criminal suspects without compromising individual civil liberties or incurring civilian casualties. They are also in a better position to work with community leaders and other local agencies to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. Other lawmakers, however, believe that counterterrorism efforts should be coordinated by national agencies because police agencies are ill-suited to handle the national security implications of terrorist related threats. They also lack the ability to direct personnel and resources outside of their local jurisdictions.

ADJUSTING THE PROSECUTORIAL RESPONSE

In liberal democracies, state attorneys are responsible for initiating judicial proceedings against criminal suspects. They weigh evidence collected from the police and file criminal charges with the court. In many instances, prosecutors have independent authority to decide whether to initiate proceedings against the suspect; in other jurisdictions, policy makers compel prosecutors to press charges in certain types of cases.

In recent years, governments have vacillated in their prosecutorial response to terrorism. Some governments have allowed terrorist suspects to have full due process rights, while

others have treated terrorists as enemies of the state. Before the attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, U.S. officials routinely prosecuted individual terrorists as criminal suspects in civilian courts; however, after the 2001 attacks, the George W. Bush administration began to treat some terrorist suspects as unlawful enemy combatants. Instead of facing criminal charges in regular court proceedings, these suspects were prosecuted and tried in military tribunals. Since the 2008 election of Barack Obama, however, federal Department of Justice officials have been authorized to selectively prosecute high-profile terrorism cases in civilian proceedings.

AMENDING THE PUNISHMENT SCHEME

In most liberal democracies today, convicted criminals are punished with loss of liberty or property, and occasionally, with loss of life. Although the death penalty remains a punishment option in some nations, its use has decreased dramatically in the last several decades. In most nations, government officials are more likely to punish criminals with alternative sanctions, such as monetary fines and restitution, compelled participation in rehabilitation programs and community service, and fixed terms of imprisonment. In some jurisdictions, judges have full discretion over criminal sentencing; elsewhere, lawmakers are responsible for determining the terms of punishment.

Since the early twentieth century, sentencing policies have reflected a variety of philosophical beliefs. Some lawmakers assert that offenders can be rehabilitated through compelled participation in educational and behavioral modification programs. Others contend that bad behavior can be deterred by more punitive sentences or prevented altogether by sentences that incapacitate incorrigible offenders. Still others insist that the government only impose sentences that are justly deserved. Since each position has its practical advantages and disadvantages, democratic lawmakers have struggled to find a policy mixture that can curb crime while minimizing costs and maximizing liberty. Accordingly, when crime rates fluctuate, officials will often try to amend the sentencing scheme first before examining other parts of the system.

See also *Capital Punishment; Civil Law; Due Process; Law and Society; Trial Courts; Universal Jurisdiction.*

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Crisis Rhetoric

Rhetoric is the use of persuasive language or other symbols, while *crisis* is a type of rhetorical terminology that conveys a sense of urgency and suggests that a threatening event, different from routine events, has occurred.

GENERATIVE AND STRATEGIC CRISIS RHETORIC

Crises may be rhetorical in two senses: generative and strategic. First, the language that policy makers use to talk and write about issues, whether intentional or not, influences their perceptions of reality. They then convey these depictions of reality to journalists and citizens, often unconsciously, through their messages. When government officials choose to speak about armed conflict in another country as a "crisis," for instance, their language immediately heightens the importance of events there and generates perceptions of a particular political reality for themselves and others.

Crises also can be rhetorical in the strategic sense that Aristotle described in *The Rhetoric* as the ability to identify, in any situation, "the available means of persuasion." Leaders may intentionally adopt a crisis terminology and construct messages in order to win public opinion in line with their view that a crisis exists and that their policy choice is the best means to resolve the crisis. In 1947, most Americans did not view the Soviet Union as a threat, but U.S. president Harry S. Truman and his State Department embarked on a campaign to convince them otherwise and to gain support for the Truman Doctrine. Conversely, leaders may use language strategically to downplay perceptions of crisis, as when the Sudanese government in 2009 attempted to avoid Western intervention with claims, quoted by Reuters's news service, that the humanitarian crisis in Sudan was "absolutely under control."

U.S. PRESIDENTS AND CRISIS RHETORIC

In the United States, since the end of World War II (1939–1945), presidents have been particularly prone to employing rhetoric that encourages perceptions of foreign crisis, and their rhetoric tends to have a number of recurring characteristics. First, presidents depict dangerous scenes of crisis abroad that pose a threat to both American interests (e.g., American lives) and ideals (e.g., freedom). Presidents argue that these scenes, in turn, dictate particular actions and goals. The portrayal of crisis scenes serves to frighten listeners and usually represents the world in black-and-white terms that simplify complex issues. In so doing, presidents attempt to justify particular policies as the only options available by claiming that time is of the essence if devastating consequences are to be avoided.

A second aspect of presidential foreign crisis rhetoric is its depiction of the United States. In their messages, presidents usually portray a nation that is powerful and determined, yet also peaceful and patient. When presidents take military action, they describe the United States as reluctant to do so, but—in the face of grave threat—resolute. Presidents often draw upon the myths of mission (the idea that the United States should be a model for all the world) and manifest destiny (the idea that the United States is destined to spread American institutions and values) to depict the nation as a moral agent with sacred world responsibilities. Presidents also consistently depict crises as tests of character in which the United States must prove its credibility, often through acts of military intervention.

A third facet of presidential foreign crisis rhetoric is its treatment of the enemy. When presidents urge strong military action, they frequently depict an enemy that is too dangerous and too wicked to ignore. Conversely, presidents interested in diplomatic solutions choose to deemphasize enemy portrayals, for fear that such language will undermine public support for diplomacy or even lead to demands for a military response.

A fourth characteristic of presidential foreign crisis rhetoric is its reliance upon references to the president's office, title, and responsibilities as a way to legitimize policy decisions. Since the Korean War (1950–1953), U.S. presidents have regularly used crisis rhetoric to justify military actions that they already have taken, thereby deepening the need to appeal to presidential authority.

When presidents choose to convince citizens that foreign crises exist, they also can depend on a number of advantages to help them do so: Americans's limited knowledge of international relations, the institutional credibility of the presidency, and the rally around the president phenomenon in which citizens tend to support their presidents, at least in the short term, during crises.

In addition, presidents can rely upon a largely compliant mass media to convey their messages for two basic reasons. First, administrations have become adept at news management, an activity that began to accelerate during the latter half of the twentieth century and includes tactics to affect coverage positively, such as President John F. Kennedy's use of exclusive interviews and the Ronald Reagan administration's "line of the day." Second, as media companies have come to treat the purpose of news as profit, rather than public service, they have cut resources from news gathering and encouraged coverage that is entertaining in order to appeal to a wider audience. Such changes, along with a compressed news cycle, have encouraged journalists to rely on official sources, rather than investigating issues themselves, to fulfill the constant demand for stories easily and inexpensively.

From another vantage point, presidents may seem less able to influence public opinion today since the number of media outlets, and hence choices, has proliferated; electronic news coverage tends to summarize presidential messages rather than airing them as spoken; and media coverage, while not questioning facts, discusses politicians' motives cynically.

Nonetheless, when a foreign crisis appears to threaten the nation and citizens have rallied around the president as a representative of the nation, journalists still become especially deferential, thereby allowing presidents to convey their views readily, as President George W. Bush did after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. Presidents find their persuasive task more difficult, however, when they cannot resolve a crisis or their personal credibility is badly damaged, as with Lyndon B. Johnson and Vietnam and Jimmy Carter and Iran.

Over time, the relationship between presidential power and foreign crisis rhetoric has tended to be symbiotic: presidents have used their power to support their rhetoric, and they have used their crisis rhetoric to expand their power. From 1990 to 1991, for example, George H. W. Bush sent 400,000 U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia without asking for congressional consent or invoking the War Powers Resolution of 1973. Presidents have regularly used crisis rhetoric to legitimize unilateral actions and, most often, Congress has assented, thereby ceding the executive branch greater control over foreign policy. If critics oppose military action, they may be attacked for not "supporting the troops."

Foreign crisis rhetoric also discourages careful deliberation by arguing that danger leaves no time for delay, as in George W. Bush's insistence that Congress complete any debate on Iraq prior to the November 2002 elections. Equally troubling, foreign crisis rhetoric may justify extreme measures that violate civil liberties to achieve security.

WORLD LEADERS AND CRISIS RHETORIC

While American presidents have been particularly prone to using crisis rhetoric, other world leaders have often been similarly inclined. Spanish prime minister José María Aznar, for example, engaged in crisis rhetoric before the Spanish parliament in 2003 to justify his support for an impending U.S.–led war against Iraq. According to Teun A. van Dijk in a 2005 article, Aznar depicted a crisis, created by Iraq, which threatened the entire international community, and portrayed his government's actions as peaceful and defensive in nature. In 2004, Russian president Vladimir Putin likewise used crisis rhetoric to represent Chechen hostage takers as part of an international terrorist threat and to bolster perceptions of his own leadership, thereby obscuring Chechen grievances. International leaders have also learned from the example of American presidents that news management techniques can be instrumental in attaining positive media coverage for their crisis interventions. When Israeli military forces invaded Gaza in January 2009, Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert gave Western journalists easy access to Israeli locations where Hamas rockets had landed, but prevented them from covering the bloodshed in Gaza.

In an era when so many issues vie for public attention, the allure of crisis rhetoric remains strong. The government of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il demonstrated this point quite well with its March 2009 accusation, quoted in *The Boston Globe* and *The Wall Street Journal,* that U.S. president Barack Obama's administration "is now working hard to infringe upon the sovereignty" of North Korea "by force of arms in collusion with the South Korean puppet bellicose forces." According to analysts, this crisis rhetoric was both a response to the new, more conservative South Korean government and a bid to gain U.S. attention.

See also *Emergency Powers; Executive Privilege; Language and Politics; Media, Political Commentary in the; Media and Politics; Rhetoric.*

. . . .   DENISE M. BOSTDORFF

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Critical Juncture

A *critical juncture* is an episode of pivotal transformation, during which an institution undergoes fundamental and revolutionary change. Critical junctures are unlike other changes because critical junctures are not incremental: They are one-time episodes with lasting consequences. The critical juncture secures a choice or a path through which the institution continues after the juncture has passed. The choice is secured, or "locked in," because other choices are either excluded from later analyses or because other options are eliminated through cost-benefit comparison. As part of the path–dependency analysis, a critical juncture helps establish the trajectory of a society.

Identifying a critical juncture is, strictly speaking, only possible after the fact. Analysts cannot know that a critical juncture is in fact critical until afterwards, because it requires that the institution(s) it fosters become self-reinforcing. Identifying an event as a critical juncture often involves creating counterfactual projections as to what might otherwise have occurred. In this way, an episode may be identified as critical to an institution's creation, it or contributes to how an institution has changed. Counterfactual arguments explain how a moment was critical by creating possible alternatives to history.

Of course, journalists and politicians often see particular movements as historic even as they happen, but a historic moment is not necessarily a critical juncture. At times, it seems that social forces move inexorably toward a certain outcome. For instance, given the preceding rise in women's status in the legal profession, the appointment of a woman to the U.S. Supreme Court in the twentieth century seemed inevitable at some point, if not exactly when it would occur.

By contrast, critical junctures are contingent on preceding events, but yield unexpected outcomes of these events. A crucial facet of critical junctures is that, though proceeded by enabling social conditions, they are context specific and differ from society to society. These episodes may last moments or linger on for years, depending on the circumstances. Critical junctures interrupt or profoundly influence existing institutions, but are unpredictable even by those familiar with a society's institutions.

Scholars who employ path dependency as an explanation of events therefore investigate antecedent conditions to a critical juncture, but rely more heavily on posterior events. Not only do different environments and actors within societies affect how critical junctures affect the development of an institution, but different institutions and processes are more susceptible to change than others. Antecedent conditions cannot reliably predict if there will be a critical juncture, what will change, or how the institution will change. Following a critical juncture is a period of *historical legacy* in which the effects of the juncture persist. This legacy may become evident directly after the juncture, or it may become evident only long after the event has transpired. For instance, the Magna Carta in 1215, which established certain rights of the nobility in England, is now recognized as a critical step toward universal human rights.

Critics of analyses that employ critical junctures argue that the concept is either too broad to be useful or too vague to explain anything. The idea of a critical juncture may be applied to different contexts, but it may also be so context specific that it cannot be generalized to other circumstances. The same scenarios, actors, and processes are unlikely to occur

in and influence disparate processes. Likewise, the concept of a critical juncture leaves unanswered how long a juncture might last or specific attributes that a critical juncture must entrench before it becomes important.

Analyses that use the critical juncture framework are also criticized as being overly deterministic, and exclude the role of individual actors outside the critical juncture and may be unfalsifiable. Also, path dependent solutions work only in hindsight, and while most historical analysis allows analysts to develop predictions, a key component of a critical juncture is that the outcome is either random or unpredictable. In this way, critical junctures inhibit prediction. Lastly, deterministic arguments may create logical tautologies: Something is a critical juncture because it shaped an institution as such, and something was shaped as such because of the critical juncture.

Critical junctures are widely used within political science to explain important moments in the history of a society or institution. Scholars point to seemingly important events and attempt to show how an incident shaped an outcome that might not have been, no matter how entrenched it has become. While many argue that such analysis lacks scientific rigor, others argue that explaining these critical moments is important to understanding how institutions develop.

See also *Magna Carta; Path Dependencies.*

. . . .   RYAN GIBB

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Critical Legal Studies

See *Jurisprudence and Legal Theory.*

Critical Race Theory

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT

Critical race theory (CRT) began in the early 1980s as an insurgent intellectual movement within the American legal academy. The movement's impetus was, according to Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas, the editors of the 1995 book, *Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement,* "a deep dissatisfaction with traditional civil rights discourse" felt by students and younger professors, mostly of color, in top U.S. law schools. CRT students and scholars maintained that legal academic elites such as the Harvard Law faculty promulgated a naïve view of racial justice, which worked to preserve de facto white supremacy by underestimating the breadth and depth of racial injustice in the United States. CRT proponents held that an implicit social compact existed between liberals and conservatives in the American intelligentsia about how racial justice would be debated and understood. As described by Kimberlé Crenshaw and her colleagues in *Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the Movement,* liberals and conservatives together would exclude "radical or fundamental challenges to [the] status quo . . . by treating the exercise of racial power as rare and aberrational rather than as systemic and ingrained" (xiv). Racism would be conceived as the "intentional, albeit irrational, deviation by a conscious wrongdoer from otherwise neutral, rational, and just ways of distributing jobs, power, prestige, and wealth. The adoption of this perspective allowed a broad cultural mainstream both explicitly to acknowledge the fact of racism and, simultaneously, to insist on its irregular occurrence and limited significance" (xiv). The intended effect of this tacit agreement was to forestall radical challenges to de facto white supremacy and to confine racial reform to liberal incrementalism.

The radicalism of CRT's critique of American white supremacy elicited shock, outrage, and even ridicule from both the law school establishment and the American intelligentsia. But as CRT produced a steady stream of law review articles deconstructing the conventional wisdom of American legal liberalism—illustrating the gap between that conventional wisdom and real-life minority experience—the movement won adherents. Closely allied with critical legal studies (CLS), which sought to expose the ways American law systematically perpetuated and legitimated economic exploitation, CRT drew sustenance from the Marxist and poststructuralist insights of CLS while at the same time forcing it to move race closer to the center of its inquiry. CRT thus constituted of both "a left intervention into race discourse and a race intervention into left discourse" (Crenshaw et al., xix). Today CRT scholars hold tenured professorships in prestigious law schools and are making inroads in the disciplines of history, sociology, political science, and philosophy. While there is less resistance to CRT today than there was at its inception, many scholars and pundits still consider CRT to be conspiratorial and antiwhite.

PREMISES AND TENETS

CRT is a diverse intellectual movement without a rigid orthodoxy. Its adherents nevertheless share some premises and tenets. First, critical race theorists insist that though *race* is bankrupt as a biological concept, it is significant as a social concept. For five centuries, changing conceptions of race legitimized the enslavement, dispossession, colonization, and oppression of African, Native American, Latino and Latina, Asian, and Jewish peoples; though those conceptions of race have been discredited, they still organize inequality and infect modern thought. To diagnose the ways those conceptions of race continue to distort social perception and structure inequality, it is necessary to employ race as a social category. In addition, to avoid essentialism and overgeneralization, it is important to study the various ways different groups have been racially categorized and characterized at different points in time.

Second, critical race theorists consider white supremacy to be constitutive of, and not anomalous to, the American polity. This premise overturns the mainstream belief that civil rights advances of the 1950s and 1960s—*Brown v. Board of Education* (1954), the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965—purged the laws of racial injustice, removed all obstacles to racial equality, and restored the legitimacy of an otherwise just system. Critical race theorists opt for their historical view not out of eagerness either to discount the triumphs of the civil rights movement or to be reflexively anti–American, but rather out of a carefully considered belief that (1) their view more accurately reflects American historical and sociological reality, and (2) any sugarcoating of that reality provides a false sense of comfort and forestalls the achievement of racial equality. Critical race theorists also wish to emphasize that America's achievement of racial justice is not destined and inevitable. History can and does move backward; realizing racial justice thus requires moral vigilance and political action.

Third, CRT is highly critical of the turn toward the ideal of *colorblindness,* both in the judiciary's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and in American political culture generally. While many critical race theorists agree that a colorblind society is the ultimate goal, all are skeptical that social and economic white supremacy can be dismantled without color-conscious, results-oriented public policy. Maintaining that racial justice means substantive racial equality, they argue that those who opt for formalistic understandings of racial justice—intentionally or not—act to preserve the social and economic privileges white Americans accumulated over three centuries of de jure white supremacy. Against those who characterize prominority remediation as morally equivalent to antiminority discrimination, critical race theorists respond that the two are morally asymmetrical. They urge judges to consider social and historical context in adjudicating color-conscious public policies, and measure their constitutionality by whether they reinforce or undermine de facto white supremacy.

Fourth, CRT emphasizes the importance of attending to *intersectionality*—how individuals live within multiple identities. Because both antidiscrimination law and identity-based social movements typically are organized around single dimensions of identity—race *or* sex *or* sexual orientation, to name just three—our structures of law and protest are ill-equipped to address problems that arise from hybrid forms of oppression. If a black woman, for example, is denied a promotion because her boss feels special animus against black women, that boss can defuse her race-based or sex-based antidiscrimination claim by pointing to recent promotions of black men and white women. The law's insensitivity to the fact that people suffer hybridized forms of discrimination leaves these victims without legal recourse. Scholars of intersectionality analyze these dilemmas and develop conceptual frameworks capable of addressing them.

See also *Intersectionality; Race and Racism; Racial Discrimination; White Supremacy.*

. . . . JACK TURNER

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Critical Realignment Theory

Popularized in the 1960s and 1970s, critical realignment theory gained credibility through the efforts of such notable scholars as V. O. Key Jr., E. E. Schattschneider, James L. Sundquist, and Walter Dean Burnham. For years, critical realignment theory was considered conventional wisdom, and political scientists pondered over when the next critical realignment would occur. Not without its critics, critical realignment theory garners an important place in political science with its definition of eras and electoral politics.

Shortly before the end of World War II (1939–1945), the field of political science began toying with the idea of realigning elections. In *A Theory of Critical Elections,* Key provided the first conceptualization of a critical election. Having studied American presidential elections, Key suggested that two types of elections occur—a few defining *critical elections* and a larger number of quite ordinary and undistinguished elections. Key argued that the defining features of critical elections are (1) voters' involvement is more intense, (2) voters are concerned with the result of the election, (3) the results of the election produce a transformation in the electorate, and (4) the results of the transformation endure for several election cycles. These critical elections usher in a new era in which the electorate shifts as a whole and the dynamics of the electorate are redefined. Although Key identifies two elections that meet the criteria of critical elections, the U.S. presidential elections of 1896 and 1928, he fails to discuss periodicity or the affects these elections have on government processes or policies.

Sundquist builds on the work of Key and Schattschneider and illustrates the significance of the eras that mark the time in between critical elections. Sundquist finds that not all realignments occur in one election, but may be the result of several critical elections. Several features are characteristic of

critical realignment theory. Again, in examining voter support of political parties over time, two types of elections are prevalent, realigning and nonrealigning. The existence of critical elections that foster a realignment in the electorate occur in regular intervals. The cycle between critical elections culminates with a transformation in the electorate approximately every thirty years. Many of the transformative effects are the result of oscillation between a weakening and strengthening party identification. As party identification strengthens so too does voters' concern with the election, and high turnout results. There is also evidence suggesting that third parties usually perform well right before a critical election and this may factor into the realignment. Furthermore, realigning elections or critical elections usually focus almost predominately on national issues. Those elections that are characterized as critical elections produce notable changes in the political order. Different interests are recognized as salient to the voters, new ideological issues act as cleavages between the parties, and a long span of unified government emerges. As a result, new government policies emerge that seek to address these new differences or salient issues.

Building on the work of Key and others, Burnham was the first to articulate a specific time period to identify the time span between elections that can best be categorized as a critical election. These critical elections serve to disrupt the current party system at the time and thereby usher in an era that identifies with different policies, ideologies, theories, and presuppositions. Burnham specifies that these critical elections occur every thirty to thirty-six years and, as a result, exhibit a cyclical quality.

Although critical realignment theory is customarily considered an influential theory of elections in political science, it does have its share of critics. Perhaps the greatest critique leveled at critical realignment theory is the failure of a critical election to occur in more than seventy years. The last election that scholars support and recognize as a critical election is the presidential election of 1932. A few scholars have posited the occurrence of a critical election in the 1970s, and perhaps the 1990s, but these elections fail to meet the criteria of a realigning election as established by the theory in the 1960s and 1970s. As David Mayhew states, " . . . the chief contemporary charge against the realignments genre is that it has ceased to be relevant: No certifiable electoral realignment has occurred since 1932." Several explanations exist. First, more than seventy years since a critical election results from the decay of the American parties in the 1960s and 1970s as a result of ticket splitting and increasing numbers of independents. Second, parties seek out the median voters in elections and actively attempt to be less polarizing in order to garner their support. Last, a critical election did not occur as per the schedule of every thirty years because there was not a strong enough event to cause realignment.

See also *Key, V. O., Jr.; Realignment, Partisan; Voting Behavior.*

. . . .   RICHARD M. YON

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Critical Theory

Critical theory as a philosophical tendency was formed within German culture, but the term was actually coined in the United States. The critical theory project took shape at the Institute for Social Research, founded in 1923 in Frankfurt. The first director of the institute, Carl Grunberg, and many of its early members like Henryk Grossman, Fritz Sternberg, and Felix Weill were primarily interested in the study of political economy, imperialism, and the history of the socialist labor movement.

MAX HORKHEIMER, WALTER BENJAMIN, AND THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL

Max Horkheimer, who took over as the new director of the Institute for Social Research in 1930, changed the orientation of critical theory. Seminars of an interdisciplinary sort were organized among the members of Horkheimer's inner circle and, ultimately, they would produce the major works of critical theory normally associated with the Frankfurt school. Participants included Leo Lowenthal, an expert in literary criticism who joined the institute in 1926, and Theodor W. Adorno, who was considered valuable for his knowledge of music, and who began his collaboration with the institute in 1928, yet only became an official member ten years later. There was also Erich Fromm, a gifted psychologist, who started his nine-year collaboration in 1930; Herbert Marcuse, a philosopher and former student of Martin Heidegger, who joined in 1933; and Walter Benjamin, the most unique of these thinkers, who never officially was a member at all.

Benjamin was completely unknown in the United States until the preeminent political theorist, Hannah Arendt, edited a collection of his essays, *Illuminations* (1969). Benjamin thereafter became celebrated as an iconoclastic thinker involved with investigating and meshing traditions as diverse as Jewish messianism, baroque, modernism, and Marxism. With the new popularity of the radically subjective postmodern movement during the 1980s, however, his fame reached extraordinary proportions: A library of secondary works has appeared and almost every volume of Benjamin's four-volume *Selected Writings* has become an academic bestseller. His critique of progress and optimistic illusions, his attempt to reconstruct theory through the assimilation of seemingly mutually exclusive traditions, his skepticism concerning traditional foundations and universal claims, and his preoccupation with subjectivity produced a transformation of the entire critical project. Benjamin's work spoke directly to many on the left who, following the collapse

of the social and cultural movements associated with the 1960s, felt they were living in an age of ruins. Above all, however, his inability to decide whether to emigrate to Israel or the United States and his subsequent tragic death in 1940, while attempting to flee the Nazi invasion of France, put a particularly dramatic stamp on his life and the experience of exile.

Exile marked the work of the Institute for Social Research. Horkheimer, in fact, only coined the term *critical theory* in 1937, after having fled to the United States. His seminal essay on the subject, "Traditional and Critical Theory" (1937), treated it as an approach qualitatively different from "vulgar" materialism—that is to say positivism or behaviorism—and metaphysical idealism. Following the approach developed in the classic works of unorthodox Western Marxists like *Marxism and Philosophy* by Karl Korsch and *History and Class Consciousness* by Georg Lukács, Horkheimer insisted that critical theory should be understood neither as a philosophical system nor a fixed set of proscriptions. He instead viewed it as a method of liberation, a cluster of themes or concerns that would express an explicit interest in the abolition of social injustice and the psychological, cultural, and political reasons why the international proletarian revolution failed following the events of 1917 in Russia. With the publication of "Authority and the Family" (1934), for example, Horkheimer sought to analyze how a patriarchal familial structure inhibited the development of revolutionary consciousness among workers. "The Jews and Europe" (1938) insisted that confronting bigotry called for confronting economic exploitation: or, as Horkheimer put the matter in his essay, "he who wishes to speak of anti-Semitism must also speak of capitalism." Works like these set the stage for a new mode of *dialectical thinking*—a version of Marxism—that went beyond the economic interests of classes and elites as well as the institutional dynamics of the state.

THE CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY AND TOTALITARIANISM

Reactionary sexual mores, mass culture, the division of labor, and the need to grasp the universal through the particular would prove essential themes for the Institute for Social Research. Deeper issues mired in the anthropology of human existence also became matters of concern for critical theory. Indeed, the need for a response to these issues turned critical theory into an ongoing threat to the stultifying dogma and collectivism of "actually existing socialism." In the spirit of Marxism, critical theory leveled an attack on all ideological and institutional forms of oppression including those justified by Marxism itself. Critical theory was—from the first—intended to foster critical reflection, a capacity for fantasy, and new forms of political action in an increasingly bureaucratized world.

Most members of the institute remained suspicious of the different ways in which supposedly neutral formulations of science veiled repressive social interests. That is why they employed a methodological approach indebted to both the *critique of ideology* (*Ideologiekritik*) that derived from German idealism and Marx's sociology of knowledge. Ideals of freedom

and liberation thus provided the basis for the social critique of the existing order. In the United States, however, the character of this engagement changed dramatically from that of the early days. The most compelling reasons were connected with the failure of the proletarian revolution, the increasingly stark reality of totalitarianism, and the looming shadow of McCarthyism.

Major scholars associated with the Institute for Social Research—albeit often at the fringes—added much to an understanding of the ideological forces behind the new totalitarian phenomenon and its structure. Its emergence in Germany was analyzed in diverse works of an interdisciplinary character. *Escape from Freedom* (1941) by Erich Fromm, which proved enormously popular, analyzed the psychological appeal of Nazi totalitarianism. Siegfried Kracauer, who was close to Adorno and Benjamin, offered what would prove a classic examination of German film in the Weimar Republic in his work entitled *From Caligari to Hitler* (1947). In a more social scientific vein, Otto Kirchheimer contributed *Political Justice* (1961) and Franz Neumann, with *Behemoth* (1942), introduced the first significant work that analyzed the structure of the Nazi state. Horkheimer himself edited a five-volume work, *Studies in Prejudice* (1949), for the American Jewish Committee while Adorno led a team of researchers in producing the classic book *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950). In the context of the United States, both looking backward to the 1930s and forward to McCarthyism, *Prophets of Deceit: A Study of the Techniques of the American Agitator* (1948) by Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman as well as Lowenthal's work on American anti-Semitism, *Images of Prejudice* (1945), are significant works.

Following the Hitler-Stalin Pact that unleashed World War II (1939–1945), the proletarian revolution ceased to serve as the ultimate aim of the critical enterprise. The working class lost its standing as the revolutionary subject of history and the Frankfurt school no longer saw its interests as sufficient for generating a critique of the status quo. A new phase in the development of critical theory began with the completion of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944), including a sensational last chapter "Elements of Anti-Semitism," in 1947. Horkheimer and Adorno, its authors, called into question the old belief in progress, science, and the benefits of modernity. They insisted that by privileging mathematical reason, the Enlightenment not only assaulted reactionary forms of religious dogma, but also, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the more progressive normative ways of thinking. Scientific rationality divorced from ethical concerns was, indeed, seen as culminating in the number tattooed on the arm of the concentration camp inmate.

Dialectic of Enlightenment offers less the vision of a better world emerging from the Enlightenment than one increasingly defined by the commodity form and bureaucratic rationality, in which the individual is stripped of conscience and spontaneity. Stalinism on the left, Nazism on the right, and an increasingly bureaucratic and robotic mass society emerging in the United States inspired this book: mass society, the horror of war, and—perhaps above all—the concentration

camp universe. The new reality demanded a significant revision in the more traditional understandings of critical and radical theory.

THEODOR ADORNO AND THE CRITIQUE OF THE BUREAUCRATIC ORDER

Communism had turned into a nightmare, Nazism was even worse, social democracy had been integrated into the status quo, and liberalism—with its emphasis upon the abstract individual of the social contract—had seemingly become anachronistic. For Horkheimer and Adorno, the possibility of revolutionary transformation faded in the face of an apparently seamless bureaucratic order buttressed by the culture industry intent on eliminating subjectivity and any genuinely critical opposition to the status quo. This development is what required rethinking of the usually positive view that progressives had traditionally accorded the Enlightenment. Not the *philosophe* or the political critic but the bohemian intellectual, who challenged society in its entirety, was seen as embodying whatever emancipatory hope existed for the future. Thus, for the proponents of critical theory, it had become necessary to supplement the dialectical framework of Hegel and Marx with the more modernist and subjectivist tenets of nineteenth-century German philosophers Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche in combating the collectivist strains within advanced industrial society.

It was now incumbent upon a genuinely critical theory to explore the ways in which civilization in general, and modernity in particular, were flawed from the beginning. The critical theory of society would thus require a more directly anthropological form of inquiry. According to Horkheimer and Adorno, indeed, it was now necessary to highlight not the needs of some class-bound and collectivist "revolutionary subject" like the proletariat, but the ways in which individual subjectivity might resist the conformity generated by an increasingly administered and culturally barbaric universe. Political resistance thus made way for a philosophico-aesthetic assertion of subjectivity in *Negative Dialectics* (1966) and *Aesthetic Theory* (1970), two monumental works by Adorno, while Horkheimer emphasized a philosophico-religious understanding of resistance in *The Longing for the Totally Other* (1970).

Adorno was probably the most talented proponent of this new turn in critical theory. His interests extended from musicology and literary analysis to sociology, metapsychology, and philosophy. Adorno's works evidence a rare standard of intellectual brilliance. They include extraordinary studies on modern music, in his masterful *Aesthetic Theory,* and *Minima Moralia: Reflections of a Damaged Life* (1947).

Adorno's work exemplifies the abstruse style that has become identified with the Frankfurt school. The heritage of dialectical philosophy surely had an impact on its formation and the complex use of complex concepts employed often demanded a complex articulation. Especially in the ideologically charged context of the war and its aftermath, however, members of the Institute for Social Research also self-consciously employed an *Aesopian* form of writing. As exiles living in the United States, they sought to hide their indebtedness to Marx by substituting the highly abstract language of Hegel. But also noteworthy about the style of Adorno and Horkheimer, their famous analysis of the culture industry developed in *Dialectic of Enlightenment,* written while they were living in Los Angeles, implied that popularity would necessarily "neutralize" whatever critical or emancipatory messages a work might retain. Nevertheless, there was nothing ambivalent about the willingness of Erich Fromm—or Herbert Marcuse—to engage the public in a radical fashion.

ERICH FROMM AND HERBERT MARCUSE

Erich Fromm was surely the most lucid stylist to emerge from the Institute for Social Research. He was also the most popular and, arguably, the most loyal to its original purpose insofar as he always sought to link theory with the practical demands of social change and individual transformation. Fromm grew up Orthodox and he studied with some of the leading rabbis in Europe. His dissertation dealt with the Jewish Diaspora and another of his early works with the Sabbath. The psychoanalytic institute he founded in Berlin with his first wife, Frieda Reichmann, soon became known as the Torah-peutikum. His interest in the psychological appeal and ethical impulse provided by religion, indeed, never fully disappeared.

Fromm was initially one of the most influential members of the institute and a close friend of Horkheimer. His concern was with how psychological attitudes mediated the relation between the individual and society. Even during the 1920s, he was intent upon linking Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic theory with Marx's historical materialism. For this reason, when Adorno first insisted on developing an anthropological critique of civilization from the standpoint of Freud's instinct theory, he clashed with Fromm, who insisted upon the primacy of Freud's more practical clinical studies. The dazzling newcomer won the battle. Fromm divorced himself from the institute by 1940 and proceeded to write a number of bestsellers, including *Escape from Freedom.* Quickly enough, his former colleagues condemned him for the "superficial" quality of his writings even while his influence soared among left-wing intellectuals and a broader public from the 1950s to the 1970s.

As for Herbert Marcuse, while in the United States, he not only worked with the Office of Strategic Services as an expert on West European politics, but also wrote papers on totalitarianism and, in 1958, published a highly respected study entitled *Soviet Marxism.* In spite of his penchant for utopian thought, so prominent in *Eros and Civilization* (1955), Marcuse also remained faithful to the original practical impulse of critical theory. His most influential work, *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), actually anticipated the seminal role of the new social movements and a radical cultural politics in responding to the bureaucracy, commodification, and conformism of advanced industrial society. Pessimism concerning the future of a society in which all radical alternatives were being absorbed, and all ideological contradictions were being flattened out, combined with a utopian vision built upon the radical humanism of the young Marx, the *play principle* of Schiller with its

utopian assault upon the repression demanded by reality, and the metapsychology of Freud. This tension, indeed, permeated all of Marcuse's writings.

THE LEGACY OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND FUTURE OF CRITICAL THEORY

In the United States, the popularity of Fromm and Marcuse contrasted strikingly with a virtually total ignorance of the work produced by the rest of the Frankfurt school. The legend that critical theory inspired the movement of the 1960s is, certainly in America, misleading; its major works were translated only in the 1970s. During that decade, journals like *Telos* and *New German Critique* helped publicize its ideas and the works of its most important representatives. In Europe, however, the influence of the Frankfurt school on the partisans of 1968 was strong. Its emphasis upon alienation, the domination of nature, the regressive components of progress, the mutability of human nature, and the stultifying effects of the culture industry and advanced industrial society made the enterprise relevant for young intellectuals who had come of age through the movement of the 1960s.

Horkheimer and Adorno, however, were appalled by what they had helped inspire. Following their return to Germany, the former became rector and the latter, somewhat later, a dean at the University of Frankfurt. It is somewhat ironic that these new stalwarts of the establishment should have anticipated the movement's concern with a cultural revolution and the transformation of everyday life demanded by so many of their students. These themes were as real for many activists of the 1960s, both in Europe and the United States, as the quest for racial justice and the anti-imperialist opposition to the Vietnam War (1959–1975). Nevertheless, these themes lost their salience in the general malaise that followed the collapse of the movement and the emergence of a neoconservative assault upon the so-called adversary culture.

A new set of academic radicals embraced instead the deconstructive and radically subjectivist elements in the thinking of the Frankfurt school in general, and in the work of Adorno and Benjamin in particular, with their emphasis upon the fragmentary character of reality, the illusion of progress, and the need to substitute experimental cultural for political resistance. All this fit the time in which radicalism retreated from the streets into the university. Critical theory of this new *deconstructive* or *poststructuralist* sort invaded the most prestigious journals and disciplines ranging from anthropology and film to religion, linguistics, and political science. Elements of it have, indeed, have become features of the very society that the Frankfurt school ostensibly wished to challenge.

But that time, too, is passing. If it is to remain relevant, especially in the United States, critical theory must begin taming its metaphysical excesses, mitigating its subjectivism, and affirming its repressed political character. These concerns inform much of the work undertaken by Jürgen Habermas, the brilliant student of Horkheimer and Adorno, who came to maturity in the aftermath of World War II. Of particular interest, in this vein, is his *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (1985). Habermas was never in exile: He experienced the impact of totalitarianism directly in his youth, and it left him with a profound respect for the liberal political legacy, the *public sphere*, and the repressed possibilities of *communicative action*. Habermas has also gained a large academic following in the United States. Nevertheless, his work provides an important beginning for resurrecting the critical undertaking.

A *clash of civilizations*, globalization, new forms of imperialism, and a powerful tide of conservatism are creating new problems for a new generation of critical theorists. It is becoming increasingly necessary to begin reconstructing the practical impulse of the critical project, its repressed political purpose, and its speculative legacy for the present. Critical theory was originally intended to foster social justice, cultural experimentation, and human happiness. Its academic transformation into a form of metaphysics cannot remain immune from criticism. Remaining honest to the tradition of critical theory thus calls for confronting it from the critical standpoint. Whatever the other differences between them, all of its major representatives would assuredly—today—find themselves in agreement with that claim.

. . . .   STEPHEN ERIC BRONNER

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Croce, Benedetto

Benedetto Croce (1866–1952) was an Italian philosopher of history and aesthetics who emphasized the importance of the human imagination, consciousness, and intuitive understanding in the concrete experiences of living. Born near Naples, Croce was raised in a wealthy family. In 1883, only Croce and his brother survived the earthquake of Casamicciola, which killed his parents and sister. At age sixteen, he went to Rome to live with his uncle, Silvio Spaventa, who introduced Croce

to art and politics. He studied law at the University of Rome without taking a degree, returned to Naples, and enriched his intellectual life by traveling to Spain, Germany, France, and England.

In 1910, Croce was made a life member of the Italian Senate in honor of his work. When Mussolini rose to power, Croce left his one-year tenure as minister of education (1920–1921). Croce's 1925 *Manifesto of the Anti-Fascist Intellectuals* severed his relationship with philosopher Giovanni Gentile (1875–1944), who supported Mussolini's Fascism. Croce continued to be a critic of the Fascist regime, publishing his bimonthly review *La critica* from 1903 to 1944. Subsequently, the Fascists raided his personal library was raided, and his books were banned. Due to his international reputation, Croce avoided imprisonment. After the fall of Mussolini in 1943, Croce led the Liberal Party and remained its president until 1947, the same year he established the Italian Institute for Historical Studies.

Giambattista Vico, Giovanni Gentile, and G. W. F. Hegel were major influences. Croce applied Vico's cyclical theory of social progress to the relation between art, philosophy, and practice. Also, many scholars view Croce as neo-Hegelian because of his view of history as dialectical and progressive. Unlike Hegel, Croce opposed idealism as a systematic, utopian philosophy, because of human's lower nature. Croce also rejected materialism and positivism as morally bankrupt. Fighting against the ideological illusion of systematic certainty, he argued for moral ambiguity in knowing the ethical ideal. Since Croce believed logic rested on intuitive knowledge, the foundation of his philosophy as aesthetics was an ongoing process of moral experience and expression. Croce's core philosophical writings are *Aesthetic,* published in 1902, along with *Logic* and *The Philosophy of the Practical,* both published in 1908. Because of his stress on the arts and the power of symbols and language as the imaginative source for knowledge, Croce's liberalism was aristocratic.

In *History as the Story of Liberty,* published in 1938, Croce distinguishes four forms of history: politics or economy, ethics or religion, art, and thought or philosophy. The standard of judgment correlated to these forms are the useful, the true, the beautiful, and the good. Underlying these diverse forms is one individual human spirit of liberty activating its expression. The unity is organic as new realizations of particular premises revise earlier manifestations of the same type of knowledge. In Croce's view, political philosophy arises from the particular individual acts in society, which ideally express morality and truth. It is only in the concrete historical situation that one can realize one's higher nature in politics. Croce defined philosophy as historical, and hence aesthetic and practical, a view criticized as *historicism*—giving undue credence to immanence as if transcendence were not a separate metaphysical, spiritual reality.

See also *Hegel, Georg W. F.; Historicism.*

. . . . JOANNE TETLOW

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Crosland, Charles Anthony Raven

Charles Anthony Raven Crosland (1918–1977) was a leading British socialist intellectual in the mid-twentieth century whose theories had a major influence on the evolution of the Labour Party. He also occupied key cabinet positions in several Labour governments.

Under Prime Minister Harold Wilson's first government in 1964, Crosland was deputy to George Brown, who had run against Wilson. In 1965, Crosland was appointed secretary of state for education and science and began a campaign for comprehensive education in England and Wales. In 1967, he moved to the Board of Trade as its president, remaining until 1969. He then became secretary of state for local government and regional planning until 1970.

In the 1970s, Crosland became the leader of the right wing of the Labour Party. After Roy Jenkins resigned, Crosland stood for the deputy leadership of the party but was eliminated in the first round. After Labour's return to power in 1974, he became secretary of state for the Department of the Environment. Following Wilson's retirement in 1976, Crosland contested the leadership but finished last in the poll. He then switched his support to the eventual winner, James Callaghan, who duly rewarded him by appointing him foreign secretary in 1976.

Crosland was an active member of the Fabian Society, an organization founded by Sidney and Beatrice Webb that sought the establishment of a democratic socialist state in the United Kingdom, and he contributed to their major publications.

Crosland expanded on his revisionism in *The Future of Socialism* (1956), in which he challenged the dominance of the Webbs in Fabian thinking and countered their ascetic top-down Fabianism with a more liberal version. Crosland was a revisionist in the manner of German political theorist Eduard Bernstein, who rejected the Marxist analysis of modern societies and defined socialism in terms of ethical goals rather than class and the common ownership of means of production. Crosland argued that classical capitalism was dead in the sense that robber barons no longer controlled the means of production as they did in the nineteenth century. State regulations had dispersed and curtailed ownership, and decision making now resided with managers and technocrats rather than capitalists. Power relations had irrevocably changed in society, and Marxism had to change as well. Socialism had to be redefined in terms of greater social equality and greater social justice, encompassing not merely economics but also other areas such

as gender, race, and politics. Public ownership, until then one of the cardinal tenets of socialism, had to be jettisoned because it was no longer the essential component of a socialist society, but only one of a number of means to achieve economic equality. The desirability of public ownership depended on its effectiveness in advancing social justice.

In *Socialism Now* (1974), Crosland advocated for a "democratic equality," which he defined as a dynamic concept. He recognized that some inequality may be good for society or for an efficient economy because otherwise the have-nots might be worse off under equality of outcome. Incentives, Crosland asserted, are necessary to entice scarce talent and enlarge the common good. Equality is not a virtue in itself but only in relation to its efficacy as a means to social justice.

Crosland believed in leveling up rather than leveling down. Thus, without economic growth, everyone would be worse off than before and equally poor. Economic growth has fiscal dividends that enable governments to use public expenditure to redistribute or transfer wealth without impoverishing any sector of society. Growth in income ultimately equalized opportunity and access. It led to better lifestyles and improved efficiency. Crosland also placed emphasis on comprehensive education as a means to achieve greater social equality and reduce social disparities incrementally. He had little sympathy for the idealistic socialism that had dominated nineteenth-century thinking.

See also *British Political Thought; Socialism; Webb, Sidney and Beatrice Potter.*

. . . .   GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN

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Crossman, Richard

Richard Howard Stafford ("Dick") Crossman (1907–1974) was a writer, diarist, and British Labour Party politician who served as member of British parliament for Coventry East from 1945 to 1974. He held high ministerial positions in Harold Wilson's Labour governments from 1964 to 1970, but his most lasting contribution to British political life was the publication of three volumes of his controversial ministerial diaries.

In his youth, Crossman won a scholarship to Winchester College and later a scholarship to Oxford University's New College to read classics. After taking first-class honors, in 1930 he became a don and tutor at New College, where he taught and published books on political philosophy. In the late 1930s, he left Oxford for Labour Party politics, working

as a writer and editor for the left-of-center *New Statesman*. During World War II (1939–1945), he served in the Ministry of Economic Warfare, coordinating political propaganda and psychological warfare. After the end of the war, he won the seat of Coventry East and began his career as a member of Parliament.

Despite his demonstrated abilities, Crossman remained on the Labour backbenches for nearly two decades, in part because of his contentious role in various Labour leadership challenges of the 1950s. His association with Aneurin Bevan and later with Harold Wilson marked him as a left-wing rebel, and it was not until the death of Hugh Gaitskell in 1963 that Crossman was able to use his close relationship with Wilson to help Wilson win his campaign for the party leadership. When the Labour Party won the general election of 1964, Crossman was named minister of Housing and Local Government.

Crossman served as housing minister until 1966, when a cabinet reshuffle gave him the position of lord president of the Privy Council and leader of the House of Commons, a position that he did not greatly enjoy. His diaries reveal that he missed the power and authority that the department had given him. In 1968 when Wilson combined the departments of health and social security to form the single Department of Health and Social Security, Crossman received the charge of the department. As its minister, he worked on a proposal to revise the existing flat-rate state pension program by adding a new earnings-related component.

When the Labour Party lost the 1970 election, Crossman resigned from his party's front bench to accept the editorship of the *New Statesman.* He also began to edit and format his political diaries for publication—a task that acquired a particular sense of urgency when he was diagnosed with cancer. Crossman's determination to give a full and complete account of his time within the Wilson cabinet ran into strong opposition from the cabinet office. Not only did his diaries flout the official secrets acts, which protected government documents from early release, but also his near-verbatim accounts of discussions in cabinet and between ministers and civil servants broke the long-standing tradition of confidentiality within the British political system. The ensuing legal battle to prevent publication was still unresolved when Crossman died in April 1974, but his ministerial diaries would eventually be published. To this day, the Crossman diaries remain a valuable resource for historians and politicians, and the precedent set by their publication opened the way for the printing of other political diaries, both by Crossman's contemporaries and by future politicians.

See also *British Political Thought; Political Philosophy.*

. . . .   SHANNON GRANVILLE

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Cryptography

Cryptography, from the Greek *kruptō,* meaning "to conceal," and *graphō,* meaning "to write," is the science of concealed writing; it is a technical term referring to the translation of messages into ciphers or codes. *Cryptology* is the study of both cryptography and cryptanalysis. *Cryptanalysis* is the science of decrypting ciphers and codes without a key. Within modern cryptology, there are many theories and practices, particularly focusing on the basic infrastructure used in cryptographic systems.

The fundamental intention of cryptography is to enable two individuals, normally called "Alice" and "Bob," to communicate information securely. "Oscar" is the potential third-party adversary who wants to intercept the message.

A general model of a cryptosystem can be visualized as follows: Alice wants to communicate a plaintext message to Bob. She ciphers the plaintext message using a key according to the encryption rule of the system. Bob receives the ciphertext, which can also be received by Oscar, who can be either a passive observer intending to gain the key for reading all the communication messages or an adversary intending to impersonate the original messenger and to modify the message to the receiver. Cryptosystems are intended so only Bob is able to decode (decrypt) the ciphertext because he possesses the key that reconstructs the message into plaintext, thereby preventing Oscar from receiving any information from the message. The difference between enciphering and encoding is enciphering requires each letter (or numeral) of a message to be replaced by another letter (or numeral), whereas encoding replaces entire sentences, syllables, or words. The code is the predetermined rules for converting the messages from one representation to another. A cryptosystem using an encryption key for message communication is specified by a five-tuple representing P, C, K, E, and D. P is a finite set of every possible plaintext; C is a finite set of every possible ciphertext; K is a finite set of every possible key; E is the space of the encryption rule; D is the space of the decryption rule; therefore, $k \in K$, e_K: P→C. Conversely, each $k \in K$ and each $x \in P$ contain a d_K, such that $d_K(e_K(x)) = x$ for all plaintexts x.

The antiquity of cryptology is well attested in the history of civilization. The beautiful hieroglyphic script of ancient Egypt, for instance, would have been impossible to decipher without discovery of the Rosetta stone by French soldiers in 1799. The Spartans used a cryptographic device called a *scytale,* wherein a sheet of papyrus with a message relating to their military campaign was wound around a cylinder; to read the cipher, the recipient had to possess a staff of the same diameter on which the papyrus could be unwound. The Greek historian Polybius created a 5 × 5 grid using the twenty-four letters of the Greek alphabet, known as the Polybius square. During World War I (1914–1918), the Germans used the ADFGX cipher for communication. The German cipher used a 6 × 6 grid based on the Polybius square. The cipher of Julius Caesar encrypted messages in a rotated alphabet that used a shift of three letters to the immediate right. In the New Testament, the name *Babylon* was sometimes used as a designation for Rome. Jewish literature equated Edom, Egypt, Kittim, and Rome with Babylon as a type of cipher.

Ancient ciphers and codes, however, were much more simplistic than those of the computer age. Crypotological progress was essentially halted between the decline of the Roman Empire and the rise of Islam. Cryptanalysis among Arabs was pioneered in the eighth century and subsequently continued. The necessity of mathematical advances, which had not yet occurred, meant that cryptology would not be developed further until late in medieval history. In 1412, Arabic knowledge of cryptology was described in the *Subh al-Asha,* the classical fourteen-volume encyclopedia, with tremendous detail. Francis Bacon developed a biliteral alphabet, known as the biliteral cipher, in his *De Augmentis Scientiarum* (1624) using the two characters, *a* and *b*, in groups of five letters. Edgar Allan Poe, in his 1843 short story, "The Gold Bug," popularized cryptanalysis with a detailed description of methodology to decipher any monoalphabetic substitution cipher. Additional development in cryptology occurred in harmony with the emergence of modern armies and intelligence services throughout the nineteenth century. The end of the world wars and invention of the computer advanced cryptology even further. The ciphers and codes of the present age are so advanced that it is impossible to decode them without the combination of both human ingenuity and computer proficiency.

See also *Cybersecurity.*

. . . .   RON J. BIGALKE JR.

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Cube Law

Cube law is a theory about democratic politics positing that in single-member electoral systems with two dominant parties, there is overrepresentation by the party or grouping that receives the most votes in elections. Concurrently, the party that secures the least number of votes is underrepresented.

Cube law is not applicable to systems with more than parties or to electoral arrangements with proportional or cumulative voting. Articulated by J. P. Smith in the 1909 report of the British Royal Commission on electoral reform, cube law holds that if the ratio of votes gained by two parties is X/Y, then the proportion of seats gained by the respective groups should be X^3/Y^3. Hence, if party X secures 60 percent of the vote and party Y gains 40 percent, the ratio would be 60/40 or 1.5 votes for the majority party for every 1 for the minority. The seat ratio would be $60^3/40^3$ (3.375/1), which would give the majority party seventy-seven seats to the twenty-three for the losing party. Cube law has been fairly accurate in predicting elections in two-party systems, especially contests in the United States. Decomposed cube law was developed in the 1960s in an effort to apply the theory to multiparty systems.

See also *Minority Representation; Proportional Representation.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Cue Taking

The cue taking model centers upon how a member of a legislative body makes thousands of decisions every term, including those on bills requiring a high level of technical expertise but falling outside particular areas of interest. There is an opportunity cost of time and resources if the representative tries to learn more about those issues. Hence, in order to cope with the volume of decisions, legislators need a technique to deal with the information overload.

There are two sets of actors in the system: *cue takers* and *cue givers.* When a members must cast a roll call vote on a complex issue outside their expertise, they behaves as cue takers. Cue takers look for cues provided by cue givers. Cue givers are trusted colleagues who—because of their formal position in the legislature or policy specialization—are more informed on the issue; in addition, cue givers are those individuals with whom the cue taker would probably agree if their own individual research was completed. In that sense, legislators efficiently allocate their resources since they do not need to know about every single bill being voted, and they can trust other legislators who know more about the issue. Many representatives act as cue givers on some issues and cue takers on others.

From this classical usage as proposed by Donald Matthews and James Stimson, political scientists have expanded the study of cue taking to include voters, who take cues from political elites, and *outer ring* media outlets, which take cues from "prestige" media outlets. These studies show that cue taking is a pervasive phenomenon, but the extent of its importance varies in different populations and must be verified empirically.

See also *Heuristics.*

. . . . MARCIO A. CARVALHO

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Cult of Personality

Cult of personality refers to the common practice among twentieth-century dictatorships of promoting religious types of devotion to their national leader. As described in George Orwell's novel *1984,* through skillful use of the mass media and pervasive secret police monitoring, a modern state can create fanatical mass adulation of its leader on a scale not possible in premodern dictatorships. In the absence of democratic elections, this provides a mechanism to secure the loyalty of a state's subjects.

The practice arguably began with Russian leader Joseph Stalin's decision to place the corpse of revolutionary Vladimir Lenin, the founder of the Russian Communist Party, on public display after Lenin's death in 1924. By 1930, the public veneration of Lenin had expanded to include Stalin. Similar cults developed in the fascist regimes of dictators Adolf Hitler in Germany and Benito Mussolini in Italy, and in the later communist regimes of China's Mao Tse-Tung, North Korea's Kim Il-Sung, Cuba's Fidel Castro, and others.

The term itself originated with the February 1956 speech by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in which he denounced Joseph Stalin's "cult of personality." Although Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet president from 1964 to 1982, did not wield Stalin's power, he did generate a so-called cult of personality, as did some post-Soviet leaders, notably Saparmurat Niyazov in Turkmenistan. One open question is to what extent *personality cults* are the result of pressure from below, from local officials and ordinary citizens, rather than being simply constructed from above by the national leadership.

See also *Caesarism; Charisma; Stalinism.*

. . . . PETER RUTLAND

Cultural Policy

Broadly defined, *cultural policy* deals with institutional support and guidance for ways of life or culture as understood in anthropology. Such support can include the diffusion of governance to make possible the cultivation of specific tastes and habits, through educational and other means. Examples of cultural policy include the support of particular languages and other symbols of nationhood to foster patriotism and nationalism. Cultural policy can be viewed in the narrow sense of institutional support for creative and aesthetic human

expression, yet all cultural expressions, narrow or broad, are important for cultural identities and often emerge at the forefront of political debates.

Cultural policy studies in general are interdisciplinary and broad in focus, though public policy literatures in political science attending to cultural policy tend to confine their understanding to institutional support for creative and aesthetic human expression. These include fine and performing arts and creative or entertainment industry products such as films, music, and publishing. Beyond these core aesthetic expressions, cultural policy can often relate to cultural tourism exploring the tangible and intangible heritage of societies and design elements of industries, such as advertising, architecture, and textiles.

FROM PATRONAGE TO SUBSIDIES

Historically, support for cultural expressions depended on patronage from royalty, religious institutions, or the wealthy elite. In ancient India, the fine and performing arts flourished in and around temples; Indian classical dance and music, for example, had religious significance. The Florentine Renaissance, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, was spurred by the impetus given to the arts by the house of Medici. The modern era broadened the categories of the wealthy, in turn expanding patronage and thus encouraging new forms of art. The English bourgeoisie, which arose from the early Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth century, gave a boost to English romantic painting through an emerging trend of private art collecting that spurred the romantic painters with a market for their works. Meanwhile, absolutist monarchies such as the Bourbons in France or the Hapsburgs in Austria preferred grand symbols of patronage, such as magnificent opera houses designed for imperial or national glorification.

After World War II (1939–1945), governments played an active role in cultural policy by giving various kinds of direct and indirect support to the arts and thus encouraging the growth of artists as a professional class. Historically, most artists had worked part-time, bringing about the popular image of the starving artist. Direct support for the arts came from government subsidies and grants and support for institutions such as museums, performing arts centers, and arts festivals and fairs. Indirect support for the arts came from tax, philanthropic incentives, and restrictions on creative industry products from other countries, ostensibly to encourage national ones.

CULTURAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES

The United States, in particular, has encouraged tax and philanthropy incentives to encourage arts financing. While the total budget of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) in the United States was only $132 million in 2006, charitable giving to the arts was $12.51 billion. The NEA budget was itself supplemented by other federal appropriations for arts institutions such as the Smithsonian ($517 million), Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB; $416 million), and the Kennedy Center ($18 million).

The United States does not have an official cultural policy because support for the arts comes from agencies such as the NEA, and the government keeps itself at arms length from issues of culture that are supposedly left for the citizens and private industry. In practice, the U.S. government does intervene in arts controversies, such as the reining in of the NEA or CPB when they were deemed too far to the left in the 1980s or, on the other hand, the quite visible impetus given to U.S. cultural products in public diplomacy initiatives. Despite these interventions, it is generally believed that independent arts agencies such as the NEA, or its role model, the UK's Arts Council, tend to keep direct political interference more to a minimum than when the support comes from ministries of culture. Nevertheless, public choice theorists often note that bureaucrats in arts agencies have an incentive to follow conservative policies in the arts so as to avoid highly charged controversies, especially around images of national heritage.

INTERNATIONAL MINISTRIES OF CULTURE

Most countries in the world boast of ministries of culture even though, as in the United Kingdom, they might have independent funding agencies for the arts. Thus, the ministry of culture in France has been historically important not only for inculcating a sense of French identity but also for supervising important funding organizations such as Centre National de la Cinématographie (CNC), a crucial pillar in the support of French cinema. Public support for the arts is difficult to calculate because of the myriad instruments and institutions involved, and thus comparative estimates are difficult. It is estimated that France and Austria have some of the highest yearly arts expenditure per capita at €180 and €179, respectively.

Ministries of culture are also gaining importance in the developing world after years of neglect in the postcolonial era, due to lack of resources or relegation of culture to recessive tradition, as opposed to the impetus given to modernization through industrialization. Countries like China and India have now prioritized creative industries in their economic development while cities that thrive on arts and creativity and derive their identity from it are coming up all over the world. Centers of music production are flourishing in places such as Bamako, Mali, and Bogotá, Colombia, while film production takes off in Mexico, South Africa, and India. The spectacular opening ceremonies at the XXIX Olympiad in Beijing directed by film director Zhang Yimou, choreographer Zhang Jigang, and composer Tan Dun presented a culturally confident China to an estimated global television audience of between two and four billion people.

At the international level, many countries feel threatened by foreign, especially U.S. or Hollywood, creative industry exports. The Uruguay Round of trade talks (1986–1994) at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) galvanized the debates on cultural exports. The European Union (EU), especially with French backing, vigorously contested the market liberalization that would ensue from GATT's measures, fearing that Hollywood would further dominate their cultural

markets and weaken the influence of domestic cultural products and policies. The EU, therefore, did not make any commitments in the audiovisual negotiations, the so-called cultural exception. The phrase was often used in European context to note that the importance of creative products to cultural identity was such that they needed a special exception to global norms governing international trade. The fear of future liberalization goaded Canada and Francophone countries led by France to assemble an international coalition of cultural ministries and civil society organizations to act concertedly to frame the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention on the Protection and Promotion on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, which came in to force in March 2007. The purpose of this convention is to recognize the importance of cultural industries to national and societal cultural identities and diversity of cultural expressions. More importantly, the convention seeks to promote national autonomy in cultural policy and exempt it from global market norms. Nevertheless, UNESCO itself lacks effective enforcement powers and thus the future impact of the convention remains unclear.

CONCLUSION

Cultural policy is intricately tied with cultural identity and politicians, and cultural industry elite often exploit this link to their advantage in trying to restrict or ban particular cultural expressions or flows of cultural products. For example, the EU's Television Without Frontiers directive that went into effect in 1992 has tried to reserve a majority of the television broadcast content in its twenty-seven member states to national or EU programming for the explicit purpose of promoting European cultural identities. Nevertheless, cultural products and flows continue to grow globally. Cultural identities, as a result, continue to assimilate many influences—as they always have.

See also *Free Trade; Political Culture; Politics, Literature, and Film; Public Policy; Trade Diplomacy.*

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Cultural Relations

In terms of foreign relations and policies, cultural relations exist at various levels. Cultural relations can be set between a given government and its artists, writers, and producers. Cultural relations can exist within the private sector; between countries; ministries between universities in different countries; or involve states, nongovernmental organizations and institutions like the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a promoter and facilitator of cultural endeavors. Cultural relations may include the arts and artists, producers and distributors, but also museums and donors.

Over the past twenty years, the balance of cultural relations has been faced with the issue of diversity of cultural expressions, which seeks to promote—in a single place—a broader horizon of artists and works from various cultural backgrounds and countries. Since the 1990s, diversity of cultural expressions has become a significant issue for many states where the cultural landscape is heavily influenced by a significant proportion of products (movies, popular music, magazines, television programs) from the United States, in particular, through the phenomenon of cultural dumping. The commerce of culture is not like others because art and culture cannot be reduced only to mere merchandise. In 2005, UNESCO approved a Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions in recognition of the importance of cultural diversity around the world.

The basic notion of cultural relations as a dialogue of cultures can take many forms of expression, sometimes unsuspected or unpredictable. The Olympic Games with official ceremonies and national anthems, an exhibition about a foreign country in a national museum, the world tour of the Red Army Choir, and the banning of Salman Rushdie's novel *The Satanic Verses* are all examples of cultural relations that simultaneously carry, at an international level, a strong political dimension within the expressions of art and culture. Here, culture is understood as the expression of a nation's specificity and uniqueness through its art, language, literature, history, symbols, and traditions.

Scholars in political science and international relations have mixed perspectives about cultural relations: Some academics in North America often neglect these aspects as being outside of their discipline, while others, especially in Europe, would likely consider cultural relations as a core, although overlooked, part of their field.

The relationship between power—that is, the governments—and artists, has sometimes been in conflict. In the former Soviet Union, Josef Stalin persecuted composer Dimitri Shostakovich (1906–1975), who had a love-hate relationship with the dictator. Incidentally, the genius composer once dedicated his Tenth Symphony as a musical tribute to the life of Stalin. Also in the former Soviet Union, abstract artists like Kazimir Malevich were rejected by the regime during the 1930s because their art was too far from the official social realist trend. During the same period, expressionist painters like

Max Beckmann also faced banning from the 1930s and were forced into exile from Nazi Germany.

THE HOLLYWOOD FILM INDUSTRY

The Hollywood film industry should is more than just a sector of the cultural industries; it ranks among the three most important exporters of the United States. Scholars like Thomas Guback, Manjunath Pendakur, Ian Jarvie, Toby Miller, John Trumpbour, and Janet Wasko have demonstrated that the Hollywood movie industry operates as an oligarchy, which explains why U.S. movies dominate the most lucrative markets (movie theatres, DVD rentals) in North America and in many countries, even though the United States is not the biggest film producer in terms of quantity (India produces a far greater number of feature films each year). The U.S. movie industry is political and linked with the highest power: Through the decades, the U.S. government has sometimes imposed boycotts of countries, such as England in 1949, which did not want to fully cooperate in terms of opening their markets to Hollywood movies.

Movies themselves can have a highly political content, especially documentaries. Some directors, like Leni Riefenstahl, used film to glorify Nazism and Hitler in her famous documentary *Triumph of the Will* (*Triumph des Willens,* 1935). But on the other hand, contemporary filmmakers like Australian Dennis O'Rourke (*Half Life,* 1985) and Peter Watkins (*The Journey,* 1987) masterfully demonstrated how politics, culture, and the media can hide the maneuvers of the most powerful leaders even when the media do provide news stories, which are often revealed to be uninformative. However, these important political documentaries about international issues are often available only through alternative networks and are hard to find in stores. For example, in the documentary *Half Life,* O'Rourke provides an impressive amount of archival footage about the side effects of the secret U.S. nuclear testing made in the Pacific Ocean during the 1950s, where hundreds of islanders were exposed to radioactivity without being protected or treated.

MUSEUMS AND MEMORIALS

Museums are not just houses for exhibitions about old objects and the past; in their narratives on history, these institutions acknowledge and interpret how past events, including conflicts and wars, should be understood now and tomorrow. Since any museum's mission is to educate citizens and visitors (in addition to preserving its collections), a country's history museum can be a challenging place to highlight and explain both sides of sensitive issues such as colonialism, slavery, ethnic tensions, and warfare. Hence, visitors can visit the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, in Hiroshima; the Maison des esclaves (House of the Slaves) on the Gorée Island in Senegal; and the recent Museum of Genocide Victims in Vilnius, Lithuania. All of these sites serve as tangible proof of the human rights violations that occurred there. The transition from one political regime to another can be told by museums as well, as Steven Dubin explained in his analysis of the South African museums that dealt with colonialism and apartheid.

As French historian Pierre Nora has demonstrated, even places can have a history, even if a place's specific story is not always obvious; for instance, the location where President John F. Kennedy was shot in Dallas, or the site of a battle. The history of these places and events can be remembered and commemorated by memorials. Similar to a paraphrase, a memorial seems to say in symbolic terms: "something important happened here, even though you cannot tell or see any trace anymore." Sites of former concentration camps in Germany, Poland, and central Europe are notable examples; regardless of whether or not the original buildings remain intact, people ought to know that a significant part of world history has occurred there. For newcomers and younger observers, testimonies are just words; buildings and historical places are tangible. In his book *Memorial Museums: The Global Rush to Commemorate Atrocities,* Paul Williams analyzes the processes and uses of memorializing through the years. Today, a fundamental question remains for museums who own objects that are not tolerated anymore. How should the artifacts that were used to legitimate an oppressive system be displayed? Giant portraits of former dictators or symbols of a previous colonial presence can become disturbing exhibits for a new generation of visitors. Should these works be retired and hidden? Depending on their policies, institutions answer in various ways.

PEACE PARKS

Borders are sometimes seen as zones appropriate for cultural relations, as international frontiers can create special forums of exchange between countries. There are times, however, that frontiers are so imbued with conflict that the only possible use is a demilitarized zone, and sometimes a peace park. Such peace a park exists, for example, between the North and South Korea, which used to be considered a no-man's-land. Peace parks can exist either between "good neighbors" or between states in conflict; they are built by two countries (or sometimes more) that agree to dedicate a region to a common cause, in many cases in order to protect first the environment and wildlife, but sometimes to avoid unwanted uses.

CULTURES CONFIRM DIFFERENCES

In an era of new technologies, globalization, and the Internet, individuals can be in touch with others in just a few seconds, despite the distance between them. But as French sociologist Dominique Wolton demonstrated, this illusion of proximity should not hide the barriers created by the sometimes deep differences between people, that vary significantly from one culture to another, one country to another, or one continent to another. These sorts of differences can be seen, for example, when American businesspersons go abroad and experience different corporate cultures, rules of hospitality, and etiquette.

In the twenty-first century, cultural relations are not exclusively handled by political leaders and policy makers, as proven by the emergence of celebrity diplomacy, whenever rock stars and actors use their image to promote what they consider to be worthwhile causes, as did John Lennon (1940–1980) for peace during the late 1960s and 1970s. Some artists were even recognized as diplomats. In Europe, popular singers like Nana

Mouskouri and Salvatore Adamo were nominated as ambassadors of good will for the United Nation's Children's Fund. In 2009, Armenia named popular French singer Charles Aznavour as its ambassador to Switzerland.

Diplomacy schools are no longer the only road to becoming a world-class diplomat because some celebrities have gained levels of respect and credibility, not only in their country, but also from an international audience. Moreover, celebrities can sometimes attract awareness from the media for overlooked issues, thereby providing the issue with increased public exposure. This can often take the form of popular artists meeting with notable advocates or important political figures like Nelson Mandela, for example. For many observers unaware of current politics and international relations, these types of meetings are perhaps their only encounter with political and human rights issues.

See also *Cultural Policy; Politics, Literature, and Film; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).*

. . . . YVES LABERGE

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Cultural Rights

DEFINING CULTURAL RIGHTS

Cultural rights as identified in the International Bill of Rights (Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR 1948], the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR 1966], and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESC 1966]) appear as a discrete category of human rights, separate from political, civil, economic, and social rights. *Cultural rights* in international law include the right to education; the right to "take part in cultural life;" the right to "enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications;" the right to "benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary, or artistic production of which he [the person] is the author;" and the freedom to pursue "scientific research and creative activity" (UDHR, Articles 26 and 27; ICESC, Articles 13, 14 and 15).

Together these rights in effect point to an expansive notion of culture. Elsa Stamatopoulou, chief of the United Nation's Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and extensive advocate for cultural rights, identified three different meanings of the word *culture* as applied by international law in her 2004 article "Why Cultural Rights Now?" They are:

1. Culture in its *material sense,* as product, as the accumulated material heritage of mankind, either as a whole or part of particular human groups, including but not limited to monuments and artifacts;

2. Culture as *process* of artistic or scientific creation, that is, the emphasis being placed on the process and on the *creator(s) of culture;* and

3. Culture in its anthropological sense, that is, *culture as a way of life* or, in UNESCO's words, the "set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group"; it encompasses "in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs."

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL RIGHTS

In the arena of global human rights, political and civil rights are often referred to as the *first-generation rights* while economic, social, and cultural rights are referred to as the *second-generation rights.* This sequencing of rights has understandably led to endless debate over whether these rights can and should be ranked by way of priority. Yet regardless of where one stands on the issue, the reality is that cultural rights were a much neglected category of rights until the 1990s, especially as they pertain to culture in both the material and the anthropological senses of the word.

The change appeared to be closely associated with the dynamics of global politics since the collapse of communism in the early 1990s. The reign of free market economy has triggered an unprecedented scale of movement among people in search of economic opportunities and improved livelihood, while some are simply dislocated by development. In addition, with the end of the cold war, multifarious identity-based conflicts, often of ethnic origin, have emerged to replace the previous wars of polarized ideologies. Given the enormous changes that took place in the last two decades and the speed with which preindustrialized societies and nonmarket economies are being displaced, it is no wonder that cultural rights have quickly emerged as a category of human rights that need much rethinking.

POLITICS OF CULTURAL RIGHTS

Since the global debate over cultural rights evolved in the 1990s, one of the most contested issues is whether cultural rights are rights of groups or individuals. The issue is challenging for two reasons: (1) human rights are typically conceived of as individual rights, as they are first and foremost meant to affirm and protect the dignity of individuals qua individuals, especially against entities such as the state; and (2) in both its material and anthropological senses, culture is associated with

a collectivity whose members appear to have something in common.

The tension thus generated is particularly challenging to liberalism, given its endorsement of the sanctity of the individual on the one hand, and the premium that it places on pluralism on the other. In the context of the contemporary Western world, this tension is articulated through the characterization of cultural rights as minority rights and they are typically associated with immigrants from the non-Western world. The political dynamics between the white majority and the nonwhite minorities is called the politics of multiculturalism, in which cultural differences are to be accommodated rather than obliterated.

Among the most influential theorists of multiculturalism is the Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka. His distinctive contribution lies in reconciling the tension between cultural rights and individualism in liberalism by identifying cultural membership as a "primary good" in the Rawlsian sense, that is, a good that is essential to individuals in pursuit of a good life. At stake is Kymlicka's view that as individuals exercise their freedom to make choices that are deemed by them to be worthy of pursuit, they do not make their choices in a vacuum. Rather, in his 1989 book *Liberalism, Community, and Culture,* Kymlicka says they require "a context of choice," which he calls "culture". Thus considered, cultural membership plays a crucial role in the attainment of self-respect, which no good life can dispense with. Kymlicka's theory of minority rights maintains that if the preservation of group identity can foster the context within which individuals make choices, then in the end group rights are by no means antithetical to liberalism. Although these special rights are rights that individuals have qua members of a group, they are meant to enhance, rather than suppress, individual autonomy. Specifically, in the context of a multiethnic state, minority rights support the claim to self-government by national minorities while immigrants are entitled to what Kymlicka refers to as "polyethnic rights." In *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights,* Kymlicka states that the latter are "group-specific measures" that enable ethnic groups and religious minorities to "express their cultural particularity and pride" but with the intent "to promote integration into the larger society, not self-government."

Another controversial issue is whether the formulation of cultural rights as human rights is in effect an oxymoron. Human rights are by definition universalistic, whereas cultural rights are most often used to affirm differences. Culture understood as a way of life implies that there is more than one way to live a life. The right to participate in cultural life can therefore be interpreted to mean the right to be different to the point where differences can no longer be adjudicated by some common standard. In other words, cultural rights can lead to both cultural essentialism and cultural relativism, rendering human rights ineffective as global normative standards. This confrontation between universalistic human rights on the one hand, and particularistic cultures on the other, seems to be fuelling a new polarity that has emerged since the 1990s. Instead of the previous ideological divide between liberal democracy and communism, we now have a comparably uncompromising cultural divide between the West and the non-Western world.

See also *Civil and Political Rights; Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; Human Rights; Individual and Society; International Bill of Rights; Multiculturalism; Relativism.*

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Culture and Politics

See *Political Culture.*

Cultures, Endangered

See *Endangered Cultures.*

Culture Wars

Culture war refers to a situation of radical conflict between opposite values or worldviews. The term derives originally from the German *Kulturkampf*, which denotes the policies enacted between 1871 and 1878 by Otto von Bismarck, chancellor of the German Empire, to fight the influence of Catholicism. By extension, the term came to mean not just the opposition between secular and religious worldviews, but more generally all situations of confrontation of radically conflicting values. In the United States, the term has been used in this sense by sociologist James Davison Hunter, who argues that a culture war on divisive issues such as abortion, homosexuality, and guns is currently taking place in America.

METAPHOR OR REALITY

The objects of a culture war are potentially unlimited. All cultural values can become the object of a radical opposition among social actors, including both individuals and communities. A few possible objects of culture wars include diverging religious faiths; secularism as opposed to religious worldviews; contrasting political ideologies; arguments in favor of or against gender discrimination; same-sex marriages; and other controversial issues such as abortion, euthanasia, and stem-cell research.

Different forms of culture wars can be grouped according to the intensity of the conflict. The intensity of conflict ranges

within a spectrum whose extremes are war as a metaphor for a cultural opposition between conflicting values, and war as a reality, that is, as an armed conflict. Discussion of either end of the spectrum relies on the concept of conflict.

In a broad sense, a conflict denotes a situation in which two or more social actors try to impose their will on objectives perceived as incompatible. The objectives of conflict can be material resources or ideals. The first case involves a conflict of interests, while the second entails a conflict of ideologies (or, more recently, of identities). These are ideal types that never appear in their pure form in social life. Most of the time, the different components of conflict are so intermingled with one another they can hardly be distinguished. All the same, it is helpful to distinguish them at the analytical level.

Conflicts differ, among other things, in the different means employed in them. In particular, nonviolent conflicts differ from conflicts based on violence, which can be understood as physical coercion. In nonviolent conflicts, the term *war* is a hyperbole—a rhetorical figure to denote the harshness of cultural conflict. Violent conflicts entail a real war, meaning an act of violence to compel the enemy to do act on the other's will. Examples of nonviolent conflicts abound in all multicultural societies characterized by a pluralism of values and where, therefore, a radical confrontation between conflicting values and worldviews is a common experience. The innumerable wars in history are all examples of violent conflict. Intermediate kinds of conflict are also possible, such as so-called "symbolic violence." The term refers to situations such as gender and racial discrimination, which do not necessarily imply the recourse to physical coercion, but nevertheless display high degrees of violence.

THE QUESTION OF A GLOBAL CULTURE WAR

Another possible criterion to characterize culture wars is their scale. Culture wars can take place within bigger or smaller political communities as well as among them. An example of culture war within community borders is the *Kulturkampf*, which took place within the German Empire at the end of the nineteenth century.

An example of culture wars on a larger scale is the alleged clash between civilizations—a confrontation between world civilizations that, according to some interpreters, now occurs. Since its publication in the early 1990s, Samuel P. Huntington's 1993 *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* has ignited a lively debate. According to Huntington, in the post–cold war world, the critical distinctions between people are not primarily ideological or economic, but cultural. In particular, it would be the Islamic and Asian challenges to the supposedly universal Western ideals that would reconfigure the fault lines of world politics.

Although many saw in the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States a confirmation of Huntington's concept, scholars continue to strongly criticize his thesis. Some question the scale of conflict Huntington described; others reject the thesis altogether. Among the former, some do not necessarily reject

the idea of culture wars but view it on a different level than Huntington. According to Benjamin R. Barber, for instance, the struggle between the jihad and the "McWorld" is not a struggle between civilizations, but rather between two different worldviews. More radically, in *The Clash Within: Democracy, Religious Violence, and India's Future,* an analysis of contemporary India, Martha C. Nussbaum argues that the greatest threat does not come from the clash between civilizations, but from the clash "within" them and even within each of us as we oscillate between self-protective aggression and the ability to live in a world with others.

Among those who reject the thesis of a clash between civilizations, Charles A. Kupchan observes in *The End of the American Era* (2002) that Huntington tends to ignore politics while overemphasizing cultural factors. Kupchan contends that the ongoing struggle between the United States and Islamic radicals is not the result of a clash between civilizations, but rather of the behavior of extremist groups preying upon discontent within Muslim majority states. Others, such as Fawaz A. Gerges in *America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?,* criticize the very idea of a culture war by arguing that it is a clash of interests and not of cultures that is shaping contemporary world politics. In this view, the idea of a culture war is not only a mistaken metaphor, but an ideological cover for conflicts that find their true sources elsewhere.

See also *Clash of Civilizations; Conflict Resolution; Cultural Relations; Identity, Politics of; Ideologies, Political; Political Culture; Universalism.*

. . . .   CHIARA BOTTICI

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Cumulative Voting

Cumulative voting is an electoral procedure in which instead of being limited to casting a ballot for a single candidate, voters are given multiple votes and may divide those votes any way they chose. Voters may cast all of their votes for a single

candidate or divide them among two or more office seekers. The number of votes given a citizen is dependent on the number of candidates. Hence, in an election with four candidates, a voter would receive four votes and could cast them in one of sixteen possible combinations.

By encouraging participation by small or minor parties, cumulative voting has been touted as a means to increase voter turnout and enhance the diversity of political systems. Voters do not face the dilemma of the wasted ballot in which they avoid voting for their preferred candidate because they don't believe that office seeker can win the election. In addition, the system lessens the negative impacts of the winner-take-all system. Proponents of cumulative voting argue that it can mitigate political gerrymandering. Some scholars have proposed using cumulative voting to increase the political representation or participation of disadvantaged groups by granting some voters additional points or votes during elections.

See also *Electoral Systems; Voting Behavior; Voting Procedures.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity concerns keeping the space provided by the computer and the Internet safe for the various users of the technology. Section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 clearly outlines the concerns of the U.S. government when it comes to cybersecurity in the following words: "The term 'cybersecurity' means the prevention of damage to, the protection of, and the restoration of computers, electronic communications systems, electronic communication services, wire communication, and electronic communication, including information contained therein, to ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation." Such a concern operates on several different levels and indicates how various activities bordering on the illegal and the criminal are within the purview of what constitutes the concern of cybersecurity.

ISSUES
Protecting users from criminal and illegal activities in cyberspace necessitates determining what these activities are. Michael Margolis and David Resnick outline two types of cybercrimes: network crimes and computer crimes. *Network crimes* are activities that use the Internet but do not necessarily entail corrupting or breaking into computers. People are the victims of these crimes, such as gambling and pornography, in much the same way as those committed in the real world. Various crimes committed in cyberspace, such as consumer fraud, stock manipulation, and various types of sexual predation, resemble life offline with their share of scammers, crooks, and predators. Thus law enforcement officials and government agencies have had to develop expertise in fighting particular types of crimes that follow crooks into cyberspace, such as "hacker hunting."

In contrast, *computer crimes* may or may not employ the Internet in committing the crime; a computer is its target. People are victims only in the sense that the computer is the object of the activity, that is, hacking into computers to steal data, spread computer viruses or worms, and disable computer systems. As a result, policing the Internet has become a routine activity.

REMEDIES
Cybersecurity standards have also been created because sensitive information is now frequently stored on computers that are attached to the Internet. This affects the individual, businesses, and governments equally. Many tasks that were once done by hand are now carried out by computer, thus the need for security to guard against information theft, which leads to identity theft. Businesses need security to protect trade secrets, proprietary information, and customers' personal information. The government also needs to secure their information. This has been particularly critical after 9/11, since some terrorist acts are organized and facilitated by using the Internet.

Various protection programs address the protection of data against unauthorized access. Data can be secured by issuing passwords and digital certificates to authorized users. To go beyond authorization to authentication, the use of digital certificates and biometric techniques (fingerprints, eyes, voice, etc.) provide a more secure method. Beyond user authentication, sensitive data can be further protected through encryption, which prevents information from getting into the wrong hands.

Computer systems use various cybersecurity technologies to remedy threats; these include the use of routers, firewalls, antivirus protection software, intrusion detection systems, intrusion protection systems, and auditing and monitoring computer usage. Various risk management strategies and techniques, as well as training and education, are valued in protecting the network.

ORDER VERSUS FREEDOM
There are those, however, who view all of this protection as a threat to individual liberty, one's quality of life, and human dignity. There clearly is a struggle between the measures to protect privacy and safeguard intellectual property and the measures that are undertaken to ensure that law and order is enforced in cyberspace. It seems that self-regulation and voluntary enforcement procedures such as shunning, flaming, and blocking people from e-mail lists and forums can no longer be used as enforcement mechanisms. Closing down illegal operations and fining and imprisoning lawbreakers are now becoming necessary with the advent of laws governing relationships in cyberspace. However, state-sponsored surveillance and commercially motivated data collection done without the consent and knowledge of the entity under surveillance can lead to cries of lost freedom.

Thus the dilemma for those who are concerned with cybersecurity is whether the primary goal should be security and order first, and freedom and access second, or vice versa. For security advocates on the national defense level, where there is constant fear of giving away too much information about high-value targets, the goal is certainly law and order first. Freedom of access is secondary for security agencies but is not necessarily so for the ordinary user.

See also *Cyberterrorism; Intellectual Property Rights; National Security Policy; Privacy; Privacy Rights.*

. . . .   CECILIA G. MANRIQUE

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Cyberterrorism

Cyberterrorism is the use of modern communication technology in the commission of terrorist activities. Although not strictly limited to the Internet, there is a strong bias toward using the Internet to exemplify the concept of cyberterrorism. Cyberterrorism does not have a single definition: In some instances, it refers to use of the Internet to disrupt information systems by formal, recognized terrorist organizations. In other instances, cyberterrorism refers to Internet use by recognized governments that may be seen as supporting or encouraging terrorist activities. When states launch attacks using the Internet, it is usually referred to as *cyberwarfare.* Sometimes cyberterrorism refers strictly to activities carried out by organizations, other times to activities carried out by individuals pursuing a common goal but without a formal organization. Cyberterrorism may refer to activities executed across international borders or within a single country.

Cyberterrorists go beyond the law and the general norms of the countries they attack to accomplish a political agenda agreed on by only a small minority within the country, and with which the majority of the country usually disagrees. Cyberterrorism is undertaken through such avenues as worms, viruses, and backdoors and has several important purposes for which it is undertaken, including extortion, the creation of economic disruption, and identity theft. The actual use of the Internet in cyberterrorism ranges from preparative acts to propaganda to carrying out an act of terrorism. Preparative acts of cyberterrorism include buying airline tickets, researching building plans, and acquiring weapons. Propaganda acts of cyberterrorism are generally limited to exhorting potential recruits into joining terrorist organizations and exhorting sympathizers to contribute money and resources. Carrying out acts of cyberterrorism on the Internet is generally limited to deluging opponents with threats or attacking computers and networks.

Much cyberterrorism is international in nature. Many groups recruit from and are active in a number of countries, and try to change the international activities of a specific country. Individuals within one country, or a small number of countries, use cyberterrorism to try to exact vengeance against another country for a perceived affront against either their homeland or their social group. Rebels fighting within one country who live and work outside of the country use the Internet to continue fighting against the government of the country through correspondence and recruitment and propaganda activities. This last situation usually occurs when a demographically identifiable group within a country fights for independence from that country or for equal or special rights. This does not negate the existence of cyberterrorist activities by groups within a single country. As a result of the frequently international nature of cyberterrorism, many countries have started working together to combat it.

Governments trying to stop cyberterrorism have used a combination of tools. Whenever possible, existing laws have been applied to stopping cyberterrorism. For example, purchasing illegal weapons on the Internet equates to purchasing illegal weapons in person or through other means. There are also specific treaties aimed at halting cyberterrorism internationally. The creator of *malware* (malignant software) is no longer punished solely according to the laws of the country of residence. Now, when malware goes international, the country that either suffered the most damage or has the harshest punishment, depending on the specifics of the treaty being applied, issues the punishment. Law enforcement agencies and sometimes militaries are now working much more closely when pursuing cyberterrorists.

Examples of cyberterrorism come from around the world. In the United States, abortion opponents use e-mail to harass doctors providing abortions. Al-Qaida operatives in Europe, the Middle East, and the United States have used the Internet to research bombing targets, purchase supplies, and recruit members. A female al-Qaida operative in Belgium used the Internet to exhort people to join and participate in bombings. Palestinians, Israelis, Chinese, Taiwanese, and Americans are known to have used the Internet to hack into and attack business and government Internet sites. Although the respective governments are sometimes blamed when this happens, complete evidence of this sort of cyberterrorism, often referred to as *hactivism,* or computer hacking as activism, is not available.

See also *Al-Qaida; Cybersecurity; Homeland Security; Internet and Politics; Terrorism, Political.*

. . . .   DAVID B. CONKLIN

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D

Dante Alighieri

See *Alighieri, Dante.*

Davos Conference

The Davos Conference, or World Economic Forum, is an annual meeting of political and business leaders, representatives of nongovernmental and private-volunteer organizations, and scholars. On average, there are about 2,000 attendees, including 20 or so heads of state that attend the week-long series of meetings. The meeting was originally organized in 1971 by German scholar Klaus Schwab and was subsequently sponsored by the European Management Forum, a Swiss nonprofit organization. The meeting was created as a means to enhance European economic cooperation and competitiveness. The conference expanded its scope in the late 1970s and became the World Economic Forum in 1987. In 1988, the forum expanded its portfolio to include efforts at peace building and conflict resolution. It was instrumental in the negotiations between Greece and Turkey that resulted in the Davos Declaration, which averted a conflict between the two countries. In 1992, the conference was the site of the first face-to-face meeting between South African President F. W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela, which helped accelerate the end of apartheid. Two years later, the forum was instrumental in mediating the initial draft agreement on Gaza between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

See also *Apartheid; Economic Development, State-led; Economic Policy Formulation.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Dealignment

Dealignment is a weakening of partisan attachments that leads to a decline in the portion of the electorate affiliated with political parties. During periods of partisan dealignment, party coalitions dissolve, leaving larger shares of the electorate as independents.

There are individual and group dimensions of dealignment. In terms of groups, the concept of partisan alignment as developed by early scholars of electoral behavior is based on the notion that political parties' social bases were built on strong class, ethnic, or religious identities in Western democracies. Hence some scholars have attributed dealignment to a weakening of those core group identities due to socioeconomic modernization. At the individual level, modernization has been associated with increasing levels of education. More educated individuals can more easily make political decisions without relying on the cues given by parties, leading to the detachment of younger, better-educated generations from parties. Changes in communications technology, particularly the rise of television, have reduced individuals' reliance on parties to interpret political reality.

Dealignment contrasts with *realignment,* which signifies the movement of group attachments from one party or coalition to another. A significant empirical issue is whether dealignment is a secular trend unlikely to be reversed or whether parties can reestablish strong social bases.

See also *Political Parties; Realignment, Partisan.*

. . . . JOSEPH L. KLESNER

Debates, Political

Political debates allow candidates for a particular office to directly exchange and discuss ideas in a formalized and structured environment. Voters seem to find political debates particularly compelling because of the possibility for spontaneous occurrences that could give them a greater sense of the candidate's true character and abilities. Indeed, the history of political debates in the United States is full of memorable and defining moments that help to explain why candidates seem so eager to control the exact number, format, and timing of these exchanges. Research has shown that political debates can have important effects on the opinions of those who watch them and thus on eventual election outcomes.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEBATES

The history of political debates in the United States dates back many years. The 1858 Lincoln–Douglas Senate debates in Illinois are often noted for their large crowds and sense of spectacle, despite their highly formalized structure in which the candidates exchanged lengthy addresses over many hours. While it was common in early campaigns for congressional candidates to confront each other in formal exchanges, presidential candidates used surrogates to debate on their behalf.

Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy participate in the first televised political debate in 1960.

SOURCE: Corbis

This allowed them to stay above the fray while providing party politicians with an opportunity to increase their stature.

Political debates entered a new era with the growth of broadcast media. In 1948, Republican primary candidates Harold Stassen and Thomas Dewey held a formal debate broadcast over the radio, and in 1956 the first televised debate occurred between Democratic primary candidates Adlai Stevenson and Estes Kefauver. The first Kennedy–Nixon debate in 1960 is often remembered for the fact that television viewers thought Kennedy had beaten the haggard-looking Nixon, while radio listeners gave the edge to the Republican vice president. There were no presidential debates in 1964, 1968, or 1972 due to Congress's unwillingness to suspend the "equal time" provision (allowing minority candidates into the debate) and a reluctance on the part of the incumbent presidents (Johnson and Nixon) to share the debate stage with their challengers.

Presidential debates returned in 1976 and have since provided many memorable moments, affecting voters and thus candidates' fortunes. For example, although Gerald Ford performed quite well in his 1976 debates with Jimmy Carter, most memories are limited to his clumsy assertion that there was "no Soviet domination of eastern Europe." In 1984, Ronald Reagan deftly addressed concerns about his age with a humorous quip about how he was not going to "make age an issue in this campaign" because he did not want to "exploit for political purposes (his) opponent's youth and inexperience." Insight from a spontaneous moment was also provided in 1988 when Michael Dukakis remained unmoved and policy oriented in his response to a moderator's question about the hypothetical rape of his wife. In addition, 1988 Democratic vice presidential nominee Lloyd Bentsen uttered one of the most striking debate lines when he told Dan Quayle that he was "no Jack Kennedy." The debates in 1992 and 1996 are often remembered for Bill Clinton's ability to connect with people through

the town hall format, while the 2000 debates gave viewers a revealing sense of Al Gore's personality when his frustration with George W. Bush became audible to viewers.

ESTABLISHING DEBATE FORMATS

Before debates occur, there is often a "debate about the debates" in which candidates wrangle over details such as the number of debates, their format, location, and timing—candidates try to gain advantage even before the debate occurs. It is common for incumbent candidates to request fewer debates, while challengers often look for more opportunities to confront their opponents, because it increases their profiles and can help establish their worthiness for office. Candidates may also tussle over the format of the debate given that some feel more comfortable behind a podium, while others excel in a more casual format. Finally, candidates may insist that debates occur in favorable locations and at times that fit with their strategic plans.

It was this type of constant haggling that eventually led the League of Women Voters to pull their sponsorship of presidential debates, opening the way for the Republican and Democratic parties to create the Commission on Presidential Debates in 1987. (This put third–party candidates at the mercy of the major parties in terms of getting into a debate.) Rather than reducing conflicts, the commission has actually institutionalized the back-and-forth between candidates. In fact, the Bush and Kerry campaigns used this arrangement to broker a deal that covered nearly every minute detail of the 2004 debates.

Once there is agreement on the debates, candidates spend considerable time preparing so that they can think quickly and effectively "on their feet" in this somewhat spontaneous environment. Candidates also want to ensure a strong performance given that debate audiences are typically quite large, and media attention is intense. The 1976 debates, for example, are estimated to have drawn between seventy-five and ninety-five million viewers, while the second presidential debate in 2000 garnered fifty-one million viewers despite competition from two baseball playoff games.

Debates do not really end, however, with the last closing statement. The media is quick to analyze the debate, providing immediate discussion of the issues and interpretation of who won and who lost. This interpretation is so critical that campaigns have developed elaborate "spin" strategies in which campaign staff work through the media to frame their candidate's performance in the best possible light. What happens after a debate can ultimately be as important as what happened during the debate.

THE IMPACT OF DEBATES ON VOTERS

Research confirms that political debates can have important effects on voters. Political scientists have shown that viewers routinely claim to learn a great deal from debates, and there is evidence showing that they do, indeed, gain valuable information about the candidates and their positions. Debates can be particularly informative for those who may otherwise have limited interest in the campaign and/or limited knowledge

of the candidates beforehand. Moreover, early debates (e.g., during the primaries) help establish perceptions of viability and electability, which can shape a candidate's eventual success or failure. A good debate performance can produce a bounce in public support as the candidate gains more favorable media attention, and previously undecided voters start to express clearer preferences. History has shown that some of these bounces have given candidates critical momentum while others have quickly faded with the next political event.

While most studies suggest that strict partisans are resistant to persuasion effects and typically have their opinion reinforced by debates, there is reason to believe that debates could still affect them by priming certain considerations that are then given increased weight in subsequent evaluations. Of course, for those who are less devoted to a party, debates can be an important determinant of vote choice, especially if little attention is paid to other campaign events. Finally, an intriguing line of research shows that viewers often react as much to postdebate commentary as they do to the actual debate performance. For many who watched a particular debate, they may rely on the media to interpret the performance or at least confirm their impression. Postdebate commentary and coverage can even influence those who watched little or none of the exchange by providing a summary judgment.

Political debates give candidates an opportunity to directly engage each other on important issues. While debates are often seen as spectacles with memorable moments, research confirms that they can play an important role in helping inform voters and enabling them to make important political decisions.

See also *Campaigns; Media, Political Commentary in the; Media and Politics; Primaries; Spin*

. . . . MICHAEL PARKIN

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Decentralization

See *Centralization, Deconcentration, and Decentralization.*

Decisionism

Decisionism is a concept that gained currency in political discourse shortly after World War I (1914–1918). In general terms, it is the doctrine that ultimately political choices are based only upon rationally ungrounded beliefs or political interests. It arose in response to the beginnings of the decline in faith in the Enlightenment and liberalism. Until World War I, the political thinkers and statesmen in the West generally presumed that the Enlightenment, and liberalism in

particular, could provide the foundations and justification for a legitimate political and social order, one consistent with the liberal respect for popular sovereignty, representative democracy, the rule of law, political equality, and individual liberty. In this respect, Western political actors believed that social and political life could be rationally grounded.

By the 1930s, however, several developments had emerged to shake the faith that the West had in its own project. The irrationalities of the causes and the horrors of the conduct of World War I, the economic collapse of the leading national economic powers and the international monetary order, the seeming intractability of the problems facing mass society and the implications for individualism worked to undermine the Enlightenment and liberal projects. Constitutional democracies in particular seemed to be immobilized in the face of the multiplicity of problems facing mass, industrialized societies. In addition, fascist political movements began to attract increasing numbers of sympathizers and supporters, more than is often acknowledged.

In response to this crisis, several thinkers, most notably Carl Schmitt, argued that the attempt to ultimately ground social and political order in some version of rational deliberation was ultimately flawed. There being no universal reason available to establish legitimate political authority, ultimately the choice of one political alternative over another is a consequence of a nonrational, mere choice or decision that political actors make. Hence, the liberal idea that legitimate political authority could be grounded in human reason or in a social contract was a myth, Schmitt argued.

This view of the act of a nonrational decision being the basis of political order helped establish two other uses of the term *decisionism*. First, it ushered in the idea that a political decision was legitimate simply because it was made by those in political authority and not necessarily because it lived up to some legal, moral, ethical, or religious standard by which it could be judged.

The second subsequent meaning is the idea that what is important in politics, particularly in times of crisis, is not how political decisions are made but only that some resolute decision is made and carried out effectively. This last point is sometimes associated with the idea of a state of exception and argues that in times of emergency, there are political choices that do not neatly fall within the boundaries of a constitutional order or the rule of law. It is the decision of those exercising sovereign power who decide what constitutes such an emergency or state of exception. Such choices are *extraconstitutional,* that is, they go beyond legal authority and are backed by the power of the state rather than by the rule of law. The fear concerning such a view is that it can be used to justify the most repressive forms of political rule in the name of the state of exception caused by alleged crises.

Recently, some political and social theorists have been willing to acknowledge that there may be times when challenges emerge requiring political action that does not fit neatly into the procedures outlined in a specific constitutional order. The task then, as Jürgen Habermas (1990) argues, is to ensure that

the decisions are made in ways that most completely reflect the values and commitments of representative democracies, political freedom, and the rule of law.

See also *Contractarianism; Counter-Enlightenment Political Thought; Decision Theory, Foundations of; Democratic Theory; Elite Decision Making; Enlightenment Political Thought; Normative Theory.*

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Decision Making

See *Judgment and Decision Making.*

Decision Theory, Foundations of

People have been consciously coping with decision problems for at least as long as history has been recorded. Some of the best advice modern theory can offer appears to have been known to the ancients. For example, the biblical Jacob, fearing his brother Esau's might, divides his camp into two bands, saying, "If Esau come to the one company and smite it, then the other company which is left shall escape" (Genesis 32:8)—thereby holding a claim to having invented diversification.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Yet decision theory, and, in particular, decision under uncertainty, was not explicitly studied until the mid-seventeenth century, when probability theory was introduced. The person most associated with the concepts of probability and expectation, Blaise Pascal, also introduced decision theory in his famous "wager." In this argument, designed to convince nonbelievers that they will be better off becoming believers, Pascal introduced several basic notions of decision theory: (1) the *decision matrix,* in which one's acts are independent of nature's choices, or the "states of the world"; (2) *domination between acts,* in which one act is better than another no matter which state obtains the goal; (3) *expected utility maximization,* according to which the choice between undominated acts should be made according to the mathematical expectation of the utility of the outcomes they yield; (4) *subjective probability over the states,* which is an application of the mathematical probability model as a way to capture one's beliefs; and (5) *nonunique probabilities,* in which one's beliefs are too vague to be captured by a single probability vector. But even after this dramatic inauguration, decision theory was largely neglected until the twentieth century, with the exception of Daniel Bernoulli's (1738) explicit introduction

of the expected utility hypothesis applied to monetary payoff and given probabilities.

By contrast, mathematicians and philosophers have been interested in the mathematical theory of probability throughout the past centuries. Jacob Bernoulli (1713) discovered the law of large numbers and also discussed different types of probability. Thomas Bayes (1763) introduced the idea of Bayesian updating of "prior" probabilities to "posterior" ones.

AXIOMATIC FOUNDATIONS

Whether all uncertainty can be quantified probabilistically has remained a topic of dispute from the very early writings on probability to the present. Frank Knight (1921) famously argued that this is not the case, and he distinguished between situations of *risk,* in which probabilities can be assumed given, and situations of *uncertainty,* in which probabilities are neither given nor can they be inferred from past statistical data. A major proponent of the opposite view was Frank Ramsey (1931), who, in the spirit of logical positivism, suggested defining and measuring one's subjective probability by one's willingness to bet. He suggested that reasonable decision makers will behave *as if* they had a subjective probability that guided their decisions, even if objective probabilities are not part of the description of the decision problem. Bruno de Finetti (1931, 1937) offered an "axiomatization" of subjective probabilities in the context of maximization of expected monetary value. That is, he provided a set of conditions on presumably observable choices and showed that they are equivalent to the claim that the decision maker maximizes expected value relative to *some* probability vector, which is taken to be that person's subjective probability. The conditions are called "axioms" partly because they are presented as intuitive, if not compelling, and partly because they are in line with the logical positivist dictum of defining theoretical concepts ("subjective probability") with observations (pairwise choices between bets).

A similar axiomatic derivation of the concept of "utility" was offered by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern as a by-product of their introduction of game theory in *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (1944). They considered a presumably observable preference relation between pairs of "lotteries," namely random variables with known distributions, and they showed that a set of axioms on the relation is equivalent to the claim that this relation can be represented by a utility function such that, confronted with any two choices, the decision maker would opt for the one that has a higher expected utility.

von Neumann and Morgenstern provided a definition of utility, coupled with the expected utility paradigm, based on a primitive notion of probability, whereas de Finetti did the opposite: He defined subjective probability based on a primitive notion of "utility." However, when neither utility nor probability is well defined, it is not obvious that the theory of expected utility maximization relative to a subjective probability is very convincing, whether interpreted descriptively or normatively. This problem was rectified by Leonard J. Savage (1954), who showed that both utility and subjective probability

can be derived, with the expected utility maximization rule, from basic axioms on "acts," which are not defined numerically and presuppose neither probabilities nor utilities.

The axiomatic results of von Neumann and Morgenstern and Savage had a tremendous impact on research in decision theory, game theory, and in the applications of these in the social sciences. The mainstream view among theorists is that expected utility maximization, with respect to a subjective probability, is the only rational way of behavior. Moreover, many also believe that it is the only reasonable model to be used in applications in which a formal model attempts to describe reality. However, the theory has been challenged, mostly, but not solely, from a descriptive viewpoint.

CHALLENGES

One of the earliest, and perhaps the most radical, objection to the theory was raised by Herbert Simon in 1957. He coined the term *bounded rationality* and argued that people do not optimize; rather, they "satisfice"; that is, as long as their performance is above a certain "aspiration level," they stick to their previous choice. Only when their performance is below that threshold do they experiment with other choices. Simon thus challenged the very paradigm of optimization, and while his theory is seldom incorporated into formal decision models, it has had a remarkable impact on the thinking of many decision theorists, who have developed models that are classified as bounded rationality, even if their departure from the basic paradigm is much less dramatic than that of satisficing behavior.

Expected utility maximization was also attacked based on concrete examples in which it turned out to provide a poor prediction of people's choices. Maurice Allais (1953) provided a "paradox" in the context of decision under risk (with known probabilities). In this example, many people violate a key axiom of von Neumann and Morgenstern (the independence axiom), and therefore behave in a way that cannot be captured by expected utility maximization (for *any* utility function). Allais's example showed that people tend to put more weight on certainty than the standard theory predicted. In other words, people tend to behave in a way that is nonlinear in probabilities. Daniel Ellsberg (1961) proposed examples (also dubbed "paradoxes"), in which many people violate one of Savage's basic axioms (the "sure thing principle"). In Ellsberg's examples, many people behave in a way that cannot be described by subjective probability. Specifically, people tend to prefer situations with known probabilities to situations with unknown probabilities. This phenomenon is referred to as *uncertainty aversion,* or *ambiguity aversion* (following Knight's and Ellsberg's terms, respectively). Expected utility theory was generalized to deal with uncertainty aversion by David Schmeidler (1989) and Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler (1989), among others.

Starting in the late 1960s, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky launched a systematic experimental study of decision theoretic axioms. In carefully designed experiments, they have shown that practically any axiom of decision theory is violated in some examples. Moreover, they uncovered several implicit assumptions of the decision theory, which were also too idealized to describe actual choices. For example, they documented the "framing effect," which shows that different representations of the same problem may result in different choices. They also suggested "prospect theory" (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) as an alternative to expected utility maximization for behavior under risk.

One key idea in prospect theory is that people respond to given probabilities in a way that is nonlinear in the probability, especially near the extreme values of 0 and 1. Another idea, with potentially far-reaching implications to research in political science, is that people react differently to gains as compared to losses. That is, the (monetary) bottom line is not all that matters to the decision maker: It also matters whether this bottom line is perceived as a gain or a loss relative to a "reference point" that decision makers have in their minds.

CONCLUSION

Formal decision theory has been extremely powerful in providing important insights into the behavior of agents in social and political environments. Formal models help analyze real-life situations and reveal analogies that might otherwise be difficult to identify. At the same time, formal models have been justifiably criticized on various grounds. Some of these criticisms have to do with assumptions of decision theory per se, such as the existence of probabilistic beliefs, and some have to do with assumptions of related fields, such as the concept of equilibrium in games. It is important not to discard the powerful insights that formal analysis might generate on account of some assumptions that need to be refined or replaced. It is to be hoped that future research will improve understanding of political phenomena using formal models, while taking each assumption thereof with a grain of salt.

See also *Behavioral Game Theory; Decisionism; Game Theory; Political Risk Assessment; Prospect Theory; Rational Choice Theory.*

. . . .   ITZHAK GILBOA

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Decline of the West

See *West, Decline of the.*

Decolonization

Decolonization refers to the process through which subject territories acquire independence. It forms the converse of colonialism, which entails the extension of formal and informal control over dominated polities. While colonialism establishes a hierarchy between polities, decolonization severs that relationship. When the international community recognizes this severing of ties as legitimate, the formerly subject polity becomes an independent sovereign state.

Historically, the subjugation of one entity by another has been a feature of every empire. However, the term *colonialism* is more commonly used to describe the expansion of the European maritime powers. From the end of the fifteenth century, technological breakthroughs and emerging capitalism allowed Spain and Portugal to expand their influence to all corners of the globe. They were soon followed by the British, Dutch, and other European powers. During this expansionary phase, the colonial powers formally annexed all of the Americas and much of Asia. This annexation reached its apex with the division of the African continent in the Treaty of Berlin (1885).

History is replete with incidences of resistance to European domination. Whereas many of the indigenous populations lacked the technical and military means to resist the colonial powers, the American settlers succeeded. The United States declared its independence first and was soon followed by the Latin American colonies after the Napoleonic wars ended. The rhetoric used by these revolutionaries would later inform some of the decolonization efforts after World War II (1939–1945).

Nevertheless, although such independence movements might be considered examples of decolonization, in that they shed their hierarchical subjugation, decolonization usually refers to the end of European domination in the twentieth century. Some of the more prominent white settler colonies, for example, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, early on gained a considerable measure of independence, transforming their status to that of dominions prior to World War I (1914–1918). After 1918, the colonies of the defeated imperial powers, particularly those of Germany and the Ottoman Empire, were not given outright to the victorious powers but were to be managed as mandates. Thus, the international legitimacy of imperial control had begun to change at the same time that indigenous nationalist movements became more effective. The Asian nationalist movements, such as the congress movement in India, were particularly well organized.

Decolonization, however, only really took hold in the aftermath of the World War II. A variety of factors conspired against the imperial powers. The United States proved unwilling to support the continuation of imperial rule. Also, the liberal economic order of the postwar period delegitimized imperial preference schemes that protected the economies of the colonial powers. Moreover, even the more powerful European states no longer seemed able to bear the military and economic burdens that came with forceful subjugation of the colonies. Nationalist movements had also grown in strength, partially due to the support of the socialist countries. Finally, the United Nations provided an international forum to give voice to independence movements. Almost 100 states thus gained their independence in the three decades following 1945. These processes are well captured by John Hargreaves in *Decolonization in Africa* (1996), and Miles Kahler explains in *Decolonization in Britain and France* (1984) why decolonization followed different trajectories.

The study of decolonization has recently been reinvigorated, because scholars have gained greater access to previously sealed government records. New compilations of information and fresh perspectives have generated multidimensional analyses of empire and decolonization (see, e.g., Brown and Louis 1999).

Moreover, although decolonization has come to refer to the end of European empires after 1945, the more recent breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) has led to examining parallels between the two processes. Thus, the study of decolonization has been extended to a broader range of cases, including those of continental empires such as the USSR.

In addition, the study of empire and decolonization has been useful for understanding the partition of territorial polities in general. For years, many multinational states such as Yugoslavia and the USSR seemed quite stable, only to unravel in short order at the end of the cold war. Why such multinational entities ended up being perceived by their composite units as imperial remains a key question for analysis, as it sheds light on general processes of territorial integration and fragmentation. Indeed, arguably the study of decolonization can illuminate cases of territorial domination that are not usually perceived as empires.

Finally, the study of imperial administration, cultural domination, and nationalist movements is relevant to the issue of failed states today. One might, for example, ask whether the colonial legacy retarded African attempts at state and nation building as well as their attempts at economic development.

See also *Colonialism; Empire and Democracy; Imperialism; Sovereignty.*

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Delegated Legislation

All countries that adhere generally to separation of powers find themselves in a dilemma. To an increasing extent, law in these countries is made not by the proper legislature, that is, the elected parliament, but rather by the executive branch. With the blessing of courts, legislators have delegated much of their lawmaking powers to administrators. Constitutional purists mourn that separation of powers is a major guarantee for freedom and that the shift of lawmaking authority from the legislative to the executive branch departs from the basic principle that *delegatus non potest delegare* ("a delegate cannot delegate"). These considerations, however, have long been bypassed by the need for administrative institutions to exercise lawmaking authority. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, acknowledges that "In our increasingly complex society, replete with ever-changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power." These developments have placed administrators in a very powerful position. Thus, it has become one of the major tasks of constitutional and administrative law to channel this power. Above all, delegated legislation is further remote from the source of legitimation, the people, than parliamentary lawmaking. In a comparative perspective there are three approaches of ensuring that delegated legislation carries sufficient democratic legitimation.

A first means is parliamentary predetermination of the executive rule. German law, for example, proves that the proper legislature under the sword of Damocles of unconstitutionality is in most cases well able to prescribe for the executive a substantive program of delegated legislation. As the German Federal Constitutional Court puts it, the legislature is obliged itself to make the "essential" decisions to guarantee that parliament elected by the people bears political responsibility for all laws, including those created by the executive. This requirement can also be found in the judicature of the European Court of Justice. Originally American law was similar. The Supreme Court once forced Congress to make the "important choices of social policy." The parallel is striking but not surprising, since American law was to a certain extent godfather at the birth of the actual German constitutional law after World War II (1939–1945).

In the meantime, however, American law allows more-or-less unfettered legislative delegation. The so-called nondelegation doctrine, once developed to restrict the delegation of lawmaking power, is "moribund," as described by Chief Justice Marshall in *Federal Power Commission v New England Power* (1974). American courts generally are willing to accept meaningless formulas such as "public interest" to avoid the need to strike down statutes delegating power. In Britain, "skeleton legislation" is as legally acceptable as it is in the United States. Under the doctrine of unlimited sovereignty, there are no constitutional restrictions on the delegation of legislative powers.

A second technique of democratic legitimation is that parliament participates in the delegated rulemaking procedure. German and British law, for example, show that by means of subsequent approval, the proper legislature assumes political responsibility beyond the original empowerment. A lack of substance in the empowering legislation may be compensated by retrospective parliamentary participation in the creation of the executive rule. Similar reasoning governs to a certain extent the "comitology" procedures in the law of the European Union. In view of the far-reaching delegated powers and the independence of public bodies promulgating rules, one could be led to think that the U.S. Congress could at least also determine that rules created by administrative agencies require its prior approval. Indeed, Congress used to exercise such a legislative veto until—to the disappointment of many commentators—the Supreme Court in the notorious case *Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha* (1983) pronounced the legislative veto to be unconstitutional on the grounds that it infringes the separation of powers.

Beyond this background, American law was left to develop a third approach to solve the problem of democratic legitimacy. Following the Supreme Court's reasoning in *Schechter Poultry v. U.S.* (1935), public participation in the delegated legislative process serves as compensation for the lack of substantive definition of the empowering norm. One basis for this is the so-called interest representation model (somewhat supported by the "public choice theory"). According to the (albeit controversial) American approach, delegated legislation then has democratic legitimation similar to that of a statute if the public exercises influence over the rule-creating authority in a way similar to that exerted on parliamentarians ("corridoring" rather than "lobbying"). The tightly structured and judicially controlled public participation in administrative legislation is a unique character of American law. It is seen as a substitute for the classical democratic process of decision making, where parliamentary decision makers are elected and are politically answerable to the voters. The American model of participatory democracy shows that the characteristic elements of the proper legislative procedure—publicity of decision making, orientation toward balance of interests, and involvement of political minorities—can enrich the exercise of delegated powers and must do so in case the due legislative process cannot exert sufficient influence on rule creation.

See also *Checks and Balances; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Legislative Systems; Legitimacy; Rulemaking.*

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Delegation, Theories of

Delegation of power is a ubiquitous feature of political life at all levels, reflected in the delegation of governing powers from electorates to legislatures (in democratic systems); from legislatures to governments (in parliamentary systems); from legislatures and governments to various nonmajoritarian institutions such as independent regulatory agencies, central banks, and courts; and in international politics, from states to international organizations, courts, and tribunals.

Such diverse acts of delegation raise two fundamental questions for political scientists: First, Why delegate? Why do political "principals" ever delegate power and authority to "agents"? Second, How can political principals, whether electorates or legislatures or states in the international system, control the discretion of their agents such that those agents will use their powers in the interests of the principals and not their own private interests?

Contemporary theories of delegation in political science have drawn largely, though not exclusively, from the rational-choice tradition and in particular from principal-agent analysis. The question of delegation cannot be divorced completely from that of the agent's discretion and subsequent behavior, but theories of delegation tend to focus on delegation of powers from legislatures and governments to various types of domestic and international agents.

WHY DELEGATE?

Delegation in politics has been defined as "a conditional grant of authority from a *principal* to an *agent,* in which the latter is empowered to act on behalf of the former" (Hawkins et al. 2006, 7, emphasis in original). Such an action, however, raises the question as to why any political principal or principals would delegate such power to another actor whose interests might not be identical with their own. The basic approach of rational-choice theories to this question is functional: Institutional choices, such as the choice to delegate, are explained in terms of the functions that a given institution is expected to perform and the effects on policy that it is expected to produce subject to the uncertainty inherent in any institutional design.

Within American politics, a pioneering literature on political delegation examines the transaction costs involved in the making of public policy, which make it difficult for reelection-minded members of Congress to produce efficient policies and satisfy their constituents without delegating powers to an agent or agents. Such models of delegation emphasize two specific transaction costs of policy making that might be reduced through delegation. First, informational transaction costs arise when legislative principals are confronted with complex policy questions that may require technical information and expert advice to craft effective public policies. Delegation to expert bodies charged with information gathering and/or technical regulation can reduce such costs. Second, legislators may encounter problems of credible commitment, in which they prefer to adopt certain kinds of policies (such as a strict monetary policy or evenhanded regulation of powerful firms) but cannot bind themselves or their successors to maintain those policies over time. For this reason, legislators may often delegate powers to bureaucratic agents (such as congressional committees, regulatory agencies, or independent central banks) who, because of their independence and their insulation from day-to-day electoral pressures, are more able to commit to maintaining a given policy into the future. All else being equal, therefore, transaction cost theories predict that political principals will delegate power, and discretion, to agents where these two types of transaction costs are high.

Having thus delegated powers to an agent, political principals encounter a second problem, namely, whether the agents use their delegated powers to pursue their own preferences that are distinct from the preferences of their principals. Hence, when delegating authority, principals can adopt two general types of control mechanisms over their agents: *Ex ante* administrative procedures define more-or-less narrowly the scope of agency activity and the procedures to be followed by it; *ex post* oversight procedures enable principals to monitor and sanction agency behavior. Such *ex post* monitoring mechanisms may include "police patrol" oversight by the principals themselves, or "fire alarm" oversight, in which agency misbehavior is caught and signaled by constituents to the principals, who may then sanction errant behavior.

Furthermore, according to such models, political principals do not apply a one-size-fits-all approach to delegation and discretion but rather carefully tailor political mandates and control mechanisms depending on the nature of the task being delegated and on various aspects of the political environment. Empirical studies of variation in delegation and discretion across issue areas and countries have largely supported such hypotheses.

Nonetheless, while dominant in the literature, rational-choice accounts are not the only way to theorize delegation, and some sociological institutionalist and constructivist theorists have suggested that political principals delegate powers to agents, not to reduce transaction costs, but rather because such delegation is widely accepted as legitimate or appropriate. For example, governments delegate powers to bodies, such as central banks or science bureaucracies, which are widely considered to be the hallmark of "modern" states. This diffusion of institutional forms across borders has been demonstrated by scholars in various studies, but evidence that these acts of delegation are motivated by normatively legitimate institutional templates rather than transaction cost calculations remains inconclusive.

DELEGATION IN DOMESTIC, COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The contemporary study of political delegation derives in large part from the study of American congressional politics, but delegation is a much more widespread and timeless phenomenon that raises questions for all four subfields of political science. From its American beginnings, the study of delegation has moved to comparative politics, where scholars have attempted both to map and explain cross-national variations in patterns of political delegation to governments, regulatory agencies, private and public-private bodies, and courts. In recent years, the study of delegation has traveled from domestic to international politics, where scholars have applied both rationalist and constructivist theories to delegation in the European Union and other international organizations. Finally, at the risk of stating the obvious, the delegation of powers raises normative questions about democracy, accountability, and legitimacy that have been at the core of political theory for millennia.

See also *Accountability; Delegated Legislation; Devolution; Distribution of Powers (in a Federation); Legislative Systems, Comparative; Principal-agent Theory; Rational Choice Theory.*

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Deliberation

A number of political theorists, notably Joshua Cohen, Amy Guttmann and Dennis Thompson, and Jürgen Habermas, have sought to define the nature and purposes of deliberation, identify prerequisites for its existence, and construct models of "ideal deliberation." Central to most definitions of *deliberation* is giving reasons and weighing arguments and information in favor of, or against, public policies. Most models of deliberation also assume that citizens share a basic level of agreement on issues before they can deliberate effectively. Because deliberation includes a variety of dimensions, however, no consensus exists about the precise definition of deliberation. In *The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government* (1994), government scholar Joseph M. Bessette provides a common definition as "reasoning on the merits of public policy." Some definitions of deliberation, however, do not require public-spiritedness or other motivations as requisites for deliberation. Individuals deliberate as long as they acquire and use substantive information related to public policy, even if their goals are narrowly self-interested. Scholars have put forward a variety of criteria to judge deliberation, including fairness, inclusiveness of participation, the breadth of viewpoints considered, responsiveness to popular desires, the logical and empirical validity of arguments, and contributions to democratic legitimacy.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF DELIBERATION

Political theorists argue that deliberation provides a number of benefits and advantages. Deliberation should improve the effectiveness of policy. If policy makers seriously consider arguments bearing upon policy decisions and weigh evidence carefully, their decisions should be more consistent with their values, and they should make fewer mistakes, than they would otherwise. Notorious policy debacles like the Vietnam War (1959–1975), the Iraq War (2003–), the collapse of the U.S. savings and loan industry in the 1980s and 1990s, and persistently large budget deficits appear to arise, in part, from faulty deliberation. Deliberation has intrinsic, not just instrumental, value. In a properly functioning democratic system, deliberation encourages citizens to seek common ground, provide reasons for their positions, and give due consideration to the arguments of others. Deliberation thus promotes mutual self-respect and legitimacy and minimizes disagreement.

Deliberation has potential drawbacks, however. It may reduce democratic participation. Because deliberation stresses logically sound and empirically grounded arguments, it may discourage or discount the participation of less educated and less economically well-off individuals who may lack deliberative capabilities. Deliberation disfavors emotional appeals that are useful in activating citizen involvement in politics. Some observers discount the relevance of deliberation altogether by denying that policy makers deliberate in any meaningful way or by assuming that deliberative activity has no impact on their decisions. What matters are interests and power, not

ideas and evidence. According to this view, policy making is a nondeliberative process of bargaining and compromise driven by self-interest.

ELITE DELIBERATION

Literature on the subject of deliberation identifies legislative bodies as quintessential deliberative institutions. In his review of over two dozen case studies of policy making in Congress and the careers of several key congressional leaders, Bessette (1994) interpreted much of what goes on in the U.S. Congress as deliberative activity and contended that bargaining plays only a limited role in legislation. In *Deliberative Choices: Debating Public Policy in Congress* (2006), Gary Mucciaroni and Paul J. Quirk studied the empirical claims about the effects of existing and proposed policies that members of Congress make when they debate public policy issues. Analyzing debates over welfare reform, estate tax repeal, and telecommunications deregulation, they found that debate was more realistic and informative in the Senate than the House, under bipartisanship, when interest groups were active on both sides of the debate, and when legislators spent more time debating issues.

The focus of much of the empirical literature on deliberation is on the United States, perhaps because of alleged shortcomings with liberalism or because explanations of policy outcomes in the United States have emphasized non-deliberative forms of political behavior, such as the exercise of power and bargaining. However, in 2005, political scientist Jürg Steiner and colleagues examined floor debate in four nations using political philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas's discourse ethics as a theoretical framework. Steiner and colleagues noted that students of consociational democracies in Europe—polities characterized by elite consensus despite deep social divisions—alluded to a "spirit of accommodation" among elites as essential to such systems, but they did not make clear the key role of deliberation in those systems. Steiner et al. found variation in the quality of deliberation across institutions and issues. Deliberation was better in polities with more consensual than competitive political institutions (such as broader cabinet coalitions and multiparty systems), second (upper) chambers, more veto players, and with nonpublic deliberative arenas.

Deliberation takes place in other institutions as well. Benjamin I. Page, in *Who Deliberates? Mass Media in American Democracy* (1996), found that the quality of deliberation through the mass media varied according to the issue on the agenda, but that overall, the diversity and decentralization of media sources of information approximate a well-functioning "marketplace of ideas." John Burke and Fred I. Greenstein compared decision making over the Vietnam War during the Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations in their 1989 study of how well presidents "test reality." Eisenhower's deliberation was more disciplined and realistic, because his leadership style and advisory system encouraged more rigorous and careful discussion of a broader range of alternatives. Public policy scholar R. Shep Melnick (1983) and others find that courts have limited institutional capacity for policy

deliberation. The judiciary's adversarial process, case-based decision making, decentralized structure, access determined by litigants' interests rather than the questions about the merits of policy, and judges' training as generalists detract from deliberation. In 1990, political scientist Marc K. Landy and his colleagues examined the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and found that the agency oversimplifies environmental issues and fails to educate the public about the difficulties inherent in their resolution. The EPA's mission as an advocate for environmental interests makes it impossible for it to search for common ground and engage in persuasion. As a result, it fails to orchestrate effective deliberation on the technical, political, and ethical merits of environmental policy.

CITIZEN DELIBERATION

Before the advent of mass democracy, theorists viewed deliberation as an elite endeavor. James Madison and other framers of the U.S. Constitution saw elite deliberation as a bulwark against the public's impulses and uninformed opinions. Legislators were responsible for filtering and refining public opinion in such a way that they would discover their constituents' true opinions—what the public would think if citizens had the same capabilities to deliberate as their leaders. Today, many observers consider *citizen* deliberation a vital component of democratic participation and a mechanism for maintaining democratic accountability. Citizens cannot limit their participation to voting, leaving policy deliberation to their leaders.

The quality of citizen participation may improve with deliberation. In a study of individuals who attended a forum on Social Security reform, individuals who attended the forum gained more knowledge about the program than similar individuals who did not attend. Second, deliberation produced opinion change over policy options for which there was already some consensus. For policy options on which citizens had little consensus at the outset, opinions changed only among citizens who held their opinions weakly, according to a 2004 study by public opinion and policy scholar Jason Barabas. Properly designed institutions may help to develop citizens' capacities for deliberation without sacrificing the political equality and legitimacy that are the hallmarks of modern mass democracy. Among the ideas for building citizens' capacity for deliberation are "deliberative opinion polls" and holding "deliberation days" just before elections.

Whatever the potential drawbacks to deliberation, few people seem to be concerned that we run the risk of having an excess of it. Given the proliferation of economic and foreign policy calamities of recent decades, it may be more plausible that governments suffer from too little careful deliberation than too much of it.

See also *Deliberative Democracy; Policy Theory; Political Participation; Public Policy Development.*

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Deliberative Democracy

Deliberative democracy denotes a normative model of democracy that rests on the belief in the persuasive power of systematic argumentations and resolutions reached in public debates and in the central role of understanding-oriented communicative action. Thus, this model of democracy is intimately connected with the discourse theory of philosopher Jürgen Habermas.

On an ideal level, Habermas defines deliberative democracy as a third kind of democracy, different from the liberal and republican models but integrating aspects of both. The main distinction among these three types of democracy bears on the role assigned to the democratic process. The deliberative model of democracy draws on the conditions of communication, under which it is assumed the political process tends to generate reasonable results, because the process takes place in a deliberative manner. Like the republican model, the deliberative model places emphasis on the process of forming the political opinion and will but does not consider a collectively acting citizenry as a condition for the realization of deliberative politics. This kind of politics depends instead on the institutionalization of the required procedures.

Discourse theory stresses the intersubjectivity of the understanding processes, which take place in parliamentary consultations and within the communication network of political publics. The informal process of opinion formation flows into institutionalized decision making and legislative resolutions, which transform the communicatively generated power into administrative power. Like the liberal model, deliberative democracy respects the demarcation between state and society. However, society is not considered to be a market-based plurality of private interests that the political process aggregates. Civil society is a base for autonomous publics and in this sense differs both from the economic handling system and the public administration. As in the republican model, solidarity plays a central role as a social integrative power, which should develop through autonomous publics and constitutional procedures of democratic opinion formation, and which should be able to withstand the influences of money (economic system) and the administrative power (political system).

According to discourse theory, the communicative conditions for the democratic formation of opinion and political will function as an important channel for the wide-ranging rationalization of decisions, which are made by the law-bound government and administration. Rationalization is more than just legitimization, as in the liberal model, but also less than constitution of power, as in the republican model. It is only the political system that can "act," not the society as a collective subject.

Though the society cannot govern by itself, it can direct the administrative power into specific channels. The political public is a differentiated arena in which the decentered society detects, identifies, and deals with social problems. In this sense, there is no need to concretely define the subject of sovereignty. The interpretation of the sovereignty of the people is intersubjective: It continues to exist, but it becomes anonymous and retreats to the democratic procedures and legal implementation of its ambitious communication requirements in order to assert itself as a communicatively generated power. From this discourse-theoretical perspective, the political system is not the society's summit, nor its center, nor its structure-giving model, but it is instead only one of many handling systems.

Related to Habermas's approach, many conceptualizations and some concretizations of deliberative democracy have been developed. They all refer to an "ideal . . . association whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members," as noted by Joshua Cohen in his 1989 article "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy," and they share some characteristics: Deliberative democracy is a *normative* and *procedural* model. It describes how democracy *should be* based upon a specific communicative *procedure.* Although public deliberation requires some necessary conditions (e.g., equality among free citizens) and is oriented to specific ends (common good), the deliberative dimension is the theory's pivotal point. Free deliberation is conceived as a communicative process that disposes of a transformative character. It stresses neither the importance of giving due weight to each individual's distinct preferences (as in the liberal model), nor the ethical validity of the outcomes. As David Miller notes in his 1993 article "Deliberative

Democracy and Social Choice," it rather "relies upon a person's capacity to be swayed by rational arguments and to lay aside particular interests and opinions in deference to overall fairness and the common interest of the collectivity" (77).

As a normative model, deliberative democracy is situated on a high level of abstraction and lacks depth to give the concept concrete form. It is based on a communicative and cooperative conception of human nature. As for its implementation, even when given the ambitious conditions for a widely open and free deliberation over "rational arguments," it is difficult to imagine how the influence of "nonrational" aspects, such as emotions and status, on this process can be avoided. Moreover, the model delivers no clear criteria for the "rationality" and "reasonability" of arguments. Its emphasis on the desirability of a genuine understanding in the context of a free and open communication in which all citizens are involved are its main merits.

See also *Democracy; Direct Democracy; Framing and Public Opinion; General Will; Public Opinion; Political Communication.*

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Democracies, Advanced Industrial

The label *advanced industrial democracy (AID)* is difficult to define. At its most basic, the label would seem to apply to democracies that are both advanced and industrialized. Yet does the label apply to a specific type of democracy, or only to those countries that are "advanced" in economic terms? Most comparative political scientists and economists have a pretty clear notion of which countries are involved, but they often use these for different comparative purposes.

On the one hand, students of the welfare state focus on AIDs in their research; on the other hand, it is regularly used for public policy analysis in democratic states. The main purpose is to analyze the relationship between democratic politics and representative government, on the one hand, and social and economic policy making within the context of the market economy, on the other hand, particularly the relationship between the size of government and economic growth.

In general, the term *AID* applies to the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Most, but not all, members receive this designation. Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey are often not included, and only recently have the formerly communist states Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland been included, though many full members of the European Union like Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovenia, are not. Hence, apparently the level of "democraticness" of a country is a defining characteristic of being an AID. This is confusing, if not inconsistent. For example, postcommunist countries all introduced after 1989 a democratic constitution and transformed their economic systems into market economies, but not all of these nations are considered AIDs. Additionally there are doubts about countries like South Korea and Mexico in view of their democratic performances.

The same observation in terms of "advanced" (society) and "modernity" (or industrialization) would seem to apply. Less-developed nations, such as India, South Africa, and Turkey, do not receive the AID label, but they could develop the necessary characteristics at some point in the future. Some of these characteristics include the use of modern technologies, secularization, and a welfare state. Researchers have made an attempt to capture this difference in development by means of the *human development index (HDI),* which ranks countries by level of development—*developed, developing,* or *underdeveloped*—by assessing life expectancy, education/literacy, and standard of living. Yet the HDI is not the sole measure used to determine whether a country has an advanced industrial economy, and it certainly is not used to determine whether a country is a democracy. For instance, oil-rich states (e.g., Venezuela) score relatively high on the HDI but low on industrialization, whereas other countries like Argentina and India move toward industrialization but are slow in democratization.

What then makes a country an AID? In general, as defined in most comparative political science studies, an AID always is a fully fledged democracy in which the rule of law is supreme and a legitimate political authority exists. Examples include Canada in North America, Australia in the southern hemisphere, Japan in the Far East, and most West and Central European countries. Second, an AID is expected to have an open market economy and a welfare state. By defining an AID in

this manner, determining whether or not a country is an AID becomes relatively straightforward and allows for meaningful analyses of the relationships between democracy and economy, between market and state, between democratic politics and welfare state development, and between economic development (or growth) and the role of the public economy. These four relationships represent the main, often contested, themes within comparative politics and political economy.

See also *Human Development Index; Industrial Democracy; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Welfare State.*

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Democracy

Democracy is a political regime form based on the rule of the many, in contrast to the rule of the few (e.g., oligarchy or aristocracy). What exactly the term denotes is the subject of dispute among both scholars and politicians. The multitude of forms that existing democracies take is mirrored by an abundance of theoretical concepts and models of democracy in the social sciences. Essentially, this makes it a contested concept.

THEORY

The history of democratic theory can be divided into classic (500 BCE) and modern (since the seventeenth century CE) schools of democratic thought. The same term underlies these schools: The word *democracy* is of Greek origin and consists of the words *demos* (often translated as "full citizens") and *kratos* ("to rule"). Despite their common terminological base, the two schools are very different with regard to how and by whom popular rule should be exercised. While modern democratic thought stresses that political power must lie in the hand of all adult nationals, the *demos* in ancient Greece consisted only of the adult, male, and free population of a city (in ancient Athens, the *demos* formed only about 10 percent of the total population). Here, popular rule was exercised collectively, directly, and in rather small communities. Modern democracies, on the other hand, tend to be nation-states in which popular rule is exercised by representatives selected in competitive elections.

1. *Classic understanding of democracy.* Classic democratic thought was nurtured by a specific form of political rule in ancient Greece. Here, democracy (*demokratia*) denoted the form of government practiced in the city of Athens about 500 BCE. It was a regime form that incorporated the *demos* in the making of collective political decisions, rendered them equal before the law, and allowed them to run for political office irrespective of wealth or social background.

Political decisions were made following public debates and elections in an assembly consisting of full citizens. While this body fulfilled legislative functions in the Athenian democracy, a 500-member council, whose members were drawn by lot from volunteers from the 139 territorial units, served as a secretariat. From the council, an executive body with rotating membership was also drawn by lot, as were the juries in the popular law courts.

Ancient Greek philosophers such as Thucydides and Plato regarded democracy as a bad form of government, likening it to mob rule. Aristotle, on the other hand, saw much virtue in the rule of the many, provided it was exercised for the common good. He suggested that this could be achieved by drawing up rules that divided and regulated the exercise of power and therefore made the democratic process less prone to abuse by powerful groups or individuals. He called the "good" form of the rule of the many *politeia* (constitutional government) and its pathological counterpart *democratia.*

2. *Modern understanding of democracy.* In the wake of the American and French Revolutions in the late eighteenth century, democracy as a form of government returned to political life after more than 2,000 years in which nondemocratic forms of rule were prevalent in the world. In political thought, Enlightenment writers such as de Alexis de Tocqueville, Montesquieu, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau reflected on equality-based state-society relations and thereby contributed to giving democracy a better image than it had had in ancient Greek thought.

Democracy continued to spread with the emergence of nation-states. However, the overwhelming majority of these new democracies were not direct (as in Athens) but were representative democracies in which the rule of the people was exercised by means of elected proxies. In his 1976 book *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy,* Joseph Schumpeter, one of the most prominent pioneers in modern democratic thinking, explicitly rejected the "classical doctrine" of direct democracy and advocated a "leadership democracy" based on competitive elitism. Today's democracies consist of political offices that are filled by means of contestation, with all adult citizens regardless of gender, ethnicity, or religious persuasion participating in the process and deciding the outcome by vote.

As a consequence of this bifurcation into voters and representatives, a dualistic understanding of state and society evolved. Given the only gradual extension of opportunities to formally participate in the political process, often as a result of social stuggles to extend suffrage from privileged social classes toward all social strata and finally to women, the relationship between state and society tends to be seen as potentially antagonistic in modern democratic thought. For this reason, it is stressed that individuals should be as free from state interference in their private lives as possible. In a liberal democracy, which today is regarded as normatively superior to a nonliberal democracy

and other forms of political rule, individual and minority rights are protected by a constitution and can be asserted against the government. Checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches (horizontal accountability) and federalism (vertical accountability) serve further to prevent democratic governments from abusing their powers.

The precondition for meaningful democratic participation in and beyond elections is a vivid civil society; that is, citizens can form or join parties and interest groups, and they are able to exercise their other democratic rights. Therefore, modern democratic theory views individual freedom, personal responsibility, and the rule of law as cornerstones of a democratic system.

CONCEPTS

Three issues are prevalent in the empirical study of democracy. The first is defining the features that separate democracies from nondemocracies. The second is classifying those regimes that have been identified as democracies. The third issue pertains to the classification of so-called hybrid regimes, which are neither clearly democratic nor clearly nondemocratic.

1. *Democratic procedures.* Scholars do not agree on what procedural characteristics a regime needs to display in order to be called a democracy. The minimalist "electoral democracy" concept, for example, demands elections that are free, fair, inclusive, and meaningful. Such elections not only entail a real chance for the opposition to come to power, but they also presuppose a range of civil liberties, such as freedom of organization, speech, and information. Some scholars believe this is not enough and add to these characteristics a wide range of civil rights, the absence of veto players not legitimized by democratic procedures, horizontal accountability, and the rule of law.

Among the many existing concepts of democracy, the most cited procedural one is political scientist Robert Dahl's polyarchy. In the Dahlian understanding, *polyarchy* (Greek for "rule by the many") denotes a "modern representative democracy with universal suffrage" and refers explicitly to modern representative democracy as a historically unique form of government, as opposed to Athenian democracy. Public contestation and participation are the two main polyarchal attributes. Dahl defines eight minimal criteria that a political regime must fulfill to be considered a polyarchy: (1) freedom to form and join organizations, (2) freedom of expression, (3) right to vote, (4) eligibility for public office, (5) right of political leaders to compete for support, (6) alternative sources of information, (7) free and fair elections, and (8) preservation of governmental accountability.

Different as all these concepts may be, they have two features in common that pose considerable difficulties in the process of separating democracies from non-democracies: (1) They are made up of several criteria, which are all necessary elements of a democracy, and (2) more problematically, most of these indicators relate to phenomena that are not either/or conditions, but matters of degree. In consequence, the researcher must decide on artificial thresholds that separate existence from nonexistence of the elements inherent in this concept. For example, how many persons need to be prevented from voting in order for the condition of universal suffrage to be violated? When exactly do elections cease to be free and fair? Resulting from (1) and (2), further conceptual difficulties emerge: Is the half-fulfillment of two conditions equal to the nonfulfillment of one condition? And is a regime that fails on five of eight conditions less democratic than a regime that fails on only one?

2. *Categorial concepts (classical subtypes).* Especially since the 1960s, comparative democracy studies focused on the differences among democracies of member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Researchers created categorical subtypes by adding certain attributes to the procedural core concept of democracy to arrive at semantically dichotomous pairs. In the wake of what political scientist Samuel P. Huntington called the "third wave of democratization," which began with Portugal's democratization in 1974, the application of these concepts was extended to young democracies in southern Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia.

One influential categorization, the distinction between presidential and parliamentarian democracy, builds on different relations between the executive (head of state and government) and legislative (parliament) powers in a democratic system of government. In a parliamentarian democracy, the parliament selects and can recall a government. It is also characterized by a double-headed executive (head of government and head of state), strong factions of political parties, and party coalitions. In contrast, a strong executive who cannot be dissolved by parliament (only by impeachment) and who is legitimized through popular elections characterizes presidential democracies. As opposed to parliamentarian systems, in presidential systems parliament and government are legally separated, and the simultaneous holding of a government post and a legislative mandate is not possible. Moreover, the head of state and the head of government are the same person. For a long time, scholars assumed that parliamentarian democracies provided more stability and were more conducive to democratic consolidation. However, the successful democratizations in Latin American after the 1980s provided empirical evidence that there is no best system and that the correlation between democratic success and institutional arrangements depends on the contexts of these regimes.

Another influential categorization, consensus/consociational versus majoritarian democracy, distinguishes modes of political conflict resolution and decision making. In consensus democracies such as Switzerland and Mali, political conflict is resolved through negotiations, compromise, and proportional rule (by means of a proportional electoral system). Diffusion of power and the institutionalized integration of all social and political forces in the political process (e.g., protection and representation of minorities) are conceived as the main features of consensus democracies. In contrast, majoritarian or competitive democracies, such as the United States and Great Britain, are characterized by elections that give power to the

strongest party (for instance, by means of a majoritarian electoral system often resulting in a two-party system) and by a political process in which power is concentrated. The enforcement of majoritarian interests, as opposed to the equal representation of all societal and political forces, characterizes this democratic subtype.

3. *Gradual concepts (diminished subtypes).* Arguably the most prolific reaction to the conceptual difficulties of distinguishing democracies from nondemocracies is the creation of ad hoc concepts to characterize regimes that share most, but not all, attributes associated with a liberal democracy. In most cases, the deficiency is expressed with an adjective, resulting in terms such as tutelary democracy, illiberal democracy, neopatrimonial democracy, and delegative democracy. In their famous treatise on conceptual innovations in comparative politics, David Collier and Steven Levitsky call these concepts diminished subtypes of democracy.

In contrast to classic subtypes, diminished subtypes are characterized by the lack of one or more of the defining attributes of a liberal democracy. This results in the root concept being diminished to increasingly resemble the minimalist concept of an electoral democracy. For example, a regime in which horizontal accountability is absent is no liberal democracy anymore, but might still be more democratic than an electoral democracy. Hence, a fluid conceptual boundary encompassing both the minimalist and maximalist concepts is imposed between democracies and authoritarian regimes, and various "defects" or "deficits" mark the difference between electoral and liberal democracy.

The advantage of creating diminished subtypes is that the perceived deficiencies of individual regimes are highlighted and that democracy can continue to serve as the root concept where a regime is perceived to verge closer to democracy than to authoritarianism. However, there are several notable disadvantages in this strategy. First, some scholars argue that it is unethical to classify one-third of the countries in the world by what political scientists perceive to be their deficits. The more serious disadvantage, however, is the conceptual dilemma this strategy poses. In terms of the strict demands of a typology, since these diminished subtypes do not possess all the necessary attributes of a liberal democracy, they should not be called democratic if liberal democracy is the root concept. In this case, it might be better to take electoral democracy as the root concept and create categorial concepts. Finally, the proliferation of such "democracies with adjectives" (according to one count, the number reached the hundreds) has created confusion and makes systematization difficult.

ASSESSMENT AND MEASUREMENT

In the 1970s, comparative democracy research turned to the quantification of attributes of political rule and created indices that aim at measuring democracy. They are an additional source of political regime assessment, but they cannot substitute qualitative classifications. Indices are easier and quicker to read than qualitative analysis, and cross-time analysis is more efficient, because changes over time can be easily detected.

At first glance, they seem more impartial and correct and less corruptible than qualitative analysis. But critics have provided evidence that they are less reliable than they appear. There are three common pitfalls in the building of indices. First, there are methodological problems in the conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation of data. For instance, indices are often subject to measurement error due to a lack of equal access to data over time. Moreover, the high aggregation levels of data often result in loss of information. Second, country cases are frequently miscoded because of limited knowledge of cases. Third, indices measure only certain elements of concepts of democracy, rather than democracy as a whole.

Three frequently updated and often-cited indices measure democratic attributes: the Freedom House (FH) index, the Polity IV dataset on political regime change, and the Bertelsmann transformation index (BTI). (Although the World Bank's governance data set comprises democratic features, it is more often referred to when measuring corruption or efficiency.) The correlation between the three scales is high despite their differences in conceptualization, operationalization, and aggregation. However, scales based on highly aggregated scores easily blur the existing differences between the political regimes under scrutiny. This deficit is partly addressed by the individual country reports that come with each dataset.

1. *Freedom House (FH) index.* This international watchdog organization has worked to promote freedom throughout the world since 1941. In 1972, FH began measuring freedom, an integral element of democracy. Using twenty-five indicators, FH annually classifies the status of political rights and civil liberties in all countries and some disputed and related territories around the world (all are referred to as "countries," a total of 194 in 2009) on a scale of 1 *(free)* to 7 *(unfree)*. FH considers countries "free" that rate 1.0 to 2.5 on scales that measure political rights and civil liberties (eighty-nine countries in 2009); those that rate 3.0 to 5.0 are considered "partly free" (fifty-eight countries in 2009); and those that rate 5.5 to 7.0 are "not free" (forty-seven countries in 2009).

These ratings are based on the operationalization of seven attributes of political rights (electoral process, political pluralism, and functioning of government) and civil rights (freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights). Although FH is well known for its parsimony, a closer look shows that the underlying concept of democracy entails not only procedural but also substantial features, such as economic rights, property rights, and social rights. Scholars frequently criticize the lack of transparency of FH's disaggregated data and measurement process. Whereas such indices as Polity IV and BTI provide a codebook, FH's standards of measurement are not made public. This is especially noteworthy since critics report that the organization has adjusted ratings according to political considerations of respective U.S. administrations. Thus, FH must be accepted largely on faith.

2. *Polity IV dataset.* The Polity IV index of political scientists Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers of the Center of

Systemic Peace leads back to University of Maryland distinguished professor Ted Robert Gurr's Polity I conceptualizations of 1975. Polity IV captures the degree of contestation and transparency of 163 political systems on an annual basis and provides a time series that dates back to 1800. It codes five dimensions of political rule (competitiveness of participation, regulation of participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on executive). Polity IV classifies countries on a scale of -10 to +10. Countries with a score from -10 to -6 (twenty-three countries in 2009) are generally considered to be *autocratic;* -5 to +5 are called *anocracies,* regimes that are considered neither full democracies nor full autocracies (forty-eight countries in 2009); and a score between +6 and +10 indicates a *democracy* (ninety-two countries in 2009). Critics of Polity IV contend that the index fails to include participation in its various facets. Polity IV does not measure the right to vote, which is normally an uncontested constitutive factor of democracy.

3. *Bertelsmann transformation index (BTI).* In 2003, the Bertelsmann Foundation launched the BTI, which is based on the concept of a market-economic democracy. It began a biannual publication schedule in 2006. The complex index examines and assesses political and economic transformation processes as well as political management in 125 nations in two sets of rankings, the status index and the management index. The third index, the BTI status of democracy, measures the progress toward democracy along five criteria (stateness, political participation, rule of law, stability of democratic institutions, and political and social integration) and seventeen indicators (subdivided into fifty-two questions) in international comparison. Scores given along each of the seventeen indicators range from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 10. The BTI does not explicitly mark a cut-off point between democracy and nondemocracy. Nevertheless, in its 2010 summary, the BTI stated that in 2009, seventy-six of the 128 countries under scrutiny were democracies, while fifty-two were autocracies. The BTI builds no extra category (as the FH index and Polity IV dataset do) for so-called hybrid regimes. Instead, it identifies defective democracies, or democracies with flaws (fifty-three in 2009). In doing so, the BTI blurs the conceptual border between democracy and nondemocracy. BTI critics further emphasize that the underlying concept of market-economic democracy induces a high degree of normativity that lowers the analytical value of the BTI. In addition, the BTI cannot be used for cross-time analysis, and it studies fewer countries than the other indices. In 2009, the Bertelsmann Foundation launched the sustainable governance indicators. They include thirty OECD member nations and aim at capturing the differences between established democracies.

See also *Anti-democratic Thought; Capitalism and Democracy; Consociational Democracy; Constitutional Democracy; Deliberative Democracy; Democratic Theory; Democratic Transition; Digital Democracy; Emerging Democracies; Empire and Democracy; Europe, Democracy in; Global Democratic Deficit; Greek Democracy,* *Classical; Jacksonian Democracy; Liberal Democracy; Middle East Democratization; Parliamentary Democracy; Participatory Democracy; Representative Democracy.*

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Democracy, Constitutional

See *Constitutional Democracy.*

Democracy, Cosmopolitan

See *Cosmopolitanism.*

Democracy, Deliberative

See *Deliberative Democracy.*

Democracy, Direct

See *Direct Democracy.*

Democracy, Emerging

See *Emerging Democracies.*

Democracy, Future of

In the aftermath of the cold war, democracy became the most common form of government in the world. Policy makers, the general public, and scholars—especially those who followed arguments such as Francis Fukuyama's in his book, *The End of History and the Last Man*—embraced the notion that the end of the superpower conflict marked the triumph of liberal democracy as the preferred form of government and the means by which many of the globe's economic and social problems would be ameliorated. Although democratic revolutions transformed regions such as Eastern Europe, as of the early twenty-first century, democracy had failed to achieve its promise or potential in many states. Such disappointments highlighted current challenges within representative systems and obstacles to the future spread of democracy. The success of democratization in the Middle East and the ability of large developing countries like China to succeed in establishing full democracy are at the forefront of current debates on the future utility of the concept.

DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS

Modern democracies are typically based on representative models in which citizens elect deputies to debate and decide policy choices on their behalf. Full democracies are those systems in which there are universal suffrage, regular elections, an independent judiciary, relatively equal access to power for all groups, and extensive civil liberties that are combined with protection for minorities and disadvantaged groups.

Some states have met with repeated obstacles as they endeavor to implement democratic systems, while others have established "illiberal" or partial democracies as discussed by Fareed Zakaria in *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*. Although these systems hold elections, basic civil liberties and governmental transparency may lack. Even in today's full democracies, there are a wide range of continuing problems in securing minority rights and expanding economic, social, and political access to disadvantaged members of society. Furthermore, many freedoms that form the core of democratic systems have prompted societal backlashes over the perceived erosion of values and morals, especially in cases in which governments attempt to balance the rights of the individual with the common good of society. Finally, security threats, including terrorism, have prompted many democratic states to adopt measures that limit individual and collective freedoms, particularly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States and subsequent bombings in Spain and the United Kingdom.

After the cold war, many countries faced similar problems as they transitioned to democratic systems. First, societies had to be reoriented toward democracy after decades or centuries of totalitarian rule. In many states, efforts to protect minority groups were limited in scope. For instance, ethnic Russians faced discrimination in many of the states of Eastern Europe. Second, along with government reforms came economic reorientations as states embraced the free market. Often this caused widespread unemployment and social disruption. Third, the elites who had dominated societies under antidemocratic systems were often able to retain a disproportionate amount of economic and political power through political organizations and power networks. The former officials usually did not embrace democracy and instead undermined democratic reforms. Fourth, many states, notably Russia, lost international power and prestige, even as other nations lost aid or assistance from the superpowers. This combination of factors impeded the functioning of new democracies and undermined public confidence in the new systems. One result is that citizens in transitional democracies often support undemocratic measures or political movements because of their impatience with the inability of democratic governments to provide for the common good of all people.

Such disillusionment can be overcome through a variety of means. States that are most likely to successfully transition to full democracies usually meet five criteria as identified by Samuel Huntington. These are past democratization efforts; a comparatively high and relatively equal level of economic development; outside support for democracy by international actors and neighboring states; reforms efforts during a worldwide "wave" of democracy; and a peaceful, rather than violent, installation of a democratic government. Hence, the states of Eastern Europe, many that had a history of democratic government and significant levels of economic development, were able to transition relatively smoothly as a result of significant internal support for democracy and diplomatic and economic assistance from neighboring states in Europe as well as the United States and the European community. Absent such factors, states face a much more difficult transition. China, for example, failed to embrace democracy and instead launched a broad crackdown during the 1989 prodemocratic demonstrations in Tiananmen Square.

Huntington's thesis is that states tend to democratize in waves (he identifies three waves, 1828–1926, 1943–1962, and 1974–1990) and that reverse waves following these periods of democratization often undermine fledgling democracies.

Consequently, a new wave would be necessary to spread democracy in the post–9/11 era. There are a range of criticisms of Huntington's argument, especially over how democracies are defined, for instance, whether many of the newer democracies in the third wave emerged as full democracies. Scholars such as Fareed Zakaria and Larry J. Diamond argue that the current period reflects a rise in pseudo democracies that are exemplified by states such as Pakistan, the Philippines, and Venezuela. In addition, in the 2000s, antidemocratic trends in countries in Latin American and Africa underscored the need for greater economic and social equality to forestall reverse democratic waves.

In the current period, one test for democracy will be its success or failure in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq after the 2003 United States–led invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein's regime. Under the Bush Doctrine, the U.S. government actively promoted democratization in Iraq and concurrently in Lebanon, but whether or not Western-style democracy will flourish in the region remains to be seen. The world's attention will be focused on the Middle East in determining the future malleability of democracy around the globe.

DEMOCRACY AND EQUALITY

Questions over the future of democracy are not limited to concerns over the ability of new states to transition from authoritative regimes. Even within full, mature democracies, there continue to be deep disparities in economic and social status. Many democracies have experimented with various forms of affirmative action—economic, social, or political preferences—to improve the status of marginalized groups. For instance, in the past two decades the European Union (EU) has initiated systemwide affirmative action programs to ensure women have more political power, while the United States began programs during the 1960s to improve the economic condition of minority groups and women and continues to enact and debate such legislation. Critics of affirmative action argue that such programs exacerbate tensions between groups and fuel the rise of antidemocratic sentiments among majority populations.

Citizen participation in the democratic process has declined significantly in many full democracies. This trend is especially apparent with the rise of voter apathy. Voter turnout has been on the decline in Europe, Japan, and the United States since the 1970s, with the greatest drop in the United States. Compulsory voting laws have limited declines in turnout in states such as Australia, Argentina, Belgium, Greece, and Singapore, which average more than 95 percent turnout during balloting. Disconnectedness between voters and government is often cited as the main reason for apathy and has led some democracies to experiment with new systems of combined proportional and single-candidate balloting. Meanwhile, there have been repeated efforts to reform the Electoral College and winner-take-all system in the United States, but none have made significant progress at the federal level.

Although democracy as a governmental form continues to face a variety of challenges, the spread of the system tends to reinforce trends toward representative government. Support from established democracies, including election assistance and requirements that states be democracies in order to join organizations such as the EU or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have proved effective aids in the democratic transition. However, the success of such inducements highlights the need for further regional support for democratic transitions in order to secure the future of democracy.

See also *Anti-democratic Thought; Cold War; Democracy and Democratization; Democratic Transition; Emerging Democracies; Voting Behavior.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

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Democracy, Representative

See *Representative Democracy.*

Democracy and Corruption

Democracies operate in concert with economic institutions. In a private-market economy, the wealthy can purchase more and better-quality services than other consumers. Yet, when it comes to politics, each person has a single vote, and legal "persons" such as corporations have no votes at all. Market purchases are individualized quid pro quo deals. The level and type of government services are determined by a collective process that requires cooperative effort. These fundamental differences between the state and the market create pressures for one sphere to invade the other. Wealthy individuals or firms, which can purchase anything they want in the market, may not see why the same should not be true in politics.

Democracies are not isolated from the money economy. Elections cost money, and the more competitive or "democratic" they are, the more they cost, as candidates battle for voters' support. Furthermore, government services, regulations, and taxes provide benefits and impose costs. On the one hand, politicians demand funds to support election campaigns, and, on the other, wealthy private interests may supply funds in return for benefits. Going one step farther, voters themselves may realize that their votes are valuable and sell them to politicians for private gifts of money or in-kind benefits, such as

public sector jobs. Payoffs by the wealthy to incumbent politicians can be used to buy the acquiescence of ordinary voters.

All democracies must police the line between illegal corruption of the political process and the acceptable use of money to influence politics. Politics and economics do not exist in completely separate spheres. Hence, if neutrality with respect to individual wealth is a political ideal, as Susan Rose-Ackerman's work argues, political economic research can help isolate the social structures and constitutional institutions that are more or less open to the influence of private wealth. One must consider both which constitutional structures are more likely to be influenced by private wealth, and for any given structure, how to draw the line between corruption and legal efforts to attract political support.

Historical and country-level case studies of corrupt elections provide background material. Quantitative work focuses on the impact of corruption on government performance and on patronage politics and the politics of reform. Cross-country research links the level of corruption to the constitutional structure of government.

COUNTRY STUDIES

Historical studies of American urban machine politics by James Scott and Rebecca Menes should give pause to those who assume that election fraud is somehow inconsistent with American democracy. Research by Donatella della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, Byeong-Seog Park, and Steven R. Reed on Italy, Korea, and Japan, respectively, illustrates the global pervasiveness of quid pro quo politics. Reform presents a puzzle. How can a system reform when corrupt officials benefit from its preservation? Barbara Geddes explores this question in Latin American democracies and concludes that reform is most likely under a grand coalition that can share both the gains and the losses. Ronald Johnson and Gary Libecap study the roll-call votes that led to the passage of the U.S. civil service act in 1883 and show that supporters tended to come from districts with customs offices or major post offices, whose constituents would benefit most from reform. Economic interests supplemented progressive calls for change. Case study research in the United States in a book edited by Bruce Stave also shows how economic interests collaborated with ideological reformers to effect political change in machine-dominated cities.

CROSS-COUNTRY RESEARCH

Cross-country research on the association between corruption and constitutional structure misses the nuance and detail of the more fine-grained and case-oriented research, but it compensates for this in its ability to capture broad regularities. Thus, Jana Kunicová and Susan Rose-Ackerman find that presidential systems that elect their legislatures through proportional representation (PR) tend to be the more corrupt than other democracies. PR, especially closed-list PR, tends to produce strong parties whose leaders can make credible corrupt bargains with the president. The multiple parties typically produced by PR limit the incentives for opposition party candidates to police the corruption of incumbents. Parties

may hope to get a free ride on the anticorruption efforts of others so that no one takes the trouble to push reform. Furthermore, politicians may be reluctant to criticize incumbents if they may be future coalition partners. Finally, with a party list, representatives are subject to little monitoring by voters.

Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman and Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini both argue that first-past-the-post electoral systems are superior to PR as checks on corruption. This contradicts both Arend Lijphart's claim that consensual democracies are less corrupt than others and Roger Myerson's theoretical model suggesting that the larger district magnitude in PR systems should reduce corruption. Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman then part company with Persson and Tabellini over the corrupting impact of presidential systems. Persson and Tabellini believe that presidential systems should be less corrupt than parliamentary ones due to checks and balances. Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman, however, find more corruption in presidential systems and argue that this stems from the president's ability to create rents in the executive in spite of the greater difficulty of passing statutes. *Because* of checks and balances—not *in spite* of them—rents that the president allocates corruptly will have staying power. The legislature will not easily be able to override corrupt bargains.

PUBLIC POWER AND PRIVATE INTERESTS

Work on constitutional structure assumes that ordinary voters lose from corruption and will punish corrupt incumbents if they learn of their malfeasance and are given honest alternatives. As the historical and case study literature suggests, this is not always so. In such cases, as Michael Johnston argues, constitutional structure may be relatively unimportant because powerful public and private interests collude to maintain control of valuable rents, limit opposition, and buy off voters with nominal private benefits. As Jong-Sung You and Sanjeev Khagram show empirically, corruption can help cement an oligarchic structure in spite of underlying democratic forms and periodic elections. Democracy needs to reach a basic level of electoral competitiveness before constitutional structure and voting rules can affect corruption levels.

See also *Campaign Finance; Corruption, Political; Corruption and Other Political Pathologies.*

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Democracy and Democratization

Modern conceptions of democracy focus on what Robert Dahl calls "contestation" and "participation." A modern democracy (which Dahl prefers to call a "polyarchy" to distinguish it from ancient or direct democracy) allows the opposition to contest incumbents for control of the state. A state is also democratic if all adults have the right to express their views and to shape the behavior of public officials. The central component of participation is the right to cast ballots in regularly scheduled and fair elections. Participation also includes the freedom to publicize antigovernment views and to assemble in public and in private spaces. This minimalist definition is commonly traced to Joseph Schumpeter, who famously discussed democracy as a struggle among elites for electoral support.

The conventional definition of democracy comes with at least three assumptions. First, it is threadbare. It says little about basic rights and liberties. For instance, it is not clear whether a government that is a product of free and fair elections can inspect personal correspondence in wartime. Nor does the conventional definition say much about the limits of public gatherings. For example, it does not say whether protest marches that block street traffic and thus affect the rights of third parties are acceptable ways of participating in politics. The conventional definition is thin because it distinguishes between democratic and nondemocratic regimes. It does not offer a measure of how a democratic political system is or can be more or less democratic.

Second, the conventional definition is in fact an empirically oriented definition, and it has little to say about the normative importance of democracy. Dahl's characterization at least implies that democracies are desirable, because they permit citizens to choose their leaders. Making key public officials win elections forces them to listen to public concerns, because, among other reasons, the opposition will inform voters when incumbents are not representing citizens effectively. However, there is nothing in minimalist conceptions that rules out the developmental or participatory virtues of democracy. In *Considerations on Representative Government,* John Stuart Mill argues that talking about politics, making demands of government, and otherwise participating in democratic government not only keeps public officials honest but also is part of the good life. Deliberation requires contemplating alternatives and reaching conclusions, characteristics that help humans to become autonomous individuals.

Third, modern understandings of democracy assume that the values of democracy have fixed empirical manifestations. Though a newly democratic regime can no longer curb the suffrage rights of women or of illiterates, democracies of the past had little problem in restricting these rights. Lowering the minimum voting age to 18 is a development of the second half of the twentieth century; a handful of political systems, such as Austria or Nicaragua, have lowered it further to 16. The history of democratic regimes, however, is full of age thresholds that exceed either of these minimums. And, while parliaments seem to be integral parts of democracy, because they are key deliberative arenas, there is nothing in minimalist conceptions of democracy that prohibits constitutions from marginalizing legislatures and strengthening executives.

TYPES OF DEMOCRACY

There are at least three important schemes for classifying democratic systems. The first (and perhaps most basic) way of sorting democracies is by the procedure for choosing the chief executive. The second uses alternative counting schemes to identify the fragmentation of political systems. The third empirically measures central features of political systems to create two- or three-category classifications of political systems. The existence of more than one classification suggests that democracies come in a variety of shapes and sizes that complicates efforts to catalog them. Nevertheless, each classification scheme seeks to sort democracies by how centralized their lawmaking authority is.

The first scheme to classify democracies draws a distinction between parliamentary and presidential systems. In parliamentary systems, the parliaments select heads of government, typically called *prime ministers.* Though prime ministers can typically remain in office for no more than four or five years, they can lose the legislature's confidence and be forced to leave office before their mandates expire. In presidential systems, *presidents* are elected independently of the legislature and are simultaneously heads of government and heads of state. *Semipresidential systems* have both prime ministers (as selected by parliaments) and independently elected presidents.

Differences regarding the election of executives do lead to dissimilar outcomes. Research shows that parliamentary systems last longer than presidential ones. Using a database of all democracies that existed between 1946 and 2002, José Antonio Cheibub calculates that the expected life of a parliamentary system is 58 years and that of a presidential system is 24 years. Presidential systems also tend to run budget surpluses more

often than parliamentary ones. Depending on the powers of the president, semipresidential systems can operate more like classic parliamentary systems or like presidential systems. If the powers of the president and prime minister are relatively evenly balanced, then semipresidential systems can produce unique kinds of dynamics that we do not completely understand. As of 2002, 45 percent of democratic regimes were parliamentary, 33 percent were presidential, and 22 percent were semipresidential.

The original impetus behind the second scheme to characterize democratic political systems dates to the eighteenth century, especially to the writings of Baron de Montesquieu and James Madison. The purpose of systems that divide the powers of government among three branches is to prevent dominance by either the royal or legislative branch. This division is known as *separation of powers* or as the *fragmentation of political systems.* If a unified state (where the powers of government are concentrated in one part of the government) possesses the unity to oppress the body politic, then fragmenting the state will protect individual liberty. According to Madison, responsibility for the multiple functions of government must be shared among officeholders, each of whom will check the power of the other. The U.S. political system is the embodiment of this type of "checks and balances" democracy, and *The Federalist Papers* remains the most thorough exposition of its principles.

Parliamentary sovereignty, a doctrine that Madison opposed, gradually displaced monarchical political systems in Europe during the nineteenth century as suffrage reform made popularly elected assemblies the central lawmaking branch of government. These democracies centralize political power, because supreme or constitutional courts cannot strike down parliamentary acts as unconstitutional. They also use single-member districts whose occupants are determined in first-past-the-post electoral systems, which enable the largest minority to convert its share of the vote into a parliamentary majority. The English political system remains the paradigmatic case of parliamentary sovereignty, such that this form of government is known as a "Westminster political system," though the rise of constitutional review and territorial devolution to parliaments in Scotland and Wales has weakened the power of the English Parliament. The political systems that many Scandinavian countries had until the mid-twentieth century, and those of former British colonies in Africa, the Americas, and Asia, are based upon parliamentary sovereignty.

Several political systems in the twentieth century refashioned the separation of powers into what Bruce Ackerman calls the "new separation of powers," which adopts functional specialization as its core principle of constitutional design. Instead of splitting each function of government between two or more parts of government, he recommends assigning each function of government to a single part of government. This principle of constitutional design emphasizes the careful delimitation of the authority among the organs of the state. As in the old separation of powers, the multiplicity of state agencies prevents the concentration of power that can lead to tyranny. Unlike the theory of checks and balances, functional specialization reduces conflict and allegedly leads to a more efficient running of the state. By empowering each part of government to pursue a specific function of government, the new separation of powers enables the state as a whole to remain democratic, to protect individual liberty, and to have a unity of purpose often lost with the old separation of powers.

Two prominent classification of democratic government build upon these notions. Arend Lijphart's distinction between majoritarian and consensual democracies pits Westminster political systems against the new and old separation of powers systems. Lijphart argues that consensual systems (which require the consent of multiple centers of power to change the law) perform better on a host of economic, political, and social indicators than majoritarian systems. George Tsebelis eschews the development of any such typology and instead develops a set of rules to identify the institutions and parties in each political system that can block policy change, actors that he usefully classifies as "veto players." Tsebelis's central claim is that changing policy is more difficult as the number of veto players increases, a hypothesis that builds upon and extends thinking about comparative government since the eighteenth century.

The final scheme for classifying democratic governments is more empirical in nature. It is a product of efforts to distinguish between democracies and dictatorships. Though one major effort simply differentiated between democracies and authoritarian systems, most subsequent efforts create a third category of regimes to recognize that a wide range of countries have political systems that combine features of democratic and autocratic regimes. Partial or semidemocracies hold competitive elections but systematically bias participation against certain interests in society. They often also have dysfunctional political institutions, that is, institutions that undermine the accountability so characteristic of well-functioning democratic systems. Using Polity IV data, Figure 1 shows that more dictatorships existed in the world (in countries with more than half a million people) than democracies until the early 1990s, when mobilization and political reform reversed this trend. By 2001, more than half of all nation-states had democracies.

DEMOCRATIZATION

Democratization refers to the shift from nondemocratic to democratic forms of government. Samuel P. Huntington suggests that there are three waves of political change through which regimes have become more competitive and inclusive. The first and longest wave started in 1828 with the elimination of property requirements in many states of the United States, so that nearly half of (white male) voters cast ballots in the presidential elections of that year. The first wave ended in 1926 with the fascist coups in several European countries. Political systems in the first wave began to contest control of the state before they gradually extended suffrage rights to the rest of the population. The second wave runs between 1943 and 1962. The third wave begins with the Portuguese

FIGURE 1:

Regime Types,1946-2008

SOURCE: Polity IV

NOTE: *Semidemocracies* (or *anocracies*) are regimes with scores between −5 and 5. *Autocracies* score between −10 and −6, and *democracies* score between .6 and 10.

generals negotiating a retreat from power in 1974. It crests with the decline of military government in Latin America during the 1980s and attempts to create new, democratic states in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991.

Research on democratization has reached several conclusions. First, four decades of cross-national research indicates that, on balance, higher GDP per capita levels do not cause political systems to democratize, even if development is associated with democracy as Seymour Martin Lipset postulated in 1959. Adam Przeworski and his colleagues, using a database of political systems in 135 countries between 1950 and 1990, found that increases in levels of development do not boost the probability that a political system will become democratic. Nevertheless, they showed that democracy is less likely to collapse at higher levels of development, which they argued explains why wealthier countries are more likely to be democratic than poorer countries. Carles Boix and Susan Stokes argued that economic development does a better job of predicting democratization for countries before rather than after World War II (1939–1945). Daron Acemoglu and colleagues, who used a database of political systems in 120 countries between 1960 and 2000, found that no relationship exists between economic development and democracy once country-fixed effects (that is, statistical models that control for the effects of unexplained or omitted variables in cross-national regression equations) are taken into account. They suggested that the relationship

between the two factors is a product of how long countries have been independent, how many checks and balances exist on executive authority, and religion. Though Epstein et al. argue in favor of Lipset's thesis, their findings are contingent upon a threefold classification of democracy: While development does not encourage autocracies to become democracies, departures from autocracy into partial democracy and transformations from this hybrid regime into democracy are highly contingent upon the dynamics of partial democracies.

Second, authoritarian regimes in the post–World War II era have different propensities to turn over power to democratically elected politicians. Barbara Geddes shows that personalist dictatorships end up being overthrown, either in a coup or revolution. One-party regimes like Mexico's survive the longest. But, when opposition movements threaten their survival, they negotiate a transition to democracy in the hopes of continuing to win in what will be more competitive elections. Finally, military regimes are the most likely to negotiate agreements with civilian politicians, because factionalism makes them the least stable of authoritarian systems. As economic downturns or social movements threaten their unity, they often reach agreement to bargain with their opponents.

Third, the decision to democratize presents both autocrats and opposition movements with a strategic dilemma whose resolution determines both the pace and final outcome of regime liberalization. Przeworski contends that hard-liners on

both sides of this divide have no incentives to negotiate with their rivals, because neither wants to share state power. Incumbent hard-liners do not want to change the nature of the autocracy, and opposition hard-liners want nothing less than the dictatorship to capitulate. Neither will back the actions of moderates who are willing to compromise on ultimate ends for the sake of political change. Knowing this, hard-liners exercise their veto to prevent encounters between pro- and anti-government moderates from reaching concrete agreements.

In these strategically fluid circumstances, Przeworski finds that successful democratization is a product of at least one of several conditions. First, regime moderates disguise their true intentions and gain the assent of their military hard-liners to negotiate a mere broadening of the regime's support coalition. Once negotiations have reached a certain point and the opposition is able to mobilize large sectors of society, regime moderates show their true colors, and democratic forces win the showdown with authoritarian hard-liners. Second, the dictatorship begins conversations with the opposition and discovers that it cannot repress its opponents. It updates its preferences and negotiates an agreement to democratize government. Third, contacts between the regime and its opponents create the possibility of a compromise, because the two sides learn to trust each other. Hard-liners conclude that regime change will not endanger their core interests, because accords can be reached with their opponents.

Authoritarianism can persist because the ruling bloc remains united and represses the opposition. The destruction of the youth movement in the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 indicates that the Chinese Communist Party, after several days of apparent disagreement, had decided to quash the prodemocracy movement. Even with the increase in the number of democracies (and states) during the third wave, 15 percent of all countries still have dictatorships.

Note too that conflict is intrinsic to both those cases that experience a transition to democracy and those that remain autocratic. Even if consensus on fundamental policy or values is a trait of stable democracies, the absence of disagreement is more characteristic of autocracies. Discord is pervasive in many democracies. At least since Dankwart Rustow, some students of democratization have highlighted this point. A central implication of this claim is that electoral competition within well-defined institutional boundaries—or constitutional democracy—is fragile, even if it appears to be well entrenched in 30 or so countries.

Establishing a well-functioning democracy therefore requires governments and opposition movements to devise a myriad number of institutions to contain and resolve conflict. At least since Dahl, analysts have recognized that there are multiple routes to democracies. Dahl himself discussed two paths. In the first path, contestation develops before inclusiveness. These are the oldest and most stable democracies, the ones politicians and citizens constructed during the first wave. In many other democracies and semidemocracies established during the second and third waves, incumbents and opposition movements must bargain about legislative procedures,

executive-legislative relations, legal institutions, electoral laws, and the nature and scope of individual rights (to name just a few areas of institutional engineering) as they negotiate a transition away from authoritarianism. The complexity of these negotiations helps to explain the institutional diversity among democracies and why time is associated with more stable democracy.

See also *Capitalism and Democracy; Democracy; Democracy, Future of; Democratic Transition; Global Democratic Deficit; Third Way and Social Democracy.*

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Democracy and Development

Does democracy cause prosperity, or do prospering nations develop democratic structures? How far do critical junctures in history determine both a society's economic development and its level of democracy? While these questions have occupied a central place in modern comparative political economy, they, nevertheless, remain highly disputed. The starting point of this ongoing debate lies in the strong correlation between the level of democracy and different measures of economic prosperity. Societies equipped with democratic institutions—such as free and fair elections, a free press, and checks and balances among the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches—are on average better off economically than those with more autocratic structures.

Modernization theory provides the traditional explanation for this correlation. Economic prosperity strongly augments the likelihood for a society to develop democratic structures. From a more cultural perspective, citizens of prospering societies slowly change their political behavior and attitudes. As a consequence of rising education levels, citizens tend to develop a political culture more receptive to political participation and tolerance, crucial elements for the emergence and stability of democracy. Increasing education also improves citizens' capacity for monitoring political processes and articulating demands toward the government, both factors constructive for democracy. Finally, there is an economic argument that relates economic modernization to democratization. In developed and diversified economies, the tax base of the state will increasingly depend on the middle classes and educated labor. But diversified taxation comes with the diversified demand of political representation. Thus, modern economies augment the likelihood of a prodemocracy bargain between citizens and the state actors. Citizens grant the state the privilege to tax only if the state is organized in a way that allows citizens to participate in the decision-making process on how public resources are spent.

While modernization theory has gained empirical support, especially with regard to the impact of education, more recent studies have carved out evidence that points toward an economic dividend of democracy. On average, democratic countries provide more public goods—such as education, health, the rule of law , and productivity-enhancing policies—than autocracies provide. The underlying theoretical argument states that autocracies and democracies differ with regard to their societal support. These differences result in different incentives for economic policy making. Autocratic regimes generally depend on a relatively small fraction of society—for example, the military, bureaucracy, or mighty oligarchs—and exclude the majority of citizens from political participation. Such a setting enables the government to supply itself with huge economic privileges. To maintain the regime, it is more rational for autocratic leaders to engage overproportionally in the distribution of economic privileges (rents) to the small distribution coalition than in providing development-promoting public goods for the majority.

In contrast, democratic governments need much broader support for political survival. Accordingly, they will find it rational to invest their resources overproportionally in nonexclusionary public goods that benefit large fractions of society. Therefore, the different incentive systems of different kinds of political order have strong implications for public policy making, which strongly affects overall economic development. Still, this theoretical perspective does not neglect the possibility of development under autocratic rule and makes a case for a more gradual differentiation between the economic impact of different levels of democracy and autocracy.

Finally, there is a third alternative for explaining the correlation between democracy and development; it focuses upon the importance of crucial events in history. Accordingly, the correlation between democracy and development is a result of endogeneity. The emergence of democracy and economic development are both caused by crucial events in a society's past. Historic path dependency becomes a critical factor from which single countries cannot easily escape. For instance, the varying quality of political institutions *and* the different levels of economic development in developing countries today are said to be heavily influenced by different types of colonization dating back centuries. Therefore, societies' political and economic development reflects critical junctures in history that are difficult to neutralize by "ordinary" political changes. While it is certainly true that history matters, the difficulty consists in making terms such as critical junctures or path dependency operational. What kind of historic events constitute tipping points that drive a society toward a new pathway from which it cannot easily deviate?

Altogether, the debate about democracy and development can easily appear as a whirlpool of interdependencies, where different scientific schools fiercely defend their claims. These competing perspectives have, nevertheless, generated most valuable insights about the relations between politics and economics. Today, the challenge consists in providing more fine-tuned explanations for the correlation between democracy and development that provide context sensitivity and show under which specific conditions the different theoretical approaches are of particular importance.

See also *Capitalism and Democracy; Development Administration; Economic Development, State-led; Globalization and Development; Millennium Development Goals.*

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Democratic Centralism

Democratic centralism is a form of internal organization and party discipline associated with Leninist political parties. Its "democratic" aspect is the idea that party members discuss and debate proposals and that decisions are taken by majority vote. "Centralism" means that once a decision is reached, all members, even those that disagree with the decision, are obligated to uphold it. Democratic centralism also has a vertical or hierarchical dimension: Lower organs in the party may offer input in decision making, but decisions from higher-ranking party bodies must be followed by the lower-level structures. Its defenders would maintain that democratic centralism allows an organization to reflect the preferences of its members while maintaining unity in action.

The origins of the term *democratic centralism* lie with the German Social Democratic Party in the late 1800s, but it gained more currency after being endorsed by Vladimir Lenin in *What Is to be Done?* (1902), in which he formulated the requirements for a professional, revolutionary party. Among Russian Marxists, Lenin's ideas were not universally accepted, and Lenin's advocacy of democratic centralism was one reason for the 1903 schism between Lenin's Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, who preferred looser party discipline.

In 1921, after gaining power in Russia, Lenin used the idea of democratic centralism to ban factions within the Bolshevik Party. Lenin's goal was to establish his authority, promote party unity, and prevent the emergence of counterrevolutionary tendencies. Later, under Joseph Stalin, alleged participation in anti-Stalin factions led many individuals to be dismissed from the party and ultimately put on trial and executed. Leon Trotsky, himself accused of leading such a faction, decried Stalin's approach, maintaining that freedom of criticism was essential for party democracy. Stalin prevailed over his critics, and under his rule, "democratic" elements effectively ceased to exist, as political decisions were made at the top with little or no input "from below." Few dared to speak out against Stalin's preferences.

Democratic centralism was formally enshrined in Article 3 of the 1977 Constitution of the Soviet Union, which read,

> The Soviet state is organized and functions on the principle of democratic centralism, namely the electiveness of all bodies of state authority from the lowest to the highest, their accountability to the people, and the obligation of lower bodies to observe the decisions of higher ones. Democratic centralism combines central leadership with local initiative and creative activity and with the responsibility of each state body and official for the work entrusted to them.

Critics of Soviet practices, however, noted that the principles of democratic centralism were contradictory and necessarily led to concentration of power at the top. For example, while democratic centralism prescribes a collective approach to the work of all organizations, criticism of agreed-upon policies is permissible only for the top leadership, not for rank-and-file party members. Hence, discussion of previously agreed–upon policies can take place only after the leadership has decided to permit it. If a policy is unsuccessful, the leadership would be hesitant to permit criticism of it, for fear that such discussions will undermine its power and authority. Another contradiction concerns accountability. While lower-level bodies are supposed to elect higher bodies, it also prescribes that the lower-level bodies are subordinate to higher bodies. In practice, this means that superiors appoint those who nominally elect them to their positions and tell them what decisions to make. Due to these factors, democratic centralism, in practice throughout communist states, led to overcentralization, corruption, and little policy innovation. In the 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika reforms were designed, in part, to move away from democratic centralism by democratizing decision making and soliciting participation of new actors in the political process.

Although all political parties try to impose party discipline, democratic centralism usually has a pejorative meaning because of its association with communist dictatorships. By orders of the Comintern (Communist International) in 1921, it was imposed by Lenin and the Russian Bolshevik Party upon all communist parties in the world and became a guiding principle of political life in those countries (e.g., China, Cuba, countries of Eastern Europe) where communist parties gained power. Some debate what Lenin truly meant by the term, and emphasize its usefulness at the time in Russia in the early 1900s for a clandestine revolutionary organization. Nonetheless, practice suggests that once a party or movement that practices democratic centralism gains power, its practices, especially in a single-party state, lead to concentration of power at the top, not greater popular input into policy, and they are used to justify repression of real and would-be political opponents.

See also *Bolshevism; Lenin, Vladimir Ilich; Leninism; Party Discipline; Soviet Union, Former; Trotsky, Leon.*

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Democratic Peace

Democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another. Instead, they traditionally opt to build stable zones of peace or rely upon diplomatic engagement. This concept is called the *democratic peace.* Although some scholars have cited instances of wars between democracies, the concept of democratic peace is statistically supported. Today, the claim of a joint, separate peace between democracies has become, as one scholar puts it, "as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations" (Levy: 1988).

As early as 1795, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote, "The natural state [among men] is a state of war. . . . A state of peace, therefore, must be *established*" (*Immanuel Kant: The Perpetual Peace,* 1795). Even more important, it *can* be established, according to Kant. He developed the idea of a relationship between a state's form of government and its hostile or aggressive external behavior. In the following centuries, this classical liberal insight was long buried under the theoretical dominance of *realpolitik,* a practical approach to foreign policy, often disregarding ethical or moral views to gain a goal. In recent decades, scholars' interest in the connection between democracy and peace has increased again. Compiling the first studies on democratic peace in the 1980s and 1990s, scholars Michael Doyle, Ernst-Otto Czempiel, and Bruce Russett were pioneers in this field.

Despite extensive research on democratic peace, scholars remain divided as to whether democratic nations are generally more peaceful than nondemocracies. While some scholars maintain that this is the case, empirical studies have cast doubt on this theory. Whereas democracies may not fight one another, generally, they are no less belligerent than nondemocracies, since democratic states have historically engaged and continue to engage in wars and armed conflicts with nondemocratic states. Attempts to explain democratic peace must review these empirical findings.

EXPLAINING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Two explanatory approaches, the structural-institutional and the normative-cultural, are predominant in regard to democratic peace. Both have been formulated in monadic and dyadic versions, the former focusing on the internal features of democracies, the latter focusing on the interaction between states.

The *structural-institutional* approach in its monadic variant builds upon the Kantian proposition, which is that public citizens in democracies are war averse, because they want to avoid the significant costs and risks associated with wars. Only in democracies, however, do the public's and policy makers' preferences translate into actual peaceful policies in an effort to evade war. Additionally, the complex and often slow processes of decision making in democracies likely makes it difficult for such governments to go to war even if they intend to do so. Moreover, it is argued that democratically elected leaders tend to refrain from initiating wars, since they perceive that supporting external conflicts could cost them their reelection. The dyadic version further supports this rationale. When two democracies oppose one another, governments still use the avoidance of war as a means to protect their free societies and prevent citizen and property losses, but avoiding war also serves to preserve their personal popular support and remain in power.

The *normative-cultural* approach in its monadic variant draws upon the assumption that democracies domestically adhere to norms and values such as the rule of law, free political participation, and a high regard for human rights. Violence as a means to promote one's goals is outlawed. Thus, citizens of democratic states believe it is morally wrong to resolve conflicts through the use of force. In their international relations, democracies externalize this tendency toward peaceful conflict settlement. The dyadic variant emphasizes that democracies act on the assumption that autocratic states will externalize their aggressive domestic behavior, thus creating an international security dilemma and in turn rendering democracies more security cautious and potentially aggressive.

Comparing the monadic and dyadic variants of both approaches, only the latter dyadic normative-cultural variant appears to address the empirical finding questioning whether democracies are completely peaceful or just peaceful with each other.

CRITICIZING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Democratic peace theory is criticized from various directions. Some scholars take issue with the methodological design of most democratic peace research. According to democratic peace studies, democracy and war are defined so that all critical cases that might be anomalies are singled out from the beginning, skewing the analysis. Critics further posit both international war and democratic dyads have historically been very rare in the international system, possibly rendering democratic peace only a statistical artifact.

Other scholars point out gaps and inconsistencies in the two predominant approaches while suggesting alternative or complementary explanations for democratic peace. Some legitimate factors that democratic states likely gauge, either each one singly or combined, when considering aggressive behavior include the effects of economic welfare and interdependence, joint membership in international organizations, imperial rule, alliances, the balance of power, and geographical proximity.

Finally, the democratic peace is also criticized from a normative or moral perspective. Some scholars believe the idea of democratic peace can be misused as an ideology manifesting Western dominance and enabling perceived violent democratic crusades. Furthermore, it is argued—under the assumption that only nondemocracies cause problems in international relations—that democracies are given a carte blanche for their foreign policies.

AMENDING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

In recent years, research has shed light on contradictions and ambivalences within and between the established causal mechanisms of democratic peace theory. These so-called antinomies have the potential to generate unexpected behavior of democracies in several fields, such as arms control, democracy promotion, and international law.

Perhaps most salient in this regard is a tendency among democracies, especially since the end of the cold war, to fight a large number of wars against nondemocracies for reasons other than self-defense. This observation, in addition to the striking variance among democracies regarding their war-proneness, led to the establishment of a complementary research agenda: democratic wars.

Highlighting the role of antinomies might help explain the war involvement of democracies with nondemocracies. There are specific democratic or liberal reasons for democratic states to fight wars against autocratic regimes. The ambivalent

character of liberal norms can lead democracies to wage war in order to promote universal values, such as the enforcement of the rule of law, the protection of human rights, or the elimination of the perceived unjust enemy.

Harald Müller contends it is not sufficient to distinguish between democracies and nondemocracies. Instead, he stresses the differences between democracies in order to account for the empirical findings mentioned above. Political cultures and identities are responsible for how democratic states interpret liberal norms and which sense of appropriateness is derived from them. Accordingly, one can distinguish between militant and pacifist democracies, with most democratic states tending toward the latter category.

Despite some persistent puzzles, the democratic peace continues to be a fascinating empirical phenomenon and fruitful research program. Since its rediscovery in the late twentieth century, much progress has been made, but there remain many opportunities and questions for future research.

See also *Asymmetric Wars; Democracy and Democratization; Democratic Transition; Kant, Immanuel; Peace.*

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Democratic Socialism

Democratic socialism is a term meant to distinguish a form of socialism that falls somewhere between authoritarian and centralized forms of socialism on the one hand and social democracy on the other. The rise of authoritarian socialism in the twentieth century in the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence generated this new distinction. Authoritarian versions of socialism are generally forms of state socialism that are highly centralized, equating state and society, and they employ extensive intervention into, and control of, public and private life, including communications, culture, and social life, in addition to centralized control of the economy.

Democratic socialists reject this authoritarian version of socialism. They contend that socialism is not a transitory state (a dictatorship of the proletariat) to a communist society but rather that it is an autonomous form that requires democracy. The idea of a transitory state was often used to justify undemocratic and even authoritarian measures as required by the initial stages of a state's transition to communism.

Though democratic socialists reject the revolutionary model and advocate a peaceful transformation to socialism carried out by democratic means, they also reject the social democratic view that capitalist societies can be successfully reformed through extensive state intervention within capitalism. In the view of democratic socialists, capitalism, based on the primacy of private property, generates inherent inequalities of wealth and power and a dominant egoism that are incompatible with the democratic values of freedom, equality, and solidarity. Only a socialist society can fully realize democratic practices. The internal conflicts within capitalism require a transition to socialism. Private property must be superseded by some form of collective ownership.

ORIGINS OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM

While there have been many utopian proposals, the origins of modern democratic socialism lie largely in a critique of the egoism and inequalities of private property and a belief that a socialist order is feasible. Seventeenth-century English Protestant religious reformer Gerrard Winstanley, founder of the Diggers, is sometimes seen as a founder of democratic socialism. Winstanley held that "the earth is a common treasury" that God gave to all men. Diggers rejected private property and lived a communal lifestyle. Certainly eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau's emphasis on equality in the claims of community and his critique of private property were consistent with socialism, though he did not use the term. Early nineteenth-century socialists like Claude-Henri Saint-Simon (the first to use the term *socialism*), Charles Fourier, and Robert Owen also developed utopian communities based on versions of socialism aiming to cure the ills of industrial society. Another early socialist, French politician Louis Blanc, suggested that the state should supply capital for national workshops run by democratically elected leaders.

The early writings of nineteenth-century German political philosopher Karl Marx have often been considered a source of democratic socialism. Marx argued that "true democracy"

requires the supersession of the state and the creation of a condition in which there is no alienation between human beings and society; in this condition, human communal essence and the commonwealth are merged. This is not, however, consistent with most forms of democratic socialism. For the most part, as noted above, democratic socialists rejected Marx's theory of revolution and his idea that the state could be superseded.

Nineteenth-century British philosopher John Stuart Mill began his intellectual life as a staunch defender of the free market but later came to see himself as a democratic socialist. Mill's work reflected two main strains of democratic socialism. He took issue with the inequalities of wealth and power created by a private property economy, but he also stressed the need for democratic education and public discussion in a civil society in which political maturity could be achieved.

Mill's ideas of cooperative economics and representative democracy were a major influence on non-Marxian socialism in England, particularly the Fabian socialists. This group, which included Irish playwright George Bernard Shaw, philosopher and historian Bertrand Russell, author H. G. Wells, and political reformers Sidney and Beatrice Webb, advocated cooperative economics and a peaceful transition to socialism. Fabian ideas were incorporated into the Labor Party in England, which advocated nationalization of industry (a task only partially achieved).

Political theorist Eduard Bernstein, who had fled Germany to England to avoid persecution and had extensive contact with British socialists, also looked to recast Marx's theories. His version of evolutionary socialism took issue with Marx on several counts. First, he thought Marx's historical materialism had neglected ethical considerations. He also wanted to account for social changes that Marx did not anticipate, such as increasing material comfort. Like other democratic socialists, he thought that democratic institutions could not be created through violent means

MODERN IDEALS OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM

In the 1970s and 1980s, following the reforms instituted in Yugoslavia, a number of philosophers known as the praxis group stressed extensive workers' control and democratic control of production. They employed a Marxist conception of human nature as self-realizing. North Americans like Carol Gould have taken up some elements of this project, stressing extensive democratization of political, social, and economic life, but with a decidedly feminist twist.

In the post-Marxist era, democratic socialists have focused on political arrangements and institutions that are compatible with ideas of equality, autonomy, and equal respect. Liberal ideals and democratic socialism have found some common ground. An early proponent of this type of approach was Canadian political theorist C. B. Macpherson, who fused the ideas of John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx to develop liberal democratic socialism. More recently, Italian political philosopher Norberto Bobbio, working in the tradition of Italian liberal socialism, has gone even further than Macpherson in advocating the combination of liberal democratic ideals and institutions such as constitutionalism, parliamentary government, and a multiparty system with socialism. Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe, while accepting Bobbio's stress on liberal democracy, takes him to task for excessive individualism. She argues that liberal democratic socialism still has to take into account the question of social cohesion. Other notable contributions include John Keane's work on civil society and David Held's work on democratic autonomy. Merging the concept of liberalizing institutions with the concept of decentralizing economic self-governance, British sociologist Paul Hirst proposed an "associational democracy." Hirst's proposal combined flexible specialization with regional economic regulation and extensive pluralism and self-government.

Other democratic socialists have responded to the issues that arise with a centralized command economy with notions of "market socialism." This group advocates a market mechanism for prices that can be combined with public ownership and direction by market planners. Regulated in this way, proponents argue, markets do not produce the large-scale inequalities of the capitalist market. For this idea first proposed by Polish economist Oskar Lange in the 1920s, economists and political theorists such as Alec Nove, John Roemer, and David Schweikart are among the major proponents.

See also *Bernstein, Eduard; Bobbio, Norberto Democratic Theory; Dictatorship of the Proletariat; Liberal Democracy; Market Socialism; Marxism; Mill, John Stuart; Nove, Alec; Russell, Bertrand; Saint-Simon, Claude-Henri; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Social Democracy; Socialism; Utopias and Politics.*

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Democratic Theory

The field of democratic theory can be divided into two sub-fields: descriptive and normative theory. The role of *descriptive* democratic theory is to characterize and study certain features of political systems that are considered democratic. *Normative* democratic theory focuses less directly on describing existing institutions and systems and instead inquires into the moral basis for democracy as a method of political decision making and governance. While this essay will focus primarily on normative aspects of democratic theory, descriptive theory must also play a significant role if one takes a democratic system to be normatively desirable only if it is in some significant way feasible.

Theorists do not agree about what they mean when they invoke the term *democracy*. A working definition is that it is a process of decision making in which all participants enjoy equal standing in some form. The etymology of the word *democracy* is simple enough; it is derived from the Greek term δη∞οκρατία *(dēmokratía),* which translates as "popular power." However there is much contention among democratic theorists over what such a power amounts to. For some democratic theorists, like Joseph Schumpeter, democratic power means minimally that rulers are selected through a competitive electoral procedure. For others, like Carole Pateman, democracy demands not only democratic political institutions but also a civil society based on participation, equality, and liberty. The role of democratic theory is less to resolve definitional disputes and more to ascertain whether there is a form of democratic governance that is legitimate and morally desirable given existing political conditions.

MAJOR THEMES

Among the central themes of democratic theory, the first is democratic legitimacy. Since it is rare that a political decision is reached unanimously, democratic theory must account for how collective decisions can be legitimately authoritative and have coercive power over dissenting participants. There is also the general project of justification of democracy: Why is democracy a better form of government than others? Theorists provide both instrumental and intrinsic arguments in answering this question. Instrumental arguments, like that of John Stuart Mill, point out that democracy brings about good political outcomes such as just social or economic conditions as well as a more tolerant, informed, and engaged citizenry. Amartya Sen invokes an instrumental justification of democracy when he argues that famine has never occurred in a democratic state with a relatively free press. David Estlund has argued that democracies have epistemic advantage over other forms of government, since democratic procedures that involve many have a tendency to produce good political decisions, which are more legitimate than the decisions of the expert few. To supplement the instrumental benefits that democracy offers, there are intrinsic justifications as well. Many theorists such as Joshua Cohen and Jeremy Waldron have argued that given the pluralistic nature of modern societies, democratic decision-making procedures are the fairest way to achieve some form of agreement among conflicting factions.

Even when theorists agree about the moral underpinnings of democracy, controversies remain over the contours of the ideal form of the democratic process. For instance, there are many questions surrounding democratic representation: Most notably, Is the form of government a direct democracy where every person directly engages in the collective decision making, or should the citizens be represented by intermediary political actors? Jean-Jacques Rousseau forcefully argues that a direct democracy is integral to producing well-informed and engaged citizens, though such a system is unlikely to be a practicable solution to the concerns of large and complex modern political societies, which characteristically demand a substantive division of labor in governance. If representative democracies strike the right balance of practicality and normativity, then a further question must be considered as to the proper role of political representatives; James Madison argued that representatives should act as delegates and simply follow the directives of their constituents. In contrast, Edmund Burke believed that representatives are the trustees of the will of the people and should act on their own judgment about matters of justice.

HISTORICAL CRITICS

Normative democratic theory need not be an affirmative project; those who are engaged in the discipline may be critical of its feasibility or normative advantage. Many criticisms of democracy are instrumental arguments; in some way or other—perhaps because of human fallibility, or the structure of the democratic process itself—democracy does not produce just outcomes. Both Plato and Aristotle argue that *democracy*—as Plato defines it ,"the rule by the governed"—was a less favorable form of government than *monarchy* (rule by an individual) or *oligarchy* (rule by the elite class). Plato believed that democracy tended to conflate expertise in governance with expertise in winning elections. In order to win elections, statesmen must appeal to the base beliefs of their constituents rather than pursue legislation that promotes justice and the common good. Hence Plato worried that democratic systems reward those who are talented at winning the favor of the public and disadvantage those who have the temperament and judgment to govern properly.

Thomas Hobbes likewise believed democracy to be an inferior form of government, because it encourages dissention and instability among citizens. According to Hobbes, a monarchy furthers the common good, since the monarch's private and public interests are entangled, forcing political decisions by the monarch to track the interests of all subjects. Hobbes could be understood as criticizing democracies for cultivating subjects and politicians whose private interests cannot be integrated with the common good. Anthony Downs and other contemporary public-choice theorists echo both Plato's and Hobbes's criticisms, arguing that citizens are not adequately informed about political matters and are too often motivated

by their own private interests to appropriately engage in collective decision making.

CONTEMPORARY STRANDS

Contemporary democratic theories continue engaging in the historical debates of the discipline and can be grouped into three major strands: procedural, substantive, and deliberative democratic theories. Procedural (or minimal) theorists, such as Dahl, Schumpeter, and Waldron, focus primarily on the democratic processes themselves rather than on the fairness of their outcomes or the development of citizen's preferences that are inputs into the decision-making procedure. Substantive theorists, such as Pateman, argue that while democratic procedures are an important component to bringing about just results, they are not sufficient and must be supplemented with, among other things, institutionally guaranteed rights. Deliberative democrats, such as Gutmann, Thompson, and Cohen, concentrate on the individual preferences of citizens and contend that deliberative procedures foster the development of appropriate and public-minded participants.

See also *Burke, Edmund; Democracy; Hobbes, Thomas; Madison, James; Mill, John Stuart; Normative Theory; Plato; Representative Democracy; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Schumpeter, Joseph Alois.*

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Democratic Theory, Parties in

Today, most scholars would agree with E. E. Schattschneider's famous assertion that "the political parties created democracy, and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the political parties" (1942, 1). However, parties as political institutions are a relatively new phenomenon, one that was at first perceived as neither unavoidable nor desirable. Indeed, criticism of parties was first raised in the eighteenth century and in some sense predates the emergence of parties in their modern political form in the nineteenth century.

PARTIES IN EARLY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The assessment of parties as political institutions depends very much on the underlying concept of democracy. While for theories of popular sovereignty, *democracy* means the implementation of the common good, or to use Jean-Jacques Rousseau's term, the general will (*volonté générale*) of the people through the rule by the people, liberal democratic theories tend to conceive of democracy as a political method to safeguard individual liberty against state power and to promote the pursuit of individual interests. From both perspectives, early political philosophy often tended to view parties as a threat to democracy. Group interest representation through parties was perceived as rejecting the interests of the individual and thus as incompatible with the idea of liberal democracy. In contrast, from the perspective of democracy as popular sovereignty, the idea of representation of particular and competing interests through parties was seen as jeopardizing common values and thus as a threat to the general interest.

One of the first political philosophers to write about parties was David Hume, who considered them "the most extraordinary and unaccountable phenomenon that has yet appeared in human affairs," (1742, 60) but was rather critical: "As much as legislators . . . ought to be honoured and respected among men, as much ought the founders of sects and factions to be detested and hated," he argued that factions "beget the fiercest animosities among men of the same nation, who ought to give mutual assistance and protection to each other" (ibid., 55). Similarly, James Madison (1787) saw the development of parties, or factions, as inevitable given the diverse interests in society, but he believed that majority factions posed a threat to the public good, individual liberty, and minority rights. Yet not all were as critical: Edmund Burke (1770) is considered the first thinker in the history of political philosophy to argue for the respectability of parties, contending that people could disagree about the common good and unite in different parties to promote what they believed to be in the national interest.

PARTIES AND MODERN DEMOCRATIC THEORY

The main change in the perception of parties came at the turn of the twentieth century with the arrival of mass democracy, which legitimized parties as political actors. As shown by Stein Rokkan (1970), parties played a historical role in integrating newly enfranchised groups into politics through the

development of mass parties. As a result, institutionalized party competition was increasingly seen as a valuable, or at least necessary, characteristic of democratic politics. Yet authors of the early twentieth century remained concerned about the role of parties in modern society. In particular, Moisei Ostrogorski (1902) and Robert Michels (1911) challenged the idea that mass parties promoted participatory democracy and popular sovereignty. Instead, they drew attention to the parties' undemocratic and oligarchic tendency to empower party leaders, thus denying individuals their sovereign right to decide and instead submitting them to strict party discipline.

Joseph Schumpeter (1942), in contrast, rejected the classic idea that democracy was a mechanism to realize the common good through self-rule by the people. Since the people were susceptible to manipulation by agenda-setting politicians, the idea of rule *by* the people was not only unrealistic, it was also undesirable. Instead, he advocated a minimalist conception of democracy as rule *for* the people, in which electoral competition between political elites, or parties, legitimized government. The electoral competition will became the outcome of the political process rather than its origin. Schumpeter's theory of democracy also opened up a new perspective on parties as actors in a political market, explicit in Anthony Downs's *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957) and Otto Kirchheimer's catch-all party, characterized by a "drastic reduction of the party's ideological baggage," powerful party leadership, and a deemphasis of both the role of the individual party member and the ties to specific social groups "in favour of recruiting voters among the population at large" (1966, 190). In this view, politics turns into the electoral competition between professional party elites that simply seek to maximize their vote share. While Downs emphasized the moderating effects of competition between two parties that had to compete for the same voters in the center, Kirchheimer was critical of catch-all parties that in his view performed badly with regard to mobilization and representation.

Thus, since the turn of the twentieth century, neither main strand of democratic theory has considered parties as obstacles to democracy per se, but the strands imply different views on the parties' roles and functions. Theories of popular sovereignty advocate a participatory form of democracy. Accordingly, the role of parties is to provide mass mobilization and integration, and their legitimacy depends primarily on direct popular involvement in party decision making. In contrast, the main role played by citizens in liberal democracies is to choose (or reject, and thus hold accountable) their leaders by means of competitive elections, while individual participation in politics as such is not an important ideal. Consequently, in this view parties are seen as a necessary instrument of electoral competition but do not need to emphasize mass membership, internal democracy, or even a particular ideology.

PARTIES AND CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRATIC THEORY: THE LACK OF DIALOGUE

Today, authors such as Richard Katz (2006) or Ingrid van Biezen and Michael Saward (2008) point out that with few exceptions, research on political parties and normative democratic theory have for some time developed in mutual isolation. While current party scholars often take a specific interpretation of the inherently contested concept of democracy for granted, the broad literature on modern democratic theory has largely ignored the wealth of empirical studies of political parties. As a result, authors argue that modern political science has done little to address or even understand current pressing concerns: A number of empirical studies have shown that parties appear to be losing some of their key functions, such as representation, mobilization, and interest aggregation. Growing disengagement from partisan politics and increasing levels of popular distrust in political parties are widespread. However, if parties are essential for representative democracy but at the same time unable to perform their representative functions, what are the implications for democracy? Are parties failing democracy, or do we need to reinvent them and their role? Do we need to reinvent democracy again? As van Biezen and Saward remind us, it is only when democratic theory and the study of parties reengage with each other "that we can try to make sense of the place of parties in contemporary democracy and, indeed, of the nature of modern democracy itself and its potential futures" (2008, 31).

See also *Alienation, Political; Democratic Theory; Hume, David; Interest Aggregation and Articulation; Political Parties; Representative Democracy.*

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Democratic Transition

Democratic transition is the process of changing, without major violence, from a nondemocratic regime to a democratic one. It can be distinguished from other paths to democratization that involve higher levels of violent conflict: "revolution," as occurred in late eighteenth-century France, and "foreign intervention," such as that undertaken by American and allied troops in Western Europe and Japan at the end of World War II (1949–1945).

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, peaceful processes of democratization took place in a number of countries that already had multicandidate elections. This democratization was done by enlarging the eligible electorate within the country. In the United Kingdom, the United States, and other former British colonies, suffrage rights were allocated gradually to different minority groups through a slow, lengthy process of moderate reforms. By a different path, in Germany and in northern European countries, such as Sweden, Norway, and Finland, enfranchisement of the electorate was sudden. Such a rapid change could have created political instability, but this shift was made in conjunction with the establishment of proportional representation electoral rules and other institutional inclusive devices.

New ways of democratization advancing more directly from dictatorial or colonial regimes developed in the late twentieth century. Social mobilization and bargaining among the elites have led to democratic transitions in southern Europe since the mid-1970s, in Latin America and Eastern Asia since the early 1980s, and in eastern Europe since the late 1980s. As a result of these processes, a majority of the world's population now lives in democratic or liberal regimes for the first time in human history.

A democratic transition requires three components. First, there must be a variety of political actors with different political regime preferences. The incumbent government may be split between hard-liners and soft-liners who promote different responses to the threat of opposition movements. Within each of these groups, radical and moderate elements can be distinguished for their propensity to either reject or accept intermediate compromises with other actors.

Second, the dictatorial regime can be successfully challenged following a triggering event, such as the death of the dictator, an economic crisis, the failure of authoritarian rulers to deliver on their promises and meet the people's expectations, or a foreign military defeat.

Third, opportunities for choice appear. On the incumbent rulers' side, the costs of implementing repression against the opposition can be compared with the potential benefits of opening the system or calling an election under relatively favorable conditions to retain or share power. On the opposition's side, the costs of fighting, including the risks of provoking a civil war and the subsequent losses and destruction, can be compared with the potential benefits of accepting a provisional compromise that establishes better conditions for further action and organization. In the end, the government and the opposition may come to an agreement because of their different expectations and uncertainty about the future.

Different models of democratic transitions can be distinguished by the roles of their actors, the paths that the transitions take, and the consequences of the transitions. First, the *transaction model,* also called *establishment of democracy without democrats, transition from inside, transformation,* and *agreed reform,* implies significant exchanges between factions of rulers while keeping the opposition in a weakened state, the introduction of liberalization before democratization, and the enjoyment of relatively advantageous conditions by former authoritarians to survive and evolve in power. Cases of initial liberalizing reforms launched from above in a nondemocratic regime include Brazil and Spain in the second half of the 1970s and the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1980s.

Second, the *round table model,* also called *extrication* or *transplacement,* involves more formal and balanced negotiations between reform rulers and opposition movements, as happened in Chile as well as in Poland and Hungary in the late 1980s.

Finally, the *collapse model,* also called *breakdown, defeat, or replacement,* implies sudden changes imposed by an unexpected crisis, improvised conversations between former persecutors and the persecuted, and quick, dramatic decisions. Changes in Portugal and Greece in the 1970s, Argentina in the early 1980s, and East Germany and Czechoslovakia in the late 1980s, among others, can fit this model.

The focus on actors' strategies might complement more traditional discussions on structural conditions for democracy. The "strategic" approach permits the use of tools from game theory to identify crucial actors, bargains, and decisions. Studies of democratic transitions also consider the role of international organizations and information as well as the relations between the path of change and institutional choices, economic reforms, and further degrees of democratic consolidation and stability.

See also *Democracy and Democratization; Democracy, Future of; Democratic Theory.*

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Democratization

See *Democracy and Democratization.*

Demonstrations

See *Protests and Demonstrations.*

Deontology

Deontology derives from the Greek *deon,* "duty," and *logos,* "science." The term refers to a branch of ethics concerned with actions as guided by moral obligation or duty. The tradition is associated with the work of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, who argued that there exist ethical values that require morally obligatory actions, regardless of their consequences. According to Kant, duty is effectively based on logical, universal unchanging sources, formulated in his principle of the "categorical imperative." In the same way, in deontological ethics, an action is considered good because of its commitment to higher-order moral values of the action itself, not because its product is good. (One cannot undertake immoral acts like torture of spies even if the outcome is morally preferable.) The emphasis on the type of motivation for action contrasts the deontological approach with consequentialism and utilitarianism. More extreme versions of deontology have been criticized as ignoring the goals and consequences of actions and/or leading to impossible situations, sometimes even producing harm. Neo-Kantian theories have been developed that try to resolve these difficulties, for example, by combining deontology with utilitarianism or additional values (such as equality and social justice).

See also *Kant, Immanuel; Utilitarianism.*

. . . . JIRI S. MELICH

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Dependence

Dependence is an unequal relationship in which an actor, group, or nation is forced to rely on an external power for resources, economic activity, or security. Dependence creates vulnerability and the potential for exploitation among the dependent actors. Within domestic political systems, dependence may emerge when individuals or groups become reliant on policies or resources. In international relations, dependency theory emerged in the 1950s as an approach to explain unequal patterns of development. Dependency theory posits that the world is divided into *dominant* and *dependent* states (also known as *core* and *periphery* states). Dominant states are economically advanced and have diverse economies and high standards of living. Dependent states have low gross national products and often have economies that are tied to the export of a narrow band of resources to the developed states. The economic inequality is the result of the actions and policies of external actors, such as multinational corporations, international financial bodies, and world markets, which encourage underdeveloped states to export resources and to import manufactured goods, products, and services from industrialized nations. Resources flow from the underdeveloped states, the periphery, to the industrialized core. These economic patterns are self-perpetuating and reinforce dependence.

See also *Globalization and Development; Multinational Corporation; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); South (Third World); World Bank.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Dependency Theory

Dependency theory was a critical reaction to the conventional approaches to economic development that emerged in the aftermath of World War II (1939–1945). There are two dependency schools: the *Marxist,* influenced by Paul Baran and developed by Samir Amin, Theotônio dos Santos, Arghiri Emmanuel, André Gunder Frank, and Aníbal Quijano, and the *structuralist,* built on the work of Raúl Prebisch and others at the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, and best represented by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, Peter Evans, Osvaldo Sunkel, and Maria da Conceição Tavares.

Both groups would agree that at the core of the dependency relationship between industrialized countries, referred to as "*the center,*" and less-developed countries, referred to as "*the periphery,*" lies the inability of the periphery to develop an autonomous and dynamic process of technological innovation. The main contention between them was related to the possibilities of economic development in the periphery.

MARXIST DEPENDENCY THEORY

Marxists would argue that development in the periphery was impossible, while structuralists would argue that dependent development was feasible. The vigorous growth in some parts of the developing world in the 1950s and 1960s seemed to justify the views of the latter group. However, the enduring process of stagnation after the 1980s debt crisis led to a reconsideration of the relevance of dependency situations.

For the Marxists, the origins of the center-periphery relationship were strictly technological and determined by the international division of labor. The center produced manufactured goods for itself and the periphery, while the latter produced commodities mainly for the center, as well as maintaining a relatively large subsistence sector. In this view, development was based on capital accumulation—which, in turn, depends on surplus extraction. A larger surplus led to more accumulation of capital and a higher growth rate. Furthermore, for Marxists it was in the uses of the surplus that the differences between developed and underdeveloped regions were most evident. In the most backward countries, where the process of industrialization did not take hold and agriculture was still dominant, underdevelopment resulted from the patterns of land tenure.

The predominance of large estates in plantation societies meant that a great part of the surplus remained in the hands

of landowners, which emulated the consumption patterns of developed countries. Excessive and superfluous consumption of luxuries would then reduce the potential for investment and capital accumulation. Hence, conspicuous consumption would be the cause of stagnation in the periphery.

If industrial development took place, then a new pattern of dependency would emerge. Industrialization would take place with participation of foreign capital, which would tend to control domestic markets. The periphery then would jump into the monopolistic phase of capitalistic development, with local governments controlled by the monopolists. However, the surplus extracted by monopolistic capital would not be reinvested in productive activities in the host country. Part of it would simply be sent abroad as profit remittances, while the other part would be spent on conspicuous consumption.

STRUCTURALIST DEPENDENCY THEORY

Structuralists argued that capitalist development in the periphery was possible, even starting off in a dependent relationship with the center, and that foreign investment was not detrimental to growth. Dependency was not a relationship between commodity exporters and industrialized countries, but one between countries with different degrees of industrialization. Furthermore, structuralists distinguished between political and economic variables in explaining dependent development.

Development and underdevelopment were economic categories related to the degree of development of the productive structure and to its level of technological development. Dependency and autonomy referred to the degree of development of the political structure and the ability or lack of ability of local political elites to take economic decision making into their own hands. As a result, dependent development in association with foreign capital was possible and occurred in countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico and in parts of East Asia.

Structuralists emphasized the importance of domestic internal developments, in contrast to the external forces of the world economy, as the main determinant of the situation of dependency. It was the internal political process that led to outcomes that favored foreign actors in the process of development. Furthermore, national capitalist development was not incompatible with the absorption of technological knowledge from multinational firms.

However, the structuralist version of dependency, in refuting the Marxist emphasis on the relevance of external factors, went to the other extreme and claimed that internal forces were the almost exclusive determinant of development. The inability to generate a domestic dynamic of technical progress incorporation, the domestic patterns of consumption, and the limitations of the domestic elites that opted for political dependency were to blame. If the successful industrialization of some parts of the periphery showed the weakness of the Marxist tradition, then the debt crisis and the failure to renovate the process of development in the 1990s proved that the optimism of the structuralist approach was not always justified.

CONCLUSION

More recently, dependency authors emphasized that industrialization and technical progress in the periphery were insufficient to break the dependency ties with the center. Financial dependency is reflected in the inability of peripheral countries to borrow in international markets in their own currencies, and constitutes the real obstacle to development. The inability to borrow in international markets in their own currencies reflects the inability of the domestic currencies of peripheral countries to acquire all the functions of money as a reserve of value, unit of account, and medium of exchange. The ability of a currency to function as international money is a question of degree. The main problem associated with the inability to provide all the monetary functions is that financial markets remain underdeveloped in peripheral countries, and the process of capitalist accumulation is hindered.

Interestingly enough, mainstream economists have also dealt with financial dependency. Ricardo Hausmann argues that, in part, underdevelopment results from the so-called original sin—that is, the fact that the currencies of developing countries are inconvertible in international markets. In this view, the external instability of domestic currencies in the periphery hinders the process of development. While mainstream and dependency authors agree on the importance of currency inconvertibility, they would disagree on the solutions. Mainstream authors would emphasize the importance of sound fiscal policies and monetary rules that promote credibility, while dependency authors would emphasize the need for capital controls and reduced integration with international financial markets.

See also *Capitalism and Democracy; Development, Economic; Economic Development, State-led; Free Trade; Globalization and Development; Monetary Policy; Political Economy, Comparative.*

. . . .   MATÍAS VERNENGO

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Deracialization

Deracialization is the process of breaking with practices of representing the Other (individuals or groups) as racialized. Racialization can be understood as a historical and cultural process that leads to the classification, distinction, and qualification of humanity into races, and it consists of representational practices that mark racial difference and signify the racialized Other. French philosopher Michel Foucault refers to this process as *fragmentation,* which is one of the functions of racism, a technology of power that permitted modern European colonization. In other words, colonial institutions exercised their power and their domination on colonized societies by creating a racialized Other as different from the Self.

The concepts of *race* and *nation* developed in connection with one another. In countries such as the United States, these relationships of power are still expressed in contemporary categories such as those of "people of color," "community of color," and "racial minorities," with which nonwhites are classified as systematically different from whites. Therefore, the process of deracialization would imply the dismantling of both social relationships and the practices of representation that were built on racism, as well as practices that construct or perpetuate stereotypes and binary oppositions, and naturalize difference. The election of President Barack Obama might illustrate the process of deracialization of social relationships in the United States.

See also *Colonialism; Foucault, Michel Paul; Race and Racism; Racial Discrimination.*

. . . .   PATRICK CLOOS

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Deregulation

Deregulation is the removal of businesses or whole industries from the process of government regulation. Deregulation can also refer to the sale of state-owned enterprises, known as *privatization,* but privatization may entail the creation of new regulatory institutional arrangements and does not necessarily represent an absence of regulation. In theory, the term can be used broadly to refer to businesses becoming exempt from all types of regulation, from price controls and competition law to pollution abatement rules to equal employment opportunity law.

Recent history has shown that deregulation is most likely to dismantle economic regulation and occurs mainly in industries that are considered ideal for natural monopolies. *Natural monopolies* are generally characterized by high fixed or start-up costs and by increasing returns to scale, where profits are realized only by serving large numbers of customers. This includes utilities, such as telecommunications and electricity, and transportation industries, such as trucking and commercial air travel. For much of the twentieth century, companies in these industries acted as monopolies that were either state-owned or regulated by public competition authorities.

The United States undertook deregulation of these industries in the late 1970s in order to let the free market play a greater role. Similar deregulation occurred in European countries as well as in developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, but the transformation there involved privatizing nationalized industries followed by the creation of new independent regulatory agencies to oversee the newly privatized businesses. Deregulation and privatization have been pushed by economists and politicians in order to reduce public sector costs, to increase efficiency in the production of services, and to reduce manipulation of output and prices for political reasons. The process, as well as the effects of deregulation on both continents, has been the subject of extensive research in economics, political science, and public administration.

DEREGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES

In the United States, several factors set the stage for deregulation in the transportation and utilities industries. First, for decades, the biggest companies had functioned as natural monopolies, overseen by regulatory agencies, yet dominating their respective industries. High fixed or overhead costs and increasing returns to scale had provided the traditional justification for natural monopoly status, but this conventional wisdom began to change as more academics and policy analysts suggested that these industries should be opened to market competition. Additionally, the belief that regulation was contributing to business costs led presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter to see deregulation as a potential solution to the rising inflation problem.

Perhaps most important, by the late 1970s a substantial amount of economic research was demonstrating that economic regulation existed primarily for the benefit of the regulated industries. In *The Politics of Deregulation,* political scientists Martha Derthick and Paul Quirk argued that this body of economic work was the primary engine that drove the efforts to deregulate several industries (1985). Marver Bernstein, one of the first scholars to analyze the issue, suggested that regulatory agencies endured a life cycle in which the agency's initial enthusiasm and eagerness to provide corrections to the free market eventually gave way to a perceived need to protect existing firms from competition, thus resulting in industry "capture" of the regulating agency (1955).

Economist George Stigler followed up on the work of Bernstein, most notably with his article "The Theory of Economic Regulation," published in 1971. To support his claim

that regulation benefited regulated interests first and foremost, he analyzed market entry regulations in the trucking industry as well as occupational licensing requirements. According to Stigler, such regulations hindered competition by inflating the profits of established competitors while blocking market entry to smaller firms, ultimately resulting in higher consumer prices. The situation could sustain itself, argued Stigler, only because the costs of regulation to each consumer was not worth the cost of organizing other consumers in order to bring about change. Stigler's highly influential work served as the basis for other important articles on the social costs of regulation by Gary Becker (1983), Sam Peltzman (1976) and Richard Posner (1975). James Q. Wilson also built on this research by arguing that capture was more likely to occur in situations where the benefits of regulation were narrowly concentrated on industry, while the costs were widely dispersed across consumers (1980).

Derthick and Quirk showed that demand for deregulation often came from agency staff. Economists within the Civil Aeronautics Board recommended against continuing regulations that erected significant barriers to market entry against smaller airline companies. Additionally, future Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, who worked then as special counsel on the Senate Judiciary Committee, convinced Senator Ted Kennedy of the anticompetitive effects of airline regulation, and, therefore, of the need to deregulate. Thus, the ideas of economists brought together a coalition of market-oriented Republicans, inflation hawks, and consumer advocates, such as Ted Kennedy and Ralph Nader.

Competitive reforms were passed in the airline industry with the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, in the trucking industry with the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, and in telecommunications with the breakup of AT&T into the regional "baby" bells in 1984. The irony of the success of Stigler and others was that their theories dictated that deregulation could only occur if regulated firms no longer wanted to be regulated. Indeed, in his 1989 retrospective examination of the theories behind deregulation, economist Sam Peltzman suggested that regulated firms had come to believe that, by the late 1970s, the benefits of regulation no longer outweighed the costs. It is important to note that deregulation in the United States had its limits. The Reagan administration wanted to scale back environmental, worker safety, and health regulations, but Congress was divided over such plans. Additionally, there was variation in the extent to which the states implemented the reforms. Public policy scholar Paul Teske showed in a 1991 article that after the AT&T divestiture, not all the states followed the advice of economists, and in a 1994 article, Teske and colleagues demonstrated that the trucking industry was able to move to the state level to capture regulators and secure beneficial regulation.

In the 1990s, the financial sector also witnessed a strong movement toward deregulation with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of the Great Depression era. Proponents of the Glass-Steagall Act claimed that it eliminated conflicts of interest in finance by keeping a firm barrier between commercial and investment banking. The banking industry, on the other hand, had sought its repeal in order to expand the operations of individual financial institutions. Additionally, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which outlined the regulation of broadcast spectrum and further reformed the regulation of telecommunications. However, critics such as Ralph Nader have maintained that the law has allowed large media companies to further consolidate and reduce competition in media markets.

DEREGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD

Deregulation followed a somewhat different trajectory in the European Union (EU), although, as with the United States, the movement was toward liberalization of markets. Postwar European regulatory institutions generally consisted of executive ministries that directly controlled nationalized industries, again in areas once thought appropriate for natural monopolies, such as transportation, energy, telecommunications, and broadcasting. In order to implement deep macroeconomic reforms, but also partly due to the influence of research by Stigler and others, such arrangements were gradually dismantled at varying speeds across Europe. Political executives then delegated the authority to regulate markets to independent agencies, with the idea that agencies would foster industry competition and limit state intervention.

In his analysis of European deregulation, public policy scholar Fabrizio Gilardi found that governments in several European countries delegated regulatory authority to independent agencies in order to enhance their credibility and potentially increase investment in newly regulated companies (2002). Thus, while deregulation may have occurred in the form of reduced state intervention, this regulatory regime was replaced by one of independent agencies, prompting some European Union public policy scholars, such as Giandomenico Majone, to ask whether they were witnessing deregulation or reregulation (1990).

Majone has posited that these changes have resulted in the creation of the modern "regulatory state" in Europe (1996). He argued that governments are primarily responsible for redistribution, stabilization (e.g., macroeconomic), and regulation, yet in the EU, government's role as regulator has grown at the expense of its other two roles. To Majone, EU governments that had once primarily focused on manipulating nationalized industries, in order to achieve particular income or employment targets, now delegated authority to agencies that were charged with correcting market failures. Moreover, the EU's stated goals of achieving a single, integrated market have required continual efforts to harmonize regulations across member states. Thus, somewhat ironically, deregulation in the EU has led to the creation of the European "regulatory state."

Deregulation in developing nations has also largely followed a path of privatizing state-owned enterprises. Much of the academic research in this area has come from economists attempting to evaluate the effects of privatization on production costs, prices, and consumer access to the goods in question. Numerous studies have been conducted; David Parker

and Colin Kirkpatrick summarize much of the literature on privatization evaluation in a 2005 article. They find that privatization by itself is often ineffective, but that when it is accompanied by competition and regulation by an independent public agency, privatization can lower production costs and lower prices for consumers, while increasing the choices available to them. However, the authors also indicate that many studies suffer from methodological flaws and that it may be difficult to generalize such findings beyond the most common context for such research, telecommunications.

THE FUTURE OF DEREGULATION

In industries once considered natural monopolies, deregulation has achieved mixed results, but research has helped to specify the economic and political conditions under which deregulation or privatization can be successful. However, the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 created strongly unfavorable impressions of the deregulation of financial institutions in the United States in the 1990s. Many observers attribute the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act to the development of sophisticated debt instruments and questionable housing loans that combined to cause the crisis. Moreover, varying standards of regulation induced some commercial banks, such as Countrywide Financial, to shift their status to that of thrift or savings-and-loan institutions, which were less heavily regulated. Finally, some observers also perceived a regulatory conflict of interest, as enforcement was financed by fees collected by regulated entities. These events, as of 2009, have created strong demand for tight regulation of financial institutions, particularly in the United States, where many believe the crisis originated. Thus, while we may be witnessing a long-term trend toward privatization of natural monopoly industries, deregulation of other sectors of the economy has been more controversial and may experience greater volatility in the level and strength of government regulation.

See also *Business Pressure in Politics; Interest Groups and Lobbies; Privatization; Regulation and Rulemaking.*

. . . .   COLIN PROVOST

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Derrida, Jacques

Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) was an Algerian-born French philosopher. He is considered the founder of *deconstruction,* an approach to textual analysis (used mainly in the fields of philosophy and literary theory but also in the study of political discourse) that seeks to understand the meaning of texts by unveiling the inherent oppositions between the apparent features and the essential message. Issues such as sovereignty, otherness, and decision making are present in many of his works, but his political criticism went beyond theory, actively questioning and engaging in issues such as the Vietnam War (1959–1975), apartheid, and the death penalty.

Born in El-Biar (close to Algiers), Derrida grew up in a Sephardic Jewish family. In 1952 he was admitted to the École Normale Supérieure in Paris, France, where he defended his master's dissertation ("The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy") in 1954. His 1966 lecture at Johns Hopkins University was followed by a long list of visiting appointments in renowned institutions, and he presented his doctoral thesis in 1980. In 1982 he cofounded and served as first director of the Collège Internationale de Philosophie in Paris, and a year after that he joined the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. In 1987 he also started lecturing at the University of California.

In 1967 Derrida published three works that introduced the concept of deconstruction: *Writing and Difference, Speech and Phenomena,* and *Of Grammatology.* The basis of deconstruction is that any text always has more than one possible interpretation, making interpretative reading a complex task constantly limited by the simultaneous existence of incompatible but at the same time closely woven meanings. Derrida, in his literary approach, suggests than it is by prioritizing appearance over essence that deconstruction operates and is able to unveil these textual oppositions. Deconstructive strategies include the diachronic or genealogical study of conceptual term usage and the critical identification of the aporias (contradictions or paradoxes) and ellipses contained in writing and thought.

Significant applications of deconstruction to political phenomena can be found in Derrida's *Force of Law* (1989), *Specters of Marx* (1993), and *Rogues* (2003), in which the tensions among democracy, sovereignty, and power are explored. Derrida argues that in a democracy, power is always abused, as it inevitably requires force, freedom, decision making, and, ultimately, sovereignty. But as democratic universalized

Algerian-born French philosopher Jacques Derrida fathered the approach of deconstruction, which allows that any text may have more than one possible interpretation.

decision making is necessarily a slow process, and many governmental decisions need to be made immediately, there is always a tendency to concentrate and unify power, to move toward imperial hegemony, excluding others from the process of decision making.

The most recurrent criticisms of Derrida and his works are usually linked to his lack of clarity and, in some instances, what has been viewed as intentional obfuscation (intent to confuse). His style was often more literary than analytical, leaving argumentation aside and opening the doors for contradictory interpretations. Derrida himself admitted that his notion of deconstruction was not easy to explain through discourse, as its object of critique is writing itself.

See also *Decision Theory, Foundations of; Democratic Theory; Sovereignty.*

. . . .   JOÁM EVANS PIM

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Descriptive Representation

Representation has many meanings, including acting on the instructions of the represented (delegate), acting in the interests of the represented (trustee), acting as the personal agent of the represented (attorney or ombudsman), and so forth. These roles primarily refer to an individual representative. While they are also relevant to the idea of representation by a legislative body as a whole, attention to representative assemblies also allows consideration of a sense of representation that only makes sense with many representatives. In Johns Adams's famous terms, the "representative assembly should be in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large," or according to James Wilson, "the legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole society, the faithful echo of the voices of the people."

Although the idea of representation as mirroring appears to be self-evidently desirable, it has its detractors, who observe that it may shift the locus of decision regarding policy compromises and coalition strategy from the voters to the representatives, and may allow members of legislatures to act in ways that are opposed by large numbers of citizens while still claiming to be representative because literally on the surface they "look like" the people as a whole. In part, the seriousness of this problem depends on how "mirroring" is understood, as indicated by the contrast between the quotations from Adams and Wilson.

In Wilson's terms, mirroring appears to require an accurate reflection of the political opinions ("the voices") of the people. In this case, one might reasonably expect representatives to make the same decisions as the people would have made themselves. The Adams formulation, and modern attention to "descriptive representation," focuses on the degree to which the assembly looks like the people ("an exact portrait") with regard to such characteristics as race and gender and perhaps also age, social class, religion, language, or other characteristics. Given the diversity of opinions within demographic groups, here it is less clear that representation-as-mirroring will lead to the same decisions as would have been made by the whole people themselves.

In contemporary debates, support for demographic representation is generally based on two arguments. On one hand, it is seen to symbolize full and equal citizenship for the groups represented; implicit in this is a direct link between interest or opinion and group membership, and the idea that decisions will be made on the basis of competition in which power (reflected in the number of legislative votes) will be decisive. On the other hand, descriptive representative may be supported on the theory that there is something about the lived

experiences of women or minorities that can only be represented by members of those groups themselves; implicit here is the idea that decisions will be made in the common interest based on the interplay of ideas, so that an effective voice is more important that a strictly proportional voice.

Whichever rationale is accepted, however, at least three questions remain to be answered. First, what groups are to be represented? On the one hand, this means specifying the dimensions of difference to be taken into account. In racially or linguistically divided societies, these categories almost always are considered relevant, as increasingly is gender. But what about age or social class (the latter having been widely considered relevant in the early decades of the twentieth century, but much less so in the twenty-first)? Moreover, are dimensions such as race and gender to be considered independently (i.e., black versus white and male versus female) or must they be considered jointly (black male versus black female versus white male versus white female)? Second, does demographic representation require proportionality (as suggested by the argument concerning equal citizenship and the term mirroring), or does it require adequacy (as suggested by the "politics of presence"), even if this means that some small groups would require *more* than their proportionate share of the representatives?

The third question is how, institutionally, demographic representation can be furthered or assured. Most directly, this can be done through the use of reserved seats (e.g., for Maori in New Zealand or "scheduled castes and tribes" in India) or quotas for nominations, whether applied in law (e.g., Belgium or France) or by internal party decision (e.g., Sweden). In closed list proportional representation systems, not only is the number of "minority" nominees crucial but also their placement on their party's list. With regard to women, some quota systems go beyond simple proportions, instead requiring "zippering"—the alternation of men and women on the list.

Beyond these "direct actions," the choice of electoral system more generally can have an impact on the degree of demographic representation. This impact, however, depends on the kind of group involved. Provided that the parties decide that they want demographic representation, closed lists are more effective than open lists; if parties are merely paying lip service to representation, however, open lists may be superior. Having large legislative districts with many representatives for each is generally conducive to representativeness, because it allows parties to present more "balanced" lists, but if a minority is geographically concentrated, single member districts may be advantageous.

See also *Representation and Representative; Representative Democracy; Representative Systems.*

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Desegregation and Segregation

See *Segregation and Desegregation.*

Despotism, Oriental

See *Oriental Despotism.*

Détente

Détente, a French term meaning "the easing of strained relations," was used by Henry Kissinger to describe the Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford administrations' (1969–1977) goals for American-Soviet relations. Détente would result from a revised foreign policy that recognized the limitations of American power; addressed relations with other countries based upon their foreign policy behavior rather than their ideology, domestic institutions, or treatment of their citizens; and attempted to entwine the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in the Western-dominated international order. In short, America would engage its adversaries unsentimentally and privilege international stability over the promotion of human rights and democracy abroad to reduce tensions.

Détente's architects recognized that the Soviet Union had achieved rough parity in strategic nuclear capabilities while retaining a quantitative advantage in conventional military forces, yet its leaders craved recognition as equals, required trade and credit from Western countries, and were becoming estranged from their Chinese allies. The United States desired the Soviet Union to halt its military buildup, recognize Western rights in Berlin, facilitate American withdrawal from Vietnam, and establish principles for managing conflicts in the third world. The Nixon and Ford administrations engaged the Soviet Union in substantive negotiations that addressed these issues simultaneously, linking progress in one area with progress in others so as to maximize leverage and generate qualitative changes in East-West relations.

Détente achieved many of its goals. The United States and Soviet Union concluded two strategic nuclear arms control agreements: The Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) froze the number of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) for five years, and the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty limited each country to two batteries of 100 defensive missiles (soon reduced to one) deployed to protect their national capitals or an ICBM field. An agreement effectively tying West Berlin to the Federal Republic of Germany and guaranteeing western access removed a constant irritant from East-West relations. The parallel warming of relations with both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China facilitated American withdrawal from the Vietnam War and reset the geopolitical

stage for American foreign policy. And Nixon's official visits to Moscow and Peking, firsts for an American president, were symbolic of—and drove—superpower cooperation.

Détente did not secure lasting cooperation, however. Domestic critics, such as Senator Henry Jackson, emphasized the concessions granted in these agreements, downplayed the benefits, and demanded better terms while also rejecting the notion that the United States should negotiate with a totalitarian enemy without explicitly linking progress on international issues to changes in the treatment of its citizens. Such pressure for increased demands, along with the loss of presidential power caused by the Watergate scandal, Nixon's resignation, and subsequent legislation, eviscerated the ability of the executive to threaten sanctions or promise inducements in its dealings with the Soviets and thereby undermined détente. Although presidents Ford and Carter continued the policy, seeking further arms control agreements and the atmospherics of superpower summitry, U.S.–Soviet relations soured. The Soviet Union took advantage of the situation by promoting third world allies, culminating with its deployment of Soviet forces to support its client in Afghanistan in 1979, which effectively ended the policy of détente.

See also *Arms Control; Cold War; Foreign Policy; Institutionalism, Comparative; New Institutionalism; Realism and Neorealism; Soviet Union, Former; Statecraft.*

. . . .   GARY SCHAUB JR.

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Deterrence

Deterrence usually refers to "deterrence by punishment" (where an attacker might be able to take over a territory but is dissuaded by the prospect of suffering retaliatory damage at home), rather than "deterrence by denial" (where the aggressor is dissuaded from attacking simply by the knowledge that his attack would fail—would be repulsed by the local opposing defenses). This kind of deterrence is often assumed to be tied to the invention of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them over the top of any battlefield, as the winner on the land or sea would still suffer horrendous damage to its cities, inflicted by the losing side's airplanes or missiles. But there were some similar discussions of such deterrence as early as the aftermath of World War I (1914–1918), when it was assumed that conventional air raids would soon be catastrophic enough to be a deterrent. And the emergence of global oceanic commerce had even earlier suggested that naval forces could impose significantly deterrent punishment on any adversary that had become dependent on commerce.

COMPONENTS OF AND PROBLEMS WITH DETERRENCE

One crucial ingredient of deterrence is that such punishment has to be sufficient on "second strike," that is, that the missiles or bombers or other means of inflicting this "countervalue" retaliatory destruction have to be able to survive all the "counterforce" attacks an adversary has inflicted in a first strike. If an attacker were able to blunt all the means of retaliation in the first strike, there would not be a deterrent.

The process of deterrence is based on a rational choice model and is sometimes thus attacked as presupposing a rationality that may be difficult to find in human decision makers. But such criticisms may overstate the problem. For deterrence to work, one must simply have national leaders who are normal enough in their motives to be averse to having their own cities destroyed and who are normal enough in their cognition processes to understand that an attack on an enemy's home cities or home territory can bring about such retaliatory destruction.

Most national leaders, but not all, would be "rational" enough to satisfy these conditions. It is sometimes conjectured that a national leader driven by a great confidence in the afterlife might be difficult to deter, because such a leader would not enough mind the retaliation that could be brought to bear in this life. Much more concern might apply to nonstate actors, the leaders of various terrorist groups, or other players who do not already govern cities and hence have nothing that can be threatened with retaliation and therefore cannot be so easily deterred.

One major concern about the deterrence mechanism has always pertained to the immorality of such approaches, since they depend substantially on the punishment of civilian targets. If the innocent are being threatened as a means of deterring the leaders who might be guilty of contemplating aggression, this conflicts with a Western or global morality that has tried to limit military attacks to military targets. The irony of deterrence is that potential attacks on civilians tend to reinforce deterrence and peace, while options for attacking military targets might undermine such deterrence and make war more likely. If a missile is aimed at the missile forces of the other side, it poses the threat that a first-strike attack could preclude retaliation. When the same missile is aimed at the cities of the other side, it reinforces the deterring prospect of retaliation. What is moral by traditional standards is thus a threat to the reliability of mutual deterrence, and what reinforces mutual deterrence is a challenge to morality.

A different problem with deterrence pertains to whether it can be extended, that is, whether the threat of massive retaliation can be utilized to deter attacks not only on one's own cities but on the cities or territories of one's allies. By a certain logic, this would not be possible, because the massive retaliatory threat would have to be held in reserve as long as

one's own homeland had not yet been attacked. But the cold war showed many instances of the United States seeking to shield Western Europe and South Korea by such "extended nuclear deterrence," utilizing a variety of ploys to couple such exposed locations to the prospect of American retaliation. The effectiveness of such extended deterrence was much debated. In the net, a great deal of conventional war may have been deterred and avoided, but many risks of nuclear war may have been accepted in the process.

DOES DETERRENCE WORK?

Assessing the efficacy of deterrence has always produced a fair amount of dispute. It is difficult to prove the cause of something that did not happen. How do we know that any adversary was actually contemplating an aggression and hence was deterred? And it is difficult to establish counting rules for success or failure. If West Germany was protected by American deterrence from 1945 to 1990, does this count as one success, or as many?

Thomas Schelling presented an important distinction in 1966 between deterrence and "compellence." In the former case, an adversary is dissuaded from an aggression that has not yet been undertaken. In the latter case, an adversary is induced, by the threat of punishment, to stop some hostile activity that is already under way. Cases in the latter category of compellence are easier to count and to sort for success or failure. A foreign regime is threatened with punishment unless it eliminates apartheid, terminates ethnic massacres, or meets some other criterion, and one watches to see whether or not the regime gives in.

This distinction between deterrence and *compellence* is particularly important when one considers the possibilities of *economic deterrence.* Rather than deterring war by threats of nuclear retaliation, perhaps the same deterrent impact can be achieved by the threat of economic sanctions and a cutoff of trade. Optimists about such economic deterrence might point to the cold war cases of West Berlin and Hong Kong. Pessimists about such economic threats sometimes cite a low success rate for sanctions, as low as 30 percent. But such low scores are derived only from the attempts at compellence, which are, as noted, easier to count but inherently more difficult to achieve, as compared to deterrence.

See also *Nuclear Club; Sanctions and Embargoes.*

. . . . GEORGE H. QUESTER

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Deutsch, Karl W.

Karl Wolfgang Deutsch (1912–1992) was a social and political scientist, born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, who became a naturalized U.S. citizen. He earned degrees from the Deutsche Universität and Charles University in Prague and a doctorate from Harvard University in 1951. After teaching at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Yale University, Deutsch returned in 1967 to Harvard, where he became Stanfield Professor of International Peace. He was elected president of the American Political Science Association in 1969, the International Political Science Association in 1976, and the Society for General Systems Research in 1983. Deutsch was a member of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the academies of sciences of Austria and Finland. He received honorary doctorates from seven universities in the United States, Germany, and Switzerland, and the Commanders Cross Order of Merit, with star, of the German Federal Republic.

Deutsch's dedication to social science was linked to a moral passion for improvement in the world. His dissertation and first book, *Nationalism and Social Communication,* sought to explain the impact of the process of "social mobilization," an expression that he coined, whereby people become uprooted from their traditions and become available for new patterns of communication and behavior. Deutsch analyzed literacy, mass media exposure, urbanization patterns, language usage, religious belief, and other indicators, preferring quantitative analysis. Social mobilization, he argued, was likely to accelerate the fragmentation of states whose peoples did not already share the same language, traditions, and basic social institutions, but it would increase the likelihood of political integration among peoples in states whose people did so share. Published in 1953, this research helps us understand the forces that contributed to the decomposition of the Soviet Union and the unification of Germany.

In *The Political Community and the North Atlantic Area,* Deutsch sought to specify the background conditions for the political integration of what he called "security communities" in the North Atlantic world through a series of conditional hypotheses, which he sought to test with empirical qualitative evidence. He introduced the concept of "security communities" to describe relations between states where war had become unthinkable notwithstanding a history of severe interstate conflict. From that concept, he derived empirical propositions to be tested on the historical experience of peoples on both sides of the North Atlantic, though especially to understand political integration in Europe. This analysis, in fact, pertains to international politics worldwide.

Deutsch's *Nerves of Government* was a more theoretical work. In his own prospectus for this book, he noted that he based it on "the comparative study of many systems of communication and control, ranging from electronic computers to biological and nervous systems, and to human organizations and societies." The book aimed, he wrote, to reorient "political thought toward a greater interest in seeing government and

politics as potential instruments of social learning, of social and economic development, and of intellectual and moral growth."

He was an early proponent of the use of quantitative methods in political science and also of the utility of making large-N data sets freely available to other students and scholars, whoever they were and wherever they worked, in order to foster replicability of research findings and launch new scholarly projects to advance the frontiers of social science knowledge.

See also *Quantitative Analysis; Social Movements; Social Order.*

. . . .   JORGE DOMINGUEZ

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Development, Economic

Economic development is a multifaceted concept with no universally agreed-upon definition. It broadly refers to a process of economic transformation leading to increased levels of prosperity in a region or country. While increased prosperity is typically associated with increases in per capita income in the region or country of interest, development is considered to encompass more than income. Because of the insufficiencies of a simplistic definition of development based solely on income per capita, new approaches such as "human development" or "capabilities" have been envisioned. Despite these critiques, per capita income level remains the most popular metric for economic development, as it is highly correlated with other indicators commonly believed to characterize development. Thus, even if usefulness of income per capita as a proxy for economic development is often challenged, it continues to be the indicator most frequently used by scholars, policy makers, and international organizations.

Economic development became a major concern in the post–World War II (1939–1945) era following the process of decolonization that led to the emergence of many countries with low living standards; these countries were categorized as "underdeveloped" or "developing" countries, in contrast to "advanced" countries. Although the general tendency has been to lump these countries together in the same "developing countries" category, the World Bank disaggregates this category into "low-income," "lower middle income" and "upper middle income" categories. There is substantial variation amongst these countries with respect to their resources, sociopolitical structures, and institutional arrangements. These differences, in turn, lead to varying outcomes regarding economic development.

Since the post–World War II era, there has been notable cross-country variation in development outcomes: Some countries, especially those in East Asia, have almost converged into the category of advanced countries, while many in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia have lagged behind.

Theories of economic development were initially set forth by economists in the subfield of development economics, which emerged in the 1950s. Undermining the differences between developing countries, these theories aimed to explain causes of underdevelopment while offering models of development. For many years, the field of political science largely viewed economic development as an exogenous determinant of political institutions and processes. A dominant perspective was that economic development was causally prior to democracy. For the last three decades, however, political scientists have increasingly studied factors explaining variation in the levels of economic development and increasingly focused on political and institutional determinants of economic development.

There has been considerable interaction between development strategies implemented by developing countries and the scholarly debate on development. Changes in development thinking and shifts in policy making are usually reflected in and affected by international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank.

FIRST WAVE OF DEVELOPMENT THINKING AND PRACTICE

In the post–World War II context shaped by the conditions of the cold war and decolonization, the dominant belief was that the newly emerging nations were different from the developed nations in their social and economic institutions, and economic development needed to be stimulated. Dominated by economistic approaches, the prevalent perspective in this era was the "big push," or "take-off" for economic development. Formulated by Rosenstein-Rodan in the 1940s, the big-push thesis suggested synchronized investment in key sectors in order to overcome indivisibilities and external economies and trigger a momentum for growth. A similar argument was developed further by Nurkse (1953), who underlined a vicious cycle of low saving, low investment, and low income in developing countries. Nurkse suggested a theory of "balanced growth" and pinpointed foreign aid to close gaps of savings, foreign exchange, and skills. According to Rostow's (1960) view of take-off, developing countries would replicate what the advanced countries had done in order to take off from a traditional society to an industrial one, which would bring about a massive structural transformation of both economy and society. The Rostowian view substantially influenced policy making regarding both project design in developing countries and aid programs offered by the advanced countries.

These views were closely affected by the Keynesian growth models, the most influential of which was the Harrod–Domar model developed in the 1930s and 1940s. Originally developed for conditions of growth in industrial economies, the Harrod–Domar thesis argues that aggregate

supply and demand need to increase simultaneously at the same rate in order to maintain full employment and price stability. Hence, in order to sustain investment, if the private sector cannot grow fast enough, the public sector needs to compensate for this weakness, and this has an important policy implication about the role of the state in development. As capital accumulation and industrialization were considered prerequisites of economic development, the Harrod–Domar thesis was applied to developing countries.

Triggering the industrialization process became a major concern for scholars and policy makers alike, signified by the models of Rosenstein-Rodan's (1943) big push, Nurkse's (1953) balanced growth, Hirschman's (1958) unbalanced growth and linkages, Rostow's (1960) take off, and Gerschenkron's (1962) great spurt. These models influenced policy making and helped structure *import substitution industrialization (ISI)* strategy, which was based on the production of consumer goods for the domestic market by using import and exchange controls and reliance on state intervention and planning. Implemented in most developing countries between the 1950s and the 1980s, the ISI regimes were dominated by export pessimism, justified through Bruno and Chenery's (1962) two-gap model. The big-push and take-off models have been critiqued on several issues, most important of which is their—implicit or explicit—association with state intervention and central planning that, in practice, triggers the push, giving rise to major coordination failures.

The Marxist perspective on economic development also offered inward-looking models for less developed countries (LDCs). It argued that the issue of capital accumulation could not be divorced from the country's links with the international economy and that the main culprit behind underdevelopment was the structure of international trade. A theory that later came to be known as the Prebisch–Singer thesis was that deterioration of less-developed countries' terms of trade vis-à-vis advanced countries caused perpetuation of underdevelopment. This view suggested that economic dependence caused by colonization and/or incorporation of nonindustrialized countries into the world economy impeded growth in the LDCs. The dependency view was developed in the 1950s and 1960s by leading experts at the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and its Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), such as Singer, Prebisch, and Myrdal.

The UN has been active through its respective agencies in development-related areas since the 1950s. The ECLA affected development thinking substantially in the 1950s and 1960s by initiating and spreading the dependency approach and inward-looking development strategies. UNCTAD was established in 1964 to accelerate economic development in the LDCs and triggered the formation of G77 (a loose coalition of seventy-seven nations) as a lobbying group of the LDCs, which challenged the hegemony of the advanced countries in making the rules governing the international economy.

Early waves of the development thought underlined "market failures" in developing countries, which provided a rationale for the state's active involvement in planning to overcome these failures. This rationale being strengthened by arguments over issues such as structural weaknesses and limited entrepreneurship, recommendations for development were centered around state action. The state, then, would ignite industrialization and facilitate structural transformation by take-offs, great spurts, big pushes, or balanced growth. This emphasis on the role of the state in development coincided with the postwar consensus in advanced countries about the state's role in economic activity with respect to Keynesian demand management and regulation of markets.

SECOND WAVE: "GETTING THE PRICES RIGHT"

The second wave of development thinking was dominated by neoclassical analysis. Shortcomings of central planning and state intervention to correct market failures were delineated as early as the late 1960s and early 1970s, as empirical evidence accumulated that there were crises in planning. Then the focus of critiques shifted toward government failures signified by bureaucratic weaknesses, coordination failures, and mislocations. Critiques of the ISI regime referred to high costs of protectionism, rent-seeking activities, deadweight losses, aggravating unemployment, and foreign exchange crises. Neoclassical critique of the first wave of development thinking underlined government failures that distorted the prices, and "getting the prices right" became the new motto. Timmer (1973) asserted that getting prices right would not necessarily guarantee development, but getting them wrong would call for the end of development. Hence, rather than structural conditions, policy making became the center of analysis to explain variation in development. Challenging the distortions in incentive mechanisms in addition to prices, Krueger (1986, 62) stated that the market failures resulted from "inappropriate incentives rather than nonresponsiveness."

Neoclassical resurgence in development thinking was coupled with the shift to supply-side economics in advanced countries, which entailed a substantial critique of Keynesianism. It was furthered by the emergence of the debt crisis in the 1980s, which was perceived as the indicator of the ISI's failure. The so-called East Asian miracle based on export-oriented development provided empirical evidence for critiques of inward-looking strategies. The new policy recommendation, then, became export promotion, liberalization of foreign trade regime, and privatization.

Starting from the 1980s, international organizations' policy advice for the LDCs reflected the neoclassical resurgence in development thinking. Initiated in 1979, the World Bank's structural adjustment programs (SAPs) aimed to provide loans for structural change in LDCs, with strict conditions: The loans were to be used to implement stabilization measures required by IMF standby agreements and supply-side measures. Conditionalities attached to funds provided by these organizations played a major role in a sea change in development thinking and policy making, resulting in a major shift from ISI to market liberalization in most of the developing countries. SAPs and their one-size-fits-all

policy prescriptions to developing countries—prescriptions that included liberalization, stabilization, and privatization—have been subject to fierce criticism that they were either ineffective or even aggravated the existing problems in those countries. SAPs have been more effective in countries equipped with better institutional arrangements, which facilitate a better implementation of the suggested policies.

THIRD WAVE: "GETTING THE INSTITUTIONS RIGHT"

Propounding a major critique on neoclassical approaches as undermining institutions and their impact on development, institutional approaches emphasize that free markets are not sufficient for successful economic performance in general and for development in particular. Underlining the need for "getting the institutions right," this perspective analyzes the role of institutions in economic development based on the premise that often the overextended state structures in developing countries are not capable of creating the institutions vital for development, such as property rights.

Since the late 1980s, the institutional perspective has become dominant in development scholarship across disciplines. As the causal priority of institutions became the central emphasis, links between various institutions and economic development have been drawn. New institutional economics (NIE) played a central role in marrying the institutions with economic development. Focusing on microfoundations of institutional arrangements, NIE suggests institutional arrangements determine the structure of opportunities and constraints on individual behavior; they shape the incentives, and, therefore, mold the business climate.

The institutional framework in developing countries tends to be weaker than in advanced countries, indicating "institutional failures" rather than market or government failures. As Acemoglu and Johnson (2004, 2) state, "The question of why some societies are much poorer than others is closely related to the question of why some societies have much 'worse economic institutions' than others." Historically, institutions in developing countries did not follow the pattern that had been followed in early modern Europe; hence, more impersonal and complex institutions did not emerge. Rather, what Bardhan (2001) calls "bad" or "dysfunctional" institutions persisted in developing countries, determining the path of development.

A widespread consensus has evolved about the role of certain economic institutions on development. According to the institutional perspective, markets "must be accompanied by institutions that limit economic intervention and allow private rights and markets to prevail" (North and Weingast 1989, 808). Thus, institutional arrangements that maintain credible constraints on the rulers in order to sanction opportunistic behavior are conducive to economic growth. Comparative historical analyses pointed out the emergence and persistence of institutions that maintained credible constraints and diminished transaction costs, uncertainties, and coordination failures.

Variation among the institutions regarding property rights and contract enforcement help explain the differences with respect to determinants of economic development such as income level and the rate of growth and investment. Additionally, institutions that resolve collective action problems, and those facilitating credible commitments and accountability, are among those most commonly studied and advised for initiating or accelerating economic development. Bureaucratic institutions are also linked to economic growth, as studies show that competent bureaucracies enhance state capacity and facilitate economic development.

A central institutional weakness in developing countries is the inadequacy of financial markets. Institutions of credit were poorly developed, suffered from access limited to few in the society, or could not catch up with the institutional transformation that early modern Europe went through. Development banks were instituted by the states to fill in this gap in financial markets, but they were not as effective in many developing countries as they were in East Asia, where the state enhanced the market rather than replacing it and prevented coordination failures.

A recent focus in the institutional approach is to analyze power relations and distributive conflicts among different groups in the society with respect to shaping institutional arrangements. Studies show that economic growth is fostered by participation in economic activity and relatively equal access to economic and political resources by a broad base of society. Likewise, unequal distribution of wealth and power may impair institutional changes that would be conducive to economic development. Therefore, allocative qualities of political institutions also matter for development outcomes, and this finding has important implications for elucidating the links between democracy and development.

Democracy and its links to economic development have been widely debated. Earlier argument, inspired by modernization theory, was that economic development preceded emergence of democratic institutions. This argument was entrenched by canonical studies such as those of Lipset (1959, 1975), Lipset and Rokkan (1967), and Dahl (1989), who argued that enhanced economic benefits for the masses foster democratic aspirations and, thus, the demand for democracy.

Recent studies, however, question this earlier belief on the causal primacy of economic development to democracy in two different ways. The first suggests that economic development has no causal effect on democracy or authoritarianism but demonstrates that democracy and income per capita are correlated, as the same variables concurrently affect level of development and democracy. The second reverses the arrow between development and democracy—democracy has the causal primacy as it fosters economic development. Olson (1997) argues that democracies can better secure property rights and contract enforcement than autocracies, which are subject to the problem of succession. The links among democracy, allocation of political power, and economic institutions are widely studied regarding their impact on economic development.

Despite the existence of a lively debate on institutions, what is lacking in the current scholarship is an analysis of institutional change. What accounts for the emergence of good

institutions that would foster economic development? Given that institutions are considered "sticky" or persistent, how might the ineffective or dysfunctional institutions in the LDCs be replaced by "good" institutions? What kind of redistributive strategies would resolve existing collective action problems that impair institutional change? What leads to the emergence and spread of informal institutions, particularly social norms?

During the initial wave of market reforms in the 1980s, which were carried out under the auspices of international organizations, institutions were not given much attention. International organizations mostly provided purely policy advice without touching upon institution building. Nor did these organizations take into consideration domestic institutional arrangements and power relations in the countries that were provided with loans and policy advice. But, later, the empirical evidence, particularly the recurring crises, showed that policy change itself was not the panacea for acute problems, and sometimes such change without an appropriate institutional framework aggravated the existing problems. Particularly after the 1997 Asian crisis, the perspectives of these organizations changed considerably, as they came to terms with the understanding that better institutions yielded better outcomes. Hence, a consensus has evolved with respect to the inadequacy of policy change without appropriate institutions.

Since the 1990s, "good governance" has become the buzzword in the international organizations and their development-related advice to LDCs, signifying a dominant belief in not only institutions but "good institutions." Under the impact of institutional schools that pinpointed the limitations of "getting the prices right," these international organizations started replacing conditionalities that used to be merely based on policy advice with those related to governance.

Parallel to the institutional resurgence in the 1990s, the UNDP also put particular emphasis on democratic governance and aimed to build local capacity for accelerating development. Having challenged the simplistic definition of development based on income per capita, the UNDP launched a new concept: "human development." With this goal, since the 1990s the UNDP has been publishing the Human Development Index (HDI), the successor to the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) of the late 1970s. The HDI takes into account life expectancy, knowledge, and education in addition to income per capita. It shows that countries that have similar income per capita levels may differ regarding life expectancy and literacy. Nevertheless, HDI indicators show a high correlation between income per capita and other indicators of "human development," which makes it an uneasy substitute for the conventional definition of economic development.

The UN's Millennium Development Goals set rather ambitious targets, of which eradicating poverty is the most pronounced. The UN seeks to consult with other international organizations to assign responsibilities to advanced countries with respect to acute problems, such as removal of trade barriers against LDC exports, abolishing explicit and "disguised" protectionism, and eliminating the debts of the poorest countries. Neither the goals nor the assignments have yet been met.

See also *Democracy and Development; Development, Political Economy of; Development Administration; Economic Development, State-led; Globalization and Development; Human Development Index; International Monetary Fund (IMF); Keynes, John Maynard; Keynesianism; Millennium Development Goals; South (Third World); Urban Economic Development; World Bank.*

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Development, Political Economy of

The political economy of development looks into the fundamental question of why some countries and regions of the world are rich and others are poor. A variety of competing schools of thought seek to explain the main reasons for underdevelopment and how to overcome development challenges. The political economy of development deals with economic considerations, but it also includes political dimensions as key factors for development prospects of countries and regions.

Defining and measuring development and underdevelopment are crucial for the political economy of development. As a rule, development indicators are used in an attempt to measure levels of poverty. Traditionally, gross domestic product and related growth rates were used almost simultaneously to define development. In the 1980s and especially the 1990s, various efforts were made to define development in a much broader sense. Such new indicators and indices as the Human Development Index (HDI) were developed.

Explaining underdevelopment and development through different theories and approaches has a long tradition that can even be traced back to early research on different levels of industrialization in Europe. Especially since the 1960s, a number of schools have been established to explain development and underdevelopment. One of the main features of these schools has been their universal approach. Influential debates were sparked by Walt Whitman Rostow's model of the five stages of growth. He tried to explain the stages of economic development that are needed before high mass consumption is reached. Other schools were looking at structures of global exploitation. The Independencia schools, originating mainly in Latin America, were influential in this context, especially

in the 1970s and 1980s. These and other theories implicitly or explicitly consider explanations to be found in or outside developing countries. New concepts are engaged in the analysis of the impact of globalization on developing countries. In general, theories of the political economy of development can be subdivided into (1) approaches developed by political scientists (e.g., Samuel Huntington) that focus on governance issues and historical development conditions, and (2) approaches developed by economists (e.g., Jeffery Sachs; see below) that focus on specific production models and the dominance of economic conditions for development prospects.

Since the early 2000s two distinct schools of thought have emerged during the development debate: The first, a "poverty trap" (standing for a number of concepts) identified by Jeffery Sachs, is assumed to be a function of a low savings ratio combined with high population growth, a situation that leads to stagnation in capital accumulation and prevents economic growth from triggering a self-sustaining dynamic. Sachs sees such factors as high transportation costs and low-productivity agriculture as principal structural causes. The poverty trap approach sees a need for a broad-based counter-strategy through a "big push." A massive increase in foreign aid is therefore necessary.

Critics of an approach of this kind point to the long tradition of the big-push idea and strategies based on external funding. Neither, it is claimed, has proved reasonable or appropriate. Counterarguments have been advanced, especially from a governance perspective. Therefore, the second set of schools of thought, the governance schools, ascribe underdevelopment mainly to governance weaknesses in the shape of insufficient legitimacy, a nonfunctioning monopoly of power, inefficient institutions, and inadequate basic government services. It is, in other words, not primarily a lack of financial resources but deficient governance structures that prevent development successes. This applies inter alia to countries affected by violent conflict or fundamental governance problems. Furthermore, it is claimed that although a number of countries have substantial income (e.g., from oil revenues), the problem is that income is not put to productive use.

Against the background of these debates, the specific links between different development dimensions are being increasingly examined. Research is, for example, focused on the influences of good governance on economic growth and vice versa and on analyzing the relationship between foreign aid and development. Particularly important in this context are the negative effects of aid (e.g., on governance structures in developing countries or on a country's own revenue efforts) and the conditions needed for positive impacts.

See also *Development, Economic; Governance.*

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Development Administration

Development administration became a strategic concern in American social sciences and to policy makers during the late 1950s, with Walter Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.* Western development literature tried to identify the noneconomic conditions for accelerated and orderly economic growth. Development administration was understood as a mechanism contributing to economic growth, stability, and systems maintenance, along with its traits of efficiency, stability, and legitimacy for nation and state building. It offered an institutional framework to convert inputs of objectives, capital, and know-how into developmental outputs. Even after the idea flagged in the West in the 1970s, it left its imprint in the lesser-developed countries of the Middle East, East and South Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These were countries either emerging from decolonization, seeking to secure the benefits of bilateral and multilateral aid for of economic and social development, or both.

Development administration so conceived emphasized the formal and technical aspects of government machinery. Developmental goals were assumed to be self-evident and, therefore, agreed on by local Westernized elites. These goals were broadly defined as nation building and socioeconomic development. Authors like Irving Swerdlow identified two interrelated tasks in the development process: institution building and planning. Still others emphasized numerous development oriented activities, such as the management of change, establishing an interface between the "inner" environment and the larger intra- and extrasocietal context, and mobilization of human and physical capital for development objectives and related democratic politics.

During the 1970s and 1980s, worldwide prosperity increased, especially among the industrialized nations. It was expected that by applying modern technology, developing nations would overcome the challenges of poverty and lack of development that lay at the heart of instability, insurgency, and the appeals of communism, and this belief was reinforced by the strong evidence of successful rapid post–World War II (1939–1945) reconstruction. The approach was essentially clothed in pragmatism in the vein of scientific management. The assumption was that problems, whatever their nature, lay

with and *at* the periphery. By contrast, the solution to all problems was always in the developed world.

The developmental creed that emerged posited that to attain development, a country's administrative structure needed to be overhauled and revamped to conform to the standards of the most advanced industrial societies. The issue thus consisted in the reorganization of the existing traditional machinery into a new entity. This process was known as *administrative development:* the modernization of the public service machinery through exogenous inducement, including the transfer of technology and the training of local staff by foreign experts. For this task, there was already a prescriptive bureaucratic model to be found in Western traditions: the administrative state. This administrative state was based on the dichotomy between politics and administration, a pyramidal hierarchy, unity of command, political neutrality, recruitment and promotion based on merit, public service accountability, objectivity, and integrity. In reality, a parallel value system encompassing these traits often coexisted in those parts of the world where Western models were set up that operated concurrently with traditional cultures, economies, and markets. The principles of development administration were generally accepted at face value by the indigenous elites, especially in those countries in Asia, Africa, and the West Indies, where a relatively peaceful transition to nationhood had taken place.

The postindependence political and bureaucratic elites rapidly moved to replace colonial administrators. Western education was widely perceived to be the vehicle both for personal advancement and for acceptance into the global community of Western-trained professionals, and these postcolonial administrative systems continued to be imitative and ritualistic. Practices, styles, and structures of administration generally unrelated to local traditions, needs, and realities succeeded in reproducing the symbolism—but not the substance—of British, French, or American administrative traditions. Even where a relatively large contingent of trained functionaries existed, as in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Nigeria, or Ghana, the old "law-and-order" colonial administrative culture prevailed. For most of the local elites, technical solutions and formalism appeared more palatable than the substantive political options needed to bring about real socioeconomic change. Reorganization and rationalization soon became ends in themselves, displacing the developmental features of development administration.

FROM HOPE TO GROWING DOUBTS

The early euphoria of the 1960s soon gave way. With energy and debt crises bringing two decades of prosperity to a rather abrupt close, the foundations of development administration were shaken. Its usefulness for the third world was called into question, and an intellectual crisis spread among students of development administration in Western countries. The gap between the center and the periphery was widening rather than narrowing, in both relative and absolute terms. Instead of development and nation building, turmoil and fragmentation proliferated throughout the "other" world, including urban

crises, drastic cessation of growth, unemployment, breakdowns of public institutions, and decline of civic probity.

During the subsequent third and fourth development decades of the United Nations, the New International Economic Order (NIEO) advanced by the nonaligned movement became an important new symbol in the development arena. Its demand for a basic realignment of the world economy and substantial changes in trade, aid, and technological transfers was generally ignored by the richer donor nations. There was no consensus concerning NIEO objectives, and some commentators felt that it might even harm certain countries. While the World Bank and the International Labour Organization (ILO) endorsed this discourse, the monumental change demanded by the NIEO did not occur. In the absence of shared strategies, the NIEO soon went the way of earlier concepts.

By the end of the 1980s, two other major and interrelated events changed the parameters of the existing global order. These were the dissolution of the Eastern bloc and the related entry of former communist states into the realm of third world nations and the accelerated process of globalization.

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe coincided with a revival of ultraconservative ideologies in the West. First, the rise of Margaret Thatcher and later Ronald Reagan (and similar events in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) added a powerful impetus to a new administrative discourse: *new public management (NPM)*. NPM dominated the scene during the 1980s and well into the 1990s. It emphasized drastic reforms predicated on a number of standard prescriptions: (1) accent on results, both in the planning and in the evaluation of programs and personnel; (2) treatment of the public and citizens as customers; (3) delegation of authority as close to the action level as possible; (4) empowerment of "clients" (devolution); (5) greater attention to cost through comprehensive auditing, contracting out (outsourcing), and introduction of competitive practices into the public space; and (6) private sector techniques intended to motivate employees, such as merit/performance pay, mission statements, and quality circles. Other key operational principles included budget restraint and downsizing bureaucracy. NPM also introduced market-driven language and the notions of corporate management and corporate culture. This paradigm was based on the premise that by reducing bureaucracy and monopolistic practices, corruption would decline, and that by narrowing down the scope of government activities, an efficient, transparent, and accountable system of governance would necessarily emerge.

For the following two decades, NPM became a fixation in the Anglo-Saxon world as well as in some important international financial institutions. The greatest charge against the type of managerialism promoted by NPM was its reductionism and lack of imagination. It tried to encapsulate a complex prismatic phenomenon into a single model drawn from an idealized version of the private sector that, in reality, existed in only a limited number of capitalist countries.

The strategy accompanied the programs of structural adjustments with which development agencies sought to address the needs of countries in the third world. As one–size-fits-all solutions, NPM recipes seldom availed the countries for which they were intended. Poorer nations ceased to be treated truly as recipient countries; they were compelled to make net transfers of their meager resources to the West. Led by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, a new economic and financial orthodoxy (called *structural adjustment*) resulted in severe setbacks to development and living standards in poorer nations. To service their debt, several countries came close to bankruptcy, and their governments became receiver states. Despite exhortations for "freer" trade, restrictive global trade practices and biases prohibited poor nations from really taking advantage of the so-called comparative advantages. The problem was further compounded by commodity prices falling to their lowest level in fifty years, while the prices of manufactured goods from rich countries, as well as foreign debts, kept rising. In this context, it is not surprising to see that poverty, inequality, repression, and despair continued to rise in the southern hemisphere.

As had happened with the calls for a new international economic order in the 1970s, the new expanding global inequity brought about a growing awareness of the need for reform, as displayed at the Earth Summit in 1992 and the Millennium Summit at the United Nations in New York in September 2000, which resulted in the Millennium Development Goals. Both events affirmed the imperative for greater solidarity worldwide and shared responsibility in meeting and addressing the challenges confronting all countries and all peoples in this twenty-first century.

A BACKWARD GLANCE AT THE FUTURE

The field of development administration was largely contingent on a seemingly inescapable dependence on exogenous models and ideas. Yet a critical mass of third world scholars and researchers has emerged questioning the foundations of the common wisdom under which they were trained. This second generation of intellectuals has emphasized the interdisciplinary and cultural dimensions of the study of comparative and development administration. These individuals have also been critical of ethnocentricity of the new public management surrogate.

See also *African Political Economy; Decolonization; Emerging Democracies; Globalization and Development; Thatcherism; Third World Debt; World Bank.*

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Development and Democracy

See *Democracy and Development.*

Development and Globalization

See *Globalization and Development.*

Devolution

Devolution refers to the transfer of power from a central government to subnational units of government. The term, which is derived from the Latin word *devolutio,* is often used interchangeably with *decentralization* in political science literature. The concept of devolution originated in the modern era and drew increased interest during the late twentieth century.

Historically, devolution followed a long period of centralization that began with the political development of nation-states during the Renaissance (1300s to the 1600s) throughout Europe and continued through the era of colonialism (1400s to the 1800s), with its transformation of national economies. The development of complex economic, societal, and governmental organizations increased, sustained, and institutionalized the highly centralized power that defined the modern nation-state. Ultimately, the centralized nation-state governments faced increased complexity and interdependence that obscured accountability and introduced inefficiencies, which in turn led to demands for decentralization, or devolution.

DEVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE "DEVOLUTION REVOLUTION"

An essential precursor to devolution in the United States was the centralization of power. As the U.S. national government developed greater administrative capacity and established greater policy authority, the centralization of power increased. The balance of federalism ultimately became weighted, with ever greater permanency, toward the supremacy of national authority. There exists broad consensus that nationalization of policy authority and achievement of national administrative capacity were realized in the early twentieth century, though the effects, causes, constitutionality, and beneficence are extensively disputed. On the one hand, government scholars such as Theodore Lowi assess the significance of the change as the "death" of the original constitutional system, which left in its place a much more nationalist "second republic" with greater centralized powers. On the other hand, scholars such as Samuel Beer argue that the increased national authority is part of the constitutional plan of the country's founders and represents the realization of the national ideal. Regardless of

the divide over the interpretation of the nationalization, it was a crucial development for the political system and a necessary precursor for modern devolution.

Public administration scholar John Gaus was among the first to consider the value of devolution for American federalism. He saw federal bureaucratic organization as limited, because "it creates new problems of control which the central organization must solve if the devolution is to be successful." The latest phase in the evolution of American federalism has been called the "devolution revolution" by Richard Nathan, and the idea behind it is simple: reduce the size and influence of government by cutting taxes and spending and by sending federal responsibilities to the states.

The election of Ronald Reagan marked the beginning of the devolutionary era in the United States. Reagan launched his 1980 presidential campaign with a promise to return power and responsibility to state and local governments. The promise partially came to pass in 1996, when the devolution revolution achieved the reform of public assistance.

DEVOLUTION AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The centralization of states across the globe increased in the postcolonial era, and, with the proliferation of nation-states, regulation and complexity also grew at an exponential rate. Although states were eroding in their traditional sovereignty, the increased complexity of their intergovernmental systems paralleled the growth of their administrative capacities. In *Comparative Federalism in the Devolution Era* (2002), Neil Coleman McCabe summarized the recent period of devolution by noting that

> developments included the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of the new Russian Federation, the breakup of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, devolution in the United States and the United Kingdom, decentralization in Mexico, separatism in Canada, the reunification of Germany, and the establishment of new constitutions for South Africa and the former Soviet satellite nations. Many of these developments were characterized by a shift of power from larger to smaller units of government and called into discussion theories of federalism and devolution.

The effects of globalism and interdependence have brought increased salience for devolution and decentralized systems of governance across the international system.

THE FUTURE OF DEVOLUTION

Some have viewed devolution as a natural occurrence in the evolution of governments and believe that as the state dissipates, subnational governments will be the choice for popular governance because of their enhanced responsiveness. The twenty-first century has witnessed an increase in threats to nation-states from a broad array of networks of organizations. These threats and the reactions to them across the international system encourage the implementation of centralization policies even though they are countervailing the inertia of

the devolutionary era. For example, after the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, law enforcement, security, and military resources were brought under the umbrella of federal oversight as part of a concentrated attempt to ensure the continued protection of American citizens. Also, the global economic recession beginning in 2008 saw many subnational governments requesting federal assistance and a synchronized international effort to combat its effects. The future of devolution will be determined by multiple forces of complexity and interdependence, though the controlling factor will likely be security issues for nation-states and the potential for global conflict.

See also *Bureaucracy; Center-periphery Relations (Federalism); Centralization, Deconcentration, and Decentralization; Distribution of Powers (in a Federation); Federalism; Globalism; States' Rights.*

. . . .   MICHAEL W. HAIL

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Dewey, John

John Dewey (1859–1952) was a leading American psychologist, philosopher, educator, and political activist. The central focus of his work is *epistemology,* or the "theory of knowledge." His seminal contributions in this area provide the inspiration for numerous movements in social and philosophical thought, including functionalist and behavioralist psychology, empiricism, naturalism, pragmatism, and humanism.

Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont, on October 20, 1859. He completed his undergraduate studies at the University of Vermont in 1879 and received his doctorate from Johns Hopkins University in 1884, under George S. Morris, an adherent to the ideas of German philosopher Georg Wilhem Friedrich Hegel. Dewey started his career as an instructor in the philosophy department at the University of Michigan in 1884, where he joined Morris. During his nine years at Michigan (1884–1888, 1889–1894), Dewey expressed his commitment to Hegelian idealism while beginning to explore a synthesis between Hegel's idealism and experimental science.

These philosophical explorations appeared in his first two books, *Psychology* (1887), and *Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding* (1888). While at Michigan, Dewey also formed important professional relationships with James Hayden Tufts, with whom he would later publish *Ethics* in 1908 (revised in 1932), and a promising young scholar named George Herbert Mead.

In 1894, Dewey moved to the University of Chicago to head the department of philosophy, psychology, and pedagogy. During these years, Dewey's idealism fully gave way to an empirically based epistemology that developed in concert with a new school of thought, known as *pragmatism.* This shift coalesced in a collaborative work, entitled *Studies in Logical Theory* (1903). During this period, Dewey also founded the University Laboratory School in 1896, now famously known as the "Dewey School," which was meant to serve as a place for the development, testing, and refinement of educational theories and practices. His experience with the lab school provided the material for his first major work on education, entitled *The School and Society* (1899).

In 1904, following a controversy over the administration of the lab school, Dewey resigned from his post at Chicago and joined the Department of Philosophy at Columbia University, where he would remain for the rest of his professional career. While at Columbia, Dewey developed his theory of knowledge further, publishing important works such as *Pragmatism* (1907), *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought* (1910), and *Essays in Experimental Logic* (1916). At this point in his career, Dewey openly challenged traditional epistemologies, specifically modern rationalism, for drawing too stark a distinction between thought, the domain of knowledge, and the practical world. He argued instead for a theory of knowledge that begins with a consideration of knowledge as an adaptive human response to environmental conditions. This new approach radically challenged epistemological orthodoxy by positing thought as the product of interaction between an organism and its environment, where knowledge has a practical "instrumental value" in guiding the interaction.

In 1916, Dewey published arguably his most famous work, *Democracy and Education.* Here, Dewey applied his theory of knowledge to education by positing schooling as an extension of civil society. Based on his theory of knowledge, Dewey argued that institutions for democratic governance are not sufficient for the creation and sustainability of democratic society. Rather, for Dewey, democracy flows from the inculcation of democratic habits within the populace. Schooling, then, has an integral role to play in the formation of these habits, preparing students and children for the demands of responsible membership within the democratic community.

In addition to his enormous influence on philosophy and social science theorizing, Dewey maintained an ongoing political activism throughout his life, including involvement in women's suffrage and the unionization of teachers. From 1919 to 1921, he lectured throughout Japan and China and made numerous educational reports in Mexico, South Africa, Turkey, and Russia.

In 1937, he presided over the Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials. Following his retirement from active teaching in 1930, he continued to work and publish vigorously until his death.

See also *Hegel, Georg W. F. Pragmatism; Trotsky, Leon.*

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Dexter, Lewis Anthony

Lewis Anthony Dexter (1915–1995) was a Canadian author and professor credited with producing some of the most influential books on political science and sociology of the mid-twentieth century. His particular interests were the proliferation of special-interest politics and the analysis of government and public policy as they relate to business and foreign trade.

A native of Montréal, Québec, Dexter received his undergraduate degree from the University of Chicago in 1935, a master's degree from Harvard University in 1938, and a doctorate from Columbia University in 1960. Over the span of his career, he lectured at more than thirty colleges and universities, including Harvard University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Johns Hopkins University.

Though his professorial career was undeniably illustrious, Dexter was equally prolific in his research and publications, publishing several well-received books and numerous articles on topics ranging from specialized interviewing techniques to the sociology of the American Congress. One of the books for which he is most well known is *American Business and Public Policy* (with Raymond Bauer and Ithiel Pool 1972), a study of the politics of foreign trade during the 1950s and early 1960s. It was awarded the Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award for making the most significant contribution to the field of political science for the year. In the work, Dexter and his coauthors explore the mishandling of economic determinism; seek to refute myths about how the Congress and government lobbyists operate; investigate the relationships between public opinion, interest-group politics, and the legislature; and examine the nature and processes of congressional legislation. In so doing, the authors paint a picture of American government and politics that ultimately differs substantially from that of popular belief.

Dexter is also recognized for his contributions to the social sciences in terms of his novel approach to nonstandardized elite interview techniques. In *Elite and Specialized Interviewing* (a volume in the series of *Handbooks for Research in Political Behavior,* published in 1970), Dexter offers practical advice and an analysis of specialized interviewing based on his own experiences as well an examination of the existing literature and the published and unpublished experiences of fellow social scientists. Though his treatment of the topic is practical and pragmatic and addresses topics as rudimentary as securing an interview and whom to interview first, Dexter underscores the fact that an elite interview is a social relationship and that the results emerging from the interview depend in large part on how the respondent perceives the interviewer and his or her purpose. This being the case, Dexter also emphasizes the methodological underpinning of elite interviews and stresses that respondents should be given the license essentially to structure their own information so that the definition of the issues at hand reflect those of the interviewee, not the biases of the interviewer or the interviewer's understanding of a phenomenon.

Dexter published numerous articles and other books, including *How Organizations Are Represented in Washington* (1969), *The Sociology and Politics of Congress* (1969; republished in 1981 as *Representation, Legislation, and Consequences*), and *The Tyranny of Schooling: An Inquiry into the Problem of "Stupidity"* (1964).

See also *Interest Groups and Lobbies; Interview Techniques; Public Interest Groups; Public Opinion; Public Policy.*

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Dhimmi

Literally meaning "protected person," *dhimmi* is the term applied in early Islam to Christians, Jews, and others (*ahl al-kitab,* "people of the book") under Muslim rule who were subjected to various restrictions but allowed to practice their own religions and follow their own legal systems. As dhimmis generally did not serve in the military, they had to pay a special tax, the *jizyah* or poll tax. While this exemplified a kind of discrimination objectionable from a modern liberal point of view, and while over the centuries some cases of harsh treatment occurred (belying portrayals of an Islamic utopia), there is widespread agreement that dhimmis enjoyed a kind of toleration that was rare elsewhere in earlier centuries, particularly in the Christian world. In general, various religious communities preferred their status under Muslim rule

to living under any sect other than their own. The relative tolerance of the Muslim invaders of the Byzantine Empire in the seventh century was one factor in their success, as disaffected Jews and non-Greek Orthodox Christians tended to welcome or at least not resist them, while the Greek Orthodox of Constantinople in the fifteenth century preferred conquest by Muslim Turks to coming under Latin Christian rule. Christians and Jews flourished in Islamic Spain, while Jews and Muslims faced persecution and exile following the Christian reconquest.

See also *Islamic Political Thought.*

. . . . GLENN E. PERRY

D'Hondt Method

The *D'Hondt method* is a way of allocating parliamentary seats in a political system with a party-list system of proportional representation. The goal is to allocate seats in a manner that closely resembles the proportion of votes cast for a particular party. It was invented by the Belgium mathematician Victor D'Hondt (1841–1901) in 1878. To use this method, one does the following: (1) Award one seat to the party with the highest number of votes. (2) Calculate a new number of votes for the party just awarded a seat by dividing the number of votes cast for the party by the number of seats awarded so far plus one. (3) Award a seat for the party with the most votes after completing step 2. (4) Repeat until all seats are filled. This system can be used with a single national party list or with subnational multimember constituencies, and with either a closed or an open list system. It is used (with some variations on thresholds for winning seats) by over twenty countries, including Austria, Argentina, the Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, Poland, and Turkey.

. . . . PAUL JAMES KUBICEK

Dialectical Materialism

Dialectical materialism is the name given (later, by others) to Karl Marx's method of analyzing history, which combined Hegelian dialectics with a materialist ontology. In dialectics, historical periods are considered to be driven by tension between opposing forces, sometimes referred to as *thesis* and *antithesis.* This tension resolves into a new force (the synthesis), which then defines a new period and arouses its own opposing force. For Georg Hegel, these forces are ideas; for Marx, however, they are material phenomena: opposing social classes, productive forces, and nature.

Marx used this method in *The Communist Manifesto, The Eighteenth Brumaire, Critique of the Gotha Program,* and other works, but more commonly, it is simply an underlying framework that informs Marx's analysis of particular situations. Marx never reduces dialectics to a formula and rarely resorts to the technical vocabulary of "thesis." However, in the hands of Marx's followers—notably Friedrich Engels, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Zedong—the method developed into a formula, then a

dogma, and, ultimately, into a specialized language with which political debates could be conducted and policies could be justified. Engels also claimed that the method applied to the natural sciences as well as to history. This claim has generally been accepted by orthodox Marxists of the Soviet school, though never applied very successfully to actual scientific problems.

The most characteristic use of dialectical materialism was to portray history as a succession of modes of production, each giving rise to the next as its internal contradictions were played out. Primitive communism, in which all shared both work and proceeds, gave rise to ancient society, in which masses of agricultural slaves supported patrician masters. A combination of slave revolts and barbarian invasions produced feudalism; the serfs had more rights than slaves but were exploited in new ways through rents in labor, in kind, and in money. As serfs resisted and fled to towns, the new capitalist era arose, in which free laborers were forced to sell their labor power to capitalists, because they had no other way to survive. Marx believed that the capitalist working class, or *proletariat,* would in turn overthrow capitalism. This time, however, there would be no one left to exploit, and the result would be a classless society, or *socialism*. The sense that socialism was the inevitable result of history, as shown by the science of dialectical materialism, made an important contribution to the popularity of socialism in nineteenth-century Europe.

At each stage of this historical progression, the basic relationship was economic—between a class that did the labor and created value and a class that controlled and exploited such individuals. Each mode of production also had its characteristic political organizations and ways of thinking, but these were ultimately determined by the fundamental economic relationships. This attribution of a determining role to economics was what made the dialectics materialist.

By the time Mao published *On Contradiction,* a pamphlet designed to be used as an introduction to Marxist methods, dialectical materialism had become a formula, according to which the key to successful socialist strategy was to identify the principal contradiction—that is, the two main social forces in conflict—and the principal aspect or dominant force of that contradiction. Dogmatic application of this method had particularly unfortunate results for women and for racial and ethnic minorities both within the socialist bloc and in socialist movements in the capitalist world. The orthodox Marxist position was that gender, race, and ethnicity were secondary contradictions within the working class; in practice, that meant that oppression based on gender and race was ignored in the quest for working-class unity. Similarly, the primacy of the leadership of the Soviet Union within the world socialist movement was justified by the claim that the principal contradiction of the post–World War II (1935–1945) world was between that imperialism and socialism.

As the unity of the Soviet bloc began to unravel following Khrushchev's secret speech of 1956, the Sino-Soviet split, and the Cuban revolution, the orthodoxy of dialectical materialism also began to be challenged, most notably by French communist philosopher Louis Althusser, who argued that economics,

politics, and ideology were relatively autonomous from each other. The subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union by the early 1990s and the restoration of capitalism in most of the formerly socialist countries shortly after greatly reduced the practical relevance of dialectical materialism in world affairs. However, it continues to inspire study, debate, and insight among large portions of the left intellectual world.

See also *Marx, Karl; Marxism*.

. . . . JOHN C. BERG

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Diasporas

The term *diaspora* comes from the ancient Greek διασπορ ("scattering of seeds"), and in its common usage it refers to the process of dispersion of a religious or ethnic community from the original homeland.

EXAMPLES

Classical examples are the Jewish, Greek, and Armenian communities, often referred to as ideal types of diasporic communities. More recently other groups, ethnic (Irish, Italians, Koreans, Chinese) and nonethnic (African Americans), have been referred to as diasporas. In addition, because the term now tends to share meaning with cognate groups ranging from immigrants to refugees and from guest workers to ethnic communities, the world has truly witnessed a proliferation of diasporas. A key problem arising from the increasingly loose use of the term is, according to Rogers Brubaker in his 2005 article "The 'Diaspora' Diaspora," its "dispersion . . . in semantic, conceptual and disciplinary space." The conceptual overstretching implies that if everything—all sorts of communities more or less dispersed—become diasporas, then nothing is distinctively so. The term therefore loses its discriminating power, making it impossible to distinguish diasporic from nondiasporic communities, (im)migrants *in primis.*

CONCEPTUALIZATIONS

Conceptualizations of diasporas can be divided into two broad approaches. On the one hand are those, such as political scientists William Safran (1991) and Gabriel Sheffer (2003), who think of diasporas in a more classical sense, as communities or "bounded entities." Here diasporas can be seen as groups,

and therefore identified, even counted with some degree of precision. A diaspora can be defined, according to Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth in *Diasporas and International Relations Theory* (2003, 452) as "a people with a common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland, whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under foreign control."

On the other hand are those that take an antiessentialist approach to the concept. Diaspora becomes an idiom, a stance, a category of practice more than a category of analysis. This does not render the term irrelevant but focuses on the importance and the political consequences of the articulation of an identity as diasporic. In other terms, diasporas matter because of what they do or what is done in their name, rather than because of what they (allegedly) are.

What emerges from the juxtaposition of the two definitions above is a diversity in the approaches to the study of diasporas. The heterogeneity of approaches should not surprise, given the multidisciplinarity of diaspora studies where the fields of enquiry—political science, sociology, and anthropology—are attentive to the evolution of the concept and the study of its empirical manifestations.

The divide in the scholarship between an essentialist and antiessentialist field is also reflected in the way in which the definition of the term is approached. The classical definition of *diaspora* comes from Safran; a community can be referred to as a diaspora if it presents the following six features: history of dispersal, myths/memories of the homeland, alienation in the host country, desire for eventual return, ongoing support of the homeland; and a collective identity defined by this relationship (1991, 83–84). A more recent attempt to redefine the concept in searching for its distinctive features comes from Brubaker, who indicates three core elements as constitutive of diasporas (2005, 5): the experience of dispersion, forced and nonforced; orientation toward a real or imagined homeland, which remains the source of loyalty and values; and boundary maintenance, that is, the preservation of a distinctive identity vis-à-vis the host society.

Even the three criteria above have been subject to heated scholarly debate. The importance of dispersion as a defining dimension of the diasporic experience has been questioned. Originally, diasporas were communities that emerged out of a forced dispersion. While dispersion and the memory thereof still remain central to diasporic identities, two new aspects have enriched the debate. First, dispersion may not necessarily have a traumatic or even forced origin, and second, as a result of the reconfiguration of political spaces in postcommunist Eurasia, dispersion may not only be the result of the movement of peoples across borders, but also the consequence of the movement of borders across settlements—the Russian-speaking communities in the former Soviet space being a clear illustration of this new type of dispersion.

In addition, the very relationship with the homeland has started to be called into question. Homeland orientation (in terms of the memory of the dispersion or the commitment to return) dominated classical definitions of diasporas.

Homeland remained the ultimate source of identity. Diasporas were homeland-centered communities. Especially on the wave of contributions coming from postmodernism, the salience of homeland orientation has been overcome by an approach that critiques the "teleology of return," thus decentering diasporas.

Finally, a strong current in cultural studies has shifted the emphasis from boundary maintenance to boundary erosion. Drawing from the literature on transnationalism, concepts such as fluidity, creority, hybridity, and hyphenated identities have gained ground in diaspora studies, pointing to the creation by and within diasporic communities of nonexclusive forms of communities, identities, and politics. This clearly stands in stark contrast to those arguing that boundaries between the community and the host society are essential for ensuring the preservation of the identity of a collectivity.

CONCLUSION

In terms of the substantive focus of diaspora studies, attention has been paid to various aspects of collective identity transformation; the maintenance of ties with the homeland and the adaptation to the host society; the economic significance of transnational networks (including remittances); and the impact of diasporas on both home and host countries' politics, especially with regard to their influence on foreign policy conduct.

See also *Essentialism; Mass Immigration; Migration; Refugees; Transnationalism.*

. . . . MATTEO FUMAGALLI

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Dicey, Albert Venn

Albert Venn Dicey (1835–1922) was an English constitutional lawyer and ideologue of unionism. Dicey was born in the English midlands and educated at Oxford, where he became a senior law professor in 1882 and remained for the rest of his life. He is known in political science especially for his *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution* (1885). It went through eight editions in his lifetime, the last with a long introduction relating his constitutional theory to his ideology. Later editions, without the controversial introduction, served as a constitutional law text for law students in the United Kingdom until very recently. In the most important U.K.

constitutional law case of recent times, the judges called him "our greatest constitutional lawyer."

Dicey's two normative principles were expressed as the "rule of law" and "parliamentary sovereignty." The rule of law meant that everybody without exception was subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and could not be punished except after due process in those courts; furthermore, liberty of speech and assembly was protected by the common law rather than by constitutional entrenchment. Parliamentary sovereignty meant that "Parliament . . . has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever." From this it followed that the only thing a parliament could not do was bind its successor, because that would "fetter" the future Parliament's ability to exercise its sovereignty.

It is not easy to reconcile Dicey's two principles. The U.K. Parliament could pass a retrospective law. Unlike the U.S. Congress, it is not constitutionally barred from doing so. In that case, Dicey's two principles are incompatible. Also, when the principle of parliamentary sovereignty came to contradict Dicey's ideology, he kept the ideology and jettisoned the principle. Such is English constitutional lawyers' reverence for Dicey that they do not generally accept that his arguments are mutually contradictory.

Dicey was a fervent defender of the union of the United Kingdom. The state was created by the Acts of Union of 1707 and 1800. The first of these added Scotland and the second Ireland to the kingdom. By Dicey's time, the Scottish union was legitimate in Scotland, but the Irish union was illegitimate in most of Ireland. The Irish Party, which had pledged to weaken the Irish union, held a bloc of over 80 seats in the House of Commons and was pivotal in four of the seven parliaments between 1885 and 1918. For Dicey and other ideologues, to weaken the union was to weaken the British empire; therefore, Ireland must be retained at all costs. This violated the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, as Parliament could perfectly properly repeal the 1800 union. Dicey devoted all his energies to blocking that and encouraged the paramilitary revolt in the Protestant parts of Northern Ireland that blocked the enactment of Irish Home Rule between 1912 and 1914. A resolution of Northern Ireland's constitutional status was not reached until the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement of 1998.

See also *British Political Thought.*

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Dictatorship

See *Autocracy.*

Dictatorship of the Proletariat

The *dictatorship of the proletariat* is a key concept in Marxist political theory, in which the state is seen as an institution for class rule, a "dictatorship" of one social class over another. In the course of fighting for socialism, the working class must overthrow and destroy the existing capitalist state and replace it with an instrument for working-class rule—the dictatorship of the proletariat—organized on a radically different basis.

At an early stage in their thinking, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels formulated the view that the working class would be driven by capitalist exploitation to take state power and implement communist measures: "The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class . . ." (*The Communist Manifesto*).

This idea became refined during their observation of the revolutions of 1848, especially in France. Marx developed a highly critical view of the French state, which he saw as a parasitic, military-bureaucratic force, drawing the conclusion that the working class would have to destroy the existing state and create a wholly new form of state structure. His first use of the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" came in 1850 in *The Class Struggles in France,* when he referred to "the class dictatorship of the proletariat as a necessary intermediate point on the path towards the abolition of class differences in general."(Marx 1973, 122)

Marx elaborated on this idea after witnessing the Paris Commune of 1871, which he described as "the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economical emancipation of labor" (Marx 1992). For Marx, the key institutional innovations of the Paris Commune were its abolition of the standing army and its replacement by a popular militia, the assumption of strict control over the police and state officials, and its adoption of measures designed to ensure a close connection between elected representatives and their constituents. Marx's vision of the dictatorship of the proletariat was thus of a state that was a genuine "servant of the people," minimizing repression and bureaucracy, and preparing for the eventual "withering away of the state."

The concept receded into the background in the latter part of the nineteenth century as socialist organizations like the German Social Democratic Party pursued power through electoral means. Those on the right of the movement, like Eduard Bernstein, advocated abandoning it; while those in the centre, like Karl Kautsky, sought to redefine it in a way that made it compatible with a parliamentary discourse. However as political differences within European socialism exploded with the unfolding of World War I (1914–1918), the Russian socialist leader Lenin raised the dictatorship of the proletariat as a point of differentiation between revolutionary socialists and "opportunists," and as a central focus for revolutionary strategy in Russia.

In *State and Revolution,* written on the eve of the Bolshevik-led revolution of October 1917, Lenin emphasized the need to smash the existing state apparatus and replace it with "a state of the Commune type," identifying the soviets (workers' and soldiers' councils) with such a state. After the Bolshevik seizure of power, Lenin used this argument to justify the dismissal of the elected Constituent Assembly, in favor of rule by the soviets. The first Soviet Constitution of 1918 defined the state as "the dictatorship of the urban and rural proletariat and the poorest peasantry," and gave this practical effect by providing for a soviet form of government (with an indirectly elected legislature) and by excluding from the electorate those not engaged in "socially useful labor." The notion of a proletarian "dictatorship" was invoked by the Bolsheviks to legitimate authoritarian treatment of their opponents, and later it provided Stalin with an ideological framework for constructing a permanent regime of repression.

In a sharp exchange with Lenin in 1918, Kautsky argued that the concept should be seen as referring not to a form of government but merely "a condition which necessarily arose in a real democracy, because of the overwhelming numbers of the proletariat."

After World War II (1939–1945), the concept became increasingly marginalized within communist discourse. The Eastern European states created under the influence of the Soviet Union were defined as "people's democracies," most Western communist parties quietly dropped the term, and the Soviet Union redefined itself as a "socialist state of the whole people" in 1977.

See also *Bernstein, Eduard; Bolshevism; Engels, Friedrich; Kautsky, Karl Johann; Lenin, Vladimir Ilich; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Marxist Parties; Socialism; Soviet Union, Former.*

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Diderot, Denis

Denis Diderot (1713–1784) was a leading *philosophe* and the chief editor of the great monument of the French Enlightenment, *L'Encyclopedie.* A man of letters of extraordinary breadth—philosopher, novelist, dramatist, polemicist, critic,

translator, and prolific correspondent—he was perhaps most famous for his vigorous criticism of the Catholic Church and France's *ancien régime.*

Diderot was born in Langres, France, and he received a Jesuit education. He refused to join the clergy, however, and turned instead to his own philosophical and literary studies. In 1741 Diderot formed a close friendship with French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, which would last for over fifteen years until they broke with one another in a quarrel. Diderot first gained public notice as a translator of English books, especially his 1745 translation of Lord Shaftesbury's *Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit.* His first original work, *Pensées philosophiques* (1746), an anonymous collection of aphorisms that owed a good deal to Shaftesbury's ideas, was burned by the Parliament of Paris for its anti-Christian rhetoric. His *Letter on the Blind* (1749), another important work of his early career, espoused a materialist philosophy and questioned the existence of God, which led to his imprisonment for three months at Vincennes in 1749.

The chief occupation of Diderot's life was his editorship of the enormously influential *L'Encyclopedie* from 1745 to 1772. He initially undertook this project as coeditor with Jean le Rond d'Alembert, a prominent mathematician, but d'Alembert resigned in 1758 due to pressure from the authorities. Diderot saw the project through to completion on his own, evading censors and contributing several hundred articles, especially on philosophy, politics, and the industrial arts. He also procured contributions from the most famous writers of eighteenth-century France, including Rousseau, Francois-Marie Voltaire, and Charles-Louis Montesquieu. The work, which ultimately included seventeen volumes of text and eleven more of illustrations, aimed to collect and disseminate the achievements of human learning in all fields, practical and theoretical. It served as a crucial means of promoting progressive ideas; criticizing the injustices of France's legal and clerical institutions; and supporting secularism, religious toleration, limited government, commerce, the advancement of science and technology, and the freedom of inquiry and expression.

Diderot's editorship of *L'Encyclopedie* did not prevent him from composing several works of his own during these years, including a number of satirical but weighty dialogues such as *Rameau's Nephew* (1762), *D'Alembert's Dream* (1769), and *Jacques the Fatalist* (1773), all of which remained unpublished until after his death. His *Supplement to Bougainville's Voyage* (1771) extolled the religious and sexual freedom found in Tahiti and is often read as an indictment of slavery and colonialism, as are his contributions to Guillaume-Thomas (the Abbé) Raynal's *History of the Two Indies* (1772). None of Diderot's works brought him much monetary profit, and hence he frequently faced financial difficulties until 1765, when he began to receive generous financial support from Catherine II of Russia. In 1773–1774 he traveled to St. Petersburg to thank her personally and to plan the creation of a Russian university, but he returned to France rather disillusioned with the possibilities of "enlightened despotism." Diderot's perennially poor health continued to deteriorate over the next decade, and he died in

Paris, widely acknowledged as one of the pivotal thinkers of the Enlightenment.

See also *Enlightenment Political Thought; Montesquieu, Charles-Louis; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Voltaire, Francois-Marie.*

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Digital Democracy

Digital democracy is one of many terms used to describe the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) to facilitate and enhance engagement between citizens and government. *E-democracy* and *cyber-democracy* are also commonly used to refer to the same phenomenon. Much of the literature stems from concern over declining levels of voter turnout in many democratic countries. ICTs are seen as a means of reconnecting citizens with their representatives by making government more transparent and accountable and thus inspiring participation.

The link between technology and democracy is not new. In the 1940s, futurist Buckminster Fuller discussed the potential of the telephone as way for people to participate in referendums. Later, in his 1992 bid for the American presidency, Ross Perot advocated the combined use of telephones and television to conduct "electronic town halls" to give people a direct voice in policy development.

TWO VIEWS: THE TECHO-OPTIMISTS AND SKEPTICS

Today, the literature on digital democracy emphasizes Internet technologies. Much of the work, particularly the early literature, is somewhat dichotomous, reflecting utopian and dystopian views. The utopian or optimistic view sees ICTs as the solution to the problems facing modern democracies. Some go so far as to suggest that the technology has the potential to revive Athenian-style direct democracy, questioning the relevance of elected representatives at a time where decisions can be registered easily and quickly from a distance. Other optimists see advantages and improvements to be made to existing structures of representative government where technologies such as email, direct chat, and social networking sites such as Facebook and MySpace provide for an easy direct connection between representatives and the represented.

The dystopian or skeptical view on the other hand does not believe the technology will have a positive impact. Some worry that it might have the opposite effect, harming democracy. Political theorist Benjamin Barber, for example, questions whether the speed associated with ICTs is conducive to democracy, which requires careful deliberation and negotiation. The speed of technology is thought to prompt reaction over

thoughtful dialogue. The anonymous nature of many ICTs may make some more comfortable to become engaged but also may encourage some to drop the civility and accountability associated with face-to-face debate. Some skeptics also point to the *digital divide,* or inequalities in access and ability to use ICTs, as a fundamental problem for digital democracy. However, there have been a number of efforts to bridge the digital divide and to ensure that all citizens have some sort of access to ICTs and the ability to use them.

CONTEMPORARY STUDIES: QUESTIONING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ICTS

Much of the current work however, has moved beyond this divide and has become increasingly involved in identifying the democratic potential of ICTs, while at the same time questioning their significance and their potential for harm within the confines of existing structures of representative government. Some of the literature examines the ways that legislatures are using technology to engage with citizens, whereas some focuses specifically on the efforts of individual members of parliament and political parties.

Electronic consultations are one of the means used to try to draw people into the policy process that have received attention. The consultations on the U.K. Draft Communications Bill in 2002 are a relatively early and good example. The consultations received a lot of attention and commentary, and policy makers were briefed about the issues being raised online. However, some studies have shown that policy makers are unsure of how to incorporate and make use of the feedback that is received electronically. This can be problematic, as Stephen Coleman and John Gøtze caution in their 2001 book *Bowling Together: Online Engagement in Policy Deliberation:* "Governments should not offer online consultation as a gimmick: They must be committed to integrating evidence gathered into the policy process and being responsive." This warning can be applied to other online efforts to engage citizens as well as people who may be reluctant to engage in future digital democracy initiatives if they do not feel they are being heard.

E-consultations are not yet commonplace, and the wider literature on the use of ICTs for citizen engagement indicates that we are just starting to see the incorporation of such interactive features. Most individual representatives and legislatures, for example, have a basic online presence in the form of a Web site, but relatively few include interactive technologies such as polls, surveys, or blogs.

CITIZEN ACTION

It should be noted that digital democracy does not refer just to the attempts by government to connect with citizenry. It also includes citizens' use of technology to become further engaged. A growing body of literature on cyberactivism discusses such use. (An example is Martha McCaughey and Michael Ayers' 2003 book, *Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice.*) Interest groups are increasingly using ICTs to raise awareness and to attract members. Letter-writing campaigns have been made quicker and easier with prewritten text and the addresses

of public officials more readily available. Coordinating group action is simplified, as studies regarding the "battle in Seattle" (the 1999 gathering to protest at a meeting of the World Trade Organization) and other events have shown.

"DIGITAL" DEMOCRACY?

Some argue that while the Internet does have the potential to facilitate the type of citizen engagement discussed above, the persons keen to make use of such new means of participation are those who would be politically active in the offline environment. In this sense, it is argued, little has changed, and techno-optimists are in effect preaching to the converted. There is still considerable debate over the significance and utility of various ICTs when it comes to the improvement of democracy. However, it is clear that cyberactivism is becoming increasingly common. Legislatures, political parties, and individual representatives are moving toward the adoption of ICTs, and most now have some sort of a basic online presence. Being "digital" is becoming the norm, so much so that some question the relevance of differentiating "digital democracy" from simply "democracy." However, the Internet does pose some unique challenges. Removing geographic barriers for example, does facilitate activism, but representative politics is still very much geographically based, and many representatives find it a challenge to keep up with the growing correspondence being received from both within and outside of their constituencies. Learning how to best incorporate feedback received from citizens electronically also makes digital democracy somewhat unique, and it will continue to be a topic of interest for those interested in the state of representative democracy.

See also *Democracy, Future of; E-governance, E-voting, E-democracy, E-politics; Representative Democracy.*

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Diplomacy

Diplomacy is conventionally understood to be the practice by which states represent themselves and their interests to one another. However, because something like diplomacy clearly predates the modern European system of states, because other actors in addition to states are increasingly said to engage in

U.S. president George W. Bush and Russian president Vladimir Putin reach out to shake hands after a round of diplomatic talks in 2001. Diplomacy is the means by which states represent themselves and their interests to one another.

SOURCE: AP Images

diplomacy, and because, as Hedley Bull notes, most of us have a notion of what it means for people to act diplomatically in everyday life, the exclusive association of diplomacy with the relations of states is untenable and becoming increasingly so.

Answers to the questions "What is diplomacy?" and "Who may properly be said to conduct it?" vary over time and across space. Diplomacy is defined neither by the types of actors on behalf of which it is undertaken nor the status of those actors vis-à-vis one another in the sense of their being sovereign and equal. What all instances of it seem to presume and affirm, however, are the following four assumptions:

- That people live in groups that regard themselves as separate from, yet needing or wanting relations with, one another;
- That these relations are somehow distinctive and different from relations within groups, in that people believe themselves to be under fewer obligations to those whom they regard as others;
- That these relations require careful handling by specialists; and
- That these specialists develop a measure of solidarity from their common experience.

Where these four assumptions are in play, we find relations that we would recognize as diplomacy.

PRESTATE DIPLOMACY

Accounts of diplomacy often imagine its origins in encounters between prehistoric groups of human beings. The accuracy of these efforts is doubtful. Nevertheless, they highlight the problems posed by the presence of strangers in a community and the development of what we would recognize as notions of immunity to address this problem. There seems to be a near-universal value that strangers carrying messages between communities should be protected and well treated, even when relations with those who sent them are not good. The Amarna tablets contain an archive of messages that were sent to Pharaohs Amenophis III and Akhenaten in the fourteenth century BCE from the leaders of their clients in the Levant and from the rival great kings of Babylonia, Assyria, Hatti, and Mitanni. The correspondence deals with attempts to arrange marriages, the exchange of gifts, visits of senior advisors, and appeals for help.

Diplomacy's relationship with commerce is highlighted by the fact that missions traveled along caravan routes. We get

intimations of the importance of prestige and intelligence but less sense of a system of continuous relations incorporating shared values. Diplomacy also can be seen in some of the great religious texts; for example, the Assyrian use of Hebrew, rather than Aramaic—then the language of diplomatic intercourse—in a parlay so that the inhabitants of Jerusalem might hear their fate debated (2 Kings 1:6–7). More recent diplomacy can be read of in the Koran, and between it and the Biblical example above, extensive evidence and records exist of relations between peoples of the ancient empires of the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. These accounts culminate in the Greek experience, plural in character and interesting, with its use of locals (*proxenos*) to represent other cities and the rarity of representatives with plenipotentiary negotiating powers. Rome and China are presented as less interesting because of universal ambitions and self-preoccupations that are said to be inimical to both diplomacy and their own well-being.

DIPLOMACY OF STATES

Contemporary developments have rekindled interest in the diplomacy of the ancient world. Nevertheless, the story of states and what is confusingly called *modern, classical, traditional,* or *old* diplomacy remains central to the story of diplomacy as a whole. This began to emerge in fifteenth-century Italy with the decline of the empire's and the papacy's secular power and flourished in eighteenth-century Europe before spreading, while mutating, to the rest of the world. The story is dominated by questions about who is to be represented, how, and with what sort of problems for those representing them. The answer, that it should be sovereigns, and increasingly sovereign states, was more asserted than argued. The sense that it could be something bigger than states receded into a concern with peace and the dilemma presented when sovereigns asked their servants to threaten the latter. This gave rise to a literature on the qualities required by those representing sovereigns, the art of negotiation, and the conditions in which diplomats might be most effective.

The value of this literature has been doubted as anachronistic in its focus on the conduct of gentlemen at court, platitudinous in its appeal to common virtues, and ingenuous in suggesting these virtues actually prevail in effective diplomacy. There is something to all these criticisms, as there is to the rejoinders that "tact and intelligence" remain important, and many contemporary insights, for example on the importance of "ripeness" or body language in negotiations, are not new. As the site of sovereignty shifted from the monarch to the state and the people, this was reflected in discussions of the qualities of diplomats. So too was the emerging sense of diplomats as a distinct class of persons with their own outlook on, requirements in, and priorities for international relations. Concerns about the immunities and privileges needed to protect the work and the reputations of individual diplomats increasingly found expression in terms of how the whole body or corps of diplomats might to be safeguarded and facilitated. By the seventeenth century, this *corps* or "freemasonry" was seen as giving expression to a European republic of shared interests and ways

of seeing the world. By the eighteenth century, the idea of *la raison de système,* serving initially as a descant to *la raison d'état* but eventually taking priority over state interests, had emerged, and it was possible to identify a system of modern European states with a corresponding diplomatic system of bilateral relations undertaken primarily through resident embassies and foreign ministries staffed by personnel animated by a sense of themselves as servants of their respective states and guardians of the society of which their states were members.

Since then, it is generally agreed that this system has been battered by a series of social and scientific revolutions and by the huge expansion of productive, destructive, and communicative capacities in which these resulted, although with consequences that are less clear. This is illustrated by the two great channels that diplomatic thinking about *la raison de système* carved out for itself. The first identified diplomacy with the balance of power. In this view, the main tasks of diplomats was to get those they represented to act with restraint—self-restraint where possible and external restraint by deterrence where necessary. This idea attracted controversy, but nothing in the great scientific and social revolutions at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries undermined it in principle. Overstimulated and overendowed national and populist states might suffer restraints on their practical and moral ambitions from diplomats less gladly, but getting them to accept restraints remained important.

However, not all the representation, reporting, bargaining, information dissemination, and intelligence-gathering activities of diplomats can be interpreted in terms of maintaining balances of power. Diplomats always had more to do, and there was always more going on in international relations, a state of affairs made more apparent by the new material and social technologies of the nineteenth century. Sovereigns and their diplomats might travel more easily, embassies might have more and easier access to information than they had in the past, but now and increasingly, so did other people. And in so doing, they also developed a greater say in what international relations were, and ought to be, about. These changes provided impetus for the second great channel in diplomatic thinking about *la raison de système,* seeing it less as a system of states and more as one for regulating them and rendering them less harmful. The principal consequences of this were the multilateral and conference diplomacy that appeared in the nineteenth century and gathered strength after the two world wars. The European congresses of the early nineteenth century sought to improve the great powers' attempts to maintain international order on their own terms. The Hague and Geneva conventions attempted to reduce the prospect of war and its consequences. And the League of Nations and the United Nations sought first to regulate, then to reform the conduct of their members by encouraging multilateral collaboration.

Bilateral diplomacy directed at reconciling the interests of particular states was supplemented by multilateral efforts directed at seeking to ease common problems and improve the well-being of all. The growth of multilateral and conference diplomacy resulted in changes in the status of certain established

types of diplomacy and diplomats. Consular diplomacy, concerned with private citizens, attracted more resources and began to lose the secondary status it had enjoyed when compared to political work. The broadly educated "generalists" gifted at a certain kind of human relations were supplemented by experts who had a grasp of the complex technical issues that increasingly became the subjects of negotiations. And the autonomy and negotiating capacity of the resident ambassador were widely seen to decline as a result of the emergence of the telegraph, the telephone, and air travel. A profession based on information scarcity and the costliness of communications was often presented as facing existential challenges from these innovations that made information accessible, communication cheap, and travel swift.

These changes were not matched by developments in diplomatic theory. The great burst of innovative thinking in diplomacy, beginning in fifteenth-century Europe and developing over the course of the next two centuries, ended with Cardinal Richelieu's *Testament Politique* around 1688, and its practical expression was completed with the codifications of the Vienna *règlement* of 1815 and the modifications of Aix-la-Chapelle three years later. What followed may be broadly interpreted as application (in the form of diplomatic history), exposition (to aid in the training of diplomats), and refinement (in response to critics). Innovations in diplomatic theory and practice came from outside the profession. The construction of international organizations, for example, may be presented as driven by the concerns of politics and political theory with how to escape from anarchy. The concern with commercial diplomacy and economic statecraft can be rooted in the rise of political economy. The focus on how foreign policy is actually made can be traced back to research into individual and group psychology, the operations of complex organizations, and rational choice models, as these have been applied to political behavior. Most recently, attempts to create a more open and representative diplomacy have applied the insights and understandings of marketing and public relations. Diplomatic studies certainly, and diplomacy and diplomats probably, have suffered as a result. Indeed, for much of the postwar period, it was possible to maintain that all three might be in terminal decline. Since the end of the cold war, however, this state of affairs has undergone an almost complete transformation, for reasons that are both surprising and paradoxical. Somehow, as our sense that a states system provides the basic political framework of the world has weakened, interest in diplomacy, diplomats, and the study of both has revived.

DIPLOMACY BEYOND STATES

Diplomacy beyond states may be understood in two senses:

- A temporal sense in which we think of states and their diplomacy fading, and
- A conceptual sense by which we are reminded that diplomacy is not necessarily the exclusive preserve of states or professional diplomats.

Empirically grounded international relations research has develop both senses by testing conventional understandings of how social worlds are believed to work. At the system level, the expectation has been tested and confirmed that states regarded as most important will have the most diplomatic representatives from other countries in their capitals. In the study of diplomacy and foreign policy, positivist approaches have tracked and demonstrated the disaggregation of entities conventionally treated as wholes. The consequences of this kind of inquiry for our understandings of diplomacy have been impressive. We find foreign ministries do not dominate or even coordinate a country's foreign relations. Other branches of government engage in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy and employ people acting diplomatically to represent them. Governments, even understood as loose ensembles of actors and institutions, do not exercise a monopoly on the conduct of the external relations of their countries. Private actors of all sorts are also engaged. Indeed, it becomes difficult to maintain the distinction between internal and external worlds on which the idea of international relations depends.

Investigators have not been sure what to do with these sorts of discoveries. Traditionalists insist that they are the product of category confusions. One cannot get closer to understanding how diplomacy operates as a meaningful social action by tracing behavioral patterns with greater precision. To say diplomats do not actually represent their states or sovereigns in the sense of standing in place of them is to misunderstand the nature of representation. Social worlds cohere despite evidence and knowledge that undermine the assumptions on which they rest, but we are still stuck with knowing that how things appear is not the full story. An alternative to the traditionalist reluctance to accept empirical evidence, therefore, is to use positivist approaches as a basis for critique and prescription. Thus, research has looked at why traditional institutions of diplomacy have been losing influence and why traditional diplomatic activities have become less effective, and it offers advice about how diplomats might become more effective by shifting, for example, from being communicators of positions and policies to becoming the instigators of coalitions of different people seeking to advance shared interests. Such approaches have great practical value but court inconsistencies, especially when governments apply the disaggregative insight to diplomats of other countries but not to their own diplomats and those diplomats' claims to act on behalf of their countries.

Paradoxically, given diplomacy's conventional identification as a conservative and even reactionary social practice, post-positivist approaches have shown the most promise of innovation in diplomatic theory by unhitching it from state practices and exploring what people in different times and places have understood to be diplomacy. The thrust of these arguments can be critical, focusing on the alienation, estrangement, and exploitation that diplomacy may be implicated in reproducing. It can be emancipatory, emphasizing the virtues of conventional diplomatic attributes like ambiguity and imagination for improving human relations. And it can be whimsical, examining the more banal and human aspects of diplomatic life to demonstrate the tyrannies of circumscribed thought and

action that closed and archaic social structures can impose upon those trapped within them. These approaches have introduced diplomatic studies to the constructivist and constitutive approaches to explanation and understanding in the broader field of international relations. They have also demonstrated how modes of thought associated with diplomats and diplomacy can enrich our accounts of international and social realities in general. Diplomats have long been familiar with the extent to which social realities are constructed, in the sense of being produced and reproduced with varying degrees of self-consciousness by the ways in which people live and the necessarily ambiguous consequences of this being so.

Far from fading, therefore, at a time of great change, we should expect diplomats, diplomacy, and diplomatic theory to prosper as new constellations of actors and new identities seek to establish the terms of their own existence and recognition of them as such, just as they did in fifteenth-century Europe. This is illustrated by the emergence of the "new public diplomacy." Previously regarded as poor diplomacy of low standing or propaganda, because it violates the principle of nonintervention, public diplomacy in its "new" iteration is presented as reempowering everybody (including states) and transforming international relations into a genuine dialogue of peoples and people. A major research effort has developed, with the funding to support it, exploring how to make public diplomacy more effective and evaluate it. The enthusiasm for this effort is prompted by the need for economic competitiveness and the need to manage the cultural and civilizational dislocations engendered by globalization, especially since the 9/11 attacks on the United States. In America in particular, agencies like the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (www.state.gov/r/adcompd/) and the U.S. Information Agency/U.S. Public Diplomacy Office (http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/) have been strengthened to address this latter challenge. The success of the campaigns to ban landmines, to press banks to provide debt relief for poor countries, and to persuade others to reduce the carbon footprints of their economies demonstrate elements of a global civil society already talking to one another and acting to make their own contribution to what happens in international relations. "Outsiders," as traditionalists point out, may have always been engaged so. What is novel and important, however, is the high importance attached to these activities by nearly everyone in the study of diplomacy.

Ever since Burke anglicized the term *diplomatique* in 1796, diplomacy has been a practice characterized by oppositions: universal yet specialized, commonsense yet esoteric, in decline yet in short supply, admired yet distrusted, and important yet neglected. In one sense, it involves representations to one another of collective identities that are necessarily ambiguous. In another, it merely refers to the state of affairs that arises between people who wish to live separately and maintain their own identities but who want or believe they must have relations with each other. Either way, general interest in diplomacy, diplomats, and how to act diplomatically always increases when, as now, the tensions between the pluralist and solidarist aspirations of human beings, on the one hand, and

the pluralist and solidarist demands of the ways they actually live, on the other, weigh heavily upon them.

See also *Foreign Policy; League of Nations; United Nations (UN).*

. . . . PAUL SHARP

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Direct Democracy

The term *democracy* is derived from two Greek words (*dêmos* and *kratein*) meaning "power of the people." The most common form of democracy is an indirect democracy or republic in which unassembled voters are confined to examining the qualifications of candidates and casting ballots to elect officers to represent the citizenry, and occasionally to decide referendums questions. Direct democracy is viewed in theory as the most democratic form, as voters in an assembly make all political decisions.

Direct democracy dates to the age of Pericles in fifth-century BCE Athens in present-day Greece. A number of philosophers at the time, expressed fear that a citizen legislative assembly would develop into mob rule, and some, such as Plato, favored rule by philosophers. In contrast, Pericles viewed the citizen assembly as limiting the power of the government, thereby providing for individual freedoms.

Direct democracy was revived in the *Landsgemeinde* in Canton Appenzell in Switzerland in 1378. Subsequently, the canton split into two half-cantons. Today, this form of direct democracy is found only in the Swiss canton of Glarus, the half-canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden, and in New England open town meetings and school district meetings in the United States. The early Athens meetings occurred in a sovereign city-state in contrast to the meetings in Swiss cantons and contemporary New England towns and districts with open meetings.

An important form of direct democracy employed in many nations in modern times is the referendum, which allows unassembled voters to make certain political decisions and assumes many forms. In the Republic of Ireland, for example, the national parliament or the president, with the approval of the Council of State, may place questions on the referendum ballot. In other places, such as the State of New York, certain questions automatically appear on the ballot periodically in accordance with constitutional requirements. Voters in certain jurisdictions in Switzerland, in twenty-four U.S. states, and in numerous municipal governments in the United States may use initiative petitions to place on the referendum ballot policy propositions and proposals to repeal recently enacted laws. Eighteen state constitutions and numerous local government charters in the United States authorize voters to place proposals to remove elected officers from office on the referendum ballot.

THE NEW ENGLAND TOWN MEETING

The New England Town meeting, a form of decision making by assembled voters, serves as the hallmark of democracy in the United States and dates to the early 1630s, following the settlement of the present-day Boston area by the Massachusetts Bay Company, a joint stock commercial company chartered by the British Crown in 1629.

The Puritans, persons of wealth who sought to purify the Church of England of Roman Catholic features, emigrated to Massachusetts Bay to establish a new commonwealth. The colony was governed in accordance with the Crown charter providing for a governor, deputy governor, and eighteen assistants empowered to hold a General Court, admit freemen, elect officers, and enact laws governing the colony. Freemen were the original male settlers and later included men admitted as freemen by the General Court, provided they were members of the church (Congregational). They constituted a small percentage of the adult male population. The charter contains no provision for town meetings, and the General Court did not authorize the first ones.

A *folkmoot,* an extralegal and informal assemblage of freemen, made decisions on town matters including construction of a church, employment of a minister, admission of new residents, land divisions, and other essential matters. This early noninstitutionalized stage of town meeting government functioned without elected town officers, and meetings were held as needed.

Residents soon discovered the town meeting needed to be supplemented by officers. The emergence of selectmen, the plural executive, and other officers resulted in less-frequent town meetings, and in most towns only an annual meeting was held to elect officers, levy taxes and appropriate funds, and act on proposed bylaws.

THEORIES OF ORIGIN

Late nineteenth-century historians engaged in disputes relative to whether the Massachusetts Bay town was indigenous in origin, a descendant of the ancient Anglo-Saxon *tun,* or derived from English institutions adapted to conditions in the New World. Evidence is lacking to support the theory that the town developed spontaneously as a new political institution. There are certain similarities between a town meeting and the primordial field meeting of farmers in southern Germany to distribute land and regulate crops with village

elders as the forerunners of the town constable and selectmen. Stronger evidence supports the third theory, as there are a number of similarities between town meeting government and churches in England, including vestry meetings of parishioners to make decisions relative to supporting the church and to elect churchwardens, who were in charge of church property. The Charlestown records of 1630 note the Court of Assistants appointed justices of the peace with "like power that justices of the peace hath in England." Direct democracy in the form of the town meeting emerged shortly after the founding of the first towns.

PROCEDURES OF OPEN TOWN MEETINGS
Today, the selectpersons call the annual and special town meetings by issuing a warrant, a fixed agenda, warning citizens a town meeting will be held on a specified date and hour to act upon warrant articles. Voters by petition may add articles to the warrant, elect town officers, and act on articles. The moderator, who may be elected at the start of the meeting or for a term of one to three years, is in charge of proceedings, decides points of law, and declares all votes. The moderator's duties are established by statute and bylaws. The latter may include a quorum requirement.

Articles normally are considered in the order listed in the warrant. A motion is made and seconded prior to debate. Amendments to articles may be proposed, seconded, and decided. The finance committee and the planning board play important roles in providing guidance to attendees.

Attendance depends in part on the presence of controversial warrant articles and in part on the size of the town, with a generally inverse relationship between the attendance percentage and the population size. There has been a secular decline in attendance by registered voters in all but the very small towns, and participation may be lower than 10 percent in towns with large populations. This decline has led a number of the larger towns, commencing in Boston in 1822, to adopt city charters or modify the town meeting.

MODIFICATIONS
The open town meeting generally is entrenched in small towns, but since 1822 has been replaced by a city charter, a town charter providing for a mayor and a council, a representative town meeting (RTM) or limited town meeting, or a referendum town meeting when the population has reached a point that makes it impossible to conduct an efficient town meeting.

Brookline, Massachusetts, had experienced a large increase in population by the early part of the twentieth century that created problems in conducting meetings, yet the town desired to keep the meeting format. Alfred D. Chandler developed the RTM and persuaded the General Court to authorize its adoption by Brookline voters in 1915. The only change in the traditional meeting is the confining of the right to vote at town meetings to elected town meeting members; all other citizens may attend and speak. Forty-one other Massachusetts towns, nine Connecticut towns, one town in Maine, and one town in Vermont have adopted the RTM.

Sixty-eight Vermont and fifty-three New Hampshire towns have adopted the referendum town meeting, where voters go to the polls to act on the warrant. In theory, this meeting type should increase voter participation, but the change has increased voter participation only to a limited extent in most towns. Voter turnout averages approximately 29 percent.

THE REFERENDUM
The referendum activates the key of democratic theory—that sovereign authority resides in the unassembled electorate. The referendum dates to the *Landsgemeinde* in Switzerland in the fifteenth century, and it allows national, state, regional, and local voters to provide advice to officers or to make policy decisions at the polls. The referendum in the United States can be viewed as an extension of the town meeting and was first employed in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1640. Today, the referendum is used in many nations to amend the national constitution and regional or state constitutions in federal nations, and to make certain other decisions, such as whether the Republic of Ireland should ratify a European Union treaty and whether the term limit on the office of president of Venezuela should be removed. Some parliamentary democracies decided all decisions should to be made by the government (cabinet). The United Kingdom historically followed this policy, but more recently it has allowed referendums in Scotland and Wales.

Referendum questions may be placed on the general election ballot or on a special election ballot (1) by the legislature, (2) automatically at periodic specified times, and (3) by the initiative that permits the electorate by petition to place a question on the ballot. The recall, a type of referendum, allows voters by petition to place on the ballot the question of the removal from office of an elected officer prior to the expiration of the term of office.

Referendums are classified as follows:

- A *constitutional referendum* involves a new constitution or an amendment.
- A *statutory referendum* involves a proposed law.
- An *acceptance referendum* allows local government voters to decide whether to adopt a state law.
- An *automatic referendum* question appears on the referendum ballot at specific times.
- A *mandatory referendum* must be held to initiate an action such as the borrowing of funds.
- A *market basket referendum* provides voters with a choice of one of several local government charters.
- An *opt-out referendum* allows local voters to opt out of a state law.
- A *protest referendum* authorizes voters by petition to suspend a recently enacted law until a referendum is held on the question of its repeal.

Proponents of referendums are convinced the voters will make superior decisions on issues (compared to a legislature beholden to special interests), facilitate governmental reform, make elected officers more responsive to the wishes of the

people, promote voter interest in public affairs by reducing alienation, and educate citizens. Opponents argue that referendums weaken representative democracy and may lead to tyranny of the majority. According to the opponents, problems are as follows:

- Many voters are uninformed and overburdened by the number of questions and officers to be elected.
- The process may produce a long ballot and voter fatigue.
- A small minority often decides the issue.
- Special interest groups can repeal laws.
- Innovative leaders are discouraged from seeking election, because their decisions can be overturned readily by referendums where the initiative and protest referendum are available.

The weight of the evidence favors the referendum. There is a general agreement that proposed constitutional and local government charter changes should be subject to the sovereign will of the people, but there are exceptions as noted above. Although the initiative, the protest referendum, and the recall have been controversial, it is apparent that, lacking such devices, many reforms would not have been adopted; many unpopular laws would have remained on the statute books; and a significant number of elected officers guilty of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance would have remained in office.

The process of enacting important laws should reflect the views of citizens, interest groups, elected representatives, and bureaucrats. The referendum actualizes the views of the citizens, fulfilling a need for a policy-making theory inclusive of elements of the theories of representative democracy and direct democracy.

DIRECT DEMOCRACY

Plato's fears have not materialized, but citizen apathy results in the town meeting becoming a de facto representative democracy with attendees casting ballots representing nonvoters. Town meeting participants, with the exception of very small towns, are a minority of the voters. Nevertheless the meeting, based upon equality and openness, welcomes all citizens, scrutinizes town administrators, and has a high rate of participation when controversial articles appear in the warrant. The meeting has its shortcomings, but voter participation compares favorably with participation in city council elections, and the quality of its decisions is as high as the quality of city council decisions.

A similar criticism is leveled at the referendum, as a minority of the voters may cast ballots, and participation is dependent upon the degree of controversy involving the question.

See also *City-republic; Democracy; Participatory Democracy; Representative Democracy; Voting Behavior.*

. . . . JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN

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Dirigisme

Dirigisme is an economic term used to describe a state-directed economy in which economic planning and other kinds of government intervention work to regulate and coordinate the production and allocation of resources. Dirigisme comes from the French word *diriger* (to direct), and economies that operate under such conditions are referred to as *dirigiste*. As an economic policy or a description of an economic state, it is the opposite of laissez-faire.

Unlike a centrally planned economy, where the government controls the production and distribution of resources, a dirigiste economy has mostly private ownership of the means of production. Nonetheless, dirigisme implies a prominent degree of government regulation and structure to direct the workings of both publicly and privately owned companies. Most economic systems contain at least some aspect of dirigisme. A government contract that subsidizes specific scientific and technological research is one particular example of dirigisme.

As an economic theory, dirigisme is most commonly associated with the economic recovery of post–World War II (1939–1945) France and the center-right governments of Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou. When Francois Mitterand attempted to introduce more state intervention into the French economy in the early 1980s—moving away from dirigisme and toward socialism—the resulting economic downturn prompted the French government to reject

dirigisme as the country's main economic policy, a decision that subsequent governments have continued.

See also *Centrally Planned Economy; State Capitalism.*

. . . . SHANNON GRANVILLE

Disability Rights

The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines a *disabled person* as someone whose "physical or mental condition" limits the person's "activity, movement, sensation, etc." Relative to labels such as *crippled* and *handicapped, disabled* is considered to be less derogatory, and it is now the preferred way of identifying individuals who have restrictive conditions.

However, underlying this change in labelling is a more profound shift in social attitudes toward the disabled. Historically, in both Western and non-Western societies, the disabled were typically seen as dysfunctional human beings who should either be treated as despicable outcasts or as helpless victims of fate. Consequently, contempt and pity were the two most commonly expressed social attitudes toward the disabled, rendering them isolated and marginalized.

Against this background, the United Nations (UN) first identified the plight of the disabled as a human rights cause that warranted global attention with the Declaration of the Rights of the Disabled in 1975. Just over 30 years later, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was adopted in 2006. Hailed as a major landmark in international law, this convention obliges signatory states to ensure that the disabled have the full range of human rights afforded to able-bodied persons and to remove any discriminatory practices, both official and customary, against the disabled.

However, the momentous shift that set the normative groundwork for the current rights-based approach to disability was the adoption of "The World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons" in 1982, which considered disability a social rather than a biomedical condition. Building on the definition of *handicap* used by the World Health Organization, which emphasizes the term's contextual dimension, the UN identified a handicap, in General Assembly Resolution 37/52, as first and foremost "a function of the relationship between disabled persons and their environment." Consequently, a handicap is not the equivalent of a permanent physiological condition. Rather, a handicap occurs when there is a breakdown in what should have been an interactive relationship.

By far the most common and concrete form of this breakdown is when the disabled "encounter cultural, physical, or social barriers which prevent their access to the various systems of society that are available to other citizens." A handicap as such represents a "loss or limitation of opportunities" for the disabled "to take part in the life of the community on an equal level with others." This characterization of disability as a sociopolitical issue meant that the disability movement became fundamentally about the restoration of social justice to a group of individuals who share the experience of oppression and marginalization. The movement has evolved to such a point that some of its advocates are starting to use disability as the basis for positive identity. Accordingly, for the first time in the history of the movement, the rights of the disabled are defended on cultural grounds, based on the claim that the disabled constitute a minority whose identity is forged by a shared history and culture of living the life of the disabled.

Cultural and otherwise, disability rights are generally claim rights that necessarily entail legal obligations to provide for the claimants. Disability rights have therefore opened all kinds of doors for the disabled in the last two decades. Taken literally, this means that wheelchair ramps that facilitate accessibility of physical space are fast becoming the global standard. Less visible and more controversial are measures that oblige employers to modify work conditions for the disabled, making workplace accommodations that go beyond physical accessibility.

It is these kinds of accommodations that perhaps pose the most challenge to the advancement of disability rights. According to the UN, chronic unemployment among the disabled is a global problem. It is estimated that in developing countries, about 80 percent to 90 percent of the disabled, who are otherwise of working age, are unemployed; in developed countries, the figure is between 50 percent and 70 percent. These are significant numbers given that by UN's count, there are about 650 million disabled persons in the world. They, therefore, constitute about 10 percent of the world's population, making them the largest minority group, 80 percent of which live in the developing world. These figures suggest that the disabled are far from being full participating members of society. Among other things, their right to work, which is guaranteed by both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights, is being consistently violated.

The disabled, therefore, stand a much higher chance than the general population of being caught in the vicious cycle of unemployment, poverty, and dependency. Against this reality, it is unclear how the living condition of the disabled can be improved by the growing grassroots movement to represent the rights of the disabled as the cultural rights of a minority. This political trend is arguably the result of the move to demedicalize disability. Yet by emphasizing the unique identity of the disabled, the advocates of this position may run the risk of ghettoizing the disabled even more.

See also *Human Rights; United Nations (UN); Universal Declaration of Human Rights.*

. . . . THERESA M. LEE

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Disaster Relief

Disaster relief is the assistance provided to individuals, families, and communities to help them cope with disruptive, disorienting events. These events can be caused by natural hazards, like hurricanes, earthquakes, wildfires, or tornadoes, or they can be triggered by humans, such as nuclear accidents, health epidemics, or terrorist attacks. Thus, the scope of disaster assistance has expanded to encompass a wide variety of emergency situations.

DISASTER RELIEF PROGRAMS

Governmental institutions play a key role in the development and implementation of disaster relief in contemporary societies. Governmental involvement is necessary, because many disasters cannot be addressed through private efforts. As a result, most countries have created a set of policies and procedures to guide their governmental operations. These policies identify when government will become involved and the types of assistance it will provide.

In most nations, governmental disaster relief policies cover four primary areas: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Mitigation programs are designed to reduce the potential damages of a disaster. These programs are undertaken before a disaster occurs, and they include such activities as building up coastal areas to better withstand storm surges and flooding, establishing stricter building codes in earthquake-prone communities, and using immunization programs to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.

Preparedness programs are also initiated in advance of a disaster, but they tend to focus more directly on ensuring that emergency management organizations are ready and able to respond to disasters. They also strive to inform individual citizens and prepare them for potential hazards. Preparedness programs include the establishment of emergency operation plans, the activation of early warning and alarm systems, the development of public education programs, and the use of simulations and exercises that replicate emergency situations.

Response programs are designed to address the immediate problems of disaster situations. The objectives of these programs are to save lives, minimize damage, and help facilitate the recovery efforts that will follow. If possible, officials activate warning systems, issue evacuation orders, and set emergency response plans into motion even before a disaster strikes. However, most response activities focus on those operations that take place after an event has occurred, for example, opening relief shelters, providing medical care and essential services, reestablishing power and communication systems, and clearing debris. Once the hazardous conditions have subsided, response activities often evolve into efforts to assess the extent of the damages and to initiate longer term relief.

Recovery programs are undertaken to restore communities to their prior conditions, or in some cases, to actually improve their situation. These include operations to help repair damaged property and provide more permanent housing as well as broader programs aimed at stimulating economic development. Many recovery programs focus on helping individual citizens, but they can also provide assistance to entire neighborhoods, communities, and economic sectors.

MODELS OF DISASTER ASSISTANCE

In the majority of nations, disaster relief is implemented in a fairly centralized manner, from the top down. That is, the national or central government is primarily responsible for developing and administering emergency aid. Subnational governments (e.g., those of villages, towns, states, or provinces) may also be involved be the process, but their actions are guided by national-level directives. In countries with centralized structures, the national government would be in charge of the nation's disaster relief operations—from mitigation and preparation through the response and relief operations. This structure of disaster relief is most prevalent in unitary political systems like those of France, China, and Great Britain.

In federal systems with more decentralized governmental structures, the process operates quite differently. Instead of a top-down pattern, disaster relief is supposed to work from the bottom up. Municipal and county governments are expected to be the first responders and deal with emergencies that occur within their jurisdictions. If they are unable to handle the situation, they can ask for outside assistance from the state, provincial, or national governments. But the basic assumption is that most disasters will be handled at the local level with little involvement by higher level jurisdictions. This bottom-up approach is evident in countries like the United States, Canada, and Australia.

COMMONALITIES OF DISASTER RELIEF SYSTEMS

Regardless of structural differences, there are similarities in the disaster relief policies of contemporary political systems. Perhaps the most striking characteristic is the key role that governmental agencies play in this process. These organizations have a variety of different titles (e.g., emergency preparedness, disaster relief, civil affairs, homeland security), locations (some are free-standing units, others are housed within military departments, and a few are spread across multiple agencies), and capabilities (e.g., some can act on their own, while others have to be called into service). But, they all provide the glue that ties together a nation's disaster relief activities.

Another trend is the change that has occurred in the focus of governmental activity. In most nations, disaster relief policies were initially construed to be quite reactive in nature; governments took action only after a disaster occurred, and their involvement was highly limited in scope and time. Current

governmental policies place much greater emphasis on pro-active measures—such as preparing society and specific local communities for emergencies before they arise—and they cover a broad range of operations.

Perhaps, the most common element of contemporary disaster relief policy is the use of an "all hazards" or generic approach to emergency management. Instead of creating a multitude of policies to deal with different types of disasters—for example, one for hurricanes or typhoons, another for earthquakes, still another for terrorist activity, and so on—nations develop a general set of procedures to cover any type of emergency situation. This enables them to respond to a wide variety of situations in a more coordinated and effective manner.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF DISASTER RELIEF

Disaster relief is an important aspect of governmental activity in contemporary societies. As the demands on governmental disaster relief systems have increased, so too have the problems with these systems. Recent events—the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2005 Hurricane Katrina disaster in the United States, and the 2008 Sichuan Chinese earthquake—demonstrated all too clearly the extreme difficulties that confront governmental disaster relief systems. All governments face the same challenges in this policy area: planning for the next disruptive event, coordinating the activities of those who are involved in disaster relief, meeting the needs of affected populations, and balancing the costs of disaster relief against *other* governmental policy responsibilities.

See also *Centralization, Deconcentration, and Decentralization; Federalism; Public Policy; Public Policy Development.*

. . . . .   SAUNDRA K. SCHNEIDER & DANIEL C. LEWIS

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Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is not a theory but rather a method of inquiry and research that seeks to understand the coherence—and sometimes the contradictions—within the discourse (the spoken or written communications) of individuals, groups, and organizations. Materials that may be subjects of discourse analysis include books, speeches, interviews, conversations, debates, articles, literature, TV programs, and even movies or documentary films. Scholars and sociologists using discourse analysis can focus on quantitative elements (the number of occurrences of certain words) or can try to interpret specific

words or constant themes that occur more often than others (or words that the discourse seems to avoid). The study of discourses allows the analyzer to link them to a worldview or to a given ideology. In his book *The Archaeology of Knowledge,* French philosopher Michel Foucault linked discourses with beliefs and social practices. Apart from sociology and political science, a variety of disciplines, including cultural studies, ethnomethodology, psychology, and social psychology use discourse analysis.

Discourse analysis aims to find meanings and hidden trends. For instance, discourse analysis revealed that Leni Riefenstahl's famous documentaries *Triumph of the Will* (1935) and *Olympia* (1938) illustrated the Nazi ideology. In France, sociolinguists Louis-Jean Calvet and Jean Véronis have studied the political speeches of French president Nicolas Sarkozy for two years in order to find his main ideas and ideology.

See also *Content Analysis; Foucault, Michel Paul; Propaganda.*

. . . . YVES LABERGE

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Discrimination

Discrimination, in its modern usage, means treating someone unfairly or unfavorably and denying individuals or groups of people equality of treatment. International labor organizations; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; and various United Nations (UN) treaties define discrimination as any distinction, exclusion, or restriction of preference based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, or any other field of public life.

Discriminatory practices are those detrimental distinctions that do not take account of the particular characteristics of an individual as such but instead consider only collective qualifications deriving from membership in a certain social or other group such as race, color, religion, or gender. Four forms of discrimination include inequality in treatment, imposing disabilities, granting privileges, and imposing obligations. Discrimination as denial of equality has many faces, including denial of economic opportunities, power, status, access to education, and career opportunities. All of these are naturally reinforcing. People can suffer discrimination at work, school, or college or while shopping, looking for accommodations, participating in public activities, or dealing with authorities.

DISCRIMINATION IN PRACTICE
UN Special Rapporteur Elizabeth Odio Benito notes in her work that manifestations of discrimination, intolerance, and oppression sometimes occur in isolation and sometimes in combination. Michel Banton points out that experimental research in social psychology has established that even meaningless information suggesting that some individuals constitute a group can be sufficient to initiate processes of group inclusion or exclusion. Discrimination, thus, also occurs without anyone intending to discriminate. The international convention therefore defines discrimination as any action or inaction that has either a discriminatory purpose or a discriminatory effect. It is generally believed that since 1949, de jure discrimination has been abolished in most parts of the world. However, the practice continues in most parts of the world, most frequently in the form of racism.

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Racism is the combination of the power of one race to dominate other races and a value system that assumes that the dominant race is innately superior. *Race* is an arbitrary and therefore problematic term employed in the classification of human beings on the basis of appearance, and it is a primary determinant of human traits and capacities. Thinking that differences are hereditary and unalterable, one ethnic group or historical collectivity dominates, excludes, or seeks to eliminate another. Its varied usages have resulted in race being seen as an objective biological fact and/or a social fact that operates through independent characteristics. According to studies by geneticists and biologists, racism has no scientific basis.

Racial discrimination operates in different forms and at different levels. It can be overt or covert, personal or institutional. Personal racisms are manifested through the individual expression, attitudes, or behaviors that accept the assumptions of a racist value system. Institutional racism is the established social pattern supported by policies, rules, and regulation that support implicitly or explicitly the racial value system. For example, in many societies, commitment to and investment in the health and welfare of different groups of people is quite disparate. There are also cases of social exclusion and isolation of minority and indigenous groups from access to economic resources and social and political processes.

One regime that continued institutional racism after 1949 was that of South Africa, with its use of apartheid. *Apartheid* was introduced in 1948 by the National Party as a system of social segregations designed to maintain a situation of inequality between whites and the other ethnic and social groups in economic, social, political, and cultural spheres. This ended in 1993.

The practice of racial discrimination continues in many parts of the world in a covert manner, more at personal and social levels than by the state, although in many cases discrimination by the state is also visible. It has been observed that victims are no longer discriminated against in the name of biological inferiority, but instead they are discriminated against socially because of religious or cultural traditions. Racial distinctions have been incorporated into a system of social class distinctions. It is also alleged that in some states, because of historical aspects, economic tensions due to migrations, and alleged terrorist activities, racism is present in various subtle forms. It continually assumes new forms, intensified by conflict over economic resources in developed as well as in developing countries. According to some observers, the process of globalization has also contributed in the resurgence of racial discrimination in some regions.

RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
Somewhat similar to racial discrimination is discrimination based on religion, and the two sometimes overlap. Religious discrimination is valuing a person or group less because of religious beliefs or treating someone differently because of these beliefs.

Elizabeth Benito (1989) quotes Gordon Allport, who argues that deviation in creed alone does not account for the persecution. The discrimination is not caused by the doctrines or teachings of religions. Instead, he argues that there is usually a political or historical reason or a stereotype that fosters religious persecution. Religious intolerance thus occurs when religion and prejudice are merged. Persecution occurs when countries, governments, and individuals use or attack religion to justify the pursuit of power, prestige, wealth, or ethnic self-interest. In many cases, the compulsions to create a national identity and pursue a collective destiny have been murderously homogenizing, with religion playing a crucial violent role. Charges of religious discrimination have been made even against liberal, secular, and democratic states, including countries in the Western developed world.

WORK AND DESCENT
In line with racial and religious discrimination is discrimination based on work and descent. This means discrimination based on vocations associated with social groups or on perceived lower status by virtue of birth, as is the case with lower castes in India, Nepal, and some other countries. Such discrimination is reflected most notably in caste or tribal societies. Its manifestation commonly includes prohibitions on intermarriage, physical segregation of communities, restrictions on access to resources, social prohibitions regarding physical contact (untouchability), restrictions on access to education, segregation in educational facilities, and restrictions on access to religious palaces and participation in ceremonies.

GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATION
Another common basis for discrimination throughout history has been gender. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) defines it as

> any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil, or any other field.

Gender discrimination exists in families, in communities, and in the workplace and can take many different forms. The treatment accorded to women in terms of property rights, rights of inheritance, laws related to marriage and divorce, rights to acquire nationality, and the right to seek employment reflects discrimination both in law and in fact. Many women face additional discrimination and denial of equality because of their race, language, ethnicity, culture, religion, or socioeconomic class. They, thus, suffer compounding affects of discrimination.

OTHER FORMS

In addition to the above well-defined groups, people also face discrimination, particularly in employment, on the basis of language, age, and disability. Gays and lesbians are discriminated against socially and in the workplace because of their sexual orientation. In the present era of globalization in which the global economy has stimulated high levels of migration, complaints of discrimination against immigrants and asylum seekers have also become common. Discriminating police behavior and visible ghettoization characterize many metropolitan cities of Europe and North America.

Concerns about discrimination have been expressed by the international community at various levels, and efforts are ongoing to eliminate it. Particularly since the adoption of Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the international community has made important strides in the flight against racism. Beginning with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), the UN has adopted a series of conventions and declarations, proclaimed an International Year of Mobilization against Racism (2001), and organized three decades against racism (1973–1982, 1983–1992, 1994–2003) along with two world conferences on the same theme (1978 and 1983). The World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance held in Durban (South Africa) from August 31 to September 7, 2001, debated an array of questions reflecting the complex interplay of prejudice and intolerance: political, social, and economic exclusion; migration; human trafficking; and indigenous peoples' and minority rights.

A number of states have also incorporated provisions for equality and prohibitions against discrimination in their constitutions. Steps have also been taken for reparations, which include the concept of *reverse discrimination*. This concept refers to current discriminatory policies or acts that benefit a group that has historically been discriminated against, generally by giving preferences to that group, or discriminating against individuals not in that group or against dominant groups. It is now well recognized that discrimination not only denies groups of human beings dignified existence, marginalizes productive individuals and groups, and depresses their creativity and initiative, it also is a negative manifestation of integrative power. Instead of bringing or holding people together, prejudice and discrimination push them apart. Those discriminated against may find society or the state responsible for the disparities in their lives and may join militant, extremist, or fundamentalists forces justifying even terrorism.

See also *Apartheid; Caste System; Homophobia; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights; Positive Discrimination; Racial Discrimination; Reverse Discrimination; Sexism; Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Women, Violence against; Xenophobia.*

. . . . AMARJIT S. NARANG

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Discrimination, Positive.

See *Positive Discrimination.*

Discrimination, Reverse.

See *Reverse Discrimination.*

Disenfranchisement

Disenfranchisement refers to the removal or refusal of the right to vote, or the right of suffrage, to an individual or group of individuals. *Direct disenfranchisement* involves explicit, intentional denial of the right to vote, usually through legislative measures. Indirect disenfranchisement occurs when attempts are made to prevent votes from having an impact on the final electoral outcome, as can occur in gerrymandering or stuffing ballot boxes. Entire groups of people have and continue to be disenfranchised purposefully. These groups include women, indigenous peoples, racial and ethnic minorities, and religious minorities, depending on the country and political and/or religious climate. *Felony disenfranchisement* refers to refusal of the right to vote for individuals who are incarcerated or who have prior felony convictions.

Full suffrage refers to the right to vote and run for office. In 1893, New Zealand was the first independent country to give women the right to vote. Australia followed in 1902, but suffrage was provided only for non-Aboriginal women. Women gained the right to vote in Canada in 1917, in the United Kingdom in 1918, and in the United States in 1920, although not all women could vote at these times; full suffrage was granted incrementally. Historically, indigenous peoples have been denied the right to vote longer than any other group.

See also *Voting Rights and Suffrage, Women's Suffrage.*

. . . .   JENNIFER E. DALTON

Disinformation

Disinformation is the deliberate propagation of misleading or false information. The term developed within the world of intelligence and international politics, and the Russian KGB first used the word *dezinformatsiya,* which is likely the origination of the English word. A government engages in disinformation to affect public opinion or another nation's leadership. For example, during World War II (1939–1945), the Nazi party was notorious for disinformative anti-Semitic speeches and writing.

Because it is intentional, disinformation should not be understood as merely false information. In C. S. Lewis's *The Screwtape Letters,* one devil writes to another:

> The fact that "devils" are predominantly comic figures in the modern imagination will help you. If any faint suspicion of your existence begins to arise in his mind, suggest to him a picture of something [fantastical], and persuade him that since he cannot believe in that he therefore cannot believe in you. (2001, 3)

Similar to Lewis's devils, a government can spread fantastical rumors that are easily dismissed, which causes people to disregard accurate reports of the government's real motives or actions as equally unbelievable. Disinformation often succeeds, because it makes a realistic appraisal of one's enemies hard to achieve.

See also *Propaganda; Soviet Union, Former.*

. . . .   RON J. BIGALKE JR.

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Dissolution

Dissolution is a parliamentary procedure in which a session of a legislature is ended and new elections follow. It is considered one of the most significant aspects of parliamentary systems. Dissolution ensures regular elections, although, unlike systems with fixed electoral dates, there is some discretion on the timing of the next round of polling.

Dissolution usually occurs within a set period of time. For instance, in Canada or the United Kingdom, the House of Commons must be dissolved within five years of its first sitting. Parliaments may also be dissolved following a vote of no confidence in the government, or a motion may be made for a parliament to dissolve itself. Some systems require a simple majority vote for dissolution, while others require supermajorities of up to two-thirds of the members. In some systems, legislatures may also be dissolved by the head of government or head of state. Dissolution commonly occurs in response to a political crisis that undermines political support for an existing government, such as the loss of a coalition partner or a political scandal. Dissolution can also be use as a political tool to build parliamentary majorities. Hence, governments may dissolve a legislature early in order to capitalize on public popularity or to ensure an election before the implementation of unpopular policies.

See also *Parliamentary Democracy; Parliamentary Government.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

Distribution of Powers (in a Federation)

Although not all definitions of federalism emphasize the formal distribution of powers between two levels of government as an essential attribute of a federal government, all federal constitutions make reference to the distribution of powers by enumerating the legislative powers and responsibilities of at least one level of government, and sometimes of both levels. In most federations, a supreme or constitutional court is occasionally called upon to interpret the meaning of these powers, either because of jurisdictional conflicts between the two levels of government, or more frequently because an individual or corporate person questions the constitutionality of legislation that is deemed contrary to the interests of that person.

The legislative powers of one level of government may be exclusive, meaning that the other level of government may not legislate at all about the same subjects, or concurrent, meaning that either level can legislate about a subject. In the event of concurrency, there is an explicit or implicit provision that one level of government, usually the central or "federal" level, has *paramountcy,* meaning that its legislation takes priority over legislation by the other level in the event that both levels have legislated and that conflict exists between the provisions of their respective laws. Very rarely, as in the case of old age pension legislation in Canada, there may be a paramountcy rule that favors the lower level of government.

DIVERSITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS

Federal constitutions also contain a rule that one level of government, usually (although not always) the lower level, may legislate about all matters not explicitly provided for in the constitution. This allocation of power over unspecified matters is known as the residual power. In the U.S. Constitution, the Tenth Amendment provides such a rule, assigning residual power to the states "or to the people." Canada and India are unusual among federations in assigning residual power to the central government. Most others, including Argentina, Australia, Germany, Mexico, Russia, and Switzerland, assign residual power to the provinces or states. The significance of the residual power depends in part on the comprehensiveness of the list or lists of enumerated powers.

Constitutional distributions of powers have tended to become more detailed and complex in modern times, as the scope of public policy has broadened. For example, the Constitution of the United States lists only eighteen subjects about which Congress may legislate, while the Constitution of Australia, largely inspired by that of the United States but drafted more than a century later, lists thirty-nine subjects about which the national Parliament may legislate. Neither of those constitutions specifies the legislative powers of the individual states, on the assumption that the individual states retain the residual power and that specification is therefore unnecessary.

Some other federal constitutions include several categories of enumerated powers. For example the constitutions of Canada and India both include separate lists of exclusive federal powers, exclusive powers of the individual states (provinces in Canada), and concurrent powers shared by both levels. The lists are much longer in the Indian constitution, reflecting its more recent origin, than in the Canadian constitution, on which India's is largely modelled. In Canada, as already noted, the concurrent power over pensions is subject to a rule of provincial paramountcy. However, other concurrent powers in Canada, over agriculture, immigration, and the export of natural resources, are subject to a rule of federal paramountcy.

The German constitution has separate lists of exclusive federal powers, concurrent powers with federal paramountcy, and subjects about which the federation may enact "skeleton" or framework provisions, with the individual states (the plural term for which is *Länder* in German) being left to fill in the details. The list of concurrent powers is by far the longest of the three lists. Like the constitutions of Australia and the United States, that of Germany leaves the residual powers of the lower level of government unspecified. The constitution of Brazil follows a somewhat similar pattern, except that the concurrent powers are referred to as "common" powers, and the fields in which federal legislation can only establish general principles are referred to as concurrent.

The constitution of South Africa is unusual in that it includes a list of concurrent powers and a list of exclusive provincial powers but not a list of exclusive powers for the central government.

COMMON FEATURES AMONG CONSTITUTIONS

Although distributions of powers vary from one federal constitution to another, some common features may be observed. Military and naval defense, foreign and interstate trade, currency and monetary policy, and weights and measures are responsibilities of the central government in all federations. Citizenship is normally a federal responsibility, except in Switzerland. Education, health, and municipal affairs are almost always assigned to the states or provinces in federal constitutions, either explicitly or otherwise. Criminal law is exclusively federal in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Russia, and Switzerland, concurrent in Germany, and left to the subnational governments in Australia. In the United States, most criminal law is made by the states, but Congress has established a number of "federal offenses." Authority over the environment, taxation, transportation, and communications may be allocated in various ways.

In most federal constitutions, it is assumed that executive and administrative powers are divided in the same way as legislative powers, but this is not always the case. In Germany, legislation in the concurrent fields is implemented and administered by the Länder, although mainly legislated at the national level. In Canada, the uniform code of criminal law, legislated at the national level, is administered by the provinces. Another complication is that the making of treaties, an executive power exercised at the national level, may override the legislative powers of the states, as it does in the United States, India, and Australia, but not in Germany or Canada. Canada and India also give the federal executive the power to disallow legislation by the lower level of government, although in Canada this power has fallen into disuse and is not likely ever to be revived.

In practice, the scope of the central government's authority has tended to expand in most federations at the expense of the authority of the states or provinces, particularly, but not only, in times of war or economic crisis. Geographical mobility of the population and the growth of the welfare state have reinforced this trend. In some cases federal authority has been formally increased by amending the constitution. More typically it has been increased by permissive judicial interpretation of federal powers or because central governments have used their greater financial resources to intervene in areas of jurisdiction formally reserved to the states and provinces. Conditional grants to subnational governments have been a particularly effective way to impose federal priorities and policy preferences on them. Allocation of the residual power to the subnational governments, as in the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. constitution, has proved to be almost totally ineffective in resisting this tendency toward greater centralization of power.

See also *Constitutional Systems, Comparative; Federalism, Comparative.*

. . . .   GARTH STEVENSON

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Distributive Justice

The term *distributive justice* refers to theories that address the fairness of allocation of economic resources and social welfare within a society. Such theories both criticize and prescribe basic institutional arrangements in society. The term goes back as far as Aristotle, but his use of it does not conform to modern usage. Aristotle saw distributive justice primarily in political terms, as those principles that ensure that deserving people are rewarded in accordance with their merit. Modern conceptions of distributive justice begin from postulates of equality rather than merit or status. Everyone is entitled to a minimum of freedom from need regardless of merit. Theories of distributive justice are also distinct from religious and secular conceptions of mutual aid, compassion, or charity. The former rely on the ethics of care; distributive justice also includes state intervention to remediate the side effects of social and economic inequality.

INFLUENCES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

One source of modern notions of distributive justice is found in nineteenth-century British idealism. Influenced by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's philosophy of absolute idealism, British idealism also took up Hegel's notion of development and the positive role of the state and applied it to social philosophy. British philosopher Thomas Hill Green especially argued that the state could play a positive role in the creation of the necessary conditions of the good life. Opposing utilitarianism, Green advocated extensive welfare measures such as schools and hospitals.

Marginalist economics was a second influence. The theory of marginal utility referred to the increase in utility of adding one unit of a good. At some point, that addition will have diminished value. The marginalist revolution in economics led by Carl Menger, William Stanley Jevons, and Leon Walras replaced older theories of value with subjective value. Marginalism held that a good, rather than having an intrinsic value, must be scarce and useful to a subject to have value. Neoclassical economics developed a theory that in a competitive market, the self-interested choices of individuals (when aggregated) yield an equilibrium that represents the optimal social welfare arrangement.

Much theorizing on distributive justice was utilitarian (a third source of major ideas). Utilitarianism holds that the morally good is that which is useful. Action should aim at the greatest good for the greatest number. Early utilitarians justified an unencumbered market, but later utilitarians argued that an egalitarian social arrangement produced the greatest good for the greatest number. Utilitarianism is a normative moral theory, but other schools of thought, like marginalist and rational choice economics, claimed to discover "scientific" and nonnormative welfare arrangements. Late twentieth-century utilitarians like John Harsanyi combined both trends. Harsanyi argued, like John Stuart Mill, that the greatest happiness principle meant the more egalitarian maximizing of average welfare among individuals and not total welfare, but he saw these principles of interpersonal comparison as social facts, not value postulates. Individuals were naturally rational decision makers who acted in accordance with an expected utility theory.

JOHN RAWLS'S PRINCIPLES ON DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

The most celebrated theorist of distributive justice, John Rawls, began his career more sympathetic to utilitarianism and marginalism. By the time he published *A Theory of Justice,* Rawls had incorporated strong normative Kantian elements, including Immanuel Kant's postulate of equal respect for persons, superseding any calculation of utility. Questions of social justice could not be solved through "science" but were normative in nature. Utilitarian theories, however, fell short in Rawls's view. An account of justice based solely on self-interested individuals could never generate the moral reciprocity that Rawls found central to extensive equality and liberty.

Rawls's theory of justice began from a Kantian outlook. In the "original position," individuals were to decide basic social arrangements behind a veil of ignorance—a position in which they were presumed to be autonomous, free, and equal, but to have no knowledge of any particular characteristics of their own lives or others. In *A Theory of Justice,* Rawls employed a "thin theory of the good" to indicate those basic needs (rather than wants) that all individuals must have met for any plan of life that all could know. In this way, their decisions take place under conditions of reciprocity in which individual self-interest does not play a central role. Rawls held that under these conditions of justice, inequalities in wealth, power, status, or life chances could only be justified if they harm no one and provide net benefit.

Rawls' two basic principles of justice are as follows:

1. *Principle of Equal Liberty:* Each person has an equal right to the most extensive liberties compatible with similar liberties for all (egalitarian).
2. *Difference Principle:* Social and economic inequalities should be arranged so that they are both (1) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged persons, and (2) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of equality of opportunity.

The first principle is a version of Kant's principle of equal respect for person; the second is an interpretation of Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto's optimality used in welfare economics. Pareto's improvements refer to a condition in which a change in the allocation of goods makes one person better off without making others worse off. Pareto optimality is reached when no new allocation can make anyone better off without

making others worse off. Inequalities are not justified simply by their contribution to the greater good, but because these inequities benefit everyone, especially the least advantaged. Rawls contended that utilitarian calculation of social needs isn't compatible with basic reciprocity. The cost of helping the poor would always be too dear in strict economic terms to justify. Rawls's position justified a very strong version of welfare state liberalism with extensive equality and redistribution of wealth and power.

Rawls argued those who are better endowed or who have a more advantageous social position are so not by merit alone. Rejecting this position, and Rawls's defense of the welfare state, Robert Nozick, in *Anarchy, State, and Utopia,* challenged the notion of distributive justice on libertarian grounds. Reviving the neoliberal idea of the watchman state, Nozick held that the state should only be concerned with safety and security of citizens and that much taxation was illegitimate. He rejected equality for a conception of desert: One deserves what one achieves through one's own effort. Inequalities that are a result of lack of effort or ability are fair and just, because they are deserved.

Other important critics of Rawls include Susan Moller Okin, who criticized Rawls for his neglect of gender and the family, and communitarian Michael Sandel, who criticized Rawls for employing a Kantian conception of the abstract individual, a purely cognitive subject without substantive qualities. Sandel held that this separates the right from the good. We cannot make sense of questions that Sandel argued without reference to our situated set of values and sense of the good. Economists like Kenneth Arrow and John Harsanyi criticized Rawls's "maximin" principle on the grounds that it was designed to yield the principles Rawls desired, was circular, and that it otherwise prejudged outcomes.

While Rawls himself saw his theory as neutral in the contest between capitalism and socialism, there was lively debate whether Rawls's conception of justice could in fact be applicable to a socialist order or whether it was more limited. Marxist critics like C. B. Macpherson argued that Rawls's presumption that class-divided societies are inevitable limited the scope of distributive justice.

Rawls attempted to answer these critics and modify his position somewhat in series of essays later published as *Political Liberalism.* There he attempted to argue, for example, that the use of the original position was not metaphysic (and hence separating right and good) but was instead a political device for making decisions and that it has weakened the terms of the veil of ignorance. In so doing, he hoped to show that the subject of his theory of justice is a social one.

While drawing on earlier criticisms, analytical Marxists such as John Roemer, G. A. Cohen, and John Elster have extensively criticized Rawls's approach to distributive justice for being insufficiently egalitarian. G. A. Cohen for example argues that Rawls's egalitarianism should not apply simply to the basic structure of society but to the whole of society. It requires an egalitarian ethos among citizens. Even a just basic structure will not eliminate all the inequalities, nor are there

inequalities that do not hurt the worst off. Roemer has tried to recast equality of opportunity so as to eliminate the contingencies of circumstances and allow equal effort to yield equal outcomes. Roemer is an instrumental egalitarian. Equality is not an intrinsic good but a means to bring about a reasonable quality of life.

See also *Aristotle; Kant, Immanuel; Macpherson, Crawford Brough; Marxism; Mill, John Stuart; Nozick, Robert; Pareto, Vilfredo.*

. . . . BRIAN CATERINO

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Districting

There are two stages to the process of determining the boundaries of electoral districts. In the first, the number of districts in a legislative assembly is established. In the United States, this phase is referred to as *apportionment* or *reapportionment*; in countries with a Westminster–style parliamentary system, it is generally known as *redistribution.* For federal countries such as Germany, India, and Canada—but not for unitary states such as New Zealand and the United Kingdom—an essential part of the first stage is the allocation of districts to their lower house of parliament according to the share of the nation's population of their respective *Länder,* states, or provinces. Once the number of districts has been established (as a result of either a governing statute or, in rare instances, a constitutional provision), the second part of the process gets under way. This is known as the *districting, boundary readjustment,* or *boundary delimitation* stage.

Statutory law is commonly used to establish the total number of seats in a legislative assembly. That is the case in the United States, where 435 districts in the House of Representatives has been a fixed number since 1929. In other countries,

the size of the assembly is variable. It may change from one reapportionment to another because of population growth or movement (Canada and the United Kingdom) or expansion to include additional population or territory (Germany following reunification in 1990).

Apportionment of legislative or parliamentary seats does not take place in political systems that have no need for territorially defined electoral districts. In Israel, for example, proportional representation is used to elect the 120 members of the Knesset, with the entire country serving as a single electoral district. By contrast, in countries that elect their assemblies by way of a first-past-the-post system (the U.S. House of Representatives), single transferable vote (the Republic of Ireland's *Dáil*), or additional member (Germany's *Bundestag*) system, geographically bounded districts must be constructed.

The frequency of boundary delimitations varies from country to country. In Australia, redistributions are triggered after a period of seven years, but they occur more often if the distribution of population requires a change in the number of members of the House of Representatives allocated to a state or territory or if more than one-third of a state's federal districts (called "divisions" in Australia) deviate from the average divisional population of that state by more than 10 percent. India, on the other hand, undertakes the massive job of redistricting its congressional seats less frequently. Thirty years passed between the redistribution of electoral districts for the lower house of parliament (*Lok Sabha*) that followed the 1971 census and the next redistribution early in the twenty-first century. It is anticipated that the next redistribution will not occur until after the 2021 census. The constitution of many countries, including Canada and the United States, requires redistricting every ten years based on the most recent national census.

The allocation of legislative districts and the actual drawing of their boundaries have long played an integral and highly partisan role in politics. Politicians of all stripes have traditionally seen the districting process as a way to try to advance their own party's chances of electoral success. The time-honored practice of government parties manipulating district boundaries for their own benefit has come to be known as *gerrymandering*.

In many countries, partisan gerrymandering has given way—largely over the past few decades—to commissions that work independently of legislatures and political parties. Canada, for instance, in 1964 followed the pioneering lead of New Zealand and Australia in turning over to nonpartisan commissions the task of designing the districts for its House of Commons. Once a decade, three-member nonpartisan commissions chaired by a judge are named for each of the ten provinces. The governing statute calls upon the commissions to design federal constituencies with population equality of electoral districts as the principle objective, subject to such practical considerations as community of social and economic interests and geographic integrity. In varying degrees, such principles are common to all countries that assign boundary delimitation to nonpartisan commissions.

With the exception of a few states in the United States where nonlegislative commissions are named to carry out the redistricting of the state legislature, the process at the federal and state levels remains highly politicized. Once the 435 seats have been apportioned among the 50 states, the responsibility for drawing district boundaries for the House of Representatives falls on the state legislatures. Partisan control of the legislative and (for veto purposes) executive branches is highly desirable to try to ensure that the districts have been designed in such a way as to favor the majority party's interests.

See also *Additional Member System; First Past the Post; Gerrymandering; Proportional Representation.*

. . . .   JOHN C. COURTNEY

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District Magnitude

District magnitude refers to the number of representatives elected in a single electoral district, riding, or constituency. Equal district magnitude occurs when the same number of representatives is elected to each electoral district and ensures that proportionality is the same from one district to the next. Variable district magnitude allows for differing numbers of representatives per electoral district and is often based on geographic representation and population size, but it can result in lower proportionality in some districts. The average district magnitude is determined by dividing the number of representatives to be elected by the number of electoral districts.

Along with electoral formula and ballot structure, district magnitude is one of the three most important components of an electoral system. District magnitude also varies among electoral systems. For instance, first-past-the-post, alternative vote, and two-round systems each has a district magnitudes of one, with only one representative elected to each riding.

The single non transferable vote, block vote, party block vote, and limited vote electoral systems have district magnitudes of more than one, while all proportional representation electoral systems require the election of more than one representative per district. District magnitude is the most important factor in determining proportionality, with larger numbers of representatives in an electoral district producing more proportionality and lower numbers producing less proportionality.

See also *Electoral Systems; Representation and Representative; Representative Systems.*

. . . . JENNIFER E. DALTON

Divided Government

Divided government exists when one political party controls the executive and the opposition party controls one or both houses of the legislature, which can occur at both the state and national levels. The existence of divided party control of government institutions is a phenomenon that captured the attention of academics, the media, and average citizens in the 1990s. Although it is not a new occurrence in American politics, divided party control of the legislative and executive branches was increasingly blamed for the stalemate and gridlock that seemed to handicap the federal government, especially in the 1990s.

Since the end of World War II (1939–1945), the existence of divided government has been an almost persistent feature of the American political system. From 1952 to 1992, seven elections produced unified government, and thirteen elections produced divided government. The gridlock associated with divided government is not only representative of periods in which divided partisan control exists but can also manifest itself during periods of unified government as well. Nonetheless, academics have spent considerable time and energy in determining the effects, if any, that divided government has on relations between the executive and legislative branches and the nation as a whole.

The return of unified government with the election of Bill Clinton as president initially witnessed legislative acceptance for presidential proposals; however, with time, the Democratic Party–controlled Congress became a vocal opponent of the president, thereby casting doubt on whether unified government was much different than divided government. Divided government derives from the manner in which the legislative and executive branches function and are constituted. Different constituencies and terms of office and the separation of the branches, which are evaluated at separate times, produce conflict and division. Introducing different partisan controls of the presidency and Congress further exacerbates the situation.

This, however, should not preclude the possibility that presidents and Congress can reach agreement during both periods of divided and unified government. Divided government happens to be just one of a host of factors that may create gridlock in the legislative process. For instance, policy-making gridlock can be blamed on the overall design of Congress and the actual trajectory legislation takes. Congress is a complex institution that is disjointed in its functions and influenced by several entities, including committees, individual members of Congress, and interest groups. All of these may disguise or even exaggerate the effects of divided government.

Some argue that divided government is an undesirable outgrowth of the separation of powers inherent to the American political system. Several scholars openly challenge the deleterious effects of divided government. David Mayhew in *Divided We Govern* argues that whether the government has been unified or divided has not made much difference. Several scholars even suggest that the manifestation of divided government provides notable benefits. Divided government adds an element to the legislative equation that, in many cases, fosters greater debate and further exemplifies the deliberative nature that the founding fathers envisioned for legislating. The disagreement that is inherent in divided government produces debate and, as a result, is a healthy component of democratic governance.

See also *Party Organization.*

. . . . RICHARD M. YON

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Divine Right of Kings

The *divine right of kings* was a political-theological doctrine that emerged from the conflicted distinction of temporal and spiritual power during the medieval period. It is an important theoretical foundation that is a basis of the modern constitutional and legal doctrine of sovereignty. As a constitutional doctrine, it had its origins in antiquity, but as modern nation-states emerged during the Renaissance, political discourse increasingly centered on the importance of royal versus representative foundations of government. Among the most important contributors to the divine right of kings theory were James I of Great Britain and Sir Robert Filmer. These seventeenth-century theorists were reacting to new modern theories of the state by social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.

James I became king of England in 1603. Prior to ascending the throne, he wrote *The True Law of Free Monarchies* in 1598. In it, he argues that kings have authority over their subjects just as fathers have authority over their children. James utilizes biblical authority to establish the kingly right to rule as equal to that of God's rule over his earthly subjects. The monarchy has authority just as does the church, because both are divine in origin. As James stated, "As the Father of his family is duty

bound to care for the nourishing, education, and virtuous government of his children, even so is the King bound to care for all his subjects." James made his 1616 speech in the Star Chamber to assert the political realization of royal authority and the regal policy prerogative, which he had written about theoretically. But for James, the practice of divine right proved more complex than the theoretical clarity of the doctrine.

Probably the greatest theoretical statement on the divine right of kings was made in 1680 by Sir Robert Filmer in *Patriarcha: A Defense of the Natural Power of Kings against the Unnatural Liberty of the People.* Filmer utilized a biblical foundation for his theory similar to that of James I and placed the authority of the divine right of kings as equal to the family and society. Divine royal authority was combined with the duty of passive obedience by Filmer to describe the natural political order. This stands in opposition to contract theories and theories of consent. John Locke's *First Treatise* is the most famous critique and counterpoint to Filmer's theory.

The divine right of kings built on previous theories of the monarchial form from Aristotle to John of Salisbury. The influence of this constitutional line of royal authority created a modern foundation for sovereign prerogative powers that is still evident in modern executives with such doctrines as the executive pardon power and sovereign immunity.

See also *Filmer, Sir Robert; Locke, John; Monarchy; Sovereignty.*

. . . .   MICHAEL W. HAIL

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Doctrines

Foreign policy doctrines are broad articulations of interest and objectives that serve both to guide the domestic formulation of policy and to communicate a state's policy intent to other actors in the international system. The doctrines contain principles to guide actions rather than specific prescriptions for action. It has become customary to name doctrines after the national leader that promulgates the guidelines, although some countries simply identify doctrines by number. For instance, one of the oldest continuous doctrines is the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, named after U.S. president James Monroe. Its aim was to halt European colonization of the Western hemisphere, and it asserted that the United States would not interfere with existing European colonies or countries. Other prominent U.S. doctrines include those named after presidents Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and Ronald Reagan, all of which were designed to contain the spread of Soviet influence. Meanwhile, the 1968 Brezhnev Doctrine affirmed the

right of the Soviet Union to utilize force to maintain satellite states. The 2002 Bush Doctrine embraced preemptive war and was used to justify the Iraq War (2003–). Several policy doctrines originated in Latin America. The Betancourt Doctrine of Venezuela forbade recognition of governments that seized power through nondemocratic means, while the Estrada Doctrine, discontinued by Mexico in 2000, called on states to offer recognition of regimes without regard to state behavior. Some doctrines, such as the 1868 Calvo Doctrine, have been applied universally. (The doctrine asserted that jurisdiction in international financial disputes belonged to the country in which the controversy originated.)

See also *Latin American Political Thought; U.S. Political Thought.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

Dollarization

See *Numeraire and Dollarization.*

Domino Theory

President Dwight Eisenhower described *domino theory* in a 1954 press conference on the importance of U.S. involvement in Indochina. Eisenhower, engaged in a containment strategy to limit expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union at the height of the cold war, explained that Soviet goals of spreading communism and absorbing client states had to be countered. China "fell" to the Communists in 1949, North Korea invaded South Korea to "unify" the country under the Communist banner, and the Soviets and Mao's China sought to stir up revolution throughout Europe and the third world. Mao's revolutionary fervor appeared especially virulent, and Laos and Vietnam appeared vulnerable to Communist takeover. Eisenhower wanted these countries kept out of Communist hands, for fear that, if the United States failed to act, these and other states would fall like dominos.

This fear and doctrine, which gained metaphoric fame during Eisenhower's tenure, actually evolved from Harry Truman's containment policy intended to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence. The doctrine motivated presidents from Truman (who wanted to defend "free peoples" threatened by communism) to all cold war presidents (who wanted to prevent Vietnam from precipitating further dominos) and to Reagan (who wanted to overturn Communist victories to inspire a reverse domino effect in the third world). Presidents from Clinton to Obama have referred to another reverse domino notion (democratic enlargement) to convey the hope that increasing numbers of "democratic" states would cascade into free states everywhere. While responsible for U.S. overextension on occasion, the original domino theory also provided an American explanation or rationalization for the necessity of intervention to contain global communism.

See also *Cold War; Communism.*

. . . .   LOUISA HULETT

Droop Quota

In single transferable vote systems that allow voters to rank order their preferred candidates, the *Droop quota* establishes the minimum number of seats necessary to be elected. In this electoral procedure, once a candidate meets the minimum number of ballots necessary for election (the Droop quota), any excess votes are transferred to other candidates. The system was created by Henry Richmond Droop in 1868 as an alternative to the existing Hare quota, which was criticized for its ability to return results in which the largest voting groups elected only a minority of seats. The Droop quota is usually expressed as number of votes (V) divided by number of seats plus one (S+1) plus one, or $[V/(S+1)] +1$. The resultant number from the quota is rounded upward as a whole number, or the fraction may be ignored, depending on the system. For instance, if an election is held for four seats, and there are 100,000 votes, the Droop quota would be $[100,000/(4+1)] +1$ or 20,001. Any candidate receiving more than 20,001 votes would be automatically elected, and excess votes would be transferred to the next leading candidate until all seats are filled. Countries such as Australia, Ireland, and Malta use the Droop quota.

See also *Electoral Quotas; Electoral Systems, Comparative.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Drug Cartels

In modern commercial usage, the term *cartel* draws from the German word *Kartell*, which has earlier uses derived from Latin, French, and Italian. In the conventional sense, a cartel refers to formal agreements among business associations, or firms, to control production, fix prices, limit competition, and/or segment markets (by product, clientele, or territory). Cartels are often considered to be illegal because of antitrust laws and regulations that seek to restrict monopolistic practices.

The term *drug cartel* is frequently used to describe organized crime syndicates involved in the production, distribution, and sale of psychotropic substances—including heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and synthetic drugs—that have been prohibited in many countries since the early twentieth century. While such organizations, also known as drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), have existed in multiple contexts, the term *drug cartel* came into vogue primarily in reference to Latin American DTOs in the later part of the twentieth century. Such DTOs typically employ their substantial capacity for corruption and violence to advance their goals.

Among the earliest DTOs to earn the cartel label were two major trafficking organizations based in the cities of Medellín and Cali in Colombia. The Medellín cartel, for example, achieved such power and wealth that Pablo Escobar, its main leader in the 1980s, was elected as an alternate in the federal legislature in 1982 and was named by *Forbes* magazine as one of the world's ten richest men (#7) in 1989.

After Escobar's death in 1993 and the Medellín cartel's subsequent downfall, the Cali cartel rose to prominence in the 1990s. The Cali cartel was developed by Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela and José Santacruz Londoño, who operated their organization through independent groups or "cells." Each cell had specialized functions related to some specific aspect of the organization, such as production and distribution, finance and money laundering, protection and enforcement, or legal and political influence.

As the Medellín and Cali cartels fell into decline, other cartels began to develop elsewhere in the region, with substantial transnational supply chain networks. Among these were organizations that rose to prominence in major cities in Mexico, notably the Guadalajara cartel in the 1970s and 1980s; the Juárez cartel, the Tijuana cartel, and the gulf cartel in the 1990s; and the Sinaloa cartel (also known as "the Federation") in the 2000s. Substantial trafficking organizations also developed in Brazil, where Luiz Fernando da Costa operated a major DTO within a larger gang network known as the Red Command (*Comando Vermelho*) until his capture in 2001. Like several other well-known drug kingpins elsewhere, da Costa continued orchestrating criminal activities from his jail cell until he was extradited to the United States in 2008.

In reference to DTOs, many experts avoid the use of the term *cartel,* because DTOs demonstrate significant differences from cartels in the conventional business world. Notably, despite their frequent efforts to limit the entry of new competitors, most DTOs do not deliberately conspire to maximize prices. Moreover, while DTOs frequently engage in other cartel-like behaviors, such as negotiating territories, such collusion requires substantial organizational coherence. Cooperation among DTOs is especially difficult to achieve in the face of intense competitive pressures, shifting market trends, and law enforcement efforts.

See also *Organized Crime and Mafia.*

. . . . DAVID A. SHIRK

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Drug Policy

Drug policy covers an extensive range of governments' responses to the problem of illegal drugs. This entry will identify the drugs in question, explain the origins of national drug policy, examine the development of international drug policy, and identify the range of policies employed. As illegal drug cultivation, production, and consumption can occur on different continents, international cooperation took hold in the twentieth century to curb supply and disrupt movement of drugs to market.

DRUG USE AND REGULATION

Drug is a generic term. It is used to describe over-the-counter remedies, like aspirin; prescription medicines, like antibiotics; and psychoactive substances that effect our moods and perceptions; these may be unregulated, like coffee; regulated, like alcohol; or prohibited, like heroin. It is this last group that forms the subject matter here. These drugs are prohibited by three United Nations (UN) conventions: the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, covering opium and its derivatives, coca and its derivatives, and cannabis; the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, covering amphetamine-type stimulants (ATSs) such as ecstasy; and the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances.

Drugs transform human behavior, and this attracts the attention of authority. Since time immemorial, authorities, both secular and sacred, have tried to control and restrict the use of drugs. Use of indigenous drugs has tended to be tolerated and regulated. Alcohol, for instance, is easily produced from fermented grain and fruit, and its use has been widely accepted in Europe, although since the seventeenth century it has been increasingly regulated. But when tobacco was brought to Europe, it was regarded as threatening and was prohibited. In many countries today, morality reinforces state drug prohibition: Drugs are bad; they corrupt the individual and threaten the security of the state and stability of society. In other countries, drug use is regarded as an ordinary consequence of human nature but one that creates problems. These positions are not mutually exclusive, but they do reinforce two different drug policies: One emphasizes the wickedness and punishment of users and dealers, and the other emphasizes minimizing the social harm caused by drugs.

INTERNATIONAL DRUG POLICY

International drug policy developed in the twentieth century. The United States played a leading role in persuading other countries to adopt a prohibition regime. It began at the Shanghai Conference in 1909 and now incorporates the comprehensive UN Conventions. Drug policy was internationalized, because the drug trade is international in scope. Colombia, for example, produces 62 percent of the world's cocaine.

There is a market for prohibited drugs just as there is for any legal product. Markets operate on the basis of supply and demand. The aim of international drug policy is to free the world from drugs, largely by intervening in the market. Domestic drug policy focuses on the demand side. Governments use education to persuade people not to try drugs and often provide treatment for addicts. These policies are reinforced by deterrence: the prosecution and punishment of those who continue to use drugs and who turn to acquisitive crime to support their habits.

International drug policy works primarily on the supply side. It attempts to reduce supply so that prices will rise to a point where users stop buying. It employs a whole repertoire of policy instruments to prevent the cultivation, manufacture, trafficking, and dealing of drugs. In principle, this approach has a lot to recommend it. Drugs are much more visible in the fields than on the street. Crop eradication, for example, persuading or coercing farmers not to grow coca or opium, is the favored policy. Eradication will have only a temporary effect if farmers have no source of alternative income and if drug barons continue to bribe and intimidate the farmers back into drug cultivation. Eradication is, therefore, often combined with alternative development, whereby farmers receive subsidies to encourage them to grow legal crops. These policies are reinforced by interdiction, which is used against all kinds of drugs, including ATSs. Interdiction covers a range of activities designed to keep drugs from reaching the market, including destruction of processing plants, the prosecution and imprisonment of drug barons, and seizure of drugs at state borders. Drugs that do get through borders may still be incepted at street level. Long prison sentences and seizure of assets are designed to deter both traffickers and dealers.

Drug policy involves the cooperation of different countries' governments with the international community to reduce drug trafficking through the use of market forces backed up by the full force of state coercion and moral persuasion. Drug policy remains high on the domestic and international political agendas. The Mexican government is confronting a wave of violence in response to its determination to curb its drug cartels, while Afghanistan struggles with the Taliban insurgency, largely funded by the illegal opium crop.

See also *Crime Policy; Drug Cartels; Sentencing Policy.*

. . . .   SUE PRYCE

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Dual Citizenship and Dual Nationality

Dual citizenship describes the status of individuals holding citizenship status in more than one country. The status suffered severe historical disfavor. In recent years, however, dual citizenship has become increasingly common. A majority of countries now accepts the legitimacy of dual citizenship.

Dual citizenship results from the interplay of national rules relating to the acquisition of citizenship. Individuals can be

born with dual citizenship where their parents hold different nationalities or where they are born in a country other than that of parental nationality. Many countries now allow individuals to retain citizenship after acquiring the citizenship of another country through naturalization. A nontrivial number of individuals hold citizenship in more than two countries, giving rise to a phenomenon more accurately described as plural citizenship.

Recent acceptance contrasts with difficulties historically provoked by the status. During the nineteenth century, European states refused to recognize the naturalization of their subjects in the United States. This resulted in competing claims over immigrants and serious bilateral controversies, including the War of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain. Immigrants to the United States who visited their homelands often faced harassment by governments seeking to extract military service notwithstanding permanent relocation.

Because of the frictions triggered by dual nationals, states attempted to suppress the status. States were never able to eliminate dual nationality, because they were unwilling to harmonize nationality laws. However, they did adopt mechanisms to reduce the incidence of dual nationality. Many countries required individuals born with dual nationality to choose one or the other at age of majority (a so-called election requirement). By the end of the nineteenth century, most European states were terminating original nationality upon naturalization elsewhere. For instance, after 1870, British subjects who acquired citizenship in the United States lost their British nationality as a result of U.S. naturalization. Because dual nationality often resulted in duplicative national obligations (especially regarding military service), individuals also shared an interest in avoiding the status.

Dual nationality remained the object of scorn through much of the twentieth century. The status was often compared to bigamy. The mid-nineteenth-century American diplomat George Bancroft observed that states should "as soon tolerate a man with two wives as a man with two countries; as soon bear with polygamy as that state of double allegiance which common sense so repudiates that it has not even coined a word to express it." Teddy Roosevelt called dual nationality "a self-evident absurdity." Public perception of the status assumed the undesirability of divided allegiance and diminished loyalty. Although there were no notable cases of dual-national saboteurs, dual nationality conjured up the specter of shadowy fifth columns.

These associations were slow to dissipate. Massive migrations at the end of the twentieth century once again set up the possibility for a greater incidence of dual citizenship. In contrast to earlier periods, however, dual citizens no longer posed a particular threat to interstate relations. States grew more tolerant of the status, and transformed conceptions of national solidarities diluted the former identification of the status with disloyalty. This diminished the incentive for eligible individuals to avoid the status. As states grew less demanding in terms of obligations extracted from citizens, moreover, individuals could reap concrete and sentimental benefits from maintaining formal ties with more than one country.

Indeed, some states have moved beyond mere toleration of dual citizenship to full embrace. It is increasingly viewed as a tool for cementing diaspora populations. This is true among such established historical diasporas as the Irish and Italians, the homelands of which have loosened citizenship rules to allow for the nationality of third-generation emigrants. Many Americans have on that basis reclaimed the citizenship of their grandparents, reaping the travel, educational, and employment benefits that come with citizenship in European Union member states. Those who returned to Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the iron curtain typically retained citizenship in their adopted homelands, in many cases while assuming leadership positions in newly democratized states. Such immigrant-sending states as Mexico, Turkey, and the Philippines have also moved to encourage the status as they look to draw on the economic prosperity of emigrant communities and to mobilize them politically in their new states of residence.

Some important countries continue to buck the trend toward acceptance of dual citizenship, especially East Asian and African states. But there are now many millions of individuals who openly hold nationality in more than one country. Plural citizenship appears almost certain to emerge an irreversible incident of globalization.

See also *Citizenship; Immigration Policy.*

. . . .   PETER J. SPIRO

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Dual Executive

Among democratic political systems across the world, three models of organizing relations between the executive and legislative branches of government exist: parliamentary, presidential, and dual executive systems. In a *parliamentary system,* the executive consists of a cabinet that is headed by the prime minister and arises directly from the legislature. The cabinet is responsible to the legislative majority, which can dismiss the executive by means of a motion of no confidence. In *presidential systems,* on the other hand, a popularly elected president appoints and directs the cabinet. The executive and the legislature have separate popular mandates, and they are mutually independent for their survival in

office. *Dual executive systems* combine the central features of parliamentary and presidential systems by dividing executive authority between a popularly elected president and a cabinet that stems from, and is responsible to, the legislature.

In dual executive systems, there are two centers of executive power, each with its own popular mandate, although in the case of the cabinet, this runs indirectly through the legislature. Dual executive constitutional design occurs across the globe but is especially common in central and eastern Europe, where it was adopted on a large scale after the breakdown of communism. Contemporary examples of governments with dual executives are those of France, Portugal, Russia, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Mali, and Peru.

The distribution of power between the president and the cabinet varies considerably across dual executive systems. A president's constitutional role may be limited to the signing of international treaties and a weak presidential veto of legislation. However, there are also presidents who possess a much broader constitutional basis for interfering in executive affairs. But these constitutional differences explain only part of the actual power relations in a dual executive system. Custom and political circumstances may affect the balance of power between presidents and cabinets at least as profoundly and can produce variations through time. The nature of the parliamentary majority is especially important in this respect. Being dependent upon support from the legislature, the cabinet's position vis-à-vis the president may be stronger when the assembly majority is opposed to the president. On the other hand, if the legislative majority is supportive of the president, the latter's executive influence generally increases at the expense of the cabinet. Such shifts in power within otherwise stable constitutional systems are possible because of ambiguities in many dual executive constitutions.

The precise scope of presidential influence is often unspecified in dual executive constitutions, which means that the actual distribution of executive tasks between presidents and cabinets is dependent upon party politics and may become the subject of intraexecutive competition. These features make dual executive constitutional design flexible, yet at the same time prone to political instability, personal ambitions, and power concentration. The academic debate on the appropriateness of dual executive constitutional design is therefore unsettled.

See also *Cabinets and Cabinet Formation; Cohabitation; Consociational Democracy; Constitutional Systems, Comparative; Prime Minister (Head of Government).*

. . . .   JASPER DE RAADT

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Du Bois, William Edward Burghardt

William Edward Burghardt Du Bois (1868–1963) was a scholar, a political activist, and the leading African American thinker of his generation. Born in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, Du Bois spent most of his long career in the United States, but he moved to newly independent Ghana in 1961, invited by President Kwame Nkrumah to become editor of the *Encyclopedia Africana,* a project Du Bois had first proposed in 1909. After the U.S. Department of State refused to renew his passport, Du Bois became a Ghanaian citizen in the last year of his life. He died on August 27, 1963, on the eve of the march on Washington.

Du Bois graduated from Fisk College in 1888 and earned a second BA from Harvard University in 1890. He spent the years 1892 to 1894 in doctoral studies at the University of Berlin, returning to the United States to receive his PhD from Harvard in 1895. He taught briefly at Wilberforce College and then at Atlanta University from 1897 to 1910.

Du Bois's achievements include a share in founding the Niagara movement in 1906, its successor the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1909, and the Pan-African Congress in 1919. He edited the NAACP magazine *The Crisis* until 1934, building its circulation up to 100,000. His dissertation, *The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United States of America, 1638–1870* (1896), and his sociological study *The Philadelphia Negro* (1899) are still considered landmarks of scholarship.

Du Bois's best-known book, *The Souls of Black Folk* (1903), is a collection of essays, ranging from personal memoir to sociological study. It combines a rich evocation of the life and culture of the African American South with a masterfully orchestrated polemic against the political ideas and leadership of Booker T. Washington. Du Bois argued, contra Washington, for three key strategic points: that African Americans should demand the right to vote, resist the imposition of social segregation, and insist on access to a high-quality liberal arts education for the community's future leaders (those to whom he referred elsewhere as the "Talented Tenth"). His declaration that "the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line" and his description of himself as "an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder" did much to define African American political consciousness.

Other notable books—among many—include *Black Reconstruction in America* (1934), which portrayed the Reconstruction era as a struggle by the freed slaves, rather than an imposition by the North on the South; *Dusk of Dawn: An Autobiography of a Concept of Race* (1940), which describes the development of his thinking about African American liberation; and *Color and Democracy: Colonies and Peace* (1945), which articulated his Pan-Africanist vision.

After World War II (1939–1945), Du Bois grew increasingly disillusioned with the chance for change in America and saw

the Soviet Union as the bulwark of anticolonial struggle. He was indicted as a foreign agent but acquitted in 1951, denied a passport from 1952 through 1958, awarded the Lenin Peace Prize in 1959, and joined the Communist Party in 1961, when he was 93 and living in Ghana.

See also *Communism; NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund; Race and Racism; Washington, Booker T.*

. . . . JOHN C. BERG

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Due Process

Generally speaking, *due process* of law constitutes the normal course of legal administration through the courts or some other adjudicatory mechanism with the appropriate safeguards in place to protect individual rights. At the heart of due process is a framework of principles and rules that structure legal proceedings; this framework has been established over time and functions to ensure that private rights are shielded from improper infringement by the state or other private parties. The steady realization over time of the rule of law and the accompanying due process protections in liberal polities constitute two of the most important features distinguishing such polities from authoritarian regimes and otherwise illiberal governmental systems. Due process is a critical constraint and restriction on the ability of governing elites to run roughshod over fundamental liberties of individuals within a free society. It helps to ensure consistent and fair application of the law by minimizing the potential influence of capriciousness or arbitrariness on the part of government officials on such matters.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

An essential element of understanding due process is consideration of what procedures, at a minimum, are necessary to guarantee proper protections. A constituent aspect of due process is the presence of a valid tribunal with the jurisdictional authority to hear and resolve the dispute in question, be it a criminal prosecution or a civil litigation. As mandated in two provisions of the U.S. Constitution, any legal proceeding that involves potential deprivation of life, liberty, or property necessitates due process of law protections. The Fifth Amendment lays out this requirement for the federal government, and the Fourteenth Amendment does the same for state governments.

The U.S. Supreme Court has engaged this very question of what level of process is due and sufficient in any given set of circumstances (e.g., a criminal prosecution, a civil litigation, a hearing on the continuation or termination of government benefits for an individual, an adjudication on the legality of a government employee being dismissed). The two major cases in this area are *Goldberg v. Kelly* (1970) and *Mathews v. Eldridge*

(1976). These two cases emanate from the administrative law context, but they have been drawn upon in subsequent court decisions as guiding precedent in other areas of the law where adjudicative procedures come into play.

In *Goldberg,* the Court laid out the prominent components of due process, and they are as follows: Persons who will be directly affected by a tribunal's decision will

- Be present at the tribunal's proceedings
- Receive timely and adequate notice of the charges against them
- Be able to make an informed decision to contest the legal actions being taken against them or to submit to/accept the actions
- Be able to engage in confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses
- Have an opportunity to present their own witnesses
- Have an opportunity to address the tribunal's fact finder or decision maker (judge or jury) orally
- Have the right to have legal counsel present and to assist as wished.

In addition, the tribunal's decision will be on the record, there will be an explanation of the decision, and there must be an impartial decision maker. For due process to be considered operative, there can be no presumption of guilt or liability by the tribunal decision maker—findings of guilt or liability must be proven by legally obtained evidence, and the tribunal's decision must be sustained by the evidence presented during the proceedings. At the foundation of due process of law is the notion of fundamental fairness, with the result being a resolution of the dispute in question based in true justice.

The subsequent *Mathews* decision built upon *Goldberg,* and it established the three-factor modern rule that governs all determinations of whether the due process provided is sufficient. One must consider (1) the importance of the private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest under the required procedures and the likely reduction of that risk by requiring more or different procedures, and (3) the government's interest in using the required procedure, as opposed to more or different procedures and the burdens those varying procedures place upon the government. The Court's own words at the end of its decision in *Mathews* are instructive:

> The essence of due process is the requirement that a person in jeopardy of serious loss be given notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it. All that is necessary is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to the "capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard," to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present their case.

In other words, the Court in *Mathews* makes a point of moving away from the presumption in favor of judicial-type procedures, as *Goldberg* laid out, and toward a more flexible orientation toward what could constitute a fair procedure, so long as the individual affected had a realistic prospect to attend to the issues at hand.

The Miranda warning informs people of their constitutional rights after being taken into police custody. The warning is one of several measures taken after rulings from the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the due process of law.

Considerations of procedural due process have become particularly salient in the wake of the American war on terror after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington D.C., with subsequent questions arising over the treatment, interrogation, and prosecution of alleged terrorists. What level of due process is "due" to this type of detainee? This necessarily brings into play a variety of accompanying concerns ranging from ensuring national security to not hindering ongoing military operations to respecting basic human rights to providing fair trials to demonstrating fidelity to international agreements on the treatment of foreign hostiles. This is a challenging question indeed, with the need to weigh and balance competing values and compelling opposing arguments in trying to determine what level of due process protections is warranted. The use of military commissions to try suspected terrorists at the American naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is at the forefront of this debate.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

There is a second type of due process, commonly referred to as substantive due process. *Procedural due process,* as presented above, is relatively straight-forward—if certain protocols are followed, then due process is considered to have been successfully followed. *Substantive due process,* in comparison, is less clear-cut conceptually and has a more subjective quality to it than procedural due process, but its implications have had an extraordinarily influential role in the conduct of American law and politics from the late 1800s onward. The creation, decline, and subsequent resurgence of substantive due process speaks to the substantial impact of Supreme Court decisions on the social, economic, and political life of the United States.

At the heart of substantive due process is a focus on the substance of legislation enacted by a state or the federal government. Is that legislative enactment or government action fair, reasonable, and nonarbitrary in its content as well as in its

implementation? If not, according to this type of due process, then the courts need to strike it down as unconstitutional, because it violates the due process clause. So this is a much more expansive and broad view of the constitutional guarantees surrounding deprivations of life, liberty, and property. With substantive due process, there are simply some regulations that the government cannot legitimately engage in, because, by their very nature, they are unfair and arbitrary intrusions into persons' rights to life, liberty, and property. Thus, the Supreme Court has drawn upon the notion of due process to discover or recognize rights that are deemed to be fundamental and that receive very high levels of constitutional protection. The concept of substantive due process was initially launched by the Supreme Court in *Lochner v. New York* (1905), and from then on for several decades, the Court manifested a strong tendency to strike down a variety of state laws on due process and similar constitutional grounds. In *Lochner,* the Court rejected as an abridgment of the "liberty of contract" a New York state law that limited the number of hours bakers could work on a weekly basis—this "liberty" abridgment for the Court was a due process violation.

The *Lochner* era demonstrated the Court's willingness to strike down any number of state laws that impacted economic relationships. This trend abated when the membership on the Court changed in the 1930s, as President Franklin Roosevelt appointed justices who abandoned this orientation toward economic regulation, and substantive due process ended up submerging for a time. It reappeared in the 1960s as a mechanism for the Supreme Court in legitimizing and validating a wide array of noneconomic interests, most notably the right to privacy, as established in *Griswold v. Connecticut* (1965), which serves as the foundation for the Court's decision that abortion rights are constitutionally protected as declared in *Roe v. Wade* (1973). Prominent examples of the continuing impact of the right to privacy are seen in the subsequent and highly controversial cases of *Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey* (1992), in which the Court modified the *Roe* ruling but still maintained constitutional protection for abortion, and *Lawrence v. Texas* (2003), where the Court found homosexual conduct to be constitutionally protected. This idea that there are certain fundamental rights that the government cannot intrude upon is constitutionally operationalized through this method of substantive due process. The debate remains highly contentious over the appropriateness of such a mode of constitutional interpretation, with critics arguing that the Court is both fabricating rights that are nowhere mentioned or envisioned in the Constitution and is not showing proper deference to enactments by the elected branches as well.

See also *Constitutional Law; Supreme Court.*

. . . . STEPHEN R. ROUTH

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Duration Model

Duration models explain the longevity of a process or predict when an event will occur. These models are also referred to as *survival, failure time,* and *event history* models by various disciplines. Such models are uniquely suited to address questions about when an event will occur, since originally they were used to study how long light bulbs last, and, therefore, they provide an appropriate set of tools for similar applications. Analysis is based on the estimation of a *survival function*—the probability that a certain process will last at least a certain number of time periods, and a *hazard rate function*—the probability that the process will end at a particular time, given that it has lasted for at least a certain number of time periods.

There are nonparametric and parametric approaches to estimate a survival function. For example, Kaplan Meier's nonparametric estimates of a survival function are derived by writing the survival function for discrete data as the product of the conditional probabilities of surviving in each time period. Duration models in political science are widely used to investigate questions on the duration of a justice's career (American politics), the duration of a militarized interstate conflict (international relations), the survival of a political regime (comparative politics), and many other questions.

See also *Event History and Duration Modeling.*

. . . . TATIANA VASHCHILKO

Duration Modeling
See *Event History and Duration Modeling.*

Durkheim, Émile

Together with August Comte, Émile Durkheim (1858–1914) is often considered the founder of sociology. Durkheim's significance is also felt in anthropology, philosophy, religious studies, and political science. His four major works are *Division of Labor in Society* (1893), *The Rules of the Sociological Method* (1895), *Suicide* (1897), and *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912). The principle argument that connects all these books is this: As societies (his Euro-centrist perspective is often criticized) enter into a transition from feudalism to capitalism, what are the social consequences for the individual as well as for society? How can a society afford individuals greater freedom of choice without undermining their attachment to institutions? Hence, integration, and how it is reproduced, is Durkheim's central concern.

Moreover, as religion loses its historic function as the dominant ethical and moral force by which individuals develop as well as receive "social integration," societies are increasingly challenged to develop a secular alternative to religion. To be sure, Durkheim did not think that the emerging modern secular society is any less moralistic than the premodern religious society. However, to the degree to which new integrative mechanisms fail or function insufficiently, the individual and society will have to pay a price. Thus, at the individual level, suicide may increase (as indeed it has), while at the level of society, anomie (normlessness) or the "forced division of labor" (coerced social cohesion or, simply, class conflict) may ensue.

Durkheim is sometimes considered the first "functionalist." *Functionalism* can be described as a school of thought that takes as one premise that societies tend to produce their own equilibrium and that economic, political, legal, and cultural (including here religious) institutions have corrective abilities, perhaps even a mandate, should a society deviate "too much" from its normal state of affairs. Exactly "how much" too much is, or what, exactly, the "normal course" or direction of a society is, Durkheim never states explicitly. However, in *The Division of Labor in Society,* he goes to great lengths to distinguish the "normal" from the "pathological," and in so doing reveals an ontological position not unlike that of, say, late nineteenth-century biology (and its influence on social theorists such as Schäffle).

In the United States, no one has built on Durkheim's work more extensively than Talcott Parsons. Parsons's structural functionalism was perhaps the most influential theoretical paradigm in the social sciences in the 1950s and certainly influenced an entire generation of political scientists. Yet other scholars have taken Durkheim's ideas quite some place else. Philippe Schmitter, for example, was one of the earliest to see useful parallels between corporatism and Durkheim's arguments in *The Division of Labor.* In turn, scholars who found corporatism a useful concept were themselves influencing later scholarship that focused on the breakdown of democracy, and, roughly, a decade later, on the transition to democracy. Durkheim's work has thus proven to be of enduring relevance.

What is more, in light of recent debates around the clash of civilizations, Durkheim's theories on religion and his attempt to establish a "science of morality" invite important comparisons between, on the one hand, late nineteenth-century social theory as an incipient social and empirical science with its own distinct methodology vis-à-vis the established field of philosophy, and, on the other hand, early twenty-first-century debates (as well as searches for common grounds) dealing with the intersection of religion and political democracy (and/or theology and political science).

See also *Comte, Auguste; Functionalism; Parsons, Talcott.*

. . . .   VOLKER K. FRANK

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Duverger's Law

Formulated in 1956 by French political scientist Maurice Duverger, *Duverger's Law* states that the simple-majority single-ballot system favors the two-party system. From this law Duverger derived a hypothesis that the simple-majority double-ballot system and proportional representation favor multipartyism. Both Duverger's Law and hypothesis suggest a kind of "institutional determinism," in which a specific set of electoral rules create a particular party system.

There are two main classical controversies concerning the validity of Duverger's Law. First, political scientists have not unanimously approved the direction of causality from electoral systems to party systems. Second, the sociological perspective postulates that not the electoral system but rather the number and type of social cleavages in a society primarily determine the party system. More recent scholarship has tried to combine the institutional and the sociological perspectives. In heterogeneous countries with cross-cutting cleavages such as Canada, simple plurality rule does not lead to a two-party system at the national level. Yet, at the district level, Duverger's hypothesis generally holds; the large majority of districts in single plurality systems are dominated by two parties. *Strategic voting*—voters might desert all candidates except the two top placed contenders (M+1 rule)—and *elite coordination*—elites may retire hopeless candidacies—account for the better fit of Duverger's Law at the district level.

See also *Ballot Design; Political Parties; Voting Behavior.*

. . . .   DANIEL STOCKEMER

Dyarchy

See *Dual Executive.*

Eckstein, Harry

Harry Eckstein (1924–1999) was born in Schotten, Germany. Eckstein, who was Jewish, was brought to the United States when he was twelve as part of the exodus from Nazi Germany that became known as the One Thousand Children. This was a program administered by the U.S. government that brought intellectually gifted children to the United States. While his sister, Ilsa, eventually escaped from Germany, the rest of his family perished in the Holocaust.

Eckstein spent his adolescent years in Columbus, Ohio. He then attended Harvard University, where he received his bachelor's degree (1948, summa cum laude), master's degree (1950), and doctorate (1953) in political science.

He began his teaching career at Harvard University as an instructor and then as an assistant professor (1954–1958). Eckstein then moved to Princeton (1959–1980), where he became the IBM Professor of International Studies in 1969. In 1980, he moved to the University of California, Irvine, where he taught until his death in 1999.

His dissertation was published as *The English Health Service* (1958). He followed this with his study of the British Medical Association, which was published as *Pressure Group Politics* (1958). In *A Theory of Stable Democracy* (1961), Eckstein presented what he called "congruence theory," which states that governments perform well to the extent that their authority patterns are congruent with the authority patterns of other units of society. Later works include *Internal War* (1964), *Division and Cohesion in Democracy* (1966), *Patterns of Authority* (1975), *Regarding Politics* (1992), and *Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?* (1998). Eckstein's contributions to the field of political science include his work on interest groups, his work on civil strife, and his use of case studies to explain comparative politics.

Eckstein was a political scientist who argued that the authority patterns in a society were a critical variable in determining whether democracy would succeed in a nation-state.

See also *Interest Groups and Lobbies; Politics, Comparative.*

. . . . JEFFREY KRAUS

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Ecological Analysis

Ecological analysis is an effort to incorporate environmental and natural science notions into traditional political analysis. It is based on the premise that the study of government and societies can be enhanced by progress in understanding the planet's ecology. Ecological analysis argues that most existing political ideologies are based on the acquisition and exploitation of natural resources to improve the standard of living of the ideologies' respective societies or to increase their military or economic security. Because of the drive to gain resources, groups developed stratified societies in which elites established control over, first, agricultural production and, later, industrial production. As agriculture spread, there was a concurrent expansion in the population. Some scholars trace ecological analysis to the work of Thomas Malthus, who blamed population growth on poverty and impoverishment. The result of these aggressive, resource-exploitive ideologies was highly stratified societies, even among political philosophies such as Marxism and Leninism, which sought egalitarianism. Elites were able to gain control of surpluses and use those additional resources to bolster their political and economic power. In contrast, political structures based on sustainable development and environmentally friendly practices will result in more egalitarian and balanced societies.

See also *Biology and Political Science; Equality and Inequality; Leninism; Marxism; Sociobiology and Politics.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Ecological Fallacy

The ecological fallacy is a concept first introduced in 1950 by William S. Robinson in a paper published in the *American Sociological Review.* Through a statistical analysis of the relationship between immigration and literacy rates, he illustrates that we cannot extend patterns found at the aggregate level to make inferences about individuals. He finds that being foreign born correlates positively with a lower literacy level. At the aggregate level, however, he finds that the higher the population of immigrants in a state, the higher is the literacy rate in that state. His analysis illustrates that if we extend the findings at the aggregate level to the individual level, we would incorrectly conclude that a given foreign-born individual would be more literate rather than less literate.

In *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research,* Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba warn against the dangers of the ecological fallacy and suggest that in general, if one is seeking to draw conclusions at the individual level, one ought to look at individual-level data. However, they do note that there are circumstances in which obtaining and analyzing data at another level of aggregation is useful, for example, when individual-level data are not available and when our theory has implications at more than one level of analysis. In these circumstances, they suggest, we can best determine the reliability of our theory by obtaining as much information as possible, at all levels of analysis. Gary King's later (1997) path-breaking work deals with the problems of the ecological fallacy in more depth. In his book, *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data,* King demonstrates the inability of previous statistical models to accurately capture the impact of aggregate-level variables and introduces a new statistical model that is able to overcome some of the methodological problems associated with ecological inferences. King continues to argue (as he did with Keohane and Verba in 1994) that more information available to the researcher is better (at all levels of aggregation) as it can help to increase the robustness and reliability of our findings.

See also *Quantitative Analysis; Statistical Analysis.*

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Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

Rights in moral philosophy and political theory are understood as justified claims. A right is an entitlement of a person or group to some good, service, or liberty. Rights create correlative obligations or duties, usually on the part of the state, to secure or to not interfere with the enjoyment of that entitlement.

Human rights are a special class of rights—the rights one has by virtue of being a human being. Human rights are predicated on the recognition of the intrinsic value and worth of all human beings. As such, human rights are considered to be universal, vested equally in all persons regardless of their gender, race, nationality, economic status, or social position. Cumulatively, human rights represent the minimum conditions for a decent society.

Economic, social, and cultural rights encompass the economic, social, and cultural benefits, services, and protections that have received widespread acceptance as legal entitlements. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, enumerates two categories of human rights: (1) the civil and political rights with which most Americans are familiar and (2) economic, social, and cultural rights. Subsequent international and regional human rights instruments based on the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are legally binding on countries that ratify them. The countries thus become states parties bound by their provisions.

BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is the major international human rights instrument setting forth internationally recognized economic, social, and cultural rights. Relevant rights incorporated in the covenant include the following:

- the right of all peoples to self-determination through freely pursuing their economic, social, and cultural development (article 1.1) and controlling their natural wealth and resources (article 1.2);
- the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favorable conditions of work (article 7), specifically fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value; safe and healthy working conditions; and equal opportunity for promotion;
- the right of everyone to form trade unions and the right of each person to join the trade union of his or her choice (article 8), which includes the right of trade unions to function freely and to strike;
- the recognition that the widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family (article 10), encompassing special protection to mothers before and after childbirth, including paid leave or leave with adequate social security benefits and measures to protect children and young persons from economic and social exploitation;
- the right to an adequate standard of living (article 11), including adequate food, clothing, and housing and the improvement of living conditions;
- the right of everyone to be free from hunger (article 11.2), which directs states to improve methods of production, conservation, and distribution of food by making full use

of technical and scientific knowledge, reforming agrarian systems, and ensuring an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relationship to need;

- the right to enjoyment of the highest attainable standards of physical and mental health (article 12), with a mandate that states take measures to provide for the reduction of infant mortality; the prevention, treatment, and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational, and other diseases; and the creation of conditions that would ensure medical services and medical attention to all in the event of sickness;
- the right to education (article 13), which states that primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all and that secondary education in its different forms shall be made generally available and accessible—article 13 also requires states parties to respect the liberty of parents and legal guardians to choose for their children schools other than those established by the public authorities—and
- three types of cultural and scientific rights (grouped together in article 15): the right to take part in cultural life; the recognition of the moral and material rights of authors, scientists, and artists; and the right to the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.

Acknowledging that it may not be possible for all states parties to realize immediately the full provisions of all of these rights, the standard the covenant uses is "progressive realization." Article 2.1 of the covenant directs states parties to take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, to the maximum of their available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present covenant by all appropriate means. Nevertheless, progressive realization over a period of time does not eliminate states parties' obligations to fulfill these rights. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, an expert body that reviews the performance of states parties, interprets the provisions of the covenant to require states parties to have a specific and continuing obligation to move expeditiously and effectively toward full realization of all the rights enumerated in the covenant. The committee also interprets the covenant to impose various obligations that have immediate effect, including core obligations related to each specific right.

PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS

The following is a list of the major international and regional human rights instruments that enumerate economic, social, and cultural rights, with the years they came into force:

- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976);
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969);
- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1981);
- Convention on the Right of the Child (1990);
- American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (1948);
- European Social Charter (Revised; 1965); and
- African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1986).

The constitutions of many countries also have provisions modeled on the economic, social, and cultural rights enumerated in the international and regional instruments. Some are in the form of directive principles of state policy that set forth goals rather than enforceable rights. Others, particularly more recently drafted constitutions such as the 1996 South African constitution, have bills of rights that recognize a broad array of socioeconomic rights.

Virtually all countries have ratified at least one international and/or regional human rights instrument that enumerates some economic, social, and cultural rights, and many also have constitutional or legal provisions stipulating rights protections and entitlements. However, in most states these rights are only partially implemented for a variety of reasons: insufficient resources, lack of political will, global economic pressures and commitments, and weak political institutions. Nevertheless, the existence of these rights commitments provides a normative framework for enlightened political actors and a basis for political mobilization and legal action. It is sometimes observed that human rights are claimed through mobilization from the bottom and not granted from the top, and that certainly is the case with regard to economic, social, and cultural rights.

See also *Civil and Political Rights; Cultural Rights; Human Rights; Universal Declaration of Human Rights.*

. . . .   AUDREY R. CHAPMAN

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Economic Development

See *Development, Economic.*

Economic Development, State-led

State-led economic development is an institutional approach to development emerging from cold war–era debates about how poor countries can achieve economic development. Drawn largely from the experiences of successful developing

countries in Asia, state-led development is now a more coherently defined approach that late-developing countries draw on as they navigate the post–cold war era of economic globalization. Situated between the theoretical assumptions of laissez-faire economics and centrally planned command economics, the concept of state-led economic development begins with the claim that effective state institutions and deliberate policy interventions can contribute to a country's capitalist-based development by guiding markets to achieve particular economic goals. Two assumptions underpin the philosophical justification of this claim: first, on one end of the economic spectrum is a basic mistrust of self-regulating free markets to achieve developmental goals; second, on the other end of the spectrum is a conviction that states are incapable of efficiently allocating production through a centrally planned mechanism and must rely on market incentives.

For proponents of state-led strategies, economic development (as distinguished from economic growth) is viewed as the expansion of the economy to increase the aggregate welfare of society and improve the standard of living of a country's population. State intervention in capitalist markets through deliberate planning and responses to market changes—or what political scientist Atul Kohli (2004) refers to as a state's "market-reinforcing behavior"—is therefore the central concern of a state-led approach to overall economic development. State-led economic development is thus more than Keynesian-style macroeconomic management. It includes a measured role by the state to develop industrial policy and regulate trade and investment for the economic benefit of domestic firms and producers. Close ties between government and big business are a crucial feature of such state-led strategies, as is the close management of labor politics by the state.

IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

The ideas of Alexander Hamilton and nineteenth-century German philosopher Frederich List are considered early influences on theories of state-led economic development. The post–World War II rise in the liberal international trading system among industrialized countries, which viewed that state intervention is inimical to market-based development, and the rise of neo-Marxist dependency theory across the developing world, along with its emphasis on class influences rather than state autonomy, led to a decline in scholarly interest in the study of state-led economic development until the emergence of Asian economies in the 1970s and 1980s. Theorists have since used analytical approaches from comparative political economy, historical institutionalism, and statist (i.e., state-theoretical) approaches to advance literature on the subject.

In practice, state-led economic development is most closely associated with the successful economic development of Japan and the newly industrialized countries of Asia, including post-1979 China, where state leaders have employed gradualism in transitioning from central planning to state-led markets. It is also correctly associated with the experiences—and more mixed results—of other developing countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and India, where attempts have been made under conditions of less state autonomy. Many development failures

in the resource-based countries of sub-Saharan Africa are also attributed to bungled attempts of state-led economic development. Among economically advanced countries, forms of state-led economic development have evolved somewhat organically as social partnerships between state, business, and labor grew to define the political economy of European welfare states such as France, Sweden, and more recently Ireland. Japan's economic downturn in the 1990s and the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis dampened enthusiasm for state-led development strategies, but mixed economies still prevail globally. Multilateral provisions established by the World Trade Organization in the 1990s now inhibit the use of certain policies associated with state-led strategies, however. In particular, the agreements on Trade-Related Investment Measures and the General Agreement on Trade in Services target specific practices states have used to favor domestic producers over foreign interests.

State intervention in the economy, involving close ties with big business, creates political hazards. In some cases, institutions and policies have been fashioned to benefit state elites at the expense of other groups and overall development. Where state autonomy is especially weak, or where economies are based heavily on natural resources, state-led approaches often succumb to rent-seeking, patrimonialism, and predatory behavior. Even in economically successful Asian countries, a consequence of state-led economic development has been ongoing revelations about high-level corruption among state officials collaborating with private-sector cronies. Politically destabilizing public corruption scandals involving presidents, prime ministers, and major political parties punctuate the recent political history of South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Thailand, for example.

INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESS

With respect to the state, theorists of state-led development do not view the state as a unitary actor but rather as a set of institutions embedded in history, culture, and various context-specific influences. In observing the multiple contexts in which state-led development strategies are attempted, scholars vary in identifying the specific factors that push leaders to pursue a state-led approach. Some scholars, including Kohli, argue deeper historical factors, colonial experience, and cultural context influence the trajectories of states, whereas others, such as Stephan Haggard, identify more proximate factors, the "critical historical junctures" such as domestic economic crises and international economic shocks, as the key stimuli inducing a "politically motivated choice" by leaders to shift toward greater state intervention in the economy (Haggard 1990, 3–4).

Greater consensus exists among scholars on the significance of institutional arrangements in determining the success of state-led development strategies once they are adopted. Among the range of approaches taken by states, some form of indicative planning generally characterizes state-led involvement in markets. State authorities, intending to complement market forces and influence both the macroeconomic and

the microeconomic environments, use indicative planning to facilitate more rational decision making among leaders of the private and public sectors in the pursuit of agreed-on national goals. The success of state-led economic development thus hinges on how the politics of a state is organized and how state power is used, or in other words, on the patterns of state authority that influence the economic context within which private economic decisions are made.

State planning, however, is not enough to determine successful development. In a multiauthored study dedicated to the question of successful development strategies titled *In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth* (2003), Dani Rodrik and colleagues demonstrate how the type and quality of institutions also influence the success of state-led development. The foundations of long-term growth, according to the study, are tied to how well economic incentives are aligned with social costs and benefits, a state's bureaucratic capacity, the quality of its regulatory structures, property rights enforcement, law and order, and conflict management. The study's findings also emphasize how "good institutions" must enable social and political stability, be "highly specific to a country's circumstances," and deliberately generate market-oriented incentives for current and future investors (Rodrik 2003, 10). Thus, the quality of institutions, not simply their creation or presence, influences the success of state-led economic development strategies in the long term.

See also *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Third World Debt.*

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Economic Interdependence

Economic interdependence is a concept from the international political economy area of study, and it relates to the level of interconnectedness between two nation-states. The idea of political economy dates back to the birth of liberalism in the seventeenth century and is further discussed by eighteenth-century European philosophers Immanuel Kant, Baron de Montesquieu, and Adam Smith. The modern discussion of economic interdependence dates primarily to the 1970s. States may be dependent on each other for trade and investments but may also be sensitive and vulnerable to events and trends in the global economy. The world financial crises of 1997 and 2009 are contemporary evidence demonstrating the large degree of economic dependence between states and the global economy, as these financial crises spread like a contagion from state to state. States today are typically economically interdependent on other states, although the degree of dependence varies across states. North Korea is relatively isolated and is the least economically dependent state in the global economy, whereas small export-based economies, such as Singapore's, rank as highly dependent on other states.

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye's *Power and Interdependence* (2001) discusses two dimensions of interdependence: sensitivity and vulnerability. Some nation-states may be sensitive to events or trends in other states and thus alter their domestic and foreign policies in response. However, states that are highly interdependent economically may be vulnerable to shifts in the global economy and the specific economic actions taken by sensitive states. As such, the level of economic interdependence between states may not be symmetric. For example, one state may be highly dependent on and thus vulnerable to another state for energy, such as Ukraine has been vis-à-vis Russia in recent years. In this situation, Ukraine is vulnerable to any fuel embargo by Russia, which provides political leverage for the latter.

HISTORICAL OBSTACLES TO THE CONCEPT

The conception of economic interdependence was obstructed first by imperialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and then by the Great Depression in 1929 and the cold war from 1945 to 1991. Levels of economic interdependence between states were extant but low leading into the twentieth century. There was hope by economic and political liberals such as Norman Angell (1933) that economic interdependence would bind states together peacefully, but this hope was dashed by the onset of World War I (1914–1918) and the Great Depression, followed by World War II (1939–1945). Still, policy makers in the leading capitalist states, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, identified the lack of cooperation between liberal states in the face of economic interdependence during the Great Depression. As World War II was coming to a close, the existing liberal economic regime, led by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Allied nations was established to manage the postwar world. Key western leaders and policy makers had come to the conclusion that World War II was potentially incited by the breakdown of economic cooperation among major European nations.

In addition, the Great Depression was exacerbated by the major global economic powers' raising tariffs against each other in the hope of obtaining external revenue to fix their own economic problems, which led to a collapse in international trade. Therefore, the postwar Bretton Woods system devised by representatives of the forty-four Allied nations

fostered global monetary and financial coordination through the International Monetary Fund, reconstruction and development through the World Bank, and free trade through the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. These three multinational corporations helped to dramatically increase the level of international trade and investment worldwide and thus increased economic interdependence worldwide.

While the new postwar economic policies and practices led to much higher levels of economic interdependence between global states, the concept of economic interdependence remained unnoticed or irrelevant by many political scientists during the cold war for two reasons. The first is that the specter of nuclear holocaust and the cold war arms race drew attention to policies related to military strength, acquisition, and security. The second is that because Marxist-Leninist theory and rhetoric provided a connection between economics and politics, the discussion of this nexus became stigmatized as radical and class based. However, the Vietnam War from 1959 to 1975 demonstrated military prowess did not equate to economic immunity as the oil crises, discontinuation of the gold standard to back currencies, hyperinflation, and the economic stagnation of the 1970s led to a renewed recognition that even the military powers of the world were sensitive and vulnerable to trends or fluctuations in the global economy.

CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the concept of economic interdependence is intermixed with the term *globalization*. While the economic dependence of states has grown in the past sixty years, so have the global connections between people as a consequence of significant increases in direct foreign investments, portfolio investments, trade, telecommunication technologies, and foreign travel. This growth in economic interdependence is a by-product of classical liberalism, emphasizing free economic markets and trade with limited government oversight, returning to the economic theories emerging in the eighteenth century, and moving away from the broader theoretical perspectives of realism and Marxism in international relations theory at times witnessed in the twentieth century. Thus, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs was replaced by the member states in 1995 in an effort to improve the enforcement of international free trade through the creation of the World Trade Organization. Furthermore, the emergence of economic integration treaties and regional organizations as characterized by the 1993 European Union model reinforces modern liberalism concepts. While the European Union created a single common market for goods, labor, and investments contributing to prosperity, it also provided a means for the once war-prone European states to form common preferences and negotiate peace terms. Similarly, examples of geopolitical organizations are the Gulf Cooperation Council, formed in 1981, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, formed in 1967. The Gulf Cooperation Council continues to seek to strengthen economic cooperation among its six member states in areas of agriculture, industry, investment, security, and trade. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations aims not only to accelerate economic growth across its ten participating countries but to serve as a platform to jointly settle domestic instability or foreign political intervention. However, there is still debate about whether the growth in economic interdependence in particular and globalization more generally are beneficial.

Current debates about economic interdependence surround issues relating to world peace, prosperity, and democratic stability. Recent U.S. leaders, such as Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, and some international scholars argue economic interdependence contributes to world peace by making military conflicts between states too costly. In contrast, realists tend to argue that current patterns of economic interdependence reinforce the power of the major power states in the world and the prospect for future wars is not reduced. Marxists point out that although there have been increases in total wealth in the world economy, there is still a gap between the rich and poor states of the world because of exploitation by multinational corporations, including the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund. Last, some academics and policy makers debate whether economic interdependence makes some states, specifically third world or developing nations, more politically unstable and/or unable to sustain democracy by their vulnerability to global economic and market trends.

See also *Democratic Peace; Dependency Theory; Globalism; Globalization; Interdependence; International Political Economy; International Relations; World Trade Organization (WTO).*

. . . .   CHARLES R. BOEHMER

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Economic Peace

See *Economic Interdependence.*

Economic Policy Formulation

In the Western democracies, following World War II (1939–1945), there emerged rather rapidly a consensus among most governments that the general reliance on market forces, which historically had dominated processes of economic policy formulation, would need to be replaced by approaches to economic governance that would incorporate much more active and systematic state economic intervention. This shift

in policy orientation was for the most part driven by the desire to avoid a return to the kinds of economic conditions that prevailed during the Great Depression of the 1930s—conditions that for many could be attributed in large part to prevailing laissez-faire policy orientations. Widespread citizen support for more government economic intervention was notably revealed by the dramatic increase in electoral support enjoyed by parties of the left in many countries in the immediate postwar period. Of note here was the impressive victory in Britain by the Labour Party in the general election of 1945. For Labour—and other like-minded parties in the capitalist democracies—the adoption of new strategies for state-managed capitalism seemed to have become both appropriate economically and viable politically. At issue of course was the question of which specific types of policy strategies would be adopted given the new state commitment to economic interventionism. It is here that the theoretical work of the great British economist John Maynard Keynes would prove critical.

THE KEYNESIAN CONSENSUS

The policies advocated by Keynes proved quite popular for the working-class parties in the 1950s and 1960s. As a system of economic governance, Keynesianism, when implemented, seemed to address effectively free market capitalism's periodic recessionary tendencies (which for Keynes generated unnecessary individual economic hardship and instability) while leaving largely intact the central values of entrepreneurial capitalism, most notably its reliance on private ownership of the means of production. For Keynes, governments could manage capitalism and promote continuous economic growth through the effective, systematic utilization of a variety of fiscal and monetary policy instruments. Particularly crucial here was Keynes's suggestion that governments could counter the initial stages of downward cycles by using public funds on socially beneficial projects. Such spending would stimulate private-sector economic activity such that high levels of aggregate effective demand and hence full employment could be rapidly reconstituted.

Politically, Keynesianism would effectively legitimize permanent, systematic state management of the capitalist economy. This left many analysts to conclude that Keynesianism represented a new form of democratic capitalism through which democratically elected governments could use Keynesian demand-management policies to promote increased economic prosperity for all societal classes.

The economic prosperity associated with the three decades following World War II throughout the industrial democracies is attributed by many to the widespread and successful implementation of Keynesian policies. The massive growth allowed for the creation of generous social welfare systems in many countries as well as an unprecedented level of employment security for middle- and working-class constituencies. Meanwhile, capitalists were placated by the maintenance of economic conditions that were conducive to consistent profitability and low inflation.

This general contentment is reflected in the political science and economics literature of the era. Authors such as Harold Wilensky, Anthony Crosland, and Andrew Shonfield shared the view that a Keynesian consensus—one characterized by a widespread acceptance as legitimate of Keynesian economics and welfare statism—had emerged and that the social conflict characteristic of prewar capitalist societies was rapidly declining. In short, most scholars, by the early 1970s, were of the assumption that a process of convergence in economic and social policy formulation was well under way.

This convergence theory and widespread optimism concerning the future of advanced capitalism was of course short-lived, as the oil shocks of the 1970s created a sustained period of economic stagnation coupled with relatively high rates of inflation. This stagflation proved difficult to counter with traditional Keynesian policies. Indeed, by the end of the decade it seemed clear to governments and scholars alike that Keynesianism, at least on its own, was no longer viable as a system of economic governance. The 1980s, then, witnessed widespread and significant shifts in state economic policy strategies. Of note here was the distinct lack of consensus concerning what the most appropriate post-Keynesian policy solutions might be. This period of general economic decline, and the divergent state policy responses to it, generated an unprecedented level of interest among political scientists in issues related to economic policy formulation in both industrial societies and developing nations.

POLICY AND THEORETICAL DIVERGENCE

In the current post-Keynesian era, government economic policy strategies have tended to be guided by one of three general economic management theories: monetarism, supply-side economics, and industrial policy. Monetarism focuses on containing inflation through tight monetary policies and strict controls on government spending. It is believed that by keeping inflation intact, governments can create an economic environment most suitable for long-term, sustained, market-led growth.

Supply-side theory, meanwhile, advances the notion that by lowering tax rates, particularly for wealthy individuals and corporations, governments can encourage increased private-sector investment in such things as plants and equipment and stimulate higher levels of consumer spending. Another key component of the supply-side doctrine is governmental deregulation. By reducing regulatory burdens on business, governments can act to promote still further investment.

Unlike the distinctly market-based orientations of monetarism and supply-side economics, industrial policy advocates using a myriad of government policy instruments—tax credits, low-interest loans, subsidies, direct grants, administrative assistance, indicative economic planning—to achieve state-established economic policy objectives. While sharing with Keynesianism the notion that governments have a legitimate role in managing capitalism, industrial policy is notably microeconomic in focus. Whereas Keynes believed that individual economic actors would act in accordance with macroeconomic stimulus policies, industrial policy is geared toward developing specific objectives and using specific policy instruments for individual firms or industries depending on their unique needs or circumstances.

Political scientists, as suggested, became increasingly interested in the issue of economic policy formulation as governments scrambled to implement policies associated with one or more of the above economic management theories following the collapse of the Keynesian consensus. Much of this interest has been reflected in the theoretical work produced to explain the specific policy options that individual governments have eventually chosen. This literature has tended to focus on those variables that have been most influential in shaping these eventual choices. Some scholars, such as Francis Castles, have focused on the significance of political parties, noting, as an example, that the political ascendance of business parties in such countries as Britain and the United States during the 1980s allowed for the adoption of monetarist and supply-side strategies, respectively. Meanwhile, where left parties retained political power, Keynesian policies were more likely to be augmented with industrial policy instruments.

Other political scientists have focused on what is said to be a critical relationship between interest group structures and economic policy choices. Among others, Peter Katzenstein's work has been seminal in this regard. Katzenstein has shown how the corporatist policy-making systems (which are characterized by the direct, formal participation by labor unions and business associations in economic policy making) of Western Europe's smaller democracies allowed these states to develop successful industrial policy solutions in response to the economic consequences of globalization and economic transformation. More broadly, some scholars have noted how the political institutional frameworks of governments in general are crucially linked to policy choices. Japan's comprehensive and successful industrial policy system, for instance, is seen by many to be a consequence of the unique set of relationships that the state's bureaucracy has with members of Parliament as well as key actors in the business community. Here, the work of such state-centered authors as Peter Evans and Theda Skocpol has been important in getting political scientists to understand the significant relationship between political institutions and public policy outcomes.

Finally, recent scholarship has paid close attention to the relative power position of trade unions and the working class in general vis-à-vis capital and the state. Here, the emphasis has been on identifying the level of political leverage and economic influence enjoyed by national labor organizations. Alexander Hicks, for example, has shown that trade union strength has clearly had an impact on the ability of governments to alter economic and social policy orientations in many industrial societies.

See also *Development, Economic; Economic Development, State-led; Economic Theories of the State; Fiscal Policy; Monetary Policy.*

. . . .   MARK GOBEYN

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Economic Systems, Comparative

Economic systems are popularly classified into various ideological types, with supplementary modifications for stages of economic development and productive structure. Until recently, the great ideological divide counterposed capitalism and socialism, each with subtypologies. Communism was given pride of place as an important socialist variant.

Development divided the world into advanced and backward categories, allowing scholars to debate whether the gap between rich and poor was narrowing or widening. Productive structure served as an indicator of modernization. The economies of advanced countries once were highly industrialized, but as of the late twentieth century have stressed high-tech services. Agricultural economic systems for the most part were viewed as premodern.

These taxonomies are becoming increasingly obsolete as ideological concerns fade, displaced by concepts such as globalization, which imply that all economic mechanisms will be more or less the same in the future, characterized by state-supervised competitive markets and harmonized by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Also, many less-developed nations now possess advanced industrial high-tech sectors with cosmopolitan enclaves. Backwaters of the colonial type are vanishing. Globalization, however, should not be conflated with the reality of world government and a common economic mechanism. Systems remain diverse, but the cultural, political, and institutional forces distinguishing them have become more subtle.

CORE SYSTEM MODELS

There is no consensus of categorization for the new comparative reality. Two obvious criteria are political governance and civic liberty, but there is a reluctance to treat authoritarianism and civic repression as ingrained to important systems like those of China and Russia. Likewise, while it is widely understood that national markets are heterogeneous, there is a tendency to suppose that the distinctions are secondary. For example, although Chinese economic efficiency is handicapped by its ban on freehold property, imposed in accordance with communist doctrine, few analysts acknowledge that communism still matters.

Systems, nonetheless, remain important. They affect productivity, income, wealth, sustainable growth, inequality, social justice, and economic welfare. The best way to appreciate the nuances is to trace the evolutionary trajectory. There were three globally dominant economic systems in 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev was installed as the last general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party: reform (1) communism, (2) American free enterprise, and (3) European Union (EU) social democracy (collectivism). Soviet, east European, Chinese, North Korean, Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian communism all featured state ownership of the means of production, the criminalization of private business, and command planning, supplemented with various bonus incentive mechanisms. The adjective *reform* refers to this latter aspect, not reliance on leasing property and markets.

American free enterprise in 1985 was a system that paid lip service to laissez-faire while being strongly affected by huge state programs, intrusive regulation, and social transfers. It was often mischaracterized as a welfare state, suggesting that government expenditures were genuinely in the public interest rather than the consequences of political rent granting.

EU social democracy cloned the American model, with three differences. First, welfare was conceptualized in socialist terms, stressing income equality; free basic public services such as health, housing, and education; and civic participation. Second, state ownership of portions of the means of production was commonplace, and third, it discouraged entrepreneurship whenever change threatened the social welfare status quo.

The year 1985 was a watershed because it marked the onset of a worldwide liberalization movement to foster efficiency and growth by denationalizing state assets, expanding market scope, and strengthening the forces of market competition. Communist nations switched from reform to market communism, culminating in the destruction of the Soviet Union and the accession of most former east and central European communist states into the EU. But these negative results (from a communist perspective) were partly compensated by the economic invigoration of China, Vietnam, and more recently Laos. Liberalization, including state outsourcing, was pressed under Republican and Democratic presidential administrations in the United States as well as throughout the EU. In the process, all three systems declared their rhetorical support for civic participation, individual empowerment, and social justice while simultaneously adopting policies that increased income inequality and privatized aspects of the social safety net.

States everywhere reduced their role as affordable providers of basic services, preferring to act instead as indirect providers of outsourced services, market regulators, and social transfer agents. This convergence has blurred the lines among the core models. All now possess markets with professed progressive social missions and stress individual empowerment that is harmonized with social justice. All have legalized some types of private property, although communists still primarily rely on asset leasing. The differences that remain, however, are essential.

SYSTEM DIFFERENCES

Communism not only is wary of freehold property but insists on one-party political control (autocracy), privileged-party rent granting in the state and private sectors, and civic repression wherever social action jeopardizes party rule. The model installs the rule of men over the rule of law. Laws, including private contracts in communist countries, are predominantly instruments of state/party administration rather than universal principles to which the regime itself is held to account. Communist regimes reject democracy, the common law, and free markets in favor of insider rent granting and party rule with or without the facade of balloting, embellished with the rhetoric of prosperity, harmony, and social justice. The model is internally inconsistent and corrupt, with inferior long-run potential after advantages of economic backwardness in nations like China are exhausted.

The EU economy, by contrast, is a democratic, open society that prioritizes workers' and minorities' rights and empowerment, a broad social safety network, and soft power. It tolerates some individual liberties that conflict with this agenda but tends to restrain private ownership, business, and entrepreneurship whenever they limit social justice and political discretion, including rent-granting insider privileges. The net result has been what is often called "Eurosclerosis": feeble economic growth, converging toward stagnation. The repercussions of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis and depression are likely to exacerbate the tendency.

The administration of Barack Obama, for a multiplicity of reasons, is pushing the U.S. free enterprise system toward EU collectivism, especially with regard to old-fashioned state-provided basic services such as health care. The comparatively feeble influence of trade unions and the working class in American politics, coupled with a stronger tradition of private-sector entrepreneurship, however, continues to make the two systems distinct. Long-term economic growth in the United States is apt to outpace its EU rival.

SYSTEMS OUTSIDE THE CORE MODELS

Beyond these fundamentals, it should be noted that economic arrangements in many nations throughout the globe fall outside the market communist, EU social democratic, and U.S. free enterprise paradigms. Japan has a communalist system that stresses team sharing, consensus building, and mutual community support. Individual utility seeking and profit maximizing are subordinated to communal concerns, violating all the fundamental axioms of classical Western market theory. Acquiescent satisficing, rather than individualistic utility seeking, prevails.

North Korea continues to rely on a pre-reform, terror-control, communist command model with forced penal labor that causes tens of thousands annually to die prematurely. Russia has had a Muscovite model in place since the time of Ivan the Great that relies on authoritarian rent granting, revocable property rights, and the antidemocratic rule of men. Thailand, under the guidance of the crown and influenced by Theravada Buddhism, is experimenting with a sufficiency economy that

subordinates material acquisitiveness to spiritual and ecological pursuits.

Thus, despite the homogenizing effects of market communism and global liberalization, national and transnational economic systems continue to diverge and flourish, with distinct agendas, property rights regimes, and regulatory mechanisms governing the public, private, and civic sectors (all aspects of rational economic choice making). Leaders no longer seem interested in perfecting archetypes such as democratic free enterprise, privilege-free social democracy, participatory democracy, or Marxist-Leninist communism. The evolution of the core transnational models instead is being diversely driven by deep-seated cultural forces and political expediency.

See also *Communism; Democratic Socialism; Economic Development, State-led; Economic Theories of the State; Globalization; Globalization and Development; Leninism; Market Socialism; Marxism; Rent-seeking; Socialism; Welfare State.*

. . . .   STEVEN ROSEFIELDE

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Economic Theories of the State

According to an economic theory of the state, the state is best understood as the outcome of voluntary individual action. Its methodological foundations are individualistic as the preferences of individuals are taken as the basic starting point from which subsequent actions and institutions are to be theorized. It combines a self-interested view of human behavior with an account of how and when individuals will choose to collaborate and act collectively. The state is seen as a collection of rules and institutions created by individuals for the purpose of acting collectively, as opposed to individually, to realize some benefit. The state itself is theorized as a form of cooperation, or as the outcome of cooperative behavior. Individuals are able to produce numerous types of benefits acting collectively that they cannot achieve acting alone, and the rules and institutions of the state are theorized as mechanisms for securing the ongoing production of this sort of benefit.

The economic theory of the state can be contrasted with other theories of the state. It is in contrast to organic views of the state that theorize the state as an autonomous entity that exists prior to and beyond the individuals that compose it, exemplified by the relationship between bees and their beehive. Its notions of voluntarism and cooperation distinguish it from conflict views of the state, which theorize it as an instrument of class domination. Also, the idea of its instrumental value with respect to individual interests contradicts the view of the state that theorizes its purpose as realizing a collective ideal or public interest beyond the individual well-being of its members.

STATE ORIGINS AND PROVISIONS

The economic theory of the state provides explanations for both the origins of states and the range of its functions in a political society. Acting individually, in a state of nature, persons are unable to secure numerous goods in which they have an interest in producing. Perhaps the most basic of these is achieving peaceful reconciliation of competing claims to scarce resources. This is done by the state by creating property rights and rules for resources' use and exchange, which are enforced by the coercive capacity of the state.

Upon achieving basic security of the person and property, individuals will make further use of collective mechanisms to produce cooperative benefits. One such benefit is the coordination of activities that allows for orderly social living, such as basic rules concerning traffic direction and so forth. This type of strategic interaction imposes no costs on individuals in the production of cooperative benefit and thus is free from the collective-action problem of free riding.

The problem of free riding explains why states are required for the provision of public goods beyond simple coordination functions. A public good is defined by being nonrival, meaning that its consumption by one individual does not lessen its availability to others, and by being nonexclusive, meaning that once it is provided, others cannot be excluded from it. A lighthouse in a harbor is an example of a public good. Public goods are prone to underprovision when left to private production because there are strong incentives to free ride on provided public goods. Self-interested individuals would prefer to consume a good without contributing to its production and be unwilling to produce a benefit that others can enjoy without contributing to it. In this case, it is mutually advantageous to cooperate through public provision.

Another cooperative benefit that the state secures is the reduction of uncertainty and exposure to natural and social risk. Acting alone, individuals will be unable to adequately limit uncertainty and secure against risk. While private insurance markets will arise to address many forms of uncertainty, the state will be required to address market failures in its provision. These include moral hazard and adverse selection resulting from information asymmetries between buyers and sellers as to the level of risk, causing heightened costs and incomplete or exclusionary coverage. State-run insurance has further advantages over private provision, such as reducing administrative costs, economies of scale, and equity in cost of coverage for high-risk, low-income groups.

Other examples of market failure that create incentives to collectively provide goods through the state include monopoly power and negative externalities. Producers with monopoly powers are able to charge inefficient prices, and a possible

remedy is to place the industry in public ownership. The state is also able to internalize the full costs of an economic activity in the producers; without its regulatory capacity, the costs could be imposed, or externalized, onto the population at large. The pollution resulting from industrial production is an example of a production cost that can be externalized onto society without state action.

CRITICISMS OF ECONOMIC STATE THEORY

Economic state theory is criticized in both its explanatory and prescriptive dimensions. Descriptively, the provision of public goods as an explanation of the origins of states is widely called into question. Without the institutions of the state, persons are unable to successfully cooperate because of the lack of coordination and free rider problems. The state in this view is called on to secure the benefits of cooperation. However, the state itself is also theorized as the outcome of cooperation, such that persons are supposed to have produced a public good for the purpose of producing other public goods they were unable to achieve without the state. By way of response, rather than explaining the origins of states, the provision of public goods accounts for the ongoing support for states and as an explanation of the functioning of the public sector.

Economic state theory is also criticized for justifying an overly narrow range of functions for the state. Because the state is justified as a mechanism for promoting individual interests in a mutually advantageous manner, it rules out redistributive policies that lessen the advantage of some citizens for the sake of improving the condition of the disadvantaged. The political economists James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, for example, argue that the principle of mutual advantage in an economic theory of the state leads to the requirement of unanimity in support of legislation, effectively granting a veto to those who gain from market exchanges. In addition to normative concerns regarding the resulting inequality that would result, there are further questions as to the potential stability of a state that is limited to the principle of mutual advantage.

See also *Collective Action and Mobilization; Collective Action, Theory of; Public Good; State, Functions of the; State of Nature; Welfare State.*

. . . .   NEIL HIBBERT

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Economy, Centrally Planned

See *Centrally Planned Economy.*

Eco-terrorism

Eco-terrorism is a type of terrorism directed at changing environmental policy. Terrorism, by definition, is a violent or forceful act that targets civilians to create fear and motivate political change. Theoretically, this fear creates political pressure on governments to change policy. Eco-terrorists create situations in which the costs of pursuing an environmental policy outweigh the benefits of that policy. Eco-terrorists may target states, but many eco-terrorist organizations also target private firms. Eco-terrorism and environmental terrorism are two different ideas. Eco-terrorist groups aim to protect the environment through terrorist actions against firms and states. Environmental terrorism describes a terrorist attack whose target is the environment. Terrorist groups engage in environmental terrorism when they attack a state's natural resources. For instance, terrorist attacks on a country's water supply and setting fire to national forests are both acts of environmental terrorism. Generally, eco-terrorists do not engage in environmental terrorism. Eco-terrorist organizations work to protect the environment, and therefore deliberately harming the environment is against their raison d'être.

The term *eco-terrorist* is contested by groups defined as eco-terrorists. Members view themselves as activists rather than terrorists. Eco-terrorist groups engage in activities similar to those of other activist groups. Eco-terrorists conduct peaceful demonstrations and civil disobedience with marches, sit-ins, and protests. Furthermore, eco-terrorist groups serve as information providers, describing the effects of the state and firms on the environment. They lobby governments and businesses to change their operations to end environmentally harmful activities or adopt other sites for programs to protect animal habitats. However, what separates eco-terrorists from regular activist groups are violent acts against people and property. Eco-terrorist organizations destroy property and threaten people to pursue political goals. Furthermore, members of eco-terrorist groups justify destruction caused by their organizations as a small price to guard against larger environmental destruction. Eco-terrorist organizations claim that they are inappropriately labeled terrorists to undermine their cause. The label "terrorist" diminishes their public credibility and legitimacy as organizations.

The theoretical underpinnings of eco-terrorist organizations have their roots in environmental movements. Many scholars cite Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* as the book that launched the U.S. environmental movement. Members of eco-terrorist groups often espouse deep ecology values, either explicitly or implicitly. Deep ecology is a system of values that at its base claims each living being has equal value. Deep ecologists object to a hierarchy evaluation of animals, making the normative claim that each animal has an equal value. While many deep ecologists are peaceful, the philosophy of deep ecology has been used to mobilize and galvanize support for eco-terrorist movements. Eco-terrorists are distinct from other environmentalists in their commitment to violence to achieve political goals and their dissatisfaction with mainstream

environmentalist movements. Eco-terrorists will seek peaceful means to pursue government or firm policy change, but they will also conduct violent acts.

Eco-terrorists have gained support, membership, and notoriety since the 1970s. Emerging from the juncture of the environmentalist movement and other social movements in industrialized nations, eco-terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon. Members of eco-terrorist groups belong to different social classes. The organizations themselves may be loosely coordinated, bound by common goals and some minimum communication. The U.S. government has named several eco-terrorist groups threats to national security. The Animal Liberation Front was founded in the United Kingdom in 1976. While the Animal Liberation Front claims to protect all animals, some of its methods threaten human life. The Earth Liberation Front was founded in the United Kingdom in 1992 and now has cells in many states, including the United States. The Coalition to Save the Preserves is an eco-terrorist group that surfaced in the American Southwest to protect forests north of Phoenix, Arizona.

Eco-terrorists engage in many methods to defend the environment. A popular tactic to defend forests from logging is tree spiking. Eco-terrorists insert metal spikes in the trees themselves to dissuade loggers from chopping them down. This metal either damages the chainsaws of loggers or becomes lethal shrapnel in a lumberyard. Eco-terrorist groups have also threatened to cut the brakes of trucking firms' trucks and have attacked universities doing biogenetic research. Eco-terrorist groups also engage in arson, cutting of fishing lines, and sabotage of machinery. Eco-terrorist groups seldom assassinate leaders of firms or states. Casualties from eco-terrorism are generally the result of sabotage or arson aimed at disarming threats to the environment.

See also *Environmental Policy; Terrorism, Political.*

. . . .   RYAN GIBB

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Edelman, Murray J.

Murray J. Edelman (1919–2001) integrated insights from linguistics, rhetoric, semiotics, psychology, and philosophy into the discipline of political science in the United States. Edelman was born in Pennsylvania, received his bachelor's degree from Bucknell University in 1941, his master's degree from the University of Chicago in 1942, and his PhD from the University of Illinois in 1948, where he subsequently taught until joining the faculty of the University of Wisconsin–Madison in 1966. In 1971 Edelman was awarded an endowed chair, which he named for the social psychologist George Herbert Mead (1863–1931). A recipient of many awards during his career, including visiting professorships, Fulbright awards, and fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation and National Endowment for the Humanities, Edelman retired from teaching in 1990 and continued to publish until his death.

Edelman was critical of the logical positivism and empiricism that dominated mainstream political science because it neglected the subtle ways in which subjective realities were shaped, manipulated, and reinforced by symbols, rhetoric, and language. In the now-classic *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (1964), he argued that popular participation by citizens was "largely symbolic" (p. 4) and that public policies thought to benefit the general public were beneficial only to small groups. His other publications include *Politics as Symbolic Action* (1971), *Political Language* (1977), *Constructing the Political Spectacle* (1988), *From Art to Politics* (1995), *The Politics of Misinformation* (2001), and numerous articles.

A major theme of his research was that political language had the power to reveal as well as to conceal. Language, he argued, can conceal the inner workings of power by naturalizing power relations or by manipulating, distracting, and deflecting the attention of citizens to trivial matters that are falsely labeled important. Political language magnifies the trivial and minimizes the serious to gain the quiescent acceptance of the status quo or to mobilize support for public policies that too often benefit only elites. For Edelman, language was not a neutral vehicle for describing an objective reality but was itself a tool for shaping meanings, manipulating hopes and fears, constructing realities, framing interpretations, rationalizing unequal distributions of resources and power, and even shaping the identity of the speaker. Whether symbols are icons or words, they have multiple meanings: a flag can invoke pride and hope, fear and hatred, or nostalgic longing depending on the social and material situation of the observer. While Edelman's scholarship might read as despairing and cynical because it portrays politics as deceptive and manipulative, it contains a strong belief in the ability of citizens to decipher spectacles and resist manipulation.

An eclectic scholar who borrowed insights from George Orwell, Jacques Ellul, Harold Lasswell, Jacques Derrida, and George Herbert Mead, Edelman's own contributions continue to shape the study of politics through his influence on scholars such as George Lakoff and Lance Bennett. In a media-saturated age, given the power of officials, campaign advisors, advertisers, and strategists to mold images, manipulate symbols, and deploy language to mobilize support or opposition to causes or persons, Edelman's groundbreaking scholarship remains insightful and significant.

See also *Language and Politics; Positivism.*

. . . .   GREGORY W. STREICH

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Education Policy

Education policy in the United States is divided into two areas: (1) elementary and secondary education and (2) higher education. Elementary and secondary education policy has historically been handled by local government, according to state guidelines and with funding from state and local taxes. Federal involvement began with the effort to desegregate schools in the landmark 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* case, and continued in a series of desegregation cases in the 1960s and 1970s that followed passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Federal funding of elementary and secondary education increased through the Elementary and Secondary Schools Act of 1965, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1971, and the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2002. Higher education policy has largely been handled as a mix of privately run colleges and universities that are paralleled by state systems of higher education. The federal government has had some involvement in higher education policy making, beginning with the Morrill Act of 1862, which set aside lands for state universities. Federal involvement grew in the post–World War II era with the significant funding of university research, provision of education grants, and creation of the guaranteed student loan program. Affirmative action policy, in particular Title IX, helped to expand access to higher education by women and minorities.

ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION POLICY

Elementary and secondary education is delivered at the local level, through school districts administered by elected school boards that are responsible for overseeing school district hiring, curriculum, and finances. In many states, school boards must conduct periodic levy campaigns to raise local property taxes to support increasing costs and new services. States are responsible for setting and enforcing standards for teacher and administrator certification, setting curriculum guidelines, and providing financial aid to supplement districts that are unable to completely fund operating with local taxes.

States typically provide supplemental funding either through foundation formulas that calculate a statewide per-pupil cost for education and then supplement local districts to bring their spending up to the per-pupil average or through set grants-in-aid that are not dependent on raising all districts to similar per-pupil spending averages. State court challenges to state systems of funding, beginning with the landmark *Serrano v. Priest* (1971) in California, led to increases in state spending on education in the 1980s and 1990s, although funding formulas that relied on property taxes remained largely unchanged. Total spending on primary and secondary education in the United States was $536 billion in 2005. Of this, 45.6 percent came from state funds, 37.1 percent from local taxes, 8.3 percent from federal support, and 8.9 percent from private sources (primarily tuitions paid for private schooling.) The national average per-pupil spending for 2004 was approximately $9,000, according to the U.S. Department of Education (DOE; see www.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/10facts/edlite-chart.html#5).

Federal education policy, administered through the DOE since its creation in 1978 out of the former Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, has created mandated standards for curriculum, teacher certification, and implementation of accountability through testing in NCLB. Prior to NCLB, the federal government provided supplemental funding, primarily for districts with high poverty rates, and for special education services. Poverty service funding included Title I funds for supplemental educational enrichment services and the free and reduced lunch program. Special education funding resulted from federal court mandates and the subsequent passage of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1971. The federal government was also very involved in pushing local school districts to desegregate, using the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to initiate court action, threaten withholding of federal funding, and provide oversight of desegregation orders.

Calls for reform of public education in the 1980s and 1990s were highlighted by the 1983 *A Nation at Risk* report issued by the National Commission on Excellence in Education and in the *Goals 2000* report issued in 1991 by the National Governors Association. States responded with stricter standards for teacher certification, increased pay for teachers (particularly in Southern states), and experimentation with proficiency testing.

NCLB OF 2002

President George W. Bush campaigned for increased accountability of schools for student performance, in particular, the performance of students of color living in urban districts. His plan for accountability resulted in the creation and passage of NCLB. NCLB added new requirements to maintain eligibility for federal funding. These involved mandatory tests of students at different grade levels to measure proficiency in math, reading, and writing as well as subject area tests in science and social studies. NCLB requires public notification of the test results aggregated by individual school building. School districts are rated on a set of standards called Adequate Yearly Progress, which measures the degree of improvement of test scores over the prior year. Districts are also required to report student attendance rates, graduation rates, and incidence of violence. Schools deemed at risk receive additional federal funding to be used to improve student performance. If Adequate Yearly Progress scores do not improve during the following two years, the DOE can require the school district to reorganize or close the school or risk losing federal funding. States are required to align their curricula with testing standards as well as align teacher certification requirements with guidelines stipulated by the DOE.

HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY

Higher education policy at the federal level is largely concerned with two areas: research funding and student financial aid. Federal student support is provided through the Pell Grant and Stafford loan programs, as well as through the guaranteed student loan program, in which banks provide education loans to students at lower interest rates and the federal government pays the difference in interest and guarantees payback of the loans. Recent developments in policy include the use

of federal student loan eligibility as an enforcement tool to require colleges and universities to provide access to student records for military recruitment and to closely monitor adherence to visa requirements for foreign students. The federal government also stimulated expansion of two-year community colleges through the Higher Education Act of 1965.

Affirmative action policies implemented by higher education to increase enrollment of minorities and women have been gradually narrowed through Supreme Court decisions, beginning with *Bakke v. California Board of Regents* (1978), which excluded the use of quotas. In 2003, a pair of cases (*Gratz v. Bollinger; Grutter v. Bollinger*) challenging the admissions policies of the University of Michigan resulted in a 5–4 decision by the Supreme Court that banned the use of a point system to advantage students based on race but upheld the use of race as a factor in admissions to achieve diversity.

See also *Affirmative Action; Education Policy, Higher; Segregation and Desegregation; Social Policy; Quotas.*

. . . .   THOMAS C. SUTTON

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Education Policy, Higher

Higher education (HE) policy varies enormously among countries, reflecting a broad spectrum of provision and politico-economic disparity. In some countries, policy is driven solely by economic imperatives; in others, by tradition and culture. In Europe, systemic diversity is decreasing as social and political interdependence grow. In other areas, such as the developing markets of Asia, diversity of provision is increasing in line with economic growth. Everywhere, HE has become so important to the development of knowledge economies that it has become more directive, more encouraging of the practical and commercial exploitation of research, and more accountable.

EUROPEAN UNION
Policy in the European Union and in countries allied to the European Cultural Convention is driven by the Bologna Declaration, a voluntary agreement aimed at harmonizing HE architecture across Europe. Further intergovernmental meetings—in Prague (2001), Berlin (2003), Bergen (2005), London (2007), and Louvain (2009)—have reaffirmed the Bologna process, which currently has forty-six signatories. The basic three-tier framework aligns mainland European and American HE—although in many ways it represents a subordination of the former—and is closely allied to the World Trade Organization General Agreement on Trade in Services—too closely, in the minds of critics. The process has

been implemented concurrently with other reforms, including the introduction of tuition fees in the United Kingdom and the internal reorganization of universities in France under the Universities' Freedoms and Responsibilities law. This has encouraged opposition, but central government control is still dominant across the sector.

UNITED STATES
In contrast, HE in the United States is not regulated directly by central government. There are a wide variety of institutions; some are among the most prestigious in the world, and others are little more than degree mills. According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United States has the second largest number of HE institutions after India, and 82 percent of the population of tertiary age are HE students (compared with 59 percent in the United Kingdom, 22 percent in China, and 75 percent in Australia). Universities are large by European standards, and those that are not private are operated by individual states. Tuition is charged everywhere, although public universities have lower fees and most have considerable endowments. In policy terms, capacity remains an issue as demand increases during and immediately after recessions, and states such as California are prioritizing the development of appropriate policies in the face of likely legal challenges. An allied issue is that of undocumented students, those who are not U.S. citizens or legal residents, who receive free secondary education but face legal and financial barriers when trying to access HE.

UNITED KINGDOM
Like those in the United States, universities in the United Kingdom enjoy an international reputation, largely because of Britain's imperial history and its leading role in the Industrial Revolution. Universities are usually established by royal charter or act of Parliament and are state financed and centrally controlled. Policy in the sector, and in education generally, is characterized by tinkering, mostly in relation to funding and inspection. In the 1980s, per capita funding dropped sharply as student numbers rose, and the system has never fully recovered. The 1997 National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education, the Dearing Report, heralded the abolition of free university education, and the government introduced tuition fees to replenish university coffers. Today, except in Scotland, undergraduates pay tuition up to a certain maximum, but funding still falls short of what is required to maintain the system against international competition and meet domestic access targets. Funding-related policies remain the preoccupying issue across the sector.

CHINA
Funding is not the major issue in China, which has more than two thousand universities and colleges and fifteen million students. The university system was developed at the end of the nineteenth century to take advantage of China's growing engagement with Western techno-scientific advances, but the system incorporates an older Confucian philosophy. The Cultural Revolution devastated the sector as student numbers and standards plummeted, but in 1977, the HE entrance

examination, the GaoKao, was reinstated alongside other reforms that brought improvement in provision, management, and investment. The government has since moved away from Stalinist-style micromanagement toward a more strategic role, and local decision making is common. The stated aim is to make elite universities, such as Peking and Tsinghua, world class, and the government has funded them accordingly with aid from UNESCO and the World Bank. Yet China is having difficulty meeting the needs of its students. While China spent 13.0 percent of government funding on education, compared with 14.8 percent in the United States, 11.9 percent in the United Kingdom, and 13.3 percent in Australia, only 1.9 percent of China's GDP consisted of education spending, compared with the United States's 5.7 percent, the United Kingdom's 5.6 percent, and Australia's 5.2 percent (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2009; China's figures are from 1999, and the others are from 2006). Although HE continues to play a leading role in the country's hyperdevelopment, and this is recognized in government policy, issues remain around regulation, opportunity, and the need to improve the quality of staff.

AUSTRALIA

HE in Australia, China's "Western" neighbor, also dates from the nineteenth century and is not surprisingly modeled on the British system. There are more than forty universities, all but two of which are public bodies in receipt of central funding under the Higher Education Support Act. The federal government has primary responsibility for policy, while governance is shared with individual states and the institutions themselves, which have a high degree of autonomy. During the 1970s, tuition fees were abolished, but a decade later they were reintroduced through the Higher Education Contribution Scheme, which, like the current UK system introduced twenty years later, enables students to defer repayment until they gain meaningful employment. More recently, government policy has sought to encourage collaboration with industry, but inconsistent funding mechanisms and poor governance has meant that results have been mixed. Far more successful has been Australia's role in the burgeoning Asian HE market and the huge overseas fee income thus generated, but serious structural and policy issues remain, including the lack of niche institutions such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (United States), École Normale Supérieure (France), and London School of Economics (United Kingdom); a dearth of high-quality research academics; insufficient funding; and as the Bradley Review indicated, widening participation. Proposed funding innovations, such as the Melbourne model, a shift to U.S.-style generic undergraduate degrees followed by postgraduate professional degrees, seem more like circumventions than solutions. However, government policy to align with the Eurocentric Bologna process seems sensible because the attractiveness of Australian universities to overseas markets would otherwise be compromised.

CONCLUSION

Despite differences in HE policy around the world, some common themes emerge as a result of globalization, including the importance of quality assurance and the fair targeting of government funding (e.g., the Research Excellence Framework in the United Kingdom, the now defunct Research Quality Framework in Australia, and various U.S. bibliometric exercises), the need to benchmark excellence to internationally agreed-upon standards across disciplines (e.g., Jiao Tong, Quacquarelli-Symonds, and Cybermetrics indices), a diminishing margin of appreciation regarding the importance of HE to economic success and the funding required to maintain that influence, and the undesirable effects among academics of increased administration as managerialism supplants scholarship across the sector.

See also *Academic Freedom; Education Policy.*

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E-governance, E-voting, E-democracy, E-politics

The Internet has permeated the business of politics in society, and the various activities within government undertaken by political actors, including citizens, politicians, journalists, and activists, fall within the realm of e-politics. One of these activities is voting online, or e-voting. Beyond the act of voting, other activities such as paying taxes, registering motor vehicles, obtaining driver's licenses, completing forms, and obtaining materials from the government via the Internet constitute what is known as e-governance. Should the Internet become successful in the democratization of political systems it can be said that electronic democracy, or e-democracy, has been instrumental in such a process.

The marriage of politics and the Internet was brought about by the desire to bring efficiency to governmental operations and provide transparency in what government does. By streamlining and computerizing operations, government agencies as well as individual actors are provided convenience in obtaining information as well as greater interaction.

E-GOVERNANCE

E-government—short for electronic government but also known as e-gov, digital government, online government, or transformational government—refers to the use of information and communication technology to provide and improve government services, transactions, and interactions with citizens, businesses, and other agencies of government. As early as 2000 some of the most visited Web sites were in the governmental realm, including the Internal Revenue Service, the U.S. Postal Service, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Institutes of Health, and the Census Bureau.

The U.S. federal government, starting with the White House under Bill Clinton, encouraged the use of the Internet as early as 1993 as a means of providing information. Congressional sites for both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate provide biographies of members, press releases, legislation sponsored and cosponsored, floor speeches, recent legislation, the status of legislation, and newsletters. Individual officeholders have a Web presence to facilitate and promote fund-raising, continuous campaigning, and constituent interaction. Information on the Supreme Court site includes court cases, rulings, and opinions. The major, and even minor, political parties have their own Web sites that encourage partisans to contribute funds, no matter how small, and engage in activities, no matter how trivial, to bring the party's and candidate's name out in the general public. This was the method used by the Obama campaign to obtain the involvement of millions of people in its call for change.

In the United States state and local governments have also gone online to varying degrees. Numerous groups and organizations, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the National Organization for Women, and magazines such as *Government Technology* are dedicated to, and have undertaken the monitoring and measurement of, what is going on in the use of information technology in the states and in government. Since 1997 *Government Technology* has undertaken a digital state survey. In the 2008 survey Utah came in on top, followed by Michigan, Virginia, and Arizona.

At the international level, countries use the Web to inform the world about themselves, to entice those who have the money and the curiosity to visit them, or to facilitate communication with the rest of the world formally by government-to-government transactions or informally by citizen-to-citizen exchanges of e-mails and the sharing of audio and video. Although the state of a country's technological development measured by the Globalization Index or the E-Readiness Index may provide insight into the usefulness of the Internet for delivering basic needs to its citizens, the digital divide is a constant reminder that the gap between the wealthy and the poor prevents billions of people from utilizing the advantages of connectivity.

Nevertheless, efforts are constantly being made to bring government connectivity to constituents. Various activities that constitute political connectivity, including e-voting, e-campaigning, and e-fund-raising (found in the articles about voting and blogging), have captured the attention of those who study progress in engaging the citizenry with the functions of government in a democracy.

E-VOTING

Electronic voting, or e-voting, has become quite controversial among those who favor it and those who want to hold on to old ways of participation in the political choice of leaders and representatives. The U.S. states of Oregon and Arizona have paved the way in experimenting with the use of electronic voting. Aside from people's reluctance to trust a computer to accept their vote—at times without a paper record of that vote—there is also the fear associated with the reliability and validity of using the Internet for choosing a nation's leaders. Surveys in the late 1990s indicated that about 51 percent of surveyed netizens favored online voting as long as it was safe, while 42 percent disagreed with online voting. Younger citizens who are more tech savvy may be more inclined to, and more comfortable with, voting through a computer or the Internet.

E-DEMOCRACY

The online activities of governments have led to a debate about the ability of this medium of political communication to bring about greater and better democracy. Political life online may seem to be a mere extension of political life offline; however, being linked through the Internet provides an additional medium through which individuals can pursue the privileges and obligations of citizenship. It is a good way of communicating one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many and improves on the conventional ways of dealing with government. This direct democracy brought about by Web connectivity has been billed as what will connect citizens to mass decision-making processes, such as the election of Barack Obama to the U.S. presidency. Obama's Web presence mobilized millions of Americans to campaign and fund-raise. Politicians have been using, and will continue to use, online formats to maintain and enforce their existing power. They cannot help but be more responsive to citizen demands since it would be difficult to withhold information as well as censor information in an open society where information is available online. Misinformation, deception, and manipulation can still come about, but overall, proponents of government presence on the net see it as a factor in the revitalization of democracy everywhere.

When evaluating e-government from a balanced perspective, it is true that as of the early twenty-first century there exist many gaps in online government service delivery, some of which are the result of security issues. The Internet is merely another mode of delivery and participation; despite

the existence of blogs, discussion groups, instant messaging, various social networking platforms, and assorted types of communications delivery methods, the Web does not give power to the powerless unless they take that power into their own hands.

See also *Blogs and Bloggers; Campaigns; Electronic Voting; Internet and Politics; Political Participation; Voting Machines and Technology.*

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Einaudi, Mario Luigi

Mario Luigi Einaudi (1905–1994) was an Italian scholar of political theory and European comparative politics. He married Manon Michels, the daughter of German sociologist Robert Michels, in 1933. After completing a dissertation about British philosopher Edmund Burke, Einaudi spent two years at the London School of Economics. His ecumenical character was already evident as he grew close to exiles from Fascism such as Catholic priest and politician Don Luigi Sturzo and Socialist historian and journalist Gaetano Salvemini. From 1927 to 1929, Einaudi attended Harvard University, conducting research on the U.S. Supreme Court. He returned to Italy, only to lose his first job, at the University of Messina, for refusing to sign the Fascist oath. Harvard gave him refuge before he was appointed at Fordham University.

Einaudi joined the Government Department of Cornell University in 1945 and was the Goldwin Smith Professor. He chaired the Department of Government from 1951 to 1956 and again from 1959 to 1963. In 1960 he founded the Center for International Studies with a mission to support academic efforts to deal with economic, social, and development problems around the world. In 1964 he founded the Fondazione Luigi Einaudi educational institution in Turin, Italy, in honor of his father, Luigi Einaudi, Italy's first postwar president.

Throughout his career, Einaudi was fascinated by the rise of modern liberalism in eighteenth-century France. Three central tenets of his work were that the study of politics must be embedded in history, that Europe and the United States have much to teach each other about the practice of democratic politics, and that the study of contemporary democratic states should not be divorced from the classics of political theory. These themes were embodied in his first book in English, *The Physiocratic Doctrine of Judicial Control* (1938), in his 1959 book *The Roosevelt Revolution,* and in his introduction of European scholars like François Goguel and Raymond Aron to the United States.

After Einaudi's retirement in 1972, with the help of the Italian government he raised the funds for the Luigi Einaudi Chair in European and International Studies at Cornell. In 1991 the university's Center for International Studies was renamed the Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies. Cornell's board of trustees honored Einaudi for his long dedication to the university and for being a "tireless proponent of clear and critical thinking, democracy, and ethics in politics; and a firm believer in the power of human values to transform the world."

Mario Einaudi died in 1994 in the family home in Dogliani, Italy, in the hills of Piedmont.

See also *Fascism; Political Theory; Politics, Comparative.*

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Elazar, Daniel J.

Born in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Daniel J. Elazar (1934–1999) was a leading American political scientist specializing in the study of federalism and federal political systems and arrangements. He was also a scholar of political culture and the Jewish political tradition. Throughout his career, he attempted to link the study of politics and public policy with its practice and has served as a consultant to numerous governments throughout the world.

While studying at Wayne State University, Elazar worked as a librarian at the United Hebrew Schools. In this capacity, he and his brother developed a system for cataloguing Judaica, which they published in 1968 as *A Classification System for Libraries of Judaica.* Elazar's Jewish roots both informed and influenced his study of politics.

Elazar next studied at the University of Chicago, earning a master's degree (1957) and a doctorate (1959). Under the tutelage of Morton Grodzins, Elazar's understanding of

federalism was developed. His dissertation was awarded the American Political Science Association's Leonard D. White Award for best dissertation in public administration in 1959 and was later published as *The American Partnership: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Nineteenth-century United States* (1962). In this volume, Elazar took issue with the prevailing interpretation that "dual federalism" characterized the American political system in the nineteenth century. He demonstrated that a significant degree of intergovernmental cooperation occurred. For Elazar, the relationship between the federal and state governments had always been a partnership.

This concept was fully developed in Elazar's seminal work *American Federalism: A View from the States* (1966). Written when the concept of states' rights was often equated with racism and discrimination, Elazar's text provided a theoretical framework that discussed and assessed the central role of state governments in the American federal system. Elazar outlined his theory of American political culture and identified three subcultures—the individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic—that were brought to and reinforced by the various immigrant groups arriving in the United States. These subcultures shaped local political structures and practices and were spread across the country as immigrant groups pushed farther west.

During this same period, Elazar initiated a unique longitudinal study titled Cities of the Prairie because of his dissatisfaction with the limited nature of the individual community studies conducted during that time that provided only a snapshot description and analysis of local power structures. The Cities of the Prairie project was an ongoing multigenerational, comparative study of ten medium-sized civil communities located in the Midwest. In this work, Elazar also expanded on Frederick Turner Jackson's thesis that the frontier was a determining factor in American politics by describing how a series of succeeding frontiers have opened throughout American history and have shaped local and national development.

During the 1980s and 1990s, Elazar turned his attention toward federal developments worldwide. His 1987 book *Exploring Federalism* presented a comprehensive interpretation of the way in which federal arrangements inform, shape, and define civil communities throughout the world. Elazar was also the founding president of the International Association of Centers for the Study of Federalism, a coalition of academic research centers focusing on federal political systems.

See also *Federalism; Intergovernmental Relations; States' Rights.*

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Election Commission

Election commissions are a special category of electoral management bodies emerging after World War II (1939–1945). They also appear in the form of a department of elections, an electoral council, an electoral unit, or an electoral board. A precise definition of electoral commissions is elusive because they are institutionalized on a wide spectrum, for example, a government-administered body (like Zimbabwe's before 2008), a board of judges managing the election (as in Turkey), an independent electoral commission (IEC) of civil society members (as in India or South Africa), and a commission mainly concerned with managing campaign financing (as in the United States).

DEFINITION

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance defines an electoral management body as "an organization or body which has the sole purpose of, and is legally responsible for, managing some or all of the elements that are *essential for* the conduct of elections and of direct democracy instruments—such as referendums, citizens' initiatives and recall votes—if those are part of the legal framework" (quoted in Alan Wall et al.'s *Electoral Management Design* 2006, 5). It may be a stand-alone institution, or it may be a distinct unit within a larger body, which also may have nonelectoral responsibilities. The essential tasks of electoral commissions are to determine who qualifies as a voter, specify all the aspects of the nomination procedure, conduct the polling, count the votes, and tabulate the votes.

Shaheen Mozaffar and Andreas Schedler, in "The Comparative Study of Electoral Governance—Introduction" (2002), and Robert Pastor, in his essay "A Brief History of Electoral Commissions" (1999), draw a distinction between established and new democracies regarding electoral management. Mozaffar and Schedler observed the tendency in established democracies to overlook the importance of electoral governance in securing the credibility and continued legitimacy of elections. According to Pastor, these systems are characterized by high levels of administrative competence, and therefore little suspicion arises regarding the government's management of elections. In new democracies, on the other hand, the need to focus on electoral management is much more pronounced. It is exacerbated by a lack of administrative capacity in the governance institutions and continuing deep-rooted suspicion between different parties and interests in the emerging democracy. Hence, an independent body is needed to level the electoral playing field.

HISTORY OF ELECTION COMMISSIONS

The election commission, as a permanent institution, first emerged after World War II. Turkey established its Supreme Election Board, the YSK, after its 1946 election. It is a board of judges that oversees elections. The board has the status of a supreme court, but its decisions cannot be appealed.

The earliest conventional electoral commissions were those in Costa Rica and India.

A group of election commission workers prepare to count paper ballots after the 2002 presidential election in South Korea. An election commission's function varies throughout the world, from managing an election to managing campaign finances.

SOURCE: AP Images

After a fraudulent election in Costa Rica in 1948, a new constitution introduced a novel institution, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, to administer all aspects of the following election. The Electoral Commission India was established in 1950. The new Indian constitution stipulated that the commission was responsible for "the superintendence, direction, and control of the electoral rolls for, and the conduct of all elections to parliament and to the legislature of every state and of elections to the offices of President and Vice President." Originally it consisted of one commissioner, but since 1989 two additional members have been appointed. They are appointed by the national president, and they can be removed through impeachment by Parliament. The Electoral Commission India has advisory jurisdiction and quasi-judicial functions, but its decisions are subject to judicial review.

In the case of an established democracy, the Watergate scandal had a profound effect on electoral management in the United States. It prompted the creation of the Federal Election Commission by Congress in 1974 as an independent regulatory agency to administer and enforce campaign-financing legislation. Its six members are appointed for six-year terms by the president and confirmed by the Senate. The Federal Election Commission does not play the conventional role of an election commission with respect to the essential tasks mentioned earlier.

FORMS OF ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT BODIES

Electoral management is institutionalized in four forms, namely,

1. an IEC;
2. a governmental electoral body;
3. a mixed form of the first two, including a governmental management body supervised by a judicial institution; and
4. a multiparty election commission.

The IEC form is normally used in situations in which government institutions are not impartial enough to allow for a fair election or they do not have the necessary management capacity to do so. IECs are also used for first elections or transitional elections as part of confidence building in a peace process or democratization. They are institutionally independent and autonomous of the executive. They are in most instances

accountable to the legislature, the judiciary, or the president. Commissioners are not involved in government but are nonpartisan members of civil society. Examples of IECs are those in Armenia, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Liberia, South Africa, Nigeria, and Thailand. In the March 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe an IEC (the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission) was used for the first time, although its independence is still questionable.

A variation on the IEC form is a transitional model. It is used as a temporary measure established by an international or regional organization to facilitate transitional elections. Some transitional models are part of a United Nations– or European Union–facilitated peace package, such as those used in Timor Leste (2000), Cambodia (1993), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996), and Namibia (United Nations Transition Assistance Group—1990).

The governmental management body—the second form—is used when the executive branch is responsible for electoral management. It is directed by a minister or a senior civil servant and is answerable to the government. Examples of governmental management bodies are found in Denmark, New Zealand, Singapore, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The mixed form of electoral management combines an independent body (responsible for policy, monitoring, and supervision) with a government department or local authority (responsible for the election's operations). This type of commission is used in France, Japan, Spain, and most of Francophone West Africa. A multiparty election commission is not entirely independent, because of the political party representatives. An example is Angola.

As part of the third and fourth waves of democratization—especially in Africa and Latin America—independent election commissions have become a standard requirement for elections. Established democracies, on the other hand, still find it difficult to adopt such a concept.

See also *Election Monitoring; Electoral Systems; Electoral Systems, Comparative; Voting Procedures.*

. . . .   DIRK KOTZÉ

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Wall, Alan, Andrew Ellis, Ayman Ayoub, Carl W. Dundas, Joram Rukambe, and Sara Staino. *Electoral Management Design: The International IDEA Handbook.* Stockholm, Sweden: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2006.

Election Monitoring

Election monitoring is the process by which external or non-interested actors evaluate the legitimacy of balloting. Credible elections are central to democracy, and election observers aid in the acceptance of polling as relatively free of manipulation or free and fair. Among the benefits of election monitoring are acceptance of the results by both domestic and international audiences and validation of democratic efforts. International observers can also provide training and technical assistance to local populations and thereby strengthen the internalization of democracy in transitioning states. Both international and domestic monitoring usually involve the deployment of observers six to eight weeks before balloting, although some missions arrive up to a year prior to elections. The observers assist with the development of electoral laws, voter registration, and oversight of balloting, including the creation of independent voter tallies. Monitors must be perceived as neutral by the parties participating in the polling. Favoring one candidate or party over others is one of the greatest potential flaws in the system. Another is that monitors may not be deployed early enough to identify all corrupt practices, including media manipulation or problems with voter registration.

Election monitoring may be conducted at either the international or the domestic level. International monitoring occurred in 1857 when Austrian, British, French, Prussian, Russian, and Turkish observers assessed plebiscites in Moldova and Wallachia. These efforts accelerated in the aftermath of World War II (1939–1945) and during the rise of international organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the European Union, and the concurrent period of decolonization. Election monitoring emerged as one of several strategies in conflict resolution efforts and was often part of peace agreements and international peacekeeping operations. The end of the cold war and the subsequent wave of democracy led to a dramatic expansion of the use of international election monitoring as advocates, such as former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, championed the practice as a means to legitimize new regimes and new democracies. Typically, election monitors are invited by host states to supervise polling or are deployed as part of a peace agreement in post-conflict states. Between 1989 and 2009, international monitors oversaw balloting in more than ninety emerging democracies or countries in transition. The widespread use of monitors reflects both efforts to secure international acceptance of regimes and the trend by which donor states and international organizations tie aid to successful elections. Among the organizations most commonly involved in monitoring are the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Council, and the African Union. For instance, since 2000, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has sent more than three thousand monitors to supervise fifteen separate elections.

Domestic monitoring has existed in various forms since the 1800s but became formalized only in the mid-twentieth

century as nongovernmental and religious groups observed elections in areas of the U.S. South and unaffiliated groups specifically formed to oversee balloting emerged in other countries. The United Nations and other international bodies have undertaken numerous initiatives to train domestic observers in transitional states. For instance, prior to balloting in 1993, the United Nations trained more than fifty thousand Cambodians to assist in electoral monitoring. Even in mature democracies, including the United States and Western Europe, domestic groups often monitor balloting.

See also *Corruption and Other Political Pathologies; Corruption, Political; Electoral Administration; Electoral Reform; Electoral Rules; Electoral Systems.*

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Electoral Administration

As a topic for political science, electoral administration is a relative newcomer. While democratic theorists such as nineteenth-century British philosopher John Stuart Mill were interested in electoral systems, they had little interest in the administrative underpinnings of democratic elections or what was needed to make them free and fair in practice.

GROWTH

All this changed in the last quarter of the twentieth century, when there was a tripling of the number of democracies in the world. The introduction of competitive elections required the development of electoral authorities that could be trusted to administer elections impartially. At the same time, electoral administration was acquiring a more professional and independent status in many established democracies, and a new premium was being placed on expertise in the field. Internationally there was increased networking and sharing of knowledge in addition to the provision of election assistance.

Bodies such as the Stockholm-based International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the Washington-based IFES (formerly the International Foundation for Election Systems) have played an important role in the development of international standards and the dissemination of good practice models. IDEA is an intergovernmental body launched in 1995, while IFES is a nongovernmental organization dating from 1987. Together with the United Nations and some national election bodies, they have joined in sponsoring the Administration and Cost of Elections Project. The Administration and Cost of Elections Electoral Knowledge Network provides comparative resources and data, practitioner networking, and capacity building. While the focus of international work on electoral administration has tended to be on assisting new democracies, the criteria that have been generated for assessing good electoral administration can be applied to any democracy.

Electoral administration covers all the steps in the electoral process: determining electoral boundaries; determining and registering those eligible to vote; registering political parties and handling candidate nomination processes; applying rules relating to the campaign period, including regulations relating to campaign finance and other aspects of campaigning; conducting elections; counting the votes; and finalizing the results. These functions may be performed by one or more election-related bodies, disputed returns may be adjudicated by special courts, and parliamentary bodies may provide multiparty oversight. The degree to which an electoral management body has control over electoral processes will be determined by the way it is authorized—whether through constitutional provisions or parliamentary legislation.

PRINCIPLES AND CHARACTERISTICS

In *Electoral Management Design: The International IDEA Handbook* (2006), Alan Wall and his colleagues identify basic principles and characteristics that form standards for electoral administration: respect for the law; fairness, impartiality, and neutrality; equity; integrity; voting secrecy; transparency and accountability; effectiveness; service-mindedness; sustainability; and accuracy and efficiency.

Wall and his colleagues further identify three basic models of electoral administration: independent, institutionally independent from the executive; government, within or under the direction of a minister and department; and mixed, a combination of the first two models with a degree of institutional independence, but under the direction and control of the government of the day. To determine where an electoral administration belongs, seven criteria are used: institutional arrangement, the relationship between the agency and the government; implementation, the level of autonomy the agency has in developing and implementing policy; formal accountability, whether it is accountable to the government executive, Parliament, or head of state; powers, the ability to develop the regulatory framework; composition, whether the agency is led by government members or persons selected from outside of government; term of office, security of tenure; and budget, the level of control it has over its own budget.

Another method of categorizing electoral authorities is focusing on who is appointed to head the agency. Louis Massicotte, André Blais, and Antoine Yoshinaka, in *Establishing the Rules of the Game: Election Laws in Democracies* (2004), differentiate between the appointment of multiple commissioners representing a diversity of political views and therefore balancing partisan views, a government minister's being in charge of the electoral process, and the appointment of a single, independent commissioner (or commissioners).

DIVERSITY

Examples of a single body's managing most aspects of national elections include the Australian Electoral Commission and Elections Canada. These bodies differ in the manner of appointment and tenure of the chief electoral official

(in Canada it is Parliament rather than government that is responsible for the appointment, which is to age sixty-five), but in both cases their independence from partisan influences is jealously guarded. Australia has been a pioneer in the development of professionalized and independent electoral administration since the invention of the Australian ballot in the mid-nineteenth century.

A more fragmented administrative arrangement can be found in the United Kingdom, where local government authorities have traditionally been responsible for voter registration and the conduct of elections. In addition, the Electoral Commission, established in 2000, is responsible for party registration, oversight of rules relating to party finance, disclosure of campaign donations and expenditure, public education, and policy advice. Separate again are Boundary Commissions and, since 1947, a Committee on Party Political Broadcasting, which brings together broadcasters and political parties to decide on the allocation of broadcast time. Paid political advertising is not allowed.

The United States has had the most extreme case of decentralized electoral administration for its national elections. The Federal Electoral Commission is responsible only for the regulation of campaign finance and is an example of a bipartisan rather than a nonpartisan electoral body. Its members may have active party links, as do electoral officials in the fifty states and forty-six hundred local authorities who are responsible for the actual conduct of national elections and voter registration and have very different approaches. One result of partisan involvement in all levels of U.S. electoral administration, including redistricting, can be a lack of trust in the outcomes; another is that all aspects of the electoral process become subject to litigation.

European and Latin American countries tend to have a national register of their citizens, and this is used for the compilation of the electoral register. This means that the electoral management body does not have responsibility for registration, and the updating is done instead by the body responsible for the civil register—in Sweden, for example, it is the National Tax Agency. Such arrangements greatly reduce the cost of voter registration, but in countries where distrust of government is high, the idea of such centralized databases may prompt fears of inappropriate data sharing.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Campaign finance is a major issue in terms of a level playing field for elections, and many democracies have moved to tighten control over the source and level of donations to political parties and candidates. Canada has recently banned all corporate or union donations, while the United Kingdom has tightened its disclosure requirements. One fear on the part of electoral management bodies is that through the auditing of political party and third-party finances, the electoral management bodies will be drawn into partisan controversy, hence undermining public confidence in the integrity of electoral administration. This is but one of the many dilemmas that arise within electoral administration; all models have both strengths and weaknesses that deserve greater attention from political science.

See also *Election Commission; Election Monitoring; Electoral Systems, Comparative; Voting Procedures.*

. . . .   NORM KELLY AND MARIAN SAWER

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Electoral College

The College of Cardinals, which meets in Rome to elect the pope when the papacy is vacant, is probably the oldest electoral college. In 1787 the framers of the U.S. Constitution adapted the concept to create the electoral college, a body of electors chosen to elect the president and vice president of the United States. The decision to use presidential electors was a compromise that took into account the difficulties inherent in a direct election and attempted to balance power between large and small states. The system is intended to protect elections from mass hysteria by relying on wiser minds. The electoral college consists of 538 electors: 3 for the District of Columbia, 2 for each of the fifty states, and 435 divided among the states, equal to the number of their representatives in the House of Representatives. The candidate who wins each state's popular vote typically receives all of the state's electoral votes (unit rule).

Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution makes provision for choosing a state's presidential electors, which allows for a number of electors equal to a state's number of senators and representatives in Congress. None of these electors can hold office in the U.S. government. Electors vote in their respective states. The votes are then sent to Congress to be counted by the president of the Senate in the presence of a joint session of the House and Senate on January 6; if that date falls on a Sunday, the votes are counted on the next day.

See also *Indirect Elections; Winner-Take-All.*

. . . .   RON J. BIGALKE JR.

Electoral Cycles

An electoral cycle is the period of time between two elections. Subject to specific electoral laws, electoral cycles are usually four or five years in length. Important components of an electoral cycle are the honeymoon, the period right after

the election; the midterm, the period between elections; and the campaign period, or time approaching an election. Very often, governments reach their highest levels of popularity during the honeymoon period, while experiencing a sharp decline in popularity afterward as the campaign period and next election approach. Popularity functions such as these are considered the outcome of an electoral (economic) cycle. Two types of studies have emerged exploring electoral cycles: the first focuses on the effect of the cycle on economic policies, while the second type looks at how economic conditions and performance prior to an election affect electoral outcomes. The latter research strategy has produced a series of forecasting models that are relatively successful in predicting electoral outcomes.

One line of research on electoral cycles examines the variations in government spending at different points in an election cycle. These studies argue that governments introduce popular policies to maximize their electoral support by increasing spending during the campaign period when voters are called to decide on their future. Empirical evidence has confirmed the above hypothesis, suggesting that government spending was increasing during the election year. This conclusion was also confirmed by a series of analyses of various electoral cycles for Western democracies (United States, United Kingdom, and Germany), where governments appeared to target increases in spending (toward specific groups) during election years. However, when controlling for objective measures of economic conditions (e.g., GDP), the results reported above lost their robustness, and other scholars reported a series of results uncovering that government spending was not related to electoral cycles. Finally, another group of scholars reached a conclusion that falls in the middle, arguing that electoral cycles are important but their substantive effects on government spending are relatively small. Thus, there is no wide consensus on the effects of election cycles on economic policies. Different scholars look at different types of budgetary spending, different types of governments, and different periods in time. Unsurprisingly, the reviewed results relied heavily on various sources of heterogeneity.

Another line of research examines the effects of economic conditions on voting behavior. Models of voter accountability suggest that electorates reward or punish government performance based on economic conditions. Incumbents are capable of directly influencing economic conditions and consequently the voters' well-being. Governments will tend to introduce popular fiscal policies before they enter the campaign to win the election. Following the assumption that voters decide by looking at past performance, incumbent parties will attempt to manipulate the economy to maximize their probability of winning. The theory predicts that objective economic conditions bring about prospective and retrospective evaluations about the state of the economy. This involves sociotropic and egocentric perceptions (i.e., perceptions about the prospective or retrospective general state of the economy and perceptions of personal finances) that mediate final subjective perceptions of the economy. Voters who think that the incumbent has performed

well are likely to reward the government responsible for their pocketbook or sociotropic prosperity. Building on that schema, politicians will seek to introduce popular economic policies in the final period of the electoral cycle to sway the electorate with the goal of establishing the feel-good factor among voters to enhance their likelihood of being reelected. This may be accomplished by introducing changes in key economic indicators such as inflation, unemployment, interest rates, and taxation. While the vast majority of the economic voting literature suggests that the economy is the focal determinant of electoral behavior, the importance and the stability of this effect seem to vary across nations and across time.

As a summary, both accounts of the electoral cycle discussed above are building on three foundations. First, incumbent governments are office-seeking actors. Second, they have the ability to manipulate national economic conditions. Finally, they will tend to manipulate the economy based on a long-term electoral cycle strategy. The first line of the reviewed research seeks to explain government spending, assuming that strategic spending is related to specific time points within the electoral cycle. The second group of scholars seeks to explain voting behavior in response to macroeconomic conditions. On these accounts, the electoral cycles are considered given, and researchers seek to find patterns of association between objective and subjective measures of the economy and the actual vote.

See also *Campaigns; Electoral Rules; Electoral Systems.*

. . . . SPYROS KOSMIDIS

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Electoral Formulas

Electoral formulas determine the allocation of representation to candidates or parties, given the tally in an election. They can be simple, with the candidate receiving the most votes winning the seat in a single-member district, or complex, with an elaborate mathematical formula in multimember districts. Indeed, because seat allocation is so straightforward in plurality systems—the candidate with the most votes in a given district wins the seat—the term *electoral formula* is generally used with respect to proportional representation systems.

The simplest element of an electoral formula is the threshold of votes required to qualify for at least one seat, although some formulas do not set a threshold. For example, in state primary elections to allocate delegates to the 2008 Democratic National Convention, the body that formally nominated the Democratic candidate for president of the United States, 15 percent of the state primary vote was required to earn delegates from that state. Where thresholds are set, they typically vary with the number of seats allocated. In elections for the European Parliament, which use variants of proportional representation from country to country, thresholds vary from none to 5 percent.

There are two major families of electoral formulas: highest-averages and largest-remainder methods. Under highest-averages methods, the first step after votes are tallied is to calculate a quotient for each party with the numerator equaling the number of votes received by that party. The formula for the denominator varies across specific methods. For example, in the D'Hondt formula, a highest-averages method used in most European systems, the denominator for each party is the number of seats already allocated to that party plus one. Initially, all parties start with zero seats allocated and a denominator equal to one. The first seat is assigned to the party with the highest quotient; then its quotient is recalculated using the new denominator (two). The second seat is assigned to the party that now has the highest quotient, which could be the party with the first seat if it received more than twice as many votes as its nearest competitor but otherwise will be the party with the second-highest vote total. The quotient is again recalculated, and the process is repeated until all seats are allocated. An alternative to D'Hondt is the Sainte-Laguë formula, for which the denominator equals two times the number of seats already allocated, plus one. This variation makes Sainte-Laguë more favorable to smaller parties than D'Hondt.

The key element of the largest-remainder method is the quota. In wide use are the Droop quota $\left(\frac{votes\ cast}{seats\ to\ allocate\ +\ 1}+1\right)$ and the Hare (or simple) quota $\left(\frac{votes\ cast}{seats\ to\ allocate}\right)$. Each party's vote tally is divided by the quota, and the result is a whole-number quotient plus a remainder (it is possible for a party's remainder to equal zero). Each party receives, at a minimum, the number of seats equal to the whole-number quotient. Unallocated seats are then awarded sequentially to the party with the largest remainder. As with the denominator of a highest-averages method, the choice of a specific quota in a largest-remainder method can alter the seat allocation. To wit, the Hare quota enhances the representation of smaller parties more than the Droop quota.

See also *Electoral College; Electoral Systems; Pluralism; Representation and Representative.*

. . . .   JENNIFER A. STEEN

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Electoral Geography

Electoral geography is the presentation and analysis of geographic information related to elections. Electoral geography can be both descriptive and analytical. Political scientists can use geographic units to display differences in political behavior (such as election results presented on a map of the states), and they can use geographic information to test theories about election behavior. Tools used can range from simple color-coded maps to computerized geographic information systems.

Elections everywhere in the world take place in a geographically definable space, and electoral geography is about how that space affects and responds to elections and the interests, incentives, and results they create. At the simplest level, elections take place in nations. Since national elections are contests that determine political outcomes for the geographically defined nation, summary electoral information can be displayed on a map. For example, a map could be constructed that shows the number of female elected representatives in each of the countries in Latin America or that shows the percentage of support for European Union membership in referenda in various countries in Europe.

Geography at the subnational level can also be used to present electoral information. Presenting candidate support by region, federal districts or states, or administrative governmental units can show where a candidate's support lies as well as suggest reasons for candidate success or failure. Such presentations can rely on states to show where a presidential candidate's support lies, or they can rely on smaller units such as counties or even voting precincts to display more detailed variations in candidate support, perhaps demonstrating that a candidate generates support more effectively in cities than in rural areas.

ANALYZING ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHIC UNITS

As suggested above, political science researchers are often interested in the display of electoral information by geographic units, but they are also interested in making inferences

from geographically referenced information. Knowing that a candidate does well in Western states might be interesting, but it is more interesting if that finding has implications for theories of electoral behavior. It is possible, for example, to predict that candidates will do well in the West if they use particular campaign strategies. Finding predicted spatial patterns related to this theory would tell us more about elections than one particular candidate's support in an area and could contribute to the understanding of electoral behavior more generally.

It should not always be assumed that governmental subunits are fixed in the analysis of electoral information. Many subunits are created as a result of political processes, some with the intent of having an effect on elections. Legislative electoral districts, for example, determine which voters participate in which particular elections for legislative office. Districts can be drawn in such a way that one group is advantaged over another. In the United States, extreme cases of the geographic manipulation of electoral districts are often called "gerrymanders," after a nineteenth-century Massachusetts governor (Elbridge Gerry) whose party was thought to benefit from a famous instance of what is now known as gerrymandering. The manipulation of electoral districts is not, however, exclusively a U.S. phenomenon. In a 2008 book chapter, for example, Alonso Lujambio and Horacio Vives document how Mexican electoral districts have been manipulated and how the process has been reformed to guard against gerrymandering. Election districts, then, are often studied by political scientists to determine the extent to which they influence election outcomes. Other geographic units can be drawn with different consequences for elections. City boundaries, for example, can expand to include certain populations, which can affect the outcomes of subsequent municipal elections.

ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES

Electoral boundaries can influence electoral outcomes in several ways. Candidates running for political office, for example, can be expected to pay close attention to the geography of their districts and to structure their behavior to accommodate the geographic realities of their districts. In *Home Style* (1978), political scientist Richard Fenno notes that candidate behavior depends to a great deal on the layout of election districts. Sprawling, rural districts demand a different sort of attention than do geographically smaller urban districts. Suburban districts require different sets of candidate behaviors than do districts made up of older, more established communities.

Voters also can be expected to react to electoral boundaries. Some of these reactions may follow from candidate behaviors, but several scholars suggest that boundaries themselves can influence the attitudes and behavior of voters. Boundaries can conform to other geographic structures in a voter's environment, which in a 1985 article, Bernard Grofman argues gives the voter the ability to "think about" the district. John H. Ely (1997) expects that voters can recognize when a district has been drawn to the advantage of one group and disadvantage of another, which can affect the voter's interest in participating in the election. In a 2005 article, Richard N. Engstrom finds that electoral district boundaries have an effect on voters' ability to identify the candidates running for office in their districts, depending on the degree to which the electoral districts conform to the location of local media markets.

The extent to which the drawing of electoral boundaries can influence elections has led many who study legislative redistricting to conclude that rules should be put into place to regulate those who draw electoral boundaries. Some states enforce what are called "traditional districting principles" that require districts to be geographically compact and contiguous and to contain preexisting political communities. These requirements have led those who study electoral geography to construct measures of these concepts. Different U.S. states have adopted different districting rules, many of which draw from the concept of traditional districting principles.

An alternative to establishing redistricting rules is to create politically neutral (or at least balanced) boundary commissions, which would presumably draw boundaries that are electorally unbiased. Boundary commissions are commonly used in democracies around the world to determine the geographic configuration of election districts. Boundary commissions exist in the United States, but almost always as part of a system to accommodate the failure of a state legislature to draw the districts.

The inclusion of geographic information in the study of elections is an important tool in political science's efforts to understand elections and electoral behavior. Although the display of information on maps is a straightforward approach, modern geographic information system technology gives researchers the ability to take an analysis further. The distance between voters and public resources, or the density of populations in different parts of election districts could well have implications for how citizens vote, and geographic information system technology can assess just this sort of information.

See also *Electoral Administration; Electoral Reform; Electoral Systems; Gerrymandering; Redistricting; Voting Behavior.*

. . . .   RICHARD N. ENGSTROM

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Electoral Quotas

Electoral quotas has two distinct meanings. The first refers to the number of votes required in an election to ensure that a party or candidate will win under a proportional representation electoral system. There are four types of quotas under this rubric. The Hare quota, the simplest of the measures, is determined by dividing the number of votes cast by the number of seats for election. The Hagenbach-Bischoff quota requires that the number of votes be divided by the number of seats plus one. Under the Droop quota, the number of votes is divided by the number of seats plus one, but one is also added to the quotient, or final result. The Imperiali quota is determined by dividing the number of votes cast by the number of seats plus two.

Electoral quotas can also refer to the proportional representation of a particular group—such as women or ethnic minorities—on party lists, for constituency nominations, or as representatives in legislatures or other elected bodies. The purpose of this type of quota is to ensure the nomination, election, and representation of a minimum number or percentage of candidates from the designated groups. This quota is most commonly used to promote the participation of women in politics. It has been successful to varying degrees around the world through various mechanisms, including constitutional entrenchment and legislation; in electoral models; and through voluntary use, through party quotas.

See also *Droop Quota; Gender Quotas; Quotas.*

. . . .   JENNIFER E. DALTON

Electoral Reform

Electoral reform is the change of some element of an electoral system, including suffrage rights, the size or number of seats in the assembly, the magnitude or number of seats in the districts, the formula to allocate seats or make a winner, and the ballot form permitting or restricting the voters' choice of parties and candidates. In the long term, major electoral reforms have expanded suffrage rights, replaced indirect elections with direct elections by majority rule, and done the latter with mixed systems and proportional representation rules.

Traditional electoral systems based on plurality or relative majority rule in multiseat districts were used in traditional compact communities in late medieval and early modern times. They are still used in a significant number of local government elections in which it can be presumed that citizens share some clearly identified, broad common interest. However, single-seat districts were diffused during processes of building or reforming large-scale parliaments in large states with more heterogeneous societies and accompanying the broadening of suffrage rights. Specifically, single-seat districts were widely introduced in Scotland and Wales, and in lower proportions in England, during the eighteenth century, and they became a general norm for the British House of Commons by the end of the nineteenth century. They were also introduced in the U.S. state of Vermont by the late eighteenth century and gradually expanded to the rest of the country, especially for the election of the House of Representatives, by the mid-nineteenth century. In Canada, France, and India, single-seat districts also became the only formula for all of the seats in the lower chamber of Parliament during the second half of the twentieth century.

The creation of new parties trying to politicize new issues and the emergence of new political demands in newly complex societies may make results with majority rule dissatisfactory for both voters and candidates. Proportional representation rules were invented with the aim of including varied minorities in the assembly and facilitate the formation of an effective political majority to legislate and rule. To establish fair representation of political parties, each party may be given a portion of seats corresponding to its votes. In a number of countries, the introduction of proportional representation rules in the early twentieth century ran in parallel with the expansion of suffrage rights and the subsequent demands from different social, political, and ethnic groups for representation, as in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and other west European countries.

In general, political parties tend to choose electoral rules with the expectation that they will give them some advantage to promote their aims. Specifically, they tend to follow the so-called micro-mega rule, by which the large prefer the small and the small prefer the large. A few large parties tend to prefer small assemblies, small district magnitudes (the smallest being one), and rules based on small quotas of votes for allocating seats (the smallest being simple plurality, which does not require any specific threshold) to exclude others from competition. Likewise, multiple small parties tend to prefer large assemblies, large district magnitudes, and large quotas (like those of proportional representation), which are able to include them within.

Since the nineteenth century, there have been eighty-two major reforms of the assembly electoral system in forty-one countries with more than one million inhabitants. More than 80 percent of these reforms have been in the direction of more inclusive formulas. Single-seat districts have been supported in countries with a single dominant party; two parties frequently alternating in power, typically a conservative and a liberal party (or a Republican and a Democrat, as in the United States); or in more recent times, a conservative and a socialist party (as in Britain). Nowadays, they are used for assembly elections basically in a number of old democratic regimes in former British or French colonies. In contrast, multiseat districts and proportional representation are usually favored in multiparty systems both by traditional incumbents, such as conservatives or liberals, under threat of losing their dominant position and by minority but growing opposition parties, as was historically the case with socialist, Christian, ethnic, and other parties. Today proportional representation rules are used in most democratic regimes across the world.

See also *Electoral Formulas; Electoral Rules; Electoral Systems; Proportional Representation.*

. . . .   JOSEP M. COLOMER

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Electoral Rules

Electoral rules are criteria to transform votes into collective decisions. They are generally inspired by one of three main principles: unanimity, which requires maximum consensus; majority, which makes a decision supported by half the voters valid; and proportionality, which gives every group a share of representation for further negotiations and broad agreements. Different electoral rules can be used for different purposes, involving both mass political elections and small-group and committee voting and decisions, because they induce the formation of different alternatives and different agendas and may produce diverse results, as will be discussed below.

UNANIMITY

Election of delegates and approval of proposals by unanimity are almost instinctive procedures in simple, homogeneous gatherings and assemblies with easily identifiable common interests and priorities. Families, groups of friends, urban gangs, neighborhood meetings, corporation partners, and club members tend to make collective decisions under conditions of general agreement. In the ancient world, the Justinian code of Rome established the principle that "what concerns similarly all ought to be approved by all," which was adopted by the Christian Church in the fifth century as the following: "He who governs all should be elected by all." In medieval Europe, consuls were elected by traders, bishops by priests and believers, magistrates by citizens, and so forth, on the basis of large consensus. Many medieval assembly regulations established that decisions should be made by "consensus and acclamation," "approval and consent," with "no discrepancy" or "no contradiction," by "free veto," and so on.

However, the requirement of unanimity made it difficult to reach many decisions, especially as communes and countries became more open and socially heterogeneous, which provoked conflicts and schisms. A variety of medieval institutions provided procedures to create unanimity where it did not exist, including silent acquiescence; shouts of commendation or acclamation; murmurs in favor of or cries against the proposer; explicit acceptance of the elected by the dissidents; preliminary voting followed by formal, public expression of the decision by all the community members; and acceptance of elections or decisions made by a qualified part of voters to whom the other voters would submit. Certain Italian communes adopted less-than-unanimity rules, such as those requiring two-thirds, four-sevenths, or other supermajorities or qualified majorities, together with indirect elections in several stages and other devices. The elections of the Christian pope since the twelfth century, as well as those of several central European kings and the German emperor from the fourteenth century on, were redesigned along similar lines. But certain assemblies, such as the Aragonese and Catalan parliaments and the Polish Diet, were reluctant to abandon the requirement of unanimity. As late as the early nineteenth century, even in the British House of Commons most decisions were still made by acclamation, which implied near-unanimous consent.

In both ancient and medieval political institutions and in modern private communities and companies, forcing explicit acquiescence of the dissidents to unanimous consent is a means to ensure that they will respect the elected, obey the collective decisions, or contribute with their duties in spite of previous disagreements. Similar features can be found in a number of international organizations, such as the United Nations General Assembly and the Council of the European Union, where it is assumed that each party is sovereign and has a veto right. Despite their many differences, all these institutions—whether they are ancient, medieval, or modern; private or public; local or international—have the following basic elements: corporate or government (not individual) suffrage, decision making that is limited to those issues in which a general common interest can be presumed, the search for near-unanimous consensus, distribution of burdens in proportion to contribution of resources, and offices that are held by turns or lots.

The unanimity rule has some good properties. Unanimous decisions correspond to the efficiency criterion associated with the name of Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto. A collective decision is said to be "Pareto-superior" if it improves the situation of some participants and does not worsen the situation of others. Also, decisions by the unanimity rule give a positive response to changes in voters' preferences. Specifically, under the unanimity rule, an increase in voters' support for the incumbent or the status quo will not result in its replacement. Similarly, a loss of support for an alternative candidate or proposal will not make it the winner—a property also called "monotonicity" that is not fulfilled, in contrast, by several procedures based on majority rule.

However, unanimity decisions may be impossible to make if voters' preferences can be located along a single dimension, such as the left-right axis or any other issue or ideological dimension on which the participants have consistent preferences. Any voter can veto a move of the status quo away from his or her preference. Advantaged voters, or in spatial terms, those whose preferences are closer to the status quo, can consolidate their advantages. The collective outcome will remain stable independent of the existence of alternative candidates or proposals that are able to reduce the aggregated distance from all individual preferences and thus increase collective satisfaction.

With the introduction of new issues or new values of judgment creating a multidimensional space, several unanimous decisions within the Pareto set, or the set of decisions fulfilling the Pareto criterion, can be made available. While new candidates or proposals may be placed at a larger distance from some voters' preferences than the status quo on one issue or value, they can also be closer to them on other issues or values and become globally more satisfactory and acceptable. But each one of the possible new winners by unanimity will give different voters different degrees of satisfaction of their preferences. Only when the initial status quo is very unsatisfactory, that is, very distant from the voters' preferences, can a new socially efficient decision be made by unanimity. In contrast, if the initial status quo is relatively less unsatisfactory, some voters will veto alternative candidates or proposals, thus causing mediocrity to endure.

MAJORITY

The majority principle was first introduced in medieval Germanic law and the Christian Church's canon law as a consequence of failures in making decisions by unanimity. When dissident members or minority groups were sufficiently large or determined and could effectively resist the imposition of the dominant group's will, there was a strong incentive to adopt a less-than-unanimity, typically majority, rule. With the formation of two or more fractions or parties, decisions made by acclamation were replaced with more formal procedures requiring counting votes and the achievement of a majority threshold. In contrast to the unanimity-based organizations mentioned above, majority rule usually requires individual suffrage and implies that the winner takes all.

It has been argued that the majority principle is the only one that satisfies these few reasonable criteria: (1) decisiveness, but only if there are no more than two alternatives (candidates, parties, or policy proposals) to choose from; (2) anonymity or voters' equality; (3) neutrality with respect to issues, not giving advantage to the largest group or to the status quo (in contrast to unanimity rule, for instance, as discussed above); and (4) positive response to changes in voters' preferences or monotonicity (but only if one alternative obtains an absolute majority support based on voters' first preferences).

In practice, different procedures have been invented to try to make the majority principle viable in real elections. Two late-eighteenth-century French academics made sophisticated proposals. Marquis de Condorcet proposed that the winner in an election should be the alternative (candidate or proposal) preferred by a majority against every other alternative, which may require multiple rounds of voting or comparisons between pairs of alternatives. When the alternatives are located along a single issue or ideological dimension, exhaustive pairwise comparisons or the Condorcet voting procedure makes the median voter's preference the winner. By definition, the median voter, that is, the voter whose preference is located in an intermediate position with less than half of voters on both sides, is always necessary to form a consistent majority on a single dimension. Since the median voter's preference minimizes the sum of distances from all other individual preferences, it can be considered a socially efficient outcome. But in a more dispersed set of alternatives forming multiple dimensions, the Condorcet procedure may not produce a winner, thus lacking decisiveness. A variant gives the victory to the alternative that wins a higher number of times (as divulgated by the Catalan philosopher Ramon Llull in the Middle Ages).

In turn, another eighteenth-century French academic, Jean-Charles de Borda, proposed a rank-order count procedure by which the voter should order preferences and give zero, one, two, and successive points to the alternatives; the winner should be the one with the highest sum of points (the German philosopher Nicolas of Cusa had also proposed this procedure a few centuries before). A more traditional procedure, also with medieval precedents, is approval voting, which allows voters to vote for all those alternatives that they consider acceptable, from a minimum of one to a maximum of all minus one; the alternative with the highest number of votes becomes the winner. There has been much discussion about how different results may be produced by these different procedures, depending on voters' distribution of preferences and their degree of homogeneity. But as has been shown recently, in most real-world settings, exhaustive pairwise comparisons, rank-order count, and approval voting tend to select the same winner.

In mass political elections, relatively less-demanding procedures are more frequently used. With a simple plurality rule, the winner is the candidate supported by only a relative majority, that is, by a higher number of voters than any other candidate but not requiring any particular number, proportion, or threshold of votes. In practice, this makes it possible for generally binding decisions presumably decided by the majority to actually be won with the support of only a minority of voters. In fact, in mass parliamentary elections by plurality rule, a single party has received a majority of seats on the basis of a minority of votes in about two-thirds of the cases in the United Kingdom and some former British colonies (out of 126 democratic elections in Canada since 1878, the United Kingdom since 1885, New Zealand from 1890 to 1993, and India since 1953) as well as in about one-third of the cases in the U.S. House of Representatives since 1828. In presidential elections, plurality rule has given the victory to minority-vote candidates in about two-fifths of the cases in the United States (through the plurality-based electoral college) and in more than two-thirds of the cases in eight countries in Latin America (out of 54 democratic elections during several democratic periods from 1945 on in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela).

In contrast, majority runoff requires an absolute majority (more than half) of votes at the first round, while in a second round of voting the choice can be reduced to the two most-voted-for candidates to secure majority support for the winner. A variant requires the voters to rank all candidates and proceeds to several counts of votes (instead of several rounds of voting) until a candidate obtains the most preferences, as in the majority-preferential vote (also called "alternative vote" or "instant runoff").

With both plurality and majority-runoff or majority-preferential voting, the median voter's preference can be defeated or eliminated. The nonmedian winner by any of these procedures could be defeated by another, losing candidate by absolute majority if the choice between the two were available; that is, he or she might not be the winner by Condorcet procedure (preferred by a majority against every other alternative). This has been the case, for instance, in five of eight presidential elections by majority runoff in France since 1965. Under plurality rule, the winner can even be the Condorcet loser or the most-rejected candidate by a majority of voters, as has happened, for instance, in several presidential elections in Latin American countries, including Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, with disastrous political consequences.

In general, the most usual procedures of majority rule just discussed are dependent on irrelevant alternatives; that is, they are highly vulnerable to manipulation since the winner may be an indirect consequence of the merge or split of other, nonwinning alternatives. If a new, nonwinning candidacy splits the votes of the winner, a different winner can be created. This may happen even if the new winner has not gained larger support (thus not fulfilling the monotonicity criterion mentioned above). Majority-rule elections thus encourage strategies aimed at altering the number of alternatives, such as divide and win and merge and win, as well as nonsincere or strategic votes in favor of a less preferred but more likely winning alternative.

PROPORTIONALITY

Proportional representation rules allocate different numbers of seats to multiple parties competing in an election on the basis of the votes received. They were invented with the aim of reducing single-party sweeps and exclusionary victories and preventing actual minority winners with the previously existing rules. As mentioned, majoritarian electoral rules had been widely used in contexts of simple societies with rather homogeneous electorates dealing with local issues. But the expansion of suffrage rights, the emergence of new political demands, and the creation of new parties trying to politicize new issues in newly complex societies made traditional results with majoritarian rules increasingly dissatisfactory for both voters and candidates. The winner-takes-all character of majority rule and the frequency of actual minority winners were at odds with increasing political and social pluralism. In a number of countries the introduction of proportional representation rules in the early twentieth century ran parallel to the introduction of other regulations favoring citizens' participation and fair competition, such as more reliable electoral censuses, the written ballot, secret vote, and an independent electoral authority validating the results.

The basic mathematical formulas that would make the principle of proportional representation operable were invented in the late eighteenth century for apportioning seats in the U.S. House of Representatives among the differently populated states. But they were reinvented in Europe in the late nineteenth century for the allocation of parliamentary seats to political parties with different numbers of votes. A proportional representation formula defines a quota of inhabitants or votes worth a seat. The "simple" quota (as devised by both eighteenth-century U.S. politician Alexander Hamilton and nineteenth-century English lawyer Thomas Hare) is the divisor between the total number of inhabitants or votes and the total number of seats. But since inhabitants or votes are not distributed in exact multiples of the quota, it usually requires an additional criterion to allocate some of the seats, most commonly to the largest remainders after the quota is used. In contrast, the smaller "highest average" or "distributive number" (as devised by both eighteenth-century U.S. politician and president Thomas Jefferson and nineteenth-century Belgian law professor Victor d'Hondt) is sufficient to allocate all seats. This quota can be calculated after the election by several procedures, including using trial and error, using a series of divisors, or lowering the simple quota until fitting all the seats to be allocated. Variants include the so-called major-fractions formula (proposed by both nineteenth-century U.S. politician Daniel Webster and twentieth-century French mathematician André Sainte-Laguë) and others. The "fixed" quota is an absolute number of votes established a priori as worthy of a seat (as proposed separately by nineteenth-century French mathematician Joseph-Diaz Gergonne and nineteenth-century U.S. activist Thomas Gilpin). Although rarely used in mass political elections, it may encourage turnout and work with uniform criteria in all districts, even if it does not permit the establishment of a previously set number of seats.

Proportional representation rules can be used with closed-party lists, permitting the voter to choose categorically only one alternative. But they are also used with other ballot formulas, including open lists or preferential votes, permitting the voter to select one or a few candidates within a party list (as used in Scandinavian countries); the double vote, requiring voters to choose both a closed-party list and one individual candidate (as used, e.g., in Germany); the open ballot, permitting the voter to vote for individual candidates from different parties (as in Switzerland); and the single-transferable vote, requiring voters to rank all individual candidates (as used in relatively small districts in Ireland).

In comparison with the majoritarian rules discussed above, electoral systems with proportional representation rules are more inclusive of several groups. They encourage multiple parties to run separately according to their own profiles, that is, not to withdraw or merge. They tend to facilitate the election of members of ethnic minorities and women representatives. Political and ideological minorities can be included in the system and have an influence on collective decision making according to their popular support to form an actual majority for institutional decision making. Proportional representation, by placing electoral contests in large districts, may also encourage the development of political parties promoting broad interests and the provision of large-scale public goods, in contrast to more frequent focuses on narrow local interests, private goods, and clientelism in individual elections in single-member districts. With proportional representation, since most

votes count to elect seats, voters are encouraged to promote a more sincere revelation of preferences. Electoral participation tends to be higher in elections with proportional representation rules than in single-member districts.

The degree of proportionality between votes and seats for each party produced by different rules can be measured with several indexes, which are all strongly correlated. With conventional measures, the deviation from proportionality may take values from as low as less than 2 percent (as in Germany, with a simple-quota proportional system) to up to 20 percent overrepresentation in favor of the larger parties (as in the plurality-rule system in the United Kingdom).

While plurality rule may fabricate a single party's absolute majority of seats on the basis of a minority of popular votes (not necessarily including the median voter, as previously mentioned), multiparty parliaments based on proportional representation tend to produce multiparty coalition governments based on a majority of seats and popular votes. In practice, there is a paradox: majoritarian electoral systems often create governments with minority electoral support, while proportional representation rules, which are praised for the inclusion of minorities, tend to produce governments with majority electoral support. In plurality-rule electoral systems, a small change in the total of popular votes can provoke a complete alternation of the party in government. With proportional representation, since some parties may have opportunities to share power with different partners, in the long term we should expect relatively more policy stability.

Nowadays, plurality rule is used for mass political elections, mostly in a number of old democratic regimes in former British colonies (as well as in most fake noncompetitive elections in authoritarian regimes). Proportional representation rules began to be used in the early twentieth century in relatively small but socially or ethnically complex countries in Western Europe, when they introduced new regulations of universal male suffrage, including Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian states. Today they are used in most democratic regimes across the world.

See also *Condorcet, Marquis de; D'Hondt Method; Electoral Formulas; Electoral Quotas; Electoral Systems, Comparative; Pareto, Vilfredo; Political Participation; Preferential Voting; Proportional Representation; Representative Democracy.*

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Electoral System, Binomial

See *Binomial Electoral System.*

Electoral Systems

Electoral systems, often referred to as voting systems, systematize the election of candidates for public office. Inherent in these systems are explicit rules for executing the voting process. These rules govern voting eligibility requirements for the populace, tabulation of the results, and voting methods. The electoral system specifies the type of ballot, the size of permissible votes, and the method for tabulating votes. These specifications are what distinguish one electoral system from another. Thus, elections in countries will vary as a result of the adopted electoral system.

Electoral systems can differ with regard to the manner in which individuals articulate their voting preferences. This mostly concerns the structure of the ballot. Electoral systems can be considered single-winner systems and multiple-winner systems. Single-winner systems elect a single person for an elected office, whereas multiple-winner systems produce elections that generate multiple winners. Several methods exist for achieving a single-winner system; the most popular are as follows. Voters participating in a ranked ballot system will rank order their preference for candidates from most preferred to least preferred. This method allows each voter to express his or her opinion about all public office candidates as a result of rank ordering. Alternately, range voting allows voters to rate or score each candidate individually along a prespecified range articulated by the voting system. The scores for each candidate for public office are tabulated, and the candidate with the greatest

score is proclaimed the winner. Plurality voting, or first past the post, is most commonly used in the United States, Canada, India, and the United Kingdom. This voting form specifies that the proclaimed winner is the candidate who wins the most votes, regardless of whether the vote is a majority of the votes. A variation of plurality voting exists in France, which specifies that if no candidate receives a majority vote, a second election occurs (a runoff election) between the two top vote-getting candidates to choose a winner. The most common methods used by single-winner systems are plurality and runoff voting.

Multiple-winner systems usually characterize elections for legislative bodies. In this instance, the concern is not necessarily which individuals get elected but how many seats the political party is able to secure. Therefore, the emphasis tends to be on the political party's composition of the legislative body, whereas in single-winner systems the emphasis is more on the individual seeking election. Many multiple-winner systems seek the distribution of political power on the basis of proportional representation. Several methods exist under multiple-winner systems. These elections can be characterized as nonproportional, semiproportional, and proportional representation. Nonproportional elections are illustrated as elections by list in which voters cast their votes for a list of candidates and the list of candidates that receives the majority of votes wins all the contested seats. Ecuador uses such a system in allocating seats in its legislature. Alternatively, semiproportional elections strive to achieve proportional results; however, there is no guarantee of this result. This is illustrated by single nontransferable votes in which each voter casts one vote for a candidate but more than one position exists; the candidate with the highest number of votes wins the office. The result can be proportional but may also result in nonproportional representation. Jordan, Thailand, and Indonesia use this method for allocating seats. Last, proportional representation guarantees proportional results by employing a party list system in most cases. Voters cast votes for parties rather than individual office seekers. Proportional representation attempts to achieve comparable results between the percentage of votes for a list of candidates and the actual percentage of seats they receive.

The candidate lists for which voters cast their votes can be either open lists or closed lists. Open lists allow voters to determine which candidates on the list win the open seats, whereas closed lists do not offer voters the same flexibility because the parties assign candidates to the seats on a predetermined basis. Nations that allocate seats based on proportional representation usually have more political parties, and it is difficult for a single party to achieve majority status; therefore, coalition government is common. An example of a country that uses a system of proportional representation based on party lists is Israel.

See also *Additional Member System; Binomial Electoral System; Candidate Selection; Electoral Formulas; Electoral Rules; First Past the Post; Proportional Representation; Run-Off; Vote, Transferable and Nontransferable.*

. . . .   RICHARD M. YON

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Electoral Systems, Comparative

A huge variety of electoral systems in the world have been established along with the diffusion of democracy and the formation of political parties. In traditional local assemblies with rather homogeneous electorates until the nineteenth century, relatively simple electoral rules were used. A typical electoral system was composed of (1) multimember districts, that is, the election of more than one representative in each district; (2) open ballot, in which people could vote for their preferred individual candidates without the restrictions of lists or groups; and (3) plurality or majority rule, by which the candidates with the higher numbers of votes were elected. This type of electoral system was able to produce a consensual representation, especially in small communities with high economic and ethnic homogeneity. However, in new contexts of relatively complex and heterogeneous electorates, once lists of candidates to be voted in bloc were formed, there were incentives to search for new electoral systems able to give representation to multiple parties. Virtually all the new electoral rules and procedures that were created since the mid-nineteenth century can be understood as innovative variations of the originating system presented above. They can be classified in three groups, depending on whether they changed the above-mentioned district magnitude, the ballot, or the rule.

The first group of new electoral rules implied a change of the district magnitude from multimember to single-member districts, that is, the split of the previous large districts into smaller ones in which only one representative was elected. With smaller, single-member districts a candidate who would have been defeated by a party sweep in a multimember district may be elected. Thus, this system tends to produce more varied representation than the previous system. Single-member districts with plurality, or relative majority, rule were broadly introduced in Scotland and Wales and in lower proportions in England during the eighteenth century, and they became the general norm for all of Britain in 1885. They were also introduced in the U.S. state of Vermont in 1793 and gradually expanded to the rest of the country, especially for the election of the House of Representatives in 1842. France also replaced multimember districts with single-member districts by absolute majority rule with a second round of voting for the first time in 1820, oscillated between

both formulas during long periods, and has reestablished single-member districts since 1958.

The second group of new electoral rules implied new forms of ballots favoring individual-candidate voting despite the existence of party candidacies while maintaining multimember districts and majority rules. By limited vote, the voter can vote for fewer candidates than seats to be elected in the district. One party can sweep as many seats as the voter has votes, but it is likely that the rest of the seats will be won by candidates of different political affiliations. The earliest experiences of limited vote in multimember districts took place in Spain, first in the form of a single nontransferable vote, that is, with only one vote per voter, from 1865 on, and giving each voter two votes in three-seat districts from 1878 on. Limited vote was also introduced in previously existing multimember districts in brief experiences in Britain in 1868 and in Brazil in 1875. The single nontransferable vote was used for long periods in Japan during the twentieth century.

Finally, the third group of new electoral rules implied the introduction of rules of proportional representation, which give each party list a number of seats in proportion to its votes. The early, British-style formula of single transferable vote is used in multimember districts with individual-candidate voting, although it requires each voter not only to select but to rank candidates. Other formulas of proportional representation, such as double vote and preferential voting, although they imply party lists, may be compatible with some degree of individual-candidate voting. The first wave of proportional electoral systems started in Belgium in 1899, closely followed by Denmark, Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, and Switzerland around World War I (1914–1918). The development of multiparty systems led these and other west European countries to reestablish or for the first time introduce proportional representation electoral rules at the end of World War II (1939–1945).

Currently, the vast majority of countries employing single-member districts with plurality rule are former British colonies. They include the United Kingdom and the United States as well as Canada, India, and a number of small countries in Africa and the Caribbean. France and a few former French colonies use single-member districts with absolute majority rule, which is also used in Australia with majority-preferential vote.

In the rest of the world, the increase of both the number of countries and the number and the proportion of democracies has developed together with increasing political pluralism within each country. While the number of political parties tends to increase as a consequence of the emergence of new political demands, politicization of new issues, and would-be leaders' initiatives, there has been a general trend in favor of adopting rules of proportional representation.

A recent development is the emergence of mixed electoral systems in which both majority and proportional representation rules are used for electing different sets of seats in the same assembly. Most mixed systems currently existing were established to replace previous dictatorships or plurality-rule electoral systems with single-party dominance when higher levels of political pluralism had developed. While most of these experiences are still recent, some have been short-lived and placed within a general trend toward democratization and higher pluralism.

Most electoral system changes since the mid-twentieth century have been in favor of greater proportionality. Nowadays, only about one-fifth of democracies in countries with more than one million inhabitants use electoral systems with majority electoral rules. During the third wave of democratization, which started in 1974, no new democracy established in those countries has adopted the old British formula of parliamentary elections in single-member districts by plurality rule.

See also *Constitutions and Constitutionalism; District Magnitude; Electoral Formulas; Electoral Rules; Pluralism; Proportional Representation; Representative Systems.*

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Electronic Voting

Electronic voting may be described as the use of a specific system that allows members of Congress or other legislatures to cast their votes on roll calls on the floor from their seats or other specific locations. The results may be seen on a panel as "yes," "no," or "abstention." Names appear with indications of party and state or another configuration according to the member's desire. Representatives' names and votes may be displayed if the voting is open. If the voting is secret, only the final result appears. There are two main advantages to using electronic voting systems in parliaments. The first is accountability: constituencies and civil society may have immediate direct access to their representatives' positions related to legislative bills. The second is speed: single votes do not need to be counted by hand, which also precludes counting errors.

Electronic voting is also used in general and parliamentary elections in several countries. Electronic voting machines

were developed to improve accountability, increase the speed of ballot counting, and help illiterate voters cast their ballots for candidates or parties by displaying photographs or numbers instead of phrases or names. Brazil is a good example: in the 2006 general elections, more than 125 million votes were counted in less than thirty-six hours, with no counting errors. Electronic voting machines are not completely reliable, though, and may malfunction as they did in U.S. elections in the early 2000s. Electronic voting systems are being adopted in more than sixteen countries worldwide, including Venezuela, India, and the Netherlands. Eventually constituents may be able to cast their electronic ballots via the Internet or telephone. Some experts express concern about the possibility of fraud and the security of electronic votes.

See also *E-governance, E-voting, E-democracy, E-politics; Voting Machines and Technology.*

. . . . MARCIO A. CARVALHO

Elite Decision Making

Elite decision making refers to those choices made by the intellectual, educational, and political elites in a given society. Various models of elite decision making exist. Most such models emphasize the individual level of analysis because attention remains focused on how and why particular leaders make the choices they do. However, some models of elite decision making also focus on group decision making among elites. The most prominent of these group-based models has been groupthink.

Theories concerning elite decision making have focused on both personality and situational explanations for behavior. These theories can be applied in either domestic or foreign policy contexts, although it has traditionally been more common to apply elite decision making models in foreign policy domains because American leaders typically have more freedom of action in this area. In domestic political arenas, explanations for elite decision making often contrast with models designed to explain mass public opinion.

Theories of elite decision making that focus on personality historically took the form of psychobiography, or the attempt to explain a particular leader's political actions in light of his or her personal drives and needs. This tradition, begun by Harold Lasswell, was further developed by many others including James David Barber, Fred Greenstein, and Alexander George. This approach often, but not always, drew on psychoanalytic theory to examine the relationship between childhood experiences, personal history, and political outcome. Other incarnations of this work include models that purport to locate political behavior in particular personality traits, whether those traits revolve around risk taking, authoritarianism, or some other relevant trait. Early theories of the authoritarian personality developed by Adorno and colleagues, for example, reported relationships between anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, and political and economic conservatism. Although this work came under methodological criticism, it was widely applied

to both elites and individuals in mass publics. Recent versions focus on right-wing authoritarianism. In one particularly prominent variant of the personality model, David Winter drew on earlier work by David McClelland and others to investigate how leaders' particular motives and drives affected their performance and appeal.

Some work on personality has focused on the impact and importance of emotional motives and feelings in influencing decision making. Early work in this area stressed the ways in which emotion could bias decision making in detrimental ways. Certainly, the groupthink paradigm provides an example of a model wherein too much emotional attachment between people can lead to premature consensus without appropriate analysis or sufficient criticism. However, more recent work indicates that emotion often can provide an effective and efficient basis on which to make fast and largely accurate decisions. Most likely, the relationship between emotion and performance follows the familiar inverted u-shaped function: too much gets in the way, while too little impairs functionality as well.

Some approaches to elite decision making also attempt to take into account the particular historical circumstances and demographic background of leaders. This kind of analysis focuses on how elites are influenced by, and reflect, their particular social, ethnic, religious, political, or class backgrounds. The goal in this work is to explore the relationship between these forces and later political behavior.

Some models of elite decision making focus on the situational and environmental determinants of choice. In this regard, prospect theory provides a preeminent model of decision making under conditions of risk. In this paradigm, environmental factors structure the choices that elites and other individuals make when confronted by risky prospects. Many other models drawn from psychology, behavioral economics, and decision theory can be applied to elite decision making as well.

Many models of elite decision making are criticized for similar reasons. In particular, such models come under scrutiny for their failure to take sufficient account of other factors judged to exert a greater influence on political outcomes than personality, such as political incentive structures, large-scale social and political forces, and other historical and institutional pressures. One of the most important rebuttals to such arguments rests in the obvious impact that particularly powerful leaders have had on their times, both for good and for ill. Charismatic leaders retain the capacity to shape the events of their time, and such effects are hard to examine outside of a framework of individual models of elite decision making and choice.

See also *Elites, Political; Elite Theory; Groupthink; Prospect Theory.*

. . . . ROSE MCDERMOTT

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Elite Interview

Elite interviewing is a method of obtaining information about a specific sample considered to be elite members of society who may be politicians or civic, economic, social, cultural, military, and intellectual leaders. The classic work on the topic of elite interviewing was written by Lewis Anthony Dexter in 1970. One example of elite interviewing is Harriet Zuckerman's detailed interviews with Nobel laureates who won prizes from 1907 to 1972 and were living in the United States at the time.

A researcher should ensure that the information about and from this sector of society cannot be obtained elsewhere before embarking on elite interviewing so as not to waste time and effort. Elite interviewing requires being well prepared for the interview. Direct verbal interaction between individuals is used when face-to-face contact is imperative, when immediate responses are desirable, and when such use is feasible, meaning that there is a small sample, adequate financial support, and an availability of well-trained interviewers.

In elite interviewing, the usual interviewing rules do not apply. Because elites are used to being the focus of attention, standardized questions that are not tailored directly to them should not be asked. The interviewer(s)—an individual, a team of two or more interviewers, or a group—should do their homework, memorize the questions, and ask them in whatever order the conversation allows, letting the questions drive them to the heart of the research question. Elite interviewing allows the researcher flexibility to deviate from the set pattern of questions and probe areas of interest or vagueness. The greater communication between the interviewer and interviewee permits immediate checking on information, thus ensuring the reliability of the content by using rephrased questions or asking questions again.

There are certain drawbacks of the elite interviewing method, including cost in terms of time and money, problems determining the worthiness of the information obtained and the truthfulness of that information, and problems that arise from the interviewer's bias and subjectivity.

Elite interviewing entails taking down quick keynotes to capture core issues because writing down answers during the interview process may be viewed as a discourtesy and a distraction that takes away from the flow of the interview. The interviewer therefore should jot down a few key terms and transcribe those notes immediately after the interview. Taping (audio or video) becomes acceptable as long as the interviewee is sure of the purpose and is guaranteed confidentiality. The key to a successful elite interview is making sure that nothing in the process is threatening or damaging to the interviewee's self-esteem. A good elite interview benefits not only the researcher but also the respondents when they are able to speak to a good listener, reflect on their thoughts on various issues, reminisce about past experiences, get stimulated intellectually by thinking about issues not often considered, and express views candidly without fear of the consequences. In this sense a good interviewer can obtain much information by watching out for body language and recognizing that silence can be expressive.

Suggestions for a successful elite interview include having a clearly defined objective; using terms that are operationally defined and explained to the interviewer and interviewee, and preferably pretested; and training interviewers via simulations and apprising them of the need to be ethical and to maintain confidentiality. Likewise, it is best to ascertain the optimum time for an interview, not too long, leaving both parties tired and bored, but not too short, resulting in one's missing out on important information.

See also *Interview Techniques; Qualitative Methodologies.*

. . . .   CECILIA G. MANRIQUE

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Elites, Political

In contemporary social analysis, the term *political elites* refers to the segments of national elites—the groups of powerful individuals influencing the political outcomes on the national level in a systematic and significant way—that control the government and other political institutions of the state. In liberal democracies they typically include political leaders, top parliamentarians and government officials, and leaders of the major political parties. Their power and influence reflect control over political power resources concentrated in the state as well as mutual access and the capacity for solitary action. Members of the political elite are typically identified as holders of the top power positions in government and the key organizations of the state, by involvement in making key political decisions, by reputation among their peers, or finally, by a combination of the three methods. Political leaders are typically placed at the apex of national elites (the latter including also elite groups heading business, mass media, military, trade union, and other organizations). At the other end of the power spectrum are the masses (or nonelites).

In democratic regimes, political elites operate electoral systems in which their members compete for leadership (top

executive position in the state) by mobilizing popular electoral support. They also collaborate and compete peacefully with other elite groups (administrative, business, media, trade union, military, religious, etc.), including political opposition. In liberal democracies, such as the United Kingdom, the electoral competition for leadership is free and fair. In nonliberal regimes, such as Russia, the competition is highly skewed. Dominant elite groups monopolize political leadership, and they restrict competition by intimidating political rivals. Intraelite conflict and warfare are trademarks of nondemocratic and unstable polities.

The centrality of political (as well as other) elites as the key social actors was highlighted by Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Robert Michels, and Max Weber at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Those classical elite theorists insisted that political power is necessarily and increasingly concentrated, and they criticized as ideological both Marxists, who foresaw a triumph of egalitarian socialism, and the advocates of participatory democracy. In contrast with both, the classical elite thinkers suggested persistent and inescapable power concentration in the hands of political elites who controlled large organizations, especially modern states. Revolutions, including socialist revolutions, claimed elite theorists merely reconstituted elites, and they did not narrow down the elite–mass power gaps. Democracy simply tamed and regulated elite power competition—the point subsequently elaborated by Joseph Schumpeter (in his definition of democracy as elite electoral competition for political leadership) and by contemporary elite theorists.

POLITICAL ELITES AND RULING CLASSES

Political elites are sometimes conflated with ruling classes. The latter are typically circumscribed in terms of ownership of capital and land. Class theorists of Marxist persuasion treat political power as derived from property ownership, and they see political elites as executive arms of the ruling/ownership class(es). Some students of elites, such as William Domhoff, combine the class and elite perspective and depict elites as socially anchored in the dominant ownership class(es). The classical and contemporary elite theorists, by contrast, point to the autonomy of political (power) elites, as reflected in elites' capacity to dominate or even expropriate the owners (e.g., in revolutions).

Contemporary elite theorists see the bases of elite power in command over the resources of the state (including the military might), organizational capacities, and intra-elite cohesion. C.W. Mills analyzed the emerging "power elite" in post–World War II America as firmly anchored in the national government, the military directorate, and the largest business corporations. Elite cohesion, according to him, did not preclude the possibility of temporary intra-elite divisions on specific policy questions. However, when faced with political challenges, the power elite acted in unison. Other contemporary students of political elites stress that the elites' grip on power is strengthened by their influence over the mass media, their alliances with nonelite social forces—dominant classes, strata,

movements, and politically organized groups—and their control over political succession.

MODERN ELITES

Robert Putnam provided a comprehensive overview of modern elites, including political, administrative, and business. He highlighted elite anchoring in social and institutional structures and saw elite conduct as heavily circumscribed by ideologies (revolutionary elites) and by national legal-constitutional frameworks (liberal elites). John Scott studied modern corporate elites and edited a major sociological overview of modern elites that stresses the importance of power networks. Other contemporary elite theorists, such as John Higley and his collaborators, surveyed contemporary elites in stable democratic regimes. They linked political stability and democracy with elite consensus on the rules of political rivalry. By contrast, Eva Etzioni-Halevi identified effective "coupling" of political elites with lower/working classes as a key condition of democracy.

More recently, there has been a shift in elite research that can be summarized in four points:

- The emergence of transnational power networks and elite alliances: while nation-states remain the most important institutional loci of power, other (and more diffuse) power concentrations emerge in the process of globalization. Faced with increasingly transnational/global problems (e.g., terrorism, environmental degradation, climate change, declining oil supply, water shortages, drug trade, uncontrolled migrations) state political elites consult, collaborate, and form ad hoc and lasting, typically regional, alliances (e.g., Coalition of the Willing, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation).
- Widening elite autonomy and prodemocratic orientations: the arguably most momentous events of the twentieth century, such as the dissolution of the USSR, the collapse of Soviet communism in Eastern Europe, and the subsequent democratization of regimes in Eastern Europe and East Asia, have been engineered predominantly from above by political elites, often with only halfhearted support of mass populations.
- Increasing focus on strong political leaders combined with a heightening of this focus by electronic media: these trends reinforce each other and change the physiognomy of liberal democracies to leader democracies.
- The declining impact of ideologies: Western political elites engineer and cultivate mass support in a pragmatic, opportunistic, and ad hoc manner, often through media spin and campaigns focusing on the personalities of the leaders. This reflects the fact that the support constituencies of Western elites are more fickle and less anchored in specific classes, ethno-segments, racial minorities, or religious groups.

See also *Elite Decision Making; Elite Theory; Leadership.*

. . . .   JAN PAKULSKI

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Elite Theory

Although the elite concept is often employed broadly and diffusely, it best refers to persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic decision-making positions in powerful organizations and movements, to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially. At the national level in modern polities elites number a few thousand people spread across the tops of all important sectors—politics, government administration, business, trade unions, the military, pressure groups, major mass movements, and so forth. Holding that such power concentrations are inescapable, elite theory seeks to explain political outcomes principally in terms of elite conflicts, accommodations, and circulations.

The theory's origins lie most clearly in the writings of Italian political scientist Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941), Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), and German-Italian sociologist Robert Michels (1876–1936). Mosca emphasized the ways in which tiny minorities outorganize and outwit large majorities, adding in *The Ruling Class* (1923/1939) that "political classes"—his term for elites—usually have "a certain material, intellectual, or even moral superiority" over those they govern. Pareto postulated that in a society with truly unrestricted social mobility, elites would consist of the most talented and deserving individuals but that in actual societies they are those who are most adept at using the two modes of political rule, force and persuasion, and who usually enjoy important advantages such as inherited wealth and family connections. Pareto sketched alternating types of governing elites, whom he likened, following sixteenth-century Italian political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli, to lions and foxes. Michels rooted elites ("oligarchies") in the need of large organizations for leaders and experts to operate efficiently; as these individuals gain control of funds, information flows, promotions, and other aspects of organizational functioning, power becomes concentrated in their hands. Emphasizing the inescapability and also the relative autonomy of elites, all three men characterized visions of fully democratic and egalitarian societies as utopian.

The writings of Mosca, Pareto, and Michels provide a paradigm from which a general theory of elites and politics might be derived. However, efforts to produce such a theory have not been conspicuously successful. Linking elites causally to major regularities in politics remains elusive; there is no accepted typology of elites and no accepted specification of the circumstances and ways in which one type of elite is replaced by another type; interactions between elites and non-elite populations are captured only piecemeal. Nevertheless, political scientists pay much attention to the key roles played by elites in democratic transitions and breakdowns, revolutions, regime functioning, mass movements, globalization, and many other political phenomena.

ELITES AND REGIMES

What would a general theory of elites and politics look like? The principal regularities that it might seek to explain are the characteristics of political regimes. Regimes can be conceived as structures of elite rule whose basic forms and functioning accord closely with the characteristics of the elites who create and operate them. Regimes manifest the prevailing mode of elite interaction, the disposition of elites to rule preponderantly through force or persuasion, and the political formula that elites use to justify their rule. Economist Joseph Schumpeter's "competitive theory of democracy" illustrates this approach. It conceives a democratic regime as an institutional arrangement in which elites and leaders compete periodically for voters' mandates to rule. Elites and leaders are thus the vital actors in a democracy. However, Schumpeter offered no explanation for why elites and leaders in a few polities act in this way while those in most do not. Nor did he specify dynamics of the elite competitions that produce democracy, simply assuming that they are always restrained and circumspect—a sanitized view to say the least.

To capture elite variation and its consequences for political regimes, a general theory would need a cogent typology of elites. One of its dimensions might be the extent of elite structural integration: the relative inclusiveness of formal and informal networks of communication and influence among members and factions. Another dimension might be the extent of elite value consensus: the relative agreement among members and factions about norms of political behavior and the worth of existing governmental institutions. Extensive but mostly informal integration and a mainly tacit consensus about norms and institutions denote elites that operate stable and liberal democratic regimes; extensive but mostly formal integration in a single party, social movement, or religious sect and a uniform profession of its official beliefs denote elites that operate totalitarian, theocratic, or rigidly authoritarian regimes; sharply segmented integration and little agreement about political norms denote elites that operate unstable dictatorial regimes and illiberal democracies.

A general theory would need to specify how transformations from one elite type to another occur. Revolutions, through which, Pareto cynically observed, one ruling elite is merely replaced by another, are the most obvious

transformations, although they rarely occur. Equally rarely, warring elite camps may enter deliberately into a sudden but lasting settlement of their most basic disputes. It is possible, too, that deeply opposed elite camps may, in propitious circumstances such as widespread prosperity, gradually moderate their oppositions and converge toward a live-and-let-live modus operandi that proves lasting. Whether elite transformations take still other forms, such as implosions like that of the Soviet Union's elite during the late 1980s, is an important question.

ELITES AND NONELITES

Interactions between elites and nonelite populations are the most difficult hurdles a general theory faces. Pareto tried heroically to conceptualize changing asymmetries between elites and nonelite populations regarding their rational interests and nonrational sentiments ("residues"). When these asymmetries become great, he contended, a basic circulation of elites impends. But this happens infrequently because elites are normally able to co-opt the most talented nonelite persons and devise ideologies ("derivations") that pacify nonelite populations and legitimate elite rule. However, Pareto's sweeping but exceedingly abstruse account of nonrational residues has proved inhospitable to practical application, and no more usable scheme has gained wide acceptance. A general theory must probably rest on a strategic conception of nonelite interests and orientations as constituting parameters within which elites can safely and effectively act; elites who violate these parameters risk coming to grief. But nonelite parameters for elite action are quite wide, leaving elites with a range of choices, and their choices are normally decisive for political outcomes.

See also *Class and Politics; Elite Decision Making; Elites, Political; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Michels, Robert; Mosca, Gaetano; Pareto, Vilfredo; Power; Schumpeter, Joseph Alois.*

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Embargo

See *Sanctions and Embargoes.*

Emergency Powers

Emergency powers generally refers to the temporary suspension of the normal rules and proceedings in an organized political system and the provision of special discretionary authorities to a specific agent to respond to extraordinarily dangerous situations that threaten public safety. Such situations may include foreign invasion, internal rebellion, economic depression, or a severe natural disaster. Examples of emergency provisions include the curtailment of individual rights such as speech, press, and assembly; suspension of the writ of habeas corpus; imposition of curfews and restriction of movement; unrestrained search and seizure of private property; central government management of the economy; and use of military forces alongside or in place of civilian legal and public safety institutions. Central to the concept of emergency powers is that they are legally invoked, temporarily assigned, intended to achieve immediate decisive action in response to specific circumstances that threaten the survival of the political entity, and designed to restore the political order to status quo ante.

INVOKING EMERGENCY POWERS

Autocratic governments do not require emergency powers since, as political scientist Clinton Rossiter notes, it is not necessary "to suspend rights that do not exist or augment powers that are already absolute." Therefore, these powers are associated mostly with liberal democratic regimes that have a prominent deliberative lawmaking body and a commitment to the protection of individual rights and the rule of law. In times of extreme danger, these governments may need to concentrate power, consolidate decision-making authority, and curtail individual liberties to manage the crisis to ensure the survival of the political order. In other words, they may need to become more autocratic to survive. Since the normal legislative process can be too slow, inflexible, and cumbersome to respond adequately to a dangerous situation, the executive is often the empowered political entity who can make and enforce decisions swiftly to meet the demands of the crisis.

Ideally, once the crisis subsides, the emergency powers expire, the authority accumulated by the executive is relinquished, and the normal precrisis political order resumes operations. Since emergency powers concentrate authority in one or a few individuals during the crisis, attention must be given to erecting safeguards to prevent or complicate the corruption and abuse of power, specifically the continuance of emergency powers after the crisis is over. Should the extraordinary powers not be relinquished, precrisis constitutional order could be transformed into tyrannical and arbitrary rule, thus defeating the original purpose of having emergency powers: to preserve the precrisis constitutional regime. History abounds with examples of emergency powers' leading to the usurpation of power, the institution of a state of permanent emergency, the creation of an emergency regime, and the indefinite suspension of the constitutional procedures and individual rights. Perhaps the most infamous abuse of emergency powers occurred in 1933 Germany, when Adolf Hitler, as chancellor, exploited the

emergency provisions of article 48 of the Weimar Constitution to suspend that constitution indefinitely and usher in the National Socialist regime.

One of the most important safeguards is that those political actors empowered by the implementation of emergency powers are not the same authority to decide when such powers should be initiated or terminated. In most modern democracies, the legislative branch has the authority to declare and terminate the declaration of an emergency situation, while the executive is the agent who will be empowered. Another safeguard includes the establishment of a separate authority to determine whether the political agent wielding emergency powers abuses his or her authority and to hold him or her accountable after the crisis has been met. This likely would be the legislative or judicial branch of government, which would hold a trial after the crisis to make such determinations. The German political theorist Carl Schmitt challenged many liberal democratic assumptions regarding emergency powers by suggesting that emergencies are the normal state of affairs and that the locus of sovereign power in a government rests with the one who has the authority to decide when a crisis begins and ends and which powers need to be utilized. In doing so, he justified autocratic rule in modern government.

HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EMERGENCY POWERS

The constitutional dictatorship of the ancient Roman republic is perhaps the most famous, and clear-cut, example of emergency powers. When the survival of the republic was threatened, the Roman senate would name a citizen the "dictator" and grant him extensive military powers for six months for the sole purpose of acting decisively to meet the demands of the crisis. In addition to initiating and terminating the dictatorship, the senate also checked the abuse of the extraordinary powers by maintaining control over the republic's finances.

MODERN EMERGENCY POWERS

Republican Rome's constitutional dictatorship has influenced the conceptual development of emergency powers in modern democracies. Most modern democracies contain some form of emergency powers either explicitly or implicitly in their constitutions or have adopted legislation to enact such powers in times of crisis, such as the U.S. National Emergency Act of 1976. The institutions of the state of siege (*état de siège*) in civil-law countries and martial law in common-law countries are based on the British legal tradition. Although derived from different legal systems and constitutional frameworks, the emergency institutions of state of siege and martial law consist of many similar measures and principles including the curtailment of civil rights and the use of the military and military courts for civilian use.

These are the most prominent and extreme forms of emergency powers, however, as they can be more limited in scope and extent. For instance, local and territorial governments may employ some form of emergency powers in response to local crises including natural disasters that require the use of some military forces and the suspension of some individual liberties such as imposing quarantines, forcing evacuations, and implementing curfews.

The global threat posed by modern terrorist organizations and the legal and military measures that governments have attempted in response, including military tribunals to prosecute suspected terrorists and increased surveillance on domestic populations, have brought emergency powers in liberal democracies to the forefront of recent scholarly debates. However, this debate is at least as old as the Roman republic and illustrates the perennial tension between rule of law and the preservation of the political order in times of danger.

See also *Executive, The; Martial Law; Military Courts; Military Rule.*

. . . .   TODD R. LOWERY

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Emerging Democracies

Democracy's practically uncontested status as the single legitimate regime type conceals how extraordinary an achievement its emergence has been. Emerging democracies face the task of institutionally redistributing power and of normatively legitimizing a people's self-government. They need to reconcile the urge to individual freedom and the hope for equality by ensuring that the exercise of power in the people's name becomes accountable and transparent. This emancipation of the people into a political subject implies complex social and institutional, but also ideational and symbolic, transformations. Turning the poor, the many, or the low into masters of their own affairs raises the question of the availability and the role of models in shaping institutions and moral-normative values.

MODELS OF DEMOCRACY

The ancient Greeks had no model of democracy to inspire them. Neither the Founders in the United States nor the French revolutionaries had dispositions toward the establishment of a representative democracy in its contemporary guise. Only the prolonged political stability, economic welfare, and moral purpose of freedom in the Western hemisphere after World War II (1939–1945) shaped democracy as a model in

a bipolar world. The collapse of Soviet communism turned representative democracy into a normative goal—with the possible exception of the Middle East and North Africa—on a global scale. While earlier studies theorized the socio-economic origins of democratic regimes, more recent approaches emphasized externally assisted regime changes by multilayered efforts of democracy promotion. These interrelated but diverse approaches interpreted emerging democracies with regard to technical assistance, knowledge transfer, and the rational design of democratic institutions. Structural approaches postulate a set of habitually accepted interdependent arenas such as an existing state bureaucracy, the rule of law, and civil, political, and economic society as preconditions for the consolidation of democracy. Process-oriented approaches highlight causal mechanisms by which trust networks are transformed, public politics is insulated from categorical inequality, and autonomous power centers in states are removed. Considered a globally appearing order to come, the challenges of emerging democracies have been framed in the lines of a capitalistic logic, focused on rational self-interest of autonomous political elites, not on the social spirit of the people.

THE FALLACY OF PRECONDITIONS

Such interpretations derive normative ideas and institutional practices regarding democracy from some imagined status quo of democratic values, institutions, or practices, which transcends the social and cultural context of the emerging democracy concerned. Yet values do not emerge independently from existential facts. It is questionable, for instance, whether any established Western democracy had any prodemocratic preconditions in place at its foundation. The focus on institutional design underestimates that, in its core regions, democracy has been a dramatic, messy, and contingent process, riddled with conflict, violence, and regression. Old, antidemocratic regimes were replaced by waves of democracy following violent revolutions or world wars, while creating the demos in colonial settings required ethnic cleansing of the indigenous population. An apparently strong democracy such as the United States could be undermined by the inverted totalitarianism of managed democracy (with its main aim to increase profits of large corporations) and superpower (with its focus on imperialism and militarism).

The contrasting examples of the breakdown of new democracies in the 1930s and the successful southern European (in the 1970s) and postcommunist waves (in the 1990s) proved the importance of a supportive international environment for democracy promotion. However, the focus on empiricist procedures and causal mechanisms depoliticizes the experiences that underlie democracy. Concerns for conceptual distinction require definitions of what political democracy is. Yet such essentialism may turn democracy into an ideological force that becomes politically nonnegotiable. Operational and pedagogic models for the goal of developing democracies may thus be culturally biased and potentially disregard the truly political element in their emergence.

INITIATING THE SPIRIT OF THE PEOPLE

This evidence suggests that emerging democracies require more attention to individual paths and experiences than liberal monism is ready to accept. The focus on expected or desired political outcomes risks eluding historical continuities and anthropological dimensions in emerging democracies. Institutions are like medicines. Their success depends not only on their quality or dosage but also on whether, in the long term, the body accepts the cure. Rather than to predetermine the shape of emerging democracies by importing values from outside (such as constitutionalism, structural preconditions, or assumptions about the strategic rationality of actors) it is more adequate to engage with the social body's background conditions, under which meaningful claims for people's self-government emerge.

Etymologically, *emergence* refers to rising from a liquid by virtue of buoyancy. Combining the Latin *ex* ("out") and *mergere* ("to dip, sink"), *emergence* suggests that the new has been contained by the old, from within which it rose. While democracy clearly has a global appeal at the semantic and conceptual level, the concrete methods and meanings of transparency, accountability, and the modalities of rule are embedded in cultures of democracy. According to Thomas Paine, the American constitution was not an act of government but a people constituting a government. During the French Revolution (1789–1799), the Abbé Sieyès claimed that the French nation's will was the supreme authority but that the constitution givers were fundamentally unconstitutional. In other words, the people may be unified as a political principle, but as a social reality, they remain unstable, malleable, and volatile.

Democracies, like individuals, actually emerge and come of age through processes of transition. Such transitions are not simply about connecting the dots. They are liminal moments, when people find themselves confronted with an authority vacuum, in-between the dissolved authoritarian power structures and a hypothetical future. Feelings of belonging to a political association arise from events and experiences in which many of the taken-for-granted essentials of democracy such as sovereignty, rule of law, or freedom not only are not given but are substantially threatened. The initiation into democracy thus requires attention to moments of enchantment, predemocratic imaginaries, and rituals, which all influence the symbolic transfer of meaning toward the people as the master. The myth of the people's collective will is a myth, but without this myth democracy is not possible.

Alexis de Tocqueville's recognition that Americans were born equal and thus did not require a democratic revolution did not refer to a predetermined set of sine qua non preconditions. Citizenship, for instance, was not a right but a daily practice grounded in preconstitutional ways of life, social practices, beliefs, and cultural representations. Memories of a common past, for instance, are crucial for the building of ties of solidarity, belonging, and affective association. From Athens to the United States, Spain to South Africa, commemorations of those who died for the cause of the community, in internal conflicts but also defending against external enemies,

forged collective memories of belonging and affective bonds between citizens. In Eastern Europe, communism was not only an antidemocratic legacy but also a social organism in gestation, where dissident movements articulated the power of the powerless by translating memories of humiliation, national self-affirmation, and ethic individualism into democratic aspirations. Despite the lack of a European demos and a collective memory of a European past, the recognized democracies within the European Union aspire to a new form of European democracy. Emerging democracies thus thrive on a utopian bent where ideas of inclusiveness, equality, freedom, and popular sovereignty are sustained not only by institutional arrangements but also by myths, symbols, and social imaginaries.

See also *Democracy; Democracy and Democratization; Democratic Transition; Emerging Democracies, Political Parties in.*

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Emerging Democracies, Political Parties in

Emerging democracies are countries that experience a peaceful transition to democratic rule despite a history of authoritarianism or civil conflict. Political parties in emerging democracies are difficult to classify as unitary entities since emerging democracies often have little in common due to differences in their geography, history, culture, religion, previous regimes, and transition process to democracy. Even when their party systems have common traces, the parties are often quite different. Nonetheless, these countries have some interestingly similar common ground. When facing the democratic transition, most political parties in emerging democracies form around a few leaders, unions, associations, or even clandestine terrorist organizations. Some of these organizations become so strong as political parties that they are able to elect the majority of congress members—as it happened to Hamas

in Palestine—and even presidents—such as Lech Walesa in Poland and Luis Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil. In Brazil, President Lula's party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers Party), was one of the first political parties to emerge from the country's transition to democracy in 1979. The party was formed from workers' unions, student organizations, and small underground political groups and organizations.

In most emerging democracies, people are not easily drawn to political parties due to religious reasons that drive women and other minorities out of the political process; cultural barriers that prevent people from believing that their participation in the political process matters; a lack of confidence in the new regime, based on previous unstable political and economical governments; a focus on alleviating immediate basic needs over long-term economic development; and a feeling that those currently in power are not in any manner different from those parties and groups that ruled in the former regimes.

Some emerging democracies had political parties during their dictatorial or nondemocratic periods. Some countries had only one party, while others had two or more parties that alternated in power. An important characteristic of these parties was that they did not oppose the regime in power to any significant extent. The reluctance of some in emerging democracies to see politicians and political parties as a break from previous regimes can be significant. In some emerging democracies there simply were not ruptures between old and new politics. The scenario depicted so far has as a major consequence a communication gap between political parties and society. Because of communication gaps between political parties and the population generally, some emerging democracies' political parties cannot perform classical functions, such as articulation of interests and representation. That happens because these parties are linked to personalities or charismatic leaders instead of driving their programs to the needs or interests of the people. In this sense, parties have a political program or agenda, but few really implement it when they are in power. This fact shows that there are still ideological issues that have to be controlled when dealing with political parties from emerging democracies.

There is a belief among international organizations that deal with democracy strengthening that emerging democracies are better off with a small number of political parties so that the system can be efficient to aggregate interest in society and bring those interests to the legislature. Yet one finds that most emerging democracies do not follow this model. In Africa some emerging democracies have only one political party, like Mozambique, or two, like Namibia; in Asia some have many parties, but one or two keep power for successive long terms, both in the legislature and in the executive offices; in eastern and central Europe an abundance of parties exists, and the same coalition is almost permanent; and in the Middle East the political parties are formed and disappear frequently. In Latin America, with minor exceptions (Venezuela, e.g.), there are multiparty systems without a majority political party in the legislature. In this case, the president's party does not have the majority in the congress, so the president has to

rely on a governmental coalition formed with many parties with different ideologies and perspectives. When this happens, it creates a situation of instability in the political system since the coalition is built over political interests, not common ideological grounds. Despite all the political problems and inconsistencies that might occur with political parties in emerging democracies, their presence is extremely important to consolidate democracy in their countries.

See also *Democracy and Democratization; Democratic Transition; Emerging Democracies; Party and Social Structure; Party Organization; Political Parties.*

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Emotions in Politics

The role of emotions in politics is pervasive. In political psychology, a number of studies show that emotional reactions have an impact on the way citizens organize information, learn facts about politics, form impressions, and make political decisions. Parallel lines of work have developed in political sociology, examining macro-level emotions in social processes such as traumas, collective action, social movements, rituals, and institutions. Cognitive studies in psychology also make explicit the affective content of social information, concluding that cognition and affect are interdependent in such a way that virtually all things people think about have an affective reaction linked to them. Neuroscience provides similar evidence challenging the traditional dichotomy of feeling and thinking. Affective reactions are basic and inescapable, and there can be no decision making without emotions.

DEFINITION OF EMOTIONS

Research on emotions has not settled on a commonly accepted definition of the term that is used loosely and interchangeably with terms such as *feelings, sentiments, affect, mood,* and *passions.* The word *emotion* originates from the Latin *emovere,* which means "to excite, to move, to agitate," and in common language we refer to emotions such as love, hate, anger, fear, hope, and pride. *Feelings* refers to experiences or sensory impressions such as warmth, cold, or pain or more general affective states such as desire, boredom, or depression. Because every person experiences and interprets the world differently, feelings are personal and biographical interpretations of sensations. Emotions are displays of feeling, and because they are expressions, they can be bound to social expectations and can be genuine or disingenuous. Emotions have intentionality; they are in other words about something, and they can

be behaviorally disorganized at extreme states such as terror, panic, and rage. Emotions are also acute and momentary, and as such they are distinguished from sentiments, which indicate a complex disposition originating from feelings, involve an attitude or judgment, and imply action. Emotions result from appraisals and evaluations of the environment and are not habitual or cyclical. Therefore, they are differentiated from *moods,* which refers to pervasive and emotional states or states of mind. Affect is an abstract, nonconscious experience of stimulation comprising physiological responses aroused by the environment, which determines the intensity of feelings. Affect precedes consciousness and will, connects our bodies with the environment, and influences awareness. It is often regarded as one of the three areas of human mental functions, together with motivation and cognition. *Passion* is also often contrasted with reason and refers to the deeply stirring and intense feelings, convictions, affections, and desires that are often uncontrollable. The word originates from the Latin *pati,* which means "to suffer," but in political science it often refers to anger, love, or fear.

DIFFERENCES OF KIND: THE FLAVORS OF EMOTIONALITY

While positive emotions are experienced in a very similar fashion, negative emotions are differentiated into the dimensions of aversion and anxiety. *Aversion* signifies an internal negative reaction, a dislike for something, whereas *anxiety* refers to an unpleasant emotional state with qualities of uneasiness, apprehension, and distress, which often originates from indefinite sources. As Jennifer Lerner and Dacher Keltner (2001) argue, individuals respond with aversion and anxiety under different conditions. Feelings of aversion and frustration are activated in familiar but punishing environments. The counterpoint to aversion is enthusiasm and satisfaction, generated by familiar but rewarding environments. Anxiety and unease are produced when something unexpected and unfamiliar takes place to which the individual cannot effectively respond. When the response is effective, it generates feelings of relaxation.

THE STUDY OF EMOTIONS IN POLITICS

In political science, research on emotions has been gaining increasing attention. Robert Abelson and his colleagues (1982) provide survey evidence that positive and negative emotional responses to political leaders, such as hope, enthusiasm, anger, and fear, shape their electability, after controlling for candidate traits and party identification effects. Donald Kinder (1994) shows that these emotional reactions are prevalent not only among sophisticated voters but also among the inattentive public. Dennis G. Sullivan (1996) explores emotionality in different countries. Their experimental studies find that citizens distinguish happiness, anger, and fear when observing facial displays of political leaders in a very similar fashion. For example, citizens in the United States distinguished correctly the emotions expressed by image-only videos of former president Ronald Reagan, separating happiness from anger or fear. Gestures of happiness, anger, and fear were also identified correctly by

French citizens when they evaluated facial displays of former French president Jacques Chirac.

Emotions also have significant effects on political judgments, starting from the style in which citizens process information all the way to how political decisions are made. George E. Marcus and his colleagues (2000) study affective intelligence, the dynamics between feeling and thinking, and their interaction to produce thoughtful and attentive citizens. While responses to familiar political objects such as candidates, parties, and issues are habitual, responses to novel stimuli are provoked on the basis of an unconscious learning system stimulated by anxiety. Their evidence shows that mild levels of political anxiety can inspire learning and information seeking and diminish reliance on prior opinions and stereotypes. Along the lines of this paradigm, Richard Lau and David P. Redlawsk (2006) use dynamic process tracing in political campaign environments to demonstrate how feelings of anxiety, anger, or enthusiasm toward preferred political candidates shape the processing of information and influence learning. As a side note, affective intelligence should not be confused with Daniel Goleman's (1995) psychological theory of emotional intelligence, which studies the ability of individuals to perceive and express emotion accurately, to use emotion when thinking, and to manage it appropriately for their personal or professional growth.

Studies of motivated reasoning examine the role of affect in the elaboration and organization of political information. In a series of experiments, Milton Lodge and Charles Taber (2000) show that people receive emotional cues from social stimuli that they automatically process as subjective evaluations. Individuals react cognitively and affectively to cues such as a leader's performance, political issues, natural disasters, or crisis events. These findings are in line with Robert Abelson's (1963) "hot cognition" hypothesis. All social and political concepts are laden with affect as a positive or negative tag that is stored in memory independent of its cognitive content and comes to mind effortlessly and automatically. When citizens are asked to provide an evaluation, "how do I feel?" heuristics are activated, and their feelings toward the object come automatically to mind, influencing the judgment process.

Turning to the consequences of emotionality, Leonie Huddy and her colleagues (2002) study the role of anxiety and anger under the threat-generating context of a terrorist attack. They find that fear prevents cognitive processing of information because attention is focused on the threatening source instead of other aspects of the environment. In addition, threat shapes personal behaviors designed to minimize personal exposure to terrorism. Ted Brader (2006) studies political communication in the context of emotionality, focusing on the enthusiasm and fear stimulated by visual and audio cues of political advertising. His experimental and content analysis data demonstrate a significant impact of the affective content of political advertising on participation and electoral choice. Tereza Capelos and Joshua Smilovitz (2008) extend the study of emotions in the context of international mediation, showing that perceptions of negative emotionality among disputants influence the tactics that mediators use.

ON THE MEASUREMENT OF EMOTIONS IN POLITICS

The accurate measurement of emotional reactions to political stimuli is not an easy task. Political scientists often work with subjective reports of affective reactions where direct physiological measures are not possible. As W. Russell Neuman and his colleagues (2007) explain, early survey sampling studies adopted a discrete terms approach and asked open-ended questions about likes and dislikes to approximate emotionality. Affect checklists of the basic emotional reactions identified by Ira Roseman (1984) in his structural theory of emotion were also used to select the basic items of anger, fear, pride, and hope that have been present in the American National Election Studies since the 1980s. A second group of studies adopt valence models. They treat emotional reactions as a single valence system with a positive or negative evaluation on an approach-avoidance continuum and use feeling thermometer items to record overall evaluations. Circumplex models offer a third alternative by adding an arousal dimension to the bipolar positive-negative continuum. The three approaches are not mutually exclusive, but since they rely on self-reports they share a limitation: they can identify the evaluative content but not the physiological changes or unconscious emotional experience, which cannot be verbalized.

New studies combine the traditional measures with measures of reaction time and also psychophysiological measures such as galvanic skin response, measures of heart rate, functional magnetic resonance imaging, and facial electromyography. While these techniques do not provide information regarding the processes that are responsible for the emotion generation, they can provide a good indicator of emotional intensity. Traditional and new methodological perspectives add to the systematic study of this complex and challenging topic and provide opportunities for analysis and reflection of the neurological, personal, group, and societal levels of emotionality in politics.

See also *Charisma; Mass Political Behavior; Political Psychology; Political Sociology.*

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Empire and Democracy

Social science debate is now refocused on an old concept, that of empire. In the decades following the end of the cold war and the collapse of communism, some scholars, notably Chalmers Johnson, suggested that the empire theory best characterizes the rise of the United States as the hegemonic economic and military power in the post–cold war era. The influential authors Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri maintain that the American "empire" now equates with the global spread of capitalism, both as an idea and as sets of power relationships. They say that the triumph of Western liberal capitalism has coincided with democracy's decline in the United States and certain of its close allies, such as Great Britain, and paradoxically the rise of democratization in the rest of the world.

Other writers, most notably Niall Ferguson, argue that there are strong parallels between the British empire at its zenith at the end of the nineteenth century and the United States at the end of the twentieth century. The twin commitments to free trade overseas and democracy within are common features. Ferguson warns that in the same way that the free trade phase of British imperialism collapsed dramatically after World War I (1914–1918), the underpinnings of the United States's international power are equally vulnerable. The link between the British and the American centuries was explicitly made by that notable defender of imperial values, Rudyard Kipling, whose invitation to "take up the white man's burden" was issued to the U.S. Congress at the turn of the twentieth century. Based on that type of comment, the question must be raised as to whether empires are necessarily exclusionary.

Debates about empire have become intertwined with the emerging controversies about globalization. The empire theory has as its core the concept of hegemony or control, has tended to place a premium on structure rather than agency, and ignores unintended consequences. Globalization theory, in contrast, has too often spoken about more nebulous and benign flows of ideas and cultural exchanges while ignoring the iron fist in the velvet glove. Some analysts of globalization theory, for example, Joseph Stiglitz, have also discussed democratization, arguing that neoliberalism has promoted free markets and democratization. Most writers on globalization, however, such as Zygmunt Bauman and David Held, have been staunch critics of globalization, arguing that it has narrowed life opportunities for most, has weakened the nation-state, and is an entirely new phenomenon.

The empire and globalization models are essentially dichotomous in nature, understanding reality in terms of winners and losers (globalization) or centers and periphery (empire). It is suggested here that the processes of globalization and of empire are contradictory and paradoxical. In contemporary times the unfettered processes of globalization, according to some—such as Stiglitz—have also generated market failures domestically in the United States. To put it another way, the invisible hand of the market has created problems domestically and internationally, and the visible hand needs to be reinstated. Calls for a third way between unfettered capitalism and state socialism have gained greater force since the economic recession of 2008. Whereas in the late twentieth century the third-way approach was specifically related to the political programs of specific labor parties, especially the Labour Party in the United Kingdom under Tony Blair, in the early twenty-first century the third-way model is linked with the project of democratizing international agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund.

Arguments around the implications of imperialism were prefigured by the dependency theorists of the 1970s, notably Andre Gunder Frank, who argued that imperialism necessarily stifled future industrialization and economic growth, and postcolonial scholars who maintain that imperialism stifles political developments. And in the same way as research has discovered economic growth and industrialization under British and other nineteenth-century imperialisms—such as in valuable work on the political economy of the Commonwealth Caribbean—political research on Australia, Canada, and New Zealand has discovered that political experimentation flourished in those colonies, often to be exported back to the so-called mother country of Britain.

Another example of the paradoxical nature of empire at the political level is the uneven experience of politics that continues into the twenty-first century. For the settler fragments, the process of settlement created an enhanced democratic experience; this was not usually so for the indigenes of those places according to scholars such as Nira Yuval-Davis. British imperial processes also created political and constitutional experimentation, whether through new models of federalism, early enfranchisement of women, proportional and fairer electoral systems, and in some places, new types of political rights for indigenes.

See also *Colonialism; Democracy; Dependency Theory; Empire and Democracy; Globalization; Imperialism; Postcolonial Theory; Third Way and Social Democracy.*

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Empiricism

Empiricism is an epistemology, or theory of knowledge, that claims that the foundation of all knowledge is ultimately located in the human sense experience of the world. Invariably, empirical theories offer a method for distinguishing between those forms of experience that are valid, reliable, and fundamental and that represent how the world really is from those forms of experience that tend to mislead us about the world. In addition to being a form of foundationalism, empirical theories of knowledge have tended to essentialism as well. Essentialism is the idea that there is a single quality or set of qualities that define an object, phenomenon, or experience, that is, that constitute the phenomenon as it is most essentially.

Empiricism is often contrasted with rationalism. Rationalist theories of knowledge claim that the foundation of all knowledge is ultimately traceable to the ability of human reason to identify the essential truth of the world by pure reason alone. In other words, the foundations of knowledge, as Rene Descartes tried to prove, are knowable a priori, prior to experience. It is important to keep in mind that empiricists do not deny the usefulness of human reason. They claim only that pure reason alone cannot identify what is most foundational in knowledge. Similarly, rationalists do not deny the usefulness of empirical observation. They do insist that observation does not represent what is most essentially true about the world.

MODERN EMPIRICISM

Modern empiricism begins with the work of John Locke. Locke argued in his *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1690) that when human beings enter the world, their minds are blank slates, void of any ideas or understanding. Through contact with the world by means of the senses, the human mind becomes inscribed with experience of the world around it. In recording this experience, or sense data, the human mind often reflects on it, combining or dividing various sensations, examining those sensations from a variety of perspectives or in light of other sensations. But the human mind cannot provide anything new to the collection of sense data with which it is inscribed.

David Hume, a Scottish philosopher, offered a more thorough account of empiricism. Hume argued in his similarly titled 1766 *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* that all statements that claim to embody knowledge can be divided into two categories, statements about relations between ideas (e.g., logic or mathematics) and statements of fact about the external world that could be tested for their truth and error. Statements of fact were tested relying on sense impressions, which themselves are organized in the human mind by three principles of association. Associations of resemblance cause us to connect sense impressions that resemble one another. Associations of contiguity enable us to connect sensations of objects or experiences that are in close proximity to one another. But most important are associations of cause and effect. Our experience of the world leads us to recognize that some events are always or very often preceded by other events. In such cases we are led to associate the first with the latter, which is understood as the cause of the former. This, for Hume, was what was most important in science, the accumulation of experience based on causal relationships.

In the twentieth century, empiricism was updated in the work of logical positivists. Logical positivists claimed that many of the traditional problems of knowledge, including empiricism, were problems related to language. Drawing on both Hume and Immanuel Kant, they argued that all meaningful statements are of two types: analytic or synthetic. Analytic statements are those that are true by virtue of the meaning of the terms (e.g., all bachelors are unmarried). Synthetic statements are those that claim to tell us something substantive about the world and are open to verification. Logical positivists argued that statements that fall into neither category are meaningless because they have no cognitive value; they convey no factual information about the world. Among those statements that they deemed to be meaningless are statements of ultimate principles concerning values, ethics, religion, politics, aesthetics, and morality.

THE BEHAVIORAL REVOLUTION

In the post–World War II period, a new generation of political scientists called behavioralists, adopting the logical positivist criteria for meaningful and meaningless statements, attempted to establish an empirical, scientific approach to the study of politics. Behavioralists argued that the traditional study of politics had relied too heavily on an examination of the power and authority of formal institutions and on the history of political thought. Moreover, the traditional approach was often preoccupied by normative questions related to morality and ethics rather than to offering a scientific description of the political world. A more robust scientific approach would focus on the behavior of political actors including voters and informal institutions, such as interest groups and political parties, as well as the actual behavior of those who occupied positions within formal institutions, such as legislators and judges. It would also divest itself of normative questions that had traditionally preoccupied political philosophy.

The ideal that drove what became known as the behavioral revolution was adopted from the natural sciences. If a

single, theoretical perspective could be adopted by the entire profession of political science, including fundamental, shared concepts, then political science could become a cumulative science in much the same way the natural sciences had become. Toward that end, behavioralism stressed the importance of the operationalization of the terms of political discourse. This required that concepts be defined in ways that allowed investigators to use them to describe precisely the political world. As such, they had to demonstrate two qualities: reliability and validity. *Validity* refers to the idea that a concept actually describes what it claims to describe. *Reliability* refers to the idea that a concept can be used to achieve the same results by a range of investigators. For example, in physics, Force = Mass · Acceleration ($F = ma$) would be an example of a term that both is valid (it measures force rather than some other quality such as momentum) and is used by physicists throughout the world. By the late 1960s behavioralism had become the dominant theoretical perspective in the profession of political science. Despite the substantial presence that it had, however, several reservations remained, and competing theoretical perspectives emerged to challenge behavioralism and the empiricist philosophy of science on which it relied.

COMPETING PERSPECTIVES

First, no sooner had logical positivism established itself as a dominant theory of knowledge than it was challenged internally. Specifically, Willard Van Orman Quine argued that the analytic-synthetic dichotomy that was the basis for distinguishing between meaningful and meaningless statements was linguistically unsustainable. One implication of this is that a dichotomy between facts and values, between descriptive and normative discourse, is similarly unsustainable. Moreover, the assumption that truth claims can be reduced to statements in a neutral vocabulary about an independent, objective world is similarly unsustainable, according to Quine. Adding to this line of argument, Wilfred Sellars argued that empiricism was mistaken in assuming what he referred to as the "myth of the given." This is the assumption that the knowable world exists prepackaged in ways that our language can merely represent. In effect, both Quine and Sellars were challenging the very foundations of empiricism. These and similar developments led philosophers such as Richard Rorty to argue that the entire foundationalist and essentialist projects that characterized empiricism needed to be abandoned.

Second, and drawing in part on the work of Quine, Thomas Kuhn argued that the empiricist philosophy of science was inconsistent with the historical record of scientific revolutions. This is because empiricism failed to take seriously enough the ways in which theory determines evidence and disqualifies or ignores those truth claims that are inconsistent with the theoretical assumptions of a given paradigm.

Third, from within the behavioralist ranks, some political scientists argued that the drive for basic science made much of political science irrelevant in addressing pressing problems that the United States faced. David Easton, one of the leading proponents of behavioralism, made a case for what he called postbehavioralism. The latter, while not abandoning the scientific principles that behavioralism embraced, would turn its attention to issues that the United States and the world faced, such as poverty, civil rights, the Vietnam War (1959–1975), nuclear proliferation, and so forth.

Finally, a range of competing theoretical perspectives emerged to challenge the very foundations of behavioralism and its empirical approach to the description and explanation of political life. Rational choice theory, Straussianism, critical social theory, genealogical (sometimes referred to as postmodern) theories, and interpretive or hermeneutic approaches combined to challenge empiricism, and positivism generally, on a number of issues. Among these are the nature of political explanation; the essential contestability of the vocabulary of political science, the fact-value dichotomy; issues of cultural-conceptual imperialism; and the significance of history for the nature of political life. The result has been the emergence of a theoretical and methodological pluralism that contests the older positivist will to a methodologically defined discipline of political science.

Despite these challenges, empiricism remains one of the dominant, if not *the* dominant, paradigm in political science. What remains to be answered is how it will respond to the growing challenges to its preeminence, whether its proponents will pursue an ethos of exclusion of other perspectives or an ethos of engaged dialogue with other perspectives.

See also *Cognitive Theory and Politics; Hume, David; Kant, Immanuel; Locke, John; Positivism; Rational Choice Theory.*

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Empowerment

Most definitions of *empowerment* refer to the ways in which disadvantaged groups get access to political and social power. If power is conceived in distributive terms, that is, as something such as resources, capabilities, or elected positions that can be obtained and more or less fairly distributed, then *empowerment* refers to the process of transferring resources, capabilities, and positions of power to those groups or individuals who do not have it. Examples of such conceptions of empowerment include access to power structures, for example, political offices. Once power is achieved, then it becomes important to assess the effects of empowerment on the disadvantaged group and its behavior as well as the policies designed to benefit the disadvantaged group.

If power is conceived in relational terms, then *empowerment* refers to the transformation of social, economic, cultural, and political relations and to challenging the structures related to domination and oppression. This perception of empowerment embraces Michel Foucault's concept of power as something that exists "only in action." As argued by theorists such as Iris Marion Young and Amy Allen, empowerment necessitates the destruction of structures that impede self-determination and self-development. It is a process consisting of dialogic relations including relatively powerless persons who come to understand the sources of their powerlessness and who discover the possibilities of transforming the oppressive environment through collective action. According to this perspective, it is important to understand the ways by which powerless individuals can raise collective consciousness, transform social environments, and challenge the hierarchies that perpetuate inequalities.

EMPOWERMENT AS ACCESS TO POWER STRUCTURES

In the United States, literature exploring the access of disadvantaged groups to the political arena analyzes the impact of the civil rights movement on power structures and voter behavior. According to Michael Bonds (2007), "the assumption was that black registration and voting would produce candidates, especially blacks, who would be more responsive to the needs of black citizens." Bonds argues that although there is no consensus on whether an increase in political power directly translates into benefits for the African American communities, there is evidence proving a positive relationship between political empowerment and favorable public policies.

Numerous works focus on specific strategies to ensure the access of disadvantaged groups to power structures. According to the minority empowerment thesis—which argues for electoral strategies to improve minority representation—such strategies increase minority political participation, foster positive attitudes toward the government, and increase identification with those who represent minorities in the government. For example, Jane Mansbridge has described the so-called communicative advantage. She argues that having a representative from the same ethnic or racial group or the same gender may help to break down communication barriers between constituents and their representatives.

Arend Lijphard and other political scientists have explored different electoral arrangements to increase ethnic representation in government. These strategies include the creation of special electoral districts, the use of proportional representation, and the division of the electorate along ethnic lines. The United States, Belgium, New Zealand, and Slovenia, among others, have created electoral arrangements to increase ethnic minority representation. Some theorists have pointed out that although electoral reforms may increase the number of minority politicians in power structures (descriptive representation), they may lead to a backlash from voters and politicians, thus resulting in fewer elected politicians' supporting minority-friendly policies (substantive representation).

Obtaining access to power structures implies a vision of empowerment as a consciousness-raising initiative, focusing on the ways in which social movements help individuals and groups gain access to resources and capabilities. According to Phylis Johnson, mass media, such as radio stations, have a major role to play in raising civic consciousness and fostering political mobilization, resulting in political action to obtain power.

EMPOWERMENT AS TRANSFORMATION OF RELATIONS

The conceptualization of empowerment as transformation of cultural, economic, and political relations is often embraced by critical theorists and feminist analysts. Empowerment is seen both as a process geared to bring about positive change and as an outcome. According to Jane Parpart et al. (2002), "empowerment must be understood as including both individual conscientization (*power within*) as well as the ability to work collectively, which can lead to politicized *power with* others, which provides *power* to bring change."

According to feminist literature, the goals of women's empowerment include challenging the subordination of women, transforming state institutions that have perpetuated gender discrimination and inequality, and identifying and recognizing institutions that support gender equality. This vision of empowerment is more radical than the first one outlined in this article. It implies that achieving empowerment brings about an ability to transform one's environment and power structures instead of merely gaining access to the existing structures of power.

For example, a collection of essays edited by Peter H. Smith, Jennifer L. Troutner, and Christine Hünefeldt outlines some

common strategies of empowerment that have been employed by women's movements in Asia and Latin America. These strategies include large-scale political mobilization, increasing involvement in commercial (economic) activities, and use of governmental economic development policies.

Smith et al.'s volume and other works analyzing the empowerment of women offer an interesting insight. The construction of a women-friendly state apparatus that may include the creation of government positions dealing with women's issues or quotas for women's representation in government usually weakens grassroots feminist movements. Thus, it is not entirely clear whether engineered women's representation in government helps improve the status of all women in a country, including those from lower socioeconomic classes.

Feminist perspectives exploring empowerment raise questions about the roles of international actors and social change. Well-wishing outsiders often believe that they can promote certain empowerment strategies, such as democratic elections, and thus give power to the powerless. However, case studies of women's empowerment draw attention to the importance of local participatory efforts. These efforts, however, need to be supported by national governments and international organizations.

A survey of the important insights of the two perspectives on empowerment suggests that (understood as a process) empowerment may occur at many levels—individual (micro), community, or national (macro)—and that it can be analyzed as a phenomenon with several dimensions—political, social, cultural, and economic. In both cases, the term implies an outcome, not merely a strategy; however, it is very difficult to measure this outcome. Linking empowerment to national and global power structures and relevant institutions instead of trying to address several levels of analysis may be beneficial.

See also *Advocacy Groups; Affirmative Action; Alienation, Political; Community Power; Discrimination; Mobilization, Political; Representation and Representative; Voting Rights and Suffrage; Women's Representation; Young, Iris Marion.*

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Encuentros

Encuentros, a Spanish-language term for "encounter," is most closely associated with the indigenous rights and alternative globalization movements of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The term came to international political prominence in reference to assemblies supporting the Zapatista Army of National Liberation in its fourteen-year uprising against the Mexican government beginning January 1, 1994, the date on which the North American Free Trade Agreement was implemented. It has become a regular feature of the parlance of activist and community advocacy groups involved in alternative globalization struggles and opposition to capitalist globalism, neoliberal policies, and free trade. Groups from a variety of backgrounds use this term rather than the term of their native language to describe fora, meetings, and gatherings of alternative globalization groups and/or indigenous rights movements.

In July 1996 approximately two thousand activists from forty-four countries met in Chiapas, Mexico, for the First International Encuentro for Humanity and against neoliberalism. Hosted by the Zapatistas and five indigenous communities, the meetings initiated a global network that would play a significant part in the alternative globalization protests, beginning with the Seattle demonstrations against the World Trade Organization in 1999. A second encuentro was held in Spain in 1997, with almost four thousand participants from countries representing each continent. This gathering was held to express solidarity with the ongoing Zapatista struggles, to develop strategies and tactics for supporting those struggles, and to strategize broader opposition to capitalist globalism.

Encuentros—intended to have a nonhierarchical and decentralized structure—have emphasized the political significance of organizing through networks rather than through the vanguard party model of the Socialist and Communist Internationals. Issues addressed have included indigenous rights, women and struggles against patriarchy, and the relations of activists in the global North with activists in the global South.

The recovered factory movements in Latin America, in which workers take over and self-manage their workplaces, have also initiated encuentros, including the Encuentro Latinoamericano de Empresas Recuperados (Latin American Encounter of Recovered Companies).

See also *Anti- and Alter-globalization Movements; North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); Workers' Rights.*

. . . . JEFFREY SHANTZ

Endangered Cultures

Endangered cultures are cultures that are threatened by extinction. Cultures become extinct when few people practice a culture and the number of participants is declining. While cultures have historically changed in size and composition, contemporary anthropologists, cultural community members, and cultural admirers work to restore and preserve endangered cultures. The term *endangered cultures* describes both those who are threatened by systemic changes and those affected by proximal effects.

INTENTIONAL AND UNINTENTIONAL CULTURAL EXTINCTION

Cultures become extinct through both deliberate and accidental means. Governments may deliberately work to extinguish a culture by altering, or prohibiting communities from practicing, their traditions. Military conquerors have attempted to alter the cultures of oppressed people for several reasons. Repressive governments have tried to destroy cultural traditions by killing prominent figures and through acculturation programs aimed at homogenizing a population. For example, governments have historically prohibited a cultural group's language, religion, and other social practices in an effort to weaken the cohesion and identity of that group. Settler populations bring their customs and culture to a new land and propagate old-world cultures in their new territory. However, existing social structures and religions may help maintain cultural differences between the vanquished and the settler population. By erasing cultural cleavages between peoples, a government may be able to weaken traditional centers of power. Without these centers of power, a government is better able to influence the people through culture. Elites from the dominant culture thus deliberately shape the thought and language of the dominated people. For example, creating an official language and a standard state curriculum helps homogenize the history of the people. One illustration of this arose during the French occupation of Algeria (1830–1962). To gain the rights of citizens, Algerian Muslims were forced to accept Christianity, learn the French language, and abide by French law. This assimilation effort failed, and the Algerians eventually defeated the French to win their independence.

Cultures also may become endangered accidentally. Communities may become acculturated by an exogenous source; that is, they may be influenced from exposure to different cultural communities, and individuals may voluntarily adopt cultural practices from other communities. For example, intercultural trade, marriage, and immigration create opportunities for people of different cultures to interact and learn the others' customs. However, cultures also change organically without external stimuli. For instance, migratory people in a new territory may create customs and alter their culture to adapt to the environment. Past cultural traditions may be inappropriate in the new environment. Likewise, if a migratory people encounters a second, culturally distinct people, their traditions may change in several ways. The migratory people may adapt to the cultural traditions of the second population. Also, the second population may adopt the culture of the migratory people. Finally, both peoples may alter their cultures in some new way. For example, as noted by Nigel Spivey in *Etruscan Art* (1997), although the Etruscans of central Italy (approximately 1200–500 BCE) resisted colonization, they did adopt Hellenistic art styles, the Euboean alphabet, and Greek myths.

Another unintentional way cultures may become endangered is through the international spread of ideas. This international spread need not be malicious like that of a repressive government but may be a product of interacting with other communities. Critics of globalization lament the pollution of local, unincorporated cultures because of this international influence. Globalization, that is, the increased intensity of social networks connecting people in different geographic locations, increases intercultural exposure and may asymmetrically change one culture vis-à-vis the other. For instance, American popular culture can be seen across the globe in cinema, music, and dress. This culture may become part of the language and thought of local people around the world. Proponents of endangered cultures worry that local cultures will suffer and change due to the preponderance of the cultures of larger and wealthier states.

Endangered cultures, as well as other cultures, face systemic alteration by their exposure to new opportunities. Expressing language and traditions through new media and environments gives individuals opportunities to celebrate and preserve the traditions, but this invariably affects the culture. Spoken languages and oral traditions may be lost or altered by widely accepted international norms of writing. Oral language traditions may become standardized to be recorded and taught, but the oral facet of that language and the traditional flexibility of the language may be lost. External norms and institutions cause cultures to change by prompting individuals to adapt to international cultural streams.

To many, the growth of one culture at the expense of other cultures is the result of oppressive cultures' diluting and destroying weak ones. This argument suggests that globalism and other forms of acculturation create estrangement by individuals of the extinct culture. Those alienated by the monopolizing, encroaching culture are more likely to act antisocially and reject the dominating culture. However, cultural extinction is not universally accepted as a problem to correct.

STUDIES AND PRESERVATION EFFORTS

Endangered cultures have attracted the attention of the international community as anthropologists, linguists, and individuals strive to maintain and restore threatened cultures. There is a strong normative component to the argument of those in favor of saving endangered cultures. Cultural pluralism and the norm of cultural equality drive many advocates to preserve endangered cultures. In addition, others argue that cultural diversity is objectively beneficial: preserving international cultural heterogeneity promotes critical insight into one's own culture and practices. Endangered cultures may be sources of critical thought about language, institutions, and social and familial relationships. Proponents argue that endangered cultures are oppressed by the spreading culture.

Advocates for the endangered cultures may be insiders or outsiders of that culture. Insiders may continue to practice their culture and language in the face of external pressure to change. However, social divergence inside cultural groups may also arise from within the group. Social group insiders may refine past practices to keep cultural practices attractive and in accord with changing norms. For example, Baganda women, a people in central Uganda, have historically knelt when greeting men. Urban/modernist Baganda have tried to stop this tradition to promote gender equality, while rural/traditionalist Baganda prefer that this tradition continue. Cultural change initiated by insiders is widely thought to be a natural, organic process, and most advocates of the endangered culture recognize that cultures change. Endangered cultures are not threatened by endogenous, organic changes (changes that originate without external influence and by cultural insiders) because these changes are considered to be culturally consistent. This distinction allows cultures to adapt, survive, and respond to social movements without losing local legitimacy and alienating the population.

Communities and individuals outside an endangered cultural group may also make efforts to preserve endangered cultures in several ways. One tangible way pluralists work to support heterogeneity is by preserving local customs. A second way is by preserving local languages. Different groups create local language archives to preserve languages with few remaining speakers. While native speakers might eventually vanish, their language will remain. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Works Programme, academic institutions, and many international organizations strive to protect endangered languages and cultures.

See also *Cultural Policy; Cultural Relations; Culture and Politics; Language and Politics; Multiculturalism; Pluralism; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).*

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Engels, Friedrich

German writer Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) is best known as the life-long friend and sometime collaborator of the revolutionary social theorist Karl Marx (1818–1883), whose ideas produced epochal changes in the way that politics is conceived and practiced.

Engels was born in what is now Wuppertal near Düsseldorf in Prussia. His family were pious Christians who had become moderately wealthy over several generations of factory ownership and commercial trading. His education was terminated at sixteen so he could enter the family firm, and he worked at their enterprises in the port of Bremen and also in Manchester, England. However, young Engels was a rebel and autodidact, sympathizing with liberal resistance to the authoritarian regimes of the German states. While this was confined by monarchical governments to the cultural spheres of literature and philosophy, Engels was unusual in publishing an anonymous exposé titled "Letters from Wuppertal" in a Hamburg journal at the age of eighteen. In this prescient work he detailed, with great sarcasm, the pious hypocrisies of mill owners whose wealth derived from the sufferings of subsistence laborers and whose factories spilled waste into local streams. This outlook permeates Engels's impressive and influential book *The Condition of the Working Class in England,* published in Leipzig in 1845 and praised by Marx. Engels's more theoretical article, "Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy," was accepted by Marx for a radical German-language volume published in Paris in 1844. It clearly influenced the then-obscure Marx, who later wrote *Capital: Critique of Political Economy* (1867).

Together Marx and Engels produced only three major works: the little-read book *The Holy Family* with separately authored chapters, published in Frankfurt am Main in 1845; the voluminous manuscripts written in 1845–1846 and only posthumously published as *The German Ideology* (1932); and the eventually well-known *Manifesto of the Communist Party,* published anonymously in London in 1848. From 1845 onward the two had an intensive political collaboration, a very extensive correspondence, and an important monetary relationship. After 1850 Engels supported the Marx family out of his earnings and pension.

From 1859 Engels functioned as Marx's chief reviewer and publicist, setting a biographical, intellectual, and political frame around Marx's works and ideas. While on occasion Marx provided brief summaries of his outlook and conclusions, Engels's popularizations created a systematizing conceptual structure. This gave currency to the terms that made Marxism a distinctive intellectual system: *materialism, idealism, dialectic,* and *contradiction.* According to Engels's influential accounts, Marx was the equal of German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel because Marx was said to have similarly generated a philosophy of nature, history, and thought itself and of British naturalist Charles Darwin because both were said to have constructed a positive science through which the progressive development of human history could be understood. After Marx's death Engels edited and republished numerous works by Marx with new introductions.

Engels presented his relationship to Marx as that of junior partner or second fiddle. However, this is perhaps somewhat disingenuous and has been under scrutiny almost since his death.

See also *German Political Thought; Marx, Karl; Marxism.*

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Enlightenment Political Thought

The Enlightenment was a broad movement of reform that swept through Europe and the United States from (roughly) 1690 until the start of the French Revolution (1789–1799) a century later. The intellectual leadership of the Enlightenment came from prominent men of letters (as they called themselves) such as French philosophers Voltaire, Denis Diderot, and Jean le Rond d'Alembert; Swiss writer Jean-Jacques Rousseau; Scottish philosophers Adam Smith and David Hume; German philosophers Moses Mendelssohn, Immanuel Kant, and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing; U.S. politician and philosopher Thomas Jefferson; and Italian politician and philosopher Beccaria (Cesare, Marquis de Beccaria-Bonsan); to name just a few. The best overall expression of the mainstream Enlightenment outlook on religion, history, science, philosophy, and epistemology during the eighteenth century is d'Alembert's *Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Diderot,* published in 1751.

Shadowing this high Enlightenment was a low Enlightenment of Grub Street writers and pamphleteers who popularized Enlightenment ideas in lodges, salons, and coffeehouses for a broad and less tutored audience. Also, there were important variations in emphasis and outlook between the Enlightenment's proponents in different national contexts. For example, philosophers of the French Enlightenment such as Voltaire were much more anticlerical than their counterparts in Germany and Britain. Recent scholarship has emphasized this internal diversity within the Enlightenment and made serious scholars much more cautious when generalizing about it. The diverse eighteenth-century proponents of the Enlightenment shared a general outlook and some basic beliefs rather than a commitment to a single project, as many of its contemporary opponents allege.

In English, the expression *the Enlightenment* was not used to designate a specific historical period until the late nineteenth century, long after the movement had ended, leading some scholars (still a small minority) to reject the term as anachronistic. The same is true in French (*le Siècle des Lumières*) and German (*die Aufklärung*), although the nonhistorical use of *enlightenment* as a general term for the process of replacing ignorance with knowledge was used throughout the eighteenth century (and before) in all three languages.

There was little consensus among the Enlightenment's advocates on the ideal form of government. Some, like the skeptical Voltaire, favored enlightened despotism as the best way to elevate the benighted masses, while others (a small minority) were democrats who put their faith in the people, as Rousseau did. A common myth about the Enlightenment is that its proponents were naïve optimists who believed in the inevitability of progress, even though Voltaire, the quintessential Enlightenment figure, openly mocked this view in his popular novel *Candide* (1759). At best, they were cautious optimists about the prospects for improvement with a keen sense of how slow and uncertain it could be. Even so, most believed that things had gradually improved and would likely continue to do so as reason, toleration, and science displaced religion, intolerance, and superstition. Few went as far as the Marquis de Condorcet, whose *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind* (1795) is the most optimistic statement of the Enlightenment belief in progress.

Contrary to the claims of many of the Enlightenment's enemies, very few of its proponents were atheists. Most, like Voltaire, were deists who attacked established religious institutions and beliefs in favor of a minimalistic natural religion. Faith in natural science as the best means for improving human well-being was very widespread, if not universal, during the Enlightenment. Almost all of its proponents rejected the existence of innate ideas, believing instead that all knowledge is acquired via sensory experience. The locus classicus of this view is John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), which was widely read and universally admired by the Enlightenment's eighteenth-century proponents. The scientific method developed by Sir Isaac Newton and Francis Bacon was taken as the model for the systematic and reliable acquisition of knowledge, in contrast to the obscurity of traditional metaphysics and orthodox religious beliefs, which science had disproved or displaced.

The Enlightenment was tainted by the violent excesses of the French Revolution, which many popular counterrevolutionary writers such as Edmund Burke and Augustin Barruel blamed on the steady corrosion of social and political order under the critical gaze of Enlightenment reason in the decades before 1789. The Enlightenment has continued to attract criticism ever since, from all points of the ideological compass, including reactionary *dévots* such as Joseph de Maistre, feminists such as Sandra Harding, conservative romantics such as the poet Novalis, twentieth-century neo-Marxists such as Theodor Adorno, and liberals such as Isaiah Berlin. Many of the values, practices, and institutions of our present civilization are rooted in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, so it is not surprising that its legacy continues to be hotly debated today. Many writers such as Michel Foucault have linked the Enlightenment to totalitarianism, a claim that has been strenuously disputed by its contemporary defenders such as the philosopher Jürgen Habermas. A typical recent example of the latter is Tzvetan Todorov's *In Defence of the Enlightenment* (2009).

See also *Beccaria, Cesare; Counter-Enlightenment Political Thought; Diderot, Denis; Hume, David; Political Philosophy; Political Thought,*

Foundations of; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Smith, Adam; Voltaire, Francois-Marie.

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Entitlements

Although the majority of entitlement programs are dated to the Social Security Act of 1935, the concept of entitlement is of rather contemporary derivation. The development of the concept is a consequence of what Yale Law School professor Charles A. Reich called the "New Property" theory in legal activism in the 1960s. Reich believed that protection of individual autonomy in an "age of governmental largess" demanded recognition of a new property right in governmental benefits. According to the Social Security Act, welfare recipients did not possess the legal right to obtain welfare; rather, states could provide or deny welfare in accordance with federal laws and if the fundamental constitutional rights of a recipient were not violated by the method in which it distributed its generous assistance. Historically, welfare has been largesse from the state to the poor. The rulings of the courts, such as in regard to Aid to Families with Dependent Children, have progressively asserted welfare benefits as more akin to property rights than gratuities that could be withdrawn at will.

In *Goldberg v. Kelly* (397 U.S. 254), states were required to provide a particular recipient with "public assistance payments," which "would satisfy the constitutional command" of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Justice Brennan delivered the majority opinion of the Court and stated that "such benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them." His footnote to the opinion reflected his acceptance of the New Property theory: "It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity.' Much of the existing wealth in the United States takes the form of rights that do not fall within traditional common-law concepts of property." Determining that the due process clause provides protection to welfare recipients creates a unique dilemma as to the constitutional right of an individual to due process only if the state either hindered or periled the entitlement of the "laws of nature and of nature's God."

According to the Declaration of Independence, "all men are created equal [and are] endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights," and any entitlement necessarily involves a consequential condition. The Declaration of Independence entitles every American to employ both property and talents according to choice, and the document also deems it obligatory not to violate the equal entitlements of others. However, there is no requirement to accomplish actions that are positive in nature for the benefit of others. Although the slogan "a chicken in every pot" has been attacked and exploited in the political realm, the statement helps illustrate this false notion of entitlement. The demand for a chicken in every pot would obligate someone else to provide the finances. If one person is entitled to a chicken in his or her empty pot, then one can demand the chicken, and someone else has a correlative obligation to provide such an entitlement.

Entitlement programs are normally operated initially on a limited basis, but they expand rapidly, which results in more federal spending. Entitlement programs are described generally as forming a safety net that must be accomplished through the labor of others. It would seem that entitlement to the pursuit of happiness almost certainly involves a provision for the enabling conditions, but this would not be in the context of distribution of material resources, which often impedes individual initiative and responsibility.

See also *Equality and Inequality; Property Rights; Welfare Rights.*

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Environmental Policy

Environmental policy encompasses a wide range of governmental actions that deal with environmental quality or the use of natural resources. It includes the traditional focus on the conservation or efficient use of natural resources such as public lands and waters, wilderness, and wildlife. Since

A man in China carts plastic containers to a recycling center. Environmental policies such as recycling aim to protect air and water pollution as well as public health and other aspects that affect people and governments.

SOURCE: Corbis

ozone layer, limit transboundary movement of toxic chemicals and hazardous wastes, conserve biological diversity, and reduce the risks of global climate change, among other goals. Regional environmental accords also are increasingly common, most notably and successfully in the European Union, which generally has adopted tougher requirements than those found in the United States.

Sometimes governments choose not to adopt formal policies and thus implicitly leave many or most decisions about certain environmental and resource problems (e.g., the level of energy use) to individuals, corporations, and the operations of the free market. Such decisions may be made because policy makers are not convinced that government involvement is needed or legitimate or because the level of controversy over proposals makes agreement impossible. Hence, governments find it easier to do nothing in the short term, an outcome that is common in the international arena when nations cannot come to an agreement on what to do in light of their often-divergent national interests. Governments also may choose to adopt environmental policies that rely heavily on market-based approaches and thus minimize direct regulation of the target activity while maintaining market competition and a minimal government role. For example, so-called cap-and-trade programs are a central component of proposed climate change policies that leave far more discretion to industry than would direct regulation of greenhouse gas emissions.

the 1960s, both in the United States and in other developed nations, it also has included the environmental protection efforts of government, such as air and water pollution control to protect public health. Defined more broadly, environmental policy may include government action at any level, from local to international, that affects energy use, transportation, the design of cities and buildings, agriculture, human population growth, and the protection of the earth's ecological, chemical, and geophysical systems.

Whether defined narrowly or broadly, these government policy actions represent society's collective decision to pursue certain environmental goals or objectives and to use particular tools (such as regulation or financial incentives) to achieve them. Increasingly, environmental policy extends beyond national policies and has included the establishment of major international accords that seek to protect the earth's

THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND POLITICS

The problems that environmental policies are intended to address have changed substantially over time, as have the set of policy approaches and tools that governments have relied on and the political and institutional context in which policy making and implementation take place. Many students of environmental policy recognize at least three generations of public policies, and some see this evolution as a fundamental shift from one policy epoch to another. During the 1970s, for example, the problems were defined largely as air and water pollution and later toxic chemicals and hazardous wastes. The preferred solution in the United States was federally driven regulation of industry through what became known as command-and-control policies, in which the federal government and the states set environmental quality standards and

enforced them as provided in the laws. These kinds of policies, such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, achieved many of their objectives over time, but they could not fully deal with the problems. Costs were high, and noncompliance with policy mandates was not unusual. Moreover, the policies as designed could not handle newer problems such as non-point sources of pollution (e.g., runoff from agricultural land and urban surfaces) where regulation was impractical. Those were important weaknesses.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, policy scholars and policy makers defined the problems somewhat differently and offered ideas for reform both in pollution control and in natural resources policies. They emphasized the promotion of efficiency and effectiveness through regulatory flexibility, greater cooperation between government and industry, and the use of new policy approaches such as market incentives. Especially in the United States, they also tended to favor devolution of policy responsibilities from the federal government to the states and greater collaboration among stakeholders. Controversy has swirled around many of these proposals from the second generation of environmental policy, in part because environmentalists often saw them as a rolling back of environmental policy goals while representatives from business and some state and local governments argued they did not go far enough to grant them the flexibility they sought to improve environmental performance. Reform of the major statutes from the 1970s also proved difficult because of deep partisan divisions over the issues.

By the late 1980s and into the 1990s, a third generation or era in environmental policy began, with strong roots in the concept of sustainability. It did not replace the first two eras so much as it built on the foundations that they laid and incorporated new ways of thinking about environmental problems, policy goals, and the best means for achieving them. For example, from this perspective much value is placed on comprehensive and integrated analysis of the way in which human activities affect natural systems and, in turn, how society depends on the healthy functioning of such systems, such as purification of air and water or the stabilization of climate. It is in this period that scholars and policy makers began to see that environmental problems had to be considered in relation to population growth, energy use, land use, transportation patterns, the design of cities, agriculture and water use, and many other practices.

In addition, a global rather than merely local, regional, or national perspective emerged as a key element in this view of environmental policy. Global problems such as loss of biodiversity, population growth, climate change, and growing water scarcity emerged at international meetings from the 1970s to the 2000s and helped to build a new policy agenda for the twenty-first century. The most visible signpost of the new outlook was the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and its legacy is apparent in the approved plan of action, *Agenda 21*. This broad commitment to sustainable development continued at a follow-up meeting, the World Summit on Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2002. That meeting drew new attention to the need to improve social and economic conditions in the world's poorest countries while also fostering economic growth and environmental protection, as reflected in the United Nations Millennium Development Goals adopted two years before the meeting. The Kyoto Protocol on climate change, adopted in 1997 and set to expire in 2012 and be replaced by a newly negotiated treaty, is a leading example of these trends in global environmental policy.

NEW DIRECTIONS IN STUDYING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

The implications of this shift to sustainability or sustainable development, and to international action on global environmental problems, are profound. They range from the redesign of industrial processes to the promotion of sustainable use of natural resources such as energy. Successful policies are likely to require new kinds of knowledge and new methods of analysis as well as an unprecedented level of cooperation among nations. Political science research already is beginning to reflect interest in sustainability as a concept and the value of the comparative and international study of environmental policy and politics. There is also greater recognition of the importance of interdisciplinary analysis to capture the full range of variables that can affect environmental policy adoption, implementation, and impact at all levels of government.

Other articles in this encyclopedia discuss far more than is possible here, including the use of particular frameworks, theories, and models in political science research. Suffice it to say that scholars in political science and related disciplines employ a rich diversity of approaches in their study of environmental policy and politics.

See also *Ecological Analysis; Environmental Political Theory; Globalization; Kyoto Protocol; Public Policy Development; Regulation and Rulemaking; Science Policy.*

. . . . MICHAEL E. KRAFT

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Environmental Political Theory

Viewed from one perspective, perhaps the most curious thing about environmental political theory (EPT) is that it should exist at all. Environmental concerns—climate change, species and forest destruction, toxic pollution, and so forth—are characteristically viewed as discrete interests or preferences to be weighed against others in the making of policy by liberal pluralist states. One might study public opinion regarding such concerns or examine the influence of interest groups in promoting them within the policy-making process. But from this perspective, there appears to be little place for normative theory. Even from a point of view critical of this liberal pluralism, environmental concerns would not seem to represent anything more than a particular application of a critique to this policy domain.

The very existence of EPT is therefore premised on the conviction that environment is something more than a particular set of issues or interests to be represented in political debate. Yet what this "something more" is has been contested. In the early 1970s, the popularization of the idea of limits to growth provided a provocative basis for this conviction. Perception of impending biophysical limits to human production and consumption highlights human embeddedness within—and dependence on—a larger nonhuman world. An outpouring of early writings, such as William Ophuls's 1977 book *Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity: Prologue to a Political Theory of the Steady State* and Robert Heilbroner's *An Inquiry into the Human Prospect* (1980), supposed that biophysical limits would necessitate the authoritarian imposition of social and political limits on human societies. Yet then and now many others distanced themselves from this supposition, arguing for participatory and democratic approaches to environmental challenges while retaining the conviction that the recognition of human embeddedness required the sort of systematic reflection that normative political theorizing could provide.

The label "environmental political theory" itself, along with such related ones as "green political theory," has been in play only since the 1990s. It is only beginning to become recognized within the broader disciplinary community of political theorists and political scientists. EPT is more than the mere application of political theories to environmental issues. The questions at its core could hardly be more pressing or encompassing: given what we know about the nonhuman world, how should we organize human communities? What is the relationship between the long-standing quest for such human values as liberty and justice, on one hand, and the quest for what has come to be termed "environmental sustainability," on the other? If we accept the urgent need to address far-reaching ecological challenges including global climate change, what sort of political values and institutions can facilitate—or impede—these efforts? Are elite-driven processes required to ensure that authoritative scientific knowledge is the basis for change? Or can democratic values and institutions more effectively meet the challenge? Finally, to what extent do all the previous questions rely on assumptions about the nature of nature itself? The scope of these questions should make it plain just how vital a form of inquiry EPT can be. It also illuminates the ties between EPT and other forms of political theorizing—while the label "environmental political theory" emerged only in the 1990s, many of the questions are at least as old as Aristotle.

To situate EPT, it is helpful to consider its relation to other forms of academic exploration of environmental problems. Parallel to the emergence of EPT has been a growing body of empirical work by political scientists on environmental policies and agreements, environmental movements and organizations, and public opinion on environmental concerns. By contrast, EPT, like political theory in general, emphasizes normative argument and conceptual analysis. Yet unlike some other forms of political theorizing, EPT rarely strays far from the practices that motivate it and often engages in fruitful dialogue with empirically oriented work. As such, theorizing in this field tends toward what political theorist Ian Shapiro characterized in a 2002 article as "problem-driven" political theory.

BEYOND ETHICS AND IDEOLOGY

Seemingly even more closely related to EPT, and sometimes mistaken for it, are two other fields of inquiry: environmental ethics and ecological, or green, ideology.

At times, *environmental ethics* has been used as a term for normative inquiry into environmental concerns per se, thus encompassing EPT. Yet environmental ethics, which exists largely within the discipline of philosophy, continues to be shaped by the particular ways of framing the field as it first emerged in the 1970s. Among the defining questions that have preoccupied environmental ethicists is whether (and if so, how) nonhuman entities—including individual animals, species, and ecosystems—might be recognized as having intrinsic value. Intrinsic value is an attribute that most other ethicists had reserved for human beings, contrasting it with mere instrumental value, which is defined in relation to human purposes. From this emphasis on intrinsic value, environmental ethicists have sought to distinguish between anthropocentrism (a human-centered perspective) and ecocentrism (an ecologically centered perspective rooted in claims to the intrinsic value of nonhuman entities), between weak and strong anthropocentrism, and between subjective and objective attribution of value. Authors have tended to focus on individual convictions regarding these attributions of value, suggesting an implicit confidence that the adoption of new environmental values by enough people would lead to a broader change in social and political order.

Understood in this way, EPT is also distinct from what some have termed a "green" or "ecological" political ideology. The promise of a self-contained worldview or ideology emanating from ecological concerns also relies on a division between anthropocentrists and ecocentrists. In this sense, it shares in the distinctions drawn by many environmental ethicists. If people can be divided in this way, then we might conclude that since all existing political ideologies are anthropocentric, a commitment to ecocentrism would be the basis for a radically new ideology.

Yet if we can draw one uncontested conclusion about recent work in EPT, it is that there is no singular set of political tenets on which authors have agreed (a thorough overview is provided by Peter Hay 2002 in *A Companion to Environmental Thought*). Rather than settle on *the* ecological or green conception of political order, EPT has focused on the character of this order itself, exploring the normative position of both the state and civil society, the role of democratic decision making, the institutionalization of particular forms of rationality or rationalization, the role played by ideas of nature as a source of political authority, and the ways in which dominant political and economic ideas embedded in liberal democracy may both enable and constrain possibilities for social change. The sections that follow offer an indication of the breadth of this recent work.

RECONSIDERING THE HISTORY OF WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT

The so-called canon of Western political thought, contested though it is, represents a shared language among political theorists. In this sense, an engagement with these thinkers by environmental theorists should not be particularly surprising. In recent years, entire books have been devoted to an examination of the environmental implications of work by Karl Marx, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and Henry David Thoreau. Articles and chapters of books have been devoted to these same thinkers as well as Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, John Stuart Mill, John Dewey, Theodore W. Adorno, Hannah Arendt, Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Habermas, John Rawls, and Michel Foucault, among others. In addition to their contribution to environmental discourse, such works offer the community of political theorists fresh perspectives and insights about these much-studied figures.

Yet in another sense, this body of work engaging historical texts is more striking because, of course, few if any of these historical figures offer direct commentary on contemporary environmental concerns. Moreover, other environmental writers have condemned the whole of Western thought and civilization as a root cause of environmental degradation. Environmental political theorists typically write neither to bury nor to praise these thinkers. What has attracted the attention of theorists in these works is their discussions of topics including the role of nature as a legitimizer of political authority; human alienation from nature; intergenerational relations; competing conceptions of rationality, ownership, and private property; and the relation of public to private spheres. Yet the very act of engaging these thinkers supposes that in the nuances of their arguments on these vital themes, they can offer a rich resource for critical reflection, for the illumination of important tensions, and for insight into some of the challenges faced by contemporary environmentalists.

POLITICAL CONCEPTS

In his seminal work *A Sand County Almanac,* Aldo Leopold famously writes that a new land ethic could change "the role of *Homo sapiens* from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it" (1949, 204). Yet what might such a conception of citizenship look like? Leopold's writing offers few answers. In a similar vein, the past couple decades have witnessed the rise of the environmental justice movement. What might *justice* mean in such a context? Movement activists have rarely paused to offer an explicit definition.

Questions such as these have prompted a number of environmental political theorists to examine key, contested political concepts including justice and citizenship as well as virtue, rights, pluralism, property, place, sustainability, and nature. In some cases, the fruits of their labors have been to bring insights from the works of other political theorists to illuminate environmental topics. In *Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, Movements, and Nature* (2007), David Schlosberg, for example, has drawn on the work of critical theorists Nancy Fraser and Iris Young to show how the normative claims of activists in the environmental justice movement not only are arguments for distributive equity through the redistribution of environmental harms but also are rooted in the movement's demand for recognition of their injuries, identities, and communities. In other cases, environmental political theorists have reconceptualized an idea to capture the character of the challenge posed by ecological concerns. For example, while citizenship is conventionally understood to be closely tied to the political institution of the nation-state, in *Citizenship and the Environment* (2003), Andrew Dobson has developed a conception of ecological citizenship in which obligations transcend the boundaries of the nation-state but do so asymmetrically due to the differential ecological impact (or "footprint") of citizens in rich and poor societies.

Perhaps the most potent term in environmental discourse has also come under extended scrutiny by environmental political theorists—*nature.* Heated debate often exists here, with opposing camps sometimes identified as those adhering to a realist conception, which regards nature as both objective and relatively transparent in its functions and lessons, versus those adhering to a constructivist conception, which highlights the many ways that our understanding of what counts as nature is mediated by culture, ideology, and history. Yet the depth of disagreement should not be exaggerated. Among environmental political theorists, critical scrutiny has focused on whether the claim to know nature can provide a basis for political authority. On this score, even hardened realists might acknowledge that one must be cautious in drawing lessons from nature for political argument, while constructivists can note that their argument applies to the idea of nature and ought not to imply that they regard the nonhuman world itself as infinitely malleable. In this vein, several recent works have sought to navigate between these poles, pursuing "a way of talking about nature that is sensitive to the truth value of both of these positions, but that does not succumb to their logical or political shortcomings" (Andrew Biro 2005, 9).

CHALLENGING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL

As noted above, some forms of normative environmental inquiry emphasize the need for a change in individual

ethic, worldview, or ideology. By contrast, EPT has typically insisted on the inescapability of politics itself. This leads many environmental political theorists to criticize other forms of environmental discourse for their effort to elide or escape the often-messy realm of politics, power, and contention. Timothy Luke captures this argument well in *Capitalism, Democracy, and Ecology: Departing from Marx* (1999), drawing on sociologist Ulrich Beck to argue that contemporary liberal democratic societies have eviscerated the realm of politics by transferring key environmental concerns to the realm that they term "subpolis." In the subpolitical realm, decision making is, according to Luke, "all too often depoliticized by the professional-technical rhetorics of civil engineering, public health, corporate management, scientific experiment, technical design, and property ownership."

When scientists foray into the realm of political action, for example, they frequently characterize solutions in terms of objectively necessary technological fixes derived from nature's authority. In relation to climate change, one prominent author recently wrote of the potential for a "carbon dictatorship." In *Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason* (2002), Val Plumwood has compared such an approach to a supposed need for (borrowing from Plato) an "eco-republic," which she rejects as not only oppressive but ecologically disastrous as well. The eco-republic fails because it does not recognize the centrality of "remoteness" (distance in time, space, consequences, or knowledge) to the genesis of environmental problems. Her alternative requires the expansion of the political sphere to incorporate ecologically vital perspectives of those closest to the problems in all these relevant senses.

When state administrators and policy analysts rely on cost-benefit analyses and rational choice models to calculate collective preferences for environmental protection, theorists have criticized them for relying on an overly narrow conception of rationality. Here, resistance to the narrow politics of state power, especially in an age dominated by the power of global capital, is envisioned as emerging from the vibrant yet dissonant voices present in what Douglas Torgerson has termed the "green public sphere."

LIBERALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND ENVIRONMENTALISM

Seeking to politicize the response to environmental challenges, environmental political theorists often invoke some form of democracy as necessary for the effective redress of these concerns. Yet the record of existing liberal democratic polities in this regard appears to many to be deeply inadequate. Moreover, there is a tension in arguments for a democratic response to environmental concerns that Robert Goodin, in *Green Political Theory* (1992, 168), captures well: "to advocate democracy is to advocate procedures, to advocate environmentalism is to advocate substantive outcomes: what guarantee can we have that the former procedures will yield the latter sorts of outcomes?"

As long as this dichotomy between procedure and substance remains in place, Goodin's characterization of the challenge for environmentalist advocates of democracy seems undeniable. Yet a number of theorists highlight discursive and deliberative forms of participation to imagine a democracy that facilitates environmentally responsible outcomes. This approach, according to Robyn Eckersley in *The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty* (2004, 115), "eschews the liberal paradigm of strategic bargaining or power trading among self-interested actors . . . in favor of the paradigm of unconstrained egalitarian deliberation over questions of value and common purpose in the public sphere." Such radical democratic forms still cannot guarantee particular substantive outcomes, but they are argued to make such outcomes more likely.

THEORY AND PRACTICE

As a problem-driven form of political theorizing, environmental political theorists cannot escape the question of how their ideas might translate into practice. No answer is embraced unanimously, but two distinct models can be identified in recent works. The first envisions the theorist as using his or her privileged opportunity for reflection to clarify the challenges and opportunities faced by activists and policy makers. Here, the theorist can serve as a guide to practitioners if the former is willing to ground his or her reflections in actual cases and real questions posed by these practitioners (cf. de-Shalit 2000). A second model is embodied in those works that seek to develop normative theory out of an analysis of environmental movements and socioeconomic relationships. Here, it is not just the questions but the perspectives, voices, and arguments of activists and other practitioners that become the subject for theoretical insight and reflection.

CONCLUSION

While the contours of EPT are increasingly clear, this must not be mistaken for widespread agreement among theorists. In fact, the recent outpouring of writing in this field has resulted in a proliferation of perspectives. At present, EPT is a cacophonous conversation of increasingly diverse voices. Yet this takes place in an era when the environmental challenges we face require ever more urgent action. To some, this may appear exasperating: EPT is fiddling while the world burns. While EPT strives to remain relevant to practice, however, its success ought not to be measured by its ability to agree on answers. Instead, it offers the promise of all good political theorizing: of calling our attention to the most important questions and of unsettling our assurance that we already have the answers we need. As human societies grapple with the urgent yet complex problems of climate change, biodiversity loss, toxic pollution, and many others, bringing these critical perspectives into the conversation is demanded by both theory and practice.

See also *Critical Theory; Democratic Theory; Ecological Analysis; Environmental Policy; Green Parties; Normative Theory; Political Ecology; Political Theory; Science Policy; Science, Technology, and Politics.*

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Equality and Inequality

Ideas about equality have played a central and controversial role in political discourse from a very early time. Plato ridiculed the notion of equality in *The Republic,* and Aristotle, a student of Plato, was similarly critical. Indeed, the weight of tradition in political thought leaned heavily against the view that human beings should be thought of or treated as equals until at least the eighteenth and arguably the twentieth century—although it is important to bear in mind that most of that tradition sprang from or was supported by people who belonged to elite social strata and that dissenting traditions have always existed, from the ancient Stoics and Epicureans to the seventeenth-century Levellers and beyond. For many centuries, Christianity was the principal source in Western political thought of arguments that cast the idea of equality in a favorable light. Yet Christianity was always committed to the view that human beings should be concerned more with life after death than life in this world, especially political life, so Christian thinkers seldom argued for, and often argued against, claims that human beings should be considered equals in any politically meaningful sense. With the advent of the Enlightenment, the idea of equality in this world acquired vigorous intellectual champions. By the end of the eighteenth century, it became a real force driving major legal, political, and social reforms.

We can distinguish politically significant ideas about equality into five families, each of which may be usefully thought of as united by a distinct concept of equality. Some of these families coexist on highly congenial terms; others stand in relations of competitive tension with one another. Some, too, are internally divided by rival conceptions.

The first family is united by the idea of the equal worth of human beings. Against a historical background, the concept of equal worth is controversial. Aristotle forcefully and influentially denied that human beings are equal in worth by nature: some people are intended by nature to be slaves and accordingly have both different abilities and lesser worth than those who are intended by nature to be free; women are by nature inferior in both capabilities and worth to men. Christianity rejected this view with the argument that all human beings are equal in worth because they are equally the creations of a single God. Seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, too, disputed Aristotle's assumption. Indeed, he rejected the idea of intrinsic worth altogether and argued that political associations should be founded on an agreement by all their members to regard each member of the association as equal in worth by nature to every other member. The differences between Hobbes's claim and the Christian view are considerable—the Christian view endorses the idea of a naturalistic foundation of human worth while asserting a universalistic claim about the equality of that worth, while Hobbes adopts a view of human worth that is conventionalist and therefore at least potentially particularistic—but these differences pale in comparison with their common quarrel with Aristotle, whose opinions were shared by many later thinkers. Neither the Christian nor the Hobbesian conception of equal worth entails equality of any of the more robust kinds discussed below. Nevertheless, the concept of equal worth is critically important in political thought, for it underpins virtually every other concept of or argument for equality of any significance.

A second cluster of ideas is united by the concept of equality under law. The societies of early modern Europe were divided into different orders that were subject to different legal codes and judicial institutions that conferred legal privileges selectively. For example, recognized clergymen enjoyed a privilege called "benefit of clergy" that ensured that those who were accused of crimes would be tried only in ecclesiastical courts by other clergymen rather than in civil courts by laymen. Members of the aristocracy enjoyed similar privileges. A consequence of this patchwork system of legal privileges was that ordinary people were subject to much greater legal jeopardy than those who enjoyed those privileges. If a layperson were accused of a crime against a member of the clergy, the layperson was subject to prosecution in an ecclesiastical court by clergymen, but if a clergyman were accused of a crime against a layperson, the clergyman would be tried only by his peers—by other members of the clergy—who would be likely

to sympathize with his defense. The central point of appeals to equality before the law was to reject this kind of privilege, replacing it with the presumption that within any politically defined territory, all persons should be subject to a single, uniform body of laws that are applied in the same manner to all. This concept was embodied in legal reforms that followed the French Revolution (1789–1799) and spread through Europe and beyond in its aftermath.

The concept of political equality ties together the third family. According to the most widely accepted interpretation, political equality entails that political decision makers—those who wield principal legislative and executive power—should be chosen by elections in which each member of the electorate casts one and only one vote, all votes are given equal weight, and the candidate with a majority or a plurality of the votes cast wins. The degree of political equality achieved in political systems can then be said to vary in extent and depth, where the extent of equality is a function of the extensiveness of the franchise (or conversely of the extensiveness of groups that are denied effective voting rights) and its depth is a function of the importance of voting as a determinant of political decisions. However, voting and elections are not the only processes that embody the concept of political equality. One alternative employed extensively in the classical Athenian democracy was the selection of officeholders by lot. During the English revolution of the 1640s, the Levellers were vigorous advocates of political equality, albeit of limited extent. Democratic transformations that began in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries can be seen in retrospect (much as nineteenth-century French political philosopher and historian Alexis de Tocqueville saw them at a relatively early stage) as the beginnings of a long-range era of growth in the extent of political equality on a worldwide scale. Growth in the depth of political equality during the same period has arguably been far less consistent.

A fourth family of ideas is bound together by the concept of equality of opportunity, which emerged as a political force some two centuries ago in conjunction with the early development of market societies. The principal lines of division within this family are drawn between more and less robust interpretations of the concept, with a general pattern in which increasingly robust interpretations have emerged in succession over time. At the less robust end of this continuum lies the idea that offices and positions that are sources of income should be allocated to applicants based on their aptitudes or skills without regard to their social origins or to any other attributes that are unlikely to affect their performance. According to this interpretation, the concept of equal opportunity applies only at the point of potential entry to a career or job. More robust interpretations apply the concept to earlier stages in the life trajectories of persons, especially to the earlier stages in their formal education. The most robust interpretations insist that access to educational resources and other sources of advantage be equalized for all, and the most radical of these would seek to equalize even those advantages that originate in institutions that are often exempted from political scrutiny and criticism, such as families. The term

formal equality of opportunity is generally used to denote the less robust interpretations of the concept, while *substantive equality of opportunity* denotes more robust interpretations.

A fifth and final family comprises a set of interpretations of the concept of equality of condition. This concept has played an important role in political thinking at least since 1839, when French political writer Louis Blanc formulated the famous principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." In the recent literature, three rival interpretations of this concept have competed for primacy. Equality of welfare exists when the value to each person of the things that contribute to that person's welfare (whatever these things may be) is equal to the corresponding value of things to other persons. Discussions of this view usually assume a subjectivist interpretation of value like that which has dominated the literature of economics since the late nineteenth century. By contrast, equality of resources exists when the resources available to each person are identical or equal in value to those available to other persons (where the value of resources is determined in some objectivist or otherwise uniform manner). These two interpretations are likely in some cases to lead to widely discrepant judgments about equality of condition because people's values vary considerably. The idea of equality of capabilities constitutes a third interpretation. According to this view, two or more people are equal when the values (or sizes) of their capability sets are equal, where a capability set consists of all the functionings—the activities and states of being—a person is capable of achieving. Each of these interpretations is subject to various objections from both egalitarian and antiegalitarian quarters.

The concept of equal worth is compatible with each of the other concepts of equality sketched above; indeed, most versions of the others presuppose or incorporate this concept. Political equality, too, is compatible with equality of the various other kinds both at the conceptual and the practical level. However, significant tensions exist between the idea of equality of condition on one hand and the ideas of equality under law and equal opportunity on the other, at least when these ideas are considered potential aims of institutional design. The idea of equality under law is a specific version of the more general notion of equal treatment, as is the idea of equality of opportunity. In both cases, equal treatment can be expected, usually, to lead to unequal results, just as competitors in a game that is governed by uniform rules fairly applied usually finish with different results. Yet equal results are just what equality of condition entails.

While each of these five concepts of equality has been controversial at one time or another, some are now far more hotly disputed than others. The claim that all persons should be regarded as equal in natural worth appears to be widely shared, notwithstanding the fact that many people also support the notion that some persons deserve to be much better off than others because of earned differences in worth. The idea of equality under law, too, enjoys widespread general approbation even though many people in the most developed countries, where it is most firmly entrenched as a norm, do not want to

extend its reach to immigrants or to other marginalized groups. The idea of extensive political equality is also now widely accepted, whereas the notion that political equality might also be deep—that the principal decisions affecting a political association should be determined through processes that are essentially democratic rather than through (say) bargaining among elites, many of whose authority has little or no democratic foundation—does not appear to be widely understood. The idea of equality of opportunity, at least of the less robust, more formal kind, is widely esteemed in market societies, where it provides ideological support for labor mobility, a major factor in the efficiency of production. Some of these societies appear quite resistant to more substantive interpretations of equality of opportunity—despite the fact that these interpretations may be even more supportive of productive efficiency—because they challenge social privileges that remain deeply entrenched. The notion that political associations should seek strictly to equalize the conditions of their members is not widely held today. However, a related notion—the most controversial of the politically significant ideas about equality in recent times—that is widely held and indeed has been achieved at least approximately in some places, most notably some of the countries of northern Europe, is that inequalities of condition should be limited rather sharply.

Why should inequality of condition be a cause of concern? The major arguments can be divided into two classes, political and moral.

Political theorists have long argued that sharp inequalities of condition pose a threat to both the stability of political associations and their capacity to sustain a sense of common purpose among their citizens. If some groups perceive that they are consistently at the losing end of competition for resources and other advantages, they may be tempted to "shuffle the deck," as Hobbes puts it, in an effort to improve their chances of success. More positively, some have argued that people who believe that they enjoy an equitable share of benefits will be relatively willing to take the public good seriously and to make sacrifices to sustain it when they are called on to do so. Political philosophers have sometimes argued in response to these considerations that inequalities of condition should be limited so that no citizen possesses more than four times the wealth of any other citizen. However, limitations on inequality of condition are not the only means available to address these concerns. If a society maintains equality of opportunity in a form that is sufficiently robust to sustain significant social mobility—or if it maintains the appearance that significant mobility is realistically achievable—that may be sufficient to maintain a strong sense of loyalty to an existing political and social system, even if that system results in a high degree of inequality in outcomes.

From a moral point of view, two arguments suggest reasons for concern about inequality of condition. One argument is essentially humanitarian, based on the worry that great inequalities of condition would leave some people without sufficient means to lead decent lives. As Harry Frankfurt points out in his 1987 article, "Equality as a Moral Ideal," this argument actually entails only that each person should have enough; no necessary implication about the degree of inequality that is morally acceptable follows from it. Another line of argument, which has been most highly developed by twentieth-century American philosopher John Rawls, originates in the idea that society should be conceived as a fair system of social cooperation. Rawls's thought, borrowed from eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher Adam Smith, is that the principal factor enabling a society to generate large amounts of wealth is its division of labor, which is a collective rather than an individual creation. If that is the case, he reasons, then it follows that the products of that creation should be distributed equitably among all those who play a role in the division of labor.

Many writers have objected to the idea that inequalities of condition should be limited. Eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher David Hume suggested, in contrast to Hobbes, that attempts to render a society more equal would be disruptive of order by calling into question established entitlements, which he saw as the basis of social order. Nineteenth-century English philosopher Herbert Spencer believed that goods should accrue to persons in proportion to their desert, without regard to the degree of inequality to which this principle might lead; American political philosopher Robert Nozick argued similarly that any attempt to redistribute goods for the purpose of reducing inequalities would violate individuals' rights. Austrian economist and philosopher Friedrich Hayek and others have argued vigorously that attempts to implement social justice—to limit inequalities or to bring the distribution of income or other sources of advantage into line with any centrally enforced pattern—necessarily lead to unacceptable concentration of power and ultimately to despotism.

The last of these arguments is the most disturbing. If inequalities of condition could be limited only through great concentration of power—concentration considerably greater than would otherwise be required to maintain effective national defense, to sustain an effective government, to support a productive economy, and to enforce laws—then we would, paradoxically, achieve reduced inequality of condition at the high cost of increased inequality of power. It is reasonable to regard the threat to liberty that would result as unacceptable.

Although many modern writers have accepted the assumption that limits on inequality of condition could be achieved only through considerable concentration of power, this assumption is not compelling. In many cases the degree of inequality can be affected by variations in laws that have no discernable impact on the concentration of power. For example, in the late eighteenth century, nearly every state in the new United States of America adopted legislation repealing primogeniture and guaranteeing the equal division of estates among lineal descendants in cases of intestate succession. The aim of this change was to decrease inequality in property holdings, yet the change involved only the replacement of one law of succession with another, not the imposition of new laws where none had existed before. Similarly, although laws that are designed to mitigate inequalities in bargaining power between contracting parties are sometimes decried as unacceptable intrusions by

the state on freedom of contract, the reality, as nineteenth-century English philosopher and economist John Stuart Mill pointed out, is that the expectation by private parties that the state will enforce contracts itself constitutes a call for state intervention into private affairs. No increased intervention is entailed by state regulations that determine which contracts should be enforced.

Some ideas about equality, then, are now widely accepted; others remain highly controversial and in some cases poorly understood. Even those ideas that are most widely endorsed and deeply entrenched fall considerably short of realization in practice, at least to a degree that corresponds to their acceptance in theory. In the United States, for example, the idea of equality under law, which is endorsed by an inscription over the entrance to the building that houses the U.S. Supreme Court, is compromised by the fact that wealthy defendants in criminal and civil trials are able to hire teams of highly skilled legal counselors, while indigent defendants are often deprived in practice of effective legal representation. Even if we were to set aside controversial claims about the injustice or politically adverse consequences of extreme inequality of condition, much remains to be done to achieve the equalities about which we ostensibly agree.

See also *Enlightenment Political Thought; Equal Protection; Hayek, Freidrich August von; Hobbes, Thomas; Hume, David; Mill, John Stuart; Nozick, Robert; Political Philosophy; Rawls, John.*

. . . . DAVID C. JOHNSTON

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Equal Protection

The United States of America is considered one of the beacons of civil rights among modern civilized nations. These civil rights are expressed in three documents: the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. One of the most important aspects of civil rights involves the concept of equal protection.

SOURCES OF AMERICAN EQUAL PROTECTION LAW

In the Declaration of Independence, the Founders specifically stated that all men are created equal. There were many reasons for the creation of the Declaration of Independence, but primary among them were that the colonists had not been receiving equal treatment, protection, or representation concerning the law and government.

Equal protection of the law is also mentioned in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the Fifth Amendment includes the right of equal protection even though it is not specifically stated. In practice, the U.S. Supreme Court has applied the Fourteenth Amendment and equal protection against the states, while the Fifth Amendment and equal protection has been applied against the federal government.

Many people think of equal protection as meaning that all laws should be enforced identically against all people. Although this appears to be the literal meaning of the phrase, the interpretation and application of the right of equal protection is not so broadly construed, and there are a number of exceptions. Generally speaking, equal protection applies in two situations: when a government act interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right relative to a class of people or when a government classification or category affects the rights of certain classes of people, usually a minority.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DEFINED

Fundamental right has several meanings, but the U.S. Supreme Court has presented three basic definitions. The first considers whether the right in question is a natural right under the principles of natural law, such as the right of self-defense, as espoused by Sir William Blackstone, a famous English legal commentator, in his *Commentaries on the Laws of England.* The second considers whether the right in question is fundamental to American justice and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, as recognized in *Duncan v. Louisiana.* The third considers whether the right is implied in the penumbra of

the Bill of Rights, such as the right to privacy, as recognized in *Griswald v. Connecticut*. The second meaning has been the most frequently cited by the American courts. As a practical matter, what is a fundamental right in America consists of the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as presented in the Bill of Rights, with some exceptions under the Doctrine of Selective Incorporation.

UNACCEPTABLE CLASSIFICATIONS OF MINORITIES

Under the second aspect, equal protection does not prohibit the government from classifying or categorizing people. Rather, it prohibits classification or categorization of people from three perspectives. The first level of classifications or categorizations subject to equal protection analysis includes those that are considered the most suspect. The judicial examination of laws that employ race or nationality as a classification or category are judged under what is called "strict scrutiny." For example, it violates equal protection to classify or categorize a person according to race or nationality unless there is a compelling or overriding government interest at stake. A primary example of this type of prohibited classification and race is the doctrine of separate but equal, recognized in *Plessy v. Ferguson* and subsequently overruled in *Brown v. Board of Education*.

The second level of classifications or categories subject to equal protection analysis includes those that are questionable. The judicial examination of laws that employ gender or illegitimacy as a classification or category are judged under what is called "intermediate scrutiny." For example, it violates equal protection to classify or categorize a person according to gender or illegitimacy unless the classification has a substantial relationship to an important government interest. A primary example of the prohibited use of gender as a classification or category is *United States v. Virginia,* wherein the U.S. Supreme Court found that it violated equal protection to admit only men into the Virginia Military Institute, a previously all-male, state-operated military educational institution. A primary example of the prohibited use of illegitimacy as a classification or category is *Clark v. Jeter,* wherein the U.S. Supreme Court found that it violated equal protection to apply a statute of limitations concerning paternity actions by illegitimate children.

The third level of classification or categories subject to equal protection analysis includes those that are not generally prohibited by the Constitution. The judicial examination of laws that employ economic differences or social welfare legislation are judged under what is called "rational relationship." For example, there will be no violation of equal protection if the law in question has a rational relationship to any legitimate government interest.

In *Griffin v. Illinois,* the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that equal protection in American law is applicable in criminal prosecutions under the principle that all people must stand equal before the courts and receive a fair trial. However, American courts have widely recognized that selective prosecution does not raise a constitutional claim of violation of equal protection unless the difference in prosecution is based on an improper class or motive, such as race. Thus, some discretion in prosecution is permitted even though it appears to violate the strict application of equal protection of the law.

EQUAL PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

In the realm of international politics, equal protection and equal rights are frequently advanced principles. In the United Nations Charter (1945), equal protection is mentioned in a number of places as a goal for all people. In article 1, the charter advocates equal rights for all people, and in article 13, it advocates rights and freedoms for all without regard to race, religion, sex, or language. In article 55, the charter advocates equal rights for all people concerning economic and social conditions, which is much more expansive than the American notion of equal protection. However, for the most part, the United Nations Charter is considered a document of aspirational goals and not legal mandates.

In contrast, however, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976) expresses the principle that all people have equal rights and are equal before the law, and this covenant is considered binding as a treaty under international law. Although many nations, including the United States, have ratified it, the United States has imposed a number of restrictions on its ratification, so the covenant cannot be enforced in U.S. courts.

In summation, equal protection, in the political sense, means that all people are entitled to the same protection under the law. However, in application before courts of law, equal protection can and does mean something different and is dependent on the jurisdiction enforcing the law.

See also *Human Rights; International Bill of Rights; International Norms; Natural Rights.*

. . . . WM C. PLOUFFE JR.

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Equilibrium and Chaos

Equilibrium and *chaos* are terms that enhance our understanding of the dynamics of change in political systems and political phenomena. Historically, *equilibrium* refers to a balance, or

steady state, between competing forces that may minimize tendencies toward political conflict. Competing political parties or nation-states under conditions of equilibrium may reach a stalemate in which conflict is reduced, balance is maintained, and change is minimal. *Chaos* refers to conditions in which political order and stalemates have collapsed, leading to states of disorder in which rapid change with highly uncertain outcomes may occur.

With the advent and expansion of the quantitative analysis of political data in the last half of the twentieth century, *equilibrium* and *chaos* took on more refined and precise mathematical definitions. With the expansion and availability of large sets of data, describing numerous political phenomena, political scientists can now examine these data using sophisticated techniques such as time-series analysis. These techniques allow the analyst to explore how change occurs in political phenomena over time.

Historically, scientists assumed that our world is in a state of equilibrium or balance. This means that the relationship between variables, such as that between income and voting behavior, are stable, linear, and proportional. In the 1990s a growing number of political scientists, such as Courtney Brown, began to understand that these assumptions of balance, stability, and linearity among political phenomena may not be true. What became even more resonant for many political analysts was an appreciation for the nonlinear nature of many political phenomena. When relationships between variables are nonlinear, proportionality may not occur, and instead small changes may have large and highly uncertain effects. This recognition led to an interest in the study of chaotic phenomena.

Chaos describes the long-term behavior of a system in which its descriptive data are not predictable. This means that if chaotic data represent a political phenomenon, be it voting behavior, political attitudes, or superpower conflict, then that phenomenon is subject to unpredictable and surprising behavior. In short, in a truly chaotic phenomenon we cannot predict the next result because the previous result does not serve as a guide.

Studying the mathematics of chaos is very challenging, but studying chaotic dynamics does teach us an important lesson. The world of human affairs is highly nonlinear, unstable, and unpredictable. And if the world of human, and thus political, dynamics is subject to such uncertainty, then these realities may always place limits on our knowledge. Thus, the goal of a science of politics may be an illusion and an unattainable goal.

In many historical periods global political dynamics seem to be in a predictable state of equilibrium. In other periods the political world is dominated by chaos and disorder. It is the recognition, though, that we cannot predict when such chaos and disorder will occur that makes the study of politics such a fascinating, important, and at times daunting activity.

See also *Balance of Power; Quantitative Analysis; Time-series Analysis.*

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Error Correction Model

An error correction model or equilibrium correction model (ECM) is a dynamic statistical model. Statistical models can be applied to time-series data—chronological sequences of observations—to examine the movement of political variables over time (e.g., public opinion, government policy, judicial court decisions). This allows the analyst to estimate relationships between political variables and test hypotheses. A dynamic model includes past values of the variable of interest as an explanatory variable. This captures the simple concept that what happens today affects what happens tomorrow.

A common dynamic model is the autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model. In the ADL model, the variable of interest is a function of both past values of itself and current and past values of the independent variables. Any ADL model can be transformed linearly into an ECM without placing any restrictions on the parameters of the model. Other ECMs are equivalent to ADL models with restrictions placed on some parameters (e.g., setting a coefficient to zero). Simply put, the ECM contains exactly the same information as the ADL. The choice of using one over the other is purely a matter of convenience.

Within the context of political science, ECMs offer two advantages. The first is interpretation. ECMs model changes in the variable of interest as a function of the long-term equilibrium between the variable of interest and the independent variables in the absence of exogenous shocks, short-term movements due to exogenous shocks, and the rate at which the variable of interest returns to equilibrium (i.e., the rate of error correction). Explicitly separating the long-term equilibrium relationship from short-term movements is often appealing when fitting a model to theory.

The long-term equilibrium relationship component is the key to the second advantage of the ECM. Standard estimation techniques produce incorrect results if the time-series data violate an assumption called "stationarity." A common violation is integrated data. However, a linear combination of integrated time series may exhibit stationarity; this is referred to as cointegration. This stationary linear combination can be

interpreted as the long-term equilibrium relationship between the variables and incorporated in an ECM. This allows the relationship between integrated variables to be modeled.

Because of these advantages, the popularity of the ECM in political science has been on the rise since the early 1990s, particularly in political behavior and political economy. It also has been put to use in areas such as the study of judicial processes, conflict, and foreign policy. Most of these studies have justified the use of the ECM on the grounds of cointegrated data.

In the application of the ECM, there are two points to keep in mind. First, as the ECM is simply a reparameterization of the ADL model, any concerns about model specification that apply to the latter also apply to the former. These can include endogeneity issues, specifying the correct lag structure, and serially correlated errors. Second, there is more than one procedure for estimating an ECM. Estimation when using stationary data may require a different procedure than when using cointegrated data. The ECM allows certain relationships to be estimated using ordinary least squares, which would otherwise require more advanced procedures, but there are many ECMs that cannot be estimated using ordinary least squares.

See also *Quantitative Analysis; Statistical Analysis.*

. . . . MARK A. PICKUP

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Essentialism

Essentialism is a philosophical movement that asserts that objects have certain universal properties that are common (essential) to all members of that group. The concept, however, is associated not only with the identification of groups. Differing perspectives of essentialism are reflected by pragmatists, such as Richard Rorty, who reject the traditional foundationalist theory that knowledge is justified based on foundational beliefs. Ultimately, essentialism is a perspective of different forms of knowledge or understanding that exposes the world and individuals through their essential components, highlighting attributes that are essential to a particular world. These attributes are unchanging and necessary for inclusion in a certain group. Without that particular property, an object or individual cannot be part of the group. There may be other characteristics that can be acquired or lost, but these are not

essential and are classified as accidental. The object can lack accidental properties, but not essential ones. Contemporary essentialism has its roots in the work of early philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle. Essentialism was important in the development of classic humanism as early proponents of humanism believed that there were certain unchanging characteristics shared by all people. Essentialism was criticized by Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche, who argued that humanity did not have unchanging characteristics. Identity politics, including race and gender studies, is generally highly critical of essentialism because of its reductionism and tendency to define groups by biological traits—an approach that scholars such as Edward Said argue principally contributes to fundamental differences in socially constructed perspectives of groups and to a limited or culturally biased conception of what it means to be Oriental or Arabic. Critics instead argue that there is a difference between social attributes and biological characteristics and that groups do not have fixed characteristics or biological determinism.

See also *Aristotle; Group Cohesion; Plato.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Estates

The estates were the classifications of the divisions of society that emerged in Europe during the Middle Ages. While there was variation from country to country, in general the estates were the aristocracy (the first estate), the clergy (the second estate), and the commoners (the third estate). In some countries, including France and Scotland, the clergy were considered to be the first estate, and the nobility, the second. There were often subgroups within each of the estates. For instance, the clergy was typically divided between the higher ranks, such as bishops or cardinals, and common priests or monks. Commoners were frequently divided between the small middle or business class (collectively known as the bourgeoisie or the burghers) and the peasants. In Sweden, there were four estates: the nobility, the clergy, the burghers, and the landowners. Serfs and urban dwellers who did not own land or were not free men were not considered part of any of the estates. Early parliaments comprised representatives of the estates, including the French Estates-General and the Scottish Three Estates. These bodies had elected representatives who were summoned periodically to advise the monarch or to approve taxes or levies.

See also *Press Fourth Estate.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Ethics, Political

"The Prince," Niccolò Machiavelli (1532) famously wrote, "must learn how not to be good," by which he meant, to act in a manner deemed unethical according to the ethical standards of his time. Cynics might claim that this is hardly

something politicians need to learn. Machiavelli is certainly not alone in proposing that politics and ethics do not mix or, at any rate, do not mix well. If political ethics is to be anything other than an oxymoron or a pious wish, then it is necessary to examine critically such an assumption. We can distinguish at least three categories of reasons (there are doubtless many others) underlying the assumption that ethics and politics inevitably part company: The first concerns the prevalence of political corruption in one form or another, self-seeking behavior by public officials that runs contrary to the obligations of their office; the second is the demands of representation; and the third, the demands of governance. The last category is commonly discussed as "the problem" (or "dilemma") of political dirty hands.

Political ethics will be defined, for the purposes of this article, as the principles or criteria by which to judge the morality of the politically relevant actions of political agents (the terms *moral* and *ethical, morality* and *ethics,* will be used interchangeably). In a modern democratic society, political agents range from citizens to elected officials to cabinet appointees to government bureaucrats to lobbyists. The paradigmatic political agent in a modern representative democracy, the focus of most discussions of political ethics, is the politician, the individual who runs for, and is elected to, public office. Hence, my focus will be on the politician, although some of what is said here could clearly apply to all political agents. To focus on the politician as the subject of political ethics provides a useful analogy with other principles of what is termed "role ethics," in particular, professional ethics. Political ethics concerns the principles by which to determine the morality of an officeholder's (or office seeker's) politically relevant actions, just as, for example, lawyers' ethics provides principles by which to judge the morality of lawyers' actions as they relate to their role as members of the legal profession.

Every practice, occupation, or profession is oriented toward the provision of some good: these are the ends of the occupation. In a representative democracy, political offices exist to realize not the good of the officeholder—"the power and glory of princes"—but rather the public good. That this is the end of public office in a representative democracy is reinforced by the fact that this is the reason officeholders are elected in the first place, that is, not for their personal enrichment but to serve the public. Election to office creates a fiduciary duty: the officeholder—the fiduciary—is elected to act on behalf of the public who elects him or her. Hence, it is the role-specific duty of officeholders to work to realize the public good, and the sine qua non of an ethical politician is that he or she will use his or her office for the realization of this good. In a modern, pluralist, democratic society with multiple political parties, it can be assumed that there will exist disagreement as to both what constitutes the public good and the means by which that good can best be advanced. In addition, officeholders may have obligations to different publics—as a member of Congress has obligations to his or her constituents and to the American people as a whole—as well as a range of more specific obligations, which may and commonly do conflict.

SELF-INTEREST VERSUS PUBLIC INTEREST

To talk of the public interest sets up an obvious contrast with the private interest of the officeholder. Few expect public officials to be motivated in all they do, including running for office, solely by the public interest, and whether construed as a desire to wield power and influence or a desire for public recognition, the absence of such motivations cannot be the hallmark of a reasonable political ethics. But this recognition of the mixed motives of most officeholders should be distinguished from the view according to which self-interest is construed as the only possible motivation of political actors, a view not uncommon among students of political behavior. For example, David Mayhew (1974), construing the desire for reelection as a form of self-interest, works with a vision of Congress members as "single-minded seekers of reelection," justified in part on the assumption that "politics is best studied as a struggle among men to gain and maintain power and the consequences of that struggle." Similarly, Anthony Downs (1957) postulates that politicians are motivated solely by the desire "to attain the income, prestige, and power which come from being in office," never seeking office as a way to carry out particular policies but rather as a means to the attainment of private ends, which they can attain only by being elected.

If the function of a legislature is to generate socially beneficial laws, then, in a process analogous to Adam Smith's invisible hand, good laws—laws that advance the public interest—can be seen as the consequence of a self-interested competition for power and office, "in the same sense that economic production is incidental to the making of profits." The problem with this formulation—besides its crudely reductionist view of motivation—is that it ignores the fact that the self-interest of politicians, including their interest in being reelected, can conflict in significant ways with the public good, including the good of the democratic process itself. It is for this very reason that a good deal of political ethics is concerned with so-called conflicts of interest.

Conflicts of interest are especially prominent in politics because politicians are often in the position to advance policies from which they themselves—or their friends or associates—stand to benefit in a self-interested manner, most commonly, although not exclusively, financially. The problem posed by a conflict of interest is that the existence of such a conflict is assumed to interfere with or distort a politician's discharging his or her fiduciary obligations, that is, advancing the public good. Specifically, it interferes with the objectivity or impartiality of his or her judgment. If a politician takes a bribe or receives kickbacks from a company seeking a governmental contract or if he or she holds (or will hold after leaving office) a large financial interest in that company, then the assumption is that his or her support for this particular company is motivated not by his or her impartial and objective evaluation that this is the best company to do the job (i.e., serve the public interest), but rather by self-interest (or the interest of friends or family).

Much that is legal in politics—for example, members of Congress advocating for legislation of dubitable public good

but from which they themselves, or their families or friends, stand to reap considerable financial rewards or hiding special earmarks in funding bills to provide benefits for special interests from which they have received considerable campaign contributions—is simply institutionalized conflict of interest. Unethical practices such as these cannot be justified on the basis of the ends of the institution—serving the public good—since most commonly they subvert that interest.

THE DEMANDS OF REPRESENTATION

To make any sense of the claim that the ethical politician will view the primary obligation of political office as the advancement of the public good, we must say something more about what we mean by *public good* (or in more familiar parlance, *public interest*) and what we mean by *advancement*. Should the ethical politician view the public interest as equivalent to the actual existing preferences of those he or she represents and advancement as the fulfillment of those preferences? Note that in posing this question, we have drawn a distinction between interests on one hand and preferences on the other. Some may find such a distinction objectionable, although it seems obvious that people can have preferences that it is not in their best interest to have satisfied.

The answer to this question goes to the heart of the nature of representation. In attempting to answer this question, most political scientists rely on an influential distinction first set forth by Edmond Burke. According to the delegate model of representation, the ethical representative should act simply as the mouthpiece of his or her constituents, attempting through the political process to satisfy their preferences without letting his or her own views as to the merits of those preferences intervene. According to the trustee model of representation, the ethical representative must exercise a sufficient degree of autonomous judgment to enable him or her to act on behalf of the public interest of those he or she represents, even if this means going against the immediate preferences of his or her constituents. Burke (1999) was unambiguous in his support of the trustee model: "your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion." Against the delegate view, it has often been noted that it may not be clear what a constituency, or even a majority, wants. Most of the individuals who constitute it either do not know enough or do not care enough (or both) about the issues on which their representative must vote to have clear opinions of their own, and even when their opinions are formed, it is unlikely that there will be a majority. Furthermore, perhaps what they want is incoherent, self-destructive, unjust, or shortsighted.

One of the more interesting uses of the trustee model has been to defend seemingly unethical conduct on the part of the ethical politician (i.e., the politician committed to advancing the public interest), specifically lying to his or her constituents to get elected. Carol Stokes, for example, has argued that it may be proper for politicians who want nothing more than to promote the welfare of their constituents to lie in campaigns and then switch upon being elected to unpopular opinions. Sisella Bok (1978) presents an example of this, although it is intended as a counterexample: a big-city mayor running for reelection has read a report recommending the removal of rent control, something he intends to do because he believes it is in the public interest, believing that if he makes his intention known, he will lose the election. At a news conference prior to the election, he denies, when asked, any awareness of the report and affirms his commitment to rent control. He believes that his election is very much in the public interest, as is the rent control policy he intends to pursue, and he may also believe that after the election he will be able to persuade voters of the merits of this policy. This final point is important, for the ability of a representative to engage in one or another form of rational persuasion to change the preferences of his or her constituents is seen as a way of preventing the trustee model from ultimately subverting representation altogether by allowing the representative to completely ignore the wishes of those he or she represents or ultimately act against their interests.

As Bok (1978) notes, "In all similar situations, the sizeable bias resulting from the self-serving element (the desire to be reelected, to stay in office, to exercise power) is often clearer to onlookers than to the liars themselves." Such bias inflates one's estimation of the justifications for the lie, the altruism of the liar, and the rightness of the cause. More important, lying of this sort precludes informed voting on the part of citizens and undermines citizens' trust in the integrity of the political process. Stokes too is aware of this difficulty: ultimately, voters cannot make good choices unless they are informed, and politicians who mislead them about their choices may perpetuate misperceptions.

Yet we may still be left with a nagging doubt: could a politician who eschewed all falsehoods in elections ever get elected when even honest Abe Lincoln voiced contradictory opinions about the issue of white superiority depending on whether he was north or south of the Mason-Dixon Line?

THE DEMANDS OF POLITICAL OFFICE

In a seminal essay, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," Michael Walzer (1973) argues that the demands of office are such that occasions will arise in which the ethical political leader must engage in immoral acts to advance the public good. As an example, Walzer presents a variation of the ticking time bomb scenario: a political leader orders the torture of a captured rebel leader (nowadays he would be a terrorist) to discover the location of a number of bombs hidden around a city and set to go off in twenty-four hours. The political leader believes that torture is wrong—in fact, abominable—yet he orders it to save civilian lives. In Walzer's intentionally paradoxical formulation, he has done wrong to do right. The ethical politician will not believe that preventing the deaths of potentially thousands of citizens somehow excuses the moral wrong he committed by licensing torture: he will experience appropriate moral guilt because he has dirtied his hands, albeit for a good end. Were the ethical politician unwilling to dirty his hands, he would not be a ethical *politician,* that is, he would be unable to meet the demand of political office; if he felt no moral guilt at dirtying his hands,

he would not be an *ethical* politician, even though he acted to defend the public interest.

The conflict Walzer presents is not so much a conflict between morality and immorality (or amorality) as between two competing ethical approaches, which are commonly termed "deontological" and "utilitarian." A deontological moral code tells us that certain means are intrinsically wrong, absolutely forbidden, and cannot be undertaken even for the sake of good ends. Utilitarianism tells us, essentially, that sufficiently good ends may justify means that violate deontological prohibitions. Hence, in approving the torture of a prisoner, the political leader violates a deontological prohibition against torture on the utilitarian grounds that torture is justified to save thousands of lives (although there can be equally strong utilitarian arguments made against the use of torture). Were he a thoroughgoing utilitarian, he would be assured that he did the morally right thing and have no reason to feel moral guilt. Were he a thoroughgoing deontologist, he would not have permitted the use of torture in the first place. Hence, the morally right consequentialist outcome does not excuse or erase the deontological wrong.

Many have argued that the proper political ethic should (at times, at any rate) be unapologetically utilitarian (in contrast to Walzer, who might be termed a "guilty utilitarian"). For better or worse, however, utilitarian reasoning is often used to justify political acts that most people, as a matter of everyday morality, would consider immoral, for example, political deceit and manipulation, torture, and the intentional targeting of civilian populations in war. The natural consequence of this focus is that debates concerning the utilitarian prerogative of political action often suffer from the assumption, implicit or explicit, that utilitarianism is not a moral point of view at all, even by those who make utilitarian arguments: utilitarianism is called "political expediency" by those who oppose utilitarian reasoning and "political necessity" by those who support it. And to the defenders of political necessity, deontologists who are unwilling to get their hands dirty are simply more concerned about upholding their own moral purity than protecting their fellow citizens.

Such assertions are merely confusion because one could be a utilitarian moral purist just as much as a deontological moral purist. A politician who was a utilitarian moral purist might well frighten us, for he or she could, in principle, decide that intentionally targeting a civilian population in war was the best way to preserve national security and, being a thoroughgoing utilitarian, have no reason to feel guilty about his or her actions (although there are also good utilitarian justifications as to why this would be the wrong thing to do). Yet a politician who was a deontological (specifically, Kantian) moral purist would be equally frightening, for example, someone who would not tell a lie even if the result would place the lives of thousands of his or her citizens in danger.

This said, is it true that an ethical political leader must engage in acts that most people, most of the time, would deem immoral for the sake of defending or promoting the public good? It is worth pointing out that if the validity of this proposition rests on as contrived a hypothetical as the ticking time bomb scenario, which David Luban (2005, 1425) has rightly called an "intellectual fraud," then it seems doubtful. Perhaps more important, Walzer's ethical politician is a figure of such rarity that if moral governance depends on such people, then it is likely that moral governance can never be achieved (which is certainly a possibility). Those political leaders who condone torture, for example, in violation of domestic and international law, are precisely those who are least likely to feel any guilt about their actions, least likely to publicly disclose them, and above all, least likely to seek to be held in any way accountable (but rather to take all means to avoid accountability). And they are also least likely to employ the powers they have abrogated to themselves wisely or with restraint.

See also *Bioethics and Politics; Corruption and Other Political Pathologies; Corruption, Political; Disinformation; Human Rights; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Natural Law; Natural Rights; Public Good; Religion and Politics; Torture.*

. . . .   EVAN CHARNEY

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Ethnic Cleansing

Ethnic cleansing is the intentional act of removing by force or threat of force any national, ethnic, religious, racial, or socio-economically homogeneous group from a specified area of land, usually within the borders of a sovereign state, up to

and including genocide. While it can be said that all genocide is ethnic cleansing, not all ethnic cleansings are genocide. Although *ethnic cleansing* may encompass genocide, the term does not mean that the target group is specifically designated for total extermination; rather, the group is targeted for removal from a specific geographical location or expulsion from a population. The target group may be subjected to rape, murder, arson, and torture, among other acts of violence.

Some examples of ethnic cleansing are the Americans' treatment of Native Americans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Turkish genocide of Armenians in 1915, the Nazi Holocaust of Jews and Gypsies during World War II (1939–1945), the Balkans conflicts of the 1990s (Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, and Kosovo), and the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan. The media often portray acts of violence against specific groups of people as ethnic cleansing to add effect to news stories. This downplays the significance and seriousness of true ethnic cleansing.

See also *Armenian Genocide; Genocide; Holocaust; Torture.*

. . . .   JACOB F. ENGLISH

Ethnic Parties

The main object of an ethnic party is to serve the interests of a specific ethnic group; however, the party may not represent all members or every preference. The party may be made up entirely of members of the group, or it may include other individuals who have won the trust of the ethnic group.

Whether ethnic parties emerge, the number of parties that emerge, their relative strength, and their interactions are largely determined by the strength and cohesion of the ethnic groups in a state. Strong ethnic loyalty can create intensely loyal party members, and divisions between ethnic groups may be formalized in ethnic party platforms.

GENESIS OF ETHNIC PARTIES
Environmental conditions help determine the issues on which ethnic parties focus. These issues and political framing heavily influence ethnic party members. States in which the government distributes public goods disproportionately among ethnic groups may encourage discontent in disadvantaged groups. Furthermore, economic cleavages among ethnic groups, political exclusion, and other social divisions can help establish preconditions for political opportunists to create ethnic parties. When, where, and how ethnic groups mobilize is contingent on political elites' harnessing such popular discontent and environmental preconditions. Political elites can focus the attention of ethnic groups on the differences between ethnic groups and thereby galvanize support for the party.

Ethnic parties outside of Europe have historically emerged at independence/postcolonization to compete for scarce resources or before independence to contest a colonial government. Ethnic groups often formed parties to contest a colonial administration's social and economic policies as well

as to rid a territory of a colonial power. Prior to independence, such political parties often had wide support but few active members. After states won their independence, victorious political parties controlled the government. This sparked debate among other ethnic groups that then sought a stake in the government by developing their own ethnic parties. In many newly independent states, established and dominant politicized ethnic groups helped spur other ethnic groups to politicize and contest for state resources and political space.

Ethnic parties may also be born of internal impulses. An ethnic party may embrace ethnic demands to serve the interest of its constituents. Such a party is identified with the particular concerns of the ethnic group that supports it and may polarize around a narrow set of issues. These parties appeal to ethnic group members by evoking an ethnic identity and represent a broad set of interests under a singular identity. This identity serves as an information tool: in ethnically politicized systems, individuals may not know any more about candidates than their ethnicity. By virtue of a shared ethnicity, constituents may vote for candidates with the assumption that they would better represent and defend constituent interests. Ethnic groups often vote on the basis of this ethnic identity and do not pursue other information about candidates.

CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY ETHNIC PARTIES
However, ethnic parties make conciliation among groups difficult. Especially in states with scarce resources, ethnic party elites frequently frame public goods as a zero-sum payoff. In an effort to activate the support of an ethnic group, mobilizers and elites use kinship ties, shared history, or other cultural attributes that may be particular to a specific ethnicity. Indeed, ethnic groups are by nature exclusive: there are definite ethnic insiders and outsiders. Ethnic parties allow for the stronger promotion of narrow group claims, and these claims may have absolute winners and losers. In a government defined by ethnic parties, political cleavages may enforce existing cultural cleavages in society and serve as destabilizing institutions, for example, by encouraging differences through an unwillingness to negotiate and compromise rather than encouraging unity that would produce legislation that would benefit the entire population.

The tendency to organize parties along ethnic lines is strong in deeply divided societies, particularly those in which several major ethnic groups are represented at the national level. Once one party organizes along ethnic lines, other ethnic groups are likely to mobilize. Ethnic elites may realize the potential payoffs from group organization and may be threatened by rival ethnic group mobilization. However, ethnic party systems can emerge contrary to party leaders' efforts. Party leaders, working for electoral victories, make compromises with different social groups to win a majority or votes for seats. Opportunistic political elites may take advantage of inherent weaknesses in ethnically diverse parties. Within a party, different elites may seize the opportunity to gain power by mobilizing ethnic identities and jockey for position within the party. The ethnically

diverse party may then fracture as other party leaders emulate a successful subparty split, resulting in the creation of multiple monoethnic parties from a system once characterized by multiethnic parties.

Scholars debate whether ethnic parties within a political system can cooperate, share public goods equally, and act in the interest of the general population. It may be difficult for an ethnic party to pursue policies that benefit people outside the group. Even if political leaders try to diversify the party's interest, members of the ruling ethnic group may only see state resources going to an ethnic rival. Ethnic group members may obstruct conciliatory political measures.

CONCLUSION

The adverse effects of ethnic parties can be ameliorated by individuals, parties, and institutions. Individuals and parties build interethnic alliances to win elections and pursue policy changes. A larger ethnic group may ensure a victory by adding voters from smaller ethnic groups, whereas ethnic groups of similar size may ally to challenge a larger ethnic group instead of entering political battles and maintaining their permanent losing status. Institutions can facilitate interethnic allegiances by requiring parties to win elections from multiple electoral districts. Also, some political systems have forms of affirmative action policies guaranteeing an ethnic group some minimum level of state participation.

See also *Consociational Democracy; Emerging Democracies, Political Parties in; Ethnocentrism; Fringe Parties; Nationalism; Nationalist Parties; Nationality; White Supremacy.*

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Ethnocentrism

Ethnocentrism is the inability to understand other countries except through the lens of one's own country's culture, customs, values, and institutions. Ethnocentrism plagues all peoples and countries, but its consequences are particularly important for a global power such as the United States. Americans tend to view the rest of the world from the presumption that U.S. institutions and practices are superior. Ethnocentrism pervades all aspects of American life, including scholarly works in the field of comparative politics as well as U.S. foreign policies and practices.

Ethnocentrism dominated the works of the earliest scholars in comparative politics, such as Karl Loewenstein, Carl Friedrich, and Hannah Arendt. These scholars analyzed other countries from a Western-centric position, focusing their study on comparative constitutions, comparative legal systems, and various institutions of government such as the Parliament, the executive, and judicial institutions. The logic was that if countries imitated the United States or Western Europe, they would improve. However, others, such as Roy Macridis, contended their approach was not genuinely applicable to non-Western and developing countries, which had their own ways of doing things. Although his critique spurred subsequent scholars to pursue a systematic comparative approach, their work continued to be plagued with ethnocentrism.

David Easton, for example, attempted to establish a general, unbiased, presumably universal theory through integrating different aspects of political life as a system. His analysis, however, included inputs (e.g., culture, history, interest groups) and outputs (e.g., government decisions or policies) that sounded hauntingly similar to the functions of the Western system. Gabriel Almond applied Easton's schematic and attempted to identify common functions that all political systems performed, but he still used a Western-centric approach to analyze non-Western countries.

Exogenous factors, for instance, the decline of colonialism and the resulting independence of many former colonies of the British Empire, presented the opportunity to shift farther away from the legalistic-formalistic approach and toward a less ethnocentric analysis of world politics, but the new field of political development continued to be grounded in ethnocentrism in practice.

Economists Karl Polanyi, W. W. Rostow, and Alexander Gerschenkron asserted that economic growth drove social and political development or democratization, but their approach remained as ethnocentric as the legalistic-formalistic approach because it featured a universal model of a linear trajectory resulting in a democratic-capitalistic society. In fact, their theoretical progression has failed to manifest in the new developing nations; economic and social change seem uncorrelated.

Ethnocentrism also affected sociologists such as Talcott Parsons, who advanced a set of presumably universally valid categories (e.g., affective vs. affective neutrality; ascriptive vs. merit; particularism vs. universalism) for comparing "modern" and "traditional" societies. Yet his pattern variables dichotomized traditional and modern systems, creating an absoluteness about development, and it wreaked havoc on the developing nations as it sometimes undermined the very institutions (e.g., family, religion, tribe, the caste, and the clan) that gave coherence and stability to the developing nations. Other sociologists, including Daniel Lerner, Seymour Lipset, and Karl Deutsch, developed their own theses of modernization and democratization that made Western political and economic institutions the inevitable conclusion of a unilinear development model. The economists and sociologists had a heavy influence on political scientists, including Easton and Almond. Some scholars, such as Lucian Pye, acknowledged a diversity of definitions generally associated

with change; however, Pye's work still reveals his biases toward Western democracy.

Some scholars, notably Samuel Huntington, challenged ethnocentrism, and a few constructed indigenous models of development. These challenges, however, failed to affect the field significantly. They also failed to affect American foreign policies, which have been deeply shaped by the unilinear development model. For instance, American foreign aid to promote democracy, capitalism, and civil society failed to consider indigenous conditions and imposed a U.S. model of development on emerging nations. Recently, however, a trend is emerging in the United States to counter ethnocentrism. Universities are promoting multiculturalism through the introduction of new courses in non-Western languages and area studies, there is a greater emphasis on understanding other religions such as Islam, and there are efforts to teach students about other cultures.

Nonetheless, American foreign policies and practices, particularly democracy programs, foreign aid programs, and belief in free markets, remain ethnocentric because they are based on the American model of development. Even today Americans fail to grasp that the sequences, stages, and processes of development that the West experienced cannot be repeated in today's developing nations (e.g., Afghanistan and Iraq).

See also *Ethnic Cleansing; Ethnic Parties; Identity, Politics of; Multiculturalism; White Supremacy.*

. . . . HOWARD J. WIARDA AND J. M. NORTON

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Europe, Democracy in

Democracy in Europe is a contested concept. It divides those who argue that the European Union (EU) has a democratic deficit from those who argue the contrary and divides those who would remedy the deficit through greater politicization from those who would not. Underpinning these divisions are different understandings of what democracy in the EU is or should be and how much it can be improved.

POLITICS OF THE EU

The EU's democratic institutions have much in common with national federal systems. They are characterized by a horizontal separation of powers, making for checks and balances among EU-level authorities, and a vertical division of powers between the EU and its member states, making for multilevel governance. However, unlike in federal systems, the national-level periphery has more power than the EU-level center, given member-state control of legislation. Legislation is approved by member-state executives in the Council of Ministers and by member-state representatives in

the European Parliament (EP) and implemented by national bureaucracies. However, the council and parliament are weak because of the EU Commission's role in legislative initiative and enforcement. Finally, while only the European Court of Justice has the power typical of supreme judicial courts in a federal system, it is arguably more independent, given EU rules that make it very difficult for council member states to overturn European Court of Justice judgments.

While EU institutions bear some resemblance to national ones, EU politics does not. The EU lacks a directly elected president or parliament-elected prime minister, a strong legislature, and vigorous political parties in a regionwide competitive, partisan electoral system. Instead, it has indirect representation by nationally elected executives in the Council of Ministers and the European Council, which is headed by a six-month rotating president. However, once the Lisbon Treaty went into effect, although the rotating presidency continued, the council president was appointed by the council to serve a two-and-a-half-year term that is renewable once, and a high representative was appointed as the equivalent of a foreign minister. Only the EP provides for direct representation; however, it is much weaker than any parliamentary democracy. It has no say over the appointment of the council president and has approval powers only over the appointment of the commission president. Its elections, which are organized within rather than across member states, are also second order, given the greater focus on national rather than European issues.

Most important, EU politics is not really politics in any traditional sense of party and partisanship because it is mainly about interests, whether the national interests projected by the member states in the council, the public interests defended by national representatives in the EP, or the organized interests mediated by the commission as well as, increasingly, by the EP. Partisan politics is marginalized in this pluralist, interest-based system for a variety of reasons. Political parties at the European level are weak and not very cohesive, although this has been changing in recent years. The commission's consensus-oriented, technical approach to policy initiation and development avoids left-right divides. And issues voted by the EP in codecision procedures with the council are decided mostly by supermajorities in the EP. The result is that policy making at the EU level can be characterized as policy without politics. This, in turn, leads to politics without policy at the national level as more policies are moved to the EU level even as politics continues primarily at the national level. This leaves an impoverished national political arena in which citizens feel increasingly disenfranchised because, as voters, they have voice over questions that do not count at the level at which they voice them. Nevertheless, the EU remains a sleeping giant for the moment with regard to EU-generated splits in national party politics despite the fact that some of these problems have been apparent during treaty referenda. These referenda have increasingly mobilized dissatisfied constituencies on the right and left, which helps explain the French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty and the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty.

THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EU

As a result of this wide range of political issues, the majority of EU scholars argue that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit. Only a few scholars defend the EU as already democratic enough. Majone (1998) argues that as a "regulatory state," the EU's legitimacy is based on the delegated responsibility of its "expertocracy." Moravcsik (2002) adds that the EU is no worse than other democracies, with legitimacy ensured through its checks and balances and delegated authorities. The problem with this emphasis on "output" democracy through governing effectiveness, as Scharpf's (1999) arguments suggest, is that it fails to deal with the "input" democracy expectations of citizens through representative democracy. Schmidt (2006) takes this point further by showing that unlike nation-states' mature democracies that have a full range of democratic legitimizing mechanisms, the EU has a fragmented democracy, split between "output" governing effectiveness for the people and interest consultation with the people at the EU level and "input" political participation by the people and citizen representation of the people at the national level.

Many scholars see the main solution to the EU's democratic deficit in the development of EU-level institutions that are more participatory and representative, but some argue they also need to be more redistributive. The EU itself has sought to increase its transparency and accountability and to do more to bring civil society into the policy-making process. The EU's ill-fated initiative on a constitutional treaty during the constitutional convention has been generally hailed as one of the first instances of deliberative democracy in the EU.

Some scholars argue that the EU needs to be politicized further to solve the democratic deficit, for example, by having the EP elect the commission president, hold EU-wide elections on the same day, and schedule transnational policy forums on issues of general concern. Others worry that it is too soon for any such politicization given the lack of a collective will in the EU or of a European public sphere. However, the main concern is that politicizing EU institutions will undermine the EU's ability to deliver policies efficiently and effectively. The problem is threefold: how does one maintain the effectiveness of the EU's output democracy for the people if one increases input democracy by and of the people at the EU level, since this would politicize decisions that were efficiently dealt with as technocratic in the past? By the same token, if one does not increase the input side through politicization, how does one respond to citizens' dissatisfaction with the lack of political debate about contested policy decisions? Yet if one does increase input democracy at the EU level, can one do this without undermining it at the national level? Any recommendations for the politicization of the EU have to face up to these questions and to the real limits to EU democratization today.

See also *Europeanization; European Parliament; European Political Thought; European Politics and Society; European Union (EU); New Europe.*

. . . . VIVIEN A. SCHMIDT

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Europeanization

The theoretical approach to Europeanization defines it as the outcome of a long historical process in which western European culture and civilization have influenced the rest of Europe. Besides cultural traditions and a capitalist way of life, such values as democracy, solidarity, liberty, and tolerance are promoted. As Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde (2000) argue, the result of being "Europeanized" is the development of democratic values by implementing democratic human rights regimes and open political systems.

The pragmatic interpretation of the term *Europeanization* emphasizes the policies and institutions of the European Union (EU), their influences on member states and candidate countries, and the impact of the national systems on the political and administrative structure of the EU. In this narrowed context, Europeanization can be used interchangeably with the notion of European integration process. However, two other points of view contribute to an exhaustive picture of the conceptual reality of the term: the top-down and the bottom-up perspectives.

THE TOP-DOWN APPROACH

The concept of Europeanization frequently refers to allocation of EU regulations and institutional structures to the domestic level. First, the developments and changes in the domestic systems of the EU member states—much more visible in the recently accepted member states (those that joined between 2004 and 2007)—suggest that the EU has enormous

political and institutional influence. Moreover, the top-down perspective reflects the reality that the political actors from the EU level are the individuals promoting the values of Europeanization, whereas national political actors are less involved in the process.

Claudio Radaelli (2000) sketches an even more pragmatic definition: Europeanization is a process through which the political, economic, and social dimensions of the EU become "incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies." Hence, the overarching European structure determines obvious changes in national systems.

Second, this "downloaded" Europeanization implies a whole new procedure of regulation through which European institutions—especially the legislative and executive bodies—gradually transpose different areas of policy making from the national level to the supranational dimension. Consequently, new secondary legislation (i.e., directives, regulations, decisions) agreed on by the member states must be implemented by subnational and national governments alongside domestic laws or even modifying the latter as necessary.

Third, the top-down dimension can also be explained by the shaping of domestic institutional structures. On one hand, the EU brings about the creation of new agencies and new types of cooperation; on the other hand, it affects administrative reform, public procurement, regional development, and budgetary procedures within the domestic sphere.

Thus, the EU affects the relationship between legislative and executive bodies by widening the scope of technocrats and executive leadership, especially due to their role in the economic and monetary union, and limiting the functions of traditional parliaments. In addition, during the accession process, the main actors in the negotiations with the EU are the national elites of the candidate countries, that is, the chief negotiators and their teams, some ministers, and key officials of the central civil service. Furthermore, when EU membership becomes the primary foreign policy goal, governments allocate to this purpose considerable human resources, especially from the central administration, personnel who are well trained and in possession of technical expertise. Once accepted into the EU, these administrative elites continue to have a primary role in the process of European funds absorption. In this context, it can be asserted that European integration creates new technical elites within central and regional governments.

EUROPEANIZATION AND REGIONALIZATION

In line with the idea of the top-down approach, the phenomenon of Europeanization cannot be analyzed without at least mentioning the concept of regionalization. From a broad point of view, these two concepts can be perceived as contradictory: the EU is a complex extranational network of member and candidate countries, institutions, and political actors, whereas regionalization strengthens the idea of regions as actors, underlining the importance of being as close as possible to citizens and their concerns. However, Europeanization involves regional development and greater decentralization, especially in former communist countries in which everything was strongly centralized for decades. The accession process provides new incentives for creating regional administrative institutions, and membership status offers the possibility of acquiring specific structural funds aimed at reducing or eliminating differences between European regions.

THE BOTTOM-UP PERSPECTIVE

The response of national actors, such as national institutions, citizens, mass media, and civil society, to EU regulations, directives, recommendations, and general policy guidelines influences the supranational dimension created by the European Parliament, the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the Council of Ministers, among others. Accordingly, the EU member states, especially their citizens and domestic policies, exert a strong influence on the European institutional framework by transforming them continuously.

Tanja Börzel (2003) underlines the role of member states and their governments, which are the main agents driving European integration and policy making with the goal of protecting their geopolitical interests and the economic concerns of their constituencies. In addition, as Svien Andersen and Kjell Eliassen (1993) maintain, power is shared de facto between the EU and national governments, or as Thomas Lawton (1999) concludes, there is a visible de jure transfer of sovereignty from the domestic arena to the European structure. Andrew Moravcsik (1999) and Adrienne Heritier (1999) call this national impetus the "bottom-up" viewpoint of Europeanization or even the "uploading" process of Europeanization.

See also *Europe, Democracy in; European Parliament; European Politics and Society; European Union (EU); Human Rights; Old Europe.*

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European Parliament

The European Parliament, a 785-member body, is the only European Union (EU) institution that is directly elected by the voters of the EU's twenty-seven member nations. The European Parliament, along with the Council of the European Union, constitutes the legislative branch of the EU. The parliament meets in Strasbourg, France (the official seat of the parliament) and in Brussels, Belgium. The secretariat of the parliament, the parliament's administrative arm, is headquartered in Luxembourg.

Since 1979, members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have been elected for five-year terms. The legislative jurisdiction of the parliament includes environmental protection, consumer rights, equal opportunities, transportation, and the free movement of workers, capital, services, and goods. However, this jurisdiction is limited in that issues must be referred to the European Commission, the EU's executive branch, which must draft legislation for the parliament to consider.

The European Parliament is presided over by a president, who is elected by the MEPs for a two-and-one-half-year term (one-half of the parliament's term) and can be reelected. Election is by secret ballot, with the candidate receiving an absolute majority (393 votes) being elected. If after three ballots no candidate receives an absolute majority, a president will be elected by simple majority (those present and voting) on the fourth ballot. In addition to chairing the body's plenary sessions, the president represents the European Parliament in its dealings with other EU institutions.

HISTORY

The European Parliament dates back to September 10, 1952, when the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community met for the first time. This was a seventy-eight-member body drawn from the national parliaments of the member nations. Initially, the body had no legislative powers. With the Treaty of Rome (1958), the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community were established, and the Common Assembly was renamed the European Parliamentary Assembly and became the consultative body for all three communities. In 1962, the body took its current name, the European Parliament. In 1970, the parliament was given authority over some parts of the European Community's budget, with power over the entire budget being granted to the body in 1975.

In 1979, the first elections were held for MEPs. The body elected Simone Veil, a French MEP, as the first female president of the European Parliament; she served until 1982.

It was not until 1992 that the seat of the parliament was firmly established. While the parliament had been headquartered in Strasbourg, in 1985 a second chamber was built in Brussels, and some of the parliament's work was moved there, notwithstanding protests from member states. Under the agreement reached by the European Council, the European Parliament meets twelve times a year in Strasbourg, its official home, with all other parliamentary activity taking place

in Brussels. This arrangement was reaffirmed in 1997 by the Treaty of Amsterdam.

The European Parliament has been more assertive in recent years. In 1999 the parliament forced Jacques Santer, the president of the European Commission, and his entire cabinet of European commissioners to resign over allegations of mismanagement and corruption. In 2004, the parliament rejected the nomination of Rocco Buttiglione, the Italian Christian Democrat, as commissioner of justice, freedom and security because of his opposition to homosexuality. This was the first time that the parliament had ever rejected a proposed commissioner.

POWERS

In addition to the legislative powers already cited, the body also approves the president of the European Commission (who is proposed by the European Council) and the other members of the commission. It can also censure the commission by a two-thirds vote, which will force the commission from office.

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 gave the parliament additional powers. It can establish committees of inquiry and can challenge other EU institutions if they violate EU law or treaties. The parliament receives an annual report from the European Central Bank and elects the European ombudsman, who deals with public complaints against all EU institutions.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The European Parliament is organized as follows:

The Conference of Presidents consists of the president of the European Parliament and the political group chairs. Two representatives who are not attached to political groups have seats in the conference but do not have voting rights. This body is responsible for the organization of the parliament's business, which includes establishing the charges of the parliament's committees and their membership. It is also the body responsible for relations with other EU institutions, the national parliaments, and non-EU countries.

The Conference of Delegation Chairmen oversees the operation of interparliamentary delegations and delegations to joint parliamentary committees. It elects a chair from its membership.

The Conference of Committee Chairmen facilitates cooperation between the standing committees. It consists of the chairs of all the standing and temporary committees and elects its chair from among its members.

The Bureau is the body responsible for drafting the parliament's preliminary budget and decides all administrative matters. It consists of the president of the European Parliament, the fourteen vice presidents, and the six quaestors (who are nonvoting members) selected by the parliament for a two-and-one-half-year term. The Bureau appoints the secretary-general, the parliament's chief administrative officer.

Standing committees prepare work for the parliament's plenary sessions. They draw up reports on legislative proposals that have been referred to the parliament as well as their own initiatives. As of June 2009, there are twenty standing committees covering such areas as foreign affairs, international trade,

budgets, environment, consumer protection, regional development, legal affairs, civil liberties, women's rights, and gender equality. The parliament has also established a temporary committee on climate change. Each committee elects a chair and four vice chairs and has a staff.

The College of Quaestors is a six-member body that is responsible for administrative and financial matters concerning the MEPs and their working conditions. They also serve as nonvoting members of the Bureau.

THE TREATY OF LISBON

The Treaty of Lisbon, signed in 2007, had a significant impact on the European Parliament. The codecision procedure, in which the parliament must approve some European Council decisions before they become EU law, was expanded to include all council proposals. The number of MEPs was reduced permanently to 750 in addition to the president of the parliament. As the treaty was not ratified in time for the June 2009 European Parliament elections, 736 MEPs, with another 18 observers, were elected; these observers will become MEPs when the Lisbon Treaty is ratified by all member states. The 754 MEPs will serve until 2014.

HOW REPRESENTATIVE IS THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT?

Some observers suggest that the European Parliament, notwithstanding the shift to popular elections, is not an effective legislative body. Among the weaknesses of the present structure, they contend, are that national parties run campaigns for European elections based on national agendas rather than EU issues and that the political groupings in the parliament lack a common political consciousness. They argue that elections contested by pan-European political parties campaigning on EU issues would increase voter turnout and make the European Parliament a more legitimate body. They also suggest that the European Commission and the Council of the European Union should be responsible to the European Parliament, which would then be able to operate more like a national parliament and have the power to bring a motion of no confidence against the European executive.

See also *Europe, Democracy in; Europeanization; European Politics and Society; European Union (EU); New Europe.*

. . . .   JEFFREY KRAUS

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European Political Thought

European political thought is the study of the contents, values, beliefs, and institutions of political thought, one of the most peculiar productions generated by European culture, in Europe. Accordingly, this article will provide the reader with a historical look at this phenomenon.

ANCIENT FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

From ancient Greek times (starting in approximately the fifth century BCE) to the present, European political thought has evolved around the problems of the divine, nature, man, society, and history. During this long period, European political thought has shifted from a static nature based on absolutes and eternally valid ideas to a dynamic outlook based on relativity and the notion of ideas constantly evolving and changing. In their appeal to nature, the Greeks sought both incorporeal and changeless forms (Platonism) and effects and purposes in the realm of sensible objects and of change (Aristotelianism). To the end, they created the ethos of reason. The Greek invention of the city-state and politics, which took the forms of monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic forms of government, drastically affected many European thinkers. In addition to this, Stoic philosophy, which embraced the priority of reason from the post-Socratic Greek thinkers and emphasized the virtuous life, shaped political thought in the Roman Empire until its end in 476 AD.

THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND AFTER

Medieval thought in Europe moderated Stoic thought and emphasized the role of the state in general and man's soul in particular. During the Middle Ages, which covered roughly the period between the fifth century and the fifteenth century, there were two orders of power: the priesthood, culminating in the pope, and the lay government, culminating in the king and emperor. The first one—the spiritual power—and the second one—the temporal power—were unequal in dignity, the spiritual power being the superior. Especially after the thirteenth century the human community in Christian parts of the world was thought by the popes coextensive with the Church, with the pope being the head of this unity, the secular rulers serving as his agents in temporal matters, and the clergy serving as his agents in spiritual matters.

The spiritual authority over temporal matters maintained until the Renaissance and Reformation of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, during which a realist Machiavellian turn in political thought took place. Accordingly, the concern was no more about man's soul but about both his acquisition and his retention of power. Thus real politics was born.

The Enlightenment and the scientific revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries strengthened the belief in science, reason, and human progress. The individualism of social contract theorists, elaborated in John Locke's notions of life, liberty, and property principles and Immanuel Kant's

concept of individual autonomy, also became prevalent. Both classical liberalism's emphasis on individual liberty and modern republicanism's emphasis on equality and civic friendship found its embodiment in the French Revolution (1789–1799) and its stress on liberty, equality, fraternity, and human rights.

Out of resistance to the ideas of universal enlightenment and individualism came the romantic counterenlightenment. Thinkers of this movement, such as Jean Jacques Rousseau and Johann G. Herder stressed the value of community over the individual, emphasized the local rather than the general, and promoted the notions of a multitude of traditional ways of life as opposed to the Enlightenment's embrace of the moral demand of universal reason. In England, however, utilitarianism, claiming that morally right actions are those that maximize utility, became the mainstream ideology.

EXPANSION OF POLITICAL IDEAS THROUGH THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

The Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century drastically changed the empirical grounds of European political thought and introduced the notion of the division of labor, the working class, the industrial bourgeoisie, and mass migrations of people to towns. Urbanization, the increase in literacy through compulsory education, and the impact of improved literacy on mass media contributed to the distillation of modern European thought.

Nineteenth-century Europe also witnessed some communitarian thinkers. Karl Marx and Friederich Engels's historical materialism and communist ideology, which advocated a class- and property-free society, and Mikhail Bakunin and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's anarchism, which called for the destruction of all institutions, including the state, aimed at an egalitarian postindustrial society and broadened the spectrum of European political thought to the left.

EUROPEAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

European political thought in the twentieth century took different forms in different countries. In Germany, Max Weber stressed the bureaucratization and rationalization of daily life in modern societies. Furthermore, the Frankfurt school chastised the narrative of the Enlightenment and criticized the dominance of instrumental reason that created technology-dominant life spheres in late modern societies. In the same line of thinking the German thinker Jurgen Habermas elaborated democratic theory and communication in constitutional democracies. Many thinkers and politicians incorporated and accepted these ideas for constructing the future of the European Union.

In France, however, European political thought, thanks to the enormous theoretical contribution of Jean-Paul Sartre, was first shaped by an existentialist emphasis on the subjectivity of the individual based on freedom. Later, this construction of the individual was challenged by an idea of dissolution of man by structuralism, which was elaborated in the works of such thinkers as Claude Levi-Strauss, Louis Althusser, and Jacques Lacan.

The French poststructuralist Michel Foucault challenged the conventional idea of power (juridical power) accumulated in the state with a more ubiquitous and omnipresent understanding of power (disciplinary power) continuously created and recreated within such social and institutional structures as family, school, prison, and the military.

In Italy, Antonio Gramsci theorized a new Marxist concept emphasizing the role of the party working with intellectuals to create a counterhegemony among the masses against the bourgeoisie in civil society and finally initiate a revolutionary assault on the state.

In England, apart from other ideologies, especially liberalism, conservatism—historically powerful, historically against precipitous change, and skeptical about the possibilities of political knowledge, preferring instead the purported political wisdom—also gained strength in the twentieth century.

Today, in the early twenty-first century, the postmodern emphasis on identity and difference deeply affects many thinkers and schools of thought in Europe. As the result of this phenomenon, contemporary European political thought is demanding more elaborate understandings of the individual, of civil society, and of the state.

See also *British Political Thought; Church and State; Enlightenment Political Thought; European Politics and Society; French Political Thought; German Political Thought; Italian Political Thought; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Sartre, Jean-Paul; Straussianism.*

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European Politics and Society

While European studies are interdisciplinary area studies, European politics and society is the political science subfield of European studies. It is a broad field with blurred boundaries, which encompasses research on the determinants and the

consequences of institutions, politics, and policies in European countries. It seems fair to say that the bulk of research in European politics and society focuses on west European democracies, while the study of central and eastern Europe has only more recently received rapidly increasing attention, with the democratization of this region and the Eastern enlargement of the European Union. This article aims at providing an overview of the major strands of research in the following areas of European politics and society: state- and nation-building, comparative European government, parties and party systems, and European political economy and welfare states.

THE EMERGENCE OF DEMOCRATIC NATION-STATES IN EUROPE

States, nation-states, and—eventually—modern democracies have their roots in western Europe, and much of the literature on the development of states and nations in all parts of the world draws on comparison with the European experience.

According to political scientist Charles Tilly, state formation was strongly driven by the military concerns of political entrepreneurs eager to secure their territories and by the availability of economic and political resources in particular geographical and economic contexts. Given this variation of contexts, of institutional precedents, and of the sequences of state formation, European states developed in a variety of forms. Hence, the gist of the standard works on state formation, notably the contributions of sociologists Michael Mann and Thomas Ertman, is that modern states—based on territorial centralization, infrastructural power, and modern bureaucracies—were not a product of intentional design but a highly contingent and variable outcome of particular historical contexts and sequences. This raises important implications for research on subsequent state formation processes in all parts of the world because one cannot necessarily assume the transferability of insights from the European experience.

Most Western states transformed into nation-states in the nineteenth century, adding an ideological fundament to the institutions of the state. In the famous terms of Benedict Anderson (2006), a scholar of nationalism, nations can be defined as "imagined communities," and nationalism entails the idea that nations are entitled to political autonomy. By means of historical research and comparison, the literature in this field debates the questions of whether nations have perennial roots or are genuinely modern and whether the idea of the nation emanates from the people itself or from elite discourse. There is no agreement between perennialist and modernist interpretations of nations, but it is clear that the institution of the nation-state is a genuinely modern, European invention. Institutionalist works on central and eastern Europe by sociologist Rogers Brubaker have demonstrated how institutions of citizenship contributed to the saliency and persistence of nations as relevant political categories.

Aside from state formation and nation building, democratization is the third important strand of historical studies on the political development of European states. The main goal of work on this topic is to identify the factors accounting for democratic stability as opposed to democratic breakdown, given that Europe's dark twentieth century was deeply marked by the eruption of dictatorship and authoritarianism. As with state- and nation-building, democratic stability appears to be the result of a complex historical configuration of factors. Barrington Moore proposed a model of different paths to democracy and dictatorship, with the democratic path depending on a balance of power between crown, nobility, and bourgeoisie in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and an early development of commercialized agriculture and markets. More recently, the works of political scientists Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber, and John Stephens have shown that a strong but not radicalized working-class movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was also an important driver of stable democratization.

COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT

Building on the largely historical political science literature on state formation and institutional development, a different strand of European politics research analyzes the determinants and the effects of varying government institutions. The field of comparative government is, of course, not focused on Europe exclusively, but the plurality and variation of democratic institutions on this continent (which otherwise shares many context conditions) makes it an obvious empirical candidate for comparative research.

European democracies vary to a great extent in their core institutions, such as the electoral system, parliamentary regimes, federalist versus unitary governance, direct versus representative democracy, and the possibility of constitutional review. Political scientist Arend Lijphart argued that the variation in these characteristics can be analyzed in a limited number of patterns, proportional representation tending to go together with, for example, coalition governments, federalism, and corporatism. On this basis, national democratic regimes have been categorized according to the extent to which they concentrate or disperse decision-making power. The concentration of power is particularly strong in the United Kingdom (and its former colonies outside Europe) and to some extent in France, whereas most of the other European countries, such as the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, and the Nordic countries distribute power across institutions and share it between different actors (government and opposition parties, trade unions and business association, courts, central banks, and substate governments). When discussing the sources of this institutional variation, the literature appeals mostly to a sociological explanation: most European societies are characterized by a plurality of social cleavages, that is, cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or political divides, that required some form of power sharing to allow for stable democratic government.

A very large literature deals with the effects of power sharing versus power concentration on policy outputs and policy change. The veto points and veto players literature represents an attempt to conceptualize these institutional effects in a most parsimonious way: the more actors' agreement is needed for a

reform to pass, that is, the higher the number of veto players, the higher is the expected policy stability in a country. This approach was most forcefully developed by the rational choice political scientist George Tsebelis. Thereby, the veto player approach adopts a one-dimensional concept of policy change simply in terms of change versus stability. Other scholars have attempted to substantiate predictions about the effect of institutional variations. One example is Bingham Powell's work on the responsiveness of proportional versus majoritarian regimes. Powell shows that proportional elections tend to produce policies that are closer to the preferences of the median voter. A second example is the link between power-sharing institutions and generous welfare states. Proportional democracies tend to spend and redistribute more than majoritarian ones. While this empirical correlation has been known for a long time, the jury is still out on competing explanations, at least two of them institutional. Michael Laver and W. Ben Hunt argue that coalition governments in proportional democracies tend to increase spending through log-rolling processes, whereas Torben Iversen and David Soskice argue that proportional representation electoral systems increase the chances of center-left governing coalitions, this leading to more generous social spending.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE IN EUROPE

Political parties are the key actors in representative democracies, and the study of the development and transformation of European party systems is an important aspect of European politics and society research. Political parties developed in all western European countries with and because of the extension of the franchise. Works by political scientists Richard Katz, Peter Mair, and Daniele Caramani show how early "cadre parties," representing the interests of particular, privileged social elites, were followed by "mass parties," which mobilized broad ranges of voters in increasingly homogeneous national party systems.

The western European party systems that have emerged with full democratization are similar with regard to left parties but differ when it comes to the right. While left labor parties emerged in all countries, Christian Democratic parties appeared only in certain countries of continental Europe (such as Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and the Netherlands). Liberal parties remained marginal in most countries and became important in only a few of them, such as Switzerland or the United Kingdom. And agrarian parties developed mainly in the Nordic countries of Scandinavia. Moreover, the size and relative importance of the different parties varies strongly in cross-national comparison. The most prominent explanation of this variation was developed by political scientists Seymour Martin Lipset, Stein Rokkan, and Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, referring to the specific patterns and sequences of social cleavage politics in the different countries. Cultural and territorial cleavages were not equally salient in all countries, thereby fostering variation on the right, whereas the class cleavage emerged in all countries and gave rise to the mobilization of the left. Hence, the salience and temporal sequence of cleavage politics explains the variation in national party systems.

After the introduction of universal suffrage in the first half of the twentieth century, party systems froze, meaning that the number, type, and relative strength of the political parties of national party systems stabilized. This freezing process can be explained by the fact that with universal suffrage, the electorate became fully mobilized voters developing strong and stable party identification. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, the transition to a postindustrial society fundamentally changed the sociostructural underpinnings of party politics, leading first to new social movements and then to a sustained unfreezing of European party systems. Political scientists such as Herbert Kitschelt, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Simon Bornschier showed that the emergence of Green parties on the left, the transformation of Social Democratic parties from working-class to middle-class parties, and the appearance of new right-wing populist challengers in many European countries are the main results of this ongoing transformation.

With the democratization of central and eastern Europe, the transferability of the analytical insights gained from research on the old party systems to the new democracies has become a major question. However, research by Herbert Kitschelt and other political scientists shows that party systems in these countries are not fully stabilized and nationalized yet, and the political parties seem to align along dimensions of political competition that differ from the ones found in western Europe.

EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND WELFARE STATES

The study of European production regimes, industrial relations, welfare states, and economic policies is an important and thriving subfield of European politics and society. After the Second World War (1939–1945), all western European states introduced market regulation and social protection to steer economic development and to shield their populations from the major risks of income loss such as illness, unemployment, accident, old age, or disability. Thereby, European economies developed a model of regulated capitalism, which turned out to be highly successful in the postwar period with regard to economic prosperity, low social inequality, and generalized social welfare.

With regard to economic governance in the postwar period, European economies differed in the extent to which governments intervened directly in the economy as opposed to coordinating economic regulation with the representatives of business and labor by means of corporatist institutions. Countries like France relied on a strongly centralized, unilateral, and state-led model of economic regulation, characterized by bureaucratic planning of industrial policy, state ownership of major industries, and little societal strife. By contrast, countries with weaker bureaucratic capacity and more strongly organized societies, such as Germany and Sweden, and the small open economies of Europe developed institutions of tripartite economic steering, which include the representatives of the state, labor, and capital on an equal basis. An important work

on corporatism, regulatory states, and varieties of capitalism by political scientists including Philippe C. Schmitter, Gerhard Lehmbruch, Peter Katzenstein, J. Rogers Hollingsworth, Robert Boyer, Peter A. Hall, and David Soskice analyzed and explained these different institutional systems of economic governance. However, despite the national differences in economic regulation, a major commonality of European economies in the golden age from 1945 to the mid-1970s was strong economic growth and productivity.

In the postwar era, all western European countries developed encompassing welfare states, which, however, differed substantially in their generosity and effects. It was the path-breaking research by sociologist Gösta Esping-Andersen (1990) that showed that welfare states can be divided broadly into three "worlds of welfare capitalism." In Scandinavian welfare states, benefits are relatively high, universal, and tax financed. In addition, these countries provide a wide range of welfare services, which contrasts with the welfare states of continental Europe that are based on more stratified, income- and employment-related financial transfers. The United Kingdom differs from both models since it belongs to a more liberal Anglo-Saxon group of welfare states with lower, means-tested benefits. This characterization of the "three worlds of welfare capitalism" is largely accepted, but the literature holds diverging explanations of why welfare states, and their differences, came about. One strand of literature, represented mainly by Gösta Esping-Andersen and Kees van Kersbergen, argues that welfare states are the product of power configurations: they are generous and egalitarian in the Nordic countries, where Social Democracy was strongest, whereas Christian Democracy left its imprints on the continental welfare states and the dominance of the market-liberal right accounts for the minimal welfare state in the United Kingdom. The main alternative explanation by Peter A. Hall and David Soskice builds not on power and conflict but on institutional and functional complementarity with the economic production regime: generous social security schemes emerged in coordinated, corporatist market economies because they underlay and sustained the modes of production and the labor markets in these countries.

Since the end of the golden age and with the emergence of a postindustrial society in western Europe, market coordination, corporatism, and welfare states have come to face growing challenges. During the 1980s and 1990s, direct state intervention was reduced in all European economies, and many formerly public markets, such as the network industries, were liberalized and partly privatized, not least as a result of European Union regulations. So the main question in the literature on European economic and social policies became whether the European model of regulated capitalism and generous welfare states was sustainable in times of austerity and globalization or whether all European economies would converge on a more market-liberal model. So far, however, the results of major research projects on this question led by political scientists such as Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, John Stephens, Fritz W. Scharpf, and Vivien A. Schmidt show that the cross-national differences have largely persisted, which either

may be the result of institutional inertia and path dependence or may reflect that even under changing structural conditions, different models of (welfare) capitalism continue to be viable and efficient. With the global crisis of financial markets and economies that started in 2008, some observers even ask whether the European social model may see an unexpected revival in and outside Europe.

See also *Capitalism and Democracy; Europeanization; European Union (EU); Political Economy; Welfare State.*

. . . .   SILJA HÄUSERMANN

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European Union (EU)

In a world dominated by Westphalian states, the European Union (EU) is unique. Never before have independent countries collectively ceded so much authority to a supranational polity. The European experiment begun nearly sixty years ago has resulted in unprecedented economic and political integration. Precisely for this reason, the EU has captivated scholars' attention from its inception. Although interest has fluctuated in conjunction with real-world developments, political scientists remain fixated on this sui generis organization.

Yet empirical uniqueness need not preclude theoretical generalization. In this article, we examine the political science of the EU along two dimensions. First, to what extent do scholars conceptualize the EU as sui generis versus a test case for broader theoretical development? Second, to what extent do scholars endeavor either to export EU-derived theories outward toward other fields, geographic regions, and political phenomena or to import outside explanatory theories and tools into the political science of the EU?

We proceed as follows. First, we briefly review the various stages of European integration and describe the EU as it exists today. Next, we evaluate past waves of EU scholarship, paying particular attention to the degree to which scholars emphasized specific or general explanations of the EU experience. We conclude with an assessment of the current state of the field. Recent work is ample, diverse, and represented in multiple venues that spotlight all types of EU-related political science. We propose that the most promising programs for future research are those that engage the EU both in its empirical specificity and in its opportunities for theoretical generality.

THE SUI GENERIS EU

Following the devastation of World War II (1939–1945), western European elites committed themselves to peace through economic cooperation. In 1951, six countries—Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) through the Treaty of Paris, carrying out designs for a united Europe envisioned by Jean Monnet and proposed by French foreign minister Robert Schuman. The 1957 Treaty of Rome extended this cooperation to a broader functional sphere by calling for the establishment of a common market (the European Economic Community) within which goods, services, labor, and capital could circulate freely. The European Community, which emerged in the 1960s, covered a wide range of economic and related policies through an institutional framework comprising most importantly an executive and supranational European Commission, a legislative and intergovernmental Council of Ministers, a consultative supranational European Parliament (EP), and a supranational European Court of Justice.

Spurred by the European Community's early success, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined in 1973, followed by Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986. A new treaty, the Single European Act, entered into force in 1987. It called for completion of the single European market and undertook significant institutional reforms, including a return to majority voting in the Council of Ministers and an enhancement of the powers of the EP, the members of which had been directly and democratically elected since 1979. The 1993 Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) expanded the sociopolitical ambitions of the new EU and outlined a future economic and monetary union, resulting in the 1999 adoption and 2002 circulation of a new single currency, the euro. Additional reforms further empowered the EP, renamed the Council of Ministers with the title Council of the European Union, institutionalized the European Council (gathering heads of state and government of EU member states), and laid the groundwork for expanded membership to include Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995, ten Mediterranean and central/eastern European countries in 2004 (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta) and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. The present EU encompasses nearly five hundred million citizens within twenty-seven member states and manages an economy of nearly $15 trillion (GDP; 2008 estimate). Its functional scope now ranges across most of the policy terrain once monopolized by the Westphalian state.

The EU is unquestionably the most successful regional integration effort in the world. Nowhere else has a group of national governments repeatedly concentrated such extensive decision-making power in the hands of a largely supranational entity. Throughout its history, European integration has provided ample fodder for political scientists, who have approached its study in a variety of ways.

POLITICAL SCIENCE OF THE EU

Our review of the history of political science research on the EU is largely conventional, closely following accounts offered

European Union:
☐ Member
▧ Non-member

ICELAND

Norwegian Sea

ATLANTIC OCEAN

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

Gulf of Bothnia

Helsinki ★

Stockholm ★

Tallinn ★
ESTONIA

Gulf of Riga

Riga ★
LATVIA

Gotland

Baltic Sea

LITHUANIA
Vilnius ★

RUSSIA

UNITED KINGDOM

North Sea

IRELAND
Dublin ★

London ★

Copenhagen ★
DENMARK

NETHERLANDS
★ Amsterdam

Berlin ★

Warsaw ★
POLAND

BELARUS

RUSSIA

Brussels ★
BELGIUM

GERMANY

Rhine

Luxembourg ★

LUXEMBOURG

English Channel

Paris ★

FRANCE

Prague ★
CZECH REP.

SLOVAKIA

Danube

Vienna ★
AUSTRIA

Bratislava ★

Budapest ★
HUNGARY

ROMANIA

UKRAINE

MOLDOVA

Bay of Biscay

SWITZ.

SLOVENIA

Ljubljana ★

CROATIA

BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA

SERBIA

Bucharest ★

Danube

BULGARIA
Sofia ★

Black Sea

PORTUGAL
Lisbon ★

Madrid ★

SPAIN

ANDORRA

SAN MARINO •

ITALY

Corsica (FR.)

Adriatic Sea

Rome ★

MONTE-NEGRO

KOSOVO

MACEDONIA

ALBANIA

GREECE

Athens ★

TURKEY

Sardinia (IT.)

Mediterranean Sea

Sicily

MALTA

ALGERIA

TUNISIA

MOROCCO

LIBYA

0   300 Mi
0   300 Km

TURKEY

Mediterranean Sea

Nicosia ★

CYPRUS

Inset scale same as main map

Under the European Union, independent member states have integrated political and economic systems to create a supranational organization.

by James Caporaso and John Keeler (1995) and John Keeler (2005). Our main departure is to focus on the disciplinary contours of this evolution and to emphasize the interplay between the specific and the general in the political science of the EU.

FIRST WAVE: GENERALIZABLE INTENTIONS, LATE 1950S THROUGH EARLY 1970S

Conventional accounts date the first wave of political science research on the present-day EU from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. Three broad-scale grand theories of European integration emerged, all of which aspired to generalization either from the outside in (assimilating Europe to patterns identified from geographically and historically different cases) or from the inside out (deriving general lessons from the postwar European experience).

The first major approach began with a collective, interdisciplinary project led by political scientist Karl Deutsch of Princeton University. Focused on the question of international community formation, Deutsch and colleagues in *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (1957) examined ten historical cases to generate propositions about the prospects for a North Atlantic community, including western Europe. Deutsch's "transactionalism" argued that integration was a function of social interconnectedness, as produced by such things as flows of goods, mail, and people and as measured by these and by survey data tapping mutual sympathies among individuals. The greater the extent to which members of the units were assimilated into a common social space, the greater were the prospects for community formation and political integration. While political scientists undertook considerable and quite sophisticated research along these lines during the next decade and a half, transactionalist research petered out by the early 1970s, with an overall decline in political scientific interest in integration and the EU.

The second and most prominent first-wave integration theory—one that has never disappeared from political science research on the EU—emerged with the publication of Ernst Haas's *The Uniting of Europe* (1958). Analyzing the ECSC in the 1950s, Haas derived four general conditions for political integration: (1) well-developed central institutions that could argue for and respond to integrative demands, (2) elite activation around those central institutions, (3) embrace of "inherently expansive tasks" so as to promote "spillover" from initial to later steps, and (4) "continuity of national policy aims" (Lindberg 1963, 7–12). Haas's "neofunctional" approach to regional integration married the practice of Europe's "founding fathers," Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann, with the methods of modern political science.

Neofunctionalism became a vibrant political science research program in the 1960s. First, it gave rise to a spate of research on regional integration beyond Europe. While ambitious in their intent to generalize from the European experience, these efforts proved unsuccessful, especially insofar as less-developed countries were concerned. Second, and at the same time, neofunctionalism grappled with challenges presented by developments within Europe itself. French president Charles de Gaulle's 1965–1966 refusal to countenance further integrative steps laid out in the Treaty of Rome posed a special challenge to the theory, which had been predicated on continuous progression toward deeper integration. The resulting proliferation of concepts, variables, and measures suggested that neofunctionalism was an increasingly degenerating research program.

The last approach in this wave (and the major alternative to neofunctionalism), intergovernmentalism, insisted on the primacy of nation-states and national experiences in delimiting European integration. Most forcefully articulated by Stanley Hoffmann (1966), it argued that integration would proceed only as far as national governments conspired to work together, as national interests would always retain precedence and thereby hinder the emergence of a truly supranational organization. This would be especially true in areas of "high politics," including political and security issues, where the absolute sovereignty of nation-states would remain intact. Intergovernmentalism drew its inspiration from realist theories of international relations (IR), imbuing national governments with concrete security preferences that, in conjunction with uncertainty over other states' future intentions, would constrain their willingness to put European interests above national ones. Supranational and transnational efforts to transcend these hard constraints would only antagonize states and further retrench state sovereignty in core areas.

All three first-wave approaches aspired to general theoretical accounts of European integration. Deutsch and colleagues worked from the outside in, assimilating the postwar North Atlantic experience to patterns of community formation identified from other times and places. By contrast, Haas approached generalization from the inside out, analyzing the ECSC to "advance generalizations about the processes by which political communities are formed among sovereign states" (Haas 1958, xi). Hoffmann held the middle ground. While he sought to draw inferences from the European experience to "contemporary world politics" and "unification movements elsewhere" (Hoffmann 1966, 867), his major contribution was arguably to bring general IR theory (in his case, realism) into the study of the EU. In all three cases, theoretical elaborations and limitations, while aspiring to generality, mirrored facts on the ground, with the relatively optimistic neofunctional and transactionalist approaches holding sway when the EU was working well as a supranational organization and intergovernmentalism ascending when it was not.

SECOND WAVE: SUI GENERIS APPROACHES, EARLY 1970S THROUGH LATE 1980S

The second wave of political science research into the EU began with events in the real world, including the end of supranational integration post–de Gaulle and the end of the postwar economic miracle in the major European economies. Caporaso and Keeler (1995) refer to this as the "doldrums" period for the EU and political science research into it. Haas (1975) announced the obsolescence of his own neofunctionalism. And Donald

Puchala (1972) claimed that regional integration theorists had been like blind men inspecting an elephant, each finding a different part and none agreeing on the others' characterizations. The zeitgeist involved a substantial abandonment of grand theory and a retreat into narrower, less ambitious work that eschewed generalization beyond the European case. Work of this time was predominantly descriptive rather than explanatory or theoretical. John Keeler (2005) brings several indicators to bear along these lines, the most relevant of which is the retrenchment of work on the EU into specialized journals such as the *Journal of Common Market Studies* and the *Journal of European Integration*. In one view, "integration theory [was] run into the ground, probably because . . . this new and complex phenomenon could not be studied by our conventional tools of analysis" (Loukas Tsoukalis, quoted in Rosamond 2006, 12).

THIRD WAVE: GENERALIZABILITY RETURNS, LATE 1980S THROUGH 1990S

The European integration process was relaunched in the mid-1980s, most notably with the 1985 adoption of a single-market program calling for the abolition of all internal barriers to economic exchange by the end of 1992. This "1992 program," embodied in the 1987 Single European Act, not only reinvigorated the EU but also catalyzed a rediscovery of integration theory among political scientists. Two main contenders, both rooted in general IR political science scholarship, emerged relatively quickly. The first, signaled by Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman's (1989) analysis of the single-market program, characterized the revival of the European Community as a series of elite bargains (involving especially the European Commission, industrial elites, and national politicians) responding to changes in the international economic structure (relative U.S. decline and the rise of Japanese economic power). Subsequent work emphasized similar features in explaining smaller-scale parts of EU integration and continued to insist on a foundation in IR, rather than integration, theory.

The reemergence of accounts that were at least consistent with, if not explicitly derived from, neofunctionalism generated a new intergovernmentalist response that emphasized the primacy of state interests in driving and delimiting the European integration process. Andrew Moravcsik (1991) downplayed the entrepreneurial success of the European Commission, denied any inherent institutional logic toward deeper integration, and minimized the role of transnational elites. Viewing European integration as "conventional statecraft," he emphasized that states' preferences and power defined both the demand for and the supply of supranational integration. This IR-inspired liberal intergovernmental approach eventually provided a powerful synthesis combining a theory of institutional choice with rigorous accounts of state preference formation and interstate bargaining.

In contrast to liberal intergovernmentalism, the rediscovery of supranational institutions and transnational societal (business) actors found expression in a further body of third-wave literature dealing not with the broad architecture of European integration (i.e., it was not a grand theory) but with the activities of the European Court of Justice and the ongoing process of legal integration. A related vein of research on the constitutionalization of the EU's founding treaties—whereby it was transformed from traditional international law into a hierarchically integrated legal system granting rights directly to citizens—merged neofunctionalist insights about elites with Karl Deutsch's concern for international transactions to provide a powerful political theory of EU legal integration. This discovery of the law by political scientists working on the EU remains a key feature of the literature.

Two last third-wave developments bear mentioning here. First, there were at least two additional attempts at developing grand political science theories of European integration to rival the revived neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist work. Gary Marks (1993) proposed a theory of "multilevel governance" that sought to account for the general upward and downward diffusion of political authority in the EU and beyond. Alec Stone Sweet's (1998) work on legal integration guided new scholarship on EU development along transactionalist-neofunctionalist lines. Second, the 1990s amplified and extended the third wave's emphasis on the importation of theories, models, and methods from across political science. Simon Hix's (1994) call for more comparative politics work on the EU inspired countless studies. The 1990s also saw increasing attention to the American politics literature, with the adoption of ideas including spatial models, principal-agent models of delegation, and numerous others.

FOURTH WAVE: THE NORMAL POLITICAL SCIENCE OF THE EU, PRESENT DAY

The current phase of political science research into the EU represents a continuation of trends begun in the third wave. The grand theories of European integration have not gone away. References to neofunctionalism (also known as supranationalism) and intergovernmentalism remain de rigueur in the literature. Yet the bulk of research is occupied with lower-order problems tackled through middle-range theories, most often drawing on (or at least consonant with) broader political science literatures. Debates seem increasingly pragmatic rather than paradigmatic.

Thus, the normalization of the EU in political science is perhaps the most striking feature of the present-day literature. Recent work from both sides of the Atlantic draws on and informs non-EU work across the subfields and methodological traditions of the discipline. Four journals mainly devoted to the EU—*Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of European Integration, Journal of European Public Policy,* and *European Union Politics*—speak equally to EU specialists and to political science generalists working in a wide range of subfields. The amount of EU-related work appearing in general journals is also on the rise. The degree of transatlantic and interdisciplinary cross-fertilization stands at unparalleled levels. Thus, we reject any long-standing questions about subfield (especially comparative and IR) incompatibilities, about an alleged transatlantic scholarly cleavage, and about the appropriateness of applying general political science to the sui generis EU.

CONCLUSION

The analysis above documents the main approaches to the study of the EU along two complementary dimensions: the scope of their theoretical aims (general or particular) and the direction of theoretical application (inside-out or outside-in). While not necessarily exclusive to any one period, the categories produced by this division allow us to capture the many ways in which EU scholarship has evolved and progressed over the years. The first period attempted to develop generalizable theories of integration, both from the inside out and from the outside in. Scholarship eventually moved to a second, more sui generis period concerned with EU-specific affairs when real-world integration decelerated. The third period witnessed the resurgence of prior integration theories, the development of entirely new exportable theoretical explanations, and the application of imported explanatory frameworks to EU data. Over the long haul, and in the present fourth wave, all of these trends have come to coexist. While the EU is still undeniably unique, political scientists now view it as a means for acquiring both general and specific knowledge.

Having summarized the main trends in EU-related political science, we here conclude with some final thoughts on its future. We expect the EU, as the most advanced regional integration project worldwide, to remain an important fixture of political science research for three reasons. First, the EU continues to evolve, providing a living laboratory within which to study rigorously a great many political phenomena. Second, this evolution inspires political scientists insofar as it reveals both an EU specificity and suspected similarities to political-economic, institutional, and behavioral processes operative elsewhere. Third, new regional integration efforts under way around the world may look to emulate the EU's model of supranational governance and economic union, giving rise to an already-bourgeoning field of comparative regionalism. Precisely because it is so distinctive and seductive, the EU provides scholars with endless options for engaging in both inside-out and outside-in theoretical work, either of which satisfies the aspirations of general political science.

See also *Deutsch, Karl W.; Economic Policy Formulation; European Parliament; Institutionalism, Comparative; Judicial Systems, Comparative; Legislative Systems, Comparative; Monetary Union; Regional Integration, Comparative.*

. . . . K. AMBER CURTIS AND JOSEPH JUPILLE

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Euthanasia

Euthanasia ("good death," from the Greek *eu,* meaning "good" and *thanatos,* meaning "death") refers to any medical act with an intended consequence of inducing the death of the patient (usually a terminally ill patient) in a painless manner. Euthanasia is a hotly debated topic in the field of medical ethics. Some doctors argue that the primary duty of medical doctors is to preserve human life under all circumstances. Indeed, the traditional Hippocratic oath (dating in its original form from the fourth century BCE) claims that medical doctors should never "prescribe a deadly drug." Especially in the twentieth century, however, various authors and legal and moral authorities have claimed that medical doctors have a moral and legal right to prevent their patients' suffering by helping them to die in a dignified and painless manner.

DEFINITION AND CONFLICT

In practice, *euthanasia* refers to a whole range of medical acts that are often not clearly distinguished from one another,

ranging from not prolonging a life-sustaining (but also not curative) treatment to providing prolonged and possibly lethal sedation to dying patients to administering an active life-terminating treatment. It should be noted that *euthanasia* typically refers to the life-ending act among chronically or terminally ill patients. Although during the Nazi era in Germany (1933–1945), the indiscriminate killing of mentally ill patients was labeled "euthanasia," this in no way falls under the current definition of the practice.

In various countries, laws and policy measures on euthanasia are a salient political issue. While liberal and progressive parties and groups normally are in favor of allowing euthanasia, the reverse is the case for conservative political parties. The topic of euthanasia is salient because it raises fundamental bioethical questions among the population, in the same manner as abortion or gay marriage tend to do. Often, the laws on euthanasia rise high on the political agenda because of the media focus on specific cases in which terminally ill and suffering patients were denied a physician-assisted death. In various countries, finding a compromise on the legal status of euthanasia has proved to be quite difficult.

EUTHANASIA IN EUROPE

The Netherlands was the first Western country to legalize euthanasia in a law of April 2001, which took effect on April 1, 2002. The 2001 law proclaims that every patient has an inalienable right to determine the manner and conditions in which he or she wants to end life. The law installs a specific procedure to allow patients to request euthanasia if they are in a state of "incurable and unbearable suffering." Healthy persons, too, can file formal statements indicating that they opt for euthanasia if, at some point in the future, they end up in such a position and are no longer able to express themselves. Medical doctors in the Netherlands who perform euthanasia will not be prosecuted if they follow a specific procedure. The doctor must be certain there is no standard medical solution for the suffering and that the patient has made the decision in a voluntary manner; the doctor must also have provided the patient with all necessary and relevant information and consulted another medical doctor before actually performing the act of euthanasia. Since 2002, the law has been implemented without any major incidents. There is some political discussion, however, about whether the law should be broadened to apply to patients who are not yet sixteen years old or to patients who are suffering mentally but not physically.

Neighboring Belgium followed suit in September 2002. Belgium basically copies the Dutch law, but the country installed an administrative procedure to report all cases of euthanasia to a central authority. In Belgian politics, euthanasia for minors remains a hotly debated question; there have also been some political debates about whether Catholic hospitals (which are the only hospitals available in some regions) should provide this service.

EUTHANASIA IN THE UNITED STATES

In a number of other industrialized countries political debates about euthanasia laws are under way, without having led to a specific change in the law. In France, the debate was revived in early 2008 by the case of a cancer patient with a large and very painful face tumor who requested permission for a physician-assisted death from the highest court in France. Shortly after the request was turned down, the patient committed suicide.

In the United States, too, some highly publicized clinical cases led to intense political debate. In 1976 the New Jersey Supreme Court decided that coma patient Karen Ann Quinlan could be taken off an artificial breathing machine. During the 1990s, the highly publicized trials against Michigan doctor Jack Kevorkian (1928–) led to intense debate, eventually leading to the conviction of Dr. Kevorkian on murder charges. In 2005, controversy erupted over the case of Terri Schiavo, who had lived in a coma for fifteen years. Despite attempts from President George W. Bush to stop a legal decision, Florida courts eventually gave permission to end the life-sustaining treatment of the patient.

In 1990 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled (in *Cruzan v. Director of Missouri Department of Health*) that there is no obligation to maintain life-sustaining treatment for terminally ill patients. There is no legal ground, however, for an active form of euthanasia that would actually shorten the life of the patient. In 1994, the state of Oregon passed a law allowing medical doctors to prescribe, but not administer themselves, lethal drugs to terminally ill patients. The Death with Dignity Act (in effect as of October 27, 1997) mandates that patients administer the lethal drugs themselves. Various attempts by the Bush administration to stop the implementation of the act failed, and in 2006 the act was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Gonzales v. Oregon*. According to official Oregon figures, in the period from 1997 to 2008 some four hundred patients have used the Death with Dignity Act to die in a painless manner. In November 2008, voters in the state of Washington approved the introduction of a similar act in their state.

It can be expected that the 2006 U.S. Supreme Court decision will lead to debate about euthanasia in other states. Euthanasia will remain a contentious issue, with sharp cleavages among the population, mostly according to liberal/conservative or religious dividing lines.

See also *Religion and Politics; Religious Right; Right to Die; Right to Life.*

. . . . MARC HOOGHE

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Evangelicalism

A religious movement born in Great Britain and colonial America, Evangelicalism has been politically significant for over two centuries. It is largely a Protestant spiritual renewal movement, emphasizing religious conversion, doctrinal orthodoxy, personal piety, and public morality.

The best definitions of Evangelicalism (e.g., David Bebbington's 1989 *Evangelicalism in Modern Britain*) focus on four hallmarks: (1) respect for the authority, perspicuity, and truthfulness of the Bible; (2) an emphasis on a personal acceptance of the faith, commonly described as conversion, a faith commitment, or being born again; (3) a belief that religious faith should permeate one's life, be shared with others, and be manifested in love for others; and (4) an affirmation of orthodox teachings about Jesus Christ, including His deity, virgin birth, atoning death on the cross, bodily resurrection, and eventual earthly return.

ORIGINS OF THE MOVEMENT

The movement's roots are found in the First Great Awakening of the eighteenth century. Leaders such as Jonathan Edwards, George Whitefield, and John Wesley sparked this spiritual revival. The political impact was personified by William Wilberforce, who fought a lifelong battle to end the slave trade in Britain.

It was the Second Great Awakening in the nineteenth century that gave rise to a distinctive evangelical presence in American public life. Nathaniel Taylor, Lyman Beecher, Charles Finney, and other evangelists inspired mass conversions, which led to the founding of hundreds of voluntary reform associations. Some associations were principally religious in their mission, distributing Bibles or promoting evangelism, but others concentrated on social and ethical issues: helping orphans, the deaf, and the destitute; promoting peace, literacy, and temperance; and combating dueling, prostitution, lotteries, and slavery.

As the century unfolded, pietistic fervor in the United States led to notions of Christian perfectionism and millennialism. When the number of converts reached a critical mass, they began to speak in terms of "manifest destiny" and "Christian America." The high-water mark was the effort of Northern evangelicals to spark widespread opposition to slavery. The low-water mark was the capitulation of Southern evangelicals to the proslavery cause.

After the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865), industrialization began to change the American landscape. Evangelical groups such as the Salvation Army, the Volunteers of America, the YMCA, and the Christian and Missionary Alliance responded by moving into the poorest areas of urban America to set up relief efforts. This was also the era in which evangelicals founded a number of colleges, formed the Christian Labor Union, and launched the Woman's Christian Temperance Union.

RETREAT AND REVIVAL

By the turn of the nineteenth century, evangelical efforts were overshadowed by more theologically liberal proponents of the social gospel. The Protestant social gospel movement, led by men such as Walter Rauschenbusch, Charles Sheldon, and Washington Gladden, shifted the focus of Christian churches from individual conversion to social reform by supplanting traditional doctrinal teachings with modern notions about human progress and God's immanence. These modernists moved from the periphery to the center of American Christianity, consolidating their power in seminaries and denominations. Among American Christians who were unwilling to jettison orthodoxy were the three groups that would become the heart of modern Evangelicalism in the United States: the fundamentalists, the Pentecostals, and the holiness movement. Each of these groups retreated from public life, establishing a vibrant but largely unnoticed subculture in middle America.

Feeling betrayed by the groups' separatism, contentiousness, and divisiveness, in-house critics soon gave birth to the modern evangelical movement. Men such as Carl F. H. Henry, Edward John Carnell, and Harold Ockenga, "fundamentalists with PhDs," led the charge, alongside the evangelist Billy Graham. Having been excluded from or marginalized by the major denominations, these men created parachurch organizations such as the National Association of Evangelicals (1942), Fuller Seminary (1947), and the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association (1950) as well as the magazine *Christianity Today* (1956).

A turning point came in 1947 with the publication of Henry's *The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism*. Henry argued that fundamentalism had become socially impotent, ethically indifferent, and morally irresponsible. His manifesto precipitated a profound change of heart within evangelical circles. Henry's influence was extended when Graham invited him to edit *Christianity Today*. This magazine helped forge the modern evangelical movement. During Henry's twelve-year tenure, politics, the bane of the fundamentalists, became common fare for evangelicals. The next generation dutifully returned to the public arena.

In the 1970s, the first wave of modern evangelical activism was surprisingly left of center as evidenced by Evangelicals for McGovern, *Sojourners* magazine, Ron Sider's *Rich Christians in an Age of Hunger* (1977), Evangelicals for Social Action, and the Chicago Declaration: a call to action on the issues of peace, race, and poverty. In 1976, the year pollster George Gallup and soon thereafter *Newsweek* magazine proclaimed the "Year of the Evangelical," evangelicals helped elect President Jimmy Carter, "the best known Baptist deacon in America."

This dalliance with the Democratic Party was short-lived. The catalyst for change was the rise of social liberalism. As social liberals gained control of the Democratic Party as well as the nation's media outlets, entertainment industry, and colleges and universities, their values became increasingly ubiquitous. The shunning of traditional values and moral authorities left social conservatives, including evangelicals, reeling. Evangelicals were eager to join forces with anyone who would fight back.

The link between political conservatism and evangelicals solidified during the second wave of evangelical activism when

Republican organizers helped Jerry Falwell, a Baptist television minister with a largely fundamentalist audience, form the Moral Majority in 1979. Similar organizations developed around the same time: Focus on the Family (1977), Christian Voice (1978), Concerned Women for America (1979), Religious Roundtable (1979), and the Traditional Values Coalition (1980). During the Reagan years, these groups mailed millions of voter guides, registered hundreds of thousands of voters, and enlisted thousands of campaign workers. Their actual influence, however, is contested, and the most visible of the lot, the Moral Majority, eventually fell on hard times and was disbanded in 1989.

The third wave of evangelical activism surfaced when another television evangelist, Pat Robertson, mounted a campaign for the 1988 Republican presidential nomination. His campaign brought the Pentecostal/Charismatic wing of Evangelicalism into politics. Defeat did not dampen Robertson's ardor for politics; he soon formed the Christian Coalition (1989), which employed a grassroots strategy, helping evangelicals achieve new levels of success.

The cumulative effect of these three waves is clear: evangelicals across the board are more likely to vote and more likely to vote conservatively. Despite limited electoral success and frequent public ridicule, evangelicals remain, for the foreseeable future, a force to be reckoned with in American politics.

EVANGELICALISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Contemporary evangelicals are a fusion of disparate groups. There are sociological, historical, and most important, theological differences among them. Even the political views of evangelicals cover the full spectrum—left, right, and center. Although many are conservative, most are not actively involved in organized political action.

The movement approaches politics with an Augustinian perspective, a Protestant theology, and a republican spirit. Their Augustinian perspective, reflecting the lingering influence of St. Augustine of Hippo, emphasizes dual citizenship (in an earthly city and in the City of God), human depravity (the corruption of human nature due to sin), and the indispensability of civil society. Their Protestant theology prizes the authority of the Bible, the centrality of religious liberty, and the separation of church and state. Their republican spirit demands limited government, democratic populism, and moral virtue.

The conservative majority has a brand of conservatism that differs from libertarians, traditionalists, and neoconservatives. They believe in the idea of an enduring moral order that societies ignore to their own detriment. They believe the Bible is key to knowing that moral order and that institutions other than government (the family and the church) are essential to preserving that moral order. They have a keen awareness of human fallibility and thus see a need for prudent restraints on human appetites and institutional power. Generally populist, evangelicals recognize that tradition can embody sinfulness as well as wisdom; they understand that a free market does not solve all problems (and actually creates many), and they mistrust centralized power in most forms (including corporations).

Evangelical activism is often associated with social issues such as abortion, same-sex marriage, stem cell research, pornography, and school prayer. Although those issues remain important, evangelicals are increasingly active in pressing for human rights and providing humanitarian aid. Various faith-based evangelical organizations have fought the slave trade in Sudan, exposed human rights abuses in North Korea, combated child prostitution in Cambodia, and fought for religious freedom for Tibetan Buddhists. Other issues on their agenda include prison reform, racial reconciliation, global poverty, third world debt relief, environmental stewardship, and sex trafficking.

In his 2002 book, *The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity,* Philip Jenkins suggests that a conservative Christian resurgence is spreading around the globe in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Evangelicals are at the forefront of this resurgence. With some exceptions (evangelical Presbyterians in South Korea and evangelical Anglicans in Kenya and Nigeria), the rapid resurgence is largely a charismatic Pentecostal movement.

Comparative study of the political implications of the resurgence is a relatively new endeavor. Initial studies suggest (1) most evangelical movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are largely independent of evangelicals in the United States; (2) given the movement's lack of an organizational center, political agendas are generally determined by autonomous congregations in their local context; (3) much of the growth in Evangelicalism has occurred in disadvantaged and marginalized communities; and (4) evangelical churches serve as schools of democracy, teaching adherents important lessons about grassroots organization, civic leadership, and responsible participation.

Although evangelicals around the globe adhere to orthodox theological doctrines and traditional moral values, they are not easily categorized in liberal–conservative political terms. Evangelicals have endorsed right-wing authoritarian regimes, contributed to democratization, and supported leftist revolutionary movements. Political agendas vary from promotion of narrow interests to universal demands for democracy and human rights. They promote their agendas with a full range of political activity from running for public office (e.g., Lee Myung-bak in South Korea) to organizing minor political parties (e.g., Brazilian Republican Party) to defending basic human rights from the pulpit (e.g., Archbishop David Gitari in Kenya). Given these global developments, the political influence of Evangelicalism may well be even greater in the twenty-first century.

See also *Faith-based Initiative; Fundamentalism; Pentecostalism; Protestant Political Thought; Religion and Politics; Religious Right.*

. . . .   DAVID L. WEEKS

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Event History and Duration Modeling

Event history analysis is a statistical technique that assesses the risk of an event's occurring. An event is a change from one state to another, for example, death, entry of a challenger in an election, confirmation of a judicial nominee, or the onset of war. The dependent variable is the time until the event occurs; the model considers both whether and when an event occurs. This technique is also referred to as duration, survival, or reliability analysis.

Event history models manage problems common to longitudinal data, such as censored observations and time-varying covariates. Censoring occurs when information about an observation is incomplete, such as when an observation has not experienced an event before the data collection process ends. Time-varying covariates take on different values over time for a single observation.

Parametric models assume that the time until an event occurs follows a specific distribution. The semiparametric Cox model is more appropriate when the primary objective is to understand the impact of covariates on the risk of an event and is the most commonly used model in event history analysis. Semiparametric models do not specify a distributional shape for the timing of events but are parameterized by the explanatory variables.

Key concepts for estimating and understanding the event history models are the hazard rate, risk set, failure rate, and survival function. A hazard rate is the probability that an event will occur for a particular observation at a particular time. The risk set includes all of the observations that are still at risk for experiencing the event. Once an event occurs, the observation is incorporated into the failure rate. All observations that have not failed are included in the survival function. The hazard rate is the proportion of the failure rate to the survival function.

Diagnostic tests should be used in event history analysis and include diagnostics to test for outliers, influence, adequacy of the model, linearity in the covariates, and proportional hazards. If the proportional hazards assumption holds, the hazard rate will be the same at the first time period under study as it is at the last period under study. There are numerous substantive reasons one may not expect the assumption of proportional effects to hold, such as learning. To correct for nonproportionality, the offending covariate is interacted with some function of time.

Advanced event history models incorporate ordered multiple events (repeated events model) and unordered multiple events (competing risks model). In repeated events data, dependence is possible when an event is conditional on another event's having occurred or the result of correlation in repeated processes. The conditional frailty model can handle both types of dependence.

See also *Duration Model; Reliability.*

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Executive Immunity

Executive immunity aims to protect members of the executive branch by providing them the discretion needed to execute duties without fear of reprisal or civil liability. The U.S. Constitution fails to address the concept of executive immunity. Instead, the issue of granting immunity to members of the executive branch is often based on its adherence to

common-law principles. Declarations of executive immunity are quite complicated and are thus left to the discretion of the judicial system. As a result the legal basis for granting executive immunity is conflicting and perplexing.

In 1895, the Supreme Court in *Spalding v. Vilas* declared that executive branch officers were permitted absolute immunity. The tradition of limited presidential immunity goes back to this case. The courts frequently assert that the president or executive branch officials would be restricted in making decisions if immunity did not exist as a shelter. In *Barr v. Matteo* (1959), the Supreme Court stated that the purpose of immunity is to "aid in the effective functioning of government." Further rulings proposed the concept of qualified immunity and provided that absolute immunity would be granted as long as the official operated within the scope of his or her duties and did not knowingly violate the law.

See also *Executive Privilege.*

. . . .   RICHARD M. YON

Executive Order

Executive orders provide presidents with the unilateral authority to make decisions and, in many cases, law. The power to hand down executive orders, although not specifically stated in the U.S. Constitution, is implied through its grant of executive power to presidents and its requirement that laws be "faithfully executed." In executing their duties, all presidents have issued executive orders to control and guide executive branch agencies and departments. Congressional authorization is not required, but executive orders provide the same authority as laws passed by Congress and can be controversial.

Presidents have used executive orders to desegregate the military and schools and to end racial discrimination in federal housing and hiring. Congress provides the president with a considerable amount of discretion in executing laws, and, in many cases, Congress is not explicit as to how a law or program should be implemented. Therefore, presidents fill in the gaps and provide details for their execution by issuing executive orders. However, a president's actions are still checked. Executive orders can be overturned by the president or made invalid by the passage of a law. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court can declare executive orders unconstitutional.

See also *Executive, The.*

. . . .   RICHARD M. YON

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Executive Pardon

The Constitution provides the chief executive (the president) with the power to pardon: "he [the president] shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment." Three qualifications exist: the act being pardoned must have been an offense against the United States, impeachment cannot be involved, and the act in question must have already been committed. Pardoning is one of the more controversial powers exercised by the president because there is no check on this power; even though the judiciary is considered the arbiter of the Constitution, it is unable to oversee this executive function and rule on its constitutionality. Nevertheless, presidents seriously consider their options and exercise caution. A president's pardon may still raise the ire of the press, public, and Congress, as was the case when President Gerald Ford pardoned Richard Nixon. The power to pardon provides the president with the authority to constitutionally check abuses by the legislative and judicial branches. Rooted in English tradition, the pardon is at the president's sole discretion, and reasons for granting a pardon do not need to be disclosed. Presidents issue pardons to provide general amnesty to groups or to individuals whose actions were highly visible. President Jimmy Carter pardoned the Vietnam draft evaders; President Bill Clinton pardoned Marc Rich (the indicted international commodity trader), sixteen members of the Puerto Rican nationalist group FALN, and his own brother. President George W. Bush commutated the jail sentence of his former assistant I. Scooter Libby rather than issue him a pardon.

See also *Executive, The.*

. . . .   RICHARD M. YON

Executive Privilege

Executive privilege is the right granted to the president and executive branch officials that permits them to refuse to release information to Congress, the courts, and the public. Although the U.S. Constitution is not explicit in the provision of this right to the president, presidents have justified its use through the separation of powers doctrine that is inherent in the Constitution and the primacy of the executive branch in certain governmental activities, namely, foreign policy. Scholars believe that the concept of executive privilege is based on common law and derived from the English crown. Thus, "crown privilege," as it was referred to in England, was commonplace in monarchical systems.

Presidents frequently cite the precedents established by their predecessors in claiming executive privilege. The issue of executive privilege is quite perplexing. First, the American public and press genuinely encourage a strong presidency model. As such, presidential claims to executive privilege may at times be encouraged or implied by America's conventional support for a strong or activist presidency. Second, even though critical factions exist that challenge an activist president, seldom is there agreement on what is legitimately covered by executive privilege and what is not. Third, the Constitution lacks specificity on the subject, thereby making determinations of the constitutionality of a president's claim of executive privilege all the more difficult and indeterminate. Fourth, the Supreme Court usually defers to the president. Fifth, claims of executive

privilege are not exclusively issues about foreign policy but can encompass domestic policy as well. Furthermore, presidents usually are held to different standards depending on whether the issue is domestic policy or foreign policy. This double standard further aggravates the ambiguity surrounding executive privilege. Sixth, different outlooks on the issue of executive privilege suggest different institutional perspectives. Congress sees challenges to presidential authority as part of its constitutional obligation, while presidents see it as meddling in the affairs of the executive. Either way, these factors contribute to the controversial nature of executive privilege.

Several reasons provide justification for challenging a president's use of executive privilege. Critics argue that the use of executive privilege lacks a constitutional foundation. The Constitution is silent on the matter and does not explicitly state that the president does or does not have the authority to claim executive privilege. Another argument posed by critics has to do with the intent of the country's Founders. It is well documented that the Founders had reservations about a strong central government and a strong executive. In particular, they feared that a strong executive or president might transform into a tyrannical leader. Many in opposition to executive privilege view the exercise of power that is not explicitly granted to the president in the Constitution as bordering on abuse of power. According to critics, the unilateral and relatively unchecked nature of claims of executive privilege goes beyond the original intent of the Founders. Others argue that the principles and values that make America unique—open government, democratic society, and the free flow of information—come into question when something antithetical to these values is allowed. Furthermore, for the government to perform as intended, Congress should be fully provided with information about the actions of the executive branch. Last, presidents and their staffs are frequently accused of abusing the privilege. A few presidents and their staffers have invoked executive privilege to conceal illegal activities, cover up embarrassing information, and use it as a tool in maintaining political leverage. This cynical view of executive privilege is founded in the increasing distrust the average American has for government.

Regardless of whether executive privilege is indeed a power that can and should be exercised by the president and his or her staff or whether conditions should be placed on its usage, executive privilege is founded in the precedent established by George Washington and continued by his successors. Washington withheld certain portions of correspondence, which were requested by the Senate, between the secretary of state and the minister of the United States to France because he believed the information was damaging to the national interest. Similarly, Abraham Lincoln refused a congressional request to turn over information related to the arrests of Baltimore police commissioners at Fort McHenry. In 1901, William McKinley refused Congress's request for information regarding a War Department investigation into the use of Cuban funds. Last, George W. Bush invoked executive privilege and refused to release information regarding Vice President Dick Cheney's meetings with energy officials. As these examples illustrate,

presidents continue to claim executive privilege, regardless of the challenges, in executing their duties.

See also *Accountability; Checks and Balances; Executive, The; Transparency.*

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Executive, The

The word *execute* means "to put into effect"; thus, executive agencies are those institutions of government that carry out the will of whoever controls government. In a democracy, the executive is expected to follow the direction of popularly elected leaders; in a dictatorship, the executive is expected to do whatever the dictator commands. Every type of government relies on organizations that ensure that its laws are faithfully executed. In an era of big government, this means not only enforcing laws that require citizens to pay taxes but also executing laws that deliver benefits to citizens, such as education and social security checks.

Every state has a multiplicity of organizations to execute its many programs; otherwise the intentions of rulers would be only invocations of what they would like to see happen. To turn intentions into public policies that affect citizens, a government must have the organizational means to get things done. Without a functioning executive, a government would be little more than courtiers in the household of a monarch whose will has little or no effect outside the gates of the royal palace. With an effective executive, the Pharaohs of ancient Egypt were able to build pyramids and control the floodwaters of the river Nile. Today, the executive is used to deliver the public policies that collectively affect every household and every citizen. If executive institutions ceased to carry out their tasks, for example, in the aftermath of military defeat, this would result in a failed state. This occurred in Baghdad, Iraq, immediately after the U.S. invasion in 2003.

The organizations that put the intentions of governors into effect are described as the executive branch of government. *Executive* is a collective noun, and the organizations that can be grouped together under that heading differ in many respects. They can be headed by elected officials, political appointees, or individuals chosen because they are experts, for example, a medical doctor in charge of a public health agency. Some executive institutions are located in the national capital, while others are part of local government, and some have offices nationwide.

Executive agencies provide continuity in the work of government. Because a constitution is difficult to amend, the institutional structure of government changes little when an election replaces one president with another or when parties alternate between controlling the cabinet or being in opposition in a parliamentary system. In public policy whatever an election outcome, executive agencies maintain activities laid down in laws enacted by administrations in the past. The money to pay for these activities comes from public budgets

German chancellor Angela Merkel and U.S. president Barack Obama shake hands at a November 2009 meeting. As the national executives of their nations, Merkel and Obama follow the direction of those who voted them into office.

SOURCE: Corbis

funded by the routine collection of taxes by revenue agencies. Many of these laws were enacted so long ago that the services in question—free secondary education, social security benefits, or clean air—are taken for granted.

The structure of the executive branch is often described as a hierarchy: political officials at the top of a pyramid, deciding what ought to be done; expert civil servants advising on technical and practical matters of policy and supervising the actions of lower-ranking officials administering policies; and public employees at the bottom delivering the outputs of public policy. Alternatively, a geographical model characterizes the executive as a sprawling range of hills with the bulk of the population living in the valleys distant from policy makers at the peak of executive institutions. To execute policies nationwide, central government departments cannot be confined to the national capital. They must have regional and local offices, or the actual execution of policies must be placed in the hands of regional and local governments and specific functional institutions such as hospitals.

ORGANIZING FOR POLITICAL DECISIONS

To give direction to executive agencies requires the political power to make decisions that are binding on many lower-level public employees. Formally, this power can be placed in a single office, that of a president or a dictator, or it can be given to a collective body, such as the cabinet in a parliamentary system.

American government is an extreme example of a democratic system that formally concentrates executive authority in a single individual. Article II of the U.S. Constitution declares, "The executive power shall be vested in a president." The Constitution says little about what the executive power consists of, beyond that of being the commander in chief of the army and navy and appointing ambassadors and judges. At the end of the eighteenth century, the federal government had few policies and few resources.

Today, the policies and institutions of the executive branch are vast. The *United States Government Manual,* published annually by the U.S. Government Printing Office, requires almost five hundred double-column pages to list in succinct form the dozens of agencies into which the federal executive is divided. The roles of the president have expanded too. Today, the president is meant to be head of state, leader of public opinion, manager of the economy, commander in chief of the armed forces, and leader of the free world as well as head of the executive branch. Each of these roles is extroverted, that is, it directs attention away from what is happening within the executive branch to what is happening in the national economy, on other continents, and in public opinion polls.

Since the president has not gained any more hours in the week to deal with these problems, the more numerous and varied the activities of the executive branch, the less time a president can devote to the great majority of policies that officials carry out in the president's name. In the words of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt, "The president is the prisoner of first things first; and almost always something else comes first." The chief priorities for presidential policy making are major issues of national security and the economy, problems extending outside the control of the executive branch.

The president cannot be a hands-on chief executive as may be the case with the head of a business firm. Management by exception, that is, concentrating on what is out of the ordinary, leaves supervision of routine activities of the executive branch in the hands of others. Nominal subordinates may appropriate the authority of the White House to advance their own interests and importance. For example, Richard Nixon was not consulted by White House staff who organized the Watergate break-in; he nonetheless paid a high price for covering up what his nominal subordinates initiated.

On many continents political leaders have sought to be strong presidents unchecked by the courts, a legislature, or even free elections. This can lead to a dictatorship in which power is personal. Major executive agencies can be placed in the hands of loyal followers who can influence the execution of laws corruptly in ways that benefit themselves and their political allies and punish their opponents. In the Soviet Union, the Communist Party placed party officials within the executive to make sure that public officials followed the party line. Josef Stalin, general secretary of the Communist Party, used terror and arbitrary punishments to enforce his will on the executive. In Nazi Germany, underlings perverted the workings of the executive in enthusiastic attempts to carry out what they thought Adolf Hitler would want. The People's Republic of China is today an outstanding example of a collective, undemocratic executive, concentrating ultimate authority in the hands of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Parliamentary democracies place control of the executive in the hands of a cabinet consisting of a prime minister and major politicians in the governing party. Ministers are individually in charge of the departments that collectively constitute the executive branch. The prime minister can practice intervention by making a preemptive claim to handle a policy in a crisis rather than leave it in the hands of a cabinet minister; however, cabinet ministers collectively have their hands on the departments of government. The prime minister's political eminence makes him or her the focus of media attention, which is sometimes favorable and sometimes unfavorable. The prime minister holds office as long as he or she can maintain the confidence of a majority of members of Parliament. Individual ministers are concerned not only with heading a government department but also with promoting their own popularity in Parliament, in their party, and with the public.

European political systems usually have a coalition government relying on two or more parties to constitute a majority in Parliament. Ministers in charge of departments of the executive branch are politicians of different parties. Coalition government strengthens the position of departmental ministers, who tend to see their political role as giving direction to their own department and to benefit their own party rather than government as a whole. This weakens the prime minister's authority in the executive branch; his or her first priority must be to maintain the support of a coalition of parties, or he or she will lose office by the collapse of the coalition. An American president often has problems dealing with Congress but remains head of the executive branch for the full duration of a four-year fixed term.

The European Union illustrates what happens when officials in the equivalent of its executive branch, the European Commission in Brussels, lack executive power. Officials in the departments of the commission can make decisions that are meant to have an impact across the whole of the European Union. However, the commission depends on the national governments of its twenty-seven member states to translate its decisions into national laws and to administer them in ways that are consistent with the intentions of the commission. It does not have executive control over what is done in its name. Nor does the commission have sanctions to invoke against a government that drifts from the intent of its directives; this is left to the courts.

Because the executive branch is both large and heterogeneous, decision making cannot be concentrated in a single person or a cabinet meeting a few hours a week. The concept of the core executive has been developed as a complement to the legalistic description of the executive. For any given issue, the membership of the core executive consists of a network of limited size that includes representatives of the major political groups affected by a decision and its implementation. A president or prime minister monitors the deliberations of core executive groups dealing with major issues. In the very porous American system, participants can include select members of Congress, committee chairs, their staffs, lobbyists, academic experts, and others with a stake in an issue. The membership of the core executive is not fixed, as are such formal offices as president or prime minister. Instead, it shifts with the issue at hand: executive branch officials involved in executing national security policies differ from those executing health policies. When disagreements arise between different organizations, they are resolved by political negotiations: politics unites what institutions divide.

ORGANIZING TO DO THINGS

In the introverted world of politics within the national capital, the most important concerns are those affecting power struggles and bargaining within the core executive. But for the outcome of such struggles to influence society, those powerful within the core executive must reach out to deliver programs to citizens far from the corridors of power in cities, suburbs, and rural areas that are hundreds or even thousands of miles from the national capital.

To understand the execution of public policy requires broadening attention from the core executive within central

government to the great variety of public agencies deliver-ing programs wherever citizens live. In the American federal system, this includes state and local government institutions, separately elected school boards, public utilities, state universi-ties, and special-purpose organizations executing everything from sewage disposal to printing money. In European welfare states, executive agencies extend to hospitals and a number of industries in state ownership. Every executive agency can be characterized in terms of its territorial scope, whether national, regional, or local, and in terms of its functions, whether broad, such as education, or narrow, such as running programs for dis-abled children or funding research in science and technology.

The programs of government. Whereas the institutions of government describe what government is, the programs of government describe what it does. Historically, government developed to maintain domestic order and provide security against foreign invasion. To do this required an army, diplo-mats, a police force, courts, and tax collectors. These programs remain major concerns of governors today. The agencies exe-cuting these policies are at the center of central government; they also appropriate outside the country to deal with foreign policy, the international economy, and military and counter-terrorism actions. While the maintenance of public order can be described as a public good, many citizens have viewed col-lection of taxes as a public "bad."

Industrialization challenged government with new prob-lems, such as providing sewage and clean water in cities; today, government executes programs dealing with air pollution, wherever it occurs. Regulatory agencies were created to ensure safety at work and that food was not contaminated. Today, every government has a variety of executive responsibilities for industry, employment, and trade. Whereas laws and budgets for these programs are enacted in the national capital, they must be executed on the spot, as in the case of inspecting factories. Unemployed people seek jobs from local employment agen-cies, and trade departments promote the export of domestically produced products through offices on every continent.

Social programs now account for the bulk of the money that government spends. Social security is the most costly pro-gram, with health second and education third. These programs are important to individuals throughout their lives, and at any given time every household benefits from one or two of these programs. In this way people are in regular contact with exec-utive agencies such as local schools and hospitals far removed from decision making at the top of the executive branch.

The growth of government has not been led by a big increase in the number of popularly elected representatives but by the great increase in the number of programs that govern-ment delivers. In turn, this has greatly increased the variety of institutions that collectively constitute government's executive agencies. Growth has occurred not at the top of the executive branch but mainly at the base through the multiplication of schools, hospitals, and other agencies responsible for delivering services to citizens nationwide. To understand the sprawling range of executive agencies, we must look outside as well as inside central government.

Different structures for different programs. Every public agency is authorized by laws that set out its policies, resources, orga-nization structure, and geographical scope within which it can execute its responsibilities. Within government, there are big differences in goals, resources, and geographical scope. Depart-ments of defense within two countries are likely to have more in common than do a department of defense and a department of agriculture within the same country.

To deliver programs, executive agencies can draw on three resources: laws, money, and personnel. Although most pro-grams make at least minimal claims on all three resources, they differ radically in the relative importance of each. Programs concerned with citizenship or abortion tend to be law inten-sive: laws set out what people can or cannot do within a mini-mum of involvement by executive agencies. Social security programs are money intensive: the principal responsibility of a social security agency is to collect social security taxes and pay out social security benefits. Education and health programs are labor intensive; they entitle people to receive the services of teachers, doctors, and nurses.

The organizations that constitute the executive vary with the nature of the program. An organization chart that is limited to the top of the executive branch—for example, members of the cabinet in a parliamentary system or heads of presidential agencies—is misleading. Even though a department may have a head with singular authority, within every department divi-sions have different and competing priorities. In a department of health, there is a common goal of promoting good health, but there are differences in the spending priorities of those concerned with promoting the health of children, those car-ing for older persons in ill health, bureaus concerned with the treatment of mental health, and those dealing with cancer. In a ministry of education, the concerns and priorities may be related logically but not related in the work of bureaus responsible for such different educational programs as primary education, scientific research, and educating the blind.

From a program perspective, a map of executive agencies is radically different from an organization chart that focuses on the top of central government. An agency concerned with broad issues of economic policy will have few employees but a high concentration of economic experts. It will also be based as close as possible to the key political decision makers in the national capital. By contrast, an organization concerned with delivering the mail to every household requires a network of local offices to take mail to the doorstep, regional offices to sort mail for distribution, and a small central coordinating office in the national capital.

Very few agencies are hierarchical command-and-control institutions in which the decisions of the political head are meant to be executed without question. A ministry of defense approximates this form of organization because there is a clear chain of command from the lowest- to the highest-ranking officers in the army, navy, and air force. In turn, each armed service is responsible to a politically appointed minister of defense, and the minister is accountable to the president or to a cabinet and parliament. Yet this seemingly simple structure is

complicated by differences in the ways in which the army, the navy, and the air force provide defense and in intradepartmental competition about which should be given the most money and the best equipment. Moreover, while civilian heads of the military can pull rank on uniformed officers, career military officials can claim that their expertise in defense matters gives them a claim to influence political decisions.

Some executive agencies are top heavy because their programs are exclusively the responsibility of central government, for example, the foreign ministry. It is distinctive in having far more staff scattered across the globe in its embassies without any branches within the country it represents. By contrast, a traditional program of government such as trash collection is executed by local government agencies rather than by a central government department for trash. A pensions ministry is concerned with a program paying out money to millions of people wherever they live. It requires a central office to pool the payments that individuals and employers make and to make payments from its central fund by computerized bank transfer. Thus, the British agency responsible for paying pensions is located more than 200 miles (322 kilometers) from London, and in the United States the Social Security Administration is located in Baltimore, Maryland, rather than Washington, D.C.

Health and education programs require the dispersion of schools, doctors' offices, and hospitals nationwide. Federal systems make this a point of principle: many services of this type are primarily the responsibility of the states that are partners to a federal compact. Unitary states accept institutional devolution as a necessary consequence of the welfare state. In the most centralized unitary states, the national ministry of education may have regional and local offices, employ teachers at all levels from primary school upward, and make decisions about the school curriculum. However, the top minister's capacity to influence the delivery of services is shared with those who are employed locally, and local education authorities turn over responsibility for delivering education to school heads and then to classroom teachers. Teachers have professional training in how to educate youths and considerable discretion in the classroom due to the remoteness of their nominal superiors.

The executive is multilevel and has many sides. Within every executive agency, the personnel are mixed. The leadership can be elected politicians and partisan supporters. In the United States, the president appoints hundreds from outside the Washington, D.C., area to high positions. In Europe, many of these posts are occupied by civil servants who are very experienced in the affairs of the department. In Britain, they are politically ambidextrous, that is, prepared to work for a government from either side of the House of Commons, whereas in continental Europe, high-ranking civil servants can combine party loyalties and expert knowledge of government. Government departments also have senior staff recruited for their expertise, for example, generals and admirals in the department of defense, economists in the central bank, and scientists in a department of the environment. However, for every one person to give direction to a program, there are likely to be hundreds employed to deliver it.

A comprehensive map of the executive branch, like a geographical relief map, needs to take into account both peaks in the national capital and valleys where most citizens live and where most public employees work. It must also take into account differences between programs. Those concerned with problems that are collective, such as the ministry of defense and the central bank, must be in the national capital. However, those concerned with delivering services such as health care, trash collection, and roads must operate wherever citizens live. While most of the money spent by executive agencies comes from national taxation, most of the people employed in delivering public goods and services are employed by local and regional government or by hospitals, schools, and universities.

The functional and geographical diversity of executive institutions creates the problem of joining up government. President Woodrow Wilson reflected, "I live in the midst of the government of the United States, but I never saw the government of the United States." A half century later a report commissioned by President Lyndon Johnson concluded, "The federal government remains largely a collection of fragmented bureau fiefdoms unable to co-ordinate with themselves intelligently."

THE POLITICS OF THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT

Politics provides a dynamic stimulus to the routine activities of executive agencies. Different agencies that are nominally subordinate to the same president or cabinet can fight for budget resources, for priority in promoting new legislation, and for the president's or prime minister's favor. Within a government agency there are debates about which part of the agency should benefit if there is extra money to be spent and which part should suffer if there is a budget cut. There are also debates about whether and how many existing programs should be altered and which new programs an agency should promote. Politicians tend to favor making changes for which they can claim credit, whereas career officials tend to favor the status quo. Expert staff can be pulled two ways, favoring innovations that fit their professional views of what government ought to do while opposing initiatives that politicians endorse but that public employees could not deliver.

Agencies operating at different levels of government and responsible for different policies are becoming increasingly interdependent. For example, what universities teach undergraduate students depends in part on what is done in local schools in teaching mathematics and writing skills. National agencies concerned with promoting full employment rely on educational institutions to give their students skills that make them employable, and national agencies promoting new technology depend on what universities achieve.

In a unitary system of government, this creates intragovernmental politics. The national agency has the formal authority to make decisions, but the capacity to deliver programs requires the creation of a nationwide network of subordinate institutions. Even a country as centralized as Britain gives local governments responsibility for running schools, fire departments, and recreational facilities, and the creation of devolved

assemblies in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland creates grounds for dispute about political principles and about the details of implementing a policy.

In a federal system, cooperation between agencies dealing with the same problem is an intergovernmental matter since each is accountable to separately elected groups of citizens, and this can justify differences in priorities for taxing and spending. Even when national policies set out common goals, the ways executive agencies act to meet these goals can differ from one part of the country to another.

In today's world, public policies are increasingly becoming intermestic as domestic and international influences jointly affect what a public agency does. The penetration of international influences is no longer confined to national departments dealing with foreign affairs and defense. A local government in an area where old industries are declining will look abroad to attract investment in new industries and office work. From Thailand to the Caribbean and the Mediterranean, countries that lack industries have turned to tourism, with foreign visitors providing the money that can be used to pay for imports of such necessities as energy. Tourists need not only private enterprises to provide hotels and restaurants but also public agencies to keep beaches clean, streets safe, and natural beauty spots beautiful. A central bank may control money supply in the national capital, but what that money will buy internationally depends on what happens in trading on foreign exchange markets.

The growth in intermestic problems has led national governments to set up institutions to get things done by acting across national boundaries. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established in 1949 to provide for the collective security of Europe, the United States, and Canada. Its executive headquarters in Brussels is in charge of defense forces that integrate units from the national forces of more than twenty countries. The European Central Bank has replaced the national currencies of sixteen countries with the euro and sets interest rates for half of Europe from its headquarters in Frankfurt.

The creation of supranational executive agencies has not eliminated political problems; instead, it has added another level to the interinstitutional politicking of multilevel governance. North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces are still subject to decisions taken by national governments. This is illustrated by member states' differing about whether and how their national forces could be committed to action in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The European Central Bank controls the money supply of national governments, but it lacks executive authority over the decisions of national governments about taxing and spending euros. The lack of executive power is even more evident in organizations with global responsibilities. The World Bank's capacity to give grants to developing nations depends on contributions from the governments of developed nations because it lacks the ability to collect taxes. Any United Nations effort to intervene in violent conflicts depends for its execution on the provision of effective forces by member states.

See also *Bureaucracy; European Union (EU); Governance.*

. . . . RICHARD ROSE

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Exit Poll

An exit poll is a public opinion survey that is undertaken as voters leave polling facilities. Its goal is to provide an early approximation of who won balloting. Exit polls typically ask voters whom they voted for and record basic demographic data. They may also endeavor to measure voter attitudes on Election Day. Such polls are generally conducted by media outlets and provide indications of factors such as turnout and voter sentiment. In some countries, exit polls have been used to assess electoral fraud. If official results vary too greatly from the exit polls, it can be an indication of problems in the voting or counting systems. Exit polls have been criticized for providing inaccurate data since voters are not always truthful in their responses and problems with sampling points may skew the results. Increasingly, media outlets have pooled their exit polls or participated in joint polling in an effort to bolster the accuracy of their information. The early release of exit poll data has been criticized for depressing voter turnout: if early results indicate one candidate or party won, the supporters of the opposing candidates or parties may not vote. As a result, some countries, notably New Zealand, have outlawed the practice.

See also *Polling, History of; Turnout.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Experimental Design

Experiments offer a unique opportunity to examine the nature and direction of causal relationships between variables. Experiments represent a particularly effective and useful method when investigators need clear causal information, past studies have generated inconsistent or contradictory findings, multimethod validation is desired, or methodological triangulation may prove helpful in uncovering complex or subtle underlying processes.

Experiments typically refers to laboratory studies in which the investigator retains control over the recruitment, assignment to random condition, treatment, and measurement of participants. There are three important ways in which experiments differ

from other forms of social measurement. First, experimenters do not wait for events to occur and then observe and measure them; rather, experimenters create such situations, capture exactly what they are interested in studying, and measure those variables. Second, experimenters manipulate conditions so that some participants receive a control condition while others receive the treatment condition; then experimenters observe any systematic differences between groups or individuals, keeping everything the same except the manipulated variable. Third, experimenters randomize participants to conditions to ensure that observed differences do not result from preexisting differences between participants. Experimenters typically report average treatment effects and remain less concerned with the effect of a particular treatment on a given individual. Therefore, in analyses of results, demonstrating no effect may reflect a true finding but may result from additional factors that exert opposite effects on different kinds of people.

Experiments offer several important advantages. In addition to the ability to determine causal connections and randomize participants to conditions, experiments also allow scholars to take precise measurements of variables. Whether such measurements involve paper-and-pencil tests, physiological or behavioral measures, or other forms of self-report, experimenters can design and test the measurement strategies best suited for the scale and topic they are investigating. In this way, experiments allow researchers to begin to explore the microfoundational processes underlying a wide variety of social and political processes.

Experiments do not come without certain disadvantages. Experiments often present seemingly artificial situations and environments to unrepresentative participant pools. Artificial environments often result because it is either impossible or unethical to create the situation that the investigator wants to study. In addition, certain participants may or may not be suitably representative of the population most relevant for application.

Another important concern relates to the consequences of noncompliance among participants. Most experiments analyze data according to intent to treat, wherein participants are randomly assigned to treatment or control and the data are analyzed regardless of adherence to treatment or subsequent noncompliance or deviation from the experimental protocol. This can bias results if a participant's withdrawal from the experiment resulted from the treatment itself and not from some extraneous factor.

Experiments possess two kinds of validity, internal and external. *Internal validity* refers to whether a researcher is actually getting at the variables he or she claims to be investigating. *External validity* refers to whether particular findings can generalize to a larger, external reality. In general, psychologists are much more concerned with maintaining internal validity, whereas political scientists care much more about external validity.

Basic experimental design can take one of several forms. Within-subject studies examine changes within an individual as the result of a manipulation over time. Between-subjects studies explore the differences between people under these conditions. Often, it may be ethically impossible to compare individuals, as when a scientist wants to understand the effects of a certain disease; in such cases, a matching paradigm is used whereby control individuals are found who match the affected target participant in every way possible except for the existence of the illness or the other variable of interest. In matching designs, manipulations occur within the participant, but effects might then be compared across participants. Participants should never be matched to examine differences in a natural dimension such as race or sex because too many other variables are intertwined with such characteristics to make such a comparison valid or viable.

Field experiments and natural experiments are other kinds of experiments. Field experiments allow investigators to randomly assign individuals or groups to treatment and control. Although analyses must take account of additional contextual factors that can influence observed outcomes, they also permit an investigation of phenomena that might be hard to reproduce or study in a laboratory setting. In this way, there is a trade-off between a gain in external validity and a potential loss in internal validity. Natural experiments occur when an investigator takes advantage of a natural occurrence, such as a fire or hurricane, to examine particular consequences, but these experiments do not allow investigators to randomize participants across conditions.

Experimental incentives often differ. Participants in most economic experiments receive pay; participants in many experiments in psychology are given extra credit in return for participation. Finally, experimental ethics remains an important part of the process. Some experiments involve deception; others, such as those in economics, never do. All experiments should obtain informed consent from participants.

See also *Causal Inference; Field Experiment; Validity.*

. . . . ROSE MCDERMOTT

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Extradition

Extradition is an action of international cooperation in handing over a person accused of criminal activities. In this process one sovereign state delivers an accused criminal or fugitive to another sovereign state at the request of the latter state. There are two major reasons for this transfer: first, to repress criminal activities, and second, to allow for the lawbreaker's being

punished according to the penal laws of the state where the crime was committed. The process of extradition has advanced among nations to maintain law, order, and tranquility, thus promoting a general sense of peace and happiness in society.

The history of extradition treaties dates back to 1280 BCE between Ramses II of Egypt and the Hittite prince Hattusuli III. It was signed after Ramses defeated Hattusuli. Originally it was a peace treaty between the two rival kings, but provisions were put in place for the return of criminals of one party who had fled and taken refuge in the territory of the other. The word *extradition* is derived from a Latin word *extradere,* which means "forceful return of a person to his or her sovereign." The term *extradition* was first used in a French decree of 1792; this is refuted by some scholars who argue that the term was employed as early as 1555 by the parliament of Paris against the extradition of its nationals.

Historically, extradition was sought not only in criminal cases but also for the handover of political and religious opponents of the ruling party or the reigning families. In European history, religious and political opponents were delivered by the formal procedure of extradition. Sovereigns obliged other sovereigns by surrendering a person or a group of people who were responsible for affecting the stability of the political order of the requesting state. By the nineteenth century Western Europe turned against the extradition of fugitives accused of political offenses. Belgium was one of the first states to enact a law, in 1833, that incorporated the principle of nonextradition for political offenses.

In international law *extradition* is generally defined as "the surrender of an individual by the state within whose territory he is found to the state under whose laws he is alleged to have committed (or already have been convicted) of a crime." In the United States, international extradition is governed by federal law, leaving the states with no power to extradite persons to foreign countries. The European Union (EU) adopted the European Arrest Warrant Act in 2002, which was designed to harmonize EU state responses to threats of terrorism and cross-border crime. The European Arrest Warrant Act also abolishes the system of extradition among EU members and replaces it with obligations of mutually recognized arrest warrants issued by judicial authorities of the member states.

See also *International Cooperation; International Law; Multilateralism.*

. . . .   FARAH JAN

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Extraterritoriality

The term *extraterritoriality,* or *exterritoriality,* usually denotes the exclusion of foreign nationals from the territorial jurisdiction of the host country. The concept thereby deals with functional exceptions to the Westphalian principle of territorial sovereignty—either granted by international law or agreed on bilaterally. Exceptions under international law extend to cases such as military occupation and national ships on the high seas; bilateral military status-of-forces agreements are made routinely for externally deployed soldiers. Historically, the most classical example for extraterritoriality under international law was the doctrine on diplomatic status popularized by Hugo Grotius through his seminal work *De jure belli ac pacis* (1625). The concept is best explained through the image of an extraterritorial fictional space under the jurisdiction of the accredited country surrounding the diplomat. As this theory does not reflect state practice and international jurisdiction, it has been replaced by a concept explaining granted immunities and privileges through the functional necessity to efficiently exercise consular functions and diplomatic representation. Another historical application of extraterritorial jurisdiction concerned Western nationals in non-Western countries—such as Japan, Turkey, and China—who remained under national rule (during the second half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century).

In a wider sense, forms of extraterritorial rule and jurisdiction going even beyond nationals can be observed in reaction to global challenges overburdening single states. Examples are the fight against terrorism (cf. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 [2001], internationally prescribing specific legislation), universal jurisdiction, and international economic regulation.

See also *Diplomacy; Grotius, Hugo.*

. . . .   THORSTEN LUHDE

Fabianism

Fabianism has been one of the most discussed and controversial issues in political theory and practice in the later half of the nineteenth century and twentieth century. In England, the Fabian socialists, such as Sydney and Beatrice Webb, Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, G. D. H. Cole, William Clarke, and Annie Besant, realized the importance of the working class and visualized the possibilities of establishing socialism through a gradual process by increasing public ownership in industry and more representation of labor in the legislature, trade unions, and cooperatives. Whereas Eduard Bernstein's revisionism, influenced by the ethical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, was a direct attack on Marxism, Fabianism attacked Marxism indirectly. Fabian socialists believed in a gradual approach toward socialism through democratic means instead of revolutionary socialism. They were guided by the philosophy of the Roman general Q. Fabius Maximus, surnamed Cunctator, which means "delayer." Fabians believed in the philosophy, "For the right moment, you must wait as Fabius did most patiently when warring against Hannibal, though many censured his delays; but when the time comes you must strike hard as Fabius did, or your waiting will be in vain and fruitless" (see Mehrotra 1984, 246).

FABIANISM VERSUS MARXISM

The Fabians eschewed the revolutionary spirit of Marxism without ever adopting a doctrinaire attitude toward it. Unlike the Marxists, the Fabianists did not have any coherent philosophy. Nor did the Fabian Society have any authoritative spokesperson or a president. It was essentially a middle-class movement that Thomas Rush (1955–1956) noted was "free from any infusion of those of whose wrongs they were lecturing to set right" (p. 151). In Bernard Shaw's (1908) view, it was unreasonable to expect a society so constituted to be "ardent class strugglers" and "revolutionaries."

As intellectuals, the Fabians were more concerned with those values that suited their respective societies. They modified Marxism considerably. While retaining the revolutionary zeal of Marxism, they rejected its basic tenets, such as class struggle, economic determinism, theory of surplus value, dictatorship of the proletariat, and inevitability of revolution. Although Fabianism was based on the socialist creed of the Marxist traditional, historical, and economic foundation, they were poles apart from Marxism. For instance, whereas Marx found in history a continuous struggle between the haves and have-nots, Sidney Webb, one of the early Fabianists, observed that history constantly reveals both the "irresistible progress of democracy" and almost continuous progress of socialism. They did not consider socialism antithetical to democracy. Webb pointed out the fact that in England, middle-class suffrage superseded aristocratic suffrage in the early nineteenth century.

Fabianism emerged essentially as an English school of thought. Although Karl Marx spent the last thirty years of his life in England, Marxism never found a fertile ground. England being the mother of parliamentary democracy, the Fabians held deeply the view that transformation in the society could be brought by persuasion and flexible means. They did not believe in propagating socialists' ideas to achieve their desired goals. Rather, they sought elections to the local bodies, corporations, and Parliament with the aim of reforming the structure and working of the Parliament.

AN EVALUATION

The Fabians forgot the hard fact that the masses do not live on ideology alone, however sound or logical it might be. They also failed to realize that the parliamentary method is not "a way of confrontation" but of constant "adjustment, compromise and tactics" (see Dwivedy 1984, 348). The Fabians proved to be more ideological than pragmatic. They were generally criticized for their reformist attitude. J. Ellis Barker criticized Fabianism for being the least clear of a definite type of social order, and Friedrich Engels criticized the Fabians for their "tactics to fight the liberals not as decided opponents but to drive them onto socialistic consequences" (Mehrotra 1984, 253).

The Fabians were essentially reformers who believed in reforms without resentment and social reconstruction without dogma or fanaticism. Their socialism was the socialism of the simple minded; it signified indefinite extension of state activity. For most of the Fabians, it was "a journey with no assigned destination," wrote Alexander Gray (1946, 349). The Fabians played a significant role in practical politics by putting forward many workable schemes, such as social legislation, public ownership of basic industries, radical taxation, and welfare state.

See also *British Political Thought; Marxism; Socialism.*

. . . . ASHA GUPTA

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Faction

A faction is an informal or unofficial group within a political party or other body. Factions are typically formed to pursue specific policy or legislative goals. Factions may also be organized on a regional basis. These groups pursue objectives that may not initially be shared by the broader membership of the organization. They differ from caucuses or other formal groups because of their ad hoc basis. The groupings usually do not have a formal structure or leadership system, although some political parties' systems grant formal recognition to factions. Factions generally do not conduct regular meetings or conventions or prepare policy platforms. Factions can weaken the stability and solidarity of a political party. Their pursuit of narrow goals can undermine the broad appeal of a party or grouping. They may also create infighting within the party. Early proponents of democracy, including the Baron de Montesquieu, argued that factions and political parties would undermine democracy by subverting the general good to special interests. In the United States, factions dominated the political system before the rise of the formal party system. The early factions, the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, later evolved into the Federalist Party and the Democratic-Republican Party.

See also *Caucus; Interest Groups and Lobbies; Montesquieu, Charles-Louis.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Failed States

See *Collapsed and Failed States.*

Fainsod, Merle

Merle Fainsod (1907–1972) was a prominent American scholar in the field of Soviet studies. He taught at Harvard University for forty years and produced influential works that described and analyzed the Soviet system.

Fainsod was educated at Washington University in St. Louis and at Harvard University, where he received a doctorate in 1932. He joined the Harvard faculty, and in addition to serving as a professor of government, he worked in various positions in the U.S. government (1936–1943) and served as the director of the Harvard Russian Research Center (1959–1964) and of the Harvard Library (1964–1972). His dedication to the university led one colleague to describe him as "Harvard's man for all seasons," and his teaching influenced a whole generation of students, many of whom would make their own contributions to Soviet studies.

Fainsod produced a number of important works. *International Socialism and the World War* (1935) analyzed the downfall of the Second Socialist International and was praised as a work of political history and as an essay on political theory. *Smolensk under Soviet Rule* (1958), based on a unique archive of Soviet documents captured by the Germans in World War II (1939–1945), detailed the inner workings of the Stalinist dictatorship. Fainsod also wrote dozens of articles on Soviet politics and society.

His most important work, however, was *How Russia Is Ruled,* originally published in 1953. Drawing on a unique source of data from interviews with Russian émigrés in Europe, Fainsod presented a detailed picture of life in the Soviet Union, including both its political institutions and its social structure. Described as a paradigmatic volume, *How Russia Is Ruled* emphasized the totalitarian aspects of the Soviet Union under Stalin, including the centralization of leadership, repression, suppression of opposition, and the deification of the leadership. Terror, however, was the lynchpin of the system. In addition, through use of data from interviews, he focused on inequality within the Soviet Union and the emergence of a hierarchical structure in a political system that ostensibly stood for equality of all. He also highlighted how loyalty to the Soviet system was weakest among the workers and peasants, the very classes supposed to be served by the Communist Party. *How Russia Is Ruled,* path breaking as one of the first empirical analyses of the Soviet Union as it really functioned and drawing on survey data, became the preeminent text in the field, and Fainsod's methods and insights would shape the field of Soviet studies.

Some suggested that changes in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death in 1953 made some of Fainsod's assessments dated. As a result, his classic work was extensively revised, was retitled *How the Soviet Union Is Governed* (1979), and included Jerry Hough, one of his former students, as a coauthor. Unlike Fainsod's original work, this volume emphasized that many features of Soviet politics and society were comparable with those in Western democratic states. Its arguments, as well as the fact that it was published with Fainsod's name on it, generated controversy within the field.

See also *Soviet Union, Former.*

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Fairness

The distinctive domain of fairness is decision-making processes or institutions. The concept of fairness is closely linked to a number of other moral concepts, including justice, equality, and impartiality. Like these other notions, fairness centers on how people are treated by others, especially the requirement that everyone be treated alike unless there are good reasons to treat particular people differently. Thus, a fair procedure makes decisions or allocates benefits or burdens on the basis of appropriate criteria, which are applied similarly to all cases unless exceptions can be justified. Fairness is appealed to in assessing both means through which decisions are made and the outcomes decisions bring about. The former is generally labeled "procedural" fairness, the latter "distributive" fairness. Although these two dimensions of decisions frequently run in tandem (i.e., fair procedures give rise to fair outcomes, and unfair procedures to unfair outcomes), this may not always be true. While the notion of fairness pertains to both dimensions, it is more closely associated with procedures, whereas the notion of justice (distributive justice) is generally more closely associated with outcomes.

Specific qualities that constitute fairness vary across contexts, in accordance with the nature of different decision processes or institutions. The variety of relevant contexts requires a corresponding range of criteria of fairness. For instance, in a fair election, candidates compete on even terms. In a fair bargain, participants reach an agreement under conditions that are similar for all, with no one having an advantage over others. In a fair trial, court officials are not biased toward one or another of the parties involved. In these and countless other cases, fairness turns on people's being treated equally, with departures from equality requiring justification, although exactly what constitutes equal treatment varies according to context.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

The concept of fairness has a long lineage. The *Oxford English Dictionary* gives examples of *fairness* and cognate words used in English with their present sense as far back as 1460. But we find clear instances in other languages many centuries earlier. For example, although the Greeks lacked a word that clearly means "fairness," Thucydides uses the concept in his *History of the Peloponnesian War* (late fifth century BCE). He describes the besieged people of Melos asking their Athenian besiegers to consider "that in the case of all who fall into danger there should be such a thing as fair play and just dealing (*ta eikota kai dikaia*)" between people. In other words, they request that similar rules apply to the strong and the weak without regard to differences in power. In his *Politics* (late fourth century BCE), Aristotle argues that standards of justice or fairness differ in different regimes. In democratic regimes, ruled over by the many who are poor, the governing idea is that people should be treated alike, so political offices should be distributed through a lottery system, while according to this view, free birth and citizenship constitute being alike. In contrast, in oligarchical regimes, ruled over by the rich, fairness is treating people differently, according to their merits,

with amount of property in this case constituting degree of merit. An important lesson of Aristotle's account is that there is no generally accepted standard of fairness with regard to either procedures or distribution. Different ways of dealing with people may seem to be fair as long as they accord similar treatment to people who are similar in important respects.

RECENT USAGE

In recent years, fairness has received considerable attention because of the work of John Rawls and his theory of "justice as fairness." In *A Theory of Justice* (1971), Rawls argues that specific principles of justice can be justified by showing that they would be chosen by representative individuals placed in a carefully constructed, artificial-choice situation. To ensure that people's particular interests do not influence their choice of principles, Rawls places the representative individuals behind a hypothetical "veil of ignorance." They are to choose principles without knowing about their own specific identities or attributes (e.g., social position, talents, religion, sex, age). Rawls calls his theory justice as fairness because this designation conveys the idea that the resultant principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair. In recent years, different aspects of fairness have figured prominently in social science research. Researchers have examined people's views about procedural fairness in political, business, education, and other settings. Numerous studies support the strong effects of procedural considerations, which are not only distinct from outcome considerations but frequently more influential, even in cases with highly unfavorable outcomes. In assessing a variety of institutions, participants have been shown to place greater weight on their views of how decisions are made than on how the outcomes of the decisions affect them. An important implication of this so-called fair-process effect is the realization of people's willingness to accept undesirable decisions if they believe that the decisions have been made fairly. This has special salience with regard to political or other systems that require sacrifice of their subjects. Contrariwise, people have been shown to react strongly against decision processes they view as unfair, especially when decisions have outcomes they also view as unfavorable.

Concerns about fairness are also appealed to in order to ground moral requirements to support cooperative associations. The principle of fairness (or fair play), developed by H. L. A. Hart in 1955, is based on fair distribution of benefits and burdens. When a number of people join in cooperative activities to produce and receive common benefits, other people who receive the benefits but do not share the burdens of providing them (i.e., free riders) may be viewed as treating the cooperators unfairly. To remedy this situation, they too should cooperate, even if they would prefer not to. Developed along these lines, the principle of fairness grounds an influential recent account of why people should obey the law. Given the large-scale cooperation necessary to produce essential benefits of contemporary societies that include national defense and law and order, people who receive the benefits incur moral requirements to bear their fair share of the burdens required to produce them. Since important state benefits are coordinated

by the law, the principle of fairness can support general moral requirements to obey the law.

See also *Equality and Inequality; Justice and Injustice.*

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Faith-based Initiative

President George W. Bush's faith-based initiative had three primary components—regulatory reform, technical assistance, and tax reform—each designed to help religious social service providers partner with government.

The regulatory reform component included legislation designed to expand charitable choice to nearly all federal social service programs. These provisions, originally added to the 1996 welfare reform legislation and included in three subsequent laws, reduced barriers, thereby allowing religious organizations to apply for federal funding while maintaining their religious character. The second part provided technical assistance to smaller social service providers to help them navigate the federal grant process. The final piece, tax reform, sought new tax incentives to help charities.

The faith-based initiative was a high priority for Bush. Issued on January 29, 2001, Bush's first executive order created the White House Office of Faith-based and Community Initiatives (WHOFBCI) to help coordinate and implement faith-based initiatives. His second executive order created faith-based centers in five cabinet-level departments; two later orders added five more.

The regulatory and tax proposals attracted controversy and failed in Congress, but the WHOFBCI and its satellites succeeded behind the scenes in changing regulations, earmarking money for faith-based organizations, and generally transforming the relationship between the executive branch and religious groups.

President Barack Obama retained the faith-based office, changing its name to the Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships and creating an interfaith advisory council.

See also *Church and State; Religion and Politics.*

. . . . AMY E. BLACK

False Consciousness

False consciousness is a concept often attributed to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels that explains the oppressive processes and the possible misguiding effects of the dominant ideologies on individuals and masses. In fact, Marx and Engels do not use the phrase *false consciousness* in their collaborative writings, although they clearly acknowledge the fact that ideologies imply a view of reality that is "illusory, deceptive, partial, distorted" (McCarney 2005). The idea of a false consciousness was later used by several philosophers such as the French poststructuralist thinker Louis Althusser, who explained that whenever masses adopt the dominant ideologies, they get a false representation of reality.

The efficiency of ideologies precisely creates in the minds of the masses a kind of illusion about one's place in society. For example, the working poor living in urban North America would feel less like victims or exploited workers if they regularly watched the evening news relate cases of poorer people living in the third world and facing natural disasters and political corruption. In other words, false consciousness is the distorted perception of the masses. According to Marxism, the common individual does not adopt a false consciousness because he or she is unintelligent or because he or she is voluntarily creating stories but rather because the dominant ideologies make the world and reality appear as represented by the dominants.

In that sense, the mass media often contribute to the reproduction and perpetuation of the false consciousness, while the alternative media often try to reveal and denounce it, traditionally appealing to the awakening of the silent masses and crying for social change. In the same fashion, totalitarian regimes, such as North Korea, encourage a flattering, idealized image of themselves and try to ban any kind of critique. In the first pages of his book *False Consciousness* (1962/1976), French sociologist Joseph Gabel identifies racism, such as anti-Semitism, and Stalinism as two important examples of false consciousness. Believers of these two ideologies were morally wrong although they were convinced that anti-Semitism and Stalinism were solutions for a better world.

The academic study of false consciousness is fundamental in disciplines such as political science, sociology, philosophy, and cultural studies. In 1960, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu introduced the concepts of habitus and doxa to explain that most people accept the dominant ideologies as inevitable. The conceptual and theoretical study of false consciousness is also central in the works of European sociologists such as Karl Mannheim, Gyorgy Lukács, Raymond Boudon, and Nicholas Abercrombie.

See also *Althusser, Louis; Anti-Semitism; Bourdieu, Pierre; Ideologies, Political; Lukács, Gyorgy; Mannheim, Karl; Marxism; Stalinism.*

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Family Values

Although *family values* can, in theory, apply to any of the world's many cultures—entailing an endorsement of traditional families as the building blocks of strong societies—the term has special importance for students of American politics and the American culture wars, which characterized the political landscape during the 1980s and 1990s. While never a strictly partisan term, *family values* played an important role in the Republican Party's efforts to gain and keep the support of social conservatives during those years and into the twenty-first century. Vice President Dan Quayle's address to the Commonwealth Club of California in the spring of 1992—in which he criticized television character Murphy Brown for bearing a child out of wedlock, connecting a post-1960s "poverty of values" with the hopelessness of urban poverty that fed the Los Angeles riots of that year—represents perhaps the most noted example of the rhetoric of family values.

Family values is an umbrella term referring to issue positions that combine a rejection of the many changes in post-1960s sexual morality with a defense of traditional family structures. It emerged out of opposition to the rise of modern feminism, *Roe v. Wade,* and the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, each of which was presented as part of a wider assault—pursued by a countercultural elite—on traditional values. (The Family Research Council, the American Family Association, and Focus on the Family—three of the most prominent groups promoting a family values agenda—were formed between 1977 and 1983.) Just how closely such family values resemble actually existing families in the nation's pre-1960s past remains a contested question, as Stephanie Coontz argues in *The Way We Never Were* (1992). The positions generally subsumed under the category of family values include a defense of traditional heterosexual marriage and support for legislation or a constitutional amendment defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman; opposition to abortion and support for adoption alternatives; support for public policies that encourage intact, two-parent families and discourage divorce; and opposition to media violence and pornography. Somewhat more broadly, family values evokes such character traits as deference toward authority, self-discipline, sexual restraint, and respect for one's elders.

Although, as mentioned above, the politics of family values in the United States does not divide evenly along partisan lines, it is undeniable that the Republican Party has been far more adept than the Democratic Party at building alliances based on such an agenda, and strong Christian right support for Republican candidates throughout the 1980s and 1990s provides evidence of this Republican success in speaking the language of family values. (More generally, Bill Clinton's critics often cited his admission of marital infidelity as evidence of his lack of commitment to traditional family values.)

Democrats speak of family values as well, but with far less attention to sexual behavior and far more attention to economics, often stressing a commitment to such issues as a living wage for working families threatened by poverty, universal health care to enable families to pay skyrocketing bills, and support for government services that aid families in balancing work and home life. Hillary Clinton's book *It Takes a Village* (1996), published while she was First Lady, places special emphasis on the many important factors outside the family that influence children's prospects for safe and happy lives. Bob Dole, the 1996 Republican presidential nominee, fired back in his acceptance speech, "It does not take a village to raise a child. It takes a family to raise a child." And in 2005, then senator Rick Santorum (R-Pa.) authored *It Takes a Family: Conservatism and the Common Good,* an overt demurral from Clinton's earlier work.

Debates about family values often evoke the culture wars thesis about American politics during the 1980s and 1990s. James Davison Hunter (1992) sketches out an American cultural-political landscape populated by two competing moral visions. On one hand, Americans holding orthodox views tend to see truth and morality in fixed terms and occupy tightly bounded communities that locate the sources of moral authority in an unchanging transhistorical or transcendent essence. Such a position views moral obligations as fairly concrete, personalized, unchanging, inflexible, and unaffected by the passage of time or with scientific or technological progress. On the other side of the cultural battleground, Hunter locates progressives who understand moral obligation and commitment as requiring a sensibility to historical or situational context and who view ethical obligations as unfolding and evolutionary in nature.

See also *Abortion and Politics; Culture Wars; Left; Right; Voting Behavior.*

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Fanon, Frantz

Frantz Fanon (1925–1961) was an ethno-psychiatrist and political theorist who spent his adult life fighting racism and promoting social justice. He was a Renaissance man who practiced medicine, actively resisted French imperialism, and wrote prolifically on a range of issues across the disciplines of political science, psychology, sociology, and economics. He is

widely known in the early twenty-first century as an antiracist revolutionary who advocated violence as a means of liberating the third world from European colonialism.

Fanon was born in Fort-de-France, Martinique. He was the fifth of eight children born into a middle-class black family that had the means to send him to the Lycée Schoelcher, where he received a French-colonial education. As an Afro-Caribbean growing up in a French colony, he witnessed at an early age white condescension and racism toward blacks. At the same time, he was taught by the Négritude poet Aimé Césaire, who challenged the dominance of French culture and advocated black pride. The psychology and politics of colonialism thus became dominant themes in Fanon's life and work.

In 1943, at the age of eighteen, Fanon joined the Free French forces led by Charles de Gaulle and was sent to fight in North Africa and Europe during World War II (1939–1945). After the war Fanon returned to France and studied psychiatry at the University of Lyon. He defended his dissertation in November 1951 and in the following year married Marie-Josephe Dublé, with whom he had one son. While working at a hospital in Saint-Alban, France, Fanon observed a variety of psychiatric problems among Algerian and Moroccan immigrants resulting from French racism, which he called the "North African syndrome." These experiences provided material for a collection of essays on language, sexuality, racism, and black identity that were published in a seminal book titled *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952).

In 1953 Fanon was appointed chief physician at the state hospital in Blida-Joinville, Algeria, which was then part of France. While caring for patients there he again observed the many pathological effects of French racism against the Algerians. Deciding that he could no longer work for the French in their colonial hospital, he joined the Algerian independence movement Front de Libération National (FLN) and resigned from his post. The French subsequently expelled Fanon and his wife and son from Algeria. Exiled in Tunisia, he continued practicing psychiatry and began writing for *El Moudjahid* (The Freedom Fighter), the underground newspaper of the FLN. He became the spokesperson for the FLN, twice narrowly escaped assassination, and in 1960 served as the Algerian ambassador to Ghana.

Fanon was diagnosed with leukemia in late 1960 and sought treatment first in the Soviet Union and then in the United States. While sick and dying, he hurriedly finished *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961), a masterpiece for which French existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre wrote the preface. This book, in which Fanon wrote that colonized peoples are emancipated through violence against their oppressors, quickly became an iconic handbook of third world liberation. When Fanon died on December 6, 1961, at the age of thirty-six, he was hailed by many as a revolutionary prophet.

See also *Colonialism; Race and Racism; Racial Discrimination; Sartre, Jean-Paul.*

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Al-Farabi

Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Uzalagh ibn Tarkhan Abu Nasr al-Farabi (c. 870–950) probably was born in Wasij, a village area of the city of Farab in Transoxiana. Likely of Turkic origins, he has become known in modern times as al-Farabi after his city of origin rather than as Abu Nasr as was traditional among Muslim scholars.

Many of the details of al-Farabi's life are unclear. One source is his short semiautobiographical history of philosophy, *Kitab fi zuhur al-falsafah* (*Book on the Rise of Philosophy*), which survives as a few fragments documenting several events in his life.

A prolific author, al-Farabi completed more than one hundred books dealing with logic, literary theory, politics, philosophy, and all the sciences known to the medieval world, with the exception of medicine. Al-Farabi was fluent in Arabic, Turkish, Persian, Syriac, and Greek. As a linguist he wrote several commentaries on Aristotle's *Poetics, Rhetoric,* and *De Interpretatione.*

Al-Farabi probably completed his Quranic studies in Bukhara, where he became an Islamic judge (*qadi*). He was a practicing Sufi whose musical writings included discussions of the therapeutic benefits of music on the soul. These discussions were allied with his writings on psychological matters.

To complete his mastery of Arabic, al-Farabi studied in Baghdad. He also mastered the subject of logic, surpassing his teachers in the subject and dominating the field during his lifetime. One of his logic teachers, Yahanna ibn Haylan, a Nestorian Christian, made the writings of Neoplatonism available to him.

Al-Farabi traveled to Egypt and Ascalon after his stay in Baghdad. He then moved to Aleppo, where the Hamdani ruler Sayf al-Dawlah, a patron of the arts, took al-Farabi into his court.

Because of the importance of his work in philosophy, al-Farabi is called the Second Teacher (*al-Mu'allim al-Thani*) in the history of Islamic philosophy, with the first teacher or major philosopher being al-Kindi. As a philosopher, al-Farabi was greatly influenced by Neoplatonism, expressing his metaphysical views in his work, *Ibsa al-Ulum* (*The Enumeration of the Sciences*).

Al-Farabi was the first Muslim to write works on political philosophy. He was also the greatest political philosopher of the early Middle Ages. His political works were the last of his writings and include *al-Siyash al-Madaniyah* (*Civil Polity*), *al-Sirah al-Fadilah* (*Virtuous Regime*), and *al-Madinah al Fadilab*

(*Virtuous City*). In addition, his summary of Plato's last book, *Laws,* was the only commentary on the book until the 1800s.

See also *Arab Political Thought; Islamic Political Thought; Political Philosophy.*

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Farm Lobby

The farm lobby is a collection of interest groups representing agricultural producers in the United States. It held sway in U.S. agricultural policy for most of the twentieth century and continues to be influential today.

The political organization of farmers in the United States began with the Granger movement, which lobbied successfully in state legislatures for the regulation of railroads in the 1870s and 1880s. The movement produced several state associations and the first national organization of farmers, the National Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry, which was founded in 1867. However, farmers' organizations did not establish a permanent presence in Washington until World War I (1914–1918) when the National Grange, the National Farmers Union, and the American Farm Bureau Federation opened offices in the nation's capital. Of the three peak associations, the Farm Bureau had the largest, most prosperous, and most broadly dispersed membership, and it was the most significant by a good measure.

The farm lobby rose in access and influence during the interwar period. In one notorious instance in 1921, it enlisted a farm bloc of sympathetic senators and representatives and ambushed the congressional leadership on the eve of adjournment, winning several concessions, including passage of the Packers and Stockyards Act and the Futures Trading Act. Motivated to address a postwar economic crisis, it invested most of its energy in a campaign for economic aid to its core constituency, farmers of corn, wheat, cotton, tobacco, and milk. Unsuccessful in the Republican era, its lobbying efforts paid off with the passage of the New Deal Agricultural Adjustment Act in 1933. The farm lobby played a central role not only in Capitol Hill committee rooms but also in the offices of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and in the farmer-elected Agricultural Adjustment Act committees that administered the subsidy program in the countryside.

For its first three decades, the farm lobby maintained a bipartisan posture, working with farm state representatives and senators on both sides of the aisle. However, after the Second World War, debates about the nation's agricultural policy became politicized, and the farm lobby split on ideological lines. During the Eisenhower and Kennedy-Johnson administrations, the Farm Bureau and other conservative elements of the farm lobby supported Republican reforms in the agricultural subsidy programs that were opposed by the Farmers Union and other liberal groups. As interest groups representing producers of particular commodities proliferated, the farm lobby also fragmented. In the 1970s, the farm lobby patched up its ideological divisions, but it no longer speaks in one voice to the extent it did at midcentury. Still, the farm lobby remains a formidable presence in its domain. Since the Reagan administration, it has successfully resisted Republican attempts to curtail agricultural programs and Democratic initiatives to turn them to broader, progressive purposes—despite the dramatic decline in the economic and electoral importance of farmers.

Because of the farm lobby's political prowess, political science scholarship has taken an active interest in it. The farm organizations were among the earliest mass-membership advocacy groups, and they are a subject of many leading studies of interest group mobilization and membership. Truman (1951), for example, uses the agricultural sector to illustrate the way destabilizing disturbances in social relations propel the formation of lobbying groups, and Olson (1971), in critique, draws on the history of the Farm Bureau to show the importance of selective incentives in the maintenance of collective action. The farm lobby's interventions in the political process are textbook cases of the ways and conditions of interest group influence in American politics. With studies of agricultural politics, political scientists have analyzed the methods of group representation in Washington, influence of group cohesion and governmental structure, patterns of cooperation and conflict, exchanges of political intelligence and support, financial contributions to election campaigns, logrolling and coalition building, and organizational repertoires and governmental reforms on interest group access and influence.

The farm lobby also figured in the development of the pluralist model of American democracy and critiques thereof. In a classic statement of pluralist theory, Truman (1951) used the activities of the farm lobby to develop a group interpretation of American politics, depicting the political system as an equilibrium among organized and potential interest groups. In an early critique, McConnell (1953) related the decline of broad, inclusive, and democratic agrarian politics to the rejection of party mobilization and the embrace of interest group politics in the formation of the Farm Bureau. Likewise, Lowi (1979) used the farm lobby's involvement in legislation and administration of agricultural policy as a prime exhibit of the pathologies of pluralism's progeny, interest group liberalism.

See also *Agrarianism; Coalition Formation; Interest Groups and Lobbies; Lobbying; Pluralism.*

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Fascism

As an ideal type, Fascism is an ultranationalist totalitarianism of the extreme right and an ideology of the twentieth century, the era of mass politics. Fascism has appealed to people who reject modern bourgeois democracy, with its individualism and materialism, but who also oppose revolutionary communism.

The earliest Fascist governments were a reaction to the social upheaval, economic decline, and psychological impact of World War I (1914–1918) and its aftermath in postwar Europe. The despair of Europeans, their suffering and deprivations during this interwar period (1918–1939), together with the fear of communism, fed into a willingness by many people to blame other groups (usually racial) and nations for various economic and social problems, and to follow politicians who voiced their grievances. The rise of Fascism demonstrates how democratic liberties can be abolished and totalitarian ideas and regimes gain acceptance.

REGIMES

The first Fascist government came to power in Italy in 1922, led by Benito Mussolini (1883–1945). Mussolini skillfully combined syndicalism with nationalism. He called for direct action and advocated a national mission to revolutionize society from above, using government, and from below, using a mass movement to create an organized and robust community. To Mussolini, all liberty belongs to the state, and the only individual rights are those that stem from the needs of the state. Under the guidance of its natural leader, or *Duce,* the nation finds liberation from bourgeois and Marxist values in a culture dominated by elite warriors, heroic men ready to sacrifice their lives and their treasure for the good of the nation.

Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) came to power in Germany in 1933, demanding revision of the entire domestic and international order and promising new, permanent solutions. The

Benito Mussolini, left, and Adolf Hitler led the first fascist governments, capitalizing on nationalism, racism, and imperialist expansion to maintain their regimes.

SOURCE: © Michael Nicholson/Corbis

prior government, dominated by social democrats and their allies, seemed unable to respond to a series of crises faced by a German people despondent after losing World War I and confronting heavy war reparations, together with massive unemployment, daily violence in the streets, runaway inflation, and a worldwide economic depression. The result was a population with shattered belief systems, willing to submit to any authority that promised to reestablish the old values and greatness of the past. Offering national salvation and leading a political revolution that secured social stability by applying a reactionary program combined with economic and social modernization, Hitler soon replaced the democratic constitution of the Weimar Republic with a dictatorship of his National Socialist German Workers', or Nazi, Party that made him supreme leader (*Fuehrer*) of both state and party.

Hitler's autobiography, *Mein Kampf* (1925, 1926), presages key themes of his years in power. He combines radical and

conservative notions in an often-shifting muddle of ideas. Hitler views Mussolini as an early model but soon surpasses him, emphasizing a more virulent form of racism that is irrational, anti-intellectual, and antimodern on its face and includes large doses of pseudoscientific social Darwinism: all life is an instinctive struggle by the pure race for victory over all other races, and for a loving unity among racial brothers. This is the historical destiny of the superior Aryan race.

Hitler posits that world history is made by culture founders, the pure race, which is strong, loyal, and willing to realize its historic mission and obey the leader. This race is the source of all natural leaders and is destined to rule the world. All loyal members must be willing to sacrifice themselves to this end, to be ready to hate and kill their racial enemies to the point of total extermination, and to dedicate themselves to absolute obedience to the leader and his chosen deputies.

Hitler's regime institutionalized the leadership principle. He was the absolute leader, answerable to nobody else, the only one who truly knew the will of the people and could lead them to their promised destiny as rulers of the world. He instituted a virtual police state under the direction of Heinrich Himmler (1900–1945), which empowered the new, paramilitary army of elite men whose only thoughts were to obey and fight for their leader to establish a legal reign of terror, including establishing death camps and concentration camps, and to arrest, imprison, and murder enemies of the regime. Every institution was designed to express the spirit of the *Volk* and to advance the victory of the Aryan race. To gain control, Hitler's followers first used street violence. Once in power, state violence was employed.

Together with his minister of propaganda, Joseph Goebbels (1897–1945), Hitler refined the big lie as a means to keep the masses in line. They used emotional appeals to a romanticized nationalism, including myths of a wonderful past that would be resurrected once all their enemies were defeated. A cult of personality was created around the supreme leader.

Mussolini's Fascist Italy and Hitler's Nazi Germany provide two concrete examples of Fascism in practice. They illustrate both the interaction of ideas and their application in a tangible setting, which at times led to the diluting or jettisoning of what had earlier seemed to their followers essential objectives. Many ideas were declared but never implemented, such as nationalization of trusts, profit sharing by large enterprises, communalization of wholesale distribution, and division of landed property. Indeed, some of these ideas were directly undercut by Hitler's support of conservative elites willing to be co-opted by him, such as the Prussian landed aristocracy, the military, the bureaucracy, and major capitalists. But he voiced a few constant themes: racial purity, the leadership principle, and the importance of *Lebensraum,* or imperialist expansion of national borders to provide living space and abundant resources in the east for favored ethnic groups.

AIMS AND METHODS

In light of the often thin relationship in Fascist governments between theory and practice, some consider the importance

Fascists place on irrational myths, social Darwinist ideas such as survival of the fittest, and racism as a capricious mix of often conflicting or incoherent promises signifying little of substance other than political opportunism in the service of power. Nevertheless, there are constants that can be identified, then related to philosophies and other ideologies and illustrated with reference to the goals and practices of actual regimes.

Fascist goals are reactionary, offering coordinated political action to revive a mythic triumphal era of the past, including traditional class structures and relationships, through the creation of a new order dominated by a new man whose mission is to cleanse the world of all enemies of the people, revolutionize society, and create a new way of life and a new civilization to be enjoyed by all. Only then can a new national civilization be realized.

Fascism promises to secure these utopian goals by instituting an elitist, repressive state apparatus that does not shrink from violence and bloodshed. Fascists believe the state should have every right to intervene in any sphere of human activity. Total conformity is demanded. No individual or group political or social rights against the state are permitted; neither is any disagreement with state goals. Any who are different and who might dissent and thus threaten the regime lose their freedom to act independently, especially religious and labor groups, academics and other intellectuals, and artists.

Fascism sees unlimited government at the moral center of the nation, and only a single political party is permitted to exercise total power. That party and its offshoots in the government and secret police organizations embody all the virtues of the new man, whose only purpose is to obey and fight for the leader. These bodies are entitled to wield unrestricted power as their members employ a monopoly of terror, organized violence, even genocide, unchecked by any law, against regime enemies.

Fascists' reviled enemies are members of repudiated, purportedly inferior racial, religious, or other targeted groups, such as homosexuals and assertive women. But the common foe also includes supporters of parliamentary democracy and Marxists. Fascists disdain the methods of the former, including their espousal of individual liberties, the rule of law, and open and competitive elections, and they reject the goals of the latter, such as the wish to create a society of economic and social equals where neither nation nor state has any purpose. Xenophobic hatred of enemies and foreigners is both a result of such revulsion and a useful tool for unifying the population behind the leadership and giving it an outlet for its grievances.

Fascists claim this serves the real interest of all the people. *The people,* it should be clear, does not refer simply to those living within the geographical borders of the state. In this new homogenized and revitalized organic community, membership is restricted to members of the preferred ethnic or national group, race, or religion.

Under Fascism, religion becomes a tool of the state. Traditional religions are subordinated to newly devised, quasi-religious beliefs and co-opted as a way to further the regime's

power. These new beliefs promote a messianic civil religion that promises national resurrection. Fascism posits that this will be accomplished by a communal body of believers who owe their highest loyalty not to themselves, their families and friends, or any traditional religious authorities who do not share the vision of the leader but to their nation.

As an alternative to coercion, Fascists seek the cooperation of established conservative elements of the old regime, including army, church, and industry. Each group is promised rewards: the protection of private ownership and virulent anti-Bolshevism for the owners of production, full employment for the workers, national regeneration for traditional conservatives, imperialist ventures for the military, state support for compliant religious authorities, recognition of special status for farmers and peasants, and encouragement to engage in xenophobic nativism for the masses seeking scapegoats for their grievances, real or imagined. As William Brustein (1996) argues in his book *The Logic of Evil: The Social Origins of the Nazi Party,* the motives of these groups may provide evidence for the thesis that many Germans joined the Nazi Party to promote their economic interests.

Change comes from the top, engineered by a government using the power of the total state dominated by a single political party and headed by a self-anointed supreme leader who embodies the national will and is aided by a paramilitary vanguard. Together they pledge to transform the chaos and degeneracy of the past into a resurgent community. The state is the creator of all values, secular and spiritual. It embodies national unity and is the guarantor of this oneness. Its strength is in the spiritual union of the masses. The nation is the source of all that is good—culture, civilization, true freedom—and the duty of all people is to patriotically serve their nation.

In the new community, equality of all is impossible because the masses are not fit to govern. The only attainable equality of the atomized masses is that of conformity as obedient contributors to the goals proclaimed by the leadership. When directed to it, even mob action is an appropriate means of public policy, particularly when carrying out racist policies. Regime supporters are whipped into a hysterical state in mass meetings by carefully crafted calls to defeat perceived enemies, all of whom can justifiably be subjugated, even eliminated.

Following a military model, at the head of this movement is the charismatic leader, the undisputed possessor of all the virtues of the new man, who instinctively knows what the incoherent masses really want because he embodies the spirit of the people. He is above criticism, as he is never wrong. All power flows from his desires, his will, his commands. He is the embodiment of the national purpose, the head of nation, state, party, and all their organs. He chooses the few qualified to serve as his subordinate leaders, who are often allowed to operate, unchecked, in their own assigned spheres of influence.

The leadership is almost exclusively male. Those few women who have a government function are placed in positions subordinate to men because of their assumed inferiority, and they are given work that is stereotypically the province of females, such as directing a women's organization or working as a secretary.

Traditional gender roles are rigidly observed. The state is the guardian of public morals and actively suppresses banned activities, such as demands for gender equality and homosexuality.

In elevating the leader to a godlike status among the people, the state's organs monopolize all means of information and communication, both to propagandize in support of the regime and to limit internal opposition. This monopoly enables the media to generate big lies without fear of contradiction. Big lies are untruths of such enormity and impudence that they are certain to influence the masses, for whom an emotional response is easier than reasoning.

State organs of propaganda also create a communal liturgy for mass organizations, where patriotic rituals, such as parades, songs, and flag-waving rallies, replace rational discussion and deliberation. They develop cults of physical strength, personal sacrifice for the fatherland and its people, and the need for violence and brutality toward enemies as they engage in imperialist conquest in pursuit of utopian goals.

War is good. It shows the capacity of individuals for sacrifice and mobilizes the masses for common purpose. It illustrates the value of unity of command, centralization of authority, and hierarchical leadership.

The state is the master of the economy. Fascism utilizes new methods for enhancing state power through control, planning, and mobilization of the national economy, including agriculture, industry, and finance. While Fascist regimes may permit ownership of private property and capitalist enterprise, these are subject to state regulation. Business and labor are placed in an organic and corporatist relationship with the state. These ties are organic, wherein individuals and groups are seen as subordinate parts of a complex structure of interdependent elements whose roles and value are determined by contributions to the state. Thus, where business or other elites have been active in putting a Fascist government in power, they have contributed and can expect to benefit.

Corporatism refers to a harmonious society divided into a limited number of noncompetitive corporations or monopolies based on the function each performs, such as labor or management. These corporations are created and sanctioned by the state to represent the interests of each functional group when economic decisions are made, but under close control of the regime. They replace both independent trade unions and owner organizations. Strikes are illegal, disputes are mediated by state agencies, and government sets all prices and wages. Class antagonism and class struggle are replaced by state-guided cooperation and an almost feudal bond between classes. All classes work together, each to its own task, each to its own place in a hierarchy, and each to its (unequal) rewards.

INFLUENCES

Fascism draws on certain ideas of political philosophy and incorporates ideas from other ideologies, particularly nationalism and anarcho-syndicalism, as well as from the organicist strain of socialism. From the ancients, such as Plato and Aristotle, Fascist thinker Giovanni Gentile (1875–1944) took the idea that humans are by nature social and political animals who are

free only as members of a community, in opposition to those liberal democrats who think humans are atomistic individuals.

Assimilating ideas from Machiavelli, Rousseau, and Hegel, Maurice Barrès (1862–1923), French politician and theorist, favored extreme nationalism. The central goal of politics is organizing and maintaining the power of the nation that expresses the organic needs of the vital collective. A strong hierarchical regime organizes the masses for united action. Incorporating biological determinism, romanticism, social Darwinism, and anti-Semitism, Barrès saw an unconscious, irrational vitalism at the root of the national soul. All values, such as justice and liberty, even honesty, must be measured in relation to the indispensable needs of the nation and the essential requirement that it conquer its enemies, especially the twin evils of Marxism and liberal democracy.

Georges Eugene Sorel (1847–1922) was an anarchist of the syndicalist school who supported socialism through collective action of the workers but preferred strikes and direct action to politics. In *Reflections on Violence* (1908) he advocates a general strike by the working class that would swiftly lead to a violent revolution that would wipe out decadent bourgeois society. Parliamentary government would be replaced by workers organized into industrial syndicates. These small economic communities would serve as the center of economic, social, and indeed all productive life, and all daily decisions would be made by people at their workplaces. Mussolini used some of Sorel's ideas, skillfully combining syndicalism with nationalism.

CONTEMPORARY FASCISM

Today Fascism is widely reviled. Still, most Western industrial nations have small, transitory groups that could be considered neo-Fascist and that often model themselves on Fascist movements of the past, agitate for their version of chauvinism and racial purity, and threaten a revival of some kind of Fascist government. These include political parties and organizations such as the National Socialist Movement and the Ku Klux Klan in the United States, Pamyat in Russia, the National Alliance in Italy, the National Front in France, and the Freedom Party in Austria.

In addition, some scholars have regarded movements and regimes in Latin America (Peron's in Argentina, Stroessner's in Paraguay, Pinochet's in Chile), Africa (Qaddafi in Libya, the National Party in South Africa), and Asia (Hindu extremists in India and governments in China, North Korea, and Myanmar) as Fascist. Other writers consider a number of these as more authoritarian than Fascist, and the difference between the two remains open to debate. Today the Internet serves as a means to propagate race hatred, anti-Semitism, and Holocaust denial, frequent themes of contemporary Fascists.

What has been termed Islamo-Fascism is an extreme fundamentalist version of Islam. It is a response to the failure of Western and Marxist ideologies to meet the perceived needs of the masses in Middle Eastern nations. It preaches such messages as the need for revolutionary struggle against enemies and the use of the power of the state in a totalitarian manner to achieve utopian goals, including a regenerated worldwide league of Muslim nations that would serve as a bulwark against the decadent, secular, capitalist Christian and Jewish West. As a result of an apocalyptic war, the Islamic caliphate of ancient times would be reestablished in a new society. The former Taliban regime and its warrior loyalists in Afghanistan and elsewhere reflect this outlook.

The evaluation of the impact of Fascist regimes depends on such empirical questions as whether the leaders are all powerful or rule over a mix of competing subordinates and bureaucrats of both state and party. For Nazi Germany, at least, regime outcomes might have reflected the unplanned consequences of competing elites in the economic sphere. But the case can be made that when it came to the Holocaust, a—perhaps *the*—major policy initiative of the Third Reich, there was a unity of purpose that, in most cases, reflected the direct and total wishes of Hitler. Another dispute is between so-called functionalists and intentionalists about whether most governmental action in Fascist nations was accidental or planned. Again looking at the Holocaust, one sees a series of carefully planned actions that were implemented in a sometimes-haphazard manner due to unanticipated circumstances, as observed by Daniel Goldhagen (1996). Finally, Hannah Arendt (1951) raises the question of the pervasiveness of totalitarianism. Were all Germans cowed by the organs of the state, particularly the secret police, or was the regime sensitive to popular resistance and willing to allow some individual liberty and choice? Once more, the Holocaust is instructive: a few favored elites who had Jewish ancestry may have escaped the heavy hand of the Nazi regime, including most notably Himmler's immediate subordinate, Reinhard Heydrich, and Erhard Milch, the head of the German Air Force. But with the exception of a few selected key people, resistance to this policy was typically met with severe retribution, including arrest, imprisonment in a concentration camp, and even execution. Until his assassination, Heydrich was one of the major enforcers of this strict policy.

See also *Anti-Semitism; Barrès, Maurice; Fascist Parties; Holocaust; Sorel, Georges; Totalitarianism; Xenophobia.*

. . . .   DONALD G. TANNENBAUM

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Fascist Parties

Fascist parties evolved in most European societies after World War I (1914–1918), and the war was the most important reason for their emergence. Fascist parties were often founded after 1918 by semidemobilized units from regular armies, and they reflected both the incubated nationalism generated by the war and the extremely high levels of militarization that marked many European societies after armistice. The most notable parties broadly characterized as Fascist are the Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF) in Italy, the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) in Germany, and the group of parties known as the Falange in Spain. Less significant examples of Fascist parties are the British Union of Fascists, the Arrow Cross Party (Hungary), and the Iron Guard (Rumania). Fascist parties were normally organized around one powerful leader: for example, Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany, and Franco in Spain.

FASCISM, LIBERALISM, AND CAPITALISM

Fascist parties were defined by their hostility to the pluralistic principles of liberal democracy, and they normally came to power by mobilizing paramilitary units to contest the power of the democratic state and to disrupt normal democratic procedures. Where they entered government, Fascist parties either suspended or demolished the institutions of liberalism, that is, elected legislatures, independent judiciaries, and formal constitutions. They opted instead for a system of strong leadership, in which the directive or quasi-dictatorial force of the party was checked neither by countervailing powers nor by catalogues of general rights, and in which the party executive fused functions normally divided in liberal states between legislatures and executives. In most cases, Fascist parties imposed strict censorship on the media, and they ensured that activities in civil society were subject to repressive control. Fascist parties were also marked by the belief in the integrative function of extreme nationalism. This latter feature meant that some Fascist parties pledged themselves to racist policies and legislation. The NSDAP was a fervently anti-Semitic and racist party, and after its assumption of power in 1933, it violently persecuted all minorities, especially Jewish people. However, the PNF was not originally a racist party, but it began to adopt racist policies in the later 1930s. The nationalist regime in which the Falange was integrated was not essentially marked by racist policies.

In addition to World War I, the factor triggering the growth of Fascist parties was the economic crises of the early 1920s and 1930s. The appeal of Fascist doctrine was conditioned by a widespread anxiety about both the collapse of capitalism and the threat of Bolshevik revolution. Fascist parties tended initially to campaign on a collectivist platform, and both the PNF and the NSDAP employed anticapitalist rhetoric in their earliest manifestos. Debate still persists as to whether Fascist parties should be classified as belonging to the family of left-wing or right-wing parties. However, it was crucial to the structure of Fascist parties that they lacked a solid ideological core, allowing them to adapt their message to the opportunities of the political landscape in which they operated. In most European countries after 1918 the anticapitalist vote was already captured by entrenched socialist and communist parties, so Fascist parties soon abandoned their anticapitalist stance and recruited support from among the middle classes and even (albeit to a debatable degree) among business elites, who were alarmed by the rise of the far left and the power of the union movement. Fascist parties thus developed a catch-all ideology, which traversed a number of points in the conventional left/right spectrum, and this eclectic ideological design was fundamental to their success. This meant that Fascist parties could create unusual cross-class fronts and that they could produce new and destabilizing political cleavages to weaken established parties. In consequence, Fascist parties tended to campaign successfully in political systems whose transitions to parliamentary democracy had lacked deep consensual foundations, that were marked by precariously balanced and easily unsettled coalitions, that possessed strong left/right polarizations, and in which no one social class possessed a clear monopoly of power. A divided labor movement was a common precondition for the emergence of strong Fascist parties. Once established in power, Fascist parties did little to alter existing patterns of production, and they pioneered a highly technocratic pattern of corporate-capitalist growth management.

FASCISM AND WEAK STATES

Fascist parties also tended to be successful in societies that were marked by a history of weak or belated state integration. In Italy and Germany, in particular, the delayed process of national unification in the 1860s and 1870s meant that these countries were governed by states that lacked institutional cohesion, that struggled to perform reliable fiscal and judicial functions, and that failed to exercise power evenly across all their territories. In consequence, these states could be easily destabilized, their executive structures could be easily detached from their representative institutions, and they were highly susceptible to the influence of private groups seeking to arrogate public authority. Arguably, in fact, government by Fascist parties was not government by states at all: it was

government by compensatory organs of coercion, which assumed control of the means of public violence in societies in which the traditional organs of statehood were too weak to withstand intense economic pressures, and which farmed out state power to a diffuse array of quasi-privatistic societal actors and organizations. A strongly integrated state, possessing a broad-based democratic apparatus, was the main bulwark against the success of Fascist parties.

THE LEGACY OF FASCISM

Most Fascist regimes collapsed during World War II (1939–1945), and after 1945 Fascism lost potency. Some elements of Spanish Fascism arguably survived in South America, notably in Argentina under Perón. Some parties of the post-1945 European right have identified with the Fascist legacy. Examples are the Movimento Sociale Italiano in Italy, the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands and the Deutsche Volksunion in Germany, and arguably, the Front National in France. Since the 1980s, some populist parties, although clearly outside the Fascist camp, have successfully recruited voters by reviving elements of Fascist ideology. Examples are the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs in Austria, the Progress Party in Norway, the Schweizerische Volkspartei in Switzerland, and the Alleanza Nazionale in Italy. However, most populist parties campaign primarily on an anti-immigration ticket, and their link with Fascism is merely a questionable element of their own propaganda.

See also *Conservative Parties; Ethnic Parties; European Politics and Society; Fascism; Nationalist Parties.*

. . . . CHRIS THORNHILL

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Federalism

Federalism is a political movement that advances the governing concept of shared rule and self-rule through the development and operation of governmental arrangements called "federations." It represents an ideology of a particular form of divided government that promotes and preserves both unity and diversity. Most federal countries comprise some combination of territorial, ethnic, economic, and social diversity as the basis of their constituent units.

Although only about twenty-five or so existing nation-states encompass full constitutional divided rule federations, they tend to include many countries that are large in both area and population, for example, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Nigeria, India, and the United States. Such smaller nations as Austria, Belgium, Malaysia, and Switzerland are federations as well. Also, many countries either experience high degrees of federal arrangements—Bosnia, Italy, Spain, South Africa, Ethiopia—or devolve substantial subnational autonomy in all or in parts—United Kingdom, Denmark-Greenland, France-Corsica, Tanzania—to be included in Federalizing nations. In addition, supranational movements such as the European Union (EU) are federal-like or at least confederal in nature. The EU country interests are struggling with a constitution that vacillates between maintaining state powers and upholding the more Federalist view of forming a strong European government.

It is not easy to conceptualize Federalism, because of the variety of interpretations that have been ascribed to it in the three centuries or so of its modern existence. William Stewart (1984) provided a list of almost five hundred labels characterizing Federalism, for example, "centralized Federalism," "marble cake Federalism," and "judicial Federalism." The list has since grown considerably to include such common terms as *cooperative Federalism, coercive Federalism,* and *regulatory Federalism.* Recently, vertical fiscal imbalance in Spain and South Africa has been called "consumption Federalism," whereas Germany's proclivity to forge countrywide agreement on major policies is called "unitary Federalism."

How can Federalism and federation be defined both in practice and as objects of study? Preston King (1982) considers federation to be "an institutional arrangement, taking the form of a sovereign state, and distinguished from other such states solely by the fact that its central government incorporates regional units into its decision procedure on some constitutionally entrenched basis" (p. 8). Federalism, which obviously informs federation, is "the recommendation and (sometimes) the active promotion of support for federation" (p. 8). Daniel Elazar (1987) defines Federalism simply as self-rule plus shared rule, operating contractually on a noncentralized basis through a matrix of governments, with fluid power loadings. Since their inception in the late eighteenth century, Federalism and federation have become important areas of study within political science.

Unity in federal countries is represented by a single federal or general (national) government, whereas diversity is manifested through constituent unit governments: states, provinces, and regions. The general government holds together the constituent units and acts, for all the people, on behalf of the entire country. Diversity is enhanced by the power that is shared in constituent governments through its own set of institutions. Depending on the country, respective ethnic, economic, geographic, and social differences, in combination, normally demarcate these units.

Canadian provinces, for example, represent different linguistic-ethnic, geographic, and economic interests. Australia's federation is based largely on both geographic and economic differences; its states were preindependence colonies. Belgium is federated by linguistic-ethnic differences between the Flemish and Walloons. India's states are a mixture of historic principalities, distinct ethnic-language groups, British colonial demarcation, and religious preferences. In each case, federal arrangements have developed to allow for representation and promotion of these differences within the framework of a single country.

For some time, divided rule was considered to be a product of some bargain among sovereign entities that agree to yield sovereignty to increase their public security, sometimes economic interests, or both. William Riker (1964) notes that the product of the bargain is a division of final decisions between two levels. Alfred Stepan (1999) argues that the problem with this definition of origin is that many democratic federations follow a different political and historical logic, one of "holding together" through Federalism. He cites as examples India in the late 1940s, Spain in the late 1970s, and Belgium from the 1970s to the 1990s, where strong unitary features were set aside in favor of constitutionally devolved power and their polities were transformed into federal countries.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS

As numerous theologians and political philosophers have noted, the federal idea has biblical roots. Theologically speaking, the partnership between people and God as described in the Bible was covenantal in idea, which in turn was transformed to the covenantal (or federal) relationship between individuals and families leading to the formation of political bodies as compound polities. The term *federal* is derived from the Latin *foedus,* which like the Hebrew term *brit* means "covenant." The political application of this theological use gave rise to *federal* as explicitly governmental. The ancient Greeks used federal arrangements after the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE) for military purposes, as small city-states combined in limited union or confederation to ward off larger powers. The constituent cities delegated to federal rulers only military authority, retaining diplomatic, treaty, and related powers. Similarly, in northern Italy and southern Germany, medieval cities formed military confederations to resist the power of larger nation-states. Both of these federative movements suffered from increasing restrictions on the authority of military leaders by their constituent governments, which led to ineffective defensive performance and eventual dissolution. Moreover, in general, confederations were unable to mobilize sufficient political support or government power to maintain themselves in an age of exclusive nationalism. They proved unable to raise revenues, promote their economies, or even defend themselves.

That indeed is a primary force behind the American transformation from a confederation into the first modern federation. The Articles of Confederation were written in 1777 but were not adopted until March 1781 as the War of Independence from Britain (1776–1783) was ending. The roots of the struggle between the forces of strong national government and

independent states go deep into colonial history and experience, as do quasi-independence and partial self-governance under the British Crown. In the end the articles left ultimate power in the hands of states, whereas the general government was given, according to Merrill Jensen (1950), "specific and circumscribed powers."

The story of the first federation that followed the U.S. Constitutional Convention of 1787 is well known. The new federal system, which developed largely along nationalist lines and very much according to James Madison's image, would occupy some middle ground between a confederation of sovereign states and a consolidated (or unitary) nation. After much debate and compromise, a single countrywide union was formed that would act directly on the population, through representative assemblies rather than through the states. The national government was to be insulated from the direct political control of the states, but its own influences would be checked by division of institutional powers between the legislative bodies, the executive, and a judiciary. The new national government was to be a limited government of enumerated powers but with all of the necessary means to secure the safety, liberty, and prosperity of the larger community.

The nineteenth century saw the establishment of a number of federations or at least constitutionally federal regimes, influenced to some degree by the United States. The first was Switzerland in 1848, followed by Canada in 1867, the German Empire (and Reich) from 1871 to 1918, and Australia in the early twentieth century. Four Latin American countries—Venezuela (1811), Mexico (1824), Argentina (1853), and Brazil (1891)—followed suit with federal constitutions, although they all have faced varying degrees of instability and/or military governments that, in effect, have attenuated their federal arrangements and have experienced periods of strong centralization.

FEDERALISM IN THOUGHT

Neither the ancient Greek philosophers (e.g., Plato and Aristotle) nor their successors developed a theory of Federalism. The earliest writings surrounded the Swiss and Dutch confederations, which led to the first full-blown conceptual framework. Johannes Althusius (1562–1638) made the connection of union or *consociatio,* the first federal theory of popular sovereignty. Althusius stated in his *Politica* that "human society develops from private to public association by the definite steps and progressions of small societies, the public association exists when many private associations are linked together for the purpose of establishing an inclusive political order (*politeuma*)" (Carney 1964, 84).

The work of James Madison at the American Constitutional Convention and in the *Federalist Papers,* which supported ratification of the proposed Constitution, did the most to forge modern federal theory. Madison argued for a large republic in which both local and collective interests were to be represented, where power given by the people would be divided between two governments (*Federalist* No. 51). It is described as "a compound republic, partaking of both a national and federal character" (*Federalist* No. 62), "a confederated republic"

(*Federalist* No. 63), forming a combination of the great and aggregated interests, the local, and particularly state representations (*Federalist* No. 10). At the time Madison made no distinction between "federal," "confederate," and "confederacy," but Gottfried Dietze (1999) maintains that he clearly meant to distinguish between a compact forming a league among distinct societies and a compact by the people, not of individuals composing one entire nation but of the people of the states. The federal state is one state composed of several states, invoking "both the national and federal character" (*Federalist* No. 62).

Alexander Hamilton, like Madison, thought the supremacy clause granting the general government ultimate power when there were disputes among the levels is where the emphasis of Federalism lies. He writes in the *Federalist Papers,* "The vigor of government" is "essential to the security of liberty" (*Federalist* No. 1) and to be effective must possess energy in pursuing the public good (*Federalist* No. 30). He clearly considers territorial power (and institutional power division) less important than does Madison. The advantage of a modern federation is that it can act directly on individuals, and through its greater powers the federal government prevents states from falling into a state of anarchy, civil war, or dissolution. A strong federal government is more likely to slay "the political monster of *imperium im imperio*" (*Federalist* No. 15). Hamilton makes it clear that there is only one national government, one federal republic, one federal state.

Federal theory in the United States and elsewhere has naturally been expanded through the number of applications to different countries and, of course, as these countries evolve and deal with new situations. Robert Agranoff and Michael McGuire (2003) note that the application of U.S. Federalism has changed and theoretically has been characterized as dual, cooperative, coercive, and more recently open to a number of models of overlapping and opportunistic behavior. American theory in general has been centralizing or national in focus. In a similar vein, federal experiences on a cross-national basis have been ideologically identified as leaning toward pluralist in a multiple institutional sense, centralist in formation of a union, decentralist in the sense of reinforcing multiple power centers, and balanced between integration and diversification.

Federal theory has also been closely attached to particular value or normative positions. Alain Gagnon and Charles Gibbs (1999) indicate the three most central as (1) communitarian, both social and political; (2) functional, in the sense of operating manageable political systems; and (3) democratic, enhancing the liberty of persons plus participation of citizens and the promotion of equality. Promotion of these principles has evolved as being part of the federal ideology. For example, as democratic ideals and universal suffrage systems emerged, federal systems evolved along with the rise of democracy through political parties and other forms of mass political participation.

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND LAW

Ronald Watts (1999) writes that federal systems normally require "a written supreme constitution not unilaterally amendable and requiring the consent of all or a majority of the constituent units" (p. 7). Because federal countries share rule, their constitutions must identify the broad foci of powers since two levels govern the same territory and people and each has the authority to make some decisions independent of the other. Watts identifies the following essential features of federal constitutionalism: (1) delineation and distribution of powers and institutional structures, (2) broad design of constituent units, (3) allocation of legislative and executive powers, (4) essential federal or general government powers, (5) the role of constituent unit representatives in decision making, (6) special provision for proportionate representation, (7) role of courts and judicial review, (8) constitutional amendment processes, (9) protection of individual and collective rights, and (10) the status of the constitution as supreme law.

Most federal countries live under systems of dual constitutionalism wherein constituent unit's—states', provinces', and regions'—government constitutions frame their governments, similarly distributing powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and generate provisions governing local governments. Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Mexico, Spain, and the United States are among those with subnational constitutions.

FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS AND POWER SHARING

Institutions within federal countries make a difference because they structure patterns of interaction within societies. One important institutional feature of federal countries is the distribution of powers between levels. In 2004 Enric Argullol Murgadas and associates examined the allocation of competencies by level in some twelve federal countries. In all systems some powers are exclusive by level, and some are concurrent, with residual powers varying by particular federal system. While such powers as foreign policy, defense, the monetary system, borders and immigration, and management of the economy are normally exclusive general government powers in all countries, a mixed pattern of overlapping responsibilities between the first and second tiers of governments exists in most countries, with states, provinces, or regions taking the lead responsibility for the operation of most domestic/welfare state functions, for example, employment, health, education, social services, and economic development.

Almost all federal countries employ legislative second chambers or senates that to varying degrees are representative of area or constituent units. Some are appointed, and some are popularly elected by the constituent units. Their powers vary considerably from country to country. In the United States, Australia, and Brazil senate and lower-house powers are equal, whereas in Canada and Spain second chambers are considerably weaker. Germany has a unique situation wherein the upper house *Bundestag* not only has equal powers to the *Bundesrat,* its parliament, but includes direct representatives from the *Länder* (state) governments, most of whom are Länder cabinet administrators.

Legislative bodies are normally organized by the major political parties that are in the majority and minority of each

chamber, similar to that of nonfederal parliaments. The parties in federal systems, however, are almost always organized on a federal basis. Spain's two major statewide parties, for example, maintain their basic units at the regional or autonomous community level so that, in effect, there are at least thirty-four party organizations (more, when nonstate parties are considered) that convene centrally only around general elections. The same pattern holds for Canada, Australia, the United States, and many other countries.

All federal countries distribute revenue powers among the levels of government, although the general governments tend to raise the largest sums of money. Vertical and horizontal (among subnational units) imbalances are then adjusted through such mechanisms as tax sharing and subventions. Older federations, for example, the United States, Canada, and Australia, use the federal general spending power for broad purposes, even those that effect exclusive powers of other levels. These actions have generally been upheld by their courts.

The divided power nature of federal systems means that some form of court must adjudicate jurisdictional disputes and resolve conflicts. Some differences are, of course, worked out politically and/or administratively, and some systems rely on referenda to settle some issues. All federations nevertheless provide for judicial remedies for disputes relating to federal questions, that is, matters of power and responsibility by level. Some countries use their general federal court systems to adjudicate such constitutional issues as well as other matters relating to general government. This is the case for Austria, Australia, Canada, the United States, Malaysia, and India. Other countries—Germany, Spain, and Belgium—employ dedicated constitutional courts, which specialize in matters of rights and constitutional interpretation, particularly matters relating to issues and conflicts between the tiers of government.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Fiscal and program interdependencies among governments mean that officials within federal countries must interact regularly. These actions are called intergovernmental relations (IGR). Dale Krane and Deil Wright (1998) define IGR as "the various combinations and interdependencies and influences among public officials—elected and administrative—in all types and levels of governmental units, with particular emphasis on financial, policy, and political issues" (p. 1168). The concept (not the practice) originated in the United States during the Great Depression of 1929, when new activities and programs drastically altered the concept of separation of functions by level of government. It has come to characterize the patterns of interaction among levels in many countries, particularly in federal systems.

Deil Wright (1988) sets out five distinct features that define and guide IGR studies: (1) number and types of governmental units, their legal status, and changes over time; (2) number and types of public officials by jurisdiction and unit; their background, attitudes, and perceptions of their roles and responsibilities; and their actions; (3) patterns of interaction among and between officials representing various jurisdictions and governmental units; (4) range of involvement by all public officials elected and appointed, national and local, executive, legislative, and judicial, particularly when involved in policies that affect multiple units; and (5) policies and programs implemented through intergovernmental arrangements, with emphasis on administrative rules in programming, fiscal flows, and services delivery. In many ways the process study of IGR as a means of understanding federal countries stands in contrast to and considerably enhances more legalistic and institutional analyses. It is studied in many other federal contexts under different labels, for example, "central-local relations" and "multilevel governance."

IGR unfolds in federal systems through a number of administrative, political, economic, and legal mechanisms or practices that operate across jurisdictional boundaries. Among the more important economic mechanisms are the various forms of subventions or grants, tax efforts (e.g., shared taxes), tax forgiveness/reciprocal taxation, fiscal auditing and accounting, intergovernmental loans, and intergovernmental fiscal equalization commissions. Among the more important and widespread legal mechanisms are regulations imposed by higher-level governments on subnational governments, cooperation and intergovernmental agreements among governments, and reciprocal or interdependent legal actions (e.g., EU social policy and the many organic laws governing subnational governments). There are several important political instruments, including various intergovernmental councils, first ministers' conferences in parliamentary federal systems, sectoral conferences, second legislative chambers in countries such as Germany and South Africa, forms of intergovernmental contacts and lobbying by individual officials and by associations, and use of internal political party channels to advance intergovernmental interests. Finally, the most notable administrative instruments include contracts for services, program assessments or audits, negotiation for performance or results in exchange for controls, and various forms of place-based or regional management at the horizontal level. While the extensiveness of these practices obviously varies from country to country, they have proved to be the major lenses through which researchers examine the various IGR dimensions.

SOCIAL FEDERALISM: VALUES AND ATTITUDES

Vincent Ostrom (1987) writes that the way "people think and relate to one another is a most fundamental feature in the governance of human affairs" (p. 10). It is believed that the manner and the customs of people, called "habits of the heart" by Alexis de Tocqueville (1848/1969, 305), include the covenantal forms of Federalism. To William Livingston (1952), where there are geographically distributed diversities the result may be a society that is federal, and "coherence in the society may depend on devolution upon these groups of the exercise of functions appropriate to the diversities they represent" (p. 37). Social Federalism includes (1) an underlying culture or belief in the values of Federalism; (2) mutual respect or comity among the partners, who will not harm one

another's interests; and (3) recognition by all or most parties of the social diversity that different constituent units manifest politically.

It is thus not only economic and political forces that ultimately make the outward forms of Federalism (e.g., an ideology) necessary. Social and cultural issues are also forces of maintenance and growth. Federal systems do not grow by accident but as a result of multiple forces. As William Livingston (1952) writes, "a federal system is consciously adopted as a means of solving the problems represented by these stimuli" (p. 36).

CONCLUSION

The Federalism idea involves both structure and processes of governance that seek to establish unity on the basis of consent while preserving diversity by constitutionally uniting separate political communities into an encompassing polity. Powers are divided and shared between constituent governments and a federal government, where the constituent governments have broad responsibilities and the autonomy to carry out responsibilities and the federal government undertakes broader countrywide responsibilities. A democratic federation is, in effect, a republic of republics, which emphasizes partnership and cooperation for the common good while also allowing diversity and competition.

In an era of increasing globalization and international interdependence, along with increased contemporary within-country emphasis on ethnic identity and decentralization, there are those who maintain that a postmodern era of Federalism is emerging that promotes a variety of new federal arrangements. To Daniel Elazar (1996), the nation-state system is taking on a new dimension or overlay on government, "a network of agreements that are not only militarily and economically binding for *de facto* reasons but are becoming constitutionally binding, *de jure*" (p. 419). These agreements are federal in nature, not in the sense of federation but in other ideational manifestations of Federalism, including the revival of such confederal arrangements as the EU, various union arrangements (United Kingdom), devolved regional autonomy (Italy), consociational arrangements (Belgium), federacies (Puerto Rico and customs unions), and leagues (North American Free Trade Agreement, free trade areas). The state is not going away, but new forms of shared rule or multilevel governance are emerging. Wherever both unity and diversity must be simultaneously preserved, Federalism is an ideology that can offer solutions.

See also *Constitutional Courts; Democracy; Democratic Theory; Federalism, Comparative; Intergovernmental Relations; Nationalism; Nation-building.*

. . . .   ROBERT AGRANOFF

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Federalism, Comparative

Federalism is a principle of government that seeks to reconcile unity and diversity through the exercise of political power along multiple autonomous levels. The crux of this principle is the idea of combining self-rule and shared rule. Through Federalism, different political units can live together yet apart since they share a government while at the same time having their own.

Federalism as a principle has three main political uses: fragmenting political power to protect against absolutism (the case of the United States), decentralizing policy making to stimulate economic development and render government more efficient and closer to the people, and managing ethnic diversity by devolving power over fields that traditionally create tensions between the various communities (Canada and Switzerland).

FEDERALISM AND FEDERATIONS

If Federalism is a principle, *federation* refers to a specific type of political system where two or more levels of government are sovereign (autonomous) within their own given jurisdictions. Therefore, a federation is made up of a federal level of political authority and constituent (or federated) units whose names vary. In addition to the sharing of sovereignty between levels of government, federations generally present three features.

The first is a formal division of power between central and regional governments. Powers of federal governments almost always include citizenship and immigration, defense, foreign policy, international trade and commerce, and currency. Constituent units usually have power in the areas of language, culture, health, education, social services, and municipal affairs. Most federations also specify concurrent powers, that is, powers that should be exercised by both levels of governments.

The second feature of federations is that the division of powers is specified in a constitution. In most federations, constitutional change in the division of powers requires a qualified majority in the two federal legislatures, one of which represents the constituent units, and the support of a majority of the constituent units themselves. This is the case in the United States, where constitutional change necessitates a two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives and the Senate in addition to the support of three-quarters of the states. In Switzerland and Australia, the requirement is a qualified majority in the federal legislatures and popular support as demonstrated by a referendum where the change is approved by an overall majority and a majority of constituent units.

The third feature of federations is the representation of constituent units within central institutions. The idea of having constituent units participating in decision making and policy making at the federal level embodies the federal concern with unity, shared rule, and interdependence. The Senate of the United States provides meaningful representation for its constituent units because it combines formal power with the democratic legitimacy provided by the election of two senators per state.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND FISCAL ARRANGEMENTS

The study of comparative Federalism often involves a focus on intergovernmental relations and fiscal arrangements. The division of power in federations almost never translates into a situation where the two levels of government can act without having to interact with one another. This need for interaction explains why federations have developed mechanisms of consultation and coordination such as meetings between heads of government from constituent units and/or cabinet ministers and specific forums such as the Council of Australian Governments.

Federalism tends to give policy areas such as health care and education, which are expensive to fund, to constituents that have less revenue than the federal government. For this reason, federations have developed mechanisms for financial transfers that can be conditional or unconditional. Conditional transfers are transfers for which the federal government stipulates how the funds should be spent. Unconditional transfers come with no strings attached. In the United States, virtually all transfers are conditional. Constituent unit governments can have varying degrees of fiscal autonomy, which in turn conditions their budgetary situations. In federations in which constituent unit governments are strongly dependent on the federal government for financial resources but have the freedom to borrow, persistent deficits often result.

In giving autonomy to constituent units, federations may unwillingly accentuate uneven economic development. In this context, most federations (the United States being the exception) have equalization payments, which are unconditional. The idea behind equalization payments is to reduce socioeconomic disparities between constituent units and prevent disparities in the levels of social services among those units. These types of transfers generally stem from the federal government and are based on an agreed-on formula.

CENTRALIZATION/DECENTRALIZATION, SYMMETRY/ASYMMETRY

Comparative Federalism studies also involve researching the different outlooks that federations can take. Two pairs of concepts are frequently used to characterize federations. The first is centralization/decentralization, which refers to the relative power of the federal government and the constituent units. A centralized federation is a federation in which the powers of the federal government are relatively greater than those of the constituent units. A decentralized federation is a federation in which the powers of the constituent units are relatively greater than those of the federal government.

This being said, characterizing the degree of centralization/decentralization of federations is tricky because it is unclear which criterion should be used. At least three criteria can be considered.

The first is the written constitution. Which level of government is given more powers? Who has power over the most important fields? Who is given residual powers, that is, power over all fields that are not specified in the constitution? This is seemingly a straightforward approach for assessing the degree of centralization/decentralization of a federation. However, it is often misleading because federations change, sometimes becoming quite different from their original forms as specified in the constitution. A second criterion that can be used to compare the relative importance of public spending by the different levels of government is government expenditures. The argument is that federations with the highest percentage of public spending for constituent units are more decentralized since their units are the most able to use their powers to effectively provide public services. From this perspective, federations such as Malaysia and Austria are centralized, while Switzerland and Canada are decentralized. A third criterion involves looking at federal institutions. This angle involves focusing on the representation of the constituent units in these institutions and on their capacity to shape federal policy making.

In addition to being centralized or decentralized, federations can be symmetrical or asymmetrical. Symmetry means that all constituent units have a similar status and similar powers. In contrast, asymmetry involves one or more constituent units' having a distinct status and different powers. Asymmetry can be constitutionally specified. The Belgian constitution, for example, recognizes the existence of two types of constituent units, regions and communities, each with different sets of powers. Canada exhibits signs of political asymmetry, which refers to constituent units' developing a de facto distinct status or acquiring additional powers through informal arrangements. Quebec has greater powers than other provinces in the fields of immigration, pensions, taxation, and manpower training.

See also *Federalism; Federation and Confederation.*

. . . . ANDRÉ LECOURS

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Federalism and Foreign Relations

Among the roughly 195 nation-states in the world today, only two dozen or so maintain federal systems of government, but these governments represent almost 40 percent of the world's population. In an era of globalization and growing interconnectedness among nations, many noncentral governments in federal systems have decided to engage in foreign relations. Flanders (Belgium), Catalonia (Spain), and Quebec (Canada) have the most active foreign relations programs in terms of money spent and personnel devoted to international activities. Quebec, for example, has created its own Ministry of International Relations with more than 550 personnel and an annual budget exceeding one hundred million dollars. In Canada, provincial governments are generally free to act internationally within their areas of competence outlined in the Canadian constitution, and the national government is expected to consult with the provinces before entering into any international treaty affecting these provincial areas of competence. In the case of Quebec, both the pro-Federalist Liberal Party and the pro-sovereignty Parti Québécois have consistently favored being engaged internationally.

In the United States, Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, and the commerce and supremacy clauses in the same document, clearly indicate that the federal government is to play the primary role in foreign relations. However, almost forty state governments now operate about two hundred offices abroad, and most governors lead international missions every year. The federal government does not object to states' involving themselves in a wide range of international activities, but it frowns on states' making their own foreign policy. For example, Massachusetts mandated its own set of economic sanctions against Burma (Myanmar), and some states have attempted to impose sanctions on companies doing business with Sudan, Iran, and a few other countries. The federal courts have ruled that Massachusetts exceeded its authority in the Burma case and Illinois did the same in its sanctions against Sudan. The federal government wants to ensure that the nation will speak with one voice on major foreign policy issues and expects state governments to refrain from making their own foreign policy.

The North American Free Trade Agreement has helped intensify linkages between the provinces in Canada and the states in Mexico and the United States. A number of cross-border organizations have been created to facilitate greater regional cooperation among noncentral governments. Similar regional organizations have been created in Europe, and within the European Union itself, noncentral governments in federal or quasi-federal systems such as those of Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Spain often dispatch representatives to Brussels as well as to other places around the globe. Some of the Swiss cantons are very active in the field of foreign relations, as are some of the Australian states. Increasing involvement in foreign affairs is also occurring among some of the constituent units in Argentina, Brazil, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Russia, and South Africa.

Federal systems in general will face some significant challenges in the future as globalization intensifies and noncentral governments increasingly engage in international activities as a way to protect and enhance the interests of their constituents. Some refer to this phenomenon as "glocalization," meaning the growing linkages between the international and the local. Noncentral governments in federal systems are guaranteed constitutionally some autonomy to act within their areas of competence, and they will desire to exercise this competence beyond the borders of their own nation-states in an increasingly complex and interdependent global setting. Even in the United States, where the Constitution clearly favors the national government's dominating foreign relations, the Tenth Amendment reserves all powers not explicitly delegated to Washington, D.C., to the states and the people. Arguably, these reserved powers may provide the state governments with the flexibility to be actively engaged in an even broader range of overseas pursuits.

Activism in the realm of foreign relations is a mechanism for some noncentral governments to enhance their own positions

within their respective federal systems. Quebec's special relations with France and within La Francophonie underscore its intention to protect its French language and distinctive Québécois culture within a Canadian nation that is overwhelmingly English speaking. In its foreign affairs, Flanders is able to accentuate its economic dominance and the special status of the Flemish language, and Catalonia is doing the same in emphasizing its distinctiveness within the Spanish Federalist structure. In these cases, activism in foreign relations is a symptom of ongoing regional tensions and uncertainties within certain nation-states.

Finally, *intermestic* denotes the blurring of the line between what constitutes domestic policy and foreign policy in an era of expanding globalization. This blurring is especially germane in federal systems, and federal nations will continue to struggle in ascertaining the appropriate and effective role of their non-central governments in foreign affairs.

See also *Center-periphery Relations (Federalism); Foreign Policy Role; Regions and Regional Governments.*

. . . .   EARL H. FRY

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Federalist Papers

Written to persuade New York voters of the merits of ratifying the U.S. Constitution, *The Federalist Papers* are a collection of eighty-five articles that seek to explain and justify key features of the Constitution and to respond to the objections of its critics. *The Federalist Papers* are typically regarded as one of the most important works of American political thought and are a critical record of both the principles and the debates that informed the drafting and ratification of the Constitution.

The Federalist Papers were written principally by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison (due to illness and other obligations, John Jay wrote only five articles). Published under the pseudonym "Publius," *The Federalist Papers* appeared three to four times a week in New York newspapers between October 27, 1787, and April 2, 1788. Advocating a more powerful, central government, *The Federalist Papers* reflect the Framers'

concern that the Articles of Confederation were unable to ensure political stability and resolve conflicts between the states as enforcement of the acts of Congress under the articles was left to the state governments. Publius argued that a more energetic national government that would both represent and act directly on citizens without being mediated by state governments would foster the United States's political and economic development, curb the potential excesses of popular government, and better secure the rights of citizens. For Publius, the Constitution embodied the progress of the "science of politics" and proved that people could establish government through reflection and choice rather than depending on accident and force.

REPUBLICANISM AND REPRESENTATION

Publius described the form of government created by the Constitution as republican, although Madison's use of this term departed from its traditional association with civic virtue and small, culturally homogeneous nations. Madison described a republic as "a government deriving power directly or indirectly from the great body of people, administered by people holding office for specific term or good behavior." By emphasizing representative government and the indirect power of citizens, Publius insisted that applying the "republican principle" to the more expansive territory of the United States would render the principle more effective and the government more stable. A large republic would enable a scheme of representation that could insulate officeholders from the transient passions of the public while retaining a sense of the people's will. Because representatives would be elected from relatively large districts and senators chosen by state legislatures, they would more likely be selected on the basis of their reputation and public standing; less animated by merely local attachments, they would filter rather than simply mirror their constituents' interests. Moreover, as Madison argued in *Federalist* No. 10, a large republic could more effectively address the problem of faction, which he defined as any number of citizens, whether a majority or a minority, "who are united and actuated by some common impulse or passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." The republican principle itself could solve the problem of minority faction—minorities would be diluted through the process of representation—but a large republic would guard against majority faction by taking in such a large number of interests that no single one would be able to form a majority.

CHECKS AND BALANCES

The U.S. Constitution sought to mitigate the threat that an energetic national government might pose to individual rights through the separation of powers (the justification that Publius credits Montesquieu with having provided). However, given the tendency of power to extend beyond its limits, the mere delineation of specific powers to each branch would provide only "parchment barriers" to the concentration of

power in any single branch. These powers therefore had to be not only separated but also blended; Publius insisted that each branch must be given partial agency in the others as a way of checking their actions. The limitation of government through an adversarial institutional arrangement thus reflected Madison's belief that "ambition must be made to counteract ambition." The idea of checks and balances rested on the fundamental assumption that individuals are driven at worst by passion and at best by self-interest. Because the ambition of officeholders would lead them to increase the share of power that they exercised, their interests must be carefully attached to the preservation of the rights and powers of their office. By carefully blending the powers of each branch (e.g., the veto power of the president, the Senate's power to try impeachments), Publius argued that each could check the actions of the others and thus resist their encroachments.

FEDERALISM

Despite Madison's claim that the division of power into national and state governments would provide a "double security" for citizens' rights, Publius typically envisions the national government as a brake on the excesses of the state governments, not vice versa. While opponents of the newly proposed Constitution largely agreed that the national government created by the Articles of Confederation was too weak, they nonetheless believed that states were better suited to protect citizens' freedom; because state governments were more responsive to the popular will, the states would be a more reliable check on the power of the federal government. By contrast, Publius believed that without a powerful national government the states were likely to fall into dissension among themselves, and Hamilton framed the ratification debate in *The Federalist Papers* as a choice between union or disintegration into "an infinity of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths." Precisely because states were more responsive to the popular will, they were more susceptible to faction, and Publius therefore believed that the threat to liberty posed by state governments was at least as great as that posed by the national government. Given people's natural attachments to what is local and close at hand, Publius—Hamilton in particular—worried that the national government might not be powerful enough and repeatedly argued that the energy of the national government must be commensurate with the importance of the powers granted to it. By giving it authority over matters of national and international importance, Publius hoped that the national government would attract more ambitious individuals and gradually garner the attachments and confidence of the people.

The Federalist Papers are often taken as a guide to the Framers' intent, and while they are an indispensable exposition of the principles underlying the Constitution, there are limitations to using them in this manner. In the first place, they were written to secure the ratification of the Constitution. As such, they were carefully tailored to their readers and sought to put the document in the best possible light. Second, the Framers' sense of the compromises that would be necessary to secure ratification constrained the drafting of the Constitution itself,

and *The Federalist Papers'* discussion of some of the Constitution's features presents necessities as virtues. Finally, Hamilton and Madison were only two of the individuals involved in drafting the Constitution, and in subsequent years even they would construe the document differently; for Hamilton the national government it created might have its own will and ends, while for Madison it was charged with protecting private rights and serving as a neutral arbiter of conflicting interests. The single voice of Publius therefore masked significant differences of opinion among participants in the constitutional convention, who ultimately agreed on the text but not necessarily the meaning of the Constitution.

See also *Checks and Balances; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Federalism; Representation and Representative; Republicanism.*

. . . .   MATTHEW VOORHEES

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Federal Mandates

A federal mandate, or direct order, in the United States is a federal regulation that must be complied with by a subnational government under the threat of a criminal or civil sanction. There are myriad arrays of federal mandates involving a broad range of state and local functions and programs. An excellent and prominent example of a federal mandate in the United States is the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, forbidding employee job discrimination by state and local governments on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Additional prominent federal mandates involve the environment (air and water quality), homeland security, fair housing, fair labor standards, occupational safety, drug and alcohol testing, and endangered species.

Prior to the 1960s, there were relatively few federal mandates imposed on state and local governments. The proliferation of federal mandates began in the mid-1960s and continued with even greater force in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, substantially due to the belief of the U.S. Congress that the imposition of federal mandates on state and local governments was an efficient and economical mechanism for promoting uniform national minimum policy standards. In an aggregate sense, this

development marked the shift from a somewhat voluntaristic national-state-local intergovernmental relationship to one of a more coercive federal nature.

A number of developments in the United States accounted for the proliferation of federal mandates during the last half of the twentieth century. First, the general failure of the states to alleviate critical environmental problems, such as air and water pollution, generated support for national action and federal mandates. Second, members of Congress became convinced that conditional grants-in-aid to the states and local governments had failed to solve national problems. Federal mandates, and other forms of federal regulation, were viewed by Congress members as the only feasible alternative approach for alleviating these problems. Third, national public interest groups, particularly those concerned with environmental problems, supported and strongly lobbied Congress for corrective federal mandates. In addition, influential business interests often preferred that their operations be regulated by a single mandated federal standard rather than a variety of state regulatory policies. Fifth, state and local officials, in some instances, such as with regard to the licensing of interstate motor carriers, viewed with favor the imposition of a federal mandate. And finally, members of Congress, often for reasons of political expediency and visibility, championed the passage of a federal mandate to achieve a desirable and popular social goal.

The imposition of federal mandates on the state and local governments has been criticized on various grounds and has generated a fair amount of political controversy. First, and most critically, state and local officials have viewed with considerable dismay the federal government's practice of imposing mandates on subnational governments without any compensatory or adequate funding. Second, federal mandates have often proved to be inflexible, prescribing rigid policies and performance standards regardless of varying circumstances. Third, federal mandates in some instances have been found to be counterproductive, such as the federal mandate that requires state and local governments to issue documents in both English and Spanish, increasing their operational costs, even in those instances in which there is largely an absence of Latinos. In addition, on occasion federal mandates have proved to be inconsistent, with state and local officials confronted with conflicting goals, standards, procedures, and timetables. And finally, the continuing proliferation of federal mandates has served to render the operation of government more confusing and incomprehensible to the citizenry, undermining the concept of democratic accountability.

Partly in response to the various criticisms of federal mandates, Congress passed in 1995 the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, which requires that Congress define the costs and consequences of any proposed new federal mandate. The passage of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act has not reduced the number of federal mandates but has rendered new federal mandates less extensive and more narrowly written.

As a result of the proliferation of federal mandates and the consequent enhancement of the regulatory role of the federal government in the intergovernmental system, the American polity has transitioned from cooperative Federalism to an era of coercive Federalism. Given the continuing and increasing range of domestic and foreign policy challenges confronting the United States and often the need for a national response to these challenges, we can well expect the federal government to promulgate additional mandates and other forms of policy regulations.

See also *Center-periphery Relations (Federalism); Centralization, Deconcentration, and Decentralization; Commerce Clause; Environmental Policy; Federalism; Regulation and Rulemaking; Subsidiarity.*

. . . .   NELSON WIKSTROM

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Federation and Confederation

The two forms of organizing political authority—confederation and federation—can, in theory, be distinguished as follows. A confederation is a union of equal, sovereign states (normally recognized as such internationally) that have formed, for limited general purposes, a common government. By contrast, a federation consists of a system of divided powers wherein a central government and territorial units (known variously as provinces, regions, states, or cantons) each has different policy responsibilities. Thus, a confederation is a treaty-based union that concedes few powers to the center for the sake of the liberty of the constituent units, which are also in principle free to secede. Conversely, a federation has a constitution, which presupposes the permanency of the union, designed both to secure individual rights and to divide power—the purpose being to reconcile unit self-government and individual freedom. As a result, even if in both types of union the units are subject to a central political authority, in a confederation this binds the states only as collective actors, thereby not creating rights or duties for individuals. However, in a federation, government reaches down to individuals, for instance, by guaranteeing certain constitutional freedoms or extracting taxes directly from citizens. This difference is visible in the legislative institutions of both types of union since a confederation has only one chamber, where all units are represented, whereas a federation has two chambers, one chosen to represent the units and another that represents all the citizens. This is why a confederation is best described as a union of states while a federation is at the same time a union of states and a community of individuals.

In addition, given the need to respect state equality and sovereignty, decisions in a confederation—especially over reforming the treaty of union—are taken by unanimity; all members must agree before the powers or purposes of the union can be altered. The division of powers between territorial levels of government in a federation cannot be changed unilaterally by either level. Any change is based on a constitutional process incorporating both the units and the center. However, federal decision making is based on the majority principle, not unanimity; for constitutional change this typically requires a higher threshold, known as a "supermajority," rather than a simple majority. Hence both types of union share similar features that distinguish them from unitary states, which have a simple hierarchy of government, no special representation of territorial units in the legislature, and a center free to redraw the boundaries and reallocate the powers of territorial government unhindered.

CONFEDERATIONS AND FEDERATIONS IN MODERN WORLD POLITICS

Although better known as an international organization, the United Nations (UN) is in effect a global confederation, which tries to reconcile state sovereignty with a weak common government concerned with global problems, notably peace, human rights, international development, and environmental protection. The UN also illustrates the chief defects of confederation: the absence of a coercive authority to enforce member state compliance except ultimately via recourse to armed force, the subsequent reliance on states' respect for their UN-imposed obligations, and the stymieing effect of unanimous decision making, at least among the permanent members of the Security Council. These structural weaknesses help explain why self-defense confederations such as the United Provinces of the Netherlands (1579–1795), the Swiss Confederation (1291–1848), the German Bund (1815–1866), and the United States under the Articles of Confederation (1781–1789) failed to survive into the modern era.

Indeed, it was the desire to remedy the faults of confederation that prompted the members of the Philadelphia Convention (1787–1788) to design the first modern federation, the United States of America. U.S. Federalism was intended as a preferable alternative to a unitary, centralized republic because individual liberty was thought to require an effective central government kept in check by unit self-government. Hence, Federalism is considered a way of institutionalizing democracy, which is why nondemocratic federations, such as the former Soviet Union (1922–1991) or even the contemporary Russian Federation (1991–), are sometimes seen as spurious instances of federation. Nonetheless, the spread of Federalism has been such that by 2000, two billion people lived in federations.

By cleaving political authority between two levels of government, the U.S. federal Constitution left unresolved many problems regarding how this separation would function in practice. The study of these issues is known as intergovernmental relations. Major research questions in this field include whether federations are subject to ongoing centralization or else cycles of centralization and decentralization. The impact of Federalism on the effectiveness and outcome of policy making is also much studied. The relationship between democracy and Federalism is also considerably debated since the antimajoritarian nature of federal decision making has been linked to conservatism and the entrenchment of special interests.

Today, however, the principal attraction of federation is less the protection of abstract notions of individual liberty than the ability to guarantee certain rights dear to ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities by granting autonomy to these territorially based minorities. Thus, the development of Federalism in plural societies such as India, Canada, or Belgium has been explained as a process of holding together a state, often leading to asymmetric autonomy between the constituent units.

AN IN-BETWEEN CATEGORY: THE EUROPEAN UNION

The novelty of the European Union (EU) is its combination of confederal and federal principles. What began as a regional economic confederation is now neither a pure federation nor a pure confederation. Instead, the hybrid EU polity is characterized by the creation of an autonomous, constitutionalized legal order consisting of individual rights alongside a political order where major decisions are taken unanimously by member states. Thus, aspects of confederation, notably the treaty system of common government, the right of exit, and a chamber representing state governments, coexist alongside a federal legal order. There is also a directly elected lower chamber—the European Parliament—whose federal-like legislative powers have continued to expand.

The EU, therefore, is almost a political laboratory, as the merits and flaws of confederation and federation are constantly debated—often drawing on the U.S. experience—especially from the perspective of the respective democratic legitimacy they confer. In addition, the EU model is seen as a blueprint for overcoming long-standing antagonisms between nation-states. However, it remains to be seen whether the EU is an exceptional case or whether other regional organizations of states, such as the African Union, Mercosur (South American), or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, will mimic its hybrid development.

See also *Centralization, Deconcentration, and Decentralization; European Union (EU); Federalism, Comparative; Sovereignty.*

. . . .   ANDREW GLENCROSS

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Feminism

The term *feminism,* deriving from its mid-nineteenth century French origins in *feministe,* refers most basically to an ideological commitment to the social, economic, and political equality of men and women within nations and across the globe. Feminism entails a way of critically engaging with the world from a perspective grounded in sex, gender, and sexuality to advance freedom, equality, and inclusion for women as full citizens with the right to determine their life paths. Two identifiable periods of feminism, often referred to as the first and second waves, track democracy's political trajectory beginning with women's ongoing struggle for equal rights in the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century suffrage movements and moving into claims related to sexual liberation, employment, education, and the family from the early 1960s until today. This highly contested term encompasses diverse schools of thought emanating from multiple identities and standpoints that reflect how feminism transforms the political arena by interjecting an understanding of its subjects as gendered, sexed, and sexual human beings. Feminism, in all its rich complexity, then conveys a theoretical vision requiring direct action to address the oppression of women that has changed the meaning of politics by identifying and challenging the boundaries of public and private life in two key ways.

FIRST WAVE: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION

First, formal recognition as citizens marks the initial break through the barrier to women's participation in formal politics associated with the first wave of feminism. Between the late 1700s and the early 1900s, broader claims to equal rights narrowed into the right to vote. The resulting suffrage movements grew out of the revolutionary periods in France, Britain, Germany, and the United States during the late eighteenth century. Olympe de Gouge (b. 1748), in the midst of the French Revolution (1789–1799), vehemently proclaimed women's equal rights in her *Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Citizen* (1791), which resulted in Maximilien Robespierre's putting her to death by guillotine in 1793. In the United States, Elizabeth Cady Stanton (1815–1902) modeled the *Declaration of Sentiments* (1848) on the Declaration of Independence (1776), which justified the American colonists' revolution against Great Britain. Women first broke into the formal political realm in New Zealand, the first country to grant women unrestricted voting rights in 1893. British women won suffrage in 1918, the United States in 1920, and the French, a late European arrival, in 1944. Voting rights now extend to most women across the globe, with the exceptions of those in Bhutan, Brunei, and Saudi Arabia, indicating a dramatic redrafting of who participates in public life.

In addition, the fight for formal recognition evolved into women's push for representation as elected politicians. Widow's succession, the process of a woman's assuming her husband or father's office after his death, served as the primary way in which women entered public office. Sirimavo Bandaranai (1916–2000) of Sri Lanka became the world's first female prime minister in 1960 when she ran as the Sri Lankan Freedom Party's candidate after her husband's assassination. She won office in her own right in 1970. Prominent female heads of state such as Indira Gandhi (1917–1984), Indian prime minister from 1966 to 1977, and Golda Meir (1898–1978), Israel's prime minister from 1969 to 1974, indicate how women increasingly acquired leadership positions by winning elective offices with greater levels of political power. Women now hold 16 percent of the seats in legislative bodies worldwide; that, coupled with voting rights, signals how feminism transformed the public sphere by securing greater inclusion of female citizens and representatives on a global scale.

SECOND WAVE: EQUALITY, LIBERATION, AND GLOBALIZATION

Second, feminism expanded its focus on the formal political arena to include jobs, education, the family, and reproductive freedom as part of a growing awareness that the private sphere shapes both the public and women and men's role in it. Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex* (1949) catalyzed the second wave, which, unlike the first, aimed to liberate women from their biologically determined sex roles as mothers and wives. Second-wave feminists responded to the two-pronged struggle for equal rights and liberation in diverse ways indicated by the schools of thought—ranging from liberal, radical, socialist, Marxist, lesbian, and black to cultural, psychoanalytic, and postmodern—that contributed greatly to building contemporary feminism's theoretical foundation. The slogan "the personal is political" broadly conveys the key shift in this period when women awakened to their oppression as women in the classroom, the boardroom, and even the bedroom. Issues conventionally classified as personal, or belonging to the private, such as birth control, abortion, marital and date rape, sexual harassment, and domestic violence became legislative and policy-making matters. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in *Roe v. Wade* (1973) granting women the legal right to an abortion propelled reproductive rights, conventionally relegated to the private sphere, into the center of American politics. As a result, the backlash against feminism formed, first taking shape in the Moral Majority established in 1975, which morphed into the Christian Right, ushering in an era of social conservatism lasting into the twenty-first century.

Globalization combines with democratization to reveal other fault lines that stake out the contemporary political terrain of feminism. At the International Women's Year gathering held in Mexico City in 1975, Mexican feminists convened a countercongress to highlight the diversity of women's issues and their rejection of first world women's claims to represent all women. This event spotlights a division between women in the global North and South working to advance feminism.

Third world, global, and transnational feminisms, in response, challenge the Western imperialist and colonial legacy of feminism that perpetuates the exclusion of women from different castes, classes, and colors and provide alternative visions for a global feminist movement. Given its role in redrawing public and private life and the identity of political subjects, feminism remains a site where the politics of gender, sex, and sexuality will be negotiated around issues such as human trafficking, surrogacy, gay marriage, and HIV/AIDS and provides a lens critical for analyzing the complex dynamics of power in and between political communities and their citizens.

See also *Feminist Movement; U.S. Politics and Society: Women, Political Participation of; Women Legislators; Women's Rights; Women's Suffrage.*

. . . . JOCELYN M. BORYCZKA

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Feminism, Postcolonial

The term *postcolonial feminism* references a field of study and activism by and for women that challenges dominant patriarchal ideologies and practices of postcolonial societies. The term is rooted in oppositional consciousness to the dominant social order as a form of transformative politics. Tied closely to nationhood, its strategies are marked by political activism of women concerned with gaining rights. It challenges gendered state biases that disable empowerment and equal rights and views women's political struggle as essential to deconstructing patriarchal power. Postcolonial feminists have therefore challenged state power structures for access to political equality and participation, opposed discriminatory legislation that oppresses women, and championed women's empowerment. The beginnings of postcolonial feminism tend to be associated largely with colonies and former colonies of Western powers in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. As a field of activism, it can be dated to the decolonization period (from the 1950s and 1960s) in former colonial countries, and as a field of study, it is often associated with the rise of postcolonial and feminist writings of the mid-1970s.

HISTORY

Postcolonial feminism is a subset of both postcolonial and feminist studies. A history of the term suggests it is has been framed by active legacies of colonialism and postcolonial movements. Feminists were concerned that the transfer of power at independence to many former colonial states was in fact the transfer of national sovereignty to a masculine power structure. Although independence offered the promise of new beginnings, for women it signaled the transfer of power to local elites, who inherited dominant patriarchal colonial systems of administration with embedded values relating to the diminished place of women in nationhood. Women activists saw the need for political struggle, which was influenced by the larger feminist movement of the 1960s, civil rights in the United States, growing black power movements in former colonized states in the 1970s, and a rising postcolonial consciousness worldwide. Hence, an association of postcolonial issues with feminist thought brought together discourses of power and domination and challenged institutional and ideological structures that oppressed women.

VARIATIONS

Postcolonial feminism draws attention to varying conditions of women that are contextual, geographical, and temporal. Hence, there is no single form of postcolonial feminism. Geographical examples include dowry deaths in India; state-legislated discriminatory laws that demean and punish women in Pakistan; access to clean water and housing in Africa, Central America, and Southeast Asia; and challenging practices of dislocating women as subjects of history in the Caribbean. Representations in the media that objectify and circulate stereotypes about postcolonial women is another major concern of the field. Postcolonial feminists have drawn attention to the need to replace disparaging images of these women with images defined by the women themselves.

DEFINING THE FIELD

There has been a tendency to conflate postcolonial feminism with third world feminism. Although both feminisms sometimes overlap, Robert Young suggests postcolonial feminism's particular politics are framed by gendered power relations that allow postcolonial state structures to enforce a neocolonial status on women. Third world feminism on the other hand is less focused on nationhood but functions as an umbrella term for a range of feminist contestations and voices that focus on women's marginality, exclusion, racism, sexuality and sexual expressions, and global capitalism, among others.

Major international proponents of the postcolonial feminist ideology include feminist critics Hazel Carby (1987), Chandra Talpade Mohanty (1991), Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988), Sara Suleri (1992), Anne McClintock (1995), Ania Loombia (1998), and Uma Narayan (1997). Some authors tend also to associate the term mainly with third world or developing countries; however, many feminists from developed countries identify their struggle against marginalization as postcolonial. Indigenous feminists in Canada, Australia, and the United States suggest they live in both a colonial and a postcolonial moment simultaneously (a fourth world) and therefore suffer various levels of oppression shaped by legacies of dispossession, racism, and sexism. Hence, fourth world feminists bring to postcolonial feminism a focus on indigenous women's rights and struggles for status, legal rights, citizenship, and social justice.

CONTESTATIONS

Contestations within the field are marked by tensions within feminism itself. Postcolonial feminists argue against Western liberal feminism's tendency to universalize and speak for all women. Liberal feminists are also accused of stereotyping postcolonial women by focusing on their difference and distance against a Western norm. Chandra Mohanty draws attention to the continuous discursive production of "difference" about these women as distant, muted subjects.

Contestations relating to voice also resonate within postcolonial feminism itself. Gayatri Spivak suggests that many (elite) theorists and writers in postcolonial societies are often unaware of the true conditions of marginalized and subaltern women and are therefore unable to speak for these postcolonial subjects. Hence, the continuous production of texts about these women renders the subaltern voiceless and incapable of speaking. The field is therefore challenged to reconfigure its continuous production of postcolonial women as voiceless subjects and instead provide them with agency by highlighting their experiences as authors and speakers.

See also *Colonialism; Feminism; Feminism, Radical; Feminism, Socialist; Feminist Legal Theory; Feminist Movement; Feminist Political Theory; Postcolonial Theory.*

. . . .   CHRISTINA ABRAHAM

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Feminism, Radical

The term *radical feminism* references a school of feminist thought and approach to mobilization that envisions women's liberation as completely transforming existing political, economic, and social structures by eradicating the sex/gender system. *Radical* comes from the ancient word for *root*. Radical feminism then identifies the root of women's oppression throughout political history in sex, meaning the traditional sex roles of mother and wife in the family, male and female biology, and genital intercourse. "The personal is political," a well-known slogan from radical feminism, captures how this movement transformed the female private sphere into a site of politics where men's exercise of power over women maintains patriarchy. Radical feminism, a movement at its peak of activism in the United States between 1967 and 1975, as a result, redrew the boundary between male public and female private life by locating the body, sex, gender, and sexuality in the political arena so that reproductive freedom, domestic violence, child care, rape, and sexual harassment remain crucial issues nationally and globally.

Evolving from the 1960s civil rights and student movements, radical feminism began by asserting the claim that women needed to organize *as women* for *their* issues. Casey Hayden and Mary King's "Sex and Caste" memo (1965) first expressed this position and equated women's liberation with that of all human beings. The movement took shape as small groups of women, starting with the New York Radical Feminists in 1967, met in each other's apartments and homes to share and analyze their emotions and daily experiences with work, school, and marriage. These consciousness-raising groups popped up across the United States as women awakened to the broader social, political, and economic structures oppressing them as women, which catalyzed action for change.

Grassroots direct actions using creative and performative strategies characterized how radical feminists translated consciousness raising into challenging women's traditional sex roles. The New York Radical Feminists organized the first such action following the Jeanette Rankin Brigade protest against the Vietnam War (1959–1975) in January 1968, when five hundred protestors gathered at Arlington Cemetery to bury Traditional Womanhood next to the symbol of Traditional Manhood. This burial illustrates radical feminism's position that achieving equality and freedom for women requires eliminating sex roles, which would render gender, or the social construction of male and female, obsolete. Later in 1968, national media turned attention on the Miss America Beauty Pageant protest in Atlantic City, when the female body was clearly politicized. Radical feminists outside on the boardwalk—while female contestants wearing swimsuits and spiked heels paraded across the stage inside the convention center—threw girdles, bras, eyelash curlers, and other objects representing the constraints of femininity into the Freedom Trash Can. This protest conveyed a rejection of women's sexual objectification that extended into a powerful critique of how men exercised power over women through sex and sexuality.

Heterosexual intercourse, as a result of Kate Millett's groundbreaking book *Sexual Politics* (1970), became central to radical feminism as a power relationship paradigmatic of all others in society. Shulamith Firestone, in *The Dialectic of Sex* (1970), proposed eliminating male and female sex roles by

using artificial methods to replace sexual intercourse for pro-creation as the basis for the family. Radical feminism's claims about the power exercised through genital sex led to the sex wars of the 1970s and 1980s when radical feminists such as Robin Morgan, Andrea Dworkin, and Catherine MacKinnon framed pornography as the cause of rape and violence against women. Others such as Ellen Willis, in contrast, advocated for women's right to explore various forms of sexual desire that might include pornography. Theorizing sex as an exercise of power sustaining women's oppression, whether in beauty pageants or pornography, radical feminism inserted the body into the terms of American political debate.

Radical feminism achieved its landmark success in the fight for reproductive freedom with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in *Roe v. Wade* (1973), which granted women the legal right to an abortion. This movement's significance for the twenty-first century can be measured in the United States by acts such as the Violence Against Women Act (1994), which secures federal legal protections against domestic violence, and globally as the United Nations and transnational feminist organizations align women's rights with the struggle for human rights.

See also *Feminism; Feminist Movement; Women, Violence against; Women's Movement, Comparative; Women's Rights.*

. . . . JOCELYN M. BORYCZKA

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Feminism, Socialist

Socialist feminism is a system of analysis of gender oppression as well as a strategy for political change. While it has been defined and practiced in many ways, there are central tenants that link the socialist feminism movement together. Socialist feminism focuses on the intersection between capitalism and patriarchy. It examines the ideological construction of femininity within patriarchal capitalism. Socialist feminism draws attention to issues such as sexuality, reproduction, domestic and paid labor, gender socialization, class conflict, sexism, and classism. Socialist feminism recognizes oppression based on gender and social class. Its focus most often does not extend to subordination based on ethnicity, sexuality, age, and able-bodiness.

THEORISTS IN SOCIALIST FEMINISM
The socialist movement has traditionally been attributed to the contributions of the nineteenth-century writers Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. From the earliest days of European socialism, however, women have played a significant, although somewhat invisible, role within the socialist movement. They have challenged men's definitions of socialism and have struggled for analyses and programs that better reflect the interests and needs of women. Some significant theoretical and political contributions to the socialist movement have been made by women such as Emma Goldman, Rosa Luxemburg, and Alexandra Kollontai.

Engels's classic work of 1884, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State,* is a significant text within the socialist feminist movement. It asserts that women's liberation could come only with women's entry into the paid/public workforce. As many socialist feminist scholars have suggested, women's work within the domestic/private sphere serves to support not only individual families but the interests of the capitalist economic system as well. The family serves to reproduce societal values and norms that perpetuate the existence of capitalism. As Nancy Hartmann asserted, the nuclear family in North America should be considered the principal site of women's subordination.

Emma Goldman, an early twentieth-century writer, drew attention to the role of capitalism in shaping sexuality and sex roles. Much of her theoretical work laid the foundation for contemporary socialist feminist scholars such as Nancy Hartmann, Pat Armstrong, Hugh Armstrong, and Meg Luxton.

Juliet Mitchell, writing in the 1970s and 1980s, outlined four central points of a socialist feminist analysis. She emphasized the need to restructure (1) the production of goods and services, to meet human needs; (2) the organization and control of sexuality; (3) the practices surrounding childbearing as well as women's responsibility for the emotional, physical, and psychological needs of family members; and (4) the organization of gender socialization. Mitchell stressed that all potential egalitarian solutions with regard to any of these central issues must be explored in relation to one another to prevent one system's solutions becoming another's problems.

DEFINING SOCIALIST FEMINISM
Socialist feminism combines Marxist feminism, which attributes women's subordination to the class oppression of capitalism, with radical feminism, which attributes women's oppression to patriarchy. Socialist feminists assert that the root of gender subordination is the combination of capitalism and patriarchal ideology. Women are thus seen as casualties of both classism and sexism. The elimination of gender inequality from a socialist feminist perspective can be achieved only by the eradication of both capitalism and patriarchy.

Socialist feminism has been considered by some scholars to be synonymous with Marxist feminism. While it is rooted heavily in Marxist feminist writings, there are several differences

between these two paradigms that should be noted. For Marxist feminists, gender inequality is a product of the inequality between classes. Ending women's oppression, within this view, would thus require the elimination of economic oppression. Socialist feminism, however, does not postulate that gender oppression can be reduced to economic exploitation. Instead, socialist feminists suggest that gender subordination is a social phenomenon in and of itself, requiring recognition and analysis. Socialist feminists have critiqued Marxist feminists for their concentration on class, accusing them of discounting the effects of gender.

A central issue for socialist feminist writers is the collectivity of oppression. The organization of social class is considered to be inseparable from gender: the rich exploit and oppress the poor just as men exploit and oppress women. This is not to suggest that women's subordination can be attributed to one man, however. Socialist feminists assert that women's oppression is a result of the collective oppression of all women by all men, within a world organized by class.

RESISTANCE AND THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Some social feminists claim that women's experience, culture, and practice can provide a basis for a feminist resistance to patriarchal ideologies. Nancy Hartsock (*The Feminist Standpoint Revisited and Other Essays,* 1983) claims that "the feminist standpoint," rooted in women's particular experiences and perspectives, is necessary for developing a critique of patriarchal ideology and practice. The feminist standpoint is also crucial for the expansion of discussions surrounding theory and practice and how both can be forwarded in alternate, and perhaps more progressive, directions.

Contemporary socialist feminist scholars are moving beyond the traditional constructions of gender, feminism, and politics and have begun exploring them within a contemporary context. Donna Haraway's work investigates the complexity of women's identity within the context of the rapidly changing world of technology. She examines male bias within a culture of science and technology. Clara Fraser examines the connection between sexism and racism as well the issues surrounding women's involvement within the contemporary socialist movement. Socialist feminism is a developing and ongoing theoretical and political project.

See also *Engels, Friedrich; Feminism; Feminism, Radical; Marx, Karl; Socialism.*

. . . . ANDREA QUINLAN

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Feminist Legal Theory

Political theories that examine the fundamental structure of the law and have ramifications for the practice and application of the law are known as jurisprudence (Smith 1993, 483). Feminist jurisprudence holds that the law has been written primarily by men and reflects male life patterns and ideologies. Thus, feminist legal theory looks at legal concepts and distinctions and critiques any subordination of women found within such notions. Feminist legal theory is descriptive in that it describes the world, but it is also normative in that it argues for a specific remedy: bringing women's experiences to light in legal reasoning and challenging patriarchy. As jurisprudence, feminist legal theory is related to critical legal studies and legal realism. Both critical legal studies and legal realism argue that the law is not objective but represents a point of view, and both are focused on solving problems in the world. Likewise, feminist legal theory tries to determine how the law can treat women and men more equally and how to use the law to eliminate women's subordination to men in different areas of life (the family or the economy, e.g.). Different types of feminist legal theory argue for different ways of solving the problem of inequality, but all feminist legal theories agree that the law is patriarchal, that this patriarchy is neither natural nor inevitable, and that the male norms embedded in the law can and should be corrected.

LIBERAL/SAMENESS APPROACH

Different approaches to feminist legal theory may be most easily understood through the evolution of the question of sex differences under the law. The first phase of feminist legal theory, which arose in the early 1970s, is often called the "sameness" or "equality" phase and was most influenced by core concepts of liberalism such as autonomy, choice, individualism, and the moral equality of all people. In this phase, feminist legal theorists aimed to assimilate women into the existing legal structure rather than change the structure of the law. This is also known as the "formal equality" approach because it argues that the law should not distinguish between the sexes; if the form of the law treats men and women the same by ridding itself of explicit distinctions between the sexes, then equality has been achieved.

Associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court Ruth Bader Ginsberg is closely associated with this phase of feminist legal theory because she applied the formal equality doctrine to her work with the American Civil Liberties Union's Women's Rights Project and took on many cases wherein the law explicitly differentiated between men and women, whether this distinction worked to the benefit of men or women. In fact, many of Ginsberg's clients were men challenging laws that excluded them from a special privilege granted to women.

The formal equality approach has been successful in changing the way the Supreme Court applies the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause to sexual discrimination cases. Gender is now considered suspect under this clause, so any law that treats people differently based on their sex is

subject to review at the level of intermediate scrutiny. This means it is easier to discriminate legally between men and women than between racial groups (such laws are subject to strict scrutiny), but it is harder than discriminating on the basis of age, for example, as such laws are subject only to rational-basis review, the most lenient level of review.

RADICAL AND CULTURAL/DIFFERENCE APPROACHES

While the sameness/equality doctrine was still being argued, difference (cultural) feminism and dominance (radical) feminism became more prominent in the 1980s. Rather than contending that women are the same as men, this difference approach to feminist legal theory argues that there are important differences between women and men. Building on psychologist Carol Gilligan's work, *In a Different Voice* (1982), difference feminists say that while men have an "ethic of justice" that emphasizes abstract rules and rights, women have an "ethic of care" that emphasizes concrete relationships and responsibilities. This relational approach, especially as developed by legal scholar Robin West, focuses on women's culture and biology, emphasizing women's connection to others due to mothering and reproductive roles and the physical acts of pregnancy and breast-feeding. According to this view, female virtues should be brought into the law by promoting caretaking and interconnection rather than individualism and empathy rather than detachment. Difference legal scholar Carrie Menkel-Meadow's work has influenced the rising practice of alternative dispute resolution (mediation), which is premised on cooperation and trust as the basis of legal dealings rather than the adversary system of the courtroom.

The dominance approach to feminist legal theory is most closely associated with American feminist Catharine MacKinnon and radical feminism. MacKinnon argues that rather than being natural distinctions, sex differences are cultural constructions premised on male dominance and female subordination. To treat women and men equally, the law must not support these views. Instead it should recognize that men and women are equally different from each other rather than seeing men as a norm from which women differ. Because men and women are different, they must be treated differently to get equal outcomes. This position is considered radical because it calls for substantive changes in the structure of the law, not formal assimilation of women into men's laws. Dominance feminism arose in response especially to legal areas in which men and women were clearly different and not similarly situated—for example, domestic violence, rape, and sexual harassment. This approach has been most successful in getting, for example, marital rape and sexual harassment defined as "harms" where formerly these categories or harms did not exist in the law.

DIVERSITY APPROACH

Beginning in the 1990s, feminist legal theory developed an interconnected set of approaches loosely labeled the "diversity" view. Whereas the difference approach studied women's differences from men, the diversity views examined women's differences from each other, arguing that not all women have had the same life experiences. The diversity approach is anti-essentialist and more contextual than earlier modes of feminist legal theory, and it is informed by pragmatic feminism, critical race theory, lesbian feminism, postmodern theory, and work on intersectionality. Diversity theory states that there are distinct harms that women experience when they inhabit multiple, overlapping subordinated identity categories. Thus, it contests gender essentialist theories that make women choose whether they want to press claims as women or as Hispanics, for example, rather than as both, as Latinas. Like difference theorists, diversity theorists argue that access to institutions is not sufficient to achieve equality, not only because once women have access to formerly all-male places of employment they might be subject to sexual harassment, for example, but because the kinds of harassment they face will be different depending on their race and sexuality. The diversity approach examines particular problems as they arise and how gender expectations affect specific groups of women differently.

CONCLUSION

The varying approaches to feminist legal theory are still employed by legal scholars and lawyers addressing questions of patriarchy in the law, although the sameness approach has had the most influence on legal decision making. The other perspectives, such as the difference or diversity approaches, have had more acceptance in law schools and journals but have been less successfully adapted to the actual practice of the law.

See also *Feminism; Feminism, Postcolonial; Feminism, Radical; Feminist Political Theory; Gender and Politics; Women Legislators; Women's Movement, Comparative; Women's Representation; Women's Rights.*

. . . . CARISA R. SHOWDEN

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Feminist Movement

There have been a number of discrete but related movements for women's equality and for the social transformation of gender relations. Early texts such as Christine de Pizan's *The Book of the City of Ladies* (1405) and Mary Wollstonecraft's *A Vindication of the Rights of Women* (1792) contributed to as well as reflected women's challenges to male authority and their vision of a more just, egalitarian, and beautiful society.

While women have been political actors in a wide variety of economic, social, and religious contexts, organized political action by groups of women with sufficient numbers and presence to rise to visibility as a political movement began in the mid-nineteenth century. Each of these movements involves a set of organizations, ideologies, and cultural practices that are extensive, often contradictory, and dynamic, leading feminist scholars to stress the importance of movement both as the actions of a body of persons and as the process of motion itself.

Feminism is often described as occurring in three waves. Each emergence has been closely linked to political activism around racial and class injustices. In the United States, the first wave, from about the mid-1800s to the 1920s, emerged largely out of the abolition movement and is symbolically represented by the Declaration of Rights and Sentiments issued by the Seneca Falls Women's Rights Convention of 1848. The first wave eventually narrowed around demands for women's suffrage, finally achieved in 1920, but the movement actually had a much broader theoretical and practical reach, including radical critiques of capitalism, religion, sexuality, and war. Across Europe, Japan, and Australia, the first wave combined middle-class women's agitation for property rights, legal equality, and marriage reform with working-class women's trade union activism. In Africa, South America, the Middle East, and Asia, first-wave feminism generally emerged in the context of anticolonial movements for national liberation. Success in achieving suffrage, along with the devastating consequences of economic collapse, Fascism, and war, led to a decline of feminist movements after 1920.

Second wave refers to the women's liberation movement of the 1960s through 1980s. Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex* (1949) was perhaps the foundational text, along with Betty Freidan's *The Feminine Mystique* (1963). In the United States and Europe, feminism emerged in connection with the civil rights movement as well as antiwar activism, environmentalism, and cultural revolution. In the third world, national liberation movements again provided the context for feminist organizing. Women of color in both the developed and the developing worlds confronted the white, middle-class orientation of mainstream groups such as the National Organization for Women, while lesbians problematized homophobia in the movement as well as the larger society. *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings of Radical Women of Color* (1981), edited by Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherríe Moraga, was a pivotal text. The academic field of women's studies was initially the creation of the second wave, as were a host of reforms involving legal equality, health care, domestic violence, and reproduction.

While many aspects of the second wave continue to thrive, particularly the insistence on bringing race and class into conversation with sex and gender, a third wave of feminist organizing emerged in the 1990s. Third-wave feminism often attracts younger women, who may distinguish themselves from their aging second-wave counterparts, as reflected in Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richard's book *Manifesta: Young Women, Feminism and the Future* (2000). Third-wave feminism reflects the rise of postmodernism in the sense that it deconstructs the categories of women and men as well as gay and straight that had often been taken for granted as necessary for political organizing, as shown by one of the most influential texts of the third wave, Judith Butler's *Gender Trouble* (1990). Third-wave feminism is more self-consciously global than its predecessors, energized by the series of United Nations conferences on women, and has campaigned worldwide for women's rights as human rights. Critical analyses of neoliberal models of globalization, environmental destruction, and rape in war are prominent contributions of an increasingly global feminism.

See also *Beauvoir, Simone de; Feminism; Feminism, Postcolonial; Feminism, Radical; Feminism, Socialist; Feminist Legal Theory; Feminist Political Theory; Feminization of Poverty; Friedan, Betty; Gender and Politics; Gender Gap; Glass Ceiling; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Movements, Comparative; U.S. Politics and Society: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Political Identity; U.S. Politics and Society: Women, Political Participation of; Wollstonecraft, Mary; Women's Movement, Comparative; Women's Suffrage.*

. . . .   KATHY E. FERGUSON

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Feminist Parties

Although feminism as a social movement dates back to the nineteenth century, feminist political parties are relatively recent phenomena in most countries. Feminist parties, like environmentalist parties, are oriented around specific political issues and concentrate on addressing the needs of women in

the context of patriarchal and masculine political cultures. For example, in Sweden, the Feminist Initiative was founded in 2005 and focused during the 2006 elections on the premise that "women's lives, choices and opportunities are restricted by the patriarchal power structure" (Feminist Initiative).

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Calls for female suffrage and political representation increased during the second half of the nineteenth century, especially following the Second Industrial Revolution (1870–1914), when a great number of women entered the workforce in the 1850s. While early feminist movements concentrated on the specific issues of abuse of women in the sex trade, marital rape, sexual abuse of children, and equal educational, employment, and legal rights for women, it was the focus on the universal suffrage of women that united all feminists.

The second wave of feminist movements emerged in the 1960s with the shift from civil and political rights to changing socially accepted values, beliefs, and attitudes toward women in society. This movement managed to politicize women by mobilizing around a wide range of issues, including unofficial (de facto) and official legal inequalities, sexuality, family, the workplace, and reproductive rights.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE EMERGENCE OF FEMINIST PARTIES
The third wave of feminism began in the early 1990s. Argumentatively, it challenged what many considered the second movement's view of a universal female identity with an over-emphasis on the experiences of upper-middle-class white women (although this claim is disputed). Instead, under the influence of poststructuralism, the third feminist movement focused on micropolitics, avoiding the normative approaches to what is or is not good for women and instead concentrating on the discursive power and ambiguity of gender. Thus, this movement emphasized the importance of incorporating women's ethnic, national, religious, and cultural identities into everyday politics.

Swiss political scientist Simon Hug offers one convincing explanation of how these feminist social movements developed into formal political parties by suggesting that women needed to form their own political parties to protect their own interests when existing political parties failed to incorporate the demands of these feminist movements. Other scholars argued that additional factors must also have contributed to the establishment of feminist parties, such as a greater public consciousness of the palpable inequality between men and women, a politicized social cleavage between men and women, and a low threshold for party entry in the political system. For example, the two-party presidential system and a high threshold for congressional party representations in the United States offer a difficult political environment for women in which to establish political parties and win elections. Multiparty election systems with lower thresholds for representation, such as those in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, Israel, and Poland, provide more political incentives for women to formally organize under a specific political party.

The politicization of women's issues has proven that parties can accommodate feminist demands in two ways: through rhetoric, as in most countries, and through affirmative action and positive discrimination (by filling certain quotas), such as in the Labour Party in Norway and Social Democratic Parties in Denmark and Sweden. However, most political parties in Europe encouraged the integration of women into politics by creating separate women's groups within their own parties instead of having women create their own separate parties.

CONCLUSION
The desire to eliminate discrimination and gender-based inequalities and promote women's issues in politics has resulted in a number of feminist parties currently found worldwide, including the Shamiram Women's Party in Armenia, the Australian Women's Party in Australia, the Cambodian Women's Party, the FemINist INitiative of BC in Canada, the Feminist Party of Germany, the Gabriela Women's Party in the Philippines, the Women of Russia Party in Russia, the Feminist Initiative in Sweden, and the parties of the All-Ukrainian Party of Women's Initiative in the Ukraine.

However, these political parties do not overcome the low representation of women in politics, as, for example, the world average of women in Parliament was only 18.8 percent as of January 30, 2010. Feminist parties, while not a recent phenomenon, still have a long way to go to succeed in achieving equal representation and parity for women in the societies.

See also *Feminism; Feminist Legal Theory; Women's Representation.*

. . . .   SEZGIN S. CEBI

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Feminist Political Theory

Feminist political theory involves distinctive modes of critique engaging both the classic texts in Western political theory and the inequitable and unjust conditions of women's existence. Investigating androcentric bias in key concepts and practices such as freedom, justice, order, sovereignty, autonomy, democracy, liberalism, nationalism, the state, war, and peace, feminist political theory seeks to illuminate the barriers and constraints that circumscribe women's lives, explain their dynamics and persistence, and identify mechanisms for change.

Working within particular philosophical traditions, feminist theorists have identified omissions and distortions circulating

in philosophical texts that generate noxious representations of women. They have demonstrated that classical and mainstream philosophers often violate disciplinary standards of argument and evidence when making claims about women, that their contradictory assertions about women undermine the internal consistency of their claims about human nature, and that they routinely fail to notice that the hypotheses advanced about women are inadequately warranted.

CONCEPTUALIZING GENDER JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

Feminist political theories articulate claims of justice that do not fit the models of justice as restitution, reparation, or rectification developed in the Western philosophical literature. Since Aristotle advanced his conception of compensatory justice as a rectifying or reparatory transaction between one person and another, Western philosophers have argued that both wrongdoing and its rectification must be tied to specific historical events. But the systematic inequities that women experience in particular times and places do not conform to the model of injury or the possibilities for rectification that Aristotle envisioned. As such, mainstream philosophy denies any possibility for rectification: how can justice dispel something that cannot be accounted for by a verdict? How can women be accorded sovereignty when it is not a matter of restoration precisely because women have never had it? How can justice address the micro-inequities that permeate women's daily lives when they are not unlawful or illegal?

Feminist theorists have developed analytic strategies and conceptual vocabularies necessary to make the injustice of male domination and women's subordination visible and to refigure conceptions of justice so that rectification becomes possible. In an effort to denaturalize social relations and social roles of women and men, liberal feminist theorists have argued that women's nature is an altogether artificial thing, the result of forced repression of certain capacities and excessive stimulation of other capabilities. They have emphasized the role of law in excluding women from educational and occupational opportunities, from legal standing and constitutional rights, and from participation in politics and public life, thereby producing women as inferior beings. As early as the 1830s, black feminist theorists in the United States also pointed out that state and federal laws deprived black women and men of the status of human beings, denying them rights of self-determination and constitutional protections in ways that differed significantly from the deprivations experienced by white American women. Contrary to dominant beliefs, feminists argued that the subordination of women and the systematic dehumanization of blacks was the effect of the legal code, a socially produced and sustained hierarchy, not a reflection of natural aptitudes and abilities. Within this liberal framework, laws that served as the instrument of sexual and racial oppression were targeted for change. Thus, one strain of feminist and critical race theorizing has consistently focused on the transformation of the state and its legal apparatus as a primary mechanism for social change.

Socialist feminist theorists construe the causes of women's oppression and the strategies for social change quite differently, suggesting that a full understanding of the woman question requires conceptualization of exploitative divisions of labor within capitalist industrial production, unequal roles in physical and social reproduction sanctioned by marriage practices and kinship systems, commodity fetishism, and modes of circulation, trade, and exchange. Arguing that the overthrow of capitalism and the achievement of socialism are essential to the feminist project in the long run, socialist feminist theorists advance specific prescriptions for social transformation in the domestic labor debates, proliferating versions of materialist feminism, and in dual systems theory, which explores the intricate relations between capitalism and patriarchy.

While some feminist theorists problematize women's exclusion from the major institutions of the public world (social, political, economic, religious, academic), others focus on difference as a primary category of analysis (women's differences from men as well as systemic differences among women based on race, class, nationality, sexuality, historicity), and yet others embrace the postmodern refusal of categorization, deploying deconstructive and genealogical methods to interrogate binaries and investigate power-knowledge constellations of particular concepts. Suspicious of the will to truth embedded in quests for analytic precision and totalizing metanarratives, postmodern feminist theorists urge transformative strategies designed to destabilize boundaries, fixities, and givens and to resist normalizing practices.

Western feminist political theorists have challenged received views about the nature of political life, particularly concerning the assumed neutrality of the state. They have demonstrated how the mutual constitution of public and private realms has marginalized women and undermined their full citizenship; how conceptions of politics, power, freedom, and order have been tied to male experiences of embodiment that exclude women; how social contract theory presupposes an exploitive sexual contract prior to the creation of the state, which the state then enforces; how conceptions of proper femininity have been used to fix meaning and escape instability by making the unfamiliar familiar and the unknown known; how the state functions as a mechanism to shore up particular conceptions of race and nation tied to practices of kinship; and how dominant paradigms of power continue to neglect gender power embedded in organizational rules, routines, and policies that sustain prohibitions, exclusions, denigrations, and obstructions that circumscribe women's lives while normalizing male dominance and rendering women, along with their needs and interests, invisible.

FEMINIST THEORY IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

Postcolonial feminist theorists have advanced persuasive critiques of ethnocentric universalism, a mode of structural domination that suppresses the heterogeneity of women and

men in the global South. Replicating patterns of Western hegemony, dominant assumptions about the public/private distinction fail to recognize that enslaved and colonized peoples had no private sphere sanctioned by the state; every aspect of existence was subject to intervention by the state and its representatives. Gendered divisions of labor such as the male breadwinner–female homemaker model taken for granted by Western theorists are at odds with women's role in the production of subsistence in much of the global South and occlude inequalities created when Western development agencies imposed an ill-fitting male-breadwinner model in many parts of the world. Western analyses of class dynamics fail to comprehend how class relations can be complicated by caste even decades after the legal abolition of castes. To avoid prescriptions for social transformation advanced in ignorance of the specificities of women's needs and circumstances and without consultation with women in the global South, post-colonial feminist theorists insist that the politics of representation, the question of who speaks for whom and what is said, must become central to feminist political theorizing.

See also *Feminism; Feminism, Postcolonial; Gender and Politics; Sexism; Women's Rights.*

. . . . MARY HAWKESWORTH

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Feminization of Poverty

The term *feminization of poverty* is used to explain the fact that women and their dependent children make up the bulk of the world's poor. The term was coined in 1976 by sociologist Diana Pearce. In developing nations, poverty may be the result of a heavy dependence on the agricultural sector and the lack of government resources. In some countries, women and children eke out a scant existence by working the land while older males labor in more affluent neighboring nations to ensure the family's survival. In developed countries, women become poor through divorce, insufficient employment opportunities, low levels of education, or exclusion from decision-making processes. Those who reject the concept of the feminization of poverty generally do so because they view women as extensions of men or because they view the problem of poverty as non–gender related.

In all societies, women's work is devalued in relation to men's with the result that women are paid less for doing the same work even in countries where laws promise equal pay for equal work. The inequities arise in part because women tend to cluster in lower-status female-dominated occupations. Globally, women earn one-half to three-fourths of the salaries paid to men. In some developing countries, women need their husbands' permission to work, obtain passports, buy or sell property, secure bank loans, and open bank accounts. These are some of the same political issues that propelled the first wave of feminism in the United States and Europe during the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The problem of female poverty is so extensive that the United Nations has declared poverty "a violation of [women's] human rights to health and well-being, food, adequate housing, a safe and healthy living environment, social security, employment and development." The United Nations General Assembly designated 1996 the International Year for the Eradication of Poverty and subsequently established guidelines aimed at alleviating the feminization of poverty.

THE UNITED STATES

Despite the fact that the United States is the most heavily developed nation in the world with a per capita income of $41,000, 12 percent of the population lives in poverty. It has been estimated that 57.2 percent of all Americans living below the poverty line are female and that one in every four American children under the age of six lives in poverty. Among Americans who earn less than $4,000 annually, 70 percent are female. Minority women are more likely than white women to be poor. Current estimates place female poverty rates at 31.7 percent for black, 32.0 percent for Hispanic, and 12.6 percent for white people. In contrast, 24.7 percent of male poor are black, 26.8 percent are Hispanic, and 9.8 percent are white.

In addition to sex and race, common factors associated with poverty are single parenthood, low levels of education, and a lack of marketable skills. Women are economically vulnerable after divorce because men often fail to pay child support, and

alimony is rare among lower economic levels. Mothers who have been out of the job market raising children often find it difficult after a divorce to reenter the work world where advancing technology rapidly changes skill requirements.

Women with small children have an additional disadvantage as workers because they must find safe and affordable child care. An overhaul of the welfare system under President Bill Clinton broadened the safety net for mothers on welfare through job programs and extended periods of subsidized health care for low-income working mothers. However, many low-income women never receive welfare and must depend on families, friends, and churches for support when fathers fail to shoulder their responsibilities.

Even if they do find jobs, women are faced with pay inequities. In 1960, women earned 60.7 percent of male wages. Within two decades, that number had dropped by 0.5 percent. After 1981, in response to the women's movement and new laws, the wage gap steadily decreased. Yet even as wages for women in the general population grew, the extent of poverty among female-headed families rose to one in five as a result of social programs eliminated or slashed under the Reagan administration. By 2004, still far from equity, the wage gap narrowed to 77.0 percent.

EUROPE

Poor women in Europe face many of the same problems as do those in the United States. Part-time work is a major factor in the feminization of poverty, and large numbers of European women, particularly single mothers and those in Northern Europe, work part-time. In the Netherlands, 88 percent of women are so employed. The wage gap is also large among European women and has changed little during the past several decades except in Britain (68 percent), Portugal (72 percent), Denmark (85 percent), and France (81 percent). Unlike women in the United States, poor European women have access to strong safety nets that assist those in need.

Among all countries of the world, Finland and Sweden serve as role models for preventing the feminization of poverty. Parents share responsibility for children, and extensive social welfare systems keep single-parent families from falling into poverty, in part because of government-supported daycare centers and liberal paid parental leave policies.

THE MIDDLE EAST

Women in much of the Middle East are denied political and economic rights because of religious and cultural dictates. The most extreme example is Afghanistan, where Islamic law is enforced by the Taliban. Afghani women are barred from the workplace, and restrictions on female education result in a female literacy rate of only 21 percent. Domestic violence is prevalent; but if women leave abusive husbands, they are left without means of support.

Afghani women are frequently prevented from receiving necessary health care because they cannot be treated by male doctors. With a fertility rate of 6.69 children per woman, females suffer from a variety of pregnancy-related conditions. Lack of access to health care is particularly devastating among poor women because Afghanis face high risks of food and waterborne diseases such as hepatitis A and typhoid fever, and malaria is a constant threat from March to November.

In November 2006, Muslim women launched a campaign to end repression by holding a convention in Barcelona, Spain, to address issues that promote the feminization of poverty. The convention agenda specifically targeted polygamy, domestic violence, and Islamic laws that relegate women to inferior roles.

HIV/AIDS AS A FACTOR IN POVERTY

Women in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia are the poorest in the world. They often live under appalling conditions in nations with low per capita incomes; low life expectancy; high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates; high incidences of preventable diseases; and limited access to education, health care, and social services. They may also lack access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation. During the past few decades, women in these nations have been further impoverished by HIV/AIDS outbreaks that have reached epidemic proportions.

By the end of 2005, 24.5 million people in Africa were living with HIV/AIDS, with South Africa (21.5 percent) and Zambia (16.5 percent) experiencing the highest incidences. Women are disproportionately affected by HIV/AIDS because men are more likely to have multiple sex partners. In 2000, estimates by international organizations placed the number of children orphaned and impoverished in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean at 34.7 million and predicted that the number will reach 44 million within a decade.

See also *Gender and Globalization; Gender and Politics; Poverty; Sexism; Women's Rights.*

. . . . ELIZABETH RHOLETTER PURDY

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Feudalism

Feudalism is an indefinite term referring to either a form of political organization or a type of economic system. Politically, feudalism is an aristocratic hierarchy in which political authority is dispersed among lords and their vassals. Such feudal relations center on the homage pledged to lords by vassals, who were granted a benefice or fief (usually land) in return for service (primarily military). While feudal relations arose in many countries, such as Japan from the ninth to nineteenth centuries, they dominated in northern Europe during the Middle Ages, especially in Germany, France, and England. *Feudalism* was not a term used during this time to describe a specific system of government but is an abstraction used by Enlightenment scholars, some of whom gave it a primarily economic meaning and condemned it as a form of oppression.

Vassalage was a bond of honor between lord and vassal, who might be someone already recognized among the aristocracy or a free commoner. In a solemn ceremony the vassal gave an oath of personal loyalty and service for which the vassal received support and protection by the lord. A vassal would attend his lord's court; be consulted in governmental, judicial, and military decision making; and most important, fight in the service of his lord. A king would have vassals throughout his domain, and these in turn would establish vassalage relationships with others in their localities. Vassalage gave rise to a new class of nobility—knights, heavily armed warriors mounted on horses and obliged to serve their lords. Simultaneously, a code of honorable behavior called chivalry arose among these knights. Thus, vassalage differed from the relationship of serf and peasant to lord, subject to ruler, or citizen to state. Vassals not only gave counsel in the lord's court but performed most governmental functions in their own localities in which they were lords in turn. Under feudalism, then, political authority was shared among a small group of free lords and military leaders, each of whom exercised it in relatively limited territories and who further distributed that authority to subordinates. Government was not centralized but functioned mostly at the local level at which the lord and his court maintained order, determined law, collected taxes, and performed judicial and administrative functions. In these ways, feudalism is one antecedent of Federalism.

Peasants pay taxes to their lord in both money and livestock. Feudal lords controlled agricultural resources, which peasants paid to use.

SOURCE: The Granger Collection, New York

Vassalage hearkens back to both German and Roman traditions, but in the Middle Ages it came to be accompanied by a benefice or fief, by means of which the vassal could support himself. This land grant was precarious, contingent on fulfillment of duties to the lord, but it provided a stronger and more stable bond between lord and vassal. Fiefs eventually became hereditary, with the vassal's heir paying homage to the same lord. The details of the duties and rights for both vassal and lord varied greatly from region to region. As a result there was no single, fixed form of feudal government. Feudal relations began in the eighth and ninth centuries in Europe as loose, flexible alliances, and they gradually became increasingly precise and clearly articulated in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries when feudal relations were at their height.

Feudalism as an economic term arose with Enlightenment scholars in the eighteenth century. Feudal lords presided over most means of production in the agrarian economy: land, forests, rivers, buildings, markets, and mills. The land was either worked by serfs or rented to peasant tenants, but in principle the entire produce of the land belonged to the landlord. Adam Smith, in *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776), used the term "feudal system" to describe a system of economic production in which peasants and serfs are exploited by being coerced to labor for the landlord rather than provided with the monetary incentives of a free market system. A similar understanding of feudalism as manorialism was adopted by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who described feudalism as one of the phases of political and economic development marked by severe class oppression.

While feudalism in Europe during the Middle Ages was characterized by considerable violence and frequent warfare between lords, it was not anarchic. The possession of substantial land and political authority entailed the public responsibilities of defending, policing, administering, and judging. Political power was exercised locally as a private possession of a lord, but concepts of central government survived in the form of kingship, which retained real prestige if not always executable sovereign power. Vassalage assigned certain duties and rights to both lords and vassals, which preserved conceptions of individual liberty and other rights, thereby guarding against absolutism, as demonstrated in the Magna Carta.

See also *Class and Politics; Magna Carta.*

. . . . STEPHEN J. LANGE

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Fidelism (Castroism)

Fidelism (also known as Castroism) is a political ideology derived from and inspired by Fidel Castro (1926–). As an ideology, Fidelism represents a particular case of cross-fertilization of revolutionary pan-Americanism in the tradition of Simón Bolivar and the European Communist movement. Although Fidelism today represents a tendency within the broader communist tradition, it is the only tendency to have developed from outside the communist movement. In that sense, Fidelism represents the a posteriori application of a Marxist-Leninist doctrine to the political praxis of a particular Latin American revolutionary movement. Fidelism can further be distinguished from other tendencies within the communist movement by its source of authority, its tactics, its unique geographical influence, and its revolutionary strategy.

The source of authority in Fidelism is Fidel Castro. The seeds of Fidelism were planted when Castro led his audacious yet unsuccessful attack against Cuban President Fulgencio Batista at the Moncado barracks on July 26, 1953. This act enabled Castro to emerge as an independent political figure with his own personal following. Castro's "history will absolve me" speech, delivered during his trial in October 1953, became the centerpiece for the new Castroites and represented a program of radical social reform for Cuba with Fidel Castro at its helm. The program itself fit well within the confines of traditional left-wing Latin American politics in Cuba, which is situated well outside the communist movement. Castro and his movement drew inspiration from the likes of Máximo Gómez, Simón Bolivar, José Martí, and other Latin American revolutionaries. As such, Fidelism was uniquely Cuban from its inception. Following the July 26 attacks, the charismatic and audacious Fidel Castro was able to build a personal following in Cuba and elsewhere, which gave him an increasing maneuverability to define and redefine his movement and ideology.

Fidelism stresses tactics over ideology. Even before coming to power, Fidel Castro continually demonstrated a willingness to negotiate and employ selective ideologies as a means for securing power and consolidating his vision of a more equitable and just society in Cuba. In fact, Castro has never firmly cast his movement in any theoretical mold. Rather, he has shown a willingness to enter into broad alliances with any group that will enable him to build political capital and consolidate his vision. During his struggle in the Sierra Maestra in Cuba's Southeast, he entered into broad alliances with Auténicos and the Communist party. Upon seizing power in 1959, he emphatically told the United States, "We are not communist. The doors are open to private investments that contribute to the development of industry in Cuba." It was only after relations with the United States deteriorated that Castro turned toward Marxist-Leninism and the Soviet model to consolidate his power in Cuba and defend his nationalist project against U.S. aggression. Following the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Castro once again demonstrated this ideological flexibility by initiating limited, market-oriented reforms. In this sense, Fidelism is not so much an ism as it is a leader who is willing to borrow ideology to support his actions.

Fidelism can be distinguished from other communist tendencies in that it is uniquely Latin American. Argentine revolutionary Che Guevara pointed out that the Cuban revolution has provided Latin Americans with a uniquely indigenous alternative that speaks to them in Spanish, in their own language. Thus, the inspiration for and language of Fidelism is uniquely Latin American, a difference that exacerbates and nationalizes the differences between Fidelism and other communist tendencies.

Finally, Fidelism's revolutionary strategy represents a stark departure from traditional communist formulations. In Marxist formulations of revolution, objective conditions created the basis for armed struggle. However, Fidelism exalts the ethos of guerrilla warfare over historical condition. Castro, Guevara, and the Castroites presented their victory as the exclusive outcome of an armed struggle waged by guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra. As Guevara writes, "We have demonstrated that a small group of men who are determined, supported by the people, and without fear of dying . . . can overcome a regular army. . . . We must make agrarian revolution, fight in the fields, in the mountains, and from here take the revolution to the cities, not try to make it in the latter." In this formulation, armed struggle alone is sufficient. This unique guerilla aspect of Fidelism is accredited primarily to the contributions of Guevara.

See also *Communism; Latin American Political Economy; Latin American Political Thought; Latin American Politics and Society; Leninism; Revolutions, Comparative.*

. . . . MICHAEL MCNAMARA

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Field Experiment

Field experiments, as distinct from laboratory experiments, are randomized interventions that take place in naturalistic settings. Field experiments are principally designed to establish causal relationships. Well-executed field experiments combine the strengths of randomized designs with the external validity of field studies. While a laboratory study, for example, might examine the effects of political advertising on voter turnout by exposing treatment and control groups to different advertising stimuli within an artificial setting and gauging their vote intentions by means of a survey, a field experiment would randomly manipulate the content and timing of actual advertisement campaigns and attempt to link these varied interventions to observed patterns of voting. Both types of studies use randomization, but the latter has the advantage of linking cause and effect in terms that have direct real-world applicability.

Although field experimentation is in principle a strong research methodology, in practice it faces important ethical and pragmatic constraints. Rarely do social scientists have the opportunity or authority to manipulate the variables of most interest to them, such as culture, political systems, economic prosperity, and the like. Even in situations wherein random interventions are attempted, they are sometimes undone by the people charged with implementing them. Political campaigns participating in a field experiment may be tempted to influence the control group in an effort to garner additional votes.

The challenge of orchestrating field experiments and maintaining the integrity of the randomization means that they tend to occur in a small number of sites that are chosen for reasons of convenience rather than through systematic sampling procedures. This constraint raises the issue of whether the study's conclusions apply only to the types of people who actually participate in an experiment. Replication is the appropriate response to concerns about drawing conclusions based on studies of particular times, places, and people.

A further complication arises when experimental subjects refuse to participate in the study or cannot be reached for treatment. Although noncompliance diminishes the power of an experimental design, it is a remediable problem as long as the decision to participate is unrelated to the strength of the treatment effect. The statistical correction is to perform an instrumental variables regression in which the independent variable is whether a subject was actually treated and the instrumental variable is whether a subject was originally assigned to the treatment group. The resulting effect estimate is termed the "treatment-on-treated" effect because it is the effect of the treatment on those who actually receive it. The severity of attrition problems depends on whether there is differential attrition for treatment and control groups.

Despite these challenges, field experimentation has grown dramatically in political science since the late 1990s, as scholars have sought to assess the effectiveness of interventions ranging from voter mobilization tactics to tax compliance to lobbying. Scholars have also become increasingly adept at seizing opportunities to study naturally occurring randomization, such as judicial assignments, ballot order, and the representation of women in local governance. The continued growth of field experimentation depends on whether policy makers and political actors can be convinced to incorporate random assignment when deploying resources across time or space, so that they and the scholarly community can rigorously assess the effects of their interventions.

See also *Causal Inference; Causation and Correlation; Experimental Design; Validity.*

. . . . DONALD P. GREEN

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Filibuster

The filibuster is a parliamentary tactic used to delay or prevent a vote on legislation through unlimited speech or debate. The word *filibuster* is derived from the Dutch word for "pirate" and connotes the attempt to highjack a piece of legislation that would otherwise pass with a majority vote. The origins of the filibuster date to the Roman senator Cato the Younger who, when faced with a measure he opposed, would speak continuously until the proponents of the action would withdraw it or grant concessions. Many modern parliamentary systems allow some form of the filibuster. For instance, in most Westminster systems, parliamentarians may be allowed to continue debate on a measure and introduce endless amendments as long as they are related to the motion. In the United States, initially members of both the House of Representatives and Senate had the right to filibuster. However, the House imposed restrictions on debate in 1842. Senators continue to have the privilege of unlimited debate, although the Senate adopted a rule in 1917 that allows it to invoke cloture with a three-fifths majority vote (sixty senators). Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) holds the record for the longest filibuster at twenty-four hours and eighteen minutes during his 1957 effort to block the passage of civil rights legislation.

See also *Cloture; Westminster Model.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Film and Politics

See *Politics, Literature, and Film.*

Filmer, Sir Robert

Twentieth-century political scientists know Sir Robert Filmer (1588–1653), an English absolutist theorist and perhaps the most famous proponent of the theory of patriarchalism during the seventeenth century, primarily in his capacity as the target of John Locke's criticisms in the *Two Treatises of Government.* Eldest son of Sir Edward Filmer of East Sutton, Kent, Robert Filmer entered Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1604.

After a year at Trinity, Filmer was admitted to Lincoln's Inn to study law, although it is not clear whether he ever actually did so. He married Anne Heton in 1618 and inherited his family's estates upon Sir Edward's death in 1629.

By the time that the English Civil War (1642–1651; armed conflict between Parliament and King Charles I) broke out in 1642, Filmer—although a fervent supporter of the king—was too old to take an active part in the fighting. Remaining at his family estate, he was forced to contribute to the parliamentarian cause when Kent fell to Parliament and was imprisoned for a time during the mid-1640s. Three important works by Filmer appeared in 1648: *The Freeholder's Grand Inquest,* a historical survey that argued that Parliament sat at the king's pleasure; *The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy,* which attacked parliamentary supporter Philip Hunton's *Treatise of Monarchie* (1643); and *The Necessity of the Absolute Power of All Kings,* which reproduced excerpts from Richard Knolles's 1606 translation of French sovereignty theorist Jean Bodin into English. With the execution of the king in January 1649, Filmer retreated from public life, although he did remain informed about the political and intellectual currents of his time. Filmer's *Observations upon Aristotle's Politiques*—a critique of Hobbes, Milton, and Grotius—appeared in 1652, one year before his death.

Filmer's best-known work, *Patriarcha,* was written around 1628 but remained in manuscript form until its publication in 1680, at which time it was celebrated by resurgent Anglican royalists and denounced in print by no less than three important Whig thinkers: Locke, James Tyrell is his *Patriarcha, Non Monarcha* (1681), and Algernon Sidney is his *Discourses Concerning Government* (1698). In *Patriarcha,* he took aim at such Catholic thinkers as Robert Bellarmine and Adolfo Suarez, who had criticized the Crown's requirement that English Catholics take oaths of allegiance in the wake of the Gunpowder Plot. More broadly, however, *Patriarcha* attacked contract theories of political obligation, which claimed a right on the part of the people actively to resist the king, and denounced defenses of Parliament that sought to limit or extract concessions from the king. In distinct contrast to his most famous critic, John Locke, Filmer equated political power and paternal power and denied the natural freedom of humankind. In other words, just as a father possessed absolute authority over his family, the king possessed absolute authority over all the families in the kingdom. Just as every individual was born subject to the head of his or her family, so was everyone born subject to a political ruler.

See also *British Political Thought; Patriarchy.*

. . . . ANDREW MURPHY

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First Past the Post

First past the post is an electoral formula whereby the candidate who obtains a plurality of votes in a single-member district wins the corresponding seat. One of the simplest, oldest, and most widely adopted election mechanisms—used by countries including the United States and the United Kingdom—first past the post is also highly disproportional as it grants, by definition, 100 percent of district representation to the party that wins a simple majority of the vote while leaving the remaining competitors unrepresented regardless of their electoral strength. This incentivizes electoral aggregation at the constituency and national level and penalizes third parties with a geographically dispersed support. Based on this logic and on empirical evidence, most comparativists believe that in the medium or long run first past the post favors a two-party system—the oft-cited Duverger's law—or at least decreases the number of parties compared to other mechanisms such as proportional or runoff formulas (exemplified, respectively, by the German and French systems).

For advocates of first past the post, by simplifying the party system and facilitating the formation of single-party or small coalition governments, this formula allows voters to choose between clear public policy alternatives and increases the stability, efficiency, and democratic accountability of parliamentary executives. Critics, on the other hand, view first past the post as a less than democratic mechanism, which reduces the options of the electorate and produces a distorted picture of the society in representative institutions, where cleavages are artificially reduced, minorities are systematically underrepresented, and political diversity all but disappears.

See also *Duverger's Law; Electoral Formulas; Electoral Rules; Proportional Representation; Run-Off; Winner-Take-All.*

. . . .   PIER DOMENICO TORTOLA

Fiscal Conservatism

Fiscal conservatism is an ideological perspective on what constitutes the appropriate approach to economic matters within modern capitalist states; it is a term more commonly used in the United States, Canada, and Australia, but the perspective can be found throughout Europe as well. The fundamentals of the approach favored by this perspective include limited government spending, low tax rates, free trade agreements with other nations, only modest amounts of business regulation, a strong respect for individual property rights, and balanced budgets. Sometimes referred to as "traditional economic conservatism" or "classical liberal economics," this perspective grounds itself in what its advocates see as the laissez-faire tradition of economic thought, beginning with Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and continuing on through contemporary economists such as Milton Friedman and George Stigler. As such, it is a perspective that either completely rejects or greatly qualifies the economic arguments advanced by contemporary liberal thinkers such as John Maynard Keynes, agrarian or

protectionist political leaders such as John Taylor or Henry Clay, and socialist thinkers such as Karl Marx.

Fiscal conservatism does not carry with it any necessary connection with traditionalism or conservatism on social or moral matters. In fact, it is not uncommon to find fiscal conservatism pared with social libertarianism, assuming that a leave-it-alone approach to matters of individual wealth and economic growth ought to be paralleled with a similar hands-off attitude toward matters of lifestyle and culture. Many fiscal conservatives, while not embracing a fully libertarian attitude with regard to social issues, will nonetheless often emphasize their identity as economic conservatives as opposed to people whose conservative beliefs are focused more on social or moral matters and are rooted in religious or traditionalist beliefs. At the same time, some fiscal conservatives embrace some form of social conservatism as a necessary supplement to their own fiscal preferences, arguing that a virtuous culture is the most likely foundation for the trust that capitalist economies require. This intersection of contrasting conservative priorities has often been the cause of deep disputes among those political parties that have most strongly adopted fiscal conservatism as part of their platform.

Fiscal conservatism's use as a descriptive label was greatly shaped by the historical contest between collectivist economic theories and capitalist ones throughout the twentieth century in the United States and Europe. For example, the growth of government spending, federal regulations, and tax rates in the United States, particularly through and following the Great Depression of 1929 and World War II (1939–1945), led many to believe that local and free enterprise economic principles were being consciously undermined by opponents of economic freedom. Through the 1960s and 1970s, the notion of fiscal responsibility was put forward by many conservative thinkers and activists in the United States in contrast to what they perceived as the socialist-influenced profligacy and bureaucratic entanglements that resulted from postwar economic planning. This movement was paralleled by similar efforts during the same time period to reform the economic restrictions that had been put in place by social democratic governments in many western European nations following the war. With the election of Margaret Thatcher as prime minister in Great Britain in 1979, Ronald Reagan to the American presidency in 1980, and Helmut Kohl as prime minister of West Germany in 1982, the fiscal conservative reaction attained significant power, and the economic deregulation, reduction, or simplification of tax rates; privatization of industries; cutting of government social services; and other moves in the direction of less intervention in the operations of the free market during the 1980s are often looked on by fiscal conservatives as a high-water mark for the ideology.

Fiscal conservatism does not necessarily mandate an opposition to all government spending, regulation, or taxation, particularly if the policies in question are tied to matters of national defense, which is generally recognized by voters and parties alike to not be a matter particularly governed by economic realities. In regard to government spending or

regulation on public interest matters such as health, education, or environmental protection, rather than rejecting such responsibilities entirely, often fiscal conservative thinkers will suggest making use of market-like incentives to harness the self-interest of individual economic actors to accomplish public ends. It is believed that a reliance on vouchers, tax breaks, and other similar policies will provide the public goods that society needs without top-down, command-and-control policies that, fiscal conservatism argues, distort the innovation and opportunities that markets provide.

See also *Centrally Planned Economy; Conservatism; Free Trade; Liberal Theory; Libertarianism; New Conservatism; Social Conservatism; Taxation.*

. . . .   RUSSELL ARBEN FOX

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Fiscal Policy

Fiscal policy involves decisions about government revenues, spending, and borrowing. These decisions require politicians to address the reality of limited means and unlimited desires. The politics of fiscal policy is often contentious and is affected by rules that vary across national and subnational governments. Issues may be divided according to the size of government, as measured by spending and taxes (fiscal scale), and the causes and consequences of deficits (fiscal balance).

SIZE OF GOVERNMENT

Prior to the twentieth century, the fiscal scale of democratic governments tended to be quite limited except during times of war. Nondefense government spending and taxes grew relative to the economy in many countries from about 1910 to 1940, and then again from about 1960 to 1980. Reasons for this expansion likely included demands created by industrialization and urbanization, widespread acceptance of the idea that the provision of social services and free education are basic government functions, and an enhanced ability to monitor economic activity and collect taxes and fees.

Looking across national and subnational governments, current levels of spending and taxes depend on political and institutional variables as well as demand. Liberal parties tend to tax and spend more than conservative parties, but the ability of a party to move fiscal scale to its most preferred level is often dependent on maintaining control for a number of years. Some recent research in political economy has focused on the effects of government structure and electoral rules on fiscal scale. In general, presidential governments chosen in majoritarian electoral systems tend to have smaller fiscal scales than parliamentary governments chosen in proportional representation systems. Additional research has focused on the effects of constitutional or statutory restrictions, such as California's famous Proposition 13, which limits the amount of property tax revenue available to state and local governments. In the United States, the mere existence of a state constitutional provision that allows citizens to place tax and spending limitations directly on the ballot tends to restrict the fiscal scale of government.

DEFICITS AND DEBT

Although voters everywhere tend to prefer lower taxes, they also look to elected politicians to provide various services and programs that cost money. The temptation, therefore, is to finance these services and programs with borrowing that pushes the burden of payment into the future.

Fiscal balance, like fiscal scale, may be affected by the design of institutions. Governments elected in majoritarian systems tend to run smaller deficits relative to the economy. Balanced budget laws and constitutional restrictions on borrowing are fairly common for subnational governments in the United States, but few, if any, national governments have these restrictions.

An alternative source of discipline is credit markets. Governments that run persistent, excessive deficits find that the cost of borrowing goes up and interest payments begin to crowd out spending on services and programs. The possibility of actual default creates substantial risks for lenders and may lead to a request for assistance by the national government to a subnational government or by international sources to a national government.

In recent decades, persistent, significant deficits absent wars or recessions have become an important issue. In the 1930s, governments adopted Keynesian economic principles to combat economic recessions with increased government spending. While this was politically popular, the Keynesian prescription to offset these deficits with increased taxes or decreased spending during times of prosperity was not at all popular. In the 1980s, some conservative governments adopted supply-side economic policies in the belief that the best way to stimulate economic growth is to encourage investment by cutting taxes. Once again, cutting taxes is politically easy, but offsetting spending cuts is hard. Finally, most industrialized democracies have adopted a variety of entitlement programs that provide for income security and health insurance. As life expectancies increase and populations age, the ratios of beneficiaries of these programs to taxpayers increase. The result is that a number of national, as well as some subnational, governments are on unsustainable trajectories. Reform of entitlement programs that benefit middle- and upper-middle-class citizens who turn out to vote in elections is a very difficult political task, but one that many governments are likely to find unavoidable.

See also *Budgeting; Keynesianism; Monetary Policy; Political Economy; Taxation; Third World Debt; Welfare State.*

. . . .   ROBERT C. LOWRY

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Floating Voter

Floating voters (also known as swing voters) are individuals who do not maintain their allegiance to a particular party but instead vote for candidates in other parties or groupings. Traditionally, most voters maintain their loyalty to a particular party, and most scholarship suggests that party affiliation is formed during childhood. However, in the twentieth century, an increasing percentage of the electorate began to vote for candidates based on ideas or policy preferences as opposed to party ideology. The rise of floating voters prompted many political parties to seek candidates who could appeal to members of other parties. Some political leaders considered floating voters faithless party members because of their willingness to cross party lines during elections. Research has also indicated that some floating voters are less informed and more likely to cast ballots based on personal preferences rather than political analysis. Other theorists assert that floating voters reflect democratic ideals since they are not bound by partisanship and vote based on policy choices. Consequently, they can serve as a corrective mechanism for political parties that advocate policies or measures that are out of step with the mainstream. The number or percentage of floating voters increases during periods of significant economic, social, or political upheaval.

See also *Candidate Recruitment; Candidate Selection; Voting Behavior.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Follett, Mary Parker

Mary Parker Follett (1868–1933) was an American political analyst and social activist in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. She formulated her political and social views and theories based on many years of civic engagement and community-based experiences, including her participation in the Women's Municipal League and her tireless dedication to establishing social centers in the Boston, Massachusetts, area.

Born in Quincy, Massachusetts, to a wealthy Quaker family, Follett had an unhappy childhood. In 1884, she attended Thayer Academy, an academically challenging private school in Boston, and graduated at age sixteen. When she turned seventeen, she applied to and was accepted to enroll in the Society to Encourage Studies at Home to continue her education. After three years of study in the society, she enrolled as a special student at Harvard Annex for Women (Radcliffe College), taking time out to study at Newnham College in Cambridge, England. She eventually returned to Radcliffe, received an AB degree, and graduated with highest honors in June 1898. While a student at Radcliffe, she conducted research on government and published it as *The Speaker of the House of Representatives* (1896), a well-documented scholarly account of the U.S. Speaker's political power based on historical and qualitative research methods.

In the early part of the twentieth century, she was involved in social work public service in the Boston area. Shortly later, she was chair of the Women's Municipal League's Committee on Extended Use of School Buildings. In 1911, she continued to devote her time and energy to help build a sense of community by helping to establish the East Boston High School Social Center. Her involvement in public service and government affairs continued through her appointment to the Massachusetts Minimum Wage Board and appointment as the vice president of the National Community Center Association in 1917. In 1918 she published *The New State,* her second book, now considered a classic in democratic political theory.

In the early 1920s, Follett began her work on management and administration in industry and public institutions in earnest. In 1924, she wrote her third book, *Creative Experience,* which was based on her community experiences on conflict resolution and small-group management. Her last two books, based on her civic and professional work experiences during twenty years in Boston-area neighborhoods, served as the basis for constructing a new model of democracy whereby she sought to empower Boston-area immigrants by making them responsible for their civic duties, thus increasing their level of participation in government affairs. Follett left the United States for London in 1928. Unfortunately, prior to this move abroad, she destroyed most of her personal papers, and she requested that any other papers be destroyed upon her death.

Despite Follett's major contributions to political science, she is best known for her work on management and organization, which was summarily dismissed in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s, although it remained highly popular in Great Britain. Her work on management resurfaced in the 1960s and today is considered classic management theory.

See also *Democratic Theory; Organization Theory.*

. . . . JOSEPH C. SANTORA

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Food Policy

A food policy is a decision, program, or project, endorsed by a government agency, business, or organization, that affects how food is produced, processed, distributed, purchased, protected, and disposed of. Food policy can pertain to local, regional, provincial, national, or within-institution regulations. Food policy is closely related to agricultural policy, which is the process of assessing sectoral performance and providing appropriate and participative policy formulation for the development of the sector. These policies aim to correct market failure, to react to crisis situations, and to promote environmental sustainability. The main objective of the policies is to increase productivity and income growth, to enhance food security and equity, and to ultimately reduce the number of those suffering from hunger.

THE WORLD FOOD SITUATION

DEFINING FOOD SECURITY

To understand the genesis and underlying rationale of most international food policies, one must first examine the endemic global or regional food problems prompting the need for such policy regulation. Problems, such as food security, have become a priority for countries and international organizations that work collectively to alleviate low levels of food security plaguing many nations. Food security means having sufficient amounts of food within a population and is largely measured on a variety of factors including the availability of world supplies of food, accessibility of available supplies, income of the designated population, consumption rate of food, and amount that can be set aside for future use. Although over the past three decades the world has produced more food, and agricultural production has experienced favorable conditions, food insecurity remains a major problem worldwide.

Food security is an important issue that will continue to be faced by policy makers from developing countries and developed countries in this and the next millennium. A clear understanding of the causes of hunger and malnutrition is imperative to enable and challenge policy makers to lay the groundwork at the grassroots level for appropriate policy measures and the development of programs designed to alleviate hunger and its consequences. Due to a lack of reliable worldwide population data, it is difficult to say exactly how many people are undernourished. However, even in the absence of appropriate data collection and analysis, there is general agreement that the number of people severely affected by hunger and malnutrition is extremely large.

STATISTICS

According to a World Food Programme estimate, the number of undernourished people in the world increased in 2008 to 963 million, an increase by 115 million during the past two years. This increase is due to dramatically rising food and fuel prices aggravated by widespread turmoil among international financial systems. Currently, another 1 billion are at risk of falling into the ranks of the hungry, and if trends continue, this number is expected to grow dramatically. The Food and Agriculture Organization's latest estimates show even before the recent surge in food prices, worrisome long-term trends toward increasing hunger were already apparent.

The vast majority of the world's undernourished people—907 million—live in developing countries according to the 2008 data reported in the Food and Agriculture Organization's *State of Food Insecurity in the World*. Of these, 65 percent live in seven countries: India, China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Ethiopia. Progress in these countries with large populations would have an important impact on global hunger reduction. In sub-Saharan Africa, one in three people—or 236 million—are chronically hungry, the highest proportion of undernourished people in the total population, according to a 2007 World Bank Africa report. The majority of these persons resided in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Due to the widespread and persistent conflict in the country from 2003 to 2005, the number of chronically hungry persons in the Congo rose from 11 million to 43 million, and the proportion of undernourished rose from 29 to 76 percent.

DEVELOPMENT OF FOOD POLICY

Historically, food policies have been designed to solve global and regional problems of food security and stimulate economic growth for third world nations. As mentioned previously, in many countries, food policy forms an integral part of agricultural policy. For example, in Germany, agricultural, health, and environmental policies are closely linked to food policy as they are shaped by legal and regulatory policies, financial and commercial policies, and research and educational policies. Furthermore, while independent states have domestic food policies, many food policies as discussed below are created and regulated by collective state efforts to effectively rely on regional resources and international support to relieve a region's food security problems writ large.

In Africa, the agricultural policy called the Comprehensive Africa Development Programme was developed in 2003 by African heads of state and governments. Its primary objectives are to (a) improve national agricultural policy frameworks; (b) strengthen institutions and governance; (c) enhance agricultural productivity; (d) foster trade, investment, economic growth, and sustainable development; and (e) promote regional integration. The Comprehensive Africa Development Programme is an acknowledgment of the failures of past agricultural policies in Africa, which attempted to bring a green revolution to Africa.

European Union (EU) agricultural policy has its roots in the post–World War II food shortages of the 1950s and early 1960s. The emphasis was on providing enough food for a Europe emerging from a decade of war-induced shortages. Subsidizing production on a large scale and buying up surpluses in the interests of food security are now largely things of the past. EU policy aims to enable producers of all forms of food—from crops and livestock to fruit and vegetables or wine—to survive by themselves in EU and world markets.

In the 1960s, many Asian governments, particularly India's, created and implemented a favorable policy to support a new

agricultural innovation called the green revolution. The green revolution was a response to the emerging Asian food crisis incited by rapid population growth and stagnant grain production. The revolution was driven by a technology revolution comprising a package of modern inputs—irrigation, improved seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides—which would together significantly increase crop production. The speed and scale with which it solved the food problem was remarkable and unprecedented, and it contributed to a substantial reduction in poverty and the launching of broader economic growth in many Asian countries. Today, Asia's significantly growing populations and state attempts to modernize its agricultural and economic investments to keep pace with global markets limit the lasting effects of the green revolution. However, without the green revolution in the 1960s, analysts claim the food insecurity and poverty in Asia could have been much higher than it is today.

CHALLENGES FOR FOOD POLICY

The key challenge for food policy is to help agriculture play its role as an engine of growth and poverty reduction. Food policy should provide a useful framework to focus the discussion on food insecurity. Essentially, designing food and agricultural policy that will enable rural populations to pull themselves out of their impoverished conditions remains a challenge in many developing countries. Addressing the political economy of agriculture-for-development agendas will continue to be difficult, particularly in Africa. Due to poor investment in research and development throughout the continent, it will likely be difficult in the short term to establish food policies and a regulatory environment that will promote new waves of technological agricultural innovations in Africa. Last, a major challenge facing the agricultural sector is the effect of global climate change on agriculture. This effect is uncertain. Therefore, a preventive policy and a plan of action have to be elaborated by policy makers not only nationally but also internationally.

See also *Agrarianism; Disaster Relief; Environmental Policy; Environmental Political Theory; Farm Lobby; Human Development Index; Millennium Development Goals; Poverty; Public Policy; Social Welfare.*

. . . .   ROUKAYATOU ZIMMERMANN

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Ford, Henry Jones

Henry Jones Ford (1851–1925) began his life as an editor, and for the next thirty-three years he worked for six magazines in three cities. He then went on to teach at Johns Hopkins University, the University of Pennsylvania, and Princeton University, and during that time he also served a term as president of the American Political Science Association (1918–1919).

While at Princeton he met Woodrow Wilson, then president of the college. When Wilson became governor of New Jersey, he brought Ford along with him and appointed him to the position of commissioner of banking and insurance. Later, as president of the United States, Wilson sent Ford to the Philippines on a special mission, reporting directly to Wilson. It is universally agreed that the mission was to write a report on the governmental conditions in the area, although any such report was never published. Toward the end of Wilson's presidency, he appointed Ford to a position on the Interstate Commerce Commission. This position, however, was ad interim due to a growing difference of opinion between Wilson and the Senate of the time.

Ford was also a published writer. In addition to numerous articles, he wrote *The Cost of Our National Government* (1909); *The Scotch-Irish in America* (1915); *The Natural History of the State* (1915); *Woodrow Wilson, the Man, and His Work* (1916); *Washington and His Colleagues* (1918); and *The Cleveland Era* (1919). A major topic of interest for him was the American presidency, which he thought of as an elected kingship that dominated public policy. Ford felt that the president, when need be, could control Congress through recess appointments and vetoes. As a reformist, Ford believed that the presidency need be only as powerful as a role that ends party duplicity and defines issues in such a way that the public can decide on them. The increase in power for the president came about because of popularity. Citizens made the president the "organ of the will for the nation" (Ford 196). Through this overwhelming presidential support, the power of the legislative branch dwindled. Congress would avoid any difficult decisions and often did unless the president decided to bring them back up again. He had the power to control them.

See also *Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Federalism; Separation of Powers.*

. . . .   ARTHUR HOLST

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Forecasting, Political

Political forecasting identifies political phenomena that may occur at a later point in time, whether specific events or conditions in the broader political milieu. The forecasts that result may provide (1) estimates of a predicted event's magnitude, through point forecasts, such as the percentage vote that a candidate is expected to receive in an upcoming election; (2) estimates of the probability that an event will occur, such as the likelihood of an international crisis erupting; and (3) scenarios of the future, which specify alternative outcomes that are conceivable and the intervening circumstances necessary for each outcome to occur, such as alternative configurations of power that might exist among nations in twenty years.

RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE FORECASTING

Although political forecasting anticipates the future, *future* has different meanings. In fact, political forecasting encompasses predicting political phenomena in the past. For example, data from one decade might be used to create a statistical model of conflict in the Middle East, which then is used to predict outcomes in a later decade in the past. In this useful procedure for testing hypotheses, the future is from the perspective of the original period on which the model is based. The results are retrospective forecasts, *ex post* forecasts, or post-diction.

Predicting the actual future is termed "prospective forecasting," "*ex ante* forecasting," or "pre-diction." These forecasts may be useful in testing models and hypotheses, like retrospective forecasts. But by attempting to predict the current future, prospective forecasts have an additional practical value. For example, knowing the likely income from government revenues next year is useful, regardless of whether the forecast tests a hypothesis. This applied dimension of prospective political forecasting has led to criticism by political scientists who contend that an activity that does not contribute to understanding political phenomena lacks scholarly value. In practice, however, usually there is a theoretical underpinning to prospective forecasts because many applied forecasters are scholars whose theoretical knowledge of the subject informs their forecasts.

SUBJECTS OF POLITICAL FORECASTS

Most political forecasting to date has focused on three subjects: (1) elections, (2) interstate and domestic political conflict, and (3) government revenues.

ELECTIONS

Forecasts of the popular vote in U.S. presidential elections have been made by random-sample campaign polls since 1936. Polls were joined by a judgment-based index technique in 1982, by regression forecasts also in 1982, by futures markets for elections in 1988, and by Delphi surveys of experts and combining forecasts in 2004. All of these techniques usually have predicted the election winner correctly, with the 13 Keys index having a perfect record. Forecasts of the percentage vote have varied in accuracy, depending on the method and election year. The elections futures market at the University of Iowa appears to have been the most consistently accurate over time.

Forecasts of the U.S. electoral college vote, most of which are compilations of state forecasts, have appeared less frequently and have had variable accuracy. Beyond U.S. presidential election outcomes, prospective forecasts have been made of party nominations for president, of congressional election results, and of results in parliamentary and presidential elections in Europe and elsewhere.

CONFLICT

Political forecasters also have been active in predicting domestic political conflict, primarily in developing countries, and conflict among nation-states. Forecasts of domestic conflict have predicted forms of internal political instability, such as riots and military coups, as well as larger societal collapses (state failure), including civil wars and revolutions. Forecasts of conflict between nation-states have focused mostly on crises and wars. More recently, predicting attacks by nonstate terrorist groups has gained increased attention. In practice, the lines between intrastate and interstate forecasting have become blurred in part because some phenomena have aspects of both, such as external interference in civil wars.

Conflict forecasting often has a policy motivation. Major academic projects in this field have been funded by government agencies, and some conflict forecasting is undertaken by agencies in-house, especially within intelligence and defense organizations, to support policy requirements. In fact, much of conflict forecasting is conducted under the banner of *early warning,* a term that implies there is a policy response to the warning.

GOVERNMENT REVENUES

Because every unit of government is dependent on tax revenues and must produce budgets for the future, revenue forecasting is important at all levels of government. The volume of government revenue forecasts in the United States is large, owing to the thousands of municipal governments that exist in the country. In the many smaller municipalities, revenue forecasts often are limited to the impressionistic judgment of local officials. By contrast, forecasting revenues for the U.S. federal government is a complex quantitative process undertaken by the Congressional Budget Office and executive organizations, notably the Office of Management and Budget and the Treasury. At the state level, revenue forecasts usually are produced in the state finance office or similar organization by economists who use systematic forecasting methods and who sometimes draw on expertise in state universities.

Revenue forecasts often are significantly inaccurate. Much of this error is due to the difficulty of the forecasting task,

but political influences and other biases may play a part. An administration that favors increased spending has an incentive to overestimate revenues to bolster the argument that new programs are affordable. An administration that favors reducing taxes may also overestimate revenues to justify tax cuts. At the state level, where the government budget must be balanced, forecasting agencies usually underestimate revenues, particularly exercising caution toward uncertain revenue sources.

OTHER SUBJECTS

Predicting changes in Federal Reserve monetary policy has long occupied many government, business, and academic analysts. Other more limited political forecasting activity has included predicting (1) the outcome of U.S. Supreme Court cases, (2) Senate votes to confirm Supreme Court nominees, (3) the performance of the president, (4) congressional support for legislative positions taken by the president, (5) the length of the Iraq War (2003–), (6) the likelihood of Quebec's seceding from Canada, and (7) the probability of political occurrences abroad that are detrimental to domestic companies' foreign investments.

CONCLUSION

Although underappreciated within political science in the past, political forecasting is gaining increased recognition for bringing rigor to hypothesis testing and for contributing to the policy requirements of government. Growing support for forecasting is evident in the formation of the Political Forecasting Group and its designation in 2006 as a Related Group of the American Political Science Association.

See also *Budgeting; Counterfactual; Electoral Cycles; Exit Poll; Political Risk Assessment; Polling, History of; Simulation; State Failure.*

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Foreign Aid

Foreign aid (or development assistance) consists of voluntary transfers of resources from a donor to a (developing) recipient country. More specifically, official development assistance (ODA) is restricted to transfers of government resources via bilateral or multilateral channels.

DEFINITIONS AND OVERVIEW

Bilateral ODA involves only the donor's and the recipient's governments, while multilateral channels consist of international organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations Development Programme. ODA therefore excludes private funds raised by international nongovernmental organizations. In 2008, bilateral and multilateral ODA from members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) totaled approximately US$120 billion; the biggest bilateral donor countries were the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan. Although OECD donors agreed in the late 1970s on a spending goal of 0.7 percent of their countries' combined gross national income, ODA in 2008 represented only roughly 0.3 percent of OECD members' gross national income.

Generally, aid can be delivered in different forms. First, one can distinguish between humanitarian aid and assistance delivered for more structural objectives. Humanitarian aid is normally short term, is often in material form, and exists as a response to cases of humanitarian crisis caused by natural catastrophes or political violence. In contrast, structural aid has rather long-term goals and—at least rhetorically—aims at reducing economic and political barriers for development. Primarily, long-term aid is an attempt at promoting economic growth, poverty reduction, and democratization. Nevertheless, the list of such structural goals has continuously expanded during the past five decades, as mirrored in the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. Currently,

international development challenges—such as climate change, new security threats, and economic turmoil—have added a global perspective to the foreign aid agenda, which traditionally focused mainly on national contexts. According to some observers, this expansion with little prioritization is threatening to overburden the capabilities of development assistance and is reducing the accountability of aid organizations.

A second distinction can be drawn between financial and technical instruments of providing development assistance. Financial instruments typically consist of subsidized credits, grants, and debt relief, which are often conditioned on policy or institutional reforms in the recipient country. Technical cooperation in the form of capacity building mostly contains training or assistance when reforms are implemented. As development assistance increasingly is targeted to tackle institutional barriers for development, financial and technical cooperation have become more political. A political dialogue at the national level often accompanies aid instruments between donor and recipient governments because profound, reaching reforms in fields such as education, health, and public finance generally have far-reaching implications for the political settlement of the recipient society.

THE AID EFFECTIVENESS DEBATE

At least until the 1990s, the debate about the effectiveness of development aid was mainly centered on the impact of aid on economic development, which, in turn, was assumed to further increase overall human development. Studies evaluating the effectiveness of development aid across countries, however, uncovered a paradoxical finding: although development aid has mostly been evaluated in a positive manner at the project level or in specific sectors, such as education, no robust evidence of causality between development aid and economic growth or poverty reduction at a macro-economic level could be identified—at least not for the period spanning from the 1960s to the 1990s. This micro-macro paradox can be attributed to a number of negative externalities, which result from the increasing aid dependency of poor countries.

First, substantial aid inflows can negatively affect the recipient country's international competitiveness because, as the currency appreciates with growing aid inflows, the competitiveness of the tradable sector declines (a phenomenon known as Dutch disease). Second, poor countries especially face constraints in their absorptive capacity because they simply do not have the human and technical capacity to manage large resource inflows and the administration connected to this in an effective manner. Third, high aid inflows can distort incentives for policy makers to engage in development-friendly policies. High aid inflows channeled through recipient countries' governments can be prone to misuse and may even spur corruption inside the recipient country. Moreover, aid flows are subject to fungibility. Fungibility implies that governments tend to alter their spending decisions and reallocate their budgets in such a way that development aid can at least partly substitute national spending in sectors relevant for development. The resulting fiscal maneuvering space of recipient governments can be used

for sustaining patronage systems and protecting autocratic structures. The challenge of fungibility and the potential misuse of aid for serving powerful interest groups are reduced in countries where political transparency and democratic participation are higher. Considering this, empirical evidence suggests that the effectiveness of development aid is dependent on the policy environment of the recipient and is increased by good governance.

POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVES ON FOREIGN AID

To be most effective, most forms of aid should overproportionally flow not only to the relatively poor but also to relatively well-governed countries. At least until the mid-1990s, the allocation of aid had not always responded to these criteria. Moreover, an analysis of specific donor countries' allocation patterns revealed great heterogeneity. While especially Scandinavian donors responded to development-friendly allocation criteria, larger countries often disbursed aid according to their own geostrategic, economic, or diplomatic interests. In addition, aid disbursements and conditionality of multilateral organizations such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund were also influenced (not determined) by political interests of major donor countries, namely, the United States. Consequently, critical perspectives on development assistance have repeatedly pointed out that self-interest-driven aid-allocation patterns of major donors have contributed to limited aid effectiveness in the past.

Political economy perspectives have also revealed how the growing bilateral and multilateral aid bureaucracies developed special interests of their own. In the past, aid projects often were badly coordinated, and donor organizations competed for scarce resources, gave little importance to independent evaluation, and established different standards, thereby impeding knowledge diffusion and transparency. Moreover, the overall donor fragmentation and project proliferation imposed high transaction costs on recipients' administrative structures. Thus, it became evident that for aid to be effective, what mattered were both the institutional quality of recipient countries and the institutional setup of donor countries responsible for organizing development promotion.

In response to criticism of traditional aid delivery, the international aid system has embarked on a transformation process. In this context, the Paris Declaration of 2005 set out a series of principles aimed at (1) improving harmonization of donor activities and reducing the proliferation of small-scale projects, (2) strengthening the recipient countries' voice in defining aid strategies, and (3) strengthening independent evaluation and learning processes. More recent studies have also pointed out that aid allocation in recent years has become more in line with development-friendly criteria. To what extent these reforms have constrained the impact of special interests and substantially increased aid effectiveness remains a question. In sum, from a political economy perspective, foreign aid to a certain extent mirrors the challenges of domestic social policy. While there is consensus that a society needs at least some

transfers from the rich to the poor, one crucial challenge for making social policies effective consists in constraining the impact of powerful interest groups that emerge in the course of the redistribution process.

See also *Development Administration; Economic Development, State-led; Foreign Direct Investment; Foreign Policy; Globalization and Development; International Monetary Fund (IMF); Millennium Development Goals; Structural Adjustment Program (IMF); World Bank.*

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Foreign Direct Investment

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an investment made by a multinational corporation in a country other than its home country. For a company to be considered a multinational corporation, it must possess at least one FDI project in which it maintains management rights or control. There are two main forms of FDI: Greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions. Greenfield investment is the name given to the construction of new facilities, usually geared toward production, in foreign countries. This is a familiar form of FDI wherein an international business builds factories in foreign countries for manufacturing uses, such as Nike's opening a factory in the Philippines. However, mergers and acquisitions is the most common form of FDI. This occurs when a company is able to gain control of the managerial aspects of a foreign company, usually through the purchasing of stocks.

Historically, it was during the era of British hegemony in the nineteenth century that FDI started to become a norm. The use of the British East India Company to govern India is a classic example of the beginnings of FDI—the British Crown left the development of the Indian colony up to a new multinational corporation. However, it was not until after World War II (1939–1945) that investment in countries by foreign companies exploded. Immediately after the war, the leading recipients of FDI were developed countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom. This occurrence happened because of the international economic environment in the 1940s and 1950s. The Bretton Woods organizations were pushing for a much larger and internationally inclusive global economy that could be achieved through international investments, and European and American companies were investing in each other's countries at a very high rate during this time. The United States was devoted to the rebuilding of western Europe through the Marshall Plan, which was reciprocated in later years by investment in the United States itself.

FDI has been promoted as the road to development for many less-developed countries. For instance, the United Nations (2000) claims that "FDI has the potential to generate employment, raise productivity, transfer skill and technology, [and] enhance exports." Investment is supposed to create growth; however, this is done at the expense of domestic policy because less-developed countries are supposed to exude an air of political and financial stability, usually through privatization and liberalization. Also, multinational corporations pressure local governments to deregulate health and safety standards, keep minimum wages low, and not constrain the use of child labor. Many less-developed countries see the use of FDI as a means of neocolonialism; instead of foreign governments controlling policies, multinational corporations take their place. Underdeveloped countries worry that multinational corporations will challenge local domestic authorities by demanding policies that will make the country more attractive to foreign investors. Also, smaller local businesses are threatened by the influx of bigger international corporations, and many of these companies fall victim to multinational corporations, hurting the local economy.

According to the 2004 Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index compiled by A. T. Kearney, a global management-consulting firm, corporate investors named China, the United States, India, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Australia, Hong Kong, Italy, and Japan as the top ten countries that are nonrisk investments. These investors see Asia and Europe—especially in the eastern and central parts of the continent—as the areas with the highest growth potential in the coming years. Africa, on the other hand, is seen as one of the most risky investment areas because of corrupt governments and high crime rates. Multinational corporations are also less likely to invest in a country that is not just politically unstable but also militarily unstable. Places like Africa, where there are a number of conflicts taking place, are not attractive to outside investors as there is no guarantee of the safety of their investments.

See also *Colonialism; Dependency Theory; Foreign Aid; Marshall Plan; Multinational Corporation (MNC).*

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Foreign Policy

Work on foreign policy is ubiquitous because its central focus is essential to the study of international relations (IR) more generally: understanding how decision makers perceive threats, constraints, and opportunities in their external and internal environments, and how these perceptions guide actions toward other governments and nongovernmental actors. The subfield of foreign policy is a prominent research area in the study of IR. The Foreign Policy organized section of the American Political Science Association has one of the largest memberships of the association's thirty-seven sections; the subfield supports a dedicated journal, *Foreign Policy Analysis;* and the academic publishing house Palgrave Macmillan hosts the book series titled *Advances in Foreign Policy Analysis.* Foreign policy research can be found across the major paradigms of IR, including realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Foreign policy scholars have published work covering all the regions of the globe in studies that are both historically grounded and focused on the contemporary. Seminal studies investigate foreign policy making of the great powers, especially U.S. and Soviet decision making during the cold war era and at the end of the cold war. Other studies compare and contrast the foreign policies of different states on similar issues and focus on the foreign policies of middle powers and small states. Scholars of foreign policy have also addressed the dominant debates in the field of IR, including the extent to which decision makers are influenced by domestic or international factors or a combination of the two, the behavior of democracies versus authoritarian states, and whether rational choice or sociological frameworks are more useful in the study of political behavior. While the decision-making approach to foreign policy has dominated the subfield, new developments in the study of foreign policy include the analysis of how state decisions are influenced not only by individual policy makers but also by larger factors, such as cultural trends and religion. In addition, recent work has moved beyond the dependent variable of foreign policy to focus on foreign policy change and on the impact of foreign policy on domestic politics (the second image reversed).

PARADIGMATIC APPROACHES TO FOREIGN POLICY

It is typically argued that realist IR theory does not provide a theory of foreign policy. To be sure, realist theories primarily focus on broad trends and patterns in interstate interactions and make predictions regarding aggregate state behavior. Kenneth N. Waltz, one of the most prominent contemporary political realists, has famously noted in *Theory of International Politics* (1979) that his theory of international politics "does not tell us why state X made a certain move last Tuesday"

U.S. foreign policy under the Monroe Doctrine encouraged expansionism and the United States established an imperial presence in many places around the world.

(p. 121). Notwithstanding Waltz's claim that structural-level theories cannot account for state foreign policy, most realist theorists have applied their approaches to account for foreign policy outcomes, and they often participate actively in foreign policy debates.

Realists generally make three interrelated claims regarding foreign policy. First, realists assert that foreign policies are largely driven by external constraints and opportunities, namely, the state's position in the international system and the system's distribution of material capabilities. While realists acknowledge that domestic politics, normative discourse, and ideas and ideologies can affect a state's foreign policy decision making, they suggest that most of the time foreign policy is a function of material factors such as international anarchy and the states' capacity for fighting wars. Since international structural conditions are constants and generate both fear and lack of trust, foreign policy choices tend to be limited and are reflective of the national interest and the need to survive. Indeed, even contemporary neoclassical realists, who attempt to bring domestic-level variables and decision makers' perceptions back into the study of foreign policy outcomes,

nevertheless begin their analyses with the external pressures and incentives that states face: unit-level variables intervene between structural constraints and foreign policy choice.

Second, realists claim that if states face similar structural constraints and opportunities, then their foreign policies will be remarkably similar as well. Differences in state regime types and identities, as well as new leadership and decision-making styles, are largely irrelevant to the analysis. Last, realists argue not that domestic politics and individual-level variables never matter for foreign policy decision making but rather that states that continually base foreign policies on such factors will inevitably suffer from poor foreign policy performance. That is, realists focus less on the foreign policy–making process, which may or may not be influenced by nonstructural factors, and more on the consequences of foreign policy outcomes. Past and recent realist studies have, for example, criticized U.S. foreign policy for being inconsistent with national strategic interests due to the influence of ideology and domestic political interest groups.

Whereas realists view foreign policy choices as driven by a state's position in the international system, liberal IR theorists maintain that variation in state-societal factors influences foreign policy, even for states that face similar structural constraints and opportunities. Focusing on the domestic sources of foreign policy, scholars have examined a wide range of variables including institutional fragmentation and cohesion, public opinion, and the role of the media.

In recent years, the proposition that democratic states' foreign policies are more pacific—whether only in relation to other democracies or in general—than are those of autocracies has become a cottage industry within both the subfield of foreign policy and the broader field of IR. Discussions of foreign policy decision-making processes and outcomes, particularly crises among democracies that resulted in near-wars, dominate the debate about the notion of democratic peace. For proponents, it is crucial that foreign policy match the predictions made by democratic peace theory; democratic peace theorists are interested in showing not only that in the aggregate democracies act differently abroad but also that democratically elected decision makers act and think in ways consistent with the theory. For opponents, the analysis of foreign policy crises and war and peace decisions suggests that power differentials and material capabilities matter more for the decisions of both democratically elected and authoritarian leaders.

Foreign policy researchers have also used case studies of foreign policy to challenge the democratic peace theory's truncated version of domestic politics in general and democratic politics in particular. Criticism has been leveled at the democratic peace theory's perspective on the second image, which tends to emphasize regime type (democracy vs. nondemocracy) at the expense of other domestic-level variables that also vary among democracies (e.g., civil-military relations, executive-legislative balances of power, and leadership styles). Here, foreign policy analysis has suggested that democratic states frequently endorse different foreign policy positions as a result of differing national roles and leadership orientations; that for democratically elected leaders threat perception is often based less on the regime type of opposing states, as democratic peace proponents claim, and more on the personalities and international rule-following propensities of foreign counterparts; and that domestic pathologies of democratic decision making, such as the executive's ability to manipulate information and the agenda, can lead to detrimental foreign policy outcomes.

While realist and liberal IR theorists engage the study of foreign policy, constructivist IR theory is perhaps the most closely associated with foreign policy analysis due to its emphasis on how threats and national interests are defined and framed and the ways in which external reality is shaped by agents, including foreign policy decision makers. Constructivists have examined how international and domestic norms influence the type of response that foreign policy makers will opt for when faced with an international crisis and how international events and developments are constructed as threats and problems for national security. The central argument here is that nonmaterial factors, including norms, culture, ideology, and identity, can shape decision makers' opinions regarding appropriate and inappropriate foreign policy options as well as assessments of the likely consequences of different foreign policy actions.

THE DECISION-MAKING APPROACH

Central to the study of foreign policy is the notion that human beings misperceive information and that organizations skew decision making away from rational choice. An understanding of political psychology and bureaucratic politics is thus at the core of the foreign policy subfield. As Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer (2006) note, "research programs in foreign policy have always maintained that who decides matters" (p. 3). The focus of inquiry is the process of decision making, including the framing of problems, the prioritization of goals, and the assessing of options.

Foreign policy researchers have developed approaches that apply to individual decision makers, foreign policy makers working in small-group forums, and foreign policy decisions and implementation by large organizations. What unites these approaches is the key assumption that beliefs, attitudes, formative experiences, memories, and values shape the ways in which foreign policy makers approach and cope with the world around them.

One of the most influential research programs on the psychological dimensions of decision making is the analysis of operational codes. Scholars have teased out how foreign policy choice is influenced by the beliefs of leaders regarding the likelihood of international conflict; leaders' propensities for believing in worst-case scenarios and their tendency to reason by analogy; and a leader's estimation that he or she can change the world. Another prominent research area has developed around prospect theory. Applied to foreign policy, prospect theory claims that foreign policy makers will expend more risks to avoid perceived losses to national security than they will to realize gains in state power or resources. Recently, the approach has been persuasively used to investigate great power foreign policy and war and peace decision making.

NEW TRENDS IN THE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, IR scholars have increasingly challenged the secularized nature of IR theory and have endorsed new theoretical approaches that explicitly include the religious dimensions of social and political life. Recent work on foreign policy has picked up on this theme. For example, in the context of the United States, scholars have considered how U.S. foreign policy has reflected the ebbs and flows in the political fortunes of various Christian religious dominations and how the foreign policy decision to go to war in Iraq in March 2003 was influenced by President George W. Bush's religious beliefs and the religiously based views of other prominent neoconservatives in the Bush administration. Outside of the U.S. context, new work investigates how religious opposition groups have influenced Israel's capacity to pursue peace making as a foreign policy option and whether religious viewpoints dominate the foreign policies of states in the Muslim world. Non-Western states may fuse religion and the state in ways that are markedly different from the liberal secular model. Accordingly, foreign policy researchers should continue to investigate whether and how religiously motivated actors and religiously based institutions influence foreign policy decision making and outcomes in polities characterized by religion in the public sphere.

In addition to focusing on culture and religion, foreign policy analysts must further investigate the nature of foreign policy change. While a number of studies of foreign policy change have been recently published, more work needs to be done. In light of the major shift in U.S. foreign policy sparked by the September 11 attacks—changes that continue to have short- and long-term consequences for both the United States and IR—scholars of foreign policy need to continue to develop cross-national models that tell us how domestic and international variables contribute to large-scale foreign policy change. We need to better understand the conditions that give rise to changes in national security and economic strategies and the circumstances under which decision makers learn and are then able to alter established foreign policy platforms: do the same domestic and international variables that influence the initial choice among a set of foreign policy options also influence the decision to alter foreign policy course? Does it matter if foreign policy change is abrupt or not?

Last, while the study of domestic-level influences on foreign policy has a long pedigree, scholars of foreign policy have recently begun to study the reverse causal arrow by considering the impact of foreign policies on domestic politics, including state-societal relations and state-building and institutional development. Driven as much by theoretical interests as by bipartisan U.S. support for democracy promotion abroad, particularly since the end of the cold war, foreign policy analysts have investigated the success of U.S. policies to support democracy in different global regions and how regime change can best be achieved. Outside of the U.S. context, scholars have considered how the European Union's foreign policies have influenced domestic political reforms and church-state relations in those states seeking European Union membership, as in the case of Turkey. Recent work in the subfield has also investigated the impact of regional security conditions on the propensity for states to democratize. A key finding in this growing literature is that foreign policies that support peaceful means of regional conflict resolution can influence not only the likelihood of war but also domestic institutional development, civil-military relations, and bargaining outcomes among domestic political actors. Future work in the subfield should continue to explore how different foreign policy choices, such as decisions to pursue external balancing (e.g., alliances) versus internal balancing (e.g., nuclear weapons programs), influence domestic political outcomes over time.

Future work on foreign policy must continue to advance in these areas while also encouraging the application of theories and perspectives to multiple states across regions and historical time. Typically, work on foreign policy focuses on just one country. The subfield boasts many seminal and new studies of the foreign policy decision-making process and foreign policy outcomes in countries as diverse as Israel, China, Japan, Cuba, and many more. A comparative study, however, permits multiple tests of theoretical propositions and enables findings to cumulate across states with disparate histories, regime types, and identities. Several new studies aim to compare and contrast the foreign policies of different states. Yet compared with single-country analyses, studies of comparative foreign policy are few and far between. More work remains to be done on how foreign policy is both similar and different across a diverse range of international actors. This will be facilitated by regional and country-specific experts' collaborating with foreign policy and IR theorists, as well as students of comparative politics, to develop models that apply outside of the U.S. context and that are meaningful and robust for the changing and volatile nature of contemporary IR.

See also *Constructivism; Democracy and Democratization; International Relations; Liberal Theory; Prospect Theory; Realism and Neorealism; Religion and Politics; Secularism.*

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Foreign Policy Role

The foreign policy role is the currency of international relations, the medium of exchange in foreign affairs. It is neither power (the means of foreign policy) nor state interest (the long-term goals of statecraft to which a government aspires). The foreign policy role is the practical, day-to-day reality of international political discourse, which governments barter, jealously guard, and sometimes contest. It involves the particular concerns and immediate ends of statecraft. As with state interest, a foreign policy role is legitimized when other actors recognize the role and declare it politically acceptable. Role is that which the system allows the state to obtain.

Governments speak of "giving China a role" in talks with North Korea about relinquishing the development of nuclear weapons. More than symbolic association, role may involve institutional concerns such as admittance to the World Trade Organization for Russia, with all the likely trade benefits; membership in the prestigious Club of Eight for Canada; or permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council. Inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or in the European Union is crucial to governments like Romania and the Czech Republic. Role concerns sovereignty and economic growth. Security itself may be at stake for governments such as those of Ukraine and Georgia as they seek a closer role in European affairs.

In power cycle theory, role is coequal in significance with power in statecraft; it is the coordinate concept that amends realism. Role is implicated in major war and is crucial to long-term equilibrium. Role lags behind power on both the rising and the declining sides of the state power cycle, causing power-role gaps. Failure of role to adjust to power change creates a structural disequilibrium that goes to the heart of the capacity to act in foreign policy and is a cause of massive warfare. Perception is always key to role, and misperception of role is often the operative cause of war. Foreign policy role is a large element of foreign policy identity.

The War of the Spanish Succession (1703–1714) was fought over whether, after the death of the last Spanish Hapsburg, Spanish possessions would be bequeathed to the grandson of the French king, uniting the Spanish and French crowns. Most of Europe found this role for Louis XIV's grandson a recipe for French predominance. At the Treaties of Utrecht, until he gave up claims to the inheritance of France, he was denied the role of king of Spain. The dynastic transfer of territory and population was no longer a legitimate barter of the foreign policy role.

A quintessential example of the centrality of role, and of what it entails in diplomacy, is the Crimean War (1853–1856). Traditionally, Russia enjoyed the role of protector of Christians in Ottoman-controlled territories. Napoleon III forced the sultan to recognize France as the protector of Latin Christians; the sultan rejected Russian claims for equal recognition of its role. This contest over role precipitated a three-year war that involved every major power except Austria.

Security is nonnegotiable, but security roles can be transferred. After 1970, Britain voluntarily transferred order-maintenance in the Persian Gulf to the United States. Role also sometimes invites acknowledgment of spheres of influence as the Soviet Union demanded of the United States (unsuccessfully) regarding Soviet presence in Eastern Europe. Agreement regarding the respective roles of governments in a dispute is often propitious to its management.

See also *Foreign Policy; Interest Aggregation and Articulation; Power; Power Cycle Theory.*

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Foreign Relations

See *Federalism and Foreign Relations.*

Formal Political Theory

The term *formal political theory* is a catch phrase for myriad modeling traditions in political science. The various traditions include game theory, social choice theory, spatial theory of elections, decision theory, and behavioral game theory. At the heart of formal theory is an axiomatic system or mathematical approach to model political behavior. The underlying premise that drives this approach is the assumption made about human behavior (or players) relating to rationality. This assumption specifies that players who populate the various models take actions that maximize their (expected) utility or payoffs. While there are many assumptions that define a utility function or how players have preferences over outcomes, the basic premise is that given the choice of two or more alternatives a player is able to rank the alternatives from best to worse or specify indifference between alternatives, and when given a choice between two or more alternatives players will always behave rationally and select the alternative that has the highest value to themselves regardless of how this affects other players. Using this assumption, formal political theory allows a mathematical method to model human behavior within political institutions.

GAME THEORY

John Von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern pioneered game theory in 1944 by building on earlier work by Ernest Zermelo (1913), Emile Borel (1921), and John Von Neumann (1928). Game theory studies the interdependence of actions of players or their strategic interaction. This approach is concerned with how the adoption of particular strategies by players results in optimal (or nonoptimal) outcomes. Since incentives are held fixed, the resulting outcome usually is determined by the payoffs assigned to particular strategies, the information that players have about the actions of other players or assigned payoffs, and the institutional rules that have been imposed on the players' environment.

Game theory can be divided into two broad categories: cooperative (or coalition) games and noncooperative (or strategic) games. (Cooperative game theory is also called "social choice theory" and will be discussed later.) In noncooperative games players cannot enter into binding agreements, whereas cooperative games players are allowed to enter into binding agreements. The classic distinction used to revolve around whether players can communicate with each other, but noncooperative games that allow for communication have been developed, such as cheap talk games. Within noncooperative games there is a further distinction between normal form games (games represented by a payoff matrix) and extensive form games (games represented by a game tree). The extensive form is useful to model games where players have more than one move and also games where players might have imperfect information such as the case wherein a player may not know what action another player has taken. Normal form games consider a situation in which the players must make choices simultaneously so that they make choices without

knowing how the other player is going to choose. There are also repeated games in which players play the same game for either a finite or an infinite number of times. Games can also have incomplete information wherein players do not know all of the payoffs (or probabilities of payoffs) of the other players.

In the early 1950s, John Nash proposed a solution for non-cooperative games referred to as a Nash equilibrium, in which all players' play strategies are optimal or a best response given what other players have played. A Nash equilibrium is established when all players have selected strategies and no player has a positive incentive to change her or his strategy given what strategies other players have adopted. Games can have two types of equilibrium, either a pure-strategy equilibrium (where players select a single strategy) or a mixed-strategy equilibrium (where a probability distribution is calculated over the strategy set). A mixed strategy assigns a particular probability to each strategy in the set, for example, it might specify that a player will select strategy A 45 percent of the time and strategy B 55 percent of the time. Nash proved that all games with a finite strategy set have at least one Nash equilibrium either in pure or mixed strategies, although games can and do have more than one Nash equilibrium.

Subsequent equilibrium concepts have been refinements of the Nash equilibrium. In terms of solving games, one concept that is often invoked is Pareto efficiency, named after Vilfredo Pareto (1935). When a game has more than one equilibrium, then a Pareto-optimal equilibrium is an equilibrium wherein all players jointly are better off than another equilibrium wherein there is a lower payoff for all the players. A weaker version of the selection of a Pareto-optimal equilibrium is the case in which some players are indifferent to payoffs in another equilibrium but other players receive a positive gain from its selection.

Other noncooperative equilibrium concepts or refinements have included the notion of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. This concept simply eliminates a player's strategy if all payoff components of a player's particular strategy are lower than another viable strategy. Subgame perfect equilibrium for extensive form games eliminates outcomes that are not reasonable given the game's structure. This procedure eliminates outcomes that would not be chosen given that the players are rational. For Bayesian games that incorporate incomplete information, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium was developed to predict outcomes when uncertainty over a state of nature or when another player's move is involved. In this refinement, Bayes rules are used to establish that players' beliefs are consistent with the history of game play.

CLASSIC NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES

The first classic noncooperative game is the chicken game. In this game two players (in the original game they are portrayed as rebellious teens) are in their cars, and they drive their cars at high rates of speed directly at each other; the first to swerve away is considered to be the chicken and loses the game. In this game if each player chooses not to swerve they end up in the worse payoff (possible death), but if one player swerves and

the other does not, then the one who does not swerve wins since the one who swerves is considered a chicken. There are two equilibria to this game, in which one player swerves and the other player does not and vice versa. However, the best (or Pareto outcome) is for both players to swerve. One aspect of this game is the existence of a credible threat (i.e., reputation building). For example, if one of the drivers were to throw his or her steering wheel out of the car, then that action would be a credible threat and the other player should swerve.

The second game examines social dilemmas and is referred to as the Prisoner's Dilemma. The classic story behind this game is that two suspected criminals have been arrested for a crime, and the district attorney separates them, giving each the same deal. The deal is that if one criminal reveals the details of the crime before the other, the one who confesses first will get a lesser sentence in court than the other suspected criminal. Hence, each suspected criminal achieves a better outcome if he or she confesses or reveals the details of the crime while the other criminal remains silent. The best outcome is a cooperative outcome (or Pareto outcome) if both criminal suspects remain silent and do not confess the details of the crime. The worse outcome for both criminal suspects is for both of them to confess. The dilemma in this game is that both players have a dominated strategy to confess or defect, which yields an outcome that is worse than the outcome if they both cooperated. This game illustrates the problem of cooperation because even if the two players could communicate and agree not to confess, they both still have incentives to renege and to confess.

The last is the battle of the sexes, which is a coordination game. In this game a husband and wife have to decide whether to go to a ballet or to a boxing match. The man most prefers to go to the boxing match, whereas the wife most prefers to go to the ballet. Each prefers to be together rather than to be alone, but the husband gets more utility if they go to the boxing match and the wife gets more utility if they go to the ballet. Each receives his or her lowest utility if he or she goes alone. In this game there are two equilibria in which they both go to the boxing match or they both go to the ballet. Hence, both players have an incentive to cooperate, but the problem is coordination since they do not agree on which outcome is better. In this game bargaining may lead to a solution, or the wife could restrict alternatives and say that she faints at the sight of blood, forcing the husband to go to the ballet.

SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY

Social choice theory, or cooperative game theory, examines how the aggregation of individual preferences translates into a group choice or collective preference (sometimes referred to as "collect choice"). The problem explored is generating a social choice function (a voting mechanism that determines voting outcomes) that is fair and equitable. The roots of social choice theory date back to 1299 when Ramon Llull proposed that candidates in multicandidate elections compete against each other two at a time.

Cooperative game theory, unlike noncooperative game theory, assumes players compete as teams as opposed to individuals, where coalitions are a team of individuals who have agreed to coordinate on a common set of strategies to play in the game. It is assumed that cooperation can be enforced by an outside party.

Cooperative games are derived and solved either axiomatically or spatially. Using the axiomatic method, conditions (or axioms) are specified, and then these conditions are checked for consistency. Spatially (or geometrically), the political environment is composed of dimensions (vectors in Euclidean space), where the dimensions can be thought of as policy spaces. Players within the space are assumed to have utility functions represented as points on the dimension for one dimension and within the dimension for two or more dimensions. Utility functions defined over dimensions measure the distance an alternative is from a player's ideal point (or a player's personal location in the dimensional space) and assume that the closer the alternative is to the ideal point, the more that player prefers that alternative.

The central problems investigated within this area can be illustrated by the voter's paradox. Assume that three equal-sized groups of voters have to decide among three alternatives: x, y, and z, where group 1 most prefers x to y to z, group 2 prefers y to z to x, and group 3 prefers z to x to y. Now assume that the voting rule requires pairwise comparisons of alternatives. If x is paired against z, then z wins since groups 2 and 3 prefer z to x. Now pair z against y where groups 1 and 2 prefer y to z. Pairing y against x yields x as the eventual winner. This configuration of preferences yields what is called an intransitive social ordering, in which the winner of the election depends on the matchup that voters are presented with. In other words there is no Condorcet winner (named after Marquis de Condorcet 1785), which is a winner that beats all other alternatives in a pairwise comparison.

This example is generalized by the general impossibility theorem or the Arrow's impossibility theorem (named after Kenneth Arrow 1951), which proves that when the social choice function assumes four reasonable assumptions about preferences and there are more than two alternatives, then it is impossible to develop a perfect system of voting. The following are Arrow's four assumptions: assumption 1 is "universal domain," which assumes social preferences should be transitive and complete in the sense that given a choice between alternatives y and x, x is preferred to y, y is preferred to x, or the two are indifferent. Assumption 2 is Pareto efficiency, positing that if each individual prefers one alternative to another, then that alternative should be the winner. Assumption 3 is "nondictatorship," in which one individual should not dictate the outcome. Finally, assumption 4 is "independence from irrelevant alternative," wherein the social preference of y compared with x should be independent of preferences for other alternatives. Arrow proved that these four assumptions are inconsistent and result in a voting system that is a dictatorship. In other words, there is no voting rule, such as majority voting, for establishing social preferences from arbitrary individual preferences.

Furthermore, Alan Gibbard's (1973) and Mark Satterthwaite's (1975) impossibility theorems show that any reasonable

voting scheme such as majority-rule voting is susceptible to manipulation even when considering strategic or sophisticated voting. Strategic voting is voting for a player's lesser-preferred alternative to gain a more desirable outcome.

Formally, there have been two ways to bypass these results. First, it is argued that interpersonal comparison of utility is not scientifically sound. That is, what one person derives from a utility, such as food for a homeless person, is different from the utility a person derives if he or she is wealthy. Hence, it is impossible to assign the same utility for food to the two individuals. Second, the impossibility theorem can be solved if players are assumed to have single-peaked preferences. Single-peaked preferences assume a single dimension where x comes before y and y comes before z, each individual has a preference over the dimension where there is a unique ideal point over their most preferred preference (the highest peak), and the second and third preferences descend below the first. In the voter's paradox example, if the dimension is arranged such that x appears first, y second, and z third, then the voter's third preference ordered of z, x, y would be disallowed since it is not single peaked (x is second in order instead of y).

When social choice functions are examined spatially, one of the primary efforts is trying to define a core. Like the Nash equilibrium, a core is a point or strategies in which no coalition of players has a positive incentive to defect (i.e., it is the set of maximal choices). When a majority-rule core exists, then it is also known as a Condorcet winner (see Peter Ordeshook's 1986 *Game Theory and Political Theory* for variants on the properties of the core.)

Assuming two dimensions and using Euclidean preferences (which allow players to have preferences over two dimensions), a core is guaranteed only by the very strict Plott-McKelvey symmetry condition. Since this condition requires precise placement of ideal points in the dimensional space, which is unlikely or rare in the real world, it is conjectured that equilibrium in two-dimensional space is unlikely unless institutional rules are imposed. Lacking institutional structure within two dimensions, Richard McKelvey ("Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Bodies" 1976) proposed what is referred to as the "chaos theorem," which means there is instability within the dimensions since there is no Condorcet winner. Assuming all players vote sincerely and that one player (an agenda setter) can determine the location of the alternatives that are voted on within the dimensions, then this player can achieve any desired outcome (including his or her ideal point). Again this result implies that majority-rule institutions can be dictatorial.

Instability within the dimensions can be overcome by imposing institutional structure such as issue-by-issue voting in which players vote for one alternative on one dimension first and then they vote for another alternative on the second dimension. This effectively reduces the two-dimensional model to two one-dimensional models, wherein the equilibrium is the intersection of the median of the two one-dimensional models. Other institutional features create a structurally induced equilibrium or stability such as different types of voting rules, committee types, and norms of reciprocity, among others.

A subset of these types of spatial games is the spatial theory of elections. In 1957 Anthony Downs proposed the famous median voter theorem in which candidates seeking political office will take a position on the dimension at the median preference of voters (Duncan Black contributed similar findings for committees in 1958). The implication of this theorem is that in a two-candidate election the position of both candidates will be similar or close to the median voter. In a single-dimension environment, equilibrium is ensured as long as there are an odd number of players. James Enelow and Melvin Hinich (1984) introduced the ideal of salience and separability for spatial preferences that allowed voter choices to be more realistic.

INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING

As opposed to the previous discussion that involved two or more players, as the name implies, individual decision making concerns the study of an individual player and whether that player's behavior conforms to the tenets of expected utility theory. The classic example that illustrates the problems of expected utility theory is the Allais paradox, named after Maurice Allais (1953). Consider two sets of gambles: A and B, and C and D. An individual has a choice between, for A, getting one million dollars with certainty and, for B, an 89 percent chance of getting one million dollars, a 10 percent chance of getting five million dollars, and a 1 percent chance of getting nothing. When experiments are conducted, participants overwhelmingly pick A. Now consider gamble C and D. An individual has a choice between, for C, a 10 percent chance of getting five million dollars and a 90 percent chance of getting nothing and, for D, an 11 percent chance of getting one million dollars and an 89 percent chance of getting nothing. In this case participants generally choose C. However, it can be shown that selecting A in the first lottery and C in the second lottery violates the independent axiom since both gambles yield the same expected payoffs. Instead, to satisfy this condition players should select A and D or B and C. (See also Daniel Ellsberg's 1961 paradox for similar results.)

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979) proposed prospect theory, which examines the way people frame decisions. They argue that individuals do not view probabilities in a linear manner; rather, they view probabilities according to a nonlinear weighting function that alters their perceptions of losses and gains. Other developments in this area have included George Ainslie and Nick Haslam's (1992) hyperbolic discounting and Robert Sugden's (1993) regret theory.

BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY

One of the most recent developments in formal theory is the advent of behavioral game theory. It is argued that people are generally nonrational and do not make decisions according to the dictates of expected utility theory. Behavioral game theory attempts to predict how people actually behave by incorporating psychological (or stochastic) elements and learning into formal models. A critical part of behavioral game theory is laboratory experiments to test the behavior of players within various game theory models. Richard McKelvey and Thomas

Palfrey's (1995, 1998) quantal response equilibrium is an example of an application of behavioral game theory since this concept allows players to make errors and learn during game play.

See also *Behavioral Game Theory; Decision Theory, Foundations of; Game Theory; Social Choice Theory.*

R EBECCA B. MORTON AND
. . . . KENNETH C. WILLIAMS

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Foucault, Michel Paul

Michel Paul Foucault (1926–1984) was a French philosopher and social theorist. Trained initially in philosophy and later in psychology, he turned to a critical analysis of modernity (including its conception and practices of knowledge and its practices of the self), the constitution of power, the development of modern institutions, and the deployment of discourses and practices of sexuality. In his accounts of these phenomena he examined how they were intertwined, often reinforcing one another, sometimes at odds with one another, and how they changed over time.

Foucault described his early work as a form of archaeology. This involved the detailed historical examination of the rules that govern systems of thought and discourses of knowledge with respect to any particular subject matter. For example, in *History of Madness* (2006; originally published in English in abridged form as *Madness and Civilization*), Foucault examines the development of rules of exclusion and confinement regarding those considered insane in the modern period. These rules were not those that were consciously applied, but those that operated just below the level of conscious examination and discussion of madness and reason that took place during the emergence of the modern account of unreason.

Foucault's later work shifted to a genealogical focus that explored the changes that take place from any one historical period to another. This genealogical method, influenced by the work of German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, emphasizes the extent to which the changes that take place from one historical period to another do not reflect any grand strategy, conscious plan, or progressive laws of development but are the result of the contingent coincidence of historical and technological developments, competing systems of ideas, and the development of new institutions.

Several themes emerge in Foucault's thought. Most fundamentally, along with Nietzsche, Foucault can be described as an antiessentialist. That is, he believed there is no single account of the world that reveals the essential world, as it is in itself. This also leads him to reject foundationalism, or the claim that there is a single form of knowledge that is the foundation for all other forms of knowledge.

Second, Foucault also challenged the Enlightenment idea that power and knowledge could and should be separated from one another. In his view every discourse of knowledge is made possible by networks of power and institutions, and every network of power is made possible by discourses of knowledge.

Third, much of Foucault's later work concerns the ways in which the self—or the individual in modern terms—is constituted by practices, institutions, discourses of knowledge, technologies, and philosophical doctrines. His *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (originally published in 1975) is an examination of how modern systems of power in the form of surveillance, standards of normality, and systems of discipline take hold in modern institutions and everyday life, thereby constituting modern practices of the self that reflect less freedom than is understood by modern individuals. Similarly, his three-volume *The History of Sexuality* (originally published between 1976 and 1984) explores the changes that take place in how ideas and practices of sexuality are formed and the behaviors they impose on modern individuals.

In response to these phenomena, Foucault encouraged practices of the self that are resistant to forms of discipline, standards of normality, governmentality, and subjugation. He articulated an ethics of the self that would help to provide for greater resistance to the increasing docility of individuals and the homogenization of modern, totalizing societies.

See also *Essentialism; French Political Thought; Modernization; Nietzsche, Friedrich.*

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Fourth Estate, The

See *Press Fourth Estate.*

Fractionalization Index

The concept of fractionalization denotes the fragmentation and indirectly also the concentration of a set of elements (a population) into subsets (or components) along certain criteria. In the social sciences, such sets of elements used as the unit of analysis are commonly social systems, such as a legislative body, a party system, or a society as a whole. An index of fractionalization measures the degree of such fragmentation or concentration characterizing a system. Fractionalization becomes a relevant feature of political life in the context of social and political cleavages, that is, where circumstances that have the potential for conflict among members of a population force those members to take sides. Among the criteria, on which the division of elements or individuals into relevant subgroups might be based, are attitudes toward political issues, voting behavior, membership in parties or other politically relevant organizations, or social characteristics, such as mother tongue, religion, caste membership, and other self-ascriptive identity markers.

A commonly used index of fractionalization (F) is computed as the complement of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration, $H_j = \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_{ij}^2$, that is, by subtracting the values of that index from 1. The formula for F can thus be stated as $F_j = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_{ij}^2$, where s_{ij} is the share of group i ($i = 1 \ldots N$) in the unit of analysis j. The value of this index indicates the likelihood that two randomly drawn elements of a given set belong to different subsets within that set, with higher likelihoods indicating a higher degree of fragmentation. The values of the fractionalization index range from 0 to 1. The larger the number of subsets of the total population, and the more evenly the elements are distributed among those subsets, the larger will be the value of the fragmentation index. In political science, Douglas Rae first proposed the use of this index to measure the fragmentation of party systems in 1967.

To illustrate the results of the fractionalization index, demonstration of a few hypothetical constellations based on a frequently encountered example drawn from political sociology appears useful. If a population is divided along religious lines, the different preferences over the issues at hand might conceivably be condensed into subgroups along religious affiliation. If the population consisted of four religious subgroups of equal size, this would yield an H-value of 0.25 and an F-value of 0.75. If, hypothetically, the population consisted of only one religious affiliation, this would yield an H-value of 1.00 and an F-value of 0.00, indicating maximum concentration and conversely minimum fragmentation. If ten subgroups of equal size (0.10) existed, the H- and F-values would be 0.10 and 0.90, respectively, indicating a high level of fractionalization. If, however, the raw number of religious subgroups were three, of which one group's share was 0.80, while the other two groups were of equal size (0.10), the H-value would be 0.66 and the F-value, 0.34. If, on the other hand, the groups were of equal size, the H-value would be around 0.33, and the F-value would be around 0.67. Thus, due to the fact that the formula provides for a weighting of each component's weighting by its own share, the relative weight depends heavily on the distribution of group sizes.

To provide for a more intuitive interpretation regarding the relative strength of contending parties to a conflict, the "effective number" indices have been proposed and found acceptance as alternatives in research on party systems as well as ethnic politics. They were first suggested by Laakso and Taagepera in 1979 to measure the number of "relevant" parties (Sartori) in a competitive party system. The most commonly found formulation for its calculation, related to the party systems literature, is

$$N_j = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} s_{ij}^2}.$$

However, in a generalized form it can also be stated as $N_j = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} s_{ij}^a \right)^{(1/1-a)}$. A population divided into four equally strong groups would thus yield an effective number value of 4. This is more in accordance with intuition than an F-value of 0.75 for the same constellation. Due to this more intuitive appeal, this index has become relatively more popular than Rae's index

when measuring the level of concentration or fragmentation of size or relevance of a system of elements in political science. Since, however, this index also has a number of mathematical properties that produce counterintuitive results, especially in situations wherein one component is comparatively large in relation to the others, criticisms and suggestions for its modification have frequently been made.

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Framing and Public Opinion

Frames are discursive cues, found throughout the communication process, that emphasize a particular interpretation of an issue or event. Frames initially appear in a speaker's mind as conscious or unconscious decisions are made about how to present an issue to the public. The speaker then expresses the frame in text (e.g., article, speech) by using language that reinforces the selected interpretation. For example, a newspaper article might frame the offshore oil drilling debate by emphasizing environmental concerns or energy needs. Frames are also used by individuals to structure their comprehension and interpretation of issues. Someone who thinks about the environment when evaluating offshore drilling would be thinking through an environmental frame of mind. Finally, frames can be found more broadly at the societal level. In fact, it is the stock of preexisting ideas shared within a culture that enables frames to be useful elements of communication.

Framing affects public opinion when a speaker's frame shapes how an issue is perceived and evaluated. Specifically, framing occurs when a speaker highlights a particular piece of information, leading individuals to focus on this information above other considerations when forming an opinion. For example, a speaker might frame the offshore drilling debate by emphasizing energy considerations that could cause people to think about energy needs (rather than environmental concerns) when evaluating the issue, thus making them more likely to support drilling. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman's work on prospect theory showed that even very subtle frames could affect public opinion. One of their studies found that people were more likely to support an economic policy when it was framed as producing 95 percent employment than when it was framed as resulting in 5 percent unemployment, even though both scenarios have an equivalent outcome.

Framing research has developed in many directions, creating what Robert Entman (1993) calls a "fractured paradigm." Some work focuses on text by using frame analysis methodology to study how frames are used in discourse among social movements and political institutions. Others have focused on the potential for bias in media reporting based on the selection (and thus exclusion) of particular frames. By obscuring certain elements of a debate, the media (and those who seek to control them) could exert power over how the public understands critical policy options, from domestic issues to decisions about going to war. In addition, the potential for political elites to control the framing of issues, and thus control the issues on which the public expresses an opinion, raises concerns about the veritable nature of public opinion.

These concerns are at least partially addressed in work on the moderation and limitations of framing effects. While framing had traditionally been treated as a fairly automatic process, growing evidence now suggests that people consider a frame and weigh its merits before adopting it. As such, framing effects can be moderated by strong predispositions (e.g., values, partisanship), political knowledge, the frame's perceived applicability, its relative strength, and the credibility of the speaker. Moreover, competing frames and counterarguments from interpersonal discussions can lessen a frame's initial impact.

Public opinion can be influenced by the way speakers frame issues or situations. While framing effects have been widely demonstrated, researchers continue to investigate the implications of framing and the factors that may condition its impact on public opinion.

See also *Media Bias; Media Effect; Prospect Theory; Public Opinion.*

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Francophone Africa

The term *Francophone* applies to all people whose cultural background is primarily associated with the French language. Francophone Africa specifically refers to all the African states formerly colonized by France and Belgium in the period between the late nineteenth and the mid-twentieth centuries. There are twenty-nine Francophone African countries situated mainly in west, central, and north Africa.

French is the official language in eighteen of these countries. It is one of two official languages in six of them and is spoken widely, though not officially apportioned, in the remaining five countries. It is ironic that during the colonial era French was spoken by only a few educated elite, but today French is a major language in independent Africa; the number of French speakers is second only to the number of English speakers. Each of the French-speaking countries has adopted the language to fit in with local pronunciation and existing vocabulary.

ATLANTIC OCEAN

EUROPE

ASIA

Mediterranean Sea

Tunis

Algiers

TUNISIA

Rabat

MOROCCO

ALGERIA

LIBYA

EGYPT

SAHARAWI ARAB DEM. REP.

Nile

Red Sea

CAPE VERDE

MAURITANIA

Nouakchott

MALI

NIGER

CHAD

ERITREA

SUDAN

DJIBOUTI
Djibouti

Praia

SENEGAL
Dakar

THE GAMBIA

GUINEA-BISSAU

Bamako

Ouagadougou

Niamey

N'Djamena

GUINEA

BURKINA FASO

Conakry

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

GHANA

BENIN

NIGERIA

CAMEROON

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Bangui

ETHIOPIA

SOMALIA

Yamoussoukro

Porto-Novo

Lomé

TOGO

Malabo

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Yaoundé

Congo

UGANDA

KENYA

SAO TOME & PRINCIPE

Libreville

GABON

DEM. REP. OF THE CONGO

Kigali

RWANDA

Victoria

SEYCHELLES

Brazzaville

REP. OF THE CONGO

Kinshasa

Bujumbura

BURUNDI

Cabinda (ANGOLA)

TANZANIA

ATLANTIC OCEAN

ANGOLA

ZAMBIA

MALAWI

Moroni

COMOROS

MOZAMBIQUE Channel

MAURITIUS

ZIMBABWE

Antananarivo

NAMIBIA

BOTSWANA

MADAGASCAR

Mozambique Channel

SWAZILAND

SOUTH AFRICA

LESOTHO

INDIAN OCEAN

☐ Francophone country

0   500 Mi

0   500 Km

The nations of Francophone Africa are noted by their colonization by France or Belgium, and many hold French as their official language.

In sub-Saharan Africa, Francophone nations include Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, and Togo. In north Africa, Francophone nations include Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. In terms of size, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the largest. Neighboring Rwanda on the other hand holds the double distinction of being the smallest but also the most densely populated Francophone country in Africa. Except for Algeria, all Francophone African countries are members of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (the International Organization of La Francophonie), an intergovernmental organization that brings together French-speaking nations to enhance cooperation in areas such as culture, science, governance, and the economy.

French colonialism in Africa dates back to 1848 with the official inclusion of Algeria as part of the Republic of France. This followed several years of French military action in the region following disagreement with then Algerian ruler (dey) Hussein, who had provoked French hostility in 1827 for refusing to apologize after slapping the French consul with a fly whisk. Stung at home by defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871) against Germany, the French increasingly looked to Africa to enhance its prestige. The officially quoted motive however was the idea of *mission civilisatrice* (spreading French civilization).

The proceedings of the Berlin Conference of 1885 (also referred to as the "scramble for Africa"), during which European powers formally divided Africa, became the road map for French colonization in sub-Saharan Africa. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the French had occupied Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, and Niger. Senegal was the administrative capital of the French west African colonies.

It was in west Africa that the French applied a distinct administrative style known as "assimilation." The basic idea was to train specific Africans to become Frenchmen by abandoning their cultures in favor of the French culture and then to offer them French citizenship. Unable to sustain this policy for long, the French later turned to a policy of "association." This was a more lenient approach, with the main idea being to inculcate a sense of pride, love, and respect for France among the colonial subjects.

Following protracted armed conflicts in both Tunisia and Algeria in the early to mid-1950s and other hostilities in Morocco and Cameroon, the French colonial empire began to fold in the late 1950s amid bitterness at the country's rejection by some of its colonies (as seen in the case of Guinea's vote to reject union with France). Tunisia became independent in 1956. Other French colonies across Africa followed suit in quick succession, with Algeria finally gaining independence in 1962.

Belgium's prized possession in Africa was the Congo Free State (today's Democratic Republic of the Congo). Initially occupied by King Leopold through a private company in 1876, the Congo became a Belgian colony in 1908. Of all the Francophone colonies in Africa, the Congo suffered greatly under Belgian colonialism as a result of the colonial administration's policy of forced labor and brutal mistreatment of the indigenous people. The country became independent in 1960.

Although similarities abound across Francophone African countries especially in law, administration, and education systems, these countries differ significantly in levels of democratization and economic growth. Francophone Africa is largely undemocratic and is marked by poverty and dependence on foreign assistance. Chad, for example, remains poor, badly governed, and conflict prone. On the other hand, despite being a progressive democracy, Senegal is heavily reliant on donor assistance and has been offered beneficial debt relief as one of the International Monetary Fund's designated Highly Indebted Poor Countries.

In the early twenty-first century, the French continue to play a major role in Francophone Africa. Not only are a significant number of the countries dependent on France for trade and financial assistance; but the French military remains on call to intervene in case of armed conflict in many of its former colonies, as seen in the cases of French military intervention in Côte d'Ivoire (2002) and Chad (1983, 2006, 2008).

See also *African Political Economy; African Politics and Society; Anglophone Africa; Colonialism; Lusophone Africa; Postindependent Africa, Politics and Governance in.*

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Frank, Andre Gunder

Andre Gunder Frank (1929–2005) was a sociologist, political scientist, and world historian active in the debates surrounding dependency theory and world systems theory during the late twentieth century. He was born in Berlin, but his family fled Germany following Hitler's rise to power. He lived in Switzerland for a time as a youth until his family immigrated to the United States in 1941. Frank attended Swarthmore College and received his doctorate in economics in 1957 from the University of Chicago, where he completed a dissertation on Soviet agriculture under the supervision of the noted free market economist Milton Friedman.

Frank taught at several American universities before moving to Latin America in 1962, where he took a position as professor of sociology and economics at the University of Chile. Frank was part of the intellectual circles in Chile at the time that assisted in the social and economic reforms inaugurated by the democratic socialist president Salvador Allende. Allende would later be overthrown in a coup by conservative general

Augusto Pinochet, who turned to the free market economic policies of the so-called Chicago school (Frank's former colleagues) to modernize and develop his nation.

During this period, modernization theory was the dominant paradigm in the social sciences explaining economic history and the relative lack of development of the so-called third world. Modernization theory argued that the third world's economic and social difficulties resulted from a lack of capitalist institutions, the weakness of their internal markets, and their lack of involvement in global trade. For modernization theory, the key to third world development was strengthening the internal market and developing an export-based economy rather than one based on subsistence peasant agriculture.

Frank quickly became a leading dissident against modernization theory. Attending conferences across Latin America, he argued that the third world had been integrated into the capitalist economy from its outset and that the underdevelopment of these countries was written into the very global nature of capitalist development itself. In a sense, the third world's backwardness was precisely the reason the West was modern and advanced. According to Frank, a structural imbalance was built into the global capitalist system that created the geographic disparity of wealth between the third world and the developed countries.

During the 1960s, Frank and several colleagues began to formalize this view. A new school of dependency theory—to which Frank was a major contributor—quickly became an influential methodology among dissident and left-wing scholars in the social sciences across the globe.

Following the Pinochet coup, Frank fled to Holland, where he found an academic position at the University of Amsterdam. During the 1970s and continuing until his death, he would play a key role in the development of world systems theory, a social science paradigm that argues the world has been unified in a global social and economic system since at least the sixteenth century and that social and economic events in one region have effects throughout the system. In this field, Frank proved to be just as controversial as he was in his earlier work. He argued that the world system actually arose in antiquity rather than in the so-called long sixteenth century. He also authored a controversial book arguing for the central importance of Chinese civilization in the world system. Western Europe's global dominance, he argued, was a relatively recent and temporary phenomenon that would likely be surpassed by a new era of Asian—and specifically Chinese—hegemony in the not too distant future.

Frank was a voluminous author who wrote numerous books and articles. His influence was felt most profoundly in the 1960s and 1970s through the key role he played in the development of dependency theory. However, his work in world system theory, while controversial, is an important point of reference for world historians today.

See also *Dependency Theory.*

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Frankfurt School

Frankfurt school usually refers to a set of intellectuals of Marxist origins who worked within the framework of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research after Max Horkheimer became its director in 1930. This article discusses the impact of and the intellectuals within this school. It first reconstructs the profile of the first generation of Frankfurt school theorists and then analyzes the second and third generation as well as their contemporary legacy.

THE FIRST GENERATION

The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research was funded in 1924, but it was only under the directorship of Max Horkheimer that it gained its distinctive character. The institute was an interdisciplinary research organization that brought together philosophers, economists, sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, and literary and music critics, including Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin (although he was not a formal member), Erich Fromm, Leo Loewenthal, Herbert Marcuse, Otto Kirchheimer, Franz Neumann, and Friedrick Pollock. After Hitler's rise to power, the institute was closed, and its members emigrated to Switzerland first (in 1933) and then to the United States (in 1935). The institute was reopened in Frankfurt in 1950.

Horkheimer exercised a deep influence as director of the institute, pushing his colleagues to question the economicism of orthodox Marxism and take into considerations what earlier Marxists had relegated to the so-called superstructure of politics, law, culture, and ideology. In his contributions to the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung,* the institute's main intellectual organ, Horkheimer argued for the need to develop what he named a "critical theory" of society, an intellectual endeavor that, thanks to its multidisciplinary approach, is able to analyze human relationships in their complexity and thus better identify the conditions for emancipation from domination. While traditional social science simply reflects the way things are and is therefore aimed at perpetuating the status quo, a critical theory seeks to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them.

What is typical of the Frankfurt school is its combination of an unorthodox Marxist theory of society with insights taken from German philosophical tradition (in particular Georg Wilhem Friedrich Hegel) and psychoanalysis (in particular

Sigmund Freud). Authors in the Frankfurt school tradition typically combine such a theoretical background with empirical analysis. So while Neumann and Kirchheimer analyzed the rise of Nazism by looking at the way in which it destructed the traditional liberal legal protections such as the rule of law, others emphasized the psychological and sociological conditions that favored the emergence of an authoritarian personality. The latter generated a big multidisciplinary research project whose final results were published in 1950 as *The Authoritarian Personality.*

The critique of totalitarianism is, however, not limited to the sole European Fascism; Frankfurt school theorists are known for having diagnosed germs of a totalitarian domination in mass industrial democracies as well. In particular, Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse put forward a powerful critique of the role of ideology in industrialized societies. In their influential *Dialectic of Enlightenment,* Adorno and Horkheimer analyze the mechanisms of domination inherent to what they call "culture industry." Although high culture once possessed a critical potential, this has vanished in contemporary mass culture; the latter has become a homogenizing system of entertainment that includes cinema, film, and music and is aimed at only reproducing and stabilizing the system of domination. Difference is tolerated only as it can be subsumed under universal domination. While Marcuse's critique of industrial societies, as developed in *Eros and Civilisation* and *One-dimensional Man,* discloses a possible way out from domination in the liberation of the unnecessarily repressed instincts and the power of imagination, the authors of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* seem to see no way out from the system of domination. In their view, the entire Western Enlightenment is based on an instrumental concept of reason as domination over nature that cannot but result in the opposite of reason, that is, myth and barbarism.

The critique of reason remains a crucial theme of Horkheimer's writings, which assume a darker connotation toward the end of his life (showing the influence of Schopenhauer's metaphysical pessimism). In his later writings, Adorno continues instead his critique of systematic philosophy by rethinking history and society in light of a negative dialectic.

THE SECOND GENERATION AND THE LEGACY OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL

The most complex figure within the second generation of Frankfurt school theorists is Juergen Habermas. Professor of philosophy in Frankfurt until his retirement in 1994, Habermas's contribution spans from social sciences to moral, legal, and political philosophy. Notwithstanding significant continuities with his predecessors, Habermas criticized Adorno and Horkheimer for overlooking the unfulfilled potential of emancipation of modern rationality. In his view, they failed to provide a solid basis for a critical social theory because their critique rested on the tacit assumption of a privileged standpoint from which to expose ideology.

In Habermas's view, a critical theory must be concerned not only with the unmasking of domination but also with the validation of its own critical standards. Habermas put forward a new version of critical theory in which the Marxian legacy is as important as the Kantian one. In his *Theory of Communicative Action,* a work that combines the insights of German philosophy with the analytic philosophy of language, Habermas argues that the normative foundations for critical social theory must be found in the conditions for communicative action, that is, the "idealizing presuppositions" that must be undertaken by anyone trying to come to an understanding with someone else. Habermas's attempt to ground reason in a universal pragmatics of communication has been extremely influential for the following generations of critical theorists. In his successive writings, and in particular in *Between Facts and Norms,* Habermas applies his discourse theory to legal theory and to the theory of democracy.

With the partial exception of the first research directly promoted by the Frankfurt Institute, it is impossible to identify a single method that unifies all Frankfurt school theorists. Yet it is perhaps in such a capacity to inspire critical social research in very different ambits that the main legacy of the Frankfurt school resides. Among the newest generations of critical theorists, some, such as Rainer Forst, have continued the search for the normative foundations of reason, whereas others, such as Axel Honneth, have recovered Hegel and psychoanalysis by emphasizing the importance of conflict and the struggle for recognition. Others, such as Albrecht Wellmer and Alfred Schmidt, have recovered insights from the first generation, in particular Adorno and Horkheimer. Finally, there are also those contemporary theorists who have enlarged the agenda of critical theory to new objects such as international relations or gender studies.

See also *Critical Theory; Horkheimer, Max.*

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Freedom

Freedom is a prime example of what W. B. Gallie refers to as "essentially contested concepts," a term that refers to concepts that participate in a tradition of conflicting interpretations so fundamental that they are permanent and without resolution. Understanding the concept of freedom means understanding the fundamentally different ways in which the concept has been used. A particularly important distinction is that between freedom from hindrance on one hand and the freedom to fully realize one's potential on the other. This difference roughly corresponds to that between the Anglo-American tradition of "freedom from" and the continental European tradition of "freedom to," although that puts it a little too simply.

Drawing fine semantic distinctions, such as that between *freedom* and *liberty,* will not help us understand freedom. In practice, the terms are synonymous, as the British philosopher and historian of ideas Isaiah Berlin points out in his famous work "Two Concepts of Liberty." We can pursue the meaning of *freedom* by deciding which distinctions are useful and which are not and even whether approaching freedom by making fine distinctions is fruitful.

NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE FREEDOM

Berlin argues that we should not confuse freedom with every good thing, such as a decent income and life chances. Freedom, Berlin says, means lack of restraint. He calls it "negative liberty," not because it is bad but because the definition focuses on limits to actions. Berlin says that to know freedom, you must ask how many doors are open to you and how wide they are open.

Berlin defines "positive liberty" as the freedom to realize one's deepest ambitions, to participate in one's own governance, and to become who one truly is. Under positive liberty, one is not free just because no one prevents him or her from speaking out in public or from getting a better education. Because positive liberty includes the means to realize one's values, one is free only when he or she has the means to get others to listen to him or her and only when one has a decent education, which is often what it takes to open doors in this world.

Berlin does not dismiss positive liberty, but he worries that emphasizing positive liberty as true freedom risks giving too much power to the government or even to fellow citizens. For a person to possess the means to self-development, such as a college education, he or she may have to be more heavily taxed, which could restrict freedom to travel, for example. Berlin asks, How much freedom does a person really have when the majority of citizens, rather than the tyrant, tells that person what to give up to be free? Furthermore, positive freedom is more likely to result in the confusion of freedom with constraint. Jean-Jacques Rousseau notoriously remarked that the individual may be "forced to be free" by the community if the individual fails to understand that his or her good is bound up with that of the whole.

Another distinction that is well known among those who study freedom is what Benjamin Constant called "The Liberty of Ancients Compared with That of Moderns." Ancient liberty, the liberty of classical Athens, for example, is the freedom to participate in one's own self-governance, so as not to be governed by another city-state or polis. The ancient notion of freedom inspired German-émigré political philosopher Hannah Arendt, who sees the apex of freedom as residing in the Athenian polis. Modern liberty, by contrast, is the freedom to be left alone by government to make money and enjoy the pleasures of private life. Most people in contemporary society see participating in government as, at best, a civic duty. Participation is hardly ever understood as the essence of freedom.

What has changed in the modern world to transform the meaning of freedom so completely? The simple answer is the rise of individualism, in which people come to think of themselves as autonomous centers of value or choice. This view is epitomized by French existential philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre in *Being and Nothingness.* In our minds and imaginations, he claims that men and women are absolutely free. Sartre says that while we cannot make the world in any way we want, we are free to interpret our world in any way we choose. The trouble is that I am not the only one in the world. When I live with others, they become the enemy of my freedom, as it is everyone's natural tendency to view themselves as they imagine others see them. In seeing myself this way, I betray my original freedom, defining my situation in relationship to the other.

Sartre calls this betrayal bad faith ("mauvaise foi"). For Sartre, freedom has nothing to do with the fact that the world resists people's will. Freedom means that people have a choice about how to react to everything that happens to them and how to come to terms with it. Indeed, Sartre holds that, for the most part, we choose our passions. Somewhere deep inside each one of us there is an empty space that Sartre calls "néant," or nothingness, which no one and no thing can touch. That place is freedom, for in it, people can give the events of their lives any meaning they choose. For example, I may see prison as a chance to liberate myself from a life of crime, as Malcolm X did.

WHAT IS FREEDOM GOOD FOR?

The concept of freedom can be written as a history of competing definitions, a history that could be organized in many ways. However, a more fruitful approach would be to consider why freedom is such a difficult concept in the first place. German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel put it this way: "No idea is so generally recognized as indefinite, ambiguous and open to the greatest misconceptions . . . as the idea of freedom: none in the common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning" (*Philosophy of Mind,* 1971, 239). It seems there is something about freedom itself that makes it, at least in the

modern West, both an unquestioned good and a questionable concept.

Instead of asking, What is freedom? it is more useful to ask, What is freedom good for? Here, the British philosopher John Stuart Mill is useful. Mill's (1975) argument appears to be a straightforward utilitarian argument: "Freedom allows the maximum of self-expression consistent with the rights of others, and in this way, the marketplace of ideas is enlarged. More speech puts more ideas in play, and from these ideas, the best will eventually be chosen and so freedom brings progress."

Such an interpretation is not incorrect. However, a closer reading of Mill reveals his aristocratic side. Mill was never primarily interested in the freedom of the average man or woman. Mill valued freedom as providing an opportunity for an exceptional few to make of their lives a work of beauty. From this perspective, freedom is the means, and the cultivation of individuality is the end. Hence he writes,

"It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human begins become noble and beautiful objects of contemplation. In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fullness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units, there is more in the mass that is composed of them. I might here close the argument: for what more or better can be said of any condition of human affairs than it brings human beings themselves nearer to the best things they can be? Or what worse can be said of any obstruction to good than it prevents this?" (*On Liberty,* 1975, 59–60)

FREEDOM AS COMMUNAL VIRTUOSITY

If Mill were interested in freedom for the sake of the richness and virtuosity of the individual, then Hannah Arendt may be seen as taking this argument a step further by claiming in "What Is Freedom?" that freedom is virtuosity. Freedom is not just the cultivation and development of certain excellences. Freedom resides in the public performance itself in which we act and speak in public, showing others who we are and bringing something new into the world. Only through such acts of political creativity do humans overcome the entropy that would otherwise overtake human existence.

While critics often focus on Arendt's nostalgia for an ancient Athenian ideal of politics that no longer has a place in the modern world, the more salient problem with her vision of freedom is that, in the end, it fails to include the full scope of human interaction. A critical reading of her work suggests that it is the role of our fellow citizens to serve as an audience, so someone may be present to appreciate and remember our noble words and great deeds. Even a virtuoso needs an audience who can understand and appreciate his or her art.

A vision of freedom that is better suited to the shared character of political life is required. Jazz musicians talk about being "in the groove," a state of improvisation that involves not just one person's music but also the music of others in the group. Although individual skills and talent are involved, they do not create the groove. It is created by the space among the players, and as such, "in the groove" is a temporary creation, as transient as the performance. If "in the groove" is a spontaneous experience at one level, at another level it reflects spontaneity built on hundreds of hours of negotiation, learning to barter the musical assertion of others with one's own musical self-assertion. "In the groove" is, of course, not just an account of playing jazz music. It is a way of thinking about the complex sharing with others that freedom requires. It is about creating freedom in a complex space that is framed by the activities of those who make and share the freedom they create.

This communal virtuosity has sometimes been experienced in times of great political struggle. In Arendt's "The Revolutionary Tradition and Its Lost Treasure," her reference to the "lost treasure" refers to the poet René Char who joined the French Resistance to Nazi occupation during World War II (1939–1945) and found himself. Arendt writes, "Wherever he went he appeared as he was to others and to himself. . . . He could afford to 'go naked.' These reflections . . . testify to the involuntary self-discourse, to the joys of appearing in word and deed without equivocation and without self reflection that are inherent in action" (Arendt 2000). Arendt argues that such an experience could be brought into mundane, everyday political practice. She takes Thomas Jefferson's ward system as a model for a participatory democracy that may not be compatible with freedom as lack of constraint, or negative freedom, but a space in which average citizens flourish through political participation.

Yet it may be that Arendt continues to ask of politics what it cannot—and perhaps should not—deliver. In particular, one wonders whether political freedom is really the realm in which such ambitions should be realized, especially in the day-to-day grind of administration and party life or even for such a good cause as the French Resistance. Recall Berlin's simple caution that because freedom is good does not mean that it is every good thing. Contemporary political philosopher Richard Rorty argues in *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* that conflating politics and self-development—that is, ignoring the distinction between public and private—is risky business.

FREEDOM'S AFFINITY WITH CONSTRAINT

The equation of freedom with constraint is at least as old as the Greek and Roman Stoics and reaches its apotheosis, although certainly not its end, in the work of Immanuel Kant. Consider Epictetus, who taught that the path to freedom is to want only what happens to us. "Whoever wants to be free, therefore, let him not want or avoid anything that is up to others. Otherwise, he will necessarily be a slave" (*Handbook,* c. 15). Desire is the enemy of freedom, for it is desire that confronts us with a world of possibilities beyond our control.

Therefore, the stoic "is on guard against himself as an enemy lying in wait" (*Handbook,* c. 48). In sum, "do not seek to have events happen as you want them to, but instead want them to happen as they do happen, and your life will go well" (*Handbook,* c. 8).

That the stoic achieves freedom by means of self-constraint, never wishing for anything he cannot have, is not news. But how does Immanuel Kant, personification of the Enlightenment, fit into this scheme? For Kant, human freedom is the freedom to accept objective reality, such as the laws of nature, or the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is a standard of rationality from which all moral principles are derived: act only according to those principles that you would have become universal laws. For example, to steal when you do not want stealing to be legal for everyone is, in Kant's view, a logical contradiction. Kant believes that the laws of objective reality, which appear to be external to human beings, are actually the unwitting projections of human reason. Thus, to accept these laws is equivalent to accepting what we ourselves have willed or made. "The will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings insofar as they are rational; freedom would be the property of this causality that makes it effective independent of any determination by alien causes" (Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,* 1981, 49). Although a person may rebel at the determination of these laws, if the person is rational, he or she will accept these laws, knowing that he or she helped make them. This is not Stoicism. Rather, it is a stoicism gone on an idealistic adventure, discovering that all the things people once thought were constraints on freedom were actually willed on themselves, as rational beings, all along.

FREEDOM AS EXPERIENCE AND PRACTICE

Let us give the critical theorists of the Frankfurt school, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, the last word on Kant's strategy, recalling that they are writing during the postwar era in American life, in which the self-censorship of movies was at its peak. "Kant intuitively anticipated what Hollywood has consciously put into practice: Images are precensored during production by the same standard of understanding that will later determine their reception by viewers. The perception by which public judgment feels itself confirmed has been shaped by that judgment even before the perception takes place" (*Dialectic of Enlightenment* 2002, 65–66).

The point, of course, is that to call self-censorship freedom because it conforms to what one would have wanted anyway ignores the possibility that what one wants depends on what one thinks one can have. And why would anyone restrict his or her imagination in this way? It would be done to protect the illusion of perfect freedom. If I cannot imagine having something, then I need not experience the limits to my freedom.

What lesson is to be drawn from all this? Perhaps only that it makes more sense to go out and test one's freedom, even risk losing it, than to devote entire philosophies to guaranteeing that one's freedom is already absolute. In the end, freedom is an experience and a practice, not just an idea or a concept.

See also *Academic Freedom; Arendt, Hannah; Freedom of Association; Freedom of Conscience; Freedom of Religion; Kant, Immanuel; Liberal Theory; Liberalism, Classical.*

. . . .   C. FRED ALFORD

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Freedom of Assembly

In the United States, freedom of assembly is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the American people. It is specifically guaranteed under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in the Bill of Rights. As it is located in the Bill of Rights, it is considered a legal right, enforceable in the courts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and enforceable against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Freedom of assembly is distinct and different from freedom of association. Generally, freedom of assembly usually applies to the congregation of groups, and freedom of association applies to the rights of individuals to associate with other persons or entities.

A POLITICAL RIGHT

However, it is not just a legal right; it is also a political right. The difference between the two is not just academic. A legal right is a right that is enforceable by the courts. In contrast, a purely political right is a right that is recognized in a political philosophy. There is frequently overlap between political and legal rights. Some political rights might be enforceable in a court. Others might not be enforceable.

A primary example of a political right would be the right to revolt. In the U.S. Declaration of Independence, it is expressly recognized that when a government becomes destructive of the unalienable rights of the people, the people have the right to alter or abolish it—that is, to revolt, which is exactly what colonial Americans did during the American Revolutionary War (1776–1783). However, no court in the United States of America has recognized or approved of the right to revolt, nor has any other court in any other nation. Indeed, if a court were to recognize such a right, it would essentially be permitting its own destruction. Thus, it is a purely political right.

An example of the qualitative difference and difference in enforceability between legal and political rights can be found in the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of *Baker v. Carr* (1962), wherein the Court recognized the various aspects of what constitutes a political question. More specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in the case of *Luther v. Borden* (1849) that it will not consider issues that are purely political in nature, such as whether a state has a republican form of government. This was an interesting situation addressing what is known as Dorr's Rebellion, where a portion of the populace of Rhode Island attempted to establish its own government on the grounds that the regular government was not representative of the people and attempts at internal change were ineffective. Although the Court did not address the freedom of assembly in *Luther,* it is interesting to note that Dorr and his followers actually met to formulate their new government.

A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

Freedom of assembly, under the First Amendment, is a fundamental right that allows the people to peacefully assemble. The U.S. Supreme Court has presented three basic definitions of a fundamental right. The first is whether the right in question is a natural right under the principles of natural law, such as the right of self-defense as espoused by, for example, Sir William Blackstone, a famous English legal commentator, in his *Commentaries on the Laws of England*. The second is whether the right in question is fundamental to American justice and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, as recognized in the case of *Duncan v. Louisiana* (1968), which was a case in which an African American was denied the right to a trial by jury. The third is whether the right is implied in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, such as the right of privacy, as recognized in the case of *Griswold v. Connecticut* (1965) concerning access to birth control. The second meaning has been the most frequently cited by the American courts. As a practical matter, what is a fundamental right in America consists of the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as presented in the Bill of Rights, with some exceptions under the doctrine of selective incorporation, which mandates that most of the rights listed in the Bill of Rights are fundamental and are applicable against the states as well as the federal government.

In the decision of *De Jonge v. Oregon* (1937), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the primary purpose of the freedom to assemble includes the right to consult on public affairs and to petition for the redress of grievances. Thus, the basis of the freedom of assembly is to protect the political process, which is significantly dependent on the right to assemble. However, this does not mean that the freedom to assemble involves only consulting on public affairs or petitioning for the redress of grievances. There are other facets of political activity that fall within the freedom of assembly. Thus, it is clearly a political right, and it is enforceable in the courts as a legal right.

A LIMITED RIGHT

The U.S. Supreme Court, in the decision of *Kovacs v. Cooper* (1949), recognized that all rights, even fundamental rights guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, are not absolute. Limitations can be imposed. One example is the requirement of licensing. It has been universally recognized across the United States that the government's requiring some form of licensing for public demonstrations is constitutional and does not violate the right to assemble. However, such licensing cannot subject the participants to unreasonable limitations on the time, place, or manner of the public demonstrations.

A primary example of an appropriate limitation on the right to assemble is the crime of rioting. Although the people have the fundamental right to gather for political purposes, such a gathering must be peaceful. If the gathering becomes violent and disorderly, disturbing the general peace, then the participants will lose the protection of the right to assemble and be subject to criminal prosecution. However, even abhorrent ideas are protected by the freedom of assembly, as illustrated by the infamous Nazi parade in Skokie, Illinois, in 1977. The Skokie case involved a Nazi group's attempting to parade in a significantly Jewish community. It brought the issue of the right to assemble to the forefront, even where the content or purpose of the assembly might be highly offensive to many people.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Political rights are recognized in international law. In the United Nations Charter, political rights are not specifically mentioned. However, in articles 1 and 55 of the charter, equal rights and the right to self-determination are jointly recognized; these are political rights, and as a practical matter, they cannot be implemented without the right to assemble. Furthermore, in article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the right to peacefully assemble is recognized. However, it must be realized that even though these rights are recognized in these international documents, the United Nations Charter is generally recognized to be aspirational as opposed to mandatory, and the covenant, even though it is a treaty, is not enforceable in American courts because of the numerous reservations made during its ratification. Thus, the issue of legal as opposed to political rights involving the right to assemble is a significant issue concerning international law.

See also *Bill of Rights; Blackstone, William; Freedom of Association; Freedom of Speech.*

. . . . WM. C. PLOUFFE JR.

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Freedom of Association

Freedom of association is essentially the right to interact with other people or entities without interference from the government. It is not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution. However, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the decisions of *NAACP v. Alabama* (1958) and *Bates v. City of Little Rock* (1960), specifically recognized the freedom to associate as being related to the right to assemble and freedom of speech under the due process clause. Both of these cases involved the government's attempts to obtain the membership lists of organizations, which the Court found interfered with the freedom of association. It must be realized that freedom of association is distinct and different from freedom of assembly. Generally, freedom of association applies to the rights of individuals to associate with other persons or entities, and freedom of assembly usually applies to the congregation of groups.

A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

Even though freedom of association is not listed in the Bill of Rights, it is considered a fundamental right. The U.S. Supreme Court has presented three basic definitions of a fundamental right. The first is whether the right in question is a natural right under the principles of natural law. This includes the right of self-defense as espoused by Sir William Blackstone, an eighteenth-century English legal commentator, in his *Commentaries on the Laws of England*. The second is whether the right in question is fundamental to American justice and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, as recognized in the case of *Duncan v. Louisiana* (1968), in which an African American youth was sentenced without a jury to a term of two years in jail for assault. The third is whether the right is implied in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, such as the right of privacy, as recognized in the case of *Griswold v. Connecticut* (1965) concerning access to birth control. The second meaning has been the most frequently cited by the American courts. As a practical matter, what is a fundamental right in America consists of the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as presented in the Bill of Rights, with some exceptions under the doctrine of selective incorporation, which mandates that most of the rights listed in the Bill of Rights are fundamental and are applicable against the states as well as the federal government.

The U.S. Supreme Court, in *NAACP v. Alabama* (1958), found that the freedom of association is broad ranging and does not concern just public political matters. It found that the freedom of association applies, essentially, to any reason, whether it be public, private, political, economic, religious, or cultural. Moreover, in contrast to the freedom to assemble, the freedom to associate involves the right of privacy as, among other aspects, it may involve controversial matters. Thus, although the freedom of association involves political rights, it is much more.

Also of great importance, the freedom of association involves the rights of labor. The U.S. Supreme Court, in the decision of *National Labor Relations Board v. Weingarten* (1975), found that the freedom of association applies to labor and unions in that there is a right to associate to advance the interests of labor against management.

LIMITS

However, like the freedom to assemble, the freedom to associate is not absolute. As with all rights, even fundamental rights guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the decision of *Kovacs v. Cooper* (1949), recognized that limitations on the right can be imposed. But such limits must be reasonable, and as it is a fundamental right, any infringement will be examined by the courts under strict scrutiny.

These circumstances came to the forefront in the infamous Supreme Court case of *Dennis v. United States* (1951). Dennis was an organizer and member of the Communist Party in America and taught from various Communist books. Dennis was indicted and convicted because one of the tenants of the Communist Party was the violent overthrow of the United States. However, as stated in the vehement dissents, there was no clear and present danger. Thus, Dennis was convicted, at least in some part, based on his membership in the Communist Party. This case still raises serious questions about the freedom of association today and if it is truly a fundamental right or if it was sacrificed on the altar of political expediency. However, few would dispute that associating with groups that present a clear and present danger as to the violent and imminent overthrow of the government would not be protected under the freedom of association.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

In the realm of international law, the freedom of association is not specifically mentioned in the United Nations Charter. However, it is present by implication. In articles 55 and 62 of the charter, social equality, social progress, and social problems are recognized as goals, which implies that freedom to associate is also present. Furthermore, in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in article 22, the freedom of association is specifically recognized and includes the right to unionize.

Indeed, one of the most infamous international examples of abuse of the freedom of association was in South Africa during the period of apartheid. *Apartheid* loosely translates as "apartness." It refers to the principle that the white race is so superior to the black race that the two must be kept apart. In support of the enforcement of apartheid, people were banned, which means that they were not allowed to meet or communicate with more than one person at a time.

The freedom of association is an essential fundamental right that has effects throughout a person's life and not just in the

political arena. As demonstrated in South Africa with apartheid, without freedom of association, life can be so restricted that the concept of liberty becomes meaningless.

. . . .   WM. C. PLOUFFE JR.

See also *Bill of Rights; Blackstone, William; Civil and Political Rights; Freedom of Association; Freedom of Speech.*

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Freedom of Conscience

One might understand the concept of conscience as a judicial concept whereby, on reflection, we retrospectively make a personal judgment about what we did. The judicial conscience results from personal values or internal judgments, engaging in a subjective evaluation of our prior actions. An intuitive notion, the retrospective approach to conscience is strongly associated with moral and value-oriented evaluations. Such evaluations might lead one to suffer from a guilty conscience given prior actions that are, in retrospect, deemed incorrect.

Conscience also acts as a prospective concept, serving a legislative role in directing a person's actions and providing a broader framework for consideration and evaluation of future events. Conscience in the legislative sense results from a meta-judgment closely linked to one's essential moral commitments, creating a disposition to act pursuant to one's fundamental beliefs and self-identifying moral principles. It is a self-conscious activity to create self-committed decisions about what is right and wrong.

Thus, a pacifist belief dictates a refusal to use weapons against another human being, resulting in military conscientious objection and a refusal to engage in any form of military service requiring or supporting the use of arms against another. There even have been instances of pacifists' conscientiously refusing to pay a portion of their income tax, against the percentage of monetary resources dedicated to the support of the military.

The legislative role of conscience has been subject to greater analysis and consideration given its potential to alter the future behavior of individuals. Thus, respect for the prospective nature of conscience has resulted in the emergence of a human right to freedom of conscience as a protected belief, one that is closely associated with, and at times even comparable to, the importance accorded to a religious belief and its attendant freedom(s).

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL NATURE OF CONSCIENCE

Conscience in the legislative sense leads to the instillation of a conscientious belief. Such a belief is composed of an internal aspect, the *forum internum,* involving the development of one's conscientious belief system, and the *forum externum,* whereby one externally manifests a conscientious belief.

The forum internum relates to the ability to mentally develop, and eventually adhere to, conscientious beliefs, creating the groundwork for future external behavior. This evaluative, cognitive, conscientious process shapes and develops a belief into a structured set of cognitive directives or imperatives that mandate particular and specific external action (or inaction). A belief system centered on the importance of human life will dictate the type of actions that one may hold to be morally unacceptable to undertake against another (such as to perform an abortion) pursuant to the beliefs that have internally shaped and formed.

An ensuing conscientious decision to act personifies that person's approach to moral action for both that particular action and similar future situations. A conscientious belief manifests when the belief requires a particular form of practice. One must discern a link between the action and the particular practice demanded from the belief system. The forum externum then results from an internal-driven process to create a set of mandates that merit manifestation of one's conscientious beliefs as external actions taken in pursuance of a belief. Manifestation of a conscientious belief reflects the standard developed in the forum internum, as manifestation of a conscientious belief relates to an application of specific and crucial principles deriving from the belief. Thus, a medical practitioner harboring a conscientious belief concerning the importance of human life even in its earliest stages might refuse when asked to cooperate in certain medical actions, such as abortions. The conscientious belief manifests to prevent the individual from performing an action contrary to the belief itself.

Unlike a religious belief, however, which is (generally) associated with a set of stated principles and norms, the scope of manifestation for a conscientious belief is a vexing issue due to problems of proof regarding the existence of a particular conscientious belief and demonstrating one's actual belief in the asserted principles. Nonetheless, a conscientious believer desires to adhere to an asserted conscientious belief regardless of the outcome. What is important is the manifestation of a conscientious belief to ensure the maintenance of the belief. Prevention of the desired action or inaction will not only impede its performance but also generate an unyielding predicament that can serve to thwart the internal conscientious belief as well.

CONSCIENCE AS A HUMAN RIGHT

Given the importance of the development and manifestation of a conscientious belief, the notion of conscience as a protected human right has emerged in both domestic and international frameworks. The scope of the right remains unclear, however, since in many instances, the right is associated with a religious belief at the expense of allowing for the manifestation of a conscientious belief.

For example, the principal allowance for conscience as a human right is its association with pacifism, as many states

recognize the right of military conscientious objection. A military conscientious objector asserts a conscientious belief, such as against the bearing of arms, whereby the requested action by the state, participating in the military, entails a direct conflict with the belief. States might provide an exemption from military service or an option of alternative military service that does not involve the use of military weapons. The problem is that many states limit conscientious objection solely to religious-based contentions, at the expense of conscientious beliefs that also merit manifestation and protection, such as when emanating from a nonreligious pacifist who asserts a conscience-based belief in not using weapons of any sort.

Conscientious belief also maintains legal protection in international treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 18, and the European Convention on Human Rights, article 9. For example, the attendant oversight committee of the International Covenant, the Human Rights Committee, has stated that the capacity for military conscientious objection applies to all forms of beliefs, both religious and otherwise, thereby including conscientious beliefs as well. By contrast, the European Court on Human Rights has held that the European Convention does not necessarily provide for the right to military conscientious objection as the right of exemption is left to the decision of a state.

In his 2009 report, the United Nations Human Rights Council–appointed special rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief referred to nontheistic and atheistic beliefs that merit protection against discrimination, such as in the field of education. The understanding was that conscientious beliefs are entitled to some form of protection against state discrimination, such as in state schools mandating daily religious prayer for all students or providing universal religious instruction. Previous rapporteurs had also called on states to recognize and apply the right to military conscientious objection and provide the means for alternative service.

Finally, the potential capacity for additional forms of conscientious objection merits noting. This includes conscientious objection in the medical field, such as objecting to the performance of abortions or euthanasia; claiming refugee status after feeling a state denied a person the right to military conscientious objection; and the capacity for selective conscientious objection (wherein a specific military action is conducted in a manner contrary to one's conscientious belief).

See also *Freedom of Religion; Human Rights; Pacifism and Conscientious Objection.*

. . . .   LEONARD HAMMER

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Freedom of Information

Freedom of information (FOI) signifies one's right of access to information held by government. Generally, this access includes access to both government-owned documents and government meetings. FOI, sometimes referred to as the "right to know," contributes more broadly to transparency, which is evaluated by how well one is able to see what government is doing. According to Suzanne Piotrowski (2007), transparency is achieved through five avenues: FOI laws, proactive dissemination of information, open meetings, whistle-blowing, and leaks. FOI—and transparency generally—is salient because it helps to ensure and foster democracy, accountability, and citizen trust as well as potentially curb corruption. Since democracy works best when people are informed, information flow from the government, then, can be thought of as a way to ensure better democratic practices and citizen participation. Furthermore, access to government documents, information, and meetings paves the way for an accountability mechanism or check from the public by allowing the public to monitor the decisions and actions taken (or not taken) by government. While FOI is thought to be an essential right for all, too much FOI could potentially pose a threat. Personal privacy and the need for secrecy—especially in cases of security—have the potential to be at odds with FOI rights. As a result, one's right to know as well as one's right to privacy and security must be balanced in such a way that neither is breached.

HOW FOI IS ACHIEVED

FOI can be achieved in two major ways: access to documents and access to meetings. Access to documents is typically obtained through the use of FOI laws. FOI laws vary around the world but generally include, among other components, the types of documents that can be requested, who can request them, from what government agencies and bodies they can be requested, the types of documents exempt from release, the process for appealing denial of access, and fee schedules. Some laws protect the FOI rights of citizens only, while others allow all persons to submit and be granted requests for information.

The first known FOI law was adopted in Sweden as the Freedom of the Press Act in 1766, which mandated that all public records be considered open to the public. According to David Banisar (2006), the worldwide spread of FOI as a right did not occur until almost two hundred years later after World War II (1939–1945) with the establishment of the United Nations and the creation of international standards for human rights. Furthermore, Banisar reports that as of 2006, close to seventy countries in the world have such laws on the

books, and an additional fifty laws are pending. In recent years, FOI laws have come to be known as standard, with the international community—such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the African Union—urging countries to adopt them.

A second avenue of access to government documents is proactive dissemination. Here, governments release documents and information without having been asked. Proactive dissemination may occur when information is requested at such a frequency that it is best for the government to release it for the public to peruse on its own or when it is no longer necessary that the information be private. Documents released this way can be kept in libraries, online, or in other locations. Proactive dissemination practices and norms may or may not be included in FOI laws.

Another way FOI can be achieved is through the use of sunshine laws. Sunshine laws, or open meetings laws, allow for the public to attend meetings and proceedings of a governmental body. In the United States, these laws are typical of all states and apply to state and local government bodies. These laws generally include requirements of notice, agendas, and written minutes of meeting proceedings. Much like FOI laws, there are usually specific provisions that cover which types of meetings can be conducted in private. Common examples of acceptable closed meetings in the United States include proceedings pertaining to particular personnel or meetings during bargaining for real estate transactions. In some cases, written records of proceedings conducted behind closed doors are liable to becoming public once privacy or secrecy is no longer at issue. Last, FOI and access to meetings are sometimes covered together under a single law.

WHEN FOI IS FAILED

FOI, as discussed above, can help to ensure democratic processes within government. Citizens and residents who utilize these laws can act as a potential check on government with close inspection of information and proceedings. However, FOI can only truly be achieved if a government is transparent and open about its information. In other words, FOI rights are upheld when governments produce honest documents and information in a timely manner that is not burdensome on requestors.

When dishonest or falsified government information is released to the public under the guise of true information, FOI is violated and is only present in theory. In these cases, whistle-blowing or leaks are sometimes necessary for FOI rights and transparency to prevail. A whistle-blower is defined by Sissela Bok (1989) as one who "make[s] revelations meant to call attention to negligence, abuses, or dangers that threaten the public interest. They sound an alarm based on their expertise or inside knowledge, often from within the very organization in which they work." A leak occurs when an informant on the inside, usually keeping him- or herself anonymous, releases this information to the press. A famous example of leaking occurred in the United States during the Watergate scandal of the 1970s Nixon administration. When whistle-blowing or

leaks are necessary for the public to be informed, FOI is not being maintained.

See also *Transparency.*

. . . . ERIN L. BORRY

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Freedom of Movement

Neither the 1787 Constitution of the United States nor any ratification since mentions anything specific about a right to move or travel within the country or beyond its borders (Article I, Clause 6 recognizes the right of national legislators to travel to and from Congress). Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized this right as a part of U.S. law, and it is also an important part of international law.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Article IV of the Articles of Confederation (replaced by the Constitution of 1787) did confer upon "the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted," the right to "free ingress and regress to and from any other State." The privileges and immunities clause of Article IV of the 1787 Constitution that displaced the Articles of Confederation omits specific reference, as does the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) ratified after the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865), which says in part, "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." Yet there are many federal and state laws that have curtailed or burdened an individual's freedom of movement, and some of them have been invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court as unconstitutional infringements on the right to travel. Many other laws and regulations raise important constitutional problems.

In *Saenz v. Roe* (1999), the Court acknowledged that while the Constitution does not mention travel in any context except for regarding members of Congress, such a basic right is nevertheless firmly established in U.S. law and precedent. In *Shapiro v. Thompson* (1969) the Court struck down a one-year durational residency requirement as a condition for receiving

welfare benefits for which a newly arrived state resident was otherwise eligible. Connecticut sought to discourage people from moving there to receive richer benefits than they had been receiving in other states. The 6–3 majority held that this was unconstitutional restraint on the right to travel interstate, although the justices failed to identify the source of this right. Thirty years later in the *Saenz* case a 7–2 Court majority declared unconstitutional a California law that provided a newly arrived and eligible resident with welfare benefits but, for the first year, only the dollar amount he or she had been receiving in the previous state of residence. Congress, in revising welfare law through its 1996 amendments, had authorized the states to do what California had done here.

Admitting that nothing is specified anywhere in the text of the document, speaking for the majority in *Saenz,* Justice John Paul Stevens explained, "The 'right to travel' discussed in our cases embraces at least three different components. It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State." The "second component," he said, is "expressly protected" by the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV of the Constitution: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." California interfered with the third aspect of the right to travel—"the right of the newly arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the same State," a right, the Court announced for the first time, "plainly identified" in the Fourteenth Amendment: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." Discriminatory penalties imposed on this third component of the right are unconstitutional, even if Congress allows them as Congress did here, because the national legislature cannot authorize a state to violate the Constitution.

LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

This right to travel elaborated on in *Saenz* raises all sorts of constitutional issues that eventually find their way into the judiciary and occasionally percolate up to the Supreme Court. Congress, for example, can restrict travel to other countries and can impose passport restrictions on certain people. However, these restrictions could raise First Amendment issues if, for instance, the limitations on foreign travel were aimed at someone's political or religious affiliations. Many of these once cold war questions were resolved by the Court in favor of individual freedom, but these matters could recur in the context of the war on terror. States also have the legitimate power to restrict the movement of parolees or condition child custody on parental residence within the state of the child. Other impediments relate to laws that track sex offenders, most of which require convicts, even those who have completed their sentences, to register their whereabouts and/or

document or confine their permanent residence. This can become public knowledge, often posted on official Web sites. The public interest promoted by such regulations is to alert people that a convicted sex offender might become one of their neighbors. The state of Washington had a law compelling convicted rapists who had completed their sentences to live in confined quarters that some argued were a jail in disguise, thus triggering the issue of double jeopardy, forbidden by the Fifth Amendment. A federal judge in Seattle had, in fact, ruled exactly that.

Perhaps the most inevitable collision with the undefined and, given the sweeping language in *Saenz,* broad right to travel will develop from same-sex married couples who move to states that do not recognize such marriages. Many people move from one state to another because of job offers or transfers or for other reasons. Article IV of the Constitution requires each state to give "full faith and credit" to all "public acts, records, and judicial proceedings" of all other states, including marriage certificates and licenses. Almost forty states have laws refusing to recognize same-sex marriages, civil unions, or domestic partnerships. Congress has authority in the full faith and credit clause in that it "may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof." In 1996 Congress passed and the president signed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which specifically exempts states from any obligation to recognize such marriages. Gay and lesbian couples in Massachusetts, for example, or any of the other handful of states permitting same-sex marriages, may have their marital status legally abolished simply by resettling in another state. Some may challenge DOMA as beyond the power of Congress under the full faith and credit clause. However, one could also claim that state laws spun from DOMA constitute an undue interference with the right to travel, or in the language of *Saenz,* the right of the traveling citizen "to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State."

The amorphous right to travel has an indefinite reach that potentially collides with many legal restrictions. It will be interesting to see how the judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, develops this line of constitutional law.

LIBERTY OF MOVEMENT BEYOND THE UNITED STATES

Freedom of movement in the international arena is ostensibly protected by international law. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966 and in effect since 1976 as a multilateral agreement endorsed by most countries in the world, contains article 12, which guarantees "liberty of movement" within the territory of a state for anyone lawfully within such a state. It also ensures that everyone is free to leave a country (including his or her own) and ensures the right not to be "arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own

country." However, article 12 recognizes that restrictions can be imposed on movement "to protect national security, public order, public health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others." Limitations obviously can be significant given the ambiguity of this language. Citizens of the European Union have firmer and more secure legal rights to move and reside within any of the member states of the European Union. By treaty and by a parliamentary directive, European Union residents and their families can enter any member state and reside there for up to three months, a stay that can, without too much legal interference, become permanent.

See also *Constitutional Courts; Constitutional Law; Homeland Security; International Bill of Rights; Supreme Court.*

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Freedom of Religion

Freedom of religion, *libertas religionis,* is among the oldest internationally recognized rights, and most people today in liberal, secular states around the world consider religious freedom a fundamental human right. Even most states with an official religion allow the practice of other religions within their jurisdictions. How much religious freedom, of course, varies from one state to another.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES

In the United States, religious freedom takes pride of place in the Bill of Rights, the bedrock of constitutional freedom emulated in emerging democracies in the post–World War II era. The First Amendment (1791) of the United States Constitution (1787) guarantees that "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. Article I of the Constitution also prohibits religious oaths as a precondition for federal elected office. Thus, freedom of religion has been enshrined in the basic law of the country since the earliest days of the constitutional system—in fact, absolutely protected, according to the text of the First Amendment. In *Cantwell v. Connecticut* (1940) the Supreme Court held that the amendment's protection also applies against the states: "The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered

the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws."

The basic constitutional problem, besides defining religion, has been framing the extent to which a believer is free to observe his or her religion. To make exceptions from otherwise valid laws because they curtail someone's religious practice could seriously impair government's ability to govern effectively and fairly. The Court in the *Cantwell* case acknowledged this by holding that "the Amendment embraces two concepts—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be." The "nature of things" has changed profoundly. It was difficult enough at the beginning of the Republic when most people were Christians of some sort. Today the problem is compounded greatly because the United States is the most pluralistic country in the world. Every known religion is practiced somewhere in the country, and many laws, from local to national, to some extent restrict the free exercise of religion. Observances of familiar, mainstream religions almost never generated lawsuits. Constitutional disputes have arisen from religious minorities, and when they appeared before the country's highest court, if the groups prevailed, these disputes tended to be resolved mostly as free speech matters. For example, the Supreme Court held in *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette* (1943) that government cannot compel Jehovah's Witnesses—in fact, anyone—to salute the American flag because the freedom of speech clause protected them. When Jehovah's Witnesses first sought exemption from compulsory flag salutes in public schools in Pennsylvania on free exercise of religion grounds (saluting the flag was akin to worshipping a graven image, in violation of their religion), the Court in *Minersville School District v. Gobitis* (1940) rejected (8–1) the claim that the free exercise clause required any exception. For most of American history the Supreme Court had given little attention to the meaning of the free exercise clause, and the *Gobitis* case exemplified that posture.

PROTECTING THE "EXERCISE" IN FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

In 1963, however, that changed. Adell Sherbert was a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church and refused to work on Saturdays, her religious Sabbath. She had worked for years as a textile mill operator for a company in South Carolina that switched from a five- to a six-day workweek. After she was fired for refusing to work Saturdays, she filed for workers' compensation benefits for which she was eligible as long as she was able and available to work but could not find suitable work. The state's Employment Security Commission denied her benefits when she claimed she was not able or available, for religious reasons, to work on Saturdays. She sued, lost her case, but eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court, where a 7–2 majority unexpectedly ruled in *Sherbert v. Verner* (1963) that South Carolina had imposed an unconstitutional burden on her free exercise of religion. Just two years before, the Court had flatly rejected the plea of an orthodox Jew for an exemption from a state's blue laws, which forced

businesses like his to close on Sundays (his Sabbath required him also to close on Saturdays). Fashioning an abrupt reversal of constitutional policy, the majority in *Sherbert* held that in defeating a free exercise claim for exemption the burden is now on the government to show a "compelling" state interest achievable only by interfering with the religious practice in question. This new standard is very difficult for states or the federal government to pass. Government must not only demonstrate a compelling public interest but also prove that intruding on religious freedom is the least drastic, or perhaps the only, means of promoting that interest. The Court was unconvinced that South Carolina's denial of Mrs. Sherbert's benefits was necessary to thwart fraudulent and deceitful compensation claims.

In *Wisconsin v. Yoder* (1972) the Court reconfirmed its commitment to this new posture. Applying the same test, a unanimous Court ruled that children of the Old Order Amish religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church were constitutionally exempted from Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law. Their parents had sued claiming that high school was not necessary to their simple lifestyle and that coercive exposure to modernity through a high school curriculum collided with their free exercise of religion. The Supreme Court agreed, although one justice wanted to leave the decision to the children, not the parents. In *Yoder* the Court recognized the problem in trying to distinguish between secular and religious: "Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses." However, when Christian fundamentalists objected to mandatory use of certain books in high school curricula offensive to their children's religious convictions, the Supreme Court refused even to hear their claims. The message thus seemed to be selective constitutional exemptions from general regulatory laws for some religiously inspired conduct. The free exercise predicament and inconsistent results were all too obvious.

JUDICIAL RETREAT

Other liberal democracies never went as far as the United States in interpreting their constitutional principles so broadly, and many nonliberal states impose substantial limitations on religious practice. France and Italy, where religious freedom is comparatively very high, nonetheless have not exempted Muslim girls and young women from public school dress codes. Wearing the burka or *hijab* in public schools has created in both countries the inevitable clash between religious freedom and public order. Having given religious practice a greater value in the conflict of liberty and order at least since the *Sherbert* case in 1963, in *Employment Division of Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith* (1990), a narrowly split (5–4) Court eliminated this problem altogether by

suddenly reversing course. As long as the contested regulation is nondiscriminatory (that is, not aimed specifically at religious behavior) and rationally related to a legitimate governmental goal, no one could henceforth claim immunity on the basis of religious obligation. In reformulating free exercise law, Justice Antonin Scalia's majority opinion attempted judicially to "distinguish" both *Yoder* and *Sherbert* as particular, special exceptions. However, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, for herself and three other dissenters, complained that the Court "dramatically departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence." Under this policy, the federal, state, or local government in the United States could ban the hijab in public schools as long as the prohibition was driven by some neutral, secular purpose.

Despite a congressional effort to reverse the Court's interpretation of the First Amendment, the Smith doctrine has prevailed. The free exercise problem generated by religious pluralism has disappeared. As the Court in *Cantwell* first ruled, people can believe whatever they want, but free exercise of their religions no longer has constitutional shelter unless government has specifically targeted those religious practices. Other countries where freedom of religion is cherished continue to wrestle with these difficult issues, which increase in number and intensity in accord with the spread of religious pluralism and diversity.

See also *Bill of Rights; Church and State; Freedom of Conscience; Religion and Politics; Religious Persecution.*

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Freedom of Speech

U.S. Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo in *Palko v. Louisiana* (1937) described freedom of speech as "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom." Without the capacity to identify and protest injustice, people would neither know what their rights are nor be able to challenge deprivations of those rights. Near universal agreement on the merits of speech rights in the abstract, however, has not entailed any general agreement on what speech constitutions and laws must permit. Legal scholars, elected officials, and judges dispute the central purposes of free speech, what constitutes speech, and the values that might

justify some limits on speech. These disputes have gone international. The United States protects far more speech than any other constitutional democracy.

Proponents of expression rights insist that what Thomas Emerson (1970) described as a "system of free expression" serves at least four values. First, speech rights are central to the discovery of truth. "Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put the worse, in a free and open encounter," John Milton famously declared in his *Areopagitica* in 1644. Second, speech rights are a necessary condition for democracy. Popular sovereignty exists, democratic theorists recognize, only when citizens are free to debate the merits of rival policies and candidates. Third, speech rights are vital for self-expression. An open society values diverse individuals who express and establish their identities through various communicative acts. Finally, expression rights may be a means by which political opposition is cabined. People who are free to express their contempt for the status quo with words are less likely to express their contempt with violence. John Stuart Mill in *On Liberty* (1859) combined several of these principles when he observed, "Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action."

REGULATING FREE SPEECH

These different values determine what counts as speech. Some proponents of the truth function of expression believe that government should protect only rational arguments. Insults, obscenity, advertising, and political buttons might not count as speech under this rationale. Many democratic theorists insist that government should protect only political speech. Alexander Meiklejohn, the most influential American free speech theorist during the 1960s, insisted that while government could never regulate speech on political affairs, radio and television were forms of entertainment that could be regulated, as is any other business enterprise. Great literature could not be regulated, in his view, only insofar as such works as *Hamlet* and *Anna Karenina* could be said to influence voting and other political choices. Those who champion self-expression believe government must protect a wider range of speech. Great literature and even mediocre literature and obscenity merit the same degree of protection as political speech because an open society allows people to choose what communications to make and receive. During the past half century, commercial advertising has increasingly enjoyed free speech protection as a form of economic communication.

The conditions under which speech should be regulated are as controversial as what counts as speech. At one extreme is the view that communication that meets the conditions for speech can never be regulated, no matter what the possible harm. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black advanced this position when he declared that the words "no law" in the First Amendment mean "no law." Once Black found that a person had engaged in constitutionally defined speech, he rejected claims that any contrary value could justify regulation. At the other extreme is the bad tendency test, a test that enables government to regulate any speech that has some tendency to cause some harm. Under this view government can regulate pamphlets because they have some tendency to cause litter as well as speech critical of the government, no matter how tame, because such speech might have some tendency to cause crime. Actual practice in most nations, not surprisingly, takes a position in between these two poles. Speech may be regulated, but only when the harm is serious and a very likely consequence of the speech.

FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER DEMOCRACIES

Free speech in the United States has been subject to increased protection and expanded scope for the past century. At the turn of the twentieth century, both elected officials and justices insisted that only political speech was subject to any protection. Many insisted that persons could be imprisoned for opposing government policy even when they did not explicitly advocate unlawful conduct. After admitting that the petitioners in *Schenck v. United States* (1919) "confined" themselves to advocating "peaceful measures such as a petition for the repeal of the [draft]," Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes nevertheless maintained, "We do not see what effect it could be expected to have upon persons subject to the draft except to influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out." Contemporary U.S. constitutional law excludes speech from protection only when speakers incite illegal conduct and that incitement is likely to cause such conduct in the immediate future. The Supreme Court has further insisted that persons have a constitutional right to criticize public officials as long as they do not intentionally or recklessly utter falsehoods and that government can place a prior restraint on speech only if officials can demonstrate a harm equivalent to imperiling a ship at sea. In the contemporary American free speech law, obscenity, commercial advertising, and campaign finance are given (almost) the same protection as political expression. Racial insults are given the highest degree of political protection, because they are considered a form of political speech.

Other democracies do not tend to provide as great a degree of protection. Great Britain, other European nations, and new democracies in both Asia and Africa are willing to limit speech on a lesser showing of harm. In particular, most other nations regulate hate speech and campaign finance far more than the United States. The right to free speech in Canada and other countries does not include the right to deny the humanity of other citizens or spend unlimited sums of money in efforts to gain political office. Studies indicate that the Japanese and Germans, in particular, are far more concerned with the potential harms to reputation than the free market of ideas.

Americans who are aware of practice in other democracies tend to see foreign speech regulations as proof that other nations are still not quite as free as the United States. Many civil libertarians are convinced that any regulation of speech will provide precedents creating a slippery slope that will eventually threaten basic democratic rights. Citizens in other nations charge the United States with being more concerned

with the forms than substance of democracy. Basic democratic rights, in this view, require active governmental intervention to ensure equal access to the marketplace of ideas.

See also *Censorship; Civil and Political Rights; Freedom of the Press.*

. . . .   MARK A. GRABER

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Freedom of the Press

Freedom of the press is the right to publish information and opinions and disseminate it to the public without interference from the government. It is both an individual and an organizational right. This means that it applies to both individual people and organizations that publish written material, such as newspapers and publishing houses. However, with the advent of modern technology, the term *press* has taken on an expansive meaning; it is not limited to just the printed word. Freedom of the press also includes electronic publishing media, such as news broadcasts on television and blogs on the Internet.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

Freedom of the press is located in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution. Although freedom of the press is part of the First Amendment and intricately linked to freedom of speech, it is a separate and distinct right. In America, freedom of the press is a fundamental right, which means that it has the highest level of protection in the American political and legal system. However, this freedom is not absolute.

In modern times, there are a number of laws prohibiting certain public statements involving, for example, libel, obscenity, and national security. Libel is the defamation of a person through the written word. A person who has been defamed in writing generally has the right to sue for damages and equitable relief prohibiting the defamation in court. However, if a person is a public figure or a private person who speaks publicly on an issue of public concern, then the protections provided by libel laws are reduced. The publication of criticisms of public officials and statements on matters of public concern are considered to be essential to a free political system. Furthermore, the government cannot be libeled. In the realm of politics and American political theory, this is an essential protection; otherwise, the ruling party would be able to easily stifle dissent and opposition.

SEDITION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Indeed, in 1798, the infamous Alien and Sedition Acts, enacted under President John Adams, made it a crime to criticize the government and were intended to stifle political opposition. President Thomas Jefferson subsequently pardoned the people convicted under the Sedition Act. Although the Sedition Act was not tested in court, because it had expired, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized its unconstitutionality in the famous case of *New York Times v. United States* (1971) as being the antithesis of American democracy.

National security can also be a reason for limiting freedom of the press. The Smith Act of 1940 made it a criminal offense to advocate for the violent overthrow of the U.S. government. In the related case of *Dennis v. United States* (1951), which concerned people who were members of the Communist Party advocating the violent overthrow of the government, the Supreme Court found that if a publication presents a clear and present danger resulting in the illegal evil meant to be prevented, then the First Amendment will not protect the publication. Dennis's conviction was upheld. This principle was reinforced in the famous decision of *New York Times v. United States* (1971), when the Supreme Court ruled that the publication of the Pentagon Papers during the Vietnam War (1959–1975), which revealed information about the conduct of the war that embarrassed the U.S. government, was protected by the right to freedom of the press, as there was no clear and present danger to national security.

OBSCENITY

Obscenity is difficult to define. In American society, there have been numerous cases involving what is obscene and not protected by the First Amendment. In the famous case of *Miller v. California* (1973), which involved a person distributing obscene material, the U.S. Supreme Court defined something as obscene if it met the following test: (1) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct; and (3) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The difficulty of applying this definition is highlighted by the statement of Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart—even though he could not define obscenity, he knew it when he saw it. Obscenity can have an important role in political debate. For example, in the case of *Cohen v. California* (1971), the Supreme Court found that the use of the phrase "Fuck the draft" (worn on a T-shirt) was protected by the First Amendment, as at the time of the Vietnam War, the draft was a serious political issue. In the opinion, Justice Harlan noted that one man's vulgarity may be another man's lyric.

CONCLUSION

Whatever the form or purpose, it is widely accepted that freedom of the press was primarily enacted for the protection of political discourse. At the time of the American Revolution (1776–1783), much of the impetus and support for the revolution was based in the publications of such

luminaries as Benjamin Franklin. Indeed, political speech, to include statements in the press, is given the highest level of protection under the First Amendment, as opposed to other forms of speech, such as commercial speech and advertisement.

Freedom of the press is also recognized internationally. In article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the right to a free media is recognized.

See also *Censorship; Freedom of Information; Freedom of Speech; Hate Speech; Internet and Politics; Journalism, Political; Media and Politics; Media, Political Commentary in the.*

. . . .   WM. C. PLOUFFE JR.

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Freedom to Bear Arms

One of the most controversial amendments in the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution is the Second Amendment, which protects the right to keep and bear arms. The controversy stems from four basic issues: (1) Is it an individual right or a collective right? (2) What is the purpose of the right? (3) Is it a fundamental right? and (4) Is it necessary in modern society such that certain limits should be placed on it?

A COLLECTIVE OR INDIVIDUAL RIGHT?

Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, the first issue, whether the right to keep and bear arms is a collective right or an individual right, has been the primary focus of discussion concerning the Second Amendment. Proponents of the collective right theory stated that the Second Amendment applies only to militias that are under the control of the government and not to individuals. The individual right proponents relied on the fact that it was the individual citizens who bore arms during the American Revolution (1776–1783) and not militias controlled by the government. Furthermore, the many writings of the Founders clearly supported the individual right to keep and bear arms.

In modern jurisprudence, the issue has been raised in the lower courts in a number of cases, but these decisions almost uniformly find that the Second Amendment provides only a collective right. One of the most famous exceptions was the decision in *United States v. Emerson* (1999), wherein a federal district court in Texas found that it was an individual right. The

issue was brought to the U.S. Supreme Court on a number of occasions, but the Court refused to hear the issue. Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of *District of Columbia v. Heller,* in 2008, ruled that the Second Amendment protected an individual right to keep and bear arms.

PURPOSE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT?

As to the second issue, the purpose of the Second Amendment, once again, there is controversy. However, the controversy is more frightening, lurking underground, and not often mentioned, if mentioned at all, in either court decisions or academic debate. Indeed, this controversy is probably the most political of all questions. This political question is the issue of the right to revolt. The U.S. Declaration of Independence clearly advocates the right to revolt against a tyranny. The writings of the Founders indisputably recognize the right to revolt. Indeed, the Founders did just that, revolt from British rule. Yet even a cursory review of the literature and judicial decisions reveals an overwhelming focus on the right to self-defense, usually in the context of defending oneself from common criminals. The right to revolt is conspicuously absent.

As no American court has recognized the legal right to revolt, it would seem that there is no such right. Indeed, if a court were to recognize such a right, it would essentially be permitting its own destruction. However, there are grounds for considering the right to revolt a political right. A legal right is a right that is enforceable by the courts. In contrast, a political right is a right that is recognized in a political philosophy. There is frequently overlap between political and legal rights. Some political rights might be enforceable in a court. Others might not be enforceable.

Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has specifically recognized that it will not hear what is referred to as "a political question." In the decisions of *Baker v. Carr* (1962) and *Luther v. Borden* (1849) the U.S. Supreme Court explained that political questions involve those issues best left to the other branches of government. As a practical matter, anyone who unsuccessfully revolts against the government would be subject to criminal prosecution, and a defense based on the Second Amendment would not be recognized.

A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT?

The third issue is whether the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right. The U.S. Supreme Court has presented three basic definitions of a fundamental right. The first is whether the right in question is a natural right, under the principles of natural law, such as the right of self-defense, as espoused by, for example, Sir William Blackstone, a famous English legal commentator, in his *Commentaries on the Laws of England* published in the late eighteenth century. The second is whether the right in question is fundamental to American justice and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, as recognized in the case of *Duncan v. Louisiana* (1968). The third is whether the right is implied in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, such as the right of privacy, recognized in the case

of *Griswold v. Connecticut* (1965) concerning access to birth control. The second meaning has been the most frequently cited by the American courts.

As a general matter, fundamental rights in America consist of the first ten amendments, the Bill of Rights, to the U.S. Constitution, with some exceptions under the doctrine of selective incorporation. Under the doctrine of selective incorporation, some of the rights in the Bill of Rights are not incorporated. In this context, this means that the right in question will not apply to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. If a federal right is not incorporated, then the states are not required to enforce or acknowledge that right. At this time, the Second Amendment, although it has been recognized as an individual right, has not been recognized as a fundamental right such that it should be incorporated and applicable to the states.

AN OUTDATED RIGHT?

The fourth major issue concerning the right to keep and bear arms is whether society has changed such that the right is outmoded. There are numerous political groups opposed to the ownership of guns. They have successfully lobbied for the enactment of numerous gun control laws across the nation, which mandate such requirements as licensing, waiting periods before purchases, background checks before purchasing, and prohibitions. The basic premise of such groups is that guns are dangerous. Many people are killed with guns, and many crimes are committed with guns. These groups argue that regulating, controlling, and even prohibiting the ownership and use of guns will reduce these dangers to society. There is significant evidence supporting aspects of these claims.

However, when considering the right to keep and bear arms, a balancing must be made: do the benefits of individual gun ownership (the right to revolt against a tyrannical government) outweigh the risks (crimes committed with guns)? This question is still being debated in the political arena in America. In the international context, the right to keep and bear arms is generally not recognized. It is not part of the United Nations Charter, nor is it part of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

See also *Bill of Rights; Blackstone, William; Civil and Political Rights; International Bill of Rights.*

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Free Trade

The concept of free trade is rooted in the eighteenth-century antimercantilist movement seen in Europe and prerevolutionary America. Mercantilism is an economic theory founded on a belief that the global volume of international trade is fixed or unchangeable and that the prosperity of a nation depends on its supply of capital, particularly gold and silver. According to mercantilists, governments should maximize their capital with protectionist policies, encouraging exports and discouraging imports through tariffs and subsidies, resulting in a positive balance of trade. Conversely, the emerging free trade concepts in the 1700s among intellectuals in France, Great Britain, and colonial America were based on a belief in laissez-faire government and international commerce. Focusing on agriculture as the only source of true wealth for nations, a group of French economists known as physiocrats argued a nation's net product could be increased by reducing barriers to trade and regulations impeding the growth of this sector.

English economists such as David Hume and Adam Smith, "helped transform anti-mercantilism into the positive cosmopolitical vision of free trade benefiting humanity" (Eckes, *Opening America's Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776,* 1995, 4). They argued mercantilists failed to understand the benefits of free trade between nations and the notion of comparative advantage, which was fully developed later in the 1800s by David Ricardo, an English political economist. The theory of comparative advantage argues, for example, that if France were a more efficient producer of both cloth and wine than Britain, but Britain could produce cloth with fewer resources than it could produce wine, both countries could financially benefit by specializing, Britain in cloth and France in wine, and then trading. Trade, in other words, was no longer viewed as a zero-sum game but as a means of enhancing the wealth of all nations involved.

HISTORY OF FREE TRADE

In prerevolutionary America, one could find ardent supporters of free trade in Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Paine, and Thomas Jefferson. While Paine and Jefferson argued for "freedom to trade," Franklin thought trade should be free between all nations of the world and "no nation was ever ruined by trade, even, seemingly the most disadvantageous" (Eckes 1995, 2). Early taxes imposed by the British parliament on the British colonies in North America came disguised in the form of tariffs on specific imports. The Townshend Acts of 1767 placed duties on goods that the colonists did not produce in great quantities, such as paper, glass, and tea. While some colonists avoided the tariffs by boycotting the taxed products, others

staged public protests, leading to the Boston Massacre of 1770 and the Boston Tea Party in 1773. After the Declaration of Independence in 1776, the Continental Congress, seeking freedom to trade on equal terms with other nations, drafted a treaty calling for reciprocal national treatment, which is treating foreign products the same as domestic ones in terms of taxation and regulation, and unconditional most favored nation treatment, which is granting all countries equal trade privileges. Although these principles did not become standard practices in U.S. treaties or under international obligations until the twentieth century, they established the groundwork for fair international treatment in trade.

An overwhelming need for revenue, however, seemed to override many nations' support for actual free trade during the next century. In the United States, the first tariff bill of 1789 included a mix of ad valorem, which is a percentage of the value of a good, with fixed per-unit taxes designed primarily to service the war debt and finance government expenditures. However, political controversy over which goods to tax and whether high or low tariffs were optimal for preventing economic depressions or recessions raged on through the 1800s and into the 1900s in the United States and the world.

The 1930 Smoot-Hawley Bill, which passed the highest tariff rates in U.S. history, is believed to be at least partially to blame for the severity of the worldwide economic depression that followed shortly thereafter. The U.S. Congress reacted by passing the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, delegating greater powers to the executive branch to lower tariffs through bilateral reciprocal trade negotiations. The 1947 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), a multilateral treaty signed by twenty-three countries, including many of the Allied states, was designed to spur international trade by reducing tariff barriers. Many of the GATT's provisions were derived from bilateral treaties negotiated by the United States under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. The GATT was supposed to operate under the charter of the International Trade Organization, but failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the International Trade Organization on the grounds it would cede too much sovereignty to an international body left the GATT as the only legal framework for international trade negotiations. The GATT contract embodied legal rights and obligations for member countries, including articles requiring most favored nations and national treatment, which were supposed to enable smaller, less developed countries to have equal trading rights and stature when engaging with large countries. In 1995, the GATT agreement evolved into the current 153-member World Trade Organization (WTO).

THE WTO AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS

Although subsequent international trade agreements negotiated under the GATT/WTO put the world on a path to freer trade by substantially lowering tariff rates, it by no means rid countries of the political need for protectionism. Provisions in the GATT/WTO, such as the escape clause, which allowed for exemptions from principles of free trade, as well as other nontariff barriers not restricted under the agreement, replaced tariffs as a means of protecting industries worldwide. For example, protection through the implementation of WTO-sanctioned antidumping statutes has grown substantially around the world. *Antidumping* refers to a legal statute which allows for a remedy, namely, an import duty, to offset the effects of dumped imports, where *dumping* is defined as selling goods below cost of production or home market price. As of 1984 no developing or middle-income countries were using antidumping statutes; however, by the end of the 1990s over forty developing countries had enacted new legislation to administer such protection. By 2001, it was estimated more antidumping duties were levied within one year worldwide than were levied from 1947 through 1970.

In addition to the creation of the WTO, and perhaps to bypass pressures of a growing global economy, free trade agreements have proliferated around the world. While hundreds of these agreements are bilateral in nature, numerous multilateral free trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Economic Community of West African States, the European Economic Area, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, promote freer trade among member countries, lowering barriers regionally, if not globally. While some argue these bilateral and multilateral agreements have created a chaotic and discriminatory system undermining free trade and the principles on which GATT and the WTO were originally founded, the proliferation of such agreements is expected to continue.

See also *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); Nontariff Barriers to Trade; North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); Trade Blocs; Trade Diplomacy; World Trade Organization (WTO).*

. . . . WENDY L. HANSEN

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Freezing of Party Alternatives

The freezing of party alternatives is a concept that asserts that political party structures in democratic systems tend to block or freeze the emergence of additional competitive parties, especially in two-party systems. The idea was first developed

by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan in 1967. The two scholars argued that once party systems matured, they tended to self-perpetuate and block competitors. Lipset and Rokkan particularly stressed that the contemporary two-party system in the United States predated the electorate and may not have been able to adequately keep abreast of the political and social changes. The result is unchanging party systems in developed democracies such as the United States or the United Kingdom. Only during periods of significant political, social, or economic upheavals are alternative political groupings able to displace established parties. This is in sharp contrast to the proliferation of new parties in some parliamentary systems in western Europe. The freezing hypothesis argues that dominant parties in two-party systems tend to absorb or co-opt alternative political groupings, as the Republican and Democratic Parties did to the Progressive Party in the early twentieth century. Critics of the freezing hypothesis contend the concept is more a historical observation than a developed theory of comparative political parties.

See also *Fringe Parties; Lipset, Seymour Martin; Party Systems, Comparative; Political Parties; Rokkan, Stein; Third Party Intervention.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Freire, Paulo

Paulo Freire (1921–1997) was a leading Brazilian educator and theorist. His life's work is an attempt to liberate the marginalized classes, who constitute a culture of silence in many parts of the developing world. His primary theoretical contribution is the philosophy of popular education that reflects classic Platonic tendencies, enriched by a Marxist, anticolonialist framework. Today, his work serves as the foundation for critical pedagogy and numerous popular and informal education programs around the world.

Born to middle-class parents in Recife, Brazil, Freire grew up knowing poverty and hunger during the Great Depression of 1929. In 1943, he studied law at the University of Recife. After passing the bar, Freire abandoned law and worked as a schoolteacher. In 1946, he was appointed director of the Department of Education and Culture of the Social Service in the State of Pernambuco. Working primarily with the illiterate poor in this post, Freire began to formulate a means of communicating with the dispossessed that would later develop into his dialogical method for adult education.

In 1961, he was appointed director of the Department of Cultural Extension at Recife University, where he was afforded the first opportunity for significant application of his theory of education. Freire's literacy program was an overwhelming success, with three hundred illiterate sugarcane workers learning to read and write in just forty-five days. In response, the government approved the creation of thousands of literacy programs across the country based on Freire's model.

In 1964, following the overthrow of the Goulart regime in Brazil, Freire was imprisoned for seventy days. After a brief exile in Bolivia, Freire worked in Chile under the Frei government. In 1967, he published his first book, *Education as the Practice of Freedom,* and in 1969, he took a visiting professorship at Harvard University.

During this period, Freire wrote his most influential text, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970), in which he described education as a path to permanent liberation, with two stages. The first stage, conscientization, is a process in which a learner moves toward critical consciousness, an awareness of being an oppressed "object" in a world where only "subjects" have power. This process is the heart of liberatory education and stands in contrast to what Freire termed "banking education," a dehumanizing method of education where learners are conceptualized as passive recipients of preselected knowledge. The second stage, praxis, comprises a dialogical cycle of action-reflection-action, in which critically conscious individuals seek to transform the social order.

After leaving Harvard in the early 1970s, Freire served as the assistant secretary of education for the World Council of Churches in Switzerland. In 1979, he was invited by the Brazilian government to return from exile, where he assumed a faculty position at the University of São Paulo. He also joined the Workers' Party in the city of São Paulo and acted as a supervisor for its adult literacy project from 1980 to 1986. When the Workers' Party prevailed in municipal elections in 1988, he was appointed minister of education for São Paulo.

Throughout his life, Freire joined in writing more than a dozen books, integrating strands of thinking about educational practice, critical theory, democracy, and liberation. Specifically, his emphases on dialogue, conscientization, praxis, the "naming of oppression," and the lived experience of participants are the core tenets of his "pedagogy of hope." Such innovations have had a considerable impact on the development of education practice and theorizing, especially in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

See also *Civic Education; Critical Theory.*

. . . . MICHAEL MCNAMARA

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French Political Thought

One view of French political thought is that it is a local version of a wider European intellectual phenomenon, one possibly so tied to European history that the notion of a separable French variant lacks focus. However, those who prefer to paint only on a European-wide canvas themselves make a case for a French variant. For example, they make the invidious comparison between Englishman John Locke's and

Swiss-born Frenchman Jean-Jacques Rousseau's versions of the social contract as the good and bad examples of a common European endeavor, continuous from Thomas Hobbes on, to construct an understanding of democratic sovereignty. Such comparisons ignore, however, the specific purposes to which Locke's and Rousseau's arguments were put in their national contexts. Interconnected though modern European and North American political thought may appear, it can be broken down into national histories because political thought is also a response to, and an effort to affect, the peculiarities of a country's institutions and practices.

TWO SPECIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY

To pursue the invidious comparison in question, it establishes a pejorative account of French political thought as the bad other of English thought, a cautionary tale for Lockean liberals of some of the ill-fated uses to which the contractualist vocabulary might tempt its adherents. French thinkers, beginning in the nineteenth century with Alexis de Tocqueville, got into this game as well in hoping that the potential in France for what we might call "illiberal liberalism" (whose roots were classically exhibited in Tocqueville's *The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution*) could be corrected by looking for instruction from abroad in England or the United States (as expounded in *Democracy in America*). The post–World War II French antitotalitarian liberals, beginning with Raymond Aron and Michel Crozier and culminating with François Furet, pursued the same line in seeking to correct the political habits of their compatriots by a timely transplantation of Anglo-American ideas.

On the other side of the ledger, Tocqueville's *Democracy* also shows the author's misgivings about America, starting with the famous chapter that considers the fate of blacks and Indians. Crozier eventually wrote a disapproving book, *Le Mal Américain* (The Trouble with America). In addition, Pierre Rosanvallon, a successor to Furet, has recently suggested (in a perhaps unintended homage to Louis Hartz) that a liberalism that is too sure of itself runs into its own pathologies. The history of the illiberal liberalism of the French can be turned on its head. France struggled harder than other nations to create a liberal civil society, but in compensation it may now be more on guard against utopian fantasies regarding its new-won achievement. If the history of French political thought has changed in recent decades, it is principally because of the felt need to highlight these concerns regarding the status of French civil society and the long struggle to find a space for it in the shadow of one of the principal republican legacies of the French Revolution: the Jacobin state and the idea of the nation as one and indivisible.

THE THREE ERAS OF FRENCH POLITICAL THOUGHT

French political thought falls into three eras: (1) the monarchical period, from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century; (2) the eighteenth-century nexus of Enlightenment and revolution; and (3) the republican period, from the nineteenth century on. The monarchical period tells a story in which the seventeenth-century growth of the absolutist state seemed initially a naturally protective response to the horrors and intolerant fanaticism of the sixteenth-century religious civil wars, despite the presence of an even older, fifteenth-century constitutionalist tradition that was helpless in the face of such terrors. Following Nannerl O. Keohane, this era exhibits an alternating rhythm, and occasional synthesis, of thinking that was respectively constitutional, from Claude de Seyssel and Francis Hotman to Fenelon, Duc de Burgundy; absolutist, from Jean Bodin and Cardinal de Richelieu to Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet; and individualist, above all Michel de Montaigne but also including René Descartes (*Passions of the Soul*) and the Jansenist and Jansenist-influenced variants (Blaise Pascal and the Duc de Rochefoucauld).

The three features of the first era were often interwoven. As an absolutist, Montaigne was no liberal constitutionalist. Nevertheless, he established a psychology of the self that was an important legacy to his fellow Bordelais countryman, Charles-Louis de Secondat et de Montesquieu. Together, Montaigne and Montesquieu constructed a distinctively French "liberalism of fear." In Judith Shklar's classic account, this French liberalism was focused not on English-style contractual right but simply on the human vices. Cruelty was without exception the worst vice and nearly the sole responsibility of states to eradicate, its being not otherwise the purview of liberal governments to tell people how to live. One can detect, as Stephen Holmes shows, liberal constitutional elements even in Bodin's absolutist model. Montesquieu works this paradox in another manner. The juridical definition of *monarchy* found in *The Spirit of the Laws* begins in agreement with Bodin ("in a monarchy the prince is the source of all political and civil power") but then subverts the claim by stressing a constitutional role for "intermediary bodies" that relies on aristocratic honor as a decidedly individualist instrument for civil disobedience to the crown.

The second period is the nexus of the French Enlightenment and the French Revolution (1789–1799) from the death of Louis XIV in 1715 to the final defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1815. This was a century of transformative thinkers brought to bear on a decade of transformative actors. Among representative figures there was the dramatist and essayist Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet). There were the Encyclopedists Jean le Rond d'Alembert and Denis Diderot. Michael Sonnenscher reminds us that we must not forget the Abbé Sieyès, whose 1789 *Qu'est-ce que le Tiers État?* (What Is the Third Estate?) may have set the course for subsequent events. Among the actors there were the Gironde advocates of a federal republic such as Jean-Pierre Brissot standing in intransigent opposition to the Montagnards of the Jacobin Club, advocates of a unified, indivisible republic, such as Louis-Antoine de Saint-Just. One cannot understand French political thought without reflecting on how obsessively the French regarded the historical question of the influence, real or imagined (and if real, beneficial or malign), of the philosophes on the revolutionary generation of 1789 to 1799. On the recent account of Dale K. Van Kley, it may as much be the case that the story of revolutionary origins lay in religious crises. But the role of the secular Enlightenment

was simply too juicy for both celebrators and despisers of the revolution to ignore.

Two thinkers, neither typical, are iconic figures for considering the paths taken and not taken in the revolutionary years: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Montesquieu. Montesquieu's beloved *parlements* overplayed their hand in the early 1770s Maupeou regime, discrediting the very instrument that Montesquieu's disciples had counted on for a British-style transition into constitutional monarchy. Although the revolutionary years witnessed a failed attempt in this direction, by then the ideas of Rousseau had rushed in to fill the ideological vacuum. The author of *Discourse on Inequality* and *The Social Contract* had in fact adopted both Montesquieu's egalitarian model of republican government and his anthropological insistence on customs and manners as the mainstays of regimes. In juridical terms, however, if Montesquieu's preferred form of rule—the reformed monarchical state—represented the domination of ancient constitutional elements over absolutist arguments, Rousseau presented a picture of the republic in which the idea of Bodinian absolutist sovereignty achieved its democratic formulation. The creation of the republic from the ashes of absolute monarchy did not lay to rest the absolutist hegemony of the state over society.

Rousseau has become a far more problematic figure in light of a renewed appreciation today of the relevance of his political concepts to the revolutionary founders of the Jacobin republic and in the perspective of feminist authors concerned about his attitudes toward women. Rousseau is not simply the great egalitarian democrat of two generations ago but also a misogynist antiliberal whose conceptual understanding of democracy played a role in blocking the establishment of a pluralist civil society. But as nineteenth-century political actors sought in the succession of regime changes for the right balance between state and civil society, they were often motivated by the suspicions borrowed from the Jacobin disciples of Rousseau for whom the central threat to the whole democratic community was posed by the contrarian opinions inherent in merely partial associations. There was no absence of perceived threats from civil society. Rousseau spoke to liberals who feared the hostility of the Catholic Church to the republic and to socialists who dreaded the growing powers concentrated in the owners of industry. Nevertheless, in the absence of any legitimacy for individuals who inhabit the intermediary bodies of civil society, which are necessarily partial and self-interested, there could be no legitimacy in the creation of a new regime, however universal its aspirations, because all would-be universal actors are also tainted by the fact that they too possess only a particular identity. The issue has survived in the contemporary controversy about whether veiled Muslim women should be allowed in French public schools as a sign of respect for their special cultural origins or (and quite apart from the feminist angle) whether the school should be honored as the last refuge for the young to learn—not how to defend their particular identities, but how to release the grip of partiality and group self-preference to develop more encompassing loyalties.

The original currents of thought of the nineteenth century either were inspired by the revolution or stood in some degree of unease with it. On the classic account of René Rémond, three successive regimes gave their names to abiding political ideologies. (1) Legitimism, born in the Bourbon restoration of 1815 to 1830, wedded parliamentary government to an *ancien-régime* monarchy that blurred the boundaries between state and civil society. Ironically, this reactionary philosophy helped to establish, Anne Sa'adah suggests, a more pluralist socialism, a *deuxiéme gauche,* among Catholics and other voters who in the 1980s had moved left but rejected the Jacobin state and its hard view of the boundary between state and society. (2) Orleanism, the signature *enrichissez-vous* creed of the 1830 to 1848 constitutional monarchy, was unique in lacking a popular nationalist base. It was, however, a French version of an individualist, procapitalist liberalism. (3) Bonapartism legitimated two empires (Napoleon, 1801–1815, and Louis, 1851–1870) by exalting executive authority as the embodiment of popular nationalism. Bonapartist appeal allowed Charles de Gaulle and the architects of the Fifth Republic (1958–present) to graft an American-style executive or presidential authority onto older models of parliamentary government found in the Third (1870–1940) and Fourth (1946–1958) Republics.

A host of liberal thinkers kept hopes for a republican regime alive by advocating a cautious, postrevolutionary moderation. Witness Madame de Staël or Benjamin Constant, who split republican theory down the middle and jettisoned the (to Constant) dangerous part that Constant identified as the participatory liberty of the ancients (and of the recent, troubling revolution) in favor of the personal, commercial, and intellectual liberties of regimes he dubbed "modern." But republican ideas found renewed sustenance in a great variety of nineteenth-century authors (to list only three, the liberal Catholic Félicité de Lamennais and the historians Jules Michelet and Edgar Quinet) who planted intellectual seeds that blossomed in the brief Second Republic (1848–1851) and the more enduring Third Republic.

The revolution also provoked originality on the extreme right—for instance, in Louis Bonald, the theocrat who claimed that the revolution was divine punishment for the sins of France. More striking was Joseph de Maistre, the passionate ultramontane absolutist who expressed the rage of the Jacobins themselves, although his fury was instead directed at the whole of Enlightenment and revolution. In Maistre one finds a violence of thought and manner that offers a foretaste of what the authoritarian nationalism of Maurice Barrès (author and activist) and Charles Maurras (leader of Action Française) were to provoke in the twentieth century: namely, Fascism.

France nurtured three original socialist minds, none inclined to the Marxist variant, which was too indebted to the French Jacobin tradition; each was distinct from the other, antiauthoritarian, and seeing initiative properly coming from below. Each also showed a Girondin affinity for decentralization: in local communities, the phalansteries of Charles Fourier; in the anarchist federal principle of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon; and in revolutionary syndicalism and the "general

strike" of Georges Sorel. We need only add to this pantheon the name of Louis Althusser, the original Marxist savant of the late twentieth century.

The prosecution for espionage and imprisonment of the innocent Jewish army officer Alfred Dreyfus (1894–1906) created yet another yawning division among the political clans, pitting army against the republic, right against left. And not incidentally, novelist Émile Zola's famous "J'accuse," addressed to the president of the republic, established the public ideal of the "engaged intellectual," of which the post–World War II writings of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir were such distinguished models. The rise of the Soviet Union divided the French left after 1920 between socialist and communist. These partisans aside, the horrific slaughter of trench warfare in World War I (1914–1918) also created a generation attracted either to never-again pacifism or to brute-force Fascism. The latter would prepare some members of this unhappy generation to collaborate in the Vichy regime (1940–1944) even as Vichy also provoked, famously, the Resistance, that strange coalition of communists and organized Christians. It also established after World War II (1939–1945) Christian democratic parties that in the Fourth Republic split the difference between left and right.

Beginning in the 1930s, the French political intelligentsia exhibited a remarkable fascination with German idealist and postidealist philosophy, principally Hegel, on whom Alexandre Kojève gave his famous lectures, and Nietzsche and Heidegger, a source not only for the poststructuralists, including Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, but for their predecessors among the phenomenologists and existentialists, figures such as Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Albert Camus.

THE FOUR PREOCCUPATIONS OF FRENCH POLITICAL THOUGHT

There are four ways in which French political thought as a whole may differ in its emphases and style from other national discourses. (1) From early on it was attentive to anthropological and psychological concerns—that is, it was more genuinely fascinated by the habits and manners of diverse peoples, despite the blindness of official Fifth Republic ideology to issues of ethnicity and religious origins. (2) Early and late, it was more historically oriented, or more inclined to find legitimization for practices in answers to historical questions. (3) A novel development, from Descartes and the Enlightenment to Henri de Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte, Ernest Renan, and Émile Durkheim, it was with varying degrees of conviction inclined to see in rationality and science a legitimization for public administration as either a supplement to or even a substitute for political representation. (4) As illustrated earlier, these preoccupations were often brought to bear on the constantly renewed debate about the proper limits of state authority with respect to the expanding or contracting limits, the independence or dependence, of associational life.

Anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss's identification with Rousseau in *Tristes Tropiques* came from the latter's famous

preference for the habits of hunters and gatherers over those of "civilized" Europeans, but where did Rousseau come by his sympathy for the alien and the remote? The answer is Montaigne. Skeptical and horrified in equal measure at Machiavellian politics and religious war, Montaigne achieved in the *Essays* an anthropological masterpiece of inversion, "Of Cannibals," which asserted the moral superiority of such tribes over allegedly more "civilized" Europeans. In addition, the *Essays* were psychologically performative. They helped generations of readers fabricate a modern—that is, mobile and private—self that could survive both political and religious overcommitment.

An intense appreciation for history was the second feature of a French manner of political thinking. It also played a role in supporting the anthropological and psychological outlook. When, in the last section of *Spirit of the Laws,* Montesquieu leans toward a modified form of the Comte de Boulainvilliers's *thèse nobiliaire,* and against the *thèse royale* that claimed that the French state was heir to the Roman Empire, he committed himself to anthropological sympathy for the barbarians of the north much as Montaigne drew our attention to the moral superiority of cannibals.

The disputed origins of France in either the Roman Empire or the barbarian conquest posed the fork-in-the-road historical question for monarchical France. Do the French identify with the defeated classical empire and inherit its failings, or do they identify with the uncivilized, still-pagan conquerors? On the *nobiliaire* view, the invasion of the barbarian Germans ("our fathers the Germans") that ended in the conquest of Roman Gaul not only legitimated the Frankish aristocracy but, because of the happy manners of the nomadic conquerors, put French government on the long, torturous road to political freedom. One sees hints of these archaic sentiments in Tocqueville's wistful look at the nomadic American Indians in *Democracy.* He imagines them as bearing a likeness to his own aristocratic ancestors.

The republican era replaced the old historical questions with new ones. France had been refounded in revolution. Gallo-Romans and Germans disappeared from historical consciousness, but there was now a new fork-in-the-road question. On one hand, should one distill from the tea leaves of French revolutionary history a celebration of the legitimacy of revolution as the road to the liberation of peoples? Starting with Karl Marx's reading of French crises from the Great Revolution to the 1870 Commune, there were many revolutionaries in the next two centuries who, because they once lived in France, learned that revolution was a revelatory moment in the upward climb of humanity. On the other hand, should one begin from the prospect that revolution had been less than a success—even a disaster—but that, nevertheless, it was a new origin for France and an experience from which something useful had to be pried? This was more or less the perspective of Tocqueville and other liberals of the post–1815 generation.

The Enlightenment gave rise to a novel preoccupation that turned out to have a bright future—the ideal of reason or

rationality. The latter term is forever associated with the name of René Descartes—father of Cartesian rationality—although Descartes himself thought politics was too complex for science and recommended only a quiescent "provisional morality." Rationality is often in conflict with the other traditions. It is typically a rival to the historical view. As science and enlightenment depended on a view of the uniformity of human nature, neither subtle psychology nor attentive anthropology was quite the forte of the rationalist outlook either. But again there were iconic figures capable of playing all three parts. Montesquieu, master psychologist and skilled practitioner of *longue durée* history, was also in no small part a founder of the modern social sciences. However, he neither thought that scientists should rule nor that individual reason amounted to much. In free countries, he insisted, it matters not whether "individuals reason well or badly" but whether they are in the habit of freely speaking their reasons in public forums. Reason is the consequence of the mediation of institutions—in this case, the separation of powers that pits ambitious reasoners against one another—a cult of honor ("virtue" in republics, "merit" in England) that channels private desires into public interest and political representation that legitimates offering reasons (good or bad) in public.

In the nineteenth century the historian and politician François Guizot managed to eliminate representation from the formula. For him the "public reasons" that emerged from the mediation of institutions might well serve as a substitute for political representation itself. This manner of raising the authority of rational agents above representative institutions that depend merely on opinion follows in the tradition of eighteenth-century physiocrats—for example, François Quesnay and Pierre-Paul Le Mercier de la Rivière and, after them, reformers such as the Baron Turgot and the Marquis de Condorcet. As Rosanvallon has shown, in the rationalist school there was no right to make bad law. Legislatures could be discredited, much as scientists would be if they allowed error to substitute itself for truth. The guarantee of freedom and rights did not lie in the arbitrary or wild expressiveness of representative government but in rational procedures for collecting evidence that led to truth. This was, of course, a perfect ideology for the postrevolutionary survival of the ancien-régime state bureaucracy, as was exhibited in Napoleon's establishment of elite schools (*grandes écoles*) and scientific research institutes connected to the state.

Last but not least is the central theme in this account—the preoccupation of French thought with the sovereignty of the state and its potential for conflict with individuals and groups situated outside the state. To what degree should state authority legitimate independence for the partial associations, the intermediary bodies of society? To what extent can these associations become a threat to the purposes of the state and those it represents, whether that concerns its independence in the midst of religious war or in the midst of class war? A contrast suggests itself. In the Anglo-American world, civil associations are more often than not, and sometimes naively, regarded as presumptively good. In the traditions of French political thought, civil associations are more often than not, and sometimes ill-advisedly, regarded as presumptively bad.

Have any recent political thinkers broken with these traditions? The most likely candidates are Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. Foucault, however, preserved something of the older French intellectual habits. A critic of Enlightenment rationalism and the despotic practices it founded, he ended up adopting a guise toward democracy that was severe, skeptical, and watchful—not unlike Tocqueville's democratic pessimism. *The History of Sexuality* shows a thinker fully absorbed in anthropological comparisons. Like Montaigne, Foucault discovered in Greek antiquity the solace of a pagan ethics. The *Lectures at the College de France* of 1975–1976 ("Society Must Be Defended") was a defense of civil society. In resurrecting the Comte de Boulainvilliers's prerevolutionary fascination with the wars of the Barbarian conquest, Foucault argues that it was the French aristocracy (not bourgeoisie or proletariat) who invented a subversive historical discourse that was a weapon of self-defense for "peoples" and "societies" in an unending war with "officials," whose kindred weapons were the "disciplinary" human sciences. Foucault's subsequent interest in "governmentality," (a rethinking of the issues of *Discipline and Punish*) is but the classical French quest for discerning in remote but connected habits what Montesquieu called the "spirit that governs men"—now, however, displayed on the micro-level of "bio-politics." With all the severity of the Cartesian rationalist, Foucault cast an unflattering light on how precisely this Cartesian spirit has invaded and transformed these various practices of civil society.

Let us turn to Jacques Derrida's later and more explicitly political or ethical writings: *Force of Law, Specters of Marx, Politics of Friendship, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, On Hospitality, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason,* and *The Beast and the Sovereign.* In these writings we find an extreme but still-recognizable version of the Montaignian skeptic. Not unlike the sixteenth-century author, Derrida rediscovers in various domains, such as law, justice, and hospitality, a source of unease. They possess an ever-transformative internal dialectic that renders them both demandingly necessary and always undecidable—that is, impossible, or at least impossible to fully satisfy. In passing we mention Derrida's own taking up of the classical theme of national "spirit" (*Of Spirit*). Equally interesting is his return to the old French tension between an insistence on sovereign closure to malign external influences and cosmopolitan openness to diverse manners and customs. This whole drama of the postrevolutionary period, enacted as the always unhappy compromises between the Jacobin state and the society it would superintend, or the world in which it acted, is played out again in a new deconstructive philosophical key.

Among these master thinkers there is no doubt great novelty, but they are also recognizable iterations of traditional obsessions—symptoms, so to speak, that suggest continuities lurking in every effort to digress from the past.

. . . . MICHAEL MOSHER

See also *Beauvoir, Simone de; Comte, Auguste; Condorcet, Marquis de; Derrida, Jacques; Diderot, Denis; Durkheim, Émile;*

Enlightenment Political Thought; Foucault, Michel Paul; Maistre, Joseph Marie de; Merleau-Ponty, Maurice; Montaigne, Michel de; Montesquieu, Charles-Louis; Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Saint-Simon, Claude-Henri; Sartre, Jean-Paul; Tocqueville, Alexis de; Voltaire, Francois-Marie.

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Freund, Ernst

Ernst Freund (1864–1932) was one of the leading American legal thinkers at the turn of the nineteenth into the twentieth century. He was a practicing attorney, law professor, political scientist, writer, and social reformer. Freund was educated at the German universities of Berlin and Heidelberg and became a professor of administrative law and municipal corporations in 1892 at Columbia University in the United States. He received a PhD in political science while he was at Columbia, and in 1894 he accepted a position with the political science department at the University of Chicago in Illinois. In 1903 he joined the faculty of the new law school on the Chicago campus and was instrumental in developing and advancing its curriculum on social and public service, political science, and the law. Freund also helped establish the first graduate school of social service in the country. In 1915 he served as the president of the American Political Science Association.

Freund's most famous work was his highly influential 1904 *Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Rights.* This book constitutes the first methodical analysis and structured elucidation of governmental police power in the American context, and it had a profound impact on the way the country's legal and judicial systems considered the topic. At the heart of Freund's dissection of police power was an engagement of the question of the extent of the limitations placed on legislative power by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Freund called for a structure of legal rules and regulations that would properly balance rights of the individual versus rights of businesses and property rights. He clarified what police power entailed—the authority of the government to advance the general, public welfare by regulating the use of property—and when and where such an exercise of authority is legitimate, such as in the securing of public health and safety, public morals, public order, and security. He saw police power as not frozen in time with a particular understanding but instead as a much more elastic and malleable concept susceptible to adaptations over time in accord with varying social, economic, and political circumstances and conditions. This book and other writings helped cement Freund's reputation as one of the foremost analysts and theorists of administrative law.

In 1928 Freund published another seminal work, *Administrative Powers over Persons and Property.* In this book, he articulates his concern over too great a growth and expansion of government power and calls for an appropriate reconciling and balancing of inherent respect for individual rights, social obligations and societal responsibilities of property, and the dominating demands of the public interest and common welfare. He importantly delineates here the differences and implications of power, authority, and leverage in society among governmental actors, individual citizens, and property. At the forefront of Freund's arguments is an unyielding need to marry the law, legislative enactments, and legal interpretations with actual social reality. That is to say, Freund saw a compelling necessity for the law to remain sensitive and responsive to genuine needs of actual persons, not to be caught in an impersonal vacuum of pure jurisprudential theorizing.

Freund was also a staunch defender of and strong advocate for free speech rights in both his scholarly writings and personal life. It was his essential belief that unfettered, open dialogue, debate, and discussion comprise a critical foundation of U.S. politics and society, and the American polity could only suffer if such speech rights were diminished and the range of discourse improperly narrowed.

See also *Administrative Law; Law and Society; Police Powers.*

. . . . STEPHEN R. ROUTH

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Friedan, Betty

Betty Friedan (1921–2006) was an American writer and feminist known for being a founder of the National Organization for Women (NOW) and for her writings, public statements, and actions that helped change the perception of the role of women in American society.

Born in Peoria, Illinois, she attended Smith College and graduated with a major in psychology. At Smith, she became the editor of the campus newspaper, and under her leadership the paper editorialized in favor of the unionization of the maids on campus. Friedan then spent a year completing a master's degree in psychology at the University of California at Berkeley, where she became politically active and was involved in a number of left-wing causes.

After leaving Berkeley, Friedan moved to New York City and became a reporter. She wrote for the Federated Press, a news service that was controlled by the Communist Party. She then wrote for the *UE News,* the newspaper of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America. She was fired by the paper because she was pregnant with her second child. In 1963 Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique* was published. An outgrowth of a survey of Smith College graduates that she had conducted for the fifteenth reunion of their class in 1957 (later extended to other female college graduates), the book discusses the role of women in industrial societies. It contends that the role of the full-time homemaker repressed and stifled women and that there was an absence of female role models who both worked and took care of a family. Friedan argues that women are as capable as men and can follow any career path. She asserts that restrictive laws and narrow social views were responsible for the limits on women's lives rather than any inherent weakness or incapacity and that women could find personal fulfillment outside of their traditional role as homemakers. The book became a best seller, is credited with launching the contemporary feminist movement, and became the catalyst for the passage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

In 1966 Friedan helped found NOW, serving as its first president until 1970. Under her leadership NOW lobbied for equal legal status for men and women. Among the organization's successes were a 1967 executive order extending affirmative action to women and an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ruling that sex-segregated employment advertising was illegal. NOW was the first national organization to support abortion rights (Friedan was a cofounder of the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws in 1968) and the Equal Rights Amendment. The August 26, 1970, Women's Strike for Equality, organized by NOW, culminated with a march on Fifth Avenue in New York City where more than fifty thousand participated. The following year, Friedan helped found the National Women's Political Caucus. The National Women's Political Caucus was intended to be a vehicle for women who wanted to work within the traditional political structure to increase the participation of women in politics. In 1973 she helped found and was a director of the First Women's Bank and Trust.

While lauded for her work in the women's movement, Friedan was criticized by some for focusing on the concerns of white, middle-class, married women while ignoring the issues of the poor, minorities, and lesbians. During the 1970s Friedan left NOW, claiming that the organization devoted too many resources to lesbian issues, which she believed was a private issue and not a women's rights issue, and that many feminists hated men. In 1977 she attended the National Women's Conference and supported a resolution on lesbian rights.

Friedan wrote five more books: *It Changed My Life* (1976), a collection of essays; *The Second Stage* (1981), in which she dealt with the issues of women attempting to balance the demands of career and home in the "post-feminist" age; *The Fountain of Age* (1993), which examined the challenges faced by older women; *Beyond Gender: The New Politics of Work and Family* (1997), which focused on economic justice; and *Life So Far* (2000), a memoir.

Friedan taught as a visiting professor at several universities and was also associated with the Institute for Women and Work at Cornell University where she was the director of the New Paradigm Program.

See also *Feminism; Feminist Movement; Gender and Politics; Gender Gap; Gender Issues; U.S. Politics and Society: Women, Political Participation of; Women's Movement, Comparative; Women's Rights.*

. . . . JEFFREY KRAUS

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Fringe Parties

There is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a fringe party. *Fringe party* is mostly used by journalists, politicians, and political scientists as a pejorative term to demarcate the boundary between "reasonable politics" and the "lunatic fringe," a label famously applied by Theodore Roosevelt in his autobiography (1922) to describe "the foolish fanatics always to be found in such a [reform] movement and always discrediting it." Consequently, some political scientists have argued that the term should best be replaced by more neutral expressions, such as *marginal parties, nonestablished parties,* or *nonmainstream parties.*

FRINGE PARTY CHARACTERISTICS

It is, however, possible to derive a set of common and interrelated characteristics of fringe parties from the way the phrase is used in political language. Fringe parties do usually attract only minor segments of the electorate, they are small in terms of party membership, their leadership does not (any longer) belong to the established elite groups of their respective political systems, and their party ideology either violates the political consensus or is simply considered irrelevant by most voters.

Put differently, fringe parties are not part of their countries' political mainstreams, and they are not normally electorally relevant parties. This statement does, however, require two qualifications. First, most new parties (e.g., the green parties) started out as fringe groups but became both electorally relevant and accepted by the more established parties and the majority of the citizenry over time. Second, some parties remain isolated and outside the political mainstream although they attract relatively large segments of the electorate (e.g., some Communist parties and some members of the extreme right party family).

Moreover, the ideological marginality of a party is not only conditional on time but also more generally conditional on political context. Within the boundaries of a liberal-democratic regime, parties that promote a dictatorship of the proletariat or biological racism are clearly beyond the pale because their ideology contravenes the system's most basic norms and values. Left- and right-wing extremist groups that aim to abolish or radically transform liberal democracy are therefore among the most prominent fringe parties in Western democracies. Within the context of a stable authoritarian system, however, a nascent grouping of Democrats would well be considered a fringe party while the dominant nondemocratic parties define the political mainstream.

TYPES OF FRINGE PARTIES

Most fringe parties are marginal not because they harbor extremist views but rather because they tend to campaign for a single issue that is not—at least not in itself—important enough to secure them sufficient levels of political support. Examples from Western democracies include, but are not limited to the following:

RELIGIOUS PARTIES

Historically, religious conflicts have had an impact on the formation of European party systems during the nineteenth century. In postwar western Europe, the Christian Democratic party family has been rather successful electorally, and Christian values have had an impact on the party ideologies of many other Western parties. Today there is, however, a number of tiny Christian parties that represent fundamentalist and/or evangelical views and try to distance themselves from both mainstream churches and Christian Democratic parties. Moreover, an even smaller number of non-Christian (mostly Islamic), spiritual, and New Age parties exist in Western countries. So far, they have had no electoral success whatsoever. In other countries where religious cleavages are more prominent (e.g., India or Israel), religious parties can be much more relevant and would not automatically be considered part of the fringe.

REGIONAL AND ETHNIC PARTIES

In many countries, ethnic and regional cleavages are simply not salient enough to sustain a single-issue party, rendering attempts to mobilize political support on the basis of some long-forgotten territorial unit futile. However, where they exist, ethnic parties are sometimes well integrated into the political system, such as the Swedish People's Party in Finland. They might even enjoy special privileges like the parties of the Danish and Sorbian minorities in Germany, which are exempted from the 5 percent electoral threshold. Therefore, it would be difficult to portray these parties and their constituencies as being on the fringe in any meaningful way.

In other countries, regionalist or separatist movements may have started out as fringe parties. But during the revival of regionalism after the Second World War (1939–1945), they became relevant political players that cannot be ignored by mainstream parties. This would include many of the regional parties in Spain, the Scottish National Party, or the various regionalist movements in Italy that merged to form the Lega Nord. Similarly, many regional and ethnic parties in India are too relevant to be considered genuine fringe parties.

SOCIAL GROUPS, SPECIFIC INTERESTS, AND FRIVOLOUS PARTIES

There is a host of rather colorful parties that claim to speak for large segments of society such as women, the elderly, or families with children. Normally, the interests of these groups are fairly well represented by mainstream parties of the left and of the right that cannot afford to ignore these groups. Consequently, women's/feminist parties, family leagues, and gray parties usually fail to attract relevant numbers of voters.

For more specific and concentrated interests such as hunting, farming, or even car driving, the incentive structure is slightly different because demands from these groups are more

easily ignored by the existing major parties. In most countries, however, agrarian and similar parties were either absorbed into mainstream parties or linger at (or beyond) the border of political irrelevance. The French Hunting, Fishing, Nature, Tradition Party is a case in point.

Other parties might campaign for a single political issue that is less obviously linked to a social group but nonetheless seen as marginal by most voters. An example would be the host of tiny and ineffectual eurosceptic groups in generally europhile countries such as Germany. It is, however, worth pointing out again that both the green parties and the anti-immigration parties of the extreme right began their ascendancy as marginal single-issue movements.

Finally, there is a bewildering host of frivolous parties that exist to make fun of real fringe or mainstream parties, either to get access to state funding or just for the fun of it. Examples include beer lovers' parties in several post-Soviet states, Canada, Germany, Norway, and Poland; parties that allude to grand (and often fictional) political and religious ideas (Imperial British Conservative Party, Scottish Jacobite Party, Church of Militant Elvis Party); parties that exist to challenge political correctness and the establishment (the Anarchist Pogo Party of Germany and the PARTY, which campaigns for rebuilding the Berlin wall); or the many British groups that play with the word *party* (Mongolian Barbecue Great Place to Party).

See also *Ethnic Parties; Political Parties; Religious Parties.*

. . . .   KAI ARZHEIMER

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Fromm, Erich

Erich Fromm (1900–1980) was a German-Jewish-American psychoanalytic social critic, humanistic thinker, and social psychologist who first visited the United States in 1933 to lecture and then immigrated the following year to escape the rise of the Nazi state.

Closely associated with the Frankfurt school of critical theory, Fromm combined a deep nonreligious understanding of biblical texts with close readings of Marx, Freud, and others to produce an original body of work that highlights the contradictions and development of Western liberal democracy as it pertains to the mental health and well-being of its citizens. Fromm's basic insight is that the psychological toll of market economies' emphasis on competition and material accumulation has made individuals vulnerable to forms of authoritarian rule that paradoxically mirror their own fear of freedom. Fromm, however, was no social determinist or pessimist but argues that human community can be built on a reawakened sense of reason, solidarity, and love. Although underplaying the role of institutions and constitutional safeguards such as separation of powers, checks and balances, and civil liberties that might be invoked to protect the citizen from the state, Fromm's work nevertheless remains fresh and full of insight regarding the role of self-understanding and mass psychology in the contemporary world.

The most enduring of Fromm's books for political scientists is his 1941 tour de force *Escape from Freedom.* In recounting the emergence of the individual from the Middle Ages through the Protestant Reformation and the subsequent development of capitalism, Fromm posits a dynamic social-psychosocial theory that examines the personal and social structures that contribute to the making of an "authoritarian character." This emergence, recapitulated in an extreme form in the rise of Nazi Germany, includes personality types driven by economic social forces and unconscious pathological anxieties who would willingly give up the "burden of freedom" and submit to the manipulation of hateful and repressive leaders rather than face the ambiguities and uncertainties of being human in the modern world. Looked at from a historical and comparative perspective, what can be thought of as Fromm's political theory of collective action and human behavior in times of accelerated economic transformation and stress has important implications for understanding globalization and the rise of religious fundamentalism and reactions to it in the twenty-first century.

Having published more then twenty books and three hundred articles, Fromm continually explores the interplay of ideas and social structures on the formation and malformation of human personality and by implication politics. In *The Sane Society* (1955), Fromm argues that affluent democratic societies could be "sick" due to the constant bombardment of advertising and creation of personality types that act more like conforming robots than free and autonomous individuals. In *The Art of Loving* (1956), Fromm argues that in an alienated capitalist society, love is more often than not unconsciously confused with the buying and selling of goods, thereby transforming the beloved into an object of desire rather than a subject of mutual trust and respect. Fromm paid his most explicit theoretical debt to Freud and Marx in *Beyond the Chains of Illusion* (1962), arguing that human freedom lies in the awareness of the inner and outer constraints that bind the individual and society. Only in conscious choices can a more just and peaceful world be achieved.

The political theorist John Scharr, perhaps Fromm's sharpest critic, argues that Fromm is a utopian thinker whose

emphasis on human freedom avoids the difficult political choices of authority. Despite the criticism that Fromm offered no practical way out of the modern dilemma, he was active in politics in the 1950s and 1960s for a time as a member of the Socialist Party of America and a supporter of Senator Eugene McCarthy's run for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination. Fromm was also the author of *May Man Prevail? An Inquiry into the Facts and Fictions of American Foreign Policy* (1961) and cofounder of SANE, an activist peace group that called for a ban on nuclear weapons.

See also *Frankfurt School; Human Nature and Politics.*

. . . . KENNETH A. BETSALEL

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Functionalism

Functionalism (sometimes referred to as structural-functionalism) is a theoretical perspective and methodological strategy employed predominantly in sociology and anthropology, but it can be found in most social sciences. The English social scientist Herbert Spencer and the French sociologist Emile Durkheim explicitly laid the theoretical foundations of functionalism and provided the first empirical work applying the functionalist perspective. While both theorists assumed populations grew larger and denser leading to differentiated structures with distinct functions meant to handle the problems emerging from larger societal systems, each theorist tended to emphasize different processes of societal evolution. For Spencer, the emphasis was on the process of differentiation, which was a sign of societal adaptation staving off disintegration, conquest, or collapse. Conversely, Durkheim was more interested in understanding how these differentiated parts were integrated into the whole such that social organization and relations remained stable and potential competition or conflict was prevented. Ultimately, the idea that society was a whole with distinct parts that were mutually dependent on each other through a division of labor came to be the guiding principle of functionalist theory and analysis.

THE TENETS OF FUNCTIONALISM

Spencer initially drew an analogy between biological organisms and society, which he conceived of as a supraorganism. Essentially, organisms and societies are similar in that they grow in size, followed by differentiation of and growth in structure and function. Differentiation implies mutual interdependence as a division of labor emerges to deal with the increasingly specialized nature of the units constituting the greater whole, such that the whole often outlives the death of one or more of its parts. Spencer had in mind institutions—such as polity and kinship—when he referred to social units, but one could extend this analysis, as Talcott Parsons would,

to any structural element of society: norms, roles, or cultural patterns such as values.

Differentiation was driven by the fact that societies have needs or requisites that social structures function to meet. As a group grows larger, problems emerge, making these needs salient and pressuring specialized units to appear to better meet these needs. For Spencer, the most important needs were production of material/symbolic/human resources, distribution of these resources, and coordination/regulation of disparate social units; Durkheim, on the other hand, saw integration as a key problem and emphasized structures such as the economic division of labor in his work. Spencer's theory saw societies on the precipice of collapse, as they tended to keep growing, producing more pressures to differentiate, and eventually failing to successfully meet the new exigencies. At some point, a society or group would succumb to conquest from a bigger, better-organized group; collapse; or disintegrate.

Based on these assumptions, a functionalist asks the basic question, What does X look like, and how does X function for society? A second question, first posed by Robert Merton, would ask what a structure's manifest (or overt) function was vis-à-vis its latent (or underlying) function. All social phenomena can theoretically be analyzed asking these questions, including religion or government, slavery, stratification, or status positions. The methods are meant to be comparative and, if possible, historical. For instance, one could ask what the structural elements of slavery are in societies A and B, as well as how they function to sustain the social order in both societies. If the structure and function are similar, slavery can be argued to have universal or generalizable qualities; conversely, where it varies in structure and/or function, one would want to find more cases to determine if one form is an exception to a rule, or whether slavery depends on the sociohistorical context in which it is embedded. And indeed, Spencer's and Durkheim's insights fueled the British anthropologist tradition of the early twentieth century—exemplified by Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown's work—which applied functionalist principles to ethnographic work on preliterate peoples; this work is still relevant today.

MODERN FUNCTIONALISM

Talcott Parsons is the father of modern American functionalism. His goal was to build a grand synthetic theory that drew from the insights of the masters. Society was a system; it had four needs: adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latent pattern maintenance. Visually, he represented these four needs by drawing a fourfold box representing each subsystem that functioned to meet the society's larger needs. Each square internally differentiated into four smaller boxes representing the subsystem's creation of structures functioning to meet its internal needs. His model attempted to account for everything from the biological level (which was analogized as located in the economic sector, the primary location for adaptive structures) to the psychological level (where the polity was oriented toward collective goal setting and attainment) to the social level (where integration occurred through roles, status positions, and

expectations predicated on the other levels penetrating social life) to the cultural level (where values, ideologies, and beliefs were generated and imposed on the lower levels).

By the 1960s, a slew of criticisms emerged challenging Parsonsian functionalism. First, Parsons (and to a lesser extent Durkheim) was guilty of tautological reasoning: a social structure existed because it was necessary, and it was necessary because it existed. Second, the problem of power and conflict was noticeably absent from early functionalist thought; the dynamics of inequality were often peripheral. Third, by emphasizing the process of differentiation as the master pattern of change functionalists made the mistake of (1) reproducing nineteenth-century teleological notions of progress, (2) ignoring the multilinear and uneven evolution of societies, and (3) implying that society had a natural state of equilibrium.

Recently, neoevolutionary thought has been integrated with functionalism in an attempt to rectify the errors of the past. Jonathan Turner's work, specifically, avoids the idea of needs by reorienting our focus toward ubiquitous forces such as population growth or resource scarcity, pressuring individuals and groups to find ways to adapt or face problems of higher magnitudes. Success, for Turner, means that a society temporarily adapts to its environment but, in doing so, unwittingly plants the seeds for new logistical loads that it must again adapt to. His innovation comes from replacing needs with selection pressures, which divorces the causes and consequences of social structures while also avoiding the teleological assumptions made by Parsons because societies are not headed in a particular direction but innovate in often surprising ways.

Other sociologists have tried to revive functionalism either by calling it something new and changing much of the language (Niklas Luhmann and systems theory), by integrating it with Marxist arguments (Immanuel Wallerstein and world-systems analysis), or by throwing out much of what we recognize as functionalism and reorienting the entire focus of the lens (Jeffrey Alexander and neofunctionalism). What never changes is the underlying question that nearly all social scientists ask at the onset of their research: what is X, what does it look like, and how does it work?

See also *Durkheim, Émile; Parsons, Talcott.*

. . . .   SETH ABRUTYN

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Functional Representation

Functional representation is an alternative form of political representation in which legislators are chosen not by territorial units but by various other groups such as social class, occupation, or minority status. It was developed as a means to provide representation to groups that might otherwise be marginalized in the political process. In addition, it reflected concerns that traditional political systems created artificial divides between politics, economics, and society. Initially, functional representation was popular among industrial organizations that sought either direct election of representatives to national legislatures or the creation of consultative bodies that had a role in the policy process. For instance, several countries in western Europe developed consultative assemblies whose members were elected by socioeconomic groups. In contemporary Slovenia, the forty-member National Council is composed of representatives of employer groups, employee groups, farmers, trade groups, and so forth. In many modern systems, functional representation is used to ensure minority participation in the legislature. For example, in the Croatia House of Representatives, five of the delegates are elected to represent the country's minority groups. Opponents of functional representation assert that it creates legislators that serve very narrow special interests instead of broad segments of society.

See also *Minority Representation; Representative Systems.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

Fundamentalism

Fundamentalism is notoriously difficult to define, as countless political science commentators have found. Part of the difficulty lies in the use of the term in a pejorative sense to describe those whose religious or political opinions lie outside the norm. Few groupings that are labeled as fundamentalist would willingly describe themselves as such. The 1992 *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* describes fundamentalism as either "an extreme Protestant position characterized by the belief that the Bible is a verbally accurate recording of the word of God" or "adherence to traditional beliefs of any kind." This definition incorporates many who could not be considered fundamentalist; however, in these two concepts lie both narrow and broad definitions of the term. The narrow definition traces fundamentalism to its Christian origins in the early twentieth century and has been described by George Marsden (1980) as "militantly anti-modernist Protestant evangelicalism" (p. 4). The broad definition seeks to expand the term to include other faith and nonfaith groupings that possess similar characteristics and ways of operating. Jeffrey Hadden and Anson Shupe (1989) provide a useful definition for this broader definition, describing fundamentalism as "a proclamation of reclaimed authority over a sacred tradition which is to be reinstated as an antidote for a society that has strayed from its cultural moorings" (p. 111).

CHRISTIAN FUNDAMENTALISM

In its narrow definition, *fundamentalism* refers to the movement in the United States and Britain that developed out of the teachings of Princeton Theological Seminary and a series of pamphlets published between 1910 and 1915 called *The Fundamentals,* which called Christians to return and adhere to a strict and literalist interpretation of an inerrant Bible, which emphasized belief in the deity of Christ and the virgin birth. The movement grew in opposition to prevailing trends in the church, inspired by German higher criticism and scientific discovery of modernism and liberalism. Those who clung to the fundamentals of a literal interpretation of the Bible saw themselves as the guardians of true Christianity against nominal Christianity and nonbelievers. They considered themselves a faithful remnant in a fallen world that had begun to infect the church. They spent the following six decades avoiding political involvement and cooperation with mainstream churches while building their own churches, schools, colleges, theological and evangelistic training centers, and publishing houses. In the 1970s the *Row v. Wade* decision on abortion and attempts to bring about the Equal Rights Amendment spurred fundamentalists to act politically in defense of what they perceived to be an attack on traditional values. They reemerged as a potent political and religious force in the 1980s with tens of millions of adherents. During the following three decades, the movement was to emerge as a dominant force in both American Christianity and the Republican Party.

CHARACTERISTICS OF FUNDAMENTALISM

The defining characteristics of Christian fundamentalism can also be used to understand fundamentalisms more broadly. Marty and Appleby's comprehensive "Fundamentalism Project" in the 1990s identified nine ideological and organizational characteristics of fundamentalism. Among five ideological characteristics, they note, first, fundamentalists' tendency to react against secular modernization and the perceived marginalization of religion. Second, attention is drawn to the selectivity of those aspects of tradition and modernity fundamentalists choose to reshape, reject, or embrace. Although modernism might be rejected, modernity with its technological progress is embraced to spread their message. Third, fundamentalists tend to have a Manichean worldview, a dualism that sees the world in absolutist terms of good and evil. Fourth, there is a belief in the inerrancy and absolutism of sacred texts. Finally, fundamentalists believe in the idea of millennialism and messianism, that there was and/or will be a golden age when they will be rewarded and nonbelievers will be punished. The four organizational characteristics include, first, the idea of an elect or chosen membership. Second, this membership needs to be separate and distinct from other members of society. Third, fundamentalist groups are typically male dominated and led by a charismatic or authoritarian figure; dissent is not tolerated and leads to schism rather than compromise. Women's roles tend to be subordinate and conform to traditional roles in a patriarchal society. Finally,

adherents' behavior is carefully prescribed and includes dress codes, drinking and eating, the type of entertainment that can be enjoyed, and the relationships that can be entered into.

FUNDAMENTALISM TODAY

Marty and Appleby's work is helpful in identifying the commonalities shared by different fundamentalist movements. Although the term remains contested, it is in common usage and as such is useful in designating groups that share such features. These ideological and organizational characteristics are shared by Christian, Jewish, Islamic, Hindu, and other fundamentalists. They possess different sacred texts and leaders but adopt similar approaches in claiming inerrancy for their interpretation of such scriptures and reacting against the marginalization of religion in a globalized era. They are comfortable using modern technology to disseminate their worldview while simultaneously attacking selective Enlightenment values. Convinced of their own right standing with their God, they adopt a dualistic view of the world and eagerly await the time when they will be rewarded for their obedience and faithfulness. Members of fundamentalist movements are set apart from others, made to believe they are special and different from the majority of the society in which they live. Accordingly, they may act and dress differently to identify themselves with other group members and to differentiate themselves from fellow citizens. The strong charismatic leadership of such movements retains control over members and shapes the ideological agenda, mobilizing support on behalf of the specific issues on which they decide to concentrate.

Fundamentalism has developed to become a feature of the modern political arena in ostensibly secular states such as the United States, India, and Turkey as well as more overtly religious countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, where no clear separation of religion and state exists. Fundamentalists have formed political parties that have gone on to govern, such as the Bharatiya Junata Party in India or Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi in Turkey; others have infiltrated existing parties including the Republican Party in the United States. Yet other fundamentalists, such as al-Qaida, have eschewed the democratic process and pursued violent means to achieve their political and religious objectives. Others including Hamas and Hezbollah pursue violent, political, and social welfare means to advance their religious/political objectives. The wars and acts of terrorism of the early twenty-first century have thrust fundamentalism to the fore of political science discourse, a long way from its rather quieter beginnings a century ago.

See also *Al-Qaida; Religious Parties; Religious Right.*

. . . .   LEE MARSDEN

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Furnivall, John Sydenham

British academic John Sydenham Furnivall (1878–1960) was born in Great Bentley, Essex, United Kingdom. He attended Trinity Hall, Cambridge, and received a second-class degree in 1899 in Natural Science Tripos. In 1901 he joined the India Civil Service, arrived in Burma (present-day Myanmar) in 1902, and received multiple promotions, culminating in his appointment in 1920 as commissioner of land settlements and records. His work in Burma led to a lifelong interest in its political, social, and economic evolution. In 1910 he cofounded the Burma Research Society, in 1924 he founded the Burma Book Club, and in 1928 he founded the Burma Education Extension Association. After retiring in 1925, Furnivall returned to the United Kingdom. From 1936 to 1941 he was a lecturer at Cambridge University in Burmese language, history and law.

Furnivall's academic publications include *Netherlands India* (1939) and *Colonial Policy and Practice* (1948). In 1942 he wrote *Memorandum on Reconstruction Problems in Burma* for the soon to be independent government of Burma. During the succeeding two decades, he served as an advisor to the Burmese government, received awards from the Netherlands (the Order of the Orange-Nassau in 1948) and the Burmese government (Thado Thiri Thudhamma in 1949), and was awarded a doctorate by Rangoon University (in 1957).

Furnivall's analysis focuses on defining and explaining the conditions under which colonial "topical" societies could achieve economic progress and welfare. European conquests produce plural societies, in which different cultural groups coexist in the same geographic region and are under the same formal authority but have different institutional rules and supporting moral imperatives. Within an individual's own cultural group, he or she behaves by its rules. In other situations, in which interaction is with other groups according to market and contract rules, one's own cultural constraints do not apply, and the other groups can be exploited. In this context, economic progress and welfare are difficult to achieve and

uncertain. Economic progress is the expansion of production but is not the same as improving welfare. In Furnivall's analysis in *Colonial Policy and Practice* (1948), welfare is the creation and expansion of the social environment that allows the individual "to obtain both what he knows he wants and what he wants without being aware of it." Examples of these wants are safe food and water, fair commercial transactions, and honesty in legal presentations.

Furnivall believed welfare also included the enforcement of social obligations. In *Colonial Policy and Practice* he lists three principles of economic progress and welfare that summarize the contrast and potential conflict between the two. First, buyers "would pay twopence rather than threepence"; second, sellers want "threepence rather than twopence"; and finally, economic progress and welfare are conditional on the expression of a common social will—the acceptance by all members of society of a common set of political and social rules. For welfare to improve and progress to be made, the first and second principles must be limited by social will. The final requirement for the achievement of welfare is autonomy. Autonomy is the ability or political power of people in a society to develop their own criteria of welfare. Furnivall believed that while autonomy alone would not ensure the development of social will or economic progress, welfare could be achieved only when economic progress occurred with the development of social will and autonomy. His model presents progress as stemming not just from technologies or markets but, importantly, from the acceptance of the same concepts of welfare and norms of social interaction by all people within a nation. Rather than economic development's resulting in welfare, autonomy and welfare were prerequisites to economic development.

See also *Autonomy; Economic Theories of the State; Progress.*

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G7/G8 and G20

The acronyms G7/G8 (Group of Seven/Eight) and G20 (Group of Twenty) denote two informal interstate coalitions that coordinate the policies of nation-states in regularly held summits at the ministerial or heads-of-state level. This informal mode of governance contrasts the highly organized, formal decision-making mechanisms typically analyzed in international relations studies, such as in the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. Scholars observe increasing trends of informality in international relations since the cold war due to a shift in political decision making from formal forms of governance to informal bodies. This is the result of resistance to reform in formal institutions, a growth of informal groups within formal institutions, and the informal addressing of policies that were traditionally handled through formal agreements. Against these overall trends in international relations, the G7/G8 and G20 have become decisive institutions in certain key policy fields, although the two coalitions differ in regard to their history, composition, and policy contents.

The G7/G8 was created in 1975 following the 1973 oil crisis and subsequent global recession. Originally referred to as the G6, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, and the United States gathered annually to coordinate financial and economic policies for industrialized countries. In 1976 Canada joined the group, and since 1977 the European Union has participated in all of the group's summits without being a recognized member. The addition of Russia, which was officially invited in 1998 as the group's latest member, created the Group of Eight. However, Russia is not a full participant in all activities, because it is excluded from the G7 finance grouping.

Since the 1970s, the small gatherings of G7/G8 heads of states have evolved into annual summits that attract huge media attention, mass mobilization, and public consultation with key civil society stakeholders. The G7/G8 has broadened its agenda from pure financial and economic issues to wide-ranging policies, including foreign affairs, science and technology, financial markets, energy, environment and climate, and employment/labor. The original informal mode of governance has been steadily formalized through regular policy meetings and routinization of cooperation on the ministerial level. The annual summits of the heads of state remain the core of the cooperation. They are prepared for intensely, with representatives of the leaders, known as "sherpas," in constant contact throughout the year.

The success of the G7/G8 is variable, as some give the group good marks for implementing policy decisions and commitments, while others fault it as an inefficient club bent solely on representing the interests of the global North by largely excluding the global South from its decision-making processes. The crisis of the legitimacy of the G8 is due largely to the fact that the group fails to represent the most relevant economies of the global economy. Against this background, the enlargement of the G7/G8 by the economic powers from the global South, including Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa, is the subject of various political and academic debates. The financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 illustrated that the G8 countries alone may not be able to adequately respond to global challenges.

The G20 was created in response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998, in recognition of the fact that not all relevant economies were integrated in the informal modes of governance on the global economy. In 1999, finance ministers and central bank governors from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey met for the first time in Berlin at the invitation of G7 finance ministers, creating the G20. The choice of these countries was based on the size of their economies and populations, on the need for regional representation, and on traditional political ties of G7 countries. Since its inception, the G20 has played a moderate role in financial global governance; its role in coordinating global financial policies was strengthened by the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. Given the legitimacy crisis of the G7/G8, it is likely that the G20 will continue where the G8 has left off and become one of the central informal coordination mechanisms in global governance.

See also *International Administration; Transnationalism; United Nations (UN).*

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Game Theory

Game theory analyzes social situations in which parties choose actions in pursuit of their individual goals, each person knowing that his or her success depends on all the choices made. A player, X, tries to predict others' moves and considers their views of the situation. However, X realizes that they are likewise trying to predict X's move, so a circularity appears. The most important concept in the theory, the equilibrium of John Nash, is an attempt to escape the circle.

The analysis is conducted mathematically, so the details must be specified precisely. In the simplest case, parties know their goals and the consequences of their moves, and they know that the others are similarly informed. In more sophisticated games, the players may be uncertain about goals, moves, or outcomes, and their uncertainty is expressed as probability distributions. The use of mathematics ensures that all assertions have a clear meaning within the formal system and that the conclusions follow undeniably from the premises.

Game theory applications have yielded results that seemed odd at first but made sense when the logic was examined, and without the discipline of mathematics the analyst might have slipped back into the conventional thinking. The theory's precision does not mean that it can predict real parties' actions in specific contexts, since it is impossible to model all variables in play or measure all the parameters. The theory's contribution has been to clarify the structure of different kinds of conflict or coordination.

Game theory proper is distinguished in its applications. It is a mathematical enterprise guided by interest in abstract systems, following criteria that are basically aesthetic. The greatest number of applications are in economics, followed by political science, biology, computer science, law, linguistics, and the philosophy of ethics.

GAME THEORY IN PLAY

Game theory is different from rational choice theory, which assumes that parties pursue self-interested goals such as pleasure, resources, or power. Game models sometimes include these kinds of goals, but they often do not. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, the founders of the field, also initiated modern utility theory to provide a basis for measuring one's goals even when they are not money or any other quantitative commodity.

A *strategy* is a complete plan of action for the game, instructing a player what to do for any information that might arise. A *Nash equilibrium* is an assignment of strategies to the players, such that each player would be ready to use his or her strategy even if, hypothetically, the player learned the others' strategies. Whether this property should persuade sensible players depends on the situation. In the most favorable case, players' culture and history might give them shared expectations about each other's moves, and it follows that they would use a Nash equilibrium.

For a wide class of games, at least one equilibrium exists, but often a game possesses several. The theory's own logic thus shows it is not deterministic and leaves a role for outside factors like precedent or culture. To increase the theory's predictive strength and to eliminate certain nonsensible equilibria, writers have constructed requirements to reduce the set of Nash equilibria, for example, *subgame perfection, intuitive criterion,* and *forward induction.* They show the importance of beliefs about events that never happen, that is, of players' expectations about behavior on nonoptimal paths of play. Other work has contended that Nash's concept is too narrow and tried to generalize it, prominent concepts being *rationalizability* and *correlated equilibria.*

Behavioral game theory, a development of the past two decades, tests simple models in the laboratory. Other research has focused on certain elements from the beliefs-goals-strategies triad: *Interactive epistemology,* for example, studies knowledge about other parties' knowledge, and *the theory of games in coalitional form* considers only the values of the coalitions players can join and not the moves they might make to get into them. *Evolutionary game theory* drops the element of strategic thinking in favor of imitation or heredity, so that a certain rule that does well in one generation of players will be used more often next time.

A prominent application in political science studies the growth of trust and reputation in social institutions. *Repeated games,* where the same elementary game is played over and over, have a major role. Also fundamental are *signaling games,* in which an informed player makes a move from which another player draws information as a basis for action.

GAME THEORY IN APPLICATION

Game theory has been applied to nuclear weapons strategy, and some scholars have claimed that it set American policy during the 1950s or guided specific decisions. In fact, the nonformal strategy came first and the games later. The theory's real contribution has been generic knowledge about strategic issues, such as how to make a threat credible, when past resolved behavior provides a reputation that deters future challenges, how to reduce the mutual temptation to launch a preemptive attack in a crisis, whether building weapons sometimes signals resolve rather than increases military strength, what role emotions or lack of control plays in deterrence, and how states should deal with the security dilemma, where weapons built for defensive purposes also add offensive capability and

spark building by the adversary. Other research has studied the advantage of democracies in crisis bargaining, the regularity that democracies seldom get into war with each other, the greater difficulty of negotiating an end to a civil war compared with an international one, reciprocity in trade agreements, the effectiveness of economic sanctions, the design of international treaties, the role of honor and face in international affairs, and strategic aspects of terrorist recruiting.

In the analysis of governance systems, strategic questions arise from four viewpoints: that of founders who set up a constitution to achieve stability and fairness; that of candidates trying to get elected; that of voters who vote strategically rather than simply choosing their favorite; and that of legislators who assemble allies and construct clever motions. An early paper from a founder's perspective was Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik's 1954 proposal on measuring the power of a committee member based solely on the voting rules. Later examples have asked whether any voting methods exist that motivate voters to act sincerely rather than strategically, that is, to choose their most preferred candidate rather than consider, for example, "electability." (The answer is that the only such methods are bizarre and undesirable.) A literature has developed on how the median voter theorem holds up with strategic voters under various voting systems.

See also *Formal Political Theory; Rational Choice Theory.*

. . . . BARRY O'NEILL

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Gandhism

Gandhism may be defined as the ideology of Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869–1948). "Mahatma," or "Great Soul," was an honorific title bestowed on him by Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941). It is significant that Tagore, a renowned Nobel Prize–winning poet of India, could hold Gandhi in such high esteem while also serving as Gandhi's most eloquent critic. Their extensive dialogue, public and private, signifies a stellar ability for expressing profound differences with utmost civility.

The voluminous writings by leading advocates of Indian independence reveal this civility. It consistently marked the divergent ideologies of the nationalist movement from 1885, when the Indian National Congress was founded, until liberation from British imperial rule came in 1947. An initial feature of Gandhism that deserves emphasis is how its spirit of tolerance nurtured such civility in the midst of vigorous debate about fundamental moral and political issues. This flowed steadily from 1919, when Gandhi assumed leadership of the

Mohandas Gandhi tries to settle a dispute in Calcutta (now Kolkatta), India, in 1934. Gandhi's philosophy of tolerance and nonviolence is called Gandhism.

SOURCE: AP Images

Indian Congress, until January 30, 1948, when he was assassinated by a Hindu fanatic, Nathuram Godse, who contended that Gandhi had betrayed Hinduism through his tolerance of Muslims and Islam.

TENETS OF GANDHISM: TRUTH AND NONVIOLENCE

The attitude of tolerance in Gandhism was consistent with Gandhi's idea of truth (*satya* in both classical Sanskrit and modern Hindi). This concept featured so prominently in his ideology that he titled his autobiography *The Story of My Experiments with Truth*. Consistently repudiating the connotations of "Mahatma," he characterized himself as "a humble but very earnest seeker after truth," as one who "often erred in my estimates and judgments" without "infallible guidance or inspiration." Indeed, he insisted that any "claim to infallibility would always be a most dangerous one to make."

However, Gandhi did claim to have found the way to truth. This path was the way of nonviolence (*ahimsa)*. The concepts of *satya* and *ahimsa* are so entwined in his ideology that he asserted his (fallible) belief that, as stated in his autobiography, "There is only one fundamental truth which is Truth itself, otherwise known as Nonviolence. Finite human beings shall never know in its fullness Truth and Love which is in itself infinite. But we do know enough for our guidance." Mistakes

will inevitably occur as we pursue truth. This is the connection to tolerance, because any leadership, movement, or government must respect the dignity of the individual, which "necessarily includes the power as much to commit errors as to set them right as often as they are made."

The most dire and dangerous error is the commission of violence. Gandhi called his theory and practice of nonviolence *satyagraha,* translated as the "force" of truth applied in a spirit of love. His pacifism is sometimes interpreted as qualified, because he sanctioned violence in exceptional cases of self-defense. The overwhelming spirit of his ideology, however, is expressed in clear pacifist statements like this one from his autobiography, made in direct refutation of Bolshevism and terrorism: "I do not believe in short-violent-cuts to success. I am an uncompromising opponent of violent methods even to serve the noblest of causes. There is, therefore, really no meeting ground between the school of violence and myself."

His reference here to "the school of violence" is particularly noteworthy, because it serves as a reminder that in the history of terrorist movements, India ranked high throughout the twentieth century. Gandhi frequently referred to being surrounded by two forces of violence: the oppression of the Raj or British government on the one hand, and, on the other, a well-organized group of Indian terrorists who possessed charismatic leadership and a sophisticated nationalist ideology.

SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN GANDHI'S LIFETIME

In March 1930 Gandhi announced a plan of action that would become India's and the world's most famous mass civil disobedience campaign: a dramatic resistance to the salt tax by marching to the western seacoast and collecting natural salt in a symbolic protest against the government's monopoly on its manufacture. He informed the British viceroy ten days before he started his march that his sole purpose was to set in motion the force of pure nonviolence. The so-called salt *satyagraha* did demonstrate the power of nonviolence by mobilizing millions of Indians against unjust laws and thus giving collective expression to the idea of a "duty to disobey" that Gandhi had derived in large part from the thought of American essayist and practical philosopher Henry David Thoreau. By the end of the year, hundreds of thousands of resisters had been arrested, following Gandhi through the prison gates in the cause of *swaraj* (national liberation).

Gandhi's movement to independence, however, eventually crashed in civil war and the partition of the subcontinent into two nations, India and Pakistan. Neither Gandhi's long tenure of charismatic leadership nor the ideology that he conceived and applied could prevent the horrendous civilian violence that engulfed northern India from 1946 to 1948, during which hundreds of thousands of Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs were massacred. It was this terrible slaughter, unleashed even after Gandhi's scrupulous schooling of his country in the requirements of *satyagraha,* that led him to proclaim on August 15, 1947, as India celebrated its independence, that both he and his methods had failed. He was assassinated four and one-half months later.

GANDHI'S LEGACY

Gandhi and his legacy have gathered admirers worldwide. Writing on Gandhi's philosophy, American psychologist Howard Gardner commends his creativity among geniuses of the twentieth century, calling Gandhi a thinker of the highest order. Soon after Gandhi's death, American physicist Albert Einstein urged international emulation of his thought and practice. Pacifists like American civil rights activist Martin Luther King Jr., the Dalai Lama of Tibet, and Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi expressed similar thoughts as they strove to pursue his model.

Gandhi's life and ideas resound in many arenas and in varied formats, from opera to environmentalism. When American composer Philip Glass discussed the thought behind his unique opera, *Satyagraha,* he commended Gandhi's relevance to the cause of saving the earth's resources. In a 2008 interview with the *New York Times,* Glass asserted that the environment and nonviolence made a perfect match, stating that if humans followed Gandhi's principles, the earth would not be plagued with so many problems.

See also *Colonialism; Nonviolence; Pacifism and Conscientious Objection.*

. . . .   DENNIS DALTON

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Garbage Can Model of the Policy Process

The garbage can model was developed by Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen in 1972 to explain the decision-making process of "organized anarchies," such as universities. Organized anarchies are characterized by problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation. Participants involved in decision making often do not clearly define their preferences and may not have strong preferences on the issues under consideration. In addition, participants are often unclear about how the overall organization's processes work. They may understand their own functions well but usually do not grasp how their own responsibilities fit in with the larger organization. Instead of basing decisions on a comprehensive understanding of the organization's processes and functions, decisions are based on a trial-and-error approach and anecdotal evidence. Finally, participation in these choice processes is relatively unstable. Participants can enter and exit the decision-making process freely, and

variations in contributions stem from time and resource constraints rather than from features of the decision under consideration.

These characteristics of organized anarchies make a rational-comprehensive approach to decision making extremely difficult, if not impossible. Under a rational-comprehensive approach, problems and preferences are clearly defined, all alternative solutions are systematically evaluated, and decisions are made based on which alternative will best achieve the defined objectives and preferences. As described, organized anarchies are unable to utilize this approach. Instead, they operate as a "collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work" (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972, 2). Outcomes in these circumstances depend on the mix of problems, solutions, and participants that pertain to a certain choice opportunity (i.e., the content of the garbage can). Thus, context and timing are crucial factors in determining choice outcomes.

Although the garbage can model was developed in reference to universities, it has also been used to explain the governmental policy process. Perhaps the most well-known application of the model is John Kingdon's 1984 multiple streams model of governmental agenda setting. In this variant, the organization is more structured than an organized anarchy, but the traits of problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation remain. Kingdon argues that three independent streams run through the governmental agenda process: a problem stream, a solution stream, and a political stream. The problem stream consists of various actors measuring and highlighting certain policy problems for the government to address. The solution (or policy) stream consists of the development of and advocacy for public policy proposals and reforms. The political stream consists of contextual factors that influence government officials and other political actors, like election outcomes, public opinion shifts, and interest group pressure. Like participants in the garbage can model, participants in the multiple streams model are highly fluid and include politicians, academics, interest groups, and policy entrepreneurs. The governmental agenda responds to these streams when a "policy window" opens, providing an opportunity for a particular problem and/or solution to move to the top of the governmental agenda. In this model, policy entrepreneurs play a critical role, actively seeking to join the streams, matching policy proposals to problems and political opportunities. As with the garbage can model, governmental agendas are better understood as the outcome of timing and context rather than of a rational-comprehensive approach to decision making.

See also *Multiple Streams Theory.*

. . . . DANIEL C. LEWIS

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Garvey, Marcus M.

Marcus Garvey's (1887–1940) goal of black unity, pride, and self-determination made him a preeminent black nationalist leader in the early twentieth century. His philosophy echoed in the pan-African movements and anticolonial struggles of the mid-twentieth century and in the black power movement of the 1960s. His call for self-respect and pride can be heard in the lyrics of James Brown ("Say it loud, I'm black and I'm proud!") and reggae artists such as Bob Marley and Steel Pulse. His emphasis on a glorious African history that black people must reclaim lives on in the reparations movement, the Afrocentrism movement, and other cultural movements.

Garvey was born in the British colony of Jamaica in 1887. He left school at age fourteen, apprenticed as a printer, and edited several newspapers in various Central American countries before traveling to London, where he sharpened his oratorical skills and his interest in African history. He returned to Jamaica in 1914 and founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) under the banner of "One God, One Aim, One Destiny!" but garnered little support. In 1916, he moved to the United States and established the UNIA headquarters in Harlem.

Garvey claimed the UNIA had six million members at its peak, and critics concede that it had at least 500,000 members spread across more than 700 branches in thirty-eight states. His newspaper, *Negro World,* reached a circulation of about 50,000 in the mid-1920s. In contrast to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Garvey and the UNIA had greater appeal to the black masses, earning Garvey the label "Black Moses."

Garvey was critical of the NAACP for its middle-class and interracial leadership as well as its tactics of lobbying and litigation that did not adequately address the economic and cultural degradation of the majority of black people in the United States. While W. E. B. DuBois and other NAACP leaders viewed Garvey as an unrealistic and dangerous self-promoter, Garvey rejected their goal of equality and racial integration in the United States as a naive illusion.

Garvey's nationalism had economic and cultural dimensions. Economically, he was influenced by Booker T. Washington's strategy of self-help and racial uplift through education, skills, and businesses. Culturally, Garvey counteracted the mindset of subservience and self-degradation by drawing on a glorious African history to inspire self-respect, pride, and black unity with slogans such as "Africa for Africans" and "Up! You mighty race, you can accomplish what you will."

Garvey's grandest goal was the emigration of black people back to Africa, where he sought to create independent states that would ensure self-determination for African descendants throughout the diaspora and provide a basis from which black people could act as equals on the world stage. To carry this

out, he established the Black Star Line Steamship Company, which purchased ships by selling stock to UNIA members. This venture was a financial disaster, and in 1922 the U.S. government charged Garvey with mail fraud. Though guilty only of mismanagement, he was tried, convicted, and jailed in 1925. President Coolidge commuted Garvey's sentence in 1927, and he was deported to Jamaica. He died in relative poverty and obscurity in London in 1940, having never set foot in Africa.

See also *African Political Thought; Pan-Africanism; Reparations.*

. . . .   GREGORY W. STREICH

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Gatekeeping

Gatekeeping is a practice used by legislative bodies to allow only selected measures to be debated or voted upon. Gatekeeping is alternatively known as exclusive proposal power and jurisdictional dominance. It may take several procedural forms, including action by legislative committees to obstruct or delay measures, or actions by legislative leaders to prevent votes on bills. Gatekeeping can serve to force consensus on issues, but it can also serve to obstruct popular legislation. Systems in which gatekeeping occurs have strong institutional power vested in legislative leaders such as the speaker or committee chairs.

Gatekeeping is typically undertaken to prevent debate or votes on a measure that is opposed by committee chairs or members, who believe that the measure would otherwise be enacted by the full legislature. The practice may also be utilized to avoid debate on a contentious matter that could embarrass or undermine the majority party or grouping. Consequently, scholars have asserted that the most significant power of a legislative committee is the ability to say "no" or prevent action on a measure.

Gatekeeping can also occur at the supranational level. For instance, the European Commission has a gatekeeping function within the European Union and can prevent certain legislative acts.

See also *Consensus; Group Theory.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Movements, Comparative

See *Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Movements, Comparative.*

Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Political Participation

See *Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Political Participation.*

Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Politics

See *Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Politics.*

Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender U.S. Legal Questions

See *Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender U.S. Legal Questions.*

Gay and Lesbian Rights

See *Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights.*

Gellner, Ernest

Ernest A. Gellner (1925–1995) was an influential philosopher, historian, and social anthropologist who made major contributions to the study of Islam, nationalism, and modernity. He was a stalwart champion of critical rationalism and open systems of thought, defending them from, among others, Marxists, relativists, psychoanalysts, and dogmatic advocates of the free market.

Gellner was born in Paris but grew up in Prague. His Jewish family decided to move to Great Britain in 1939. At the end of World War II (1939–1945) he enlisted in the Czech Army, but after the war, foreseeing the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, he returned to Britain to finish his studies, first at Oxford and then at London School of Economics (LSE), from which he received a PhD in 1961. A year later, thanks in large measure to the critical acclaim of his first book, *Words and Things* (1959), which attacked linguistic idealism and contained a foreword by Bertrand Russell, he became professor of philosophy, logic, and scientific method at LSE.

Gellner would maintain his post at LSE until 1984, when he left to become professor of social anthropology at Cambridge. In 1993, he returned to Prague as the research director for the Center for the Study of Nationalism at Central European University, where he would work until his death.

Throughout his career, Gellner published path-breaking books, earning a reputation as one of the most original and versatile scholars in the world and having command of numerous languages. *Thought and Change* (1964) was a penetrating analysis of modernity and theories of social change. *Saints of the Atlas* (1969) was an ethnographic study of Moroccan tribal people. *Muslim Society* (1981) was an influential tract in Islamic studies. *Nations and Nationalism* (1983) became a classic work in the burgeoning field of nationalism and ethnic studies and

is perhaps his more enduring study. In it, Gellner argues that nationalism arises as a product of modernity. Nations, in Gellner's terms, "'have navels,'" meaning they are born; they are not something eternal, as many nationalist partisans might argue. His *Plough, Sword, and Book* (1988) similarly emphasized the unique features of modern life, and, although his stages of history have similarities with those of Marxism, he steadfastly rejected many Marxist assumptions and stood against communism. Last, after the end of the cold war brought the possibility of democracy to Eastern Europe, he became a scholar and advocate for civil society, publishing *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals* (1994), which tried to explain the collapse of communism while also arguing against putting all one's faith in free-market ideology.

Gellner is hard to classify on ideological grounds, as he engaged in heated intellectual debates with those on the right and on the left. He made many enemies in the academy, at times seeing himself as the head of a one-man crusade against critics of rationalism and liberalism. One colleague, David Glass, remarked "that he wasn't sure whether the next revolution would come from the right or from the left; but he was quite sure that, wherever it came from, the first person to be shot would be Ernest Gellner" (Davis 1995).

See also *Nationalism.*

. . . . PAUL JAMES KUBICEK

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Gender

See *Race and Gender.*

Gender and Globalization

Gender refers to a set of qualities and behaviors expected from a female or male person by society. Gender roles are nurtured or learned, are socially determined, and can evolve over time. In contrast, an individual's sex has traditionally been thought not to change, being based in biology and "hard" science. Scholars in more recent years, however, have suggested that sex may be as socially constructed as gender. Feminine and masculine norms and ascribed behaviors vary widely across the globe, within and among cultures, and across time. More recently, the trends of globalization have affected gender. The term *globalization* here is used to mean the acceleration or intensification of economic, political, social, and cultural relations across state borders. Mainstream scholars often analyze globalism by using neoliberal concepts such

as free trade, deregulation, and privatization. However, these lenses tend to ignore the way that experiences of men vary with those of women. There has been a recent shift to recognize gender-differentiated vantage points and experiences due to globalization.

While neoliberalism scholarship emphasizes that globalization has improved the lives of some, recent feminist scholarship suggests that such gains can be differentiated by gender. Despite increased access to information, technology, goods, and services for many people, both women and men have suffered under political and economic globalization. The poorest and most marginalized people in the world are suffering more than they are benefiting under globalization, and women constitute a majority of this population. In areas such as conflict and security, economic access and poverty, health care, human rights, and political power, there is a gendered difference in the impacts of globalization.

Neoliberals emphasize that globalization has helped foster the spread of formal democracy. Feminist scholars have shown that this has not, however, directly translated into increased political equality and influence for women. Women have less numerical and substantive representation in formal political channels than do men. Legal standards established by constitutional provisions or statutes—such as electoral gender quotas or the international Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted internationally in 1979 and stemming from international work on human rights dating back to the 1960s—are important but have fallen short in leveling the political playing field for women.

The gendered gap between rich and poor is increasing due to certain features of globalization both across and within the global North and South. Women in the North are losing jobs as a result of outsourcing of jobs to the South. The dismantling of the welfare state in much of the South is a large burden on people—mostly women—who have lost health services, educational access, child care, and agricultural and economic supplements. Aid to Southern countries typically benefits men, providing extension training, agricultural inputs, and market access to male farmers. The informal economy, in which most women in the developing world work and from which they gain the means for the survival of themselves, their children, and their communities, is usually overlooked by formal economic assistance.

Active, armed conflicts under globalization have shifted in type (internal vs. international) and frequency (more regular), and this has had an unequally adverse effect on women. Reasons for the change in types and prevalence of violent conflict include the spread of arms, global climate change, and interactions of people in competition for scarce resources. Women bear a disproportionate share of the burden of this insecurity. An increasing number of conflict casualties (death, wounded, or displaced) are civilian rather than combatants, including women and those for whom they have charge: children, the sick, and the elderly. Women also suffer when tax revenues are shifted to military spending from social programs

on which they and their children depend. Militarism pollutes the environment, hurting the crops on which women depend to provide for their families and increasing health concerns to which women must attend. Finally, insecurity and violence in the public arena encourage active and passive violence against women in private. Women are increasing victims of wartime rapes and domestic violence correlating with global insecurity.

Far from being passive, women have redefined the aims and indicators of globalization and development through work under such initiatives as the United Nations "Decade for Women" (1976–1985) and global women's movements, such as women fighting for their own and their country's liberation in Chile, women fighting for the equal rights of all citizens in Australia, or women struggling against oppressive social norms and public policies that perpetuate gender oppression in the context of problematic caste and class issues in India. Although there have been significant gains in political, cultural, and economic benefits to women under globalization, on the whole, globalization has been detrimental to women.

See also *Feminist Political Theory; Gender Issues; Globalization; Women's Representation.*

. . . . VIRGINIA PARISH BEARD

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Gender and Politics

The study of gender and politics in political science rests on an initial body of research that established women as a politically relevant group for political scientific analysis and sex as a political variable. A small number of early influential studies of women and politics can be identified, the best known of which is Maurice Duverger's *The Political Role of Women* (1955), a work commissioned in part in response to transnational feminist demands for empirical research on women's political and economic status. By the mid-1900s, developments such as quantitative databases based on large, nationally representative samples, the apparent ease of identifying the sex of survey respondents, and computer-facilitated quantitative analysis allowed for the generation of research on sex-related differences in mass political behavior and preferences. By the 1970s this research, increasingly informed by developments in feminist political thought and by feminist movement mobilization in North America and Western Europe, provided the foundation for moving from research on women and politics to a gendered analysis of politics. Although gender and sex are related concepts in political science research, their relationship continues to be debated among political theorists and empirical scholars in the discipline.

DEFINING SEX

It is worth noting that, for many decades, political science engaged primarily in single-sex research, in which sex was not a variable but a constant. Male political elites, male elected officials, and men as citizens and voters were the central focus of political science research and theory and, in some cases, the exclusive concern of the discipline. The development of a disciplinary subfield of women and politics research shifted the treatment of sex as a constant to sex as a variable; feminist theorizing made women visible in political theory.

In political science, as early as 1974, with Wilma Rule Krauss's article "Political Implications of Gender Roles," "gender" emerged as a variable distinct from "sex," with sex treated as "a biological fact" and gender expressed through "gender identity." The variable "sex" was based on state-assigned sex classification, generally at birth, as male or female. The variable of "gender roles," related to but distinct from "sex," was understood as sets of traits and behaviors considered to be "feminine" or "masculine." Sex as a dichotomous variable, operationalized as "male" and "female," was found to have limited analytical utility, however. Sex-based political research on women has served more to correct and to modify previous research concerning sex-related differences than it has to develop complex models of the political meanings of sex; nonetheless, it has provided the foundation upon which a gendered analysis of politics is being constructed. The distinction of sex and gender, as separate variables, has clarified, empirically, the socially constructed features of masculinity, femininity, sexualities, and structural meanings of gender, distinct from biological assumptions about sex and sex difference. As political scientists asked questions that could not be answered by employing sex as a political variable—for example, do party nomination rules structure internal party competition to advantage male rather than female candidates? Why do numbers of elected women increase in the aftermath of war?—they began to turn to gender as a concept for purposes of political analysis; they also turned to, and relied heavily on, gendered research in anthropology, history, labor studies, psychology, sociology, women's studies, and sexuality studies as well as on theoretically related work being developed in regard to race and research on the intersections of race, class, and gender.

A poster for women's suffrage calls for political equality for women, pointing to other areas in society in which women already participate. The role of gender in politics came to the fore in the mid-twentieth century.

SOURCE: Corbis

DEFINING GENDER

Gender as a concept in political research is conventionally understood as sets of socially constructed meanings of masculinities and femininities derived from context-specific identifications of sex, that is, male and female, men and women. These meanings emerge from stereotypes about male and female behavior, from "characteristics people tend to associate with women and men, femaleness and maleness" (as Beth Reingold writes in her 2000 book *Representing Women,* p. 47), from normative assumptions about appropriate behaviors of men and women, and from social structures of power. As Nancy Burns noted in "Gender: Public Opinion and Political Action" (2002, p. 463–464), "Gender is a repertoire of mechanisms that provide social interpretations of sex, that enable sex to structure people's lives. Gender is a set of ways in which people and institutions make sex matter. Gender is a principle of social organization. Gender is a hierarchy." Gender represents both the outcomes and processes of human actors and institutions in developing meanings about a range of femininities and masculinities that are not "natural" but are identifiable social and political constructions. As Iris Marion Young concluded in her essay "Modernity, Emancipatory Values, and Power," "Gender is . . . a set of ideational and social structural relationships that people move through, rather than attributes they have attached to their persons" (p. 493).

Gender and the political are mutually constitutive, and hence a central question for scholars of women, gender, and politics is how gender and politics interact to construct hierarchies of political power. Gender produces and transforms political inequalities, privileging most men in relationship to most women but also privileging some women in regard to other women and to some men. At the same time, political institutions, laws, and political practices construct gender, identifying appropriate political actors as primarily (or exclusively) male, establishing masculine behaviors as normative and fitting political institutions to a model of the male actor. As Lisa Baldez writes in her 2007 work "Intersectionality," because "gender never . . . operates independently of other aspects of political life, . . . it is misleading to think of gender as an autonomous category of analysis" (p. 229).

Gender has multiple meanings that rely on context and that change across time. No universal content emerges from "sex" that gives single and universal meaning to gender; the identification of a person as male or female does not automatically indicate that person's political behavior, political preferences, or location in political hierarchies of power. As Laurel Weldon notes in her 2006 article on "The Structure of Intersectionality," "Gender norms and practices vary across groups of women and men as well as across nations, regions, generations, and cultural groups" (p. 238), and across age, race, and time. These norms and practices also have "multiple logics"; that is, their development, workings, and functions differ according to context. The political implications of gender, as a result, were different for white working-class women in the United

States in 1942 than they were for black women in the south-ern United States in 1962 or for northern Italian upper-class women in 1982 or for Hutu Rwandan women in 2002. In these examples, all individuals are "women," but the gendered political meanings and power for these groups of women differ substantially. How gender works for these women, and for other women and for men, cannot be assumed on the basis of sex. The extent to which women and men are differently politically empowered is a matter for empirical research and political theorizing.

Gendered meanings and structures, such as "welfare recipi-ent," "labor movement," "suicide bomber," and "Parent-Teacher Association," intersect with and mutually constitute those of, for example, race, class, and caste. It is not yet clear, however, how they do so. Intersections of gender with race, class, and other politically relevant categories have yet to be fully theorized and developed for empirical analysis. As Ange-Marie Hancock observes in the 2007 article "Intersectionality as a Normative and Empirical Paradigm," relationships among intersectional categories remain "an open empirical ques-tion" (p. 251), for the location of such intersections and for the identification of how such intersections function politi-cally in gendered terms. An appreciation of gender as multiple and intersectional responds to the theoretical and empiri-cal research undertaken in race studies and gender studies, although, according to Hancock, "a comprehensive intellec-tual history of intersectionality research" has yet to be pub-lished (p. 249), and its impact on gendered political research remains to be assessed.

GENDER IN POLITICAL RESEARCH

How does gender as a concept function in political science research? Gender, unlike sex, can serve as both an independent and a dependent variable. Gender and the political are recipro-cal in nature; in political science, scholars examine "the partic-ular and contextually specific ways in which politics constructs gender and gender constructs politics," as Joan Scott writes in her 1986 article "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis" (p. 1070). Insofar as gender is constructed by state and society—for example, who counts as a citizen, the exten-sion of nationality to spouses of men but not of women, the extension of rights to men but not women, policies protecting workers in male-dominated workforce that do not encompass work primarily undertaken by women—gender functions as an effect or outcome of human agency and politics. Because gender also serves to construct political choices and outcomes, it can function as a determinant of such phenomena. As Helen Irving writes in *Gender and the Constitution* (2008), "Formal equality can produce unequal results; where similar treatment is offered to persons who are not similarly situated, further disadvantage for the disadvantaged can be the outcome" (p. 2). Furthermore, gender can function both as a categorical con-cept and as a dynamic process concept for political research.

Employing gender as a category involves the "multidimen-sional mapping of socially constructed, fluid, politically relevant identities, values, conventions, and practices conceived of as masculine and/or feminine, with the recognition that mascu-linity and femininity correspond only fleetingly and roughly to 'male' and 'female,'" as Karen Beckwith writes in her 2005 article "A Common Language of Gender?" (p. 131). Gender as a category variable has utility in its classification of "feminine and masculine behaviors, actions, attitudes and preferences" and its impact on "particular outcomes, such as military interven-tion, social movement success, and electoral choice, among others" (p. 131). Recent research on gendered campaign strate-gies of women and men running for office, on gendered media behaviors of male and female candidates, and on gendered interactions among women and men in national parliaments are examples of the utility of gender as a category variable. For example, Dianne Bystrom and her coauthors, in *Gender and Candidate Communication* (2004), found that women running for elective office in the United States developed specifically gendered campaign styles designed to transcend—or to take advantage of—stereotypes about female candidates and women in politics. Kathleen Dolan, in her 2004 *Voting for Women,* found that voters held gendered assumptions about policy issues, about women's and men's likelihood of promoting some issues rather than others, and about ideology; in her 2008 review of the scholarship on female candidates in the United States, she found that "women candidates of both parties [are] seen as more liberal than their male counterparts but also they are per-ceived as more liberal than they actually are" (p. 116).

Mary Hawkesworth, in her 2003 article "Congressional Enactments of Race-Gender," for the U.S. Congress, and Joni Lovenduski, in her 2005 book *Feminizing Politics,* for the Brit-ish House of Commons, found structures and practices in each institution that shaped differences in access to power and influence between men and women in these national legisla-tures. Examples include differences in treatment by colleagues, where, as Hawkesworth found (pp. 538–539), female legisla-tors were explicitly excluded from Congressional committee press conferences and remained unrecognized for speaking by their male colleagues, and where female members of Con-gress employed techniques akin to "groveling" to influence their male peers, "[indicating] a power dynamic that Con-gresswomen of color must take into account in devising their legislative strategies" (p. 538). These indicate the ways in which gender can be identified and employed as a category variable for political analysis.

In contrast, gender as a process concept functions to iden-tify "the differential effects of apparently gender-neutral struc-tures and policies upon women and men, and upon masculine and/or feminine actors," as Beckwith observes (2005, 132), as well as the behaviors of individual women and men to shape structures and policies to a specifically gendered outcome. Examples of such research include studies of the gendered impact of electoral rules, nomination procedures, and policy-making and other decision-making processes, where structures, procedures, and practices produce outcomes that advantage some men and disadvantage some men. Lovenduski describes "a deeply embedded culture of masculinity that pervades politi-cal institutions in Britain . . . manifested in the agenda-setting,

formulation and implementation stages of the policy process" (2005, 48, 53), ranging from the adversarial debating style of parliamentary speeches to explicit, articulated sexism by members of Parliament (2005, 54–56). Other examples are the gendered outcomes of democratic transitions and other regime changes, of military interventions, of war and revolution, and of mass mobilizations such as strikes and protests, where the disruption of traditional gender roles, abolition of previous political institutions, dissolution of political party systems, and other major changes can create opportunities for women's political empowerment.

Gender as process is also evidenced, for example, in the strategic decisions and actions of women and men in constructing new political systems, drafting constitutions, negotiating party alliances, and organizing transnational social movement campaigns. Gender employed as a process variable moves beyond, for example, differentiating between foreign policy preferences of male and female elites to a focus on the ways in which institutional structures and practices shape the interactions, alliance formation, and discourses available to and influenced by male and female political elites in foreign policy decision making. Gender as a process variable also helps to reveal how states and institutions become gendered; that is, how states adopt and accommodate structures that create and confirm gendered political differences, such as an all-male military, girls' exclusion from state- or religious-based educational institutions, and workplace protections for industrial workers.

Joan Acker, in her 1992 article "From Sex Roles to Gendered Institutions," defines gendered institutions as those where "gender is present in the processes, practices, images and ideologies, and distributions of power in the various sectors of social life" and she recognizes that "the institutional structures of . . . societies are organized along lines of gender" (p. 567). Other state-focused gender research has turned to issues of gender in institutions and in political institutional development, how institutions structure gender and mobilize women, and how organized women actively work to restructure (and hence to regender) institutional structures. For example, Louise Chappell's book *Gendering Government* (2002) found, for Australia and Canada, that relatively similar feminist movements, facing different institutional arrangements, developed state-specific strategies to achieve their goals, strategies that included crafting changes within each state. As activist women responded to the political opportunities offered by state structures, they mobilized in ways that shifted each state in terms of gender, creating new avenues for women's influence. In Australia, with "high federal political capacity," effective women's policy agencies at the national level, and norms that accommodated advocacy of gender interests, organized women employed a strategy of internal, insider bureaucratic positioning and external lobbying vis-à-vis parliament (pp. 159–163, 173). In contrast, Canada offered different opportunities for advancing women's interests, primarily through constitutional measures, such as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which, as Alexandra Dobrowolsky shows in her 2003 chapter

"Shifting States," activist women helped to forge. Dobrowolsky found that activist women were particularly successful in developing new, women-friendly political institutions in Scotland with the opportunities afforded by the prospect of a Scottish Parliament (pp. 133–139).

Work of this type, analyzing the gendered nature of institutions, according to Acker, demonstrates the states' susceptibility to influence. Not only do states and other institutions express, practice, and shape gender; they are also responsive to the attempts by political actors to regender them; that is, to recast the terms and contexts of state and institutional arrangements, practices, and discourses in order to leverage political advantage and to increase strategic political opportunities and outcomes along gender lines.

Focusing on gender as a concept that functions independently and dependently, conceptualized as category and/or process, allows scholars, as Corrine McConnaughy writes in her 2007 article "Seeing Gender over the Short and Long Haul," to "[account for] the interaction of gendered identities and attitudes, social location, and political context" (p. 380). This permits us to treat gender as "a meta-concept, to construct meaningfully distinguished concepts within it, and then to model explicitly those concepts *and their interactions*" (p. 380; emphasis in original).

What gender as a concept does for political science is to provide an analytical strategy for the political and politicized relations of power between and among women and men that cannot be fully or clearly identified or analyzed by a reliance on sex as a variable. Research using gender and sex as variables still includes the counting of self-identified women and men, interpretation of regression analyses that include a sex variable (see Nancy Burns's 2005 article "Finding Gender"), and analyses of the presence of men and women in political institutions. Gender, however, has moved political research further toward the heart of disciplinary research, with foci on the social, activist, and legal constructions of empowered and/or disempowered women and men across intersectionalities of, for example, race, class, caste, sexuality, and nationality; on the imbrications of gender and power in institutions; and on the strategic employment of masculinities and femininities in constructing and gaining political power. Gender also makes clear the imposed, involuntary political differences and inequalities imposed upon (and often resisted by) women, revealing the gendered and racialized dichotomies of, for example, enfranchisement, access to office, legal status, and provision of government benefits.

CONCLUSIONS ABOUT GENDER IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Although political science may not yet have a common language of gender, two common defining components are evident. First, *gender is socially constructed.* Despite some disputes concerning the relationship between sex and gender, or the utility of gender as a concept, scholars of women, gender, and politics concur that gender is a social construction of political import that marks neither natural nor essential qualities of individuals or institutions. As a result, gender can

be seen in—and is useful in analyzing—the construction of political institutions, the development of political practices, the crafting of new constitutions, and the resolution of wars and revolutions.

Second, *gender reveals power differences.* Scholars of gender and politics recognize that the effects of gender are not neutral. Gender constitutes a constructed set of differences among sexed persons in terms of relations of dominance and subordination that are systematic and structural, although the processes of their construction and their specific consequences are matters for empirical investigation. As Acker reminds us, gender signifies "the patterning of difference and domination through [socially and culturally constructed] distinctions between women and men that is integral to many societal processes" (1992, 565). Gender is worked to structure—or to undermine—power differences between and among women and men. As Scott concludes, "Gender is one of the recurrent references by which political power has been conceived, legitimated, and criticized" (1986, 1073).

A third defining component is emerging from research on gender and institutions (including the political economy): the recognition that a focus on gender, rather than sex, permits analysis of gender as structured in institutions, processes, and practices, independent from any specific human actors. As structures are developed through human agency, which individual human actors are at issue and how they are gendered become inscribed in the structures themselves. Such inscriptions have staying power and persist beyond the presence (and, often, lives) of the original actors. Institutions, processes, and practices developed primarily (or exclusively) by men are structured with identifiable masculinities which, developed in women's absence (or exclusion), persist in producing and replicating inequalities in political power. As Burns writes, where we "find gender" is not only in individuals, but in political and other institutions. Gender "is made and remade across . . . institutions in ways that build linkages across institutions. . . . Without taking simultaneous account of the host of institutions in which women and men operate, scholars are not likely to understand the causes and scope of disadvantage" (2005, 139).

For scholars undertaking gender and politics research, operationalizing gender as a category concept for empirical research continues to be problematic. Analyses of female and male political elites, and of women and men as, for example, voters, political activists, and members of the military and other state authorities, have had to continue to rely primarily on a dichotomized sex variable as a surrogate for the multidimensional variable of gender. As Reingold observes, employing the terminology of gender in such a context can result in

> evoking age-old sexual stereotypes: gender (the activities and values associated with women and men) gets affixed to sex (women and men in public office) as if it were an accurate and exhaustive descriptor of the actual behavior and attitudes of all such women and men. . . . Recognition of gender difference gets translated into expectations of dichotomous, stable and universal sex differences." (2000, 48–49)

Despite such risk, one strategy has been nonetheless to employ the terminology of "gender" rather than "sex" in such research, to signal a recognition of the nature of the social construction underlying the categories with which scholars are working and to disrupt any presumptions of the foundationality of sex for politics. A future project for gender and politics scholars will be the development of operationalizations of gender variables in contexts where sex currently must suffice.

Sex and gender continue to be linked conceptually and theoretically, even as they are conceptually distinct concepts. This is the case in part because political science still lacks a wide range of knowledge, especially comparative and longitudinal, about women's political behavior, political beliefs and attitudes, means of organizing, behavior in governmental office, experience in campaigning, response to power inequalities, and exclusion from political power—among other concerns. The subfield of women and politics research still requires this basic, investigatory, cumulative research. In this regard, our major concern with women and politics has not been precluded by, or surpassed by, a focus on gender. Fortunately, as Fiona Mackay reminds us in her 2004 article "Gender and Political Representation in the UK" (p. 114), feminist theoretical developments continue to inform and to hone gender as a political science concept, in order "to bridge the gap between sophisticated theorizing about gender and the operationalization of workable concepts for empirical research."

See also *Feminism; Feminist Political Theory; Gender Gap; Gender and Politics; Gender Quotas; Patriarchy.*

. . . .   KAREN BECKWITH

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Gender Gap

The *gender gap* refers to a pattern of systematic differences in political attitudes, political behavior, and party affiliation between men and women. Theories of the origins of the gender gap have emphasized variation in the political socialization experiences of men and women that shape the political resources and perspectives of these groups.

From World War II (1939–1945) through the 1970s, a traditional gender gap—one in which women held more conservative political attitudes and were more likely to support center- or right-wing parties—appeared in most countries of the world. Societal differences between men and women, such as their longevity, labor force participation, and levels of religiosity, generally yielded these patterns.

However, beginning in the late 1970s, a new pattern emerged in the United States, in which women tended to hold more liberal positions on a variety of issues, such as the appropriate role of government, gender equality, and other issues that are particularly salient to women's experiences. The gender gap in voting—the difference in the proportion of women and men voting for any given candidate—has also been evident in the United States since 1980, with women being more likely to vote for and identify with the Democratic Party in comparison with their male counterparts. This modern gender gap has been the result, not of movement by women to more liberal attitudes and behavior, but of the increasingly conservative attitudes—and consequent voting behavior—of men.

Although it was first thought to be a reflection of American exceptionalism, the modern gender gap is now experienced in most advanced industrial societies, while preindustrial countries continue to demonstrate a traditional gender gap. Some scholars have suggested that the political socialization experiences of men and women in countries that have undergone the modernization process emphasize postmaterialist values, such as gender equality, feminist identity, and group consciousness. In agrarian societies, however, these values have not been incorporated into the socialization experience because of the lack of modernization. These patterns confirm that the modern gender gap is the result of differences in value orientation rather than differences in standard social and demographic characteristics between men and women.

In addition to being exhibited in differences in political attitudes and voting behavior, the gender gap is also apparent in levels of political activism and participation. Overall, women tend to be less politically active than men, particularly in agrarian societies. However, in the United States, women have voted at an increasingly higher rate than men since 1980, though they have not bridged the gap in other forms of conventional political participation—such as making campaign contributions, contacting governmental officials, or joining a political organization—nor have women reached the same level of representation in the federal legislature. In other postindustrial societies, women have gained increasing representation in their national legislatures; for example, women compose nearly 40 percent of the Norwegian Parliament. As these social trends continue in modern society, these patterns have caused some scholars to suggest that the gender gap in terms of political representation may weaken.

See also *Feminism; Gender and Politics; Women, Political Participation of; Women's Representation.*

J ANET BOX-STEFFENSMEIER AND
. . . . ERIN MCADAMS

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Gender Issues

Gender as a term has gained increasing usage in mainstream as well as academic discourse, often confused with *sex* and regularly thought to be a proxy for a focus on women. Sex, however, refers to biology and anatomy. Gender, by contrast, is a term explicitly meant to focus on both sexes and how they interact. Maleness and femaleness, in the sexual sense, are determined by biological and anatomical traits, including the presence of external and internal sex organs and secondary sexual development at puberty. Gender, on the other hand, refers to a set of qualities and behaviors expected from a female or male by society. Gender roles are nurtured or learned formally and informally, varying widely within and among cultures. The roles and expectations due to gender emerge in such areas as the economic, political, and sociocultural arenas. Lack of a gendered perspective on these issues thus misses truth.

PREVALENT DISCOURSE DISPROPORTIONATELY "MASCULINE"

The views and experiences that often find fullest expression in public and private discourse and action are male or fit culturally ascribed ideas of masculinity. Men have wielded public-sphere power, defined the agenda and content of national and global discourse, and created the world in which we live based on their own lived experiences. Thus, many of the policies and assumptions that guide our understanding of the lives of all human beings ignore the varied reality that women face. A focus on gender issues highlights the need to concentrate on women's realities to truly understand political, economic, social, and cultural realities.

Understanding the truth behind such pressing issues across the globe as unequal economic opportunities, the persistence of poverty, differing political voices, or measures for dealing with the growing HIV/AIDS pandemic requires recognition of the divergent and complementary experiences faced by men and women. Furthermore, data show that not only is truth gendered, but women's experiences are different from and disadvantaged in relation to those of men. The existence of gender differences in certain arenas often has adverse consequences on society's social, political, physical, and economic well-being, as well as on women's lives, families, socioeconomic status, and health. To combat this oppression of women, the areas in which their gender matters must be addressed.

ROLE OF GENDER IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POWER

Examples of gendered issues abound, but there are certain areas that warrant particular mention. First, in the economic arena, including employment opportunities, labor requirements, and household provision, there is a root issue globally to which studies of gender turn: public versus private space. This dichotomy also affects a second area that requires gendered attention, and that is the political arena. Women's economic and political power is circumscribed relative to that of men due to the continued effects of the dichotomy of public-private space, separating men's productive and political/public arena activities from women's reproductive and personal/household activities. Cultural expectations, including those espoused by religions, reinforce the idea of man as the public earner and politically appropriate leader and woman as the opposite—a supplementary earner and politically inappropriate leader.

The recognition of economic gender differences is traceable to Esther Boserup, a Danish female economist. In the 1960s, Boserup studied reasons for the failure of international development efforts to have the anticipated positive results in developing regions. She noticed that women were central to economic life, especially in the subsistence agricultural sector, and that male decision makers in international development had created and implemented programs aimed at increasing the productivity of the male worker. Thus, development activities further disrupted gendered divisions of labor to women's detriment, as had colonialism and modernization policies.

Men were given access to money and resources to improve their cash-crop–focused economic activities. Women's agricultural work lost land and productivity. Women's work was, however, vital, because it included growing food to sell for supplementary income and for consumption. The nutrition and economic needs of women and communities were being undercut relative to the cash-crop farming of men. Women slipped further into poverty, and their workload within the home and in the labor economy increased.

Differences between men and women in the economic arena, with spillover effects in the domestic realm, continue today and exist in both developed and developing regions. Women continue to be undervalued and underpaid relative to men and bear the brunt of domestic work despite their employment status.

ROLE OF GENDER IN DIRECT AND STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE

Moreover, with an increasing prevalence and shifting nature of conflict around the world, it is imperative that the varied experiences of men and women in conflict situations receive attention. Women both participate in and bear the brunt of the effects of conflict. In the discipline of political science, conflict and security are viewed through the lens of direct violence, thereby overlooking the role of structural violence and insecurities generated by structural inequalities. Women have suffered under each of these types of violence. A gendered view of violence gives a more complete picture of the causes and consequences surrounding conflict and security by bringing the role of passive violence, which exists through structural violence, into the research and conversation. Women bear the brunt of the negative effects of conflict. Some factors of a gendered perspective include women's role in the care for those who are wounded and for the communities that are left ravaged by warfare, and, increasingly, women as the victims of rape and other sexual violence by combatants. This leads to social exclusion, increased birthrates, and exposure to diseases such as HIV/AIDS.

It also accounts for the role that women play in all forms of conflict, not just as victims but as "warriors" in such struggles as those in colonial Africa against the imperial powers. A perspective on violence that accounts for gender differences, therefore, does not see women only as victims of conflict, and it also does not separate violence at the international, national, and family levels. Gender-sensitive viewpoints on conflict see these as interconnected realms within which violence must be addressed concurrently to move toward true security. In contrast, gender-blind or gender-oppressive worldviews perpetuate poverty and resource scarcity in ways that propagate conflict.

GENDER IN HEALTH CARE

Finally, the lack of women's rights extends to health care issues. The HIV/AIDS crisis exemplifies gender differences in the health and health care arenas. Women bear the onus of care giving for sick family and community members in both developed and developing countries. This adds to women's

already heavy domestic and economic loads. Women in developing countries, where HIV/AIDS rates are highest, often have little control over sexual or procreation decisions (such as frequency of intercourse or use of condoms), leading to increased health risks for women. Women also risk contracting HIV/AIDS due to economic necessity if they choose or are forced into prostitution to make a living. There is a gendered difference in how health crises play out, and one must take this difference into consideration to truly understand the politics of health care.

See also *AIDS, Politics of; Feminist Political Theory; Gender and Globalization.*

. . . . VIRGINIA PARISH BEARD

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Gender Mainstreaming

Gender mainstreaming has become the most common label used by academics and practitioners to describe any institutional strategy employed to incorporate gender issues into institutional practices, culture, and outcomes. As a result of its varying and widespread usage, however, there is no consensus or clarity about what gender mainstreaming is, what its potential is, or indeed whether efforts to implement gender mainstreaming have been a success or failure to date. There is more agreement as to a definition of gender mainstreaming. Emile Hafner-Burton and Mark Pollack (2002) cite the definition of gender mainstreaming used by the Council of Europe as the "(re)organization, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes so a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and all stages by key actors normally involved in policy-making" (p. 342).

Although gender mainstreaming first came to prominence at the Beijing Women's Conference in 1995 when governments and other actors were exhorted to "promote an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective in all policies and programmes," its origins lie in the shift from the liberal "women in development" policies to "gender and development" policies among academics and development practitioners in the 1980s. Gender mainstreaming was identified as a mechanism that could help to ensure that development policies became more relevant to women. A decade after the Beijing conference, it had been widely adopted by international, regional, and national institutions such as the European Union, World Bank, United Nations Development Programme, and Inter-American Development Bank.

Various explanations account for the apparent ease with which gender mainstreaming has been adopted by a range of organizations. For example, Emile Hafner-Burton and Mark Pollack (2002) and Jacqui True (2003) include favorable political opportunity structures, the strength of women's transnational networking, effective discursive framing, and the activities of gender policy entrepreneurs within institutions. However, there has been considerable debate among scholars such as Teresa Rees (1998) and Sylvia Walby (2005) about whether gender mainstreaming is integrationist, transformative, or agenda setting. Namely, does it simply introduce a gender perspective without challenging the existing policy paradigm and therefore can be promoted instrumentally on the basis that gender mainstreaming will enable other policy goals to be achieved more easily and efficiently? Or does gender mainstreaming result in more profound change—transforming and reorienting existing policy paradigms, prioritizing gender equality, and changing decision-making processes? Is it therefore a technocratic tool that makes claims to gender equality less radical, or an important feminist strategy that can make significant changes, or both simultaneously? Can gender mainstreaming be implemented by existing policy actors, or does it require more deliberative democratic processes? Or can it be implemented, as Walby, claims by a "velvet triangle" of academics, feminist bureaucrats, and organized women?

The overall assessment of gender mainstreaming's potential and success as a strategy therefore varies tremendously, depending on whether analysts have an integrationist or agenda-setting/transformative view of it. Skeptics, often arguing from a transformative perspective, claim that it has allowed the mainstream to tame claims to equality, whereas others (often integrationists) believe that the implementation of gender mainstreaming has achieved significant improvements. But, when one analyzes the impact of gender mainstreaming, it is important to recognize that formally adopting gender mainstreaming as a strategy is not the same as implementing it. Increasingly, it is acknowledged that it is necessary to evaluate what has happened in practice. In 2005 Caroline Moser provided a framework of three categories with which to evaluate gender mainstreaming: It can evaporate (when positive policy intentions are not followed through in practice), it can become invisible (when what happens on the ground is not captured by monitoring and evaluation procedures), and it can be resisted (essentially, when political opposition creates mechanisms that block gender mainstreaming). Her study of international organizations finds that although there has been significant rhetorical change—because much has been achieved in the initial stages of adopting the terminology and

creating the policies—the subsequent stages of implementation and evaluation have been more circumscribed, and the impact of gender mainstreaming is often less than had been anticipated. Different institutions and policy domains also vary considerably in the implementation and outcomes of their gender mainstreaming strategies. From the research that has been done to date, the different political opportunity structures, ways that issues are framed, and roles of actors inside and outside the institutions all affect whether gender mainstreaming is adopted and what happens to it in practice.

See also *Gender Issues; Women's Representation.*

. . . .   GEORGINA WAYLEN

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Gender Quotas

Gender quotas are a corrective measure used by political actors (e.g., political parties) to enhance representation of women in political and public institutions such as parliaments, councils, and parties. They require women or female candidates constitute a targeted minimum of the members of a publicly elected or appointed political body. Gender-neutral quotas establish a maximum percentage held by either gender.

Two kinds of quotas exist: legally binding quotas and voluntary party quotas. Legally binding quotas force all parties to nominate a specific percentage of women on their candidate lists as established by a constitution or legislated by electoral laws. There are two subcategories of legally binding quotas: reserved seats and legislative quotas. Reserved seats allocate to women a set percentage of seats in an assembly or council. Legislative quotas oblige parties to nominate a certain number of women on their slates for electoral office. The latter category, voluntary party quotas, is a quota provision that is regulated and enacted at the discretion of the parties. Parties set targets for the nomination of women on candidate slates and/or for offices within each party.

When supported by a variety of international and transnational actors such as the European Union and the African Union, quotas can be an effective way to address the underrepresentation of women. Quota provisions have helped to increase the number of female legislators in the past fifteen years from 11.5 percent of the national legislators in the mid-1990s to 16.9 percent in 2007. Out of the twenty countries with the most female deputies, 90 percent have some kind of quota clauses.

Reserved seats are applied in sixteen (mostly African and Asian) countries. In some of these countries, such as Kenya and Nepal, these provisions are minimal, reserving respectively 3 and 6 percent of the parliamentary seats to women. Other countries, including Rwanda, which has the highest percentage (48.8 percent) of female deputies globally, reserve up to 30 percent of their parliamentary seats for women.

Thirty-nine countries throughout the world have adopted legislative quotas. For some states, such as Armenia and Niger, the required numbers of women nominated are rather low and do not surpass 10 percent. Other countries, such as Brazil and Serbia, require parties to nominate thirty or more women on their candidate lists, but many parties in these states have not completely implemented the quota clauses, and women's representation in the national assemblies lags at less than 20 percent. However, in countries like Argentina, Belgium, and Costa Rica, women's representation has dramatically increased due to quota rules. For example, in Belgium, following a 33 percent quota provision, the number of female legislators more than doubled from 15 percent in 1995 to 35 percent in 2005. Generally, parties enact a quota rule if they risk sanctioning for noncompliance. If parties are not punished for not implementing the clause, they are typically lax in following these provisions.

Voluntary party quotas are the most frequently employed gender quotas. In total, 159 parties in sixty-eight countries have adopted this measure. Required percentages of women range from 20 to 50 percent and, depending on the party, are anywhere from minimally to completely implemented. The ruling party's enactment of quota clauses will directly affect the overall representation of women. For example, the African National Congress in South Africa completely executes its quota rule of 50 percent women and significantly enhances women's representation in the national assembly, which is at 33 percent. In most cases, party clauses have a direct impact on the number of female legislators of the party that has implemented the clause and an indirect influence on the nomination of women in other parties. The enactment of quota rules by one or more parties may pressure other parties to also include more women on their slates. In general, left and center-left parties are more inclined to adopt quotas than are conservative or center-right parties.

Quota rules are the subject of normative controversy. Supporters of quota provisions generally advocate that quotas benefit women as a group, promote equality of results, and establish gender as a category of political representation. This view sees quotas as a precondition for the effective implementation of mainstreaming strategies such as abortion rights, childcare provisions, or equal pay. Opponents contest quota rules on the grounds that these rules privilege groups over individuals, infringe on the opportunity for equality, and ignore more pressing social issues. Some research also questions the utility of quotas. According to this view, quota rules may limit or detract attention from gender-sensitive policy making and gender-differentiated policy outcomes, because women elected through quotas may either not pursue women-friendly policy change,

or they may be perceived as merely token representatives who have been put in place solely to fulfill a legislative policy.

See also *Gender and Politics; Gender Gap; Gender Issues; U.S. Politics and Society: Women, Political Participation of; Women Legislators; Women's Representation; Women's Rights.*

. . . .   DANIEL STOCKEMER

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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) emerged as a "temporary" intergovernmental organization in 1947. It served as a negotiating forum promoting multilateral trade liberalization. Despite its small secretariat and uncertain status, it promoted significant reductions in tariffs, but it was supplanted in 1995 by the World Trade Organization in response to persistent shortcomings.

Following World War II (1939–1945), the Bretton Woods framers of postwar economic arrangements hoped to create a formal international trade organization (ITO) that would liberalize trade, regulate investment flows and international commodity agreements, and promote development. When negotiation to form an ITO broke down, smaller talks among fifteen leading western trading nations (led by the United States) became the de facto forum for discussion of multilateral trade liberalization. The GATT sprung from these talks. While only twenty-three countries, or "contracting parties," signed the first round of GATT tariff reductions in 1948, through successive rounds, the treaty expanded to include over 110 countries in the 1990s.

While the GATT was based in Geneva, its principle preoccupation was negotiating tariff reductions through a series of multilateral trade "rounds." Often these rounds were hosted elsewhere, giving the name to each negotiating round (e.g., the last two rounds were the Tokyo and Uruguay rounds). Each round was guided by a set of GATT principles intended to ensure liberalization; these included the principle of reciprocity, the "most favored nation" provision (which required that members give the same market access to all members that they give to their most favored trading partner), and "national treatment" (which required that states not discriminate against foreign goods). Within these principles, each round focused on binding states to further reductions in existing trade barriers.

Early GATT rounds were undoubtedly successful at achieving tariff reductions. Over the forty-seven year period in which GATT was the key multilateral trade IGO, trade consistently grew at a faster rate than did the size of domestic economies, suggesting that GATT promoted deeper economic integration, which many associate with economic growth. Indeed, most states flocked to join GATT, given its successes.

Prior to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, however, the GATT appeared increasingly incapable of dealing with the competing agendas of developing and developed countries on politically sensitive issues such as agricultural trade and the expansion of GATT coverage. As tariffs were successfully reduced, negotiators from developed states turned to the removal of more complex forms of trade protectionism. These "nontariff barriers" proved harder to eliminate, because they required deeper coordination of domestic public policies in areas that were politically more sensitive. Demands that the GATT should also include trade in services, investment, and intellectual property only further overstressed its informal structures. Both the Tokyo and Uruguay rounds focused on these types of "post-border paradigm" concerns, and both took much longer to complete than earlier rounds, drawing attention to the shortcomings of the GATT system. Perhaps most problematically, the GATT lacked an effective dispute settlement system, meaning GATT rules were often violated.

Given these problems, the most important outcome of the Uruguay Round was the agreement to supplant the GATT with the more-formally organized World Trade Organization (WTO). The GATT remains the key treaty within the WTO structure, but it has now been joined by treaties covering services, investment, and intellectual property—all under the supervision of the WTO, with its larger permanent secretariat and more effective dispute settlement system.

See also *Free Trade; Globalization; Intellectual Property Rights; Nontariff Barriers to Trade; North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); Trade Blocs; Trade Diplomacy; World Trade Organization (WTO).*

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General Assembly, United Nations (UN)

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is the plenary and main deliberative organ of the UN. In the UNGA

and its six main committees, all member states of the UN (i.e., today this means practically all states of the world) are represented. While the size of national delegations is variable, each state commands only one vote. In addition, some nonmember states, liberation movements, and international organizations participate in the work of the UNGA without the right to vote. The UNGA combines a quasi-parliamentary operation mode and a quasi-legislative output with the substance of an intergovernmental agency in which representatives bound by imperative mandate carry out the will of their governments ("parliamentary diplomacy"). Sessions of the UNGA usually start in mid-September, and the main workload is done by mid-December. From the period 1946 to 2007, the General Assembly conducted sixty-two regular (annual) sessions, twenty-eight special sessions, and ten emergency special sessions.

The UNGA controls the budget of the UN, reviews annual reports from other UN organs, including the Security Council, and elects the Security Council's members (apart from its permanent members). The UNGA has the right to discuss any matters within the scope of the UN Charter or relating to UN organs, and—except for matters under consideration by the Security Council—it may make recommendations to the member states of the UN and to the Security Council. Therefore, the UNGA is primarily a general discussion forum used by the governments of the world, with foreign ministers and heads of government frequently participating in the general debate.

UNGA resolutions with an outreach beyond the UN sphere are nonbinding. Nonetheless, they entail a measure of moral obligation and normative standard, at least for the assenting states, in particular when a consensual decision has been made by all governments of the world. Decisions made by the General Assembly on important questions are reached by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions include recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of members to UN organs, the admission of new members to the UN, and budgetary questions. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, are made by a majority of the members. A frequently used instrument in the UN ballots is abstention. The practice of consensual decision making has gained ground in the UNGA since the 1960s due to its affinity with the principle of sovereign statehood and a widening gap between power in world politics and voting power in the UNGA.

In 1944, the initial great power proposals for the UN provided for a rather limited role of the General Assembly. As a result of the combined effort of other powers, the authority and scope of activity of the UNGA was strengthened at the UN Charter conference in 1945. Later, the stalemate of the potentially more powerful UN Security Council in the cold war made the UNGA the most important UN organ. In 1950, with the enactment of the so-called Uniting for Peace resolution, the UNGA even managed to change the constitutional order of the UN and enabled itself to bypass the

Security Council if that council failed to act because of the veto of a permanent member. However, when the process of decolonization changed the membership structure of the UN, the automatic UNGA majority of the United States faded to the benefit of a majority of developing countries (the "Group of 77"). This shift in voting power in the UNGA implied a detachment from economic and military power, limiting the influence and actual impact of the General Assembly. Since the 1990s, the revitalization of the UNGA has been a standing political catchword in the UN. This idea is related to the political economy of new public management, but it is not clear to what kind of vitality it refers.

In the UNGA, the tension between the principle of sovereign statehood and the representation of people has formally been solved to the benefit of the former: The vote of the government of Micronesia has the same weight as that of the government of China. Nonetheless, the UNGA is frequently referred to as the "parliament of man." Suggestions to apply the principle of weighted voting are legion and as old as the UN. They imply, apart from improved proportional representation, a better congruence of voting power in the UNGA and other types of power. Moreover, some proposals suggest the representation of various shades of political opinion within the single member states or that representatives be elected directly by the people. Similar suggestions concern the establishment of a "second assembly" or "UN parliamentary assembly" alongside the UNGA. While all such proposals are utopian, they give evidence of humanity's century-old dreams about a world polity and the central role of the UNGA for the imaginary surplus of the UN, pointing beyond the mere intergovernmental cooperation of now.

See also *United Nations (UN).*

. . . .   NORBERT GÖTZ

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General Will

Although he was neither the first nor the last to use it, the concept of the general will is inextricably linked to the political thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). In a number of works, but especially his *Social Contract* (1762), Rousseau argues that a just political society is one in which the citizens promote and obey the general will. In developing this argument, Rousseau insists that the general will is not to be confused with "the will of all," that it is always right, that it is to be found on the side of the majority when votes are counted, and that those who refuse to follow it must be "forced to be free."

Such enigmatic and apparently outrageous claims have led to much controversy about the meaning and coherence of this concept in Rousseau's thought. Unsympathetic critics have long dismissed what he says about the general will as either vacuous or incoherent nonsense; some have deemed it downright dangerous. In *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy,* for instance, Jacob Talmon (1960) charges Rousseau with "dangerous ambiguity" (p. 40), because the general will points toward both democracy, in its attention to the will of the people, and totalitarianism. The danger, Talmon says, is that Rousseau's general will "gives those who claim to know and to represent the real and ultimate will of the nation . . . a blank cheque to act on behalf of the people, without reference to the people's actual will" (p. 48; see also Lester Crocker's 1968 *Rousseau's Social Contract: An Interpretive Essay*).

Sympathetic interpretations of Rousseau's thought tend to begin with a fundamental distinction he draws between *man* and *citizen.* That is, Rousseau holds that we may think of every member of the body politic in two ways: first, as a unique individual with a particular set of interests—a human, and second, as a public person who shares a common interest in the welfare of the body politic—a citizen. As a human, everyone has a *private will* that aims at his or her particular good or personal interests, but as a citizen, everyone has a *general will* that aims at the common good or public interest. The general will is different from the "will of all," then, because the latter is the sum of private wills. If every voter decides whether to vote for or against a tax increase simply on the basis of personal costs and benefits, for example, the result of the vote will be the will of all. But if they all vote as citizens, in an effort to promote the common good, the result should be the general will.

Understood in this way, Rousseau's other statements about the general will seem less enigmatic and outrageous, if not always clear and compelling. Thus it happens that the general will is always right, for the will of the citizen by definition aims to promote the common good. The general will is to be found in the vote of the majority, moreover, because the majority is more likely than those in the minority to be right about which policies really will serve the common good (on this point, see Brian Barry's "The Public Interest," 1964). Finally, individuals who break the law must be "forced to be free," because their disobedience is the act of *humans* who act contrary to their will as *citizens.* People who know, as citizens, that paying taxes is necessary, yet nevertheless try to avoid paying their share, are refusing to obey the general will. Such a person, Rousseau says, hopes to "enjoy the rights of the citizen without wanting to fulfill the duties of a subject, an injustice whose spread would cause the ruin of the body politic" (see Rousseau, 1978, 55). Forcing such people to be free is thus a matter of being forced to obey the laws that they freely agree to as citizens.

Other philosophers who make significant use of the general will in their writings include Georg W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) and the British idealists T. H. Green (1836–1882) and Bernard Bosanquet (1848–1923), although all gave the concept a more metaphysical cast than Rousseau did.

See also *Hegel, Georg W. F.; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques.*

. . . . RICHARD DAGGER

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Geneva Conventions

The Geneva Conventions are a series of treaties concerning the treatment of prisoners and civilians in times of war. The Geneva Conventions have a long history and were developed over many years and through a number of wars.

THE HISTORY OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS

In 1864, in Geneva, Switzerland, twelve European nations enacted the Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, formally known as the Red Cross Convention. It was ratified by most major powers by 1867 and later by the United States in 1882. The Convention provided basic protections for the ambulances, hospitals, and medical personnel of all armies, including civilian personnel treating wounded soldiers. It was the first treaty to recognize the red cross as a universal symbol to identify medical personnel.

In 1906, also in Geneva, thirty-five nations created the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field. It, too, was formally known to as the Red Cross Convention. It superseded, yet maintained the effectiveness of, the Red Cross Convention of 1864. It expanded protections for soldiers who were sick and

wounded to include protection from robbery and ill treatment. It also required certain protections for the dead and for material used in the care of the sick and wounded soldiers.

The next of the Geneva Conventions treaties was enacted at The Hague on October 18, 1907, by forty-four nations. It was titled the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of Principles of the 1906 Geneva Convention; it applied the principles adopted in the 1906 Geneva Convention to maritime warfare and outlined specific protections for hospital ships.

On July 27, 1929, again in Geneva, forty-seven nations, including the United States, enacted the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field along with Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Like the previous two meetings in Geneva concerning the treatment of soldiers and civilians during times of war, it was formally known as the Red Cross Convention. It superseded the Red Cross Conventions of 1864 and 1906, and it presented additional protections, including reporting of compliance with the protections to a neutral information agency, routine inspection of POW facilities by medical personnel, protection for medical aircraft, and suppression of abuse through domestic legal means. During World War II (1939–1945), this Geneva Convention was in force.

After the experiences of World War II, the major nations of the world met to improve the protections granted by the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Conventions. On August 12, 1949, in Geneva, Switzerland, the nations enacted the four current Geneva Conventions.

THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS TODAY

Geneva Convention I, the Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, provided and expanded the protections of the Geneva Convention of 1929. Both medical and religious personnel were included in the protections, as were civilians and laborers attached to military forces in the field and those inhabitants of invaded areas who spontaneously took up arms to resist an approaching enemy. The Convention prohibited the military forces holding prisoners of war from discriminating based on the prisoners' sex, race, nationality, religion, and political opinion. The Convention also required that the military forces publicly identify the combatants or civilians who were being held in custody or who had died and that all prisoners of war had the right to a fair trial and defense if accused of wrongdoing.

Geneva Convention II, the Convention for the Amelioration of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, revised the Tenth Hague Convention of 1907 and applied the same protections expressed in Geneva Convention I of 1949 for maritime personnel and medical vessels, although restrictions were placed on hospital ships such that they could not be used for military purposes and could not use secret codes.

Geneva Convention III, the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, incorporated Geneva Convention I, providing the same protections as the Geneva Convention of 1929 but clarifying and expanding them. It defined as a prisoner of war the following classes of captured persons: a member of the armed forces; a member of a militia or volunteer corps; a member of a resistance group that has distinctive emblems capable of being seen at a distance, openly carries arms, and acts in accordance with the laws of war; civilians or laborers attached to military forces; and civilians who spontaneously take up arms to resist an approaching enemy and who respect the laws of war. Prisoners of war were required to provide certain identifying information, which the captors were required to report to the prisoners' home nations. Prisoners had to be given reasonable food, water, shelter, clothing, and medical care; were allowed to be used for certain labor, but had to be removed from the war zone; and were allowed to make complaints but were subject to judicial or disciplinary proceedings for misconduct.

Geneva Convention IV, the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, addressed how to treat civilians in a war zone, which had not been addressed by the previous Geneva Conventions. Under Geneva Convention IV, a civilian not taking active part in the hostilities was to be treated without violence, with honor, with respect for family rights, with respect for religious practices, and with no insults or humiliation. They were to be protected from coercion designed to obtain information about third parties and were to suffer no discrimination based on race, religion, age, sex, or political opinions. They could be compelled to work in occupations relative to necessary food, shelter, clothing, transport, or medical services, all of which had to be nonmilitary, and they had to be paid wages. Civilians could be interned, but only if absolutely necessary, and internees had to be allowed access to the courts. Internees were generally afforded the same protections presented in Geneva Convention I—they had to be allowed reasonable food, water, clothing, shelter, medical care, and religious activities and access to a canteen to purchase goods at market value. All internees had to be reported to the protecting power and were to be allowed communication and receive relief consignments. If they were charged with misconduct, they were to be given a fair trial and the right to appeal. The occupying power could requisition food, medical supplies, or other goods from them only when fair market value was paid and civilian needs were taken into account.

As with all political solutions to political problems, the Geneva Conventions have not fully solved the problems concerning the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians. Enforcement is difficult. However, they are an attempt to bring some humanity to the otherwise inhumane activity of war.

See also *Human Rights; International Law; International Norms; Prisoners of War (POW).*

. . . .   WM. C. PLOUFFE JR.

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Genocide

A concept created by Raphael Lemkin in 1944, the term *genocide* was originally used for Nazi patterns of state violence against the European Jewish populations during World War II (1939–1945). The word combines the Greek prefix for race or tribe (geno-) with the Latin suffix for killing/murder (-cide). The most frequently cited examples of genocide include the Holocaust during World War II, the "killing fields" of Cambodia in the 1970s, the "100 days" in Rwanda in 1994, and the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 1995.

In 1948, Lemkin's concept of genocide was codified and established as an international crime through the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The convention defined the term as "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such." It is important to note that the convention's definition does not include the targeting of political, ideological, economic, professional, or other groups. Genocide refers solely to groups one is born into, what Rudolph Rummel (1994) refers to as "indelible groups."

As defined by the convention, overt acts of genocide include (1) killing members of the group, (2) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, (3) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, (4) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and (5) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

In addition to defining the crime of genocide, Article 1 of the UN (United Nations) Genocide Convention calls on signatories "to prevent and to punish" genocide whether it is committed in times of war or peace. The responsibility for the prosecution of genocide currently rests with the International Criminal Court (ICC). Created by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998, the ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

The enforcement of the UN Genocide Convention and the prosecution of genocide are problematized by its definition. The concept, the behavior, and the designation of relevant actors, as such, are highly contested on numerous grounds. First, identifying and proving the intent of the perpetrator is extremely difficult. Because of the legal obligation to prove that the specific and targeted destruction of a group was the intended act of the perpetrator, governments and prosecutors have favored the more broadly defined charge of "crimes against humanity." Violent acts against a group without the intent of that group's total destruction could be prosecuted as crimes against humanity but would not meet the threshold of evidence necessary for the charge of genocide.

Second, the manifestation of genocidal behavior has been problematic to define. Although biased toward extremely violent, overt, short-term activities such as mass killing, the concept of genocide can also be applied to relatively less violent, covert, long-term activities such as depriving a group of access to water with the intent of that group's imminent destruction. The latter is similar to the "structural violence" discussed by Johan Galtung (1969). In addition to structural violence, systematic acts of targeted destruction such as mass rape are increasingly being considered for prosecution under the Genocide Convention.

Third, while the original focus of the crime is on the perpetration of genocide by political authorities (government officials, militaries, police, and militias), it is possible for actors unaffiliated with these authorities to undertake relevant genocidal activities (e.g., rebels and revolutionaries). The attention on governments is largely explained by their affiliation with the largest and most famous instances of genocide as well as the fact that to engage in relevant behavior, the perpetrator would generally need access to resources that only political authorities would have at their disposal: lethal weapons, extensive human resources, and large-scale administrative capability.

The concept, behavior, and designations of actors are not the only controversial elements involved. Exactly what is to be done when genocide is identified is another complex matter. Following World War II, there was an informal claim among advanced, democratic nations that they would "never again" allow something like the Holocaust to occur, but the record of stopping such abuse seems at face value to be lacking. Designations of genocide are few, and even when specific behavior has been so labeled by one member nation, there are ways that other signatories can block, delay, or completely undermine the initial effort preventing intervention and contributing to impunity.

See also *Crime against Humanity; Holocaust; International Criminal Court (ICC); War Crimes.*

. . . . CHRISTIAN DAVENPORT AND CYANNE E. LOYLE

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Genocide, Armenian

See *Armenian Genocide.*

Gentile, Giovanni

Giovanni Gentile (1875–1944) was an Italian philosopher, educator, and politician. As a neo-Hegelianist, he developed an extremely rigid form of idealism referred to as "actual idealism" or "actualism." He eventually considered himself the "philosopher of Fascism," even though he showed an interest for this movement only after the success of the 1922 March on Rome, which brought fascist Italian dictator Benito Mussolini to power. In fact, some of Gentile's most important philosophical works, such as *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act* (1916) and *Logic as Theory of Knowledge* (1917) were written before the rise of fascism in Italy.

Born in Castelvetrano, Sicily, Gentile soon discovered his vocation for philosophy, joining the faculty of the University of Palermo in 1906 and subsequently moving to Pisa (1914) and Rome (1917). Between 1922 and 1924, he held the post of minister of education and implemented a complete reform of the Italian educational system. While minister he also took on the challenge of developing an ideological and cultural agenda for the Fascist Party that would rely greatly on his own philosophical views. Following publication of his 1925 "Manifesto of Fascist Intellectuals," he became involved with a number of cultural and scholarly initiatives, including the National Fascist Institute of Culture, the National Institute for Germanic Studies, the Italian Institute for the Far and Middle East, and the National Centre for Manzonian Studies. He also edited the *Italian Encyclopedia* (1932).

Despite these associations, Gentile's relations with the fascist regime were uneasy at times. Gentile vehemently opposed the signing of the 1929 Lateran Pacts with the Holy See, and many of his works were eventually banned by the Catholic Church. He also opposed the 1940 alliance with Germany and Japan (the Tripartite Pact). However, he supported Mussolini and the Salò Republic until his assassination by communist partisans in April 1944, eleven months before Mussolini's own assassination.

Gentile's philosophical views supported the idea that only "concrete acts" can define reality, which on its own is simply an abstract set of unrelated phenomena. Reality is therefore an extension of the individual who sets its terms; it is not something exterior to the individual. Thought in action ("pure acts") implies the merging of subjects and objects, theory and practice, past and present. Countering materialism, realism, and positivism, Gentile rejected externalized historical dialectics and emphasized the confrontation between subjectivity (thesis), objectivity (antithesis), and philosophy (synthesis). Philosophy cannot be disassociated from life, or vice versa, as its purpose is to guide it through "thought in action."

In *Genesi e Struttura della Società* (1943), Gentile argues that the autonomous individual is nothing but a formal abstraction, because in reality, state and individual cannot be separated. His legal-naturalist views characterized the state as an eternal unifying and organic condition capable of overcoming individualized interests, thus providing a philosophical legitimization for fascist corporatism. Through the control of the state, fascism would shape a new antimaterialist and spiritual consciousness with mystical proportions. In spite of this, Gentile also considered himself a liberal, but he believed individual freedom could occur only within the authoritarian state capable of moderating and unifying divergent interests.

See also *Fascism; Italian Political Thought; Political Philosophy.*

. . . . JOÁM EVANS PIM

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Geopolitics

The concept of geopolitics is widely used in the public domain by politicians, journalists, policy analysts, and academics. As a result of its broad usage, providing a precise, succinct definition of the term is nearly impossible. In the academic world, the concept of geopolitics is used in many disciplines of the social sciences. Political scientists, economists, geographers, and historians all use the concept widely as well, but with differing meanings.

In most general terms, the term *geopolitics* refers to simple visualizations of relationships or concepts in world politics. At the end of the cold war, for example, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill predicted that an "iron curtain" would come down over Europe virtually separating the East from the West. A more recent example is the "axis of evil," a term used by U.S. President George W. Bush in 2002 to describe the connections of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq to a group of rogue states. In short, geopolitical descriptions in this sense provide a geographical simplification of international relations.

Geopolitical activities, however, are not solely conducted by states and their governments. International organizations such as the United Nations (UN) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), nongovernmental organizations such as Amnesty International, private multinational businesses, and supranational institutions such as the European Union (EU) are also geopolitical actors. They not only influence international decision-making processes but also have a stake in world politics in terms of strategic, military, political, economic, social, and environmental issues.

Swedish political science professor Rudolf Kjellen first used *geopolitics* as a scholarly term in 1899. His approach to geopolitics can be termed the "realist approach"—he emphasized the role

of territory and resources in political decision making. World politics at the time was divided into states and empires as well as sea and land powers. Specifically, geopolitics was the intersection of politics and geography. British geographer Halford Mackinder then promoted the term to endorse the field of geography as an aid to British statecraft abroad. During the Nazi regime, models of *Lebensraum* (the need for more "living space," a justification for the German invasion of Europe during World War II) and autarky (a state's ability to be politically self-sufficient) were added to the concept of geopolitics. German political geographer Friedrich Ratzel presented the state as a natural organism that flourished or died with the struggle among states in an anarchic world. The term *geopolitics* was associated with fascist ideology of the 1930s and 1940s, so it is thus not surprising that after World War II (1939–1945) the concept fell into disuse.

With the beginning of the cold war in late 1949, the scholarly concept of geopolitics was transformed and the term acquired a new meaning. With the birth of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 and the ascendance of the doctrine of containment and deterrence, the term came to refer to geostrategy in pursuit of particular diplomatic and military goals. For the rest of the twentieth century, the scholarly concept of geopolitics was extended to strategic regions in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Europe. Particular attention was paid to the struggle between the two superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union. With the end of the cold war in 1989, the concept of geopolitics was amended again, and the debate shifted from geostrategy to geoeconomics—the primacy of economics in international affairs—in the post–cold war era.

See also *International Relations Theory; Political Geography; Political Theory.*

. . . .   BENJAMIN ZYLA

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George, Alexander L.

Alexander George (1920–2006) was an American political scientist and scholar of international relations. He saw the role of the political scientist in a democratic polity as that of scholar-advisor to the policy maker. He was particularly concerned about the origin of foreign policy crisis and the management of crisis abroad by democracies. At the heart of this management advice was international relations theory, which he differentiated in terms of substance and process.

Substantive theory encompassed mediation and dispute resolution, deterrence, détente, and crisis management. It was always tied to specific historical events such as the Korean War (1950–1953) or the termination of World War I (1914–1918). Motivation for the development of such theory stemmed from the practical desire to understand why wars started, how they ended, or whether important diplomatic signals were missed.

Process theory involved the attempt to improve the quality of foreign policy decision making. A central task was to identify "malfunctions" in decision making. George rejected the assumption that all decision making was necessarily rational. Moreover, process theory distinguished two kinds of decision-making rationality: technical rationality and value rationality. Normative considerations could, and sometimes might have to, enter into theory via process.

While at the Rand Corporation from 1948 to 1968, and later at Stanford University, George focused on an evaluation of deterrence theory and its operation during crises such as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, during which the Soviet Union sought to place missile installations in Cuba during the cold war arms race. In 1975 he received the Bancroft Prize for the book *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy* (1974) that he coauthored with Richard Smoke.

George tackled the subtleties of concept with very precise language. Illustrative of this is his use of the term *coercive diplomacy* for the concept of "compellence" proposed by American economist Thomas Schelling. George preferred the notion of coercive diplomacy, because he believed that it preserved the distinction between offensive and defensive uses of coercive threat, a conceptual delineation that ultimately held great significance for strategic literature.

Deeply psychological, George's analysis of decision making frequently employed case studies. He also offered a profound critique of structural realism. First, he argued that international relations theorist Kenneth Waltz's reformulation of the understanding of realism as espoused by German-born American political scientist Hans Morgenthau was not a theory in the sense that it could be invalidated or refuted scientifically. Second, George claimed that structural realism ignored the asymmetry of motivation that often allowed weaker states to eclipse the greater power of a stronger state. Third, he noted that the greater scope of interests of the larger state, often proposed as a positive characteristic of great power diplomacy, was actually a liability, because it discouraged focus and concentration of resources to achieve a maximum payoff.

Instead of neorealist, game theoretical, or rational choice interpretations of international politics, George advocated a three-fold approach to strategic assessment. He believed that "generic knowledge" of strategy was necessary. A model of actor-specific behavior was also essential. Finally, an abstract conceptual model linked to policy makers' judgment was no less crucial. All of this had to incorporate specific intelligence and information as well if it was to be of assistance to the policy maker. In the end, George was an influential voice favoring policy-relevant knowledge in international relations that would help prevent as well as manage foreign policy crises.

See also *Foreign Policy; International Relations; International Relations Theory; Morganthau, Hans Joachim.*

. . . .   CHARLES F. DORAN

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George, Henry

Henry George (1839–1897) was an American political economist whose works have influenced social and political theorists of the left and the right and whose books sold in the millions. An opponent of private monopolies in business and state interference in economic matters, George's primary influence has been on libertarian social theory. He is perhaps best known for his support of a single tax on land or land value tax.

George was particularly concerned about privately controlled resource enterprises, especially mining interests, and land speculators. His analysis suggested that private control over land explained why wealth and poverty under capitalism advanced simultaneously. As population in an area grows, the land also grows in value, thus requiring that those who work it pay more to do so. An opponent of natural monopolies, George called for taxation, regulation, and limited state ownership. He argued for state-operated telegraph services, control of railroad tracks, and municipal control of water supplies.

George's most influential contribution to economic theory is perhaps his advocacy of a single tax on land. For George, the economic rent gained from land should be shared socially rather than be controlled by private interests. In his best-known work, *Progress and Poverty* (1879), George argues that a large proportion of the wealth created through social and technological development in a market economy becomes concentrated in the hands of monopolists by way of economic rents, and this is the primary cause of poverty in capitalist economies. Collecting private profit by restricting access to natural resources upon which all depend for survival amounts to a system of theft and slavery. This is made even worse given that productive activity such as industrial works were burdened by taxes while land values were not.

George regarded natural resources as the product of nature rather than human labor or initiative and believed that as such, they should not provide the basis by which individuals acquire revenues. Nature as the common heritage of all humanity must be made a common property of society as a whole. George advocated taxation of unimproved land value as a way to share land wealth socially without employing a policy of land dispossession and nationalization. This single land tax would allow the state to remove taxes on all other, more productive, economic undertakings and transactions. George's ideas have recently been taken up by environmentalists who view the earth as the common property of all species. Such environmental economists are also seeking to reduce the economic practice of treating ecological damage as an externality in which private interests hold monopoly control over profits while shifting the social and economic burden of ecological harm onto society.

George's positions also reveal the contradictory nature of much of libertarian theory. His fondness for supposedly free markets did not include labor markets and the free flow of working people in search of employment. George was an active supporter of immigration restrictions, and the articles that brought him his earliest notoriety expressed his opposition to Chinese immigration into the United States. According to George, the willingness of poor immigrants to accept lower wages had the negative effect of driving down wages for all working people. While this argument has been taken up by contemporary conservative opponents of immigration, progressives and labor activists have pointed out that the real issue is one of working-class organization and power within the labor market, including immigrant and domestic workers, rather than immigration itself.

George's works have influenced generations of social and political theorists, both progressive and conservative. Prominent figures influenced include Fabian socialist and playwright George Bernard Shaw, anarchist author Leo Tolstoy, and Chinese nationalist and revolutionary Sun Yat Sen. American civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. took up George's call for a guaranteed minimum income as a defense against extremes of poverty, while conservative economists such as Milton Friedman praised George's views on free trade. Contemporary anarchists such as the market anarchists associated with the Molinari Institute claim George as an influence.

See also *Anarchism; Conservatism; Libertarianism; Mutualism.*

. . . . JEFF SHANTZ

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German Political Thought

German political thought is an equivocal concept that may be best understood in the way of a Wittgensteinian "family resemblance." While the adjective *German* can be understood to refer to a core of works written in German, by Germans, and reflecting the institutional, social, and cultural context of Germany, the use of *linguae francae* and the fragmented history of Germany prevent unambiguous demarcations. Additionally, the domain of the "political" does not coincide with contingent disciplinary boundaries: next to the political thinkers, theologians, jurists, economists, sociologists, and others have made important contributions. Therefore, who does and does not belong to German political thought will always be controversial. With these reservations in mind, one may trace certain currents of German political thought in their historical development (e.g., idealism, romanticism, critical theory) and perhaps even identify something "typically German" in each

author without succumbing to the illusion that the "typical" must be the same in all of them.

THE PROTESTANT TRADITION

A suitable starting point is the man who shaped the modern German language with his translation of the Bible: Martin Luther (1483–1546). Of course, the great church reformer was first and foremost a theologian, but his quest for a purified theology entailed the breakup of the medieval unity of theology, philosophy, politics, and law. In the context of his fights with papal and imperial authority, his distinction between a temporal and a spiritual regiment and his affirmation of both in *On Secular Authority* (1523) ended up serving the rise of national particularism and the territorial state. Authoritarian elements in his thought are undeniable: Because all men are sinners, God has subjected them to the "law and sword" of worldly authority; they must not revolt, not even against a tyrannical government. At the same time, by limiting the worldly regiment to matters of life, limb, and property, by insisting on the *Freedom of a Christian* (1520), and by advocating the "priesthood of all believers," Luther provided powerful figures of thought that could later be used to argue for freedom of conscience, the primacy of the moral law, and representative government. These achievements are derogated by the anti-Jewish diatribes in his last works, *On the Jews and Their Lies* (1543), which are often cited in attempts to explain why Germans succumbed to the anti-Semitic Nazi regime 400 years later.

The effort to extricate politics from its entanglement with theology, philosophy, and jurisprudence, while keeping it compatible with Protestant doctrine, also permeates the work of the Calvinist jurist Johannes Althusius (1557–1638). In his *Politica, Methodice Digesta* (1614), he propagates the idea of a "symbiotic" commonwealth or "consociation" that Michael Lessnoff (1986) described as a "'contractualized' version of Aristotle...."With this,Althusius originated the peculiar social contract theory of German natural law that the distinguished legal scholar Otto von Gierke (1841–1921) later tried to pass off as the standard version. Contrary to Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Fichte, this tradition posits not one social contract but (at least) two: a treaty of association (*pactum unionis*) and a treaty of subjugation (*pactum subjectionis*).

NATURAL LAW

The German natural law tradition gained weight and widespread dissemination through Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694), who produced the most influential natural law philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Writing against the background of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) and in critical appropriation of the ideas of Grotius and Hobbes, Pufendorf elaborated a system of rights and obligations pertaining to individuals and political associations under a secular natural law, emphasizing sociality as its basis: In order to be safe, humans must be sociable. In Germany, his work gave rise to an important natural law school that included Christian Thomasius and Christian Wolff. Abroad, Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Madison were among the authors who picked up some of his ideas.

GERMAN IDEALISM: KANT, FICHTE, HEGEL

In terms of international impact, arguably no one rivals the main representatives of what became known as German idealism: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Although these authors never thought of themselves as a group or movement, they explored roughly similar approaches to fundamental philosophical problems by asking how the thinking subject should conceive of itself, the external world, and the relation between them. Political matters are discussed within this comprehensive framework and with quite different results by Kant, Fichte, and Hegel (and not much at all by Schelling).

Immanuel Kant's (1724–1804) contributions to political thought were undervalued for a long time, mostly because his groundbreaking treatises on theoretical and moral philosophy, including *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781/1787), *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), and *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), drew so much attention. This has changed, not least because of the homage paid by John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and others. Kant is the paradigmatic enlightenment thinker, believing in reason and progress. He viewed the social contract as an idea of reason, demanding that reason's moral law of justice and right—related to, but not identical with, the famous "categorical imperative"—set the normative imperative for politics. Reason requires (1) a republican constitutional order within states, (2) a republican order between states, and (3) a rudimentary cosmopolitan order beyond the state. Among other things, these demands made Kant one of the progenitors of democratic peace theory.

Like Kant, whom he admired, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) built an impressive philosophical system of which the legal and political philosophy forms an important but sometimes neglected part. In a characteristic "idealist" move, the fundamental principles of law and justice (*Recht*) that are to govern the analysis and practice of politics are deduced from the axiom that a finite reasonable being cannot comprehend itself without ascribing itself a free will. Fichte's attempt to show how the state ought to be reformed to conform ever more to reason's ideal results in the model of a "closed commercial state" where freedom is maximized by a socialist order and command economy.

The attempts to capture the world's totality in a single philosophical system find their climax in the work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), Fichte's successor at the University of Berlin. Convinced that he is living in a time of world-historical transformation (and not modest about his own role in it), Hegel aims for a philosophical system that gives truth its genuine form. His *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (1821) is a classic of political thought in its own right, but his lasting influence has to be attributed equally to philosophical ideas developed elsewhere, especially the concept of *Geist* ("spirit" or "mind"), the *dialectic* as a logical and ontological principle, and the philosophy of history informed by these concepts. Hegel portrays history as the rational/reasonable process of *Geist* coming to realize itself by becoming ever more self-conscious, objectifying itself in particular forms of

social, political, and cultural life (e.g., the "rational" modern nation-state), and creating the external world, all in a series of dialectical moves. The intriguing breadth and depth of Hegel's philosophy—and its notorious complexity—continue to inspire and provoke. Diverse thinkers and movements owe it great debts, among them the Frankfurt school and communitarianism.

MARX AND ENGELS

Hegel's most influential disciple and critic, however, was Karl Marx (1818–1883). If judged by his own statement in *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845) that philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways while the point is to change it, Marx has been vindicated. Even though one must not confuse Marx's ideas with Marxist ideology (Marxism), the works of Marx and his lifelong friend and collaborator Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) were fundamental for the socialist and communist movements that came to dominate the fate of so many.

The crucial shift in Marx's thinking occurred when he parted company with the "Young Hegelians" like Bruno Bauer and Ludwig Feuerbach and turned the critique of religion and philosophy into a critique of the socioeconomic conditions of human life. Drawing on German idealism, French utopian socialism, and British political economy, Marx and Engels then fashioned a view of history, society, economy, and politics that puts labor, the "conditions of production," and the concomitant class system at the center. For them, the "forces of production" define the relations of power and constitute the economic base of society, on which rises a political and legal superstructure that codifies and reinforces the domination of one class over the other. History is seen as a sequence of class struggles driven by material factors (dialectical materialism, historical materialism) that will find resolution only in a world revolution, the transitional "dictatorship of the proletariat," and the final stage of a classless and stateless society. Today, scientific socialism, Marx's and Engels's theoretical edifice, has been largely torn apart, but many of its building blocks are still in use, be it in the general political dictionary (alienation, surplus value, class, expropriation, bourgeoisie, etc.), or in the methodological toolkit of sociology and history, or in the antiglobalization movement that builds on Marx's analysis of capitalism.

GERMAN ROMANTICISM

Marx was not the first to step out of German idealism's shadow. Right on idealism's heels, a movement formed that shares pride of place with it among German contributions to the world of thought and culture: romanticism. While customarily regarded as a movement in literature and the arts, the romantics' insistence on the importance of individual feelings and the needs of the soul naturally led to political ideas of prime importance, most notably an organic conception of society that sought to combine the values of individual self-realization and community life.

From a political perspective, the pivotal members of the Romantic circle were the author Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829),

the theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), and the poets Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843) and Friedrich von Hardenberg, called Novalis (1772–1801). As much as romanticism was a reaction against idealism, the former was beholden to the latter, which is why Fichte and Schelling are usually mentioned in treatises on either one. Likewise, the romantics yearned to go beyond the classicism personified by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805), and Christoph Martin Wieland (1733–1813). On the periphery of their movement, one finds the fourth member of the quadrumvirate of "Weimar Classicism": Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), who is customarily credited with creating nationalism and historicism as political theories.

NIETZSCHE

If Marx was the revolutionary who upended the great systematic constructions of German idealism by "standing Hegel on his feet," his near-contemporary Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) was the subversive free spirit who tried to undermine its very foundations. Nietzsche casts into doubt the metaphysical certainties at the heart of Western civilization: "God is dead," Platonist philosophy and Christianity's "slave morality" have corrupted the entire culture, and nihilism reigns. What is called for is a heroic "reevaluation of all values" that acknowledges the inextricable uniqueness of individual human experience and the resulting "perspectiveness" of all judgments about right and wrong, true and false.

Nietzsche's style was antisystematic, epigrammatic, often puzzling, and sometimes disturbing. Racists like Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855–1927) and the Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg (1893–1946) took his talk about the "Übermensch" and the "blond beast" as grist to their mills. Still, Nietzsche has become a fixture of political and social thought in democratic circles. One main reason is that he was the archetype of the radical critic. His unrelenting questioning and unmasking of the powers that be—established concepts, norms, social structures—provoked and inspired modern moral philosophy, the philosophy of language (e.g., Wittgenstein), postmodernism, poststructuralism (e.g., Foucault), cultural theory, and other streams of thought. German poets and thinkers of all stripes have been influenced by him, including Thomas Mann, Martin Heidegger, Oswald Spengler, Max Weber, and Theodor Adorno.

THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY: MAX WEBER AND CARL SCHMITT

Max Weber (1864–1920) is often named as one of the founders of sociology, along with Marx, Comte, and Durkheim. Actually, his methodological and substantive contributions have enriched the entire field of the social sciences and humanities. One key to Weber's methodological legacy is the term *Verstehen* (understanding). For Weber, sociology is a "science which wants to understand social action interpretatively and thereby to explain it causally in its course and consequences" (*Economy and Society*, 1922, 1). It can achieve this by identifying the rationale of actions as instrumental

(*zweckrational*), value-rational (*wertrational*), affectional/emotional, or traditional. These distinctions—which display Weber's debts to Kant and neo-Kantianism—also inform many of his substantive contributions, notably his interpretation of Western history as a process of progressive "rationalization"; his thesis that Protestantism promoted capitalism (*The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,* 1904); his "ideal types" of traditional, legal, and charismatic authority; his ubiquitous definition of the state as a "legitimate monopoly on the use of force"; and, last but not least, his ethical instructions for scientists and politicians.

In the interwar period, Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) established himself as one of the leading legal theorists of Germany. His alliance with the Nazi party and ideology has made him a deeply problematic author but could not overshadow the fecundity of his ideas on sovereignty and the concept of the political, as the attention of even post–Marxist feminist thinkers like Chantal Mouffe in *On the Political* (2005) demonstrates.

LIVING THROUGH AND AFTER WORLD WAR II (1939–1945)

Entangled in the tragedy of Germany in the twentieth century are the life and work of Hannah Arendt (1906–1975). Raised in a liberal German-Jewish environment in Kant's hometown of Königsberg, Arendt was influenced as a student by the brand of German existentialism developed by her teachers Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger. She was forced to flee the Nazis and deprived of her German citizenship in 1937, yet the Nazi ideology and crimes provided her with the material for two of her best-known books: *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), which traces the intellectual and social origins of Hitler's and Stalin's regimes, and *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (1963), which was based on her trial reports for the *New Yorker.* She became an American citizen in 1951 but cherished the intellectual heritage of her native Germany. She translated some of her own works from English into German, including her philosophical magnum opus *The Human Condition* (1958), a neo-Aristotelian attempt to identify the practical human activity "action" as the basis of a true understanding of political life.

Arendt's fate of being forced to flee her homeland was shared by a group of German-Jewish social philosophers whose careers were conjoined by the Institute for Social Research, which was established at the University of Frankfurt in 1923, transferred to New York in the 1930s, and reestablished in Frankfurt in 1950: Max Horkheimer (1895–1973), Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979), Erich Fromm (1900–1980), and Theodor W. Adorno (1903–1969), today collectively known as the Frankfurt school. While Fromm advanced the psychological analysis of society, and Marcuse became an icon of the student revolutions of the 1960s, the lasting impact of the Frankfurt school must be attributed to the "critical theory" developed chiefly by Horkheimer (who coined the term in a 1937 essay on "Traditional and Critical Theory") and Adorno.

Well versed in the German idealism of Hegel and Kant, inspired above all by Marx, and spurred on by Nietzsche's nihilistic conclusion of enlightenment, Weber's gloomy analysis of the "iron cage of modernity," and Sigmund Freud's insights into the repressive nature of civilization, Horkheimer and Adorno expounded critical theory by exposing the self-destructive tendency of enlightenment. In *Dialectics of Enlightenment* (1944), they aim to show how enlightenment's aspiration to create a rational system of value-free, objective, and noncontingent knowledge leads to totalitarian claims in both science (where positivism "reduces the world to the blindness and muteness of data," p. 174) and society (where capitalism administers persons as things). The purpose of critical theory, instead, is to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them. Sometimes, it seems to be this emancipatory attitude rather than any specific theoretical insight that has secured the Frankfurt school a place in the genealogical lineage of present-day academic movements like feminist theory, multicultural theory, theories of deliberative democracy, and the antiglobalization movement.

POLITICAL THOUGHT IN WESTERN GERMANY

In German political thought, the obvious heir to Horkheimer and Adorno's critical theory is Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929), a member of the "second generation" of the Frankfurt school who worked as Adorno's assistant from 1956 to 1959 but left the Institute of Social Research because of conflicts with Horkheimer. But Habermas's impact extends far beyond that. Works including *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962), the two-volume *Theory of Communicative Action* (1981), and *Between Facts and Norms* (1992) have established Habermas as one of the leading social philosophers in the Western world.

Despite the stupendous scope of his treatises, one can argue that a single powerful idea constitutes the gravitational center that holds them together: the idea that the pragmatics of language exact and reveal a "communicative rationality," which, first, conditions the ways in which one can talk about scientific, moral, legal, and political claims; and which can therefore, second, be used to construct a critical social theory that integrates systems theories with action-oriented theories. "Discourse ethics" and "deliberative democracy" are the logical corollaries of this idea.

In his attempt to develop a fundamental and comprehensive theory of social action that has something to say about matters of knowledge, ethics, politics, and (lately) faith, Habermas ingeniously incorporates ideas of tremendously diverse lineage: He borrows from the great systematic thinkers in the history of German thought, Kant, Hegel, and Marx; from the Frankfurt school; from sociological classics like Weber, Durkheim, and Parsons; from American pragmatism (especially George Herbert Mead) and the philosophy of language—all to create a system of thought that is unmistakably his own.

Habermas's main rival for the title of most influential German theorist after World War II and one of his productive interlocutors has been Niklas Luhmann (1927–1998). A student of Talcott Parsons, Luhmann devoted his life to the

elaboration of an all-encompassing systems theory of social life in which the primary units of analysis are not people or groups but the structures and operations (especially communications) of the diverse systems that constitute the overall system of society.

Among the younger generations of political thinkers in Germany, no one has so far matched the breadth and depth, let alone the international impact, of Habermas. This does not belittle the quality and originality of their writings. It simply means that the next chapter in the history of German political thought has yet to be written.

See also *Adorno, Theodor W.; Arendt, Hannah; Critical Theory; Engels, Friedrich; Frankfurt School; Fromm, Erich; Hegel, Georg W. F.; Horkheimer, Max; Kant, Immanuel; Luther, Martin; Marcuse, Herbert; Marx, Karl; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Pufendorf, Samuel; Weber, Max.*

. . . .   MARC SCHATTENMANN

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Gerrymandering

Gerrymandering, a pejorative term, earned its name from the fifth U.S. vice president, Elbridge Gerry (1744–1814). While Elbridge Gerry was serving as governor of Massachusetts from 1810 to 1812, the Massachusetts legislature, which was controlled by the Democratic-Republicans, changed the district boundaries in Essex County in order to weaken the political fortunes of the county's Federalists. After redistricting, a local newspaper said the new district had the shape of a salamander, so the newspaper creatively merged Elbridge Gerry's last name with the shape of the district and referred to it as a "gerrymander."

Political scientist Leroy Hardy defines *gerrymander* as "a technique used for partisan purpose in the creation of constituencies . . . [that entails] the consolidation of opposition strength [in an] arbitrary [or] unnatural" manner. The political party in control develops "safe seats" that cannot be challenged by their opponents, thereby limiting strength of the opposition.

Since its first use in 1812, the term has become commonplace in politics. The U.S. Constitution provides the states with the authority to redraw district lines in order to ensure equality of representation. Political parties and state legislators eagerly wait to redraw congressional and state districts in order to protect their partisan turf, weaken their opposition, stake out new territory for their respective parties, and disadvantage certain groups within the electorate.

If a district is redrawn for partiality on the basis of partisanship, race, religion, or economics, it has been gerrymandered, and the constitutionality of the new district is called into question. The U.S. Supreme Court determines whether claims of gerrymandering in redrawn voting districts are legitimate. This determination can be a difficult task, with the ultimate criterion being to ensure fairness. Technological innovations, such as geographic innovation systems (GIS), have made it easier for the politically savvy to devise various redistricting plans that undercut the strictest rules for impartial redistricting, allowing the system to continue to be manipulated to produce gerrymandered districts.

The U.S. Supreme Court has grappled with the issues of defining fairness and what constitutes a gerrymander, and no definitive definition has been provided for the latter. At one time the Supreme Court refused to hear cases that claimed political gerrymandering, because the justices believed that it was not the Court's responsibility to make decisions regarding political matters. However, since gerrymandering can encompass redistricting based on economics, race, and religion, the Supreme Court has begun to consider the constitutionality of redistricting efforts. In *Davis v. Bandemer,* 478 U.S. 109 (1986),

the Supreme Court began to consider the question of partisan gerrymandering in redistricting when they argued, "Each political group in a State should have the same chance to elect representatives of its choice as any other political group."

One should not confuse redistricting with gerrymandering. These are two different concepts. Redistricting can occur without resorting to gerrymandering; however, there can be no gerrymandering without redistricting. Redistricting takes place when a voting district's boundaries are redrawn for the purposes of equalizing representation among constituents. According to Mark Rush, a political science professor at Washington and Lee University, gerrymandering is more accurately

> the alteration of district lines in order to deny or impair the representational opportunity of a group of voters who, under other circumstances (i.e., a different districting plan), could, if they so desired, coalesce to ensure the election of a candidate who would serve as their delegate to a legislative assembly. (1993)

Gerrymandering is exemplified by the controversial redistricting that occurred in Texas in 2003. Tom DeLay, a Republican U.S. representative, assisted in redesigning his state's election districts in order to ensure that Texas's congressional delegation became more Republican.

See also *Redistricting.*

. . . . RICHARD M. YON

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Gilman, Charlotte Anna Perkins

A major American writer of the early twentieth century, Charlotte Perkins Gilman's (1860–1935) literary contribution to feminist theory was largely forgotten for several decades after her death. However, during the 1960s women's movement, a new generation rediscovered her writings.

Charlotte Anna Perkins lost her father shortly after her birth when he abandoned his wife and children. Perkins and her brother grew up in near poverty. As an adult, Perkins designed greeting cards and taught art to support herself. In 1884 she married artist Charles Stetson. After giving birth to their only child, Katherine Beecher Stetson, Perkins suffered from depression and was instructed by well-known physician Silas Mitchell to live a quiet domestic life caring for her husband and child

and to cease all writing and drawing. Nearly driven to insanity by her domestic captivity, Perkins left her husband and moved to California with her daughter.

Instead of causing a mental breakdown, writing enabled Perkins to challenge the nineteenth-century social restrictions that limited women. Her first novel, *The Yellow Wallpaper* (1892), explores the ordeal of a dutiful wife who undergoes Dr. Mitchell's rest cure. Determined to influence public opinion, she also became coeditor of *The Impress,* a women's journal, and contributing editor of *The American Fabian,* along with Edward Bellamy. She admired Bellamy's utopian novel, *Looking Backward* (1888), and gave public lectures on his ideal socialist society. Like Bellamy, Lester Ward, and other prominent social critics of the late nineteenth century, Perkins was optimistic that a greater understanding of Darwin's evolutionary laws would produce the fundamental economic and social changes she believed were necessary to truly liberate the human potential of women.

In 1898 Perkins published her most famous work, *Women and Economics,* which challenged the sexual and maternal roles of women. She argued that domestic duties and economic dependence prevented both women and men from realizing their full humanity. In her subsequent books, including *The Home: Its Work and Influence* (1904), she held that only women's economic independence could bring genuine social progress. Women's contribution to the social, or "human," sphere must be released for the next stage of human evolution. The author's utopian novel, *Herland* (1915), originally serialized in her monthly journal, *The Forerunner,* offered a preview of this next stage of human evolution through the eyes of three male travelers. *Herland*'s "new" women were conscientious agents of natural selection who had created a society of peace, beauty, and plenty.

In 1900 Charlotte Perkins married her first cousin, George Houghton Gilman, an attorney. They lived happily together until his death in 1934, two years after Charlotte Gilman was diagnosed with inoperable cancer. She moved back to California to live near her daughter and complete her autobiography, *The Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman* (1935). She concluded the book with the line, "I have preferred chloroform to cancer." By the time of her suicide in 1935, Gilman's calls for a radical restructuring of society had ceased to influence the women's movement. But her conviction, stated in her 1911 work, *The Man-Made World,* that "women are not undeveloped men; but the feminine half of humanity is undeveloped human" has continued to inspire many American feminists.

See also *Feminism; Feminist Movement, Women's Movement, Comparative; Women's Rights.*

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Glasnost

The campaign for *glasnost* (meaning "openness") was the first sign that Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was serious about reform. Gorbachev used the word in his first speech after he came to power in March 1985. The next year, finding his economic reforms blocked by party conservatives, Gorbachev encouraged the media, still subject to close state censorship, to more openly discuss social problems. He hoped this would pressure bureaucrats to embrace reform. However, intellectuals seized the opportunity to raise issues way beyond Gorbachev's economic agenda, from the crimes of Joseph Stalin to the rights of national minorities.

Free speech initially took root in some intellectual journals, theatrical performances, and movies, and then spread to news magazines and eventually television. Pioneering editors, such as those at the weeklies *Moscow News* and *Arguments and Facts,* brought hitherto taboo topics into the public arena. By 1987 the elaborate system of state prepublication censorship had effectively collapsed.

August 1987 saw a wave of nationalist protests in Armenia and the Baltic republics, but Gorbachev refused to give in to conservative critics who were calling for a reversal of glasnost. On the contrary, he accelerated the pace of reform, introducing limited competitive elections in March 1989. A new June 1990 law on press freedom formally abolished censorship.

See also *Censorship; Perestroika; Soviet Union, Former.*

. . . .   PETER RUTLAND

Glass Ceiling

The *glass ceiling* is a metaphor for the range of unofficial and artificial barriers that stop otherwise qualified individuals from obtaining promotions or top positions within an organization. These obstacles are usually not apparent or formal, hence the reference to a "glass" barrier. The concept was popularized in the 1980s and applied to the business sector, and wages in particular, following successive studies that revealed that men continued to dominate senior positions and earn, on average, higher salaries than women for comparable work. Since the term gained popularity over two decades ago, responses to economic glass ceilings have included attempts to diminish the wage gap through affirmative action legislation and both formal and informal quota systems, but inequity in both wage and opportunity is still among the most pervasive of contemporary social and political issues.

Within political systems, glass ceilings have prevented women and minority groups from obtaining elected office or governmental posts, even though legislation may exist that formally bans overt discrimination. In practice, a glass ceiling may exist within political parties and manifest itself in the selection of candidates to run for political office. It may also impact the selection of party or legislative leaders.

There have been a variety of responses to the phenomenon. Some systems require that political parties have a certain percentage of women or minority candidates. For instance, France requires that 50 percent of a party's candidates be women and India's INC (Indian National Congress) party maintains a 15 percent quota for female candidates, while Afghanistan's constitution ensures that 27 percent of seats in the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House) and 17 percent of seats in the Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders) are occupied by women. Other systems, including that of the United States, concentrate on enforcement of antidiscrimination laws.

See also *Discrimination; Gender Gap; Minority Representation; Women's Representation.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

Gleichshaltung

The German word *gleichshaltung* (meaning "synchronization" or "coordination") originally referred to the campaign by the National Socialists (Nazis) during the 1930s to have the Nazi party take complete control of the German state through the creation of a cult of personality around the party leader, Adolf Hitler. The ultimate goal was the establishment of a single, unified political state under the control of the dominant party. The Nazis undermined, outlawed, or replaced potential rival groups, including other political parties, trade unions, civic organizations, and the media. They also created parallel party structures that eventually superseded existing political bodies or agencies.

Central to Gleichshaltung was the notion that the "leader" represented the will of the people. All political, economic, and social power flowed through that leader into the institutions and structures established or captured by the party. Consequently, existent systems of checks and balances were eliminated or circumvented. Opponents of the process were identified as enemies of the state and subject to persecution and punishment. Within two years of their assumption of power, the Nazis had gained control over all major German institutions, with the exception of the Catholic Church. Gleichshaltung subsequently came to mean any effort by a political grouping to displace the state and install a monolithic, totalitarian single-party system.

See also *Cult of Personality; Fascism; Fascist Parties; National Socialism; One-party Systems; Totalitarianism.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

Global Democratic Deficit

The phrase "democratic deficit" has been most frequently used in reference to the European Union, but it is applicable to any supranational organization to which states belong but of which their citizens do not have direct democratic control. International institutions raise at least two issues relating to democracy: (1) representation and accountability to individuals that live within states that are part of a supranational organization, and (2) the democratic equality of representation among state members themselves. The global democratic deficit usually refers to the first of these two concerns.

The central concern is that because of supranational rules and decisions, citizens of a democratic country are occasionally subject to domestic policies that they have not, or would not, put in place through their own domestic democratic processes. On such occasions, citizens may feel that they have been overruled by a supranational organization to which they have no direct recourse. There are at least three broad responses to this problem. Proponents of cosmopolitan democracy seek to extend the principles of democracy to the global level by shifting the foundation of global governance from sovereign territorial states and their executives to the political autonomy of individuals and global society. Some skeptics of cosmopolitan democracy agree with the basic concern about a global democratic deficit but propose a different set of institutional reforms. Supranational delegated democracy does have its defenders.

The European Union, although not a perfectly democratic institution, provides an example of a supranational organization with a directly elected parliament. Some cosmopolitan democrats propose the establishment of a global parliament or people's assembly. The concept is not new, and in fact a similar idea was proposed and rejected when the League of Nations was formed. Still, the United Nations (UN) remains governed by diplomats who are appointed by state executives, and there are no direct institutional links between the people of the world and the UN, which is the largest global governance institution. A movement to increase citizen electoral participation within and outside the UN has grown, and there have been numerous proposals for doing so.

In addition to the creation of an institutional assembly for the people, global conferences that include the participation of citizens, global civil society, and nongovernmental organizations may provide another avenue for strengthening global democracy. Citizen participation in global governance through conferences and other means of global or "new" diplomacy have been credited with significantly influencing the creation of the International Criminal Court and the establishment of an international convention prohibiting the use of landmines.

In addition to calls for increasing direct citizen participation in global institutions, pressures for improving nonelectoral accountability, such as transparency, and linkages to nonstate actors, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and global civil society organizations, have intensified. Increasing avenues of participation for NGOs and civil society organizations as representatives of "the people" has the potential to increase accountability of global institutions but would not create global democracy in the way that cosmopolitans seek. Still, institutional reforms improving transparency and creating closer working conditions between global nonstate actors and international organizations have been the most common and visible effects of the global movement to reduce the democratic deficit.

Most scholars agree that the perceived legitimacy of international decision making is important to its public acceptance and the continuation of multilateralism. However, the goal of democratizing global governance is not universally championed. All democratic systems of government involve some delegation, particularly when it would not be practical or optimal for decisions to be subject to popular vote. For example, when decision making is highly technical or best insulated from majority opinion in order to protect a minority, liberal democracies often decide to delegate decision making to a body that is not directly accountable to majority opinion. Many international institutions might be viewed in this way. Even if individuals do not have the opportunity to vote for or against individuals with decision-making power in international institutions, they do have the opportunity to influence the process through their domestic governments, which in turn have a voice in the affairs of the international institutions of which they are a part. In this way, multilateral institutions are democratic, if only indirectly.

See also *Democracy; Direct Democracy; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Transparency.*

. . . .   MOLLY RUHLMAN

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Globalism

Globalism is a ubiquitous term often used in a sloppy manner to describe general globalizing trends as well as particular systems of ideas and values connected to various globalization processes. For purposes of analytical clarity, however, it is useful to distinguish between *globalism,* a political ideology that endows globalization with certain norms, values, and meanings—and *globalization,* a multidimensional set of social processes that extend and intensify social interdependencies across the globe. This distinction is not meant to suggest that globalism (the ideational package) exists in isolation from globalization (the material process). The complexity of actual social life admits to no such thing as political ideas and values isolated from their socioeconomic context and their institutional manifestations. But it is crucial not to lose sight of the considerable role played by ideas, beliefs, language, and symbols in shaping the conditions of the social world. A focus on the ideological dimensions of globalization allows a more extensive analysis of the production and worldwide circulation of ideas and norms.

Globalism, then, refers to powerful ideologies ranging across the left-right political spectrum both in support of and in opposition to the project of extending a free-market model of capitalism to all regions of the world. The dominant variant of globalism focuses on the concept of the "market." To be sure, the wide-ranging preeminence of "market" harkens

back to the heyday of liberalism in mid-Victorian England. And yet, the fundamental difference is that the idea of the market has moved beyond the political framework of national economies to an expanded vision of an integrated global economic exchange. In other words, while the grand ideologies of modernity—liberalism, conservatism, socialism—expressed a largely prereflexive *national* imaginary in compressed form as explicit political doctrine, the focus of the political belief systems in the early twenty-first century is the political articulation of a *global* imaginary. Naturally, the principal types of globalism contain some ideational components of the grand ideologies. However, most of these old concepts have been rearranged and hybridized with new concepts into novel ideational structures.

The public interpretation of the origin, direction, and meaning of the profound social changes that go by the name of globalization has fallen disproportionately to global social elites composed of executives of large transnational firms, corporate lobbyists, journalists, public relations specialists, intellectuals writing to a large public audience, state bureaucrats, politicians, and cultural celebrities. The public advocacy of market globalism involves five ideological claims that recur with great regularity.

Claim #1: Globalization is about the liberalization and global integration of markets. This claim is anchored in the liberal ideal of the self-regulating market as the normative basis for a future global order. The liberalization and integration of global markets are presented as both desirable and "natural" phenomena that promote individual liberty and material progress in the world.

Claim #2: Globalization is inevitable and irreversible. According to this assertion, globalization involves a spread of irreversible market forces driven by technological innovations that make the worldwide integration of national economies inevitable. The portrayal of globalization as some sort of natural force suggests that people must adapt to the discipline of the market if they are to survive and prosper.

Claim #3: Nobody is in charge of globalization. The claim of inevitability contains yet another implication. If the natural laws of the market have indeed preordained the course of history, then globalization does not reflect the arbitrary agenda of a particular social class or group. In that case, certain social elites are not in charge of globalization, but markets and technology are.

Claim #4: Globalization benefits everyone. This claim lies at the very core of market globalism, because it provides an affirmative answer to the crucial normative question of whether globalization should be considered a good or a bad thing. Market globalists assert that free trade and open markets provide the best prospect for creating jobs, spurring economic growth, and raising living standards around the world. While market globalists typically acknowledge the existence of unequal global distribution patterns, they insist that the market itself will eventually correct some of these "irregularities."

Claim #5: Globalization furthers the spread of democracy in the world. This claim is rooted in the assertion that free markets and democracy are two sides of the same coin. Persistently affirmed as "common sense," the actual compatibility of these two conditions remains nonetheless an open question.

The five central claims of market globalism constitute the foundation of a powerful wide-ranging regime that bestows political meaning on the process of globalization. Although market globalism has become the preeminent ideology of our time, it is worth remembering that no single ideational system ever enjoys absolute dominance. Even a hegemonic ideology contains small fissures and contradictions that threaten to turn into major cracks when confronted by persistent dissent. As both the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the massive antiglobalist protests since the late 1990s have shown, market globalism is increasingly challenged by social justice globalism and populist globalism—two ideologies that disseminate alternative meanings of globalization. And yet, these ideological challengers share with market globalism their common embeddedness in an overarching social imaginary centered on the global rather than the national. And so it appears that far from moving toward an "end of ideology," the twenty-first century constitutes a teeming battlefield of clashing globalisms.

See also *Anti- and Alter-globalization Movements; Globalization; Globalization and Development; Interdependence; Modernization.*

. . . . MANFRED B. STEGER

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Globalization

Since its earliest appearance in the 1960s, the term *globalization* has been used to describe a process, a condition, a system, a force, and an age. To avoid both the indiscriminate usage of these concepts and the sloppy conflation of process and condition that encourages circular definitions, it is necessary to draw meaningful analytical distinctions between causes and effects. For example, the term *globality* refers to global phenomena as a social condition, whereas globalization signifies a set of social processes that are thought to transform our

present social condition into one of globality. Indeed, like *modernization* and other verbal nouns that end in the suffix *-ization,* globalization captures the dynamic of development or unfolding along discernable patterns. At its core, then, globalization is about both new and intensifying forms of human interactions and interconnectedness that stretch across the planet.

At the same time, however, scholars have increasingly realized the dangers of conceptualizing globalization processes according to rigidly nested geographical scales separating the global from the national or the local. This crucial task of rethinking historically contingent categories of spatiality yields important insights into the nature of the mutual embeddedness of the global in the local, and vice versa. Hence, the fledgling academic field of global(ization) studies requires methodologies and theoretical models that engage not only global scalings but also attend to both national and subnational levels.

Since the first scholarly debates on globalization in the 1980s, globalization has remained a slippery and hotly contested concept. In spite of the remarkable proliferation of research programs, students of globalization have remained divided on the utility of various methodological approaches; the value of available empirical evidence for gauging the extent, impact, and direction of globalization; and, of course, its normative implications. The failure to arrive at a broad scholarly consensus attests not only to the contentious nature of academic inquiry in general but also reflects the uneven and contradictory nature of the phenomenon itself. Hence, there seems to be very little utility in forcing such a complex set of social processes as globalization into a single analytic framework.

The persistence of academic divisions on the subject notwithstanding, it is also important to acknowledge some emerging points of agreement. During the 2000s, in particular, there has been a noticeable convergence of scholarly views on the following three positions: (1) Globalization is actually occurring and can be defined according to certain characteristics. (2) Globalization is a long-term historical process that, over many centuries, has crossed a number of qualitatively distinct thresholds. (3) Globalization is a multidimensional set of social processes that cannot be reduced to its economic and technological aspects; it also contains crucial political, cultural, and ideological dimensions. The bulk of this essay will explore these three positions in some detail.

THE OCCURRENCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF GLOBALIZATION

During the 2000s, it has become increasingly evident that neither so-called hyperglobalizers who link just about everything to some transnational process nor so-called globalization skeptics who contend that globalization amounts to little more than "globaloney" have offered convincing arguments for their respective views. While the skeptics' insistence on a more careful and precise use of the term has forced the

participants in the globalization debates to hone their analytic skills, their wholesale rejection of globalization as a vacuous concept has often served as a convenient excuse—frequently offered in the name of scientific precision—to avoid exploring the actual phenomenon itself. In the early twenty-first century, many social scientists have converged on the position that the global transformation of social relations is real and can be appropriately subsumed under the general term *globalization*. However, rather than constructing grand narratives, many researchers have instead opted for methodological middle-range approaches designed to explore specific manifestations of globalization.

These more modest research initiatives have made it possible to identify four central characteristics of globalization. First, globalization involves the creation of new and the multiplication of existing social networks and activities that challenge traditional political, economic, cultural, and geographical boundaries. For example, the creation of satellite news corporations is made possible by the combination of professional networking, technological innovation, and political decisions that permit the emergence of new social orders that transcend parochial arrangements.

The second characteristic of globalization concerns the expansion and the stretching of social relations, activities, and interdependencies. Modern financial markets stretch around the globe, and electronic trading occurs around the clock. Gigantic shopping malls have emerged on all continents, offering those consumers who can afford them commodities from all regions of the world—including products whose various components were manufactured in different countries. Aided by new technology and economic deregulation, even criminal networks like terrorist cells have sprung up in dozens of nations on all five continents, ultimately turning groups such as al-Qaida into global terrorist networks capable of planning and executing attacks on a heretofore unimaginable scale. The same process of social stretching applies to less sinister associations, such as nongovernmental organizations, commercial enterprises, social clubs, and countless regional and global institutions and associations such as the United Nations, the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the Common Market of the South, Doctors Without Borders, Amnesty International, the Union of Concerned Scientists, the World Economic Forum, Microsoft, and General Motors, to name but a few.

Third, globalization involves the intensification and acceleration of social relations. The Internet relays distant information in mere seconds, and satellites provide consumers with real-time pictures of remote events. The intensification of worldwide social interdependencies means that local happenings are shaped by events occurring far away and vice versa. The ubiquitous phrase that "globalization compresses time and space" simply means that things are happening faster and distances are shrinking dramatically. Indeed, the current rise of the global network society would have not been possible without a technological revolution—one that has been powered chiefly by the rapid development of new information and

transportation technologies. Proceeding at an ever-accelerating pace, these innovations are reshaping the social landscape of human life.

Fourth, the creation, expansion, and intensification of social relations do not occur merely on an objective, material level. Thus, globalization also involves the subjective plane of human consciousness. People become increasingly conscious of growing manifestations of social interdependence and the enormous acceleration of social interactions. Their awareness of the receding importance of geographical boundaries and distances fosters a keen sense of becoming part of a global whole. Reinforced on a daily basis, these persistent experiences of global interdependence gradually change people's individual and collective identities and thus dramatically impact the way they act in the world.

Thus, a comprehensive definition of globalization that reflects this general consensus on these four constitutive characteristics might look like this: Globalization refers to a multidimensional set of social processes that create, multiply, stretch, and intensify worldwide social relations while at the same time fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening connections between the local and the distant.

GLOBALIZATION AS A PROCESS

The answer to the question of whether globalization really constitutes a new phenomenon depends upon how far back in time one is willing to extend the chain of causation. Some researchers consciously limit the historical scope of globalization to the last four decades of postindustrialism in order to capture its contemporary features. Others are willing to extend this timeframe to include the path-breaking socioeconomic and political developments of the nineteenth century. Still others argue that globalization really represents the continuation and extension of complex processes that began with the emergence of modernity and the capitalist world system some five centuries ago. And a few remaining scholars refuse to confine globalization to time periods measured in mere decades or centuries. Rather, they suggest that these processes have been unfolding for millennia, since about 10,000 BCE, when humans first settled on all five continents.

No doubt, each of these contending perspectives contains important insights. The advocates of the first approach have marshaled impressive evidence for their view that the dramatic expansion and acceleration of global exchanges since the early 1970s represents a quantum leap in the history of globalization. The proponents of the second view correctly emphasize the tight connection between contemporary forms of globalization and the technological innovations of the Industrial Revolution. The representatives of the third perspective rightly point to the significance of the time-space compression that occurred in the sixteenth century with the capture of the Americas by European powers. Finally, the advocates of the fourth approach advance a rather sensible argument when they insist that any truly comprehensive account of globalization falls woefully short without taking into consideration ancient developments.

Regardless of one's preference for a particular perspective, it can hardly be denied that scholars have increasingly turned toward history to make sense of globalization. While researchers in the early 1990s tended to emphasize the novelty of the phenomenon—sometimes dating its origins as late as the 1989 collapse of the bipolar world—the prevailing view in more recent years has shifted toward the longevity of these processes while recognizing that globalization has undergone dramatic changes and qualitative leaps at certain points in history. As a result, new periodization efforts have yielded much revised chronologies that tend to eschew conventional Eurocentric historical narratives and instead present globalization not as a linear, diffusionist process starting in the West, but as a multinodal, multidirectional dynamic full of unanticipated surprises, violent twists, sudden punctuations, and dramatic reversals.

GLOBALIZATION AS A MULTIDIMENSIONAL PROCESS

A multidimensional set of social processes, globalization cannot be reduced to its economic and technological aspects. It must be complemented by sustained explorations of its political, cultural, and ideological dimensions. This final point of agreement affirms the importance of presenting globalization as a multidimensional process. From its beginnings in the late 1990s, the academic field of global studies has been dominated by accounts focusing on economic and technological aspects of the phenomenon. To be sure, a proper recognition of the crucial role of these factors should be part of any comprehensive interpretation of globalization. But it is equally important to avoid the trap of technological and economic determinism. The burgeoning literature on various nonstructural aspects of globalization attests to the growing recognition of the centrality of ideas, subjectivity, and symbolic exchanges in the current acceleration of globalization processes. In general, researchers have identified three major dimensions of globalization: the economic, the political, and the cultural–ideological.

Economic globalization refers to the intensification and stretching of economic interrelations across the globe. Gigantic flows of capital and technology have stimulated trade in goods and services. Markets have extended their reach around the world, in the process creating new linkages among national economies. Huge transnational corporations, powerful international economic institutions like the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund, and large regional trading systems like the European Union and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation have emerged as the major building blocs of the twenty-first century's global economic order. Moreover, the liberalization of financial transactions has led to the deregulation of interest rates, the removal of credit controls, and the privatization of government-owned banks and financial institutions. Globalization of financial trading allows for increased mobility among different segments of the financial industry, with fewer restrictions and greater investment opportunities.

Most people associate economic globalization with the controversial issue of free trade. After all, the total value of

world trade exploded from $57 billion in 1947 to an astonishing $6 trillion in the late 1990s. During the 2000s, the public debate over the alleged benefits and drawbacks of free trade reached a fever pitch, as wealthy Northern countries have increased their efforts to establish a single global market through regional and international trade-liberalization agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Free trade proponents assure the public that the elimination or reduction of existing trade barriers among nations will enhance consumer choice, increase global wealth, secure peaceful international relations, and spread new technologies around the world. While there seems to be some evidence for the increase of productivity as a result of free trade, it is less clear whether the resulting profits have been distributed equitably within and among countries. Many studies show that the gap between rich and poor countries is widening at a fast pace. Hence, free trade proponents have encountered severe criticism from labor unions and environmental groups, who claim that the elimination of social control mechanisms has resulted in a lowering of global labor standards, severe forms of ecological degradation, and the growing indebtedness of the global South. The emergence of large-scale social protests around the world attests to the pervasiveness of these dissenting views.

Political globalization refers to the intensification and expansion of political interrelations across the globe. These processes raise an important set of political issues pertaining to the principle of state sovereignty, the growing impact of intergovernmental organizations, and the future prospects for regional and global governance. Obviously, these themes respond to the evolution of political arrangements beyond the framework of the nation-state, thus breaking new conceptual ground. Contemporary manifestations of political globalization are apparent in the partial permeation of old territorial borders, in the process also softening hard conceptual boundaries and cultural lines of demarcation. Emphasizing these tendencies, hyperglobalizers have suggested that the period since the late 1970s has been marked by a radical "deterritorialization" of politics, rule, and governance. Considering such pronouncements premature at best and erroneous at worst, globalization skeptics have not only affirmed the continued relevance of the nation-state as the political container of modern social life but have also pointed to the emergence of regional economic and political alliances as evidence for new forms of territorialization. As each group presents different assessments of the fate of the modern nation-state, they also quarrel over the relative importance of political and economic factors.

A third group has tried to offer a synthesis that captures important insights from both hyperglobalizers and skeptics. Conceding that globalization has exerted a considerable influence on most national economies to follow the Anglo-American model, they nonetheless insist that there remain important differences among national economies. In short, capitalism does not develop toward a one-size-fits-all model but comes in several varieties. Members of this third group, who focus on Europe, have furnished empirical studies suggesting that the rise of the new global economy in the late 1980s neither led to the destruction of some of the central features of the traditional European welfare state nor eliminated the fiscal powers of nation-states. Thus, these scholars conclude that globalization appears to have had a differential impact on social and industrial policy in Europe.

Out of these disagreements, however, there have emerged three fundamental issues and themes that probe the extent of political globalization: (1) the curtailment of the power of the nation-state by massive flows of capital, people, and technology across territorial boundaries; (2) the search for the primary causes of these flows; and (3) the possible emergence of forms of global governance and extensive network of nongovernmental groups often described as "global civil society." Indeed, political globalization is perhaps most visible in the rise of supraterritorial institutions and associations held together by common norms and interests. In this early phase of global governance, these structures resemble an eclectic web of interrelated power centers such as municipal and provincial authorities, regional blocs, international organizations, and national and international private-sector associations.

Cultural globalization refers to the intensification and expansion of cultural flows across the globe. The exploding network of cultural interconnections and interdependencies in the last decades has led some commentators to suggest that cultural practices, not the economy, lie at the very heart of contemporary globalization. Facilitated by the Internet and other new technologies, the dominant symbolic systems of meaning of the global age—individualism, consumerism, and various religious discourses—circulate more freely and widely than ever before. Since images and ideas can be more easily and rapidly transmitted from one place to another, they profoundly impact the way people experience their everyday lives. In the early twenty-first century, cultural practices frequently escape fixed localities such as town and nation, eventually acquiring new meanings in interaction with dominant global themes. The thematic landscape traversed by scholars of cultural globalization is vast, and the questions they raise are too numerous to be fleshed out in this short essay. Some of the most important issues include the tension between homogenization, difference, and hybridization within and among various cultures; the crucial role of transnational media corporations in disseminating popular culture to all parts of the planet; the globalization of languages; and the impact of materialist and consumerist values on Earth's ecological systems. Finally, cultural globalization contains important ideological aspects involving various norms, claims, beliefs, and narratives about the phenomenon itself. The heated public debate over whether globalization represents a good or a bad thing highlights the importance of ideology. As a result, various ideologies of globalism compete with each other in the struggle to shape public opinion around the world.

No doubt, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing political fallout have given an unexpected jolt to the contemporary struggle over the meaning and the direction of globalization. In general terms, one can discern

two possible future trajectories of globalization. First, the expanding "global war on terror" might stop, or at least significantly slow down, even such a powerful set of social processes as globalization. There are already some early warning signs. More intense border controls and security measures at the world's major air and seaports have made travel and international trade more cumbersome. Since 2001, calls for the tightening of national borders and the maintenance of cultural distinctiveness have been heard more frequently in public discourse. Second, it is also possible that the ongoing efforts to contain these violent forces of particularism might actually increase international cooperation and encourage the forging of new global alliances. As a result, there is the possibility that globalization may actually intensify. Given these conflicting prospects, it seems entirely appropriate to end this essay with the observation that the future of globalization hangs in the balance.

See also *Anti- and Alter-globalization Movements; Gender and Globalization; Globalism; Globalization and Development; Modernization.*

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Globalization and Development

Globalization is an increasingly important phenomenon affecting the world in political, economic, social, and cultural arenas. In her 1999 article "Gender and Globalization," Valentine Moghadam describes globalization as "a complex economic, political, cultural and geographic process in which the mobility of capital, organizations, ideas and discourses and peoples has taken on an increasingly global or transnational form" (p. 367). Further, globalization in both practice and ideology concerns the growing and deepening global relationships in governance, capital flows, trade, civil society, migration, and other areas.

Development is part of and affected by globalization. Broadly defined, development includes the social, economic, and political structures and processes that enable all members of a society to share in opportunities for education, employment, civic participation, and social and cultural fulfillment as human beings, in the context of a fair distribution of the society's resources among all its citizenry. For example, some people or communities may lack the resources, facilities, or networks available to other community members necessary to benefit from development projects. Educational opportunities necessary to access created jobs or investment programs may vary across communities. Development is also affected by gender relationships and structures, social relationships and hierarchies, family arrangements, and networks that affect the distribution of resources and the information offered through political and economic development programs. Although globalization can overcome the downsides to such structures through exchanges of ideas or social norms across national or cultural groups, it has also facilitated development led by developed countries, with their perspectives on gender issues, economic productivity, and institutions or social networks. Programs are often planned with these perspectives yet applied in quite different contexts. Furthermore, globalization is often dominated by liberalization policies that can place undue burdens on the poorest residents of developing countries by removing economic and political safety nets.

Development studies, especially post–World War II (1939–1945), held basic tenets that included the third world and its inhabitants as homogenous, a belief in a linear concept of progress, and the nation-state as the central unit of analysis. Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, globalization challenged this approach. Diverse experiences in development, such as those of oil-producing states, of the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan), of Latin American countries with respect to the role of their militaries, and of the newly independent African states contested any theories that previously tried to capture all developing countries under one umbrella. This largely resulted in an end to the belief that development was an inevitable, linear path toward modernization as experienced in industrialized nations and to a shift away from postmodern thinking, such as dependency theory. The new priority became micro-level, actor-centered research.

In light of the varied development experiences in the developing world and the growth of globalization, both macro/institutional and micro/local actor aspects had to be included in the conversation and planning of development. Thus, an understanding of development must include considerations of economic and political policies and institutions as well as educational levels, resource access, and social networks available to individuals and communities. A realization of the

increasing gap in development between first- and third-world countries, and of the presence of higher levels of environmental destruction and the use of abusive labor practices that led to development in industrialized nations in the first world, called into question the inevitability or desirability of other nations replicating the same path of development.

Key events of globalization underpin this shift in thinking. Economically, the debt crisis across the developing world in the 1970s and the fall of the Bretton Woods system led the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to become debt collectors and capitalist economic modernizers. Politically, the cold war and its political pressures intermixed with the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs in the developing world. These events encouraged an assessment of development in light of globalizing political and economic forces.

This assessment includes various themes that bridge the fields of development and globalization, including global economic policies such as trade regulations through the World Trade Organization; environmental impacts of development across water, air, and land that are not confined to one national entity; and migration of people in and out of country due to economic realities or safety/conflict situations that require the response of multiple state governments. Globalization has led to certain realities that shape these themes: the predominance of the neoliberal, capitalist economic viewpoint; the results of structural adjustment programs in developing countries; international multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations' efforts; and global resource changes due to climate change, lived-poverty requirements, and the increased flow of people and goods. Globalization thus requires the field of development to ask such questions as the following: How should people live? What should states and economies look like? How are the economic, social, political, and cultural actions of people in one part of the world linked to and affected by the activities of people in other parts of the world? How does culture affect the interplay of development and globalization? How is good governance defined? What determines access to and control over the flow of globalized technology? How is knowledge controlled across the globe?

Knowledge is an increasingly important purveyor of development, and access to expert knowledge and the control of intellectual capital are crucial determinants of development inequality. The state is taken as the necessary central actor in the international arena in dependency, modernization, and world-system theories of development. With the increase of globalization, this centrality as part of development is challenged. What role is there for state sovereignty given the increasing impact of inter- and intrastate actions? Political (international accords), economic (deregulation), and cultural nationalism (identity) all challenge state sovereignty.

See also *Dependency Theory; Development, Economic; Economic Development, State-led; Globalization; International Monetary Fund (IMF); World Bank.*

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Godwin, William

Political philosopher William Godwin (1756–1836) was born in Cambridgeshire, England, to middle-class parents. His father was a Nonconformist minister, a profession for which Godwin was initially educated. His life was at times turbulent; he was declared bankrupt in 1825 and was scorned and satirized by former friends and in the conservative press for both his political views and his personal life. In his later years, his troubled reputation led him to publish under pseudonyms.

Godwin married protofeminist and social critic Mary Wollstonecraft in 1797, an act that surprised many, given his controversial claim, as stated in his 1832 *Fleetwood: The New Man of Feeling,* that "marriage, as now understood, is a monopoly, and the worst of monopolies." Wollstonecraft died that same year, shortly after the birth of their daughter Mary, who would become the author Mary Shelley. Godwin's candid biography of Wollstonecraft, *Memoirs of the Author of a Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1798), added to the notoriety of both. Godwin remarried in 1801 and raised five children, three of them stepchildren.

Godwin published work in biography, fiction, children's literature, history, and drama in addition to his noted writings in political philosophy. He also campaigned on behalf of some of his fellow Jacobins—those sympathetic to the aims of the French Revolution (1789–1799)—when they were charged with treason.

In his political writings, Godwin was deeply preoccupied with the ways in which institutions, particularly those of the state, undermine personal autonomy, and he became widely regarded as an important figure in the anarchist tradition. Like John Locke, he was also strongly empiricist in his approach, and to an extent embraced the idea of the perfectibility of humanity, a project that he hoped could be achieved through social policy as well as on an individual basis. He is therefore also considered to belong to the utilitarian tradition.

Godwin's optimism about the future in relation to the possibility of increasing standards of living was a target for Thomas Malthus's criticism in the latter's *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798). In reply, Godwin published *Of Population* in 1820, in which he rebutted the generalizations on which he believed Malthus's figures regarding population growth were based. Godwin was also an early advocate of the idea that social injustice could be exposed in fiction, and he wrote several novels that embodied his political ideas, the most successful of which were *Things as They Are or the Adventures of Caleb Williams* (1794) and *Fleetwood* (1805).

Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and Its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness, published in 1793, is the best known of Godwin's political works. Along with Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790) and Thomas Paine's *Rights of Man* (1791), Godwin's *Political Justice* was one of the most widely read and discussed responses to the French Revolution.

In later years, Godwin developed friendships with notable writers of the Romantic period, such as Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Charles Lamb. Like Jean-Jacques Rousseau, by whom he was greatly influenced, Godwin wrote about themes that spanned the Enlightenment and romanticism, particularly in his later works, which combined a belief in rational judgment as the key human ability with studies of human psychology and the impact of emotion on human action.

See also *Anarchism; Burke, Edmund; Empiricism; Jacobinism; Locke, John; Paine, Thomas; Rousseau, John-Jacques; Utilitarianism; Wollstonecraft, Mary.*

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Goldman, Emma

Emma Goldman (1869–1940) was an anarchist, socialist activist, speaker, and writer born in Lithuania (then part of the Russian empire) and active in the United States, Soviet Union, and several Western European countries.

Goldman worked in the garment industry in St. Petersburg and, after emigrating in 1885, in Rochester, New York, where she married Jacob Kershner and became a U.S. citizen. Inspired by the story of the 1886 Haymarket tragedy, in which labor strikers and police clashed and several people were killed, she became an anarchist through self-study. After leaving her husband, Goldman moved to New York City in 1889, where she first worked with Johan Most and then, after her views diverged from Most's, she studied the works of Pyotr Kropotkin. During these years, Goldman entered into a political and romantic relationship with fellow anarchist Alexander Berkman, whom she defended after he was imprisoned for the attempted assassination of industrialist Henry Clay Frick in 1892.

Goldman lectured widely, at political demonstrations as well as in lecture halls, advocating socialism, anarchism, absolute freedom of the individual, modern drama, and free love. She played a major role in making the freedom and gender equality of women part of generally accepted anarchist principles. She applied these standards to her own life, having long-term liaisons with Ben Reitman and possibly Hippolyte Havel as well as with Berkman.

After Berkman's release from prison, he and Goldman published a monthly journal, *Mother Earth,* from 1906 to 1917, when its offices were raided by government agents and its subscription lists seized under the provisions of the Espionage Act. During this period Goldman's major essays were collected in *Anarchism and Other Essays* (1911).

Goldman was imprisoned from 1893 to 1895 for inciting to riot after she led a march of 1,000 people to Union Square in support of free bread for hungry workers. She was imprisoned twice more, in 1916 for distributing birth control literature and in 1917 for obstructing the draft. Her U.S. citizenship was revoked in 1908, and she and Berkman were deported to the Soviet Union in 1919 during the Palmer Raids.

Goldman had hoped to find a land ruled by workers in the Soviet Union, but she became a strong critic of the lack of personal freedom under Communist rule. She left the Soviet Union after two years and published her opinions in two volumes, *My Disillusionment in Russia* (1923) and *My Further Disillusionment in Russia* (1924). Her two-volume autobiography, *Living My Life* (1931, 1934), is an important statement of her views as well as a memoir of her activities through 1927. Her other major book, *The Social Significance of the Modern Drama* (1914), is a collection of essays on thirty-two plays by nineteen European playwrights, including Anton Chekov, John Galsworthy, Gerhart Hauptmann, Henrik Ibsen, Maurice Maeterlinck, George Bernard Shaw, August Strindberg, Leo Tolstoy, and William Butler Yeats; this volume helped to popularize modern drama in the United States.

Emma Goldman advocated anarchism, socialism, and individual freedom. She spoke out in favor of gender equality and was imprisoned in 1916 for distributing pamphlets on birth control.

SOURCE: The Library of Congress

In 1925, Goldman married Welshman James Colton in order to acquire a British passport so that she could travel freely in Europe and visit the United States. She went to Spain in 1936 to support the antifascist struggle and affiliated with the Federación Anarquista Ibérica (CNT-FAI) in Barcelona, publishing an English-language bulletin for them and then serving as their representative in London. She died in Toronto in 1940 and was buried in the Waldheim cemetery in Chicago, Illinois, near the graves of the Haymarket martyrs.

See also *Anarchism; Kropotkin, Peter.*

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Good Governance

The concept of governance is as old as human civilization. In their 2002 article, "Comparing Governance across Countries and Over Time," Goran Hoyden and Julius Court note that there are those who view governance, on the one hand, "as concerned with the rules of conducting public affairs, and on the other, those who see it as steering or controlling public affairs" (p. 12). In essence, *governance* means the process of decision making and the procedure by which decisions are carried out, or not carried out, by those who govern. It is distinguished from *government,* which refers to an institution consisting of a set of instruments through which people of a state govern themselves by means of laws, rules, and regulations enforced by the state apparatus. Good governance is a subset of governance, and its essential ingredients depend on such fundamental values as accountability, transparency, justice, fairness, equity, and ethics as practiced in a liberal democratic polity. Good governance is also part of a government's goal of sustaining a good quality of life for its public. Ultimately, governance links an administrative system to a collaborative arrangement with interest groups, citizens, industry, legislators, and a judiciary, creating legitimacy of the public domain while letting each group share its perspective on governance with the rest.

GOOD GOVERNANCE

"Good governance" has become a catchphrase used widely by various international agencies such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It means "governing well" by establishing a system of clean governance to achieve the anticipated goals and objectives of the public and the government. In essence, the concept is based on at least ten values:

1. democratic pluralism, which is essential to maintain cultural sensitivity in a pluralistic society to ensure empathy and tolerance of diversity, fundamental freedom and equality for all, and universal participation in the governing process;
2. legitimacy in the eyes of the public under the law of the land, that is, through constitutional instruments such as free and fair elections;
3. consensus among competing interests and equity in approach;
4. public participation in decision making;
5. rule of law to ensure fairness and nonpartisanship;
6. responsiveness of the governing systems toward the needs of the various stakeholders;
7. efficient and effective accountability of the institutions responsible for the governance, so that power is not misused and outcomes are delivered as anticipated or planned;
8. transparency in action to build confidence in the state or other institutions;
9. moral governance, which refers to public service ethics and moral accountability in the process of governance; and
10. a strategic vision for sustainable long-term human development.

In summary, good governance refers not only to the institutions of government, but also to all the players involved in the process of governance, the values listed above, and ethical conduct, incorruptibility, and sensitivity, which are key factors.

A fundamental principle is that those who govern are accountable to those who will be directly or indirectly affected by their decisions or actions. Transparency and rule of law are prerequisites for ensuring accountability. Moral or ethical behavior is essential for sustainability of the dynamic relationships formed during the conduct of the governance. Incorruptibility requires a clean conscience and keeping the public good above the private. These factors, including various impediments to good governance, are equally pertinent in the resource-starved developing world, where corruption further impoverishes the state, affecting the poorest of the poor.

IMPEDIMENTS TO GOOD GOVERNANCE

Among major impediments to good governance, corruption and corrupt behavior among public officials constitute a most insidious challenge; however, institutional or bureaucratic hurdles and inadequate compliance mechanisms are equally responsible for bad governance.

The biggest challenge to good governance faced by many countries is inefficiency in the implementation of various policy programs and effective delivery of service. While a country may have adequate legal mandates to solve problems, the gaps in policy implementation mechanisms indicate that enforcement of policies is rather weak and at times nonexistent. In addition, there always exists jurisdictional fighting across levels of government and among various ministries desperate to safeguard their jurisdictions, so policies and programs enthusiastically initiated by one ministry or department may be considered unnecessary or problematic by others and, thus, are slow to be embraced.

Many poor nations have crafted various laws concerning social welfare, environmental protection, and economic development, but they are rarely enforced because of insufficient financial, technical, and administrative resources. Powerful interest groups are often able to influence the regulatory system or bypass compliance measures that are in place. Finally, for government regulators, the cost of enforcement in time and resources is higher than the cost of nonenforcement. Government officials thus suffer from a negative public image and lack of public credibility, both of which contribute to a level of inertia that can inhibit good governance.

DETERMINING GOOD GOVERNANCE

Two standards are used to suggest what is required to craft good governance: one for developing nations and another for industrialized countries. International aid institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, developed the standard that applied to developing nations, whereas the standard applied to industrialized nations mimics the features of liberal democracy found in Western societies. Critics question the validity of a standard, because they believe it imposes values that are "a cover for extending Western influence" (Hoyden and Court 2002, 23).

Despite the fact that in some developing nations, as in industrialized nations, resources may be diverted from the purpose originally intended for them, developing nations often suffer disproportionately from direct political interference in the administrative and enforcement process; policy goals deflected and responsibilities for achieving policy mandates evaded; and rampant reliance on tokenism by a government administration to fill ministry positions rather than talent. Nevertheless, the tenacity of some administrators and political leaders is such that they are able to keep a system of good governance functioning. And so, it would be erroneous to conclude that the various impediments facing these nations are such that they preclude the establishment of good governance.

See also *Consensus; Corruption and Other Political Pathologies; Corruption, Political; Governance; Legitimacy; Pluralism; Rule of Law; Transparency.*

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Goodnow, Frank Johnson

Frank Johnson Goodnow (1859–1939) was an American professor of administrative law and political science, a university president, and a progressive social reform advocate. Cofounder

and first elected president of the American Political Science Association, he is considered the "father of public administration." His prolific scientific work—he authored a dozen books and more than sixty articles—did not preclude him from engaging in frequent public service efforts.

A graduate of Amherst College, Goodnow received a law degree from Columbia University Law School in 1882. He completed his education with a year of study at the École Libre des Sciences Politiques in Paris and at the University of Berlin. In 1884, he was appointed to the Columbia School of Political Science. He remained affiliated with Columbia for thirty years before accepting the post of president of Johns Hopkins University in 1914, a position he left only to retire in 1929.

His first book, *Comparative Administrative Law: An Analysis of the Administrative Systems, National and Local, of the United States, England, France and Germany* (1893), followed a mainly legalistic approach but brought at least two major contributions to the political science of his time. It was the first of a long series of volumes in which Goodnow initiated the systematic study of public administration as well as a pioneer work in the United States for the use of a comparative method of inquiry.

His classic, *Politics and Administration: A Study in Government* (1900), is an influential analysis of the American political system. It also triggered one of the most enduring controversies in political science. Following U.S. president Woodrow Wilson, Goodnow carved a dichotomy between two distinct functions of government, *politics* as the sphere that "has to do with the guiding or influencing of governmental policy" and *administration* as the sphere that "has to do with the execution of that policy," that has been fiercely debated. Severely criticized by Dwight Waldo in his *Study of the Administration* (1955), the discredited separation between politics and administration has now been replaced in the work of public administration specialists like James H. Svara by the notion of interrelationship. However, Samuel C. Patterson and other contemporary scholars who argue that Goodnow has been misinterpreted are rehabilitating the distinction. According to them, he intended the "typological distinction" for analytical purposes only.

Goodnow's acknowledged expertise in public administration and his taste for public service earned him numerous appointments to commissions and boards. In 1900, he helped redraft the New York City charter. In 1911, he served on President Howard Taft's Commission on Economy and Efficiency, and in 1913 he took a leave of absence to become legal adviser to the president of the Chinese Republic. Goodnow was a trustee of the Institute for Government Research and the Brookings Institution. He is remembered as a proponent of progressive policies and a tireless critic of political corruption.

Goodnow also dedicated part of his life to the institutionalization of political science as a discipline. Already a founding editor of the *Political Science Quarterly* (1886), Goodnow took part in the creation of the American Political Science Association and was chosen to serve as its first president for two consecutive terms in 1904 and 1905. Even though he was a vocal progressive advocate himself, during his presidency Goodnow was particularly concerned with building the reputation of scientific objectivity and the nonpartisan image of the association.

See also *Administrative Law; Politics.*

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Gosnell, Harold Foote

Harold Foote Gosnell (1896–1997) was an American political scientist and social science methodologist. He is remembered for bringing quantitative methodology into the mainstream of political science, using both experimental and statistical methods. In his 1933 essay, "Statisticians and Political Scientists," he advocated for the use of statistics in the fields of political parties, public opinion, citizenship, legislative behavior, and political psychology. Gosnell is associated with the influential Chicago school of social science, which saw behavior as a function of social structure and environment rather than personal characteristics. His innovative work on voter turnout, black politics, and Chicago's Democratic machine left lasting substantive legacies.

Gosnell earned his bachelor's degree in 1918 from the University of Rochester, which later created a graduate fellowship named in his honor. He received his doctorate in political science from the University of Chicago in 1922. He joined the faculty there and was promoted to assistant professor in 1926 and associate professor in 1932.

Gosnell's dissertation, *Boss Platt and his New York Machine* (1924), broke new ground in its use of survey research, comparisons, statistics, and political psychology to study the political leadership of former New York senator and representative Thomas C. Platt. Reviewers of the book praised it while pointing out that it was unconventional and unlike typical biographies.

Gosnell's next books, *Non-voting: Causes and Methods of Control* (1924), coauthored with Charles E. Merriam, and *Getting out the Vote: An Experiment in the Stimulation of Voting* (1927), are considered by many as landmarks in political science and are recognized in particular for their use of a multimethod approach. Gosnell and Merriam conducted interviews with party officials, officeholders, and election activists, and gathered data on the characteristics of voters and nonvoters. They interviewed a random sample of nonvoters and, as Karl D. Berry notes in his 1974 book *Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics,* produced the "first major study in political science to use both random sampling and the statistics of attributes,

the book combine[d] new methodology and familiar concern in a fashion which startles the profession." In *Getting out the Vote,* Gosnell provided the first use of experimental methods to study voter turnout, finding that mailing reminders regarding upcoming elections to potential voters increased turnout. Another of Gosnell's works, *Machine Politics: Chicago Model* (1937), was the first book to use correlation, regression, and factor analysis in political science.

Gosnell is also remembered for his forward-thinking substantive research. *Negro Politicians: The Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago* (1935) was the first book on the subject of African American politics, and his *Why Europe Votes* (1930) provides an early account of cross-national voting.

After Robert M. Hutchins, a critic of behaviorialism, became president of the University of Chicago, Gosnell left the school for a position at the Office of Price Administration in Washington, D.C. He also served at the Bureau of the Budget and Department of State. Gosnell later served as an adjunct professor at American University, visiting professor at the University of Washington, and professor of political science at Howard University. He published four more books during this time, *Grass Roots Politics* (1942), *Democracy: The Threshold of Freedom* (1948), *Champion Campaigner: Franklin D. Roosevelt* (1952), and *Truman's Crises: A Political Biography of Harry S. Truman* (1980).

In 1995 the Harold F. Gosnell Prize of Excellence was established to honor his influence and legacy in the field of political methodology.

See also *Political Participation; Quantitative Analysis; Statistical Analysis; U.S. Politics and Society: African American Political Participation; Voting Behavior.*

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Governability

Governability can be defined as the capacity of governors to steer the ship of state toward its policy objectives. Policies depend for their success not only on what governments do but also on the responses of others that government can influence but not completely determine. First of all, policies must be framed within the limits of resources. Second, policies must be acceptable to those whose endorsement is required to turn intentions into law. Third, policies must secure cooperation from all involved in implementing them. If all of these conditions are met, then the actions of governors are effective, and the political system appears governable. If these conditions are met to some extent, then governability is difficult but achievable.

Ungovernability occurs when a policy exceeds the limits of resources, consent, and implementation. In extreme cases, maintaining order and protecting national boundaries are beyond the control of government. A government invaded by a stronger foreign army may be defeated, as happened to Iraq in 2003. However, the governability of an occupied country also depends on the support of domestic institutions and the cooperation of its citizens. In the extreme case of the East German Communist regime in the months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, ungovernability arose from the open defiance of its authority by East Germans who realized that their repressive government would no longer shoot or jail those who protested against it.

A MATTER OF DEGREE

The capacity of a government to achieve its policy objectives depends on its choice of goals, its political institutions, and the behavior of its citizens. Obstacles to governability are usually matters of degree. Each condition varies from one area of public policy to another as well as from country to country. Hence, societies and political problems are more or less governable.

The realistic choice of policy goals is a necessary condition of governability. What is realistic is affected by resources. The inability of low-income countries to finance major social benefits on the scale of Scandinavia is an obvious illustration. Low-income countries often lack the personnel to provide high-standard services to all their citizens. Some governments lack the transparency and integrity to administer foreign aid without favoritism and corruption.

Within a developed country, the annual budget cycle matches policy intentions with the money at hand. If there is a gap, governors have the choice of raising taxes to make more money available, scaling down their policy intentions, or inviting inflation by increasing the money supply. Population size affects personnel. A rich but small country such as Luxembourg lacks the people to carry out major large-scale scientific projects, while the European Union offers small countries the opportunity to pool resources to conduct big projects. Countries with hundreds of millions of people can mobilize resources selectively to achieve major goals. While the income of individual Chinese is low, the aggregate resources at the command of the one-party government of the People's Republic of China are very large.

The endorsement of policy intentions is more readily secured in a dictatorship than in a democracy. An arbitrary despot can threaten those who disagree with the loss of office, wealth, or liberty. Democracies vary in the extent to which institutions act as checks on the initiatives of the leaders of government. Federalism often requires approval at two levels of government. The separation of powers between the American president and Congress requires two federal institutions to agree. In the British parliamentary system, control of the executive and legislature is in the hands of a prime minister holding that office because he or she has the confidence and disciplined support of the majority in parliament. In parliamentary systems elected by proportional representation, government is usually a coalition,

thus requiring the endorsement of two or more parties before a policy proposed by the prime minister can become law. This makes governing more difficult as well as more consensual.

INTERDEPENDENCE

National government is part of an interdependent system that determines policy outcomes. It can influence but not control entirely what others do. For example, the governability of the education system depends not only on what policy makers decide and the resources it allocates but also on what teachers do in their classrooms and how their students respond. The success of a crime policy depends not only on what the police and courts do but also on the behavior of criminals.

Government policies for managing the economy have always depended on the response of a multiplicity of actors in the marketplace. These include business firms, trade unions, financial institutions, and individuals in their roles as workers and as consumers. Government can design policies to promote economic growth and full employment, but success depends on what economic actors do as well. The increasing internationalization of economic activity has made managing the national economy into an "intermestic" problem, because the economy is much affected by what happens outside national boundaries as well as domestically. Public institutions such as the European Union and the International Monetary Fund operate across national boundaries. Major banks now have offices in New York, London, and Tokyo, and automobile manufacturers have plants on three continents. Each institution has the capacity to influence one part of the global economy; collectively, they create obstacles to any government being able to command and control what happens in the international economic system.

Interdependence is even more important in determining the consequences of a national government's foreign policy; a foreign policy without foreigners is an empty domestic political gesture. In international relations, governments are very unequal in resources. Nonetheless, governability often depends on how others, state and nonstate actors such as al-Qaida, respond to the initiatives of the strongest powers.

To describe governability as a political problem is misleading if this is taken to mean that there is a solution. Instead, governability is better understood as a condition of contemporary governance. Challenges to governability have increased because the intentions of governors and popular expectations have expanded as well as resources.

See also *Interdependence; Policy Evaluation; Policy Theory; Power.*

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Governance

Good governance requires representation and effectiveness. A representative government, if it is not effective at decision making, may generate frustration and conflict among different groups. In turn, administrative effectiveness, if it is not based on fair representation of the society, can be counterproductive, since it may produce arbitrary governmental decisions against the citizens' majority preferences. However, the neologism *governance* emerged in political science and public administration studies in reference to a set of institutional rules, coordination, and decision-making processes aimed at attaining effectiveness in defining collective goals, making priorities, and producing outcomes as, in a similar way, one can talk of private corporate governance, rather than of representative government.

Concern with governance has grown with changes in the environment of existing governments and the subsequent worsening of their performance. Recent processes of increasing internationalization, usually labeled "globalization," and intensification of societal complexity have indeed undermined the basis of traditional territorial jurisdictions and hierarchical, top-down coordination mechanisms. They have caused different forms of state decline, state restructuring, or state failure. In the new environment, good governance requires larger and more diversified territorial scopes of public policies and a new functional specialization and fragmentation of policy-making and political institutions.

CAUSES OF UNGOVERNABILITY

Put in more theoretical terms, recent concerns with governance reflect a decreasing fit between institutional structures and recurrent patterns of behavior in the environment of these structures—a situation that may emerge in human history in different places and times. The current perception of a decreasing performance of state-centered governance can be attributed to three different processes: (1) increasing internationalization of human exchanges and relationships; (2) state failures, provoked by excessive demands on governments, excessive state intervention, and the fiscal crisis of the state; and (3) the failure of certain states.

INTERNATIONALIZATION

Increasingly, the world is becoming organized into a number of vast transnational areas of "imperial" size going beyond the limits of traditional nation-states. First, broad military and security alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), provide an international umbrella for collective security that makes traditional state armies inefficient or even unnecessary. The change of scale is especially necessary in order to face new threats from international terrorism and the diffusion of weapons of mass destruction. Second, transnational trade agreements proliferate, such as the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Virtually no country in the world remains outside some formal

international trade agreement, especially under the sponsorship of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Widespread currencies, such as the dollar and the euro, and international monetary policies make traditional states obsolete in their task of shaping and protecting markets and inefficient in governing the economy.

Dramatic reductions in the costs of transport, especially by air, and of communications, especially by telephone and the Internet, have greatly favored these new developments. Just as other technological changes in the past (like gunpowder or railways) induced the formation of relatively large states and made them viable, others are now creating larger areas of human relations that make traditional states too small for efficient performance.

At the same time, transnational processes create new opportunities for local political units of small size to develop their self-government. Specifically, the larger the markets, the more regionalized the economic activity tends to be. In general, economic differences across the territory increase with internal integration, which tends to foster territorially differentiated political demands. Also, *linguae francae,* such as English and others, permit human beings to develop broad communications while maintaining their own local languages and cultures and avoiding the costs of forced homogenization typically imposed by large nation-states. Indeed the number of independent countries has increased dramatically since the early twentieth century, leading to an overall decrease in the size of countries, a process that has developed in parallel to the diffusion of democracy across the world. Decentralization of large states, diverse forms of asymmetric federalism, and the independence of small political units, while they undermine traditional nation-states, also favor the introduction of new forms of democratic governance.

STATE FAILURES

Warning calls regarding the problems of the state to cope with the tasks with which it was confronted began to rise during the 1970s. They were triggered by both increasing political unrest in mature democracies and a new period of economic stagnation. An early report on the governability of democracies, which was addressed to the Trilateral Commission dealing with problems in Western Europe, Japan, and the United States, remarked on the "overloading" of government. The authors identified at the time three main sources of concern: increasing demands from diverse social groups, increasing public expenditure, and the decomposition of political party systems, provoking the vanishing of single party majorities in legislatures (and "divided government" in the United States). They concluded that "the demands on democratic government grow, while the capacity of democratic government stagnates."

A specific failure was the management and performance of state-owned enterprises. Especially after World War II (1939–1945), many private companies were expropriated and managed by government officers, not only in communist-dominated countries but also in a number of Western European democracies under labor or social-democratic governments, most

prominently in Britain and France. It can be estimated that in the peak year of 1982, counting both communist and non-communist countries, about one-third of total world output was produced by state-owned enterprises, while more than 40 percent of the world's wage earners were state employees. In noncommunist countries, state-owned enterprises experienced lower productivity increases than private enterprises, as could be observed when they were compared with private enterprises of the same sector in other countries. The average deficit of state enterprises was about 19 percent of their output by the mid-1970s. In order to maintain activity and employment, state enterprises received huge amounts of transfers and subsidies from central governments, and this money had to be extracted from resources in other sectors of the economy.

More generally, a new strain of academic literature focusing on state failures remarked that not only state-owned enterprises but also most state agencies formed to provide public services were oversized and socially inefficient, because they were controlled by self-interested politicians and high-level bureaucrats interested in expanding the state. In this approach, it is assumed that while politicians usually do not give priority to economic efficiency (but rather to political power), nonaccountable bureaucrats tend to expand the size of the bureaucratic apparatus and inflate personnel, which, like any inefficient monopoly, produces low production and absorption of profits. "State failures" became the other side of traditionally identified "market failures" in the provision of public goods.

Finally, as a consequence of its overload and excessive size, the state experienced a fiscal crisis, as has been identified since the 1970s from different and even opposite intellectual platforms. From a perspective critical of the capitalist system, it was remarked that the requirements of "capitalist accumulation" contradict those of "legitimation," given the sustained tendency for public spending to outpace revenue. From a new conservative perspective, criticism of tax-and-spend policies provoked political and electoral revolts against parties and politicians favoring high taxation. Currently, the bulk of public expenditure in most European countries depends on broad social security systems, especially old-age pensions. Specifically, in continental Europe, social spending amounts to more than 30 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). The state has the dilemma of choosing ever increasing tax burdens—a choice that encounters political resistance—or cutting back public spending programs.

FAILED STATES

As reviewed above, bad governance can be linked to some blatant state failures, especially in high-income countries. But in other parts of the world, rather than state failures, there are failed states. In contrast to the former, the latter are undersized and insufficiently operative states.

The better-established states are the few units that have been accepted as members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), since, according to the organization's criteria, they must share a commitment to democratic government, good governance, and a market economy. In total, there are thirty such states, of which twenty-three are

in Europe, three in North America, two in Asia, and two in Oceania. Elsewhere, the attempts to build sovereign and effective states have been much less successful. Good governance in a state requires indeed an extremely costly initial accumulation of resources into the hands of the public authority, a condition detrimental to the opportunities for private initiatives, at least at some foundational stage. Building a new public administration able to impose order, guard the borders, and collect taxes over a large territory requires heavy, labor-intensive investments, which may imply net losses for the economic activity of the subjects. Only when the size of the bureaucracy is sufficiently large can it be more technology intensive and produce outputs with net social benefits. Many countries have not reached such an advanced stage of statehood development. In particular, a number of former colonies and other deprived territories without administrative resources have been unable to achieve minimum levels of state effectiveness and governance.

In several dozen countries at the bottom of the scale of statehood, the government has actually ceased to function, if ever it did. This implies that the central rulers have no control over most of the state's territory; they are ineffective in collecting taxes; they do not provide even the most basic goods and services (not even money coinage, for instance); there are epidemic diseases, widespread crime, disorder, rebellions, ethnic civil wars, and frequent interstate border conflicts; natural disasters become highly destructive; and masses of people emigrate, up to the point that emigrants' remittances become the first source of income for natives. There are several accounts of failed states in the current world, including the World Bank's list of between thirty and forty "fragile, collapsed, or failing states," its list of states in internal conflict called LICUS (low income countries under stress), and Britain's Department for International Development's list of forty-six "fragile states" of concern. Most of these states are located in Central and West Africa, the Middle East, Asian territories of the former Soviet Union, Central America, the Caribbean Sea, and the Andean region.

NEW GOVERNANCE

The decline or failure of governance in the framework of traditional states implies economic inefficiencies, bad governmental performances in providing public services, and democratic deficits in the form of low levels of rulers' control and accountability. Subsequent responses have attempted to address these concerns.

INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Increasing relations beyond the traditional limits of nation-states require certain worldwide institutional arrangements, including international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WTO, interstate agreements, and common practices such as arbitration. But as transnational exchanges and relationships develop within large world regions, such as North America, Europe, or Asia, rather than as true "globalization," it also makes other complex institutional arrangements highly relevant. At continental scale, multilevel governance implies a set of overlapping jurisdictions in which

no authority rules with exclusive powers. Rather, the central government may rule indirectly through local governments, the latter may develop self-government on important issues, and power sharing can be widespread.

The EU is a case in point in order to discuss how to overcome the so-called democratic deficit. At the European level, the Council of Ministers, which represents the citizens of each country through their own institutions, can be considered an upper chamber of territorial representation of a federal-like type. Accordingly, the council is increasingly made up of representatives of not only the state governments, but also the substate, regional governments and parliaments. Likewise, the European Parliament, whose members are chosen directly in Europe-wide elections, can be considered the lower chamber, the representative institution of the European citizens. In fact both chambers, the council and the parliament, develop significant legislative powers and mutual vetoes. Since the council and the parliament are elected separately and by different rules, they tend to have different political party majorities, and the corresponding interinstitutional decisions tend, thus, to be based on very broad agreements. In turn, the European Commission, which is appointed by the two parliamentary chambers, can be considered the EU's executive, but it shares powers with those at the other levels.

The current institutional arrangements of the EU create new opportunities for representation and decision-making power of different territorial governments. The officially adopted principle of "subsidiarity" favors the allocation of decision-making power to the smallest political unit capable of dealing effectively with the corresponding issue, although the subsequent distribution of powers is subject to case-by-case specifications. Transnational cooperation also develops across state borders, leading to the formation of euro-regions and leagues of cities. As borders, customs, police controls, and exchange offices have vanished, neighboring regions located on either side of state frontiers tend to coordinate their common interests and develop "good practice" solutions.

In this multilevel framework, traditional interstate direct relations and cooperation, based on a mutual recognition of sovereignty, are being replaced with more complex relations among states, euro-regions, regions, metropolitan areas, cities, and other structures. The traditional model of the sovereign state was a Procrustean bed pretending that one size fits all. In contrast, different territorial scales appear to be efficient for the provision of different collective goods to be consumed and financed by human groups of different size.

NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

In response to state failures, a number of proposals to improve corporate management of public administration in the provision of public services have been highlighted since the 1970s and 1980s. Specifically, there have been widely diffused proposals to introduce private sector management methods and market rules into the public sector. State managers should be made more accountable (a problem previously identified regarding managers of big private companies), public agencies should compete among them, and state-owned enterprises

should be required to produce returns as if they were private firms operating in competitive markets, especially through contracting out, quasi-markets, and consumer choice.

With this, both politicians and citizens (or consumers) were bound to ask why, if state-owned enterprises were to work like private enterprises, should they be state owned at all. A new proposal was, thus, *privatization* (in fact, in many cases, re-privatization), a word that had been coined with this purpose in 1968. State governments have been indeed downloaded and downsized. During the 1980s and 1990s, there were more than 4,000 privatizing transactions, valued at more $1 trillion, in more than 100 countries. By 2000, the share of state-owned enterprises in the gross domestic product had been reduced to less than half its previous value in high-income countries (from 10 to 4 percent), less than one-third in low-income countries (from 16 to less than 5 percent), and less than one-sixth in former communist European countries (from more than 90 to less than 15 percent). Divested firms almost always became more efficient and more profitable, increased their capital investment spending, and became financially healthier than state-owned enterprises (with the major exception of Russia), according to a review of twenty-two empirical studies on privatization.

In a parallel campaign, international organizations, private think tanks, and certain political leaders argued that the civil service should reduce staffing, introduce budgetary discipline, decentralize administration, and make greater use of nongovernmental organizations. In a number of countries, public officers and bureaucrats were submitted to performance measures such as managing by results, value for money, and closeness to the consumers.

The creation of networks has been highlighted as a particularly innovative way to improve service delivery systems. *Networks* in this sense are combinations of government with the private and voluntary sectors, including local authority, central government, unions, and business. They can be conceived of as a form of social coordination and allocation of resources based on trust and cooperation among varied actors, and they differ from traditional models of policy making based on either hierarchy or markets. Networks are self-organizing and develop diplomacy, reciprocity, and interdependence. However, they have also been blamed for being unrepresentative, closed to outsiders, unaccountable for their actions, and prone to serve private rather than public interests.

Finally, the fiscal crisis of the state was responded to with claims for fiscal responsibility. The policy of balanced budgets—that is, to equate the public revenues with public expenditures over the business cycle—was adopted as mandatory by most states of the United States during the 1980s and the 1990s. The EU requires member states using the euro to have an annual deficit of no more than 3 percent of gross domestic product. The IMF has made balanced or near-balanced budgets a condition of aid to some low-income countries.

SUCCESSFUL STATES?

Among other virtues, the recent discussion on governance has challenged certain traditional statements about the advantages of statehood. Contrary to some conventional knowledge,

sovereign statehood does not appear to be a necessary condition for good democratic governance. Indeed, democracy—in the sense of free elections and control of rulers by broad layers of citizens—had already existed in numerous local communities in the ancient and medieval world, long before the notion of state was invented, and democracy is now practiced in many private organizations, in several hundred democratic but nonsovereign local and regional governments, and in transnational institutions such as the European Parliament.

Historically, most of North America, Russia, and Asia kept very large compound republics or empires for long periods and were unacquainted with the Westphalian model of sovereign nation-state. It was in Western Europe that a few large, robust states were built by affirming their own sovereignty vis-à-vis other states. But, after long periods of continuous interstate and civil wars and conflicts, only in the second half of the twentieth century did Europe achieve an institutional equilibrium able to provide democratic governance, peace, and prosperity by building a very large union based on military, commercial, monetary, and political cooperation among states.

In large parts of Latin America, Africa, and the Arab region, former European colonies tried to replicate the Western European model of sovereign nation-states, but the failure of a high number of states in those regions seems unquestionable. Bad governance in these countries implies not excessive intervention, as is claimed for high-income countries, but lack of rule of law and insufficient provision of public goods. So far, institutions such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the African Union, and the League of Arab States have been revelations of intention and hope more than effective organizations. But, in the absence of operational states, building and putting into effect large institutional networks of this sort might be, as it was in Europe, the best way to attain stable good democratic governance in those parts of the world.

See also *European Union (EU); International Monetary Fund (IMF); North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); World Trade Organization (WTO).*

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Governments, Regional

See *Regions and Regional Governments.*

Governor

In the United States, each of the fifty states has a governor who serves as the leader of the executive branch. The power and influence of the governor varies from state to state. In general, the governor has the authority to veto legislation, activate the state's National Guard, and grant pardons.

One area of great variance among the states is the ability of the governor to appoint members of the executive branch of state government. The governor in 48 states may appoint members of the executive branch with state senate approval; in Massachusetts, such appointments may be made with the approval of the state's Governor's Council or no other approval, and in New Hampshire, such appointments may be made with the approval of the state's Executive Council. Some states allow the governor and lieutenant governor to run on the same ticket, while other states have separate elections for the two offices. Other important state offices such as those of attorney general, state auditor, and secretary of state are often elected positions. The powers of governors and other elected officials in each state's executive branch are typically defined by the state's constitution and vary among the states.

Over the past fifty years, the nature of governorships has changed due to a push during the progressive era to increase the state executive's power. Examples include a lengthening

of terms; only two states have governors serving terms of less than four years. In all states except Virginia, a governor can run for reelection. The governorship is increasingly becoming a stepping stone to the U.S. presidency. In each presidential election since 1976, a governor has been one of the two major parties' nominees for president or vice president.

See also *Term Limits.*

. . . . JAMES NEWMAN

Gramsci, Antonio

Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) was an Italian journalist, activist, and theorist who developed an alternative Marxist political analysis. Although the concepts Gramsci contributed were somewhat obscure during his life, they were later viewed by many as the most important developments in Marxist thinking of the twentieth century.

As a young journalist, Gramsci wrote and edited a number of Italian socialist papers focusing on political developments such as the rise of fascism. Later, after being arrested in 1926 and imprisoned by fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, Gramsci wrote his famous *Prison Notebooks* (1929–1935), which are more philosophical than his earlier works and are the basis for the contemporary assessment of his ideas. As these works demonstrate, his major theoretical break with early forms of Marxism was that he rejected economic determinism, or the notion that economic factors drive social and political changes. Instead, he placed more emphasis on the roles of culture, ideology, and human agency in explaining historical development.

Gramsci explored the social basis of ruling class domination in society, suggesting (in perhaps his key insight) that it was grounded in hegemony. For Gramsci, hegemony combined traditional forms of economic and coercive (or violent) forms of domination with intellectual and moral leadership that made domination seem "natural" to the dominated. He also believed hegemony had to be constructed and struggled over, as it was possible for other classes in society to pursue their own hegemonic ambitions. Indeed, Gramsci felt that for the working class to challenge the hegemony of capitalists, they would need to organize ideological alliances with other societal groups supportive of the interests of the working class—a counter hegemony. Espousing a theory perhaps more appropriate to modern democratic societies then other Marxist political strategies, Gramsci argued that through a war of position, the working class, engaged in a long ideological and organizational struggle, could undermine the cultural domination of the ruling class.

This focus on ideas and culture as key sites of social struggle also led Gramsci to place considerable emphasis on the role of intellectuals (allied to different classes) in helping to construct or undermine a particular hegemony and also to develop the distinction between civil society (the nonstate sphere of the social world) and the state in capitalist hegemony—challenging capitalism required ideological organization in civil society.

The twenty-first century popularity of Gramsci in political science and international relations is due to the fact that his

Marxist analysis fits well with other contemporary currents in political philosophy—in part because Gramsci influenced later thinkers like Michel Foucault. Gramsci's ideas seem not only a more accurate description of the world as it works (compared to economically deterministic Marxism) but also appeal to other social theorists who emphasize the role of culture and ideology in political struggle. However, views of his most important intellectual contribution vary. For cultural historian Raymond Williams, a popularizer and critic of Gramsci's ideas in cultural studies, Gramsci's focus on culture and ideas is key. For political philosopher Renate Holub, Gramsci's value is the extent to which he overcomes some of the limitations of much postmodern political thought. For scholars of international relations, like Stephen Gill, Gramsci's primary contributions are the crucial concepts, like those of hegemony and civil society, that are used to understand contemporary global order.

See also *Capitalism; Civil Society; Hegemony; Italian Political Thought; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Williams, Raymond.*

. . . .   RUSSELL ALAN WILLIAMS

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Great Power

For centuries, scholars have noted the international importance of powerful states. Today scholars differentiate international systems according to the number of great powers. Most scholars agree about how great power should be measured and which states are likely to be great powers in the coming decades. Debate centers on why individual great powers rise and fall and on how the rise of new great powers will affect international conflict and cooperation.

THE IMPORTANCE OF GREAT POWERS
According to structural realists, great powers matter for three reasons. First, as Kenneth N. Waltz explains in *Theory of International Politics* (1979), in the absence of an international sovereign, powerful states "set the scene of action for others as well as for themselves" (p. 72). In other words, as Thucydides noted in his account of the Athenian conquest of Melos in 415 BCE, "The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" (*History of the Peloponnesian War,* bk. 5). The suffering caused by powerful states can be deliberate or inadvertent. Great powers frequently conquer and coerce weak

states. In addition, they often seem like the proverbial bull in a china shop—insensitive to the damage they do.

Second, as Waltz explains, "Great power gives its possessors a big stake in their system and the ability to act for its sake" (1979, 195). Given international anarchy, there is no guarantee that great powers will accept this role or, if they do so, that their approach to collective goods problems will be satisfactory. Power is not the same as control. But powerful states are the actors best situated to address collective goods problems such as "the four '*p*'s"—poverty, population, pollution, and proliferation" (Waltz 1979, 209).

Third, in pursuing their interests and molding the international system to their liking, great powers often threaten other states, which respond by trying to balance their power. Thucydides noted this phenomenon in the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE), when the Athenian conquest of Melos stoked Sparta's conflict with Athens. Together, the temptation to use power and the inability to foresee the consequences of its application have led scholars to characterize the actions, interactions, and fates of powerful states as tragic or paradoxical.

Structural realists are not alone in seeing great powers as the main actors on the international stage. For neoliberal scholars such as Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, constraining great powers and helping them solve the security dilemma is essential to global governance. According to hegemonic stability theorists such as Charles Kindleberger, a robust international economic system requires a powerful state willing to establish and enforce economic rules and pay a disproportionate share of the costs.

POLARITY AND THE RISE AND FALL OF GREAT POWERS
Because individual great powers have the capability both to wreak havoc and to spearhead collective efforts, international conflict and cooperation are strongly affected by how many great powers exist in a particular era. Scholars distinguish among systems of three or more great powers (multipolarity), two great powers (bipolarity), and one great power (unipolarity). Within each system, individual great powers may rise and fall.

What causes great powers to rise and fall is a matter of debate. Some scholars, such as Amy Chua, argue that states become great powers when they espouse certain political, social, or cultural norms such as tolerance. By contrast, Robert Gilpin, George Modelski, and William R. Thompson argue that certain states initiate waves of technological innovation that crest with military and industrial dominance and then dissipate with emulation. Other scholars, such as Paul Kennedy, argue that great powers fall because they overreach.

MEASURING POWER AND ANTICIPATING THE RISE OF NEW GREAT POWERS
According to Waltz, which states are great powers is more or less self-evident, with states ranked according to "how they score on *all* of the following items: size of population and

territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence" (1979, 131). Since the decline of the Soviet Union, the United States has been far ahead of all other states in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), military spending, and worldwide military and diplomatic presence.

Although realists are often described as only or primarily concerned with military power, most realists actually measure power at least partly in terms of economic capability, which can be converted into military, diplomatic, and other capabilities as needed. But even economic power does not tell the whole story. Today the European Union (EU) surpasses the United States in GDP. But the EU does not have the political capability either to speak with one voice or deploy its military under one authority. Similarly, although the Chinese and Indian economies are growing rapidly, the former is more likely to face internal constraints than the latter, due to its aging population.

By reflecting on international history and sifting through the economic, military, political, and other capabilities and attributes of contemporary states, most analysts have come to the conclusion that, over time, the United States will lose its unipolar status. This could occur in one of three ways: through the absolute decline of the United States (the erosion of its economic and military capabilities); through the relative rise of today's middle powers (their economic growth and commensurate political and military involvement); or through some combination of the two. When and how this will occur are open questions.

According to realists, in the nuclear era, the rise of new great powers is likely to be met with less military resistance than the rise of great powers in the conventional era, when wars related to power transition were common. This is because the declining great power, the United States, is a nuclear state, and all of the middle powers that could rise in the medium term—China, the EU/Germany, India, Japan, and Russia—either have nuclear weapons or could quickly develop them. Thus, like the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war, the old and new great powers are likely to limit their military encounters to proxy wars on the periphery of international politics, that is, in the contested territories of the world.

According to liberals and constructivists, the relations of twenty-first century great powers will be most strongly affected not by polarity or nuclear weapons but by their internal attributes (for example, their democratic or authoritarian institutions) and by the norms and institutions of the emerging international system.

See also *International System; New World Order; Weapons of Mass Destruction.*

. . . . KAREN RUTH ADAMS

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Great Society

The Great Society was the general term for U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson's package of domestic reforms, which were enacted by a Democratically controlled Congress in the mid-1960s. The Great Society programs were initially proposed in 1964 as part of the president's efforts to improve racial equality and eradicate poverty in the United States. Many of the economic and social programs enacted became part of Johnson's War on Poverty. The Great Society programs were designed to complement and expand on the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt as well as to finalize a number of policy initiatives begun under President John F. Kennedy.

A series of measures were enacted to improve racial and gender equality, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Over a three-year period between 1964 and 1967, more than $3 billion—an enormous sum at the time—was spent on poverty reduction programs, including education and worker training initiatives as well as the creation of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Office of Economic Opportunity. The Great Society also included the creation of public health care insurance programs for the elderly (Medicare) and the poor (Medicaid).

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

See also *Entitlements; New Deal; Social Engineering; Social Welfare; Welfare Rights; Welfare State.*

Greek Democracy, Classical

Etymologically, the term *democracy* stems from *demos,* "the people" and *kratos* "rule." In the long history of democracy, ancient Greek forms were distinctive in providing their members with direct rule, unconstrained by

representatives. There were many Greek democracies, and there were significant differences between them. But in most if not all instances, rule of the people was effected through large political institutions open to male citizens, generally a public assembly and public courts. Democratic cities also had magistrates and other officials, but these generally served short terms and, at the end of their terms, were subjected to public examination. At these sessions, any citizen could lodge a complaint. In addition, magistrates were generally chosen by lot, as the Greeks viewed election as an oligarchic practice, since it favored candidates from well-known or wealthy families.

DEMOCRACY AND DEMAGOGUES IN ATHENS

The largest and most important democracy was Athens, about which we also have the fullest information. In Athens, democratic reforms were initiated in the sixth century BCE by Solon and Cleisthenes. All adult male citizens were eligible to attend the assembly and to speak and vote on the fundamental matters of state that were decided upon after a few hours of open debate. The assembly's agenda was overseen by a Council of 500, members of which were chosen by lot from Athens' ten tribes. This body was divided into ten parts or committees (*prutaneis*). Each committee sat for one-tenth of the year, with one member chosen by lot to be in charge and to be, formally, head of state for a single day.

Service on juries was open to all male citizens, with service on these large bodies—up to 2,000 members—also determined by lot. In the absence of an appeals process, decisions by juries were final. Magistrates were generally chosen by lot, but on the whole exercised little power. The main exceptions were ten generals, who were elected annually and combined important military and political functions. All magistrates were under additional popular control, through scrutiny before selection and through examination at the end of their terms. Over the course of its history, the Athenian democracy became increasingly democratic. Additional functions were turned over to popular institutions, while political participation increasingly came to be paid. Pay for jury service was initiated by Pericles (ca. 462 BCE) and payment was later extended to participation in the assembly and eventually for attending the theatre.

Given the large size of major political institutions, decisions in democracies were decisively influenced by the ability to make speeches and so to sway these bodies. One term used to refer to politicians was *rhetors.* Demagogues—literally "leaders of the people"—were able to influence policies, mainly through their ability to sway the assembly, which in turn depended heavily on the demagogues' prestige and reputations for providing sound advice. In Athens, it was through these factors rather than the offices he held that Pericles dominated politics for some thirty years in the mid-fifth century (ca. 461–429 BCE).

ANTIDEMOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS

Because the major Greek political philosophers—Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle—were from elite backgrounds and held generally antidemocratic sentiments, the tradition of ancient political philosophy is highly critical of democracy. These figures generally viewed democracy as rule by the poor and uneducated, which was not only inherently unjust to their betters but also led to unsound political decisions. Especially bitter criticism is presented in Plato's *Gorgias.* Plato criticizes the politics of oratory. Political success is based on catering to people's appetites, telling them what they want to hear, rather than offering sound advice. In Athens, this generally meant favoring imperial expansion and increased public employment, contributing to a bloated, festering city.

Along similar lines, a major theme of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* is the irrationality of the demos, which led to disastrous policies and contributed heavily to Athens' eventual defeat. In Thucydides' eyes, Athens' power and greatness resulted from the restraining hand of Pericles. Though Athens was officially a democracy, during this period, it was actually ruled by its first citizen. Thus Pericles' death—in the beginning years of the war—ushered in a period of decline along with infighting among his would-be successors.

Aristotle too is critical of extreme democracies. In the course of analyzing myriad Greek democracies, he distinguishes different kinds based on how inhabitants live. His preference is for cities that are heavily pastoral or agricultural, because citizens' work draws many of them away from the city center and prevents them from attending the assembly. The worst form is encountered in large commercial cities, which effectively turn over political power to the mob. According to both Aristotle and Thucydides, the best constitution Athens enjoyed is the moderate oligarchy that was instituted for a time in the closing years of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE), in which the franchise was restricted to the 5,000 wealthiest citizens.

CONCLUSION

This barrage of criticism, at least in regard to Athens, must be recognized as unfair—although the extent to which similar factors held in other cities is subject to debate. Like other democracies, the Athenian system gave the average citizen unparalleled rights of political participation. A large percentage of the citizens were active in political affairs, in accordance with the Greek ideal that ruling and being ruled in turn is one of the highest forms of life. On the whole, the Athenians exercised their power well. In spite of the overall turmoil of the Greek political world, Athenian democracy was generally stable for some two centuries. The main outbreaks of instability were oligarchic seizures of power in the closing years of the Peloponnesian War, in 411 and 404 BCE. When the oligarchs had been defeated, in 403 BCE, the Athenians enacted a generous amnesty, which quickly restored a measure of social harmony.

Direct participatory democracy in Athens and other cities was made possible by their small size. Population estimates are necessarily rough. A reasonable estimate for Athens at its peak would be 30,000 to 40,000 male citizens. Including women and children, this figure would be 110,000 to 150,000. The entire population, including metics (foreign residents) and

slaves was perhaps 300,000, while the populations of other cities were much smaller. In Athens, as in other Greek cities, citizenship depended on birth. Athenian citizenship required that both parents be Athenians and was virtually impossible otherwise to attain. Accordingly, although democracy provided enormous advantages to male citizens, they were a relatively small percentage of the overall population. In spite of its inclusiveness, Greek democracy excluded most inhabitants.

See also *Aristotle; Democracy; Greek Political Thought, Ancient; Plato; Thucydides.*

. . . .   GEORGE KLOSKO

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Greek Political Thought, Ancient

Ancient Greek political theory originally centered on the *polis,* the distinctive Greek city-state. Greece is naturally divided into relatively small, self-contained territories, many of which are islands in the Aegean Sea. Each area formed its own politically independent society, the polis. The polis was generally viewed as a moral union. Its educational function was to raise its citizens to the conception of virtue embodied in its laws or customs. The Greek word *nomos* (plural, *nomoi)* means both "laws" and "customs," which by traditions were divinely rooted. The small size of Greek communities allowed many to develop direct democracies and so to give rise to the Greek ideal of ruling and being ruled in turn as one of the highest forms of human life.

Because of the centrality of the polis, when Greece was conquered by Macedon, in the late fourth century BCE, and the no longer autonomous polis ceased to be the center of existence, Greek political theory underwent a fundamental shift. The Hellenistic period (in contrast to the earlier "Hellenic") dates from the loss of Greek independence. The date conventionally used is the death of Alexander the Great (323 BCE). The term *Hellenistic* is from the Greek *hellenizein,* to speak Greek. The conquests of Alexander united much of the Mediterranean world in large political units or empires. This area literally began to speak Greek, as Greek culture spread throughout this overall region, and moral and political

Plato, left, and Aristotle walk the halls of the School of Athens and discuss philosophy. The two men's political teachings emphasized ethics in politics.

SOURCE: The Granger Collection, New York

theorizing was carried on by the great Hellenistic schools, the Stoics and the Epicureans.

Hellenic political theory, epitomized in works of Plato and Aristotle, provides conceptions of the relationship between the individual and society sharply different from those of contemporary Western views. While the liberal tradition conceptualizes the individual apart from society, endowed with rights that are not granted by society, the Greeks integrated the individual much more into society. As classically argued in Aristotle's *Politics,* the polis is "prior to" the individual. Because he can achieve full development only as a member of a polis, a man is a "political animal." Remove a person from the polis, and he is no longer really a person, as a pawn removed from a chess set is no longer a pawn but simply a piece of wood.

Degrees of individualism varied in different societies. Commercial, democratic Athens had a thriving culture, with individuals—only adult male citizens—given a certain degree of freedom to live as they pleased. On the opposite pole was highly militarized Spartan society, which devoted enormous efforts to turning its citizens into indomitable soldiers. In Sparta, children were taken from their families at the age of five or six to be raised and educated communally under harsh conditions that would ensure toughness. Citizens had plots of

land, farmed by helots—essentially serfs—while they devoted themselves to military training. Commerce was minimal, and gold and silver forbidden. Meals were eaten at common tables, while the state intruded into family life in many other ways. As a result of this system, Spartans were famous throughout Greece for their bravery and their willingness to place the interests of their community before their own. Plato and Aristotle, the greatest Greek political theorists, were from upper-class backgrounds. Highly critical of extreme democracy, they were attracted to Sparta and its ideal of state-inculcated virtue. The influence of Sparta is apparent in Plato's *Republic* and *Laws.* Especially as described in Plutarch's life of Lycurgus, Sparta has epitomized a virtuous society ever since.

BEGINNINGS

The tradition of Western political theory began in ancient Greece. An impulse similar to that which led early philosophers such as Thales and Anaximander to inquire into the nature of the universe led other thinkers to raise questions about the nature of political association and the laws and customs of societies. One factor prompting questions about the nature and status of nomoi was contact with other societies, which led to the discovery that many Greek norms differed from those of other peoples. A common effect of such contact was moral relativism, a belief that nomoi rested solely on convention. Traditional Greek norms of justice required not oppressing the downtrodden, as commanded by the gods. But these claims were called into question by relativism. A sophisticated relativistic position was advanced by Protagoras of Abdera, perhaps the greatest of the Sophists, itinerant Greek teachers of rhetoric and other arts, who played an important role in the development of democracy. Protagoras declared that "man is the measure of all things" and doubted our ability to know about the gods because of the difficulty of the subject combined with the shortness of human life. In regard to standards of proper conduct, Protagoras argued that there is no truth beyond social conventions, and so one should adapt to those of one's society.

But other thinkers searched for moral norms rooted in something more substantial than convention and so opposed "nature" (*physis*) to nomos. The Sophist Antiphon argued that the only sanction of human norms was fear of punishment, while by nature, every creature seeks its own advantage. Therefore we should adhere to social norms only for fear of being caught; if we can break the rules undetected, we should do so. An alternative to the traditional view of justice was visible in the animal kingdom, and so thinkers argued for the naturalness of the law of the jungle. A full-fledged immoralist doctrine is expressed by Callicles, a probably fictional character in Plato's *Gorgias.* What we regard as rules of justice were devised by the weak to prevent the strong from oppressing them. Genuine moral standards require that the strong allow their natural tendencies to be unleashed. They should subordinate the weak and have more—have large appetites and the ability to satisfy them. The first occurrence of the phrase "law of nature (*nomon . . . ton tês physeôs*)" in Greek prose occurs in a one of Callicles' speeches in the *Gorgias.*

Evidence of the influence of such views is found in Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War.* As presented by Thucydides, figures on both sides of the conflict defend their objectives with norms of power politics. This attitude reaches its peak in a dialogue Thucydides recounts between representatives of Athens and of the island of Melos. The Athenians demand that the Melians submit to them and so forfeit their independence, supporting their position by appeal to the rule that everyone recognizes in such cases: The strong do what they will, and the weak suffer what they must.

SOCRATES AND PLATO

Countering relativism—not only moral but epistemological—was central to Socrates' philosophical endeavors and to the mission of moral reform to which he devoted his life. According to Plato, Socrates claimed to be ignorant, not to possess the all-important moral knowledge he sought. However, he was superior to other Athenians in recognizing his own ignorance and so knowing that he should seek it. Socrates therefore attempted to waken his fellow citizens to their ignorance, so they would join his search. Although Socrates was similar to the Sophists in various ways, he broke with them in believing in somewhat traditional rules of justice. More than this, he claimed that justice is both necessary and sufficient for happiness. In the *Gorgias,* Plato has him argue that to do wrong (*adikein*) is worse than to suffer wrong (*adikeisthai*), because wrongdoing damages one's soul. Socrates himself steadfastly refused to do anything he viewed as wrong, and so he allowed himself to be executed rather than commit the injustice of escaping from prison.

Although Socrates apparently did not develop a systematic political philosophy and, as an exclusively oral teacher, did not produce a conventional body of philosophical works, he did have important political views. His faith in the power of knowledge found expression in sharp criticism of Athenian democracy, because its method of distributing political offices through a lottery system turned over important matters of state to people unqualified to deal with them. Socrates also criticized democracy, because the people were volatile and easily swayed by emotion. This is one reason he avoided public life, approaching his fellow citizens in a private capacity, like a father or an elder brother. On one occasion when he served in the Athenian Council, he unsuccessfully attempted to prevent the assembly from taking a popular but clearly illegal action, at considerable risk to himself.

Greek political theory achieved its culmination in the works of Plato and Aristotle. In his autobiographical *Seventh Epistle,* Plato describes his desire to enter politics as a young man but how he was disillusioned by successive regimes he viewed as unjust in the closing years of the Peloponnesian War. In this epistle, Plato claims that, given the corruption of existing societies, the only possible good society is one that combines political power and wisdom, and so in which philosophers rule as kings. The overall pattern for Plato's political theory is visible here. He was sharply critical of Athenian democracy, and throughout his life, he proposed different alternatives in which the polis would return to its

traditional role of educating citizens to make them as virtuous as possible.

Irresolvable problems of interpretation follow from Plato's use of the dialogue form, with Socrates generally as his main spokesman. The "Socratic problem" is the problem of distinguishing between Plato's representation of the historical Socrates and his use of Socrates as a spokesman for his own ideas. The influence of Socrates appears most strong in Plato's early works, many of which end in puzzlement or *aporia*. Following the pattern of the historical Socrates, the Socrates of these dialogues raises questions about the nature of moral knowledge, and he is frequently depicted as unsuccessfully attempting to define different virtues. These dialogues also develop Socrates' criticisms of democracy. An especially bitter denunciation is presented in the *Gorgias,* which examines rhetoric through Socrates' questioning of Gorgias, a famous teacher of this art. Socrates unmasks rhetoric as a kind of pandering. It is an art of telling people what they want to hear, rather than what is good for them, and works only because they are too ignorant to understand their real interests. In a contest before a jury of children, the physician who tells people unpleasant truths will always lose to the rhetor, who offers them sweets. Much admired politicians—Miltiades, Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles—were successful because they catered to people's appetites. The results of their efforts are a city that is corrupt and swollen, stuffed with harbors and arsenals and similar trash.

Plato's search for securely rooted moral standards is combined with his criticism of existing political systems in the *Republic.* In the course of attempting to provide a definition of justice and to counter a series of immoralist claims for injustice, Socrates constructs a just city to enable himself and his interlocutors to observe justice on a large scale. The city is divided into three classes: Philosophers who rule are supported by auxiliaries, who are the city's fighting force, and the third class is farmers or craftsmen, who make up the bulk of the population. The rulers and auxiliaries constitute the Guardians. Plato's main argument for the superiority of justice to injustice is based on an elaborate analogy between cities and souls, which, he argues, have corresponding parts and corresponding virtues, which depend on relationships between the parts. Justice is a condition in which each part fulfills its proper function. The superiority of justice to injustice is proved by contrasting the harmonious just city and its corresponding soul with forms of unjust cities and their corresponding souls. The unjust forms are ridden with conflict and faction, and so they are clearly inferior to the just city and soul.

Plato's political theory is single-minded. The purpose of the city is to promote virtue—balance and harmony in the soul, which requires that the philosophers control the environment and shape the entire city to this end. Because of the recalcitrance of appetite and Plato's belief that people are most susceptible to conditioning when they are very young, the just city is dedicated to lifelong education—although whether for Guardians alone or all citizens is a question on which scholarly opinion is divided.

Plato believes strongly in the psychological power of art and so devotes a great deal of the *Republic* to detailed criticism of poetry, which at that time was the chief Greek artistic medium, especially that of Homer. Because most people are not able to master their appetites themselves, they must be subjected to philosophic rule—"enslaved to the philosophers," though this form of "slavery" is for their own benefit.

For the two classes of Guardians, the rulers and auxiliaries, Plato introduces distinctive institutions of community of family and of property, which are intended to ensure the Guardians' undivided loyalty to the city and to eliminate sources of conflict between them. According to Plato, philosophers alone are qualified to rule, not only because of their superior knowledge, but because of the elevation of values that accompanies the acquisition of knowledge, the ordinary temptations of ruling hold no attraction for them. They rule only out of duty to the city, and as an alternative to being ruled by people inferior to themselves. One of Plato's striking innovations is to have the Guardians include women as well as men. And so his commitment to "philosopher-kings" is, strictly speaking, a misnomer. But in spite of the fact that Plato was undoubtedly a pioneer in regard to women's equality, this was limited to superior women who would qualify as Guardians. Traditional families are maintained outside of the Guardian class.

In the years following the *Republic,* Plato apparently lost faith in the possibility of philosopher-kings and the unchecked political authority their existence allowed. In his later works, the *Statesman* and, especially, his last work, the *Laws,* he appears to reject outright the idea of rulers with superhuman qualities. He retains his central commitment to educative states but is far more reliant on traditional institutions, especially the rule of law. In the *Laws,* Plato's attention to education is arguably more extreme than in the *Republic.* He argues that, in order to successfully educate someone, the process must begin before birth. Pregnant women should perform rhythmic exercises to instill rhythm and harmony in the souls of future citizens.

The ideal city in the *Laws* is a colony to be founded in Crete. The Athenian Stranger, the work's main spokesman—Socrates is absent from the *Laws*—proposes a detailed system of government, modeled on Athenian democracy but with extreme democratic elements modified. There is an elaborate system of institutions that includes numerous checks and balances, and a social system, modeled on Sparta, that deemphasizes the role of wealth. The tedious detail of Plato's construction somewhat disguises the vast knowledge of Greek history and institutions and ingenious attempts at reform that went into his designs.

ARISTOTLE

Although Aristotle was Plato's student for twenty years, he broke from the high idealism of the *Republic*—although less so from the *Laws,* which Plato was probably writing during the time Aristotle was at the academy. Aristotle's ethical teaching is clearly indebted to Plato, as is evident in his interest in psychic balance and harmony, achieved through lengthy habituation and conditioning. Aristotle viewed "ethics" and "politics" as a single subject, and in his corpus, the *Nicomachean Ethics* and

Politics form a continuous treatise. The connection lies in the fact that the virtue Aristotle explores requires that the subject be raised in a properly governed polis.

Subjects examined in the *Politics* range from the best imaginable polis, to the best that could be constructed under particular conditions, to existing political forms and measures that would make them more stable. Aristotle's argument that man is a political animal is found in Book I. In Book II, he examines ideal states in theory and practice, including a series of harsh—although frequently mistaken—criticisms of Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*, generally in regard to what he views as those works' excessive utopianism. But then, paradoxically, in Books VII and VIII, Aristotle presents an ideal state of his own, which is clearly modeled on the *Laws*.

The bulk of the *Politics* is a detailed examination of numerous Greek cities and their political forms. In composing the work, Aristotle drew upon studies of 158 different Greek constitutions—one of which, a book-length study of the Constitution of Athens by either Aristotle or his students—is extant. Aristotle shows clear mastery of the history and workings of different democracies, oligarchies, and tyrannies, and he discusses numerous instances of each. His analysis of causes of stability and instability emphasizes economic elements, although not exclusively. Democracy, which is rule of the poor over the rich, becomes unstable as the rule of the poor becomes extreme. Oligarchy, rule of the rich, becomes unstable with extreme rule by the rich. In general, in order to make these cities more stable, one should counter tendencies toward extremism. In Book IV, Aristotle presents a relative ideal, the best city one may realistically hope for, in rule by the middle class, which is the most stable state. Connections that Aristotle draws between rule by the middle class and political stability have been largely confirmed by subsequent history, including conditions in contemporary industrial democracies.

HELLENISTIC PERIOD
With the Macedonian conquests, the formerly autonomous polis became an administrative unit in a much larger political form. Political activity retreated from the center of human life, and the Greek conception of a citizen became more passive. The free citizen was no longer self-governing but was relatively free of direct domination by others. Important commentators argue that the gap between Hellenic and Hellenistic views is one of the largest in the history of Western political thought.

With political affairs in the ordinary sense largely removed from most people's lives, Hellenistic political theory has little direct political content. In regard to moral philosophy, the Hellenistic schools provided philosophies of life, helping individuals to bear up during this troubled period. The Stoics preached the imperturbability of the wise person; the Epicureans preached peace of mind, and similar attitudes were upheld by other schools.

The Stoics were the most influential Hellenistic philosophical school. Believing in moral norms rooted in nature and accessible through reason, they developed the conception of natural law that was central to subsequent political theory for 2,000 years. As moral laws were rooted in nature, so was society. The Stoics viewed people as driven to enter society because of natural urges. A watered down form of Stoicism attained enormous influence from the second century BCE onward, as perhaps the most influential philosophy of the Roman Republic and then empire. When Christianity arose in the Roman Empire, it was largely lacking in social and political philosophy and so adapted dominant ideas of the times. Through Christianity, aspects of Stoicism were passed on to the modern world.

The Epicureans were less influential than the Stoics, and they opposed the Stoics on basic doctrines. Materialists, the Epicureans believed the universe was matter in motion, combining and recombining entirely by chance. In their view, neither moral norms nor society itself is rooted in nature. Rather, these are constructed by people seeking advantage in terms of pleasure and pain. Society comes about because people agree to live together, while rules of justice are purely conventional, practiced because of their utility. While the Stoics' influence is apparent in the subsequent natural law tradition, the Epicureans lived on in the materialism and social contract theory of Thomas Hobbes and later doctrines of the conventional nature of justice.

See also *Aristotle; Hobbes, Thomas; Plato; Socrates; Thucydides.*

. . . .   GEORGE KLOSKO

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Green Parties

Green political parties are formally organized around the principles of Green politics. They were born out of the 1960s protest movements and the 1970s peace movements in response to what some perceived as politics without real participation, a disrespect for other nations' sovereignty, a single-minded and one-dimensional pursuit of money, and more. At first composed primarily of well-educated young people in their twenties and thirties living in the United States and Europe, green movements, or green environmental movements, have worked to dispel the widespread misconception that to be "green" did not mean to support only nature at the expense of everything else. On the contrary, to be green meant to very well include everything else but to see it through a green lens. Hence, on the agenda of green movements across Europe were new issues related to the environment and sustainable growth as well as more traditional issues such as social security

in graying societies, education, technology and science, poverty, urbanization, and population growth.

Green movements increased their influence from that of a social phenomenon to that of a political one through the creation of green political parties. Green parties' appeal to younger generations benefited the green movements in terms of major recruitment potential and supportive voters. For example, European party systems are frequently proportional, allowing small political groups access to and influence in the government system, even if they represent only a fraction of the population. Not only could green parties emerge under these systems, they could also become coalition partners of the so-called establishment parties, and this occurred in Germany, Finland, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands in the 1990s. The United States' two-party majority system, on the other hand, does not provide the same opportunity and thus limits the political influence of the American green movement.

GREEN PARTIES' SUCCESS

How far have the green parties come? If their success is measured in terms of public support—a yardstick entirely compatible with the original claim of the green movements to create politics with real public participation—then the record is mixed. For example, green parties have become a permanent fixture of their respective European political systems and have expanded into Latin America, Asia, and Africa in the early twenty-first century. However, they seldom share power in the government. (A notable exception was in Germany during the Green Party's coalition years with the Social Democrats, 1998–2005.) Green parties are part of the legislature and wield political power. To the degree to which coalition politics is a reality, green parties have become a real option, even in coalitions that as recently as the 1990s seemed impossible. Green parties, however, have not been able to become big political parties that alone can count on more than 15 to 20 percent of the popular vote.

Another way to measure the success of green parties would be to ask how much they have changed politics, and, by extension, society. Here the record is also mixed. On one hand, it is clear that traditional parties have become "greener" and more concerned with environmental issues—and not just because traditional parties are today aggressively offering coalition status. In politics, education, schools, and science, in short—as the green movement originally argued—the environment is not just a utopian issue, it is a political, social, economic, and humane one. To the degree to which the twenty-first century reveals major environmental challenges, it is not a small measure of success if those countries that have witnessed green movements and green parties since the 1980s are, in the 2000s, better prepared to face these issues.

At the same time, as much as green parties have changed politics, politics have also changed the green parties. The German Green Party, founded in 1979, realized early on that the decision to join the establishment may come with a high cost. The party eventually split into the so-called *realos* (*realpolitik*) and the fundis (the fundamentalists), the former convinced that if the party joined the political system it would have to adopt certain practices and beliefs, including the need to become political experts or experts in politics. This idea of political expert was anathema to the fundis, who were convinced that it was dangerous to become too vested in the political system and were concerned about remaining loyal to the movement's roots. This difference between camps within green parties may be exemplary of the larger issues, including how much green parties have changed or deviated from their original objects and if they have now become victims of their own success

See also *Environmental Policy; Environmental Political Theory; Political Parties.*

. . . . VOLKER K. FRANK

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Grotius, Hugo

Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) was a Dutch jurist. He is most famous for having written *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (*The Laws of War and Peace,* 1625), a text commonly acknowledged to have ushered in the modern natural rights tradition and the study of international relations. Grotius held legal and administrative posts in the government of Holland until 1618, when he became embroiled in a religious conflict within the United Provinces. He was charged with treason and sentenced to life imprisonment at Loevestein Castle. Grotius famously escaped from Loevestein in 1621 in a chest of books and fled to France, where he was granted a royal pension by Louis XIII. Grotius left France in 1631, and, after failing to secure repatriation to the United Provinces, became the Swedish ambassador to France. He lived in Paris in this capacity until 1645, when he died in a shipwreck.

The religious and political conflict in his native Holland, the Eighty Years War (1568–1648), and the Thirty Years War (1618–1648) all shaped Grotius's approach to jurisprudence and international relations. He sought not to eliminate religious differences and armed conflicts, but rather to construct a theory of natural law that could speak to different Christian denominations and to develop a theory of international relations that both justified and regulated the practice of war.

De Jure Belli ac Pacis, which Grotius began writing in prison, represents a break with the Scholastic tradition of natural law and ushered in a new natural jurisprudence consistent with humanism and Protestantism. Grotius's approach to natural law is essentially rationalist, that is, he attempts to derive natural law from human reason and human experience rather than from the will of God. Grotius's depiction of human beings as rational creatures moved by instinctive drives for self-preservation and for sociability consequently forms the foundation of his political and jurisprudential thinking. The natural law theory of *De Jure Belli* marks the first significant conception of natural law as a series of rights belonging to individuals and to states; Grotius shifts the meaning of *ius* from a law to which

individuals are subject to an enforceable right possessed by the individual. These include a right to self-preservation and the possession of property (the individual's *suum*), and infringements upon these rights are punishable by force.

In perhaps his most significant move, Grotius argues that states have no powers but those natural to the individuals who compose them, and, as a result, states possess the same natural rights as individuals. Consequently, Grotius ultimately understands states as rights-bearing institutions that may punish violations of the natural law through war. War, when it seeks to redress violations of the natural law, is just and justifiable. *De Jure Belli* outlines the principles of natural law and the just causes of war and rightful conduct in war, and it seeks to ground a just war theory in the principles of natural law and natural justice. In the process, Grotius created a new way of thinking about natural law that paved the way for the rights-bearing liberal individual and the social contract tradition as well as for a new science of international relations that shaped the Westphalian system of sovereign and equal states.

See also *Natural Law; Natural Rights.*

. . . .   KRISTY M. KING

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Group Cohesion

Group cohesion describes the way individuals are bound together in a group and feel mutual attraction. Pressures and constraints, both external and internal, act on the group and its members to maintain the group's norms and the group as an entity

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT

Early research in the 1940s and 1950s led to the first theory of group cohesion to explain dynamics in small groups. This theory posited that group cohesion is determined by the level of attraction among group members and the extent to which the group mediates among members and fulfills their needs and goals. When these levels were high, membership continuity and adherence to group norms resulted. Later research tended to focus strongly on intragroup forces and the aspect of mutual attraction of group members, while ignoring external forces.

The understanding of group cohesion was further developed by incorporating theories of social identity (in 1979) and

self-categorization (in 1985). Both theories differentiated interpersonal and group processes from one another. Social identity theorists use self-inclusive social categories such as nationalities to show how those categories constitute part of the self-image while impacting the perceptions and behavior of members. The own group, and thus the self, is enhanced. Self-categorization theory emphasizes perceptions of difference from other groups and reduction of differences within the group. Social attraction was determined by the social relationships of an individual, by how much others were seen to be similar, and by whether or not the boundaries or differentiations among various groups were seen as permeable and legitimate.

Research initially focused on the cognitive processes of group members regarding their particular group, but it was expanded to include any collectivity an individual person thought of belonging to. In the early 1990s, new insights included groups being also seen in structural terms (from network theory) and a greater focus on the role of emotions. Research suggested that emotional attachment to the group increases as the individual's sense of control increases, a dynamic especially present in smaller groups. The concept of relational cohesion as an enforcer of group cohesion entered the analysis. Relational cohesion focuses on exchange patterns within a group that lead to positive emotions, uncertainty reduction, and the creation of behavioral commitment of members. Equal power relations and high group density increase cohesion, solidarity, and the perception of a shared experience within a group. Recent research has focused on the connections of group members and their impact on social consensus in groups.

Work on group cohesion mainly comes from sociology and psychology. Sociologists have focused mostly on the individual's connection to a group and on emotional reactions, and psychologists have focused on larger social categories and the aspect of cognitive self-categorization. The ecological theory argues that a group is maintained when member characteristics in the group spread by keeping members or recruiting new ones who fit those characteristics. Different groups may also compete for members and affect each other's development. Research has often neglected the influence of the external environment on group cohesion. Critics also charge that the focus of group cohesiveness has been reduced to interpersonal processes or attraction within a group, which does not achieve theoretical expectations.

THE IMPACT OF COHESION

The more intense and frequent the connections among group members, the greater group stability and cohesion. The closer the members are to the core of the group, the longer will they remain members. Cohesion is connected with conformity. Processes of conformity in groups develop due to the importance of group membership to individual members, group influence on members, and group size. As the first two factors increase, so does conformity. But size impacts conformity more in smaller groups. The greater the level of cohesion, the more members will seek to recruit similarly thinking people for membership. Cohesion and high performance of a group

can also promote one another. However, when good relations among group members are seen as more important, cohesion can also hinder high performance.

Very cohesive groups typically contain members who are more energetic in group activities and more concerned about the well-being of the group, aligning their own state of feeling with that of the group. As cohesiveness impacts the quality and quantity of group interaction, the behavior of group members, and their satisfaction, cohesiveness represents a powerful potential for a group's development.

See also *Emotions in Politics; Group Relations; Group Theory; Groupthink; Political Psychology.*

. . . . SYBILLE REINKE DE BUITRAGO

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Group of 7; Group of 8; Group of 20

See *G7/G8 and G20.*

Group Relations

Group relations describe the inner dynamics and interactions of people within a group. They are formed and maintained because group membership satisfies a number of human needs.

Groups vary in size and character and exist for a common purpose. A group consists of two or more persons who can interact and impact each others' needs and aims. Humans enter into relations to satisfy a basic need of belonging, stemming from evolution, where group membership assured important advantages and one's own survival. Humans have a need to control that part of the social environment that concerns themselves.

Groups reduce the complexities of life via providing information, helping to shape individual identity, and developing social norms regulating behavior. They exhibit a certain degree of inner homogeneity. Aside from norms, there are also social roles describing how people in a certain position within the group should behave. Social roles can also have negative effects, for example, when people act beyond the expectations of the role, giving up their own identity, or when people do not act according to the role.

In their groups, humans tend to categorize, identify, and compare as well as differentiate their own group from others—these processes were explored by Henri Tajfel, among others, in social identity theory. Also, various processes of control, persuasion, social facilitation, or social loafing take place. Conformity in groups largely depends on the level of importance of group membership to members, the level of group influence that a member is subject to, and the group size. The greater the first two factors, the greater the conformity. Size will impact conformity more in smaller groups, but less so or not at all in larger groups. Pressure to conform increases for members holding minority opinions. The more collective the group, also within the frame of the national culture, the greater is the inherent conformity.

Group cohesion is another important aspect of group relations, providing for connections among members and the promotion of mutual affection. Cohesion is important for group maintenance and can also improve the group performance.

Group membership can also lead to de-individuation, however, such as in cases where an individual member starts to act in a way that is against social norms and that he or she would never do alone (e.g., mobs among soccer fans or lynching incidents). This dynamic can develop because persons within a group feel less responsible for their own behavior and potentially act more aggressively. When de-individuation takes place, individual actions are more oriented along the norms of the group.

Group dynamics may further lead to information and process losses, which weaken good decision making. In such cases, important information and minority opinions are often ignored. Groupthink can develop when group cohesion and solidarity are seen as important. The level of risk taking within a group also increases the more risk is seen as cultural value in a given society. A further aspect is group polarization, describing group members making more extreme decisions when in their group than when alone.

Group relations vary across cultures due to different norms and expectations. The different dynamics can be experienced to a certain degree when entering or interacting with someone from another culture. Differences in group relations also affect modes of cooperation and conflict within as well as among groups.

See also *Group Cohesion; Groupthink.*

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Group Theory

Group theory constitutes the intellectual precursor to pluralism and was originated by Arthur F. Bentley in his *The Process of Government* (1908). The theory was built upon and refined further by David Truman in his *The Governmental Process* (1951). Thus, group theory and its offspring of pluralism and other competitor group-based theories (such as elitism and neocorporatism) are closely entwined, and discussion of one necessitates discussion of the others. Both Bentley and Truman recognized the prominent political role of interest groups in American liberal democracy and realized that giving that type of societal institution a more salient position in social scientific theorizing would result in improved and more accurate analyses of the democratic political process in America. Truman's fundamental declaration that politics is best understood by examining the interaction of groups resides as the cornerstone of this analytical orientation. Thus, at the heart of group theory is the recognition that politics is understood best as the action of groups. The pressures exercised by organized interest groups greatly influence the activities and actions of government—as groups pursue their varied interests, they become the basis of public policy and the essence of politics. These manifested pressures and influence are considered not to be democratically problematic; instead they are important elements that make up the actual strength and vigor of American democracy.

PLURALISM

Pluralism sprung from this group theory orientation, and pluralists conclude that the wide variety and diversity of interest groups and the decentralized quality of so much of governmental decision making allows a great number of groups to have impact and relevance in the public policy-making process. So in group theory and pluralism, the primary political actors are groups, not individual citizens, and this is interpreted to be a strong positive, not a negative, in the American system of governance. This pluralism of groups serves as a useful and effective check on potential governmental tyranny. In other words, American democracy works quite well precisely because of the benevolent effects of the enormous and active universe of both actual and potential groups in the country. Thus, pluralism derives from group theory and is one of the leading schools of thought in this type of political analysis.

Robert Dahl's seminal 1961 study of local politics in New Haven, Connecticut, entitled *Who Governs?,* constituted the high point of pluralistic theorizing. As his analysis adduces, government plays the role of a competitive arena where interest groups battle with each other for influence over political officials and the direction of public policy in a particular issue area. The state does not systematically privilege one set of interests over another or favor one group above others either. For pluralists, there is no inherent bias inside of government—instead, politics is a wide-open, free-ranging marketplace where leaders or representatives of various groups bargain, negotiate, and compromise with each other and political officials in the halls of power, with government acting as broker or neutral umpire.

As new interests come into being, evolving from inchoate to actual, groups develop to represent those fresh interests. Membership in these groups is open, so there is much access available for all citizens in the system. Of note, political influence or clout may not be perfectly distributed, but power still remains widely dispersed. With political power so widely dispersed, those who exercise power in one kind of decision area are not the same people exercising power in another—no one single individual or group could dominate the entire decision-making process in all areas of public policy. Different sets of groups will direct decision making in different policy areas, depending on their differential levels of intensity of preferences. The reality of group politics forces elected officials, in their unrelenting endeavors to cultivate favor to assist in reelection efforts and to consolidate their own power stakes, to reach out to a variety of groups out of necessity. Thus, pluralism works to decentralize and fragment governmental decision making across policy sectors with the result that no one single cabal of elites dictates all policy—democratic decisions are duly obtained.

CRITICISMS OF PLURALISM

As time has passed, a variety of criticisms from other group theory competitors have arisen to contest the accuracy and validity of pluralism's insights. The first major criticism came from the sociologist C. Wright Mills, who produced power elite theory in 1956. In the American context, Mills contended that the leaders of business, academia, military, and government compose a small cadre of power elites who dominate policy making. They do not compete for influence or power with each other, as the pluralists argue across issue areas, but instead are all generally on the same page ideologically and politically. The shared commonality of the interests of this power elite results in public policy debates occurring only at the margins and a slight tweaking of policy minutiae, with the probability of transformative policy change being quite slim. For Mills (and other critics as well), policy disagreements, political disputes, and partisan battles amongst political actors are mere façades—pluralism (and the ostensible fragmentation and decentralization of governmental decision making) is little more than a masquerade obscuring how decisions are truly made in the halls of power.

Another leading critique of pluralism in group theory is best captured by E. E. Schattschneider's famous statement that "the flaw in the pluralist paradise is that the heavenly choir sings with an upper-class accent." Schattschneider's point is that there is an inherent bias in the American interest group universe that strongly favors business, industry, and the generally better organized—not every group or every set of interests has the same chance to influence policy that the more moneyed ones have. Some are clearly and consistently more favored by government officials than others, and this structural skewing undermines the pluralist contention of a level playing field for all interests and groups.

Similarly, the neocorporatist view of interest group activity posits that the idea that the government is simply and solely an arena where interests come to do battle does not adequately capture the true role of the state in these interactions. Government officials will and do choose groups and interests to favor in their decisions, and these choices end up impacting the shape and hierarchy of the interest group community and the relative strengths of specific groups in that community. Neocorporatism essentially sees a cooperative relationship between government and certain interest groups (typically peak associations and broad organizations representing business and labor) so as to more effectively and efficiently stabilize the formulation and implementation of public policy (primarily in the economic realm). So, government should not be interpreted to be the neutral, low-impact variable in the policy process that pluralism posits. The state is a relevant and important factor that does necessarily affect policy outcomes; it is not just a neutral arena. This debate between pluralism and neocorporatism continues to be one of the most salient in group theory and has been so for several decades.

CONCLUSION

Group theory remains a vitally important aspect of analysis of politics in the American context as well as elsewhere. Pluralism continues to be the major focus of such theorizing, with important competitors arising over time in the form of the elitist and neocorporatist analytic schools.

See also *Bentley, Arthur Fisher; Interest Groups and Lobbies; Pluralism.*

. . . . STEPHEN R. ROUTH

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Groupthink

Groupthink, a termed coined by Yale psychologist Irving Janis, refers to a dysfunctional mode of decision making in which members of exceptionally cohesive groups strive for unanimity in opinion to the extent that they prematurely agree on a particular course of action and fail to consider more suitable alternatives. Although teams generally make better decisions than individuals, in-group pressures for solidarity, loyalty, and uniformity in beliefs and behavior can interfere with beneficial group dynamics. For these reasons, teams interacting over long periods of time can become too cohesive and too focused on agreeing with each other.

Amicable groups seeking too much agreement may fail to carefully evaluate their initial decisions and focus too narrowly on a small set of alternatives. Such groups may not see the importance of obtaining viewpoints and information from outside sources. The absence of external feedback tends to obscure the potential negative consequences of decisions and the obvious ways the plans are destined to fail. The likelihood of groupthink increases as external stress on the group increases. Therefore, groupthink is more likely to occur in the context of budget crunches, recent setbacks, or urgent time pressures.

Several additional factors predispose group members to groupthink. Groups characterized by a groupthink dynamic often believe they are immune to error and that they are too intelligent or too experienced to make poor decisions. Beliefs in the inherent morality of their positions, coupled with stereotypes of other groups as evil and immoral, also lead to faulty decision making. Groupthink is more likely to occur when group members erroneously believe that they are in unanimous agreement. This illusion of unanimity is sustained by members' self-censorship of their doubts and by so-called pluralistic ignorance. Pluralistic ignorance comes into play when team members who have serious doubts do not openly express them, leaving others to think they are alone in their disagreement. In the event that one or two individuals risk expressing their concerns, others apply direct pressure to persuade them to change their dissident opinions. In addition, "mind guards" shield the group from information that contradicts their conclusions. Mind guarding can involve suppressing external or internal information. Finally, group members engage in selective perception by ignoring information that does not conform to their preconceived ideas. As a result, members with special expertise or information may find their input is rejected. Small group psychologists agree that groupthink is more likely to occur when more of these factors are present.

Scholar Rebecca Cline maintains that groupthink is more apt to occur in the White House than elsewhere due to the president's high status and the awe inspired by the position. Persons with unpleasant information or contradictory opinions may be particularly unwilling to present such information to the president. Groupthink has been linked to several catastrophic domestic and foreign policy decisions, including the Watergate cover-up, the Iran-Contra scandal, and the Challenger space shuttle launch. Most recently, political pundits have suggested that the U.S. decision to invade Iraq should be analyzed in terms of groupthink.

The ill-fated launch of the Challenger shuttle—despite evidence of serious design flaws, weather concerns, and engineers' warnings that the primary o-ring could fail in cooler weather—is a classic example of the groupthink phenomenon. In this case, internal memos questioning the viability of the primary o-rings in cool weather were not circulated. In addition, engineers who expressed concern about the launch were silenced by direct pressure from other members of the team.

The Bay of Pigs invasion, in which President Kennedy and his cabinet uncritically accepted and supported an ill-conceived CIA plan to send Cuban exiles into Cuba to overthrow dictator Fidel Castro's government, is an often cited example of groupthink. Historical analysis indicates that at least two Cabinet members failed to express their own doubts about the mission. In contrast, historians praise President Kennedy's handling of the Cuban missile crisis, noting that he managed essentially the same team in a very different manner. To avoid another foreign policy fiasco, Kennedy altered his behavior in several important ways. He suspended the usual rules of protocol, adopted an impartial stance, assigned the roles of critical evaluators and devil's advocate to various cabinet members, and brought in outside experts to critically evaluate the group's plan. Finally, to foster a climate of independent thinking, he did not attend some group meetings.

Leaders play a pivotal role in fostering a climate that is antithetical to groupthink. In assigning tasks, leaders should avoid being too directive or indicating their desired result. They should also take special pains to elicit minority points of view. Leaders can guard against premature agreement by avoiding arbitrary termination of discussion and timelines. In addition, they can call a follow-up meeting where members can raise doubts after reviewing the decision outside of a pressure-filled environment. Finally, dividing members into subgroups to discuss the same issue can lessen the pressure to conform, especially if high-status individuals are separated from low-status individuals. Members can then be brought back together to report the outcomes of their discussion and resolve their differences.

See also *Decision Theory, Foundations of; Group Relations.*

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Guest Workers

Guest workers are people who sell their labor in a country other than their country of citizenship. As the term implies, guest workers are different from immigrants in that guest workers are in a host country strictly to work and are expected to eventually return to their home country. The term also implies that the temporary migration is voluntary.

Although various historical forms of temporary migration could be described as examples of guest workers, contemporary usage of the term generally refers to explicit policies that facilitate temporary migration for labor purposes, often bilateral agreements between sending and receiving states. Examples include Mexican agricultural workers in the United States under the bracero program from 1942 to 1964, West Germany recruiting guest workers from Italy and the Mediterranean (especially Turkey) from the mid-1950s to 1973, and Persian Gulf oil-exporting states utilizing large numbers of Asian guest workers from the mid- to late 1970s to the present.

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GUEST WORKERS

States seek guest workers for a variety of reasons, a prime motivation being a shortage of labor at particular skill levels for a particular wage. This could be a lack of unskilled workers willing to take up what is often referred to as "3D" work—difficult, dirty, and dangerous—at a relatively low wage, or a lack of highly skilled workers able to meet the demands of particular industries, such as information technology or health care.

While the demand for guest workers is often driven by market forces, it is essential to recognize how guest workers are often a form of "unfree labor" exempt from market determination of wages and working conditions. In a well-functioning labor market, where workers are free to leave their current job in search of better conditions elsewhere and employers have the recourse to hire and fire workers, workers and employers are, in a sense, in a constant negotiation over wages and working conditions. In contrast, many guest workers are severely limited in their ability to contest the conditions of their employment, as they are legally obligated to honor a contract made with a specific employer, usually for a specific period of time. Contracts and/or work visas essentially render the guest worker a captive of the employer, with the worker having a choice only between, on the one hand, continued employment under conditions provided for in the contract, or, on the other hand, leaving the country, often with financial penalties. While it could be argued that workers are free to negotiate contracts before departure to a recipient country, there are significant information asymmetries involved, especially for workers with no overseas experience.

Another common concern about guest worker programs is the possibility they will lead to permanent migration. While guest worker programs are consciously designed as a form of labor supplementation that is short of permanent migration, history demonstrates that liberal societies are reluctant to cross the invisible line of denying basic civil liberties and human rights that would be required to locate and forcibly deport guest workers who have overstayed the conditions of their employment.

HOST COUNTRY POLICIES

A good example of the above phenomenon is the West German guest worker program that formally ended in 1973 after the first oil shock. West Germany had begun recruiting

seasonal guest workers for agriculture in the 1950s, but by the 1960s the rapidly growing export economy led to recruitment of guest workers for industrial production. The guest worker program was designed to have workers rotate by going home after a year or two and did not encourage family reunification in Germany. However, guest workers learned that rotation could be delayed with the help of employers and that relatives of current guest workers could be requested by name through their employers. After the 1973 OPEC-induced oil shock, the global economy slowed and West Germany ended the formal program of guest worker recruitment. However, in the following decades, the West German government came to realize that even offering financial incentives to leave would do little to reduce the guest worker population, which in the early twenty-first century remains relatively large in Germany.

There have been suggestions that the United States should embrace some sort of guest worker program as a way to deal with undocumented migrants from Mexico, but it is doubtful that such a program would actually succeed in maintaining a fixed level of rotating guest workers. Much more likely is a repeat of the German experience, where guest workers eventually become permanent residents. When this happens, the guest workers, and their descendants, face some longer-term problems, including the lack of eligibility for citizenship, children being born and raised in the host country, and identity issues. States that are not committed to a liberal identity and liberal values, such as the oil-exporting states of the Persian Gulf, are much more likely to maintain an effective guest worker program and to discourage permanent migration.

REMITTANCES AND WELFARE-ENHANCING EFFECTS

While much attention is paid to the policies of receiving states, it is important to recognize that sending states often have an explicit policy of encouraging guest worker migration. The paradigmatic example is the Philippines, with some eight million Filipinos having migrated (nearly 10 percent of the population). Many other Asian states and an increasing number of Latin American states have more or less explicit policies to support, encourage, and sustain emigration. The primary reason that less-developed countries encourage emigration is the promise of remittances—money that migrants send home to family and friends. Remittances are a particularly valuable form of external finance, because they are in the form of hard currency. They are stable in that remittance income does not decline in a financial crisis in the sending state, and, unlike loans or foreign direct investment, there are no corresponding future foreign claims on state finances.

Economists generally think of migration, whether permanent or temporary, as welfare enhancing for both sending and receiving countries. A particular economic argument for the increase of guest workers relates to the declining fertility rates and aging populations of many wealthy countries like Italy and Japan. Migration of guest workers to these economies would provide more economically active workers to help support the social welfare programs from which an older,

retired population receives income in pay-as-you-go taxation systems. However, economic logics do not capture the full complexity of societal reactions to large numbers of guest workers in receiving countries. Additionally, a static analysis of the immediate benefits of migration for sending and receiving states does not address the dynamic long-term effects of sending countries losing skilled workers either temporarily or permanently.

See also *International Political Economy; Labor Policy; Migration.*

. . . . M. SCOTT SOLOMON

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Guild Socialism

Guild socialism is a political movement advocating for workers to control industry through a system of national guilds that operate in an implied contractual relationship with society and consumers. A. R. Orage, Arthur J. Penty, Samuel Hobson, and ultimately G. D. H. Cole are all associated with guild socialism.

Guild socialism originated from seventeenth-century British philosophers John Ruskin and William Morris and their monastic-order vision of labor and the productive process, in which the role of the wage earner is transformed into one of producer and integral member of a community. Ruskin and Morris argued that economic theory and capitalism per se had no moral implications for the essential dignity of labor as self-creation. In the weekly British literary magazine *New Age* (1907–1920), British editor A. R. Orage wrote about an emergent guild socialist sensibility, a left–Nietzschianism that charted a separate course from both syndicalism, with its tendency to pit the potentially tyrannical self-interest of producers against the general needs of the community, and state socialism, with its technocratic planning where the workforce is deprived of its right to organize work creatively on a day-to-day basis.

Guild socialist writings continued to draw upon similar theories, including Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin's writings on mutual aid (1902); the theories of Fernand Pelloutier, leader of the 1800s French trade union *Bourses des Travail;*

French writer and historian Georges Renaud's *Guilds in the Middle Ages;* and German historian Otto von Gierke's theory of the real personality and fellowship of producers' associations (*Genossenschaft*). In *Restoration of the Guild System* (1916), English writer Arthur J. Penty stressed the need to return to small-scale production, decentralized forms of control, and personalized relations to restore democracy to spheres of human activity. Guilds and cooperatives were understood as centers of mutual aid, education/apprenticeship, regulation of standards of quality, regulation of workshop health, and safety, training, and socializing interactions.

A formal political theory of guild socialism was formulated between 1913 and 1920 by Samuel Hobson and George Douglas Howard Cole. Hobson presented a national-scale projection beyond decentralized craft production in *National Guilds: An Inquiry into the Wage System and the Way Out* (1914); and *National Guilds and the State* (1920). Hobson demonstrated Fabian and Nietzschian perspectives in moving beyond medievalist origins and ideals and stressed "mastership," differentiating function from ability, expertise, and leadership qualities beyond the "profiteering spirit." In *Guild Socialism Re-Stated* (1920), Cole presents a thoroughly worked-out blueprint for "social self-management" based on participation and dialogue, resisting both Fabian and Bolshevik plans to reduce producers to implementers of plans formulated by technical experts outside the shop floor.

Cole proved to be the most prodigious and consequential writer of the new theory of guild socialism: He produced *World of Labor* (1913), *Self-Government in Industry* (1917), *Labor in the Commonwealth* (1918), and *Social Theory* (1920). Cole stressed the need to transcend French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau's attack on partial associations; for it is possible for non-statist associations to pursue their interests in a way that does not necessarily bring them into conflict with other associations or the state. In his 1914 article, "Conflicting Social Obligations," Cole noted that "the state cannot fully express the associative will of men." The state is but one of many *functional* associations that must be coordinated by some *federal* national commune of the associations. It may be guided by the general will of all its members, but it should not express their will. The state needs to be contained in the world of groups rather than vice versa.

Cole argues for social theory rather than political theory. In his work, sovereign institutions of government are deemphasized and replaced with the sovereignty of associational life in general, as a reflexive governance functionally representing the division of labor taken as a heterarchical rather than a hierarchical whole.

With the collapse of the guild socialism movement in the 1920s, Cole—impressed with trade unions' cooperation during World War I (1914–1918) and saddened by their partiality in the 1926 coal mining industry's general strike—began to appreciate the sense of underlying harmony necessary for the redistribution of material inequality and the state's "true nature." In *The Next Ten Years* (1928), Cole moved from themes of communitarianism and *mutualité* to a more pronounced functionalism involving workers' control within a strengthened trade unionism rather than a centralized collectivism.

See also *Cole, George Douglas Howard; Communism; Marxism.*

. . . .   RICHARD R. WEINER

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Guillotine

See *Cloture.*

Gulf States

The gulf states are the countries in the Middle East that border the Persian or Arabian Gulf: Iran, Oman (the small exclave of Musandam), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq (the Tigris-Euphrates river delta: the Shatt-el-Arab). The name of the gulf is disputed because of its geopolitical connotation. The United Nations (UN) officially recognizes the "Persian Gulf" as the standard geographical designation, and history names the gulf the "Pars Sea" or "Persian Gulf" because of the influence of the Persian Empire. Since the 1960s and the rise of nationalist pan-Arabist movements in the region, however, Arab states have adopted the term "Arabian Gulf." This name is controversial because of its political implications and also because the term "Arabian Gulf" is an ancient name for the Red Sea.

CLEAVAGES

The gulf naming dispute is the tip of an iceberg of linguistic, religious, historical, political, tribal, and economic cleavages between and across the gulf states. Iran's official language is Farsi, and the majority of the population is Shiite Muslim, while the official language of Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait is Arabic, and the majority of their population is Sunni Muslim. Arabic-speaking Iraq has a Shiite majority but with a big minority of Sunni Muslims, while Bahrain has an important Shiite minority.

Various tribal loyalties throughout the region are frequently divisive and are exacerbated by religious differences. Tribal lineage, family, and clan connections affect the political system of the gulf states to different degrees: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain are monarchies based on tribal leadership with no significant level of democratic participation, while Iran and Iraq are republics. Historically, the development of the states as independent entities and their

The Gulf states border the Persian, or Arabian, Gulf in the Middle East. The term for the gulf—Persian in reference to its history or Arabian in acknowledgment of pan-Arabism—is often in dispute.

administration system has also been influenced (except for the Iranian case) by the British colonial system.

Islam plays an important role in the political organization and the public life of the gulf states societies. Sharia law is applied to different degrees in all the states, and societies are generally conservative. Examples of religious conservatism are the 1979-instituted Shiite revolutionary government in Iran and the Wahabi (an Islamic sect) regime in Saudi Arabia. A counterexample was Iraq under the Baath party (Saddam Hussein's) regime: In the name of Arab nationalism, religious differences were downplayed, and Iraqi society was considered comparatively more liberal. The effect of wealth has also created contrasting trends and social changes in most of the gulf states.

Also divisive is the foreign policy outlook of the gulf states: A common stance against the recognition of Israel is counterweighted by differences in relations with the United States and the West, with some accepting the friendship and others, like post-1979 Iran, having a confrontational attitude.

From an economic perspective, the gulf has been an important waterway since ancient times. Merchant trade with India, China, and Southwest Asia was the major economic activity of the region, and after the discoveries of massive onshore and offshore oil deposits in the twentieth century, it has acquired strategic value in terms of world oil production and transportation. Collectively the gulf states possess 57 percent of the world's oil reserves and 45 percent of the natural gas reserves. In particular Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi), Qatar, and Kuwait have profited from this wealth of natural resources, and they are engaged in modernizing their economies and societies. Iran and Iraq, because of political strife, have lagged behind in this oil-driven economic development, while Bahrain and Oman do not possess enough oil and gas deposits to transform their economies. This is also why Bahrain and Oman are the only two gulf states that are not members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

POWER COMPETITION AND TENSIONS

The unequal distribution of natural resources and wealth and the competition for regional power, fueled by the growing importance of oil in the world economy, have heightened cleavages and caused a number of conflicts in the region. In addition, the political and economic interests of major world powers and their involvement in the affairs of the gulf states have contributed to make the region a security powder keg.

The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1990) was initiated by Iraq's invasion of western Iran. Saddam Hussein sought to seize control of the rich oil-producing Iranian region of Khuzestan, to reassert Iraqi sovereignty on both banks of the Shatt-el-Arab, and to preempt attempts by the Iranian Islamic revolutionary government to incite rebellion among the Iraqi Shiite majority. Iraq was financially supported by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Arab states and tacitly backed by the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the war resulted in a stalemate,

and in 1988, beleaguered by economic problems, Iran accepted a UN-brokered ceasefire. In the late summer of 1990, the two countries reestablished diplomatic relations and agreed on the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from occupied Iranian territory, division of sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab waterway, and a prisoner-of-war exchange.

On August, 2 1990, Iraq annexed Kuwait, accusing Kuwait of damaging Iraq's economy by not respecting the production quotas set by OPEC and by illegally pumping oil from the Iraqi Rumaila oil field. This action prompted the so-called first Persian Gulf War (January-February 1991): the UN-authorized armed intervention of a coalition of 32 countries commanded by the United States (Operation Desert Storm) to liberate Kuwait. Iraqi forces retreated from Kuwait, but the UN continued sanctions against Iraq, including the oil-for-food program, the no-fly zones interdiction of aerial sovereignty on northern and southern Iraq, and UN weapons inspections. These sanctions were meant to protect the Kurd and Shiite populations from Saddam Hussein's repressive attacks (which in the 1980s included the use of chemical weapons) and monitor the regime's development of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq's defiance of the sanctions led to a number of bombing campaigns.

The Second Gulf War (or Iraq War) refers to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 by the U.S.–British led "coalition of the willing" motivated by the failure of the Iraqi government to comply with the UN weapons inspection regime. In the context of the U.S. "war on terrorism," which followed the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on American soil, Iraq was also accused of supporting al-Qaida and terrorism. The stated aim was to effect a regime change, the fall of Saddam Hussein, and the rise of democracy, but some critics suggested that Iraq's vast oil fields were the main attraction of U.S. and international interest. Violence between Sunnis and Shiites threatened to tip the country into civil war, but a surge in the number of American troops and more involvement by the Iraqi government and military reduced violence significantly and increased stability. Much of this violence was believed to have been fomented by groups and governments outside of Iraq. In particular, Iran has been accused of financially and militarily supporting the Shiite majority in order to advance its regional power and to heighten the confrontation with the West regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

REGIONAL COOPERATION

Despite the troubles in the region, some cooperation does exist between gulf states. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was created in 1981, and its members include Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE. With the aim of establishing a common currency by 2010, the GCC has successfully instituted a common market and harmonized regulations in various fields such as economy, finance, trade, customs, tourism, legislation, and administration. The attraction of national sovereignty to young independent states (most of the states gained their independence in the 1960s and 1970s) as well as the cleavages and the divergent interests

discussed above are major obstacles to the development of more coherent political cooperation.

See also *Arab-Israeli Relations; Middle East Democratization; Middle Eastern Politics and Society; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).*

. . . . MONICA GARIUP

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Gulick, Luther Halsey, III

Luther Halsey Gulick III (1892–1993) is considered to be one of the most important leaders in the practice and study of public administration. Deemed the "dean of public administration," Gulick promoted the creation of several institutions that furthered both the professionalism of public managers and the study of public administration. These organizations include the Brookings Institution, the International City/County Management Association, the American Society for Public Administration, and the National Academy of Public Administration. Although he was a prolific author, Gulick once proclaimed that his interest was in the promotion of ideas into practice, rather than into print. Among his publications are *Better Government Personnel, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel* (1935); *Administrative Reflections from World War II* (1948); *Modern Management for the City of New York* (1953); and *The Metropolitan Problem and American Ideas* (1962).

Gulick had a culturally diverse upbringing. He spent the first twelve years of his life in Japan; then his family's missionary work took them to California, Germany, and eventually back to the United States.

As a young man, Gulick gained early admission into Oberlin College, where he graduated in 1914 with high honors in political science. At commencement he met keynote speaker Charles Austin Beard, a foremost authority in American history and political science. Gulick's passion for the study of public administration was inspired by Beard's commencement address, and Gulick continued his studies at Columbia University's graduate program in political science, which was headed by Beard.

Concurrently, Gulick enrolled in the Training School of Public Service of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research (BMR). There he was eventually employed by the BMR after serving as an intern. After a short time with the federal government during World War I (1914–1918), he returned to the BMR as director of the Training School. These organizations were later absorbed into the National Institute of Public Administration, with Gulick becoming its director. He served this organization in various capacities for over sixty years.

Gulick provided assistance and direction on projects outside the scope of municipal research. He conducted work on pensions and social security in the state of New York for Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt. This relationship continued throughout Roosevelt's presidency and led to Roosevelt's 1936 appointment of Gulick to the President's Committee on Administrative Management, also known as the Brownlow Commission. Gulick's work on this committee led to his seminal piece, *Notes on the Theory of Organization* (1937), in which he outlined the functions of the chief executive. These functions are represented by the acronym POSDCORB—planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting.

Although Gulick's professional life focused primarily on the study of government organizations rather than practice, he did serve as the first city administrator for New York City from 1954 to 1956. Frustrated by the political realities that slowed implementation of administrative reforms, he resigned after only two years. Gulick served for many years thereafter as a consultant on federal, state, and local projects. He remained a devoted public servant and an active participant in the study of public administration until his death in 1993.

See also *Beard, Charles.*

. . .   VICTORIA GORDON AND JEFFERY L. OSGOOD JR.

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Gunboat Diplomacy

Gunboat diplomacy refers to the practice of making threats against another state by the visible demonstration of warships. The term is associated with the early twentieth century use of small coastal or river warships to enforce the interests of the great powers in places such as Latin America and China, usually involving issues of trade and the treatment of nationals. More broadly in international relations, gunboat diplomacy is the use of conspicuous displays of military strength, or limited use of military force, other than as part of an act of war, to coerce a target state to submit to a particular foreign policy objective. Gunboat diplomacy is therefore an alternative to war, and it can be described as having failed if war erupts as a result of the demonstration.

Gunboat diplomacy has four variants. Definitive force is the exercise of force to secure or challenge a fait accompli. Purposeful force aims at changing the policy or composition of a target government or group. Catalytic force increases the policy options for leaders by deploying the flexibility of a naval force. Finally, expressive force is the demonstration of naval power to show commitment, usually by dispatching a warship into an area of interest.

See also *Great Power.*

. . . . JULIAN SCHOFIELD

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Habeas Corpus

Originating in England at least eight hundred years ago, *habeas corpus* is an ancient common-law concept strongly connected to the Magna Carta. The name denotes a court order that commands those holding another in custody to produce that individual before the court, so that the court can assess the legality of the detention. A judge or court frequently petition for a writ on behalf of someone in police custody to either force the authorities to charge the detained person with a crime, or to release the person from custody. *Habeas corpus* is considered a fundamental safeguard of liberty and by using this writ, an independent judiciary works to reinforce due process of individuals' legal protection, and intervene when states improperly detain individuals. Typically referred to as *the great writ*, this remedy exists predominately in countries springing from the Anglo-American legal tradition, but other countries with alternative legal systems have also implemented parallel protections recognizing this foundational limit on governmental power. In political systems in which personal liberty is highly valued, *habeas corpus*, or something similar to it, exists.

By the time of the American Revolutionary War (1776–1783), the right to *habeas corpus* had become a fundamental protection of individual liberty in the British colonies of North America. Upon independence, the new nation included it in the U.S. Constitution. Article I, Section 9, declares that "the Privilege of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." In this American context, the writ of *habeas corpus* demonstrates two distinct historical trajectories: the first deals with testing military authority over civilians during times of war; the second involves using the writ as a source for indefinite review of both state and federal criminal convictions.

With the first trajectory, suspending the right to *habeas corpus* essentially permits the military or other government agents to incarcerate, without judicial intervention, any person considered to be a threat. The inevitable questions arise here: Who possesses the constitutional authority to suspend this writ? Is it the president or Congress or some combination thereof? This issue came into sharp focus during the American Civil War when President Abraham Lincoln issued an 1861 executive order granting Union military commanders the power to suspend the writ as deemed appropriate. The U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on this controversy in the case of *Ex Parte Merryman* (1861) and Chief Justice Roger Taney declared that only Congress holds this suspension authority, not the executive. Lincoln disregarded this judicial enunciation, and in 1863, at Lincoln's request, Congress subsequently authorized the suspension of *habeas corpus* for the remainder of the war. The majority of modern scholarly opinion concludes that such a suspension necessitates approval by Congress—this constitutional question remains particularly contentious in light of President George W. Bush's response to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. The Bush administration's unwillingness to allow *habeas corpus* for suspects (both foreign and domestic) held in federal custody generated several important Supreme Court decisions, as seen in *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld* (2004), *Rasul v. Bush* (2004), *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld* (2006), and *Boumediene v. Bush* (2008).

The second trajectory traces to 1867, when Congress statutorily broadened *habeas corpus* to bestow federal courts the authority to release anyone from custody who had been detained in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, even if the detention could be considered justifiable under state law. This 1867 statute is the mechanism by which both state and federal prisoners convicted for criminal offenses can request federal *habeas corpus* review. In the 1960s, with the Supreme Court's expansive views on the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, prisoners challenging their convictions filed a multitude of *habeas corpus* petitions. In these matters, federal judges issue the writ primarily on the court's lack of jurisdiction where the conviction occurred or some violation of the petitioner's constitutional rights during the legal proceedings that brought about the conviction. For instance, a writ may be issued following the use of inadmissible evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure, or police's failure to inform the accused of Miranda rights, thus violating the privilege against self-incrimination.

Outside of the American context, a variety of other countries safeguard *habeas corpus* or something similar to it. Such protections from arbitrary and illegitimate government action commonly characterize liberal democracies. *Habeas corpus* persists in the constitutions or statutes of countries that directly experienced the English system of common law as British Crown colonies—including Canada, Australia, New Zealand,

India, and Malaysia. *Habeas corpus* is also visible in nations that were never part of the British Empire, but find such a potential bulwark against government misbehavior important—including Spain, Poland, Portugal, and the Philippines.

Habeas corpus may also be invoked in circumstances outside the arena of criminal prosecutions—for example, child custody cases, drug addicts seeking release from confinement for the treatment of their addiction, detention pursuant to health quarantines, and the status and deportation of aliens.

See also *Due Process; Jurisprudence and Legal Theory; Justice and Injustice; Rule of Law.*

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Hamilton, Alexander

Alexander Hamilton (1755–1804), born on the island of Nevis in the British West Indies in 1755, was the son of a Scottish merchant. His father, James Hamilton and his mother, Rachel Lavien, were not legally married, and his illegitimate birth was commonly used by his enemies to tarnish his reputation. Hamilton's father abandoned him at the age of eleven, and three years later his mother died, leaving him an orphan. The local community, at the urging of a Presbyterian clergyman, soon recognized young Hamilton's talents and provided for his passage to New York to be formally educated. He arrived in New York in 1773 and began his studies at King's College (Columbia University). Two years into his studies, Hamilton found himself immersed in the hostilities then developing between Britain and the colonies. By 1776, Hamilton was a captain of a New York artillery company. His talents were again readily recognized and at the age of twenty-two, he elevated to lieutenant colonel and joined General George Washington's staff. In 1780, Hamilton married into a wealthy and prominent family with his nuptials to Elizabeth Schulyer.

After a disagreement with Washington, Hamilton resigned his post in 1781. Washington reluctantly accepted the resignation and gave Hamilton command of a light infantry battalion. By 1781, Hamilton left the military to study and, later, practice law in Albany. However, he became restless and found public service more compelling. After being elected to the Continental Congress in 1782, New York sent him as a delegate to the Annapolis Convention in 1786, where he was one of the most vocal supporters of the Constitutional Convention, and one year later, chosen as a delegate for the event. Hamilton, frequently absent from the deliberations, was not instrumental in the drafting of the Constitution. However, he proved determined to seek its ratification and collaborated with James Madison and John Jay in writing pro-Constitution essays published collectively in 1788 as *The Federalist*.

George Washington's administration offered Hamilton the position of treasury secretary, and he proved quite skilled at placing the fledgling country on a sound financial foundation by proposing a national bank, assuming war debts of the states, fostering manufacturing, and managing the nation's debt. Despite thriving in this position, family and financial reasons forced Hamilton to hand in his resignation. Although no longer serving in public office, Hamilton still exerted a great degree of power in national politics. When Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr locked in a tie in the 1800 presidential election, Hamilton used his influence to Jefferson's advantage with his public support. In 1804, Hamilton also proved instrumental in defeating Aaron Burr's attempt to become governor of New York. Offended by Hamilton's actions and insulting remarks, Burr challenged Hamilton to a duel in Weehawken, New Jersey on July 11, 1804. Hamilton was mortally wounded and died the next day.

See also *Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Hamiltonianism.*

. . . . RICHARD M. YON

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Hamiltonianism

Hamiltonianism describes the public philosophy associated with Alexander Hamilton (1755–1804), the first secretary of the U.S. Treasury. As President George Washington began to distance himself from other key advisers, such as James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, Hamilton came to play the role of "prime minister" to Washington. Hamilton recommended sweeping economic reforms designed to address the government's immediate financial crisis and to establish a foundation for future prosperity. Hamilton hoped the success of these policies would build confidence in the new government and establish its authority. Hamilton's brilliant economic reports recommended that the national government assume the war debts of the states; engage in a complex refinancing

of the national debt; create a national bank; and introduce new taxes, including a controversial excise tax. Hamilton also recommended, yet failed to enact, a plan for government to systematically encourage manufacturers to guarantee national self-sufficiency in defense-related industries, as well as to grow a domestic market for agricultural produce.

Hamilton's economic recommendations grew from his broader views on government. An early and persistent critic of the Articles of Confederation, Hamilton strongly drove the adoption of a new constitution. He organized and contributed almost two-thirds of the essays to *The Federalist*, the classic defense and interpretation of the Constitution. He believed that a much stronger national government was needed, not only to keep the states in check but to accomplish the essential purposes of government. Hamilton made the case for the Constitution's broad powers of taxation and regulation. He also argued for a strong executive who would ensure an energetic administration and could, when necessary, serve as a check on both the legislative branch and on popular passions. When Hamilton was later forced to defend the constitutionality of a national bank, he argued for a "broad" or "liberal" construction of the Constitution's grants of powers. Where a power is granted, he reasoned, all the means necessary for accomplishing the ends or purposes of the power must be assumed to have been granted as well. Furthermore, the so-called necessary and proper clause means "necessary" in the sense of "convenient" rather than "strictly necessary." The cloud that has always hung over Hamilton's reputation is the question of the depth of his attachment to republicanism. At the Constitutional Convention, Hamilton declared his opinion that the England's constitution was the best in existence and wondered whether anything short of it would do for the United States.

Thomas Jefferson's election to the presidency in 1800 meant the effective end of Hamilton's influence and that of his party, the Federalists. Still, Republicans, and later the Whigs, adopted many of his policy ideas. After the American Civil War (1861–1865), there was a greatly renewed respect for Hamilton, which lasted until the New Deal of the 1930s. Believing Hamilton to be undemocratic and too favorably disposed to the wealthy, President Franklin D. Roosevelt deliberately cultivated the image of Jefferson as a symbol of national unity. But again, Hamilton's twentieth-century critics embraced many of his ideas regarding active government and an energetic executive.

See also *Articles of Confederation; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Federalist Papers; Hamilton, Alexander.*

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Harrington, James

James Harrington (1611–1677) was an English political writer most famous for *The Commonwealth of Oceana* (1656), considered one of the most systematic treatises to emerge from the English republican movement.

There is little reliable biographical information about Harrington's early life; he provided loans to Parliament in the early 1640s and was politically aligned with them, but he apparently was also a companion of Charles I prior to Charles I's execution. Unlike many of the other English Republicans, Harrington was not particularly active in terms of political service; instead, he worked on *Oceana.* Subsequently, Oliver Cromwell suppressed the work and imprisoned Harrington, who was not able to secure his release and the right to print *Oceana* until 1656. This was the first of two tenures in prison; Harrington was imprisoned again for a period after the Restoration.

In *Oceana,* Harrington initially establishes some basic principles of politics grounded in what he terms "ancient prudence." He praises the ancients for employing "an empire of laws, not men," and accuses philosopher Thomas Hobbes of advocating for the modern mode of "an empire of men, not laws." After describing modern prudence with a mix of history and mythmaking, Harrington sets forth the model for *Oceana.* Assuming an agrarian or natural economy and a tribally divided society, Harrington describes a number of offices and their method of election. Over three days, the citizenry elects the magistrates to govern them. Harrington also provides methods for senatorian elections and the election of certain posts via scrutiny. Ultimately, Harrington breaks the population down into thirty orders, creating many opportunities for citizen service and activity in the commonwealth.

Because of the completeness of *Oceana* and its provision of new institutions for voting and distributing duties among magistrates, it has attracted a considerable amount of attention in modern scholarship. J. G. A. Pocock is considered the leading contemporary authority on Harrington's work, and his introduction to *The Political Works of James Harrington* (1977) is often cited as the leading summary and treatment of Harrington's thought. However, the work of scholars such as Jonathan Scott, who highlights the role of motion in Harrington's work and thus focuses on similarities between Harrington and Hobbes, offers a well-developed alternative to Pocock's study.

Pocock's examination of Harrington in *The Political Works of James Harrington* places Harrington firmly in the civic republican tradition and discusses the links between Harringtonian republicanism and the classical tradition of Aristotle and (especially) Niccolò Machiavelli. Pocock pays particular attention to the importance that Harrington places on arms, and argues that adopting Machiavelli's conception of the citizen-solider allows Harrington to level his greatest critique against the feudal monarchy of England. As quoted in Pocock's work, the feudal system "clearly displays the subjection . . . of individuals whose capacity to be masters, citizens, and equals can be simultaneously displayed with equal clarity." For Harrington, the citizen-soldier cannot be justly subjugated, and must be

provided with the opportunity to function in a common-wealth constituted with a mind toward the ancient prudence that Harrington found neglected.

Harrington's work influenced many important figures in the late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century commonwealth movements; these in turn affected the political thought of the American colonies and the early American republic.

See also *Hobbes, Thomas; Machiavelli, Niccolò.*

. . . . ALEXANDRA ELIZABETH HOERL

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Hartz, Louis

Louis Hartz (1919–1986), an American political scientist, had a major influence on how scholars of the 1950s and 1960s viewed American political culture. Born in Youngstown, Ohio, on April 7, 1919, Hartz was the third son of Russian Jewish immigrants. He grew up in Omaha, Nebraska, where his father was a grocer. Hartz was accepted to Harvard in 1936 on a scholarship from a local newspaper. He completed his SB in 1940 and after a year of traveling returned to the university on a teaching fellowship for graduate study in government. Prior to completing his PhD in 1946, he married Stella Freinberg and they had one son. He then joined the Harvard faculty and quickly became a popular teacher and respected scholar.

Hartz's first book, *Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776–1860* (1948), challenged critics who claimed that government intervention in the economy violated America's long tradition of free enterprise. Hartz presented evidence that early postcolonial Pennsylvania adopted considerable government legislation in response to the demands of vying business and labor groups. In fact, both businesses and workers benefited from government assistance in the areas of education and transportation. Contrary to the opinions of free market proponents, Hartz's findings suggested that the New Deal was hardly a radical departure from the past.

A few years later, Hartz completed his most famous and widely discussed book. In *The Liberal Tradition in America* (1955), he argued that Americans never had to rid themselves of the feudal traditions and class hierarchies associated with the Old World of Europe, so never experienced a confining social order. Hartz found a liberal outlook—an outlook that was distrustful of any government not sanctioned by the people, that valued individual rights over duty, and that upheld the sanctity of private property—permeated American political thought and practice. Both major U.S. political parties, it follows, are liberal at their most basic level. This "consensus" thesis also

explained why neither aristocratic conservatism nor a socialist movement had many followers in America. Hartz's book was awarded the Woodrow Wilson Prize from the American Political Science Association in 1956.

Hartz would later extend and revise his argument to include an analysis of other new nations. In *The Founding of New Societies* (1964), Hartz maintained that former European colonies had adopted "fragments" from the whole of Europe's political culture. American and English Canada, for instance, had adopted the liberal fragments, while French Canada embraced the feudal fragments. His fragment theory became influential in comparative studies of developing countries.

By the mid-1960s, Hartz began work on his most ambitious book, titled *A Synthesis of World History* (1983), which applied his colonial fragments theory to five great "cultural areas": Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Confucianism, and African totemism. During the early 1970s, Hartz's writing and personal life were disrupted by ill health. He became estranged from his family and friends and resigned from Harvard in 1974. Nevertheless, he continued his scholarly work, traveling frequently until settling in Turkey where he died from an epileptic seizure in 1986.

See also *Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; Economic Systems, Comparative; Political Culture; Political Theory.*

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Hate Speech

Though hate speech comes in many forms, liberal democracies in the earlier twentieth century concerned themselves primarily with speech that vilified or criticized individuals and groups based on the categories of race, nationality, and religion. In the 1920s, the term *race hate* was the preferred label for such expression, while *group libel* emerged as the predominant designation in the 1940s and 1950s. By the 1980s and 1990s, gender and sexual orientation were among items added to the list of categories considered hate speech. Human Rights Watch provides a typical contemporary definition of hate speech as "any form of expression regarded as offensive to racial, ethnic and religious groups and other discrete minorities, and to women."

Hate speech and its regulation pose a dilemma for liberal democracies. On the one hand, hate speech threatens social order and the security (or sense of security) of targeted individuals and groups. On the other hand, prohibiting hate speech can threaten freedom of speech, especially if such expression

Hate Speech 715

is defined too broadly and the causative link between expression and harm is not direct. While liberal democracies have an obligation to protect the security of all their citizens, overly broad hate speech laws can stifle honest criticism of religion and identity groups—a result that is problematic for democratic legitimacy. College speech codes that typically prohibit "demeaning" or "degrading" comments are prime examples of overly broad restrictions.

RESTRICTING HATE SPEECH

Of the arguments for restricting hate speech, four stand out. First, depending on the circumstances, hate speech can directly harm the safety and security of discrete individuals or groups, mainly when the comments directly incite harmful action or constitute a concrete threat. Second, hate speech is often very offensive, hurting the esteem or sensibilities of its targets, and leading to a sense of exclusion and second-class citizenship. Third, holding long-term consequences, hate speech can contribute to the eventual rise of hate groups and societal discrimination. Some scholars point to the alarming example of Adolph Hitler's hate speeches in Germany in the 1920s, which they consider an important causative factor in the emergence of national socialism in that country in the 1930s. The fourth argument for restricting hate speech is as much logical or normative as it is empirical: liberal democracies have an obligation to prohibit (or at least no duty to protect) the speech-related activities of individuals and groups who espouse decidedly antidemocratic ideas, and who are dedicated to destroying democratic principles and practices if they were to enter the realm of political power.

The state must decide which harms of hate speech call for remedial action of the criminal law, and which harms can be properly dealt with by voluntary responses in the marketplace of ideas. For example, targeting a swastika, burning cross, or similar symbol at a private residence with the intent to intimidate or instill fear constitutes a threat that merits criminal law enforcement. On the other hand, making a general (nontargeted) racist remark in a newspaper or public forum typically causes a less immediate, discrete harm; this thereby lessens the need for legal intervention. Accordingly, there are two major models of regulation. The group libel model maintains that the criminal law should be concerned with all or most of the four harms. Consequently, this model endorses laws prohibiting general hateful rhetoric that might lead to harmful action down the road (indirect causation is a sufficient basis for prohibition), and offend or demean individuals or groups based on the categories of race, sexual orientation, and similar categories. In the decades following World War II (1939–1945), most liberal democracies reacted to the battle against fascism by adopting a form of this model. Germany's Basic Law, for example, protects "militant democracy" by prohibiting antidemocratic parties from forming and speaking. In addition, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled in *R. v. Keegstra* (1990) that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not protect the willful promotion of hatred against an identifiable group because such speech goes against multiculturalism in Canada and the charter's basic principle of equality. In the first

decade of the 2000s, nations such as France have prosecuted Holocaust denial as a form of hate speech.

FREE SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

The United States, however, has traveled a different legal path. Many U.S. states passed group libel laws beginning in the 1940s. In 1952, a divided Supreme Court in *Beauharnais v. Illinois* upheld the constitutionality of Illinois's typical group libel law, which punished speech that defamed any class of individuals based on race or creed. A few years later, however, the Supreme Court launched what would amount to a sea change in free speech jurisprudence. In reaction to the emerging civil rights movement and other challenges to authority in politics and society, the Court developed a decidedly libertarian free speech jurisprudence (the libertarian model) that liberalized all areas of free speech doctrine.

The Court designed this jurisprudence to protect the speech rights of all dissenters, regardless of the content of their views. Supporters defended the rise of this "viewpoint neutrality" principle because they believed this approach was the best way to accommodate democracy, dissent, and cultural pluralism in the United States. Today, racist and other hateful forms of expression are protected unless they pose a direct harm to individuals or society. The three major forms of unprotected hate speech are concrete threats, direct incitements to imminent lawless action that is likely to occur, and fighting words directed toward an individual (hateful speech likely to lead to an immediate disturbance of the peace). Thus, hate speech is protected by the First Amendment unless it constitutes one of these forms of direct harm. In 1969, for example, the Supreme Court in *Brandenburg v. Ohio* upheld the First Amendment right of Klan leader Clarence Brandenburg to deliver a racist speech in a cornfield in Ohio. Brandenburg's call for "vengeance" and race war against blacks and Jews fell short of constituting a direct threat or an incitement to imminent lawless action; nor did Brandenburg's speech amount to fighting words, for it was not made face-to-face with a hostile target.

During the 1980s, punitive policies based on the group libel model made a comeback of sorts in higher education, as numerous colleges and universities in the United States adopted speech codes punishing expression that demeans people based on race and related categories. Courts have consistently invalidated such codes, though they persist on many campuses. Regardless, this movement has not gained headway in larger society, which remains committed to the libertarian jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.

Critics of the libertarian model continue to maintain that the harms of hate speech merit broader prohibition. Meanwhile, advocates of this model in the United States point out that hate speech and hate are widely condemned in the United States, thereby indicating that the marketplace of ideas is doing its democratic job by providing convincing counterarguments to the views of racists, sexists, homophobes, and their kin. In addition, government and society possess ample alternative tools to fight hate in contexts in which the causative link between speech and action is indirect or attenuated.

Education, government programs, surveillance of hate groups, and the rigorous law enforcement for crimes motivated by hate are four such tools.

See also *Freedom of Speech; Language and Politics.*

. . . .   DONALD A. DOWNS

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Hayek, Friedrich August von

Friedrich August von Hayek (1899–1992) is best known as a leader of the Austrian school of economics, but he also made important contributions to political theory. He was a staunch advocate of the free market, and from that position he developed his larger notion of spontaneous order—the idea that social orders work best when they evolve out of the apparently chaotic interaction of individuals, with no central control by the government and no central planning by scientific experts. Hayek maintained that, compared to governments, markets better discover and coordinate the vast amount of fragmented and dispersed knowledge in a society—a process vital to society's progress.

Hayek was born on May 8, 1899, in Vienna, Austria. At the University of Vienna, he met Ludwig von Mises, the chief representative of the Austrian school, who turned him from a prosocialist to a procapitalist position and became the most significant influence on his intellectual development. Hayek's technical work in economics centered on issues of monetary theory, the capital structure of production, and the business cycle. In 1931, he joined the London School of Economics and later taught at the University of Chicago and the University of Freiburg.

In 1944, Hayek published what became his most famous and widely read book, *The Road to Serfdom.* At a time when Europe seemed polarized between fascism and communism, he reminded people that both are species of socialism. The book created enormous controversy by suggesting that all forms of socialism inevitably become totalitarian and thus are incompatible with political freedom and democracy. Hayek remained controversial throughout his life, but his growing reputation as a major social thinker solidified when he won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. His most important books from a political standpoint are *The Constitution of Liberty* (1960) and *Law, Legislation and Liberty* (1973, 1976, 1979). In the former, Hayek advances the classical liberal ideal of the social order, especially its principles of limited government, rule of law, private property, and economic freedom. In contrast to Mises, however, Hayek makes several concessions to the principles of the welfare state. In *Law, Legislation and Liberty,* he offers his fullest articulation of the idea of spontaneous order. He defends the British common-law tradition against legislative utilitarianism. Hayek endorses principles of justice that have evolved over time in judges' responses to concrete legal situations, and rejects the idea that the law should be handed down by a legislature based on abstract reasoning about the just social order. In his preference for the concrete over the abstract and for what has stood the test of time, Hayek harks back to the political thinking of philosopher David Hume and political theorist Edmund Burke.

By the time of his death on March 23, 1992, in Freiburg, Germany, Hayek was generally credited with being—along with American economist Milton Friedman—the intellectual driving force behind the free market revolution in government policy led by President Ronald Reagan in the United States and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain in the 1980s. Having predicted the collapse of communism, Hayek became a hero to many in East Central and Eastern Europe striving to create a postcommunist world after 1989. Rejecting the utopian notion that government can solve all human problems, Hayek was one of the foremost critics of collectivism and champions of economic and political liberty in the twentieth century.

See also *Burke, Edmund; European Political Thought; European Politics and Society; Hume, David; Political Theory.*

. . . .   PAUL CANTOR

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Health Care Policy

A health care policy is a type of social welfare policy. Like other social policies, it aims to improve the general welfare of citizens. A health care policy also distinctly aims to promote the physical and mental well-being of individuals in society.

Health care policies can operate in a variety of different ways. Some policies attempt to expand access to services; others try to improve the quality of medical benefits; some others focus on funding medical services. Health care policy operates in various ways in nations around the world, and major controversies surround the provision of health care in contemporary society.

DIFFERENT TYPES OF HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS

One way to categorize different health care policies, at least at the national level, is to focus on the degree of government involvement. Using this criterion, there are three general types of systems. National health systems, such as those in Great Britain and Sweden, depend heavily on government involvement to provide benefits to all citizens. National health insurance systems, present in nations including France and Germany, rely on the government to establish general policies, but the private and nonprofit sectors play a key role in the process. Private health care systems, like those in the United States, depend almost extensively on the private sector for the provision of medical benefits, with only minimal involvement from the public sector, primarily to help finance medical services for particular subgroups of the population.

Although this typology is still used to describe different national health care policies, it is difficult to fit most health care systems neatly into one of these three categories. Each national system has its own structure and character, reflecting the particular context in which it has developed. Moreover, many national health care systems have changed over time—expanding or reducing the role of government, changing the scope of services, altering the covered populations, or adjusting the reimbursement mechanisms. As a result, other ways of describing the variability in health care policy are necessary.

VARIABILITY IN HEALTH CARE POLICY

Even when governments are involved in health care policy, their role is not the same in every nation. The government can serve as a regulator to determine minimum levels of quality and service, as in the Netherlands. A government can provide the financing so that health care services are available, such as in the United States. Or, government can actually provide health care benefits directly through publicly owned facilities, a practice in Great Britain and Portugal. These various governmental roles are not mutually exclusive of each other; governments typically assume several of these roles within the same political system.

Health care systems differ in terms of who receives care. In some nations, health care policies are universal in nature—all citizens are eligible to receive benefits. Universal health care policies can be found in Japan, Canada, Mexico, France, and Sweden. Alternatively, other health care policies are more limited in scope. In such systems, health care benefits are restricted to particular subgroups of the population, such as the elderly people and veterans, or to specific "needy" groups (low-income families, populations with special needs, etc.). The Medicare and Medicaid programs in the United States are examples of limited health care policies.

There are also noticeable variations in how health care policies across political systems are financed. Some countries, such as Great Britain, Sweden, Australia, and New Zealand, rely on tax collections and government funds to finance health care. Other nations, like Germany, France, and Japan, use employer and employee contributions. Still others, like the United States, depend heavily on individual contributions to private health care plans in order to fund health care benefits for the majority of their citizens.

Health care policies also differ between those that are curative versus preventative in nature. Preventative policies try to address medical problems before they arise (or worsen). These include the use of vaccines to prevent the spread of diseases and routine checkups to identify problems in earlier stages before they become more serious. On the other hand, curative policies focus on dealing with medical problems after they have developed. These can include a range of typical medical treatments, such as hospitalizations and long-term care.

CONCERNS AND CONTROVERSIES

Since the 1980s, health care policies have received an increasing amount of attention because of the rising costs associated with providing medical services. Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) demonstrate, quite clearly, the growth of health care expenditures. From 1991 to 2001, the growth of health care spending exceeded the growth of the total gross domestic product (GDP) in all thirty of the OECD nations. On average, health care expenditures now consume 8.9 percent of the GDP in the thirty democracies that make up the OECD.

Health care spending has increased around the world as political systems have expanded program coverage to include more groups of the population, as more advanced (and expensive) medical procedures have become available, as demographic changes have produced older populations in need of more medical services, and as citizens' expectations about necessary health care benefits have expanded. Hence, all nations struggle with rising health care costs and seek ways to decrease health care expenditures while maintaining services to their populations.

Health care policies also do not act in isolation from other public policies. For example, environmental policies affect the quality of drinking water which, in turn, influences the health of a population. Similarly, business policies can make the workplace a safer environment; for instance, requiring stricter standards and regulations improves the health care status of workers. Additionally, income support and assistance policies can provide citizens with the finances they need to maintain healthy diets and eating habits. Therefore, the impacts of health care policies often link to those of other public policies.

Health care policies can also trigger additional policy problems. Many health care policies aim to improve the life expectancy of the population. If successful, these policies will increase the size of the elderly population. Larger elderly populations possess greater health care needs, and they also require other, quite expensive, types of social services, such as retirement benefits and housing support. Similarly, health care policies that restrict benefits to certain population groups or problems may leave other segments of the population without adequate medical coverage. This, in turn, can put pressure on employment programs and other social services.

See also *Multiple Streams Theory; Policy Analysis; Public Policy; Quality of Life; Social Welfare.*

NICCOLE M. PAMPHILIS AND
. . . .   SAUNDRA K. SCHNEIDER

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Heckscher, Gunnar

Gunnar Heckscher (1909–1987) was a major right-wing political scientist in Sweden during the period between World War I (1914–1918) and World War II (1939–1945). The son of economic historian Eli Heckscher, he was born in Danderyd in Stockholm County. He studied at Uppsala University and received his PhD in 1934 with his thesis, "Konung and Minister of State in the Constitutional Act of 1809." Later, as an associate professor of political science, he wrote a thesis on the development of Swedish conservatism and the representative system's reform. During the 1940s and 1950s, Heckscher authored many groundbreaking works, including *State and Organizations* (1947), *Swedish Government at Work* (1952), and *Study of Comparative Government* (1957).

Heckscher became an associate professor at Stockholm University in 1941 and a full professor in 1948. He also served on the boards of several government commissions and, from 1945 to 1954, was a rector at the Social Institute. He was considered a moderate conservative and was chair of the right-wing youth organization of the Moderate Party. He was elected to the second chamber of the Swedish Riksdag in 1957 and became vice chair of the National Federation of the Right.

In 1961, Heckscher took over the presidency of the Moderate Party after Jarl Halmarsson's resignation. Heckscher encountered much opposition within his own party because of his moderate position on social issues. His main achievements were the admission of Ireland to the European Union and rallying the Conservatives after their defeat in the 1964 elections. He resigned as party leader in 1965. The Social Democrats had regained power in 1964 and the non-Socialist alliance was in total disarray.

Heckscher occupies a unique niche in the Scandinavian political spectrum. He was a Jew and an atheist in a primarily Lutheran nation and a Conservative in a largely Social Democratic political system. Even among Conservatives, he was a genuine moderate who followed his intellectual instincts. As an academician active in electoral and legislative politics, he represented a generation of moderate conservative leaders of the post–World War II generation such as West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Italian prime minister Alcide De Gasperi, and French president Charles De Gaulle.

Heckscher was also an astute student of politics and government. His *Swedish Government at Work* (1952) introduced interviews to the study of government, and *State and Organizations* (1947) presented the role of associations in the political process. His most notable work was *The Welfare State and Beyond* (1984), a conservative critique and analysis of the Scandinavian welfare state, which functioned as a middle system between capitalism and socialism. The failure of this Scandinavian experiment raised serious questions regarding the viability of political institutions that attempt to change social behavior. Since the publication of Heckscher's book, the welfare state has been discredited in almost all countries and it has ceased to be a viable political option. Heckscher's other books include *The Swedish Constitution* (1959), *The Role of Small Nations* (1966), *The Budget as an Instrument of Administrative Efficiency* (1971), and *Asian Power Game* (1977).

See also *European Political Thought; Welfare State.*

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Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem

The Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) theorem is the cumulative work of two Swedish economists, Eli F. Heckscher and his student Bertil Ohlin, first published in the early twentieth century. The theorem revolutionized economic explanations of international trade, replacing classical accounts found in the work of Robert Torrens and David Ricardo. The theory purports to explain the conditions under which international trade takes place and what patterns of international trade to expect. Though it has been subject to some degree of criticism, the HO theorem, along with revisions from other economists,

represents the foundations of contemporary thinking and policy making concerning foreign trade.

The centerpiece of the theory is relatively straightforward. The theory assumes that production-factor endowments of countries are different and that different industries use different factors with different intensities. The model concludes that countries will export those goods for which they have greater factor intensities. Hence, assuming two factors of production, such as labor and capital, countries with greater labor intensities relative to capital will export labor-intensive goods, while countries that exhibit greater capital intensity will export capital-intensive goods. In effect, the relative intensity of each factor gives each economy a comparative advantage in producing those kinds of goods.

One criticism of the theorem is that it rests upon several oversimplifications, such as identical production functions in different countries, making trade patterns in the real world inexplicable within the theorem's parameters. Several empirical studies have shown that, in some instances, labor-intensive economies export capital-intensive goods, while some capital-intensive economies import capital-intensive goods. For example, Wassily Leontif (1953) found that in post–World War II America, the United States, a capital-abundant economy, imported capital-intensive commodities. Still others have argued that patterns of trade are best explained by economies of scale and strategic interactions in economic policy.

Defenders of the theorem argue that despite occasional anomalies or paradoxes in the empirical evidence, the HO theorem remains useful for explaining how international trade can occur in the context of the unequal geographic distribution of different resources.

See also *Free Trade; Trade Blocs; Trade Coalitions; Trade Policy.*

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Hegedus, Andras

Andras Hegedus (1922–1999) was a Hungarian politician who served as his country's youngest prime minister from 1955 to 1956. He signed the treaty establishing the Warsaw Pact as well as the document requesting the help of Soviet troops to crush the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. He later criticized and opposed Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and was expelled from the Hungarian Communist Party in 1973. Hegedus was a Social Democrat and a member of the Budapest school, which developed a variant of Marxism known as critical Marxism that opposed Stalinist deformative politics.

Born in Sopronfelsoszentmiklos into a peasant family, Hegedus became an active member of the Communist Party during World War II (1939–1945). At the end of the war, when the Communists seized power, he became a member of the party's Central Committee and secretariat and quickly rose to become first deputy prime minister and agriculture minister under Prime Minister Imre Nagy. In 1955, Hegedus was appointed prime minister but the next year, he was forced to leave the office and exiled to the Soviet Union. He returned to Hungary in 1958 as a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics. In 1962, he became deputy president of the Central Statistical Office, and in 1963, head of the Sociology Research Group at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and editor in chief of the journal *Valosag* (Reality). In 1966, he began to teach at the Karl Marx University of Economics. Two years later, following his condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, he was dismissed. Thereafter Hegedus became one of Hungary's best-known dissidents and denounced Soviet atrocities until the fall of communism in the late 1980s.

Hegedus worked to develop an alternative socialist model involving a pluralist society in which the bureaucracy was tempered by popular control. This would require a profound process of self-reform, including the reform of the electoral system. Hegedus's society depended on the growth of non-bureaucratic structures and autonomous networks with the means to oppose state bureaucracies. According to Hegedus, economic reforms are not enough and should be accompanied by ideological revision, since when ideologies become rigid, there is always the danger of repression and suppression of ideas. However, progress will be incremental. Bureaucracies do not give up power easily, but they can be persuaded to slowly relinquish small parts of power in order to gain greater legitimacy in the eyes of those they rule.

Hegedus's works include *Socialism and Bureaucracy* (1986) and *The Humanization of Socialism* (1976).

See also *Communism; Marxism; Political Theory; Russian Political Thought; Socialism.*

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Hegel, Georg W. F.

Philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) was born in Stuttgart, Germany, in 1770. He was educated at the Tübinger Stift, where he became close friends with Friedrich Schelling and Friedrich Hölderlin. During their time in Tübingen, they were inspired by the outbreak of the

French Revolution (1789–1799) but horrified by the Reign of Terror that took place during it, in which ideological struggles between rival political factions led to mass executions. After serving as a private tutor in Switzerland, Hegel went first to Frankfurt where Hölderlin lived, and then in 1801 assumed a lectureship in Jena where Schelling was teaching. Together Hegel and Schelling edited the *Critical Journal of Philosophy,* an organ for their new speculative philosophy. While in Jena, Hegel also wrote his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807). With the closure of the university following the battle of Jena on October 14, 1806, Hegel became a newspaper editor in Bamberg and then the head of a college preparatory school in Nuremberg. After publishing *Science of Logic* in 1816, he obtained a professorial position at the University of Heidelberg and published his *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1818). During the same year, Hegel was called to Berlin where he taught until his death in 1831. While in Berlin, he published the *Philosophy of Right* (1822) and delivered lectures on the philosophy of history, religion, aesthetics, and the history of philosophy—all published after his death. At the time of his death, he was considered one of the most influential philosophers in Europe and exercised a profound influence on many of the greatest thinkers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Hegel is best known for the development of a dialectical philosophy that combines a Kantian notion of consciousness with a notion of historical development derived from French political thinker Charles-Louis Montesquieu, Irish philosopher Edmund Burke, and others. In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel traces the development of consciousness as a historical phenomenon, demonstrating that the human intellectual project came to its end in his own time with the realization and reconciliation of everything that had previously been considered dichotomous—subject and object, individual and society, human and nature, and human and divine. This was achieved through what Hegel called absolute knowledge or science. He spelled out the conceptual foundations for this science in his *Logic,* which constituted the basis for his practical philosophy.

Hegel's political philosophy is laid out in his *Philosophy of Right*, which combines a theory of natural or abstract (property) rights, a modified Kantian moral theory, a communitarian notion of the family, a Smithian notion of economic life or civil society, and a bureaucratic model of a rational state that resembles the constitutional monarchy of England. In his *Philosophy of History* (1837), Hegel attempts to show that history is a dialectic of freedom beginning with the master and slave relationship and ending with universal citizenship; it passes from oriental despotism to Greek democracy, and Roman aristocracy to the monarchical world of modern Europe. A human's historical task, in Hegel's view, comes to its practical end in the realization of such rational states, and to its spiritual end in the completion and perfection of knowledge as the systematic science of all that is.

See also *Burke, Edmund; German Political Thought; Kant, Immanuel; Montesquieu, Charles-Louis; Political Theory.*

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Hegemony

The term hegemony means domination with consent. From the Greek *hegemonia,* it denotes leadership of an alliance by a single leader, or hegemon. Although ancient hegemons tended to possess great power, their allies conceded them leading roles due to other qualities, such as skill and virtue, as well as the policies they embraced. The tendency toward domination without consent, however, has led many international relations scholars to equate hegemony with domination that does not respect the independent existence and autonomy of allies, thus providing a different definition of the term.

In the twentieth century, political theorist Antonio Gramsci renewed interest in the concept of hegemony when he used the term in the context of domestic politics rather than international relations. Gramsci sought to understand the formation of alliances among groups to achieve domination, and he stressed the important role of ideology in convincing followers to support a leadership. Gramsci assigned a distinctive role to intellectuals as formulators of ideas that link leaders to followers. At the same time, he stressed that political struggle continued as subordinate groups sought to achieve a position of domination through a counterhegemony. This implies that some groups, instead of being enlisted in a hegemonic enterprise, are suppressed, sometimes with force. Thus, hegemony in this interpretation is a system of domination with minimal violence.

HEGEMONIC AND NONHEGEMONIC DOMINATION

With respect to both international and domestic politics, a distinction can be made between hegemonic and nonhegemonic domination, that is, between alliance and empire and between democracy and tyranny. Both employ ideology to justify themselves and to provide policy guidance. In nonhegemonic alliances and tyrannies, the dominant leader or group exercises power over others without their consent and employs ideology largely to rationalize or justify its domination. In contrast, in hegemonic alliances and democracies, leaders employ ideology to convince others to follow, and followers extend their consent to domination, implying that they retain the freedom to withhold consent. Furthermore, a hegemonic system always includes politics in which discussion and debate are possible. A nonhegemonic system, in contrast, is based solely on violence and other coercive means.

Hegemony presumes ongoing debate and discourse, dominant states or groups exerting leadership to retain their power, and allies or subordinate groups striving to shape the policy

direction of the leadership. Beyond policy matters, allies or subordinate groups sometimes strive to overturn the dominant states or groups through struggle, or counterhegemonic activity, and to establish a different hegemonic order. Thus, hegemonic arrangements involve continuous contestation. Counterhegemony arises from the ideological framework of a hegemonic arrangement, but its triumph relies upon crisis and the addition of new ideological beliefs that are combined with those from which it arose.

AUTONOMY AND PERSISTENCE

The distinctive feature of hegemony is autonomy. There are three types: autonomy within hegemony, autonomy from counterhegemony, and autonomy based on an opposed hegemony. Within hegemony, groups can advocate and implement deeply opposed policies within the context of the prevailing hegemonic system; for example, within the same system, a shift in fundamental economic policy could occur from one based upon Keynesian principles of state intervention in the private economy to one based upon Friedrich von Hayek's commitment to minimizing the state's participation in the economy. Change with counterhegemonic autonomy involves a deeper shift in which once subordinate groups forge an alliance that brings a radically different hegemonic arrangement, as exemplified in the shift in Germany in 1933 from a republic to a dictatorship, or in the shift in Eastern Europe at the end of the cold war from communist systems to liberal democratic, capitalist ones. An opposed hegemony provides a foundation for a different sort of autonomy, for example, in the cold war in which the Soviet Union retained its autonomy outside the hegemonic system dominated by the United States.

Hegemony thus refers to long-term and persistent political arrangements within which a state or a coherent group provides leadership and direction over others. At the same time, allies and subordinate groups retain their scope for participation in, and even rejection of, the leadership. Leaders have a tendency to dominate without consent, but allies and other states tend to check or balance those aspiring to a position of dominance in international relations, and subordinate groups within a society struggle to affect policies and to achieve leadership within the society. So long as these autonomous activities are sustained, hegemony can be said to persist. When allies and subordinate groups lose their scope for free participation, hegemony ends, and empire or tyranny begins.

See also *Authority; Autonomy; Cold War; Ideologies, Political; Leadership.*

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Heidegger, Martin

Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) was a highly influential German philosopher and thinker. With all that has been written by and about Heidegger, there is much that remains an enigma about both the man and his philosophy. Educated as a Catholic with the hope of going into the priesthood, he instead became a professional philosopher whose work would give little comfort to those who find faith in religious dogmas or the ideology of what Heidegger considered instrumental reason. The biggest puzzle regarding Heidegger is his relationship to politics and power and why a philosopher of nearly undisputed genius would lend his office as rector of the University of Freiburg in 1933 to support the rise of national socialism and the early triumphant stages of Adolf Hitler's dictatorial leadership. There is also the question of legacy and whether or not Heidegger's difficult style of writing and philosophizing clarifies more than it conceals about the human condition and the essentially political nature of human relations. It is, in part, because there are so many dimensions to Heidegger's life and ideas that his thinking (if not his choices) remain as provocative as they are controversial.

Heidegger's most well-known contribution to philosophy (and one with important implications for postmodern political theory) is his first book, *Being and Time* (1927). From the book's opening question—whether the true meaning of "being" is understood—to its closing query—whether being exists outside time—*Being and Time* offers a revolutionary way of thinking about what it means to be a person, or what Heidegger calls *Dasein.* Heidegger's central thesis is that people are beings who can never fully be explained rationally or scientifically, but are instead historical agents whose awareness, guilt, and anxiety over the absolute nature of death leads to a choice: lead an authentic existence in the resolve to care—often in the face of great danger—or live inauthentically by substituting nonthinking everydayness for commitment.

For Heidegger, therefore, Dasein is never a static being, but is always in the process of "becoming" through the questions asked and the choices and commitments made. Though he resisted the label of existentialist, Heidegger's *Being and Time* is considered foundational to modern existentialism, influencing such thinkers as Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus.

The problem with Heidegger's phenomenological method of analysis, a method that suggests truth is best revealed as a

German philosphor Martin Heidegger posited that humans cannot be rationally understood and are instead historical agents who may choose to live authentically.

SOURCE: AP Images

product of choice and interpretation, is that there is no way to objectively verify (or falsify) reality, or what empirical social scientists call data. Second, when applied to politics, the danger of Heidegger's methodology is that anything is possible because reality is indeterminate and commitment is based on resoluteness rather than ethics. As a result, Dasein can be equally authentic in choosing evil over good; in Heidegger's case, this may have resulted in his choosing the promise of nationalism to revive the German spirit rather than the inherent messiness of liberal democracy. Finally, Heidegger's method of investigation led him to a radical critique of technology, which he believed further alienated humanity from its roots.

Heidegger's clearest statement of his contempt for a modern world built on instrumental reason and technology is found in his 1935 lecture, "The Fundamental Question of Being," later published in 1959. Disillusioned with Hitler and the direction of contemporary society, and dealing with

a nervous breakdown and public censor at a 1945 denazification hearing (during which he was banned from teaching until 1950), Heidegger spent his remaining years living, writing, and receiving visitors at his beloved "hut" at Todtnauberg in the Black Forest of southern Germany. Scholars have since recognized an aesthetic turn away from Heidegger's earlier concern with being to a greater emphasis on the importance of place (dwelling) and poetics during this period.

Heidegger's close readings of the ancient pre-Socratic philosophers, Aristotle, medieval scholasticism, Soren Kierkegaard, and Friedrich Nietzsche influenced him early in life. His teacher Edmund Husserl at Freiberg University and the writings of the seventeenth-century Japanese Zen poet Matsuo Basho also significantly impacted the development of his worldview. As a professor at the University of Freiberg, Heidegger taught numerous students who would make important contributions to political theory, including Karl Lowith, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse.

See also *Arendt, Hannah; Marcuse, Herbert; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Strauss, Leo.*

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Herzen, Alexander I.

Alexander I. Herzen (1812–1870) was a Russian writer, philosopher, and political activist. Considered by some to be the "father of Russian socialism," Herzen spent much of his life in exile, agitating for political change in tsarist and autocratic Russia. Born in Moscow as the illegitimate son of a rich Russian landowner and a German woman, he completed his studies at Moscow University. In 1834, he was arrested for attending an event upholding views against the tsar. He was found guilty and exiled to a small town outside of Russia.

Herzen returned to Moscow in 1840 and was drawn into socialist literary circles. He worked as a state official in

St. Petersburg and in Novgorod, sent to the latter as punishment for a critical remark about police violence. In 1846 his father died, leaving him a large fortune. In 1847 he left Russia, never to return. In the same year, his first major literary work, *Whose Fault?,* appeared, examining the emergence of new ideas in Russia through fictional characters.

In Europe, Herzen became a supporter for socialist causes, despite his disillusion with many in the socialist movement, including Karl Marx. Settling in London, he began publishing works critical of the system of government in Russia. In addition to his essays, the periodical *The Bell* (*Kolokol*; 1857–1867), which he edited with assistance from the anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, gained a wide following and established Herzen as a leading voice for reform in Russia. In particular, Herzen attacked the institution of serfdom, the stifling Russian bureaucracy, and the lack of individual freedoms. It was said that the tsar himself read Herzen's works.

As a socialist, Herzen is usually assumed to be one of the earliest of the Russian Westernizers, a group opposed by more traditional Slavophiles. While it is true that Herzen advocated individual freedom and did admire the French Revolution (1789–1799), after witnessing the failed revolutions in Europe in 1848, he became skeptical about violent uprisings, the subject of his work *From the Other Shore* (1850). Despite entreaties from more radical figures in Russia and in exile, Herzen did not use his writings to call for violence. Instead, his vision of Russia tilted toward peasant-based socialism, in which rural communes would live free of obtrusive government interference. In this respect, by putting faith in the peasantry, he shared much in common with the Slavophiles.

Herzen's full agenda—including creation of a national parliament—was not realized in his lifetime. His decision in 1863 to support the demands of the Polish rebellion led many Russian liberals, who patriotically lined up with the tsar, to make a break with him. *The Bell* ceased publishing in 1868, and by the time of his death in Paris in 1870, Herzen had lost much of his earlier importance.

Herzen would, however, influence later Russian figures, particularly populists in the 1880s and 1890s who attempted to rally the peasants for political change. Although Herzen was a socialist, his humanistic ideas were not adopted by more revolutionary figures such as Lenin. Herzen did not, as the British philosopher Isaiah Berlin noted with admiration, seek to sacrifice individuals on the altar of abstractions—a charge sometimes levied at Lenin and his followers. The famous Russian novelist Leo Tolstoy praised Herzen as an extraordinary individual, and Herzen's autobiography, *My Past and Thoughts* (1867), is considered a classic in Russian literature.

See also *Lenin, Vladimir Illich; Marx, Karl; Russian Political Thought; Socialism.*

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Heuristics

Heuristics (or heuristic algorithms) are problem-solving procedures that, while may yield acceptable results in practice, provide no guarantees of yielding "good" solutions in general. Specifically, an algorithm is called heuristic if it cannot be shown to yield a result to be correct, correct within a known error of approximation, or correct with known probability.

Generally, heuristics are used for problems that are too difficult to be solved correctly, or where a provably correct procedure is too expensive, time-consuming, or cognitively complex. In political science, heuristics are used for both solving statistical models and developing political-behavior models.

Political methodologists often use complex statistical models to analyze political phenomena. While simple linear models and simple, globally concave nonlinear models are usually straightforward to solve exactly, statistical functions with many discontinuities or local optima may require heuristics for practical solution.

Cognitive heuristics, pioneered by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky's Nobel Prize-winning work on prospect theory, are often incorporated into models of political and social behavior. These heuristics represent alternatives to standard models of rational choice for individual behavior, in which individuals are assumed to possess unbounded rationality, attention, and problem-solving ability. However, while it is plausible that people often behave heuristically, there are a large variety of theoretically plausible cognitive heuristics, especially where the decision-making environment is complex; thus social scientists face a significant challenge in discovering which heuristics adequately capture or predict real behavior.

See also *Quantitative Analysis; Statistical Analysis.*

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Hierarchical Modeling

Hierarchical models, also commonly called multilevel models, hierarchical linear modeling, nested models, and multilevel analyses, are structures that consist of multiple units of analysis, one "nested" within the other. This type of model is useful in political science because often the effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable, observed at one level, is influenced by variables observed at another level. For example,

household income might affect the amount one donates to a campaign. However, the degree to which politicians practice clientelism across nations, such as giving privatized benefits to certain constituents, may also influence the effect of income on campaign donations. A hierarchical model, in this case, affords the researcher the opportunity to account for variance in individual campaign donations by considering information at all levels of analysis.

Traditional methods of statistical analysis, such as ordinary least squares (OLS), ignore the nested structure of hierarchical models by assuming observations are independent when they are not. That is, OLS assumes residuals to be independently distributed and, to the extent that observations in groups (e.g., voters in nations) share common characteristics, their residuals correlate. Violating this assumption causes the underestimation of standard errors, thus placing the researcher at risk for committing Type I errors. Adding dummy variables to flag a voter's citizenship mitigates the problem. This allows the calculation of differences in the intercepts between voters of different nations, but it does not allow the explanation of these differences with information in the set of data. Using robust standard errors, which allow residuals within groups to covary, also provides a fix for standard errors, but again, the robust standard errors do not allow one to model differences between groups.

Hierarchical models allow the information in the data set to model the phenomenon of interest as well as differences between groups on intercepts and slope coefficients. Using the example above, campaign donations can be modeled as

$$y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}x_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

where individual i is contained within nation j and is affected by explanatory variable x_{ij} (household income). The second-level effects of the nation can then be modeled by the coefficients β_{0j} and β_{1j} as follows:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}z_j + \delta_{0j}$$
$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}z_j + \delta_{1j}$$

Here the γ-coefficients are fixed parameters, z_j is a second-level predictor (the degree to which politicians practice clientelism in the example above), and the δs are the disturbances. The coefficient γ_{00} is referred to as the *grand mean* and represents the level-2 intercept. This specification allows the researcher to explore the phenomenon in question along with differences in the intercept or slope coefficients, by nation. The model expands to include more independent variables or, if necessary, to account for variables measured at higher levels of aggregation.

Hierarchical models provide several advantages to researchers, but there are weaknesses worth noting. First, the stability of any given hierarchical model decreases as more predictors are added. Second, multicollinearity is a more acute concern in a hierarchical model relative to an OLS model. Last, hierarchical models are typically estimated using either restricted maximum likelihood or empirical Bayes/maximum likelihood; both are computationally intensive.

See also *Qualitative Methodologies.*

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Higher Education Policy

See *Education Policy, Higher.*

Hilferding, Rudolf

Rudolf Hilferding (1877–1941) was a leading Austro-Marxist theorist and political figure in the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Author of *Finance Capital: A Study of the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development* (1910), classical Marxism's most important political economy work after Marx's *Capital* (1867), Hilferding introduced the term *organized capitalism*. He served twice as finance minister in SPD-led coalition governments in the Weimar Republic and was the leading theorist and key advocate of the Republic in the SPD.

Hilferding was born in Vienna, Austria-Hungary, on August 10, 1877, into a liberal-Jewish bourgeois family. He studied medicine at the University of Vienna, leaving with a doctorate in 1901 to become a general practitioner. By the early 1890s, he had become radicalized and joined with like-minded others into a reading and study group that later became the nucleus of the school of Austro-Marxism. The iconoclasm of Austro-Marxism—blending historical analysis, neo-Kantian philosophy, the Marxian critique of political economy, and contemporary developments in sociology and economics—influenced his thinking for the rest of his life.

After receiving an invitation from August Bebel, founding leader of the SPD, and Karl Kautsky, the party's leading theorist, Hilferding moved to Berlin in 1906. He was initially a leading voice against Eduard Bernstein's revisionism and he defended revolutionary politics in the debate on the mass strike.

Hilferding's *Finance Capital* begins by examining the financial market and its institutions, money, and banks, and makes the case for a new phase and type of capitalism. This new capitalism becomes organized into cartels dependent on and led by finance capital (the banking sector) and is ultimately incapable of a final economic breakdown. However, the new capitalism is also intrinsically linked to a political compromise between old (aristocratic) and new (bourgeois) order and includes imperialism as the necessary outcome. The work thereby stands both analytically and politically in stark contrast

to Bernstein's *The Preconditions of Socialism* (1899); it also highly influenced Nikolay Ivanovich Bukharin and Lenin's theory of imperialism. The antirevisionist stance is even more apparent in Hilferding's formulation of organized capitalism in response to Germany's World War I (1914–1918) political economy. Under this system, the state organizes and dominates capitalism but does so in the service of war (war economy) and thus precludes democratic reforms through parliamentary means.

Hilferding never quite associated himself with the radical left that converged around Rosa Luxemburg, however. He also kept his distance, despite an initial political friendship with Leon Trotsky, from the Russian radical left (Bolshevists), and opted for democratic socialism instead. Although Hilferding was openly critical of the SPD's embrace of World War I and eventually became the leader of the antiwar Independent Social Democrats, he had a rather pragmatic-realist view of the German Revolution of 1918 to 1919. To aid the Weimar Republic, Hilferding radically reformulated his concept of organized capitalism into a kind of parliamentary welfare state regime, a precursor to neo–Marxism's capitalist democracy, to substantiate and legitimize SPD support and actions in the Republic.

When Adolf Hitler came to power, Hilferding fled Germany. His last political intervention was the exiled SPD's radical Prague Program in 1934, which called upon the German working class to rise up against the dictatorship. His final, unfinished work, *The Historical Problem* (1940–1941), presents his departure from classical Marxism. In it Hilferding anticipates the idea of the relative autonomy of the state and a move from "class" to the concept of "social groups." He also asserts the importance of psychology in understanding social phenomena. Hilferding was arrested in Marseille, Vichy France, extradited, and died in Paris on February 10, 1941, after being tortured by the Gestapo.

See also *Bernstein, Eduard; Bukharin, Nikolay Ivanovich; German Political Thought; Luxemburg, Rosa; Marxism.*

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Hindu Political Thought

Hindu political thought has shifted throughout history. On the one hand, the classical Hindu tradition contains almost a disinterest for political issues; on the other hand, the modern phase of Hinduism includes a strong growth of political Hinduism.

THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN CLASSICAL HINDUISM

Of the numerous classical Hindu texts, some can be identified as a core: the *Vedas,* the *Upanishads,* and the *Agamas,* together known as *sruti.* In these texts, and in contemporary comments to them, one can find the discourse on Hindu political thought. Compared to the deep philosophical discussions found in classical Hinduism, however, the debate on political issues is sparse. Most political texts from the classical period (usually dated 500 BCE–500 CE) describe existing political systems and offer advice on how to implement the religious order, rather than independently analyze political problems. The existing social order is usually taken for granted, and the caste problems discussed are mostly practical aspects regarding how to rule a society based on these cleavages, rather than on the possible fairness and justification of the system. Classical Hindu political thought tends to emphasize duties rather than rights, and central for almost all writers is the concept of *dharma,* which translates as duty, path, or law. The dharma is individual and depends on one's status in the cosmic order, and this order is also dependent on all individuals correctly following their particular dharma.

The primary task of the political leaders in the classical Hindu states was to ensure that dharma was always followed, and to support their efforts, a number of writers presented treatises on the issue of government. The best known of these treatises is the *Arthasastra* by Kautilya, written in the fourth century BCE, in the early years of the Mauryan Empire (321–185 BCE). Kautilya is widely believed to be synonymous with Chanakya, the prime minister serving Chandragupta, the first Mauryan emperor. Some critics point to variations in the texts, which would indicate that the book had several authors, and that some sections of it were written later. The Arthasastra includes detailed instructions on how the ruler must act to uphold the social order; some of the chapters are dedicated to the administration, others to foreign relations and the economy. The treatise is in some senses cynical in its worldview, as at times it seems that the primary purpose is to ensure the survival of the king, and comparisons are often made with the European Renaissance treaty, *The Prince*, by Niccolò Machiavelli.

The Arthasastra of Kautilya is not unique; other similar treatises were written in the classical period, and these texts also emphasized the necessity of a firm social order and a caste system. In *Manusmrti* (Laws of Manu), believed to have been written no later than 200 CE, the creation of the world links to the prevailing social system, based on caste. The book gives detailed instructions on how the social order is to be upheld and recommends severe punishment to those who break the caste rules.

MODERN DEVELOPMENTS OF HINDUISM IN POLITICS

In the modern era, liberal and socialist ideas have dominated India's political field, resulting in the almost general acceptance of a secular state, separating religion and politics, and thereby reducing the scope for religious political thought. This secular solution was accepted by the Indian National Congress, the dominant freedom movement of British India,

and later influenced the framing of the new Indian constitution. As a reaction, a new form of Hindu political thought established itself in the early twentieth century: *Hindutva* or Hindu nationalism, an ideology influenced by both classical Hinduism and modern forms of nationalism. In his book *Hindutva,* first published in 1923, the Hindu nationalist ideologist V. D. Savarkar defined Hindutva as a feeling with a political content, and encouraged all Hindus to unite and to build a Hindu state. A follower of Hindutva, for Savarkar, is a person who sees India not only as the fatherland, but also as the holy land. The target of Hindu nationalist agitation has usually been the religious minorities of India, most importantly Muslims, who constitute 12 percent of the population.

The Hindu nationalist movement draws on traditions and concepts within classical Hinduism and often refers to *ramrajya,* a mythical Hindu kingdom, as its political ideal. The Hindu nationalists also reinterpret concepts from classical Hinduism, and transform dharma from a moral to a political concept, allowing for the possibility to brand political opponents as non-dharmic, or working against peace and social order. The Hindu nationalist movement in India, sometimes referred to as the *sangh parivar,* includes a number of associations; most important, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) formed in 1925 to assert the natural rights of Hindus in their homeland.

Savarkar's Hindu nationalism can be seen from the perspective of Mahatma Gandhi's ideas. Both Gandhi and Savarkar denounced British imperialism, shared a dislike of certain aspects of Western culture, and both advocated a form of Indian nationalism. But while Savarkar emphasized the differences between Hindus and Muslims, Gandhi urged his followers to find the similarities in all religions. Gandhi expressed his protests against the British oppression in religious terms, but never tried to incite hatred against his opponents, and when he used religion as a tool in his political struggles, it was coupled with nonviolence. The strategy of the Hindu nationalists was more or less the opposite, and they often dismissed Gandhi as being impractical or even treacherous to the Indian nation.

The ideas of Mahatma Gandhi remain respected worldwide, and in India his legacy has produced a long range of groups, mainly active within social work and education, but surprisingly little within the political field, and as of the early 2000s, no political party of size in India can be said to forward a Gandhian political ideology. The Hindu nationalist movement drew little popular support in the decades after Indian independence in 1947, but experienced an upsurge in the 1980s and 1990s. It established itself as a central force within the Indian democracy, but was also accused of possessing a fascist streak and of instigating religious riots afflicting both Muslim and Christian minorities. The prime political outlet of the movement, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), formed a coalition government at the national level after both the 1998 and 1999 elections, but was voted out of power in 2004.

See also *Gandhism; Kautilya; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Nationalism; Religion and Politics.*

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Historical Interpretation

Historical interpretation is a scholarly approach to issues that emphasizes the study of the past to develop solutions to contemporary problems. It is based on the efforts to explain past events and analyze them in order to provide an understanding of cause and effect or cost-benefit analysis. Historical interpretation dominated the early study of politics, but with the rise of other approaches to political science, the field expanded with methodologies centered on quantitative and statistical analyses. Nonetheless, it continues to be an important component of political science research. In particular, comparisons to current circumstances with case studies of past political events, trends, or situations allow examination of a policy's full course of cause and effect. Historical interpretation also continues to be a significant factor in comparative politics, where it is used to explain the evolution of individual states and the idiosyncratic factors in political or social development.

Political movements use historical interpretation to motivate their members' pursuit of the movements' goals and objectives. For instance, leaders during the civil rights movement used interpretations of past experiences to provide critical discourse on the race struggle in the United States. Likewise, Karl Marx used the approach to delineate "shared interpretations" and "observed cultural meanings" to develop his theory of class struggle. Historical interpretation has been criticized as an approach by numerous scholars, such as Jürgen Habermas, who argue that interpretations are often portrayed through "privileged" or biased "self-interpretation" excluding representation of critical perspectives, demonstrated by the past dominance of Eurocentric models.

See also *Historical Method, Comparative; Historicism; Political Science, History of.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Historical Method, Comparative

The comparative historical method approaches social science research involving the over-time exploration of long processes *within* as well as *between* a small number of cases. The goal is to arrive at generalizable theories concerning the

origins of macrophenomena, such as revolutions, the welfare state, and political regimes. This method contains two essential elements. First, because comparative historical studies focus on slow-moving structural changes, they are, according to Edwin Amenta's 2003 article "What We Know about the Development of Social Policy," necessarily "situate[ed] within the relevant historical contexts." This means that the practitioner "takes a sophisticated approach to historiography, thinks seriously about issues of process, timing, and historical trajectories, and gains a deep understanding of the cases" (94). Second, because the aim is theory building, the researcher also engages in explicit comparisons across cases to transcend the idiosyncrasies of any single case. Cross-case comparisons are vital for theory building, since, as Dietrich Rueschemeyer notes in the 2003 article, "Can One or a Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains?," "Going beyond the boundaries of a single case can put into question seemingly well-established causal accounts" (332). This allows the researcher to evaluate hypothesized cause-and-effect relationships identified in the first case by assessing how these variables play out across a small number of similarly contextualized cases.

The comparative historical method has a long pedigree, going back at least as far as sociologist Max Weber and historian Otto Hintze, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in their writings on the origins of the modern state. In a generation of scholars from the mid- to late twentieth century, political sociologist Barrington Moore Jr. wrote that the democratic-, fascist-, and communist-regime types were determined by interactions between the state's premodern regime and its process of industrialization. Later, sociologist and political scientist Theda Skocpol used the cases of France, Russia, and China to demonstrate that social revolutions were driven by a complex interplay of elite splits, economic dependency, and international threats. In the 1990s, sociologist Rogers Brubaker explained the differences between modern French and German citizenship policies as the outcome of different legacies of nation-building. Similarly, political scientist Kathleen Thelen has examined vocational training regimes in contemporary Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan, showing the marked differences among them result from nineteenth-century employer-union-artisan political settlements. A casual review of this scholarship suggests that comparative historical analysis is particularly well-suited for testing hypotheses that emphasize the importance of founding moments, path dependence, critical junctures, and causal complexity in explaining macrophenomena.

There are at least three major criticisms of the comparative historical method. The first, made against all small-n studies (or studies with a small studied population), is that there are simply too few cases (or data points) to arrive at generalizable inferences. The second problem relates to the comparability of cases, in that it is extremely difficult to identify those cases with a comparison that can adequately control for confounding variables, particularly when it comes to large-scale processes or superstructures. Finally, given the massive scope of their subject material, practitioners of the comparative historical method must rely to an unusual degree on secondary sources, which may result in biased conclusions.

Nonetheless, practical steps can be taken to minimize these concerns. Attending to the causal mechanisms within each case—often called process tracing—generates additional data points within each case, lending greater validity to the causal inferences derived from historical case analysis. Biases in the secondary source material might be guarded against by investigating the scholarly debates surrounding these sources and allowing the researcher to construct the least tendentious account of the case. Lastly, triangulating or drawing on several different sources can increase confidence in the validity of the researcher's interpretation of key events in each case.

See also *Qualitative Methodologies; Small-n and Case Study.*

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Historicism

Historicism maintains that all human thought rests on indemonstrable presuppositions that are unknown to the thinker—presuppositions that vary from one historical epoch to another. It is a powerful paradigm that underlies much of social and political inquiry since the beginning of the twentieth century. In political theory, historicism is evident in the rejection of natural right or rational norms in favor of a relativist theory of values. In the history of political philosophy, it is via the belief that all previous universal statements about the nature of politics and of the good society should be traced

back to particular social situations in which these statements were made. In political science, critique of behavioral political science for ignoring value judgments in favor of allegedly objective study of facts is another example of expressions of, or developments influenced by, historicism.

The first philosopher who insisted on the dependence of philosophy on history was Georg Hegel, but he was not a historicist. In contrast with historicism, Hegel believed that at one moment in time, history had revealed the absolute truth. The origin of historicism can be better traced to the German historical school of law, which developed as a reaction to the attempt to impose the Napoleonic code on German territories in the early nineteenth century. According to the proponents of this school, modern natural right teaching is too abstract and therefore not applicable to every place; the true norms are those discovered through studying the history of a people. The hope that one can discover valid but historically relative norms, however, was eventually abandoned because it rested on assumptions—the belief that historical peoples are natural wholes or the belief in laws of historical evolution; these assumptions were not supported by an unbiased study of history.

Further, the study of history made it clear that the particular norms from the past always had a reference to universal principles and no universal principle can oblige one to accept the norms of every historical community. Although scholars continued to believe that history, and not unhistorical philosophy, was the door that gave access to humankind's true situation, it became evident in the course of the nineteenth century that history cannot provide a substitute for universal principles. The thinker who first saw clearly that the modern turn to history leads to nihilism is Friedrich Nietzsche, who described the fluidity of all concepts as a deadly truth in his *Use and Disadvantage of History for Life* (1874).

Since historicism denies both the notion of progress and the possibility of discovering a permanent truth in the past, the basis of historicism is a historical critique of human thought showing, first, that all "advances" in human thought occurred at the expense of forgetting important insights and, second, that earlier human thought could not, in principle, anticipate possibilities that were developed later. The first such philosophical-historical critique was Nietzsche's teaching of the human mind as not a mirror of reality, but a complicated expression of a basic instinct of life, which he called the will to power. Nietzsche, however, wavered between presenting his doctrine merely as his interpretation of reality and as a transhistorical insight into the nature of reality.

The most thoroughgoing historicism emerged in the thought of philosopher Martin Heidegger, who, by rejecting the naturalistic interpretation of Nietzsche's teaching, broke with the metaphysical tradition going back to Plato. Instead of giving another answer to the question of what is being, Heidegger's confrontation with the tradition of Western philosophy led to the conclusion that being is fundamentally elusive. According to Heidegger, the history of Western thought has proved to be a series of attempts to understand various

different beings while becoming increasingly forgetful of the problem of being. Technological progress, then, has been made at the expense of forgetfulness of a fundamental problem. Since philosophy or science as the pursuit of knowledge assumes the world is fundamentally intelligible—an assumption that historicism maintains erroneous—philosophy or science tends to identify the world with what is intelligible and, therefore, it tends to dogmatically disregard everything that resists being made into an object. From the historicist viewpoint, philosophy or science impoverishes the world instead of truly clarifying it.

Although not all forms of historicism are indebted to Heidegger, doubts about the modern science's capacity for understanding and guiding human life seems to be the common motive that animates historicism in general. On the other hand, resistance to historicism in various quarters has resulted from the persistent power of natural science, or the connection between human life and the natural mechanism supporting it; the evidence that there is a permanent structure underlying the variety of human languages; and renewed arguments in favor of the necessity and meaningfulness of the question of the good society. Nonetheless, by insisting on the perspectival character of all human thought, and denying that there can ever be a view from nowhere, historicism remains one of the powerful intellectual orientations of late modernity.

See also *Heidegger, Martin; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Political Philosophy; Political Science, History of; Political Theory.*

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Hobbes, Thomas

Born in Malmesbury, England, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) was a philosopher and political theorist widely renowned for his 1651 book *Leviathan,* arguably the single-greatest work of political philosophy in the Anglo-American tradition. *Leviathan* brings together parts of Hobbes's previously published writings, including the 1642 Latin work *De Cive* and the 1640 *Elements of Law, Natural and Political.* Hobbes was also author of *A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England* (1666); *Behemoth: Or the Long Parliament* (1668); and various essays on free will, optics, geometry, and moral philosophy.

Hobbes's influence on modern philosophy and social science has been prodigious. Although he was not the originator of the idea of a social contract, as is sometimes believed, his account of how individuals emerge from an inhospitable state of nature and create government by mutual agreement is now regarded as definitive.

There is considerable debate about whether Hobbes's political theory should be characterized as liberal or authoritarian. On the one hand, Hobbes argues that government arises from the consent of the governed, and that subjects retain an inalienable right to life. From this inviolable right to self-preservation come other rights such as the right to defend one's self, the right to food and other basic sustenance, and the right to not be compelled to testify against one's self in court. Whenever possible, Hobbes's sovereign would ideally allow subjects an even greater array of liberties within what he called the "silence of the law." Hobbes also advocated a liberal policy of religious toleration, arguing that because the beliefs of individuals are known only to themselves, the sovereign should allow them to think as they see fit, so long as they conform their external actions to the law.

On the other hand, Hobbes's argument defends absolute government, and he opposed traditional liberal provisions like divided government and constitutional limits on the power of the sovereign. While he speaks of a virtually unlimited right of nature existing in the state of nature, his account of the origins of law effectively collapses the Thomistic distinction between natural law and positive law, suggesting that the laws of the sovereign are right by definition. His adamant claim that virtually any government, no matter how oppressive, is preferable to the incommodities of the state of nature and civil war tends to lend support to the status quo.

Hobbes is credited with some of the central concepts in contemporary social and political science. The first is his notion that individuals are to be regarded as rational and self-interested economizers. For Hobbes, reason operates as a "scout" for the "desires." While his complex theory of human nature is irreducible to models of *homo economicus* prevalent in neoclassical economics, rational choice theory, and game theory, Hobbes is often read this way. Second, Hobbes is widely cited as the originator of the *state of nature* concept. Absent some powerful sovereign or state authority, the civil order almost immediately devolves into a war of all against all; Hobbes famously described this in *Leviathan* as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." Lastly, Hobbes theorizes government as arising from a social contract struck between all members in the state of nature wherein if one person agrees to alienate all individual rights, save the inalienable right to self-preservation, to a third party, every other individual will do so on precisely the same terms. Although subsequent social contract thinkers envisioned a contract between the subject and sovereign, Hobbes adamantly denies that the sovereign is a party to this original agreement.

See also *Political Philosophy; Social Contract; State of Nature.*

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Hobhouse, Leonard Trelawney

Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse (1864–1929) was an English political theorist, sociologist, and activist. In addition to being the leading thinker of new liberalism, he was one of his era's most engaged public intellectuals and was instrumental in the establishment of sociology as an autonomous academic discipline.

Born on September 8, 1864, in St. Ive, Cornwall, Hobhouse was educated at Marlborough College and Corpus Christi College, Oxford. Although already engaged in progressive politics, he initially pursued an academic career, becoming a fellow of Corpus in 1894. Shortly after publishing *Theory of Knowledge* (1896), a realist critique of contemporary British epistemology, Hobhouse left Oxford in 1897 to join the editorial staff of the *Manchester Guardian.* In this capacity, as well as in his journalistic career after moving to London in 1902, he wrote hundreds of articles urging domestic reform and denouncing imperialism. At the same time, Hobhouse involved himself deeply in the nascent field of sociology. His *Mind in Evolution* (1901) and *Morals in Evolution* (1906) proposed an interpretation of evolution notable for its rejection of Spencerian instinctualism in favor of viewing social change as driven by the progressive growth of "general intelligence" coordinating public action. These works led to his appointment in 1907 as professor of sociology at the London School of Economics, the first chair of its kind in the English-speaking world and a post he occupied until his death. As before, Hobhouse split his efforts between academic social theory and public commentary. Having revived his association with the *Manchester Guardian,* he became director of its company in 1911. His later years were marked by continued contributions to Britain's progressive journals as well as the completion of his mature sociological system in a series of works collectively entitled *The Principles of Sociology* (1918–1924).

Liberalism (1911) is considered Hobhouse's most lasting intellectual achievement, where he argues that classical liberalism's laissez-faire doctrines rested on a falsely atomistic conception of the individual. To Hobhouse, classical liberals denied the fundamental interrelatedness of human life, resulting in a negative characterization of freedom as the absence of state intervention in the society and economy.

Hobhouse set out to reconcile this individualist foundation with social solidarity, arguing that negative liberty alone could not enable the self-development he saw as "the heart of Liberalism." Since self-development requires the capacity to pursue a good life, not merely freedom from state intervention, economic redistribution and social welfare necessarily afford all individuals the positive capacity for human flourishing.

As in all of his work, Hobhouse's attempt to reconcile individuality and solidarity predicates on an organic image of society as a symbiotic whole: the suffering of any particular social segment harms the body politic at large. Against criticisms that this political ontology obviates individuals, Hobhouse took pains to distinguish his organicism from competing holisms and often attacked what he considered the potentially tyrannical political implications of British idealism. These efforts notwithstanding, much subsequent discussion of Hobhouse's social theory concerns whether his own organicism ultimately collapses into an anti-individual collectivism.

Hobhouse died on August 21, 1929, leaving a body of work prefiguring many later developments in social theory. His focus on the social nature of freedom foreshadowed both perfectionist liberalism and communitarianism, and his contributions as a public intellectual to the foundations of the welfare state were unparalleled. Despite his important role in the founding of academic sociology, however, his voluminous output in this field has fallen from favor due to its strongly teleological assumptions, and thus remains of interest primarily to historians of the discipline.

See also *British Political Thought; Communitarianism; Liberalism, Classical.*

. . . .   LOREN GOLDMAN

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Hobson, John Atkinson

John Atkinson Hobson (1858–1940) was a British political economist and theorist who sought to defend liberalism while attaching a social element to it. His move to London in 1887 and his exposure to the plight of the urban industrial poor awakened his interest in the problems of unemployment and poverty as endemic to capitalism. This interest informed the course of his work over the next four decades. Hobson's most lasting contributions pertain to two areas of study—his development of new liberalism and his work on the dynamics behind imperialism.

Hobson was a leading figure in the development of new liberalism, along with T. H. Green and L. T. Hobhouse. New liberalism sought to defend and upgrade liberal theory in light of the industrial revolution and the rise of socialist thought by finding justification within its principles for redistribution and a welfare state. The new liberals, including Hobson, were strongly influenced by the thought of John Stuart Mill, who defended individual liberty by appealing to its contribution to the common good. Liberty, they believed, was needed for individuals to develop their moral powers and capacities, upon which the well-being of society ultimately depended.

In furthering the idea of the individual and political community's strong interdependence, the new liberals defended a "radical ideology of the cooperative commonwealth," with unique capacities to justify specific economic rights and duties. The cooperative commonwealth view of the nation rests on the rather peculiar notion of the organic society. By employing the imagery of organicism, Hobson accounted for society as a thing naturally created by humans, much the same way that bees naturally create the beehive. This model of society contrasted with the passive view of society as a "mere aggregate, an accumulation of human atoms, incapable of any really organic action" (Hobson, 79). With the "discovery" of society and the social dimensions of wealth, Hobson's new liberalism justified limits to individual rent-based income and redistribution to social elements of value, including individuals—in essence, a right to social property must exist alongside private property rights.

Hobson's theory of imperialism was very influential and was endorsed and modified by diverse figures such as Lenin. Hobson sought to understand why the British Empire grew at such a phenomenal rate during the final decades of the nineteenth century (adding almost 5 million square miles [12.95 million square kilometers] of territory between 1870–1900), and he found the answer in the structural dynamics of late capitalist production. To Hobson, imperialism was ultimately an economic phenomenon. Due to the problem of underconsumption in advanced capitalist nations, monopoly capital had surplus capital and sought to invest it abroad. This new "creditor class to foreign" countries sought certainty and diminished risk in foreign investment sites, compelling their home governments to continually expand their empires. It is thus investment, and not trade per se, that mainly drives territorial expansion in Hobson's theory of imperialism.

See also *British Political Thought; Hobhouse, Lawrence Trelawney; Imperialism; Lenin, Vladimir Ilich; Liberalism, Classical; Mill, John Stuart.*

. . . .   NEIL HIBBERT

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Holcombe, Arthur N.

American Arthur N. Holcombe (1884–1977) was one of the twentieth century's most prolific and respected political scientists. He received his doctorate in 1909 from Harvard University and taught there until his retirement in 1955. He also served at national universities in China, the College of Europe, Claremont College, the University of Michigan, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He contributed to a number of government agencies, including the U.S. Bureau of Efficiency (1917–1919), the President's Committee on Administrative Management (1936), and the War Production Board (1942–1945).

Early in his career, Holcombe focused on state government and party politics, publishing *Foundations of the Modern Commonwealth* (1923) and *Political Parties of Today* (1924). A visiting professorship in China led to a book on Chinese politics in 1930. Later his interests turned to international peacekeeping and the United Nations (UN). His enduring interest, however, was the U.S. political system. Throughout his career he promoted the concept of public interest, which he saw as the mediating element in conflict resolution and the animating element of a democratic society promoting civility and moderation—two cardinal civic virtues. He believed that political parties should be organizationally strong but not doctrinaire and partisan. Holcombe viewed the middle class as the repository of middle-of-the-road and moderate value systems and thus the key to the functioning of a successful democracy.

Holcombe applied the same concepts to a study of the United Nations. In his work, *A Strategy of Peace in a Changing World* (1967), Holcombe advocated the development of a two-party system within the organization as part of which members would sacrifice some of the elements and prerogatives of sovereignty. By curtailing national sovereignty, he felt the UN could become an effective world government. Holcombe was the chair of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace and authored the commission's report, *Strengthening the United Nations* (1957), which contained numerous recommendations for the institutional reform of the UN.

Holcombe's lasting legacy is in the field of political behavior and political institutions, especially in the United States. His early work, *State Government in the United States* (1928), compares varieties of state government practices and programs.

He found that two-party systems are more desirable in promoting public interest because they enable large segments of the population to come together to serve common purposes.

See also *Political Theory; Public Good and Public Interest Groups; United Nations (UN).*

. . . .   GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN

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Holocaust

The capitalized term Holocaust emerged in the 1950s and, over the next two decades, gradually replaced the German term *Endlösung* (final solution) for the macrokilling project of European Jews by Nazi Germany. Holocaust originally possessed a sacrificial meaning as a burnt offering and, because of its misleading sacred connotation, became frequently substituted by the Jewish concept of Shoah, referring to the Nazi extermination of Jews. Some authors have used the expression holocaust in reference to other mass-killing events, such as genocidal policies against Native Americans in the United States (nineteenth century), Tutsis in Rwanda (1994), and Muslims in Bosnia (1992–1995).

The genocidal project of the extermination of European Jews received scarce attention by political scientists in the United States and other Western countries after World War II (1939-1945). With the exceptions of Hannah Arendt, Raul Hilberg, and Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, the overwhelming American and international scholarship on the Holocaust was and still is conducted by historians. This scholarly deficit of the political science profession regarding one of the major planned-killing events in human history can extend to the coverage of the other killing regimes in the twentieth century.

The historical understanding of the Nazi killing project underwent substantial changes with the shift from the perpetrators' language of Endlösung to the victim- and survivor-centered symbolic concepts of Holocaust and Shoah. Both terms refer to experiences of calamity and catastrophe and have a long conceptual prehistory. The current alternating and capitalized use of these symbolic expressions indicate the primacy of the Jews as a target population for destruction, though other victim populations were included in the genocidal policies of Nazi Germany, such as Sinti and Roma (the so-called Gypsies), mentally and physically disabled people, homosexuals, Russian

prisoners of war, Polish intellectuals and priests, war-wounded people, and political opponents. The inclusion of non-Jews in the killing record of Nazi Germany has affected the discussion about the claim of uniqueness connected with a specifically Jewish Holocaust. The estimated 6 million Jewish victims are part of an overall estimated 21 million victim population.

The claim that the Jewish Holocaust was a unique historical phenomenon of selecting one people and its culture for destruction became a unifying feature of the historical literature. As a broader cultural and political discussion in the 1960s and early 1970s, it gained almost universal acceptance. Yet, with the rise of the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia (1975–1979) and the growing knowledge of the 1.7 million victims of their killing fields, the mass murderous wars in the disintegrating Yugoslavia of the early 1990s, and the death toll of 800,000 Tutsis in the politically organized cleansing rampage in Rwanda in 1994, this claim has been revisited by scholars who had originally established it. The intellectual historian Norman Cohn expressed the general ideas behind killing projects like the Holocaust best when he spoke in his 1975 work, *Europe's Inner Demons*, of "the urge to purify the world through the annihilation of some category of human beings imagined as agents of corruption and incarnation of evil."

CONTROVERSIES

In 1984, scholars debated the question as to whether the Holocaust was an intentional mass killing project designed and ordered by Adolf Hitler himself, or the result of contingent circumstances and opportunities offering themselves during the course of World War II. The division lay between the *intentionalists*, on one hand, who believed in an original design and, occasionally, also a written *Führerbefehl* (order) from Hitler himself, and the *functionalists*, on the other hand, who considered it more probable that the extermination policies became enacted as functions of the development of the war. The opposing lines have since become blurred by authors who combine intentional and functional arguments in their research. Agreement, however, has been reached that the search for an original Führerbefehl is an ideological red herring.

The claim of the uniqueness of the Holocaust as a killing event has not only been challenged by the killing record of regimes such as Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (1975–1979; 1.7 million deaths) and the Rwandan massacre of Tutsis (1994; 800,000 deaths), but also by the massive death tolls resulting from Russian leader Joseph Stalin's Gulag camps (1924–1953; 30 million or more deaths); mass executions in Ukraine (1932–1933; 7 million deaths); and Chinese premier Mao Zedong's revolutionary campaigns (1966–1976; 30 million or more deaths). Comparative studies of mass killings in the twentieth century and history in general have tremendously expanded knowledge about ideologically motivated and politically legitimated killing regimes.

See also *Anti-Semitism; Armenian Genocide; Ethnic Cleansing; Genocide; State Repression.*

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Homeland Security

The issue of homeland security took on new meaning in countries around the world after the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11). The surprise attacks proved that at-will countries could be successfully attacked if they were not prepared to defend themselves. The attacks occurred when al-Qaida forces hijacked four commercial airliners for use as instruments of mass destruction. Two attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and a third attack on the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., were successful. However, passengers averted a fourth attack by driving United Flight 93 into the ground in rural Pennsylvania. Before the day was over, nearly three thousand people, including nine from the al-Qaida network, had lost their lives, and the safety of the civilized world had been challenged.

Concerns over militant attacks throughout the twentieth century were primarily restricted to national or regional threats, such as those from the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, the Red Brigades in Italy, and Hamas in the Middle East. Prior to 9/11, groups halfway around the world had not successfully carried out an attack on a distant target.

AFTER 9/11

Within days of the September 11 attacks, the U.S. Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism), giving the national government unprecedented powers to fight terrorism. The following year, Congress expanded government counterterrorism powers with the passage of the Homeland Security Act. In the most far-reaching government reorganization since World War II, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was charged with coordinating the activities of twenty-two government agencies, including Customs and Border Protection, the Secret Service, Citizenship and Immigration Services, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Coast Guard. DHS was also given the responsibility for overseeing the gathering and sharing of intelligence among government agencies and for coordinating responses to national emergencies among private industries and state, local, and regional governments.

DHS was specifically created to identify potential terrorist threats and avert future attacks. In practice, however, the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have retained control of antiterrorist activities. Critics of DHS contend that the agency has not been successful in responding to natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, which devastated the Gulf Coast in August 2005. DHS is perceived as more successful in working with states to enhance defensive capabilities and in establishing national warning systems.

While the United States responded to 9/11 with heightened government powers and an aggressive new military policy (preemption), European nations, in addition to pledging support for the United States, strengthened their existing security measures and passed new antiterrorism legislation that, in large part, focused more on prosecution than militarily driven action. The issue was particularly relevant in Europe, where groups such as the Basque Separatist Movement in Spain and the Baader–Meinhof Gang in Germany had long made terrorism a concern. The European Union (EU) responded to 9/11 by creating a joint policing authority and taking measures to coordinate counterterrorism activities among member nations. These measures included the sharing of intelligence and police information, issuing warrants across national boundaries, strengthening border controls, and cooperating with the United States.

Despite its heightened security efforts, Europe has proved to be vulnerable to attacks since 9/11. On March 11, 2004, forces likely linked to al-Qaida exploded ten bombs on the commuter train system in Madrid, Spain. At least 192 people were killed, and 1,500 others were wounded. A few weeks later, after an unsuccessful bombing attempt on April 2, police trapped suspected individuals inside a home where they committed suicide. One police officer was also killed.

To battle the problem, rather than reorganize its homeland security systems as the United States had done, the Spanish government chose to draw on laws designed to fight domestic terrorism. Authority over homeland security activities remained in the hands of the secretary of the interior. The new strategies Spain announced were an expansion of antiterrorism resources, improved coordination within and among security and intelligence agencies, and heightened security at vulnerable points.

Another major attack took place on the London commuter system during the morning rush hour on July 7, 2005, when three bombs exploded. A fourth bomb was detonated on a bus one hour later. Overall, 52 people were killed and 700 were wounded. Four suicide bombers also perished in the attacks. Two days later, on July 9, a second set of explosives was set off, but no casualties were reported. These perpetrators, who were suspected of having links to al-Qaida, were later arrested.

A year before the 9/11 attacks, the British parliament had enacted a new antiterrorism package that expanded the government's authority for dealing with suspected terrorists both legally and financially. This strategy stressed enhanced information sharing, immigration monitoring, and tightened security at laboratories and aviation, civilian, and nuclear sites. After 9/11, the government chose to leave the responsibility for homeland security dispersed among several departments. In 2004, the government announced a new antiterrorism strategy, CONTEST, designed to focus on prevention, pursuit, protection, and preparation.

See also *Insurrection and Insurgency; Post-9/11 Politics; Al-Qaida; Terrorism, Political.*

. . . . ELIZABETH ROHLETTER PURDY

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Homelessness

The term homelessness implies the lack of a fixed, regular, stable, and adequate nighttime abode. The *homeless*, as defined by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, include persons whose primary nighttime residences are in transitional housing. In most societies, cultural perceptions determine the terms used to label the homeless. Labels such as hobo, tramp, transient, bagman or bagwoman (United States), sturdy beggar (Nigeria), vagabond, and bum have been used to categorize a person with no permanent residence, often with negative societal connotations. By the late twentieth century, the terms *houseless* and *no fixed abode* (NFA) emerged to refer to homelessness and the homeless in a way that avoided the undesirable stereotypes of other terms. Similarly, the use of houseless deemphasizes the negative connotations generally associated with the homeless—unemployment, mental unbalance, drug addiction—and instead stresses the concrete problem of not having a house or apartment in which to reside. Advocates and persons who have experienced homelessness tend to use these terms as well, while NFA is used for legal purposes. Furthermore, terms such as family homelessness, youth homelessness, veteran homelessness, domestic violence homelessness, and reentry homelessness have evolved to classify different categories of the homeless.

Considered an urban phenomenon, homelessness, a global problem, has existed since at least the sixteenth century, when England first tried to address the problem of vagrants on its streets. The industrial revolution in the eighteenth century, which greatly influenced the socioeconomic conditions of society, also intensified the occurrence of homelessness. Homelessness affects all genders, regardless of socioeconomic

status, race, age, or geographical location. In 1995, the United Nations classified six hundred million people as homeless or residing in low-quality housing, most of them women and dependent children. However, a census of the homeless is problematic. Double counts, hidden homelessness, mobility of homeless persons, and service-system paradox (where service providers tend to report higher counts) all affect homeless estimates.

Mitigating or eliminating homelessness requires understanding and identifying its causes. Researchers have largely identified three principal questions in the effort to resolve homelessness: What causes homelessness? Why does homelessness exist? And, who is at risk of becoming homeless?

In some cases, homelessness can be voluntary. Religion, culture, and an established way of life constitute the decisional basis to live without a permanent residence or place of abode. For example, the spiritual convictions of yogis in Asia, social customs of nomads in Africa, and lifestyle preferences in the developed world signify a conscious resolution to be homeless. In the United States, however, greater poverty and the lack of affordable housing since the 1980s are the principal reasons contributing to the increase in the number of homeless individuals in the early 2000s. On a global level, political conflicts and natural disasters, continued urbanization, economic programs resulting in an uneven distribution of wealth, and the collapse of traditional family support systems are all causes for homelessness. Other causes can include domestic violence, unemployment, low-paying jobs, lack of affordable housing, substance abuse, mental illness, changes and cuts in public assistance, and the difficulty of reentering society after incarceration.

The interaction between these complex sets of circumstances forces many people into poverty and drives them to prioritize and make difficult choices between provisions, shelter, and other essential human needs. As housing costs increase, more and more people cannot afford to pay for a permanent abode nor for other important provisions, such as child and health care. Policies and programs that concentrate on reducing poverty not only help the homeless find a stable residence; they also help increase access to other necessities.

Resolving homelessness relies on effectively addressing the responsible factors. The costly endeavor of homelessness management once was the exclusive domain of the public sector. However, by the end of the twentieth century, the public, private, and nonprofit sectors had formed broad partnerships to address issues of homelessness. Subsequently, there have been shifts in strategies to resolve homelessness, primarily to focus on its prevention. Economically, it is more efficient to prevent homelessness than to resolve it later. As a result, strategies to ensure livable incomes, improved availability of affordable housing, rapid rehousing, and systems that facilitate the provision of required services for low-income people are now prevalent.

See also *Human Development Index; Poverty; Urban Housing.*

. . . . ISMAILA ODOGBA

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Homophobia

Homophobia refers to aversion, bias, or discriminatory actions, attitudes, or beliefs directed toward individuals who either have or are perceived as having nonheterosexual identities such as gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and queer people (GLBTQ). The term came into its contemporary usage in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when it was used to describe what Kenneth Smith called "a fear of homosexuals" and the anxiety that one may be perceived by others as homosexual. Homophobic fear and anxiety are seen to be negative attributes, and in this regard, the term links to other social prejudices such as sexism, racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and classism. In this regard, GLBTQ groups have used the term to organize against discriminatory public policies and cultural attitudes. The term *internalized homophobia* relates to anxiety about or aversion to one's own homosexuality or nonnormative sexuality. Internalized homophobia has been linked to low self-esteem and suicide in GLBTQ individuals.

Examples of homophobia include name-calling, harassment, social exclusion, job and housing discrimination, criminalization of homosexual sexual practices, and violence. The criminalization of homosexual sexual practices can be seen as state-sponsored homophobia. According to the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), those arrested for offenses related to same-sex sexual practice are subject to the death penalty in 5 countries and to imprisonment in 72 countries. The 1998 torture and murder of Matthew Shepard in the United States brought national and international attention to the problem of homophobic violence. A bill known as the Matthew Shepard Act passed the U.S. Senate in July 2009, and is expected to pass into law. This act expands the 1969 U.S. hate-crime law to include crimes motivated by a victim's actual or perceived gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability. According to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation's 2007 *Hate Crime Statistics*, 16.6 percent of the hate crimes documented in 2007 were motivated by bias against a victim's perceived or actual sexual orientation.

Closely related terms to homophobia are *heteronormativity* and *heterosexism*. Heteronormativity refers to the assumption that heterosexuality is and should be the norm. Heterosexism (also sometimes called compulsory heterosexuality) refers to the array of attitudes, actions, and institutions that structure heterosexuality as the norm. The issue of same-sex marriage illustrates some of the differences between the terms.

The institution of marriage, to the extent that it privileges and attaches benefits to certain kinds of relationships such as marriage between opposite-sex couples, is a heterosexist one. Next, prohibiting gays and lesbians from marrying each other could be considered homophobic. Finally, the assumption that opposite-sex marriage is "natural," along with the pervasiveness of opposite-sex-only marriage within society, are reflections of its heteronormativity.

Feminist theorists have explored ways that homophobia closely links to sexism. Suzanne Pharr, for example, calls homophobia "a weapon of sexism" in that it is one important way, along with violence and economics, that rigid gender roles are imposed and enforced. According to Pharr, heterosexism and homophobia work together to uphold male dominance by both vilifying and making relational intimacy choices, other than the heterosexual nuclear family, institutionally difficult.

In addition to working to designate homophobic violence as a hate crime, GLBTQ groups around the world have pursued several strategies to organize against homophobia. These have included efforts to decriminalize homosexual acts and to mobilize the state in working against homophobia. These efforts have met with some success: in 2009, for example, the Supreme Court of India decriminalized homosexual acts and in 2006, the European Union passed a resolution against homophobia.

In 2005, May 17 was designated as the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia, and since then, the date has been recognized in over forty countries with demonstrations, rallies, educational events, and other actions aiming to raise awareness about the problem of homophobia. The date itself commemorates the day that the World Health Organization removed homosexuality from its list of mental disorders in 1990. Organizers distinguish the International Day Against Homophobia from another event, the annual LGBTQ Pride Day, by explaining that while Pride Day "emphasizes that Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, and Transsexuals are proud of their identity and refuse to be shamed," the international recognition against homophobia on May 17 "highlights that in reality it is homophobia that is shameful and must be deconstructed in its social logic and fought against openly."

See also *Discrimination; Gender Issues; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Movements, Comparative; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Politics; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights; Queer Theory; Sexism.*

. . . .   CHRISTINE KEATING

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Hook, Sidney

Sidney Hook (1902–1989) was an American philosopher, Marxist, and exponent of pragmatism. Born in Brooklyn, New York, he graduated from City College in 1923 and received his PhD from Columbia University in 1927. While at Columbia, he absorbed the tradition of American pragmatism from one of his professors, John Dewey. Hook then joined the philosophy department at New York University, where he remained until 1972. After World War II (1939–1945), Hook became involved with the Congress for Cultural Freedom, an organization designed to influence intellectual opinion away from communism and which later was revealed to have received CIA funds. As the 1960s unfolded, Hook became horrified by the assault of student radicals for academic freedom on campus. In response, he helped establish the University Center for Rational Alternatives and its journal *Measure.* In his 1987 book, *Out of Step: An Unquiet Life in the 20th Century,* Hook described the purpose of the organization and journal as "to defend the relative autonomy of the university and to resist attacks against the freedom to teach and freedom to learn from without and from within."

Despite his long career of anticommunism and his abhorrence of campus radicalism, Hook remained on the left in domestic matters. He never accepted free market economics and the notion that capitalism for all its flaws is the most rational system. In 1985, Hook was given the Medal of Freedom by President Reagan. His final institutional affiliation was with the Hoover Institution in Stanford.

Hook was a pragmatist and a naturalist who belonged in the tradition of Dewey, Charles Sanders Pierce, and William James. Hook also attributed significant influences in his development to American philosopher Morris Cohen and British philosopher Bertrand Russell. One simple principle stands at the core of Hook's thought from which radiates all his secondary views: his rejection of metaphysics and his insistence that all true knowledge is practical and contingent rather than purely theoretical and unchanging. For Hook, there could be no eternal verities apprehended by the exercise of the purest rationality, and he absorbed the insight of Scottish philosopher David Hume, who Hook believed had shown that pure reason did not exist. A clear statement of Hook's position is given in his 1989 *American Scholar* review of American author and philosopher Allan Bloom's best-selling *The Closing of the American Mind* (1987). "The difficulty with Bloom's position," Hook says, "is that, like Leo Strauss, he has not emancipated himself from the Greek notion that the cosmos is an ethos, and that

what is good and bad, right and wrong for man is essentially related to the cosmic order rather than to the reflective choices of men and women confronted by problems of what to do." It is "consequentialism" then, or the "rational modification of interests and passions," and not the conformity of conduct to certain transcendent standards which constituted Hook's standard of morals.

With the rise to prominence of American philosopher Richard Rorty, who died in 2007, the debate over the meaning and contemporary relevance of pragmatism is again near the top of American philosophy's agenda. With these changes, it is possible Hook may receive the kind of attention impossible during the fractious days of the 1960s and 1970s and not seen since Hook's tenure as one of the world's foremost authorities on Marxism.

See also *Dewey, John; James, William; Marxism; Pragmatism; Russell, Bertrand.*

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Hooker, Richard

Richard Hooker (1554–1600) was one of the preeminent Anglican theologians of the sixteenth century and is still considered one of the most influential expositors of the Anglican ecclesiastical, social, and political vision.

Born in 1554 in Exeter, England, Hooker attended Exeter Grammar School and entered Corpus Christi College, Oxford, in 1569, under the patronage of John Jewel, bishop of Salisbury. Hooker completed his BA degree in 1574 and his MA in 1577. In 1579, he took holy orders as a deacon in the Church of England and was appointed deputy professor of Hebrew at Oxford. Hooker left Oxford to become rector of St. Mary's church, Drayton Beauchamp, in 1584, and master of Temple Church, London, the following year. Temple Church was an influential London parish attended by many of the nation's political elite, and it was at Temple that Hooker engaged in his noted controversy with his Puritan assistant (and cousin), Walter Travers. The Temple years were unique ones, with Hooker delivering morning sermons defending the Anglican *via media* (middle way) between Puritanism and Roman Catholicism, and Travers taking the afternoon lecture and

forcefully defending the Puritan call for further reformation. Nonetheless, Hooker and Travers remained on good terms personally; their differences led Hooker to begin work on his *magnum opus,* the six-volume *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity,* the first four books of which were published in 1594.

Hooker married Joan Churchman, daughter of a leading London merchant, in 1588. In addition to his posts at St. Mary's and Temple Church, Hooker served the church in a number of positions, including as subdean of Salisbury Cathedral from 1591 to 1595 and rector of St. Mary's Bishopsbourne from 1595 to 1600; during this tenure, he passed away on November 3, 1600.

Deeply influenced by the religious turmoil of Elizabethan England, Hooker sought to articulate Anglicanism as a middle ground between Catholicism and Puritanism or Presbyterianism. On the one hand, Hooker, like all Protestants, decried the many medieval corruptions that he saw in the Catholic Church of his day, and he justified the break with Rome in terms of the search for a more faithful approximation of the primitive Christian Church. On the other hand, Hooker dissented from the view of English Puritans, generally referred to as the *party of Geneva*, or *party of Calvin*, who denounced the English Church for its failure to completely purge all "Romish" ceremonies and insisted that church government must not include any aspect not explicitly laid out in scripture. Hooker considered such a belief too restrictive, overlooking the fact that God had made humans both rational and social creatures and that thus reason and custom, considered alongside scripture, represented legitimate sources of knowledge about church polity.

Most political theorists are aware that English philosopher John Locke quotes Hooker more than a dozen times in his 1690 work, *Second Treatise of Government.* Hooker's influence on English social, political, and religious thought was profound, and he is generally listed alongside Thomas Cranmer, archbishop of Canterbury and adviser to King Henry VIII, as being responsible for the enduring power of Anglicanism as a comprehensive and inclusive body of thought.

See also *Locke, John.*

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Horkheimer, Max

Max Horkheimer (1895–1973) was a German philosopher and sociologist. His name is primarily linked to the Frankfurt school, of which he is considered to be one of the founding fathers. Born in Stuttgart to a Jewish family, Horkheimer studied philosophy and psychology in Munich. He then

moved to Frankfurt where, under the supervision of neo-Kantian philosopher Hans Cornelius, he wrote his habilitation dissertation entitled "Kant's Critique of Judgement as Mediation between Practical and Theoretical Philosophy" (1925). In 1930, he became chair of social philosophy at Frankfurt University and was elected director of the Institute for Social Research. The latter attracted important Marxist scholars of the time whose work has become known as that of the Frankfurt school.

Horkheimer's role as director of the institute was crucial. In his contributions to the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung,* the institute's main intellectual organ, he promoted the sort of multidisciplinary intellectual endeavour he named *critical theory*. This became a point of reference for the members of the institute and, later on, for all those pursuing a critical theory of society. Horkheimer defined critical theory as a theory that seeks to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them, and, as such, he opposed it to a *traditional theory*, which is contrarily aimed at perpetuating these enslaving circumstances.

After the rise to power of Adolf Hitler, Horkheimer went first to Switzerland in 1933 and then to the United States in 1935, like many of the other members of the institute. At first, he lived in New York, and the whole institute was relocated to Columbia University. In 1940, Horkheimer moved to California. He came back to Frankfurt in 1949 after the end of World War II (1939–1945). One year later, the institute reopened after thirteen years of exile.

Prior to the war, in Frankfurt, Horkheimer also met philosopher and social critic Theodor Adorno, the other major animating personality of the Frankfurt school. Adorno's friendship and intellectual collaboration were crucial to Horkheimer. During their exile in the United States, Horkheimer and Adorno together wrote the *Dialectic of the Enlightenment,* a few copies of which were first published in 1947 in Amsterdam before becoming a very influential work in the 1970s. The book, which reflects the authors' experience of the advent of Nazism and the rise of American mass society, puts forth a radical critique of Western rationality, by arguing that the latter, far from realizing the Enlightenment's promise of emancipation, had turned into a radical form of domination. Adorno and Horkheimer thus suggest that the entire Western Enlightenment is based on an instrumental concept of reason as domination over nature. As such, Enlightenment risks resulting in the opposite of reason, that is, myth and barbarism. The critique of reason remained a crucial theme of Horkheimer's writings, which are devoted to the development of a general critique of modern Western civilization and its logic of domination.

The last twenty years of Horkheimer's life were characterized by the recognition of his intellectual prestige (he was rector of the University of Frankfurt and lectured at the University of Chicago) and by an increasing metaphysical pessimism. In the prosperous West Germany of the postwar period, Horkheimer felt the decline of the revolutionary possibilities he had identified during the 1930s and the years of his exile.

See also *Adorno, Theodor W.; Critical Theory; Frankfurt School; German Political Thought.*

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Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa (alternatively northeast Africa, and sometimes Somali peninsula) is a peninsula of East Africa that extends for hundreds of miles into the Arabian Sea and lies along the southern side of the geostrategically important waterway of the Gulf of Aden. It is the easternmost projection of the African continent. The term also refers to the greater region containing the countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia. As such, it covers approximately 1,242,742 square miles (2,000,000 square kilometers) and is inhabited by about 86.5 million people. In the 2000s, the term *Horn of Africa* has often been extended to cover the member countries of the region's Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), namely Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda (this more expansive definition is disputed by some scholars). Regularly hit by both natural disasters (floods in Somalia, droughts in Ethiopia and Eritrea) and violent conflicts, the Horn remains among the world's poorest regions.

HISTORY OF THE REGION
Many countries in the region have proud historical roots, reaching back as far as four thousand years in the case of Ethiopia (whose emperors claimed lineal descent from King Solomon of the House of David). Partly colonized by Italy (Somalia and Ethiopia) and France (Djibouti), the countries of the Horn regained their independence between 1941 (Ethiopia) and 1993 (Eritrea). During the cold war era, ever-changing alliances between the countries of the region and the two superpowers, as well as frequent conflicts, characterized the region. Far from increasing stability, the end of the cold war and the subsequent diversion of superpower attention away from Africa's proxy battlegrounds further fueled the region's many conflicts.

In 1991, the expulsion of Somalia's long-reigning dictator Siad Barre led to Somalia's descent into a civil war. A United Nations (UN) intervention (UNISOM) between 1991 and 1995 failed to reconstitute the state. While the situation in southern Somalia has since further deteriorated, the northwest of the country (Somaliland), which had declared its de facto independence in May 1991, seems to have managed a transition to democracy, reaching a climax with parliamentary elections in September 2005.

In Ethiopia, the civil war between the Communist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam (which had toppled the monarchy in 1974) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) led by Meles Zenawi and Issais Afewerki's Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) finally came to an end in 1991. Two years later, Eritrea officially seceded from Ethiopia. Both countries have since fought several times about disputed territories, most recently in a war between 1998 and 2000 that cost approximately seventy thousand lives.

In Sudan, a coup d'état brought General Omar al-Bashir and his National Islamic Front (NIF) to power in 1989. As a result, the long-running civil war between the Arabic and Islamic north of the country and the African and Christian south escalated and fighting between government forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) intensified. Following substantial international pressure and the dispatch of a UN mission (UNMIS), a comprehensive peace agreement was signed in 2005.

PREVALENCE OF CONFLICTS IN THE REGION

Despite certain positive developments such as the peace accord between North and South Sudan, the situation in the region has further deteriorated in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Somalia, for example, entered a new conflict phase in June 2006 when fighters of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) seized power in Mogadishu, causing Ethiopia to intervene in December 2006. Since March 2007, an African Union (AU) peacekeeping force (AMISOM) has been deployed to Somalia but, as of mid-2009, has failed to create stability in Mogadishu.

Concurrently, the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea over the border enclave of Badme remains unresolved. The ruling of an international arbitrary commission, the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC), has not been implemented. In July 2008, the mandate of the UN observer mission (UNMEE), in place since 2000 to keep the fragile peace between the two countries, was terminated.

The Sudan continues to be the theatre of several conflicts, of which at least one, in the western province of Darfur, is intensifying. Despite the presence of a twenty-seven thousand-strong joint United Nations–African Union peacekeeping mission (UNAMID) and substantial international attention, the fighting between local movements and government-supported Arab militias known as Janjaweed has already cost up to five hundred thousand lives.

INTRAREGIONAL DYNAMICS

These conflicts all led to seriously strained interstate relations in the region. In order to improve these relations and provide an anchor of stability, in 1996, the countries of the Horn decided to transform the region's Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) into a broader cooperative venture addressing issues of peace, security, and development. Renamed Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the organization has since made great strides in bringing the region's states together in common projects, such as the creation of a regional multinational brigade as part of the African Union's planned African Standby Force (ASF) and a regional conflict early warning system.

INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE REGION

Given the prevalence of conflict in the region as well as its geostrategic location, it is not surprising that the Horn of Africa continues to be the subject of considerable external interests (both African and non-African). Fearing the Talibanization of Somalia (as a safe haven and training ground), the United States, for example, has substantially increased its engagement in the region. The United States maintains particularly close relations with Ethiopia, which may eventually even serve as the location of the U.S. strategic Africa command (AFRICOM) currently being established in Stuttgart, Germany. Several other countries, such as China, India, and Malaysia, have increased their presence in the region to satisfy their growing needs for natural resources. In order to curb the increasing piracy in the region and safeguard the Bab-el Mandab, an important chokepoint for international trade located between Yemen and Somalia, the international community has launched two maritime missions (NATO's Operation Enduring Freedom and the EU's Operation Atalanta) to monitor the waterways.

THE STATE OF THE REGION

Since the 1990s, the Horn of Africa has become a synonym for despair. Ranging from serious interstate conflicts, civil wars, piracy, and terrorism to regular natural catastrophes, the problems of the region appear virtually insurmountable. The most pressing challenges confronting the region at the end of 2009 included the deteriorating situation in Somalia, the radicalization of Eritrea, and the various potential hotspots in Sudan, ranging from Darfur and the indictment of President Omar al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court to an upcoming referendum between the north and the south of the country. Without significantly increased support from the international community, a lasting solution to any of the Horn of Africa's manifold problems will remain out of reach for the region and its member states.

See also *African Union (AU); Anglophone Africa; Authoritarianism, African; Boundary Making and Boundary Disputes; Regions and Regional Government; United Nations (UN).*

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Horvat, Branko

Branko Horvat (1928–2003) was a Croatian economist and one of the most active public intellectuals of former socialist Yugoslavia. He is best known for his work on Marxist economic theory in general and the theory of the labor-managed firm in particular. His approach is sometimes referred to as *Marxism-Horvatism*. Horvat was director of the Institute of Economic Sciences in Belgrade, Serbia; a long-time editor of the well-respected journal *Economic Analysis and Workers' Self-Management;* and an adviser to the Yugoslav government and several other countries in the world.

Horvat is recognized for his criticism of existing political and economic systems, both in the West and in the East. He promoted a third system that would avoid both the pitfalls of capitalism in Europe and Northern America and *etatism*, as he called the state socialist systems of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Horvat believed both were inefficient in their developmental results as well as unjust in their distribution of property and power. He hoped that a third model, that of socialism, could be developed to overcome these shortcomings. Yugoslavia had the opportunity to produce this vision of a better socioeconomic system, but Horvat was nevertheless critical of what he saw as various problems of Yugoslav reality. He advocated a mixture of self-management, the market, and planning to overcome the economic crisis which gripped the country in the 1970s and 1980s. Horvat placed great hope in economics as a scientific enterprise comparable to the hard sciences, and he was very confident about the type of knowledge economists could produce. His confidence in economic analysis garnered him a high standing in global leftist circles. He was even in the running for a Nobel Prize in Economics after the publication of his *Political Economy of Socialism* in 1982. In his own country, however, he was often out of sync with current politics.

Horvat was one of several intellectuals who founded the Yugoslav Democratic Initiative at the end of the 1980s. The initiative attempted to establish its base in all the republics and to simultaneously avoid ethnic conflict while promoting democracy. After the initiative failed and Yugoslavia broke apart, Horvat's political outlook only grew dimmer as he clashed with the economic policy of the newly independent Croatian government. He organized a small Social Democratic Party, which never recorded significant electoral results. Despite his scientific credentials, Horvat was forced to retire from his position at the University of Zagreb. He remains notable for his advocacy of market socialism, self-management, and participation as a way of more efficiently and democratically organizing the economy and society as well as his constant efforts in developing a rigorous scientific analysis to support these arguments.

See also *Economic Theories of the State; Marxism; Socialism.*

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Housing

See *Urban Housing.*

Human Development Index

The Human Development Index (HDI) measures socioeconomic development and serves as an alternative to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita as an indicator of material advancement. The HDI incorporates three dimensions of human progress: a long and healthy life, knowledge and education, and a decent standard of living. The HDI for nearly all countries has been reported annually since 1990 in the United Nations Development Programme's *Human Development Report* (HDR).

The HDI emerged out of economists' frustration with the use of a single indicator—GDP per capita—as a proxy to measure economic development and thereby rank countries comparatively and assess their progress over time. GDP per capita essentially measures annual real income per capita. Advocates of using GDP per capita to judge development favored it as an indicator, as it is frequently and consistently measured and reported. However, critics, including future Nobel Laureate in Economics Amartya Sen, pointed to many drawbacks of using GDP per capita for comparing development cross-nationally.

Sen, regarded as the intellectual father of the HDI, argued that the goal of development should not be simply to encourage the growth of national income, but rather to promote human capabilities and freedom. Mahbub ul Haq, the Pakistani economist who founded the HDR for the UNDP in 1990, stated that the real goal of development must be to "enlarge people's choices" in all areas of human life: economic, political, and cultural. Haq, with consultation from Sen and Meghnad Desai (and, later, several other noted development economists), created and edited the HDI for the first HDR.

Three component indices—life expectancy, education, and GDP—form the HDI. The indices are generated by comparing a country's actual performance to minimum and maximum goalposts on a particular indicator. For example, the life expectancy index intends to capture the development goal of a long and happy life. For an individual country, it is calculated by the following ratio:

$$\frac{\text{Life expectancy at birth}-25 \text{ years}}{85 \text{ years}-25 \text{ years}}$$

where 25 and 85 years are the minimum and maximum goalposts.

The education index serves to measure the development goal of knowledge. It is computed by this formula:

$$2/3(\text{adult literacy rate}) + 1/3(\text{gross enrollment rate}).$$

Zero and 1.0 serve as goalposts for the education indicators.

The GDP index serves as a proxy for the decent standard-of-living goal. For an individual country, it is determined by this method:

$$\frac{\log (\text{GDP per capita})-\log(\$100)}{\log(\$40,000)-\log(\$100).}$$

The GDP per capita measure used is at purchasing power parity (PPP).

The HDI is then calculated as the mean of those three indices (i.e., it is the sum of the component indices each multiplied by one third).

When the UNDP ranks United Nations member countries by HDI, those societies that have effectively promoted health care and universal education tend to rank higher on the HDI than on a GDP per capita ranking. Other countries with high per capita incomes but poor social services provision—such as many petroleum exporters—rank lower on the HDI than if the list were ordered by GDP per capita. The United States tends to rank lower on the HDI than on a GDP per capita standing, while the European welfare states usually achieve higher positions.

Some critics of the HDI have argued that since it highly correlates with GDP per capita, the HDI offers little new information about societies' comparative economic progress. Other critics, including its principal architects, lament the HDI's inability to capture other important human capabilities, including political freedom or differences in living standards for men and women. Still others criticize the equal weighting of the life expectancy, education, and income components of the HDI, offering various suggestions for improvement. In contrast, Sen has lauded Haq for putting together an index that is easy to understand and can be computed easily with data that are available for most nations. Indeed, the UNDP has produced time series for the HDI that extend back to 1975. Responding to critics, the UNDP has created and now publishes a human poverty index, a gender-related development index, and a gender empowerment measure.

See also *Development, Economic; Development, Political Economy of; Globalization and Development; United Nations (UN).*

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Humanitarian Intervention

By the end of the twentieth century, humanitarian intervention had become one of the most controversial issues in the debate on international relations and foreign policy. It entails forced intervention in the territory of another state in the name of humanitarian aid or humanity. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, a shift in paradigm occurred from the *right to intervene* to the *duty to protect*. The U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2002 illustrates this shift to "duty to protect" as part of U.S. efforts in the global war on terrorism to prevent further threats and attacks such as those against the United States on September 11, 2001, which killed nearly three thousand people.

One example that exemplifies both the right to intervene and the duty to protect is Kosovo. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mounted a military intervention against Yugoslavia in 1999 in response to the Yugoslav government's violent actions against ethnic Albanian citizens in Kosovo, a region where many residents desired independence from the central government. Thousands fled as a result of the central government's crackdown. NATO justified its involvement on behalf of Kosovars on humanitarian grounds, and in 2001 a United Nations–supervised Supreme Court in Kosovo's capital of Pristina confirmed that war crimes and crimes against humanity had occurred, including systematic campaigns of murder and rape. NATO's military action was the first of its kind against a sovereign state, and still remains controversial. Some countries, such as Russia, India, and China, claim that NATO's involvement violated both Yugoslavia's sovereignty and the United Nations Charter, while others have noted that such interventions are based more on national interests than actual humanitarian grounds.

Questions concerning humanitarian intervention include: How can a democratic country legally attack another country or invade a sovereign state? Is humanitarian intervention a right or a duty? What is the credibility of the United Nations (UN) if a group of countries are able to usurp the power to intervene in the name of humanitarianism? How humanitarian is humanitarian intervention? What are the politics, economics, and ethics behind humanitarianism?

In post–cold war politics, Western Europe and the United States have engaged in humanitarian interventions in Somalia (1992–1995), Haiti (1994), Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1995), and Iraq (2002-). Such interventions have been multilateral and based on cooperation among various governments on the basis of short- and long-term goals. Humanitarian interventions, however, have never been purely humanitarian and can be explained both in terms of idealism and realism. In the debate over humanitarian intervention, moral questions cannot be divorced from political, strategic, and prudential questions.

The normative perspective usually found in contemporary literature on humanitarian intervention is based on international law and rights, but many political and ethical issues are automatically involved in any discussions on humanitarian interventions or human rights. For instance, the UN policies

in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995 were criticized for being too slow to act militarily and failing to prevent the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica, where over seven thousand males were killed despite the town being in a declared UN safe area and the nearby presence of UN peacekeepers. In this case, the United Nations waited too long to take sides in the conflict, yet by taking sides with one of the aggrieved parties, the issue of humanitarian intervention is likely to become politicized. In the absence of coherent international legal order, law cannot provide the sole basis for humanitarian intervention. It must instead be found in ethics, which can be highly subjective.

No intervention can be considered "just" or "humanitarian" unless it is supplemented with the *right authority*, *just cause*, and *right intention*. Moreover, it should be used only as the last resort. The question of right authority is crucial to the debate on humanitarian intervention because the very decision to intervene contravenes a state's claim to sovereignty. It may be justified only in those cases in which the government agrees to accept the UN peacekeeping forces or in those cases in which the states might have "failed." However, it is not easy to legitimize humanitarian intervention in all such cases. For instance, the Israeli interventions in Lebanon in 2006 cannot be legitimized under the failed state dictum.

All sovereign states have the right to decide matters within their own territorial jurisdiction. Both the formal notion of sovereignty and the correlative norm of noninterference have been accorded legal expression under the international law. Article 2, section 4 of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force between the states and Article 2, section 7 prohibits the UN from intervening into matters falling within the jurisdiction of a sovereign state. Exceptions arise only if the state's actions become threatening and actually breach peace.

The problem occurs when it becomes imperative to overwrite a state's sovereignty to protect the human rights of its citizens. In contemporary international relations, there exist three different models of sovereignty that vary considerably over the importance of state rights versus human rights, authority of the state to protect human rights, and the need to conceive an international system to protect human rights. The models correspond to the three most generally accepted traditions of international theory—the Machiavellian tradition, the international tradition, and the cosmopolitan tradition.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND SOVEREIGNTY

Under the Machiavellian tradition, human rights are considered the prime responsibility of the sovereign state with no scope for humanitarian intervention for the other states. Under this tradition, statism remains the most appropriate model of world politics and stronger states may coerce the weaker states. Under this tradition, intervention occurs only to enhance one's power and not to protect human rights per se. The basis for intervention lies in the ability to intervene and not in the right to do so.

Those who empathize with the victims of war or the victims of human rights abuse on a massive scale reject the traditional approach to humanitarian intervention. Proponents of this second model insist on adopting the tradition of internationalism to regulate interstate relations and allow humanitarian intervention in rare cases. For instance, the 1951 UN Genocide Convention establishes a right to forcible humanitarian intervention with the UN's authorization on the grounds that repression and cruelty on a large scale can pose threats to international peace and security.

Under the third model, sovereignty of the state is seen in cosmopolitan tradition. It amounts to *sovereignty of the people* rather than the *sovereignty of the sovereign*. According to this model, the sovereignty of the state can be violated not only by outside forces but also by the indigenous use of force. For instance, Chinese sovereignty of the people was violated by the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, in which the central government engaged in a violent crackdown against peaceful student protestors. In such cases, sovereignty can be restored both by international and national powers. Such a viewpoint provides justification for humanitarian action against pariah states such as apartheid South Africa, targeted by many nations for social and economic boycotts.

Although the international and cosmopolitan traditions provide legitimacy to humanitarian intervention, they are unable to authorize agents for such an intervention. The agents could be the United Nations, the European Union (EU), NATO, or any state in its single capacity. Nevertheless, larger states cannot be allowed to resort to humanitarian intervention to serve their own self-interests. Their "moral anger" also cannot provide just cause for military intervention. For intervention to be just, the intention must also be just.

The notion of just cause excludes, among other things, motives based on self-interest—profit, power, or glory. For instance, the French intervention in Rwanda in 1994 met with widespread dissatisfaction, primarily because it was perceived as motivated more by the continued desire to play the greatpower game in central Africa than by humanitarian concerns. It can be quite difficult, if not impossible, to draw a neat line between humanitarian and political concerns or between rhetoric and actions. As such, humanitarianism cannot and should not be allowed to be used to justify "unacceptable" or "self-interest based" interventions.

Inconsistent and arbitrary judgments about humanitarian interventions further complicate the matter. Inconsistency and selectivity with regard to the practice of humanitarian intervention makes motives highly questionable. Since the UN, EU, or NATO cannot intervene in every case, it becomes important to establish criteria for when to intervene and when not to intervene. This poses a significant challenge. If humanitarian concerns are to be measured in terms of number of deaths and genocidal campaigns, then Sudan, Liberia, and East Timor have a better claim for humanitarian intervention than Bosnia.

In fact, it is very difficult to arrive at some consensus on acceptable motives focused on preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, or peace enforcement as far as humanitarian intervention is concerned. While many scholars have criticized

the UN intervention in Bosnia, there is no dearth of scholars who have opined that the UN should have intervened earlier to save lives and avert catastrophe. Despite some support for earlier intervention in crises, it is important to remember that misguided decisions and calculations can also prove costly in terms of both politics and economics. The costs of failure of a humanitarian intervention may prove too high in the long run. It is better to adopt the criteria of proportionality, and reasonable hope of success, to serve as adequate warnings against indiscriminate use of military intervention in the name of humanitarianism.

MILITARY INTERVENTION OR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

U.S. president George W. Bush's intervention in Iraq, allegedly to prevent the nation from using weapons of mass destruction and to liberate its citizens from a dictator—thus bringing about democracy—discredited humanitarian intervention around the globe. The humanitarian arguments for invading Iraq met with severe criticism when the weapons of mass destruction the United States insisted were present—and had built a coalition of allies to assist in containing the threat—were never found. In many cases, humanitarian interventions have not resulted in humanitarian outcomes. British philosopher John Stuart Mill ably summarized in *On Liberty* (1859):

> The disputed question is that of interfering in the regulation of another country's concerns; the question whether a nation is justified in taking part, on either side, in the civil wars or party contests of another: and chiefly, whether it may justifiably aid the people of another country in struggling for liberty; or may impose on a country any particular government or institutions, either as being best for the country itself, or as necessary for the security of its neighbours.

Mill did not support intervention by those governments that tried to oppress an uprising of their own citizens. To Mill, "A government which needs foreign support to enforce obedience from its own citizens is one which ought not to exist." He further added that intervention could be recommended provided it gave people freedom, but he also asserted that freedom bestowed on people from others cannot be real and permanent. People have to be their own vanguard.

In contemporary times, the question arises: is humanitarian intervention morally imperative? This debate took a sharp turn when a cyclone hit Myanmar in May 2008, killing tens of thousands of people. The junta in Myanmar could not provide immediate relief to its own people, yet refused international aid as a threat to its sovereignty. Whereas France was of the opinion that the United Nations should invoke the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine in the case of Myanmar's natural disaster, allowing for intervention, Russia, China, and South Africa disagreed. The latter opined that it was the responsibility of the states concerned to protect their populations in the event of a natural disaster.

While the 2001 R2P report included "overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened," there are many scholars who believe that natural disasters should not be politicized and that they should be excluded from R2P. Allowing intervention in such circumstances would arouse the suspicion of weaker states about the true motives of powerful states and their tactics. Weaker nations are usually afraid that dominant states might intend to bring about regime change without taking responsibility toward their nation's reconstruction.

Despite sovereignty concerns, many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are opening up to the idea of humanitarian intervention. For instance, in 2004, Indonesia's Aceh province was worst hit by a tsunami and the Indonesian government allowed international aid in the province, placed under martial law. Aceh was previously not accessible to most human rights groups, international reporters, or aid givers. Similarly, in 2005, the Pakistan government allowed access to international relief agencies in an earthquake-rocked area of the disputed region Kashmir, which divides India and Pakistan.

China too accepted international aid from the United States after an earthquake in Sichuan province in May 2008, despite a history of reluctance to accept such aid. Not all nations welcome humanitarian aid, such as India, which refused aid from other states after a 2004 tsunami and 2005 earthquake in Kashmir. While China's earlier refusals of foreign aid were motivated by its desire to retain complete control over its population, India's refusal was intended to illustrate its strength as an emerging economy and a world power that could effectively manage its own affairs.

In practice, humanitarian intervention, carried out by a coalition of nations, can prove too divisive. Despite the generous notions underlying humanitarian interventions—promotion of democracy; protection of human rights; provision of aid in the case of natural disasters; and the maintenance of peace, law, and order—accepting such aid may be seen as jeopardizing national sovereignty. Article 2.7 of the UN Charter forbids interference in "matters, which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." Despite these concerns, humanitarian interventions continue over the years, such as in Congo (1964), the Dominican Republic (1965), East Pakistan (1971), Cambodia (1978), Tanzania (1979), Iraq (1991 and 2002), Somalia (1992), Haiti (1994), and Kosovo (1999).

It is impossible to separate humanitarian motives from the political ones or for those who provide aid to claim a neutral stance. Humanitarian intervention is often directed by some omnipotent states in the north toward weaker states in the south. It is difficult to think of a weaker state in a similar role. For instance, the United Kingdom associated itself with the global war on terrorism in Iraq in support of the United States and their mutual interests as hegemonic countries. However, the United Kingdom perhaps would not have taken such a similar step in the case of India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh. Humanitarian intervention in the developed world may be perceived as mere propaganda on the part of the interveners.

Humanitarian interventions often create a problem of moral hazard. Since the causes of most conflicts and disasters are deep rooted and complex, it is hard to blame anyone in particular. If there is intervention from outside, chances are that it will be followed by retaliations from within. As such, humanitarian interventions may, in fact, increase conflictual situations instead of peacefully resolving them, though that is not to say they cannot help avoid mass atrocities or prevent further upheaval.

While international law and the United Nations provide some structure for humanitarian intervention, the surrounding debate continues. Contemporary concerns include: Can the U.S.–led intervention in Iraq be justified as humanitarian? What exactly is humanitarian intervention? When is intervention legitimate? What form should humanitarian intervention take? Should humanitarian intervention continue as it has been practiced since the end of the twentieth century? What is the relationship between social justice and individual rights in the era of globalization, privatization, and multiculturalism? No consensus exists as yet on any of these issues.

Military or "forced intervention" may or may not be part of humanitarian intervention. It definitely involves boldness and risk-taking behavior on the part of intruders, in addition to a deep sense of commitment. When considering whether intervention should occur, a nation or organization may grapple with the possibility of guilt as a crime of *omission* rather than that of *commission*. This possibility contributes to the international community's sense of reluctance to intervene in the affairs of other countries. It is easier to resort to humanitarian aid in the case of natural disasters than to engage in military interventions in the case of genocide or ethnic cleansing.

Humanitarian aid focuses on the victims desperately in need of aid, whereas military interventions are guided by many other geopolitical factors, such as the relevance of the country in question to the rest of the world, regional stability, and the attitude of the major players. It is never an objective, unbiased, neutral, apolitical, or acultural step. There seems to be better acceptance of humanitarian interventions for crimes against humanity than those for natural disasters, since many other forms of interventions are possible for natural disasters beyond forcefully delivering humanitarian aid. Another position, however, maintains that there is no such thing as humanitarian intervention.

A true internationalist believes in equal rights for all. Under these ideals, the people of Zimbabwe should be rescued from Robert Mugabe and the citizens of Iraq should be rescued from Shia militias. Humanitarian intervention, for the true internationalist, would be both easy and noncontroversial. Humanitarian intervention can also be seen as a response to the Genovese syndrome, the phenomenon implying individual apathy, societal resilience, and governmental inability to deal with big emergencies.

See also *Genocide; Human Rights; Human Security; International Relations; North-South Relations; United Nations (UN).*

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Human Nature and Politics

The topic of human nature encompasses a very large body of philosophical and psychological literature. For the most part, observers discussing human nature refer to those endogenous aspects of genetic, biological, and psychological functioning that rest inside the individual and appear immutable. For example, a person's physical appearance might be considered part of human nature, including the color of an individual's eyes or hair. Similarly, aspects of individual character or temperament can be seen to reflect a person's basic nature; some people seem more anxious, depressed, or energetic than others from birth, regardless of the situations they confront.

This phenomenon is most often contrasted with that of nurture, which concerns those features of socialization and environmental stimuli assumed to control, constrain, or potentiate particular aspects of human behavior. This traditional view presents a false dichotomy between human nature and nurture. Since the late twentieth century, advances in behavior genetics and neuroscience, working within a theoretically evolutionary paradigm, demonstrate the truly coconstitutive relationship between human genes, brain development, environmental interactions, and subsequent political and social behavior.

HUMAN NATURE AS DICHOTOMIZED VARIABLE

Political science, in general, has had difficulty clarifying the concept of human nature. Human nature has often been ignored, conceptualized in narrow and unrealistic terms, or as neorealists argue, assumed irrelevant in the face of institutional constraint. This partly results from the fact that the discipline remains invested in its ability to intervene and change outcomes. If a structure or institution appears responsible for undesirable outcomes, such as poverty, child abuse, or violence, then changing that system can mitigate the problem. However, if the cause lies inside human instinctual responses, change becomes harder to achieve.

Implicit models of human nature exist in many political science theories, although they often remain unexamined. For example, classical realists such as Hans Morganthau assume a fearful, power hungry, and rational human nature. Moreover, human nature is assumed to be endogenous, fixed, and given. Once endowed, it remains unchanging regardless of specific environmental contingencies. For structural realists like Kenneth Waltz, a static conception of human nature renders its worth meaningless, because universal and constant features cannot

explain variation in outcome. In both the classical and structural realist approach, there exists an implicit claim that human nature manifests universal tendencies, with little individual variation.

Other political science models tend to ignore the importance of human nature, arguing that explanations for important behavior reside solely in environmental factors, subject to intervention and improvement. Many institutional models, as well as prominent theories of voting, rest on implicit notions that while human nature cannot be changed, human behavior remains amenable to modification when properly incentivized or constrained by the external environment. For example, economic models that presume human behavior can be economically incentivized may not be wrong, but remain restricted to certain circumstances. People continue to do things for status, sex, or even a sense of honor that might not provide the best financial outcome.

Environmental models that stress the importance of social processes are not wrong. Rather, they omit an important half of the story, which encompasses the biological, psychological, and physiological nature of humans. For instance, models demonstrating the important effect of socialization on party identification do not encompass recent evidence suggesting that the strength, if not the direction, of partisan affiliation may have a genetic component. Such unnecessarily restrictive constructions of human nature actually serve to bolster the conception that human nature does not reflect the reality of the human body's adaptive, malleable, and individually variable complex system.

WHAT HUMAN NATURE IS NOT

What constitutes a realistic portrait of human nature? Perhaps the first thing to examine is what human nature is not. Human nature is not most of the things that have been attributed to it: it is not distinct from nurture; it is not universal; it is not static; and, importantly, it is not restricted to negative emotions such as fear, greed, and anger.

Nature and nurture do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they continually cocreate one another, such that environmental contingencies constantly interact with genotype to write and rewrite expression that produces a unique phenotype over time. Even twins with the same genotype do not necessarily evince identical disease traits, even for illnesses with established genetic components. In schizophrenia, for example, identical twins share a probability of being stricken at about 50 percent likelihood, which while much higher than the odds in the general population, do not come close to certainty, at least partly due to different environmental experiences and precipitants. Social experiences and relationships can also influence biological changes, even in other animal species, just as any honeybee can become queen after the reigning bee passes away. Some animals even change sex under the right environmental circumstances.

Importantly, human nature is not universal, and therefore can prove quite useful in explaining unique outcomes. While some aspects of human physiology have proven so effective as to drive out much variation, such as color vision, these universal features do not constitute the main focus of interest and attention in political science. Rather, aspects of human nature

that preoccupy the discipline relate more to seemingly broader aspects of human social and political behavior, such as the conditions under which people cooperate, how aggression manifests, what prompts in-group loyalty and out-group discrimination, how identities are constructed, and so on. These expressions of human character, which again emerge and change in interaction with environmental cues and triggers, demonstrably differ across individuals and across populations.

Human nature is not fixed or static. Rather, human nature develops and changes within the context of constant interaction with other people and the environment. All of these social forces can literally change brain chemistry and development, thus affecting behavior.

Human nature is also not restricted to the negative repertoire of emotions emphasized by political theorists from Thomas Hobbes to Kenneth Waltz. Clearly, fear, greed, and anger represent part of the normal panoply of human emotional responses. But just as clearly, positive emotions ranging from hope to happiness do as well. Importantly, humans are the only animals to evolve into a position of self-reflection, where humans are now capable of rewriting their own genetic structure, not only through medical intervention and environmental manipulation, but also through the ability to reflect and reason about one's self and one's institutions. The political implications of this are clear: the political and social institutions that can work in concert with basic human desires and instincts, even though those may remain variable, are more likely to prove effective and enduring than structures that work in direct opposition to prevailing tendencies.

ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF HUMAN NATURE

Scholars such as political scientist Robert Jervis have reflected on more novel conceptions of human nature resting on demonstrated common tendencies in human psychology. For example, in his 2004 article, "The Implications of Prospect Theory for Human Nature and Values," Jervis noted the ways in which prospect theory offers a particular view of human nature; this rests on cognitive foundations that focus on the importance of loss aversion, the centrality of subjective well-being, and the critical role of change in explaining and predicting human behavior. These tendencies indeed hold true across the majority of people, although certainly not all people espouse these proclivities.

An additional empirical basis for locating a foundation for an interactionist view of human nature lies in evolutionary models drawn from biology or psychology. Such models posit a functional, adaptive construction of the human mind, which allows both for individual variability, environmental responsiveness, and positive emotions. Evolutionary psychology supposes a set of content-laden, domain-specific mental programs that developed in response to repeated challenges confronted by human ancestors. Some strategies proved more important for survival than others, and these constitute superordinate psychological mechanisms; when necessary, these mechanisms either potentiate or restrict other actions, thoughts, and behaviors. Emotions likely function in this manner, at least

in part. For example, when confronting a predator, fear instigates a series of actions that include enhanced sight and vision, increased ability to mobilize muscles for running or fighting, subjective diminishing of pain sensitivity, and a transfer of blood away from the periphery to the core of the body. When the evolution of such behaviors led to the successful resolution of repeated challenges, and these responses conferred a comparative reproductive advantage, such structures proliferated. When the behaviors were not successful, they died out. Since different strategies may work differently depending on local ecology, individual genetic variation of complex social and political behaviors inevitably emerge.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Traditional images of human nature present a static and fixed set of responses. The problem with such models is that they introduce an unrealistically constrained view of endogenous human processes. Human genetic and biological mechanisms interact with their environments in complex and sophisticated ways to produce political and social behaviors of interest.

More accurate and comprehensive models of human nature would explicitly embody the myriad ways in which human brains interact with the environment to prompt change in both. Such attempts should rest on an integration of behavior genetics and evolutionary theory, which recognizes genotypic variance across individuals and populations, and also seeks to understand and appreciate the functional purpose and potential adaptive advantage of any given behavior. In such a way, it becomes possible to develop a more accurate and coherent understanding of the interplay between genes, brains, environment, and behavior.

See also Emotions in Politics; Group Relations; Morgenthau, Hans Joachim; Political Psychology; Social and Political Cognition; Socialization, Political.

. . . . ROSE MCDERMOTT

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Human Rights

Human rights are often defined as those rights that belong to persons simply by virtue of their being human. This definition neatly captures the ethical intuition of human moral equality that is at the core of human rights. The idea of human rights has been a central theme of modern liberal and democratic thought. It has also proven politically explosive, igniting the democratic revolutions that swept the Atlantic region at the end of the eighteenth century, and fanning the flames of democratization in the twentieth century. It is the commitment to human moral equality that gives human rights doctrine its revolutionary spark.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

The idea that human rights belong to people by virtue of their being human makes human rights sound less controversial than they really are. Philosophically, the idea of human rights evolved out of the natural law or natural rights tradition, which still claims some adherents among contemporary proponents of human rights. Yet contemporary questions about the philosophical foundations of, and justifications for, human rights are highly divisive. Politically, the idea has a more convoluted pedigree, with diverse origins in the transnational campaign to abolish slavery, in the women's rights and labor movements, in humanitarian projects such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Geneva Conventions, and in the institutions of the League of Nations.

One thing that is clear is that human rights are, both philosophically and politically, distinctively modern. Although the concept of human dignity is probably as old as human society itself, human rights are a modern invention. The two concepts must not be conflated: many ways of thinking about human dignity, such as in hierarchical clan, class, or caste societies, are antithetical to the moral equality at the core of human rights. This is not to deny the close connection between human rights and human dignity in contemporary theory and practice. The key international human rights instruments (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights) emphasize the idea of "equality in dignity" for all human beings, articulating a particular conception of human dignity grounded in the moral equality that human rights express.

The earliest explicit formulation of natural or human rights emerged in the context of the rigid feudal hierarchies of medieval Europe, where dignity was linked to birth and status. The terminology of natural rights was borrowed and adapted from the natural law discourses that dominated European legal, political, and theological thinking in the early modern period. The term *natural rights* essentially meant "rights held by everyone." In the medieval context, this idea of equal natural rights played a significant leveling role. In a society in which rights and duties had been based on birth and status, equal rights undermined traditional forms of authority, helping to topple monarchies and transform social and economic relations. Theorist Thomas Hobbes was perhaps the first to argue that the ideas of

Demonstrators hold signs in 2009 protest against price increases on basic commodities in India. Whether human rights are universal is controversial, but supporters claim they prescribe the equal treatment of human beings under social, political, and economic conditions, including basic subsistence.

SOURCE: Getty

moral freedom and equality could provide an independent and sufficient basis for political authority—though for Hobbes, this radical idea led to a very conservative conclusion: the transfer of all rights to an omnipotent sovereign.

Although Hobbes did not see the transformative implications of his argument, others certainly did, and the revolutionary potential of these ideas has yet to play out. If one begins from the premise that all people possess equal rights and freedom, there remains no valid justification for natural subjection or arbitrary power. In this sense, the idea of human rights is inherently democratic; it ignores social, economic, and political distinctions. While early proponents of natural human rights, such as philosopher John Locke, used them primarily to advance a bourgeois political agenda, once the genie was out of the bottle it was not long before marginalized people— slaves, women, laborers—used human rights to challenge the dominant classes.

The idea of natural human rights enjoyed considerable support among Enlightenment philosophers, although this support was often tempered by the thinkers' various and extensive prejudices. It gained global political prominence during the Age of Revolution: the American Declaration of Independence invoked certain "self-evident" truths, including the equality of all men and the "inalienable" and God-given rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen similarly extolled the "natural, unalienable, and sacred rights of man" and cited "the ignorance, neglect, or contempt of the rights of man [as] the sole cause of public calamities and of the corruption of governments." These ideas quickly won wide currency, sparking upheavals throughout Europe and America. It also resonated globally within various religious and cultural communities whose indigenous conceptions of human dignity were founded in the same idea of human moral equality. That the specific terminology and mechanism of human rights emerged in the West is an artifact of history; human rights capture an idea whose origins and appeal are truly global and find expression in many forms.

The excesses of the French Revolution (which were often distorted or exaggerated by its opponents for political advantage) (1789–1799) helped to discredit the idea of natural human rights among elites in the nineteenth century. The idea generated considerable skepticism among conservatives interested in preserving monarchical regimes, socialists troubled

by the "bourgeois" character of human rights, social Darwinists propagating a bastardized theory of social selection, and utilitarians dubious of the very idea that rights could mean anything other than guarantees enshrined in positive law. Still, social activists invoked natural human rights in the key struggles of the day (the term human rights did not enter common parlance until the twentieth century).

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The League of Nations, established at the conclusion of World War I (1914–1918), established numerous protections for rights. While the League did not survive, international protection for rights—especially worker's rights and the rights of minorities—endured. At the outset of World War II (1939–1945), British and American officials declared in the Atlantic Charter that a key war aim for the Allied Powers was the creation of an international system that would protect and promote respect for human rights. At the war's end, widespread horror and outrage at wartime atrocities helped to spur the newly formed United Nations (UN) to affirm, both in its Charter and in its 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the dignity of the human person and the recognition of equal rights and freedoms for everyone. Subsequent treaties, including the two covenants and treaties on racial discrimination, discrimination against women, children's rights, and torture, form the nucleus of a growing body of international human rights law.

Human rights played a significant role in the two most significant political developments of the postwar era: decolonization and the "third wave" of democratization. Human rights were implicated in the ongoing system of European colonialism and imperialism, often providing a pretext or rhetorical cover for naked political and economic ambition. At the same time, human rights provided a significant theoretical and political resource for colonized peoples seeking to throw off the yoke of foreign rule. Out of this experience emerged calls for new rights, such as the rights to development and self-determination.

Antiauthoritarian movements, especially in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s and in Eastern Europe in the later 1980s, relied heavily on human rights to generate domestic and international support for their struggles for democracy. Activists utilizing the power of prominent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the international media waged successful campaigns for democratization by highlighting the hypocrisy of their governments' commitments to human rights. Such commitments, whether undertaken by governments in the form of concessions or as part of broader treaty obligations, proved an Achilles heel of regimes that flagrantly violated citizens' rights. The normative (rather than legal) force of human rights was decisive in these struggles; neither the lack of global enforcement nor the absence of a genuine commitment to human rights on the part of the regimes prevented the idea from taking hold in the popular political imagination and stimulating demands for reform. Human rights are still invoked today wherever people seek to defend themselves against brutal governments.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

In international law, human rights are established by treaty or by custom. Treaty obligations are binding on all signatory states. Some international lawyers argue that human rights have now achieved the status of customary law as well, making them binding even upon governments that have not ratified the relevant instruments. Traditionally human rights have been conceived as rights that individual citizens hold against (their) governments. Increasingly, however, human rights are invoked against governments of foreign states as well as against multinational corporations, international financial institutions, ethnic or religious groups, and a range of other nonstate actors.

Human rights law plays a major part in regulating international relations. A variety of institutions, including the UN's Human Rights and Security Councils and its Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and regional arrangements like the European Court of Human Rights, the Council of Europe, and the Inter-American Court and Commission of Human Rights, help to monitor and protect human rights around the world. Critics deride the lack of enforcement capacity in the international human rights regime as evidence that it is ineffective or inconsequential. Such criticisms highlight an important problem, but tend to ignore the more diffuse, indirect effects of the regime. These include the status of human rights as the de facto standard of legitimacy for governmental conduct; violators often suffer economically, politically, and diplomatically for their poor performance.

In addition, NGOs, ranging from well-known organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to myriad local, national, and international groups, play a prominent role in monitoring human rights. Often using a "name and shame" strategy, these groups call attention to violations of human rights committed by governments and corporations and use the media to publicize these wrongs and assert pressure for change. They also lobby governments and increasingly take part in various international negotiations and deliberations. In the early twenty-first century, almost all debates in international politics take place at least in part within the human rights framework, including issues such as terrorism, development, the environment, human trafficking, and many others.

KEY CONTROVERSIES

Although human rights have become the predominant normative discourse in global politics, there is little agreement on their philosophical foundation or justification. Numerous justifications for human rights have been advanced over the years, from the natural rights arguments of the seventeenth century to more contemporary arguments based in autonomy, human capabilities, and human interests, among others. Some critics cite the uncertainty reflected in this plurality of justifications as a problem for their legitimacy, arguing that without a single, clear, and uncontroversial justification, human rights lose credibility. Yet it is not obvious why everyone has to agree on what reasons justify human rights in order to find

the idea of human rights itself appealing. Human rights are better understood philosophically as considered judgments about what human moral equality requires, given the collective knowledge about, and experience of, the world.

One persistent challenge to human rights concerns their universality. This term misleadingly collapses several important dimensions of human rights into one concept. As Jack Donnelly has argued in his 2007 article "The Relative Universality of Human Rights," what critics usually mean by universality is ontological universality or anthropological universality. The former refers to the philosophical foundations of human rights; the latter refers to the ubiquity of human rights in the cultural practices of societies around the world. Ontological universality would mean that there exists some single, transhistorical, and transcultural justification or moral foundation for human rights. No such foundation has been or is likely to be found. This fact has not prevented the emergence of human rights as the most important normative discourse of politics in the twenty-first century.

Anthropologically, human rights are not universal; they are not an inherent part of every society's cultural practice. Cultural relativists sometimes seize on this fact in arguing that human rights are alien to many cultures and illegitimate for them. The thrust of this critique is that human rights reflect individualistic values and priorities and a particular conception of human dignity that are distinctly Western and therefore inappropriate for "non-Western" cultures or societies. In its most extreme form, this critique endorses a relativism in which the only standards appropriate for a society are those that reflect its existing values and beliefs. In milder forms, this critique is used to reject certain rights or understandings of rights that conflict with traditional cultural norms. The Asian values debate of the early 1990s exemplified this tension: many Asian elites claimed that Western notions of human rights were not appropriate for their more communally oriented societies. Opponents noted the self-serving nature of these arguments and pointed out that many of the societies in question lacked institutions that would allow people to choose for themselves what rights were or were not desirable. They also argued that the elites improperly treated culture as a static and homogenous entity.

There is room for advocates of human rights to argue for general or global standards while also allowing for and encouraging some variation at the levels of interpretation and implementation. Moreover, it should be emphasized that human rights are not an *inherent* part of *any* society's cultural practice. They represent, in the West as well as elsewhere, a set of prescriptions for the equal treatment of human beings in modern social, political, and economic conditions. That these prescriptions often clash with deeply embedded cultural norms and practices is hardly surprising; it is this clash that ignites the revolutionary spark of human rights when proponents challenge the status quo. Thus, human rights might not be universal in the ontological or anthropological senses, but they are increasingly global, in that they are valued and invoked around the world.

Another long-running controversy regarding human rights concerns their so-called interdependence and indivisibility. Human rights are often divided into two categories: civil and political rights (i.e., the right to vote, the right to a free press) and economic, social, and cultural rights (i.e., the right to subsistence, the right to an education). Civil and political rights are sometimes characterized as "negative" rights, supposedly indicating that governments and individuals need only refrain from violating these rights. Economic, social, and cultural rights are often described as "positive" rights, suggesting that the state must fulfill these rights through positive action. Negative rights are sometimes described as first-generation rights, since they were supposedly conceived before and enshrined in law earlier than positive or second-generation rights and the even newer third-generation rights (such as development and self-determination).

These distinctions are conceptually dubious; many civil and political rights—the right to vote, the right to property, the right to security—require extensive governmental activity for their protection and fulfillment. The distinctions are also historically flawed: social and economic rights emerged alongside civil and political rights in the seventeenth century. That the latter were secured first in law says something about the sources of power in many Western societies but little about human rights. The distinction gained false credence because it was enlisted in the cold war rivalry between capitalism and communism, in which each side portrayed civil and political rights as incompatible with social and economic rights. The distinction was also employed in some developing countries to suggest that progress on second- and third-generation rights might justify (supposedly temporary) abridgements of first-generation rights. This "full belly thesis," that people cared more about having food to eat than about abstract ideals like press freedom or democratic elections, was often used to justify authoritarian political practices.

Most scholars and activists in the early twenty-first century recognize that human rights are global in appeal and interdependent and indivisible in practice. Article 5 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, affirms that "all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms." Interdependence and indivisibility mean that rights cannot be subdivided into classes, categories, or generations; rights cannot be secure unless other rights are secure as well. The right to vote, for instance, is not secure if one lacks the right to security from physical violence and intimidation. The right to an education is meaningless without a right to adequate nutrition that makes learning possible.

A common criticism of human rights has been that they exclude or ignore women and people of color. This criticism

is correct in two important respects. First, many rights have been defined quite narrowly and from a masculine perspective, making the idea of "women's human rights" a necessary corrective to notions like liberty and security as they had traditionally been defined and understood by men. For example, what men typically mean by security—protection from the state and its agents and officers—does not address the primary security needs of women—protection from the violence that occurs in the domestic sphere. Second, it is also unfortunately true that human rights rhetoric has been invoked in rationalizing imperialistic behavior, often in the guise of the white man's burden and *mission civilisatrice* or their contemporary analogs. These criticisms are thus very important parts of the ongoing development of human rights theory and practice. Yet they do not, as critics have sometimes claimed, demonstrate that human rights are inherently sexist or racist. Rather, they show the need to constantly subject human rights standards to internal and external critique as a way of developing and strengthening the commitment to human moral equality that animates them.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

Within the discipline of political science, human rights have—at least until quite recently—met with deep skepticism: scholars of international relations in the realist tradition regarded them as cheap talk that disguised states' true interests in power; comparativists worried about their relevance in non-Western settings; and normative theorists questioned their universality and their philosophical foundations. Since the 1990s, this skepticism has been giving way to growing interest in human rights both as a dependent and an independent variable in social scientific analyses and as a central normative concept in political life.

In international relations, constructivists and those influenced by constructivism have shown how international norms influence domestic politics (such as through democratization). In transnational politics, human rights play a huge role, providing a common vocabulary and a nexus for networks of activists in a variety of issue areas. Even traditional scholars of international relations are beginning to take seriously the effects of human rights in trade relationships, in humanitarian intervention, and in the politics of international organizations. Scholars in the field of international political economy are, with colleagues in comparative politics, asking questions about how globalization affects human rights in a variety of contexts.

Comparativists have also been developing greater sophistication in their understanding of human rights, showing the (positive) effects of (greater) wealth and (democratic) regime type on respect for human rights. They seek explanations for puzzles regarding the increased violence associated with democratic transitions, the effects of trade and foreign direct investment, and the roles of courts, amnesties, and truth commissions in achieving transitional justice in conflicted societies. Scholars are also paying more attention to social activism and networking around human rights issues.

Among normative theorists, the study of human rights has been given new impetus by concerns about global justice and global democracy. Human rights are increasingly seen both as preconditions and products of deliberative or discursive politics. While the old philosophical debates persist, there is renewed attention to how human rights are used by people experiencing oppression and domination and how human rights articulate with concerns about human welfare and autonomy.

See also *Bill of Rights; Children's Rights; Civil and Political Rights; Civil Rights Movement; Humanitarian Intervention; Human Security; International Bill of Rights; International Human Rights; International Law and Compliance; International Relations; Sex Workers and Trafficking; United Nations (UN); Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Universalism.*

. . . .   MICHAEL GOODHART

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Human Security

The human security discourse dates back to the *Human Development Report 1994*, published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), subtitled *New Dimensions of Human Security.* The catchphrase definition has become "freedom from fear and freedom from want." In 2003, the Commission on Human Security (initiated by the Japanese government, and working closely with the UN) formulated the following main characteristics, published in 2003 by

Sadako Ogata, Amartya Sen, and others as *Human Security Now:*

> Human security complements state security, enhances human rights and strengthens human development. It seeks to protect people against a broad range of threats to individuals and communities and, further, to empower them to act on their own behalf. And it seeks to forge a global alliance to strengthen the institutional policies that link individuals and the state—and the state within a global world. . . . The Commission on Human Security's definition of human security: to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment. (2–4)

Conceptually, human security breaks with the dominant referent objects of security—the territorial state and the national state. It instead puts the individual and nonstate communities in the spotlight. The main concern is no longer the state (national or state security), nor traditional warfare (military security). Security must be about humanity at every level, on every scale: individuals, (small) groups, and humanity.

Advocates of the concept argue that state-centric analyses of "international" security fall short of understanding contemporary dynamics of existential threats to people. This implies a world-society perspective that entails an analysis of how 6.6 billion individuals organize (or disorganize) their lives. Critics emphasize that even from such a perspective, the distinction between external and internal dimensions of social life resurfaces: as soon as social organization occurs, borders are formed, which imply an inside-outside logic. Hence, the referent object of human security moves back from the individual and humanity to social institutions: How do groups relate to each other and how do individuals relate to groups? Economic globalization and political integration have changed the meaning of sovereignty, but sovereign states continue to play a dominant role among these groups. In practice, the human security literature focuses mainly on (correcting) state behavior and fits in the wider discourse on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

In some countries, human security has led to reforms in military training and strategy, particularly in Canada and Norway, and in 2003 the European Union (EU) Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities presented a report titled *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe,* pleading a similar course for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In 1999, the Human Security Network was established as "a group of like-minded countries from all regions of the world that, at the level of Foreign Ministers, maintains dialogue on questions pertaining to human security." In June 2008, thirteen states participated in this network.

In the early years of the twenty-first century, the literature on human security mainly focuses on interventions in the developing world. It expresses concerns well-known from the fields of development studies and conflict management, and adds a proactive attitude. Human security is typically applied as a Northern or Western concept highlighting the urge to improve the human rights situation in many developing countries; there is a striking neglect of human security issues within Western states.

Advocates of the concept argue that peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace building cannot be successful without a human security perspective. Skeptics argue that contemporary politics overestimate the margins for change, and this brings human security policies into the sphere of either utopianism or disguised traditional power politics.

Human security policies can come top-down, initiated by governments or international organizations, and bottom-up, as local self-help initiatives. In cases of a failing or repressive government, the public sector has lost its protective functions. A retracting government runs the same risk. In the absence of a well-functioning public sector, people have no choice but to create self-help structures to provide a minimum of protection. Bottom-up policies—or human security from below—in these circumstances is about resistance and liberation or about making day-to-day life more bearable. The interaction between top-down and bottom-up human security policies is important because a successful human security policy needs roots in society as well as third-party support. Regardless of how local a conflict or lack of basic needs may be, these issues are always embedded in regional and often global contexts. Outside actors within these structures have a choice to determine their level of direct involvement, but cannot escape their responsibility to at least make up their minds. The human security discourse addresses this responsibility.

Human security is also put forth as a concept to change traditional operational military practices. Combining the traditional military spirit with the mindset of police officers and development workers creates a strong incentive to talk about human security because it highlights the changing nature of coercive power in world politics. The traditional division of labor between military, police, and intelligence is in jeopardy. UN peacekeeping has become police work with military means; globalization has increased perceptions of substate violence; network terrorism works along similar lines as transnational organized crime; with more than 50 percent of the world population living in urbanized areas, many security and development issues are about governing and managing densely populated areas. The shift from state security to human security captures many of the dilemmas involved in the contemporary use of violence. Critics, however, point at the risk of widening the concept of security too much and perhaps encompassing every threat to ordinary life.

See also *Collapsed and Failed States; Globalization and Development; Human Development Index; International Relations; North-South Relations.*

. . . .   JAAP H. DE WILDE

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Hume, David

David Hume (1711–1776) was born on April 26, 1711, in Edinburgh, Scotland. After studying at the University of Edinburgh and briefly considering a career in law, he embarked on a lifelong career as a moral philosopher, historian, and essayist. He is widely considered the leading intellectual figure in the Scottish Enlightenment, and his writings had a profound influence on moral philosophy and the social sciences.

Hume is usually associated with the philosophical doctrine of empiricism, or the idea that all moral ideas can be traced back to sense impressions. This idea influenced Hume's account of the origins of morality and justice. He is often described as a "common sense" philosopher because he believed that moral principles were best sought in everyday moral and political practices that had evolved over time—rather than in appeals to abstract principles, natural laws, or transcendent reason. Another of Hume's most enduring philosophical claims is his criticism of the *naturalistic fallacy*, or the idea that evaluative claims about what "ought" to be can be deduced from purely factual observations of what "is."

In addition to his major philosophical writings, which include *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739–1740), *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748), and *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751), Hume is renowned for his *Essays: Moral, Political and Literary* (1741–1742). Preferring the affluence and stability of modern commercial societies over the ignorance, poverty, and discord of the classical republics of antiquity, Hume argued for the civilizing role of commerce and criticized mercantilist prejudices holding that the wealth of some nations must come at the expense of others. Hume's economic writings influenced his colleague Adam Smith and are widely credited for contributing to the development of the modern science of economics. Additionally, Hume's essays included classic contributions like "Of Superstition and Enthusiasm," in which he condemned Christianity's sectarian tendency to mix into political affairs. His essays on political parties are credited with influencing the thought of James Madison, particularly *Federalist* No. 10 detailing the problems of factions. More generally, Hume's essays idealized a commercial society and the progress in arts, sciences, manners, sociability, and conversation which he believed accompanied economic prosperity.

Hume was also renowned as the author of the magisterial *History of England* (1745–1762), published in six volumes and widely considered the definitive history of England from the time of Julius Caesar to the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

Hume is often characterized as a political conservative, but he resists this kind of easy categorization. He was a moderate who refused to side with either Whigs or Tories, maintaining there was something partially true about each of their claims. Hume was, however, deeply critical of wholesale attempts to reform long-standing customs in light of reason or ideal blueprints of society, and he counseled people to obey existing governments except in cases of extreme tyranny. Neither liberty nor authority is an absolute good in and of itself, Hume maintained, but the possibility of free government hinges on achieving a proper balance between these two principles.

See also *British Political Thought; Economic Systems, Comparative; Empiricism; Smith, Adam.*

. . . .   RICHARD BOYD

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Humor, Political

Political humor is the term used to describe the use of humor in the domain of politics. Though occasionally used to describe the use of humor by political figures themselves, the term is most often reserved for humorous images, texts, and expressions that mock public officials, people in positions of authority, as well as government, institutions, policies, or practices. According to the taxonomy introduced by David L. Paletz in his 1990 article "Political Humor and Authority: From Support to Subversion," political humor can vary in terms of target (at whom or what is the humor aimed?), focus (what element or characteristic of the target is under scrutiny?), acceptability (how socially or culturally accepted is the joke in question?), and presentation (how, with what style or medium, is the humor communicated to the receiver?). These four criteria then determine where a given piece of political humor falls on a spectrum ranging from *supportive* to *subversive*. Paletz defines supportive political humor as political humor that is loyal to the dominant political order, and supportive of the individuals and institutions in power, such as the innocuous and friendly barbs in the jokes of Bob Hope. At the other end of the spectrum is subversive political humor, which seeks to aggressively—and perhaps unacceptably—criticize not just public officials, but the norms and practices of those highest in authority as well as the very institutions that hold power.

SATIRE, NONSATIRE, PARODY, AND CARTOONS

Another method to categorize political humor involves separating it in terms of satirical and nonsatirical political

humor. According to George Test, author of *Satire, Spirit and Art* (1991), political satire is political humor that is simultaneously aggressive, playful, seeks to induce laughter, and casts judgment. Rachel Paine Caufield suggests in her 2007 article, "The Influence of 'Infoenterpropagainment,'" that these four necessary elements separate political satire as a distinct subcategory of political humor, as satire "is specifically created as a means to attack perceived wrongs or ills within society" (7) and "must judge some aspect of society in a way that lends itself to correction" (8). Herein lies the essence of satirical political humor: the use of humor to ridicule institutions, practices, authorities, or citizens in an attempt to remind the audience that a better alternative is both desirable and achievable. As literary scholar Dustin Griffin argues in his 1994 book *Satire: A Critical Reintroduction,* "The business of the satirist is to insist on the sharp differences between vice and virtue, between good and bad, between what man is, and what he *ought to be."* (36). Hence, returning to Paletz's typology, the distinction between political humor and true political satire stems from the focus of the humor—the element of the target that is under scrutiny. While a nonsatirical political joke might poke fun at a political candidate's physicality or style of speech, political satire would go deeper, mocking that candidate's integrity, competence, or the very political platform that they represent.

A common form of political humor is the subcategory of political parody. Parodies are exaggerated or altered depictions of some original political practice, event, or person. Parodies include impersonations of political leaders, in which the impersonator chooses known elements, traits, or characteristics of the original political figure to exaggerate or distort. Editorial cartoons employ the art of parody to generate recognizable cartoonish versions of public officials. Parodies also include exaggerated or altered reenactments of common political events such as speeches, political advertisements, interviews, debates, or news programs. Whether or not these parodic texts constitute political satire depends again on the focus of the depiction.

One form of parody, the political cartoon, has a long and varied history as a form of political rhetoric. As explained by Stephen Hess and Milton Kaplan in their 1968 book *The Ungentlemanly Art: A History of American Political Cartoons,* American political cartoons date back to Benjamin Franklin's 1747 cartoon, "The Waggoner and Hercules," depicting a farmer stuck in mud praying to Hercules in the sky, with the caption, "God helps those who help themselves." The cartoon, aimed at generating support for the revolution, is credited with mobilizing thousands of troops. With the ability to communicate efficiently through metaphor and symbolism, political cartoons present emotionally charged arguments without saying a word. The potential influence of this form of humor is illustrated by cartoonist Thomas Nast's 1870s caricatures of an obese and aggressive William Tweed, the "boss" of the New York Democratic Party's corrupt Tammany Hall. Nast's cartoons, published in *Harper's Weekly,* have been credited with precipitating Tweed's arrest and subsequent imprisonment.

While satirical cartoons critical of the governing regime or existing power structure are common, political leaders also use cartoons as a form of propaganda, and other groups may use cartoons as a means to criticize other cultural, religious, or ethnic minorities. In the German Weimar Republic (1919–1933), following World War I (1914–1918), for example, various magazines and newspapers used political cartoons and satire to criticize the government, cultural trends, or public policies. As the National Socialist Workers Party (the Nazi Party) rose to power in the early 1930s, political cartoons transformed into a central method of propaganda, caricaturing Germany's foreign enemies and Jewish citizens, and later mobilizing German citizens for war. Satirical cartoons targeting Hitler or political elites did not appear in the government-controlled papers of the Third Reich, however—an unsurprising phenomenon under a totalitarian regime.

POLITICAL HUMOR'S ROLE IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES AND PERSUASION CONTEXTS

Scholars have long observed that the pairing of political humor and democratic governments is both logical and functional. In societies where citizens have a say in choosing their leaders and shaping the direction of legislation, political humor provides a cathartic form of criticism aimed at those in positions of authority. The fact that the right to free speech explicitly protects political humor suggests that democratic founders recognize these Freudian roots of humor as a safe form of authority-challenging expression.

Political humorists—and satirists in particular, from Aristophanes to *The Daily Show*'s Jon Stewart—all capitalize on the privileged role that humor plays as a form of communication. The political humorist knows that criticisms of institutions, leaders, and policies will be less offensive if delivered through humor rather than serious discourse. The most contemporary scholarly examinations of political humor in political science, cognitive psychology, and communication have sought to understand how and why political humor seems to suspend the audience's resistance in this way. It seems that humor's ability to suspend the audience's resistance results from the mode in which the listener processes humor. While the audience actively processes the political humor in the hopes of understanding and appreciating the joke, that same audience generally does not process with the goal of judging the humor's merit, truth value, or fairness. This discounting cue that is activated in the brain when encountering political humor signifies that it is inappropriate and unnecessary to critique the message in a serious way, because after all, it's "just a joke."

Obviously, an audience's willingness to activate a discounting cue in the face of political humor is not guaranteed; political humor can certainly offend. In September 2005, the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* sparked fury among Muslims around the globe because of its publication of political cartoons that depicted various exaggerated versions of the prophet Muhammad. Muslims objected both to the depictions of the prophet Muhammad, which are prohibited by Islam, as well as to the nature of the portrayals.

If an audience does agree to "play along" in keeping with the humorous mode, then ideas that otherwise might be dismissed out-of-hand are given attention, laughed at, and maybe even contemplated in other contexts. Indeed, research in the mid-2000s suggests that political jokes can bring issues and ideas to the top of audiences' minds, influence audiences' perceptions of political figures and institutions, and foster attention to political news and other traditional political information.

See also *Novel, Political; Poetry and Politics; Politics, Literature, and Film; Rhetoric; Satire, Political; Television and Politics.*

. . . . DANNAGAL GOLDTHWAITE YOUNG

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Huntington, Samuel P.

Samuel P. Huntington (1927–2008) was an American political scientist best known for his thesis that, in the post–cold war world, conflicts would stem from the competing cultural identities of "civilizations" rather than the ideological (and state-based) conflicts of the cold war period.

Huntington earned a bachelor's degree from Yale University before serving in the U.S. Army at the end of World War II (1939–1945). He went on to obtain his master's degree from the University of Chicago in 1948 and then completed his doctorate at Harvard University in 1951. Huntington joined

Harvard's faculty in 1950 and remained with the university for most of his career. For three years (1959–1962) he worked at Columbia University as an associate professor in the Department of Government and the deputy director of the Institute for War and Peace Studies.

Huntington advised Hubert Humphrey during Humphrey's 1968 campaign for president and served in the Jimmy Carter administration as the coordinator of security planning for the National Security Council from 1977 to 1978. He served as a member of the National Security Council/Defense Department Commission on Long-Term Integrated Strategy from 1987 to 1988. At Harvard, Huntington chaired the Department of Government (1967–1969 and 1970–1971), was director of the Harvard Center for International Affairs (1978–1989), and chaired the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies (1996–2004). He founded the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard in 1989 and sat as its director until 2000. He also cofounded and was editor of the magazine *Foreign Policy* from 1970 to 1977. From 1986 to 1987, Huntington served as president of the American Political Science Association.

Huntington's often controversial scholarship covered a number of different areas, including civil-military relations, military strategy, political philosophy, American politics, and international development and conflict. In his first significant book, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (1957), Huntington endorsed civilian control of the military and supports President Harry Truman's dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War (1950–1953).

In 1968 Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* spawned debate because it challenged the "modernization theory" that economic and social progress produces stable democratic regimes in developing nation-states. Huntington argued that economic and social growth produced more complex societies, which required states to develop political institutions capable of managing the stress produced by this modernization. Failure to do so, Huntington warned, could lead to political instability, chaos, and violence. The book also attracted criticism because Huntington labeled the apartheid regime of South Africa as a "satisfied state."

In 1993 Huntington published an article in *Foreign Affairs* entitled "The Clash of Civilizations," which was subsequently expanded into a book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996). Huntington theorized that the end of the cold war meant that future conflicts would be cultural rather than ideological in nature. This view contrasted with "the end of history" thesis presented by American political economist Francis Fukuyama, who had argued that the collapse of communism was a victory of Western ideas and the end to conflict.

Huntington asserted that cultural and religious tensions between the West and other cultures would lead to dangerous instability and future wars. He also predicted that the most likely conflicts would involve the West versus either Islamic or the Sinic (Chinese) cultures. While criticized by many scholars, Huntington's view attracted additional attention following the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States.

In *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (2004), Huntington warned that America's national identity had been threatened by large-scale Latino immigration, which he wrote could "divide the United States into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages."

See also *Clash of Civilizations; Political Culture; Political Theory; Strategic Interest.*

. . . .   JEFFREY KRAUS

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Hyneman, Charles S.

American political theorist Charles S. Hyneman (1900–1985) was born on a farm in Gibson County, Indiana, in 1900. He received his undergraduate degree from Indiana University in 1923 and his master's degree in 1925. After spending a short time doing graduate work at the University of Pennsylvania, he transferred to the University of Illinois where he received his PhD in 1929. Hyneman held appointments early in his career at Syracuse University and at the University of Illinois before he became the chair of the Department of Government at Louisiana State University in 1937. While at LSU he was instrumental in organizing the Louisiana Municipal Association and initiating a merit system for the state civil service. While Hyneman was a student of pragmatic politics, this in no way limited his accomplishments as a theorist. Much of his later work focused on the philosophical underpinnings of the American founding and the struggle inherent in developing representative government.

During World War II (1939–1945), Hyneman held three separate government posts. He worked first in the Bureau of the Budget, then in the Office of the Provost Marshal General in the War Department as chief of the training branch. Finally, he worked in the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), first as the director of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service and later as assistant to the chairman and then executive officer of the FCC.

After leaving government service, Hyneman returned to teaching, first at Northwestern University in 1947 and then at Indiana University. While he would have many visiting appointments over the next few decades, he stayed at Indiana University until his death in 1985. While at Indiana he was named as a Distinguished Professor in 1961 and from 1960 to 1961, he was the president of the American Political Science Association. Some of Hyneman's most famous books are *Bureaucracy in a Democracy* (1950), *The Supreme Court on Trial* (1963), *Popular Government in America* (1968), and *American Political Writing During the Founding Era: 1760–1805* (1984), which was coedited with one of his former students, Dr. Donald S. Lutz.

Hyneman was an outstanding scholar and practitioner, but he was equally successful as a teacher, inspiring hundreds of students to partake in their own study of the American regime. His legacy was passed on by his students, including Donald Lutz and Ross Lence, and to those who were fortunate to study under them in turn. Throughout his career, Hyneman was concerned with popular control of government. He sought to understand the American founding experience in order to illuminate how those conditions relate to contemporary political life. His understanding of politics and manner of study was pragmatic and theoretical, principles displayed in his work and his life.

See also *Political Theory; Pragmatism.*

. . . .   KYLE SCOTT

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Ibn Taymiyya

Taqi al-Din Ahmed Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) was a prominent Muslim scholar and jurist of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. He is noted for his contribution to debates about the combination of secular logic and Islamic faith, his attachment to a conservative and totalizing notion of Islam, and his defense of jihad as a primary responsibility of Muslims. Ibn Taymiyya resisted contemporary forms of innovation in religion and castigated Muslim rulers such as the Mongols who did not abide by the customs of Islamic unity, all the while defending Islamic practice as a pillar of state policy. He is therefore often credited as a forerunner of modern Salafist or Islamist movements that condemn both non-Muslim governments and their secular Muslim counterparts. His approach to jihad is widely viewed as a significant development in the tradition of Islamic militancy.

Ibn Taymiyya was born in 1263 in Harran, now located in southeastern Turkey. His birth came at a time of widespread political instability and ferment. The invasion and sack of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258 brought an end to the Ayyubid Empire and left all of Southwest Asia in danger of raids and violence. When he was about seven years old, Ibn Taymiyya's family left Harran for the more stable confines of Damascus, at that time ruled by the Egyptian Mamluks. Both his father and grandfather were noted Sunni scholars of the Hanbali tradition. His father became a teacher in Damascus, and upon his death in 1284, Ibn Taymiyya took his place.

Ibn Taymiyya taught at a time when Arab Muslim societies were being forced to respond to the political challenges of the Mongols and the Crusaders. In 1291 the last Crusader kingdom of Acre was defeated by the Mamluks, and Ibn Taymiyya joined in the defense of Damascus against invading Mongol armies in 1300. The need to maintain a unified defense against external opponents shaped his attitude to politics and to jihad.

An extensive collection of Ibn Taymiyya's teaching has come down in the form of religious rulings (*fatawa*) and monographs. He worked to renew and reinvigorate traditional scholarship, particularly in opposition to the Ash'ari school, which was premised on the unity of creation that fused Greek philosophic thought with the Islamic tradition. His opposition to the Sufi theologies of *hulul* (God's indwelling of man) and *wahdat al wujud* (unity of creation) set him against standard Sufi practices of seclusion and mantric repetition. On the other hand, he counseled Muslims to support the political mobilization of the citizenry of the Islamic state in jihad from the example of the prophet Muhammad, affirming the offensive jihad as a "collective obligation" (*fard kifaya*) and the defensive jihad as an "individual obligation" (*fard ayn*).

Ibn Taymiyya's strong denunciation of popular religion put him in conflict with the Mamluk authorities, and he was imprisoned in Cairo from 1305 to 1306 on charges of heresy. He was also imprisoned in Damascus for his outspoken conservative views from 1320 to 1321 and in 1328. He died in prison in 1328.

See also *Islamic Political Thought; Jihad; Middle Eastern Politics and Society.*

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Idealism

Idealism usually refers to views holding that reality is constituted by mind, spirit, or some other nonmaterial entities. It is opposed to materialism, holding that reality, including consciousness, is reducible to matter. Political idealism covers political views based on a nonmaterialist ontology, but the term is also used more loosely to describe any conception committed to shape the world through demanding moral ideals and a strict sense of duty. When used in the latter sense it is contrasted with realism, or Realpolitik.

Plato's political theory is idealist in both senses. It holds that moral guidance for political organization and decision making must be sought at a distance from the imperfect world of appearances known to our senses. For Plato, the visible world, with its finite, constantly changing, and imperfect objects, is like shadows of the true, higher, and eternal nature of things.

Philosophy can help us to gain precision about the ideal, objective nature of justice and thus to identify a universal standard against which political units could be assessed. One of the central features of Plato's elitist ideal was that there is a natural, hierarchical division of labor. Justice is realized when each class sticks to the tasks and virtues for which its members are naturally fitted. In Plato's *The Republic,* the ideal city is ruled by philosopher-kings, motivated by love of truth and the good of the ruled. An important implication of the philosopher's privileged position in relation to knowledge was that democracy, which Plato associated with rhetoric and ignorance rather than reason and truth, had to be rejected.

St. Augustine's political and idealist views renewed many Platonic themes in Christian form. However, in the political theology of Augustine it was clear that the ideal, eternal realm of beauty and perfection belonged to heaven and could not be approximated in our worldly political arrangements. Augustine's political theory is based on the distinction between the earthly city and the city of God. In our worldly existence, the members of both cities live together, but only members of the latter are predestined for salvation and will enjoy eternal happiness in heaven. But the fact that perfection is not to be found in this world, with its inescapable evils, does not mean that we should be indifferent about competing political arrangements. Members of the city of God should cooperate with others to support political authority and tame earthly desires for power and glory to secure people's common interest.

Another idealist tradition that builds on Plato's connection between justice and perfection is utopianism. Named after Thomas More's fictional island Utopia, utopian renaissance authors such as More, and followers such as Campanella, imagined perfect, rationally planned societies in the spirit of Plato's republic in a concrete way. More's Utopia is an egalitarian society without poverty, where property is owned in common and inhabitants share a strong sense of duty. Inspired by journeys to civilizations previously unknown to Europeans, More's work gave birth to a new genre of social criticism, often taking the form of interviews with travelers to or inhabitants of distant societies different from our own. Idealism in this utopian sense is often used negatively to describe naïve worldviews with overly optimistic assumptions about the possibility to improve the world through moral ideals alone.

The later British and German idealist traditions in political theory, particularly strong in the nineteenth century, were idealist in a very different sense and more open to conservative conclusions. G. W. F. Hegel in Germany, and the branch of British idealism he inspired with thinkers such as Bosanquet, Bradley, and Green, shared a belief in the spiritual unity of our existence. The idea that there is one single, all-encompassing, and coherent world often led to the conclusion that seemingly inconsistent or pointless events may reflect a deeper form of rationality and purpose. Defending the interconnectedness of everything and the fundamentally social nature of humans, idealists in this context attacked the atomism of liberal contemporaries and placed the role of the state, community, and spirituality at the center of political thought.

See also *Hegel, Georg W. F.; More, Sir Thomas; Plato; Utopias and Politics.*

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Identity, Politics of

Identity for most people derives from personal history, family relationships and friendships, neighborhood, region, and country. Generally, the sense of self is validated by membership in a group or affiliation with something intangible such as a culture or religion. In this sense, *politics of identity* refers to political attitudes or positions that focus on the concerns of social groups identified mainly on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation.

The scope of political movements that may be described as politics of identity ranges from the struggles within Western capitalist democracies to indigenous rights movements worldwide to nationalist projects and demands for self-determination. In general, the politics of identity has developed around the idea of empowering the oppressed to articulate their oppression in terms of their own experience.

In the twentieth century, organizing around a shared identity challenged the conventional organization of politics around beliefs or programs. Politics since then has become as much about identity as about self-interest or policy. Particularly during the second half of the twentieth century, large-scale political movements based on claims about the injustices done to particular social groups, such as feminism, minority civil rights, and gay and lesbian liberation, emerged. In this sense, identity has driven politics, if not always explicitly.

In a 2007 publication C. Heyes contends that feminist identity politics has underlined the task of articulating women's understanding of themselves and of men without reducing femininity to biology. According to feminists the experiences women share do not necessarily result from sexual differences but rather from social injustice. In this sense feminist politics of identity as a social and political movement has been based on the argument that although sex may be biological, gender is socially constructed. On the other hand, liberal–reformist gay and lesbian activists have struggled for the full acceptance of gays and lesbians in the institutions and culture of mainstream society.

S. Aronowitz notes that the politics of identity has been criticized by orthodox and revisionist Marxists and socialists. They have argued that groups based on shared identity, other than class, have diverted attention from more fundamental issues, such as class conflict in capitalist societies. However,

other scholars, including Wallace and MacClancy, have contended that—irrespective of the ideational debates and criticisms—in reality the politics of identity has become part of daily life and politics and become influential in many areas of people's political behavior from shopping to art and voting. Politics of identity is proved to be an important factor in voting behavior as experienced in 2008 presidential elections in the United States.

POLITICS OF IDENTITY AND THE NATION-STATE

National identity is privileged within the context of the so-called Westphalian state system. Therefore, national identity, as a mode of identification with a unique and distinct community, is given institutional recognition and sustained by nation-states as well as by the internationally established legal code that provides the criteria for the formal recognition of states.

In the Westphalian system national identity was structurally privileged. Globalization combined with other factors represents a great challenge to the Westphalian state system. Nationally defined territorial bounds reinforced by the insecurities of states placed obvious constraints on the ability of other modes of identification such as ethnic, religious, cultural, and gender identities to mobilize. Several recent developments have challenged this system. First, as cultures and societies are becoming interconnected, societies have become increasingly multicultural. Minorities who were incorporated into states have become more assertive, demanding compensation or autonomy. This has resulted in tensions within states and in demands for international measures for minority protection, as seen in indigenous peoples' demands for self-government—the way that Quebec ensures self-government for the Québécois—for example, Inuit demands for self-government in the north of Canada and Indian peoples' demands for self-government on reservations in the United States. Furthermore, immigration and asylum have increased the ethnic and cultural diversity of most states. In this context, the politics of identity manifests itself in claims for secession, autonomy, self-government, and federalism by national groups and in claims for ethnic rights for immigrants and refugees.

It is generally assumed that, politically, the nation-state remains the anchor of belonging since a shared language, culture, social and political institutions, and norms are derived from it. For a long time, national identity has appeared as a central issue for politics. Regarding collective identities like national identity, the politics of identity is considered a process of negotiation between interest groups. Being English, Irish, or Danish is a consequence of a political process, and it is that process, not the label, that symbolizes it. Thus, identity is an outcome of a labeling process that reflects a conflict of interests at the political level.

As noted, the politics of identity has resulted in national identities' competing with a wide range of claims for recognition from groups that include women, gays and lesbians, aboriginal peoples, immigrants, and ethnic groups. Contemporary patterns of politics of identity stimulate claims, and claimants pursue gender-based, ethnic, regional, and other modes of identification that compete with national identity.

These developments bring forth a heightened concern with identity and the recognition of uniqueness, equality, and equitable valuation. People from different ethnic and religious backgrounds seek recognition of both their unique and national identities. In the early twenty-first century, many of the concerns that excite public discourse are driven by questions of national identity and politics of identity.

In essence multiculturalism stands in contrast to assimilation, which imposes a single culture on minority groups. Some multicultural states such as Britain and Canada have praised the variety of cultural identities of their residents and wish them to be preserved rather than assimilated, despite the concern that the values of such states may be at odds with the values of those they claim to protect. In these cases, the strong emphasis on national identity has proved difficult to reconcile with the notion of multiculturalism, which claims equality for different cultures and identities.

Conflicts due to different ethnic and cultural identities lead to a sort of politics of identity, in which a marginalized community or its members are involved in the reaffirmation of identity. It is the struggle over definitions of, or claims to, politically and culturally sensitive categories of ethnic and religious identities. In the early twenty-first century, the concept of ethnic minorities is identified exclusively with nonwhite ethnic groups, who are mainly the product of immigration into Western societies during the past half century because of persecution or poverty and poor economic opportunities in their countries of origin. The reason ethnic minorities are significant for the politics of identity is not that they are different but the way they are treated by other ethnic groups, particularly by the white majority. Issues of identity and allegiance can be complicated for ethnic minorities, and many immigrants have continuing positive sentiments toward their countries of origin. The United States, which has had a relatively successful program of education to integrate immigrants into the American way of life, nonetheless contains Irish American, Spanish American, Polish American, and Jewish American communities. Similarly, there exist thriving Polish, Italian, and Ukrainian communities in Britain. Werbner points out that these dual identities show that allegiances are not mutually exclusive and that it is possible to be black or Asian and British or American.

Since the 1990s, religion as a marker of identity has been gaining prominence. Religion has played one of the central roles in the politics of identity. Particularly among Muslims, membership in the *ummah* (Muslim community) brings about the Islamic identity. Recent developments show how Islam or its militant adherents have waged jihad, or holy war, against those seen as enemies. Cases such as the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and suicide attacks elsewhere, including Britain and India, have highlighted the role of religion in instances when believers see the issue of identity as a matter of life and death.

In the case of Muslim identity vis-à-vis the West, religion rather than ethnicity comes to the fore because the Muslim

aspect of the identity is perceived as being under attack. Furthermore, Islam appears as a more useful vehicle for political mobilization. Choudhury points out how this mobilization is also considered a reaction to discrimination and socioeconomic deprivation. The increasing self-identification of second and subsequent generations of immigrants in Western societies as Muslim rather than as certain ethnic labels has developed in reaction to their external rejection by the white majority. The public devaluation and disparagement of Muslims and Islam have led to increased in-group solidarity and identification on the basis of religion.

Diasporic identities have also played a significant role in the politics of identity and the challenge to national identities. A diaspora, a transnational network of dispersed subjects connected by ties of coresponsibilities across the boundaries of empires and political communities, is a deterritorialized, complexly spatialized imagined community. Diaspora communities and identities are viewed with suspicion and are the target of racial and nationalistic imaginings. Generally, they have been identified with ethnic or national identity categories such as Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, and Palestinians. However, the categorization of Muslims as a diaspora is a new phenomenon. For Muslims, instances of transnational mobilization, including the Rushdie Affair (1989), the two Gulf Wars (1991–1991 and 2003–), and the Danish cartoon crisis (2006) have been key moments in the development of a global Muslim consciousness. Such mobilizations have been part of the learning process of becoming a politically effective diaspora.

POLITICS OF IDENTITY AND IDENTITY FORMATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Since the end of the cold war in 1991, the interest in identity has increased considerably in international relations. The rise of constructivism as a challenge to mainstream international relations theories has promoted identity as a factor in shaping international politics. Identity is considered an asset of international actors that generates behavioral dispositions.

The concept of politics of identity in international relations shows differences from the general concept of the politics of identity, which generally refers to the empowering of oppressed identities. The politics of identity in international relations comes to the fore in the formation of collective, postnational identities as opposed to national identities.

Throughout history, nation-building has been marked by struggle, by people's actively seeking recognition for their particular culture, history, language, and identity. Nation-building has always been a struggle for recognition of a particular national identity to ensure that it is recognized by the world around it and by those who see themselves as part of it. Since the end of the cold war, the formation of collective identities at the international level has also become an issue. The question of identity in the European Union, with particular emphasis on the question of the emergence of a European identity, illustrates the issue of the politics of identity at the international level. In the European identity formation case,

tensions between the universalist drive for equal dignity and the particularist drive for difference and uniqueness are embedded at the international, European, and national levels. The politics of identity in the emergence of a European identity brings about reassertion of national identity, a transformation of national identities, and the emergence of a postnational identity. There are numerous examples of claims for recognition of unique identity within Europe. Much of the skepticism to the integration process voiced by, for instance, the Danish populace stems from the felt need to protect a unique Danish ethnic identity, Dutch national identity, and even a British one in Europe. However, there are indications of a major identitive transformation in Europe. National identities are becoming more inclusive, and there are signs of an emerging inclusive conception of European identity particularly among the members of the European Union. The latter is far more akin to a postnational than a national type of identity.

The development of postnational identities, the further strengthening of international civil society, and the nonnationally oriented drive of the politics of identity have contributed to a postnational type of politics of identity, especially with regard to the development of a democratic consciousness and the individual identity of citizens. This move toward a postnational politics of identity in international systems brings the challenge of understanding how identity formation takes place in the contemporary world. Debates remain regarding how much identity matters as opposed to material structures and how far the study of discourse as opposed to that of material factors allows better understanding of international relations.

Constructivists have argued that, theoretically, identities are constructed based on the dividing lines between individuals and others. It is argued that the dividing line is not geographical, like state borders, but cognitive. In this regard, politics of identity in international relations goes beyond the formation of national identities and includes the formation of collective and transnational identities as well. Constructivists view social facts as depending on the attachment of collective knowledge to physical reality by way of collective understanding and discourse, as in the case of the classification of self and other.

Based on the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century arguments of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx that relate the question of identity formation to the conceptual pair of self/other, the collective identity formation and respective politics of identity are considered dialectical. Hegel's formulation of identity formation is both dialogical, reflected in the relative to changing culture and the other, and dialectical, the self's reaction to the other and the tension between the self and the other.

Marx incorporated Hegel's idea in his reformulation of Hegelian dialectics and focused more on the dialectical principle. His reformulation of Hegelian dialectic with identity formation has become the most popular version of identity formation. For Hegel and Marx, everything has self-identity, being-in-itself, but nothing is merely self-identical and self-contained except what is abstract, isolated, and static. All real and concrete things are part of the world of interaction,

motion, and change—that means things not merely are self-subsistent but exist essentially in relation to other things.

The logic of contradiction suggested by dialectical thinkers has been significant in terms of identity. Based on the dialectical nature of identity formation, Alexander Wendt introduced the concept of identity and collective identity formation in international relations theory in the late twentieth century. Wendt's model is based on the principle of interaction, which argues that the self/other relation evolves through interaction. This interaction between self and other and the existing international environment puts identity at the heart of the approach. According to Wendt, international politics is the process of states' taking identities in relation to others, casting them into corresponding counteridentities, and playing out the result. Using this model, Wendt built an interactionist model of the social processes, which focuses on how identities and interests are constructed as dependent variables at the unit (state) level and are winnowed at the macro (international) and population level. Within this context, identities and corresponding interests are learned in response to how they are treated by significant others. That means that international actors see themselves as a reflection of how they think others see or appraise them. For example, if the other treats the self as if it were a friend according to the principle of reflected appraisals, the self is able to internalize this belief in its own identity vis-à-vis the other, or vice versa. Based on the representations of self and other, a definition of situation is constructed by both self and other.

To show how identities are produced and reproduced in the social processes, Wendt has developed an evolutionary model of identity formation. Through repeated interaction, self and other identify themselves with each other negatively or positively. The debates occurring in the early twenty-first century on the future of international relations in Northeast Asia clearly illustrate how the politics of identity works in international relations. Memory, national identity, and history play important roles in Northeast Asia's new strategic alignments and emerging international tensions. The history of contemporary Northeast Asian international relations is closely linked to new notions of national identity and legitimacy as well as to the questions of power and cooperation. Rising nationalism in China is a symptom of a nation in need of a new identity in the wake of global communism's collapse. China's search for a postcommunist identity has coincided with the rise of neonationalism in Japan, which advocates returning to a pre-1945 world of statehood. On the other hand, in South Korea there exists a new generation of leaders seeking to heal the wounds of national division inflicted by the Korean War by reconciliation with North Korea. Jager notes that Asia's modern history has left a deep-rooted imprint on these societies' views of the world and each other. Thus, it is normal to assume that the politics of identity continues to play a significant role in shaping the future relations of states in Northeast Asia, where the perceptions of the past and the politics of identity have direct consequences for political action and international relations.

See also *Hegel, Georg W. F.; Islamic Political Thought; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Politics; Marx, Karl; Religious Minorities; State, The; Women's Studies.*

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Ideologies, Political

Ideologies are systems of ideas that shape people's thoughts and actions with regard to many things, including nationality, race, the role and function of government, property and class divisions, the relations between men and women, human responsibility for the natural environment, and more. These systems of ideas have proven to be potent, and often lethal, political forces. As the historian Isaiah Berlin observed in his 1992 book *The Crooked Timber of Humanity,* "the great ideological storms" of the twentieth century "have altered the lives of virtually all mankind," producing not only revolutions but "totalitarian tyrannies of both right and left and . . . explosions of nationalism, racism, and, in places, of religious bigotry. . . . These great movements began with ideas in people's heads: ideas about what relations between men have been, are, might be, and should be; and . . . [these ideas were] transformed in the name of a vision of some supreme goal in the minds of the leaders, above all of the prophets with armies at their backs" (p. 1).

Not all ideologies have spawned totalitarian tyrannies—not conservatism, for example, nor the liberalism that Berlin

himself embraced. But there is no doubt that the "armed prophets" to whom he referred—Vladimir Illich Lenin, Joseph Stalin, Adolph Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Mao Zedong, Pol Pot, and many others—left the landscape of the twentieth century littered with millions of corpses. Nor is there any reason to think that the apparent demise of Fascism, Nazism, and Communism in the last century signaled the end of ideologies. On the contrary, the twenty-first century already bears the stamp of new and continuing ideologies: of militant nationalists bent on ethnic cleansing, of radical Islamists dedicated to suicide bombing and other forms of terrorism, and of white racists and black Afrocentrists, gay liberationists and "traditional-values" conservatives, feminists and antifeminists, and many others engaged in culture wars. Political ideologies are potent and persistent, in short, and well worth understanding. Such an understanding begins with the history of the concept.

THE HISTORY OF IDEOLOGY

The word *ideologie* was coined by Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1754–1836), who hoped to found a systematic study of the origins of ideas in the revolutionary decade of the 1790s. Like many other French philosophers of the eighteenth century, de Tracy drew on the ideas of John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690). Locke had argued that the mind is like a tabula rasa, or blank slate, in that people are born with no knowledge or ideas; everything we know and every idea we have is thus the result of sense experience. de Tracy took this claim about the nature of knowledge as the starting point for his own science of ideas, or ideologie.

As de Tracy conceived it, however, this science was to serve the revolutionary purpose of remaking society. If ideas are the result of experience, he reasoned, it must be possible to discover their sources and explain how people come to have the ideas that they have—including the false and misleading ideas that stand in the way of freedom and progress. Among these were religious ideas, which he regarded as mere superstitions. With the aid of the new science of ideologie, however, de Tracy thought it would be possible not only to remove these and other misleading ideas from people's minds but to replace them with ideas that would lead to a rational and happy society. From the beginning, then, the concept of ideology has been associated with the attempt to shape how people think to move them to act in certain ways.

Not surprisingly, the Catholic Church, the nobility, and powerful political elites viewed ideologie and the "ideologues," as de Tracy's followers were called, with alarm. With its emphasis on rationality and science, ideologie posed a threat to traditional authority in politics and society as in religion. In conservative circles, the word *ideologie* quickly acquired negative connotations as something false, seductive, and dangerous. But it was Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) who quashed de Tracy's attempt to found a reforming science of ideas. Once a supporter of the ideologues, Napoleon changed positions in the early 1800s when, as self-proclaimed emperor of France, he needed the support of the church and the nobility. Denouncing ideologie as "sinister metaphysics," he declared the new science to be nothing but a mask to cover the subversive plans of his opponents and critics.

This sense of ideology as hiding or masking something is also evident in the way that Karl Marx (1818–1883) used the concept some forty years later. In Marx's hands, however, *ideology* referred to a set or system of ideas that served to justify and legitimize the rule of a dominant social class. As Marx and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) argued in *The German Ideology,* the task of the revolutionary philosopher is to unmask and expose "the illusion of the epoch"—an illusion shared by rulers and ruled alike but working to the advantage of the rulers at the expense of those they ruled. Once the class or classes at the bottom of society begin to see that the ruling class has no legitimate claim to its dominant position—that is, once the oppressed people see through the ideology that supports their oppressors—then revolution becomes a real possibility.

Marx's conception of ideology was not politically neutral. It was, as he acknowledged, a "weapon" in the "class struggle." But Marx thought it was a particularly powerful weapon because it revealed that the prevailing ways of thinking about social relations throughout history were merely complex and subtle defenses of the power and privileges of the dominant classes. Yet his own theory, he maintained, was not biased or ideological in this way, but "scientific." The theory did promote the interests of the oppressed and exploited, but Marx held that the interests of the exploited class in his day, the proletariat, were the interests of all humanity. To expose "the illusion of the epoch" as mere ideology thus was to speak the truth in a way that opened the possibility of a classless society in which ideology and illusion will disappear.

For Marx, then, as for Napoleon, *ideology* was a pejorative term. But this negative connotation began to shift when Karl Mannheim (1893–1947) and others pointed out that Marx's use of ideology as a weapon against the dominant class could be turned against Marx's theory. For if Marx is right when he says that the ruling ideas of society serve to justify the dominance of the ruling class, is it not also likely that the ideas of other social classes arise out of their interests and aspirations? What people think—not just the ruling class but everyone—may depend on their social positions. In his *Ideology and Utopia* (1929), Mannheim called for a "sociology of knowledge" to trace the social origins of ideas and beliefs.

According to Mannheim, the sociology of knowledge requires us to distinguish between the "particular" and "total" conceptions of ideology. To accuse one's political opponents of being ideological, for example, is to employ the particular conception, as the use of *ideological* implies that their views are biased, distorted, and serve some hidden interest. *Total conception,* by contrast, refers to the characteristic ways of thinking of an entire class, society, or historical period, such as medieval society or modernity. Because these ways of thought are so broad and encompassing, Mannheim doubted that anyone could ever stand outside them, entirely free from the web of social and economic interests, and thus be in a position to unmask the ideological sources of all ideas and beliefs. In this way he raised the disturbing possibility that all our thinking about society

and social relations is ideological. Mannheim did believe that intellectuals may be able to achieve a synthesis of opposing perspectives that comes closer to the whole truth, but even then it would be the truth of a specific historical time and place.

By raising the possibility that all social thought is ideological, Mannheim implied that there is no purely scientific or objective understanding of social arrangements. In doing so, however, he stretched the idea of ideology to mean something like a system of beliefs about the social world, or a Weltanschauung (worldview). He may also have made it harder to determine just what an ideology is. Indeed, some twentieth-century social scientists concluded that the term is too vague and contested to be useful for scholarly analysis. One counted twenty-seven definitional elements of *ideology,* for example, and others urged that a less confusing and loaded term, such as *belief system,* should supplant *ideology.*

As its continuing use attests, *ideology* has proved too important and powerful a word to be abandoned or replaced. Yet it continues to be the source of disagreement. To many, *ideology* remains a pejorative term. In their view, ideologies are bad because they always simplify and distort matters. Worse yet, ideologues use emotion-rousing slogans and simplistic analyses to persuade people that their ideology has a monopoly on the truth. Anyone who disagrees must be an enemy of truth, justice, and progress—an enemy who must be either converted or defeated. As Daniel Bell says in his 1961 book *The End of Ideology* (pp. 399–400), "Ideology makes it unnecessary for people to confront individual issues on their individual merits. One simply turns to the ideological vending machine, and out comes the prepared formulae. And when these beliefs are suffused by apocalyptic fervor, ideas become weapons, and with dreadful results."

In contrast to this negative view, many people now use *ideology* in a neutral fashion. For example, it is not unusual to find a candidate for political office distinguishing his or her ideology from that of an opponent. In such cases, *ideology* means a more or less consistent set of ideas, beliefs, and convictions about how the social world does and should operate. The candidate is likely to claim that his or her ideology is right, good, or somehow superior to the opponent's, but this claim can be made only when people believe that an ideology is not necessarily a bad thing. If it were, it would be foolish to admit that one is acting on the basis of an ideology.

Despite their differences, the negative and the neutral conceptions of ideology have at least two points in common. First, both conceptions depart from de Tracy's original understanding of ideologie as the scientific study of ideas, and second, both join de Tracy in using *ideology* to refer to a set of ideas that tries to link thought to action. That is, in both conceptions ideologies attempt to shape how people think—and therefore how they act.

A PROVISIONAL DEFINITION OF *IDEOLOGY*

These points of agreement suggest a definition of *ideology* that provides a useful basis for identifying, comparing, and contrasting various ideologies. According to this definition, an ideology is a more or less coherent and comprehensive set of ideas that explains and evaluates social conditions, helps people understand their place in society, and provides a program for social and political action. In other words, an ideology performs four functions for people who hold it: the explanatory, evaluative, orientative, and programmatic functions.

Explanation. An ideology explains why social, political, and economic conditions are as they are, particularly in times of crisis. Why are there wars? Why do depressions occur? Why are some people rich and others poor? Why are relations between races so often strained and difficult? To these and many other questions each ideology supplies—or at least hints at—its own answers. A Marxist might explain wars as an outgrowth of capitalists' competition for foreign markets, for instance, while a Fascist is apt to explain them as tests of one nation's will against another's. Their explanations are sometimes quite different, as these examples indicate, but all ideologies offer a way of looking at complex events and conditions that tries to make sense of them. Moreover, those who are firmly committed to a particular ideology—ideologues—typically will offer simple or even simplistic explanations as they try to convert as many people as possible to their side.

Evaluation. The second function of ideologies is to supply standards for evaluating social conditions. Are all wars evils to be avoided, or are some morally justifiable? Are depressions a normal part of the business cycle or a symptom of a sick economic system? Are vast disparities of wealth desirable or undesirable? Are racial tensions inevitable or avoidable? Again, an ideology supplies its followers with the criteria required for answering these and similar questions. Those who adhere to one ideology may evaluate favorably something that the followers of a different one greatly dislike—communists look at class struggle as a necessary step on the way to communism, for example, while Fascists regard it as an outright evil. Whatever the position may be, however, all ideologies provide standards or cues that help people assess, judge, and appraise social policies and conditions.

Orientation. Ideologies also supply their adherents with an orientation and a sense of identity—of who the individual is, the group (race, nation, gender, class, and so on) to which he or she belongs, and how he or she is related to the rest of the world. Like a compass, ideologies help people to locate themselves in a complicated world. Communists stress the importance of social-economic classes, for example, with the working class being the victim of exploitation by its capitalist oppressors; Nazis think that racial identity is all important; and feminists maintain that one's gender is fundamental to personal and political identity in a world marked by sexual oppression and exploitation. Other ideologies lead their adherents to perceive their social situation or position in still other ways, but all perform the function of orientation.

Political program. Finally, an ideology performs a programmatic or prescriptive function by setting out a general program of social and political action. The Russian Marxist Vladimir Illich Lenin (1870–1924) made this point in the title of one of his revolutionary tracts, *What Is To Be Done?* As he saw it, part

of the answer is that the Communist Party must take the lead in seizing state power, overthrowing capitalism, and eventually creating a cooperative, communist society. Other ideologies, of course, advance very different programs: Nazis try to rouse the master race to take action against Jews and other supposedly inferior peoples, libertarians advocate policies that will reduce or eliminate government interference in the free market, and a social or religious conservative will call for the state or government to promote morality or traditional values.

In addition to providing a useful way to compare and contrast ideologies, this functional definition helps to clarify what an ideology is by eliminating possibilities that do not perform all four functions. Thus, it enables us to distinguish political ideologies from some of the other isms, such as terrorism, that are sometimes mistaken for ideologies. Terrorism may offer a program for social and political action, but it does not explain and evaluate conditions or provide people with an orientation. It is a strategy that some ideologues use to try to advance their causes, but terrorism is not itself an ideology.

The functional definition also helps to distinguish democracy from political ideologies. Unlike socialism, conservatism, and the other ideologies, democracy offers no explanation of why things are the way they are, and it is only in a loose sense that we can say that democracy performs the evaluative, orientative, or programmatic functions. Moreover, most political ideologies claim to be democratic—Fascism, Nazism, and radical Islamism are the notable exceptions—and they could hardly make this claim if democracy were an ideology itself. One can easily claim to be a conservative democrat, a liberal democrat, or a social(ist) democrat, for instance, but not so easily claim to be a socialist conservative, say, or a liberal Fascist.

HUMAN NATURE AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

Ideologies also harbor, at least implicitly, some conception of human nature—of basic human drives, motivations, limitations, and possibilities. Some ideologies assume that it is the nature of human beings to compete with one another in hopes of acquiring the greatest possible share of scarce resources; others hold that people are naturally inclined to cooperate with and share what they have with others. So, for example, a classical liberal or contemporary libertarian is likely to believe that humans are naturally competitive and acquisitive. A socialist, however, will hold that competitiveness and acquisitiveness are unnatural vices nurtured by a deformed and deforming capitalist system that warps people whose true nature is to be cooperative and generous.

These and other conceptions of human nature are important to the understanding of political ideologies because they play a large part in determining how each ideology performs the four aforementioned functions. They are especially important because each ideology's view of human nature sets limits on what it considers to be politically possible. This connection is particularly evident in the stance ideologies take toward revolutionary change. The fact that most ideologies have played a revolutionary part in modern politics at one time or another, beginning with liberalism in the French Revolution (1789–1799)—if not sooner—suggests that most ideologies have a fairly optimistic view of what people are capable of accomplishing. After all, people will not undertake anything so radical and uncertain as a revolution unless they believe it possible to bring about a fundamental change for the better in society. Conversely, the connection between ideologies and conceptions of human nature also explains why conservatives tend to be suspicious of or downright hostile toward revolutions, for their estimate of human nature generally leads them to believe that sweeping improvements in society are either impossible or unlikely and certainly dangerous to attempt.

Core assumptions about human nature have led most ideologies, at one time or another, to call for revolution, for slow or rapid reform, for a rigid defense of the status quo, or even (in the case of reactionaries) for a return to the way things used to be. In any case, ideas—especially those systems of ideas called ideologies—clearly have consequences. These consequences, whether intended or not, are sometimes benign and sometimes dire.

See also *Civil Society; Communism; Communism, Fall of, and End of History; Conservatism; Elites, Political; Fascism; Human Nature and Politics; Liberalism, Classical; Locke, John; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Nationalism; Radicalism; Republicanism; Totalitarianism.*

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Illich, Ivan

Ivan Illich (1926–2002) was a one-time Catholic priest, Austrian philosopher, and anarchist social critic of various forms of professional authority. His foremost critique of modern culture was that bureaucratic institutions tend to act counter to their original, rational purpose, thereby undermining people's confidence in themselves and their ability to solve their own problems.

Born in Vienna, Austria, on September 4, 1926, Illich attended religious school from 1931 to 1941. His father was a

Croatian Catholic, but his mother was a Sephardic Jew, which led to Illich's expulsion from school because of the country's anti-Semitic laws. He then attended the University of Florence in Italy and the Gregorian University in Rome. Eventually he obtained his doctorate in history at the University of Salzburg in Austria.

In 1951 Illich was appointed as an assistant parish priest in the Washington Heights neighborhood of New York City where he served an Irish and Puerto Rican congregation. He left this position in 1956 to take up the post of vice rector of the Catholic University of Ponce in Puerto Rico. A disagreement with the local bishop over the issue of birth control ended Illich's tenure at Ponce in 1960.

Illich accepted a professorship at New York's Fordham University in 1961 and later founded the Centre for Intercultural Documentation (CIDOC) in Cuernavaca, Mexico. Illich became disillusioned with the church and disassociated himself from it in 1968, leaving the priesthood a year later. Illich subsequently traveled extensively, dividing his time between the United States, Mexico, and Germany, where he taught and published as an academic. He died on December 2, 2002, in Bermen, Germany.

Illich's initial criticism of professional authority was directed at the Catholic Church, and specifically at Pope John XXII's call for North American missionaries to "modernize" the Latin American Church. Illich created CIDOC to act as a counterfoil to the Vatican's participation in the modern development of Latin America. At CIDOC missionaries were asked to recognize and appreciate the limitations of their own cultural experiences and were shown how modern economic development was really a war on subsistence. Confronting pressure from the Vatican and concerned about the possible side effects of its own institutionalization, Illich closed CIDOC in 1976.

Illich continued his criticism of professional authority in the fields of education, medicine, work, energy, and gender in the 1970s and early 1980s. He criticized the processes of institutionalization, reliance on experts, and commoditization of activities that he believed served to reinforce an authoritarian worldview of continually rising expectations that could never be realized. To "de-institutionalize" society, Illich called for "convivial alternatives" that were characterized by spontaneous, voluntary, and localized social relations in which advanced technology would support these fluid, informal arrangements. It is not clear how Illich envisioned the transition from established institutions such as schools or hospitals to convivial alternatives. Nonetheless, his critical and theoretical contributions still influence scholars today, especially in the field of pedagogical theory and practice.

See also *Political Philosophy.*

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Immigration, Effects on Intergroup Relations

Immigration affects not only the ethnic, racial, religious, and linguistic makeup of immigrant-receiving countries but also conceptions of national identity and relations between the multitudes of groups that constitute pluralistic societies. In particular, it affects relations between ethnic groups, or as Max Weber (1996) describes, "those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration" (p. 35). Under the best circumstances, immigration adds to and enriches the fabric of society and leads to harmonious relationships between ethnic groups. Under the worst, it causes profound socioeconomic and political change that leads to violent conflict.

For many Europeans, immigrating to the New World meant an escape from poverty, increased economic prospects and political freedoms, and the beginning of a new life infused with great opportunity. Conversely, from the vantage point of the native inhabitants, European immigration was commonly associated with conquest, domination, displacement, disease, genocide, and the destruction of traditional ways of life. For the estimated ten million Africans brought to the Americas between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, their forced migration experience was characterized by enslavement and extreme racial prejudice. These patterns of migration and settlement resulted in a hierarchical power structure based on race, with whites holding dominant social, economic, and political positions.

INTEGRATION AND ASSIMILATION

In the modern age of migration, immigration's effect on intergroup relations differs from country to country. In so-called countries of immigration, such as Canada and the United States, where immigration was part of the nation-building process, immigrants are absorbed into society relatively quickly. That is, in countries where the vast majority of the population is descended from immigrants, the inclination is to accept the notion, We are a country of immigrants, and therefore assimilate newcomers of any background—as long as they naturalize, learn the language, and respect the laws of the land. In the United States, for example, the children of immigrants born on American soil are, pursuant to the jus soli (birthright citizenship) principle codified in the Fourteenth Amendment, automatically citizens of the country. When immigrants and their children are quickly naturalized and granted concomitant rights and liberties, feelings of social marginalization and tension between ethnic groups are mitigated.

In European countries, some of which have evolved from countries of emigration to countries of immigration, the integration and assimilation of immigrants has often been slow

and fraught with intergroup conflict. This is because immigration in most European countries was not, at least in the popular imagination, an explicit part of the nation-building process. Despite growing ethnic heterogeneity, many European countries have struggled to incorporate immigrants and embrace multiculturalism. Germany officially maintained that it was not a country of immigration until 1998, at which time nearly 9 percent of the total population was classified as foreign, and only in 2000 implemented a conditional jus soli citizenship policy. Even so, many Germans still have difficulty accepting foreigners, especially non-European immigrants, as German, even if they are born in Germany, acquire citizenship, and speak perfect German.

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND NATIONALISM

Intergroup tensions are common in countries that have experienced high rates of immigration. Race riots have periodically erupted in the United Kingdom, for example, in the Notting Hill area of London in 1958 and in Oldham in 2001. France, which has long prided itself on its civic nationalism, as opposed to ethnic nationalism, has also experienced recurrent urban unrest and violence in its immigrant communities. French youths of African descent argue that there is little real intergroup *fraternité* or *égalité* in a country where the National Front, a party that espouses a "France for the French" ideology, is an enduring presence. In the Netherlands, the much-touted Dutch model of integration, which allowed immigrants to create their own space within a multicultural Dutch society, has come under scrutiny in recent years. Since the assassinations of the filmmaker Theo van Gogh and the politician Pim Fortuyn, both of whom were critical of Muslim immigration, some skeptics have denounced the Dutch model as a failure.

Ultimately, immigration's effect on intergroup relations is context specific and determined by multiple factors. Legal immigrants tend to be more accepted by host populations, enjoy more political rights and protection under the law, and be more readily integrated than illegal immigrants. Country of origin, socioeconomic class, race, language, conditions of exit from the sending country, and conditions of entry in the receiving country also play important roles in the ways immigrants are treated and how they relate to other societal groups. In the United States, for example, white immigrant doctors from the United Kingdom are treated differently than unskilled Mexican laborers; in Germany, an Austrian typically experiences a higher level of social acceptance than a Turk; and in Sweden, Norwegian immigrants tend to acculturate more quickly than Rwandan refugees.

Nativist discourse on immigration, whether in the United States, Germany, or Australia, expresses the real and imagined fears of the demos. Those who oppose immigration often do so because they perceive immigrants as an enemy other, who are seen as overcrowding the country, taking jobs, abusing social services, competing for scarce resources, lowering standards of living, usurping political power, committing crimes, lowering educational standards, introducing new languages and religions, changing the culture and national identity, and

so on. When ethnic groups feel that their power, wealth, or prestige is threatened, xenophobic anxieties can lead to support for nationalist parties, such as the Freedom Party in Austria, Flemish Bloc in Belgium, and Republikaner in Germany.

The poet Max Frisch once wrote of immigration to Switzerland, "Ein kleines Herrenvolk sieht sich in Gefahr: man hat Arbeitskräfte gerufen, und es kommen Menschen" (A small master race feels threatened: workers were invited, and human beings are coming). His point is that there are serious economic as well as ethical dimensions to immigration, namely, that workers are also human beings with needs and wants and who, given the opportunity, will create their own space in society, put down roots, raise families, form political organizations, participate in representative democracy, and become long-term residents and eventually citizens. If this process of integration and assimilation is to happen with as much ease and as little conflict as possible, then it should be encouraged by governments, striven for by immigrants, and facilitated by the diverse groups that must inevitably coexist in contemporary multicultural, pluralist societies.

See also *Assimilation; Identity, Politics of; Immigration Policy; Immigration, Politics of; Mass Immigration; Mexican Immigration; Migration; Nation-building; Urban Migration.*

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Immigration, Politics of

The politics of immigration (entry) are distinct from, but closely related to, the politics of emigration (departure), remigration (return), and migration (movement) and can be defined broadly as the struggle for power related to the entry and permanent settlement of people in a nation-state. As such, a complex amalgamation of frequently divisive and

controversial politico-economic and sociocultural issues falls under the vast penumbra of immigration politics, ranging from border control, citizenship, national identity, and national security to labor, language, race, religion, and ethics.

LOW POLITICS

The politics of immigration exist, in one form or another, in many countries but are particularly prominent in so-called classic countries of immigration, such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, where immigration has played a central role in the nation-building process. Immigration in these countries is normally considered low politics, and with the exception of the humanitarian admittance of refugees and asylum seekers, policy is made mostly in terms of what is in the state's best interest. The general consensus among economists is that a solvent welfare state cannot have completely open borders, for it must be able to regulate who has access to its finite resources. Conversely, most countries also cannot live with completely closed borders, for capitalist societies invariably need both cheap and skilled labor. Policy makers thus focus on effectively regulating legal entry so as to meet the demand for workers and mitigate illegal immigration.

Once migrants enter, whether legally or illegally, it is difficult for governments to force them to leave. Large-scale forced deportation is neither practically feasible nor ethically in accordance with twenty-first-century human rights norms. Moreover, remigration may not ultimately be desired as national economies quickly become dependent on low-skilled foreign workers to do the dirty, dangerous, and difficult jobs natives are unable or unwilling to do and on high-skilled workers to fill important niches in the labor market. In industrialized countries such as Japan and Italy, where fertility rates are below replacement levels and populations are rapidly shrinking and aging, there is also a dire need for immigrants to offset growing demographic deficits, pay taxes, and finance the social security of retirees.

GUEST WORKERS TO RESIDENTS TO CITIZENS

The historical record indicates that temporary migrant laborers, or guest workers, commonly turn into permanent residents. The longer foreigners stay in a country, the harder it is for governments to deport them, and the more likely it is they will put down roots, invite family members to join them, and embed themselves inextricably into the fabric of society, thereby completing the transition from migrant to immigrant. However, problems ensue if large numbers of legal and illegal (i.e., undocumented) immigrants either cannot or will not adapt to the social, cultural, and political norms of their new country. When foreigners and their offspring become marginalized second-class members of society, a prospective threat arises to the social cohesion and collective well-being of the nation-state. Government policies thus encourage immigrant integration and assimilation, and knowledge of a country's language, history, and laws are normally required to acquire citizenship.

Naturalizing large numbers of foreigners has significant potential long-term consequences as electoral outcomes and the distribution of political power can change as a result. Some political parties cater to immigrant groups, calculating that when immigrants do eventually vote they will remember which party championed their cause. Left-of-center parties like the Democrats in the United States, Labour in Great Britain, and Social Democrats in Germany tend to court working-class immigrants. By contrast, their conservative Republican, Tory, and Christian Democratic counterparts, respectively, are more inclined to preserve traditional ways of life and conceptions of national identity and therefore favor restrictions on immigration. This pattern does not always hold, however, as immigration politics cuts across ideological lines. In the United States, for example, the probusiness wing of the Republican Party advocates both free markets and a flexible approach to immigration to meet labor needs. Libertarian and green parties are usually tolerant of immigrants and relatively open to immigration, while extreme nationalist parties tend to be explicitly xenophobic.

NATIONAL AND GROUP IDENTITY

Immigration shapes the ethnic, racial, religious, and linguistic characteristics of the nation-state and ultimately affects conceptions of national identity. If immigration levels are high enough, native populations often feel inundated and threatened and, especially in times of economic recession, lend electoral support to nativist candidates and parties. Pat Buchanan in the United States, Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, Jörg Haider in Austria, the late Enoch Powell in Britain, and Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands are examples of politicians who have campaigned on anti-immigration platforms. In rare cases in which mass immigration leads to an increase in electoral support for neo-Fascist parties, political order and even democracy itself are threatened.

So-called émigré politics are manifested in many ways. Some immigrants mobilize around issues of particular concern to their respective ethnic groups. Others bring the political tensions of their homelands with them and embrace the opportunity to engage in radical politics once they arrive in liberal democracies, where the freedoms of speech and press can be used to achieve political goals in their countries of origin. Kurds in Switzerland, for example, lobby for the creation of an independent Kurdistan in the Middle East; Copts in Australia advocate for the rights of their coethnics in Egypt; and Cubans in the United States agitate for the overthrow of Fidel Castro and regime change in Cuba.

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States and subsequent bombings in Spain and Britain, immigration is increasingly seen as a high politics issue of national security. This development has brought immigration politics into a new realm in which receiving countries feel compelled to put greater emphasis on border security and more closely monitor political and religious extremism among immigrants. Ultimately, immigration raises many questions about civic and ethnic nationalism, ethical obligations to refugees and political asylum seekers, the nature of multiethnic societies, membership in the state, minority and noncitizen rights, societal change, state sovereignty, and the limits of representative government.

The political challenge in the twenty-first-century age of globalization will be to minimize the costs while maximizing the benefits associated with immigration.

See also *Asylum Rights; Citizenship; Decolonization; Extradition; Globalization; Immigration, Effects on Intergroup Relations; Immigration Policy; U.S. Politics and Society: Latino Political Participation; U.S. Politics and Society: Minority Interest Groups.*

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Immigration Policy

Immigration policy refers to the laws adopted and implemented by nation-states to regulate the entry and permanent settlement of foreigners. Immigration policies encompass ways to control borders, integrate immigrants into society, and meet the labor needs of national economies. There is, however, significant variation in the theoretical and practical application of immigration policies around the world.

The immigration policies of individual countries are shaped by such things as political history, geographic location, party politics, and governmental institutions as well as by powerful, ever-changing, global economic push-and-pull forces that are beyond their control. Few countries have completely open or closed immigration policies, but some are more restrictive than others. In Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the United States, for example, immigration played an important role in the nation-building process, and immigration policies in those countries reflect this history. By contrast, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have only more recently, and reluctantly, received large-scale immigration. Migration scholars make a further distinction between economically developed countries, which regularly attract large numbers of immigrants, and less economically developed countries, which commonly experience more emigration than immigration.

More than half of the world's estimated two hundred million immigrants—that is, people residing permanently outside their countries of origin—live in Europe and North America. In countries such as the United States (a traditional country of immigration) and Germany (a reluctant country of immigration), where the foreign born constitute more than 12 percent of the total population, immigration is a particularly salient political issue. The fundamental areas of policy concern include immigrant integration, border control, refugees, family unification, and migrant labor.

MIGRANT LABORERS, FAMILIES, AND REFUGEES

Capitalist societies invariably need skilled as well as unskilled workers and, as a result, craft their immigration policies to meet the labor needs of their national economies. Highly educated immigrants with special training and talents, such as medical doctors and engineers, are usually seen as having a net positive impact on the economy. Accordingly, there is considerable global competition to attract the best and brightest immigrants. South African doctors and nurses who immigrate to Canada, for instance, are given preference in Canada's points-based immigration system, and their permanent settlement is encouraged. At the same time, many wealthy countries need unskilled workers to fill low-wage jobs, such as harvesting agricultural produce, which native-born citizens are either unwilling or unable to do. These migrants are frequently recruited through guest worker programs (such as the bracero program that brought Mexican workers to the United States from 1942 to 1964), hired on a temporary basis, and expected to return eventually to their countries of origin.

The historical record indicates, however, that temporary migrants often choose to stay in their host countries rather than return home. Many Turks and Yugoslavians remained in Germany, for example, when its guest worker program ended in 1973. When migrants remain legally, they are classified as lawful permanent residents and may, after a set number of years (normally five in the United States and eight in Germany), acquire citizenship. Immigration policies in many liberal democracies allow the immediate relatives—spouses, children, and parents—of legal immigrants to join them through family unification provisions. In some cases, more distant relatives—adult children and siblings—may immigrate as well. Family unification perennially accounts for almost half of all immigration to France and two-thirds of those gaining lawful residence in the United States.

The admittance of refugees and asylum seekers constitutes a significant, yet relatively small, part of many immigration policies. At least 141 countries have signed the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol, which define a refugee as anyone who is unwilling or unable to return to his or her country of origin because of persecution or a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." Despite the commendable work of the Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees, relatively few of the millions of people fleeing wars, persecution, and famine will ever gain refugee status in Europe or North America. In 2007, for instance, the United States admitted 1,608 Iraqi refugees out of an estimated two million living outside Iraq. In global comparative perspective, humanitarian concern for refugees falls largely outside the perceived national interest of the world's most powerful countries.

BORDER CONTROL AND IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION

Border control, law enforcement, and the expulsion of undocumented immigrants are persistently elusive policy goals. Potential immigrants may be denied entry if it is thought they will be a drain on public coffers, a risk to public health, or a threat to national security. However, many people enter legally as tourists, students, or guest workers and then remain illegally after their visas expire. Illegal immigration, whether from Mexico to the United States, from Morocco to Spain, or from Zimbabwe to South Africa, poses enormous challenges to policy makers. The 2,000-mile (3,219-kilometer) border between the United States and Mexico is so vast, and the economic push forces in Africa and pull forces in Europe are so strong, that there is little that even the most sensible, efficient, or draconian public policies can do to stem the tide of human migration.

Once illegal immigrants reside in a country it is difficult for governments to apprehend and remove them. Any serious attempt to deport the estimated twelve million undocumented immigrants living in the United States would likely be expensive, disruptive to the economy, and psychologically traumatic to those involved. Similarly, forcibly returning the estimated three million Zimbabweans living in South Africa would be unfeasible as well as contrary to twenty-first-century human rights norms. The practical, politico-economic, and ethical complexities of such scenarios explain why governments tolerate illegal immigrants year after year and why reforms are made to many restrictive immigration laws. Common solutions include providing a path to legalization and government-sponsored programs to help immigrants integrate into society.

Regulations determining who may enter, for what reasons, and how long they may stay not only vary from country to country and region to region, but also change and evolve over time. The fact that globalization allows ever more people to migrate at a time when it is increasingly difficult to control porous territorial borders suggests that immigration policies are likely to remain the focus of considerable attention for some time to come.

See also *Globalization; Immigration, Effects on Intergroup Relations; Immigration, Politics of; Mass Immigration; Mexican Immigration; Migration; Urban Migration.*

. . . .   ELIOT DICKINSON

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Immobolisme

Immobolisme (immobilism) refers to a period of political instability and inaction in France from the late 1800s through the mid-1950s. During the Third and Fourth Republics the French government was characterized by a weak executive and a strong legislature. Within the National Assembly, the number of political parties precluded majoritarian governments, and instead, the country was governed by a series of fragile coalition governments. These cabinets frequently disintegrated over policy or personality issues and often lasted less than a year. Between 1947 and 1958, the office of prime minister changed twenty-one times. This instability prevented the formulation and implementation of long-term planning and policy implementation, leading governments to be characterized as immobile or static. Immobolisme was especially damaging to France because of the dramatic socioeconomic changes that occurred and the high level of external security threats faced by the country, including the initial period of decolonization. There was a rise in the power of the bureaucracy, which itself began to develop and adopt policies in the absence of formal direction from the executive or the legislature. Although particularly associated with France, the tenets of immobolisme may also be applied to other countries with a history of short-lived governments, including Italy.

See also *Bureaucracy; European Politics and Society; French Political Thought.*

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Immunity

See *Executive Immunity; Parliamentary Immunity.*

Impeachment

Impeachment, often confused with actual removal from office, is the required first step in removing an elected official from office. Impeachment is not the same as removal. Presidents Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton were both impeached by the House of Representatives, but the trial conducted in the Senate failed to garner enough votes, in either case, to warrant their removal.

The Founders, fearing a tyrannical leader, seriously deliberated how to remove judges or presidents who abused their powers. The Constitution states, "The president, vice president and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." The infrequency with which impeachment has occurred attests to its significance; clearly, only the most extreme situations warrant impeachment. Throughout the nation's history, only two presidents have been impeached, and only one other had impeachment hearings begin. However, the judiciary has been exposed to quite a few more impeachments, and since 1936 the U.S. House of Representatives witnessed six impeachment investigations, while trials have occurred only twice in the U.S. Senate in the nation's history. The infrequency of its occurrence can also be attributed to the ambiguity that surrounds the process.

The Constitution fails to clarify what constitutes an impeachable offense. It makes clear that treason and bribery are impeachable offenses, but what about "other high crimes and misdemeanors"? What constitutes these offenses? This is a question that still plagues constitutional scholars. Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution provides the House of Representatives with the sole authority over impeachment. It also provides the House with the ability to determine the rules of the proceedings. The official process begins once a complaint of official misconduct is given to the House. Any representative, the president, a grand jury, or a state legislature can make a request for impeachment. Once a complaint is received, there are two alternate routes by which proceedings may be initiated in the House. First, the Judicial Conference can forward the request for impeachment to the House and by doing so recommend impeachment. Second, the passage of the Independent Counsel Act provides the special prosecutor with the discretion to forward a request of consideration for impeachment to the House. Once received by the House, all impeachment requests are forwarded to the Judiciary Committee. Any resolutions seeking an impeachment investigation are then referred to the Rules Committee. After the investigation into the impeachment terminates, a vote is set for the articles of impeachment.

If the impeachment passes, the House determines which representatives will serve as House managers in presenting the articles of impeachment to the Senate. They are usually chosen in an election by a majority of the House, by resolution, or by resolution in which the Speaker of the House nominates the representatives. However, the House Judiciary Committee, with the advice of the House leadership, has also recommended House managers, who directly participate in the prosecution of the official being impeached. The Constitution vests authority of the trial with the Senate. Article I, Section 3 states, "The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside; and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present." The only punishment the Senate is authorized to render is removal from office. The Constitution states, "Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit under the United States: but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment according to the law."

In the past seventy years, the United States has witnessed far fewer impeachment hearings, let alone trials, than at any other time in the nation's history. This may be the result of better-qualified officials' holding office, greater media scrutiny's keeping officials honest, the ease in executing disciplinary measures other than impeachment, and the lack of time the House has to get involved in such time-consuming matters.

See also *Accountability; Censure; Checks and Balances; Executive Immunity; Executive, The.*

. . . .   RICHARD M. YON

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Imperialism

In a strict sense, imperialism is the process of creating an empire. An empire is a complex political unit comprising diverse social units, each with distinct cultural identities, hierarchically organized under the domination of one of its parts. An empire is thus distinct from a national state, which is relatively homogeneous in its sociocultural features, and a multinational state based on a free federation of its component parts.

Historically, empires generally developed from the expansion of a relatively compact and homogeneous core state extending the territorial range of its domination. Imperial expansion in its early forms was thus largely geographically contiguous, involving a process of progressive movement outward from an original core territory. Various forms of imperial political administration were established, but all involved a substantial devolution of political authority to local officials or agents, creating a recurring problem of fragmentation as local actors chose to prioritize their own interests over those of the imperial center. This produced a typical cycle of imperial

THE ACCESSION OF THE QUEEN OF INDIA.

In 1858, the East India Company transferred its rule of India to the British Crown, adding to Britain's imperial holdings. The British attempted to administer India through indirect rule via local intermediaries.

SOURCE: The Granger Collection, New York

expansion followed by a phase of decay induced by overexpansion and the emergence of dissident forces in the periphery that threatened imperial power.

Nevertheless, imperial development often took place on top of a parallel process of cultural enlargement of the center that contributed to historical nation-building. Thus, the Roman city-state left a legacy that contributed to the formation of the Italian nation long after its imperial dominion had disintegrated, and the Chinese and Russian empires both contributed to the formation of modern national identities and nation-states.

IMPERIALISM AND THE MODERN WORLD

The emergence of economies and societies with a strong commercial orientation coupled with modern technologies of warfare and transport in western Europe led to a new form of imperialism from the sixteenth century onward, as European powers, starting with the Spanish and Portuguese, sought to establish imperial dominion over geographically distant overseas territories. Their motivations were different from those of ancient imperialism in that they were concerned less

with the construction of enlarged imperial states than with the strengthening of the political–military apparatus of the core states in the European arena.

A combination of ambitions and tensions in the home states fuelled a subsequent development of settler colonies, and in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries European powers developed colonial plantation economies in South America and the Caribbean, worked by slaves imported from Africa, to grow products for the European market.

These processes gave rise to an internationalization of the European economies and contributed significantly to the transformation of European societies into partially or fully capitalist formations, in which commercial interests and social groups predominated. Overseas expansion now became intimately tied up with the desire to secure both overseas markets and sources of raw material for the expanding capitalist industries of Europe, and the central imperial role shifted to the pioneer of capitalist industrialization, Britain.

British imperialism experienced a major political shock in the 1770s with the secession of the United States, an event that was reminiscent of the revolt of the periphery of ancient imperialism. However, the imperial system was preserved through a combination of more sensitive management of relations with colonial peripheral communities (exemplified by the eventual granting of self-government to settlers) and a more intense focus on the extension of imperial interests through trade and economic ties rather than territorial expansion. The latter has been aptly referred to as the "imperialism of free trade."

IMPERIALISM AND COLONIAL RULE

However, it was never possible to separate economics from politics, as the British experience in India demonstrated. From the seventeenth century onward, the East India Company—an ostensibly commercial structure intended to advance British economic interests while avoiding the responsibilities of formal colonization—was compelled to become more and more involved in the power dynamics of the subcontinent, leading to company rule of the subcontinent. This eventually produced a major reaction by indigenous political forces in 1857, referred to by the British as "the Indian Mutiny" and by Indian historians as "the first war of national liberation." This forced the British state to take direct responsibility for the administration of India and integrate it into the British empire.

Later in the century a combination of factors—rivalry between European states, competition for access to markets, the pressure of special interest groups, and the desire for symbols of imperial glory—led to an intense wave of colonial acquisitions in Africa and Asia. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the bulk of the African continent had been absorbed into one or another European empire, and over 50 percent of the territory of Asia was under European colonial rule.

The colonial experience was a mixed one for the colonized. The colonialism of weaker powers, such as Belgium and Portugal, tended toward the brutal and rapacious. British colonialism, with its long experience and sophisticated methods of indirect rule through local elites, checked to some degree by

democratic public opinion at home, was less harsh and more developmental. Colonialism provided a framework for transfers that could benefit the recipient societies: modern technologies, capital, education, public health, and Western-originated values of nationhood and democracy. But colonial administrations also imposed fiscal burdens on local populations and retarded local economic development when it threatened to conflict with the needs of the metropolis. The balance sheet of colonialism is complex, but at the end of the day it must incorporate the fact that colonial development was undertaken in a way that served the interests of the colonial masters and not local societies. Moreover, the liberal Western cultural values that were transferred with colonization contained within them a powerful critique of the ethos of colonial dependency.

These processes fused with the impact of two global wars, in which colonial resources were mobilized to strengthen the military needs of the European colonial powers. In the aftermath of World War I (1914–1918), indigenous resistance to colonialism began to assume a new form, centered on a nascent anticolonial nationalism. World War II (1939–1945) intensified this process still further, and in its wake modern forms of anticolonial nationalism erupted throughout the colonial world.

This ushered in a long, and often highly conflictual, process of decolonization, especially bitter where nationalist forces had to deal not only with colonial administrations but also with privileged white settler groups, as in Algeria, Kenya, and Rhodesia. The independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 marked the commencement of this process, which unfolded throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

IMPERIALISM AND NEOCOLONIALISM

The ending of colonialism, however, did not end the dependent condition of many former colonies. The term *neocolonialism* was coined to characterize the continuing dependence of former colonial societies on Western capitalist states, either their former colonial masters or the new dominant force in the world order, the United States.

Several features of these postcolonial states served to perpetuate their subordinate status within the international system. Their economies continued to rely on foreign investment centered on agricultural monocultures and natural resource extraction; they remained subject to trade regimes and international economic agencies controlled by the developed countries, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; and their states were often weak and deeply penetrated as a result of the dependence of local elites on ties with political, military, and business interests in the developed countries (often the former imperial power). Even those countries that at a later stage emerged as newly industrializing economies often did so on the back of heavy indebtedness to international financial institutions.

Neocolonialism conceived in this way could be extended to include countries that had never been formally colonized, such as the Central and South American states that were highly dependent on the United States, and it seems conceptually logical to extend the term *imperialism* to include this form of informal domination, whose economic, political, military, and cultural dimensions continue to penetrate many parts of the third world just as deeply as European colonialism did in its era.

THE THEORY OF IMPERIALISM: MARXISM

The contemporary usage of the term *imperialism* is strongly influenced by the role it assumed in Marxist discourse—both Marxist theory and Marxist polemic in the era of the cold war. Marxism has provided the most developed and influential theorization of the phenomenon of imperialism, although the term assumes a more specific meaning within Marxist discourse.

Marx himself dealt with imperialism in a relatively limited way; however, several elements of his work provided a basis for the later development of the Marxist theory of imperialism: the observation that capitalism developed in close association with the world market, his notion of capitalism as a distinct mode of production, his view that capitalism was a system driven toward continual expansion in its search for profit, his idea that the dynamics of the capitalist system led to the progressive concentration of capital in large enterprises, and his concept of the state as a social instrument that serves the interests of the ruling class.

Subsequent Marxist thinkers—in particular Rudolf Hilferding, Rosa Luxemburg, Nikolai Bukharin, and Vladimir I. Lenin—developed a theory of imperialism that saw capitalism progressively extending the world market and displacing precapitalist forms of production in favor of capitalist ones. The increasing domination of national capitalist economies by large firms intertwined with banks (finance capital), the heightened competition between national capitalist interests, and the influence of capitalist forces over state policy were seen as the root causes of the late-nineteenth-century colonial scramble and the international tensions that culminated in World War I.

LENIN AND FINANCE CAPITAL

The most influential analysis was that developed by Lenin in *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism,* written in 1916. This work was not so much a theoretical exposition as a political polemic seeking to characterize World War I as a conflict between rival imperialisms, although it later acquired iconic status as a summary of the Marxist theory of imperialism.

Lenin argued that the dominance of finance capital in the leading capitalist economies resulted in an overaccumulation of capital that could not be absorbed in the national economy. Capitalist groups sought to protect their home markets, leading to international economic conflict, but they were also driven to seek new outlets for investment through the export of capital, especially to less-developed regions. However, overseas investments required political security, which could be effectively provided only by extending the territorial authority of the national state through colonial acquisitions.

These interrelated processes constituted a new stage of capitalism in which the export of goods increasingly took

second place to the export of capital. It produced intensified competition between national blocs of capital that moved from the economic to the international political plane. One manifestation of this was the scramble for colonial possessions; another—crucial for Lenin's political argument—was the outbreak of World War I, which he viewed as a conflict driven by rival imperialist ambitions.

Particular elements of Lenin's analysis have been subject to telling criticism, in particular the implication that nineteenth-century colonial expansion was driven by the export of capital, when in fact more capital flowed into countries not subject to colonial rule (either developed countries or those in Latin America) and finance capital was least developed in the most important colonial power, Britain. However, the general sweep of his argument—the identification of a distinct, highly internationalized phase of capitalism based on the export of capital—appears quite prescient. His unidimensional reduction of international relations to interimperialist competition looks oversimplified, failing to give sufficient weight to an autonomous dynamic of state power seeking, but he appears to be right in calling attention to the importance of economic objectives in foreign policy and to the close connection between state power and control of economic resources.

Later Marxist writers have largely followed Lenin's model of imperialism and his linkage between economic objectives and interstate conflict. However, with the establishment of new noncapitalist societies, first in the Soviet Union and then in eastern Europe and China, it was argued that interimperialist rivalry was overshadowed by the conflict between the two opposed social systems and that the imperialist countries became united under the leadership of their most powerful member—the United States—in efforts to prevent the socialist model from spreading to other countries. Later Marxist writings therefore shifted their attention to the structure of the postwar international system and to the relationship between the leading capitalist countries and that section of the world that was seen as being subject to the most intense exploitation: the third world.

THE THEORY OF IMPERIALISM: HOBSON AND SCHUMPETER

The influence of non-Marxist interpreters of imperialism has not been as durable but was of considerable significance in their time. The most important was the liberal economist J. A. Hobson, who produced the pioneering work *Imperialism: A Study* in 1902, used extensively by Lenin. Hobson also located the "tap root" of imperialism in the concentration of capital and an increased volume of capital-demanding outlets for profitable investment, and he saw aggressive international behavior by capitalist states as the political counterpart to this economic drive. He did not assign as great an importance as Lenin to capital exports, seeing the search for foreign export markets as of parallel importance, and did not see imperialism as a distinct structural form of capitalism. For Hobson, imperialism was a particular form of policy, advanced by particular business interest groups. The insufficiency of the home

market was a consequence of monopoly regulation of prices and wages, which squeezed consumer incomes; an alternative to imperialism therefore existed in social reform—policies designed to enhance workers' wages and strengthen domestic demand.

Another non-Marxist approach to imperialism was developed by the economist Joseph Schumpeter. In an article published in 1918 ("The Sociology of Imperialism"), Schumpeter argued that imperialism—which he defined rather restrictively as "the object-less disposition of a state to expansion by force"—was not a product of capitalist development but of the continued influence of precapitalist aristocratic and military elites in modern societies, due to the tendency of some capitalist groups to forge alliances with such social strata. For Schumpeter, imperialist policies would eventually disappear as capitalism became more firmly established and capitalist classes acquired the self-confidence to abandon such social alliances. In this argument, Schumpeter can be seen as a forerunner of the idea of democratic peace, which has acquired influence in contemporary international relations theory.

IMPERIALISM, EMPIRE, AND THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

One important issue for analysts of imperialism in the post–World War II era is the extent to which the term can be applied to the United States, which emerged as the dominant capitalist power economically, militarily, and politically. The United States was never a major colonial power; indeed its self-image is that of an anticolonial force, based on its own history of rebellion against British rule, its espousal of an open-door policy toward China from the late nineteenth century onward, and its support for the independence of colonial states in the postwar period.

However, it can be argued that such policies are the way a late-developing but economically dynamic state in competition with European colonial powers could best facilitate its access to overseas markets. Furthermore, the United States developed a systematic pattern of informal influence in other countries, beginning with its own periphery in Latin America and taking on global dimensions in the postwar world. This led radical critics of American foreign policy during the cold war, such as William Appleman Williams, to talk about an "American empire" in their analysis of postwar American foreign policy.

More recently, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, a more far-ranging account has developed that seeks to conceptualize the whole contemporary world order as constructed around an American empire. With the United States's being the dominant power in a unipolar international system and the later formulation of an aggressive foreign policy under the George W. Bush presidency, this concept found favor among both critics and supporters of U.S. global military action.

A major debate among international relations analysts has ensued as to whether the U.S. position in the post-1989

international system is more accurately captured by the concept of empire or by alternative concepts such as hegemony, which suggest a more distinctive and fluid pattern of relations. The use of *empire* in this context has a rather metaphorical character and is based less on the structure of the U.S.-dominated international system than on a characterization of one style of U.S. foreign policy as imperial—that is, relying on the unilateral global projection of U.S. power, especially military power.

Parallel to this discussion is a debate as to whether the global role of the United States is subject to the cycle of expansion and collapse typical of historical empires—imperial overstretch. While this is a complex and multidimensional issue, the experience of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan would seem to suggest that U.S. global strategic power is subject to more severe limitations than many policy makers and analysts envisaged.

Contemporary social scientists working within the Marxist tradition draw systematically on the concept of imperialism to analyze the contemporary international system. Several issues concern them with respect to contemporary developments: in particular, the extent to which the widely recognized phenomenon of globalization represents a further phase of capitalism, with different implications from those of the classical Leninist model. Some analysts suggest that capital has become genuinely globalized (i.e., has transcended particular national identities and links to specific national states) and that there is now a major transnational component of the capitalist class that underpins efforts to forge a corresponding transnational state apparatus to manage the international system. Others suggest that capital, regardless of the increased complexity of economic composition, remains wedded to the national state and its relations are inherently conflictual, thus preserving the broad validity of the classical model.

In studying the phenomenon of imperialism, it is important to be clear what the object of analysis is. The term has been used to refer to the structure of the world economy and to the structure of global political and military relations. While these may be interrelated, they may also each be subject to different dynamics and causal processes. It may therefore be fruitful to distinguish the economic and political dimensions of imperialism and to recognize that each has, at least, a partial autonomy from the other. An understanding of the distinctive dynamics of each of these dimensions may be a necessary prerequisite to a full appreciation of the functioning of the system as a whole.

See also *Colonialism; Empire and Democracy; Globalization; Hegemony; International System; Nation-building; South (Third World); Transnationalism.*

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Impossibility Theorem

Society has a constant need to aggregate preferences. On a personal level, when making decisions, an individual has to make a rational choice based on several criteria. Taking a presidential election as an example, when deciding which candidate to vote for, the constituent has to take into consideration the candidate's previous history, political party, and program, among other factors. On a group level, voting systems are built with the purpose of extracting the decision from different voters' preferences. In this case, legislatures are the most common example. Legislatures have their own voting rules that are used to translate individual preferences into a group preference.

CONDITIONS OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM

The impossibility theorem states that it is impossible to create a voting system that will guarantee a constant set of preferences for a group corresponding to the preferences of the individuals making up that group and offer more than two reasonable choices to the individual. Kenneth Arrow proposes in *Social Choice and Individual Values* (1951) that no system could be both rational and egalitarian, and that even in a simple voting system the paradox of voting will arise. The theorem demonstrates that no voting system based on ranked preferences can possibly meet a certain set of reasonable criteria when there are three or more options from which to choose. The criteria or conditions that Arrow mentions include the following:

Rationality assumption. Social (or group) preferences should be (1) "complete" in that given a choice between alternatives

A and B, individuals from this group should say whether A is preferred to B or B is preferred to A or that there is a social indifference between A and B and (2) "transitive"; that is, individuals have to be coherent about their preferences—if A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, then A is also preferred to C.

Universal admissibility assumption. Each individual of a group may adopt any strong or weak complete and transitive preference ordering over the alternatives of a given set of alternatives.

Pareto optimality or unanimity condition. If every individual in the group prefers A to B, then socially A should be preferred to B; in other words, the group preference must reflect that A is preferred to B.

Independence from irrelevant alternatives assumption. If members of the group have their own preferences about alternatives A and B, and these preferences do not change, neither should change the group preference about alternatives A and B. This is true even if individual preferences over other (irrelevant) alternatives in the set of alternatives change. Also, social preferences should be independent of irrelevant alternatives; that is, the social preference of A compared with B should be independent of preferences for other alternatives.

Nondictatorship condition. Social or group preferences should not depend only on or be dictated by the preferences of one individual (i.e., the dictator).

For Arrow, any scheme for producing a group choice that satisfies the first four assumptions described above is either dictatorial or incoherent. In other words, there is a person who drives the group decision, or one—or more—of the group members has intransitive preferences. Shepsle and Bonchek (1997) state that Arrow's impossibility theorem implies a great trade-off: there is, in social life, a trade-off between social rationality and the concentration of power. Social organizations that concentrate power are more coherent about their decisions; meanwhile, those organizations wherein power is more dispersed are less likely to make coherent decisions.

USING THE IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM TO PREDICT VOTING RESULTS

Suppose that there are three representatives (X, Y, and Z) in Congress who have to vote for a legislative bill that allocates funds for a social program. The rankings of the three bills (B1, B2, and B3) for each of the representatives are given below. For example, Representative X rates bill 1 (B1) as the number one choice, bill 2 (B2) as the second choice, and bill 3 (B3) as the third choice.

TABLE 1

REPRESENTATIVE	B1	B2	B3
X	1	2	3
Y	2	3	1
Z	3	1	2

Another common way to represent the representative's preferences would be the following:

Representative X: B1 > B2 > B3

Representative Y: B3 > B1 > B2

Representative Z: B2 > B3 > B1

Now let us consider how the vote would go among the three possible pairs of bills. In a vote between two bills, it is assumed that our representatives would vote for the one of the two that is highest in their preferences even though their number one choice may be different from the two being considered.

In a choice between B1 and B2, the X representative would vote for B1 (remember **B1** > **B2** > B3), the Y representative would also vote for B1 (B3 > **B1** > **B2**), and the Z representative would vote for B2 (**B2** > B3 > **B1**; taking into consideration the transitivity assumption, B2 is preferred to B1). So B1 would win two-thirds of the votes, and we could say that the budget allocation set in B1 is socially preferred to B2.

In a choice between B2 and B3, the X representative would vote for B2 (B1 > **B2** > **B3**), the Y representative would vote for B3 (**B3** > B1 > **B2**), and the Z representative would vote for B2 (**B2** > **B3** > B1). As a result, B2 would win. So B2 is socially preferred to B3. Rationally, as B1 is preferred to B2 (B1 > B2) and B2 is preferred to B3 (B2 > B3), we would expect that this would imply that B1 would be preferred to B3 (B1 > B3).

However, let us consider a social choice by majority voting between B1 and B3. The X representative would vote for B1 (**B1** > B2 > **B3**), the Y representative would vote for B3 (**B3** > **B1** > B2), and the Z representative would also vote for B3 (B2 > **B3** > **B1**). So B3 is socially preferred to B1. Thus, we have the irrational result that socially, B1 is preferred to B2 and B2 is preferred to B3, but on the contrary, B3 is preferred to B1.

What Arrow was able to prove mathematically is that there is no method for constructing social preferences from arbitrary individual preferences. In other words, there is no rule, majority voting or otherwise, for establishing social preferences from arbitrary individual preferences.

See also *Agenda Control; Decision Theory, Foundations of; Electoral Formulas; Electoral Rules; Equilibrium and Chaos; Game Theory; Rational Choice Theory; Representative Systems; Social Choice Theory.*

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Impoundment

Impoundment was a historic power used by presidents of the United States to not spend funds appropriated by Congress. Successive chief executives used the authority to avoid expenditures that they disagreed with or believed were unnecessary. In 1801 Thomas Jefferson initiated impoundment when he delayed spending $50,000 that Congress had voted to fund the construction of fifteen naval gunboats to patrol the Mississippi River. Jefferson believed there was no immediate security threat on the river and that efforts to control the national debt precluded increased defense expenditures. He deferred funding the gunboats for a year. Franklin Roosevelt was also notable for his use of impoundment. Presidents argued that impoundment was one of the inherent powers of the office. In 1974, in response to the repeated use of impoundment by Richard M. Nixon in an effort to reduce public spending, Congress enacted the Budget and Impoundment Control Act, which ended the practice. Henceforth, presidents were allowed only to recommend the recession of a specific expenditure, which then had to be approved by both the House and the Senate. The loss of impoundment was one of the motivators behind efforts to enact a line-item veto power for the president.

See also *Budgeting; Checks and Balances; Separation of Powers.*

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Incrementalism

Incrementalism is a theory of decision based on the premise that actors face broad organizational and cognitive limitations in real-life situations and must deal with a complex, uncertain world, the interpretation of which is often a matter of disagreement among them. While democratic interaction is, according to Charles Lindblom and Edward Woodhouse (1993), the most efficient way to decide, an intelligent approach to analysis that aims at simplifying rather than overcoming these limitations is invaluable. Incrementalism offers a multifaceted, flexible approach to this analysis.

Although Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom's book *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (1953) introduced incrementalism as an analytical aid to decision making and it was expanded on in Lindblom (1959), its final version was tabled only in Lindblom's (1979) article, "Still Muddling, Not Yet Through."

Here Lindblom clarifies the multifaceted reality of incremental analysis by distinguishing among simple incremental analysis (limited to policies incrementally different from the status quo), disjointed incrementalism (a complex simplifying strategy limiting the analysis to familiar options, for which only limited consequences are explored; intertwining values and empirical elements, involving a remedial approach based on a trial-and-error strategy; and fragmenting the analytical work among many participants), and strategic analysis (encompassing the strategically thought and chosen stratagems that allow simplification of complex problems). The concept underwent a progressive refinement and was finally synthesized by Andrew Weiss and Edward Woodhouse (1992) as processes that (1) aid decision making by limiting analysis to familiar policies and to only some of the possible consequences they may carry, (2) employ trial-and-error methods, and (3) are more interested in remedying problems than in seeking positive goals. Incrementalism also tends to conflate values and policy goals with the empirical side of the problem (rather than order them sequentially) and to fragment the analysis among various partisan actors, each working on part of the issue.

There have been five main critiques against incrementalism. The first critique is that it is insufficiently goal oriented, but even a cursory glance to the literature will reveal that this is a baseless argument. Second is the charge that it carries an inherent conservative, proelite bias. One can refute this, however, by noting that bias depends on power distribution rather than on the model: the elites follow a pattern of decisions that favors them; incrementalism does not create this pattern. Third, incrementalism is said to be narrowly applicable, fitting only stable, noncrisis situations. Here it is worthwhile asking why nonincremental models would be better in unstable situations; crisis decision making is inherently difficult, regardless of the model chosen. Fourth, incrementalism is also charged with being vulnerable to threshold effects. Small marginal changes, which the model assumes can be easily reversed, cannot be altered if the threshold is surpassed, but this problem is common to all models of decision making. The final critique is that it is difficult to pinpoint the meaning of incrementalism, which has been applied to fields as diverse as budgeting, foreign policy, and city planning. This is a real problem; the wide array of meanings attributed to incrementalism depended both on Lindblom's delay in specifying the concept and on the liberality with which other scholars applied it. In the 1990s, neoincrementalism attempted successfully to tackle these criticisms by distilling broadly accepted definitions, bringing more precision to the discussion, and distinguishing among incrementalism as an analytical tool, as disjointed incremental strategy, and as a small-step process that involves small sequential moves.

See also *Decision Theory, Foundations of; Policy Theory.*

. . . . ANDREA MIGONE

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Incumbency

Incumbent refers to the current holder of a political office. The term is used mostly in reference to elections as candidates are often defined by their status as an incumbent or a nonincumbent because incumbency instills benefits that are elusive for nonincumbents. One of the most difficult aspects of campaigning for elected office is generating name recognition among voters, which requires money and visibility. Incumbency affords this type of advantage. To be politically viable, one needs to raise money—and in many cases, do so better than one's competition. Incumbency supplies candidates with the ability not only to call on past supporters but also to seek out new donors more easily. Contributors are more willing to donate to an incumbent because that person has already been elected once and thus has a better chance of being elected again. Last, incumbents can utilize the benefits of being in office to their advantage. They can capitalize on the esteem of their office, advertise their accomplishments and experience, and benefit from a cadre of willing supporters and staffers to assist in their election. In many respects, incumbency allows them to rely on an existing campaign structure.

See also *Campaigns.*

. . . .   RICHARD M. YON

Independence

See *Wars of Independence.*

Indian Ocean Region

The Indian Ocean region (IOR) comprises the forty-seven countries in Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australasia that share the coastal waters of the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean is the third largest world ocean, covering about 20 percent of the earth's water surface.

HISTORY

The region has the oldest heritage of international exchange in the world. The earliest urban civilizations—in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf littoral, and South Asia—were linked by seaborne commerce. In fact, early civilizations in Mesopotamia (Sumer), ancient Egypt, and the Indus Valley have developed around the Indian Ocean. For some four thousand years, the IOR was the scene of a thriving network of trade and people-to-people links. However, with the arrival of the European powers in the late fifteenth century—first

Portuguese and later Dutch, French, and British—this largely self-sustained and tightly interwoven economic, political, and cultural region was disrupted. Indian Ocean native economies were reshuffled to meet extraregional imperatives, often as suppliers of raw materials for the industrialized areas of the Northern Hemisphere. The Portuguese established a chain of fortified coastal settlements backed by regular naval patrols, which allowed them to gradually eliminate many rivals and enforce a semimonopoly in the spice trade in the region. Quickly, the Dutch, through the Dutch East India Company (1602–1798), and then the English, through the English East India Company (1600–1874), attempted to replace the monopoly of the Portuguese with a monopoly of their own.

Later, during World War I (1914–1918), World War II (1939–1945), and the cold war, the IOR was again an arena where great powers competed over resources and interests. This, coupled with South Africa's isolation during apartheid, India's inward-looking policies, and Australia's prioritization of links with East Asia and across the Pacific, created conditions that made trade investment and economic cooperation links in the region remain thin and sporadic.

Since the mid-1990s, countries belonging to the IOR have been mustering the confidence to invert their fragmented past. The attainment of this objective has been facilitated by the end of the cold war, the national economic reforms of some leading countries such as India, and the reengagement of South Africa as an important democratic state and a key regional player. This has led some countries belonging to the IOR to create trade linkages through the establishment of regional trade agreements. Besides establishing memberships in more local regional arrangements such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, and the Southern African Development Community, IOR countries have attempted to establish trade arrangements that partially cross the Indian Ocean, including the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).

IOR-ARC

IOR-ARC was launched in Mauritius in 1997. The association comprises eighteen member states: Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Egypt, Japan, China, France, and the United Kingdom are dialogue partners. Seychelles withdrew its IOR-ARC membership on July 1, 2003. The association aims to broaden cooperation among member countries in investment, tourism, construction, trade, training, environment protection, renewable energy, and agriculture. In 2009, member countries decided to establish the International Renewable Energy Agency in the United Arab Emirates. The association also includes bodies known as the Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum and the Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group. Although the charter of the organization does not provide it with an explicit mandate to engage with security issues, over the years member states

Forty-seven nations in Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australasia share the coastal waters of the Indian Ocean.

have aimed to achieve regional security and greater welfare through bilateral and multilateral relations and by strengthening the regional alliances within the framework of South-South cooperation, that is, between the developing countries of the global South.

BIMSTEC

The idea of the BIMSTEC regional cooperation project was first brought up by Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand at a meeting in Bangkok in June 1997. The aims of BIMSTEC are to create an enabling environment for rapid economic development, accelerate social progress in the subregion, and promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest. In January 2004, member countries agreed on a framework to implement a free trade agreement in trade in goods. Currently, the members of the organization are Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan, and Nepal. The regional group attempts to serve as a bridge between the five South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation countries (Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and Nepal) and two Association of Southeast Asian Nations states (Myanmar and Thailand), bringing institutional cohesion to one of the most diverse regions of the world.

The IOR is a region of vast political, cultural, and economic diversity, which has historically been united by processes of cultural interchange. It is the only major portion of the globe where all of the world's great religions are represented. But in modern times the region has been marked by great disparities in economic development and is the location of some of the world's most intractable conflicts and political disputes. However, the growth of regional cooperation and integration, embodied in IOR-ARC and BIMSTEC, might serve as an alternative mode of governance to ensure regional peace and economic development.

See also *International Organization; Trade Coalitions.*

. . . . RODRIGO TAVARES

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Indirect Elections

In an indirect election, the voters do not choose a candidate directly for office but instead choose electors who then decide whom to elect for the constituency. Indirect elections are relatively common, with perhaps the most well-known example of an indirect election involving the U.S. electoral college, which selects the president and the vice president. Other countries that elect officials via indirect elections include Germany, Italy, Greece, France, Hungary, Estonia,

Latvia, Ireland, and the Czech Republic. Some Eastern societies such as India and Pakistan select legislative officials or presidents through an indirect procedure as well. Indirect elections may have implications for democratic representation that are magnified depending on the post that is being elected.

In Europe, presidents, who typically function as heads of state, are often indirectly elected. For example, the president of the Italian Republic (*Presidente della Repubblica Italiana*) is elected by the joint vote of its lower and upper legislative bodies: the Chamber of Deputies (*Camera dei Deputati*) and the senate of the republic (*Senato della Repubblica*). The members of the German parliament (*Bundestag*) and an equal number of representatives from the federal states form the Federal Convention (*Bundesversammlung*) to elect the German president (*Bundespräsident*). Greece, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, and the Czech Republic also elect their heads of state indirectly but use only the elected parliamentary body to do so. In France, one chamber of Parliament (*Sénat*) is elected by an electoral college for a five-year term. The majority of the senators are selected by state- (*Département-*) elected representatives, and a small proportion by the elected assembly of the French living abroad who form the *Assemblée des Français de l'étranger*. Finally, the Republic of Ireland's senate (*Éireann Seanad*) is indirectly selected by various electoral bodies.

One of the most notable examples of an indirect election occurs in the United States, where the electoral college is used to elect the president. The Framers of the American Constitution wanted to ensure that the federal states would have an equal influence over the election result and simultaneously guarantee that the elected president would be chosen by sophisticated delegates and not the uninformed masses. With the electoral college, each state selects delegates equal to the number of members serving in the House of Representatives and the Senate for that particular state. The party affiliation of these delegates is determined by the winner of the popular vote in every state separately. Although, in theory, these delegates can cast their votes for the presidential candidate of their choosing, the precedent is that they vote for the candidate they have pledged to their constituents to vote for. The electoral college has been the focus of several criticisms, the first being that the presidential campaigns tend to focus on people voting in battleground or swing states. Another is that not all votes cast have an equal influence over the result. A final criticism is that the president can be elected without winning the popular vote, as evident in the 2000 election between George W. Bush and Al Gore (similar to the results in 1824, 1876, and 1888). Debate about the potential reform of the U.S. electoral college has been evident in the past, yet all reform proposals have been denied by the U.S. Congress.

Obviously, not all indirect elections are designed to serve the same cause. The majority of indirectly elected officials do not exercise substantive powers. With the noticeable exception of the American president, the post of head of state has typical and often ceremonial jurisdictions. The same holds for indirectly elected parliamentary chambers such as those in France or Ireland, as their roles are supposedly advisory and lack

significant judicial or executive authority. National govern-ments in Europe that do exercise significant power are being held accountable through direct elections.

See also *Electoral College; Electoral Formulas; Electoral Rules; Prime Minister (Head of Government); Representative Systems.*

. . . .   SPYROS KOSMIDIS

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Individual and Society

The interdependent relationship between the individual and society has been explored by classical philosophers and modern researchers, beginning with Aristotle's description of humans as social animals about twenty-five hundred years ago. At the heart of this exploration is the puzzling question of how society enters into each individual and how individuals enter into society. A central theme in Greek discussions was the balanced organization of society, so that each individual could find his or her proper role, for example, as reflected in Plato's *The Republic,* in which individuals receive training appropriate for the social position they are to occupy in an imagined ideal society. In 1516, Sir Thomas More (1478–1535) discussed another imaginary, perfect society, Utopia, in which wealth, work, and responsibilities are distributed equally and there is no private property, social classes, or even currency. Of course, utopias or perfect societies require citizens who can sustain them, and the question of how to teach people to live in and support better societies continues to be a central theme in contemporary research.

SOCIAL CONTRACTS

The interdependence of the individual and society was high-lighted in particular in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-turies through discussions of the social contract by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), John Locke (1632–1704), David Hume (1711–1776), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). It is to Rousseau that we owe the origin of the term *social contract,* or *du contrat social.* These authors were writing at a time of great industrial, economic, political, and social change and faced the challenge of justifying obedience of individuals to societal authorities. According to the logical social contract, it was assumed that sometime in the historical past, an actual contract had been agreed on between individual members of society and their rulers. This must have been the case because humans are fairly equal in their physical and mental abilities, and only through consent could leaders have obtained the cooperation of the majority to live under their authority in organized societies.

But why should individuals consent to enter into a social contract with a central authority? To this question, Hobbes (2008) provided the most direct and forceful answer: because individuals are born selfish and aggressive, and in a state of nature in which there is no central authority, life is "nasty, brutish, and short." Each individual must give up certain rights to a strong central authority so that the central authority can provide protection and prevent a war of "all against all." The Hobbesian tradition of assuming corruption and war to stem from inborn flaws in the individual is very much alive in psychologist Sigmund Freud's (1856–1939) writings, depict-ing human personality to be initially dominated by the id, which is selfish, aggressive, and governed by the pleasure prin-ciple. According to this tradition, which is very much alive in modern research, we should look to inborn characteris-tics to explain not only individual behavior but also the state of society. For example, from Francis Galton (1822–1911) in the nineteenth century to Richard Herrnstein and others in the twenty-first century, one set of researchers has argued that intelligence is basically inborn and social and economic inequalities reflect inherited ability differences. According to this logic, people at the top are there because they were born more intelligent than others.

CORRUPT SOCIETY

Rousseau set a very different tradition to explaining the relationship between the individual and society. People are born free, yet everywhere they are in chains; individuals are born good, yet there is corruption and greed everywhere. The reason, Rousseau argues, is because of the corrupt state of societies. It is corrupt institutions and cultures that cre-ate corrupt individuals. Later, Karl Marx (1818–1883) would argue this corrupt state of affairs is upheld by an ideology and false consciousness, the inability of individuals to cor-rectly perceive their own class membership and interests, and that the role of the central authority is to protect the interests of the ruling class.

This emphasis on the power of the environment to shape human behavior is endorsed by the Lockian tradition of view-ing the newborn mind as a blank slate, a tabula rasa. In the twentieth century, B. F. Skinner (1904–1990) and other behav-iorists attempted to establish a science based on the laws of learning and to demonstrate empirically how the blank slate takes shape through environmental stimuli.

INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR AND ENGAGEMENT IN SOCIETY

The decline of behaviorism and the rise of cognitive science and cultural studies have meant that the relationship between the individual and society is now studied with two major questions in mind. First, what are the universal brain charac-teristics that enable individuals to become active and engaged members of society? Second, what aspects of the environment enable society to enter into the individual and to regulate behavior? The first question has led to the study of possible

prewiring in the brain, which enables human language acquisition, moral thinking, and the like. This line of research is particularly influenced by the ideas of Noam Chomsky and by the availability of new brain-imaging technologies. Research on stem cells, robotics, and biotechnology raises the possibility that in the future, researchers will be able to make more direct and effective interventions in cases of brain abnormalities.

Although individuals do arrive in the world with their brains in some ways prewired, research also highlights brain plasticity and the foundational role of society in shaping individual behavior. In addition to the focus on biological characteristics of individuals, then, there is also research on the second question stated above, namely, those aspects of the environment that enable society to enter into the individual and to regulate behavior. Two examples are the discussions by Richard Dawkins of meme machines, a cultural unit that can be transmitted from one individual to another, and research by Fathali Moghaddam on the means by which values and other aspects of culture are spread. The rise of religious fundamentalism and terrorism has focused particular attention on sacred carriers, such as the Islamic veil and the Christian cross, that individuals believe serve to connect them with holy powers.

See also *Aristotle; Civic Engagement; Civil Society; Hobbes, Thomas; Hume, David; Locke, John; Plato; Public Good; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Social Order.*

. . . . FATHALI M. MOGHADDAM

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Individualism

Individualism is largely understood today as a normative doctrine holding the autonomy of individuals to be the final object of moral and political life. The term was originally descriptive, however, invented in the early nineteenth century to describe the atomization of European society that attended democracy's emergence after the collapse of the *ancien régime.* Scholars attribute the first public use of the word to the French conservative Joseph de Maistre, and the philosophical disciples of Henri di Saint Simon popularized it in the late 1820s and 1830s as a mournful term for the disintegration of the social whole.

The most enduring analysis of individualism as a social pathology is Alexis de Tocqueville's. In *Democracy in America* (1835, 1840), he characterized individualism as a "sentiment that disposes each citizen to cut himself off from the mass of his fellow men and withdraw into the circle of family and friends, so that, having created a little society for his own use, he gladly leaves the larger society to take care of itself" (Tocqueville 2004, 585). Tocqueville's critique of individualism as a phenomenon that dampens public involvement, depletes political virtue, and produces alienation survives into the present—inspiring Robert Bellah and his colleagues' *Habits of the Heart* (1985), one of the most popular contemporary communitarian critiques of individualism.

Individualism's vigor as an affirmative moral, political, and economic doctrine matches the vehemence of its critics. The enduring power of both the Christian ideal of individual dignity and the Enlightenment ideal of personal autonomy partly accounts for this. In the mid-nineteenth century, American philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson and British philosopher John Stuart Mill made these ideals the centerpiece of their positive normative accounts of individualism. They fortified these ideals, moreover, by positing that the individual's freedom to enact his or her inborn genius produces greater social, intellectual, and artistic goods than could ever be realized through centralized social coordination. Emersonian and Millian individualism yields a democratic political morality: the foremost obligation of individuals is to respect their own and each other's autonomy, and the objective of government is to create the social conditions necessary for citizens to realize their autonomy. The pragmatist John Dewey elaborated Emerson and Mill's conception of democratic individuality in the early twentieth century, and the political theorist George Kateb is its most eloquent spokesperson today.

Neoclassical economists and political libertarians are also counted among the twentieth century's most energetic defenders of individualism. F. A. Hayek, Milton Friedman, and Robert Nozick held that society could best honor individuals by minimizing the state's functions to just protecting private property and maintaining a competitive market economy. Reducing the role of the state to the optimization of free market competition, they argued, produces the widest range of life options and greatest life chances for individuals as well as lessens the dangers of government paternalism and tyranny.

The egalitarian liberal John Rawls responded, however, that a morally individualist theory of justice demands that government intervene in the economy to minimize material inequality. Such inequality among citizens, he claimed, is justifiable only when it is necessary to improve the position of the least well-off member of society. Because the wellspring of Rawls's egalitarianism is his basic commitment to the equal dignity of individuals, Kateb crowns Rawls's moral theory the twentieth century's "greatest statement of individualism" (Kateb 1989, 184).

The final form of individualism central to political science is methodological individualism. Methodological individualism is a doctrine of social explanation that holds that all social phenomena are descriptively reducible to interactions between persons; it denies that there are "social forces, structural features of society, [and] institutional factors" greater than the sum of the decisions and actions of society's members (Lukes 1973, 122). Articulated originally by Max Weber

in response to Hegelianism, Marxism, and Durkheimian sociology, the tenets of methodological individualism were later elaborated by Hayek and Karl Popper. The foundation of neoclassical economics, methodological individualism opposes historical materialism. At the same time, its chief contemporary exponent—Jon Elster—has sought to reconcile Marxist social analysis with methodological individualism.

See also *Civil Society; Communitarianism; Freedom; Libertarianism; Maistre, Joseph Marie de; Pragmatism; Rawls, John; Tocqueville, Alexis de.*

. . . .   JACK TURNER

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Industrial Democracy

In its most general form *industrial democracy* refers to employees' right to be involved in the decision-making process at the workplace. In some countries such as Germany and Sweden, so-called codetermination between employers and employees is a matter of law (since 1976 in Germany with the *Mitbestimmungesesetz* and since 1978 in Sweden with the *Medbestämmandelagen*), while in other countries similar arrangements are regulated in collective agreements between employers and workers. Since 1994 a European Union directive has existed that requires larger firms with operations in several European countries to create so-called European Works Councils, mainly to create a platform for consultation.

In its weakest form industrial democracy consists of mere information and consultation practices at the firm level. In its strongest form it means workers' absolute workplace control, most often combined with ownership/control of the means of production. The arguments presented in favor of industrial democracy are that fewer hierarchy and authoritarian structures create less industrial disputes, improve decision-making processes at the workplace and firm levels, increase the employees' commitment to corporate objectives, and increase productivity as well as job satisfaction.

At the same time, industrial democracy is a highly contested concept based on different national traditions and historical conjectures. In central European states, including Germany but also in Scandinavia, it is often equated with codetermination and implies collective rights and obligations. It is either based on law or included in general collective agreements. Moreover, arrangements that give workers a permanent place on company boards and in other governing bodies without opting for ownership—codetermination—are frequent here. Workers' representation in such bodies is chosen either directly by the employees or indirectly by a local or central trade union. In its most radical version, industrial democracy is closely linked with the concept of economic democracy, which implies workers' control in the form of ownership over a firm or industry as a whole. One example of such a scheme was the so-called wage earners fund proposed by Rudolf Meidner in Sweden in 1975, according to which trade unions gradually would take over the ownership of private firms.

In Anglo-Saxon countries such as Great Britain and the United States, industrial democracy most often denotes a situation of workplace control wherein the workers have control over their own immediate working conditions, the work process, working-time arrangements, and implementation of health regulations. Such control is based on local trade unions or on informal workshop arrangements. Hence the concept here is based on individual and local rights and obligations, and as such it has a long pedigree. A historical reference can be drawn to the British nineteenth-century shop steward system. The shop stewards were skilled workers who were able to dominate the work process in a certain workplace. Even though mechanization and scientific management (created by Frederick Winslow Taylor and others) did much to destroy such workplace control by skilled workers after World War I (1914–1918), it has remained a vital ideal, for example, in Britain. Industrial democracy in this version is often referred to as "craft" or "guild" socialism. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries it was also often combined with a wish to establish small-scale cooperative forms of ownership.

In the beginning of the twentieth century industrial democracy was often recognized in relation to a wider anarcho-syndicalist movement that was particularly influential in southern European states such as Spain and Italy but also in the United States. Industrial democracy as interpreted by the syndicalists was close to revolutionary socialism but at the same time highly critical of state socialism in its authoritarian version, especially that which developed in Soviet Russia after 1917. In contrast to the communists, the syndicalists emphasized the role of workplace control and cooperative ownership on the local level. In the United States the syndicalist Industrial Workers of the World

(formed in 1905) sought to organize all workers in one big union that with the help of the general strike, would overthrow capitalism and establish local ownership of the means of production. In Spain during its civil war (1936–1939), experiments in this direction were undertaken but failed in their purpose as a consequence of the defeat of the Spanish republic in 1939.

Gradually, however, almost everywhere such radical interpretations of industrial democracy have declined in importance. Today, most would interpret them as some form of codeterminism aiming to enhance corporate aims such as high productivity and look upon them as a means to achieve aims in which both employers and employees have a common stake.

See also *Capitalism and Democracy; Democracies, Advanced Industrial; Labor Strikes; Labor Unions; Postindustrial Society; Syndicalism.*

. . . . LARS MAGNUSSON

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Inequality

See *Equality and Inequality; Urban Inequality and Poverty.*

Inference

Inferential techniques allow researchers to learn something about unknown phenomena from known evidence or data. There are chiefly two types of inference: descriptive inference involves extracting useful explanations from masses of evidence; causal inference pinpoints the explanatory factors, frequently suggested by theory, underlying the available data or evidence. Scientific inference, and prediction thereof, usually deploys causal hypothesis testing in which a set of factors accounts for possible outcomes under particular conditions. The fundamental problem of causal inference describes the uncertainty regarding the underlying explanatory factors' being the real causes of the outcomes described. Both supporters and critics of inferential techniques note the influence of omitted factors or variables, difficulty of measuring what is being measured (problems of validity), and impossibility of ever knowing that the same causal factors caused the outcome over and over given that exact experiments cannot be repeated under real-world conditions (problems of

reliability). Methodologists argue that many of these problems can be dealt with by increasing the set of data observations available to make inferences. In their view, expansive data sets will minimize random variations (noise). Critics of inference, nevertheless, argue that alternative techniques such as use of rich contextual information (as in anthropology, e.g.) and path dependence (as in psychoanalysis) are equally good, if not better, techniques for building theory.

See also *Causal Inference; Path Dependencies; Qualitative Methodologies; Quantitative Analysis; Reliability and Validity Assessment.*

. . . . J. P. SINGH

Information, Freedom of

See *Freedom of Information.*

Information Society

Australian economist Colin Clark stressed the dominance of different sectors of an economy at different stages of its development and modernization, thus leading to the recognition of the three basic sectors: agriculture, industry, and service. The dominance of each sector was brought about by revolutions, especially in the agricultural and industrial sectors, thus emphasizing the significance of the agricultural revolution and the industrial revolution.

THREE WAVES OF SOCIETY

In the 1960s American writer and futurist Alvin Toffler focused on the role these sectors played in the so-called waves or revolutions in society in his book titled *The Third Wave*. The three types of societies, based on the concept of waves, each wave pushing the older societies and cultures aside, are (1) the first wave or the agricultural age brought about by the agricultural revolution, (2) the second wave or the industrial age brought about by the industrial revolution, and (3) the third wave or the information or knowledge age brought about by the information or knowledge revolution. The first wave produced an agrarian society, which replaced the first hunter-gatherer cultures. The second wave produced an industrial society, which was based on mass production, mass distribution, mass consumption, mass education, mass media, mass recreation, mass entertainment, and weapons of mass destruction. These characteristics combined with standardization, centralization, concentration, and synchronization and ended up with a style of organization called "bureaucracy," which dominated the industrial age. The third wave produced the current postindustrial society. Toffler's third wave was the product of the two previous waves or revolutions in the way humans have organized their economic affairs (agricultural and industrial). Toffler himself coined many phrases to describe what is taking place: "super-industrial society," "Space Age," "Electronic Era," "Global Village," "scientific-technological revolution," and the concurrent phenomena of "demassification," "diversity," "knowledge-based production," and "acceleration of change."

The current focus of attention is on this third wave that some have described as the dawn of the information society. It is a part of the postindustrial and knowledge society that some have described as the new age, spelling utopia for some (the optimists) and dystopia for others (the skeptics). This information revolution or knowledge revolution is characterized by the dominance of information and communications technology (ICT) and emphasizes the role of digital technologies such as the computer, the cell phone, the Internet, and so forth. It is part of a social revolution that moved the world from a traditional to a modern and now to a hypercomplex society, which in the early 1960s recognized the importance and value of information and knowledge.

THE RISE OF TECHNO-SERVICE INDUSTRIES

The origins of the idea of an information society can be traced to the work of Fritz Machlup, who in 1958 first categorized knowledge and information tasks separately from normal industrial and social activities. During that time period he claimed that 29 percent of America's gross national product came from these knowledge industries.

In the early 1970s Daniel Bell introduced the idea of the rise of the individualized, knowledge-adept social actor as one of the most respected elements of the information age. Manuel Castells in the 1980s proposed that ICTs have produced a new kind of society, the network society, characterized by the world's being brought closer together but also experiencing increasing social fragmentation and dislocation. According to Castells, this rise of a techno-service society has resulted in a social revolution, a new economy, and an information politics where those who control information—the technocrats—control power and replace the rule of wealth, landed estates, military power, and religion that has typified previous societies. The character of democratic accountability and participation in the information age is changing. There are problems of access as well as control of the public space of the Internet. There are also the political problems of privacy and censorship. Others worry about the decline of the state as a result of the distrust of government. New methods of communication brought about by changes in information technologies allow individuals to confront the state, which some consider to be outdated and no longer the most efficient way to organize society, if it ever was.

So how does one describe the techno-service economy and its offspring, the information society? The techno-service economy is made up of a diverse group of people who have a wide range of skills and training. The characteristics of the service economy are the following: (1) services are intangible, immaterial, and consumed on the spot; (2) it involves closeness between the giver of the service and the consumer; and (3) the service worker seeks to create rapport between himself and the client. The service economy in the past had the reputation of being composed entirely of low-skilled, poorly paid, dead-end jobs. The advent of technology has changed the nature of service and the characteristics of the people performing them: more skilled, more capital intensive, and more dependent on technology. Among the most educated people in society today are those who work in, operate, and control the information economy.

The size of the information sector has grown rapidly. The concomitant information society would be shaped by the use and deployment of ICTs including computers and other electronic and audiovisual media such as the television, the phone, and the cell phone, which clearly have transformed the way we live and work. At the heart of the information society as mediated by communication is the decentering of communications so that individuals can remake society by remaking their communications network, thus leading to the empowerment of the individual and his or her communicative potential. Lewis Mumford uses the term "democratic technics" to describe the ability of technology to allow for democratic self-government with free communication between equals and unimpeded access to the common store of knowledge. These are emerging because of ICTs' ability to make such flows a reality. The information society conceived as democratic technics allows individuals to express themselves outside mass parties and overcome class identities. Gone is the control of information by the expert.

With the ease and universality of access lies the key to the information technology revolution and the society that is developing around it. In the age of computers with ever-growing storage capacity, interactivity, and processing power, we have a potentially dangerous tool because the revolution is irreversible—like nuclear energy, its power needs to be controlled if it is to work for our benefit. The computer is an empowering tool because of access to information and communication, but it can also be an implement of control, giving unlimited power to those who control the information that it stores. The dilemma is how to resolve that issue.

Toffler talked about a "future shock" from the inability to keep up with the accelerating changes of the information age. It is not unusual to talk about the following types of information: misinformation, disinformation, overinformation, or information overload, which contributes to noise and boredom. Thus, in our information-dependent society those who possess information can derive real power from it, and the loss of empowerment can be caused by its absence. It could therefore be the goal of ICT in politics to enhance the efficiency of delivery methods in terms of voting, political participation, and so forth so that democracy can be maintained and enhanced.

See also *Blogs and Bloggers; E-governance, E-voting, E-democracy, E-politics; Information Technology and Politics; Network Society.*

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Information Technology and Politics

The information technology revolution is transforming business and the economy, leading to the creation of entirely new markets and the transformation (and sometimes destruction) of old ones. Its consequences for politics are more subtle but equally profound. New technologies—including most particularly the Internet but also advances in telecommunications, in cryptography, in database and data-mining techniques, and other innovations—are not leading to the immediate and radical transformation of politics as some predicted. But they are demonstrably reshaping key areas of political activity, including electoral campaigns, political participation, and interstate relations.

The most important—and controversial—area where information technology and politics intersect is the Internet. The Internet in its early years appeared unlikely to be consequential for politics. Its core user base was restricted to academics and researchers who were comfortable with the often technically demanding tools that were required to access it. However, the advent of the World Wide Web, which was initially based on the simple text formatting language hypertext markup language (HTML) and a set of associated protocols, made it much easier for individuals without technical skills to use the Internet. These individuals could use browsers such as Mosaic (released in 1993) and Netscape Navigator (released in 1994) to access online content easily. The decision of the U.S. government (which still effectively had final say over important aspects of the Internet) to allow commercial use of the Internet further helped to precipitate an explosion in online activity.

Early debates about the political consequences of the Internet focused on whether it would weaken the power of states. Many prominent early adopters of the technology were strongly libertarian and embraced the technology because it seemed to offer a solution to the problems of government censorship and control. Over time, these debates gave way to a rough empirical consensus as it became increasingly clear that governments were both willing and able to regulate new information and communication technologies. Thus, for example, claims about how the Internet rendered censorship nearly impossible were undermined by the ability of states such as China and Saudi Arabia to shape their domestic communications networks in ways that made censorship easier (although far from perfect). Ready access to new forms of cryptography did not empower individuals, although it did help foster e-commerce. Indeed, new information technologies potentially empowered states to do things that they would previously have had difficulty doing. For example, cheap storage and vast increases in computer power allowed states to collect and order vast amounts of data about their citizens and perhaps to mine the data for interesting and otherwise nonobvious relationships.

The resurgence of the state, together with the more ready availability of empirical data, has transformed debates about the impact of new information technologies on politics. Rather than making broad arguments about whether new technologies are likely to result in secular changes to the political system, scholars are beginning to try to identify more specific mechanisms through which these new technologies may have particular consequences for specific areas of politics. Some of these mechanisms are beginning to become apparent but have as yet received little academic attention. For example, the vast increase in the availability of technical information about government and politics is surely affecting the balance of political power, yet we know very little about who is accessing this information and how they are using it. The political consequences will be quite different depending on whether the information is used by ordinary citizens, by specialized actors, or by partisan operatives. Other mechanisms have attracted more attention. Much work has been done on how the Internet affects politicians' electoral strategies, and work is beginning to emerge on its consequences for citizens' political attitudes. Scholars are also beginning to examine broader forms of politics, asking whether the Internet affects nondemocratic countries' prospects for democratization and about the degree of political interdependence between states in a globalized world. The rest of this article will briefly survey how information technology is affecting political polarization and electoral politics in the United States and how it is affecting international interdependence and the politics of democratization. This provides at least the beginnings of an overview of how political scientists are beginning to take account of the impact of information technology on American politics, international relations, and comparative politics.

POLITICAL POLARIZATION

There is consensus among scholars of American politics that the past few decades have seen more polarized politics, although scholars disagree about whether this polarization results from the interactions of parties and politicians or from deeper divisions in the electorate. A significant body of recent work has explored the extent to which greater media choice helps spur polarization.

The basic logic of this argument is laid out in Markus Prior's 2007 book *Post-broadcast Democracy.* Prior uses data from cable television to argue that increased media choice allows individuals with little direct interest in politics, who tend to be moderate in their views, to avoid exposure to political information more easily. This makes them less likely to become mobilized around political issues. In contrast, people with a strong interest in politics, who tend to be more partisan than the average, can consume political information more easily, making them more likely to become mobilized along partisan lines. Thus, politically apathetic moderates are able to escape politics more easily, whereas politically interested partisans have more opportunity to consume political information and hence to engage in political activity.

The Internet provides a much greater profusion of choices than does cable television; thus, we may expect it to have even starker consequences for polarization. As a result, scholars such as Cass Sunstein (2001), in *Republic.com,* have explicitly worried that the Internet is likely to lead to increased balkanization and polarization. Sunstein argues that the Internet leads to less cross-exposure between people with different points of view and hence weaker tendencies toward moderation and mutual tolerance. He uses experimental data from social psychology to underline his claim that people are likely to adopt increasingly extreme positions when they talk only to others who share their points of view.

The empirical data appear to offer at least some support to Prior's and Sunstein's arguments (even if they have little to say about the normative concerns underpinning Sunstein's fears). Lada Adamic and Natalie Glance (2005) have shown using network data about hyperlinks between blogs (the most important online forum for political discussion in the United States) that blogs are clearly polarized. Left-leaning bloggers tend overwhelmingly to link to other left-wingers, while right-wing bloggers link overwhelmingly to other right-wingers. There are similarly sharp differences in the kinds of nonblog content that left-wing and right-wing bloggers tend to link to. Henry Farrell, Eric Lawrence, and John Sides (forthcoming) find that blog readers are demonstrably more polarized on topical political issues than consumers of traditional news media (including viewers of obviously partisan networks such as Fox News).

Even so, Eszter Hargittai and her colleagues (2008) find no evidence that this polarization is increasing over time, and they use qualitative data to point to the existence of real (albeit only occasional) substantive discussion between left-wing and right-wing bloggers. This suggests that blogs are more than mere echo chambers, even if bloggers' arguments are largely conducted along partisan lines. Furthermore, there are also online spaces that are not as directly polarized where people are indeed exposed frequently to differing points of view; Wojcieszak and Mutz (forthcoming) find that hobby discussion forums regularly lead to political discussion and expose people to others with differing points of view.

ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS

Information technology plays a key role in electoral campaigning, especially in the United States. Data mining, microtargeting on the basis of extensive electronic data, and Internet communication are important components of the political consultant's toolkit. Yet the role of these technologies has changed dramatically over time and can be expected to change further. Bruce Bimber and Richard Davis (2003) studied the role of new technologies in the 2000 election by examining largely static candidates' Web sites. By 2004, Democrats had begun to explore the Internet's potential for electronic fund-raising, while Republicans sought to combine traditional social networks with microtargeting techniques borrowed from advertising. In 2008, both major party presidential candidates tried to build participatory Web sites that would spur activist involvement and to create online systems that would integrate information from volunteers with other forms of data to allow more sophisticated targeting of voters.

Political scientists have had some difficulty in keeping up with this breakneck pace of developments. Nonetheless, they have begun to arrive at some provisional conclusions regarding the consequences of new technologies for elections. First, and most important, there is no evidence to date that the Internet itself plays a major role in mobilizing voters. Experimental research by David Nickerson (2007) finds no evidence that targeted e-mail affects either voter registration or voter turnout. This is not to say that online activity has no consequences whatsoever for participation. Donald Green and Alan Gerber find that MoveOn.org's mobilization efforts in the 2004 elections had a statistically significant and positive effect on voter turnout. MoveOn.org consists of a skeletal organizational structure combined with a massive e-mail list; while it did not use e-mail as a form of voter contact, it certainly used e-mail to organize the volunteers who then made face-to-face contact with potential voters.

There is clearer evidence that information technology is consequential in allowing politicians to gather information about voters from various databases and use it to narrowly target advertising at likely swing voters. Sunshine Hillygus and Todd Shields (2008) argue that new data-mining techniques have helped politicians to find and use "wedge issues" that are aimed at realigning voters who disagree with their party on one or more key issues. By analyzing voters' consumption patterns, media choices, and so on, it may be easier to identify "persuadable" voters and send them specifically targeted messages that are designed to stop their voting from their usual party and, ideally, defect to the other side.

Electoral fund-raising in the United States is being transformed by the Internet. Typically, candidates have had to turn either to major donors (who may want quid pro quos) or to mailing lists of smaller donors, which are expensive and difficult to maintain. In contrast, the Internet allows candidates to raise money from small donors with very little overhead. The evidence suggests that this may have impressive consequences. In the 2008 presidential campaign, the Democratic candidate Barack Obama attracted literally millions of donors to give via the Internet and hence found it to his advantage to forgo public matching funds that would have limited his overall fund-raising. While the Internet has greatly increased the pool of potential donors, there is little empirical evidence available as to what these donors (especially small donors) look like, as compared with previous generations of donors. However, on the basis of raw numbers, it is likely that large donors and individuals able to bundle large numbers of donations together are likely to be less influential than in the past and that insurgent primary candidates with little support in the party machine will find it easier than before to raise sufficient money to put together a serious challenge.

GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE

One of the most important themes of international relations scholarship over the past thirty years has been the increase in interdependence between different countries. States

increasingly find that their policy choices are intertwined with the choices made by other states, creating incentives to manage unwanted side effects through a variety of bilateral and multilateral arrangements. As Suzanne Berger (2000) has argued, this has led to increasing controversy as international relationships have come to impinge on sensitive domestic issues. New information technologies have considerably exacerbated these tensions, potentially undermining previously existing national bargains regarding pornography, gambling, intellectual property, and controversial political content. States that seek to limit their citizens' access to these goods may find it difficult to prevent citizens from accessing this content via overseas Web sites. This is particularly likely to be a problem for democracies (such as the United States) that have ruled out the kinds of far-reaching controls over Internet communications that authoritarian regimes frequently impose. Such states may seek to defend their values, and indeed spread them, by pressing private actors that are present in multiple jurisdictions into service on their behalf. Such private actors may extend the effective reach of states beyond their own jurisdictions. However, by the same token, they may impose adjustment costs on other states, presenting the problem of interdependence again in a new form.

The U.S. domestic gambling regime is an excellent example of how the Internet exacerbates problems of interdependence. While many states within the United States allow gambling, federal laws that restrict gambling across state lines have been interpreted as banning Internet gambling. This prompted gambling operators to open operations overseas in jurisdictions such as Antigua, the United Kingdom, and Gibraltar that were accessible to (and marketed to) U.S. citizens but that were beyond the effective reach of U.S. authorities. These operations proved highly successful, presenting U.S. authorities with a clear challenge to their authority.

The U.S. response was to use private actor intermediaries to seek to reimpose controls on U.S. citizens' online gambling. U.S. authorities forced financial intermediaries (such as credit card companies) and carriers of advertising (such as cable television and U.S.-based Web sites) to stop cooperating with offshore gambling operations targeted at the United States. In late 2006, the U.S. Congress passed legislation that cemented this regime, making it unambiguously clear that financial institutions that cooperated with illegal Internet gambling sites were breaking the law.

These measures have had only limited success. While they have certainly made it more difficult for U.S. citizens to gamble online, they have not stopped them. While hard data are difficult to come by, there is strong circumstantial evidence that illegal Internet gambling is thriving in the United States. Not only is it difficult for financial intermediaries properly to monitor the relevant transactions, but financial institutions have incentive to do only the bare minimum that the law requires of them. However, they have clearly imposed substantial adjustment costs on third-party jurisdictions. Antigua, which had been home to many offshore gambling companies, saw its local gambling industry collapse as a result of U.S.

sanctions and sought remedy at the World Trade Organization, with some success. The United Kingdom saw billions of dollars wiped off the value of UK-listed companies and significant burdens placed on UK-based financial services firms that had little choice but to comply with the U.S. regime if they wished to retain significant contacts in the United States.

In summary, the U.S. response illustrates how states may respond to problems of interdependence in ways that exacerbate these problems for other states. As the Internet and other forms of global communication place continued pressure on sensitive domestic bargains concerning social values, we may expect to see more tensions like this emerge.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

There has been much discussion among media and policy elites about the possibility that the Internet, cell phones, and text messaging will further the spread of democracy. Most famously, former U.S. president Bill Clinton claimed that liberty would spread in this century "by cell phone and cable modem" and that trying to control the Internet was like trying to "nail Jello to the wall." However, although there is some evidence that information technology has been used by democracy activists, there is remarkably scant evidence that this technology has played a decisive role. While journalists describe, for example, the 2009 political unrest in Iran as the "Twitter revolution," the preliminary evidence suggests that Twitter (an online communication tool) did little to help organize protests on the ground. Cell-phone text messaging did play a significant role in coordinating action in prodemocratic revolutions in the Philippines, the Ukraine, and elsewhere, but there is no way of showing that these revolutions would not have taken place, or would not have been successful, in the absence of these technologies. In a detailed examination of eight cases of authoritarian regimes, Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor Boas (2003) find that the Internet and related technologies are not necessarily a threat to authoritarian regimes. More recent work by Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, Jonathan Zittrain, and their colleagues (2008) finds that the Internet has become increasingly balkanized, as governments in both authoritarian and nonauthoritarian regimes have succeeded in filtering Internet access for their citizens. Thus, early optimistic suggestions that the Internet was sliced freedom have turned out to be badly wrong.

Indeed, the aggregate evidence suggests strongly that the causal arrow runs in the opposite direction. Helen Milner (2006) finds strong evidence that differences in regime type explain many of the lags in Internet diffusion. Authoritarian governments are less likely to allow the Internet to be easily diffused within their borders both because authoritarian leaders fear the consequences of open communication and because powerful domestic actors (such as telecommunications monopolies) are in a better position to impede developments that might hurt their profits.

However, there is some reason to believe that the Internet, along with other communications technologies, may foster

increased democratization over the longer term. Marc Lynch (2007) suggests that the Internet is less important because it empowers democracy activists to foment revolution than because it allows new "public spheres" of citizen debate and discourse, which are not under state control, to emerge. Historically, such public spheres have been linked to increases in government accountability and, perhaps, the eventual adoption of democracy. Rebecca MacKinnon's (2008) work on the Internet in China provides some support for Lynch's arguments; she finds that Western efforts to protect Chinese dissidence on the Internet may be counterproductive and suggests that benign neglect, which would allow less overtly political forms of debate to flourish, may be the better approach.

CONCLUSION

Measuring the impact of new information technologies such as the Internet on politics is still a work in progress. However, over the past ten years, there have been significant advances in our understanding of the consequences of these technologies. A set of initial debates that concerned very broad questions of the state and politics has largely been replaced by a set of more specific debates surrounding more particular consequences of the Internet for specific aspects of politics.

This is genuine progress. While early arguments helped set the tone for later discussions, they were for the most part conducted without the benefit of good data and information. By focusing on narrower mechanisms of change—and bringing good empirical information to bear on these mechanisms—we are finally making some genuine advances in our understanding of how information technology affects politics. This is not to say that scholars should refrain from tackling the large, secular questions of how these technologies are coming to reshape politics, but they will be doing so on much firmer ground if they build up from micro- and meso-level mechanisms and data. That the study of the Internet and politics is becoming more prosaic is by no means necessarily a bad thing.

See also *Blogs and Bloggers; Cryptography; Cybersecurity; Internet and Politics; Network Society; Telecommunications Policy.*

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Initiative and Referendum

The initiative, a type of direct democracy, allows voters by petition to place one or more constitutional and statutory propositions on the referendum ballot. Propositions also may be placed on the referendum ballot automatically by a constitution (illustrated by the question of convening a constitutional convention placed on the New York State ballot every twenty years) and by legislative bodies.

The initiative dates to 1715 when the Massachusetts General Court authorized voters by petition to require the town selectmen to include specific articles in the warrant (fixed agenda) calling a town meeting. Several post-1830 Swiss cantonal constitutions granted voters authority to place constitutional questions on the ballot by the "imperative petition" of voters. The new federal constitution of Switzerland in 1848 required all cantons to adopt the device that also could be used to place proposed amendments to the national constitution on the referendum ballot. The Vaud cantonal constitution in 1845 authorized placement of proposed statutes on the ballot by petition.

The 1883 California State Legislature enacted a law on incorporation of municipal corporations to implement the home rule article in the 1879 constitution. The law provided

for the placement of the question of incorporating a city on the referendum ballot by a petition signed by one hundred voters. Agrarian discontent in the post–civil war period gave birth to the National People's Party (Populist), which at its first convention in 1892 adopted a platform calling for adoption of the initiative and protest (petition) referendum on recently enacted laws. In 1898, South Dakota voters approved an initiative-protest referendum constitutional amendment, and San Francisco freeholders adopted a new city-county charter providing for both devices. Currently in the United States, twenty-three state constitutions and the Utah Code authorize state voters to use the device, and a statute or local charter authorizes voters in many local governments to use the device. The direct initiative may be used to place a proposed amendment proposition on the referendum ballot in sixteen states and to enact statutes in seven states provided the required number and distribution of signatures are certified. The indirect initiative, employed in nine states, requires voters to collect a specified number of certified signatures before the proposition is referred to the legislature. Its failure to enact the proposition during a stipulated time period results in the proposition's being placed on the referendum ballot. Additional signatures must be collected to place a state proposition on the ballot in Massachusetts, Ohio, and Utah if the legislature fails to enact the proposition. Massachusetts and Mississippi are the only states with constitutions authorizing the indirect constitutional initiative. The constitutions of Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, and Washington authorize the legislature to place a substitute proposition on the ballot.

Proponents argue that the initiative empowers voters to enact provisions in the face of an unresponsive legislative body beholden to special interests, thereby making it more representative, and that it is a voter civic education device. Opponents contend the initiative authorizes a minority of the voters to make binding decisions, overburdens voters with propositions, and allows special interest groups to achieve their goals.

The referendum, a type of direct democracy allowing voters to make policy decisions, originated in the fifteenth century in the *Landsgemeinde* in several Swiss communes that formed leagues and authorized voters by referendum to accept or reject league policy decisions. The Massachusetts Bay Colony held a referendum in 1640, and voters ratified the first Massachusetts constitution in a referendum in 1780. By 1860, the constitutional referendum and the statutory referendum in most states relative to the issuance of full faith and credit bonds had become established. The term *plebiscite* is used to describe primarily a nation's voters deciding a question of great public importance.

The UK parliament is premised on the leadership-feedback theory positing voters elect leaders to make all laws after receiving citizen feedback on proposed laws. In consequence, a nationwide referendum was not held until 1975 when voters approved joining the European Community (now European Union). Other parliamentary nations with written constitutions, such as Ireland and Italy, hold periodic referenda on proposed amendments and on questions such as the enlargement of the union. Parliament is free to place propositions on the ballot at any time.

A constitution or charter may require a periodic mandatory referendum on a specified question and mandatory voter approval prior to initiation of action on certain matters, or it may be permissive on most other subjects. A local option referendum allows local government voters to decide whether they wish to adopt a specific state law. The petition or protest referendum originated in Switzerland, was promoted by Populists and Progressives in the United States, and is enshrined in the constitutions of twenty-three states and the Utah Code in the United States and numerous local governments. The device allows voters by petition during a sixty- to ninety-day period to suspend implementation of a newly enacted statute or ordinance until a referendum is held to determine whether the law should be repealed. The device is not used often to repeal state laws, but its use is more common in local governments. It should be noted that the initiative may be used to repeal a state law by referendum.

See also *Direct Democracy; Petition; Voting Procedures.*

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Injustice

See *Justice and Injustice.*

Inner Cities

Inner city refers to the decaying central area of a major city, urban metropolis, or conurbation, comprising the most deprived neighborhoods around the central business district. It is different from the rest of the city in a number of its characteristics: it is an area affected by long-term urban infrastructure decay, poor housing conditions, and lack of basic modern social amenities; it is inhabited by a low-income population,

usually ethnic minorities; and it has high unemployment rates, low school standards, and high crime rates. However, not all cities' areas around the central business district have these physical and social characteristics. On the contrary, in some major cities the ring around the business center is the area where the upper social classes live, and the periphery of the city is where the low-income people reside. In this article, *inner city* means the physical, economic, and socially deprived areas around the city center, containing all or some of those characteristics mentioned above and having been the target of special public policies. These inner-city policies include diverse types of policy measures, applied differently in each city, with different urbanistic discourses adopted over the years, ranging from modern urbanism to new urbanism. For that reason, any generalization must be considered with caution, given the diversity of inner-city areas, the variety of inner-city policies around the world, and the strong overlap of influences and practices from one policy period or generation to the next.

The first generation of inner-city policies, implemented from the 1960s until the 1980s, defined inner-city problems essentially in social terms, in the sense that the inner city's problems should be addressed mainly through social programs carried out by local and central government departments. The aim of these policy measures was to improve these dispossessed neighborhoods through public investments in infrastructures, social welfare services, professional training, and crime prevention, among other social measures, including also the reduction of physical rehabilitation costs through the removal of buildings in brownfield sites, for example. These urban renewal projects were inspired by modern urbanism, with its principles of functional specialization, and led to the demolition of derelict housing and its replacement by tower blocks. It was an urban model easy to implement, a model that provided housing with modern amenities and open spaces where they did not previously exist but that, in some cases, was also responsible for a lower sense of community, for a decrease in the intensity of social life compared with what existed before, and for gentrification due to rises in rents and prices of homes. Economic development policy was based on public subsidies, tax incentives to encourage private investment, and other forms of support in favor of inner-city investors. The overall evaluation of the first generation of inner-city programs suggests that in numerous places in Europe (e.g., in the United Kingdom: London, Birmingham, Sheffield), in North America (e.g., Baltimore), and in other countries, besides physical improvements (e.g., reduction of preexisting densities, improved housing conditions and public space standards), they failed to eradicate part of the social and economic problems they were supposed to solve.

The second generation of inner-city policies, from the 1980s onward, looked at the inner city essentially as an economic problem, contrary to the first approach that saw it primarily as a social issue. The new vision emerged in the context of wider political and ideological shifts on both sides of the Atlantic, epitomized by the Reagan administration in the United States and the Thatcher government in the United Kingdom. Conceived mainly as a problem of economic competitiveness, the regeneration of inner cities was seen as requiring policy instruments different from those used before to create dynamic economies in and around the inner-city area, based on economic sectors in which the inner city had real competitive advantage. It included initiatives such as enterprise zones and empowerment zones, among other similar instruments. There are many examples of this approach all over the world, involving in some cases the creation of private or public-private entities to run the development process (e.g., London Docklands and its Urban Development Corporation, Hong Kong and its Land Development Corporation and Urban Renewal Authority). For the proponents of this new vision, the competitive advantage of inner cities resulted from factors such as their locations, especially their access and proximity to transportation and to the central business district, the size and characteristics of their own consumer markets, and the availability and diversification of their workforces, among other factors. On the other hand, the new approach argued that the regeneration process, contrary to what happened before, should be conducted by private corporations and through special programs for the promotion of homeownership seen as the best answer to gentrification.

Since the 1990s, a third generation of inner-city policies is replacing the previous one as part of a more general shift in the mainstream discourse on urbanism. Cultural urbanism is now seen as the key driver for urban regeneration in the inner city and in other parts of the city as well (e.g., in Barcelona, Buenos Aires, Canberra, and Shanghai, to mention just a few cases). This includes the promotion of iconic architecture, the hosting of large-scale events as place promotion, and the creation of a new image for the inner city, its brand image, as part of a larger project for the cultural city.

See also *Local Politics; Mayor; Urban Housing; Urban Inequality and Poverty.*

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Inspector General

Inspectors general are found throughout bureaucratic and military apparatuses around the world. The main purpose of an inspector general is to ensure efficiency and compliance with standards of mission statements for bureaucracies or standards of military service. Inspectors general are often recognized for their expertise within their field and in many countries are high-ranking, well-educated bureaucrats. As the head of inspections and audits for the bureaucratic departments, inspectors general investigate fraud and misappropriations of funds, time, and equipment. They also work to protect whistle-blowers, government workers who bring attention to a serious problem within their agencies. In addition, offices of inspectors general evaluate and audit programs provided by the bureaucratic departments and provide recommendations to heads of state and other interested parties, such as legislatures.

Much of an inspector general's work is in the capacity of finding wrongdoing rather than identifying good practices and making positive recommendations. Inspectors general perform many types of audits, including internal, external, financial, and performance audits. Internal audits focus on a bureaucracy or military agency, where inspectors examine the agency from within, while external audits are performed on contractors the agency has hired to perform a specific task. Financial audits focus on where the money has gone and whether the money allocated to certain projects has been properly spent, and performance audits look at the mission statement of an agency and evaluate whether the agency and its employees are performing up to standards. Although they work within agencies, inspectors attempt to remain impartial; however, objectivity sometimes comes into question when the motives of investigations and audits seem political. Opposing factions within government may request agency audits to search for wrongdoing that will allow them to reduce allocations to that agency.

Older conceptualizations of the inspector general were deeply rooted in the need for organization, efficiency, and compliance in police and military affairs. From these themes modern bureaucracies have taken these initiatives to create better government. More recently, a growing number of private agencies have begun offering inspection services to government and industry to ensure compliance with national and international laws.

See also *Attorney General; Bureaucracy; Civil Service.*

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Institutionalism

See *Institutionalism, Comparative; New Institutionalism.*

Institutionalism, Comparative

In comparative politics, like in other subfields of political science, the starting point of the contemporary institutionalist scholarship is the idea of "bringing the state back in," which became a rallying cry in the 1980s. Reacting to intellectual trends such as Marxism and system theory, this type of scholarship emphasized state autonomy and the structuring role of state institutions (i.e., formal and informal norms and rules) in political life. This push for a more systematic analysis of the state was grounded in the assumption that state actors and institutions do more than simply reflect material interests. In fact, a major institutionalist belief is that institutions mediate the concrete political impact of such interests. That is not to say that institutions are the only influential factor in politics but rather that institutions should become a focal point of comparative political analysis. Interestingly, even when institutionalist scholars work on only one country, they typically need to refer to other polities to identify and stress what is specific about that country's institutions. Therefore, institutionalist theory naturally leads to comparative perspectives on politics.

VARIANTS: SOCIOLOGICAL AND RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM

Institutionalism research in comparative politics takes different forms that largely point to the broader distinction between sociological institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and historical institutionalism. Because sociological institutionalism is not primarily centered on political institutions, it is not discussed here. As for research in comparative rational choice institutionalism, it has engaged a number of prominent political scientists such as Robert Bates, Barbara Geddes, Margaret Levi, Elinor Ostrom, George Tsebelis, and Barry Weingast. A recent example of comparative rational choice institutionalism in political science is Daniel N. Posner's (2005) *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa,* which shows how political institutions "help to determine which ethnic cleavage becomes politically salient" in multiethnic polities (p. 3). Drawing on the idea put forward by Robert Bates that ethnic groups are rent-seeking coalitions involved in rational calculations, Posner explores "the question of why individuals choose to emphasize the particular ethnic identities they do" (p. 3). From this perspective, the study of ethnic groups is highly relevant for rational choice institutionalists because it allows them to stress the rational aspects of seemingly irrational processes such as nationalism and ethnic conflicts.

Another important contribution to rational choice institutionalism is the work of George Tsebelis on "veto players," which stresses the impact of the institutional rules of the game on the behavior of (rational) political actors. As suggested below, the concept of veto player has been widely used in comparative political analysis, including analyses by scholars who do not belong to rational choice institutionalism. This remark should not obscure the fact that in comparative politics and beyond, rational choice institutionalists commonly embrace a specific vision of institutions that stems from their focus on individuals and their strategies. As Margaret Levi puts it in her classic *Of Rule and Revenue* (1988), "The rational choice approach recognizes that institutions and structures are the consequences of human actions. . . . Individuals create institutions—although, of course, institutions, structures, and other macro-states also influence individual preferences and behaviors" (p. 8).

According to Craig Parsons, however, some of the comparative scholarship known as "rational choice institutionalism" puts more causal weight on structural-economic factors than on the weight of political institutions. Important to note, Parsons cautions that in comparative politics as elsewhere, the term *institutionalism* should be used so that it refers only to perspectives truly focusing on the structuring role of institutions in political life. Stretching the meaning of the term *institutionalism* to include approaches in which institutions are not a primary form of political causality is potentially misleading; for this reason, Parsons claims that historical institutionalism is the most purely "institutionalist" perspective in comparative politics.

HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM

A key assumption of historical institutionalist perspectives in comparative politics is that institutionally embedded rules of the game strongly affect political behavior as well as policy development. From this perspective, political institutions create obstacles and opportunities for actors, and it has been argued that the number of institutional veto players/points present in a polity will structure the political. In her comparative book on health politics, for instance, Ellen Immergut has shown how national political institutions shape the mobilization of interest groups such as doctors. From this angle, "political institutions shape (but do not determine) political conflict by providing interest groups with varying opportunities to veto policy" (Kay 1999, 406). In consequence, although we cannot assume that institutions alone explain political outcomes, from a comparative and institutionalist standpoint, it is crucial to pay close attention to the structuring role of institutions in explaining political and policy differences between countries. This remark points to the fact that as far as the idea of rules of the game is concerned, historical institutionalism and the work of rational choice scholars such as Tsebelis intersect.

In addition to studying political institutions and the rules of the game they create, many comparative institutionalist scholars have taken a historical perspective on the development of institutional and policy legacies and their effects over time. Here, the objective is to explore how temporal institutional processes create constraints and opportunities that can either facilitate or impede change. One influential perspective in the historical institutionalist literature concerns the analysis of path dependence (i.e., how past developments typically constrain future change through factors such as increasing returns that make it harder for political actors to alter an existing institutional path). In comparative research, analyzing the historical paths of institutional development is critical to contemporary institutionalist research in comparative politics. A prime example is the work of Paul Pierson on the politics of welfare state reform during the Reagan and the Thatcher years. According to him, the expansion of social programs during the post–World War II era created powerful vested interests that made policy privatization and retrenchment harder to achieve during the 1980s than what conservatives and academic commentators alike had predicted. From this angle, policies and institutions are embedded in historical logics that accumulate over time to constrain or facilitate change at a later date. As Pierson (2004) states in a more recent book, the idea here is not simply that "history matters" but that the timing and sequence of institutional development is a potential causal factor that deserves close attention in comparative political analysis. In this book, Pierson, who is a historical institutionalist, draws extensively on the work of rational choice theorist Douglass North, who is widely known for his research on path dependence.

RECENT TRENDS

In recent years, reacting to the above scholarship on path dependence, historical institutionalist scholars have stressed the need for more comparative research on the sources of path-departing institutional change. Beyond outside shocks and rare critical junctures, scholars such as Kathleen Thelen argue that over time, incremental processes and political strategies can lead to path-departing changes. In her work, Thelen explores the role of forms of incremental yet path-departing change such as conversion (i.e., the transformation of existing institutions without any radical change in their formal boundaries) and layering (i.e., the creation of new institutional layers alongside existing institutions).

A growing number of institutionalist scholars such as John L. Campbell have also argued that to fully explain institutional change, scholars needed to turn to the role of ideas in institutional development. Because ideas help actors assess existing institutional legacies and forge new institutions when existing ones are seen as flawed, it has been argued that they are a key component of institutional politics. Although Craig Parsons reminds us that ideational analysis belongs to a different type of explanation than institutional analysis, he also shows that it is possible to effectively combine these two types of causal argument. It is hard to predict in which direction contemporary institutional analysis is heading as far as comparative politics is concerned but it is likely that the analysis of change will remain on the scholarly agenda for years to come.

See also *Constitutional Systems, Comparative; Critical Juncture; Judicial Systems, Comparative; New Institutionalism; Path Dependencies; Rational Choice Theory.*

. . . .   DANIEL BÉLAND

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Insurgency

Insurgency is a form of intrasocietal conflict within a state, in which a nonruling group attempts to destroy, reform, or degrade the legitimacy and popular support of the state's ruling group to effect political change. Insurgencies are primarily political movements rather than conventional military conflicts, as insurgent groups attempt to defeat a stronger military power with political activism, subversion, propaganda, and intimidation through terror and assassination tactics. An underlying feature linking many insurgencies—historic and current—is the gross disproportion between the grand political aims of an insurgency and the insurgency's meager military capability to achieve such political aims.

Insurgencies often attempt to redress their military weaknesses by exploiting their personal knowledge and understanding of their local environments. Past insurgencies have originated in trackless deserts, dense jungles, or urban settings, typically less familiar to opposing state or international forces and providing a strategic advantage to local insurgent elements. Third, and most important, insurgencies rely on their popular support to leverage the local population for the additional recruits, funding, shelter, sustenance, and intelligence needed to prevail. In his classic work *On War,* military philosopher Carl Von Clausewitz described "people's war" as "a kind of nebulous vapory essence, nowhere condense into a solid body." This, combined with support of the people for a passionate cause, is the most basic precept of insurgency.

HISTORY OF INSURGENCY

Most insurgencies are labeled "failed revolutions," "rebellions," or "crimes" by history, in large part due to their inability to effectively combat a state or international superior military force or sustain resources to participate in prolonged battles. Consequently, insurgents have been known to lose local support should the population blame the insurgency for increasing civilian casualties or infrastructure damages. These insurgencies are eventually suppressed or often forced to negotiate ceasefires while they regroup and refurbish.

That said, there have been several successful insurgencies in the twentieth century. These include the Chinese Civil War (1927–1949), which some scholars refer to as the "archetype of modern insurgency." Other notable successful insurgencies were the Cuban Revolution (1953–1959), which concluded by placing communist rebel Fidel Castro in power for fifty-one years, as well as the anticolonial wars against the French in Vietnam from 1946 to 1954 and Algeria from 1954 to 1962, in which French forces were expelled by nationalist movements. In addition, North Vietnamese guerilla forces eventually defeated the United States and Allied nations during the Vietnam War (1959–1975); inflicting large numbers of casualties on both sides and concluding with the communist guerillas' unifying North and South Vietnam under a Communist takeover.

Due to the many insurgencies preoccupying the western European powers during the post–World War II era of decolonization, the concept of insurgency did not emerge in the modern military lexicon until this time period. The aforementioned failed French campaigns in Algeria and Vietnam significantly contributed to the emerging theories and discussion of insurgency and counterinsurgency, along with the myriad of British campaigns marking the eventual British withdrawal from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East from 1945 to the 1990s. However, despite insurgencies' accounting for the most prevalent forms of armed conflict since 1945, the study of counterinsurgency is still evolving as most regular armed forces have historically regarded the study as a niche area. Two historical and influential theorists of insurgency, British army officer T. E. Lawrence (commonly known as Lawrence of Arabia) and Chinese communist revolutionary and leader Mao Zedong, both wrote of the nature of insurgency during the first half of the twentieth century. Lawrence's characterization stated, "Armies were like plants, immobile as a whole, firm-rooted, and nourished through long stems to the head. We might be a vapor, blowing where they listed." He also described insurgency as a moral contest, not a physical one, and recognized that insurgent strength derived from strategy.

MAOIST INFLUENCE ON INSURGENCY

The same logic often credited to Mao Zedong underpins insurgency as 80 percent political and 20 percent military. Of note, Mao established and led the People's Republic of China from 1949 until his death in 1976. When analysts speak of classical insurgency, generally they are referring to the Maoist insurgency as "propaganda for guns, subversion for air power, men for machines, space for mechanization, political for industrial mobilization." Mao's goal was to convince the peasantry that his Red Army's soldiers were different, not just the enforcers of the latest warlord, but an end to the cycle of depredation and impoverishment that had plagued Chinese peasants for so long. By doing so, Mao could harness an

immense source of potential energy and resources to sustain his insurgent efforts.

Essentially, Maoist insurgency emphasized the critical relationship between the guerilla forces and the people to achieve a political goal. Since according to studies, there are three strategic phases—the defensive, stalemate, and offensive—between the insurgent and government, who will ultimately meet in conventional battle, the insurgent leaders must be guaranteed of the support of the population prior to engaging in conventional operations, to secure their victory. In an insurgency, the consent of the population as to how they seek to be governed is the underlying debate. The insurgent aims to detach the population's loyalty from the state and to demonstrate a greater capacity for governance. This is accomplished by the establishment of parallel governance structures and intimidation.

CLASSICAL INSURGENCIES VERSUS EMERGING GLOBAL INSURGENCIES

Most recent scholarship on insurgency, in particular that of J. Mackinlay, detects an evolution of classical insurgency to a new, even more virulent, post-Maoist form often referred to as "global insurgency" (Mackinlay, *An Insurgent Archipelago,* 2009). At the moment there is a strong association between global insurgency and the global Islamist movement dominated by the transnational terrorist organization al-Qaida, headed by Saudi Arabian Osama bin Laden. Most experts believe the techniques of post-Maoism may be adopted by any global movement and are not specific to Muslims. Radical Islamic movements have gained considerable popularity, media attention, and widespread psychological fear in the twenty-first century through the use of their mass-casualty civilian attacks and tech-savvy Internet propaganda. Therefore, while radical Islamic terror groups have gained the most international attention, this alone does not qualify such terror groups as the only version of a post-Maoist/global insurgency.

Whereas Maoist insurgent objectives were national, post-Maoist objectives are global, transcending national geographic boundaries and identities. The population involved in the Maoist/classical insurgency is confined to a single state (and possibly that of an intervening state), which is described as manageable. However, the populations involved in post-Maoist/global insurgencies are varied and dispersed, interconnected via mass communications and the Internet and often considered unmanageable. Unlike the center of gravity in a classical insurgency, which is the hearts and minds of the local or national population, global insurgencies attempt to unify their cause by appealing to global communities under the banner of ethnicity, religion, shared oppression, or shared economic status. For some global insurgents, requiring a great degree of local support is less relevant because insurgents operate in anonymity and have external sources of funding, sponsorship, and recruitment from their theater of operations.

Another difference between the evolved global insurgency and the classical version is that the all-important subversion process in Maoist insurgency was top down, whereas in post-Maoist insurgency, it is bottom up, characterized increasingly by propaganda of the terror operations that is conceived, planned, and executed by individuals and small groups without major central direction. National, classic insurgent organizations are vertical and structured, whereas in a global form, they exist as unstructured networks, often taking direction from regional leaders rather than a single entity.

Notably, many modern insurgencies taking place in countries such as Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan fall under the classic category of a Maoist national insurgency movement, with indigenous rebel groups seeking to overthrow the current government and expelling any intervening international force. However, what makes these insurgencies unique and reflects a common emerging twenty-first-century trend is that global insurgencies, such as the transnational terrorist organization al-Qaida, manipulate these national insurgencies as venues to proliferate their own ideologies and elicit recruits. Many of these countries become safe operating havens for transnational terrorist networks. Al-Qaida operatives reach out to insurgents, playing on their mutual anti–Western objectives and objective to expel international forces. Although al-Qaida networks may not seek the same nationalist goals as the indigenous insurgents, they provide the insurgents with another source of funding, arms, and training needed to combat the state and international intervention and therefore build partnerships of convenience.

Insurgencies have become one of the most hotly debated and intensely studied aspects of contemporary war studies. With the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have drawn in international forces to quell the national insurgencies in both countries, major world powers have grown increasingly interested in learning to adapt their military structures and doctrines to meet the challenge. More generally, however, the study of insurgency and counterinsurgency has been thrust into the limelight because the once norm of regular conflict now looks decidedly irregular, a trend likely to continue as human society adapts to a radically more interconnected future and war along with it.

See also *Colonial Wars; Insurrection and Insurgency; Maoism; Protests and Demonstrations; Radicalism; State Repression; Terrorism, Financing of; Terrorism, Political; War Crimes.*

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Insurrection and Insurgency

Insurrection is an armed uprising; insurgency is armed resistance by an organized political movement against an established government. While uprisings were common during the colonial era, they differed from insurgencies in that they were generally revolts led by elites in defense of traditional rights and obligations. Such was the case of the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the Rif War in Morocco (1920–1925).

Insurgencies, by contrast, have tended to be mass movements that have their origins in the rise of nationalist sentiment at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. Although insurgencies tend to be the result of local conditions, in particular where there are weak states, social inequalities, and foreign occupation, they are often related to broader trends in global ideas, usually through complex networks of learning and cooperation. The first of these was the rise of insurrectionary anarchism of the nineteenth century, a primarily European phenomenon. A second wave consisted of mainly rural and developing world movements, coinciding roughly with the process of decolonization in the developing world. A third wave, whose intensity has been peaked by uprisings in Afghanistan (1974–2009), Kashmir (1989–2009), Bosnia (1992–1995), Algeria (1992–2005), and Iraq (2003–2009), is the rise of insurgencies associated with militant Islam. These will be discussed in turn.

INSURRECTIONARY ANARCHISM

Insurrectionary anarchism consists of informally organized groups conducting direct and spontaneous violence against political authorities on behalf of oppressed segments of the population. This anarchical approach to revolutionary war eschews the political organization typical of mainstream revolutionary movements. Although it has never succeeded politically, it was noted for many assassinations against the Tsarists in Russia, the brief seizure of government in Berlin in 1919 under Rosa Luxemburg and the Sparticists, and the first car bomb—detonated by Mario Buda against Wall Street in New York in 1920.

MAOISM

Leftist insurgency has its origins in nineteenth-century Marxist predictions of class revolution in industrializing states. An early variant, Leninism, emphasized the use of a vanguard party to guide the masses, which it did with success in Russia in 1917 but failed to do in Hungary in 1919. During the cold war, applications of communist revolutionary theory produced two contradictory doctrines: the Maoist and the focoist. Both are applications of insurgency to conditions particular to China and Latin America, respectively. Through state sponsorship by the Soviet Union, Communist China, Cuba, and East Germany, these were exported widely to Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.

In Mao Zedong's conception of peasant revolution, insurgencies proceed through three successive phases. The first is the incipient phase, during which existing forces remain dormant while cadres of the political movement are organized. This was the case of the Chinese Communist Party, which organized itself underground from 1920 until the Nanchang Uprising of 1927. The second, or guerrilla, phase consists of terrorist attacks designed to pin down the government and thereby win the initiative. This was pursued intermittently in China between 1927 and 1945. In the third phase, field armies built up during the second stage defeat the government. This coincided with China's Communist Revolution (1947–1950).

Maoism is widely read and associated with rural forms of revolutionary warfare because of the insurgents' special knowledge of social conditions, as in the cases of the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), the early phase of the Vietnam War (1960–1967), the Zimbabwe Chimurenga (1966–1980), Sendero Luminoso in Peru (1980–1992), the (Maoist) Naxalites of India (1967–2009), and the New People's Army of the Philippines (1969–2009).

FOCOISM

An alternative approach to revolutionary warfare, espoused by Fidel Castro and Che Guevera, is known as focoism. In this approach, demonstrative acts of violence, rather than political indoctrination, are used as catalysts to mobilize the population into an uprising. Revolutionary success without political mobilization was achieved in Cuba in 1959 due mainly to the widespread alienation caused by the inequitable policies of the Batista regime. Subsequent failures of focoism in, among other countries, Colombia in 1961, Guatemala and Ecuador in 1962, Peru in 1963, and Bolivia in 1967 were the result of a failure of political preparation. Focoism is usually associated with urban insurgencies. Focoist insurgency, although not termed as such, was also commonly used by noncommunist states. The United States sponsored the Khampa rebellion in Tibet (1959–1960) and the contras against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua (1979–1988). The Republic of South Africa sponsored União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola in Angola (1975–1989) and Renamo in Mozambique (1975–1992).

ISLAMIST INSURGENCY

Islamist insurgency is inspired by the Islamic revivalist movement, which draws its legitimacy from the goal of arresting the relative decline of Islam vis-à-vis Europe (since the fall of Andalusia in 1492) and the erosion of Mughal power in India. Islamist thinkers, such as Jamal ad-din al-Afghani (1837–1997), Mohammad Abduh of al Azhar University (1849–1905), and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), are generally in agreement that Islam has been distorted, and thereby weakened, by successive

injections of Sufi and modernist thought. Abduh proposes a return to the early uncorrupted practice of Islam, termed "Salafism." Qutb argues that current Islamic governments have regressed to their pre-Islamic states (*jahiliyah*), justifying their removal. Building on obligations in the Sunna to defend Islam through jihad, some extremist movements practice *takfir,* which is the act of designating the *kafir,* or unbelievers. All of these ideas have come to justify the use of unlimited violence, in particular suicide bombings and attacks on noncombatants.

For example, the Peshawar-based mujahideen resistance of Afghanistan (1974–2001) was inspired by Qutb and the Salafism of the Egyptian Muslim brotherhood. Al-Qaida is a Wahhabi movement from Arabia, which seeks to reestablish an Arab caliphate. The Taliban (1995–2009) is a Deobandi variant of Hanafi revivalism popular among the Pashtun tribes. Islamist movements also benefit from a variety of state sponsorships (Saudi Arabia and Pakistan for the Deoband and Iran for the militant Shia) as well as diaspora funding through traditional banking (*hawala*) and narco-traffic. However, Islamist insurgency has won only a handful of militant converts among non-Muslims, underlining its limited appeal. In contrast, leftist insurgents were well represented among the Palestinians, Kurds, Pashtun, Iranians, and even Iraqi Baath.

See also *Insurgency; Islamic Political Thought; Maoism; Terrorism, Political.*

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Intellectual Property Rights

Intellectual property refers to patents, copyright, trademarks, and trade secrets. Intellectual property poses interesting problems because, unlike physical property, knowledge goods and information are not necessarily rivalrous. Simultaneous usage of such goods rarely detracts from their social utility. As they are not physical property, knowledge and information are not formally scarce. Intellectual property constructs scarcity by treating it as an exclusively owned commodity. Persons granted intellectual property rights have the power to withhold their intellectual property and to prevent others from using it. Many regard intellectual property as providing incentives to innovate and disseminate creative work; with intellectual property rights, individuals and companies reap rewards from their innovations, whereas without them, they would not profit from their time and investment.

Historically, governments employed intellectual property policies to promote development goals. Initially granted as exceptions to rules against monopoly, over time and especially beginning in the mid-twentieth century, intellectual property owners have come to regard them as rights. Property rights are quintessentially political, and given the increasing importance of intellectual property in the global economy, political scientists have begun to address the politics of intellectual property.

Early political science scholarship on the politics of intellectual property focused on multilateral negotiations over revisions to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property that the World Intellectual Property Organization administers. In the 1970s and early 1980s, developing countries pressed for the New International Economic Order; they sought a weakening of laws governing intellectual property protection so that they could acquire greater access to knowledge goods. States abandoned these negotiations in the face of the 1980s debt crisis. A second wave of political science scholarship traced the incorporation of intellectual property into the multilateral trading regime (first the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and now the World Trade Organization). Member states incorporated the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) into the World Trade Organization at the end of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations in 1994. All member states are required to comply with TRIPs or face the prospect of trade sanctions.

Scholars increasingly focused on the politics of intellectual property in the face of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Some scholars focused on intellectual property and its impact on access to lifesaving medicines. In 2001 World Trade Organization member states passed the Doha Declaration on Public Health and Access to Medicines, affirming that nothing in TRIPs should prevent countries from providing lifesaving medicines to their citizens. Other scholars focused on the nexus between intellectual property, HIV/AIDS, and the implications for national security. The politics of intellectual property has been featured in literatures on nongovernmental organizations (especially concerning access to patented medicines and educational materials), grassroots activist campaigns, international regime complexes, forum shifting, bargaining, and the role of private power in the global economy.

Many international relations treatments of intellectual property rights have focused on norm setting across diverse multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Intellectual Property Organization. Scholarship has also examined vertical forum shifting between multilateral, plurilateral, regional, and bilateral arenas for agenda setting, norm setting, surveillance, and enforcement. Analyses have evolved from the initial macro-level international relations treatments

of norm setting and rule making in the trade regime to in-depth comparative and domestic politics treatments. Recent scholarship highlights aspects such as technical assistance, capacity building, and policy implementation.

Further work examines the intellectual property enforcement agenda, locating it in the literature on global business regulation. Heightened interest in a development agenda has renewed scholarly attention to intellectual property policy as a means to an end rather than as an end in itself. For example, intellectual property policy can be tailored to meet diverse development goals such as technology transfer (particularly salient in climate change deliberations), national innovation strategies, and access to educational materials and digital media. The World Intellectual Property Organization is engaged in discussions with member states about a Development Agenda that includes considerations such as the status of so-called traditional knowledge, folklore, and wild cultivars. At the same time, a number of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries are negotiating an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement in an effort to put an end to software piracy and trademark counterfeiting. The politics of intellectual property has proven to be a fruitful and dynamic area of political science research.

See also *AIDS, Politics of; Copyright; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Property Rights.*

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Intelligence Failure

Intelligence failure is a term used to describe situations when intelligence organizations, military commands, foreign ministries, or even law enforcement agencies fall short in providing accurate and timely warning to officials of nascent dangers or opportunities. The term is used to describe failures to predict specific events rather than failures to produce accurate risk assessments, which are more general estimates of the nature, severity, and likelihood of threats. Intelligence failures are often linked to strategic surprise, a type of event that can change the course of history by creating international or domestic crises or by initiating war. Examples of intelligence failures that contributed to strategic surprise include the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and the 1968 Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War (1959–1975).

TYPE I AND TYPE II ERRORS

Intelligence failures can involve Type I (false positive) and Type II (false negative) errors. The September 11, 2001, al-Qaida attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon involved a Type II error because the U.S. intelligence community failed to recognize or respond effectively to signals of an impending attack. Intelligence and law enforcement officials recognized that al-Qaida was operating within the United States and was even plotting to hijack airliners, but they failed to piece together information within intelligence channels that might have derailed the plotters. The U.S. government's inability to assess accurately the state of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein's efforts to restart his chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons program reflects a Type I error that contributed to the decision of U.S. president George W. Bush and his administration to invade Iraq in 2003. A combination of international sanctions, U.S. surveillance overflights and airstrikes, United Nations inspections, and diplomatic pressure made it impossible for Iraq to continue significant efforts to build nuclear weapons.

Intelligence failure can occur at any or all points in the so-called intelligence cycle: setting requirements for data collection and analysis, collecting information, fusing and analyzing information, and deciding to respond by selecting and disseminating warnings to organizations and individuals. In addition, effective response plans must be available to field commanders, diplomats, or law enforcement officials, and warning has to be received in time to defeat the opponent's plans. Officials sometimes have a good appreciation of what is about to transpire in the final hours before disaster, but they no longer have the means to communicate to field units or a realistic way to prevent what is inevitable.

SOURCES OF FAILURE

Sources of failure have been linked to several levels of analysis: factors that are inherent in the production of finished intelligence and warning, human cognition, organizational behavior, and relations between the intelligence community and officials. The cry wolf syndrome is an example of a problem inherent in analysis and warning. It occurs when analysts repeatedly sound false alarms that cause recipients to dismiss what eventually turns out to be a legitimate alert. Scholars also have identified several common cognitive biases that can impede both the analysis of information and the response to warning. For instance, mirror imaging—the tendency to interpret another actor's behavior using one's beliefs, experiences, values, or standard operating procedures—can cause fatal errors in analysis and response.

Organizational behavior has offered insights into the sources of intelligence failure as well. Compartmentalizaton, for example, is endemic in intelligence production because the need-to-know principle governs individual analysts' access to information. But organizations are jealous guardians of information, and bureaucratic rivalry or differences in standard operating procedures can slow the flow of information within organizations or across the intelligence community. For instance, the inability to move information across the legal and cultural boundaries between intelligence and law enforcement agencies contributed to the intelligence failure associated with the September 11, 2001, attacks. A variety of problems also can emerge to bedevil relations between the intelligence and policy-making communities. Politicization emerges when policy makers place overt or subtle pressure on intelligence analysts and managers to produce estimates to support political preferences or policies. Adaptation failure—the inability of organizations, personnel, or procedures to adjust to a shifting threat environment—is another cause of intelligence failure.

Research indicates that intelligence failures rarely occur as a result of an absence of signals within the intelligence pipeline. Accurate information is often available; what is missing is an analytical framework that can place existing information in an appropriately alarming context. This explains why data and indicators that once seemed innocuous take on a clear and compelling significance in hindsight. Imagination also is generally not lacking among victims of intelligence failure. In the 1930s, the U.S. Navy repeatedly war-gamed a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor; senior navy officers knew and told policy makers that the U.S. Pacific fleet was in an exposed position.

FUTURE OF INTELLIGENCE FAILURES

Although intelligence failures can create crises or exacerbate enduring conflicts leading to war, it is unlikely that they can be prevented in the future. Intelligence failure might be a manifestation of the structure of conflict itself. The victims of intelligence failure rarely share the same worldviews, perceptions of risk, or incentives as those seeking to surprise their competitors with a fait accompli, creating a cognitive divide that is difficult to bridge beforehand. Even when detected by analysts and reported to officials, signals of impending threats tend to be dismissed as unrealistic or even harebrained because they are deemed to be simply too risky or ultimately counterproductive to be contemplated by even somewhat irrational individuals. Reforms adopted in the wake of intelligence failure also cannot guarantee future success because of the difficulties in making changes in organizations and procedures to anticipate threats that are impossible to discern in their entirety and detail. An additional frustration is that even effective reforms can create a false sense of security, setting the stage for new misperceptions, biases, or organizational pathologies that sow the seeds of future failure.

For instance, security at the World Trade Center was vastly improved following the 1993 detonation of a bomb in a parking garage. Thus, one might wonder why intelligence analysts failed to recognize that the center might be subjected to renewed attack by Islamic fundamentalists, but experts would have considered the site to be relatively well defended against attack. Following security upgrades, traffic was directed away from the buildings, trucks were no longer allowed to drive underground, and surveillance systems were improved. There was every reason to believe that there were easier targets to attack. But in the absence of an accurate perceptual lens, expertise alone cannot prevent failures of intelligence.

See also *Cyberterrorism; Disinformation; Homeland Security; Intelligence Services; National Security Policy; Post-9/11 Politics; Regional Security; Terrorism, Political; Women and Security.*

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Intelligence Services

Intelligence services undertake counterintelligence operations, monitor internal security, make and break codes, or conduct covert operations. Some specialize in gathering information from open sources, espionage, or domestic surveillance activities to produce secret intelligence reports for government officials, members of the armed forces, or the intelligence service itself. During the past half century, technical collection systems involving imagery captured by satellites in low-earth orbit and reconnaissance aircraft, signals intelligence (intercepted communications), and measurement and signatures intelligence, which characterizes and identifies various electronic and industrial systems, have come to play a dominant role in the creation of intelligence estimates and reporting. The rise of transnational criminal-terrorist networks, however, has placed a premium on human intelligence, especially information gathered by metropolitan police forces.

Intelligence services have existed in one form or another throughout history. Today, the best-known intelligence services are maintained by national governments, although state, local, and even corporate intelligence agencies are becoming increasingly prevalent and important. The information revolution has created opportunities for subnational and private organizations to produce tailored intelligence reporting and improved situational awareness by fusing and then analyzing data from a variety of sources. The New York City Police Department, for instance, maintains liaison officers with foreign municipalities and publishes the *NYPD Shield,* an intelligence bulletin for the law enforcement community. Corporate

intelligence organizations provide risk assessments related to a firm's assets or interests while identifying immediate threats to ongoing operations or corporate personnel. Commercial enterprises also offer risk analysis and clipping services to help their clients identify business opportunities and gauge investment risks.

The U.S. intelligence services are nominally under the control of the director of national intelligence (DNI). Created in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, the DNI's primary purpose is to coordinate the activities of the organizations that constitute the U.S. intelligence community. The National Intelligence Council and the National Counterterrorism Center are part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The Central Intelligence Agency continues as an independent organization, although the community-wide role once played by the director of central intelligence has now been taken over by the DNI. The Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Departments of Justice, State, Energy, and Homeland Security all maintain specialized intelligence services. Most of this intelligence community, however, is actually lodged within the Department of Defense. The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corp intelligence agencies are all part of the Department of Defense.

Oversight of intelligence services and the concentration of police and political power in intelligence agencies vary widely. The division of labor between organizations that gather foreign intelligence and domestic police authorities often was used as a metric of democratic freedoms enjoyed within states. Authoritarian and totalitarian regimes often use their intelligence and law enforcement agencies as an instrument of state terror, helping to keep a ruling party, clique, or dictator in power. No distinction is made between foreign and domestic threats; both are often subject to scrutiny by the same organization. Under these circumstances, intelligence services and government oversight become indistinct, creating a counterintelligence state. The United States, by contrast, has utilized both congressional and judicial oversight of the intelligence community, an arm of the executive branch of the federal government. Domestic intelligence activities also are regulated by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which requires a showing of cause either *ex ante* or *ex post* for surveillance actions undertaken against individuals and careful record keeping to facilitate oversight and accountability. In addition, the United States traditionally maintains boundaries between the activities of foreign intelligence organizations (e.g., the Central Intelligence Agency) and domestic counterintelligence and law enforcement agencies (e.g., the Federal Bureau of Investigation). These boundaries between foreign-domestic and intelligence–law enforcement activities were actually exploited by al-Qaida in the months leading up to the September 11 attacks. The U.S. government agencies found it difficult to coordinate the flow of information and analysis across bureaucratic boundaries, especially when the opponent seemed to move across international borders with ease. The fact that terrorists found it easy to hide in plain sight, blending into local populations while they planned and trained for their operation, highlighted the need to better fuse and disseminate information gathered from foreign intelligence services and local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.

Intelligence reforms in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks have exacerbated the tensions created by the existence of secret organizations within democracy. Indeed, one of the chief externalities of globalization has been the blurring of the distinction between foreign intelligence operations and domestic law enforcement activities. The ability of transnational actors to operate across international boundaries has forced domestic law enforcement agencies and foreign intelligence services to share information. In the United States, this collaboration, however, is constrained by the limited ability of law enforcement agencies to maintain dossiers on individuals or groups in the absence of probable cause, a limit that does not affect the actions of U.S. foreign intelligence services that have only a limited interest in the future legal prosecution of their foreign intelligence targets. Proponents and opponents of increased government domestic surveillance also struggle to strike a balance between the need to increase domestic surveillance and the need to protect citizens' rights to privacy. For example, it is difficult to reconcile monitoring domestic communications or data mining in an open-ended search for anomalies that might indicate nefarious activity with individuals' right to privacy. It is impossible to show cause against individuals living in the United States who might be communicating with al-Qaida if their identities are unknown and evidence of the communication has to be uncovered by sifting through the phone calls of everyone in the United States. Resolving these sorts of issues promises to fuel future debate about the proper role of intelligence services.

See also *Counterterrorism; Al-Qaida; Surveillance; Terrorism, Political.*

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Interdependence

Interdependence refers to independent social actors who are structurally affected by one another's behavior. The actors are involved in each other's affairs (functional or integrative

interdependence), or they are part of the same system (systemic interdependence) (see Figure 1). Interdependence can be operationalized into a three-dimensional concept, which expresses how given actors are mutually affected by one another's behavior (see Figure 2). The first dimension concerns the degree of mutual involvement (the existential value of the relationship for the actors). The second dimension concerns the character of mutual involvement: confrontational versus constructional. The third dimension concerns the (a)symmetry of mutual involvement: the distribution of costs and benefits.

The debate about global economic and political interdependence dates back to the late nineteenth century. It reemerged (without awareness of the earlier discourse) in the 1970s, when environmental interdependence was also emphasized, and again in the 1990s. This last round fits the wider context of the present globalization discourse. Much of the debate is about the functional need to adapt global governance to existing (systemic) levels of economic and environmental interdependence: a plea to increase constructive political interdependence in the face of global needs and a critique on the ability of sovereign states to rule effectively. Consequences for conflict management are at the heart of the debate: interdependence is a major source of conflict, but it also sets structural limits on rational choice–based unilateral strategies to win or settle conflicts. The debate reflects the wider chicken-or-egg question: does politics shape the necessary conditions for economics or vice versa?

See also *Dependency Theory; Economic Interdependence; Globalization.*

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Interest Aggregation and Articulation

Citizens hold various values or preferences that they wish to promote in public policy, such as protecting the environment or encouraging steel production, and these amount to their interests in government and politics. Citizens with similar political interests often organize into interest groups, and the related concepts of interest articulation and interest aggregation, which were popularized by Almond and Coleman (1960), describe different ways that interests are input into the political system.

To articulate an interest means to express it clearly. According to Almond and Coleman, interests are usually articulated by organizations, or interest groups, that present specific desires before relevant political actors, such as legislatures, executives, bureaucracies, voters, and courts. For example, an environmental group may back legislation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Interest groups typically—but not exclusively—engage in interest articulation.

To aggregate interests means to collect and balance different, often competing, interests. Suppose that an industry group backs legislation to subsidize domestic steel production. The legislation could increase greenhouse gases, so an environmental group lobbies against it. In this scenario, the legislature would decide between competing proposals or strike a compromise between the two interest groups. In either case, it assumes the task of interest aggregation.

FIGURE 1. THREE TYPES OF STRUCTURAL INTERDEPENDENCE. FROM DE WILDE, JAAP H. (1991), *SAVED FROM OBLIVION: INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY*, ALDERSHOT: DARTMOUTH, PP. 17–27.

FIGURE 2. THREE DIMENSIONS OF STRUCTURAL INTERDEPENDENCE. FROM DE WILDE, JAAP H. (1991), *SAVED FROM OBLIVION: INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY*, ALDERSHOT: DARTMOUTH, PP. 17–27.

However, Almond and Coleman note that interest aggregation is often performed by another type of political organization, political parties. Contrary to interest groups that are usually formed by those sharing similar and narrow interests, political parties are composed of broad coalitions of citizens with vastly different interests. In assembling that coalition and appealing for electoral support, political parties need to aggregate different interests.

As Almond and Coleman (1960) admit, "The distinction between interest articulation and aggregation is a fluid one" (p. 39). Moreover, the functional allocation of interest articulation to interest groups and interest aggregation to political parties can break down. Some interest groups—often called "peak associations"—are broader than others. They speak for whole classes of society, such as labor or business, and must aggregate their members' conflicting interests. Conversely, some political parties, such as environmental or religious parties, are more articulative than other parties. The extent to which interest groups and political parties vary in being articulative or aggregative becomes a matter for theory and research.

Unfortunately, most existing theory and research neglects the aggregative function of interest groups and the articulative function of political parties. Research often cites aggregation and articulation as functions of political parties but then discusses only how parties aggregate interests, neglecting to describe how they can also articulate interests. Indeed, parties that aggregate interests are usually praised for governmental contributions, while parties that articulate interests, especially ethnic parties, are deemed politically dysfunctional. However, the consociational model of democracy sees democratic potential in ethnic parties too.

See also *Almond, Gabriel; Business Preference Formation; Coalition Formation; Consociational Democracy; Ethnic Parties; Interest Groups and Lobbies; Political Party Platform; Public Interest Groups.*

. . . . KENNETH JANDA

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Interest Groups and Lobbies

The study of interest groups lies at the intersection of many fields of political science, although it is commonly associated with democratic systems. American political science often associates interest group studies with the study of political participation, linking to the study of electoral politics, campaigns, and elections. Interest groups in the United States are commonly conceptualized as organizations outside government working to influence its policies. On the other hand, interest group studies linked to Europe or Japan become a form of political economy exploring linkages between state and society. Interest groups are generally assumed to be founded on or advocates for an economic interest, particularly in the neocorporatist tradition, which favors centralized unions and opposes liberal capitalism. In this view, interest groups act as partners in governance with the state and are likely to be involved in policy implementation as in policy formulation.

Although the meaning of *interest groups* remains ambiguous—whether it is preferable or inferior to be considered a pressure group, organized interest, state, or society—a large number of impressive studies offer contrasting insights into interest groups and their status among and influence on politics and government. The study of interest groups has inspired large bodies of literature in formal theory, especially on collective action, and in normative political theory, including most famously pluralism, the belief that power is and ought to be widely dispersed among numerous groups, all with a capacity to influence public policy. Since pluralism underscores the guiding principles for most democratic states, the presence and popularity of interest groups in a state tend to be most active within democratic models.

INTEREST GROUPS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

For many, the phrase *interest group* still conjures up an image of an organization composed of individual citizens focused on advocating a particular subject or area of politics, such as the energy sector, the environment, abortion, or animal rights. When studying such interest groups, questions still arise as to the reasons why people join specific interest groups and the consequences of these groups on the political system.

INTEREST GROUP FORMATION AND MAINTENANCE

For nearly two hundred years, the reasons motivating people to join or not join interest groups has been the object of investigation. Nineteenth-century French political thinker and historian Alexis de Tocqueville famously argued Americans were unusually likely to join voluntary associations. In recent years, Robert D. Putnam, in his works *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (1993) and "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America" (1995), expressed worry that Americans were losing this characteristic and as a result, social capital was declining. Theda Skocpol in contrast argued in his 1996 book *Boomerang: Clinton's Health Security Effort and the Turn against Government in U.S. Politics* that voluntary organizations were related to current developments in the nature of the American state rather than a natural enthusiasm of Americans to join. James A. Curtis and colleagues linked high levels of participation in civic life in America to religiosity; in a fifteen-country study, they found Americans' level of participation to be roughly equal to or less than the levels of citizens in other advanced industrial nations when religious memberships were removed.

Some of the most famous literature on interest groups seeks to explain the apparent lack of logical reasoning among members deciding to join such groups. Mancur Olson argued joining interest groups is irrational if an individual can enjoy the benefits they pursue whether or not the individual is a member. According to Olson in his 1965 work *The Logic of Collective*

Demonstrators gather to protest against excessive government spending and financial bailouts. Interest groups may lobby governments formally through organizations designed to influence legislation or they may organize public displays to make their views known.

SOURCE: AP Images

Action, interest groups must supply selective incentives limited to members to elicit and sustain membership. The most important application of Olson's theory was the difficulty of forming interest groups that pursued widely dispersed, nonexcludable benefits, such as clean air or water, generally termed "public goods." In consequence, pluralism seemed to be an unlikely platform to provide for the common good of a population and instead appeared to favor more concentrated, narrower interests that had a better chance of overcoming collective action problems. Essentially, individuals would be more incentivized to work collectively to promote their private interests rather than joining forces together to promote a widespread, ambiguous greater good. However, after Olson's theories were published in 1965, there was a surge in the strength of public interest groups in the United States and globally, which exists to this day. Scholars such as Jack Walker and his students have suggested explanations for the surge in public interest group strength, which still fall in line with the essence of Olson's argument. Walker argued against underestimating the weight of importance for

an individual to perceive support from a foundation(s) or the individualized benefit of simply belonging to an organization, which can provide satisfaction to the individual apart from the actual stated goals and objectives of the organization.

A focus on why individuals do or do not join interest groups may be misplaced. In many countries, interest group politics is dominated by organizations representing business and labor groups, which are recognized, legitimized, and encouraged by the state to serve as its partners in governance. As Robert Salisbury noted many years ago, "institutions" dominate interest group activities, and he was reinforced by other scholars stating interest group lobbying is carried out primarily by economic organizations.

INTEREST GROUP STRATEGIES: PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS

In the United States, interest groups have a long history of working in election campaigns to support candidates, favoring or sponsoring their causes. Labor unions have been particularly prominent in this regard, along with conservative interest groups such as the antiabortion group Right to Life and the gun owners' group National Rifle Association, which have also been vigorous, highly visible national campaigners. There have been repeated U.S. governmental attempts to regulate interest groups' campaigning involvement. As such, interest groups are prohibited from giving U.S. political candidates running for federal office money from their general funds, but they can raise earmarked funds through a separate political action committee (PAC) to distribute in limited amounts to candidates, amounting to US\$5,000 per election. PAC spending is regulated by a federal agency to ensure appropriate candidate spending and prevent direct corporate, interest group, or lobby contributions to candidates. Research studies as to whether PAC financial contributions have changed votes in Congress have yielded mixed results, although they generally conclude PAC contributions do not determine voting outcomes in Congress. However, while political scientists are skeptical that monetary contributions buy votes in Congress, most believe they do facilitate access to policy makers.

Despite federal oversight, interest groups have found alternative means to funnel money to politicians, such as bundling together individual contributions such that they can readily exceed PAC limits, referred to as "soft money." Campaign reforms in the United States in the past ten years—exemplified by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold Act)—have attempted to further regulate private campaign donations and corporate sponsorship of campaign advertisements. However, in 2010 the U.S. Supreme Court overturned campaign-financing laws related to corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and unions, allowing these entities to finance independent broadcasts for political candidates under the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment.

Similarly, interest group backing of campaign financing occurs in other countries. Labor unions have long been the primary source of finance for the British Labour Party, Britain's democrat socialist political party, whereas businesses

from certain industries were the traditional source of money for Britain's Conservative Party. However, the limited scope for paid television commercials and availability of free television time to the parties have somewhat reduced the need for British political parties and candidates to raise money from external sources. Notably, with the rise of capital-intensive campaign costs, meaning opinion polling, focus groups, and so forth, political candidates could begin to seek additional funds.

LOBBYING

As demonstrated by their engagement in political campaigns, most interest groups focus their energies in ways that maximize their chances of influencing policy in their states. Accordingly, when institutions gain power, they attract greater attention from interest groups. As such, the decision making of the European Union's taking precedence over domestic member state policies has led to a dramatic growth in the amount of interest groups lobbying the European Union.

In states ruled by parliamentary systems—including Australia, Canada, India, Israel, Japan, South Africa, Turkey, and the United Kingdom—the overriding dominance of the executive body inevitably makes the executive the primary focus of interest groups, according to pioneering political scientists Samuel Beer and S. E. Finer. In contrast, the UK government under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979–1990) explicitly committed itself to reducing the role of interest groups in policy making, trying to limit the administration's contact frequency and closeness with the Trade Union Congress and the employers' organization Confederation of British Industry. The Labour government led by Prime Minister Tony Blair (1997–2007) took care not to reverse this change so as to continue trying to limit union influence in the government. Similarly in Japan, the relationship between the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the general employers' organization, known as the Keidanren, and trade associations was extremely close during the period of state economic growth from the 1950s to 1990. Thereafter, as this model of economic development faltered, the relationship faltered, and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was reorganized.

The focus of U.S. interest groups on the U.S. Congress is so well known that some are still surprised that interest groups seek to influence other institutions as well. Since congressional committees generally comprise legislators whose constituencies are affected by the policies the committee adopts, then these legislators are often the targets of interest groups seeking to impose changes within constituencies. The combination of the power of congressional committees over agencies and the influence of interest groups on the legislators on the committees is often described as creating subgovernments or iron triangles, three-sided relationships between legislators, agencies, and interest groups that lead public policy to be directed toward satisfying the interest group, not the public interest. In recent decades, the iron-triangle approach has diminished as interest groups use broader policy networks to veil their strategies and activities.

Separately, U.S. interest groups are not limited to lobbying only congressional committees and legislators, but as Joel Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman depict in their studies, interest groups are in regular and frequent contact with bureaucrats and political appointees within the U.S. executive branch, including the Office of the President or cabinet members. Interest groups have also been highly visible actors in some of the tumultuous legislative and executive confirmation fights over justice nominations to the Supreme Court. Gregory Caldeira and Jon Wright have shown that the filing of a large number of amicus curiae briefs makes it more likely that the Supreme Court will hear the case. In addition, interest groups often appeal through the court system, contesting regulations issued by agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration or the Environmental Protection Agency.

DETERMINANTS OF GROUP STRATEGIES

With few exceptions, political scientists have been slow to analyze the determinants of interest group strategies. Kenneth Goldstein (1999) proposed analyzing the relevant differences between some interest groups in the United States that give large amounts to political campaigns and others that concentrate on grassroots efforts. Similarly, Wyn Grant (2000) pointed out that theorists should explain the different strategies employed by interest groups in the United Kingdom; some choose an insider strategy, developing strong relationships with government departments, while others prefer an outsider approach more likely to include protests. One explanation for these differences is that institutions shape specific interest groups—as well as being influenced by them. Interest groups in many countries—including democratic governments—have been sponsored and promoted by the government. Political funding/backing of an interest group will most likely determine the methods and degree of accessibility an interest group possesses and most likely predict the group's popular support as interest groups are inevitably shaped by the character of the political institutions supporting them.

INTEREST GROUPS, GOOD OR BAD?

Most American studies on interest groups have been related to the political and scholarly debate about the U.S. implementation of pluralism, questioning whether power is widely dispersed among the competing interests that encompass and characterize American society. In this debate, arguments have pointed out the lack of specific important interests not being represented by the interest group system or conversely demonstrating particular interest groups—usually business associated—enjoy privileged status or power within the interest group system. Thus, these questions tend to reconcile the compatibility of the interest group system and democratic values.

Aside from the impact of interest groups on policy, impact on members is also examined. Tocqueville famously argued that groups could be training grounds for citizens, providing experience at a direct, more limited level of practices vital to democracy. Such groups have been credited with the capacity to counteract the lawlessness or anomie of mass society as well as moderate society's dependence on the state. The

development of groups providing a civil society that stands between the individual citizen and the state has been seen as a key part of a transition from totalitarian or authoritarian dictatorships to truly democratic societies. This aspect of theorizing about transitions draws in part on the Tocquevillian view that involvement in groups promotes social capital and the willingness of citizens to work with and trust each other.

There has been much discussion about whether the associational life of Western democracies has been declining as citizens watch more television and engage less with each other as referenced by Putnam. Less attention and oversight are paid to the nature and activities of the groups, therefore diminishing their capacity to provide the benefits social theorists hoped they would. Skocpol notes that most interest groups in the United States today are far from social reform–minded participatory organizations Tocqueville and others celebrated.

See also *Advocacy Groups; Collective Action and Mobilization; Collective Action, Theory of; Farm Lobby; Interest Aggregation and Articulation; Lobbies, Professional; Lobbying; Pluralism; Political Action Committee (PAC); Pressure Groups; Public Interest Groups; U.S. Politics and Society: Minority Interest Groups.*

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Intergovernmental Relations

Intergovernmental relations describes how different levels of government interact with one another within the same political system. The official organizational structure of governmental units determines the basic parameters of this process. However, funding mechanisms and specific policy issues also have significant impacts on how various levels of government interact with one another.

STRUCTURAL INFLUENCES

In a federal system, political authority and responsibility are divided between one central government and a series of regional governments. The regional governments are often broken down even further into smaller governmental entities, such as counties, townships, cities, parishes, and villages. Although there are differences across federal systems, they do share some common characteristics. In most federal political systems, the central government handles those issues that affect the entire country, whereas regional units focus their efforts on matters that are particularly relevant within their own jurisdictions. Only about twenty nations have federal political systems, but they include some of the largest, most populous countries—the United States, Canada, Germany, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, India, and Nigeria.

Similar to their federal counterparts, unitary systems divide responsibilities between a central government and lower governmental units. But in a unitary system, the central government retains the ability to determine the breakdown of policy responsibilities and power across various levels of government. The vast majority of nations around the world have some form of unitary structure for political representation and governmental activity. Unitary systems include Great Britain, Italy, France, Japan, Sweden, Uruguay, South Korea, and Kenya.

Intergovernmental relationships are affected by the division of power that exists within a given political system. In unitary systems, the roles of the central government vis-à-vis subnational units are more clearly defined, allowing various levels of government to work more effectively with one another. However, in federal systems, the division of responsibilities between governmental units may not be as clear-cut. This, in turn, can contribute to greater intergovernmental confusion, tension, and conflict.

However, intergovernmental relationships are not solely determined by the organizational structure of a political system. There are countless ways for governmental units to interact with one another in both unitary and federal political systems, and there are a number of factors that affect these intergovernmental relationships.

FINANCIAL INFLUENCES

Many intergovernmental relationships involve an exchange of financial resources targeted to deliver public goods. Various methods are used to determine the amount of intergovernmental transfers, including equal sharing arrangements among municipalities, block grants for individual programs, and formulas that include economic and demographic variables. The disbursal of funds from one unit to another typically involves stipulations for administrative oversight and performance standards. In some instances, lawmakers at the national level enact mandates requiring services be provided by regional, state, or local governments but do not provide sufficient resources to implement them. This behavior is common to education and entitlement programs, wherein performance standards are often dictated by a central government but lower units are responsible for financing the cost of meeting those benchmarks.

In many federal political systems, resources flow from central to regional governments and then to localities, but the amount of money distributed and the level of autonomy that each level of government possesses vary across different federal systems. The central government in Spain, for example, distributes conditional and unconditional grants and a share of income tax revenue to municipalities and provinces, which raise additional income through local taxes, which deliver public services. Likewise, states/provinces and localities in the United States and Canada receive a share of federal tax revenue through various means—direct revenue sharing, grants, and program subsidies—but raise additional resources through income, use, and property taxes. These funds are used to finance programs mandated at both the federal and the state level.

In other cases financial arrangements are more decentralized. Swiss municipalities enjoy a fair amount of financial sovereignty from their central government. While some federal resources do trickle down to municipalities through cantons, a large majority of municipal revenue is derived from locally levied personal and corporate income taxes. Australian localities enjoy a similar level of independence from their federal government, raising a majority of their budgets through property taxes, with most federal and state grants earmarked to provide public goods including housing and infrastructure.

The transfer of funds from central to regional and/or from regional to local governments for the purpose of providing social services can lead to conflict with municipal leaders, who often find that actual program costs exceed what they have been delegated. Such intergovernmental tension is quite common. School districts in the United States, together with many state departments of education, have made light of the issue that federal funding is insufficient to comply with and meet federal education standards. Similarly, costs associated with the transfer of French high schools to regional governments have far outstripped the size of federal grants.

Global economic and demographic changes have had an impact on local, regional, and federal budgets. Technology has played a role, as goods formerly subject to taxes are increasingly delivered through hard-to-tax digital channels, creating downward pressure on state and local budgets that depend on such revenues and, with rare exception, must be balanced each year. At the same time, federal budgets worldwide have been strained by increased expenditures on health care and programs for the elderly, a by-product of a gradually aging population. In the United States, the federal government has shifted an increasing amount of responsibility for infrastructure construction and maintenance to states and municipalities. This, in turn, has created additional pressures on state governments to meet their own obligations.

POLICY INFLUENCES

Constitutional frameworks, political structures, and the needs of native populations contribute to differences in how policy relationships play out between levels of government. Areas that do not require significant dependence on subnational units for implementation, such as defense, foreign affairs, and macroeconomic policy, are directed by central governments. If

necessary, subnational constituents make their views regarding these issues known through institutional channels or by lobbying elected representatives or special interest organizations. But in several other areas, some of which are discussed below, input is required from multiple levels of government. There is often a tension in policy making between the benefits of centralization at the national level, particularly economies of scale on one hand and the need to deliver services that meet the needs of diverse constituencies on the other. Questions about accountability, funding, and oversight further complicate this balancing act, which occurs in multiple areas of policy.

EDUCATION

Given the social and economic benefits attached to a well-educated population, it is not surprising that all levels of government place education at the top of their policy agendas. Elementary, secondary, and postsecondary schools are often locally operated, with regulatory and financial support coming from a combination of local, regional, and national sources. The structure of intergovernmental associations as they relate to education differs among developed nations. Many countries operate national ministries of education, although the actual responsibility for operating the schools often lies at the local or regional level.

In some contexts, such as the United States, Canada, South Africa, and Australia, states and provinces assume a great deal of responsibility for instruction. Funding procedures differ, but in general, primary and secondary education is financed through local taxes with some schools overseen by locally elected officials. Curricula are implemented in accordance with standards developed at the local and/or state level. While states and provinces also contribute funding to community colleges and public universities, the amount is not equalized, leaving some institutions to rely more on tuition, research grants, and private support.

Many national governments do not provide sufficient financial support for schools, but this does not preclude their influence on education policy, especially in terms of establishing standards and being responsible for program accountability. An expanded federal role in the United States can be traced to the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the creation of the Department of Education in 1980, and the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act in 2002. These policies had several goals, although most centered on increasing accountability and standards in public schools and ensuring equal opportunity and access to traditionally underserved populations. State and local officials often complain that the funding provided by the federal government is insufficient to implement such policies and that federal mandates have not improved the quality of public schools. A comparable dynamic can be seen in Great Britain between local authorities and the central government. Conflict persists because educational services are delivered at the local level but funded through national taxation and regulated by a national agency, the Department for Children, Schools and Families, although some mandates have been relaxed.

Intergovernmental disputes over education policy do not appear to be as prominent in many other centralized systems. In smaller nations, such as Norway, Ireland, and Denmark, all schools (including universities) are supported almost entirely by the national government. This eliminates some of the conflict between regional and central policy makers. A similar approach is followed in China and South Korea. While education in larger European nations such as Germany and France is financed at both the national and the state level, subnational units retain some policy control. This basic model is also present in Russia, where education is mostly regulated by the central government with some input from regional authorities.

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

Emergency preparedness policy is typically established at the national level, with national, regional, and local governments sharing responsibility for program implementation. This includes the development of policies aimed at preventing the occurrence of emergencies as well as policies designed to help citizens recover from them. Coordination among governments and their supporting agencies is a complex undertaking; indeed, the delineation of responsibilities and jurisdictions is still largely a work in progress. The experience of the United States is instructive. In 2002, a new federal agency—the Department of Homeland Security—was created to improve the government's response to emergency situations. But the department has gone through subsequent structural changes, and some of its policy responsibilities have been shifted to other federal agencies and to state and local offices. While the phrase *homeland security* is largely an American term, other countries have pursued similar strategies in this policy area. For example, Canada made strides at coordinating various security and emergency response efforts by forming Public Safety Canada in 2003.

Changes at the national level have increased pressure on regional and local governments, which are often charged with carrying out actual preparedness efforts. Those responsibilities are far-reaching, from day-to-day operations to equipment procurement and disaster response planning, all of which require significant human and financial resources. Localities look to federal agencies for assistance, but national-level feedback, in terms of establishing clear security priorities with sufficient funding, is often fragmented and redundant. One conflict that both national and regional governments have grappled with is "risk versus spread"—whether funds should be concentrated to units with a higher likelihood of experiencing a terrorist attack (urban centers) or natural disaster (coastal areas), split evenly among units, or some combination thereof. Funding issues are likely to stress future emergency preparedness discussions, a policy area challenging enough given the inherent unpredictability of most disasters.

SOCIAL WELFARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH

Governments worldwide have confronted the need for social programs, including public welfare and health insurance, since the late nineteenth century, with a combination of policies directed from the national and subnational level.

Public pensions and health care are often centralized, with the national governments determining eligibility requirements and providing the majority of program financing. This basic arrangement is common throughout Europe and also in Japan, Israel, and Australia. Canada and India mandate national health insurance but leave provinces and states responsible for implementation.

The evolution of American social welfare policy has followed a different trajectory. The role of the federal government increased during the economic turmoil of the 1930s and again during the war on poverty era of the 1960s. But this gave way to a decentralized approach in the wake of the 1990s welfare reform movement. As the number of programs and providers has increased, so has the ambiguity over who bears responsibility for funding and implementation. For example, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and Medicaid are funded through a combination of federal block grants and additional state spending, but states have a great deal of discretion over program design and delivery. As the costs of these safety net programs have increased, state governments have looked to the federal government—and its wider revenue base—for more and more relief.

The United States is not alone in taking a decentralized approach to social policy. Brazil's national health system, Serviço Único de Saúde, allows municipalities to set their own priorities, providing they concur with federal guidelines. Federal resources are transferred to states and municipalities, which have assumed an increasingly larger role in service delivery. A small number of municipalities have assumed full control of providing health care, but only those that have met established federal requirements.

Yet the United States does stand apart among industrialized nations in not offering a nationalized health care system to all citizens. While federally sponsored programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program provide coverage to their respective constituencies, a majority of the population is insured by employer-provided plans, which are regulated at both the federal and the state level. Some states have made strides toward universal coverage by using a mix of public and private plans, but they have seen their successes in increased coverage tempered by cost overruns. The current health care reform debate in the United States centers on precisely this tension: how to expand access while keeping costs under control.

ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE

Climate change has received substantial attention in recent years, with many developed nations ratifying and enacting measures to reduce pollution in fulfillment of the Kyoto Protocol. These policies require careful attention to placate dueling concerns for a clean environment and continued economic growth. Most often the approach is centralized to and coordinated between national governments, which have adopted policies aimed at encouraging environmentally friendly behavior among consumers and institutions, although the United Nations has also played a role in setting global environmental policy goals. These policies typically include a mix of consumption-based taxes and subsidies. Action on climate change has been strongest in the European Union, where several member states formed the Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme to coordinate emissions across the continent.

The failure of the United States to ratify Kyoto, in conjunction with the failure of the national government under the George W. Bush administration to enact other comprehensive environmental protection measures, has led to significant policy innovation at the state level. Specifically, interstate cooperation has grown as multiple governments in specific regions have increasingly formed partnerships to advance an ecological agenda, such as the states surrounding the Great Lakes, a trend referred to as "bioregionalism." In addition, regional collaboration has been evident in climate change policy. The establishment of renewable portfolio standards is typically an intrastate political process but has led to interstate coordination, such as when renewable energy produced in one state is traded to another. Regional climate partnerships are not limited to the American border; some states have worked with Canadian provinces on climate policy. Looking forward, sustained involvement and cooperation from all parties may be a challenge, especially if climate and political dynamics change—even more so if the U.S. federal government exerts a larger role in environmental policy.

TRANSPORTATION

Governments have confronted increasing demands for infrastructure development with a mix of public and private financing for road, rail, and air transportation. In most countries construction and maintenance are funded through the imposition of gasoline taxes and/or passenger fees. Project management is usually handled by central governments in Europe and South America, while the United States takes a more decentralized approach. States raise their own revenue through taxes but also receive revenue sharing from the federal government. This arrangement is the subject of some contention among state policy makers. Because federal transportation funds are not redistributed proportionally to states, some donor states receive a smaller share of federal gas tax revenue than they originally remitted.

THE EVOLVING NATURE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

It is difficult to generalize about the evolution of intergovernmental relations in countries around the world. Each political system has experienced its own set of intergovernmental issues and problems, some of which are unique to a particular nation. However, it is clear that intergovernmental relationships and arrangements have become increasingly complex in all political systems. This is particularly evident across the last century. Major political initiatives and increasing citizen demands have prompted changes in intergovernmental relations.

In some instances these changes are the product of policies that are not specifically designed to change the intergovernmental process. This trend is visible in the United States, where

several federal policies that did not affect the basic structure of governance nevertheless led to changes in intergovernmental relations. Ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment (giving Congress the power to tax income) and passage of the Revenue Act of 1913 enhanced the federal government's ability to raise revenue and distribute grants, bringing an end to the relative separation between national and state governments. New Deal programs in the 1930s further enlarged federal power relative to the states, while 1960s Great Society initiatives created new areas of shared responsibility between national and state governments. Federal budget cuts during the Reagan administration partially severed some of those associations, leading states to take charge of various programs, effectively increasing their power relative to municipalities. More recent national reforms to social welfare programs, education standards, and homeland security initiatives have added new layers of complexity to the relationship between federal, state, and local governments.

In England and France, the national government has taken a more direct role in shaping governmental relations. Modern British intergovernmental relations were influenced initially by the 1972 Local Government Act, which replaced existing localities with a two-tiered system of counties and districts. While this legislation explicitly divided functions between different levels of government and increased the size of localities, it did little to change their autonomy relative to the central government. Certain provisions eroded during the Thatcher era as local governments mounted greater challenges to national policies. Governmental relationships evolved further as a result of the 1992 Local Government Commission for England, which abolished a number of counties and created new local authorities in urban areas.

Despite its historical nature as a highly centralized state, France represents an interesting case wherein increasing decentralization has been the trend. Laws enacted in 1982 and 1983 assigned specific functions to central, regional, and local governments. A subsequent effort aimed at increasing cooperation between municipalities, the 1992 Chevement Acts, was less successful, perhaps because it failed to provide any financial incentives. But the constitutional reforms of 2003 and 2004 did succeed in clarifying and strengthening the role of local governments.

Decentralization or devolution is a common trend in contemporary intergovernmental relationships. Decentralization or devolution is said to occur when a central government transfers power or responsibility to a regional, state, or local governmental jurisdiction. Although the particular practices vary widely, decentralization has occurred in both unitary and federal systems, including Italy, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and the United States. Although the transfer of resources or authority from national to subnational governments is usually financial in nature, it may also involve the distribution of political power and authority. For example, during the late 1990s a series of votes led to the creation of the Scottish parliament and a transfer of power to that body from the British parliament. In the same vein, the National Assembly for Wales was created in 1998 and given powers previously held by the British government.

A significant body of literature has also emerged about the consequences of decentralization on democratic policy making and governmental performance. Most scholars agree that decentralization is beneficial for democratic societies: it provides more points of access for citizen input and expands the opportunities for political representation. In addition, subnational governments are said to be more responsive to citizens' needs and more attuned to their problems. Hence, shifting responsibilities to lower levels of government can contribute to more effective and efficient governmental policy making. This, in turn, improves governmental performance.

CHALLENGES OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Perhaps the most persistent challenge of intergovernmental relations involves how to manage the ever-changing interactions and operations of various governmental jurisdictions. No matter the organizational structure, different levels of government develop their own perspectives about which policies should be pursued and how these policies should be implemented. In some cases, these perspectives may not match those of others. This can produce intense political debates about which level of government should take the lead in establishing policy directions. It can also lead to confusion and breakdowns in the delivery of critical public services. All political systems have encountered these problems of intergovernmental relations. As the intergovernmental system continues to evolve, the management of these complicated, ever-changing systems will become even more pressing.

See also *Center-periphery Relations (Federalism); Education Policy; Education Policy, Higher; Environmental Policy; Federalism; Homeland Security; Municipal Government; Social Welfare; States' Rights; Unitary Government.*

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Internal Colonialism

Internal colonialism is a relationship between urban/majority populations and rural/minority populations. This asymmetric system of power parallels the dependency theory of international relations but directs this relationship to describe domestic development. Like other formulations of the core-periphery relationship in dependency theory, strong actors in the capital-rich center have power over the impoverished majority whom it oppresses at the political, economic, and often geographic fringes of the state. These urban/metropolitan centers develop industry, become centers of capital, and dominate peasant farmers and miners through the economy. Urban elites control farmers and other preindustrial workers through the capitalist–free market system. Rural populations within the state provide raw materials and foodstuffs to support these cities and are economically repressed by the urban center.

Like other types of colonialism, internal colonialism benefits some population at the expense of another. Because capitalist centers produce and sell secondary- and tertiary-sector goods, and because there are many more impoverished farmers and miners than wealthy industrialists, the rural populations remain permanently poor. Capitalist accumulation at the metropole increases at the expense of economies at the periphery. Peripheral populations receive low capital investments and continue agricultural economies and other primary-sector enterprises to feed the industrial center. Such a drain from these local communities has lasting economic and environmental effects. The colonial economy destroys existing trade relationships and depletes local capital but also may destroy local natural resources.

While the idea of internal colonialism is used to describe capitalist accumulation in international relations theory, other disciplines discuss race relations using the internal colonialism model. Famous examples of city centers' expanding and prospering from the work of the periphery are the British at the expense of the Scots and the white urban elite of many former colonies at the expense of indigenous populations in North America, South America, and Africa. Sociologists also point to the U.S. white–African American relationship as an example of internal colonialism. In this sociological literature, elites exploit workers either by maintaining an established system of exploitation or by structuring social arrangements to strategically impoverish or exclude groups of people. Excluded groups may be defined by religion, ethnicity, or language.

However defined, elites prevent the minority group from gaining powerful or prestigious positions and enforce exploitative socioeconomic systems.

Groups in the metropole/socioeconomic center are asymmetrically stronger and have more influence on cultural, religious, and language state policies. Populations with a greater access to the state may pursue policies to homogenize the rest of the population, either deliberately or accidentally. Social policies, such as education and language training, may institutionalize the preferences of one ethnic, linguistic, or religious group and suppress those of others. Peripheral groups may be dismissed as uncivilized or antiquated. The marginalized population is disadvantaged because the social system is built to make them disadvantaged but also because the cultural roots of the system are alien to them and they are forced to adapt. Such social structures may be intuitive to the groups that create them but completely foreign to some of the communities on whom the system is applied. Internal colonialism is said to create mentalities of fatalism and resignation, similar to those dependency theory creates in its periphery. In this way, internal colonialists control the periphery both materially and psychologically.

There are several problems with internal colonialism as an explanation of social systems. First, the internal colonialism model may describe economic patterns but is less potent as a method of explanation. Internal colonialism is unable to specify particular actors and their specific motives. While it is clear that people at the center benefit from this system of trade, it is unclear what defines a state's center, how a population becomes the center, and by what method the center unites as a coherent actor against the peripheral population. Also, the model is unable to describe differences between regions: if there are only center and peripheral areas, why do some peripheral areas experience the same benefits as urban areas? Furthermore, the history of advanced industrial and postindustrial states shows that there is (1) intensive capital investment in the hinterland to efficiently produce goods and (2) a steady flow of migrants to urban centers. Shifting economies and populations complicate the model of internal colonialism. Last, the argument of internal colonialism is laden with normative commitments.

See also *Center-periphery Relations (Federalism); Dependency Theory; International Relations Theory.*

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International Administration

International administration refers to the exercise of executive and administrative powers in a given territory by an external actor, endorsed by or part of an international organization or multilateral agreement. International administration is associated with conflict resolution and postconflict reconstruction but is a separate category of policy. Compared with peacekeeping operations and other such kinds of intervention, the external actors are dominant in the political and decision-making process and commit to rebuilding and running the administrative infrastructure of the territory. Even though this involves a lack of nominal and/or effective sovereignty, international administration is different from trusteeship and protectorate given the level of multilateral engagement and the significant extent of involvement it entails.

HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

International administration was pioneered at the beginning of the twentieth century when the League of Nations allowed certain territories to be partially governed by its own appointed administration or by countries acting on its behalf. The League of Nations administered directly the Free City of Danzig (1919–1939) and the Saar Basin (1922–1935). These experiments were seen as overall successes and provided a specific inspiration for international administration practices in the past two decades. Under the mandate system, the league also granted to the victors of wars the responsibility to assist certain territories in achieving progressively their independence.

While it resembled a colonial arrangement, international administration also enshrined the idea of accountability for action in the mandated territories. Both policies continued in parallel with the creation of the United Nations. The mandate system transformed into the trusteeship system, a more elaborate and clear policy toward independence of territories, while a limited direct administration (supervision) was used in West New Guinea–West Irian (1962–1963) and Cambodia (1992–1993). While the trusteeship system ended with the independence of Palau (1994), the direct international administration in its different forms gained momentum after the end of the cold war and was used in Eastern Slavonia (1996–1998), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995–), Kosovo (1999–), and East Timor (1999–2002).

CASES OF INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

International administration is a policy designed as a response to diverse challenges and used in different contexts, both of which ultimately determine its nature, the strategies behind it, and to some extent, its success. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international administration had to create a viable state entity from three territorial formations (Bosnian, Croat, and Serb) whose inhabitants were engaged in a violent ethnic war. The main challenge was to organize and facilitate an integrated political process for the multilevel federal entity and to strengthen the central administration to support it and prevent the entities from separating. The Office of the High Representative for Bosnia, endorsed by a large multilateral body (Peace Implementation Council), had extensive executive and administrative powers, including the banning of political leaders obstructive to the peace process.

In Kosovo, the need for international administration was prompted by its abandonment by Serb military and authorities following North Atlantic Treaty Organization strikes in 1999. The territory was left virtually without any infrastructure, and the lack of authority and security that ensued could have easily degenerated into widespread ethnic and societal violence. The international administration in Kosovo achieved a reasonable level of stability, but its mandate and effectiveness are limited by the uncertain future of the province. Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008 opens the way for building a full-fledged national administrative system.

East Timor was in a similar situation when Indonesia withdrew its troops from the territory in 1999, following a referendum with a proindependence outcome after three decades of authoritarian rule and sustained repression. The territory was left with no infrastructure, while the society was organized for resisting oppressive rule only and had no tradition of supporting an autonomous and open political process. The international administration was designed as an instrument to prevent civil war and humanitarian disaster.

The success of international administration is also influenced by other factors such as size of the state, level of infrastructural development, and local support. East Timor and Kosovo are relatively small entities and thus are examples of international involvement's being extensive. A similar degree of involvement is almost impossible in Afghanistan, a large country that has historical antecedents in failing to integrate and function. The success of international administration depends on the support of local elites and citizens. If in East Timor the international assistance was seen as a positive factor to facilitate independence and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, all the major groups look with suspicion on the extensive powers of the high representative.

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

The range of activities constituting international administration differs from country to country. In the majority of cases the structure of the political process had to be reorganized, such as organizing elections and drafting key legislation regarding the activity of political parties and mass media. The institutional engineering could include the promotion in the political life of certain ethnic and disadvantaged groups, such as women. In other cases it has had to redesign the administrative structure, empowering regional governments or local authorities. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, the international administration had to implement the constitutional provisions from the Dayton Accord, signed in 1995, which ensured the representation of the three ethnic groups. The protection of human rights and freedoms was doubled by

a specific institutional design, including collective presidency and bicameralism.

Yet still the most extensive and complicated activity of international administration is in the sphere of security and infrastructural reconstruction. The international administrations have had to reform or create effective police forces and assist the judicial institutions to perform their functions. They have had to create the basic environments for economic activity and to ensure systems of taxation that enable the sustainability of the government. A daunting activity is that of restoring the functioning of public utilities and the provision of key social services and public goods such as health, welfare, and education. These activities are very difficult to carry out as the resources to do so are usually scarce and officials are forced to act in foreign and uncertain environments. International administration is assisted by a multitude of state agencies and nongovernmental agencies, each promoting its own agenda. The range of the tasks and the number of distinct actors acting in these territories create the problem of effective coordination.

The impact of international administration on the stability and development of the countries where it has operated is highly debated and controversial. It is believed to have a fundamental role in ensuring that peace arrangements are observed and institutional prerequisites for a normal political process are in place. At the same time, it is criticized for the same reasons. International administration, which can be equally ineffective, removes the responsibility from local political actors in engaging in normalization and reconstruction.

International administrations are still in operation. Some have been concluded with greater or lesser degrees of success, such as that in East Timor, which is a sovereign country but still heavily dependent on foreign support. After almost two decades of intense trial, international administration emerges as an established policy, yet its practical effects and success continue to be inhibited by the enormous resources it demands as well as the operational complications it faces at the local level.

See also *League of Nations; Mandate System; United Nations (UN).*

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International Bill of Rights

In the United States, the term *Bill of Rights* is usually assumed to reference the first ten amendments to the Constitution, which list certain fundamental rights that are the foundation of American society. However, internationally, there are many more documents that, collectively, provide even greater rights than the U.S. Bill of Rights. One such collection is known as the International Bill of Rights or the International Bill of Human Rights. This is not a formally adopted name, but one that has developed through general usage and application over time.

The International Bill of Human Rights consists of three documents: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It also contains two optional protocols included under the umbrella of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948 by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris, France, is not a binding treaty. Rather, it is a statement of goals or intentions acknowledging many of the fundamental rights recognized in the world. These rights include equal rights and freedoms without regard to race, color, sex, language, religion, nationality, social origin, property, birth, or political opinion.

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, enacted in 1966 and taking force in 1976, provides for all people, without regard to their status, the right to freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. This includes the right to choose the type of work one does, remuneration for that work, fair wages, equal pay for all without regard to sex, safe and healthy working conditions, and reasonable rest and leisure time. The right to unionize is also acknowledged, as are protections for the family. All people are recognized to have the right to adequate food, shelter, and clothing and the right to physical and mental health. The right to education is mandated to include free primary education and higher education equally accessible to all people.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, enacted in 1966 and taking force in 1976, recognizes many of the rights listed in the U.S. Bill of Rights. These rights include liberty, security of the person, right to a prompt trial, right to an appeal, protection from torture, freedom of movement, due process of law, equal protection of law, right to marry, freedom of religion, freedom of association, freedom of expression, right to vote and participate in government, and freedom from discrimination on the bases recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides the authority for the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations to receive communications from individuals concerning the violation of

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights concerns the death penalty. It prohibits any signatory to the Second Optional Protocol from executing any person.

Although admirable in the breadth and scope of the rights that are guaranteed under them, the documents that are part of the International Bill of Human Rights are extremely difficult to enforce. Some nations, such as the United States, adopt certain reservations that severely restrict their enforcement domestically. And even for those nations that have adopted them, enforcement is difficult, as the United Nations lacks any executive enforcement organs such as an international police force or standing military. However, this does not mean that the bill is not without value. It provides nations with goals they can achieve to attain the benchmark of human rights contained in the documents.

See also *Bill of Rights; Civil and Political Rights; Human Rights; International Law; Property Rights; Universal Declaration of Human Rights.*

. . . .   WM. C. PLOUFFE JR.

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International Cooperation

International cooperation refers to the collaborative interactions among different actors across international borders to address common issues or problems. Such cooperation involves both governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and may take an array of forms. Among governments, international cooperation may be bilateral, such as between the United States and Canada, or multilateral, such as among Japan, China, and Russia. Countries may also pursue collaborative actions within intergovernmental organizations (IGOs; e.g., within a global IGO such as the United Nations or within a regional IGO such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]), or nations may take shared actions within a particular supranational organization such as within the European Union. At the nongovernmental level, individuals and groups across nations may engage in international cooperation. NGOs are numerous and deal with social, economic, and political cooperation among individuals. Many are humanitarian or social groups, such as the International Red Cross or Amnesty International; others are economic units,

often multinational or transnational businesses such as Exxon or Unilever; and still others are political organizations such as the Socialist International or the Committee on Disarmament. The important characteristic of these groups is that they are outside the control of any particular government or even groups of governments.

GOALS

Just as there are numerous forms of international collaboration among governments, groups, and individuals, these different actors pursue a variety of goals through cooperative activities. One important aim focuses on pursuing greater security or resolving conflicts among states or groups. Some nations enhance their security by forming alliances. In the post–World War II years, the United States joined a number of multilateral regional organizations, such as NATO in Western Europe, the Rio Pact in Latin America, and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in Southeast Asia, and formed bilateral alliances with Japan, the Republic of China, and South Korea to protect the members from the threat of international communism.

Other times, alliances are expanded to enhance the degree of security. NATO has been enlarged from its original membership of sixteen nations in the early 1990s to twenty-eight today as a way to provide greater security in central Europe for the nations that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire. In Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was founded in 2001 among China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to enhance security, trade, and cooperation among these member states. Other nations form temporary cooperative arrangements, something less than a formal alliance, to address a particular security issue, to mediate an issue, or to address an emerging problem. During the past decade, the six-party talks among China, Russia, Japan, the United States, South Korea, and North Korea represent a cooperative effort among these parties to persuade North Korea to abandon its development of nuclear weapons. Similarly, Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union joined together to try to dissuade Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons. IGOs may elicit cooperative actions among states to promote international security. The members of the United Nations may impose international sanctions or invoke collective actions against aggressor states, such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq, or against regions or countries in turmoil, such as the Darfur region in Sudan. Nongovernmental actors may also be asked to assist in seeking to facilitate cooperation among states in disputes. For example, the Vatican served as an intermediary between Argentina and Chile to resolve a boundary dispute.

IGOS AND TRADE

International cooperation may also focus on economic and environmental activities among states, IGOs, and NGOs. Bilateral and regional free-trade agreements are now prominent features of the international system. These agreements seek to reduce or eliminate tariffs among states or regions as a way to promote greater prosperity for the signatory countries. The creation and expansion of the European Union is the premier

example of this degree of cooperation and integration among states, and that supranational organization has grown over the decades from 6 original members to more than 2 dozen today. The areas of cooperation within the European Union have expanded into numerous sectors and now into a single market. Other regions have followed this example and have created such organizations as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. The World Trade Organization, the principal IGO to promote greater global trade, now has more than 150 member nations. Sometimes selected groups of nations hold periodic meetings to foster economic cooperation. The 7 leading industrial democracies—the G7, and later the G8 with Russia added—have held yearly meetings since the mid-1970s in an effort to coordinate policy on political, economic, and environmental issues. Since 1999, the G20, composed of the finance ministers and central bankers from 19 developed and developing nations and the European Union, meet periodically to evaluate the stability of the international financial system. Finally, the United Nations may hold periodic international meetings to address a pressing issue. In December 2009, 193 nations gathered in Copenhagen, Denmark, to seek a cooperative agreement to combat global climate change. All of these kinds of cooperative efforts also serve as important venues for fostering technological innovation and collaboration.

NGOS AND FOREIGN AID

The number of both nations and IGOs has increased dramatically during the past several decades, but these actors have been surpassed by the meteoric rise in the number and activities of NGOs. By some estimates, the number of NGOs totaled only four hundred a century ago, but recent totals range from about six thousand to twenty-five thousand and to even more than one hundred thousand such organizations. These NGOs provide a vast network of interdependencies among the people of the world and often serve to knit the global community together. Such organizations include the traditional political, economic, and social organizations that are often immediately identified, but the array also includes educational, religious, media, fraternal, environmental, and humanitarian ones, among others.

Important to note, these NGOs play an integral role in facilitating international cooperation in many policy areas. Much of the world's foreign assistance is actually distributed by NGOs or private voluntary organizations. Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service, Oxfam, Bread for the World, the International Red Cross, and CARE routinely address the issue of global poverty, foster international development, and respond to natural disasters such as the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The new modes of communication have only accelerated the rise of more and more NGOs. The growth of satellite and cable television, the cell phone, and the Internet serve as the principal means for enhancing international information exchange across all areas of the world and foster instantaneous sharing of information.

RESEARCH

Important remaining questions are why international cooperation occurs among these state and nonstate actors and how these international institutions facilitate or support such cooperation. Scholars such as Robert Axelrod, Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, and Arthur Stein began to unravel these two puzzles in the 1980s, and their insights remain useful to this day. Moral and ethical imperatives and common interests may motivate some participants to cooperate and use these international organizations. Such arguments, however, appear less persuasive in explaining cooperation among states. After all, states have long been characterized as rational actors operating in an anarchic international system in which they are primarily driven by power and interest considerations. Yet as some of these scholars note, states still may cooperate with one another if their rational, self-interested choices yield less than Pareto-optimal outcomes. Consider the security dilemma faced by states, often represented by the Prisoner's Dilemma game, as illustrative of when mutual cooperation would aid states. In a stylized game of an arms race between two nations, the rational and dominant strategy for the two participants is for each to continue to increase its armaments rather than to show any constraint and trust the other state to restrain its arms spending. Yet such a strategy is both economically costly for a state and potentially dangerous for peace and security in the international system. In a situation of a "dilemma of common interests," as Arthur Stein (1982) calls it, there is an imperative for states to abandon independent decision making and collaborate with one another to achieve a better outcome for both parties. The resulting regime may consist of an arms control agreement between the two that specifies the rules, norms, and procedures that each must follow regarding this issue. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union is one tangible illustration of this kind of international cooperation. The dilemma of common interests, of course, applies to a variety of security, economic, and social issues for states in international relations and thus, in part, accounts for the emergence of numerous international organizations such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and the World Trade Organization. Moreover, the existence of these international institutions has the effect of perpetuating and perhaps even expanding the degree of international cooperation.

See also *Climate Change Conferences, United Nations; International Organization; Isolationism; Multilateralism; Nongovernment Organizations (NGOs); Prisoner's Dilemma; Summit Diplomacy; Trade Blocs; World Trade Organization (WTO).*

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International Court of Justice (ICJ)

Established in 1921, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was sponsored by the League of Nations and housed in the Peace Palace in The Hague, the Netherlands. The PCIJ was the first court available to all states on a constant basis for interstate dispute resolution. Although connected to the League of Nations, the PCIJ was not officially part of the organization, and both league members and nonmembers, once ratifying its statute, could use the court. Like the League of Nations, the PCIJ did not survive the conflict of World War II (1939–1945) and officially dissolved in 1940. During its tenure it heard twenty-nine cases and rendered twenty-seven advisory opinions requested by the league.

Following the war, the victorious global leaders sought to build a new international organization and world court for the development of stable and judicial resolutions to interstate conflict. Somewhat more skeptical about the utopian promise of international organizations and international law, the Allies sought to remedy some of the weakness of the league and the PCIJ. To gain distance from the criticism of the PCIJ, the second world court would be an entirely new body, directly integrated into the United Nations (UN) as its official judicial arm. Accordingly, the statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was annexed to that of the UN, and all members of the UN are automatically party to the ICJ, although a UN member state can refuse ICJ jurisdiction. The ICJ, however, took residency at the Peace Palace in The Hague, as had its predecessor, and is now the only one of the six principal UN organs that is not located in New York City.

STATUTE AND JURISDICTION

Similar to the PCIJ, the ICJ has dual jurisdiction to decide legal cases brought by states (contentious cases) as well as to give opinions on questions of international law requested by organs of the UN (advisory opinions). Only states, no subnational entities, other collectivities, or persons, are entitled to initiate proceedings with the court. Furthermore, the court has jurisdiction only over states that have consented to its jurisdiction. The United States withdrew from the court's jurisdiction in 1986.

ICJ judges act independently and do not represent their governments. They are elected by the UN General Assembly and Security Council to nine-year terms and can be reelected. Judges can be dismissed only by a vote of the court itself. There are fifteen judges to the court, with elections for five every three years. It is customary (and a result of the election process, which requires Security Council approval), although not mandated, that each state holding a veto on the Security Council be represented on the court.

According to article 28 the court relies on five sources of international law: (1) treaties, (2) customary state practice, (3) general principles of law applied by civilized nations, (4) national or other international court decisions, and (5) scholarly writings of experts in international law.

The first contentious case was submitted to the ICJ in 1948 (Cornfu Channel, *United Kingdom v. Albania*). The United Kingdom sued Albania when war ships hit mines in Albanian waters. The court decided in favor of the United Kingdom, and the conflict dissipated. From this first case to March 2010, 146 cases (contentious and advisory) were submitted to the court. In a recent contentious case, the first brought before the court in 2009 (*Belgium v. Senegal*), there was a dispute between Belgium and Senegal regarding Senegal's responsibility, as a signatory to the Convention against Torture, to prosecute or extradite for prosecution the former president of Chad, Hissene Habre.

The ICJ statute officially bars any individual decision from directly affecting subsequent cases. A particular court decision is legally binding for only those parties to that immediate case. Nevertheless, ICJ cases do lend to the development of international law and may be considered in future cases regarding similar disputes.

ENFORCEMENT

If parties do not comply with decisions made by the court, enforcement may be taken up by the Security Council. However, when a party to the case, or an ally to such a party, holds veto power on the Security Council, this is not a practical enforcement mechanism. When the Security Council is unwilling to enforce an ICJ decision, there is no formal recourse for the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the court has been broadly successful, and in most cases the court's decisions have been implemented. This has been particularly true of border disputes, such as the two-centuries-long conflict between El

Salvador and Honduras that was resolved by ICJ adjudication in 1992.

See also *League of Nations; United Nations (UN).*

. . . .   MOLLY RUHLMAN

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International Criminal Court (ICC)

During a five-week period in the summer of 1998, the world's nation-states, along with a large contingent of nongovernmental organizations, came together in Rome to deliberate over the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). At the final plenary session of the conference, the state delegates voted on the proposed Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. After the United States called for one final unrecorded vote on the proposed Rome Statute, as a means to measure which nation-states would support it in its opposition to the statute, the official vote occurred. The final vote was 120 in favor, 7 against (including the United States), and 21 abstentions. The Rome Conference had achieved its ultimate goal, and on the following morning, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was open for signatures.

On April 11, 2002, the statute received its 60th ratification, thus allowing the ICC to enter into force on July 1, 2002. Currently the Rome Statute has 139 signatories and 110 ratifications. One of the major exceptions to the list of ratifying countries is the United States, which initially signed the statute under President Clinton but then withdrew from any obligation to the court after the election of President Bush. The Obama administration does not appear to be moving in a radically different direction. Although the Obama administration seems more accepting of the ICC and its mandate, it still appears doubtful that this cordial relationship will ever result in ratification of the Rome Statute. The United States's primary objection concerns the sanctity of the state sovereignty rule and the ICC's ability to prosecute individuals from nonmember states. Despite this opposition, the ICC continues to receive widespread support and is currently investigating four cases: the Central African Republic, the Darfur region of Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda.

JURISDICTION

Part 2 of the Rome Statute discusses the jurisdiction of the ICC. As stated in article 5, the ICC has jurisdiction over the following four crimes: the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. The court has jurisdiction over these crimes from the time the statute enters into force; therefore, the ICC is temporally bound to the point of its ratification. No crimes committed before that date are within the court's jurisdiction.

Scholars often refer to the crimes themselves as the "core crimes" of international humanitarian law. Definitions of the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are all predicated on established international law. The foundations for defining these crimes include the Genocide Convention, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions, the post–World War II military tribunals, and the ad hoc tribunals of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

The crime of aggression is included in the list of crimes within the jurisdiction of the court, but its definition has yet to be determined. Even after this crime is defined, the definition must then pass through the procedures of an amendment to the statute, as laid down in articles 121 and 123. In September 2002, the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC established the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression. This group is currently working on a draft text concerning the definition of *crimes of aggression*. Upon completion, the text will be forwarded to the assembly for review, and in a subsequent review conference the parties to the ICC will decide whether to adopt this text.

TRIGGER MECHANISMS

The court may initiate an investigation if a state party, the United Nations Security Council, or the prosecutor refers a situation to the court. If any of these actors determines that any of the crimes defined in article 5 have been committed, they may refer the case to the prosecutor for further investigation. The case is then in the hands of the prosecutor, who must decide whether there is sufficient evidence to proceed.

Although this appears to be an approval of universal jurisdiction, it is not. Certain preconditions must exist before the court can exercise its jurisdiction. These preconditions establish the territorial jurisdiction of the court and limit the application of its power. In other words, article 13 does not give the court universal jurisdiction; it provides certain spatial considerations that determine where and when the court may exercise its power.

According to article 12, the court has jurisdiction within the territory of a state that is party to the statute. Therefore, if one or more of the crimes defined in article 5 were committed on a state's territory that is party to the statute, then the ICC has jurisdiction. The ICC also has jurisdiction if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft that is registered by a state that is party to the statute. The ICC's jurisdiction also extends to a situation in which the perpetrator of the crime is a national of a state that is party to the statute. Finally, the ICC has jurisdiction over a nonparty state if that state voluntarily accepts the court's jurisdiction.

The only exceptions to these trigger mechanisms are if a nonparty state consents to the investigation and subsequent prosecution and if the Security Council referred the case to the court. If the latter, then and only then does the court have universal jurisdiction.

Along with the aforementioned trigger mechanisms, the court must also adhere to the principle of complementarity when considering whether it has legal jurisdiction. The principle of complementarity concerns the relationship that the ICC has with the national authorities and domestic courts of an accused perpetrator. In short, the relationship of the ICC with national judicial systems is a complementary one, meaning that the domestic judicial system of the accused has the right of first prosecution. The ICC can act if, and only if, the domestic judicial system cannot properly investigate or prosecute the alleged crime. Such a situation would most likely occur because of a lack of national infrastructure or a collapse of the state's domestic judicial system. The ICC may also act if the state is unwilling to prosecute. Unwillingness to investigate or prosecute is not as easy to identify but is ultimately determined by a panel of ICC judges.

FUTURE OF THE ICC

As stated earlier, the ICC is currently engaged in four cases. Three of these cases—the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda—were referred by state parties. The fourth case, Sudan, was referred by the Security Council. The primary obstacle that the ICC has to overcome is enforcement of its rulings, indictments, and arrest warrants. Because the ICC lacks any centralized form of enforcement, it must rely on member states to enforce its rulings. This is particularly problematic in the case of arrest warrants where the home state of the accused is typically less than cooperative in executing these rulings. However, proponents of the ICC point to the increased support given to the court and the decline in U.S. hostility toward the ICC (as exemplified in its abstention on the Security Council vote concerning Sudan) as reasons to be hopeful for a successful and permanent form of international justice.

See also *Genocide; War Crimes.*

. . . .   ERIC K. LEONARD

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International Criminal Tribunals

International criminal tribunals are criminal courts designed to investigate, prosecute, and punish the perpetrators of gross human abuses. Unlike the International Criminal Court, which is a permanent standing court, and the military tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo (1946), which the Allied powers created to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during World War II (1939–1945), international criminal tribunals are mandated or temporary courts established under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. In 1993, for instance, in creating the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the United Nations Security Council declared that the unlawful detentions and mass killings in Bosnia-Herzegovina constituted a breach in international peace and security (the same rationale would later be invoked, under different circumstances, to create the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda). As such, the ICTY represented a novel mechanism for promoting peace and security. Although some would argue that it provided an excuse or a weak alternative to the more stringent demand for military intervention to stop the war, it eventually received strong financial backing and international support. More important, the ICTY seemed to overcome the problem of victor's justice, in which criminal justice served the political interests of only a few of the most powerful states (the Allied Powers). It did so by providing a prosecutorial mechanism that operated independent of the UN Security Council and establishing the basis of concurrent jurisdiction whereby the prosecutor and national judiciary would work together to investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of gross human rights abuses.

Accordingly, the ICTY statute empowers the prosecutor to investigate the core crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes and targets the guilt of individual perpetrators. It is believed that by individualizing guilt and establishing a historical record, international criminal tribunals will help to promote national reconciliation. What is more, international criminal tribunals provide an arguably independent venue for investigating and prosecuting the above crimes. Aside from this intangible benefit, two problems should be noted. First, international criminal tribunals require substantial economic resources to investigate, prosecute, and punish the perpetrators of the above crimes. This is one main reason why they need to operate efficiently within

given budgetary constraints. Second, because international criminal courts are a political solution to conflict (as opposed to political tools of Western states), they often tend to expose the politicization of international law, or complications of enforcement, as was the case with Louis Arbor's decision to indict Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic at the height of the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization war.

The looming issue, then, is whether international criminal tribunals, such as the recently established International Criminal Tribunal for East Timor, will be able to effectively complement commissions by furnishing a more credible historical record. Equally important is the issue of whether poorly funded national courts, which lack the funds and legitimacy to hold impartial and effective prosecutorial proceedings, would benefit from the legal assistance of international criminal tribunals. In Sierra Leone, for instance, where a truth commission and national court (funded by the United Nations) have been established (hybrid court), it is quite possible that an international criminal tribunal would serve a positive, complementary role. In short, these prospects should call attention to the important role that international criminal tribunals have played in promoting accountability.

See also *Genocide; International Criminal Court (ICC); War Crimes.*

. . . . STEVEN C. ROACH

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International Labor Organization (ILO)

The International Labor Organization (ILO) has been a specialized agency of the United Nations since 1946. It was originally created in 1919 as part of the Treaty of Versailles negotiations in the aftermath of World War I (1914–1918). Since its inception one of the key activities of the ILO has been the formulation of international labor standards. It is unique among other institutions of global governance in that it has a tripartite system that includes representatives from employers, labor, and government. Under Director-General Juan Somavía, who was elected to his first term in 1998, the ILO began to engage with other international institutions in attempting to develop a social side to globalization. The ILO conducts research and produces publications on an increasingly diverse series of issues that relate to the changing nature of work and employment.

International discussion of labor standards was developed at the beginning of the twentieth century, partly in response to fear among many European states of the revolutionary potential of workers. It was also driven by a concern that low labor standards would give some countries a competitive advantage in their trading relations with other, more progressive nations. The ILO sought to address these issues and advanced a model of decision making that gave both employers and workers an independent voice. Each member state sends two government representatives, one employer, and one labor representative to the ILO's annual International Labour Conference. The membership of the Governing Body is organized along similar lines.

The ILO has been successful in making labor protection part of the wider discourse on human rights. The annual conference adopts conventions that then become binding at the national level, subject to their ratification by member states. Two important examples of these conventions are number 87, the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention (1948) and number 98, the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention (1949). (Interestingly, as of 2009 both of these conventions had still not been ratified by either the United States or China.) More recently the ILO has broadened its remit. For example, in 1992 it created the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, and in 2001 it launched both the Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour and the Code of Practice on HIV/AIDS and the World of Work.

During the cold war the ILO, like many international institutions, became paralyzed by the geopolitical circumstances of the period. During the 1990s the relevance of the organization was questioned due to changes in the global economy that resulted in organized labor's becoming more politically marginalized in many countries. However, the ILO has worked hard in recent years to reassert its importance. When the World Trade Organization announced in 1996 that it would not consider linking labor standards to trade rules, the ILO saw an opportunity to find its voice again in the multilateral system. In 1999 Somavía introduced the decent work agenda, which, among other objectives, seeks to extend the focus of the ILO to include the informal labor sector, which has grown sharply in recent years. The ILO has also begun to work with other institutions of global governance, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to develop social policies within their new Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Supporters of the ILO suggest that its continued use of a tripartite approach offers hope for multilateralism at a time when the legitimacy of other international institutions is being questioned.

See also *International Labor Standards; Labor Policy.*

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International Labor Standards

International labor standards have risen in prominence alongside the dramatic increase in trade in the post–World War II era. While there is no universally agreed-on definition of *international labor standards,* most widely cited are the core labor standards defined by the International Labor Organization (ILO) in its 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. These standards are (1) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, (2) elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, (3) effective abolition of child labor, and (4) elimination of discrimination with respect to employment and occupation. These standards emanate from a number of ILO conventions. While these core labor standards have evolved over time, they are essentially a floor of labor rights that states and firms are encouraged to rise above but should not go below.

The ILO is the intergovernmental organization charged with promoting international labor standards and promoting the well-being of workers. The ILO works in a tripartite fashion by convening meetings with representatives of governments, firms, and workers. The ILO develops conventions and recommendations that, once ratified by member states, are considered to be binding for signatories. However, the ILO does not have the power to enforce agreements or sanction states that violate agreements.

The increased prominence of international labor standards is directly connected to debates about globalization and trade. As trade agreements and the general liberalization of trade under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, later the World Trade Organization (WTO), have reduced trade friction, it has become much easier for firms to locate production in low-wage and low–labor standard countries. While this may be efficient for firms in reducing unit costs, it also could discourage a country from enforcing international labor standards as doing so may lead to a loss of advantage in the highly competitive market for production, particularly for low-wage production.

Arguments in support of international labor standards cluster around two distinct logics: a normative argument based on moral claims and an economic argument based on charges of unfair competition. The normative argument for international labor standards claims that the rights of workers to collectively bargain, to be free from discrimination in the workplace, and so on are akin to human rights. Thus, international labor standards should be enforced in all places and at all times because workers have these rights by virtue of their standing as workers and cannot give these up by entering into a labor contract any more than a human being can give up other basic human rights.

An economic argument is made when it is claimed that a lack of enforcement of international labor standards leads to unfair competition wherein workers who are protected by such standards will likely be more expensive in terms of labor costs relative to those who do not enjoy such protection. Less-developed countries frequently argue that such demands for international labor standards are actually a kind of Trojan horse for protectionism. That is, industries in developed countries are not competitive with production costs in less-developed countries, so they use the language of international labor standards to protect themselves from competition.

Proponents of international labor standards must always confront the difficulty of sanctioning states that do not enforce them and gain a competitive advantage by doing so. As discussed above, the ILO does not have any mechanism to sanction states that violate international labor standards, even if those states are signatories to conventions. Some firms, under pressure from labor advocacy organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and consumer groups, have committed themselves to corporate codes of conduct that preclude utilizing suppliers that violate labor standards. George DeMartino (2000) has suggested a carefully targeted "social tariff" that would discourage states from gaining an advantage through "social dumping" (denying collective bargaining rights, the use of prison/child labor, etc.). Labor activists and unions have suggested that the WTO would be a logical organization to enforce sanctions against states that violate labor standards. Trade economists have generally argued that the WTO should continue the challenging work of promoting the liberalization of trade and leave international labor standards to the ILO lest the WTO become a site of protectionist schemes masquerading as normative commitments to labor standards. Given the continuing debates around policy responses to globalization, it is likely that international labor standards will remain a vexing issue for some time to come.

See also *Globalization; International Labor Organization (ILO); World Trade Organization (WTO).*

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International Law

The term *international law* has replaced the older terminology *law of nations* in English and Romance languages, reflecting the diversification of the law and its subjects. Nevertheless, the general public international law covered by the old denomination still constitutes the core of the international normative order, serving as the rules of the game for international politics. These rules are based on international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; international conventions and treaties, binding the consenting parties; and a set of general principles of law. The system emerged in the period from the Peace of Westphalia (1648) until the end of World War I (1914–1918) and has since been adapted and enhanced by modern international law, such as the prohibition of the threat of or use of force and the growing body of human rights law. Originally a European legal order, international law became globalized through the process of decolonization. The acceptance of its rules is today a constitutive element of statehood. Compared to national legal orders, international law lacks a system of obligatory jurisdiction and a sovereign power to enforce its nevertheless binding provisions. Even if international law is at times violated, "most states are careful to observe most obligations of international law most of the time" (Malanczuk 1999, 6).

See also *Decolonization.*

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International Law and Compliance

See *State Compliance with International Law.*

International Monetary Fund

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an international organization that is dedicated to stabilizing international exchange rates and encouraging development: its official mission statement is "to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty." As part of this mission, it offers loans to less-developed countries, often with stipulations aimed at ensuring the loans effectively encourage development.

The IMF was proposed in July 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference. There were originally forty-five member nation-states, with goals to stabilize exchange rates and rebuild the world's international payment system. Countries would contribute to a pool that could be borrowed from, on a temporary basis, by countries with payment imbalances. The IMF was formally established on December 27, 1945, when twenty-nine countries signed its Articles of Agreement. The IMF began its financial operations on March 1, 1947.

The IMF's early years focused on stabilizing the economic system; it retains influence through its work to improve the economies of its member countries. However, some of its policies have been controversial. It has been criticized for protecting the interests of the major economic powers, especially the United States; for requiring borrower nations to sell off assets to multinational corporations and implement austerity programs, which often increased taxes while reducing government spending (often leading to further decline in the standard of living of the borrower nation's citizens); and for providing loans to dictatorships while often ignoring the needs of democratic regimes. With the World Bank, the IMF has been a major target of the antiglobalization movement.

As of 2010, 186 countries are members of the IMF. Any country may apply for membership to the IMF. If the Board of Governors adopts the membership resolution proposed by the IMF's Executive Board, the applicant state must take the legal steps required under its own law to join the organization. Member states can withdraw from the IMF, although that is rare.

Member states are represented on a twenty-four-member Executive Board (five executive directors are appointed by the five members with the largest quotas, and nineteen executive directors are elected by the remaining members) that oversees the day-to-day operations of the IMF. All members appoint a governor to the IMF's Board of Governors. Major decisions require an 85 percent supermajority. The United States, with 16.77 percent of the votes, has always been the only country able to block a supermajority on its own.

The Executive Board selects the managing director, who is appointed for a renewable five-year term. The managing director reports to the board, serves as its chair and the chief of the IMF's staff, is responsible for ordinary business subject to the direction of the board, and is assisted by a first deputy managing director and two other deputy managing directors. Historically, the IMF's managing director has been European. The first deputy managing director of the IMF has traditionally been an American. The managing director as of January 2010 was Dominique Strauss-Kahn, a French academic and politician, who succeeded Rodrigo de Rato, who retired on October 31, 2007.

In July 2009, a report proposing reforms in the governance of the IMF was released. Based on that report and others, a reform plan was being drafted in 2010.

The IMF is headquartered in Washington, D.C., with additional offices in New York; Paris; Tokyo; Warsaw; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Libreville, Gabon; Bamako, Mali; and Beirut.

See also *Anti- and Alter-globalization Movements; Foreign Aid; Foreign Direct Investment; Third World Debt; World Bank.*

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International Norms

International norms provide a measure of continuity and stability to relations between states and transnational actors as they constitute authoritatively endorsed, articulated ideas and beliefs concerning some aspect of political life beyond that of domestic systems of governance. But since the boundaries between national and international phenomena have been significantly relaxed in recent years, norms that evolve and are disseminated across countries at the same time seem increasingly important to the inner life of most contemporary societies. Regardless of the level of governance, norms can be described as the microfoundations of political institutions.

This article examines international norms in five areas. After a brief introduction to the legacy of the term, three phases of the life cycle of an international norm are discussed, namely, its origins, its modes of operation, and its repercussions. The article ends by evaluating the added value of this term and its related field of research to political science overall.

LEGACY

In legal science, *norm* is used to denote a written or unwritten rule that forms part of a system of law in that it has normative power or authority. The term was later borrowed by sociologists, among them Émile Durkheim, to describe intersubjectively shared understandings and expectations of behavior within a particular community of individuals. Both the legal and the sociological concepts of norm, but especially the latter, had profound effects on political research in the twentieth century.

In the 1980s and 1990s, a theoretical current in the social sciences, constructivism, emerged to confront the perceived hegemony of rationalistic theories of politics and political processes. In a series of theoretical debates raging in the study of political organization, public policy formation, and international relations, a rationalist logic of consequences associated with preference-ordering actors was juxtaposed to a constructivist logic of appropriateness, in turn associated with an idea of social acceptance. Much empirical research was conducted

with a view of gleaning which of the two types of explanations would hold sway in a particular political and social context.

The term *international norms* predates the rationalist-constructivist debate but has thrived in the latter. In part by rendering problematic certain Realpolitik assumptions related to the centrality of material power resources and nation-state autonomy, it has served as a common denominator for a wide range of scholarship along the domestic-foreign frontier. Some of this research was charged with vast questions concerning the key characteristics of the international system or sovereignty. Other studies, more modest in scope but often equally illuminating, were devoted to the post-1945 human rights regime, United Nations sanctions instruments, and spread of prescriptive ideas concerning environmental standards or women's rights.

ORIGINS

Studies on the creation and early diffusion of international norms have gained momentum in recent years, as scholars have begun to question the outcomes of predominantly rationalistic approaches oriented toward interest-based conflict analysis or bargaining processes. In 1996, Martha Finnemore made an especially significant contribution in this respect in that she theorized the relationship between norms and institutional development but also provided three short historical case studies devoted to the rise of the United Nations Education and Science Committee, the evolution of the International Red Cross, and the transfer of the war on poverty from U.S. President Johnson's administration to the World Bank by former Secretary of States (and incumbent World Bank President) McNamara. Scholars subsequently explored other examples of governments being prepared, under certain (historical) circumstances, to commit to some universal, normative purpose and at the same time accept the costs in terms of expenses and partial loss of sovereignty. Illustrating this phenomenon, empirical studies have described instances of norms cascades, during which some set of ideas about a particularly prominent problem or solution (or both) is almost universally accepted as urgently requiring a response by the international community of states.

MODES OF OPERATION

Norms cascades remain relatively unusual and restricted to problems that are considered particularly pressing (e.g., antiterrorism measures following the 9/11 attacks in the United States) or proposed solutions that are universally embraced. International norms are otherwise disseminated by more complex mechanisms, which subsequently affect their respective modes of operation. In fact, the incorporation of international norms at the domestic level may be swift or slow, haphazard or consistent, and met with strong resistance or with overwhelming enthusiasm.

Important factors identified by scholars for explaining such different responses are whether the relevant political decision makers find the norm in question conducive to their own agendas, whether a large enough coalition supports it in society at large, whether it can be conveniently plugged into existing

legislation and institutional arrangements, and whether implementation is costly. The matter of who will be assigned to interpret and administer the application of the norm is also potentially significant, as is the scope of the latter's mandate.

REPERCUSSIONS

The literature on norm repercussions examines the vexed question of direct and indirect consequences and of compliance and the eventual effectiveness of international norms. Whereas this type of research has a long lineage going back to work on the League of Nations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the early United Nations system, recent contributions are typically based on more sophisticated methodologies. Empirical studies have demonstrated that diplomats and government representatives at times are socialized into a set of norms and that transnational advocacy groups often help ensure implementation. Whether such processes as a rule affect the foreign policy behavior of resourceful states on major policy issues remains disputed, although with many scholars' insisting that only legally binding obligations are likely to sway governments or that norm compliance ultimately conforms to underlying power relations.

THE ADDED VALUE FOR
POLITICAL RESEARCH

A shift can be noted away from the rationalist-constructivist debate of the past two decades to a reengagement with the study of law, therefore reinvigorating the legal concept of norms in political research. But while Realpolitik skepticism of the predominantly sociological concept of norms thus indirectly is taken into account, the analytical gains made in recent scholarship will remain. The study of international norms provides a positive illustration of interdisciplinary research involving the disciplines of economics, sociology, and law and an example of how policy issues fruitfully can be approached through a transnational conceptual lens. A third advantage of the field is that the study of international norms is well situated to bridge the otherwise large gap between descriptive and normative theory in political science.

See also *Constructivism; Globalization; International System; Sovereignty.*

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International Organization

International organizations are transnational organizations that are held together by formal agreements and that contain elements of formal institutional structure. International organizations can be divided into two types of organizations: intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). IGOs are those whose membership is composed of state parties. NGOs are groups with global interests and activities but whose membership is independent of state governments. Examples of the former include the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the International Seabed Authority, and the International Monetary Fund. Examples of the latter include the International Red Cross, Doctors without Borders, the World Wildlife Fund, and Human Rights Watch. International organizations can be global in their focus, such as the Universal Postal Union or the World Bank, or they can be regional in nature, such as the Organization of American States or the African Union. Currently, it is estimated that there are approximately six thousand IGOs and forty thousand NGOs around the globe, for a total of forty-six thousand international organizations worldwide.

INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS: FUNCTIONS

IGOs have been a part of the international system for over a hundred years, since the establishment in 1865 of the International Telegraphic Union (now the International Telecommunications Union). Since the end of World War II (1939–1945), IGOs have commanded a progressively more prominent place in the international system. While states still maintain pride of place as the primary actors in the international system, IGOs have become increasingly active in a number of areas. IGOs serve as forums for discussion and debate, serve as experts in particular areas of interest, provide humanitarian and other forms of assistance around the world, and facilitate state interactions by providing bodies of rules and methods of enforcement in areas such as trade, weapons proliferation, and environmental protection. Specific examples include the UN High Commissioner for Refugees' providing shelter, aid, and relocation services to refugees around the world and the World Trade Organization's settling trade disputes between its members before they escalate into trade wars.

More specifically, the functions of IGOs can be divided into several categories: informational, forum, normative, rule creating, rule supervisory, and operational. These are each discussed in turn.

IGOs serve an informational function through the gathering, analyzing, and disseminating of data. This is an important function because many IGOs are composed of experts in certain fields who are in the best position to provide information to the IGOs themselves and to member states. An example of this would be the UN Development Programme, which collects, analyzes, and disseminates data on climate change. Often researchers from IGOs have more opportunity to carry out their research all over the world than they would if they were acting on behalf of individual states.

The forum function of IGOs provides for settings in which members can meet to exchange views, work out compromises to difficult problems, and cooperate on issues relevant to the global community. This occurred, for example, when the global community came together to draft the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, working together to create emissions-reduction targets to reduce greenhouse gas levels. The Group of Twenty, or G20, is another example of an IGO whose global influence continues to increase due to the forum function this group provides to member states in discussing and setting global economic issues.

The normative function stems from the fact that IGOs are often responsible today for determining and defining the appropriate standards of behavior for their members in the global system. This can trickle down and have a universal effect on the behavior of states and other organizations in the international system. A primary example of this is the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which has been held as the global standard for human rights aspirations for over sixty years and is referred to not only by states but by other international organizations such as the European Union (EU), the Organization of American States, and Amnesty International.

With regard to the rule-creation function, many IGOs are responsible for drafting legally binding multilateral treaties. The UN, for example, is responsible for the inception of many of the major multilateral treaties in existence today, including the Convention against Torture, the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Because IGOs often have global representation of membership and provide a ready forum for discussion, they are natural forums for the creation of such treaties.

Closely related to the rule-creation function is the rule-supervisory function. Many of the multilateral treaties created by IGOs contain within their provisions the establishment of new organizations responsible for monitoring compliance with the treaties. Responsibilities of these groups may include accepting state reports of compliance and monitoring compliance with the treaty provisions, settling disputes that arise over treaty provisions, and if available, enforcing the treaty provisions and punishing breaches. As described below, there is ongoing debate within the field of political science as to whether IGOs can truly be effective if they do not have enforcement powers.

The final primary function of IGOs is operational. IGOs such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees collect global resources for housing, clothing, and feeding refugees around the world. The organization is also responsible for the logistics of determining when a situation needs refugee assistance, finding locations for refugee settlements, and distributing resources as appropriate. The fact that this responsibility is delegated to a specific international organization provides a more rapid response than might otherwise be available and can streamline the process from the UN to the refugees in need.

Under modern international law, IGOs have gained a rather significant degree of legal personality, capable of entering into agreements among themselves or with states and responsible for a growing number of tasks on behalf of the community of states. In 1949, the UN sought an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the question of whether the UN could seek damages on behalf of its employees who might be injured or killed while on assignment. In its decision, *Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,* the court held that given the functions, rights, and responsibilities given to the UN by its member states, the UN must be held to have legal personality; otherwise, it could not function as intended. This decision recognized that IGOs have legal personalities of their own and are capable of acting in the international systems as separate entities from the member states that form them.

NGOs: FUNCTIONS

While IGOs remain the dominant form of international organization in the global community because their membership is made up of state representatives, which gives them rule-making authority, the influence of NGOs has risen substantially in the past several decades. NGOs serve a number of key functions in the global system, including providing information about specific issue areas to states and their populations, serving as monitors for state behavior to ensure compliance with international norms, and providing grassroots-level support for populations in a number of areas.

First, due to their tendency to specialize in particular areas, NGOs can often be excellent sources of information and data for states and their populations as well as other international organizations. For example, states and the UN rely on annual human rights reports put out by both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to accurately assess the human rights situation in certain countries, and they rely on Doctors without Borders for its expertise in providing medical assistance in crisis situations. Unlike many IGOs, NGOs also provide information directly to specific target populations within a state to encourage grassroots activity. Examples of this include a number of environmental groups that provide information to specific communities about environmental preservation and human rights groups that provide targeted medical information to communities in Africa that practice female circumcision to encourage the cessation of the practice. However, because NGOs have no formal powers, their influence varies widely. Moreover, many NGOs are viewed as

having political agendas, which can also dampen the influence they have on international policies of states and other international organizations.

A second important function of NGOs is that they often serve as monitors of state behavior, and because they are not beholden to state power politics, they are able to report violations of international norms. One of the most important examples of this function is the annual reports published by both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch on the human rights practices of states throughout the world. States routinely refer to and use these reports in their own policy formation, and states will protest the accuracy of reports if they feel they have been unfairly criticized. The fact that states respond to these reports is indicative of their importance in the international community. Moreover, NGOs often are able to have people on the ground in countries when official state representatives are refused. Doctors without Borders is, for example, almost universally allowed into states to attend to medical issues, when an official team of U.S. or French doctors may not be welcome.

Finally, NGOs are able to provide grassroots-level support to populations that IGOs and individual states are not able to provide. While they often have a political agenda, NGOs are not part of the global power structure and therefore are often viewed as more neutral in terms of the assistance they can provide populations. NGOs have served many functions within states, from planting trees and teaching about sustainable agriculture practices to encouraging political participation to providing basic health care and education services to underserved populations. This ability to work at the grassroots level has the potential to allow NGOs to have an overall more significant impact than IGOs in terms of effecting change.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE: THEORETICAL APPROACHES

Within the field of political science, different theoretical approaches have dealt differently with the increase in number, and expansion of influence, of international organizations. Neorealism, which retains focus largely on the state as the primary actor in the international system, considers international organizations important only insofar as they serve to bolster a state's power position or further state interests. According to neorealists, states use international organizations as a tool to achieve their own agendas, participating when it serves their immediate interests and withdrawing when their own agendas differ from those of the organizations. For neorealists, the fact that international organizations have limited enforcement capabilities is a testament to the limited nature of their effectiveness.

Neoliberal institutionalists generally consider international organizations an essential tool for states in the international system. Because neoliberal institutionalists suggest that states may seek cooperation as opposed to conflict to achieve their goals, international organizations can play a pivotal role in achieving this outcome. International organizations provide states with a forum to share information and discuss problems, therefore facilitating cooperation by increasing in information sharing among states and ensuring transparency of action. Moreover, international organizations with internal rules and enforcement mechanisms also provide states with assurances that breaches of the principles of the organization will be dealt with. Finally, membership in international organizations provides states with a community of states to which they belong and with which they interact, enhancing state desires to maintain a good relationship—in other words, maintain a good reputation—so that they may continue to reap the benefits of global cooperation.

Given the constructivist consideration of the way ideas and identities within a state may shape state behavior at the international-system level, international organizations are considered for the role that they play in this process. For example, an international organization may function as a norm entrepreneur, creating and advocating new global norms to guide state action. For constructivists, international organizations are also a function of those states that create them and may reflect the ideas, culture, values, and identities of their members. For example, the EU is largely a reflection of the history, values, and ideas of those western European states that created it. Originating in the aftermath of World War II, the focus of the EU on cooperation, human rights, and democracy is largely a reflection of the sentiments of the member state countries at the time of its inception. This relationship between international organizations and the states that create them produces a bond that makes international organizations important actors in the international system.

CURRENT DEBATES CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

While international organizations are now widely recognized as part of the international system, a number of issues remain open for debate concerning these transnational actors. The foremost of these is the relationship between state sovereignty and IGOs. Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, state sovereignty has been the cornerstone of the global system. IGOs have increasingly challenged the notion of state sovereignty, usurping more and more responsibility from states. Currently there is a spectrum of IGOs in terms of their relationship to state sovereignty. On one end are organizations such as the UN, in which each individual state retains its sovereignty most of the time. In fact, only through voluntary agreement to relinquish a certain amount of sovereignty or through a UN Security Council resolution, which all member states are required to respect, do states lose any significant portion of their sovereignty at the UN. The UN Charter specifically protects the concept of sovereignty, stating in article 2(1), "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members."

On the other end of the spectrum are IGOs such as the EU, in which states must relinquish a portion of their sovereignty to become members, agreeing to have certain matters legislated at the regional level as opposed to the state level.

Certain areas such as the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people in fact have significantly been taken over by the EU bureaucracy, with states mandated to carry out EU policies.

A second issue, one closely related to the question of sovereignty, is that of the enforcement power of IGOs. Despite the rule-creation and rule-supervision functions of international organizations, these do not always readily include the power of rule enforcement. One of the biggest critiques that neorealists and some neoliberal institutionalists make about the efficacy of IGOs is that they do not have sufficient powers to enforce their mandates and that ultimately member states choose to do whatever they wish. The level of enforcement power IGOs have is largely related to the extent to which they take on elements of state sovereignty. In the EU, for example, there are relatively strong enforcement powers through the European Court of Justice and the European Commission's and European Council's ability to sanction member states for failing to carry out their obligations. Many other IGOs, however, to which states do not relinquish such a significant level of sovereignty, have much less effective enforcement mechanisms. For example, the American Court of Human Rights has little authority over states since participation is voluntary. Therefore, its decisions, while technically binding on states, are difficult to enforce. Regardless of the strength of an IGO's enforcement mechanisms, however, the effectiveness of such mechanisms ultimately relies on the state parties' willingness to comply. This leads to another issue currently being studied by international organizations scholars: state willingness to comply with IGO norms, decisions, and policies.

As is evident from the differences between the international relations theoretical approaches to international organizations described above, not all scholars of international organizations agree that they serve a benefit to the international community of states. Given this, one of the ongoing discussions within political science is the question of why states would belong to, listen to, and comply with international organizations, whether the more formal rules emanating from IGOs or the more informational and political advocacy of NGOs. There are a number of theories that have been put forth. First, from the rational-choice perspective, belonging to an international organization facilitates a state's decision-making process on certain issues because it provides the state with a forum for information gathering and discussion, as outlined above. This not only allows the state to gain information that may directly assist it in its decision-making process but provides the state with a mechanism with which to gather information on the intentions and decision-making process of other member states. This makes the decision-making process more transparent and decreases the likelihood of states' acting with incomplete information. Related to this is the fact that international organizations create a common set of standards concerning norms and procedures, providing a common basis from which all member states may act. Thus, even if the states do not adhere to the norms all the time, they at least have a common starting point.

According to current research, one of the primary effects that international organizations have on state behavior, and one of the primary reasons given for why international organizations, particularly IGOs, are ultimately effective, is that joining an international organization automatically puts a state in a peer community. Once in such a community, states face pressure to comply with the norms and procedures of the international organization. A state's reputation rests on its compliance with the organization's directives. If a state consistently goes against the policies and norms created by the international organization or consistently ignores enforcement actions against it by the organization, that state will potentially become an outcast, a position states want to avoid because it can greatly hinder their ability to promote and protect their interests. If a state is viewed as being a violator or a free rider in one organization, this can carry over to other organizations. This can influence the extent to which other states will want to enter into agreements with the violating state, which can affect all manner of transnational activities, from trade to the delimitation of shared resources to migration to security arrangements. States generally do not want to be left out of the international system, so the protection of their reputations is a key reason for them to join and cooperate with international organizations and their policies.

NGOs further contribute to the reputational effect that influences state behavior. Studies have shown that an increase in NGO activity within a state or attention given to a state increases the likelihood of policy change either within a state or at the international-system level. NGOs have a unique opportunity that IGOs do not possess, and that is the ability to work at the grassroots level within a state to encourage citizens to call for a particular state action. Moreover, unlike much IGO activity, which takes place exclusively at the international-system level, far removed from the daily life of most state citizens, NGO activity can be on the ground, tailoring approaches to the individual cultural needs of different states and populations. Examples of successful NGO activities that have effectively changed state behavior out of concern for reputation include the campaign throughout states in Africa to stop the practice of female circumcision as dangerous to the health of women and the dissemination of negative country reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, which can have a significant influence on a state's reputation at the international-system level.

See also *International Law; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Sovereignty.*

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International Political Economy

International political economy (IPE) is a discipline in the social sciences that is mostly concerned with understanding the dynamic relation between the state and the market. Originally a subfield of international relations, today IPE is an independent and vibrant field that draws on an array of contributions from political scientists, historians, economists, sociologists, and anthropologists. Despite their heterogeneity, IPE theorists all share the notion that political, economic, and social factors cannot be analyzed separately. On the contrary, they stress the intertwined nature of the relationship between the state and the market and advocate a holistic approach to the issue.

Until the 1970s, with a few exceptions (i.e., Charles Kindleberger's study on hegemony and Kenneth Waltz's 1959 book *Man, the State, and War*), mainstream studies in politics and economics treated the state and the market as two independent and separate entities. The state was mostly associated with the pursuit of power, whereas the market was mostly associated with the pursuit of wealth. However, following the 1973 oil crisis and the end of the Bretton Woods monetary system, events led scholars and policy makers to acknowledge the fact that to provide answers to practical and theoretical questions emerging from these two crises, economics and politics should be analyzed together.

The 1973 oil crisis, the decision of the Nixon administration to abandon the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate, and the disastrous military campaign in Vietnam instilled in the American elite and public the fear that the United States could lose its preponderant economic and military supremacy to other countries. These events inspired the first wave of IPE theorists interested in determining which factors would favor the stability of the international economy. Mostly drawing from the realist tradition in international relation, scholars such as Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner reached the conclusion that the answer was in the redistribution of power among states. The hegemonic stability theory, first introduced by Kindleberger, argued that the overwhelming economic and military preponderance of a country was necessary to guarantee a stable and open world economy. Based on the historical experiences of Great Britain (1815–1873) and the United States (1945–1971), IPE theorists such as Helen Milner (1998) reached the conclusion that a hegemon was indispensable "to coordinate and discipline other countries so that each could feel secure enough to open its markets and avoid beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Conversely, the theory asserted that the decline of the hegemon tends to be associated with economic closure, instability, and the creation of competing regional blocs" (pp. 113–114).

Although IPE theorists' most important contribution during the cold war was the formulation of the hegemonic stability theory, IPE research took many other directions, some of which gained even more relevance with the end of the confrontation with the Soviet Union. International trade, international finance, North-South relations, multinational corporations, and globalization are some of the most important topics in IPE. Today, despite their heterogeneity, IPE scholars address mostly two underlying issues. First, economic and technological changes have problematized structures and practices governed by the sovereign nation-state, with the result's being a sense of fatalism and chronic insecurity due to the perceived (real or not) incapacity of national governments and institutions to deal with such a challenge. In this regard, Anthony McGrew (1998) identifies three positions in the literature. First, there are those he calls "hyperglobalists." They believe that the emergence of global markets has ultimately undermined the very foundations of the state. In their view, the relation between market and state is a zero-sum game, in which the expansion of the market has determined the withdrawal of the political influence over every aspect of social action. On the other side of the spectrum, McGrew locates the skeptics. These are scholars who instead share the opinion that international markets have strengthened, rather than weakened, the nation-state. Their conclusion mostly derives from the notion that the international economy is based on a political system of sovereign nation-states, which have instrumentally used the economy to implement their political agendas. Last, scholars such as Anthony Giddens and David Held embody the transformationalists. Transformationalists argue that the nation-state has been sensibly influenced by global markets. However, they do not dismiss completely the role of

the nation-state, as hyperglobalists do. They assert instead that the nation-state is experiencing an overall transformation that is redefining its traditional role.

The second issue that has attracted the attention of many IPE theorists is the relationship between the politics and the institutional framework of social and economic development. As we move deeper into a new century, it is clear that development achievements have come short of meeting global needs. Models of development based on neoliberal economic theories and embraced by global financial institutions, such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund, have become the object of severe scrutiny by scholars and policy makers. Neoliberal economic principles, such as market liberalization, privatization, economic stabilization, and deregulation, have been challenged, and this has sparked a new interest in understanding the interaction between the national and international contexts to set constraints on development and determine possible avenues of growth. As a result, the IPE has expanded its research interests to areas traditionally neglected or only marginally studied, such as democratization, governance, poverty, human rights, gender, environmental issues, and armed conflict, legitimizing once more the interdisciplinary nature of IPE.

In the past three decades, IPE has been able to grow into a true interdisciplinary field of study. Its strong empirical foundation and capacity to draw from different academic traditions have allowed IPE to flourish and provide a vital insightful contribution to the never-ending issue of the relationship between the state and the market.

See also *Globalization; Hegemony; Multinational Corporation; Nation-state; North-South Relations.*

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International Relations

The field of international relations (IR), narrowly defined, analyzes the interactions between nation-states. Yet actors other than nation-states are analyzed by scholars of IR: international organizations, terrorist organizations, multinational corporations, and transnational movements are all explored within the field.

The study of IR has a long history—a history often revolving around human conflict. The exploration of Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese military strategist, of the art of war was motivated by the Warring States period in Chinese history from 600 to 400 BCE; the writings of ancient Greek historian Thucydides trace the competitive interactions of the Greek city-states; and the writings of Italian political scientist Niccolò Machiavelli outline his governance principles for a prince in the context of the wars of Italian unification in the sixteenth century.

While the study of conflict has been central to the field of IR, a multitude of topics are also discussed within the field. Traditionally, IR is divided into four subfields: international security, international organization, foreign policy analysis, and international political economy. This article will briefly review the major topics discussed within each of these subfields, beginning with a discussion of IR theory, a set of ideas guiding investigations into the world of international politics.

IR THEORY

Historically, the field of IR investigates the interactions or lack thereof between nation-states, commonly defined as politically sovereign territories. There are notable exceptions to this that have grown over time to include international organizations, multinational corporations, ethnic movements, and transnational actors such as nongovernmental organizations and terrorist groups. Still, a key component to all IR research is the nation-state, whether as a dependent or an independent variable.

For several decades, the core of IR scholarship has revolved around a set of paradigmatic theories or approaches, which contain sets of assumptions about the state of the world. These assumptions are then used to deduce predictions to be tested against events in the world. For many years, realism has been the ascendant body of theory holding sway in the field.

Realism dates back to the ancient (BCE) era. Realist theories emphasize power and the drive by states or statespersons to gain it. Writings from ancient China and Greece emphasize that the drive for power often resulted in war or could be harnessed to augment state power. There are numerous variants of realism. Classical realism emphasizes the innate human drive for power. Neorealism emphasizes the global distribution of power in a world that lacks a sovereign arbiter at the global level, described as anarchy, and creates conditions permissive for war when power becomes imbalance. Neoclassical realism focuses on the domestic politics within states driving them to augment their capabilities, often leading to war. Offensive realism points to a world where an innate drive for power combined with anarchy creates powerful incentives for states to constantly expand, leading to incessant conflicts. Again, while all of these variants differ regarding the mechanism by which power translates to war, all predict a usually violent world filled

with power struggles that cannot be easily remedied or controlled by norms, ideas, or international institutions.

For decades, the main competitors to realism were grouped under the rubric of liberalism. Early liberal thinkers departed from the realist assumption that there is an innate human drive for power, rather advocating the traditional liberal argument that humans are inherently peaceful. During the twentieth century, liberalism was overshadowed by World War I (1914–1918) and World War II (1939–1945). While wars appear endemic in the international system, periods of peace have historically lasted far longer than periods of war, suggesting there are human or political limits on the drive for power or the effects of anarchy. Today, two liberal approaches garner the most attention in the study of IR, liberal institutionalism and liberal internationalism. Institutionalists contend international institutions, such as the United Nations and the European Union, serve to enhance cooperation and limit conflict among states, even when those states desire power. Liberal internationalists explain domestic factors, such as public opinion and systems of checks and balance, constrain a state's external behavior. One popular and controversial supporting argument of the latter concept is called "democratic peace," which alleges democracies are less prone to instigate hostile aggression toward one another as no two democracies have fought a major war with another for at least two hundred years.

A third major IR theory is known as constructivism. Constructivists criticize realists and liberals for taking state or individual preferences for granted. According to constructivists, states and/or individuals want their political interactions with other states to be dynamic. One popular constructivist approach examines how international institutions may socialize states into new modes of behavior. Related studies examine how national identities and changes in those identities shift state thinking away from materialist/consequentialist calculations ("I should or should not based on expected outcome") to appropriateness calculations ("I should or should not based on extant norms"). Still other constructivist-oriented scholars examine how institutions diffuse norms, define sets of actors (e.g., refugees), and frame international problems (e.g., climate change).

In addition, IR theorists have studied gender-based approaches to examine numerous topics in IR including the causes of war, the gendered nature of economic development, and the gendered nature of state sovereignty. Last, Marxist-oriented approaches, designed by German philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the mid-nineteenth century, continue to receive attention as well, especially in studies of world systems theory and development policy.

These examples have merely touched the surface of the theoretical debates in the field. Indeed, IR is at times criticized for being overly theoretical, yet at its core, IR is a practical discipline. Scholarly IR trends have often been dictated by real-world events. For example, World War II brought to the fore realist-oriented arguments concerning the importance of power. The Vietnam War (1959–1975) and the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary management system in 1971,

affecting the world's major industrial players, incited significant scholarship on hegemonic decline, the potential implications for international institutions, and new scholarship on liberal theories of international politics. The end of the cold war in 1991 brought criticism of realist and liberal-based IR ideas, forcing scholars to pursue more identity-based explanations in world politics typically associated with constructivist approaches. Thus, real-world events have historically driven inquiry in IR and continue to do so in each of IR's four subfields. We begin with a discussion of the oldest field within IR, international security.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

As previously mentioned, issues surrounding war and peace, involving international security, have been a central feature of IR research for centuries and continue to remain dominant among IR scholarship today. One of the most well-known ideas throughout all of political science is the balance of power: the concept that states will join forces to stop any one state from becoming too powerful in the international system. The theory has been offered to explain both world wars of the twentieth century, the Gulf War (1990–1991), and even the refusal of many states to support the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. While considerable controversy exists as to exactly how well the idea of balance of power explains state behavior, its endurance as a core concept in international security is unquestionable.

Any discussion of the balance of power begs the question of how power is defined and measured. Tremendous scholarship in IR has wrestled with the question of defining the concept of power. If key IR theories, such as realism, gain key insights into the world by examining power, scholars should be interested in discovering the type of power sought by state leaders and whether those definitions relate to historical context.

Similarly crucial to discussions of international security is the notion of state alliances. Extensive studies have inquired as to whether alliances forestall or hasten the onset of war, what types of states are chosen as allies, and the nature of burden sharing within those alliances. Given that alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, remain important in the geopolitical realm even today, research on bilateral or multilateral alliances continues apace.

While early security scholarship focused almost exclusively on the great powers and their wars and alliances, significant scholarship influenced by global current events has risen in IR to explain the wars taking place beyond the great powers' realm. Increasing attention has turned to issues such as third-party intervention in wars, the effectiveness of peace-keeping operations, and ethnic, religious, and civil conflicts. As the threat of great-power war subsided in the late twentieth century—after the cold war—and into the twenty-first century, IR inquiries and research have turned away from the study of great powers and their wars. Major-world-power confrontations have become less relevant and frequent in comparison to the global armed conflicts occurring in modern times. No longer does IR rely solely on the billiard ball model of war, in

which states are assumed to be unitary rational actors achieving strategic goals. Rather, as substate and nonstate actors increasingly play roles in international conflicts, theories about why and how conflicts arise must change accordingly.

In particular, growing research on asymmetric warfare, including terrorism, has become increasingly common in the field, paralleling the twentieth-century evolution of transnational terrorism's capabilities and activities. There are similarities between the debates about balance-of-power politics in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe and the investigation of the origins and effects of terrorist activities. As earlier scholars sought to understand why some nation-states were engaged in internal and external conflicts at different periods, terrorism analysts seek to identify the operational patterns and political agendas, at either the societal or the individual level, that can trigger or predict terror operations. Thus, although the actors are different, the underlying questions are often similar.

Finally, in the past two decades, scholars have begun to question the state-centric view of security. Due in part to increasing interest among policy makers in human security and failed states, some IR scholars now suggest that issues such as development, human rights, and genocide have eclipsed state-level conflict dynamics as the most important line of study in the field. While this scholarly push toward human security has had only limited influence to date, the emphasis on human security issues suggests that the move away from great-power politics as the center of the security field will continue well into the future.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Studies of international organizations have exhibited a cyclical nature. Initial studies focused on behavior within organizations and voting patterns of member states. These early studies questioned the politics within the organizations and analyses of the functional programs within them. A major theory surrounding the utility of international organizations was that of functionalism: the idea that through technical cooperation, international institutions would lead to broader political cooperation, as was the case in the European Communities established as the precursor to today's European Union.

Studies of the European Union and its predecessors as well as the United Nations proceeded apace, but by the 1980s, a liberal theory, neoliberal institutionalism, began treating international organizations more theoretically. According to neoliberal institutionalism research, international organizations could tame the ambitions of states by providing information, reducing transaction costs, and lengthening the shadow of the future, all of which would lead states to choose to engage in cooperation rather than conflict to achieve their policy goals. A heated debate ensued between these liberal scholars and realists about the general question of the efficacy of such international institutions.

Today, more detailed studies of international organizations not only investigate whether institutions help states cooperate but also examine when and under what circumstances these institutions are efficacious. A key controversy is the question of compliance: do institutions change state behavior or simply codify existing state behavior? The question has driven scholars to conduct more careful measurements of outcomes in areas such as human rights, the environment, trade, and international finance to determine pre and post behavior with regard to international institutions. For example, is international peacekeeping successful because it creates strong incentives for warring parties to stop fighting or because it is authorized only in cases where it is likely to succeed?

Two other areas of inquiry within the international organization subfield have recently emerged. The first examines the determinants of institutional design: why do institutions look like they do? It is no accident that the United Nations Security Council's permanent veto players are the victors of World War II, nor is it an accident that the largest economies have disproportionate influence in voting at the International Monetary Fund. Similar decisions about institutional rules, voting procedures, and organizational structure are made for every institution, and those decisions are fundamentally political. This new research attempts to shed light on this design process.

The second inquiry treats organizations less as agents of states but rather as independent entities that, like their state members, have independent preferences over outcomes in world politics. When organizations (international or nongovernmental) are placed on a par with states in terms of their ability to act autonomously, IR scholars must deal with a new set of actors that can influence international events such as human rights standards, environmental policy, and even arms control. This forces us to reconsider our state-centric theories of IR but also adds a level of richness to our explanations of world politics.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

Although foreign policy is the smallest field within IR, scholars have long studied its process and politics in either case-oriented or comparative fashion. The bulk of this literature highlights the process by which decisions are made at the state level. For example, studies in the field examine how particular procedures guide state behavior in potentially suboptimal ways or whether bureaucratic politics serve as an intervening variable between leader preferences and policy outcomes.

In foreign policy, the processes between institutions are analyzed to determine how internal institution debates shape foreign policy outcomes, often relying on the U.S. model in this context. Specifically, scholars have examined how executive-legislative politics influence the decision to use military force, whether courts can effectively limit executive autonomy in foreign policy, and how public opinion influences foreign policy choices in areas ranging from isolationism to military force to economic sanctions.

A significant literature ties research in cognitive and social psychology to individual-level decisions in the realm of foreign policy. Political psychologists have attempted to decipher individual leaders' operational codes (rules by which decisions are made), how group decisions during international crises are made, and the effect of stress or other psychological phenomena in decision making.

The area of comparative foreign policy also continues to experience a slow but steady accretion of knowledge. The field experienced a renaissance in the 1980s as scholars examined theories such as the diversionary theory of war, the rally around the flag effect, and the dynamics of public opinion and war in comparative political perspective. Although data difficulties can limit work in this area, as information on micro-level political processes around the globe become more visible via the Internet, this field is likely to experience growth.

While research in the area of foreign policy analysis remains vibrant, it has dwindled in importance during the past two decades. Research using economic policy as a dependent variable tends to be folded into international political economy, while studies examining military aspects of foreign policy are largely subsumed by the security literature. Work continues in the area of political psychology in the field, and increasing numbers of scholars now draw on institutional theories developed in American politics (e.g., principal-agent models) to understand foreign policy issues.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

For much of the early twentieth century, questions involving trade and international finance were largely the purview of economists. Yet, after World War II, scholars and practitioners alike recognized that political choices can undermine even the most carefully constructed economic arrangements. Early work in the field of international political economy examined to what extent the post–World War II financial international institutions established by Bretton Woods were dependent on the presence of a great power—in this case the United States—willing to underwrite the global economic framework. The topic became particularly salient as the United States struggled to support the gold standard and eventually moved to a floating exchange rate in the early 1970s. Scholars debated the political options available to supplant or alter U.S. global economic leadership.

An equally prominent topic in the international political economy field during the 1970s involved economic interdependence. Scholars questioned whether interdependence in the areas of trade and finance was a source of cooperation or conflict among states. Further work investigated the political determinants of the expanding flow of international trade. For example, scholars noted that pairs of states engaged in a military alliance as well as pairs of states with democratic regimes are statistically more likely to have higher trade with one another. Work on trade has continued to expand to include the origins and effects of the international organizations that shape trade patterns: the World Trade Organization and a myriad of regional trade arrangements that now dot the globe.

In the past two decades, research on international monetary and financial relations has expanded dramatically. International political economy scholars note choices about exchange rate regimes (fixed vs. floating) are determined by domestic political factors as much as by macroeconomic conditions. Similarly, state choices concerning the money supply, taxation, and the provision of public goods have all been explored by IR scholars, who find variables ranging from political partisanship to political institutions influence such economic choices.

A large literature within international political economy has focused on development. Again, although there is a high degree of overlap with economics in this field, IR scholars have long noted the political nature of development: world systems theorists highlight the dependencies in North-South trade flows, some scholars examine how trade flows to the developing world are influenced by global organizations, and other scholars assess the influence of conditionality policy by the International Monetary Fund on economic growth rates. Still other scholars examine topics including the effects of remittances, foreign direct investment, and immigration flows on development in the global South. The research on development topics within international political economy is vast and varied and is growing quickly as scholars of many fields attempt to ascertain why economic growth in the developing world has lagged for so long and continues to do so.

CONCLUSION

The field of IR is extremely broad. In some ways, it is easier to suggest which topics are excluded from study rather than which ones are included. Indeed, the borders within and around IR are increasingly porous. Trade research and studies of human security increasingly focus on organizations that operate in those areas. Alliances are relevant to security and trade policy yet are also treated as organizations. In an era of globalization, economic and security factors are increasingly intertwined in foreign policy decision making. Examples of the intermingling of the fields are endless.

Increasingly, the boundaries between IR and other subfields also are becoming porous. On one hand, these blurry boundaries make the generation and testing of theory more difficult: no longer can IR scholars ignore important advancements in comparative politics, American politics, or political economy. On the other hand, the ability of IR scholars to explain or predict events in an increasingly complex world requires increasingly complex theory and research. While such complexity may make IR theories and research less parsimonious, it carries the promise of not only making the field more relevant to understanding today's global crises, armed conflicts, and endemic socioeconomic and political problems but beginning to develop and implement the solutions.

See also *Balance of Power; Collapsed and Failed States; Conflict Resolution; Development, Economic; Economic Interdependence; Foreign Policy Role; Human Security; International Cooperation; International Law; International Norms; International Organization; International Relations: Doctrines of Power; International Relations Theory; International Relations: Worldviews and Frameworks; International System; Mandate System; Trusteeship System.*

. . . . JON PEVEHOUSE

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International Relations Doctrines of Power

Among the most important foreign policy doctrines since the nineteenth century are balance of power, self-defense, appeasement, containment, détente, and interventionism, doctrines that unfolded in the wake of four wars: the Napoleonic Wars (1799–1815), World War I (1914–1918), World War II (1939–1945), and the cold war.

NINETEENTH- AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY EUROPEAN DOCTRINES OF POWER

The doctrines of self-defense and balance of power originated in past millennia but found creative practitioners in nineteenth-century Europe. Self-defense entails two principles: (1) states may use force to defend themselves and their allies, and (2) self-defense may involve other doctrines listed above (and more, including preventive measures to avoid war, coercive threat, collective security, counterterrorism, tribute, economic sanctioning, and deterrence based on threats of nuclear retaliation). The balance of power idea was a means for weaker states to defend themselves from hegemonic states by forming alliances to counterbalance expansionist states. Balancing power would serve to maintain independence of major states and regional and international stability.

A failure by European governments to balance Germany led to World War I and World War II. Appeasement, designed by British idealists (and Woodrow Wilson) to persuade hegemonic states to abandon aggression by offering unilateral compromises, conciliations, and economic incentives, failed to prevent World War II. These failures led American cold warriors to seek more effective defense doctrines.

THE COLD WAR AND CONTAINMENT

Suspecting that the Soviets sought territorial and ideological expansion after World War II, the Truman administration launched containment to deter aggression. George Kennan, an official at the U.S. State Department, argued in his 1946 "Long Telegram" that the paranoid, militaristic, and dangerous Soviet Union was "committed fanatically to the belief that with the U.S. there can be no permanent *modus Vivendi.*" According to Kennan's "Long Telegram," selective shows of force and economic counterbalancing would create "situations which will compel the Soviets to recognize . . . the necessity of behaving in accordance with precepts of international conduct."

Containment led to the United States's subsidizing the Western European economies, engaging in limited military actions, leading alliances that committed the United States to intervention, assisting states facing communist insurgencies, and mobilizing global public opinion. All U.S. administrations during the cold war deemed this effort necessary to prevent Soviet global dominance. The ever-growing commitments and interventions, however, aroused questions about American purpose and credibility. All administrations agreed that containment suffered a debilitating blow in Vietnam.

Richard Nixon sought to alleviate this blow through détente. Henry Kissinger defined *détente* as "the pursuit of relaxation of tensions" with the Soviet Union based on four principles: the United States must (1) resist Soviet aggression but respond to moderate behavior, (2) maintain a strong defense but not expect political power to flow from military strength, (3) accept its limited ability to produce internal change in other countries, and (4) recognize that both superpowers should receive advantages in any constructive relationship. Nixon and Kissinger described the hope that "the Soviet Union would acquire a stake in a wide spectrum of negotiations and would become convinced that its interests . . . would be best served in mutual restraint" (in Nomination Hearings for Henry A. Kissinger, Part 1, 1973).

After a decade of détente failed to fulfill these hopes, Ronald Reagan reinstituted containment. He argued that only Western willingness to resist challenges encouraged Soviet restraint. Reagan's containment entailed several assumptions:

the Soviets posed strategic and political threats to the United States and the world, détente facilitated Soviet activism, and military strength was the most effective tool to deny Soviet exploitation of international crises, convince them to negotiate seriously, and enable the United States to sustain international commitments. Containment, based on American economic and military superiority, would keep regional conflicts from spreading, convince the Soviets that expansionism no longer worked, and reduce the risk of superpower confrontation. According to Reagan in 1986, "Backing away from [Soviet] challenge[s] will not bring peace. It will only mean that others who are hostile to everything we believe in will have a freer hand to work their will in the world" (quoted in Kissinger 1993).

In the post–cold war, debate resurfaced between those for and against American interventionism to deter aggression and establish global security. Noninterventionists such as libertarian Doug Bandow do not believe interventionism is feasible, affordable, or likely to defend America's security, freedom, or prosperity. He assumes that global disorder per se does not threaten the United States, intervention on behalf of dictatorships to promote regional stability yields instability instead, and instability "can be contained by other states, met by more modest steps such as sanctions, or simply ignored" (Bandow 1992/1993, 164–169).

Selective noninterventionists call for an idealist (golden rule) ethic to guide policy. Charles Kegley (1992) argues that the ethic depends on awareness of the strategic as well as humanitarian advantages that come, in an interdependent world, from aiding those in need. This ethic requires multiple subscriber states and institutions. The United States must not go it alone. In Kegley's (2003) view, a unilateral American-imposed democratization policy is an example of unreflective globalism that employs an ends-justifies-the-means interventionism. In the idealist noninterventionist view, the United States may promote democracy by abstaining from excessive intervention and hoping that the example of democracy and freedom will inspire the nations of the world.

Noninterventionists fear that American democratization projects in Russia, Serbia, Somalia, or Iraq patronize them; paying for nation-building jeopardizes American financial equilibrium; and the expansionist impulse inspires impossible (democratization) and neoimperialist goals. This vision for American retrenchment and democracy building by example may reflect a lack of realism about power, conflicting interests, aggression, the might of reason and public opinion, and the prospects of international cooperation. Noninterventionists, while sympathetic to democratic principles and victims of tyrannies, may end up with weak proposals to cheer freedom fighters, boo bad guys, and abstain from liberating interventions.

Multilateral interventionists want to do more than cheerlead. Bill Clinton noted in 1992 that "it is time for America to lead a global alliance for democracy" (p. 421). Multilateral interventionists call for collective security, multilateralism, and intervention on behalf of democracy, human rights, and global

order. This avoids the taint of unilateralism but may lack full appreciation that consensus and effectiveness are hampered in a world of conflicting interests and limited military and economic resources.

Given the difficulties of multilateralism, unilateral interventionists (such as George W. Bush) say the United States must act unilaterally when necessary to ensure global or regional democratization and stability or to fight global terrorism. One must deal with instability on the periphery to prevent conflict escalation and erosion of the credibility (willingness to intervene) of states or organizations committed to peacemaking; in this view, the United States cannot sit on the sidelines. Multilateral interventionists see much risk of overextension in unilateralism. They urge a more prudent (and internationally endorsed) selection of problems to solve and warn that a U.S.-imposed democratic world order is unobtainable.

See also *Appeasement; Balance of Power; Containment; Détente; New World Order.*

. . . .   LOUISA S. HULETT

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International Relations Theory

International relations theory is an umbrella term for perspectives used within the field of international relations (IR) for understanding and analyzing political, economic, and social activity on a global scale. These perspectives are prepackaged analytical templates or structures for categorizing, explaining, and understanding IR. Because IR theories adopt different substantive, epistemological, and normative assumptions, collectively these theories constitute competing ways to understand global affairs. Their scope is systemic in that they are meant to have broad applicability to human global activity across both time and space. As such, IR theory constitutes a grand theory within the study of IR, as opposed to middle-range or foreign policy theories that are narrower in focus, scope, and applicability.

IR theories are typically described as if they were competing camps, paradigms, or isms vying for analytical dominance

within the subfield. Examples of IR theories include, but are not limited to, realism, liberalism, constructivism, world system theory, historical materialism, and feminism. The content and parameters of IR theories are usually described in contrast to one another, yet each perspective consists of multiple variants, some of which are in disagreement and competition with one another. There are also cross-cutting substantive and epistemological commitments, so that depending on the specific variant and subject at hand, opposing IR theories may share common assumptions and other characteristics. Still, the juxtaposition of the larger, umbrella categories or isms to one another usefully illustrates the differing commitments made by IR scholars with regard to domains of research, units of analysis, and methodological choices as they attempt to explain world politics and global affairs.

DISCIPLINARY HISTORY

The history of IR theory is typically described within the discipline as a series of "great debates," the first occurring in the interwar years of 1919 to 1939 between realism and idealism. Idealism emphasized the efficacy of international institutions, law, and cooperation. Realism, with its pessimistic emphasis on anarchy, states, security, and balance-of-power politics, is said to have won this debate following World War II (1939–1945). While there was considerable analytical coalescence within the discipline around realism thereafter, interest in international institutions and cooperation remained and led to the development of liberalism as a broad category of theories collectively interested in exploring the role of nonstate actors, international institutions, cooperation, and democracy in international affairs.

Realist and liberal perspectives, and the ongoing analytical disagreements between them, tended to dominate the IR theory subfield for much of the cold war. The cold war period also saw the development of neo-Marxist approaches, such as world system theory, which was influenced by theories of development and imperialism and conceived of global activity in terms of a world capitalist system. Marxist approaches were often described as the third leg of an analytical triad in the discipline (along with realism and liberalism), but since the cold war this position has often been assigned in most disciplinary accounts to constructivism, which focuses on the social construction of norms, identity, and interests.

Two other great debates within the discipline occurred during the cold war, and both involved disagreement over the discipline's preference for examining global phenomena with methods drawn loosely from the hard sciences. Such methods include an emphasis on empirical data collection, testing, and falsification, and they underscore a preference for research subjects that appear to be objectively quantifiable. Disagreement between the behavioralists as proponents of these methods and the traditionalists (or classicists) as critics of them constituted the second debate in the 1960s, with the behavioralists generally seen as the victors. Yet as with the realist-idealist debate, concerns about the scientific method, or positivism, did not entirely disappear. Many traditionalists found refuge in English

school theory, which examines IR as a society of states, thereby combining within the same analytical rubric elements of realism, liberalism, and constructivism and an interest in historical sociology.

POSITIVISM AND POSTPOSITIVISM

Concerns with positivism resurfaced in the late 1980s in the third debate, which sought to reveal how positivism's epistemological and normative foundations excluded and marginalized particular subjects that were relevant to understanding global affairs. A number of postpositivist theories gained prominence at this time and collectively represented an analytical assault on the positivist preferences of established IR theories such as realism, liberalism, and world system theory. Individually, these postpositivist perspectives focused on exploring different aspects of what established theories missed or marginalized.

Postmodernism, for example, concentrates on mapping out the hegemonic discourses of IR and of the discipline itself. Feminism explores how these same discourses reify and subordinate gender difference. Historical materialism draws on the work of Antonio Gramsci to examine the coconstitution of state and society within the capitalist world economy. And contemporary adherents of the Frankfurt school of critical theory rely on the ideas of Jurgen Habermas to argue that dialogue and particular forms of communication can have emancipatory effects in world affairs.

The debate between positivists and postpositivists also opened analytical space for a renewed interest in ethics and normative theory and for exploring topics such as postcolonialism and the effects of U.S. political and economic dominance on IR theorizing itself. Yet postpositivist theories did not displace positivism and the theories that subscribe to it within the discipline. Rather, postpositivist approaches exist alongside established IR theories, in which analytical innovation and variation has continued. As a result, the variations among and within IR grand theories, and the subjects they seek to address or explore, have multiplied considerably since the end of the cold war.

Taken as a whole, IR theory is an analytical domain in which there is considerable disagreement about theoretical fundamentals. IR theorists disagree about what the appropriate unit of analysis is, how to conduct analysis itself, whether particular normative commitments underwrite particular methods, and what or whether there are theoretical and empirical boundaries to appropriate disciplinary theorizing. Even whether IR theory should be described as a series of great debates or in terms of competing camps and isms is a subject of debate. Still, these IR theoretical categories remain a useful heuristic for cutting into and understanding both the disciplinary history of theorizing in IR and the ongoing analytical disagreements that continue to animate the subfield.

See also *Critical Theory; Economic Interdependence; Gramsci, Antonio; International Relations; Normative Theory; Positive Theory; Positivism; Realism and Neorealism; Systems Analysis.*

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International Relations Worldviews and Frameworks

One way to review international relations worldviews related to foreign policy is to probe the positions of key theorists within the influential schools of realism, idealism, behavioralism, and postmodernism.

IDEALISTS AND REALISTS

The twentieth century brought into focus several "great debates" in international relations (IR) theory. The oldest, and still unresolved, is the debate between realism and idealism. *Idealists* claim that human nature is basically good, rational, and law-abiding and seeks peace, well-being, liberty, democracy, justice, and self-determination. Nation-states ought to pursue these goals and will do so given rational and democratic leaders, transnational institutions dedicated to idealist goals, and global education and socialization that instruct citizens about habit-forming benevolence. Idealists from ancient philosophers to Woodrow Wilson, pacifists, and utopians see global harmony of interests and cooperation as realizable goals.

Realists, from ancient philosophers to modern proponents of balance of power like Hans Morgenthau (1948), reject most of these idealist assumptions. With a pessimistic view of human nature and transformative (harmony-producing) transnational institutions, realists see all politics as a struggle for power, national interest, and survival in a dog-eat-dog world. Rational citizens and leaders, schooled in the reality of hostile forces, incomplete understanding, scarce resources, and disagreement on the rules of engagement, must prepare for the worst; doubt

the good intentions of states with competing interests; pursue obtainable (limited, not utopian) goals of national interest; and cooperate with like-minded states (democratic scruples need not intrude) dedicated to resisting hegemonic states that seek to dominate neighbors and upset balances of power. For realists, conflict is inevitable but manageable when leaders understand that anarchy breeds danger and that a balance-of-power strategy, rather than policies based on human goodness, provides the best avenue toward stability and survival.

This debate resurfaced in the 1970s when neorealists and neoliberals delivered upgraded reports on the prospects for peace in the twenty-first century. *Neorealists* argued that states remain the major actors in an anarchical world. While cooperation occurs, states still may fight for self-defense, power expansion, stability, national or ideological interests, and economic or geopolitical necessity. Neorealists, like Kenneth Waltz, want to shore up the rigor of realist theory to enable better explanation for state rivalry. The neorealist emphasizes the persistent influence of the anarchic structure of the world as a constraint on states that still respond to structural/system-induced drives for power, security, and stability.

Neoliberals, like Robert Keohane (2002), reject the pessimism of realists who failed to predict the peaceful end of the cold war. They expect to encounter cooperation, integration, and peace once states abandon dangerous power obsessions. Where neorealists expect stability to be produced by states adjusting to international anarchy and power imbalances, neoliberals assume stability and prosperity will follow in the wake of expanded awareness of the benefits of global economic and technological interdependence and the effectiveness of transnational institutions, such as the United Nations and European Union.

BEHAVIORALISTS AND TRADITIONALISTS

In the midst of this two-part realist/idealist debate, a second great debate emerged between traditionalists, who approached IR theory as intuitive historians, philosophers, and policy analysts, and behavioralists (or empiricists), who intended to discover, by scientific method, laws of human and state behavior.

In this epistemological (ways of knowing) debate, *behavioralists* assert that knowledge depends on a logical positivism: We can only know to be true that which we can observe, measure, test, operationalize, and replicate. Only through observation, quantitative experimentation, and scientific conceptualization can we build empirically valid and cumulative theory. From observing and scientifically unpacking the interacting parts of the political world, IR scholars like J. David Singer claim to discover and describe the objective laws of interstate relations; convert facts into "hard" data, without which one cannot generalize; offer generalizations (empirically derived and sponsored) and heuristic explanations about human action; and predict from discovered trends to high probability futures.

Traditionalists are not persuaded that scientific techniques and hyper-abstractions applied to state behavior will yield accurate data measurement and empirical validity. For traditionalists, behavior is not prepackaged and uniform, but

unique; not subject to scientific predictability, but affected by chance and random human choices; and not quantifiable or subject to controlled experiments, but understood by philosophical reasoning. Traditionalists, therefore, maintain that IR theory remains slippery and impressionistic, difficult to measure, and dependent on historical and speculative analysis or on what Donald Puchala (1990) calls a metaphysical way-of-knowing accomplished through plausible and insightful reasoning and conceptualizing. Theory, in this view, derives from analytic impressions and intuition and then launches empirical follow-through. Thinking, imagining, and theorizing precede empirical testing, data making, and knowledge.

POSTMODERNISTS

Postmodernists (a.k.a. postempiricists, postpositivists, and structuralists) reject all these previous theoretical endeavors as façades because there are no "proven" facts, data, truths, or value-free theories, only perceptions and opinions. In their view, Modernist or Enlightenment metaphysicists, whether creating or asserting knowledge based on reasoning or revelation or on realist or idealist perspectives, are actually imposing their privileged Western opinion about truth as if this opinion were neutral theoretical explanation. Enlightenment behavioralists (empiricists) impose meaning on what they discover, presumably without preconceptions or bias.

Postmodernists do not care for behavioral, realist, Marxist, or natural law models, either in terms of their social scientific or value-free methods or their presumptions about data making or the ability to discover truth. For postmodernists, it is unfounded arrogance to presume that history moves with meaning toward goals like democracy, balances of power, capitalism, socialism, and even human progress toward the "better." The seemingly antitheory-theory of postmodernism questions and deconstructs all notions about truth and embraces conceptual pluralism and relativism. There is no one better idea or explanation, or rather there are many social and political constructions that portray reality according to many (equally valid or equally invalid) points of view.

Postmodernists lament that these points of view masquerade as objective truth presumably proven by rational discourse and exegesis or by the tools of science. In their view, authority figures such as political and cultural elites (usually male) of dominant power centers (usually Western) take control of people (variously poor and oppressed), language, identity, and history to coerce others to accept their power, ideas, and cultures. We are better off rejecting theoretical and ideational imperialists posing as fact-finders and neutral interpreters savant. However, postmodernists themselves reveal an imperialist impulse because they believe their philosophical proclamations are somehow true (one must, apparently, strive for absolute tolerance and yet reject all forms of dominance) and not just opinion constructions. Postmodernists rightly question, but in the grab-bag of contending IR theories, they have made little headway.

See also *Behavioral Game Theory; Idealism; Postmodernism; Realism and Neorealism.*

. . . .   LOUISA S. HULETT

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International System

Since the 1970s, scholars have largely conceived of international politics occurring within a system or environment defined by a structure and interacting units. Systemic approaches make it possible to understand two recurring features of the international political landscape: unintended consequences and equifinality. How scholars define the international system and characterize its potential for change depends on their theoretical orientation. The two main approaches are realist and idealist. Among idealists, one can further distinguish between evolutionary and revolutionary perspectives.

KENNETH N. WALTZ'S CALL FOR SYSTEMIC THEORIES

In *Man, the State, and War* (1954), Kenneth N. Waltz identifies three images, or levels, of analysis from which international politics are typically studied: the individual level, the state level, and the international level. In the first half of *Theory of International Politics* (1979), Waltz argues that international outcomes are best explained systemically, at the international level of analysis.

According to Waltz, reductionist approaches (those at the individual and state levels of analysis) are inappropriate wherever unintended consequences and equifinality prevail. In the international realm, unintended consequences are evident in that individuals who prefer to avoid war are often drawn into fighting, and states whose policy is to ally with certain types of states often end up allying with others. Equifinality, by contrast, is evident in the fact that all manner of individuals and states participate in war.

Unintended consequences and equifinality demonstrate that individual and state actions are affected by systemic conditions. These conditions must be taken into account when explaining and predicting international outcomes and prescribing foreign policies.

WALTZ'S STRUCTURAL-REALIST THEORY

In the second half of *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz develops the first systemic theory of international relations. Today structural-realist theory remains at the center of scholarly debates about how international relations work and whether they can be changed.

In developing structural-realist theory, Waltz defines the structure of the international system in terms of anarchy (the

absence of world government) and polarity (the distribution of capabilities among units). In addition, he argues that states should be "taken as the units of the system" (Waltz, 1979, p. 93). According to Waltz, a state is an "autonomous political unit," an entity that "decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems" (pp. 95–96). Finally, Waltz assumes that states seek, at least, to survive.

From this theory, Waltz derives several hypotheses about international outcomes. In particular, he expects that strong states have better survival chances and more influence than weak states. He also predicts that balances of power recurrently form to limit the reach of the strong. Above all, Waltz expects that wars continue to occur "because there is nothing to prevent them" (1959, p. 232). Specifically, in the anarchic international system, there is no sovereign to limit the expansion of strong or ambitious states and to help states avoid the "security dilemma," in which relative power is, at once, the best guarantor of security and likely to make one a target.

According to Waltz, it is necessary to distinguish between change *in* the system and change *of* the system. Changes in the distribution of capabilities, for example the rise of a third great power in a bipolar era and the consequent emergence of multipolarity, are simply changes in the system. A change of system would occur only with a change of ordering principle, from anarchy to hierarchy. Like classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau, Waltz and other structural realists doubt that such a change will occur. Unlike classical realists, however, structural realists' pessimism arises not from a dim view of human or state nature but from the structure of the international system. International anarchy gives states both the means and the motive to preserve their sovereignty.

ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Unlike realists, idealists are optimistic about the transformation of the international system from an anarchic realm characterized by conflict to a hierarchic, or at least cooperative, realm. There are two types of idealists: those who argue that system transformation is inevitable and evolutionary, and those who argue that change is possible but will not occur without deliberate, revolutionary action.

Liberalism is the most prominent evolutionary theory. Liberal arguments range from classical claims, about the inevitable and pacifying spread of capitalism and democracy at the state level of analysis, to neoliberal assertions, about the socializing effects of international institutions and economic interdependence at the system level. According to neoliberals Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (2001), weak states and nonstate actors are "able to put increasing leverage on [strong] states" (p. 225), thereby creating "*de facto* governance" (p. 261). What unites classical and neoliberal arguments is their view of human nature. According to liberals, all people seek prosperity and justice. In pursuing these interests, individuals transform the world into one that is good for all.

Marxism, dependency theory, and constructivism are often characterized as revolutionary theories. Whether this is apt depends on the argument under consideration. Karl Marx's claim about the role of technology in the rise of capitalism and inevitable emergence of a cooperative socialist order rests on evolutionary logic. By contrast, for dependency theorist Johan Galtung system transformation requires deliberate choices and strategies by center and periphery classes and countries. Constructivist Alexander Wendt's early argument about the possibility of replacing "self-help" with "other-help" norms rested on revolutionary logic. By contrast, his more recent argument that a universal desire for recognition leads inevitably toward world government has strong evolutionary tones.

Feminists, too, differ in their predictions about system change. Liberal and radical feminists take an evolutionary view, asserting that female enfranchisement and participation have made international politics more cooperative than they once were and that progress will continue as more women become involved. By contrast, critical feminists such as Sandra Whitworth argue that the behavior of both men and women reflects gendered norms of competition and dominance constructed by governments and militaries. For a more cooperative and nurturing international system to emerge, these norms must be deliberately reconstructed.

For structural realists such as Waltz, changes in the attributes, interdependence, and norms of states are changes in the international system, not changes of the system. Unless states surrender sovereignty to a world government, the anarchic structure of the international system will persist, and war and conflict will continue to occur, both intentionally and inadvertently, among a wide variety of leaders and states.

See also *Great Power; New World Order; Realism and Neorealism.*

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Internet and Politics

At no other time in the history of American politics has the Internet been considered such a major factor in the mobilization of the electorate than during the 2008 election. From the grassroots fund-raising efforts of the Obama campaign to the mass mobilization activities to get supporters in many localities to engage in various political participation activities, the Internet was indeed a force in bringing about the success of Barack Obama's presidential campaign. The big question now becomes, Is the Internet going to be a permanent feature of American politics, especially when this generation of candidates and voters will bring such technological knowledge with them?

The Internet is a set of many networks linking together millions of computers to send and receive data. It allows for the facilitation of communication, especially one-to-many communication. The Internet began in the 1960s as a Department of Defense project called the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network, or ARPANET. Although purely a defense project, it found its next greatest use in academia in the 1970s and 1980s with the growth in computing for research. As computers became smaller and faster, the age of personal computing brought the technology into the hands of the ordinary user. People have found use for computers in various business tasks, so the commercialization of the Internet has gained in importance. E-mail is the most common Internet activity, followed by entertainment. Beyond commerce for both employment and consumer activities, the next most common use of the Internet is obtaining political news. Other uses include health-related activities, education, and religious activity.

USES IN POLITICS

The Internet plays a substantial role in politics and government today. In 1993 the White House went online with the introduction of the Web site www.whitehouse.gov. The 1996 and 1998 campaigns were benchmark years for when democracy met the Internet. The dawning of netocracy was hailed because the use of the Internet created active participatory netizens. The Howard Dean presidential campaign is considered a precursor to the Obama campaign in its initial use of the Internet as a method of fund-raising, campaigning, and mobilizing citizens to engage in active participation in the political process beyond the act of voting. By 2004 the Internet would serve as an integral part of any campaign. Part of the success of the Obama campaign can be attributed to a large Web presence that allowed ordinary citizens to participate in the process through small contributions, house parties, bake sales, and so forth. Even after the election was won, the Web continued to be used by Obama supporters to inform people about the direction of the country and as a way to solicit and maintain continued support of Obama policies.

Beyond the White House, the entire executive branch of government has a Web presence. Both houses of Congress have Web portals at www.senate.gov and www.house.gov, where members of Congress can inform their constituents about their voting records, legislation that they have sponsored, their

personal biographies, and much more. The U.S. Supreme Court has a Web presence at www.supremecourtus.gov, and materials on the site include court cases, rulings, and opinions.

The various components and institutions in the political system also have their presence on the Web. Political parties major (Republican and Democratic) and minor (Libertarian and Progressive) inform their supporters as well as would-be detractors about their platforms and goals. Major interest groups such as the National Rifle Association and the American Association of Retired Persons likewise find that having materials on the Internet allows them to make their presence felt. This allows for activism and political engagement to take place at the netroots. This form of direct democracy has been billed as what will connect citizens to mass decision-making processes. Media sources at all levels—newspapers (*New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today, Wall Street Journal*), magazines (*Time, Newsweek, The Economist*), and television (CNN, FOX, ABC)—can also be found on the Web.

Most major countries in the world have found uses for a Web presence: to inform the world of their existence, to lure those who have the money and the curiosity to visit them, or to facilitate communication from government to government or from citizen to citizen through exchanges of e-mails and the sharing of audio and video. Although the state of technological development in a country may provide insight into the usefulness of the Internet to deliver basic needs to its citizens, the digital divide is a constant reminder that gaps between wealth and poverty will prevent billions of people from availing themselves of the advantages of connectivity.

Whereas initial interest in the Internet for government was geared toward providing information to constituents, today it allows for more than that, including greater interaction so political mobilization can take place. Those who favor going electronic in various facets of our lives believe that the Internet will ultimately strengthen democracy through information dissemination and mobilization. As the Net becomes more integrated into our lives it will be an integral method for discussing political issues such as cyberlaw cases, gambling and pornography on the Internet, online voting, and debates at the national and international levels regarding the impact of the so-called digital divide.

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS

The Internet has challenged the responsiveness of government to the needs of the revitalization of democracy. Although some political scientists contend that political life online is a mere extension of political life offline, it is also another medium through which expressions of political activity can be channeled. Positive political consequences have come about as a result of the popularization of the Internet. It has allowed for greater political access to those otherwise not able to make their thoughts and ideas known. It has been used by various groups to engage in agenda building and agenda setting and is a powerful tool in voting, campaigning, fund-raising, and mobilizing volunteers.

Proponents of the use of the Internet in government say that it makes government more responsive, more efficient, and

less bureaucratic. The greater transparency that Web presence brings could prevent government from withholding or censoring information. However, information delivered can be only as reliable and credible as the producers of the information allow, and therefore misinformation, deception, and manipulation can still take place.

Many see the Internet becoming as available as the telephone and television. Idealists believe the Internet holds promise for narrowing the digital gap and bringing about democracy and world peace. However, it can be just as instrumental in spreading hate and bigotry—just as the Internet can help spread freedom, it can also be used to curtail it. There are things that the Internet cannot do. As an alternative mode of communication and participation, it will not lead to the triumph of direct democracy. It does not automatically give power to the powerless. It has the potential to reinforce existing relationships of elite domination due to the persistence of the digital divide. And with billions of people worldwide still not online, it will not automatically build a global village without borders.

See also *Campaign Finance; Campaigns; Voting Machines and Technology.*

. . . . CECILIA G. MANRIQUE

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Interregnum

Literally "between reigns," *interregnum* refers to the time when England was kingless after the regicide of Charles I in 1649 and before the restoration of Charles II in 1660. This period is known as the commonwealth period after the English Civil War (1642–1651), when the Puritans sought to establish a godly republic under the leadership of Oliver Cromwell and the force of the New Model Army. Parliament declared the monarchy abolished—there was no king and no House of Lords. The first republican government—the Rump Parliament, a unicameral body—lasted only four years (1649–1653) when Oliver Cromwell established a protectorate (1654–1658) to be succeeded by his son, Richard Cromwell (1658–1659). In 1660, Charles II took the throne and ended the interregnum by restoring the monarchy, House of Lords, and episcopacy to England.

The political theory of the interregnum was English republicanism, a combination of classical republicanism, natural law theory, and ancient constitutionalism. Several political works of English republicanism were published, such as Marchamont Nedham's *The Case of the Commonwealth of England Stated* (1650), Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651), John Milton's *A Defence of the People of England* (1651), and James Harrington's *Oceana* (1656). Freedom of worship was granted to Presbyterians, Independents, Quakers, and Baptists. The Church of England lost ecclesiastical control as the principles of liberty of conscience, universal toleration, and egalitarianism, which had been advocated by the Levellers during civil war radicalism, were implemented by the Puritans, both Presbyterians and Independents. Parliamentary sovereignty as representative constitutionalism, civic and moral virtue among the people, and individual natural rights were core principles of English republicanism.

See also *Constitutional Monarchy; Monarchy; Parliamentary Government; Republicanism.*

. . . . JOANNE TETLOW

Intersectionality

Intersectionality is an approach to research that emphasizes the significance of intersecting social categories. Race, ethnicity, gender, and class are categories of difference that can serve as identities but are also social structures associated with status hierarchies. Intersectional research focuses on ways that these categories of difference, and their related social structures such as racism or sexism, interact to reproduce social inequalities. *Intersectionality* also refers to a normative theory, claiming that meaningful understandings of social phenomenon require a consideration of the ways that multiple social categories and structures interact with each other.

While gender studies research commonly focuses on sexism to explain social inequality and race studies research typically concentrates on racism, intersectional research is explicitly interdisciplinary, focusing on the ways that social institutions such as racism and sexism interact. Intersectional theory can be used to combat the tendency for researchers to explain social inequality by looking at one factor only, such as race, gender, or class. Explaining what goes on at the interstices of social categories and social institutions such as racism and sexism is a central goal of intersectional research. The concept of intersectionality is central to the work of many interdisciplinary researchers.

Intersectionality is often characterized as a codeword for research on women of color, but intersectionality theorists point out that class, ethnicity, citizenship, religion, age, sexual orientation, marital status, and disability—in addition to gender and race—are all categories of difference that interact with each other in varying and multiple ways. The intersections of these categories of difference have been described as axes of disadvantage or axes of structural inequality.

Philomena Essed's concept of gendered racism is an example of intersectional work. Essed uses the phrase "gendered racism" to explain how women in racial minority groups often experience the interaction of racism and sexism as more than just racism plus sexism. Gendered racism describes the gender-specific ways that racism often manifests itself, creating and reinforcing race- and gender-specific stereotypes. In the United States, the welfare queen stereotype, for example, applies not to African American people in general nor to all women but specifically to African American single mothers. More traditional research that focuses on only race and racism, or sex and sexism, would miss this important interaction.

Intersectionality has been developed primarily by race and gender scholars since the 1980s and early 1990s. Intersectional approaches are more commonly found in gender studies, race studies, and sociological research, but political science researchers are increasingly utilizing intersectionality. Political theorists such as Ange-Marie Hancock and Wendy Smooth have considered the value of, and implications of, an intersectional approach in political science research.

See also *Gender and Politics; Race and Gender; Race and Racism.*

. . . . CARLY HAYDEN FOSTER

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Interstate Compacts

An interstate compact is a binding agreement among two or more states that has the legal status of a contract and a statute. Originally, interstate compacts were used mainly to resolve boundary disputes and apportionment of river water among the states. In the early twentieth century, they began to be used for a greater variety of purposes. As new issues emerged that were no longer regional in nature, states in geographically disperse locations across the country began to form compacts.

The formation of a compact is a step-by-step process. Compacts can be created formally, with states negotiating in a multistate commission, or informally, with state officials formulating compacts at regional conferences. Concerned state legislatures must enact the compact. Political compacts require the consent of Congress to become effective.

Interstate compacts have a long history in the United States. In colonial times they were used to settle boundary disputes among the colonies. Interstate compacts continued to be used for this purpose after the country gained its independence from the United Kingdom. The Framers of the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union codified the process forming an interstate compact in the document.

The current power to form these compacts is derived from the compact clause (Article 1, Section 3, Clause 3) of the U.S. Constitution: "no State shall, without the consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power." For a compact to be created, the states must come to a mutual agreement and, depending on the parameters, must obtain congressional approval.

The law of interstate compacts has been developed in several major U.S. Supreme Court cases. The most important is *Virginia v. Tennessee* (1893), a case that dealt with a tract of land that was claimed by both states. The Court ruled the consent of Congress is necessary if a compact encroaches on the powers of the national government. The Court also stated that congressional consent could be given both explicitly and implicitly.

Until the early twentieth century, the use of compacts was limited. Since that time, there has been a growth not only in the number of compacts but also in the subject matter they cover, including compacts dealing with transportation, business, criminal justice, and education. In the 1980s, the use of compacts in disposing of low-level radioactive waste became more common because of an act of Congress encouraging their use. States have also used compacts to regulate and raise revenue through gambling.

Several criticisms have been leveled at interstate compacts. Paul Hardy (1982) discusses four problems associated with them. The first is the length of time it takes from formation to implementation of a compact. The process can be very time consuming because of the different levels of government involved. The second is their inflexibility. It is often difficult to modify compacts once they have been implemented. Third, states relinquish some of their sovereignty when they enter into a compact. Finally, compacts may prove difficult to enforce, as some states may not live up to their end of the bargain.

Political science scholarship on interstate compacts has been relatively limited compared with other areas of American state politics. Most of the research on interstate compacts has been conducted by legal scholars. Two of the most important articles, written by political scientists, were published in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*. David Nice's (1987) article "State Participation in Interstate Compacts" systematically examines which factors are associated with the use of interstate compacts. He finds that geographical proximity of state capitals as well as state-level socioeconomic and political factors are important determinants in the utilization of compacts but that they are conditional on the subject matter of the compact. Patricia Florestano's (1994) article "Past and Present Utilization of Interstate Compacts in the United States" is more descriptive in

nature and analyzes the changes that have occurred with regard to the subject matter and the states participating in interstate compacts.

Interstate compacts continue to be used by states to resolve political and social issues. The general trend is that their scope will continue to be expanded. Future scholarship should discuss and analyze the efficacy of compacts as well as their potential to address new regional issues.

See also *States' Rights.*

. . . . ADAM W. NYE

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Interstate Rendition

Fugitives from justice in a federal nation may flee to a sister state or a foreign nation, and a process established by the national constitution or a foreign treaty, respectively, is necessary to ensure their return to the state from which they fled. Members of the New England Confederation, established in 1643, utilized a rendition process subsequently included in the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union (Article IV). Currently, the U.S. Constitution (Article IV, Section 2) and a congressional statute (18 U.S.C. §3182) govern the rendition process, and the United States has entered into extradition treaties with many foreign nations.

The governor of the state from which the fugitive fled demands that the governor of the asylum state apprehend and return the fugitive to the demanding state. Whether the offense committed by the fugitive is an offense in the asylum state is immaterial. The U.S. Supreme Court in *Dennison v. Kentucky* (65 U.S. 66) in 1861 ruled the asylum state governor

has only a moral obligation to return a fugitive. The Court in *Puerto Rico v. Branstad* (489 U.S. 227) held in 1987 that the governor of the asylum state has a constitutional mandatory duty to return the fugitive. The fugitive, however, has due process of law rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and may demand a hearing before the governor and an appeal to the judiciary to secure his or her liberty.

All state legislatures have enacted the Agreement on Detainers, an interstate compact establishing a similar process for a state penal institution prisoner to be returned temporarily to another state for a trial on an untried indictment, information, or complaint.

See also *Extradition; Federalism; Intergovernmental Relations.*

. . . . JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN

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Interview Techniques

An interview is the act of posing questions to a respondent to obtain information. In political science, interview responses are typically recorded and then analyzed for research purposes. Interviews are used to fulfill a variety of methodological needs and may be the most applicable design to gauge a respondent's attitudes about a topic(s), obtain factual information about the individual, or ask respondents to self-report their behaviors or habits. Interviews not only can obtain qualitative data on political phenomena but also help to acquire firsthand, factual, and in-depth knowledge about entities, organizations, and social movements from those associated with the item in question.

Although an interview can assume one of several forms, an interview by its nature is predicated on interaction between the interviewer(s) and the respondent(s)/interviewee(s). As such, an interview is generally conducted in one of two ways: either face to face (either in person or, in some cases, via electronic teleconferencing) or over the telephone. The method chosen for the interview is contingent on the nature of the research, cost, and time frame.

A researcher may opt to conduct face-to-face interviews with respondents, although this method can be costly in terms of both time and money and is thus frequently reserved primarily for smaller sample populations. For larger samples, a researcher may opt to conduct interviews over the telephone or administer a questionnaire. A telephone interview is conducted by an interviewer or a series of interviewers who may or may not include the researcher him- or herself or the principal investigator of the study. A telephone interview is typically less expensive than a face-to-face method and is particularly useful for larger sample populations and when time and cost limitations may preclude the face-to-face method.

Depending on the nature of the interview's response format, an interview can be considered either qualitative or quantitative research. Less-structured interviews are frequently qualitative, particularly when the research objective is exploratory in nature, as they generally provide respondents an opportunity to answer open-ended questions in as much detail as possible and do not constrain responses. However, highly structured interviews in which the interviewer is administering a standardized questionnaire (particularly those with a higher volume of closed-ended responses) are more quantitative, especially when the researcher plans to code and statistically analyze the data obtained. In this sense, the interview technique may be qualitative in nature but useful in quantitative analyses.

INTERVIEW STRUCTURE

There are multiple types of interviews ranging from highly structured formats using predetermined questions and/or questionnaires to relatively spontaneous, unstructured formats that are more conversational in style and fluid in nature. Some research designs may incorporate both structured and unstructured interview formats, and some may employ a semistructured hybrid of the two. The latter is known as a focused interview.

A highly structured interview typically involves the administration of a predetermined, standardized set of questions, a questionnaire. This particular structure can be beneficial when a researcher is dealing with large sample sizes and will be comparing the data either across the sample or across other populations. The standardized approach also maximizes the reliability and validity of the measure but is frequently an impediment to more exploratory research as questionnaires typically constrain responses and do not allow an interviewer to stray from the script to probe for more information or clarify responses. Highly structured interviews may also prove to be impossible for some types of research, particularly if the researcher lacks the knowledge or understanding necessary to construct a viable and comprehensive questionnaire or when the nature of the research necessitates individual interpretation or in-depth exploration of a topic.

Unstructured interviews provide the interviewer with the capacity to control and guide the direction of an interview. They also allow an interviewer to probe responses and accommodate for the intangible elements that may affect responses. These intangibles include the intensity with which a respondent may respond to an opinion question, the respondent's mood during the interview, and response latency, the amount of time it takes a respondent to answer a question, which can be important when analyzing the level of truthfulness in a respondent's answer.

In a semistructured/focused interview, the interviewer may prepare a list of questions or topics that ought to be covered in the interview, and he or she may delineate in what order these items should be addressed. Although a researcher may use this as a guide, a semistructured focused interview affords the researcher significant flexibility in terms of how the interview will be conducted and allows for additional questions to be asked if certain responses require clarification or exploration. This method is particularly useful when interviewing elites.

The chosen structure of the interview is typically contingent on the nature of the research as well as practical limitations (i.e., cost and time frame). Generally speaking, the more exploratory the research, the less structured the interview will be. In other words, when the research goal is exploratory in nature, the researcher will wield less control over the topic and direction of the interview as the research objective is more to gauge the respondent's interpretation and underlying attitudes, which may be lost in a more structured setting.

POTENTIAL METHODOLOGICAL PITFALLS OF INTERVIEWS

Interviews, particularly those that are less structured in design, are fraught with potential methodological pitfalls. The wording of the questions and/or the order in which they are asked, for instance, may affect respondents' answers to those questions. The very presence of an interviewer may inspire a certain type of response, generally one that is more prosocial in nature, particularly in interviews examining more controversial topics. The gender, race/ethnicity, sexuality, and age of the interviewer may affect responses, particularly in face-to-face interviews. The actions of the interviewer may also influence respondents. Indeed, the very analysis and interpretation of the data may be affected by the interviewer's own preexisting biases or knowledge of the topic being researched. In this sense, interview data are frequently not especially useful when reliability and validity of measurement instruments is essential to the research, except when employing highly structured, standardized techniques.

See also *Elite Interview; Questionnaire; Reliability and Validity Assessment; Survey Techniques and Design.*

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Investiture

Investiture (from the Latin *Investitura* and the German *Gewere*) involves the formal installation of an individual (incumbent) into an office, organization, or rank. The term is generally used in reference to one's installation into a formal office,

such as that of the aristocracy, church, or state. Investiture is preceded by a formal ceremony. For example, British investiture is a unique ceremony: an individual who has been awarded an honor is presented with the official medal from the queen or the prince of Wales. Presidential inauguration is another example of the investment of a head of state. Under the feudal system, the term referred to the ceremony between a suzerain (feudal lord) and a vassal. Having received the homage of the vassal and oath of fealty, the suzerain would invest him with either land (fief) or office by presentation of some symbol according to custom. During the eleventh century, the term designated both the act and the ceremony for abbots and bishops by which princes granted certain property (benefice), political rights, and titles. The investiture controversy of the eleventh and twelfth centuries was an ecclesiastical dispute regarding whether a suzerain or pope should grant the symbols of his authority to an ecclesiastical vassal. The sword and scepter were emblematic of feudal authority, whereas the ring and staff were symbols of spiritual authority. Pope Gregory VII (Hildebrand) sought to abolish lay investiture wherein a suzerain, who was normally a layman, invested ecclesiastical leaders with a clerical office.

See also *Church and State; Feudalism; Papacy.*

. . . . RON J. BIGALKE JR.

Iron Curtain

In a speech in Fulton, Missouri, on March 6, 1946, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill warned that "From Stettin, in the Baltic, to Trieste, in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent." Churchill's speech is seen as signaling the onset of what later came to be called the "cold war." The speech came as a shock to Western public opinion, which still saw the Soviet Union as a loyal ally in the recently won war against Fascism.

Churchill felt the need to speak out against Soviet actions in those Eastern European countries that were occupied by the Red Army, especially Poland. Political leaders and parties that were not considered loyal to the Soviet Union were being brutally suppressed. It was clear that Joseph Stalin intended to permanently occupy and control as much territory as he could in central Europe. As of 1946, the borders between East and West were still quite open. It was only later that elaborate border defenses were erected to prevent people from Eastern Europe from fleeing to the West: a more literal iron curtain. (The term *iron curtain* originally referred to a fire-protection device that could be dropped onto a theater stage.)

See also *German Political Thought; Soviet Union, Former; State Repression.*

. . . . PETER RUTLAND

Iron Law of Oligarchy

See *Oligarchy, Iron Law of.*

Irredentism

Irredentism refers to a state's policies aimed at annexing adjacent territory and ethnic kin living in (those) neighboring countries. As a political dynamic it lies at the intersection of domestic and interstate politics, well capturing the blurring of the boundaries between the two in the contemporary world.

The term derives from the Italian *terre irredente* ("unredeemed lands"), indicating the territory inhabited by Italian-speaking communities left out of the state-building process in the second half of the nineteenth century (Trentino, South Tyrol, and Istria, all on Italy's northeastern borders). In this sense irredentism can be seen as a remedial form of state nationalism that seeks to solve the mismatch between ethnic and political boundaries left by the process of modern state formation.

As pure forms of nation-states are more the exception than the rule in the contemporary political system, the potential for irredentist disputes is considerable. However, unlike in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when episodes of irredentism were far from infrequent, in postwar Europe and in the post–cold war period, irredentism has turned into a sort of "anomaly," notes Markus Kornprobst (2007, 459), a latent phenomenon that, according to Naomi Chazan (1991), tends to manifest itself particularly at times of political reordering in the international system. Irredentist disputes have not disappeared (e.g., the Republic of Ireland, West Germany's refusal to acknowledge its post–World War II [1939–1945] boundaries and the German Democratic Republic, Serbia's and Croatia's policies toward various portions of Bosnia Herzegovina in the 1990s, interstate disputes in postcolonial Africa, the Kashmir conflict), but empirical evidence has contradicted expectations about their occurrence and frequency. This has led to the opening of a new path of enquiry investigating why some conflicts escalate into irredentist disputes whereas others do not.

Donald Horowitz (1991) has observed that some conflicts, separatist and irredentist in particular, move in and out of categories. Because of the nature of the actors involved, some empirical overlapping is inevitable. At the same time, irredentism has to be kept distinct from separatism (the attempt of a group to separate from the state it finds itself in) and self-determination, namely, from attempts by one group to unify territories belonging to separate states into a new political entity (i.e., the Kurdish case).

There are two discriminating factors distinguishing conflicts that are irredentist from those that are not: (1) the role of the state (as opposed to nonstate actors such as irredentist organizations) and (2) the presence of policies that are explicitly aimed at (re)gaining/retrieving control of territories and peoples that the state claims as its own (as opposed to more vague orientations and sentiments or even claims that may or may not be sanctioned by the state).

As the phenomenon of irredentism is multifaceted, it is not surprising that the focus of scholarship has been extremely diverse. First and foremost, the question of the conditions under which an irredentist dispute arises (or fails to) and the

mechanisms through which disputes are settled have received the largest share of scholarly attention. The possible causes are manifold, and the following is simply a list of some of the factors identified in the literature as triggering irredentism: the size of the community of ethnic kin (to be redeemed), the influence of the alleged homeland, contagion effects across state boundaries, ethnic security dilemmas, international toleration of state behavior, and political reordering in the international system. While identifying the causes of irredentism occupies a central position in the literature, other questions have animated the debate too: the identity of the actor raising the demand (i.e., the government of the irredentist state), the nature of the demand (i.e., boundary adjustments), and the way in which demands are presented (i.e., negotiation, declaration of war). Last but not least is the way irredentist disputes end. Settlement of irredentist disputes occurs in one of the following manners: readjustment of boundaries in accord with irredentist demands, redefinition of group action (switching to separatism), withdrawal of irredentist demands, and dispute settlement, including dejustification of the claim to land and people by the irredentist state.

Overall, the literature on irredentism has encountered three problems. First is the often interchangeable use of the concept with separatism. The two are clearly cognate phenomena but are analytically and empirically distinct, as noted above. The focus of irredentism is on the state willing to redeem lands, not on the peoples to be redeemed who may or may not be engaged in separatism. Second, the principal agent behind irredentism has to be clearly identified. Here authors have divided themselves between those who have acknowledged the centrality of the state and others who instead have pointed to the role of organizations within the home country and even minority groups themselves in the host state. Last is the lack of conceptual clarity, namely, the risk that irredentism encompasses virtually anything, from actual state policies to claims, movements, and even orientations within the very same minority groups that the state aims to retrieve.

Scholarly interest in irredentism is growing, and both large-sample comparative analyses and more qualitative studies have greatly contributed to the advancement of our knowledge about why some conflicts escalate into irredentism whereas others do not.

See also *Boundary Making and Boundary Disputes; Secession; Self-determination; State Formation.*

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Islamic Political Thought

The basic assumption of Islamic political thought is that the believers' primary objective is being able to lead a life in accordance with *Ibada* and *Hisba*—that is, adhering to the Quranic injunctions to do service in the name of God and to do good and prohibit evil. The Quranic injunctions are embodied in the Sharia, which is law comprising rulings in the Quran (God's word) and Hadith (narratives of Prophet Muhammad's sayings and doings and, for the Shia, the narratives of their twelve Imams also). In this the Islamic state is pivotal because it assumed and was accorded a moral mission to enforce the application of Sharia with a view to ensuring that believers performed the duties of Ibada and Hisba. This task entailed four responsibilities: safeguarding the community from moral and physical danger from within and without, safeguarding the community against schisms and heresy in accordance with the rulings of the ulema (religious scholars), enforcing the rules of the good moral life as they were set forth in the Quran and Sharia and interpreted by the ulema in accordance with the various schools of law, and being just and ensuring justice.

On the basis mainly of Hisba (doing good and preventing evil), it was considered a command of God that the Muslim community should resist or disobey a government that violated the precepts of the Sharia. Other than morally sanctioned rebellion or civil disobedience, the only means available to the community to protest wrongful acts of a sovereign were the protests and warnings of religious leaders. These generally took two forms: the first one was fatwas, that is, formal rulings by one or more of the ulema based on Sharia. But the ruler could get around a fatwa by having a counterfatwa issued by a mufti (official deliverer of fatwas) under his control or one who simply disagreed with the original fatwa. Theoretically under Islamic notions of government, the state's judiciary and executive powers were limited by the Sharia.

THE MODERN PERIOD

In the modern period beginning with the dominance and influence of the West over Muslim countries in the nineteenth century, Islamic political thinking and practice underwent important changes. Most modernizing states in the Muslim world derived law, at least theoretically, from Western-style legislative processes and institutions, including parliaments, which could ultimately have authority over Sharia. But there is continuity between traditional and modern concerns in this regard: to the older discussions of Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) of the place of Sharia in governance were added questions relating to democracy in general and specifically where sovereignty lay in the Islamic polity: in the people or in God's commands?

Demonstrators in Morocco protest a law they believe goes against Sharia, or Islamic law, which comprises rulings in the Quran and Hadith to guide the lives of Muslims.

SOURCE: Corbis

DIALOGUE WITH WESTERN MODERNITY AND MUSLIM REFORMERS

In many ways modern Islamic political thought has been one of an adjustment to Western political domination. Muslim political thinkers have reacted in different ways to the question of the place of Islam in modern politics: from advocating secularism (separating politics from religion) to re-instating *salafism,* a return to Islam as it was practiced during the time of the prophet and his companions. Among the Islamic political thinkers who more or less rejected incorporation of Western forms of democracy into Islamic political thinking were Hasan Al-Banna (1906–1949) and Sayyid Qutub (1906–1966). Others such as Maulana Maududi (1903–1979), Imam Khomeini (1902–1989), and Muhammad Asad (1900–1992) considered democracy to be compatible with an Islamic polity as long as Sharia remained the supreme source of legislation and lawmaking and the latter did not contradict the former. In varying ways, these authors, among others, saw no incompatibility between representative government and the supremacy of Sharia. This position follows from the concepts of *ijtihad* (independent reasoning—a term used by earlier Muslim scholars to refer to independent legal reasoning on matters about which they were not in agreement), *ijma* (consensus of scholars), and *qiyas* (analogical reasoning), which are applied by jurists in complex ways within Sharia—reasoning that allows for change and innovation to be incorporated into the Islamic polity. Ijtihad is often posed as being opposite to *Taqlid* (the unreflective reproduction of tradition), but this view is problematic in relation to understanding Islamic political thought. The orientalist thesis that the Islamic legal tradition became ossified—that the gates of ijtihad were closed—after the first formative years of Islam, is untenable. Argued change in relation to particular circumstances was always important to the Sharia, and its flexibility was retained through such technical devices as custom (*urf*), public interest (*maslaha*), and necessity (*darura*).

In any case, a tradition passed down in history imperceptibly accumulates something new and is never an exact copy of a previous tradition, including in the political realm. A case in point is the way some modern Muslim scholars (such as Sayyid Qutub) would classify most Islamic countries as being in a state of *jahliyya* (ignorance or barbarism), a situation that Arabia was in before the advent of Islam. Their strategy to end

this situation does not entail exact copying of the methods by which the original jahliyya was ended. It often means putting an end to contemporary jahliyya, using present-day discourses and practices including modern technology, media, and even armed conflict and establishing a state based on Sharia. Another example of change within tradition is that classical Hanafi doctrine forbade torture to extract evidence, but later Hanafi *fiqh* accepted it for reasons of expediency.

The practice of including or rejecting forms of political innovation (*bida*) falls within the parameters of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence comprising the four schools of the Sunni tradition—Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali, and Shafi—and that of the Shia including the Jafaria), which grades laws and acts according to the stipulations of the Sharia: mandatory (*wajib*), recommended (*mandub*), permitted (*jaiz*), disapproved (*makruh*), and forbidden (*haram*). Islamic political thought is located within this Sharia-bound matrix of discourses and practices. These concepts, including the historical situations in which they are located, can explain the change and continuity in and the connection between the past and present of Islamic political discourses and practices.

See also *Middle East Democratization; Middle Eastern Politics and Society.*

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Isolationism

Isolationism refers to a foreign policy in which a nation seeks to limit its contacts and involvements with other nations to achieve and maintain its security and well-being. Although the array of ties among individuals, groups, and nations make the pursuance of isolationism more and more difficult today, this approach has been popular throughout human history and remains an attractive option for some nations.

Historically, Japan adopted a policy of isolation for centuries, lasting until 1902 when it allied with Britain—in an effort to obstruct Russian expansion and control of a China-based, Japanese-controlled port for use by the Russian navy. At the time, Britain was also breaking from a period of political isolationism. China, too, pursued isolationism for varying periods of time throughout its history, most recently during Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. Today, North Korea pursues a policy of isolationism in foreign affairs by limiting its contacts with the rest of the world and by severely restricting access to its country. Myanmar has long followed an isolationist policy as a means to preserve its

independence and to protect itself from the influence of other nations.

Although a nation may not want to pursue isolationism, a nation's geography; its limited political, military, or economic capability; and its lack of domestic unity may limit its involvements abroad. Nations fraught with domestic turmoil, such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan, have limited options in terms of foreign policy as they continuously struggle to maintain internal stability. Thus, many weak and failing states will ultimately pursue a more limited or isolationist foreign policy. The actions of the international community may also force isolationism on some countries. During Saddam Hussein's rule of Iraq, the imposition of international sanctions on Iraq after the Gulf War (1990–1991) limited the country's international engagements. Similarly, Libya under Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi's rule since 1969 was internationally outcast due to Libyan involvement with and alleged sponsorship of international terrorist activities. In 2003 Libya announced its decision to abandon its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons program and was able to reintegrate into the international community, particularly improving relations with Europe and the United States.

ISOLATIONISM AS A POLITICAL TOOL: CASE STUDY OF THE U.S. HISTORY OF ISOLATIONISM

More often, though, isolationism is a deliberately chosen foreign policy. By using the United States as a case study, we will examine a country with a long-held tradition of isolationism and explore the philosophical and practical reasons for which the United States employed an isolationist strategy for most of its history. On a philosophical level, the aim of America's Founders was to avoid the entangling conflicts that seemingly enveloped Europe and from which the colonists had recently departed. According to the Founders, isolationism would allow the nation to develop its distinct values and beliefs. On a practical level, isolationism also had an appeal. The thirteen original colonies were hardly unified at the outset of the new nation, and substantial foreign involvements would only be detrimental to achieving unification since a weak and fragmented nation would likely have little impact on politics abroad but severely risk America's becoming dominated by European politics.

Thus, isolationism quickly became embedded in America's foreign policy through the political statements and doctrines of its early presidents. U.S. President George Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality for the United States in 1793 during a war between France and England was perhaps the first declaration of this policy. Washington, in his Farewell Address of 1796 further outlined future U.S. political isolationism, stating, "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible." President Thomas Jefferson's inaugural address in 1801 echoed this sentiment by declaring the United States should have entangling alliances with none. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 specified these positions by stating that the United States would stay out

of the affairs of Europe and that Europeans should stay out of the affairs of the Western Hemisphere.

America's foreign relations during the next century and a half largely adhered to the imperatives of political isolationism. Although the United States established numerous commercial and friendship agreements with countries around the world, it formed very few political ties. The few political involvements were largely confined to expanding control over the American continent or enforcing the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere. Even when the United States became more globally active at the turn of the century and subsequently gained control over the Philippines and other territories after the Spanish-American War in 1898, domestic voices were quickly raised over these seemingly imperialist and globalist pursuits. The United States became involved in World War I (1914–1918) relatively late in 1917, three years after the war began, primarily because Germany violated the freedom of the seas principle toward neutral passenger ships, killing U.S. and European civilians traveling the Atlantic Ocean. Yet President Woodrow Wilson's call for the creation of a collective international security organization among states, the League of Nations, to stop future international aggression met with stiff opposition in the U.S. Senate. Staunch isolationists, such as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R–MA) and Senator William E. Borah (R–ID), led the opposition and defeated American participation in a new international institution. By 1920, the campaign slogan adopted by Warren Harding, the Republican presidential candidate and later president, was a "return to normalcy," a thinly veiled appeal to return to isolationism after the internationalism of the Wilson years.

This isolationist sentiment continued into the next decade and right up to the outbreak of World War II (1939–1945), as the U.S. Congress passed several pieces of legislation, including the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, a highly protectionist measure to seek to insulate the United States from the economic problems in the rest of the world and a series of Neutrality Acts throughout the 1930s in an attempt to keep the United States out of foreign wars and conflicts. Regardless, the events at Pearl Harbor, World War II, and the postwar threat of international communism ultimately compelled the United States to abandon isolationism. Since then, the United States not only has been involved in but has led the development of multilateral agreements and alliances, in addition to sponsoring international organizations. Still, appeals for U.S. isolationism appear from time to time, specifically after the country has engaged in a foreign armed conflict in which significant American losses or expenses are incurred and future threats remain. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War (1959–1975) in the early 1970s and with the formal end of the cold war in the early 1990s, isolationist sentiments emerged among the American public. After the events of September 11, 2001, some calls were made for isolationism as a way to insulate the United States from future terrorist actions. According to periodic foreign policy surveys during recent decades, roughly 20 percent of the American public routinely embraces isolationist views as a foreign policy option.

See also *Homeland Security; International Cooperation; League of Nations; National Security Policy; Post-9/11 Politics; United Nations (UN).*

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Italian Political Thought

Italian political thought has charted, and often directed, the journey of Western ideas and practices from Roman times to the medieval Christian period to the modern world. Italians have been artisans of political theory and empirical inquiry. The reflections and experience gained in the art and practice of governance by successive generations of Italians have arguably inspired or played a part in the neo-Roman theory of free citizens and free states in early modern Britain, the creation of an Atlantic republican tradition, the growth of public choice theory in the 1960s, and the conceptualization of liberal socialism in the first part of the twentieth century as well as showing that ordinary people can successfully resolve collective-action dilemmas, or contentious politics, in the management of common property resources over extended periods.

Like the Greeks, the Italians had the advantage of an early start. But unlike the Greeks, the Italians did not, for a variety of reasons, stop contributing. Successive generations of Italian thinkers wrote as comparativists and seldom as parochial thinkers or narrow pan-Italian nationalists. Their contributions meshed with, and continue to be easily understood in terms of, familiar categories of thought in the Anglophone world. Because Italy was less directly involved in the competition of national monarchies and was late to achieve national unification, Italian perspectives tended to be less caught up in momentary conflicts. As Anthony Pagden (1990) notes in *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination,* "For centuries . . . the Italians had been the most sensitive, the most astute observers of the European political scene" (p. 5). In that sense, Italian political thought often possessed the quality of distance modern social scientists seek. While thinkers often wrote in

response to particular political-economic exigencies confronting their community, they each, at the same time, engaged in reinterpreting the past. This way, as John Burrow (2007/2008) put it, "the image of Rome [in the Renaissance] assumed a different form from that current in the Middle Ages, [and] focused not on the imperial city, the *urbs aeterna,* but on the struggling early republic to which the Romans of the first century BC had themselves looked back as a lost era of patriotic republican virtue" (p. 260). By the time of liberation and unification in the middle of the nineteenth century, Italy had accumulated such a rich and variegated patrimony of political-economic ideas that the meaning of the past posed serious dilemmas about how to look to the future.

For all these reasons, the Italian tradition of political thought is not easily reducible to a single linear narrative or simple summary. Yet general trends do emerge. These are an emphasis on microfoundations of political behavior accompanied by a preference for empirically informed ideas and speculations, an approach to institutional order that does not presume unitary or command forms of rule (the state) as the only way to enhance liberty and institutions of self-government and sustain organized existence, a view of political economy as involving reciprocal assistance and the promotion of public happiness, and a repertoire of republican and liberal ideas that cannot be contained within the analytical framework of either liberalism or republicanism.

MICROFOUNDATIONS

The microfoundations of Italian political thought rest on the individual as the basic constituent of the world (who is malleable by others but who can shape himself) and a strong dose of political realism. Thinkers in the Italian tradition have been concerned with not just the role of ideas but how those ideas emerge and give meaning to political action—hence the persistent reference to the importance of artisanship in the crafting of institutions of all sorts. The discourse about microfoundations has proceeded in terms of the unity of mind and body and the relationship between ideas and deeds.

UNITY OF MIND AND BODY

Following the Greek discovery of the mind, there emerged in the Western philosophical tradition a mind-body dualism. This dualism gave rise to an excessively intellectualistic conception of the mind as the primary source of our ideas. One characteristic of Italian political thought is a rejection of this dualism and an insistence on the unity of man. Over time several arguments have been used to justify this position.

Generalizing from an isolated human consciousness was considered misguided because the world was not something that an isolated mind could imagine and construct ex nihilo. Consequently, both philosophical idealism and extreme forms of rationalism were rejected. Immanuel Kant was seen as pushing the Cartesian system of thought to its logical conclusions and identified with what should be avoided: extreme rationalism. A nineteenth-century thinker went as far as to predict, wrongly, that Kant would be relegated to the dustbin of intellectual history. Italian thinkers were more open to British

sensism or empiricism, but they saw problems there too. By locating the search for knowledge and even for truth primarily in the individual's sensory and emotional experience of a world without history (and hence without culture) much of British empiricism was viewed as replacing one source (the mind) of knowledge with another (sense and emotions). As much as many Italian thinkers during and after the Enlightenment admired the empiricism of the English over the rationalism of the French and the idealism of the Germans, they could not accept any of them in toto.

Italians derived from Giambattista Vico and Catholic thought an awareness of the complex historicity and cognitive evolution of humanity, which did not allow them to reduce human thought either to some mere movement of the speech organs, as Hobbes did, or simply to an atomism of the mind, as Locke seemed to do. The emphasis on self-preservation by English authors was generally viewed as a Protestant way to undermine the importance of human sociality and, indirectly, the teachings of the Catholic Church. This helps to explain why, for example, Italian Enlightenment thinkers privileged comparative cultural analysis rather than introspective psychology. For all their declared hostility to medieval thinkers, many Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment figures in Naples as in Lombardy remained within the Catholic tradition when they emphasized the unity of man (and woman).

UNION OF WORDS AND DEEDS

The independence of Italian political thought showed itself in a closely related feature: an emphasis on empirical inquiry and interdisciplinary work. This involved a rejection of the separation of legal, economic, and philosophical issues into categories distinct from each other and the pragmatic use of classical and Catholic writings and examples. The mode of analysis was especially noticeable in the eighteenth century, but it was not unique to that period. An antiabstractionist and interdisciplinary mode is common to the different periods and streams of Italian thought. The main interest was in men, not Man. This interest took many forms.

With Niccolò Machiavelli, we see it in his insistence on considering individuals self-interested beings and on political realism more generally. His attention to what is, as opposed to what ought to be, is nevertheless always accompanied by speculation of what can be done. Some later analysts regard Machiavelli as practicing a form of humanist realism or civic humanism. Some intellectual historians have discovered this humanist realism at work in Renaissance Naples as well. A chief weakness with Machiavelli's realism is that it was primarily concerned with how to achieve and maintain power— not unlike what Richard Neustadt was to do in the United States with his work on presidential power. In the words of American economist Scott Gordon (1999), a chief problem with Machiavelli is that he "does not examine the organization of government as a means for making collective decisions, and despite his republicanism, he does not consider how the liberty of the citizen may be preserved, or how the self-interest of the governors may be directed to the service of the general welfare" (p. 162).

There were other thinkers who, just as Machiavelli, had a realistic view of human nature and insisted on a secular view of the state but went much further in showing how the problems of factional politics and government organization can be met to maintain liberty and achieve a stable social order. A case in point is Gasparo Contarini's *De Magistratibus et Republica Venetorum*. Well before the English translation as *The Commonwealth and Government of Venice,* the book became almost instantly a classic study for understanding why Venice of all the other city republics retained such a long-enduring form of republican independence. Contarini's reflections also became a main source of idealization of the myth of Venice by foreign writers.

From the book alone, one would never know that aside from having served the republic in different important posts abroad, Contarini was a profoundly religious man, a theologian, and a prince of the church. He advanced a temporal and secular view of government: the purpose of civil society is that men "might live happily and commodiously." He recognized that "there have been many commonwealths which have far exceeded Venice as well in empire and in greatness of estate, as in military discipline and glory of the wars; yet have there have not been any, that may be paragoned with this of ours, for institutions and laws prudently decreed to establish unto the inhabitants a happy and prosperous felicity" (1599, 5 ff).

More generally, Contarini anticipated a lesson American patriots were to learn later from *The Federalist:* that human beings are rational creatures, that they can devise means of effective governance to generate good laws without either depending on the altruism of governors or denying the importance of civic virtues and human ability in the selection of men for office, and that it is possible to ensure accountability of rulers through various forms of checks and balances. Rulers could be ruled. Against this backdrop, it becomes easier to understand the high praise heaped on Contarini by Gordon, who tends to gloss over the fact that Venice's form of government was hardly democratic. Still there is something to Gordon's point when he avers that Contarini's book "did for political science what Adam Smith's mode of the marketplace did for economics: it showed how a stable social order can be achieved without a hierarchical structure of authority and demonstrated that personal liberty is harmonious with social order in a pluralist system of countervailing powers" (1999, 162).

Practical realism was also the motivating force behind the ruling elite literature made famous by the works of Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto. When he was still a student at the University of Palermo, roughly between 1878 and 1881, the young Mosca boldly swept away the prevailing tendency among historians and political scientists to explain how governments worked largely by the type of regime this way: "among the constant facts and tendencies that are to be found in all political organisms, one is so obvious that it is apparent to the most casual eye. In all societies—from societies that are very meagerly developed and have barely attained the dawning of civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful societies—two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled" (1939, 50). Yet sensitivity to practical details has not been the privilege of political thinkers alone.

In a famous novel set in seventeenth-century Milan, *Column of Infamy,* the nineteenth-century writer Alessandro Manzoni, a chief figure in Italian literature, ably sketched the personal responsibility of public officials to do good even under autocratic political regimes. More recently, students of comparative politics have described the phenomenon with the expression "Rome flattens everything. Fascism without Rome would have been Nazism." The slogan of Italian Communism in the 1970s and 1980, "the Italian Way to Socialism," captures a dimension of the same thought, as did Antonio Gramsci's earlier refashioning of Communism. Some theorists, such as Hannah Arendt, have explained the same thought in grander terms: "the almost automatic general humanity of an old and civilized people" (Arendt 1963, 179).

MULTIFORM NATURE OF POLITICAL RULE

In identifying the multiform nature of political rule as an enduring lineament of Italian political thought, there is no suggestion that the principle of liberty and the conceptual language appropriate to that principle had been worked out in institutional forms from the very beginning—far from it. But there is no doubt that a prevailing view among successive generations of thinkers was to think of liberty and self-government as plants of many roots.

Aquinas accepted the doctrine of natural hierarchy with the king as the best kind of ruler, while arguing for widespread popular participation in the actual conduct of government. He unsuccessfully tried to reconcile both views through a theory of a mixed constitution. Likewise, Dante's (1998) call for an extension of natural hierarchy (the monarchy) to solve the problem of universal peace came alongside his strongly held view that "citizens do not exist for the sake of the consuls nor does the people exist for the king; quite the contrary the consuls exist for the sake of the citizens and the king for the sake of the people" (p. 69).

The great challenge over the course of Italian history was how to suggest solutions to what was a visible reality throughout the entire peninsula and islands: widespread asymmetrical human relationships but also a great commingling of horizontal and vertical legal systems as well as ascending and descending political and economic orders. Men of thought and action knew a lot about local self-rule and good government, but they still did not find a satisfactory solution to how to organize multiple jurisdictions in relation to each other. Lorenzetti's famous painting about good and bad government in the communal hall of Siena generated learned commentaries about which mechanisms were appropriate to translate into practice his vision of good government. For all their brilliance, the people in Lorenzetti's fresco did not have the intellectual resources to think of ways to combine self-rule with shared rule. Thus, while many Italian thinkers rejected Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* as an appealing argument but disastrous for

the prospects of self-government, they did not offer persuasive alternatives—and what they suggested has seldom, if ever, reached the international scholarly community.

A leading nineteenth-century federalist and republican thinker from Milan, Carlo Cattaneo, characterized the lack of conceptual resources in the construction of a new cognitive map this way: "the idea of equality of rights in the disparity of force, the idea of federal justice, was a ray of light reserved to illuminate future generations" (Cattaneo 1858/1957, 243) in North America—a point also made by Tocqueville (1835/1969) in the first chapter of *Democracy in America* when he drew attention to the fact that Americans were building society on a new foundation and applying "theories till then unknown or deemed unworkable" (p. 30). It was in fact Cattaneo who, probably for the first time in the history of Italian political thought, showed that it was possible, through a federal commercial republic, to harmonize and foster liberty (the focus of liberal theory), equality (the focus of democratic theory), and heterogeneity (the focus of federalist theory). Characteristically, Cattaneo envisioned a federal commercial republic for Europe as well as Italy.

The unification of Italy in the nineteenth century was a rejection of Cattaneo's vision and an affirmation of the entrenched view of the European state. The Risorgimento differed from earlier European state making in some important respects.

The prospect of a single political regime for the entire Italian peninsula and islands generated considerable debate for more than sixty years on two general topics: whether it was possible to achieve freedom and self-government through peaceful means and avoid the trap of violence, armed revolt, and war and what constitutional design or model of government was best suited to a population that had lived under separate and diverse political regimes for more than thirteen hundred years. Some of the sharpest minds took part in the debate. As described by Raymond Grew (1996), the challenge of constitutional choice had "a particular resonance in Italy where nineteenth-century constitutions were associated with the liberties of medieval communes; the historical and patriotic perspective of [Ludovico Antonio] Muratori; the romantic figure of [Pasquale] Paoli popularised by Rousseau; and the eighteenth-century projects for constitutions in Corsica, Tuscany and Lombardy, which were written by prominent Italians and widely discussed across the peninsula" (p. 221).

The centralized system that emerged in liberal Italy after 1860 was greatly helped by war, but it was also the product of a conscious choice between alternative regimes. At the same time, federalist, nonunitary principles of organization were such a central part of the Italian political tradition that the victory of centralized government and administration failed to eclipse them completely. Nonunitary forms of rule gained renewed support starting in the 1880s, as government performance began to deviate radically from expectations. The establishment of regional government in the 1960s and recent attempts at fiscal federalism attest to the enduring attraction of a theory of governance grounded in a polycentric system of order.

POLITICAL ECONOMY

There is a rich literature available in English on the importance of trade in the history of Italian political thought. The experience of Venice as a transnational commercial republic generated a considerable literature in several languages, and its outpouring continues unabated. Equally important theoretically, although less known, are the treatises in support of commerce, trade, and entrepreneurship penned by two friars in the fourteenth century: San Bernardino of Siena and San Antonino of Firenze. San Bernardino's originality was in promoting economic entrepreneurship, and for this his work has been widely praised by historians of economic thought and of the Austrian school of economics. But it was not until the Enlightenment that the centrality of trade and commerce emerged in full force in Italian political thought, under the rubric of political, public, or civil economy.

Two main Italian groups of political economists of the time from Milan and Naples worked, often independent of one another, to place economic issues at the center of public thought and life. A combination of factors came together, and these include various attempts to update the Aristotelian and Scholastic tradition and the Italian tradition in physics and mechanics; the extension of the emerging scientific methods to the betterment of human society; the renewed importance of the principle of usefulness, especially in the work of the Milanese Pietro Verri, now extended to reform institutions of society, as evident in Beccaria's famous work on crime and punishment; and an attentiveness to political, economic, and intellectual developments taking place in Europe. Italian thinkers were as much influenced by their European counterparts as the latter, Baron de Montesquieu and Adam Smith included, were influenced by the former.

A recent book by John Robertson (2005) advances a powerful restatement of the interconnection of different movements of ideas during the Enlightenment. He focuses on similar facts in dissimilar milieux that conventional wisdom would hardly put together: the Enlightenment in Scotland and Naples, the two "kingdoms governed as provinces" (p. 147). He breaks new ground in showing why the science of human nature and sociability was an essential part of the intellectual life in both kingdoms and how much David Hume and Vico drew, albeit in different ways, on the revival of Epicurean moral philosophy in seventeenth-century France, which in turn served to provide philosophical foundations for political economy. Robertson challenges us to think again about the proposition advanced by standard accounts that have Scottish illuminati resolve "the riddle" of the modern world all by themselves—or that the Enlightenment was a movement dedicated to the overthrow of religion and even clerical power, more generally. The commitment to political economy in Scotland and Naples began when Hume, Ferdinando Galiani, and Antonio Genovesi persuasively argued that commerce might replace war and conquest as the means of human betterment and national aggrandizement. Genovesi wrote about human betterment and the wealth of nations years before Adam Smith did.

The Neapolitan and Lombard thinkers sketched sophisticated blends of institutional interaction between public and private institutions that went beyond the narrow confines of state and market to give meaning to trade as *socialitas* or reciprocal assistance and to convey a strong positive relationship between trade and public trust and happiness. These intellectual developments raise questions of their own that did not have answers at the time: why were the outcomes of the Enlightenment very different in Scotland and Naples? What factors were at work in the two kingdoms that advanced or retarded human betterment? What happened after 1760?

Other generations of scholars answered these questions in the nineteenth century, thereby generating a new body of ideas and empirical inquiry. Interregional variations were accounted for in two ways. First there were the relative bargaining powers, transaction costs, and discount rates of regional rulers vis-à-vis others who counted in society: the Sicilian parliamentary barons were stronger and more united than their Neapolitan and Lombard counterparts vis-à-vis their respective rulers. Second, what were also at work were alternative conceptions of how best to repair failings in agriculture as well as government. The interaction of these factors created a complex matrix of choice and results. Some wanted to make a tabula rasa of the past but could not for the way they pressed the issue; the result was that either nothing was done to repair failings or some reformist policies were introduced. Others succeeded in making a tabula rasa of some institutions. The net result was that for different reasons "liquidating the heredity of the past" (to use the famous words of the Neapolitan French-inspired viceroy of Sicily, marquis Domenico Caracciolo) did not produce the desired results in both Naples (were that it succeeded) and Sicily (where it did not). Where more modest reforms were introduced with local cooperation, such as in Lombardy and Tuscany, they had far more productive consequences than anticipated.

Also by the nineteenth century, with industrial development, new ways to conceptualize the relationship between politics and economics were gaining ground among attentive Italian thinkers and the public. One way was that the form of government best suited to free men in a commercial society was not the enlightened despotism or monarchical sovereignty of the previous century but a constitutional monarchy or a federal republic. Most political and economic thinkers continued to promote free trade, but they differed from their counterparts in the Scottish Enlightenment in their search for mechanisms capable of reconciling economic inequality with adequate provision for those excluded, who possessed no property except their labor.

These developments help to explain why Italian fiscal theory and political economy "have never been plagued with the heritage of utilitarianism which has so influenced the development of fiscal theory in England and America" (James M. Buchanan 1987, 334). It equally helps to explain why many nineteenth-century thinkers such as Cattaneo, Napoleone Colajanni, and Antonio de Viti de Marco found no contradictions in being friends of both free trade and the nascent labor movement and could praise Britain but also criticize its government for the treatment of the working class and the Irish people. The world of equality, they thought, has as much to fear from politics as from economics.

By the twentieth century what had been a broad current of political-economic thought branched out in even broader directions to inspire two seemingly opposed ways of thinking: a liberal formulation of socialism in the 1930s in response to both the Great Depression of 1929 and Fascism and the emergence of public choice theory in the United States in the second half of the twentieth century. It should come as no surprise that some of the early writings of James Buchanan, before public choice gained its name and fame, were published in the Italian journal *Il Politico,* whose editor, Bruno Leoni at the University of Pavia, did much to keep the flame of classical liberalism alive in the immediate postwar period.

A PUBLIC SCIENCE BEYOND LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM

For quite some time it was commonplace in the international intellectual community to maintain a binary, paradigmatic distinction between liberalism and republicanism, nourished by a growing literature. A recent study by Andreas Kalyvas and Ira Katznelson has helped to discredit the binary distinction. The authors draw on the writing of six leading thinkers—Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, James Madison, Thomas Paine, Germaine de Stael, and Benjamin Constant—to successfully demonstrate that many republican principles and ideas were part of the modern liberal beginnings. Their conclusion, unthinkable in Anglo-American academic circles as late as the 1970s, is unsurprising to careful students of Italian political thought.

Machiavelli aside, there are streams of republican thought in Italian history yet to be tapped. Practically every region of Italy can point to some form of free government or republican democracy in the past. This republican tradition is not to be confused with the French republican tradition that misled Gramsci so much. As Franco Venturi noted, "Jacobin propaganda, monotonous and exalting at the same time, brought into Italy a republican ideal which was ill-suited to a country in which the republican experience was firmly rooted" (1971, 19) A chief merit of Cattaneo in the nineteenth century was to go beyond republicanism and liberalism to fashion a public science aimed at making sense of the progress of civilization (*incivilimento*) and self-government that could not be adequately addressed by either separately. Equally important, Cattaneo's work can be used jointly with more recent studies to suggest ways to remove untenable and false distinctions and dichotomies that have so preoccupied the Anglophone academic world: the distinction between negative and positive liberty and the dichotomy between methodological individualism and community; between individual action, collective action, and institutions; and between self-interest and the public good. In stressing the master role of ideas, Cattaneo argued that people have first to learn the arts of incivilimento before they can practice self-governance. Polycentric federal

republicanism lies at the heart of his science of self-governance. Cattaneo laid the groundwork for a public science that never developed in the nineteenth century but may be developing in the early twenty-first century in the form of civic studies and a science of citizenship, with the Indiana University Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, founded by Elinor and Vincent Ostrom, as one of its major centers.

CONCLUSION

In spite of the importance of the contributions sketched above, Italian political thought as a whole has not had as much influence as British thought in the development of liberty and institutions of self-government throughout the world. No doubt, it is partly due to the relative position of the two countries in world affairs. But if the study of comparative political thought is more than simply the study of canonical authors and texts, then there is much to be gained from a careful study of the history of Italian political thought. The preceding pages suggest why.

See also *Gramsci, Antonio; Hobbes, Thomas; Kant, Immanuel; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Roman Catholic Social Thought; Roman Political Thought; Smith, Adam.*

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Ze'ev Jabotinsky (1880–1940) was a liberal Zionist leader and author. He was born in Odessa, then a part of the Russian Empire. At age eighteen he went to Italy and Switzerland to study law and then served as a correspondent for several Russian newspapers, signing his articles and reports with the pseudonym Alatalena. He earned a law degree from the University of Rome. The pogrom against the Jews of Kishinev in 1903 spurred Jabotinsky to join the Zionist movement. He organized self-defense units and fought for Jewish minority rights in Russia. He was elected a delegate to the Sixth Zionist Congress, which was attended by Theodor Herzl, the founder of political Zionism. During this period, Jabotinsky also worked to promote the use of Hebrew and for the establishment of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Following the outbreak of World War I (1914–1918), Jabotinsky left for the front as a newspaper correspondent. In Alexandria, Egypt, he joined Joseph Trumpeldor in organizing the Jewish Legion, battalions that fought with the British army against the Turks. Jabotinsky opposed the Zionist leadership and asserted the right of the Jews to seize Palestine by force if necessary. He participated in the assault on the Jordan River and the conquest of Esalt. In 1920, after his discharge from the army, he stood at the head of Haganah, a Jewish paramilitary organization, against the Arabs and was condemned by the British to fifteen years of hard labor, a sentence that was later commuted. From 1921 on, Jabotinsky was a member of the Zionist executive and one of the founders of *Keren Hayesod,* a fundraising organization for Israel. Following further disagreement with the Zionist movement, he seceded in 1925 to establish the Union of Zionists-Revisionists (*Hatzohar*), which called for the immediate establishment of the Jewish state. In 1929 he founded the youth movement *Betar* to instill a militant spirit in Israeli youth. Also in 1929 he left Palestine on a lecture tour and was not allowed to reenter.

In 1935 the Zionist Executive rejected Jabotinsky's program calling for the immediate establishment of the Jewish state. He thereupon resigned from the movement and founded the New Zionist Organization (NZO). In 1937 he founded his third organization, the *Irgun Tzvai Leumi*, as the military arm of the NZO. These bodies cooperated in the *Af Al Pi,* the illegal immigration of Jews into Palestine during which forty ships transported Jewish immigrants from Europe. The groups that Jabotinsky founded evolved after the formation of the State of Israel into the Herut Party.

Jabotinsky was an outstanding orator and continued to write poetry, novels, short stories, and political commentaries until his death in 1940. He is ranked among the most noted Hebrew writers, poets, and translators of the modern era. His complete works and speeches were published in fifty volumes in Israel. He was a great promoter of the Hebrew language, which he considered part of the Jewish identity. He demonstrated this affinity by changing his Russian name of Vladimir to Ze'ev, which means wolf.

Jabotinsky wrote a number of books on his struggle on behalf of the Jewish people. They include *Turkey and the War* (1917), *Samson the Nazarite* (1930), *The War and the Jew* (1942), and *The Story of the Jewish Legion* (1945).

As a political Zionist, Jabotinsky was the heir of Herzl, but he added military strength to the Herzl legacy. He was a National Liberal in the great nineteenth-century tradition and a revolutionary in the mold of Italian soldier and patriot Giuseppe Garibaldi.

See also *Jewish Political Thought; Zionism.*

. . . .   GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN

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Jacksonian Democracy

Jacksonian Democracy refers to an ideology and political movement in the second quarter of nineteenth century America characterized by the widespread expansion of suffrage and a pervasive egalitarian sentiment (in terms of opportunity, not outcome). Its primary figure was President Andrew Jackson, while Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* (1835 and 1840) offers the most sophisticated contemporaneous appraisal of the time, sympathetic to its promise while critical of its excess.

The Jacksonian era was dominated by a hostile reaction to the alliance between the state and privileged private interests, who were accused of using their influence within government to restrict access to the economic opportunities created by rapid expansion. Jacksonian Democrats sought to reduce the privileges of moneyed interests and restore genuine equality of opportunity to the common people. There was no hostility to wealth, only a fear of exclusion from it. Preserving economic access for the small capitalist would require enhancing the people's political power and using that power to limit the elites' ability to co-opt the state. Though women, Native Americans, and blacks were still excluded, the era saw the culmination of a broad movement to open democratic participation to more Americans. Barriers to participation fell (increasing access to the vote and reducing the power of party elites to determine candidates) while immigrants were welcomed into "The Democracy" to swell vote totals and turn the Democrats into a genuine mass party. Gradually the National Republican/Whig opposition adopted similar strategies, with mixed results.

Jacksonians were united by their commitment to a producerist ideology. Rejecting traditional arguments that only those with property could be invested in the well-being of the nation, Jacksonians (theoretically) extended a political voice to any white male who was willing to work to pacify the continent and add to America's bounty. The act of labor, more than the type, was the source of civic virtue. One need not be a farmer to be a good citizen, as was often the case for Jeffersonians. Individualism was the spirit of the age, but it was an individualism that connected individual prosperity with a larger common good. The generation of private wealth was given a public dimension, becoming an important component of citizenship. One served the republic by serving himself.

The Jacksonians purged themselves of the founders' fear of excessive democracy and ignored de Tocqueville's concern that the uncritical sanctification of majority could lead to a "tyranny of the majority" potentially more destructive of liberty than the tyranny of the monarch. The movement was far more democratic than it was liberal; believed that the will of the people was by definition virtuous and just, rendering restraints on it unnecessary and illegitimate. The national character of the people was somewhat uncertain, however. Given the rapid increase in size and population, the instability caused by the rise of bourgeois capitalism, and the social dynamics of immigration, about the only thing that could unite the Jacksonians as a national coalition was a focus on participation itself (alongside their fear of entrenched elites). However, that participation most prominently manifested itself at the state and local levels, where the illiberal, coercive strains of democratic rule were most likely to manifest, both politically and socially.

The presidency of Andrew Jackson embodied the spirit of Jacksonian democracy. Jackson believed the presidency was the only authentically national office in the country, a direct attack on the authority of the Congress. As president he claimed to be the "tribune of the people," and he used his authority to eliminate some of the checks on executive power that interfered with institutionalizing the popular will. If the president was indeed the voice of the people, then by extension most limits on executive power were antidemocratic. Of particular institutional consequence was Jackson's argument that the president could veto legislation solely on the grounds of his (and by extension the people's) personal opposition to the bill, rather than solely on issues of constitutionality. However, Jackson primarily used his influence to weaken the federal government (e.g., the fight over the National Bank), provided the states accepted the overarching sovereignty of the union (e.g., the nullification crisis).

See also *Democracy; Tocqueville, Alexis de.*

. . . .   BRIAN STIPELMAN

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Jacobinism

Jacobinism was a radical political movement that emerged during the French Revolution (1789–1799). The term later came to be used to describe any extreme left-wing grouping. The Jacobins were initially formed in 1789 in the Brittany region of northwestern France. Their formal title was the Society of the Friends of the Constitution, but their popular name was derived from the Dominican monastery where the group met. The members were moderate republicans who sought to limit the authority of the monarchy. The early Jacobin leader Honoré de Mirabeau advocated a constitutional monarchy modeled on the British system. The Jacobins became more radical under the leadership of Louis de Saint-Just and Maximilien Robespierre, who gained the support of the Paris working class. More moderate Jacobins left the organization and formed the Feuillants, but became increasingly marginalized. The Jacobins helped undermine the Girondists and in 1793 were able to gain power. Under Robespierre, they instituted the Reign of Terror (1793–1794). The excesses and political repression of the Jacobins led to their downfall and both Robespierre and Saint-Just were executed during the counterrevolt of July 1794. In Great Britain, the term *Jacobin* was applied toward radicals, beginning in the 1790s, and later radical groups calling themselves Jacobins emerged in France during the mid to late 1800s.

See also *French Political Thought.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

Jacobson, Harold K.

Harold K. Jacobson (1929–2001) was a prominent scholar in the field of international relations. Although he published works on a variety of topics, he is best remembered as a pioneer in the study of international environmental policy. A native of Michigan, he studied at the University of Michigan and Yale University, from which he received a doctorate in political science in 1955. In 1957 he joined the faculty of the department of political science at the University of Michigan, where he worked until his death. He was known by all simply as "Jake."

Jacobson had wide-ranging interests, and his research and teaching covered such fields as decolonization, international conflict, international law, international negotiations, international organization, and international political economy. He wrote, edited, or coedited twelve books and produced numerous scholarly articles. Among his major works are *Networks of Interdependence* (1979), an optimistic assessment about the prospects for international organizations and a more integrated international system, and the coedited *Double-edged Diplomacy* (1993), which highlighted the role of domestic politics in international negotiations. Arguably his most important work is *Environmental Protection: The International Dimension* (1983, cowritten with David Kay), which was the first book to offer a systematic approach to the study of international environmental policy by examining international environmental agreements. Jacobson's approach emphasized the role of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations in shaping the adoption and implementation of environmental policy, the latter of which he noted was always more of a problem. He was not only a social scientist well-schooled in the methods of behavioralism, but also an advocate, as his works reflect his normative commitment to human rights, environmental protection, and international cooperation.

Due to Jacobson's teaching and research, he assumed many prominent positions and won numerous awards. He served as director of the Center for Political Studies and the Institute for Social Research, both at the University of Michigan; as president of the International Studies Association from 1982 to 1983; and as a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He also held numerous leadership positions in the American Society of International Law. In 1989 he became the founding chair of the (International) Human Dimension of Global Environmental Change, and for his groundbreaking work with that organization he received an Award for International Scientific Cooperation from the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1995, a rare achievement for a social scientist. From 1994 to 1996 he served as the lead author of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, working with many international organizations, including the United Nations, on global environment issues. One of his final works, *Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords* (1998), emerged out of his advocacy work on this issue.

See also *Environmental Policy; International Organization; International Relations; International Relations Theory; International Relations: Worldviews and Frameworks.*

. . . . .PAUL JAMES KUBICEK

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James, Cyril Lionel Robert

Cyril Lionel Robert James (1901–1989) was a major contributor to socialist and pan-African thought. He wrote on history, literature, philosophy, art, sports, and politics. His best known books include *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the Haitian Revolution* (1938); *Notes on Dialectics* (1948); *American Civilization* (1950); *Mariners, Renegades and Castaways: Herman Melville and the World We Live In* (1953); and *Beyond a Boundary* (1963). Along with the Italian social theorist Antonio Gramsci, James is one of a small number of twentieth-century Marxist intellectuals whose reputation has continued to rise after the collapse of Soviet-style communism.

James was born and raised in Trinidad, which at the time was part of the British Empire. He migrated to England in 1932 in hopes of pursuing a career as a novelist and literary critic, then became active on the far left and turned to political topics. He supported himself through cricket journalism and became a widely known figure on the English left. He also joined the International African Service Bureau, which was a nexus of interwar anticolonial activism. Toward the end of the 1930s, James took part in the founding convention of the Fourth International (FI), a communist organization. It was on behalf of the FI that James relocated to the United States in 1938 to take up a leadership position in the country's fledgling Trotskyist movement. Within a few years, however, he had broken with the FI and developed his own ideas about civil rights, socialist democracy, art and politics, and the distinctive role of small socialist groupings. He developed these ideas with a small number of cothinkers in the so-called Johnson-Forest tendency, whose circle included Raya Dunayevskaya, the founder of Marxist-humanism in the United States; Chinese American theoretician Grace Lee; and American Marxist Martin Glaberman.

James was deported from the United States in the early 1950s as an "undesirable alien." After losing his appeal for citizenship, he reluctantly returned to Britain, where he continued to correspond with his U.S. collaborators but also began writing on cultural questions as well as the modern history of the Caribbean. He spent nearly four years in the West Indies in the late

1950s and early 1960s, where he participated in the movement for national independence. His most important work for the nationalist cause was his role as editor of *The Nation,* a weekly newspaper that was part of the People's National Movement, led by his childhood friend Eric Williams.

Inspired by his experiences in preindependence Trinidad, James returned to pan-African issues and traveled throughout Africa and the Caribbean in the 1960s. He spoke on numerous campuses during this period and became well known for his advocacy of both black protest and his somewhat anarchistic version of democratic socialism. In his final years James settled in London. He was awarded the Trinidad Cross, the country's highest public honor, in 1988. Since his death, a number of biographies and studies have been published on various aspects of his life and work.

See also *Gramsci, Antonio; Marxism; Socialism.*

. . . . KENT WORCESTER

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James, William

William James (1842–1910) was born to a wealthy family in New York City on January 11, 1842. His father, Henry James Sr., who was educated at Princeton Theological Seminary but rebelled against "Old Princeton" Calvinism, wrote prolifically regarding ethical and religious matters. Influenced by the mystic writings of Emanuel Swedenborg, Henry Sr. sought to develop a humanistic theology that was more personally suitable to his own soul, as expressed in his *Substance and Shadow: Or, Morality and Religion in Their Relation to Life* (1863); *Society the Redeemed Form of Man, and the Earnest of God's Omnipotence in Human Nature* (1879); and other works. The influence of his father's unorthodox theology is evident in James's reconsideration of consciousness and spirituality.

James was reared in both New York and Europe and educated privately. At the age of eighteen he revealed an interest in art and studied with artist William Morris Hunt, but James ended this career pursuit abruptly and entered Harvard University in 1861 to study medicine. James began teaching physiology at Harvard in 1872 and eventually became professor of philosophy. His Harvard lectures were a synthesis of philosophy, physiology, and psychology. James was a considerable influence on Harvard students such as Spanish philosopher and poet George Santayana and American writer Gertrude Stein. In 1878 he married Alice Howe Gibbens, with whom he had five children (one of whom died in infancy) raised in an environment of free thought and tolerance.

James is regarded as both an eminent American philosopher and psychologist. His two-volume treatise *The Principles of Psychology,* published in 1890, was a pioneering work that influenced the development of nearly all the foremost psychological theories of the subsequent seventy years and became a foundational text. Early statements of his ideas of the nature of freedom are evident in noteworthy chapters explaining the "stream of thought," "consciousness of self," "the emotions," and the "will." His 1897 publication of *The Will to Believe* expanded on conceptions of freedom differentiating between "hard" and "soft" determinism. *Talks to Teachers on Psychology: And to Students on Some of Life's Ideals* (1899) contributed to the development of educational psychology.

James accepted an invitation to deliver the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion at the University of Edinburgh in 1901 and 1902. The publication of his twenty talks appeared as *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902), which contributed to the psychology of religion by distinguishing "experience" and "philosophy" (defending the former against the latter) through a humanistic and scientific methodology. These lectures, along with the publication of *Pragmatism* (1907), which articulated James's experimentalism and redefinition of the correspondence theory of truth, helped place his name among the most renowned American philosophers of the period. *A Pluralistic Universe* (1909) was the publication of his Hibbert Lectures at Manchester College on the Present Situation in Philosophy. The relevance of his "philosophic attitude" was published posthumously as *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (1912). James died of heart failure at his family's summer home in Chocorua, New Hampshire, on August 26, 1910.

See also *Religion and Politics.*

. . . . RON J. BIGALKE JR.

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Jennings, Ivor

Sir Ivor Jennings (1902–1965) was an English constitutional lawyer. He adapted jurist and constitutional theorist Albert Venn Dicey's doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty for an era of executive sovereignty over parliament. Although an acute observer of Dicey's weaknesses, Jennings provided few constructive arguments of his own. Due to this he was overshadowed when constitutional writers reverted to their former hostility to executive domination over the legislature and by the sudden rise of judicial review in the United Kingdom.

Born into a working-class family in Bristol, Jennings was marked as an academic lawyer from an early age. He attended Cambridge University, then went to work as an academic lawyer for his entire career, apart from a spell in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), where he was a university principal. He was much sought after as a constitution writer for newly independent states in the British Commonwealth in the 1950s.

In his 1933 *Law and the Constitution,* which ran into five editions, Jennings merged the constitutional doctrines of Dicey and British economist and journalist Walter Bagehot. From Bagehot he accepted the view that the UK executive and legislature were fused, so that "acts of Parliament" meant "acts by the governing party." The basic feature of the British constitution was, for Jennings, not parliamentary sovereignty, which he dismissed as a "legal fiction," but the fact that the executive derived its authority from popular election and would therefore not deliberately pass any act that made it likely to lose the next general election.

Nevertheless, parliamentary sovereignty did play a role in Jennings' constitutionalism, as it held the courts in check. Like earlier English constitutional writers, Jennings was hostile to judicial review of legislative or executive actions. The government was elected; judges were not. It was for the government, not the judges, to face the people with the consequences of their decisions. He repeated this analysis in his 1936 *Cabinet Government,* which remained influential until the 1970s.

As with Dicey and Bagehot, Jennings' constitutional arguments have been sidelined by the rapid growth of judicial review in the UK since the 1980s and by the first straightforward setting aside of a statute of the UK Parliament. This occurred in 1991, when first the European Court of Justice and then the UK domestic courts ruled that an act discriminating against Spanish fishing companies must be set aside as incompatible with the European Communities Act 1972.

See also *Constitutional Law; Constitutional Systems, Comparative; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Dicey, Albert Venn.*

. . . .   IAIN MCLEAN

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Jeremiad

The jeremiad, a form of social criticism and political rhetoric, takes its name from the Jewish prophetic tradition, in which critics regularly arose to chastise the community for violating God's commands and call it back to its most basic values. More generally, though, such rhetoric has appeared in all times and places, and is not unique to any particular religious tradition. In common usage, the term tends to be used to describe social and political criticism that decries the loss of important social values and longs for a simpler, more virtuous, or ethically superior past. Jeremiads identify a crisis in contemporary society, relate that crisis to a falling-away from fundamental values, trace out a process of decline from earlier virtuous generations (epitomized by founders or godly ancestors), and call for renewal and reform, to recapture the promise of communal life. Thus the jeremiad involves both social critique and historical memory.

The American version of the jeremiad draws heavily on the notion of America (later, the United States) as a "chosen nation," with a special role to play in the unfolding of God's purposes in human history. Early New England clergy employed this rhetorical form to understand how and why a host of social and even natural disasters—factions, dissension, Indian wars, crop failures—had afflicted their settlements. Jeremiads continued throughout the Revolutionary War (1775–1783) period, the Civil War (1861–1865), and even in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks.

See also *Jewish Political Thought; Religion and Politics.*

. . . .   ANDREW MURPHY

Jewish Political Theory

The ways in which the Jewish people have thought and written about politics, divine authority and human power, and the dispensing of justice have been shaped by their unique historical experience. Over the course of two and a half thousand years, Jews have lived under a remarkable variety of political forms and practices, including loose tribal federation, monarchy and regional power, imperial client state, diasporic semiautonomous communities, voluntary religious associations, and modern democratic nation-states, and have struggled against as many.

Unlike the classical Western traditions, Jewish political theory is not primarily located in philosophical treatises, nor is it controlled by the fundamental category of the *state* and the question of how to construct the best regime. Jewish political discourse has tended to be occasional and situational, emerging from and attempting to deal with immediate political circumstances, always with reference to the Jewish religion. Because *the political* as such has rarely received systematic or independent theoretical treatment in Judaism, and because the Jews have endured a long period of statelessness and dispersion, some have questioned whether such a Jewish political tradition exists. Nevertheless, a sophisticated and

nuanced intellectual engagement with the practical and theoretical problems of politics can be found in texts throughout Jewish history—embedded in the narratives, poetry, and laws of the Hebrew Bible; the discussions in the Talmud and other rabbinic literature; communal enactments, law codes, and responsa; biblical commentaries; and philosophical writings. In the seventeenth century, Christian political thinkers such as Petrus Cunaeus, James Harrington, and John Selden looked to the Bible and rabbinic writings to reconstruct the political history of the Jews as a model of a godly commonwealth. Recent interest in this tradition has yielded a number of important scholarly projects. There is growing recognition, moreover, of the extent to which these sources have had an impact on the development of political theory in the West, evidenced by recent establishment of the *Hebraic Political Studies* journal.

PEOPLEHOOD, REVELATION, AND LAW

The Jewish political tradition is marked by its national, religious, and legal character, and the concepts that form the conceptual basis of this tradition—Jewish peoplehood, its covenant with God, and the law (Torah)—have remained constant up until the modern age. Jewish political discourse develops with reference to divine revelation, beginning the covenantal relationship with God, based on the acceptance of the sovereignty of God and His Torah. The Jews are therefore bound by special duties and obligations of the Torah, which aim at molding the people into "a kingdom of priests and a holy nation" (Ex. 19:6). The Torah may be seen as a religious-political constitution of the Jewish community. Under the leadership of the rabbinic sages, the dominion of the law came to comprehend all aspects of human life: worship, personal status and family life, agriculture and commerce, civil and criminal matters, and social organization. This *halakhah* served to maintain the semiautonomous Jewish communities through the centuries of exile.

The political questions that these communities faced, practical and theoretical, were deliberated with reference to the divine law. Such discussions revolved around matters of immediate concern, such as the organization of the community, the form and extent of authority, taxation, communal welfare, judicial practice, and resort to coercive power. The issue of the legitimacy of and obligations to "foreign" political authority was dealt with under religious law as well, based on the Talmudic dictum of *dina de-malkhuta dina* ("the law of the kingdom is the law").

Jewish thinkers also engaged in speculative issues, such as the nature of the covenant between God and Israel, the revelation of the Torah, the meaning of exile, the messianic expectations for the restoration of the Jewish state, war, and relations with non-Jewish populations.

MEDIEVAL JEWISH POLITICAL THOUGHT

In the medieval period, due to the growing authority of Islamic philosophy, a more theoretical interest in the political meaning of Judaism emerged, seen in such treatises as Saadia Gaon's *Book of Beliefs and Opinions,* Judah Halevi's *Kuzari,* and Joseph Albo's *Book of Principles.* The most significant political theory was developed by twelfth-century philosopher and legal codifier Moses Maimonides. In *The Guide of the Perplexed,* Maimonides depicted the divine law (Torah) as the constitution of the ideal city and Moses as its prophet-legislator. In *The Book on Kings and Their Wars,* the final treatise of his monumental codification of rabbinic law, *Mishneh Torah,* Maimonides detailed the character of Jewish kingship and the deeds of the messianic king. Even in these works, political concerns are fully integrated into the broader questions of Jewish belief and practice. Because Judaism did not make a distinction between the realm of politics and earthly life and the realm of religion and spiritual life, Jewish political discourse had no need to engage with the theoretical problem of the relationship between the *sacerdotium* and the *regnum* that directs so much Christian political thought in the West.

MODERN JEWISH POLITICAL THOUGHT

Jewish political thought underwent significant modifications in the modern period. The centralization of authority and bureaucratization of political life, and the influence of liberal and Enlightenment political ideas, shifted the social and political situation of the Jewish communities in western and central Europe. The possibility of emancipation—the granting of civil and political rights—made the unity of legal, religious, and the national elements, which had characterized traditional Jewish political theory, difficult to maintain. Already in 1670, Jewish excommunicant Benedict (né Baruch) Spinoza had, in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,* suggested the outlines of the Jewish predicament. Following Maimonides, Spinoza argued that the Jewish law was the constitution of the Israelite state, but he maintained that once this state had ceased to exist, the law itself was rendered obsolete. Spinoza's critique of Judaism as an anachronistic political phenomenon significantly influenced Enlightenment critiques of Judaism as a "political" religion.

The dominant trend of Jewish political thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could be regarded as liberal. Jews advocating emancipation advanced new understandings of the tradition to defend the suitability of Judaism and facilitate the Jews' entrance and adaptation into the modern world. This motive is clear in the initial attempt at a modern presentation of Judaism: Moses Mendelssohn's *Jerusalem, or, On Religious Power and Judaism* (1783). Mendelssohn formulated a social contract theory that would secure the toleration of different religious societies and developed a conception of Judaism compatible with natural religion and the contractual state, which would permit Jews admittance into the civil society. Though the law had originally served both political and religious functions, after the destruction of the Israelite state, the law became purely religious. Modern Judaism would be reconfigured as a purely voluntary religious association, the performance of the law serving to secure knowledge of

metaphysical religious truths, the community losing its power of coercion.

Subsequent liberal Jewish thinkers took a far more radical stance regarding the enduring authority of the law. Influenced by German idealist philosophy and historical critical research, thinkers such as Hermann Cohen, Abraham Geiger, and Ludwig Philippson rejected the centrality of the law and focused on the prophetic-ethical and universalist elements of the religious tradition. The liberals also denied the national character of Judaism and radically reinterpreted the messianic idea from the hope for the reestablishment of a Jewish state to that of a universal messianic age, in which the ethical teachings of Judaism would be manifest in all the nations. This would be promoted through the mission of Israel, in which the teaching of Judaism would indirectly become embodied in social institutions and in the constitutional state.

By the early twentieth century, this liberal theology increasingly came under assault by a postliberal, "existentialist" brand of religious thought and Zionism, whose proponents reasserted the centrality of the Jewish "nation" and its distinctive political destiny. The theological ferment of the early twentieth century produced diverse theological–political positions, notably the retrieval of a biblical anarchotheocratic tradition by Martin Buber, the apolitical interpretation of Judaism of Franz Rosenzweig's *The Star of Redemption,* and the development of a mystical redemptive Zionism in the work of Rabbi Abraham I. Kook.

With the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, Jewish political thinkers were faced with a novel situation: a Jewish state that was not principally governed by Jewish law (though family law is an important exception). They have had to engage—and are still engaging—with the fresh problems of state sovereignty, the relationship of religious to secular political authority, the meaning of the enduring diaspora, and the connection of the *halakhah* to the coercive arm of the state.

See also *Diasporas; Islamic Political Thought; Liberalism, Classical; Spinoza, Baruch; Zionism.*

. . . .   JEROME E. COPULSKY

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Jihad

Literally jihad means "effort" and in Islamic tradition it has been interpreted as "striving for God." According to the Quran and *hadiths* (narratives of sayings and doings of Prophet Muhammad), jihad is a duty that may be achieved in four main ways: by the heart, the tongue, the hand, and the sword. The first is known also as the *greater jihad* and describes the inner struggle to control one's bad inclinations against seduction and enticement by earthly pleasures and achieve spirituality; while the *lesser jihad* describes the armed struggle against *unbelievers* and the defense of Islam. Which of these is more meritorious has long been a point of dispute among scholars, though one may, in general, say that this depends on the socioeconomic and political context in which the discourse on, and call for, jihad has taken place.

MEANING AND HISTORY OF JIHAD

Jihad is not one of the five pillars of Islam (which are profession of faith, prayer, fasting, giving of charity, and pilgrimage) and instead constitutes a collective duty to fight under certain circumstances, such as when Muslim lands are occupied by non-Muslims and when Islam is in danger. Jihad is often equated with a "holy war." This is wrong because military action is only one possible manifestation of spiritual effort. In fact the Arabic word for holy, *muqqaddas,* is never applied to war, *harb,* in the classical texts. And because there has never been a cohesive centralized theological authority in the Islamic world, there never was a consensus about the virtue of religious warfare, though there are several references to jihad and warfare in the Quran. For example: "And fight in God's cause against those who wage war against you, but do not commit aggression—for, verily, God does not love aggressors" (2:190).

In premodern times (when Muslim lands had not come under the direct or indirect rule of the European powers), the legal theory of jihad came to be articulated in the context of a distinction between *dar ul-harb* (the domain of war) and *dar ul-Islam* (the domain of peace), making jihad appropriate only to the former. During this period, another juridical category relating to jihad emerged called *dar ul ahd* (the domain of treaties) that allowed for peaceful trade and social interaction between Muslim and non-Muslim territories. In the premodern period, most jurists stipulated that it was permissible according to *sharia* (Islamic religious law) for Muslims to live as subjects under a non-Muslim ruler (generally a Christian) as long as they could practice their faith openly. This of course has resonance with the situation of Muslims living in the contemporary West under non-Islamic laws whereby they can practice their religion.

JIHAD IN THE MODERN PERIOD

In the modern period (the period when most Muslim lands came under direct or indirect European rule, from the eighteenth century onward) the doctrine of jihad was reformulated. Many, though not all, jurists stipulated that Muslims living under non-Muslim governments (and therefore according to *sharia* in *dar ul-harb*) were not to undertake jihad as long as they could practice Islam and maintain its central institutions. Nevertheless, Muslim revolts against colonial rule sometimes invoked jihad, and in recent years militant Islamists have raised jihad to the level of an individual religious duty. But these usages have not had the support of most Muslim jurists, for the legal preconditions of jihad, as argued by many Muslim scholars, must include both the presence of a genuine threat to Islam and the likelihood of success in opposing it.

There are minor differences in the doctrine of jihad in the two major traditions of Islam, the *Sunni* and *Shia,* and in the subbranches of these. According to classical *Shia* scholars, jihad can only be waged under the leadership of the *imam* (religious leader).

Historically, *fatwas* (religiously sanctioned proclamations) for jihad have been issued by state and nonstate actors in differing political and ideological contexts. In the modern period, jihad has been invoked to resist Western colonial domination; among others, by the Faqir of Ipi against the British in the 1930s in what is now the northwest frontier of Pakistan. This jihad took the form of guerrilla warfare and a major war against the British in 1936 and 1937. Earlier in the 1820s, Sayyid Ahmed Barelvi called for a jihad against the British and the other non-Muslim rulers of India. In the 1830s and 1840s, Abd al-Qadir carried out a jihad against the French occupation of Algeria. In Egypt Ahmed Urabi's rebellion against the British in the closing decades of the nineteenth century was proclaimed as a jihad. In the early part of the twentieth century in Libya, the *Sanusi* order of *Sufis* (Muslim religious mystics) proclaimed a jihad against the occupying Italian forces and inflicted a defeat on them in 1915. Probably the most unusual *fatwa* calling for jihad was under the Ottoman Turks. The Sultan of Turkey in November 1914 declared war against Britain, France, and Russia, which was accompanied by a *fatwa,* extolling not only subjects of the Sultan, but all Muslims living under European colonial rule. This *fatwa* was translated into Arabic, Persian, Tataric, and Urdu. In the 1930s, Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam led a jihad against the British and Zionists in Palestine. In the 1980s, Afghan *mujahideen* declared a jihad against the Soviet occupiers of Afghanistan. Other groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as well as the Iraqi insurgents, have declared jihad against the United States and its allies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan.

The doctrine of jihad and the terms related to it, such as *dar ul-harb* and *dar ul-Islam,* are not part of a transhistorical world view. The doctrine belongs to an elaborate political vocabulary in which jurists or *ulema* (men of religious learning) and modernist reformers argued in response to varying circumstances. But what has connected the discourses on and practices of jihad, in spite of differing circumstances in which these have been located, is resistance to perceived dangers to Islam and Muslims.

See also *Islamic Political Thought; Just War Theory; Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism; Terrorism, Political.*

. . . . PERVAIZ NAZIR

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Jim Crow

Laws pertaining to the separation of races in the American South were referred to as Jim Crow laws. The term *Jim Crow* can be traced to the early nineteenth century. Jim Crow was

the name of a character in a popular minstrel play performed in the United States during the 1820s. The character possessed characteristics supporting stereotypes of blacks held by many whites in America.

Jim Crow laws prohibited interaction among blacks and whites in public and in private. The scope of the laws was broad and detail was great. Separating blacks and whites in public places such as schools, parks, restaurants, buses, theaters, restrooms, and waiting rooms was common. Many cities had segregated sports teams.

Social interaction was prohibited in many aspects of private life as well. Many states prohibited interracial marriage and sexual activity between white and nonwhite people. Some cities would not allow black and white citizens to come together to play cards, dice, or dominoes.

Elimination of these laws was a slow process. After passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Voting Rights Act of 1965, and Housing Act of 1968, nearly every remaining Jim Crow law was repealed.

See also *Race and Racism; Racial Discrimination; Segregation and Desegregation.*

. . . . JAMES NEWMAN

Journalism, Political

Political journalism reports about domestic politics and institutions. It can include political analysis, opinion, interpretation, and advocacy. From the middle of the first half of the nineteenth century, American newspapers' partisanship and reliance on opinion were the norm. The papers were numerous, slim, and financed by political parties.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the demographic shape of the population changed. Citizens were moving from rural to urban life, as retailing expanded and industry developed. Economic shifts made large numbers of newspapers catering to partisan groups uneconomical. Greater gains came from a strategy of shifting away from party and toward the more inclusive market. As urban newspapers gained wealth, many could detach themselves from party control and back independence among their journalists, who, nonetheless, could be curbed by owners.

With the professionalization of journalists, they specialized on given aspects of politics and society. These assignments would be their *beats.* The *yellow journalism* of the mass press and partisan news of the past declined. Professionals aimed for well researched, politically centrist reporting, and investigative or *accountability* journalism advanced the watchdog role for news.

The advent of electronic media affected political journalism in newspapers. Radio news at first tended to rely on (or even read from) newspaper accounts. When television became the electronic medium of choice, newspapers turned to more second-day or analysis stories and commercial radio tended to reduce news to brief top-of-the-hour headlines. Public radio by the 1980s developed daily programs with extensive political journalism, but popular stations over the next decade advanced a new form of politicized *talk show,* most often an aggressive, name-calling, partisan vehicle of the political journalist "celebrity," known for extreme political views.

To compete with the dynamic narratives of electronic media, newspaper journalists attempted to create more striking storytelling, moving away from the straightforward stance in search of "interesting" stories.

In the political and social upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s, public trust in institutions plummeted. Some political journalism adopted the style and content of identity politics in response to the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and other minorities' claims. Others did investigations of government malfeasance and crime. What had been a comfortable and mutually rewarding relationship between journalist and government sources broke apart in the new climate. Some political journalists began to write in a critical and emotional style. They claimed that the truth of the turbulence at home and an unpopular war abroad could be conveyed only by a "new" journalism of descriptive equivalence. Journalists disagreed about how objective or engaged political journalism should be. But political journalists at elite newspapers maintained the norms of balance and fairness.

The decline of mass circulation magazines and then the entry of cable television fragmented the audience for political reporting. Considerable research into the public as a multitude of niches can isolate dimensions of preference, so that channels now target niches with precision. Cable channels adjust programming for tastes in news as well as entertainment and provide political journalism of every persuasion. The "big three" U.S. broadcast networks still have a commanding but diminishing lead for their classic news programs. The loud and heated opinion journalists on cable channels are increasing their ratings rapidly.

The Internet makes information available faster and in far greater volume. If the definition of journalist includes the millions of bloggers on the Web, then political journalism has grown astoundingly. Bloggers are a disparate group, many or most of whom use unidentified sources and rely on opinions. Some provide on-the-spot pictures and observations if they happen to witness catastrophes, police violence, and mass political events.

Political journalism in elite newspapers and magazines continues, but the companies are in declining economic health. Surveys show that for the television public the line separating news from political comedy satires and entertainment magazine shows has become indistinguishable. The high-voltage extremist political journalists are further blurring the distinction.

See also *Blogs and Bloggers; Cartoons, Political; E-governance, E-voting, E-democracy, E-politics; Media, Political Commentary in the; Media and Politics; Media Bias; Media Effect; News, Construction of; Press/Fourth Estate; Television and Politics.*

. . . . ELLEN MICKIEWICZ

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Judgment, Political

In philosophical terms, judgment is the intellectual process of subsuming particulars under, or otherwise connecting them to, universals. Thus, this particular thing is a cat, that particular thing is a chair, and so on. Ordinarily, we have widely accepted rules, formulas, or tests for making such judgments reliably. The concept cat includes, or is even constituted by, criteria for determining which particular things in the world are cats and which are not.

JUDGMENTS IN ABSENCE OF CLEAR CRITERIA

Special difficulties arise, however, in cases where there appear to be no such rules, formulas, or tests. Is the flower beautiful? Unlike the concept cat or chair, the concept beauty seems to include or suggest no clear criteria that would govern its application. Political judgments—for example, does this particular public policy best serve the public interest?—are often thought to be of this kind. Like beauty, the concept of the public interest does not seem to come with ready-made rules for determining how it should be applied to particular cases. Of course, we routinely make judgments about what is in the public interest. Such judgments are obviously central to all political life. Thus, the problem is to discover how we make them in a way that allows us reliably to distinguish good judgments from bad.

ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY: ARISTOTLE

The theoretical treatment of the problem is conventionally traced to Book VII of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics.* Plato had argued in *The Republic* that kings should be philosophers and philosophers kings, suggesting thereby that good judgment in politics is simply a matter of applying the methods of rational, scientific analysis to matters of political consequence. Against this, Aristotle proposed a strong distinction between *episteme* (scientific knowledge) and *phronesis* (practical wisdom, prudence, or judgment) and attempted to show how phronesis can produce a kind of objective rational knowledge despite being unscientific. It is far from clear, however, that he succeeded in doing so. In particular, some scholars have doubted that Aristotle provides a convincing or even explicit positive account of how phronesis actually operates.

EARLY MODERN APPROACHES: HOBBES AND MACHIAVELLI

In the early modern period, Thomas Hobbes proposed a similar distinction between *sapience* (a kind of infallible scientific knowledge) and *prudence* (a type of skillful know-how) and offered the still influential claim that prudence or political wisdom is largely a matter of historical knowledge and hands-on experience; the prudent person is the one who has observed or directly experienced what has generally worked well in the past. For some scholars, such an account seems very much to comport with the earlier and personal example of Niccolò Machiavelli, a well-traveled public servant and, at the same time, an historian of note who used both his practical experience and historical knowledge to offer lessons in good judgment to would-be princes.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY: IMMANUEL KANT AND JUDGMENT OF BEAUTY

Much later, toward the end of the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant produced his so-called third critique, the *Critique of the Faculty of Judgment,* a work that, though not directly concerned with political matters, has had a major impact on all subsequent thinking about political judgment. Kant argued that nonscientific or *reflective* judgment, as opposed to scientific or *determinant* judgment, is not, properly speaking, a matter of knowledge at all. In Kant's terminology, it is *noncognitive.* The logic of reflective judgments is that they claim to be universal—they should be endorsed by everyone—but they are nonetheless subjective (i.e., incapable of being demonstrated).

The case of beauty is, for Kant, paradigmatic and shows how reflective judgment, though not a matter of knowledge, is also different from mere taste. If I claim that spinach is delicious, I am expressing nothing more than a preference. I know full well that I am making a purely subjective claim—spinach is delicious to me—and that I cannot offer any objective proof that spinach really is delicious. On the other hand, if I say that the painting is beautiful, I am implicitly saying that everyone should agree with this—everyone should recognize the beauty of the painting—despite the fact that, as with the spinach, I can offer no objective proof that it is so. In making his argument, Kant adverts importantly to the notion of common sense. Reflective judgments presuppose, without being able to prove, the existence of a kind of aesthetic sensibility that is common to all rational creatures and that makes it intelligible to claim, for example, that the beauty of this or that object is something that we all should acknowledge.

CONTEMPORARY DEBATE

Largely through the work of Hannah Arendt, Kant's approach has set the terms of much contemporary debate. For Arendt, Kant's theory of judgment, with its emphasis on common sense and the alleged implications of this for the possibility of free and open deliberation in the public realm, is in fact the core of Kantian political thought.

Subsequent writers have sorted themselves at least in part according to whether they accept Kant's general approach. Thus, some authors insist on the ineffable, indeterminate, impressionistic, and even aesthetic quality of good judgment in politics. In the words of Michael Oakeshott (1962), political judgment is a "pursuit of intimations" that occurs in a kind of "mental fog." Others, however, insist that good judgment, if it is to be a

meaningful category, must have stronger claims to objectivity. For example, it must be eligible for a kind of rational reconstruction that provides, if only after the fact, objective reasons for preferring one course of action to another.

See also *Kant, Immanuel; Political Philosophy.*

. . . .   PETER J. STEINBERGER

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Judgment and Decision Making

Judgments refer to external evaluations of the world, regarding the probability, likelihood, or frequency of events occurring. Judgments often happen under conditions of uncertainty. Decisions involve internal trade-offs of values and often take place under conditions of risk. Judgments can be systematically and predictably influenced by heuristics, which represent basic rules of thumb, helping to reduce the time and effort required to render good judgments. Most of the psychological research on judgment and decision making has been conducted by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky; their work has proven widely influential in a variety of disciplines, and Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in Economics for this work in 2004.

The three most important judgmental heuristics are representativeness, availability, and anchoring and adjustment. Representativeness refers to the way in which people judge the probability that one object, person, or event belongs to a particular category based on similarity. This tendency leads people to underutilize the base rate, or prior probability. This results in three specific biases. First, the conjunctive fallacy occurs when individuals judge scenarios that encompass specific details to be more likely because they appear more representative. This makes decision makers overestimate certain probabilities, leading to unwarranted optimism in planning. Second, people tend to believe in the law of small numbers, assuming that chance processes correct themselves in short strings, as when one expects tails to follow heads quickly on the toss of a fair coin. Last, people often engage in nonregressive prediction, failing to understand that many outcomes return to the mean regardless of intervention. The representativeness heuristic encourages the sometimes inappropriate use of historical analogies when decision makers use obvious similarities between cases to draw implications and instructions on how to act based on past experience, often without full recognition of the important ways in which the events may differ.

Availability encourages individuals to judge frequency according to associations that are triggered in memory or imagination. The strength of these associations then serve as the basis for judgments of frequency. Problems arise because such associations derive from many factors, such as vividness, salience, and primacy and recency effects, which do not strongly correlate with actual probability. Availability contributes to worst and best case scenario planning, as plausibility and ease determine judgments of likelihood.

Anchoring and adjustment biases predictions toward initial values, or anchors, which are then often insufficiently adjusted to current circumstances. This leads to the disjunctive effect, whereby people underestimate certain probabilities. This can prove important in planning and failure analysis.

Decisions are then made on the basis of these judgments. Prospect theory offers a psychological model of decision making under conditions of risk. It encompasses two phases: editing and evaluation. Editing, or framing effects, constructs options for choice. The order or method of presentation can decisively affect substantive choice. Evaluation includes two functions, value and weighting. The value function evaluates relative change from an individual's reference point, typically represented by the status quo. People tend to be risk averse in a domain of gains and risk-seeking in a domain of loss. Loss aversion establishes that losses hurt more than equal gains please. The weighting function evaluates psychological significance. Certain or impossible events carry more weight. Further, low probability events are overweighted, while moderate and high probability events are underweighted.

See also *Decision Theory, Foundations of.*

. . . .   ROSE MCDERMOTT

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Judicial Activism

Judicial activism is too often simply a criticism made against a judge who exercises the power of judicial review to strike down a democratically enacted law on constitutional grounds. If judicial activism is only a way to disagree with a judge's decision, it has little jurisprudential value. Judicial activism means more than just simply invalidating a democratically enacted law, just as judicial restraint means more than simply upholding one. The term implicates a court's role in a constitutional system.

THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN JUDICIARY

In the United States, judicial activism has been associated with liberal judges since Earl Warren's tenure as chief justice

of the U. S. Supreme Court, during which the court struck down legislation by interpreting the Constitution to expand the scope of individual rights in such areas as privacy and criminal procedure. However, as the political science literature persuasively shows, conservative justices also seek to strike down legislation as unconstitutional. According to Thomas Keck, the court under Chief Justice William Rehnquist was the "most activist in American history" (2004, 203). Political scientists such as Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth (2002) have shown that justices often invalidate laws and policies on the basis of ideological preference.

So, whereas a liberal judge may be more likely to invalidate laws that infringe privacy or expand executive power, the conservative counterpart may be more likely to do so when laws infringe property or benefit racial minorities. Judges invariably invalidate legislation, acting in a countermajoritarian fashion. That is the role of a judge in a constitutional system. Though the empirical literature is instructive in highlighting the way in which all justices—conservative and liberal—seek to strike down laws, it does not capture the normative sting of accusing a judge of judicial activism. Equating activism simply with the frequency or likelihood with which a court strikes down laws is insufficient. After all, there is a connotation of illegitimacy about judicial activism.

Within political science, this connotation of illegitimacy stems in part from what Alexander Bickel famously called the "countermajoritarian problem." Bickel argued that judges should restrain their desires to bring about policy outcomes because their insulation from political accountability subverted the democratic process. While some authors have tried to reverse the stigma on judicial activism (notably Terri Peretti's book *In Defense of a Political Court*), the stigma remains politically important. A normative response to Bickel's thesis is possible, however, that explains the negative connotation of judicial activism while showing the essentially democratic function of judicial review. This response draws on Bruce Ackerman's distinction between higher and lower lawmaking. This distinction defines judicial activism as the perception that a court has engaged in higher lawmaking. This definition has two parts. First, in the U.S. political system (as with most constitutional systems incorporating judicial review), the court's constitutional role preserves "higher" lawmaking moments against "lower" lawmaking ones. Second, this distinction can be connected to the perception that a court has gone beyond merely interpreting a constitution.

HIGHER VERSUS LOWER LAWMAKING

Central to the definition of judicial activism is Ackerman's distinction between higher and lower lawmaking. This distinction posits two levels of democratic lawmaking. The Constitution, including its amendments, represents higher lawmaking. According to Ackerman, these are moments of heightened deliberative democratic debate where the "people" do more than simply pass a law. They engage in *constitutional* decision making, not just *legislative* decision making. Statutes, laws, policies, executive orders, and the like are instances of lower lawmaking. After all, consider that the process for amending

the U.S. Constitution is far more onerous than simply passing a law. Amending, for instance, requires ratification by three-quarters of the states. Higher lawmaking, then, is substantively more democratic than a simple law or statute. The role for the court is to preserve higher lawmaking moments from lower ones by invalidating laws that conflict with the Constitution. (This is a separate issue from whether other branches may perform this preservationist role.)

For instance, if Congress were to pass a law that instituted a national religion, the court's duty would be to strike it down even though a current majority favors it. The law conflicts with the First Amendment's establishment clause. If a state were to pass a law that disenfranchised women, the court's duty would be to invalidate it under the Nineteenth Amendment. These would *not* be instances of judicial activism. Rather, they represent the dualist legal structure of a written constitution in which the court thwarts current majority interests that conflict with the higher democratic interests of the Constitution. The court, in this view, must preserve these hard fought "constitutional moments."

BEYOND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

If Ackerman's argument is correct, then the question of judicial activism (sometimes seen under the rubric of *institutional power*), spills over into the question of judicial interpretation of the constitution. It implies that the court's role is to *interpret* the Constitution by invalidating laws and statutes that are inconsistent with it. Judicial activism is thus the perception that the court has engaged in higher lawmaking; it has gone beyond interpretation. By co-opting the constitutional democratic process, and in particular its amendment procedures, the court goes beyond its role as merely the preserver of higher lawmaking. Rather than seeking to uphold the higher law against its lower counterpart, the court improperly makes higher law. This explains why judicial activism is widely viewed as illegitimate. It does not allow the relevant democratic polity to deliberate, debate, and ultimately decide constitutional issues.

Sanford Levinson proposes a useful typology for appreciating the bounds of interpretation. He posits a sliding scale of constitutional change from interpretation, to amendment, to revision, and to revolution. An interpretation is a judicial decision that "was already immanent within the existing body of legal materials." An amendment, on the other hand, "represents a genuine change not immanent within the preexisting materials." (1995, 20–21). Judicial activism is the perception that the court has genuinely changed the document. Such changes or amendments, he and others argue, must occur through the "people," not the court.

If one accepts this framework, the perception that the court has engaged in higher lawmaking still often hinges on what theory of interpretation an individual adopts. Crudely put, the two opposing theories are static and dynamic ones. The static conception, often associated with originalism, contends that constitutional language must be understood as it was written. Its dynamic counterpart contends that constitutional language

must be interpreted in a way that expands or informs liberty. A judge who deploys a dynamic theory of interpretation may interpret *equal protection* to strike down legislation that limits marriage to opposite sex couples or may interpret constitutional language to expand rights; this can be seen by the static camp as judicial activism. However, by insisting on the original language or meaning of the text to strike down a law relevant to a situation never envisioned by the framers of a constitution or its amendments, originalists can be accused also of judicial activism by the dynamic camp. Thus, the charge of judicial activism goes beyond any particular theory of interpretation: conservative or liberal. It rests on the perception that the court has exceeded its constitutional role by engaging in higher lawmaking rather than simply upholding it.

See also *Constitutional Law; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Judicial Behavior; Judicial Philosophy and Decision-making; Judicial Restraint; Judicial Supremacy.*

. . . .   SONU S. BEDI

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Judicial Behavior

Judicial behavior is a field of inquiry in political science that seeks to understand and explain actions taken by judges and courts. At the foundation of this scholarly endeavor are systematic efforts to build generalizable theories, empirically tested, that illuminate and clarify the primary factors that drive judicial decision making. As political scientist James Gibson declared trenchantly concerning this subject, "judges' decisions are a function of what they prefer to do, tempered by what they think they ought to do, but constrained by what they perceive is feasible to do" (1983, 9). In this one sentence, Gibson penetratingly distills down the essence of political science insight into the actual world in which judges reside. That is to say, many forces sway, motivate, and direct judges in the fulfillment of their duties that are beyond the narrow confines of the law. This constitutes the central debate among political scientists and legal scholars on judicial behavior: which set of influences—political, legal, personal, or some combination thereof—best explain the actions of judges and why.

LEGAL VERSUS POLITICAL SCIENCE MODELS
One can fruitfully break this debate down into two major camps or schools of thought. The first camp, composed mostly of lawyers and law professors, espouses the classic and traditional view taught in law schools, focusing on the role of the law and legal principles in determining the choices judges make. The second camp, more recent in its origin compared to the legal approach and populated by political scientists, instead prefers to focus on the role of politics. Scholars commonly refer to the first camp's orientation as the legal model, and the second camp, with its emphasis on political consideration, is further divided into the attitudinal model and the strategic model.

LEGAL MODEL
The legal model contends that judicial decisions result from judges' attempts to apply legal principles and engage in varying modes of constitutional interpretation and techniques of statutory interpretation. At the heart of the legal model is the concept of *stare decisis* (Latin for "let the decision stand"), according to which judges draw on the principles and rules laid out in earlier cases and use them to guide their decision in similar cases (a practice drawn from English common law). In addition to precedent, according to the legal model, the other prominent law-based considerations judges entertain consist of the intention of the Framers or legislators and the plain meaning of the words or text in the relevant constitutional provision or statute. Legal model adherents argue that judges are process-oriented as opposed to being result-oriented. That is to say, judges render decisions based on the appropriate legal consideration and wherever the law (precedent, text, intention of the Framers or legislature) takes them, with no palpable effect stemming from the judge's own political or personal wishes in terms of the final disposition of a case. Thus, the legal model de-emphasizes and discounts the

potential impact of a judge's ideological or policy preferences in a case and instead stresses and focuses on the role of purely jurisprudential factors and law-based considerations.

ATTITUDINAL MODEL

This orientation of the legal approach in downplaying the political is exactly what political scientists find flawed and lacking, and these concerns led to the respective development of the attitudinal model and the strategic model, which many scholars believe more accurately capture the dynamics underlying judicial behavior. The attitudinal model, as advanced and developed by Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, contends that judicial decisions are essentially a function of judges' political ideologies and philosophies. In other words, judges decide cases in terms of their policy wants and preferences. Thus, attitudinal model adherents argue that judges are more result-oriented than process-oriented—they decide cases in light of the result they wish, allowing their ideological attitudes to directly affect their resolution of disputes in front of them. As Segal and Spaeth express it, "Simply put, Rehnquist [William Rehnquist, former chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court] votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall [Thurgood Marshall, former associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court] voted the way he did because he was extremely liberal" (2002, 86). The attitudinal model is essentially the result of a blending and merging of various perspectives and conceptualizations from legal realists, economists, political scientists, and psychologists. This attitudinal orientation has tended to dominate analysis of judicial behavior of the U.S. Supreme Court and other appellate courts, where the justices and judges have higher levels of discretion and leeway in their decisions compared to trial court judges, who are much more necessarily constrained by procedures and precedents.

STRATEGIC MODEL

The strategic model, also referred to as the rational choice model, takes issue with some of the primary assumptions of the attitudinalists. The debate and dialogue between the strategic and attitudinal models is at the current forefront of judicial politics scholarship in political science (although there is also an increasing call for a greater appreciation of the relevance of the legal model). Proponents of the strategic model accept the attitudinalist proposition that judges are primarily seekers of legal policy, but at the same time point out that judges are not simply ideological automatons who slavishly decide cases liberally or conservatively to advance their political preferences. For strategic model adherents, judges at times will act in a strategic, sophisticated manner (as opposed to sincere behavior) and vote on cases (and take other actions as well on the court) in ways that belie their underlying ideology. In other words, judges will vote divergently from their policy preferences in a case directly in front of them so as to be better able to achieve their policy goals elsewhere or at a later time—judges will sacrifice short-term "loss" for longer-term "gains."

As Lee Epstein and Jack Knight put it, "justices are strategic actors who realize that their ability to achieve their goals depends on a consideration of the preferences of others, of the choices they expect others to make, and of the institutional context in which they act . . . the choices of justices can best be explained as strategic behavior, not solely as responses to either personal ideology [as the attitudinal model posits] or apolitical jurisprudence [as the legal model contends]" (1998, xiii). Thus, the strategic model incorporates insights from both the attitudinal and legal models, along with its own recognition of the strategic quality behind much of judicial behavior. Prime examples of reasons behind such strategic behavior include: maintenance of good and effective working relations with other justices on the court; not wishing to motivate the Congress to react negatively to a court ruling that may lead subsequently to injury to a justice's policy preferences; preservation of public opinion/support in favor of the court so as to maintain its institutional legitimacy and influence for future cases; and sensitivity to a period of crisis in the nation and accompanying deference to the elected branches (especially the president acting as commander-in-chief) until a better time develops to act differently.

See also *Judicial Activism; Judicial Philosophy and Decision-making; Judicial Restraint.*

. . . . STEPHEN R. ROUTH

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Judicial Independence

Judicial independence in modern society and in the classical liberal tradition is considered to be one of the cornerstones of any free and democratic society. But what is meant by *judicial independence*?

Considering the concept of the term *independence,* the first definition that comes to mind usually involves the idea of freedom. When freedom is applied to a principle, a person, or an entity, it usually is used in the context of freedom from some form of restraint or influence. In this matter, the entity under examination is the judiciary, which in most governments is the formal structure of courts to resolve legal disputes.

Courts, when resolving legal disputes, can be subjected to a number of influences. These influences may include other branches of government, the litigants, other judges, special interest groups, and society or public opinion. Each of these

potential influencing entities might have a particular interest in how individual cases are decided by the courts. If any of these entities had a controlling influence over the courts in the adjudication process, then it can be logically concluded that judicial independence was lacking. However, there is another influence over the courts that many people would consider to be a proper and a controlling influence: the law. Generally, the courts are expected to make rulings according to law, under the assumption that the law is designed to accomplish justice.

This leads to the reason why many free and democratic political systems and societies find at least some form of judicial independence desirable and incorporate judicial independence into their legal systems. Free and democratic societies generally, at least in theory if not practice, follow the principles of fairness and justice in the resolution of legal disputes, with decisions being made in accordance with the facts and previously established law, giving all parties notice and the opportunity to be heard. If the courts can be controlled by other influencing factors, such as the ones listed in the previous paragraph, then the decisions of the courts likely will not be based on the facts and the previously ascertained law.

Indeed, history is replete with examples of societies and political systems where the judiciary has little or no judicial independence. In these political systems, resolution of legal disputes might depend on such factors as the whim or caprice of the rulers or on the desires of a wealthy opponent who could cause the decision to be based on factors other than the facts or the law. Even in free and democratic societies, external factors such as public opinion and special interest groups have been known to influence court decisions. Examples of judicial corruption, even in free and democratic societies, are too numerous to be listed here.

In the basic governmental structure of most free and democratic societies, the courts are separate and distinct from the other major branches of government. Usually, such as in the Untied States of America, there are three basic functions or branches of government: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. This structure was advocated by one of the famous French philosophers of the Enlightenment, Montesquieu, whose writings greatly influenced the Founders when they wrote the U.S. Constitution. This governmental structure was intended to help prevent tyranny, wherein power was concentrated in a single person or group of people. In many tyrannies throughout history, the tyrants could control the adjudication process as a means of social and political control. Judicial independence from the other functions of government helps ensure a fair adjudication on the facts and law before the courts.

As this discussion illustrates, *judicial independence* is not a precise term. One definition of it can mean that the judges are completely independent of all influences, including the law. Of course, such an interpretation is an extreme example that no government follows. Judicial independence, in the context of a free and democratic society with a government of laws, is a concept that allows the courts freedom from controlling influence from other branches of government, special interest groups, or wealthy litigants, but also contemplates limits on the courts to act within the scope of the law and the principles of justice where the law does not address specific situations.

Examples of the application of the concept of judicial independence are found in national governments, such as the U.S. Constitution and its doctrine of the separation of powers, and international treaties, such as Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

See also *Checks and Balances; Civil and Political Rights; Judicial Activism; Judicial Behavior; Judicial Review; Judicial Supremacy; Jurisprudence and Legal Theory.*

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Judicial Philosophy and Decision-making

Judicial philosophy is the set of ideas that inform how justices and judges rule in cases. Judicial philosophies can be based on many different elements. They may be based on theories of constitutional interpretation, views about the place of courts in a democratic republic, or notions about the role of precedent and what the words of the Constitution meant at its founding. Some justices advocate a more active role for the court to address social evils or protect "discrete and insular minorities." Others encourage judicial restraint to avoid usurping the democratic process of lawmaking.

Political science scholarship, however, has called into question whether such philosophies are explanatory of judicial decision making. Justices also may alternatively base their decisions on their opinions or attitudes about public policy. For this reason, justices usually are labeled as conservative, liberal, or moderate, the same labels that are applied to other political actors. While all judges and justices espouse judicial philosophies, this entry centers on the place of judicial philosophies

in the decisions made by justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

CLASSICAL JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: INTERPRETIVISM AND ORIGINALISM

The most basic distinction in judicial philosophies for Supreme Court justices is between *interpretivism,* which sees the task of judicial review as a matter of interpreting and applying the Constitutional text, and *noninterpretivism,* which is willing to reject aspects of the text for the sake of contemporary notions of justice. As few if any justices explicitly defend noninterpretativism, judicial philosophies tend to rather be contrasted between "strict" and "loose" constitutional interpretation.

A variation on the classic strict-loose differentiation in judicial philosophy, one that is widely discussed politically in the early twenty-first century, is a difference in viewpoint among justices as to the importance of what the words meant at the time of the framing of the Constitution and its amendments. Justices who subscribe to the judicial philosophy that restricts the scope of the Constitution to its original meaning are commonly known as *originalists.* They argue that the court preserves its proper democratic function by restricting itself to upholding the decisions of the past, and that new applications of those principles should come from the legislature or a constitutional amendment.

Nonoriginalist justices, by contrast, believe that what the words meant when the Constitution was written is only one factor among many to consider when interpreting the Constitution. They argue that in some cases, the words of the text themselves carry a greater meaning than the Founders may have intended. For instance, the Fourteenth Amendment was originally intended to give equal rights to African Americans (especially former slaves), but its prohibition of discrimination is not restricted and should be applied more generally. They also generally place more importance on court decisions since the founding period in light of changing social, economic, and political factors through history. Contemporary originalist justices, such as Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, are usually considered conservatives. In contrast, nonoriginalist justices may be liberal, moderate, or conservative, depending on the many additional grounds upon which justices make constitutional choices.

A POLITICAL SCIENCE MODEL OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING: ATTITUDINALISM

Political scientists have responded to these varied judicial philosophies by empirically investigating how judges actually make decisions. Political scientists widely hold the notion that at the core of judicial decision-making is not an official judicial philosophy, but rather a judge's view of what the policy outcome should be in a particular case. This view asserts that judges base their decisions on the facts of a case juxtaposed against their personal policy choices. Scholars with this view are called *attitudinalists.* Attitudinalists believe that when

conservatives on the Supreme Court are replaced by liberals, as was done in the late 1930s and early 1940s, and again in the 1950s and early to mid-1960s, liberal decisions in policy terms are the result. They would similarly expect that when conservatives are appointed to the court, conservative policy decisions are the result. Attitudinalists claim that preferences alone, usually policy preferences, account for a justice's vote in a particular case.

Thus, attitudinalists say that Supreme Court justices are like elected and appointed government officials who are free to make decisions based on their political preferences or "attitudes" to public policy. In fact, attitudinalists claim that justices are freer to make decisions in terms of their attitudes on policy because they have life tenure, unlike elected officials. Jeffrey Segal, perhaps the foremost attitudinalist of the past two decades, argues that judges vote their ideological preferences. In addition, attitudinalists argue that legal discretion in cases that reach the Supreme Court combines with institutional incentives, like life tenure, to favor court independence so justices are capable of acting like single-mined seekers of legal policy. In other words, "Justices decide cases on the merits in light of the facts in the case vis-à-vis their sincere ideological attitudes and values" (1999, 238). The most pure form of the attitudinal model, one in which jurists have unconstrained choice to make decisions on the basis of judicial philosophy, viewed as policy desires, is the Supreme Court, especially when justices make decisions on the merits of a case. The reasons for this are that "[n]o court can overrule the Supreme Court, the Justices have life tenure with no diminution of pay, and docket weeds out legally unambiguous cases" (1999, 238).

Attitudinalists consider institutional and legal norms (such as the rule of following precedent, the need to be consistent in the development of doctrine, interchanges among justices in the decision-making process itself, and changing political, social, economic, and historical contexts outside courts over time, including those after a given judge joins a court) to play little role in shaping or constraining the Supreme Court, or any courts, in what Howard Gillman has called "the presumptive desire of judges to promote policy preferences" (1999, 66). Among the factors that attitudinalists reject as key to court decision making include legal rules, the *certiorari process,* opinion assignment, accommodations among justices in the decision-making process, precedent, and theories about the role of the courts as compared to legislative and executive institutions.

AN ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL SCIENCE VIEWPOINT: HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM

One group of nonattitudinalist scholars, called historical institutionalists, considers historical accounts of institutional development or interpretive characterizations of the actions of judges and other political actors. They look at preference formation itself and view the process as constitutive.

> Judicial behavior is not merely *structured* by institutions but is also *constituted* by them in the sense that the

goals and values associated with particular political arrangements give energy and direction to political actors. The work is historical because it is assumed that, over time, as institutions interact with the features of the political system and attempt to cope with a changing society they might transform themselves and develop new norms, traditions, and functions. (Gillman and Clayton, 1999, 6–7).

Historical institutionalists also argue "that individual conduct is not just the consequence of particular institutional settings, but the product of much larger social frameworks" (7). Social institutionalists argue that:

> individuals find themselves embedded in cultural and organizational fields or sectors which determine the very concept of self-interest and utility. Thus the conduct of individuals within particular institutions must be understood to be within the contextual web of attachments, obligations, and affective bonds that constitute the essential grounds of conduct. These would include such broad social and cultural structures as class, race, gender, and religion (7).

Thus, social institutionalists explore the larger ideological or cultural contexts within which institutions develop identities.

Scholars of what has been called the historical institutionalist model of court decision making argue that judges are less affected by personal judicial philosophy and attitudes than they are by the institutions in which they are embedded and, most importantly, the social, economic, and political world outside institutions. Thus, it is institutional, legal, and historical factors which explain doctrinal change, not the attitudes of judges toward public policy. Moreover, these factors cause judges to make decisions in support of a public policy or case outcome that they would oppose were they not a justice, but rather an elected official.

Finally, part of the Supreme Court decision-making process may also involve strategic concerns among judges as to the effect of a decision on the Supreme Court as an institution. For example, a justice might consider whether reversing a landmark decision would undermine the legitimacy of the court, when the principles upon which that decision was based not only continue to exist, but have been expanded by subsequent cases, and where citizens have relied on the decision in their everyday lives. This is exactly what the Supreme Court asked and answered when it refused to overturn the 1973 abortion rights case, *Roe v. Wade,* when it decided *Planned Parenthood v. Casey* in 1992. The court did this even though several justices in the majority opposed the policy that gave women the right to abortion choice.

See also *Constitutional Law; Judicial Activism; Judicial Behavior; Judicial Restraint; Judicial Review; Judicial Supremacy; Supreme Court.*

. . . . RONALD KAHN

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Judicial Restraint

Judicial restraint is too often simply an endorsement of a judge who upholds a democratically enacted law on constitutional grounds. If the term is only a way to agree with a judge's decision, it has little jurisprudential value. After all, the role of a judge in the system of judicial review is to uphold laws that are constitutional and strike down ones that are not. Judicial restraint means more than simply upholding a democratically enacted law just as judicial activism means more than simply invalidating one. The term implicates a court's role in a constitutional system.

HIGHER VERSUS LOWER LAWMAKING

Like judicial activism, much of the debate about judicial restraint is confused with the debate on the "correct" theory of constitutional interpretation. That is, references to judicial restraint often simply turn out to be a proxy for a static, conservative theory of interpretation, one generally associated with originalism. This confusion is belied by empirical work on judicial behavior, which shows that liberal judges may be just as likely to uphold legislation as their conservative counterparts. Whereas a conservative judge may be more likely to uphold laws that infringe sexual freedom or expand executive power, the liberal counterparty may be more likely to do so when laws infringe property or benefit racial minorities.

Other authors avoid this confusion by seeing judicial restraint as simply a prescription that courts should show a large degree of deference to democratically elected or majoritarian institutions. These theories are borne from the larger countermajoritarian problem, articulated most comprehensively by Alexander Bickel, who proposed restraint and the passive virtues as ways of mitigating the antidemocratic tendencies of

judicial review. While this meaning of *judicial restraint* does not collapse it into a theory of interpretation, it seems to equate judicial restraint simply with the frequency or likelihood with which a court upholds laws.

Such an understanding of judicial restraint has been criticized as insufficient, because it fails to capture the normative implication of the term, namely that the court has opted *not* to fulfill its constitutional duty. In contrast with Bickel's characterization of judicial review as antidemocratic, Bruce Ackerman distinguishes between higher and lower lawmaking. The heightened degree of democratic deliberation that enters into drafting and ratifying a constitution or constitutional amendment distinguishes those documents as more genuinely democratic than the typical laws and policies of a government. The highest court of a democracy has a duty, on this view, to invalidate those laws and polices—lower lawmaking—that conflict with the constitution, the higher law. Judicial restraint occurs when the court refuses to perform this role and refuses to strike down a law, even though the judges may very well see the legislation as unconstitutional with their theory of interpretation. This primarily happens (though this is not an exhaustive list) when: (1) a judge decides not to review the case; or (2) a judge decides for political reasons that it is better overall not to strike down a possibly unconstitutional law.

REFUSAL TO REVIEW

First, and this is a more subtle type of judicial restraint, a judge may simply refuse to hear a case. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court hears only about 2 percent of all cases that come before it. This process of certiorari means that the court will review petitions from thousands of cases, but only select a few to hear and review. Individual justices may have their own reasons for practicing this kind of judicial restraint. Because a justice does not need to publish or justify a decision not to review, these reasons need not be constitutional or even legal in nature.

The court often declines to judge a case if it poses a delicate political question or one that lacks a judicially enforceable rule, even if a constitutional issue is at stake. In *Luther v. Borden* (1849), two factions claimed to represent the legitimate government of Rhode Island. The court refused to decide that issue, reasoning that its disposition was too political because the president had already sided with one of the factions.

REFUSAL TO STRIKE DOWN

Second, and this is the more obvious type of judicial restraint, a judge may refuse to strike down a law because it may provoke some kind of backlash. In this case, even though a judge believes the law may be unconstitutional, that judge declines to invalidate it, reasoning that doing so may cause more harm than good. Though *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) struck down the doctrine of "separate but equal," the decision failed to integrate schools in the short term, perhaps even fueling racist sentiments in the long run. Political scientist and legal scholar Gerald Rosenberg famously argues that the decision did not have the force that is often attributed to it; rather, *Brown* led to more retrenchment from the South. In reply,

Derrick Bell, a constitutional scholar, contends that if he had been a justice on the court, he would have likely upheld separate but equal, even though he concedes that such segregation is unconstitutional. He argues that practicing such judicial restraint would have been better for racial minorities in the long run precisely because it would not have invited the backlash that *Brown* did.

In another example, the California Supreme Court struck down that state's ban on same-sex marriage in 2008. Californians in turn passed Proposition 8, an amendment to the state constitution overturning the court decision. The amendment enshrines the prohibition on same-sex marriage at the constitutional level. Before the state supreme court decided the case, the prohibition was merely statutory. In this way, judicial intervention may have injured the cause of same-sex marriage. One of the dissenting judges in the California opinion—considering the possibility of such an antigay backlash—suggests that judicial restraint may be a better strategy of furthering the cause of gay and lesbian equality (Judge Carol Corrigan, dissenting opinion, *In re Marriage Cases* at 8). This kind of judicial restraint trades any short-term gain for long-term results. It requires that the judge consider the deleterious effects of invalidating a possibly unconstitutional law.

See also *Constitutional Law; Judicial Activism; Judicial Behavior; Judicial Independence; Judicial Restraint: Judicial Review; Judicial Supremacy; Supreme Court.*

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Judicial Review

Judicial review is the capacity of a court to review and, if necessary, reject the laws or directives of the legislative or executive branch. In administrative law, *judicial review* simply refers to court oversight of government actions, and in this usage, judicial review is a necessary component of the rule of law (the government is restrained by the laws in place). In constitutional law, *judicial review* refers to the power of the courts to strike down the laws in place as violations of the more basic principles enshrined in the Constitution and its history of interpretation.

Judicial review in the constitutional usage is essentially an American contribution to the art of government. Within the constitutional usage, *judicial review* can be used in a narrow or broad sense. In the narrow sense, judicial review is essentially collateral—that is, it does not consider the merits of the impound decisions but examines only its constitutionality or basic legality. In the wider sense, it includes even appeals on the merits of a decision taken either by the executive or the legislature.

ORIGINS AND PURPOSE

The origin of judicial review can be traced to the Cokian dictum of the common law (named after Lord Chief Justice of England Edward Coke), under which there are certain principles, which are considered fundamental and higher, and they cannot be altered even by the parliament. With the provision of a written constitution, a new basis for judicial review was created. Judicial review is not explicitly provided for in the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court was established by the Constitution and subsequent Judicial Act in 1789, but this court's power to invalidate laws or other government actions was only declared in *Marbury v. Madison* (1803), in the decision written by Chief Justice John Marshall.

The distinction between a legislative act and the constitution is basic in any type of written Constitution. It is the very source of judicial review, whether expressed explicitly or inferred logically. Judicial review can be seen as an outcome of the supremacy of a constitution over legislative acts. Both the legislature and the judiciary derive their respective authority from the Constitution. Under judicial review, it is the duty of the judges to pronounce upon the constitutionality of the legislative acts. Without judicial review, there would be no court of appeals for citizens who consider a government's action, while currently the law of the land, to be in violation of the principles on which the country is founded.

The generality of some clauses of the Constitution (for instance, "equal protection") allows the judiciary in the United States to invalidate a law passed by the Congress on the basis of inherent goodness or badness of the law. This wider application of judicial review is highly contested in political theory, usually couched in terms of *judicial activism* and *judicial restraint*. In practice, as undoing a high court decision is extremely difficult, much depends on the creative interpretation of the wisdom of the legislative policy expressed through due process of law. Because the U.S. Constitution is very brief with a rigid amendment procedure, many see the judiciary as playing a crucial role in adapting the Constitution to the changing circumstances. A similar phenomenon occurs in India, although the words *due process of law* were replaced with *procedure established by law* (drawn from Japan).

Under the guise of the due process clause, supreme or constitutional courts have succeeded in striking down congressional laws passed by the legislatures as unjust, unreasonable, and violative of the supreme law of the land dedicated to preserving and protecting the ideal of constitutionalism. The role of the judiciary is thus not confined merely to the annulment of legislative discretion but also interpretation and application of legal rules to social facts. Former U.S. Supreme Court justice Benjamin Cardozo argued that the chief worth of judicial review lies in: "Making vocal and audible the ideals that might otherwise be silenced, in giving them continuity of life and of expression, in guiding and directing choice within the limits where choice ranges" (Cardozo, 94). "It is very well said that judicial review affirms as well as negates. It exercises both 'power releasing' and 'power breaking' function. It helps in accelerating and quickening the movement and expediting the realization of social conscience" (Cardozo, quoted in Mason, 1979, 244–245).

FROM JUDICIAL REVIEW TO JUDICIALIZATION

It seems there are times when judges cannot escape the duty to judge, to choose between competing social values or make a choice amounting to indulging into politics. It has led to some problems and controversies. In the late twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court played a proactive role as the fallout of the judicialization of politics in general. *Judicialization* implies a process whereby the judiciary engages in administrative supervision. It also implies the proactive role played by the judiciary in social engineering by laying the foundations for desirable behavior on the part of the public institutions and the masses alike.

According to proponents of this trend, the judiciary is in a better position to resolve the contentious issues in pluralistic and modern complex societies as the judges appear to be apolitical, neutral, and fair to the vast majority. Moreover, they can give equal attention to all the aggrieved parties and take a nonpartisan and long-term perspective, a feat that cannot be performed by the legislative or the executive. Under this interpretation, the judges not only adjudicate between the two litigants in whom the "better boxer" wins the game but also take side with the just party. They can do so because they are capable of taking independent decisions and autonomous actions, whereas the executive and the legislative branches are found to be too fragmented to do so. Thus, judicial review can help in providing logical and rational solutions in an atmosphere charged with partisan politics and interest group lobbying.

The appropriateness of the trend of judicialization has been called into question in legal studies at least since Alexander Bickel's 1962 work *The Least Dangerous Branch*, wherein he

coined the term *countermajoritarian difficulty* to describe the removal of important societal judgments from democratic, majoritarian processes. One response from the court itself has been to argue for its role in protecting "discrete and insular minorities" (*United States v. Carolene Products,* 1938, footnote 4) against majority-backed laws that may make sense in themselves but prove onerous for an unfavored group. Moreover, many political scientists since Bickel have argued that, in fact, judicial power is "politically constructed." It is less insulated from popular pressure and reprisals from political actors than previously thought, and therefore represents not a frustration of democratic processes, but a different outlet for them.

CONCLUSION

Whatever the outcome of the current debates in political science, it is clear that the genius of any constitution lies not only in static meaning but also in the adaptability of its great principles in the light of current problems and needs, and judicial review provides the primary means of extending those principles in many countries, especially the United States, in the early twenty-first century.

See also *Administrative Law; Constitutional Law; Judicial Activism; Judicial Behavior; Judicial Independence; Judicial Restraint; Judicial Supremacy.*

. . . .   ASHA GUPTA

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Judicial Selection and Nomination

Courts play an important role in most Western democracies and varying roles elsewhere in the world. Understanding judicial selection offers a window on how justice is dispensed, which is a reflection of how politics and the political system of a given country work.

At the outset, it must be recognized that an independent judiciary is a hallmark of a free society. In the United States, the Framers of the Constitution, mindful of this and also influenced by French political thinker Montesquieu's work, incorporated the principle of the separation of powers among the branches of government. The judiciary was established as a separate and distinct branch of the federal government. The president was charged with nominating justices, and the U.S. Senate was given the task of deciding whether to confirm the nominee. To guarantee the independence of the federal judiciary, judges were given lifetime tenure, removable only by impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction after a trial by two-thirds vote of the Senate.

An independent judiciary is impossible and the ability to dispense justice is questionable from a judiciary whose members owe their jobs to an executive who can remove or discipline them at will. However, there is also a serious question of whether there can be a truly independent judiciary if that judiciary is selected or retained by popular election. Indeed, can a judge whose selection and retention is by election be as neutral and objective as a judge with life tenure? Are civil service methods of selection, which are in use in many Western democracies, superior to more political selection methods in producing fair and objective justice?

JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS

Many judicial selection methods are used in countries worldwide. Legislatures, the chief executive or heads of executive branch departments or agencies, and even members of the judiciary, as, for example, in Sweden, participate to varying degrees in selection processes. In the United States, five methods are in use by the states and one used by the federal government. More than three-quarters of the states elect some or all of their judges at general elections in which individuals run for judicial office as members of a political party (partisan elections) or are required by law to run without a party affiliation (nonpartisan elections). About one-third of the states use the merit plan to fill some or all their judgeships, and this method involves a nominating commission submitting to the governor a list of names to fill a particular judicial position. The governor by law must make the selection from that list. Five states and the federal government select their judges by appointment of the chief executive with the approval of another body, typically the executive council or senate. Three states use the legislature to select some or all their judges, with the governor having no constitutionally mandated role in the process.

In practice, scholars have found that all these methods in use in the United States involve politics of one sort or another. Studies of electoral methods have found that judicial elections, particularly at levels below the highest state court, tend to be ignored by the electorate, with low voter interest and turnout. Furthermore, the majority of judges in electoral systems are initially selected for interim appointments by the governor to fill vacancies on the bench that occur between elections due to resignation, retirement, or death. This means that at the next election such judges run as incumbents and are often uncontested.

Research has found that the party label is the most significant factor in the voter's choice: judges who are Democrats tend to be more liberal than judges who are Republican.

Judicial selection of federal judges in the United States has some similarities with selection in the states. Party-organizational politics, the politics of policy, and bar association politics all come into play. But because federal judges are nominated by the president, the center of selection activity lies in the executive branch. Participants in the negotiations, particularly for lower-court judgeships, include not only Justice Department and White House officials but also U.S. senators and other major leaders of the president's party from the state in which a federal judgeship is to be filled or the state that by tradition expects to be represented on a federal court of appeals.

The professional credentials of judicial candidates are subject to close scrutiny by the Justice Department, but the political reality is that typically 90 percent of judicial appointments go to members of the president's party. Furthermore, the policy or ideological outlook of the candidate is important. If an administration sees the judiciary as affecting its policy agenda, as was notable with the Franklin Roosevelt, Reagan, and two Bush administrations, it will tend to screen judicial nominees to eliminate those antithetical to its policy agenda. The U.S. Senate in more recent decades has played a more active role in the confirmation process, with nominees perceived as being either too far to the political left or political right running into difficulty, but presidents can use their appointment powers to move the judiciary in a more liberal (as was the case with the Carter and Clinton appointees) or more conservative directions (as was the case with the Reagan and the two Bush appointees).

JUDICIAL SELECTION AROUND THE WORLD

For countries other than the United States, relatively little research has been conducted on judicial selection and its impact. The principal judicial selection mode in civil-law countries is that which considers the judiciary a form of civil service and part of the government bureaucracy. Judges work their way up the judicial hierarchy—all outside the political appointment process. Judges are typically seen as defenders of the regime insofar as the regime is responsible for the law that judges must apply.

The bureaucratic route to a career judiciary may be by a competitive entrance examination that enables those who pass to attend a school for judges (the selection method, for example, in France, Portugal, and Spain) or by solely a competitive entrance examination (the method found in Belgium, Brazil, Italy, and Peru). Grades on examinations typically determine first judicial appointments and subsequent promotions usually are based on seniority and the assessments of senior judges or state ministries of justice. An alternative bureaucratic selection method uses a type of an apprenticeship without examinations and schooling (as with Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Germany). Bureaucratic selection systems tend to produce a more conservative judiciary.

In England, a common-law country, there are some similarities to the United States in that judgeships are not considered a form of civil service and that there is a tradition historically of political experience and party patronage playing a role in the Lord Chancellor's selection of judges for the appellate courts. Higher court judges are drawn from the legal elite. In general, partisan considerations are much more muted in England than in the United States, although both countries tend to place an emphasis on professional qualifications. The selection process generally favors the appointment of judicial conservatives. More systematic empirical analysis is needed to sketch in the details of judicial selection and its impact around the world.

See also *Judicial Independence; Judiciary; Precedent; Supreme Court.*

. . . . SHELDON GOLDMAN

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Judicial Supremacy

Broadly speaking, judicial supremacy is the position that courts have supreme or final power to interpret a nation's constitution or supreme law. A person who subscribes to judicial supremacy supports the rulings of judges even despite any belief that such rulings are based on incorrect or flawed interpretations of the constitution.

Scholars, politicians, judges, and other commentators who reference judicial supremacy are frequently imprecise, linking the concept with a range of different practices and beliefs. Nevertheless, one should distinguish judicial supremacy from judicial exclusivity, the view that courts alone should have the power to engage in constitutional interpretation, as well as judicial review, the specific power of courts to invalidate government action on constitutional grounds. Supporters of judicial supremacy necessarily believe in judicial review, but do not automatically believe in exclusivity. A judicial supremacist might recognize that legislative and executive bodies, state

officials, and even the populace at large could discuss the meaning of a constitution, so long as, at the end of the day, these interpretations were subordinate to courts' views.

ARGUMENTS FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

Defenders of judicial supremacy advance three general arguments in support of this practice. First, giving courts final authority to determine the meaning of a constitution is supposed to be instrumental for enforcing this document as a nation's highest law. Without supremacy, a constitution's limits on government powers and protection of rights might be compromised by the encroachments of other government officials, or by the confusion created by having multiple and perhaps contradictory readings of law. Judicial supremacy recognizes courts—with some supreme tribunal at the apex of the judiciary—as the designated referees for working out constitutional disputes between political institutions and between government and citizens. This arrangement purportedly ensures that a constitution's meaning and application is unambiguous, stable, and somewhat insulated from the electoral and transitory concerns that often motivate political figures such as legislators. Larry Alexander and Fred Schauer have elegantly articulated this argument, concluding that judicial supremacy supports a constitution's capacity "to achieve a degree of settlement and stability, and . . . remove a series of transcendent questions from short-term majoritarian control" (1997, 1380).

A second justification for judicial supremacy contends that it is a necessary arrangement because of the status of constitutional interpretation as a branch of law. Under this understanding, the superior capacity of judges to elucidate constitutional meaning must be recognized and protected due to their specialized training and capacity for dispassionate legal analysis. One version of this argument (famously set out in the U.S. case *Marbury v. Madison*) holds that because a constitution is law, and judges are distinctively associated with interpreting law, it is their privileged duty to give meaning to the constitution.

Finally, some argue that, especially in systems of governance based on the separation of powers, judicial supremacy is necessary to protect the independence of jurists. Without supremacy, courts would be institutionally impotent, possessing insufficient tools to promote their special functions and to check the other branches of government.

A number of other factors account for countries' acceptance of this enormous power in the judiciary. In some cases, nonjudicial officials use courts' status as supreme constitutional interpreters to help enact legal change. If a governing coalition can get the support of judges protected by judicial supremacy, they gain a decisive ally in efforts to chart a new policy path. Keith Whittington (2009) has shown how presidents often will entrench or expand judicial power (including interpretive supremacy) to develop their own policy and partisan goals, or to navigate uncertain political and electoral waters. Judicial supremacy also can be an invaluable tool "both as a means of avoiding political responsibility for making tough decisions

and as a means of pursuing controversial policy goals" that could not otherwise be advanced through normal legislative or electoral politics (Graber, 1993, 37). In sustaining judicial supremacy, legislators and executives can attempt to hand off and escape accountability for some divisive, volatile issues.

CRITICISMS

Judicial supremacy has been challenged as being an inaccurate description of public life and an undesirable political arrangement. As both a matter of prescribed law and effective political practice, courts do not construe the meaning of a constitution in every aspect of public affairs, or on every question. As Walter Murphy puts it, "in no constitutional democracy does any single institution have either a monopoly on constitutional interpretation or a guarantee of interpretive supremacy" (2007, 469). Instead, to varying degrees (and with more and less formal acknowledgement of the arrangement) many nations embrace some version of what is often called *departmentalism* or *coordinate construction*, in which the power to interpret the national constitution is shared among governing institutions. In the American context, for example, the judiciary has been quite reluctant to weigh in on the parameters of constitutional war powers or the impeachment process, leaving these (and many other) subjects to be constructed by nonjudicial officials.

Moreover, a number of scholars and politicians have suggested that judicial supremacy dangerously wrests responsibility for defining and protecting supreme law from the people and their representatives. In a number of nations, including the United States, nonjudicial officials take oaths to support and protect their constitutions, and arguably, this signals an independent and equal commitment by these individuals to understand and articulate constitutional meaning.

Judicial supremacy might also give too much power to judges, who are traditionally removed from the direct control of popular forces and are fallible in their legal judgments and assessments of public policies. Moreover, research suggests that courts are not always effective in actually promoting their supposedly signature functions, such as protecting individual liberties or inducing stability in the overall political system. In view of these objections to judicial supremacy, recognizing the authority of other branches of government, and even the people themselves, to engage in their own, "coordinate" forms of constitutional analysis could perhaps better support the values embedded in a nation's highest law.

See also *Constitutional Law; Judicial Philosophy and Decision-making; Judicial Restraint; Judicial Systems, Comparative.*

. . . .   BRUCE G. PEABODY

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Judicial Systems, Comparative

The fundamental purpose for judicial systems or the court systems is to provide an institutional mechanism for the resolution of disputes. While the specific characteristics of judicial institutions vary across countries, they all operate to ensure that a neutral party (i.e., the individual judge or group of judges) exists to resolve conflicts between separate parties. As Martin Shapiro (1981) observes, courts serve as the lynchpin in a triadic system of conflict resolution—where two parties experience a dispute and rely on a neutral third party to resolve the dispute. To better understand how courts fulfill their conflict resolution responsibilities, this entry provides information on the composition and organization of judicial systems around the world. It focuses specifically on the legal structures of courts, the role of judges and attorneys during court proceedings, and the relation of the judiciary to other branches of government.

LEGAL STRUCTURES OF COURTS

When deciding how to organize their judicial systems, countries initially must address two important questions. The first question involves the legal foundation of the judicial system. What types of law will be emphasized or even permitted in judicial proceedings? In civil-law systems, emphasis is placed on statutory laws and specific legal codes that typically codify elements of customary law. Of note, civil-law systems are the most prevalent law system worldwide, found typically in continental Europe and the former colonies of those countries, including all of South America minus Guyana, the Caribbean, most of Africa, and most of Asia and Southeast Asia. Consequently, in civil-law systems, a tremendous amount of legal deference is afforded to legislatures and parliaments, with courts playing a more subservient role in the development of law.

In common-law systems, which are primarily associated with the United Kingdom and the United States, emphasis is placed not just on legislative statutes, but also on judge-made law. Common-law countries allow for rulings from relevant past judicial decisions, called *precedent*, to determine the proper outcome of contemporary disputes. Common-law systems are additionally found in Australia, Canada, India, and parts of Africa including Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Arguably, the introduction of judge-made law presents these courts with additional avenues to have a substantial influence on broader policies. Some countries, primarily found in the Middle East, also have adopted a system of law based on sharia, or Islamic law. In these countries, the legal foundations of the judicial system are derived from the Quran (or Koran), and courts apply religious principles to resolve disputes.

The second question to be considered when establishing a judicial system that countries must address is whether their judicial systems involve the jurisdiction of specific courts. The term *jurisdiction* refers to the authority vested in courts to resolve certain disputes. Some countries, such as the United States, provide their courts with general jurisdiction—the authority to hear any and all legal disputes. Other countries, such as France, have a set of courts with general jurisdiction to resolve the majority of disputes, but also rely on a special *constitutional court* derived from the Kelsenian court model to resolve more important conflicts related to constitutional provisions or protections. Essentially, the constitutional courts in this model do not address specific complaints involving the rights of individual citizens, but rather they rule on the constitutionality of the acts of public powers, seeking to protect the constitutional order.

THE ROLE OF JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS

The role of judges and attorneys differs dramatically—especially during trials—depending on whether the country employs an adversarial or inquisitorial system. Countries using the former system pit one litigant directly against the other as adversaries to resolve disputes. In these adversarial systems, the attorneys for each litigant actively argue their clients' positions both in terms of the evidence introduced to the court and the legal arguments developed. Thus, each litigant's attorney tries to prove a particular set of facts, circumstances, and law while simultaneously trying to discredit the opponent's version. Given the active nature of the attorneys, the role of the judge in adversarial systems is somewhat more passive. Judges remain the neutral arbiter, interjecting themselves into the court proceedings only to rule on matters of procedure. In this way, the judge acts as a referee over the attorneys, ensuring they follow the proper rules of litigation.

In countries employing an inquisitorial system, judges possess a more active role and work with attorneys to uncover what actually happened. Rather than rely on attorneys to provide evidence and legal arguments as opponents, inquisitorial systems allow the judges to assume more control over court proceedings. They can call on court-appointed experts to provide neutral testimony, instead of relying on attorneys to call their own experts, who may provide testimony favorable to only the attorney's litigant. Additionally, judges routinely ask questions of attorneys and litigants directly, in order to clarify legal or evidentiary aspects. Consequently, the role of the judge in these countries is more assertive than what is observed in adversarial systems, where the role of the attorney is more active.

THE RELATION OF THE JUDICIARY TO OTHER BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT

The ability of courts to serve effectively as the lynchpins in the conflict resolution process also depends on their relationship to the other branches of government. In particular, effective judicial systems must possess suitable levels of independence and legitimacy, especially when their decisions affect other governmental institutions and powers. At a fundamental level, judicial independence is necessary to ensure the decision-making process of courts and judges is not influenced or biased by external considerations for a more detailed discussion of judicial independence. Many countries provide specific provisions for judicial independence in their constitutions, while simultaneously giving courts the authority to nullify statutes or actions of governmental institutions by claiming them to be unconstitutional. This latter authority is called judicial review.

For other branches of government to comply with court decisions—especially those decisions that declare governmental actions or statutes unconstitutional—courts must also enjoy suitable levels of legitimacy. This concept refers to the *reservoir of good will* developed by the judiciary among the other branches of government and also among the general populace of the country. Courts with higher levels of legitimacy can expect and receive widespread compliance with their decisions, even rulings that are unpopular. Courts with low levels of legitimacy must tread carefully as they resolve controversial disputes. Further, court systems with the ability to uphold and defend their own interpretation of the law and rulings on constitutionality or judicial review are more commonly associated with democratic regimes and less likely to be as effective in socialist, totalitarian, or theocratic systems.

See also *Administrative Courts; Civil Law; Common Law; Constitutional Systems, Comparative; Law, Comparative; Law and Society; Legislative Systems, Comparative; Judicial Supremacy; Trial Courts.*

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Judiciary

The judiciary refers to the courts or institutions that administer the law on behalf of the state or the sovereign. It also refers collectively to the judges, magistrates, and other personnel who function in courts and resolve disputes under law or legal principles. The judiciary's role in government and the process by which judges decide disputes vary among countries and over time.

LEGAL SYSTEMS

The role of judges is shaped in part by the legal system in which they operate. Comparative legal scholars have identified several different families or systems of law: the Anglo-American systems of common law; the Roman-inspired French, Germanic, and Scandinavian civil-law systems; socialist legal systems; Chinese or Far Eastern systems of law; and Hindu or Islamic religiously based families of law. Most research in political science examines the role of judges in common-law or civil-law legal systems.

Common-law systems date back as early as eleventh century England and are today found in most nations that trace their legal heritage to Britain. Such systems formally recognize the creative, policy-making role of judges. Judicial decisions are a source of law alongside government regulations, statutes, and constitutional provisions. In cases of government regulations, if a judge finds no authoritative statement of the law, they can "make" law by enunciating a new rule, principle, or legal interpretation that allows them to resolve the dispute at hand but is also applicable to future cases by creating a precedent, the body of which is called *common law.* In common-law systems, precedent binds future decisions under the doctrine of *stare decisis,* a Latin term meaning "standing by things once decided." Precedent has vertical and horizontal dimensions. Vertical precedent holds that decisions of higher courts are binding on lower courts, while horizontal precedent holds that a court's interpretation of the law should be consistently applied by the same court in future cases. Common-law systems thus recognize the creative, lawmaking role of judges while also ensuring uniformity and stability in the law through the doctrine of *stare decisis.*

In civil-law legal systems, judges interpret law but are in theory prohibited from creating law. Courts are not empowered to issue rulings more general than the case being judged, and only legislative enactments (rather than judicial precedents) are legally binding. Civil-law systems have their origin in Roman law and Emperor Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis issued in the sixth century. In later centuries, continental legal scholars adopted a similar approach and developed extensive legal codes, the most well-known being the Napoleonic Code. Within these systems, it was believed that because the law was written very specifically, there was no need for judicial interpretation. Judges base their decisions on the provisions of codes or statutes from which solutions in particular cases must be derived. Civil-law systems do not recognize the doctrine of *stare decisis* but rather the concept of *jurisprudence constante*

The justices of the International Court of Justice preside over issues that go beyond national boundaries, whereas many national and local judiciaries perform constitutional review independently of the executive.

that requires judges to rule in a predictable and nondiscretionary way. Judges in socialist legal traditions also are expected to strictly apply legislative codes but legal interpretation is explicitly recognized as part of the political process and judges are not considered independent interpreters of the law. In the People's Republic of China, for example, the final authority over the interpretation of the law is the National People's Congress rather than judges.

In practice, civil-law judges are often just as creative as common-law judges. When applying textual provisions of a code, civil-law judges must often look to underlying rationales in the structure or purpose of the code to resolve disputes. The culture and behavior of judges in civil and common-law systems nevertheless differ considerably. Civil-law judges are more constrained in interpreting statutes and more reticent to look to principles beyond legal texts. Judicial opinions in common-law systems also tend to be longer and contain elaborate reasoning, whereas opinions in civil-law countries are short and formal in nature, as judges are apt to cite only legislation but not prior case law.

Legal academic scholarship about judges and the role of the judiciary tends to be prescriptive, focusing on normative theories of jurisprudence and the development of legal doctrines. Although not without a normative component, political science scholarship tends to be empirically inclined, focusing on how judges actually behave and on the social and political impact of judicial decisions. Political science scholarship has covered a broad range of issues and topics but three strands of research are central to the field: judicial independence, judicial policy-making, and judicial decision-making.

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

An independent judiciary is critical to democracy but the degree to which the judiciary is conceptually and functionally independent of other branches of government varies. In parliamentary democracies that fuse different governmental functions in a single institution, the judicial function is often conceptualized as part of the executive. Judges and government ministers both apply laws made by parliament; while ministers apply the law through general policies or

regulations, judges apply it in particular cases between individual litigants. In these countries there is less concern about judicial separation and more emphasis on the idea of judicial impartiality. In Great Britain, for example, the Law Lords is the highest court in the land and a part of Parliament. By contrast, countries that embrace a stricter separation of powers tend to emphasize the idea of separateness as well as judicial impartiality. In these systems judges are usually conceptualized as performing a distinct function of government and are barred from simultaneous service in other branches. In the United States, for example, federal judges are barred from membership or service in the executive or legislative branches; the only exception is the chief justice's role in presiding over presidential impeachment trials in the Senate.

The relationship between the judiciary and other branches of government is also influenced by differences in the legal system. In some common-law countries, the judiciary is expected to balance or check the power of other branches of government. By contrast in many civil-law systems, such as France, the purpose of separating powers was to assign specialized roles to legislation and judging. Formal recognition of the policy-making role of judges also leads many common-law countries to provide some form of direct democratic control over the appointment of judges. Federal judges in the United States are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, and in many American states judges are directly elected. In British Commonwealth countries such as Australia, Canada, and England, judges are often selected by the elected executive (though usually assisted by selection commissions). By contrast, in civil-law systems judicial selection usually is removed from direct political influence. The bench usually is appointed in the same fashion as other parts of the administrative bureaucracy. In France, for example, there is a specialized graduate school for judges; in Japan judges are selected by the court-administered Legal Training Research Institute.

Scholars have adopted various approaches to analyze judicial independence. A large body of research examines the formal institutional structures that tie courts to the elected branches. In addition to differences in the way judges are selected, provisions for judicial tenure also differ. In many civil-law systems, judges are considered professional civil servants and spend their entire careers on the bench, although their tenure on any one court may be limited. In common-law systems, judges are sometimes given life tenure as a means of securing their independence, although in many jurisdictions judges are elected or appointed to fixed terms of office. Studies indicate that the mode of selection and the provisions for tenure have important consequences for the way judges behave and their independence from other branches or elected elites. In a classic 1957 study of the U.S. Supreme Court for example, Robert Dahl found that the political process of appointing justices ensured that the court acted in line with the party coalition that controlled the national government. Similarly, studies of state judiciaries have found that judges who stand for periodic election are more likely to behave in ways that reflect public opinion and popular attitudes than those with

life tenure. Other institutional mechanisms that political scientists have studied as affecting judicial independence include provisions for removal and discipline of judges, control over judicial administration and budgets, and the formal powers granted to courts and judges by the constitution.

Rather than focusing on specific institutional arrangements, some scholars studying judicial independence have analyzed whether judges can act without political manipulation or examined strategic interactions between courts and other branches. This latter approach assumes that political elites foster or thwart judicial independence to advance their political goals. Judicial independence is fluid rather than fixed and waxes or wanes depending on the interests of other political elites. A 2003 study by Tom Ginsburg comparing the judicial role in Asian democracies found that political elites were more likely to foster an independent judiciary in countries with multiparty electoral competition than in countries dominated by a single party because judicial independence provides a form of "insurance" to prospective electoral losers. Other scholars have employed formal theory or game-theoretic approaches to explain why elected elites might foster judicial independence as a way of gaining important informational advantages not otherwise available to them.

JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING

A second major research focus in political science is the scope and impact of judicial policy making. The power of judges to make policy depends on several factors. For example, common-law judges are generally more active policy makers than civil-law judges, and appellate courts are more powerful than trial courts. The most salient feature of a court's ability to make policy is the power of constitutional review: the authority to examine the actions of the legislative or executive arms of the government and determine whether such actions are consistent with the country's constitution.

Elements of constitutional review date back to as early as the Holy Roman Empire in the twelfth century, where judicial-type bodies were empowered to deal with jurisdictional disputes between rulers. Nascent forms of constitutional review later emerged in France in the thirteenth century and in Portugal under Philip's Code in the seventeenth century. The modern concept of judicial review however emerged in the early nineteenth century as a distinctively American institution. Chief Justice John Marshall's famous opinion in *Marbury v. Madison* in 1803 is generally credited with establishing judicial review in the United States (although there is some dispute among contemporary scholars about its importance). Today more than 150 countries around the world have empowered courts to exercise some form of constitutional review.

Judicial constitutional review takes several forms. In some countries such as Canada or the United States, constitutional review can only be exercised in concrete cases or controversies and only *a posteriori* or after the fact. Laws or government actions can be held unconstitutional only when they have already occurred and only when they involve a specific dispute

between separate litigants. By contrast, in other countries, such as France, judicial review takes place in the abstract and only before the law or government action occurs. In principle review is advisory, prospective, and usually abstract or in reference to a general constitutional question rather than particular parties. In countries such as Germany or South Korea, courts can exercise judicial review only after a law has taken effect, though they can do so either in the abstract or in concrete cases.

Systems of judicial review also differ in either concentrating or diffusing the power. Approximately one-third of countries allowing judicial review follow the American model wherein the power is diffused throughout the judicial system and can be exercised by ordinary courts (e.g., Canada, Japan, and the United States). Another third follow the Austrian or continental model, wherein review is handled only by specialized constitutional courts or special chambers of high courts (e.g., France, Germany, and New Zealand). The countries have some form of mixed system that combines elements of concentrated and diffused review, such as allowing only specialized courts to decide claims of unconstitutionality but allowing other courts to decline to apply laws deemed unconstitutional (e.g., Brazil, Portugal, and Taiwan).

Legal academic scholarship has focused largely on what law professor Alexander Bickel called the *countermajoritarian difficulty,* or the normative problem of reconciling judicial review with democratic theory. Political science scholarship has generally focused instead on the empirical conditions that give rise to judicial review and the substantive interests that it advances. For example, a large body of empirical scholarship has demonstrated that far from protecting disempowered minorities, judicial review often serves to entrench or advance the interests of political and economic elites. Other studies have demonstrated that judicial review can effect policy change only when it is supported and implemented by other powerful political actors.

JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING

One of the most sophisticated strands of political science research examines judicial decision making. In contrast to legal academic scholarship, which characterizes judicial decisions as driven by legal doctrines, political science has focused on the political and social forces that influence judicial choice. This body of literature has examined various extralegal influences on judges, including intracourt relations, management of workloads, career advancement, or the role of personal characteristics such as race, sex, and religion. Until recently most research on decision making focused on the U.S. Supreme Court and adopted behavioralist approaches. Indeed C. Herman Pritchett is generally credited with pioneering the field in his seminal 1948 work *The Roosevelt Court.* By examining individual voting patterns, Pritchett demonstrated that justices on the court voted in blocs, with some consistently voting in a liberal direction and others voting in a conservative direction. The systematic voting patterns led him to argue the justices based their decisions on ideological or political policy preferences rather than the law. Later scholars applied

the techniques of dimensional analysis to develop increasingly sophisticated measures of judicial ideology. Political scientists Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth distilled the insights of this line of empirical research in their major 1993 work *The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model.* While the attitudinal model is specifically tailored to the unique institutional features of the U.S. Supreme Court (and is not readily transferable to study of other courts such as trial courts bound by appellate decisions or courts that do not permit separate votes or opinions), its key insight of modeling decision making as a function of individual judicial policy preferences has been extended to research of decision making on many other courts and by judges in many other countries.

Rather than focus narrowly on individual attitudes, recent scholarship has examined the role of institutions in structuring judicial choice. One line of this research builds on Walter Murphy's 1964 classic study, *The Elements of Judicial Strategy,* which posits that judges are motivated to maximize individual policy preference but recognizes that they must act strategically with other judges and other political actors to achieve their goals. Often employing formal or game-theoretic modeling, researchers adopting this approach have examined both exogenous institutional constraints on judicial choice, such as the relative power of other branches or the relative dependence of a court on other courts, as well as endogenous constraints on choice, such as the institutional rules, procedures, and norms internal to a court.

A different line of institutionally focused research on decision making adopts historical and interpretive analysis. It seeks to demonstrate how judicial preferences are not only constrained but also constituted by institutional norms and structures. Rather than reflecting policy preferences, judicial decisions are viewed as the product of institutionalized norms and perspectives that are distinctive to courts and the judiciary. Rather than separating legal and political attitudes in the judicial mind, this research connects the two, demonstrating how judicial beliefs about the law are shaped by political and social forces over time. This scholarship shares an affinity with previous political science scholarship that was often labeled *political jurisprudence.* It too sought to analyze judicial decisions in light of how broader political and social changes influenced legal doctrines and institutions. The key distinction is the extent to which the later research adopts a more rigorous and self-conscious methodology grounded in new institutionalist theories of political change.

Other approaches to judicial decision making have included psychological analyses that demonstrate that judges seek approval from audiences such as policy elites, law faculty, the public, and the media, or that judges seek to legitimize their policy choices to implementing populations by appealing to legal norms. Like other areas of judicial behavior research, studies of decision making are methodologically diverse and theoretically rich.

See also *Constitutional Courts; Judicial Activism; Judicial Behavior; Judicial Independence; Judicial Selection and Nomination; Precedent; Rule of Law; Supreme Court.*

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Jurisdiction, Universal

See *Universal Jurisdiction*

Jurisprudence and Legal Theory

Jurisprudence is the study of law in its broadest forms. Historically, jurisprudence has been concerned with the answer of two questions—one descriptive, one normative: What is law and what is justice (or to what ends should law be put)?

Answers to these questions in different times and different nations have come not only from legislators, judges, and lawyers practicing law but also from scholars who have inquired about the nature of law and observed law in practice. *Jurisprudence* has been invoked in many ways, sometimes focused on what law is, under the rubric of legal science, legal theory, or legal analysis, and sometimes focused on what law should be under the philosophical frameworks of natural law, utilitarianism, law and economics, pragmatism, critical legal scholarship, or race and gender critical studies.

ANCIENT AND CLASSICAL LEGAL SYSTEMS

Archeology and anthropology describe social organizations in prehistoric societies, which had systems like law. Some scholars suggest that any continuous social organization may be called law if it creates norms, and therefore one can think about law as an element of the most essential social organization. Jurisprudence usually examines laws from a broad array of materials, describing the law and its operation in social contexts.

The earliest records of systems of law come from Sumerian records of legal transactions, which were later codified in the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, probably written around 2050 BCE. The Code of Hammurabi is very detailed, listing a variety of things that people ought to do and ought not to do and a variety of punishments for those who would fail in their duties. The law was pronounced in written rules made public in the name of the king who pronounced laws justified by a special relationship with their god. The rules say that they bind every person, and the rules are very specific in their requirements and their punishments.

Not all ancient legal systems were based on exact rules and punishments. Ancient Egyptians developed a religious law that was followed in life and measured at death, when the gods would balance one's sins against one's virtues. This practice introduced the principle of measurement governing a variety of prohibitions and expectations.

In both the Babylonian and Egyptian examples, certain aspects of the rules and of principles were applied during the life of individuals and as means of religious judgment. In those records we see different approaches, an emphasis in Babylon for rules with specific punishments and an emphasis in Egypt for principles with balanced punishments applied case by case. These approaches correspond with the use in Babylon of written laws to judge conduct that follows the writing and in Egypt with judgment following conduct. Legal systems reflecting by these approaches include the Jewish law apparent in the Tanakh and the Mishnah, in which judgment sometimes follows unrighteous conduct, yet written laws are still very specific. In all of these instances, there is a very strong relationship between the law, the religion, the state, the society, and the expectation of individual conduct within these contexts.

The first sustained effort to understand the nature of law apart from its statements by lawgivers and applications by priests or officials came with the zenith of Greek philosophy,

particularly around the time of Socrates, Plato, and then Aristotle. Plato's writings depict Socrates's arguments and Plato's own views in a sustained description of what the law is as well as what the best systems and rules of law must be. These philosophers considered democracy an unreliable basis for law, believing that democracy would fail and be replaced by the rule of a mob or of a tyrant. Plato thought the law must require people to live the best life according to their talents and stations. This view, with less emphasis on the need for philosopher kings, was developed with great precision by Aristotle.

Aristotle argued that lawmakers should follow the laws themselves and that this was more important than whether the laws are made by a single king, a small group of counselors, or the people as a whole. This principle is now recognizable as the rule of law. Aristotle developed the Socratic idea that the purpose of laws was to encourage each person to live the best possible life. This was to be done through the pursuit by law of the common good as well as pursuit of the individual virtues in each person's life, which in turn should be encouraged by laws. Aristotle's sophisticated analysis of law describes the ideal system of laws and organization of the state according to law, basing his understanding of law on a broader understanding of morality, an approach later taken as the basis for much of natural law.

Greek legal practice was manifest in the laws of Draco, Solon, and later the Athenian assembly, which together yield a considerable commercial and dispute-driven system of legal arbitration, including arbitration between states. In general, law in Ancient Greece relied on a system of principles and rules, such as the requirement of keeping a contract or treaty, which were applied by neutral arbitrators.

ROMAN LAW

Roman law organized the personal, social, commercial, state, and military relationships of the early Roman state and republic, as well as the vast Roman Empire. Manifest in the historical record is the influence of rules and of principles, and in the application of them the organization of the state; of private relationships in contracts; and of private noncontractual duties. Moreover, we see in Roman law the origins of complex institutions for hearing legal disputes and the rise of specialization and the professionalization of roles for those with legal expertise. Over time the Romans developed a complex legal machinery with a variety of judicial offices to hear disputes, as well as separate legal systems of rules to adjudicate questions rising between Roman citizens and between Roman citizens and noncitizens. Later, more sophisticated courts advised on special questions dealing with problems of state and problems of law themselves. Imperial Roman law was created through legislation enacted by the Roman senate, decrees promulgated by the emperors, and the decisions of law judges, particularly the judices, who were especially knowledgeable in the law.

Toward the end of the Roman Empire, some jurists had become especially acknowledged for their knowledge and wisdom, particularly Ulpian, Gaius and Tribonian, whose work in particular was the foundation for the great books organized under Emperor Justinian known still as the Corpus Juris, or the body of law. The summary of the corpus, the Institutes of Justinian, describes the entire imperial legal system and its rules of law for easy legal study. The Institutes organize the law into questions of justice and of law and describe specifically what is meant by *jurisprudentia*, which is the knowledge of both what is just according to the law of nature and what is required according to the specific rules of the civil law. The Romans firmly believed that the civil law reflected the natural law in a manner similar to that of the Greeks. The summary of this law includes not only its nature, which is to say that it is both written and unwritten, but also its fundamental principles—the most important of which are three: to live honestly, to hurt no one, and to give all persons their due.

Our understanding of Roman law and its philosophy is greatly enhanced by the writings of Cicero, the great lawyer of the republic, centuries before the writing of the Institutes. Cicero understood the law to be a tool for the regulation of private affairs and of public affairs, governing the actions of private citizens and of public officials. Particularly in his book on laws, he lays out a comprehensive argument for the importance of law in a manner that echoes Aristotle, in which the laws must be made fairly and applied fairly to both private and public parties. From Cicero and the institutional writers we see Roman law as a series of rules both written and unwritten and based on principles, particularly those that were believed to reflect the natural organization of human beings in society. Those governed by the state should have a more specific series of rules with more specific punishments, and those outside of the state should have access to the law and be treated under the law in a manner that was more principled and less governed by specifics and particulars of rules. There is a professional cadre of lawyers evident from Cicero's time forward, whose influence grows as the empire grows and whose judgments become essential to the creation of legislation and to the application of law in specific cases throughout the empire.

CANON LAW AND THE MEDIEVAL STATE

With the fourth century conversion of Roman Emperor Constantine I to Christianity, the church entered the protection of the later Roman Empire, and the principles and rules governing relationships within the Christian church became a more important source of law to both the states of Europe and to the individuals living there, regardless of their religion. Canon law became organized through the decrees of bishops and the statement of counsels, collected by monks and bishops and their staffs into treatises, or *decretals,* and summaries, or *summae.*

Canon law was organized very much in the light of the Roman legal tradition, moderated by the biblical text and the church fathers. Canon law therefore takes as its source the authority of the church in the revealed gospel, interpreted through ecclesiastical institutions such as the offices of the pope, various councils, and the decrees of church courts.

Canon law was particularly essential to understand relationships tied to church sacraments, and therefore it was especially important in the regulation of families. The greatest expositor of law in the canon tradition was Saint Thomas Aquinas. He grounded the laws of the state in a divine order, from which arises a natural order, within which states create law, and according to which the state-created law binds individuals.

With the fall of the Roman Empire and the development of independent principalities and states, the law within each state grew somewhat independently. Some laws evolved with little participation from state officials, most importantly the private commercial legal customs among international merchants. Still, law was promulgated by the civil officials of each state, increasingly regulating property and private lives and serving as the primary tool of social order.

The Middle Ages saw a considerable movement of ideas among the various states as both church lawyers and increasingly academic lawyers and professionals moved among states, either as a result of private travel or princely conquest and statecraft. Early English lawbooks, for instance, were very much in the French tradition of institutional writing reflecting both canon and civilian texts, the decrees of the kings and counselors, and the decisions of the king's justiciars. The great illustration of this is the thirteenth-century text of Bracton, which is very detailed in describing rules and principles governing private affairs but also treats the origins of laws and the rule of the king, particularly the famous adage that the king is under no man but God and the law.

LAW AND THE MODERN STATE

The rising authority of the kings and the waning influence of the pope gave rise in the fifteenth century to a new understanding of the power of kingship and its relationship to laws. This trend is manifest in the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, a Florentine legal official whose descriptions of the powers of a prince were relatively unfettered by moral or religious obligation toward any purpose beyond the acquisition and maintenance of power. Even so, Machiavelli expected the prince to use laws as a tool of state and made clear the prince must respect the expectation of the people that those laws must be fair and just, and if the prince would rule them effectively the prince must manage their interests.

This more subtle understanding of a natural relationship between interest of the governed and the governors was a hallmark of the writings of law in Europe for the next several hundred years. Hugo Grotius, a Dutch legal scholar of the next generation, developed the idea of law as tied to the natural order, understood through reason rather than as a dictate of the divine. From this conception came a single powerful model for law based on a view of mankind that was both Aristotelian in its natural reason and very practical in its human observation.

These descriptions of law and state must be understood alongside the views of a growing cadre of professional lawyers, whose own understanding of the law was more technical but still framed as a view of what the law is as well as what it should be. Sir Edward Coke, a seventeenth-century jurist and parliamentarian, created a systematized foundation for law, requiring a careful and reasoned understanding of the rules of law developed by reason and reflected in legal materials, which could only be interpreted by learned counsel and skilled judges. Coke argued that the law could not be applied by the king but must be applied by professionals and could not be arbitrary. Laws had to be reasoned; rational law could not embrace principles or rules that did not reflect a form of underlying logic. Coke also argued strongly for a coherent organization of legal institutions with a common rule of law binding everyone within the kingdom. Though Coke was less concerned than classical thinkers with the promotion of virtues through law and more concerned for the regulation of property and commerce, the institutions of law as Coke described them were very similar to the institutions of law promoted by Aristotle and then by the Romans.

The idea of law evolved with conceptions of the state and its sovereignty, both of which changed with a series of challenges to royal authority, such as the English Civil War of the 1650s, the Peace of Westphalia of 1678, and the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The church had lost its powers over the princes of Europe, but the princes themselves were losing power to parliaments and a new bourgeoisie that displaced the previous feudal social and political order. A debate ensued over the sovereignty of the state, whether the power of the state was ultimately superior or was limited by anything at all.

This argument is illustrated in the tension between the writings of social contract thinkers like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Hobbes wrote of a king above the law created by a social compact by which the people alienated their natural-born freedoms in return for the safety of a legal order created by the king. Locke, opposing a similar argument by Robert Filmer, accepted that people had a natural freedom and that an arrangement like a contract existed, but that the rights of the people could never be fully surrendered, and the king could not be above the terms of the contract. Thus Locke argued the king must perform the contract to secure order with the least loss of that liberty required for order. So as Hobbes believed the law served the interests of the king as the king defined them, Locke saw the law as serving the interests of the people and their collective and individual good.

A view of the interests of the governed was emerging as essential to conceptions of the state and the law. Gottfried Leibniz argued that officials have the power of law in order to exercise the charity of the wise to use the law for the benefit of the people bound to it. Scots lawyer David Hume and economist Adam Smith, writing in the eighteenth century, analyzed law in the light of Hume's famous dictum that one must distinguish between what is and what ought to be to argue that the law must be built on a system of exact justice, public works, and public institutions.

These arguments were furthered in the fiery debates preceding and following the birth of the United States of America and the French Republic. Writers such as the Baron de Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison wrote extensively about popular will and the

appropriate reasons for law, as well as the importance of institutions and essential values in making law, seeking an understanding of law justified by the will of the majority of the people as well as to balance that will through certain principles like rights, protected by institutions that divided state power.

UTILITARIANISM

The principle of proportionality in people's private affairs recurs in jurisprudence throughout history since the Babylonian and Hebrew injunction of an eye for an eye. It reached a high point in the writings of criminal law of eighteenth-century Italian Cesar Beccarra and particularly in the analysis of an Englishman living in France early in the 1800s, Jeremy Bentham. Bentham argued that the fundamental purpose of law was utility, or the promotion of the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. This assessment of the law from a framework that does not depend on divine revelation or an arcane assessment of natural order, but rather on principles of utility that may be assessed by any observer was a profoundly democratizing move. From a utilitarian perspective the individual governed by the law is as competent to assess the law as is the lawmaker or the judge.

This type of redefinition of the potential answer to the question "what should be law" did not arise without also a change in the question of "what is law." It is unsurprising that such a transition would occur at roughly the same time as the principles of John Locke became manifest in the statements of Thomas Jefferson and others in the Declaration of Independence in the United States. Law, indeed, was moving from a source of rules created by the elite and managed by a profession to a source of rules in which the polity as a whole had a great stake.

LEGAL SCIENCE

The growth of professional legal philosophy and the increasingly public role of the judiciary spurred the growth in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of attempts to study law more scientifically. One of the earliest of these attempts flowed from the notion that law is the command of the sovereign, an idea advanced by John Austin. Austin's analysis of the law gave rise to an understanding of the law as a formal system of rules that are carefully organized and reasonably related so as to achieve fundamental purposes. This perspective became known as the study of legal science (but is now commonly characterized by scholars as the era of legal formalism).

Legal science presumed to have the study of the law echo the study of scientific principles of the natural and practical sciences in the world. Under this approach certain enduring principles of the law were to be isolated and mapped with a taxonomy, rather like the taxonomy given by Linnaeus for biology. This understanding of the law would demonstrate an innerconnectedness of legal rules and principles, one that is illustrated with Sir Frederic Maitland's adage that the law is a seamless web, a pluck in one place disturbing the law throughout. Legal science recognized law as an artificial creation—in the same manner that inventions reflected the underlying physical and chemical nature of the universe. So too would the artificially constructed law reflect the underlying conditions of the natural world.

SOCIAL DARWINISM AND ITS SUCCESSORS

A related nineteenth-century legal movement influenced by science is misleadingly labeled *social Darwinism*. The fundamental idea of social Darwinism's view that people behave according to natural law is that populations of people, and particularly nations and races, compete for survival. This idea owes less to Charles Darwin than to Herbert Spencer, who coined the term *survival of the fittest,* and to their American apostles such as William Sumner, who saw law as a tool for social competition that must allow the strongest to survive unfettered by artificial weakness that would hamper the competition of great nations to reach powerful heights. This was the intellectual basis for the law of empire as well as commerce, environmental exploitation, and—above all—contract without regulation.

One outgrowth of this view was the rejection of institutional understandings of law as well as democratic justification, challenged by continental arguments like those of Rudolf von Jhering and François Geny, who argued that institutional law and natural law must reflect the native customs of the people the law represents. The fascist theories of Giovanni Gentili and Carl Schmitt directly rejected laws as a limit on the state, arguing that people and institutions must yield to a national leader whose decisions would be the law, and whose will would be the justification for law because it would manifest the national interest.

These views of law are important but contested in the United States in the twentieth century. Social Darwinist arguments were challenged by realism and progressivism, leading to the New Deal. And a new interest in the theories of natural law in procedure and in human or natural right followed World War II (1939–1945), once it became known that the German state and its skillful legal institutions had led to the Holocaust.

LEGAL REALISM

Legal realism challenged some of the fundamental propositions of legal science, particularly the notion that law was an inevitable product of certain essential or immutable fundamentals. In both Europe and the United States, an understanding of law as being rooted in the individual action by legal officials began to gain credence. In the United States, this view of the law was presaged by the writings and speeches of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who had once been a legal formalist but whose descriptions of law both as something to be studied and as something to be understood from the perspective of the bad man inspired a generation of legal philosophers that followed. Chief among these were Karl Llewellyn and Roscoe Pound, who along with judges such as Jerome Frank and Benjamin Cardozo developed a rich approach to the law that recognized the law as a system of obligations and rules, yet understood the necessity of seeing these rules as the product of individual choice made by legal

officials. Legal realism thus saw laws that favored the wealthy not as inevitable principles reflecting the natural order but as social choices made by officials from a ruling elite. Legal realism thus provided an intellectual framework that made changes in American law, particularly those of the New Deal of the 1930s, more plausible. Following World War II, legal realism prompted something of a reaction as scholars sought a clearer understanding of law as rules rather than merely the acts of officials, which seemed too arbitrary in its reliance on the preferences of judges in shaping the path of the law.

LEGAL POSITIVISM

The most recognized description of law in the twentieth century was that the law is best understood as a system of rules, both regulating the creation and management of law and regulating the individual actions of daily life. These rules, classified by H. L. A. Hart as secondary and primary rules, describe a mature legal system. According to Hart and other legal positivists, law is whatever is made as a law according to the rules of law. Thus what makes a statute a law is that it is adopted by the appropriate system of rules as ordained in a constitution or, as Hart described the fundamental rule for the origination of law, the fundamental rule of recognition. Positivism has led to a greater appreciation for law as a structure of rules, yet it also has prompted debate over whether rules alone sufficiently describe the law and whether rules can provide an understanding of justice.

MODERN NATURAL LAW

Challenges to positivism arose from normative perspectives on what law should be. Some have argued, such as Lon L. Fuller, that certain conditions are required in law or forbidden from law to be considered a valid law or the product of a valid legal system. Thus a legal system that attempted to enshrine laws that are impossible or laws that destroy the authority of the legal system cannot be considered law. Ronald Dworkin has argued that laws must rely upon moral norms to function; for instance, juries must rely upon moral understanding in order to apply or give meaning to rules. John Finnis has argued that certain continuing understandings of the good must inform our understanding and criticism of law.

LAW AND ECONOMICS

Building on the utilitarian tradition, the study of economics developed in the nineteenth century, initially describing human and economic activity, including the regulation of conduct, and then promoting certain practices on the basis of their ability to develop the wealth of society. In the early twentieth century, lawyers embraced economic models such as those of Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks in order to measure the balance of harms from various industrial activities, as well as Pigou to determine the most valuable rules of contracts. In the late twentieth century, the pursuit of microeconomic efficiency in the law, particularly influenced by the Chicago school economists led to a riposte that the economic criticism of law had become a defense of wealth and corporate capital from state protections of the individual.

LEGAL PRAGMATISM

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. argued for a view of law that was practical rather than theoretical, which reached decisions based on all of the legal sources, all of the facts, and was respectful of the popular will in legislation. This pragmatic view has been revived by Richard Posner, an American judge and legal scholar and earlier in his career a prominent proponent of the law and economics perspective, whose later jurisprudence has revived legal pragmatism as a rejection of the grand theorizing of legal formalism, legal positivism, or even the utilitarian strain of law and economics, in favor of a recognition that judges make legal decisions on the basis of facts and the weighing of consequences rather than interpretive theories or theories of justice. Moreover, jurists make their decisions and individually weigh expected consequences within a context shaped by psychological, career, and institutional factors. These factors may include ideology as it colors the perspective of individual jurists, but Posner argues that ideology is mitigated by a practical respect for the appearance of judicial modesty and an understanding of a decision's social context. Jurisprudence in this formulation is about applying the law to presented facts with recognition of the social context, the likely consequences, and the underlying political tensions within a given polity.

CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES

Some contemporary legal scholars, inspired by the student radicalism of the 1960s and new means of literary and social criticism that examine the role of discourse in constructing how we perceive reality (made up of various strains of thought loosely referred to as critical theory), challenged the pervading understandings of what law is and should be. Legal scholars like Mark Kelman, Duncan Kennedy, Mark Tushnet, and Roberto Unger argued that the discourse of law and of justice enshrined in principles such as positivism and natural law (and later pragmatism) was so laden with the vices of power and the subjugation of people for social and economic reasons that there could be no legitimate authority in these approaches. Critical legal scholars argued that the law must be assessed through "mapping" its connections to centers of power and criticized through "trashing" by comparing the rhetoric of law (its claims to universality) to its practices and effects in fact (like creating and preserving hierarchies and in reifying social and political inequalities). Pointing to obvious failures of the law to provide security for the poor and dignity to all, critical scholarship declared the law and its institutions unredeemable because they promoted injustice rather than justice. Critical legal studies (CLS) adherents had a normative agenda. They sought to expose hierarchies of power and law's role in creating and preserving them in order to seek a more egalitarian basis for law—that is, a new definition of justice. Most criticism of this approach points out the difficulty of rebuilding a basis for law from an approach that undermines the legitimacy of discursive practices, including its own.

IDENTITY CRITICISM

Feminist legal theorists, critical race theorists, queer legal theorists, and others have argued that the law cannot be understood except from the viewpoint of a group or a member of a group that has been a victim of the law. Thus, critical race scholars argue that American law must be defined by the experience of those whose ancestors were slaves and who suffer continuing discrimination and economic disenfranchisement based on race. Feminists argue that the law cannot be understood unless it is seen as a male enterprise of gendered power that denigrates a feminine understanding of society and social values. Thus, rules making it difficult to prosecute claims of rape and systems of taxation favoring corporations over families would be seen in a different light from the traditional patriarchal or phallocentric perspective. Queer theory and others have argued similarly that the law must be seen from a lens of those who have been particularly villainized by law, such as homosexuals, "illegal" immigrants, or other marginalized groups stigmatized or ignored by the law. Together, these identity-centered approaches share a similarity with CLS in their desire to unmask the positivist and natural law schools' failure to recognize the contradictions in modern liberalism's universal claims for its conceptions of law and justice. Where they depart from CLS is in the emphasis on which inequalities are most reified by legal practices (that is, which contradictions are most glaring), and how legal liberalism's own rhetorical claims can be used to challenge these contradictions.

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

As the law changes and as social understanding changes, so does our understanding of the law. It is likely in the future that we shall see law from an increasingly global perspective, defining law by national institutions and by supranational behavior. We will judge the law from traditional models of national and parochial understanding of what good law is or bad law is, but we will judge the law from a variety of perspectives that include greater degrees of controversy as various religious and cultural conceptions of law are given greater weight in both international and local dialogue. The stakes for legal institutions will continue to rise as such debates seem to grant one group or another group power because their conception of justice becomes manifest in local law. Thus the future of law will be a future of controversy both in the consideration of what the law is and what the law should be.

The defining element of law may be institutional: law is a process managed by officials and a legal profession that is responsive to the popular cultures that it serves and that it must regulate. If this is true, then the law is best understood to be rules created and managed by officials within a professional culture. Though there are considerable arguments over what the law should be, it is likely to be some balance between the liberty of the individual and the required support of the common good, such as universal education, safe environment, and sound economy.

See also *Critical Theory; Feminist Legal Theory; Judicial Philosophy and Decision-making; Law and Society; Legal Realism; Natural Law; Public Good; Sources of Law.*

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Justice and Injustice

The concepts of justice and injustice have been deployed for about two and a half millennia to evaluate human beings, human actions, and the consequences—discrete and aggregate—of human actions. Although the concept of justice has been developed into numerous and often conflicting conceptions, its applications have evolved considerably. A tendency to use the concept dichotomously has persisted throughout its history.

The English term *justice* derives from the Latin word *jus,* which comes in turn from a Sanskrit word meaning "to join" or "to bind." Cognate terms exist in a number of ancient languages. In the Hebrew Bible, *mishpat* is a legal term meaning what a judge should decide, while *tzedek* is an ethical term that refers to a righteous person, and *tzedakah* refers to the abstract quality of righteousness. The early Greek term is *diké,* meaning what is right and implying an idea of order or balance that must be restored when disturbed. A person who did what was right was called *dikaios.* When later Greek writers, including Plato, began to discuss justice as an abstract quality, they invented the term *dikaiosyné* to denote the quality displayed by a *dikaios.* The abstract concept of justice thus makes its appearance in the extant literature with the advent of terms like *tzedakah* and *dikaiosyné.*

As a political concept, justice involves agents (i.e., actors capable of intentional action) and circumstances that are susceptible to change through the actions of agents and have an impact on the benefits they enjoy, the harms they suffer, and the burdens they bear. Beyond these stipulations, the scope of the concept is a matter of controversy.

A widespread early concept of justice is embodied in the notion of *lex talionis,* which refers to the general rule that wrongdoers should be punished for their crimes by being made to suffer the same harm they have inflicted on their victims. The Hebrew Bible decrees that "thou shalt give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand" (Ex. 21:23–24; cf. Dt. 19:21). According to the Roman Twelve Tables, when a man has committed a certain offense, he should suffer retribution like the crime he has committed. By the standards that prevail in "highly developed" societies in the twenty-first century, *lex talionis* may seem inhumane. However, historically it was probably an effective means of minimizing violence by limiting the severity of acts of retribution and asserting some degree of centralized control over them.

CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE

Most of the territory covered by the concept of justice can be mapped by explicating three major distinctions: between natural and conventional justice, between corrective and distributive justice, and between conservative and ideal justice.

Aristotle introduces the first two of these distinctions in his *Nicomachean Ethics,* and his discussion, though far from definitive, has been highly influential. Natural justice, according to Aristotle, is strictly objective and noncontingent; what is just by nature is so, whether or not human beings recognize or accept it as such. In contrast, what is just by convention is so as a result of contingent human agreement or decree. Conventional justice, then, is subject to change by human artifice; natural justice is not. Natural justice also establishes boundaries for the range of possible institutions, practices, and rules that can be established as just by convention. No human agreement or decree can ever make a practice just if it is unjust by nature. This distinction underpins traditions of thinking about natural law and natural rights that have played a formative role in political and legal thinking over the past millennium and that remain vital in some quarters.

Aristotle also distinguishes between distributive and corrective justice. According to his account, the notion of distributive justice applies to "the distribution of honors, of material goods, or of anything else that can be divided" among the members of a group, such as a political association (1962, 1130b). In contrast, corrective justice applies to private transactions, which Aristotle divides into the voluntary and the involuntary. Voluntary transactions arise from private agreements such as those embodied in contractual exchanges. Corrective justice in relation to these transactions is called for when promises are broken or contracts are breached. The involuntary transactions that raise issues of corrective justice are wrongs inflicted unilaterally by one person upon another, such as theft, assault, and defamation. Most if not all of these "transactions" would be classified as crimes or torts in most modern legal systems. In both kinds of cases, the purpose of corrective justice is to restore a relationship between equal parties when one of them has disrupted it by committing a wrong. The restoration is achieved by inflicting a loss on the offender and, whenever possible, either restoring the status quo ante or supplying some compensation for the victim. The fundamentals of this notion of corrective justice persist.

It is also useful to distinguish—following nineteenth-century utilitarian philosopher Henry Sidgwick—between conservative and ideal justice. Conservative justice upholds established rights and entitlements, whatever these happen to be, regardless of whether they are established through criminal laws, tort law, contract law, or institutions designed to give effect to a conception of distributive justice (such as tax codes or laws regarding the inheritance of property). The notion of ideal justice, in contrast, is intended to serve as a critical standard that might be used to guide reform of established rights and entitlements.

Sidgwick's notion of conservative justice is roughly equivalent to Aristotle's idea of justice by convention. While the notions of ideal justice and natural justice overlap, however, they are not identical. The idea of natural justice presupposes that at least some things are endowed by nature with moral significance; the notion of ideal justice does not. Further, while the idea of natural justice establishes boundaries that restrict the range of justifiable human practices, it does not, as usually conceived, provide a basis for thoroughgoing assessments and possible reforms of existing institutions, practices, and rules in the way that ideal justice often does. It is plausible to think of the idea of natural justice as a particular, limited theory of ideal justice, and of the latter idea as a modern generalization and extension of the former. The distinction between distributive and corrective justice stands in a roughly orthogonal relationship to both these other great distinctions.

The most widely accepted general definition of justice is expressed in the Latin phrase *suum cuique tribuere,* "rendering to each person his due," found in the *Digest* of Roman law and in earlier writings by Cicero (the same idea is expressed in the opening arguments of Plato's *The Republic*). Of course, this formula is mute about questions concerning precisely what things are due to which people.

CONTENT OF JUSTICE

The substantive content of justice—of claims about what is due to whom—is hotly contested. The principal alternatives are separated by two major fault lines. The first has to do with the relationship between distributive justice and corrective justice. According to one family of views, corrective justice either comprises the whole of justice so that the notion of distributive justice is meaningless or inconsequential (philosophers Cicero, David Hume, and Friedrich Hayek share this view), or the notion of distributive justice is essentially reduced to that of corrective justice (philosopher Robert Nozick). According to a rival family, distributive justice comes before corrective justice either in the sense that the principles of corrective justice are derived from those of distributive justice or in the sense that corrective justice is fully applicable only to situations in which at least a modicum of distributive justice has been realized.

A second major fault line divides proponents of distributive justice from one another. One view is that the primary or sole basis on which goods should be distributed is desert or merit. According to proponents of this view, some people should, as a matter of justice, receive greater shares of certain goods than others because they deserve them. According to an alternative view, the primary basis on which goods should be distributed is need. This view leads to a presumption that goods should be distributed equally to all people—or to all members of a political association—unless differences in individuals' needs justify inequalities or there is another compelling reason to accept inequalities.

The notion that corrective justice comprises the whole of justice has a distinguished pedigree in the political thought of Europe and its extensions, with Roman thinker Cicero standing as one of its principal progenitors. Cicero's argument for this view rests on a sharp distinction between justice and beneficence. Justice is violated, he claimed, only when people inflict actual harm on one another. By contrast, failures of beneficence merely deprive people of a possible benefit rather than of something that is their due.

Cicero's argument is probably the most influential defense of the view that corrective justice should be understood to comprise the whole of justice. Yet neither Cicero nor anyone else has ever made a compelling case for the corollary claim that existing distributions of holdings of property and other goods should be exempt from critical scrutiny on grounds of justice. An argument for this view can be reconstructed from the writings of David Hume, who suggests that human beings are so competitive, egoistic, and unsociable by nature that it is far more important for people to respect established entitlements than it is for those entitlements to conform to any particular principle of distributive justice. Even if this claim is correct, however, Hume's conclusion that distributive justice has no role to play in our conception of justice as a whole does not follow from it. Indeed, Hume's particular arguments against notions of distributive justice are vitiated by the fact that he considers (and rejects) only two alternatives to the maintenance of the status quo of his time, namely,

the abolition of all private property and the thorough equalization of all property holdings. Most proponents of distributive justice argue for neither.

Most prominent advocates of the idea of distributive justice hold that it theoretically precedes corrective justice. The basic idea of corrective justice is to redress an imbalance caused by a violation of an existing rule of justice by inflicting punishment in some form on the violator, restoring the status quo ante, or supplying compensation to approximate a restoration. This idea makes sense only if the status quo ante is just, or at least not grievously unjust because it would be perverse to invoke corrective justice to restore a status quo ante that cannot be defended on grounds of justice.

One could argue, as Friedrich Hayek does, that it makes little sense to apply the concepts of justice and injustice to a social or distributive order as a whole. Hayek would like us to regard the distributive consequences of social institutions as if they were facts of nature altogether beyond the scope of human control. He suggests, at times, that human beings do not possess the collective capacity to shape distributions of entitlements on a societywide scale; at other times he asserts that we possess this capacity, but the costs of exercising it would be unacceptably high.

Hayek believes that the capacity of human beings collectively to shape their societies in accordance with common purposes is far more limited than some eighteenth-century Enlightenment and later enthusiasts have believed. We shape our social institutions and their consequences through fits and starts, by trial and error, often taking one step—or more than one step—backward for every two steps forward. It is not true, however, that we possess no capacity to predict the consequences of our institutions and to adjust them accordingly. Modern representative democracy stands as a monumental, if flawed, testament to the effective human capacity for invention. So do modern market systems, which only a century or so ago helped make it possible for societies in which they had taken hold to eliminate from within their borders the dire poverty that was long regarded as a fact of nature.

CONCEPTS OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Although the idea of distributive justice is certainly defensible and arguably presupposed by any persuasive theory of corrective justice, the proponents of distributive justice are deeply divided between two alternative conceptions.

Historically, the dominant conception of distributive justice is that the primary basis on which goods should be distributed is desert or merit. Aristotle argues that distributive justice is proportional—that is, that goods (honors, wealth, and the like) should, as a matter of justice, be distributed among persons in proportion to their deserts. Indeed, he asserts that this claim is uncontroversial, though he concedes that people disagree about the basis of desert. This view appears to have gone nearly unchallenged among political philosophers for some two millennia; Henri de Saint-Simon reasserted it in the nineteenth century, albeit with an entirely different conception of the basis of desert from Aristotle's.

Advocates of ideal distributive justice on the basis of desert typically, and perhaps necessarily, view desert as a "natural" or prepolitical moral notion, because the point of such a conception is to constitute a standard that can be used to criticize existing institutions and to guide reforms. Suppose desert were purely an artifact of existing institutions and practices. In that case, while the members of a given society could deploy their notion of desert for piecemeal criticism of particular practices or institutions that fail to live up to the standards embodied in that notion, they could not invoke their notion of desert as a standard to judge institutions or practices as a whole because to do so would be viciously circular. However, it does not seem possible to sustain the view that desert is prepolitical. A society that is constantly concerned about defending itself from attack, for example, is likely to hold the characteristics typical of successful warriors in high esteem and to regard them as highly deserving, whereas a society that thrives on the production and dissemination of knowledge is likely to regard intellectual virtues as more worthy of rewards. The qualities that are grounds of desert seem to be, at least to a significant degree, products rather than presuppositions of institutional arrangements.

The principal alternative conception of distributive justice is that it is based primarily on need. In the 1790s, both philosopher Johan Gottlieb Fichte and political journalist "Gracchus" Babeuf argued that states should, as a matter of right or justice, redistribute wealth from the wealthy to the poor, so all citizens could have an agreeable life. In 1839, politician and historian Louis Blanc formulated the principle, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need." The most elaborate and rigorous defense of this broad conception of distributive justice was developed in the second half of the twentieth century by philosopher John Rawls. In his theory of justice as fairness, Rawls argues that inequalities in people's shares of goods can be justified but only if they satisfy certain conditions, the most innovative of which is that the inequalities must work to the benefit of the least advantaged members of a society (i.e., those who are least well-off). Rawls calls this condition the *difference principle.*

Although the notion of distributive justice based on need is ancient, it has gained prominence only since the French Revolution (1789–1799). One likely factor behind its recent prominence is the emergence in the Enlightenment of the perception that human problems once considered insoluble might be susceptible to human intervention and amelioration. Another may be the democratization of political discourse and theorizing that accompanied the modern democratization of political institutions.

Desert-based and need-based conceptions of distributive justice are inherently in tension with one another. At least from Aristotle onward, the assumption behind desert-based conceptions has been that desert is distributed unequally among people, so the implication of principles based on desert is that benefits should be distributed unequally as well. Most advocates of need-based distributive justice have assumed that genuine needs are generally distributed in a roughly equal manner so that goods should be distributed in an egalitarian manner unless departures from an equal distribution are justified on some other ground.

In recent years, the range of subjects to which the concept of justice has been applied has grown. St. Augustine and others early in the Christian era attempted to apply the concept of justice to the initiation and conduct of war; these efforts have been refined significantly over the past several centuries. Since the middle of the twentieth century, scholars and other interested parties also have begun to apply the concept of justice to circumstances in the immediate aftermath of war and the collapse of authoritarian regimes, applications that have led to the invention of a new field of *transitional justice.* The scope of the concept of justice also has been extended—controversially—in "inward" and "outward" directions. In recent years, the concept of justice has been applied to personal and familial relations that were once widely considered exempt from considerations of justice, mainly through the work of feminist writers who have argued that the division of labor, responsibilities, benefits, and burdens within families should be subject to critical scrutiny in much the same way as more public institutions are. Scholars and activists have argued also that both corrective and distributive justice should be extended beyond their traditional range, which customarily has stopped at the borders of established political associations, and applied to some of the most heinous transgressions without regard to borders, as well as to the global distribution of benefits and burdens.

See also *Distributive Justice; Hayek, Friedrich August von; Hume, David; Just War Theory; Nozick, Robert; Sidgwick, Henry; Transitional Justice.*

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Just War Theory

Just war theory is a body of principles developed over centuries that attempt to delineate what justifies the initiation of armed conflict and what rules govern the subsequent conduct of fighting. The contemporary dominant strand of the concept developed from the Western, Judeo-Christian canon, but non-Western philosophies, including Hinduism and Islam, also have rich just war traditions. The main rival philosophies to just war theory are pacifism and political realism. The main tenets of just war theory have been incorporated into international law and custom and are enshrined in various key documents such as the United Nations Charter.

JUS AD BELLUM

The Latin phrase *jus ad bellum* (justice toward war) is generally used to describe the criteria by which a state has a legal or moral right to resort to force. In the Western tradition, six factors were necessary for the instigation of a just war. First, war could only be waged by a recognized, legitimate, sovereign political authority. Key to this principle was the notion that only the highest political actor, whether it is a sovereign or an elected or appointed body, had a legal monopoly on the use of force. Consequently, substate actors could not legitimately resort to force as a private initiative or venture because such actions would undermine the stability of society and the international system. Second, war should only be undertaken for the right goals. Conflicts were not to be initiated because of greed or revenge or antagonism. Instead, the ultimate goal of the use of force was to restore peace. Third, there had to be just cause. Just cause has historically manifested itself in one of three ways: defense against attack, the reclamation of territory or property unlawfully taken, or to combat a recognized evil or danger to the international system. Fourth, war must be the last resort after all other options have been exhausted. Fifth, the destruction of war must not outweigh the potential benefits of the conflict. Sixth, and finally, conflicts should be initiated only if there is a reasonable expectation that a lasting peace may be achieved.

JUS IN BELLO

Jus in bello (justice in war) describes the rules of war once a conflict has begun and is based on two main tenets. Proportionality requires that combatants only use appropriate force to achieve their objectives and avoid gratuitous violence or destruction of property. Discrimination obliges belligerents to avoid direct attacks on civilians or other noncombatants. Instead, combatants should employ all necessary and proper steps to protect noncombatants from violence.

THE WESTERN FOUNDATIONS OF JUST WAR THEORY

In the Western philosophical tradition, the roots of just war theory can be traced to disparate sources ranging from Plato's discussions of the proper conduct of soldiers and warfare in *The Republic* to passages in the Old and New Testaments that call for mercy toward enemies during war and efforts to avoid armed strife. The theologian St. Augustine is generally credited with developing the first extensive effort at just war theory, which included a prohibition against warfare based on hatred or greed, developed in works such as *Against Faustus*. Augustine also argued for the importance of legitimate authority in initiating conflict to maintain order, as well as the need to limit conflict. St. Thomas Aquinas codified what became the basis for contemporary just war theory in his work the *Summa Theologicae,* including the main tenets of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello.* Nonetheless, wars of conquest and religious conversion became common during the medieval period. Later contributors to just war theory included Hugo Grotius, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and, in the contemporary period, political philosopher Michael Walzer, whose *Just and Unjust Wars* develops a secular form of just war theory. Walzer discounts pacifism, but stresses the importance of ethical behavior in the conduct of war.

NON-WESTERN JUST WAR THEORY

Both Hinduism and Islam developed a form of just war theory that emphasizes the importance of stability and the protection of the social unit from external threat. Ancient Hindu philosophy argued that leaders had not only a right to defend their people from internal and external threat, but also both a moral and religious duty to do so. Under Hindu custom, justifiable wars included those to expel foreign invaders, disputes over territory, and conflicts in response to affronts to royal power. Nonetheless, as with Western just war theory, war should be the last resort. Sacred Hindu texts also endorsed discrimination and the protection of noncombatants and the principle of proportionality in the use of force. In the twentieth century, nonviolence became increasingly important through the advocacy of Mohandas Gandhi.

As with Christianity and Hinduism, Islamic tradition accepts that force may be needed to preserve order and to ensure the triumph of good over evil. The main justification for the use of force is to protect the community from external threat. However, some Sunni scholars also justified conflict that spread Islam. Typically, secular conflicts to expand territory or gain wealth were not considered just. Under other branches of Islam, the use of force is acceptable only in defensive wars.

Buddhism typically rejects warfare and emphasizes nonviolence. However, under some circumstances, force may be justifiable, such as when it is used to protect innocents from evil. However, even when force is used, peace and the restoration of stability remain paramount.

JUST WAR THEORY AND PREEMPTIVE WAR

Under just war theory, preemptive war is acceptable only if an attack is imminent and all other efforts to resolve a conflict have been exhausted. Preemptive wars are distinct from preventive wars, which are waged to overcome a pending threat, but one that is not necessarily imminent. Preventive wars are generally held to be illegal under modern just war theory. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was criticized under the just war doctrine as a preventive war.

See also *Augustine of Hippo; Casus Belli; Civil Wars; Gandhism; Thomas Aquinas; War Crimes; War, Distraction Theory of.*

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Kant, Immanuel

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was a German philosopher and a thinker of the very highest rank. He is considered by many to be the most important philosopher of the modern age.

In his so-called first critique, *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781 and 1787), Kant sought to describe the inherent logic of the truth claims routinely made about the world. Arguing against the empiricism of Scottish philosopher David Hume, according to which all of our thoughts result from sense impressions reflected in the mind, Kant proposed a different kind of empiricism in which a priori intuitions and categories of human cognition impose an intelligible structure on the phenomenal world. He argued, further, that this logic denies reliable access to "things in themselves," such as the metaphysical reality that is behind, beneath, or beyond the world of appearances. In his second critique, *The Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), Kant sought to reconstruct the inherent logic of moral reasoning. Arguing against utilitarianism, he proposed a deontic—or duty-based—theory according to which, in the formulation of the *categorical imperative*, an action is moral if and only if a universal law can be rationally endorsed that would prescribe or permit, for all rational agents, any action of the very same type. Such a theory emphasized the centrality of free will—an individual cannot be morally praised or blamed unless it is believed that the individual could have chosen to act otherwise. The theory also defined freedom in terms of rational self-legislation. In his third critique, *The Critique of the Faculty of Judgment* (1790), Kant sought to describe the logic of claims that we make about individual particulars—this is an X, that is a Y—in circumstances where there are no rules, formulas, or scientific tests for doing so. Principal examples are aesthetic claims, in which something is said to be beautiful, and functional claims, in which something should be understood in terms of the role it plays as part of a larger organic entity.

For political scientists, Kant's epistemology has been a direct or indirect source of resistance to the perceived positivism or scientism of behavioralism. For political theorists, his ethical theory has been the fundamental source of anticonsequentialist views—morality involves a concept of right that is not fully reducible to the maximization of the good—of which the *Kantian constructivism* of American political philosopher John Rawls is the most well-known example. Kant's theory of judgment, in part through the work of political theorist Hannah Arendt, has been enormously influential in debates about the nature of prudence and practical wisdom.

Although Kant himself produced no systematic treatise on politics, his writings endorse a version of liberal social contract theory, and his famous essay "Perpetual Peace" (1795) argues for a worldwide federation of free republican states.

See also *Arendt, Hannah; German Political Thought; Hume, David; Political Science, History Of; Political Theory.*

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Kashmir

Kashmir is the northwestern region of South Asia. It refers to a geographical area that includes the Indian-administered regions of Kashmir Valley, Jammu, and Ladakh; the Pakistani-administered Northern Areas and "Azad" Kashmir; and the Chinese-administered region of Aksai Chin and Trans-Karakoram Tract.

The political and religious dominance of different rulers has punctuated the history of the area. It was an important center of Hinduism and Buddhism until 1346, the year of the advent of Muslim rule. In 1820, the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh annexed Kashmir and held it until 1846, at which time the Dogras, starting with Gulab Singh, became its rulers upon the purchase of the region from the British under the Treaty of Amritsar. The Dogra rule (under the paramountcy, or tutelage, of the British Crown) lasted until 1947, when the former princely state became a disputed territory.

The Kashmir dispute has multiple dimensions. First, it is a conflict between India and Pakistan over territorial sovereignty.

Kashmir is a disputed region in South Asia. Parts of it are administered by India, Pakistan, and China, though the greatest tensions over the region are between India and Pakistan.

Since the 1947 partition, which resulted in the independence of India and Pakistan, the central pillar of Indian argumentation on Kashmir rests on the Instrument of Accession to India, signed by Hari Singh, the maharajah and last Dogra ruler, on October 26, 1947. Pakistan refutes this argument on the grounds that the maharajah had no political legitimacy to sign the document since his rule was contested. Pakistan highlights that the Instrument of Accession was signed in the midst of an agitated political atmosphere, since the maharaja had taken refuge in the Hindu-dominated Jammu province following a widespread Muslim riot, which led to the invasion of Kashmir by members of Pakistani tribes.

The legal contention gained a new dimension when India took the dispute to the United Nations (UN). In the Security Council resolutions of April 21, 1948; June 3, 1948; and March 14, 1950, the UN called on the Pakistani government to initiate the withdrawal of the tribe members and Pakistani nationals from Kashmir. Simultaneously, the UN asked the Indian government to start withdrawing Indian forces while maintaining the minimum force level necessary to maintain law and order. It also mandated that a free and fair plebiscite be held to determine the wishes of the Kashmiris about accession to either India or Pakistan.

India and Pakistan engaged in active combat over Kashmir in 1947, 1965, and 1999. Additionally, India waged an armed dispute with China in 1962, which led to the loss of the strategic region of Aksai Chin in Kashmir to China. However, since the 1947 war, which led to the division of Kashmir into two areas controlled by India and Pakistan respectively, separated by a line of control (LoC), none of the military disputes have been able to significantly influence the dynamics of the conflict, either from a territorial or political perspective. While the general animosity between India and Pakistan may have seemingly abated in the early years of the twenty-first century, the situation remains problematic.

The Kashmir dispute is also a conflict between India and the Kashmiris living in India-administered Kashmir. Their central claim is the fulfillment of their right to self-determination, meaning the right to determine their political future based on their common identity (*Kashmiriyat*). Kashmiri native insurgency against Indian rule emerged in the late 1980s and aimed at contesting the increasing erosion of the special status Indian-administered Kashmir held since 1947. As of 2009, however, the voices of the Kashmiri people are being represented more emphatically through political separatism rather than through armed militancy.

Another angle to the dispute is the conflict between India and foreign religious militants who have been operating in Kashmir since 1996 to wage a jihad for the establishment of a rigid Islamic theocracy. These foreign militants, driven to Kashmir by the end of the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989) and by the adoption of a radical interpretation of Islam, have been incorporated into organized militant groups, allegedly with the support of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The support Kashmiris give to foreign militants is somewhat ambiguous. While some may be sympathetic to the militants' violent resistance to Indian rule, others are wary of the implications of tagging Kashmir as a religious struggle.

Kashmir is an intricate and multidimensional conflict, the resolution of which seems to be tangled by divergent political and religious arguments. Whereas India seems to assent on the maintenance of the status quo and the transformation of the LoC into an international border, Pakistan, in opposition, vindicates the self-determination agenda—aspiring, nonetheless, for the complete accession of Kashmir into its territory. On the other hand, Muslim Kashmiris living in the Kashmir Valley (and probably also in Pakistan-administered Kashmir) are inclined to choose complete independence. In order to address these competing views, some proposals suggest, for instance, further autonomization of Jammu and Kashmir within the Indian federation; shared sovereignty, partial or total condominium, between India and Pakistan; the Chenab formula, which divides Kashmir along the line of the Chenab River); the creation of a free economic trade area; the transformation of Kashmir into a buffer state; a region-by-region plebiscite; the establishment of a UN trusteeship; the ethnic-religious division of Kashmir in administrative units; or the creation of a confederation.

See also *Boundary Making and Boundary Disputes; Cold War; International Relations; Jihad; Nationalism.*

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Kautilya

Kautilya (flourished ca. 300 BCE) is the purported author of the *Arthashastra,* a sprawling work of political thought dating from some time between the third century BCE and the second century CE. Tradition states that Kautilya, a poor member of ancient India's priestly caste, trained Chandragupta Maurya, the first Maurya emperor, and helped him overthrow the Nanda dynasty. After they had achieved victory, Kautilya retired and poured his lifetime of experience into the *Arthashastra.* Most modern scholars have concluded that Kautilya is an otherwise unknown author who lived under the Maurya, but new archaeological evidence may clarify the origin of this work, much as it has for other ancient Indian texts.

Kautilya's *Arthashastra* has only recently garnered much attention in the West, but is usually compared with China's *Han Feizi* (ca. 250 BCE) by Han Feizi and Italy's *The Prince* (1531) by Niccolò Machiavelli. Although some commentators have criticized the totalitarian nature of the state that it proposes, the *Arthashastra* contends that ubiquitous government regulation through the rule of law is the best way to achieve material prosperity for all. This goal is enshrined in the name of the text itself. The term *artha* carries the meaning of material wealth, health, and safety, and the text examines all three of these topics. *Shastra* means treatise, rules, or general knowledge. Hence one modern scholar proposes translating the title as *The Treatise on Material Prosperity.* According to the text, government plays a primary role in securing artha*,* and it advises the ruler on making every aspect of government administration serve this purpose.

According to the text, artha requires wealth, justice, and territorial expansion. To achieve these goals, the state should consist of seven elements, including the king, his counselors and other officials, the treasury, military and police forces, territory and population, fortified cities, and allies. The king's role is to ensure that each of these elements remains oriented toward the state's three goals by safeguarding the welfare of the people from both internal and external dangers. Performing this tremendous task requires government control of every aspect of people's lives, from economic activity to travel and family planning, and the enforcement of a balance between individual wealth and community responsibility.

The *Arthashastra* helpfully provides lists of specific laws and punishments for each area of regulation. For instance, it details the rules for a national curfew, including circumstances for exempting certain individuals (like midwives and police officers), as well as guidelines for labor contracts and fair prices for various commodities. Enforcing all these laws requires, according to the *Arthashastra,* an elaborate secret service of professional agents who infiltrate all aspects of life, reporting on and influencing people's behavior. Rather than wrestling with possible moral implications of this system of strict control, the *Arthashastra* takes it as given that life will be best for all under this authoritarian system.

See also *Hindu Political Thought; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Totalitarianism.*

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Kautsky, Karl Johann

Karl Johann Kautsky (1854–1938) was one of the leading figures in socialist theory in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the immediate aftermath of Friedrich Engels's death, Kautsky arguably became the most influential proponent and defender of orthodox Marxism. His works were translated into several languages in his lifetime, and he played a crucial role in the networking of Marxian movements and thinkers across the globe.

Kautsky was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, on October 16, 1854. He studied history and philosophy at the University of Vienna between 1874 and 1879 but did not complete any degree. Kautsky's political activism seems to have been originally inspired by Czech nationalism, which he became aware of during a visit to his aunt in Bohemia in 1868. In his formative years, he was influenced by figures as diverse as English historian Thomas Buckle, German biologist and philosopher Ernst Haeckel, German physician and philosopher Ludwig Büchner, Czech historian and politician Frantisek Palacky, and French novelist George Sand. Beginning in the early 1870s, Kautsky became increasingly more interested in various strands of socialist thinking. In January 1875, just nine months after its establishment, Kautsky became a member of the Austrian Social Democratic Worker's Party. However, it would take him several years to adopt a Marxist framework of analysis.

Kautsky established himself as a leading socialist thinker in the 1880s; developed personal contacts and friendships with the most important exponents of Marxian thinking of his time, such as Friedrich Engels, Max Adler, August Bebel, and Eduard Bernstein; and became the primary editor of the famous socialist periodical *die Neue Zeit.* His standing in the Marxian movement was obvious at the Erfurt Congress of 1891, where he wrote the theoretical part of the official program of the world's largest socialist party, Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD). *Das Erfurter Programm,* Kautsky's pamphlet that was later turned

into a book in 1892, became his most famous work, and is still considered one of the important Marxist classics. In the 1890s, he was also at the forefront of Marxist reflections on the so-called agrarian question, namely, the intensely debated potential impact of nonproletarian classes on the proletarian struggle.

From the early 1900s forward, Kautsky found himself in the unfortunate position of having to fight simultaneous battles on numerous fronts: against the establishment of the day, against noncontinental socialists such as Ernest Belfort Bax, against Bernstein's controversial revisionism, and against the more revolutionary exponents of Marxism. In all his battles, he tried to expose the silent and hidden debates involved. For example, he wrote a remarkably candid article in which he reflected on his own initial encouragement of Bernstein's Marxist self-criticism. Such intellectual integrity, however, would cost him dearly. Following the Russian Revolution of 1905, Kautsky came increasingly under attack from radical Marxists. In the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Lenin openly targeted him for his theories such as *ultra-imperialism*, in which Kautsky entertained the possibility of relatively peaceful continuation of capitalist exploitation under evolving interimperial strategies. Thereafter, "renegade Kautsky," as he was labeled by Lenin, became gradually marginalized both politically and intellectually. Kautsky died in Amsterdam on October 17, 1938, leaving behind a wide range of writings in different formats.

See also *Bernstein, Eduard; Engels, Friedrich; German Political Thought; Lenin, Vladimir Ilich; Marxism; Socialism.*

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Kelsen, Hans

Legal scholar Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, on October 11, 1881, and raised in Vienna, Austria-Hungary. He came from a Jewish family but was not particularly religious, and in 1905 he converted to Catholicism in an attempt to more fully assimilate into Austrian society. In 1906, Kelsen received a doctorate in law from the University of Vienna, where in 1911 he became a professor of constitutional and administrative law.

Kelsen served during World War I (1914–1918) as a legal advisor to the Austrian war minister. Following the war and subsequent collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, he resumed teaching law in Vienna, founded the *Austrian Journal of Public Law,* and played a central role in drafting the constitution of the First Austrian Republic. This constitution, which was implemented in 1920, is still in use (albeit in altered form)

in present-day Austria. From 1921 to 1930, Kelsen was a member of the Austrian Constitutional Court but was eventually dismissed for political reasons. He moved to Germany in 1930 to teach international law at the University of Cologne, but, being of Jewish descent, fled to Geneva, Switzerland, when Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party came to power in 1933.

Kelsen was a prolific writer on a wide range of legal topics, but he is best known as a legal positivist and for his *Pure Theory of Law* (1934). In this work, Kelsen argues that an effective legal system should be based on objective laws rather than subjective political, social, or moral values. Lawyers should act as legal scientists and the law should be practiced and carried out as scientifically as possible. The law, Kelsen believed, is ultimately derived from a basic norm—or *Grundnorm*—and deals not with what is, but with what ought to be.

In the late 1930s, Kelsen taught at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva as well as the German University in Prague, but increasing anti-Semitism and the onset of World War II (1939–1945) made it virtually impossible for him to continue working. As a result, he and his family immigrated in 1940 to the United States. Kelsen lectured for two years at Harvard University, while simultaneously learning to speak English, before joining the political science faculty at the University of California at Berkeley. A highly productive period followed in which he published *Peace Through Law* (1944), *General Theory of Law and State* (1945), *The Law of the United Nations* (1950), *Principles of International Law* (1952), and *What is Justice?* (1957).

In the course of his long and productive career as a law professor, scholar, judge, and political philosopher, Kelsen influenced generations of students in Europe and the United States. In particular, his ideas had an enormous effect on the Vienna School of Legal Theory and legal positivists such as H. L. A. Hart. When Kelsen died in Berkeley, California, on April 19, 1973, he was recognized as one of the most notable legal scholars of the twentieth century. Today, the *Hans Kelsen-Institut* in Vienna, a federally funded foundation, commemorates his life, work, and legacy.

See also *Law and Society; Political Law.*

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Kemalism

Kemalism is the collection of political principles assembled by Mustapha Kemal (later Ataturk; 1881–1938), who is credited with founding the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Kemalism has served as the basis for state nationalism in Turkey, although

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded the modern nation of Turkey in 1923. The basic principles behind his rule, referred to collectively as Kemalism, include republicanism, secularism, populism, revolutionism, nationalism, and statism.

SOURCE: AP Images

The caliphate—the position as head of the Islamic community which was held by the Ottomans—was abolished in 1924. Ataturk also carried out a series of reforms to secularize education and the civil service and to prohibit many public displays of religion.

3. Populism: Associated with social revolution and promotion of equality, populism sought to put class-based and occupational organizations under the control of the state in order to stress the unity of Turkish society.

4. Revolutionalism: Traditional ways were abandoned in favor of modernity and Westernization, and included elements such as changing the alphabet to Latin script and banning old forms of dress.

5. Nationalism: Political aims focused on the desire to create a nation-state out of the ruins of the multinational Ottoman Empire and on the Turkish language as the unifying factor. Pride in being a Turk—exemplified in Ataturk's saying "How happy I am to be a Turk"—was a special point of emphasis.

6. Statism: The state was perceived as necessary to take the lead in economic development.

Although a contemporary of Nazism and Stalinism, Kemalism was not a totalitarian ideology. It did, however, foresee a strong role for the state in economic, social, and cultural life, and during Ataturk's leadership Turkey remained an authoritarian, single-party state. Ataturk did not envision the principles of the state to be an ideology, which he equated with something dogmatic and static. Instead, he preferred to see his vision as progressive, pragmatic, and dynamic.

Since Ataturk's death, Turkey has made various efforts to establish democratic government and has experienced great political, social, and cultural changes. Kemalism, however, remains as a sort of state ideology and a powerful influence especially in the military, which sees itself as the guardian of Ataturk's principles; in addition, Ataturk is a highly revered figure among most Turks. However, Kemalism has been challenged on a number of fronts. Political Islam emerged as a force in Turkey in the 1970s, and a party with Islamic roots won the 2002 elections. Issues about the proper role of religion in the public sphere, such as female students wearing the Islamic headscarf, remain very controversial, although secularism remains enshrined in the Turkish constitution as an unalterable principle. Some Kurdish groups have taken up arms against the state, objecting to Kemalism's view of a monoethnic, unitary Turkish state. Whether and how to grant rights to Turkey's large (up to 20 percent) Kurdish minority has also been a major issue within Turkey. Free market reforms in the 1980s undermined the principle of statism, and the growth of civil society and pressures to create a more liberal democracy in the 1990s have worn away at the traditional Kemalist concept of populism.

As it was grounded in Turkish nationalism, Kemalism was never intended to be a model for other countries. Some leaders in central Asia—composed of Turkic peoples—spoke in the 1990s of Turkey as serving as a model, but there has been

many of its principles have eroded or been challenged since the 1970s.

The history of Kemalism stretches back to the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, when various groups attempted to reform the empire and articulate Turkish nationalism and new principles for governance. These efforts led to political instability and conflict, and the Ottoman Empire itself collapsed as a result of World War I (1914–1918). In its stead, Mustapha Kemal, an Ottoman military officer, organized Turkish resistance to foreign occupation. He spearheaded the creation of the Republic of Turkey, based on Turkish nationalism, and served as Turkey's president from 1923 until 1938. He took the name Ataturk, meaning "father of all Turks." The basic principles of the early Turkish Republic, put into formal form by Ataturk's Republican People's Party, eventually became known as Kemalism.

Kemalism is made up of six components or *arrows*:

1. Republicanism: Political power in Turkey would come from the Turkish people, not the Ottoman sultan, who was stripped of power by Ataturk.

2. Secularism: Separation of state and religion, which in the Turkish state was primarily Islam, was established.

no systematic, explicit effort to adopt Kemalism as a guiding principle.

See also *Nationalism; Stalinsim; State, The; Totalitarianism.*

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Key, V. O., Jr.

Political scientist and empiricist Vladimer Orlando Key Jr. (1908–1963) graduated from the University of Texas at Austin and completed his doctorate at the University of Chicago in 1934. The bulk of his academic career was spent at Johns Hopkins University (1938–1949), Yale University (1949–1951), and Harvard University (1951–1963).

Key was a central figure in the postwar development of political science in the United States. He combined an extraordinary grasp of detail and data overlooked by others, with an equally exceptional capacity to integrate this information into compelling propositions about the nature of democratic politics in the United States. He regarded political parties as central to the vitality of a democracy. Key's work was noteworthy for the innovative use of charts, scatterplots, maps, and tables that accompanied his texts. He was a founding personage in the behavioral revolution that swept political science in the 1950s.

In his later years, Key became increasingly alarmed by changes in the polity that undercut the role of political parties as organizers of electoral politics. Toward the end of his life, the media-and-poll-driven politics of the so-called permanent campaign were still in its infancy, but he clearly perceived the trend and its implications. He came to be equally concerned that the pioneering survey-research enterprise of that period was, by excluding politics, gravely devaluing the role of the electorate in the political system's decision making. While deeply committed to the use of statistics and quantification in political research, Key was strongly opposed to the *presentism*—the omission of the time dimension—that so often accompanied the behavioral revolution. For Key, the time dimension was an essential ingredient in adequate analysis of the complex structures and processes of electoral politics; in other words, history mattered. As Key stated in his work *The Responsible Electorate* (1966), "The perverse and unorthodox argument of this little book is that voters are not fools."

Key was a venerated figure within his profession, but his practical influence on developments within American political science went into decline for some years. However, there has been a reversal of interest more recently. This may be because of Key's early work in at least three areas of research that later scholarship has expanded upon. The first of these areas concerns the cognitive capacity of voters and retrospective voting. The second involves the professional study of critical realignments in American electoral politics and dates back to Key's seminal article of 1955, "A Theory of Critical Elections." The third area is American political development. Here the link between contemporary study and Key's work may be found in Key's insistence on the central political role of institutions and processes, as these are shaped by the contingencies of time.

See also *Electoral Systems; Political Parties; Political Philosophy; Political Science, History of; Political Theory.*

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Keynes, John Maynard

The father of the school of liberal economics, Britain's John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) is considered by many scholars to be the most influential economist of the twentieth century. After graduating from King's College of Cambridge University in 1905, Keynes accepted a position at Britain's India Office. In 1913, he was appointed to the parliamentary Royal Commission on Indian Finance and Currency. World War I (1914–1918) interrupted Keynes's career, and he developed a life-long hatred of war.

Keynes's economic expertise earned him a seat on the British delegation to the Versailles Peace Conference, where he argued that the Allies were defeating themselves in demanding that Germany pay reparations beyond their capabilities. In *The Economics of the Peace* (1919), Keynes made a strong case for establishing economic stability in Germany through increased industrialization. His supporters believe that if the Allies had followed Keynes's recommendations at Versailles, World War II (1939–1945) could have been averted.

Keynes's unpopular views on postwar economic policies caused his reputation to decline briefly, but he redeemed himself in 1921 with the publication of *Treatise of Probability,* followed by *A Treatise on Money* in 1930. Keynes also published a large body of articles that appeared in newspapers and journals such as the *London Times,* the *New York Times, Atlantic Monthly, Yale Review,* and *Political Quarterly.*

Keynes's most influential work, *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,* was published in 1936. In it Keynes rebuts the economic theories of French economist Jean-Baptiste Say, who argued that supply creates its own demand. *General Theory* also offered alternatives to Scottish philosopher Adam Smith's laissez-faire theory based on the belief that the best thing a government could do for the market was to leave it alone. Keynes suggests that economics are cyclical, responding to fluctuating wages, employment, prices, and production output. Whenever the economy enters a downward spiral, in Keynes's view, the government is obligated to institute measures designed to stimulate the economy.

Keynes's ideas won wide acceptance during the Great Depression of 1929 and influenced President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal policies in the United States. At the end of World War II, Keynes was one of the British delegates at the Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire at which forty-four nations examined ways to rebuild countries debilitated by the war. The result was the creation of World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In the early twenty-first century, these international organizations continue to be involved in the economic development and rehabilitation of developing countries.

In the post–World War II years, Keynesian economics led to the establishment of social welfare states in Western democracies and has continued to influence government policies throughout the world. However, Keynesianism has not been without its critics. Those detractors have faulted Keynes for a number of failings, charging him with neglecting to develop comprehensive theories on significant concepts such as those dealing with inflation and bureaucracy.

The theories of post-Keynesians have continued to come into conflict with the views of classical economists, particularly those of Milton Friedman and others at the Chicago School of Economics. A major clash between the two groups occurred in the 1980s, when such views provided the basis for Reaganism in the United States and Thatcherism in Great Britain. Neo-Keynesians returned to favor with the election of Tony Blair in Great Britain and Bill Clinton in the United States. In the latter instance, however, neo-Keynesians soon lost ground with the election of George W. Bush in 2000.

See also *British Political Thought; Economic Systems, Comparative; Keynesianism; Political Theory; Smith, Adam.*

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Keynesianism

Conventionally, Keynesianism refers to Keynesian economic theory and its policy implications based on the ideas of British economist John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946), whose main book, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,* was published in 1936. Keynesian economics argues that in absence of state intervention, markets often lead to inefficient macroeconomic outcomes, such as unemployment and low economic growth, due to insufficient aggregate demand. Aggregate demand, in the simplest case of a closed economy, consists of consumption, investment, and public spending. According to Keynesianism, consumption depends on individual income level, while investment depends on the unpredictable "animal spirit" of investors. Public spending is the only variable left for governments to regulate aggregate demand, and through it, the level of economic growth and employment.

Keynes's classical framework was later expanded in the box of tools of post–World War II macroeconomics, popularized by a new generation of textbooks. This toolbox included fiscal and monetary policies to stabilize demand and therefore output over the business cycle. Fiscal policies included public spending and taxation, while monetary policies included changes in the interest rate and the money supply. This postwar version of Keynesianism—known as the neoclassical synthesis built on analytical models first developed by John Hicks in 1937—is controversial as it is based on theoretical foundations and policy instruments that Keynes is believed to have rejected.

THE EMERGENCE OF KEYNESIANISM

With respect to economic crises, pre-Keynesian economics was based on Say's law, according to which the main source of demand is the flow of factor income generated through the process of production. Demand is thus generated by the increase in supply. Say's law therefore rules out any possibility of systemic demand-deficit crises once resources are employed. In its most basic formulation, the mechanism that allows full employment of all resources is wage and price flexibility, through which markets are believed to equilibrate, hence making unemployment a theoretical impossibility.

This economic theory, however, provided little insight in dealing with the persistent level of unemployment in the Great Depression. The threat of social unrest and political instability put pressures on Western governments to intervene. Classical economists' theoretical apparatus, with its implication of laissez-faire and its prescription for nonintervention, was increasingly at odds with what Keynes termed in 1937 as "practical conclusions" and proposals of public spending to respond to the crisis.

Keynes understood that unemployment was no longer a means to retrieve profitability and, as explained by Robert Skidelsky, that wages were "downward sticky." Hence, when profit expectations become increasingly uncertain, investors hoard money instead of lending for productive investments with an uncertain return—a phenomenon known as the liquidity trap. Thus, economic growth could not be reestablished through wage flexibility, due to the growing power of

organized labor, or a fall in interest rate, due to the liquidity trap. With investors no longer investing, only the government could expand aggregate demand by expanding public spending. Keynes saw this expansionary fiscal policy as triggering a multiplier process that would expand output above the initial increase in public spending. The initial increase in output induced by public spending would increase jobs, thus also increasing consumption. This in turn would further increase output, and so on. This multiplier effect, originally discovered by Richard Kahn in his 1931 article "The Relation of Home Investment to Employment," became the central analytical tool of postwar income determination models and modern macroeconomics.

THE SPREAD, CRISIS, AND RETURN OF KEYNESIANISM

Keynesianism represented an important theoretical, policy, and pedagogical rupture with previous practices. Its wide acceptance within academic and policy circles in the West warranted the label of Keynesian revolution. This general consensus defined the economic problem as unemployment, the means for its solution as economic growth, and the set of policy instruments for managing and achieving growth as monetary and, especially, fiscal policies. To work, this consensus required a "deal" among social forces in society—namely organized labor and capital—that allowed the creation of a social and institutional context within which Keynesian policies could be implemented without threatening profitability. The principle of yearly wage increases was accepted by capital in exchange for productivity increases granted by organized labor. These *productivity deals* allowed the profit and wage share of total output overall to remain constant, while both wages and profit increased. Only in this context is the fiscal multiplier truly stable, which is the basic condition for Keynesian government policies to operate. The institutional arrangement making this possible is dubbed in the 2000 book *Keynesianism, Social Conflict and Political Economy* as the "social microfoundations of Keynesianism" (De Angelis, 37).

Keynesianism entered into crisis in the mid-1970s, through a confluence of stagflation (simultaneous high inflation and high unemployment) and pervasive social unrest, especially from social sectors previously excluded from the Keynesian deal. In the 1980s, Keynesianism as a paradigm based on the triad goal, policy means and instruments was abandoned, superseded by the monetarist critique and the advent of *monetarist* and *supply side* policies. Politicians privileged monetary policies and abandoned full employment objectives, although an ad hoc use of expansionary policy tools (e.g., military expenses in the early 1980s) remained. In the early twenty-first century, especially after the global economic crisis of 2008, there is a growing debate about returning to Keynesianism, especially a *green Keynesianism*, which would undertake massive public expenditure policies in renewable energy sources, promote employment policies, and increase regulation of the economy.

See also *Economic Policy Formulation; Fiscal Policy; Keynes, John Maynard; Monetary Policy.*

. . . .   MASSIMO DE ANGELIS

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Kirchheimer, Otto

Otto Kirchheimer (1905–1965) is considered one of the most important constitutional theorists of the twentieth century. He received his doctorate from the University of Bonn where he was a student of political theorist Carl Schmitt. Kirchheimer joined the Socialist Party of Germany and from 1930 to 1933, while employed as a professor of political science, he edited the party magazine *Society.* During the Weimar Republic, in 1930, he published a groundbreaking study of the Weimar constitution entitled *Weimar and Then What? Formation and the Presence of the Weimar Constitution.* In 1932, he published a seminal article on fascism entitled "Legality and Legitimacy" in the socialist journal *The Company.*

After the seizure of power by the Nazis in 1932, Kirchheimer became an outcast both as a Jew and as a socialist. He spent the next seven years in Paris at the French office of the International Institute of Social Research. Here he worked with George Rusches on *Punishment and Social Structure,* which was published in 1939. Kirchheimer emigrated to the United States in 1937 but continued his work for the institute, both as a research assistant and as a lecturer for its Columbia University program. In 1943 he moved to Washington D.C., working from 1944 to 1952 in the Research and Analysis Branch of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and from 1952 to 1956 he worked for the U.S. State Department. Kirchheimer was also a visiting professor of sociology at Wellesley College in 1943, a lecturer at the American University from 1951 to 1952 and a lecturer at Howard University from 1952 to 1954. In 1954, he joined the graduate faculty of the New School for Social Research, and he was professor of political science at Columbia University from 1961 to 1965.

Kirchheimer published only one other major book in his lifetime, *Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedures for Political Ends* (1961). His collected essays were published in *Politics, Law and Social Change* (1969). Never engaging in system building, his great achievement was to uncover the basic mechanisms of political order and disorder. He had an extraordinary ability to sort through massive quantities of data and derive significant

and original insights. His work had a central theme of political tension resulting from legal order and economic power. Democratic consensus, Kirchheimer held, was precluded by class struggles, as Weimar proved.

Kirchheimer shifted his focus to fascism after the Nazis took power in Germany. He became an opponent of the Frankfurt school and its economic theories, believing that under the Third Reich the state had become a monopoly that suppressed all opposition. After World War II (1939–1945), Kirchheimer turned his attention to political justice and the role of political parties in postwar development. He formulated the concept of *catch-all parties,* which would displace confessional parties. Catch-all parties—more commonly known in the twenty-first century as *big tent parties*—do not insist on ideological conformity, choosing instead to include individuals who embrace differing points of view. In his work on political justice, Kirchheimer condemned the use of the court system to exclude certain political parties on the basis of their ideology. His concept of the catch-all party was part of his more comprehensive theory of party transformation. It characterized opposition parties as the principal check against the unbridled growth of an authoritarian state.

Kirchheimer's other works include *Boundaries of Expropriation* (1930), *The Government of Eastern Germany* (1950), and *Politics and the Constitution* (1964). Three collections of his essays were published posthumously: *Political Domination* (1967), *Functions of the State and Constitution (*1972), and *From the Weimar Republic to Fascism* (1976).

See also *Fascism; German Political Thought; Political Parties; Political Theory; Schmitt, Carl.*

. . . .   GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN

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Kita Ikki

Kita Ikki (1883–1937), born Kita Tirujiro, was the principal theoretician and strategist of the National Socialist movement in the early Showa period in Japan before World War II (1939–1945). In 1906, the first book that he published, *The Theory of Japan's National Polity and Pure Socialism,* was banned. Thereafter he became associated with Okamai Shumai, Kotoku Shusui, Sakai Toshihiko, and other revolutionary socialists in Yuzonsha, an ultranationalist organization. Kita's revolutionary fervor led him to go to China as a member of the Tongmenghui, an underground resistance movement organized by political leader Sun Yat-sen. Here he sought to help in the Chinese Revolution (1911–1912) and to overthrow the Qing dynasty. However, after the assassination of Liberal Party leader Song Jiaoren, Kita was ordered to leave China.

After returning to Japan in 1913, Kita published an account of his Chinese interlude under the title of *The Chinese Revolutionary Party and the Chinese Revolution.* He went to China again in 1916 but returned to Japan in 1919 as a disillusioned socialist. He became an ardent chauvinist and nationalist and sought to promote Japan's imperial ambitions. These attitudes were at odds with Marxism, which tended to de-emphasize national identities, so he abandoned his Marxism and became thereafter the spokesman for the far right. His new fascist sympathies appeared in his next book, *An Outline for the Reorganization of Japan* (1923). His goal was Kokutai (the national polity), through which Japan would unify and lead a free Asia.

Under Kita's plan, a military coup would usher in a totalitarian regime under the emperor, who would then suspend the constitution, reorganize the Diet, nationalize industries, impose limits on private property, and, above all, liberate the rest of Asia and bring it under Japanese rule. Kita's ideas were a mixture of Marxism, fascism, agrarianism, religion, and militarism. He soon attracted support from young army officers, and on February 26, 1936, approximately fourteen hundred soldiers, from three regiments belonging to Kita's Yuzonsha, launched a coup and took over key buildings and assassinated top public officials. The emperor denounced the coup and it slowly failed. Kita was arrested, convicted of treason, and executed.

Although Kita's ideas were aborted, they lingered in the imperial court and were instrumental in the vision of the Co-prosperity Sphere that Japan tried to create during World War II. This concept focused on the idea of Western powers being expelled from Asia and replaced by Japan. In this sense, Kita was one of the instigators of World War II in Asia. Kita was a nationalist in the sense that he bitterly hated all Western powers, but in the end he advocated a form of Japanese imperialism that was worse than the one it would supplant. Kita also retained strong socialist ideals although he claimed that he had abandoned socialism. He advocated the confiscation of large corporations and the imposition of limits on the amount of wealth or land that a person could possess. He also called for workers to receive one-half of the profits of their employers. In the 1963 book *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics,* leading Japanese political theorist Maruyama Masao called Kita the "ideological father of Japanese fascism." He referred to Kita's book, *An Outline for the Reorganization of Japan,* as "the *Mein Kampf* of Japanese militarism."

See also *Asian Political Thought; Fascism; Political Theory; Socialism.*

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Knowledge Management

Knowledge management is the comprehensive effort to acquire, manage, and disseminate information in order to achieve specific goals or objectives. The dramatic rise in data resulting from the information revolution of the 1990s prompted organizations to endeavor to develop broad-based strategies to integrate knowledge and experience across all sectors. Knowledge management is designed to enhance the individuals' ability to easily access information and to spread their insights and discoveries. It uses technology to increase efficiency and expand capabilities, and it has been implemented along with other organizational improvements, such as total quality management, in an effort to reduce redundancy and enhance innovation. The field inspired a range of multidisciplinary books, essays studies, and seminars in the early twenty-first century.

Because of the enormous amount of information collected, analyzed, and maintained by modern bureaucracies, knowledge management systems have become increasingly important. For instance, after the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, the inability of counterterrorist organizations to share intelligence prompted reforms to better manage and share information, including the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Knowledge management systems have also been important for researchers by expanding data and providing new means to distribute analyses.

See also *Cybersecurity; Homeland Security; Intelligence Services.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

Kohr, Leopold

Leopold Kohr (1909–1994) was an Austrian philosopher who formulated the theory that small is beautiful. Although he is little known outside his home country, he had a profound impact on economic and political thought in the latter years of the twentieth century. Born in Oberndorf, Austria, he insisted that everything he learned worth knowing he learned from that small town of fewer than two thousand people. He obtained his doctorate in law from the University of Innsbruck, his doctorate in political science from the University of Vienna, and he also studied at the London School of Economics. In 1937, Kohr became a freelance correspondent during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). Although not Jewish, he fled Austria in 1938 after the Nazi takeover and immigrated to the United States where he became a citizen. He taught economics at New Jersey's Rutgers University from 1943 to 1955, at the University of Puerto Rico from 1955 to 1973, and the University College of Wales at Aberystwyth from 1973 to 1978.

Kohr described himself as a philosophical anarchist. He protested the cult of bigness and unrestricted economic growth, and he promoted the concepts of human scale and small community life. He argued that massive external aid to poorer nations stifled local initiatives and participation, and he called for the dissolution of centralized political and economic structures in favor of local control. In his first published essay, "Disunion Now: A Plea for a Society Based upon Small Autonomous Units" (1941), Kohr called for the breakup of Europe into smaller parts. He developed his ideas further in his best-known work, *The Breakup of Nations* (1957), in which he states, "There seems to be only one cause behind all forms of social misery: bigness. . . . Whenever something is wrong something is too big." He cited examples such as the dinosaurs and the Soviet Union to prove his point. He argued that small organizations and small cities are more benevolent, creative, efficient, and stable than their larger counterparts. His ideal was Switzerland, which maintained itself as a prosperous state amidst warring Europe.

Kohr continued to express his ideas in a series of books over the next thirty years. In *Development Without Aid* (1979) he calls on developing nations to reject Western aid and to seek self-sufficiency. In *Overdeveloped Nations: The Diseconomies of Scale* (1978), he proposes that the larger the state, the worse off the citizen. In *City of Man* (1976), he praises the medieval city as more culturally and socially effective than its modern counterpart. In *The Inner City: From Mud to Marble* (1989), he maintains that urban giantism will lead to a breakdown of the social order and that human settlements need to return to "the human scale." Two of Kohr's profound contributions to social science were his use of the terms *verhaltnismassigkeit,* or proportionality, and *appropriateness*. Proportionality is a measure not only of efficiency but also of goodness. Appropriateness is the correlation between size and harmony.

Kohr helped cement the foundations of alternative economics and political science; he was an important inspiration to the green, bio-eco, fourth world, decentralist, and anarchist movements. One of his students was economic theorist E. F. Schumacher, who took Kohr's seminal idea as the title of his 1973 book, *Small Is Beautiful*. A number of thinkers continued to develop Kohr's seminal ideas, including Austrian philosopher Ivan Illich and English anarchist poet and critic Herbert Read. Kohr was awarded the Right Livelihood Award, often called the alternative Nobel Prize, in 1983.

See also *European Political Thought; Illich, Ivan; Political Philosophy; Political Theory.*

. . . .   GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN

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Kollontay, Aleksandra Mikhaylovna

Aleksandra Mikhaylovna Kollontay (1872–1952) was a major figure in the Russian Socialist movement from the

late nineteenth century to the Bolshevik Revolution (1917). Born in St. Petersburg in the noble Domontovich family of Ukrainian, Russian, and Finnish background, at age twenty-two she married her cousin Vladimir Kollontay, but after the birth of a son in 1894 became increasingly dissatisfied with domestic life. In 1899, after a year of study in Switzerland, she embarked on a career as a revolutionary journalist, joining the then-illegal Russian Social Democratic Party. At first, Kollontay was neutral in the Bolshevik-Menshevik split but in 1904 she joined Leon Trotsky's Bolshevik faction, only to leave two years later over the issue of boycotting elections to the Duma.

Kollontay's first publications were studies of the Finnish economy. By 1905, she became an ardent feminist and had found the issue that would engage her for the rest of her life: the emancipation of women. Her first major work was *The Social Basis of the Woman Question,* published in 1908. That same year, Kollontay fled Russia to avoid arrest and remained in Western Europe until 1917, lecturing and writing. She worked for the German Social Democratic Party and taught at Russian dramatist Maxim Gorky's school in Italy.

In 1914, Kollontay established contact with Vladimir I. Lenin and was a principal organizer of the Zimmerwald Conference against World War I (1914–1918). She returned to Russia in 1917 after the February Revolution. When the Bolsheviks seized power in November of that year Kollontay was appointed commissar of social welfare. As commissar, she promoted funding for maternity care, drafted protective legislation for women workers, and revamped divorce and civil marriage laws. Kollontay resigned in 1919 in protest against the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which ended the war with Germany.

Also in 1919, Kollontay was named to head the *Zhenotdel,* an official agency devoted to women's issues. Over the next two years Kollontay developed the organization's program of setting up nurseries, day care centers, and maternity hospitals. Her vision of Zhenotdel as an advocate for women did not sit well with the male-dominated Bolshevik leadership. Further, Kollontay's involvement in the 1921 Workers' Opposition Party, a group critical of Lenin, led to her downfall. In 1922, she was dismissed from Zhenotdel and demoted as a member of the diplomatic service. After two decades as a Soviet diplomat, Kollontay retired in 1945 and died in 1952.

The leading Marxist feminist of her era, Kollontay, through her work with Zhenotdel, was a trailblazer for both socialist and nonsocialist governments in the twentieth century. The emancipation of women from subordination within marriage was the central issue of her agenda. Viewing the traditional family as an outgrowth of feudal social structures rooted in the concept of private property, Kollontay believed that society, rather than the family, should be the source of support for both men and women.

Between 1918 and 1923, Kollontay wrote extensively, calling for the abolition of existing family structures and their replacement with what she called "winged Eros," a form of free love without formal or legal imprimatur. Winged Eros would be free of economic considerations or child-bearing responsibilities, for children would be reared communally, as wards of the state. Even the radical Bolsheviks found the idea abhorrent. Rediscovered by Western feminists in the 1970s, Kollontay became once again an icon in the history of feminist thought.

Kollontay's works include *The Love of Worker Bees* (1923), *The Autobiography of a Sexually Emancipated Woman* (1927), and *Selected Writings* (1978).

See also *Feminism; Feminism, Radical; Feminism, Socialist; Feminist Movement; Feminist Political Theory; Gender and Politics; Lenin, Vladimir Ilich; Marxism.*

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Kropotkin, Peter

Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921) is principally known as a revolutionary anarchist and is particularly regarded as an inspiration to green anarchists. He was born to a land-owning aristocratic family in Moscow, Russia, in 1842. He was educated at home and later the Moscow gymnasium before entering the prestigious Corps of Pages in St. Petersburg, a military school whose students served as pages to the imperial court. In 1861, the same year as the emancipation of the serfs, Kropotkin, as the best student in his class, served as personal page to Emperor Alexander II.

Kropotkin then chose to join an obscure Cossack regiment in eastern Siberia. His letters from this time to his brother, to whom he was especially close, indicate that Kropotkin was already critical of the government and was keen to be useful to his fellow man. In Siberia, he undertook studies of the surrounding geography and nature and involved himself in (largely unsuccessful) reform projects. His later writings would continue this twin focus on the natural and political environments. In 1867, Kropotkin resigned from the military and entered St. Petersburg University, where he studied mathematics and worked for the Russian Geographical Society. In 1872 Kropotkin travelled to Switzerland, then home to a number of radical Russian émigrés, but to his regret failed to meet the anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, by whom he was greatly influenced.

On his return to St. Petersburg, Kropotkin joined the radical Tchaikovsky circle, which held to the principles of collective landholding, autonomy, and egalitarianism. He rejected the Western route to socialism via industrialization and proletarianization. Instead, the principal influences on Kropotkin's thought would remain French philosopher Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's antistatism; Bakunin's emphasis on mass insurrection, which might include violent revolution; and the example of the peasant communes.

In 1874, Kropotkin was arrested and imprisoned for his political activities, but through family influence he was transferred

from a political prison to a less harsh hospital prison when he became seriously ill. After his recovery he was able to escape, seeking refuge first in Britain and then Switzerland, where he married fellow radical Sofia Ananeva-Rabinovich. He was later expelled from Switzerland and imprisoned in France before eventually settling in London. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, Kropotkin returned to Russia, where he was treated with toleration by the Bolshevik regime and was apparently admired by Lenin.

During Kropotkin's long exile, he wrote and lectured extensively. His work appeared in an impressive range of outlets such as the anarchist paper *Le Révolté,* which he cofounded; the *Atlantic Monthly;* the respected scientific journal *Nature;* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica.* His books include a study of the role of the masses in the French Revolution (1789–1799), an examination of the tsarist tyranny in Russia, and *Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution* (1902), in which he refutes the primacy of the competitive drive in social Darwinist theory. His best-known work is *Memoirs of a Revolutionary* (1899), but his clearest and most detailed descriptions of anarchist society are *The Conquest of Bread* (1892) and *Fields, Factories and Workshops* (1899).

See also *Anarchism; Bakunin, Mikhail; Bolshevism; Lenin, Vladimir Ilich; Political Theory; Russian Political Thought.*

. . . . KERRI WOODS

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Kuhn, Thomas

Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996) was an American historian and philosopher of science. His book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) has been an enormously influential text for all subsequent students of the nature and logic of scientific and social scientific inquiry.

According to standard views, science is a rational, cumulative process in which discovery builds upon discovery, theory builds upon theory, and the growth of scientific knowledge is linear and relatively constant. Kuhn's historical investigations suggested a very different view. According to Kuhn, there are two kinds of science. Normal science—which includes most science—is always undertaken internal to a particular *paradigm*, a worldview that comprises or is constituted by a distinctive set of methodological, conceptual, theoretical, and even metaphysical presuppositions. The task of normal science is to pursue the implications of the paradigm and, in particular, to explain findings or phenomena that seem puzzling or anomalous. Revolutionary science, on the other hand, occurs when anomalous results turn out to be so numerous or important as to undermine the authority of the paradigm. In such a circumstance, the revolutionary scientist proposes an entirely new paradigm—a radically different way of thinking about things; a new worldview emerges that can explain formerly anomalous findings and that gives rise, in turn, to a new practice of normal science. The Copernican theory of planetary motion is a standard case of Kuhnian paradigm change.

In political science, critics of mainstream behavioralism used—and sometimes misused—Kuhn to question the claims and ambitions of those who sought a truly objective science of political behavior involving the formulation of testable empirical hypotheses, the gathering of large sets of data in strictly quantified form, and the rigorous application of statistical tests. These critics argued that behavioralism was, at best, merely one paradigm among many. Hence, behaviorist claims to objectivity were, allegedly for Kuhnian reasons, untenable and political science ought to be, instead, a multiparadigmatic discipline that embraces a wide range of methodological, epistemological, and political perspectives.

See also *Political Attitudes and Behavior.*

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Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement that contains legally binding greenhouse gas emissions targets for industrialized (Annex 1) countries. Signatories committed to cutting their combined emissions of six key greenhouse gases to 5.2 percent below 1990 levels by 2008 to 2012, with each country agreeing to its own specific target. For instance, Japan was expected to achieve a 5 percent reduction, while the European Union (EU) had a target of -8 percent. Low emitters, such as Norway and Iceland were permitted to increase their emissions.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL'S GENESIS

In 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) established an international framework to gather and share information, strategies, and policies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to climate change, and to provide technical and financial support to developing countries. While the UNFCCC

Students in Beijing, China, hold up a sign in support of the Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement that aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in industrialized nations.

benefits from nearly universal membership, it contains no formal obligations.

Recognizing the need for binding commitments, the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) adopted the Kyoto Protocol at its third meeting in 1997 and was implemented in February 2005. The world's largest emitter, the United States, never ratified the treaty.

POLICY MECHANISMS

While there is wide discretion as to how countries meet their obligations through national policies (alternative energy sources, transportation, land use, etc.), the Kyoto Protocol introduced market-based mechanisms to stimulate technology transfer, private sector involvement, or to enhance the cost effectiveness of meeting targets through reductions in other countries. Creating a *carbon market*, these mechanisms include: *emissions trading* among Annex 1 countries; *joint implementation,* allowing an Annex 1 country to earn carbon credits for projects that reduce emissions or enhance carbon sinks in other Annex 1 countries; and *clean development mechanisms,* permitting Annex 1 countries to accrue credits for projects in non–Annex 1 countries.

SIGNIFICANCE

The Kyoto Protocol is the first and only climate change treaty as of 2009. Its detractors emphasize that its targets, to be reached by 2012, are relatively short term, affect a limited number of developed countries, and require no firm commitments from rapidly industrializing countries—most notably China and India. The U.S. rejection of the treaty is also often singled out as a major failure. In terms of achieving emissions reductions, the treaty had not fulfilled its initial targets as of 2009, though some sixteen industrialized countries were on target. At that time it was unclear if the industrialized countries would realize the goal of 5.2 percent reduction in greenhouse gases by 2012.

The Kyoto Protocol established a global climate regime, set specific targets (see Table 1) and timetables, and developed an institutional framework with flexible implementation mechanisms. While much of the focus is on national level targets and

TABLE 1: KYOTO PROTOCOL TARGETS

COUNTRY	TARGET (1990**– 2008/2012)
EU-15*, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Monaco, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland	–8%
United States	–7%
Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland	–6%
Croatia	–5%
New Zealand, Russian Federation, Ukraine	0
Norway	1%
Australia	8%
Iceland	10%

SOURCE: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol. http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/3145.php

   *The 15 States who were EU members in 1990 will redistribute their targets among themselves, taking advantage of a scheme under the Protocol known as a "bubble," whereby countries have different individual targets, but which combined make an overall target for that group of countries. The EU has already reached agreement on how its targets will be redistributed.

   **Some Economies in Transition (EITs) have a baseline other than 1990.

implementation, the effects of a climate regime are much more diffuse. Increased awareness of climate change and support for action has manifested in policy change at the local level. As of August 2009, more than seven hundred local authorities participate in the Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) Campaign, including a number of major U.S. cities.

FUTURE INFLUENCES

While the obligations under the Kyoto Protocol expire in 2012, its influence will continue. The next phase of negotiations is scheduled to take place in Copenhagen, Denmark in December 2009, and will build on the framework and mechanisms already established. The European Union emissions trading scheme, established in 2005 as a result of the Kyoto Protocol, is likely to be the cornerstone of an eventual global climate regime.

See also *Climate Change Summits, United Nations; Environmental Policy; Environmental Political Theory; International Cooperation.*

. . . .   BETSI BEEM

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Labor Policy

Government involvement and scholarly interest in labor policy have been consistently strong for several decades. The post–oil shock unemployment crisis of the 1970s, combined with the growing importance of the service versus the manufacturing sector in the industrialized world that followed, created conditions of economic hardship that, for most governments, were serious enough to mandate substantive policy responses. These responses, which have included a broad assortment of policy instruments, have been divergent—in both scope and level of effectiveness. Scholarly interest in labor policy, then, has focused not only on identifying and explaining specific policy responses to the aforementioned developments, but on comparatively evaluating government labor policy programs.

Another substantive area of political science research related to labor policy is the issue of *industrial democracy*. With the ascension of social democratic and labor parties in western Europe during the 1950s and 1960s came significant government efforts to democratize capitalism at the point of production. Such efforts have included *codetermination* laws designed to enhance worker participation in company boardroom decision-making processes and so-called quality of work life initiatives targeted at promoting greater participatory rights for workers on the shop floor and other places of employment.

ACTIVE AND PASSIVE LABOR MARKET POLICIES

Government involvement in matters concerning the labor market has been most substantial in the advanced industrial democracies, particularly in western Europe. Such involvement has been characterized by the use of both passive and active labor market policies. Passive labor market policies include such instruments as unemployment benefits, severance pay policies, and various disability benefits. These traditional policies are called passive because they are designed simply to provide financial assistance to workers during unemployment or disability. As such, they do little if anything to enhance workers' employability, skill levels, or technical competence. Such objectives are more commonly associated with active labor market policies, which were first instituted in western Europe in the 1960s. As active labor market policies have been associated with such ambitious objectives as promoting economic growth and transforming labor market characteristics, such initiatives, despite receiving slightly less government financial support than their passive counterparts, have received the bulk of attention from the policy analysis community.

Active labor market policies (ALMP) were initially developed in response to certain labor market conditions that were created by the sustained period of rapid economic growth following World War II (1939–1945). ALMP, it was thought, could be employed (on a limited and temporary basis) to prevent labor market bottlenecks and other demand-side labor market problems that might prove detrimental to existing growth patterns. In contrast, during the 1970s and 1980s, as mentioned above, ALMP were used much more comprehensively in an effort to counter problems caused by the slow growth and high unemployment that had come to plague the industrial democracies. This comprehensive approach to ALMP persists today in many countries, as governments seem to have reached the conclusion that permanent, active involvement in labor markets is vital to long-term economic stability.

Active labor market policies have been designed to achieve a number of objectives. For instance, governments in many countries typically employ such ALMP as direct job creation programs, wage subsidies, job-training subsidies or grants, and subsidies and other financial supports for self-employment initiatives to counter economic downturns. They also utilize wage subsidies, job search assistance, and worker retraining programs to reduce problems caused by decline in the manufacturing sector and other structural economic changes. Governments seeking to enhance labor force skills and productivity also frequently use job training and retraining programs. Finally, some ALMP are aimed at supporting specific societal groups, such as women or the disabled. Here, governments have employed such policy instruments as employment counseling, job search assistance programs, training or retraining grants, wage subsidies, antidiscrimination regulations, and informal or formal quotas.

Scholars such as Richard Layard (and colleagues) and Peter Katzenstein have suggested that in countries such as Austria and the Scandinavian democracies, where industrial and active labor market policies have been most comprehensively and systematically implemented, governments have demonstrated an ability to successfully sustain satisfactory economic

performance levels during difficult periods of structural economic change, most notably the decline in the manufacturing sector in the 1980s. While acknowledging that dramatic reductions in manufacturing employment levels similar to those experienced in other advanced capitalist countries were eventually realized in these smaller European democracies, these authors suggest that through systematic ALMP programs, their governments could effectively manage processes of economic adjustment while avoiding the kinds of structural unemployment problems and other hardships experienced by workers in countries like Britain and the United States, where governmental use of ALMP has been much less extensive. These conclusions have been tempered somewhat by the work of authors such as John Martin and Robert Flanagan, who argue that, in general, ALMP have thus far been only marginally successful in addressing such labor market challenges as structural unemployment and the need for greater labor mobility. Comprehensive Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) studies of the macro impact of labor policies have reached few definitive conclusions.

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY INITIATIVES

Another topic associated with labor policy is industrial democracy. Related primarily to the established democracies of western Europe, industrial democracy policies are designed to enhance worker participation in the capitalist economy at the level of the individual business firm. Such policies have mandated expansions in employee information concerning changes in company policy, consultative rights for workers, and participation by workers in management decision-making practices—both at the company boardroom and on shop floor levels. In Germany, for example, the government has promoted industrial democracy through various postwar codetermination and works constitution acts. The Codetermination Act of 1976, for instance, mandated that supervisory boards composed of equal numbers of employee and employer representatives be created for firms with at least two thousand employees. These boards have either consultation or codetermination (with management) rights in areas such as work time scheduling, overtime policies, vacation time planning, occupational safety issues, wage scales, rules for hiring or dismissal of workers, and job classification policies.

While generally popular among employees and their respective trade unions, the practice of codetermination has of late been viewed by employer associations in a more critical light. In Germany, for instance, recent modifications to codetermination laws seem to have been driven by the demands of industrial firms to reduce the consultative authority of advisory boards to allow for greater managerial decision-making flexibility, which is seen by capital as being essential in today's increasingly competitive global economy. Furthermore, German employers, concerned with remaining competitive within the single European market, have articulated the need to further adjust Germany's codetermination practices to bring them more in line with the less extensive codetermination laws in the European Union's other member countries.

Besides enhancing labor's decision-making powers at the company boardroom level, industrial democracy initiatives have been directed also toward the shop floor. In Sweden, among other countries, quality of work life (QWL) programs were established by public law to promote substantive rank-and-file participation on matters directly related to the production process. Through regularly scheduled consultative meetings, worker input is encouraged in a number of areas, such as production methods, technology usage, and product refinement. Here, the goal is not only to increase workplace democracy, but to enhance worker productivity and overall product quality as well. The elimination of assembly-line production techniques in many Swedish industries, which has been linked to both greater worker job satisfaction levels and enhanced labor productivity, has been attributed in part to QWL dialogue sessions.

Research related to industrial and workplace democracy has centered around three general topics of interest. First, some scholars have been concerned about determining the extent to which industrial democracy efforts have actually promoted greater, more meaningful labor force participation in the capitalist economy. Second, scholars interested in determining the effects of corporate governance laws on the economic competitiveness of business firms have attempted to examine the impacts that industrial democracy initiatives, most notably codetermination laws, have had on such issues as managerial flexibility and company responses to global economic challenges. Finally, some research has focused on labor productivity levels and how they have been impacted by codetermination laws and QWL measures. Regarding the first two areas of scholarship, conclusions vary depending on the country being analyzed, as the various case studies contained in a volume edited by M. Donald Hancock and colleagues indicate. As for the issue of labor productivity, much more consensus prevails, with the bulk of scholarly analysis suggesting notably positive relationships between the extent of industrial democracy (particularly shop floor initiatives) and labor productivity levels.

See also *Collective Action and Mobilization; Economic Policy Formulation; Industrial Democracy; International Labor Standards; Labor Strikes; Labor Unions; Workers' Rights.*

. . . .   MARK GOBEYN

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Labor Strikes

A labor strike is a mass work stoppage by union members designed to disrupt business production or the provision of services. A strike normally takes place in response to a critical impasse in negotiations between a union and an employer in collective bargaining. Electing to withdraw one's labor as part of a concerted strike action is the most powerful form of leverage available to workers, given the power imbalance inherent in the employment relationship. Labor strikes are designed to exert pressure on the employer to come to an agreement with the union on the terms and conditions of employment.

Labor strikes, which were legalized in most advanced capitalist countries in the early twentieth century, are regulated by a strict legal framework and are seen as a last, but often necessary, resort when a labor union and an employer cannot reach an agreement in collective bargaining.

A labor union's ability to strike is often juxtaposed with an employer's ability to lock out its workers. In a lockout situation, an employer withholds work from union members and denies them access to the workplace to exert pressure on the union to settle the collective agreement.

Workers who are on strike or who have been locked out normally picket their workplaces to advise the public of the labor dispute and discourage customers from doing business with the employer. Picket lines are used also to dissuade replacement workers, often referred to as strikebreakers or scabs, from performing the work of striking union members. Labor strikes are sometimes associated with picket line violence, motivated primarily by the tension caused by an employer's decision to hire scab labor. To offset the loss of wages experienced by striking union members, labor unions typically distribute pay to union members who participate in picket duty.

The success of a labor strike is often measured by what the union gained in the long term, rather than what it sacrificed in the short term, by engaging in industrial action. Prolonged strikes normally cause deep-rooted resentment between the union and management, as well as between union supporters and strikebreakers.

Although labor strikes normally take place within the regulatory frameworks imposed by states, instances of illegal strike activity are not unprecedented. Workers infrequently engage in wildcat strikes (illegal work stoppages that occur while a collective agreement is in force), sympathy strikes (striking in support of another striking union local to demonstrate solidarity), and general strikes (a concerted effort by several unions across several industries to strike all at once to shut down a city's economy). Labor strikes also have been used as political weapons to pressure elected governments into agreeing to the demands of the labor movement. These more militant forms of illegal strike activity usually are treated with open hostility by the state, often resulting in fines and even imprisonment for labor union leaders.

A more moderate variation of the conventional labor strike is a tactic known as *work-to-rule*. Union members engaged in a work-to-rule campaign do not withdraw their labor completely, but rather continue to perform their work duties exactly as required by the collective agreement, without any extra effort. A work-to-rule campaign could, for example, take the form of a mass refusal to work voluntary overtime, or a strict adherence to complex occupational health and safety regulations to slow production. Work-to-rule campaigns often are launched in response to specific workplace grievances during the life of a collective agreement. This type of workplace action is popular in the public sector, where the conventional right to strike is more restricted. A large proportion of public sector union members do not enjoy a statutory right to strike by virtue of working in what governments have deemed "essential services."

The incidence of labor strikes in most advanced capitalist countries has been in decline since the 1970s because of structural shifts in the economy, the deradicalization of the labor movement, and the state's increasingly hostile attitude toward the right to strike and labor rights. The decline in the incidence of labor strikes has closely reflected declines in levels of union density, the proportion of a country's nonagricultural workforce belonging to labor unions.

See also *Collective Action, Theory of; Collective Action and Mobilization; Economic Policy Formulation; Industrial Democracy; International Labor Standards; Labor Policy; Labor Unions; Marxism; New Right; Protests and Demonstrations; Syndicalism; Workers' Rights.*

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Labor Unions

Labor unions are collective workers' organizations, and their central purpose is to represent employee interests vis-à-vis employers and the state through collective bargaining and political action. While the earliest unions were formed to protect the interest of skilled trades and craft workers in the eighteenth century, these organizations enjoyed no formal

legal status. Technological advancements in the late nineteenth century radically altered the mode of economic production and gave birth to industrial-based labor unions representing primarily blue-collar workers. The growing popularity and discontent of labor unions during this period forced governments to afford legal recognition to unions in exchange for labor's acceptance of a highly regulated system of labor relations. The subsequent recognition and growth of public sector unions changed the predominantly male, blue-collar character of organized labor by dramatically increasing the proportion of women and white-collar workers belonging to labor unions. Thanks in part to the state's legal recognition of labor unions, organized labor reached its peak in terms of union density, the percentage of the nonagricultural workforce belonging to unions, in the years following World War II (1939–1945).

Labor unions are generally organized along industry lines with affiliated union locals representing workers at individual workplaces or in specific geographic locations. Unions typically work together as part of the broader labor movement to promote the political aims and objectives of the working class. In most advanced capitalist countries—with the exception of the United States—unions share close ties to socialist or social democratic political parties. This party-union relationship is premised on the belief that unions have a direct stake in influencing broad areas of public policy to achieve a degree of social justice and economic equality for the benefit of the working class. Labor unions are credited with playing a key role in welfare state expansion and progressive labor law reform, including the enactment of a minimum wage, a reduced workday, and workers' compensation.

Collective bargaining is the central function of labor unions. Through this process, unions and employers negotiate legally binding employment contracts, known as collective agreements, which protect union members in a particular workplace or industry. Collective agreements typically outline wages, working conditions, grievance procedures, benefit entitlements, and other rules governing the employment relationship.

To exert greater pressure on employers in collective bargaining, members of labor unions sometimes will vote to engage in strike action by withdrawing their labor, thereby disrupting business production or the provision of services. Strikes are the most powerful form of leverage available to unions. Labor unions are charged also with representing union members in grievance disputes with management over adherence to the collective agreement.

The value and desirability of labor unions is highly contested. Unsympathetic neoclassical accounts of organized labor primarily focus on unions' ability to develop labor monopolies that drive up wages and interfere with the functioning of the free market. From this perspective, labor unions are essentially viewed as businesses charged with protecting the economic welfare of union members at the expense of nonunion workers and corporate profits. On the other hand, Marxist accounts of organized labor view the development of workers' organizations as the inevitable outgrowth of capitalist class divisions. Although theoretically well positioned to spread class consciousness and advance the cause of socialism, the Marxist view generally argues that most labor unions in advanced capitalist societies have accepted the logic and desirability of capitalism and therefore have lost any serious revolutionary potential. Institutionalist scholars view the growth and development of labor unions as a response to harsh and often unsafe working conditions that accompanied the introduction of the Industrial Revolution. From this perspective, labor unions are seen as a counterweight to the dominant power of business and an important agent of workplace democracy. In other words, labor unions assist in humanizing capitalist employment relations without necessarily questioning the legitimacy of the system.

Union membership in most advanced capitalist democracies has been in decline since the 1970s, corresponding with the ascent of neoliberalism and the new right. This decline is largely due to structural shifts in political economy, deindustrialization, globalization, trade liberalization, strong employer resistance to unionization, and unsympathetic government policy in labor law.

See also *Collective Action, Theory of; Collective Action and Mobilization; Economic Policy Formulation; Industrial Democracy; International Labor Standards; Labor Strikes; Marxism; New Right; Syndicalism; Workers' Rights.*

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Laicite

Laicite is the French ideal of a secular society with a distinct separation between church and state. Laicite emphasizes individual religious freedom as well as organized religion free from state intervention and sponsorship. Laicite originates from the French Revolution (1789–1799), when the absolute monarchy collapsed along with the overthrow of contemporary political and social order. Prior to the revolution, the Catholic Church had considerable economic and political power, but afterward subsequent French governments confiscated the church's landholdings and wealth, eliminating many of the privileges of the clergy.

In 1801, an agreement between Napoleon Bonaparte and Pope Pius VII known as The 1801 Concordat restored the

Roman Catholic Church as the majority religion in France, but did not declare Catholicism as the official religion of the state. The Concordat reinforced the religious freedoms mandated in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, adopted by the French National Constituent Assembly during the revolution and introduced man's universal human rights into the French constitution. In 1905, laicite was more fully developed and protected by legislation, which forbade state support for any religion and banned religious education in the public schools.

Other countries, including Belgium, Brazil, Turkey, and the United States, have enacted similar laws and customs to practice secularism. More recently, with increases in immigration in the late twentieth century, new challenges have been posed to the French concepts of laicite prompting legislation in 2004 to ban religious garb, including Islamic headscarves, Christian crosses, Jewish Stars of David, or Sikh turbans, in the French public school system. However, some French laicite regulations have been criticized as too stringent and discriminatory, needing reform. French president Nicolas Sarkozy has publicly urged a more active role for faith in French public life and met with Pope Benedict XVI in 2007; however, despite attempts at modest reform, Sarkozy as well as the majority of France continue to advocate for a strong separation between religious practices and domestic politics.

See also *Church and State; Freedom of Conscience; Freedom of Religion; French Political Thought; Investiture; Secularism.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Laissez-faire

The apocryphal origin of the term *laissez-faire* is traced to Jean-Baptiste Colbert, finance minister to Louis XIV in seventeenth-century France. Colbert, who believed in state wealth and regulation (turning France into "a nation of shopkeepers" according to English political economist Adam Smith), at one time asked a group of manufacturers what the state might do for them. One replied, "*Laissez nous faire,*" translated as "let us do" or "leave us alone." These words, recorded by French physiocrats in the eighteenth century who believed in unhindered commerce, were later taken up by influential thinkers such as Smith, who made them famous in his work *The Wealth of Nations,* first published in 1789. While writing of the free exchange and trade of goods, Smith shied away from the term *laissez-faire* itself, which is now closely associated with him, especially in the rise of capitalism and free trade in nineteenth-century Europe. Meanwhile, economic historians often note that the physiocrats stood more for "*pas trop gouverner*" (do not govern too much) than a complete hands-off approach. Advocates of laissez-faire agree on minimal government intervention in the economy; the debates are on what minimal would constitute. Smith himself relegated issues such as defense, currency, education, and control of monopolies to public means. The popular meaning of the term *laissez-faire* now refers to minimal government interventions and unhindered capitalism, markets, and commerce thereof.

EUROPEAN ORIGINS

Ideas of laissez-faire contain several antecedents in the moral political economy of the modern era. That human beings should profit from their enterprise and be allowed to exchange the product of their labors can be traced back to Niccolò Machiavelli, who distinguished between "virtue" that is acquired and "fortune" given from birth. He privileged virtue, the exercise of which he saw as the source of good governance. However, Machiavelli's contribution to a laissez-faire approach lies in favoring virtuous conduct among individuals, consistent with Renaissance philosophy; ideas of a noninterventionist state arose later. For example, French physiocrats likened the economy to a human body, believing that a natural harmony among various parts was possible if economic flows were continued unhindered and each part was allowed to function independently with its productive capacity encouraged. Adam Smith would reflect this idea of moral harmony in his writings on political economy, speaking of the "invisible hand" that guides productive endeavors:

> It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. (Smith, 1977, 18)

Ideas of self-love were also part of Scottish Enlightenment, which Smith furthered. For Smith, self-love and self-interest would generate growth and wealth rather than the visible hand of the state.

The growth of the English Industrial Revolution, attributed to economic incentives rather than regulation, boosted laissez-faire ideas and capitalism itself. In particular, enforcement of private property rights created large landholdings. The increased economies of scale from production and the consequent fall in the prices of products along with improvement in the means of transportation led to the creation and unification of national markets and search for international ones. By the mid-nineteenth century, exports accounted for about 20 percent of Britain's national product. German markets began to be unified with the creation of the *Zollverein,* or the customs union, in 1834. France, by the mid-nineteenth century, was the leading producer of textiles on the continent. Modern markets were themselves a result of the Industrial Revolution.

The repeal of corn laws in Britain in 1846 was a triumph of industry over agriculture and followed the tilt of British legislative policies in Britain, which began to favor industrial towns over the agricultural countryside by the 1830s. These changes in the 1850s might be seen as the climacteric toward free trade in Britain followed by continental Europe. Again, free exchange and possibilities of peace were emphasized in intellectual thought best summarized in French economist Frédéric Bastiat's words: "Where goods do not cross frontiers, armies will."

DECLINE AND RENEWAL

Between the late nineteenth century and World War II (1939–1945), laissez-faire ideas declined as many countries turned again to restrictions on trade and policies of mercantilism enforced through the visible hand of the state. This rise in protectionism coincided with the growth of the modern welfare state, central planning, and public ownership. Criticism of these developments was leveled by thinkers like Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises, who argued that the calculations required to sustain an economy were too complex for central planners. The Austrian school (which included F. A. Hayek and von Mises) and the Chicago school (including Milton Friedman) of economists intensified their defense of laissez-faire in the mid-twentieth century in response not only to the Soviet and Chinese central planning models, which they attacked as inimical to human freedom and enterprise, but also to Keynesian policies that grew the welfare state in the West. Meanwhile, at the international level, the foundation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 led to progressive doses of liberalized, if not free, trade among its member states. GATT evolved to become the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995; together the two bodies have undertaken nine major rounds of liberalizing trade negotiations among countries.

CONCLUSION

Despite the continuing presence of the WTO and other regional trade blocs, the cause of free trade is increasingly in jeopardy, at least in Western countries, due to slow growth rates, global financial crises, and fears of imports from emerging markets. Academic and policy communities question whether unregulated self-interest or markets by themselves generate wealth and consumer welfare without leading to vast income inequalities or deleterious business cycles. The political will to open international markets is also declining. Nevertheless, world exports of goods and services were at an all-time high of $15.8 trillion and $3.7 trillion, respectively, in 2008. Domestically, capitalism is flourishing, even if government intervention occurs in varying degrees. Nevertheless, despite a brief period of success in the 1980s influencing U.S. president Ronald Reagan and British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, laissez-faire advocates have yet to win the battle of ideas in politics. The political fortunes of laissez-faire from Colbert's France to the current regime in Communist China have been tied up in economic interests and their ability to persuade the state to "let go."

See also *Capitalism and Democracy; Free Trade; Hayek, Freidrich August von; Liberal Theory; Smith, Adam; Trade Diplomacy.*

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Land Use, Urban

See *Urban Land Use and Town Planning*

Language and Language Policy

Language policy involves taking an official or authoritative stand about languages and the use of languages in a given territory or state. Language policy that legitimizes language X may be perceived by the users of language Y to disfavor their language. Therefore, there are usually political, social, economic, and cultural consequences when one language is made official while others are not, making language policy not only a linguistic issue, but a political issue as well.

Language policy specialists are interested in the outcome of language acquisition, language use, and language change as a product of state-citizen relations. Language public policy studies are gravitating toward the following five special issue areas: linguistic history and etymology; official language policies and nation-building; language and culture; monolingualism, bilingualism, and multilingualism; and language policy management and development.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LANGUAGE POLICY

While ancient languages abound, the written records of the kinds of language policies employed by ancient states have yet to be uncovered. From our contemporary perspective, the systematic treatment and study of language only appeared much later in the work of post-Enlightenment phenomenologists. Edmund Husserl and Ludwig von Wittgenstein were two nineteenth century European phenomenologists who exemplify research interest in the structure of language. The existentialist tradition in the work of French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre and the ontological value of language and technology in German philosopher Martin Heidegger's work represent some of the more interesting turning points in contemporary political theory. Most modern political philosophers and political theorists themselves often focus on language and meaning. In *Language Policy and Modernity in Southeast Asia,* Antonio L. Rappa and Lionel Wee raise the complexities involved in understanding the social construction of language and the political consequences of the nonneutral construction of language in terms of linguistic instrumentalism, displacement, complementarity, equivalence, and language management systems.

The resources for language policy analysts include Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure's linguistic structuralism and theory of the signifier and the signified (*document de langue*).

French anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss viewed culture as a system of symbolic communication but through diachronic analyses rather than Saussure's synchronic analysis. Anthropologists Bronislaw Malinowski and Franz Boaz examined variations in genealogical linguistic histories. American linguist Noam Chomsky's ideas about surface structure and deep structure as *a priori* semantic constituents continue to dominate the study of language and its subfields. George Lakoff, an American student of Chomsky's interpretive semantics, built on Chomsky's structured/nonstructured rules involving reality-dependent grammar (native experts) rather than a grammar-dependent reality (scientific experts). In the "linguistic wars" that followed in the 1960s and 1970s, Lakoff and his collaborators tried to show how reality was an important variable in generative semantics—that is, influencing grammatical rules that governed phrase structure. But it was only in his coauthored book with Mark Johnson published in 1980, *Metaphors We Live By,* that Lakoff presented the seminal nature of his thesis: metaphor is central to political reality. Nonmetaphorical work is reserved mainly for descriptors of a physical science of the world. Metaphors tend to generate embedded nuances within vocabularies and the larger paradigms within which cultures exist. Hence, a single metaphorical unit can represent a potentially infinite set of meanings within a given culture. In the case of the Inuit, metaphors used in Inuit share the larger linguistic material of Eskimo languages; this is similar in standard Thai, Bahasa Malaysia, and Bahasa Indonesia. An officially recognized language with an abundant set of metaphors is likely to be a more useful policy instrument.

SHIFTING LANGUAGE AND LANGUAGE POLICY

Some scholars of language policy believe that languages tend to "shift" or evolve over time. Therefore, it would be useful for scholars to study an official language's evolution. This is especially important if the language in question might impact the existing government policies on language. For example, Joshua A. Fishman's graded intergenerational disruption scale in language policy analysis might be used to understand how languages shift. Rappa and Wee adapted the Fishman scale to examine how "an indigenous language, while widely used in highly prestigious domains, can, over time, become restricted to 'mere' community and family-based interactions" (2006, 131). An example of this is the *Papia Kristang* (the language of the Christians), a Eurasian Portuguese creole that arrived in Southeast Asia in 1511, that suffers from the fact that:

> as younger generations of speakers lose touch with the language so that most speakers tend to come from the older generations, there is, in the final stage, a very real possibility that indigenous language may be completely displaced . . . correlating with this decline in the fortunes of the indigenous language, of course, is the rise of its potential replacement, English. (131)

A significant contribution to the understanding of language policy and meaning comes from the postmodern and poststructural schools associated with Jean Baudrillard, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Henry S. Kariel, Jacques Lacan, Jean-François Lyotard, and Richard Rorty. Their complex analytical methods deconstruct language formations and language games as discursive power arrangements that impact society, culture, gender, class, and citizenship and the state to examine the marginal, the *other*, voice and noiselessness, contingency, weak ontology, simulacra, and "origins" in language policy.

THE IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE POLICY

Language policies are important because governments have long known that languages are valuable political tools of communication and control. Indeed, language policy is so important that very often official policies exist about how languages ought to be studied and taught within a given education system. Within democracies, there are often large lobbies for language recognition. While the United States, for example, does not have an official language policy, the wide use of Spanish within the American polity had led to Spanish being used in many government departments, offices, and bureaus. Because language itself is a very sensitive issue that can raise emotional feelings among people, language policies and their policy makers have to tread carefully as some language policies can do more harm than good.

In conclusion, research on language policy remains a very important area in policy studies and political science, as language policy is about legitimizing or "authorizing" a predominant human language in a given territory. The debates within language policy are significant for a large variety of political and linguistic reasons, including the life of the language itself, the value of the language to the people within a given language community, and the financial support that follows government policies on language.

See also *Language and Politics; Mexican Immigration; Multiculturalism; Nationality; Political Culture; Tradition.*

. . . .   ANTHONY L. RAPPA

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Language and Politics

Anthropologists, social psychologists, and linguists have long known that language is not usefully thought of as a mechanism that conveys meaning all by itself. Meaning, political and

otherwise, is always a function of the context from which it springs. It is as dependent on the various needs, desires, myths, and legends that inform the society interpreting it as it is on the literal meaning of the words used to articulate it.

In *Doing What Comes Naturally* (1989), Stanley Fish targeted the political actor's ambitions by stating in the preface that "the realm of the probable—of what is likely to be so given particular conditions within some local perspective—is the only relevant realm of consideration for human beings." Given this abrogation of absolute truth, a political scientist, in the full majesty of the scientific project, might question the prominent role language has historically maintained in the political maneuverings of actors in the allocation of goods and values. One might assert that appropriation backed up by the credible threat, or actual application of violence, is the most measurably direct way to power, whereas nothing is directly appropriated by talk. What has been overlooked in such a stance is the cost of the opposition to one's appropriations, and it is to limit these costs that rhetoric has found its place in the political game.

The use of language to morally justify an action is precisely what makes politics distinct from other methods of allocating values. Not only is such language useful in homogenizing the reactions of one's allies to an action, but it can win the acquiescence of others whose lasting support is needed to reduce the possible opposition to one's own plans. In this way discourse has become the measure of long-lasting political effectiveness as opposed to the more immediately satisfying, but ultimately unstable, outcomes resulting from violent conquest. As Fish (1989) notes, it is not that the categories of the true and the good have been abandoned, "but that in different contexts they will be filled differently and that there exists no master context . . . from the vantage point of which the differences could be assessed" (478). Fish goes on to state that "truth itself is a contingent affair and assumes a different shape in the light of differing local urgencies and the convictions associated with them" (481).

Most pragmatists locate the origins of rhetorical, as opposed to philosophical, truth in the rise of democracies in fifth century BCE Greece. In 1907 Ferdinand C. S. Schiller wrote that "the rise of democracies rendered a higher education and a power of public speaking a *sine qua non* of political influence—and what acted probably as a still stronger incentive—of the safety of the life and property, particularly of the wealthier classes" (31). Language is an important catalyst for political action, because without it leaders could not serve the groups seeking political favors while encouraging spectators to abstract reassurances from a complex environment. Democracies have long realized that unmediated force equals weakness in politics just as it does in marriage. Because democratic politics is primarily about nonviolent persuasion and language is the least violent means of political persuasion we possess, the symbiotic relationship enjoyed by language and politics is crucial to effective democratic life.

A strong example of the subliminal nature of much political language is the speech act. John L. Austin is credited with describing, if not naming, the speech act in his 1962 book *How to Do Things with Words,* in which he introduces an illocutionary (or speech) act as the idea that "by saying something, we *do* something," as when a minister joins two people in marriage by saying, "I now pronounce you husband and wife" (1975, 108). In law, and by extension therefore in politics, certain phrases have all the import of acts, as when a person says that "I nominate Hillary Clinton to be president," "I sentence you to life imprisonment," or "I promise I'll pay you back on Thursday." In these examples the implicit authority or promises confirmed by such statements carry with them meaning significant enough to garner respect or raise expectations that should the speakers fail to follow through with their declaration or should they be made by someone without authority to speak, then there are real consequences in the world.

THE LANGUAGE OF POLITICS

Political language is at its most efficient when it is reifying an abstraction, a valuable asset in a contemporary political culture that deals in abstractions to a remarkable degree. Despite being an abstraction, the "state" for example has become a potent and obsessively protected symbol entirely on the basis of the language that describes it. It is part of a movement that has developed that encourages citizens to focus their political imagination on the quantitatively remote and symbolic aspects of urban life and away from the qualitatively personal relationships of family and community. This trend has magnified the possibility of people being manipulated through vague symbols that still engage them emotionally, albeit with less and less conscious comprehension over time. This becomes an even greater problem when cultural assumptions clash in heterodox social groupings.

Every culture contains a uniquely parochial system of values in its understanding of linguistic values. As Edward Sapir (1949) notes,

> distinctions which seem inevitable to us may be utterly ignored in languages which reflect an entirely different type of culture while these in turn insist on distinctions which are all but unintelligible to us. . . . It would be difficult in some languages . . . to express the distinction which we feel between 'to kill' and 'to murder' for the simple reason that the underlying legal philosophy which determines our use of these words does not seem natural to all societies. (36)

Even within a single society, there are subtle distinctions in word use that resonate at a different pitch for different audiences. The word *freedom* tends to be favored by those George Lakoff describes in 2004 as employing "strict father" principles to the world. It suggests a "freedom from" removal of constraints so that the actor can engage in self-improvement and familial protection "free" of the interference of dangerous liberals and their ideas. The word *liberty,* on the other hand, speaks to those who favor a "nurturing parent" approach who see civil liberties as a protection that offers citizens the "freedom to" bring out the best in people.

A recurrent problem with political language is its relatively short shelf life. The chronic repetition of stale metaphors

evokes only conditioned and uncritical responses in one's supporters, who are grateful for the opportunity to lapse into a mentally restful state while old clichés wash comfortingly over them. On the other hand, such language produces no material proposals for the opposition to critique. This situation forms the focus of George Orwell's 1946 essay "Politics and the English Language," in which he criticizes the bad writing that signals a political tract: "If the speech he [a political actor] is making is one that he is accustomed to make over and over again, he may be almost unconscious of what he is saying, as one is when one utters the responses in church" (Orwell, 1961, 363). Once a term, or a series of statements, becomes a regular vehicle for expressing group interests, it loses its descriptive qualities, becoming merely evocative and consequently extremely dangerous. To declare that a "worker has nothing to lose but his chains" or to insist on asking "whose side are you on?" during a long strike that threatens the viability of the worker's company creates an uncompromising mood that threatens to transcend the reality of the global marketplace, the incremental value of any offer the company makes, or the sustainable lifestyle that may vanish once the company closes its doors.

While spoken words have the power to create negative outcomes for individuals who rely on their authority for good, language that is never uttered can be equally lethal to rational outcomes. For example, a growing number of unlikely foodstuffs, including flavored soda drinks, most condiments, and even McDonald's salads, contain high-fructose corn syrup. Highly refined corn syrup has been linked for some time to an epidemic of obesity, type 2 diabetes, and heart disease in Americans, including an alarming number of children. To explicitly verbalize the problem is to begin to look for a solution, while for those who cannot or will not articulate the problem, there is no possibility of articulating a solution.

THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE

Political correctness, which seeks to minimize offense to racial, cultural, or other identifiable minority groups, is the result of the increasingly vague understanding people have of the heuristics of language that make up so much of our contemporary lexicon. Critics have argued that political correctness is tantamount to censorship, endangering free speech by limiting what is considered acceptable public discourse in a culture. It has even been argued that political correctness is a Marxist plot to express liberal conceptions of free speech as a pernicious form of social and cultural repression, especially in federally controlled institutions such as government offices and universities.

There is little doubt that word choices have measurable framing effects on the perceptions and attitudes of listeners. The practical question is whether the use of racially derived terms, for example, promotes racist acts and attitudes. In the case of *ascription,* which is to *description* as *racism* is to *race,* it appears inarguable that to view ourselves as relatively variable in terms of personality, behavior, and mood while viewing others as much more predictable in their personal traits damages our ability to

accept them as fully human in ethical, if not ontological, terms. To declare women incapable of parallel parking serves to irrationally and unfairly reduce one's capacity to accept women as deserving of as much respect as men, at least in the realm of vehicular manipulation.

For political science, a concern worthy of analysis is the degree to which people forget to apply thought to the application of self-censorship leading to certain words becoming taboo without sufficient critical evidence to back such an elevation in etymological power. In the United States, the so-called N word is in danger of such critical neglect, in that it is a common expletive among young blacks of a certain generation but is social and political poison coming out of a nonblack person's mouth. In 2008 New York City banned the use of the word *nigger* by all citizens. The ban is a symbolic one and it is, in effect, a plea for the public to stand in solidarity to restigmatize the word, and it underlines the emotion and political potential that can be condensed into a single word.

As documented by Randall Kennedy in *Nigger: The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word* (2002), even words that have slight resemblance to the "troublesome word" have caused problems, such as when David Howard, a white city official in Washington, DC, was forced to resign from his job when he noted that the administration would have to be "niggardly" with its finances in the upcoming year. Black colleagues took offense at his use of the word, and even when it was pointed out that niggardly has no etymological connection to the American word, coming as it does from an Old Norse word meaning a miserly person, and that Howard, who was gay, would not have knowingly maligned another minority, they still insisted that he step down.

Political language has an even darker side, which is generally evoked by the words *propaganda* and *rhetoric,* and although their reputations are much maligned by philosophers they continue to have real political value. At root, effective propaganda does little more than call the attention of a group with shared interests to a proposed line of action that appears to further their interests, as does the federal government's food pyramid. Words and phrases are chosen that permit the broadest possible number of sympathetic associations, which is the criticism aimed at it by more rationally inclined analysts, whereas if those evocative phrases are substituted for clear and truthful declarations, the propagandists fail in their task. Poor propaganda attempts to change citizens' behavior without evoking the concerns of its target audience, since what is valid for philosophy or logic is anathema to propaganda. The worst aspect of effective propaganda is that it offers a substitute for thinking on the part of this group, because someone has already done the thinking that they should have done themselves.

RHETORIC

Contrary to the arguments of philosophers stretching back to Plato, the power of rhetoric is not due to any mystical power in words themselves, or even in their particular arrangement, but rather in the degree to which they answer the emotional and practical needs of human beings. Men have long harbored

the belief that the perfect "pickup line" will result in an infallible series of sexual conquests, whereas the truth is that only on those occasions when the emotional needs of the object of desire match the tenor of the introductory statement will a successful union result.

Not all of the Platonists' complaints are invalid, however; it remains true that accuracy or truth has little currency in rhetoric, because the single criterion of value is that the statement resonates with the beliefs of the target audience. These beliefs may be as irrational or as false as any one might imagine, but if the rhetor fails to conform to the belief systems of the group, no organizational or grammatical principle will bring about a political success. As Richard Rorty (1979) points out, the only political certainty human beings have access to is that "our certainty will be a matter of conversation between persons, rather than a matter of interaction with nonhuman reality" (156). Such a conversation will no doubt be filled with the mixture of sensible and irrational beliefs to which humans are prey. Teachers who hear the phrase "federally mandated testing" will not react to the dictionary definition of those three words but rather will have a Pavlovian response filled with social, economic, and professional anxieties that they might fairly or unfairly believe is directed at curtailing teachers' freedom to teach or even at terminating teachers' employment. Schiller (1907) states that "it is still possible to observe how society establishes an objective order by coercing or cajoling those who are inclined to divergent judgments in moral or aesthetic matters" (38). This cajoling rarely focuses on truth claims made by those who remain socially recalcitrant, as a philosopher might demand, but on the utility an alternative social and political approach promises. Truth claims are relative to individuals, and different individuals might make a series of reasonable but different arguments based on the same evidence that, when contradicted, cause individuals to stop interacting with the heretical speaker. However, utility, varied as it is, when activated rhetorically as a motive, has the power to cause the agent to agree to the principle in order to enjoy the specific benefit that agent has in mind. Rorty believes that winning debates with rhetorical imagination will return us to "where the Sophists were before Plato brought his principle to bear and invented 'philosophical thinking': we shall be looking for an airtight case rather than an unshakeable foundation" (157).

This accumulation of emotional value in individual words led to George Lakoff's (2004) explanation of the power of political framing. In *Don't Think of an Elephant,* Lakoff notes the power of certain words to frame a debate so that one's opponents are constantly defending an emotionally unacceptable position they have been led into by the careless use or dismissal of a trigger word. The Democrats' failure to prevent the phrase "death tax" from framing the debate in the late 1990s rather than the more emotionally neutral "estate tax" caused them to fight the subsequent legislative battle to repeal it on their back foot. Even wealthy Democrats were concerned over the inevitability of a punitive tax on the death of a loved one, to say nothing of the nonaligned public, who were unclear as to what an "estate" might involve but were quite sure about

the finality of death and taxes. When their political naiveté was exposed they were quick to react. In May 2005 Bill Frist, the U.S. Senate majority leader, declared that to defeat the Democratic filibuster against the Republican state supreme court nominees he would employ "the nuclear option." Although Republican PR firms spent millions to rename the attack on the filibuster "the constitutional option," their efforts could not overcome the emotional power with which the word *nuclear* was invested. Such trigger words can mollify and placate just as easily as they can excite and radicalize. Indeed most trigger words, such as *social security, national security, democratic election,* and *military intelligence,* overcome their oxymoronic juxtaposition when they serve to calm the public's fears. When common language is profoundly irrational in its claims, it is wiser to think of it as a heuristic series of cues than a tool for reasoned analysis; to ignore this application in the real world is to ignore the political heart of rhetoric.

Fish (1989) gives the rhetorician of common language a true place in a state's hierarchy of values:

> The skill which produces belief and therefore establishes what, in a particular time and a particular place, is true, is the skill essential to the building of a civilized society. In the absence of a revealed truth, rhetoric is that skill, and in teaching it the sophists were teaching "the one thing that mattered, how to take care of one's own affairs and the business of the state. (481)

See also *Framing and Public Opinion; Orwell, George; Political Communication; Propaganda; Rhetoric.*

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Laski, Harold Joseph

Harold Laski (1893–1950) was a twentieth-century British political theorist and the author of more than twenty books and thousands of articles. He was also a celebrated teacher at the London School of Economics and Politics, a prominent leader in the Labour Party, and a widely read public intellectual

in both Britain and America. His extraordinary career led one Oxford historian to dub 1930s England "The Age of Laski."

Born in Manchester, England, Laski was the son of a successful Jewish cotton shipper. He was a precocious youth who suffered from bad health. At the age of sixteen, Laski met his future wife, Frida Kerry, who encouraged his interest in eugenics and the suffragette movement. His first article, "The Scope of Eugenics" (1910), published in the *Westminster Review,* impressed Francis Galton, the scientist who founded eugenics. Laski entered Oxford University to pursue his interest in science but switched to studying history and politics under H. A. L. Fisher and Ernest Barker.

After graduating from Oxford in 1914, Laski was hired to write editorials for the *Daily Herald*. Turned down for military service due to a weak heart, Laski accepted a history lectureship at McGill University in Canada and, two years later, taught at Harvard University. To supplement his teaching salary, Laski contributed articles for the *Nation* and the *New Republic* and published his first book, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* (1917), in which he praised American pluralism and the federal system. His second book, *Authority in the Modern State* (1919), called for trade union organization and rigorously defended free speech. Laski's writings not only established his scholarly reputation, but they also enabled him to cultivate friendships with prominent American figures including associate Supreme Court justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and future president Franklin Roosevelt. While in America, Laski also had begun writing one of his most widely read works, *A Grammar of Politics* (1925). In this book, Laski set out the principles of Fabian socialism and explored how the British industrial society could be organized according to a more just productive and distributive plan. Like most of Laski's writings, *Grammar of Politics* combined general theorizing with practical suggestions for reforming the existing society.

Upon returning to England in 1920, Laski joined the London School of Economics. He was affiliated with the London School for thirty years and, in 1935, became professor of political science. Laski's radical politics tested the limits of academic freedom. Critics complained that he indoctrinated students in communism. Laski, however, may be more aptly described as a democratic socialist. In Isaac Krammick and Barry Sheerman's 1993 *Harold Laski: A Life on the Left,* Laski is quoted as saying "The true socialist is a libertarian, not an authoritarian."

Laski preferred using words rather than a violent revolution to transform society. Putting his philosophy into practice, he helped found the Left Book Club (which launched English author George Orwell's writing career) and *Political Quarterly,* a British journal on politics. In the hope that an educated workforce would bring "revolution by consent" through the electoral process, he encouraged workers to start their own literary periodicals.

Laski often presented himself as a radical, intellectual outsider, but he also was an insider who influenced current events through connections with important political actors. While keeping up his vigorous teaching and writing schedule, he served from 1937 to 1949 on the executive committee of the British Labour Party and was elected chair when the party came to power in 1945.

In his final years, Laski published one of his most popular works on American politics and society, *The American Democracy: A Commentary and an Interpretation* (1948). He remained actively engaged in teaching and writing until his death from pneumonia at the age fifty-six.

See also *British Political Thought; Political Theory; Socialism.*

. . . . RAMONA JUNE GREY

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Lasswell, Harold Dwight

American political scientist Harold Dwight Lasswell (1902–1978) was considered a great scholar and a terrific mentor, but his name was never a well-known one in his field. Lasswell joined the American Society of International Law in 1948. He was vice president of the organization from 1966 to 1970 and then held the office of president until 1972. While part of the society he created the Board of Review and Development, was a chair on the Panel on Communications and Linguistics, and served as a member of the Panel on Self-Determination.

In his first book, *Propaganda Techniques in the World War* (1927), Lasswell creates what he calls propaganda analysis to understand the complexities of collective communication flows. This later bloomed into the fields of content analysis and communications theory. Another of Lasswell's most remembered contributions is to the idea of modern democratic theory. He mentioned four points that new democratic systems would have to take into account: flawed personality structures, man's predisposition to self-defeating symbolism, the rise of precarious elites of ability, and the surfacing of contemporary propaganda.

One of Lasswell's more interesting studies was of political symbolism, one of the four parts of his democratic theory. He put forth the idea that symbols are used to exemplify power. An example of this can be found in barriers used to separate political power from intruders. In medieval times this would be a moat. In the contemporary world this could mean walls or gateways. Lasswell also originated the term *policy sciences,* which are an approach to understanding and solving problems, contributed to multidisciplinary inquiry about man in society, and created a structure of inquiry about worldwide social processes.

In his 1939 work *World Revolutionary Propaganda: A Chicago Study,* Lasswell stated that propaganda is "the control of attitudes by the manipulation of symbols." Since the advent of world wars, Lasswell argues, democracies have needed to

bring their entire nation's focus on the single effort of winning the war. To achieve this, the government must turn to propaganda to keep the citizenry in agreement with the government's cause. Lasswell gives an example of this as the war bonds issued during World War II (1939–1945). He goes on to show that propaganda is used extensively in circumstances other than war and uses its expansion in the United States during the Great Depression as an example. He claims that propaganda has become a part of the democratic process and observes that elites see world politics as only a competition where the most deceitful image maker wins.

Lasswell is also well known for his use of psychoanalysis to explain political behavior. He argued that applying Freudian theory to politics would reveal deep knowledge of politicians and political systems themselves. Lasswell believed that to survive in the future political realm, such analysis was pressing and necessary.

See also *Content Analysis; Political Communication; Political Philosophy; Political Psychology; Propaganda.*

. . . .   ARTHUR HOLST

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Latin America and Globalization

Since the 1990s, *globalization* has become a buzzword in Latin American political science. Although it has many meanings, the term is generally employed as a metaconcept to explain a complex set of processes. These processes include the liberalization of trade; the emergence of new forms of social relations; and increasing cross-border flows of services, capital, technology, people, information, ideas, and culture, facilitated in large part by innovations in communication, technology, and international governance structures.

DEBATES SURROUNDING GLOBALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA

Two central debates have guided much of the literature on Latin America and globalization. The first debate centers on the novelty, scope, and inevitability of globalization's effect on the Latin American state. On this account, Held (2000) identifies three basic positions in contention: the *globalist,* who sees globalization as inevitable and irresistible by the national order; the *traditionalist,* who rejects the novelty of the process and clings to traditional, state-level explanations; and the *transformationalist,* who sees a significant shift at the global level but questions globalization's inevitability and

scope. The second debate, in contrast, accepts globalization's transformative properties and seeks to unravel its positive and negative features in Latin America. This debate is typically characterized by two, competing narratives. The first narrative, *globalization as progress,* has tended to stress the positive features of globalization in Latin America, including its capacity to increase wealth, freedom, democracy, cultural diversity, civil society, and social relationships. The second narrative, *globalization as disaster,* has tended to stress the negative features of globalization in the region, including its imperialistic tendencies, exploitation of labor and the poor, the undermining of democracy, the homogenization of culture, and the destruction of the natural environment.

CURRENT GLOBALIZATION ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

What is new about globalization for Latin America? As demonstrated in the writings of Raul Prebisch, Latin American dependency theorists, and the Import Substitution Industrialization policies of the 1950s and 1960s, Latin America has long recognized that it is part of an international economic system. However, when referring to globalization in Latin America, scholars typically are referring to the critical period of state restructuring and market liberalization that began with the Mexican debt crisis in 1982 and 1983 and continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The root cause of this crisis is often traced back to the world energy crisis in 1973, when the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) limited the supply of oil and drastically raised prices. While many Latin American countries were severely hurt by the increase in oil prices, OPEC countries accumulated unprecedented amounts of excess reserves, or *petrodollars,* which were subsequently recycled through loans to Latin America and other middle-income developing countries to help these countries pay for oil and elaborate development projects. A second oil shock in 1979 led to additional lending to help Latin American countries pay for oil price increases. This second price increase also produced inflationary pressures, which industrial states sought to control by raising interest rates. The overall impact of these events was excess lending, inflation, and higher interest rates, leading to the debt crisis in Latin America in 1982. Starting with Mexico, numerous Latin American countries found themselves no longer able to service their debt payments. On the brink of bankruptcy, these countries were forced into negotiations with multilateral lending institutions, namely, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

The ensuing restructuring initiatives and the prolific role of multilateral lending institutions in these negotiations of the mid-1980s is often taken as early evidence of globalization's presence in Latin America. These negotiations spawned a multitude of economic policy recommendations that meant to stabilize Latin American economies, rectify the region's balance of payment difficulties, and integrate Latin American economies into the emerging global economic system. Initial measures in the 1980s included reducing deficits, restricting credit,

instituting devaluation, and holding down wages. However, beginning in the 1990s, more extensive market liberalization policies were deemed necessary and subsequently introduced throughout the region. In some cases, such as Nicaragua in the early 1990s, market liberalization initiatives were introduced directly and voluntarily by Latin American political and policy elites who were committed to an emerging free market international policy culture. In other instances, such as Bolivia in the late 1990s and 2000, market liberalization reforms were introduced as conditions of IMF and World Bank lending through structural adjustment programs. The conditions of these loans entailed a variety of market liberalization measures, including the reduction of tariffs and the elimination of quota restrictions, privatization of public companies, deregulation, curtailment of social spending, and reductions in the cost of labor. A well-publicized instance of structural adjustment is the privatization of the Cochabamba water supply in 2000 as a condition of Bolivia's acceptance of a $25 million loan from the World Bank that year. The economic philosophy behind this restructuring effort is often referred to as *the Washington Consensus,* a phrase first coined in 1989 by John Williamson, then of the Washington-based Peterson Institute for International Economics, to connote the consensus that existed among members of the U.S. Congress, international financial institutions, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, and U.S. think tanks about what constituted desirable economic policy reforms for stabilizing Latin American economies and integrating Latin America into global markets.

EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON LATIN AMERICA

Given the number of Latin Americans living below the poverty line, the market liberalization policies and global economic integration plans associated with globalization have been contentious policy solutions in the region. For example, during the 1990s and 2000s a number of Latin American countries privatized their water supplies to reduce state spending and open channels for foreign investment. This move sparked massive resistance from civil society organizations, arguing that water is a basic necessity of life and a basic right of the people as exemplified in Bolivia's Cochabamba "water wars" in 2000. In addition to privatization, numerous Latin American countries engaged in contentious social policy reforms, capping social spending, launching ambitious decentralization projects in health and education, such as Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico in the 1990s. Some countries, like Nicaragua in 1993, even went so far as to implement a system of user fees in education and health care. In response, actors from various segments of civil society have mobilized to confront their governments and to rally against a perceived futility and cruelty of free market solutions.

POLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA

In addition to economic restructuring and global market integration initiatives, globalization is associated also with the concerted move toward political liberalization, political reform, and democratization in Latin America. These initiatives were cast under the rubric of "good governance" and were promoted extensively by the World Bank and other international institutions. The demands for global market integration reinforced pressures for governance reform in Latin America as foreign investors demanded investment guarantees and political stability as safeguards for their investments. The initiatives for good governance reform included anticorruption measures, the creation of judicial branches, accountability reforms, political liberalization, and democratization. Although the impact of these initiatives is debatable, a growing number of countries have nevertheless proven capable of surviving economic crises and transferring power through elections. However, despite adopting electoral procedures, many Latin American countries continue to suffer from high levels of corruption and clientelism.

While global market integration initiatives and good governance reform are said to constitute *globalization from above,* globalization also has led to a convergence among diverse grassroots movements in Latin America, a process referred to as *globalization from below.* Innovations in technology and communications have enabled local movements in Latin America to become aware of common interests, build networks and alliances, and promote a unified front in the struggle for social justice. Emphasizing the grassroots nature of social movements and the solidarity and networking properties that link them across traditional boundaries, scholars of this alternative perspective demonstrate how globalization enables civil society to pressure states and other powerful actors to take certain positions. For example, in their struggle for land reform and social justice that began on January 1, 1994, the same day the North American Free Trade Agreement entered into force, the EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) built key networks and alliances with the international community that enabled the movement to achieve significant victories in its struggle against the Mexican state. Labor unions and grassroots nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) throughout Latin America, such as Brazil's Landless Workers Movements, have appealed also to global civil society, building transnational advocacy networks to lobby for land reform, fair wages, human rights, education, restrictions on child labor practices, and other policy changes.

The debates surrounding globalization continue to this day. Specifically, the literature on this subject continues to examine and explore the scope and depth of neoliberal penetration in the region, the capacity of states to resist these pressures, and the benefits accrued from global policy prescriptions. In recent years, these debates have taken a new twist as several left-leaning social movements have swept to power on distinctly antineoliberal agendas. The election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1998), Luiz Lula da Silva in Brazil (2002), Néstor Kirchner in Argentina (2003), Evo Morales in Bolivia (2006), and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua (2006) may be a sign that Latin Americans are reconsidering their role and place in the new, global economy. For example, Chávez has called for "alter-globalization" in Latin America through Pan-Latin Americanism,

expressed through regional cooperation in trade negotiations with the rest of the world. While a number of countries have expressed their support for this arrangement, it remains to be seen if Latin America can develop and sustain its own, unique alternative.

See also *Anti- and Alter-globalization Movements; Globalization; Globalization and Development; International Monetary Fund (IMF); Latin American Political Thought; Latin American Politics and Society; World Bank.*

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Latin American Political Economy

Latin America's political economy has been marked by major swings from outward-oriented, liberal trade policies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to some of the most sustained efforts at import-substituting industrialization (ISI) in the mid-twentieth century, back to significant experiments in neoliberal, market-oriented reforms in the late twentieth century. Economic development strategy proved to be the most contested issue on the policy agenda in Latin America in the twentieth century. Agrarian interests and transnational capital have preferred free trade and liberal investment policies since the 1880s and earlier, while populist coalitions of the domestic business class, workers, and many peasants have advocated protectionism and state control of the economy. International actors, especially from the United States and including international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have played critical roles as they have pursued their investment and trade interests or pressured Latin American governments to adopt orthodox economic policies.

While the Latin American political economy has been strongly influenced by free trade liberalism emanating from Britain and the United States, a homegrown challenge to liberal hegemony has come from dependency theory. Dependency theory grew out of Latin American intellectuals' reflections on the constraints posed to economic development and democratic politics given the region's place as a primarily natural resource or agricultural exporter in the global capitalist economy. Dependency writers emphasize the historical roots of contemporary underdevelopment and non-democratic practices. Latin Americans' choice to focus on primary product exports owing to their comparative advantage in those goods worked to their disadvantage because the terms of trade favored the manufactured goods purchased from the industrialized nations. Dependency writers emphasize class conflict as the driving force in Latin American politics, seeing the local bourgeoisie as the agents of transnational capital and highlighting the role of the United States in perpetuating the dominance of economic elites. Dependency writers provided an intellectual basis for ISI pursued by regional governments in the mid-twentieth century.

PHASES IN LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY

The Iberian empires strived to maintain tight mercantilist control of their colonial economies but were often thwarted by smugglers who sought to trade more directly with Britain, its American colonies, and northwest Europe. The destruction wrought by the wars of independence (1810–1825) caused many newly independent republics to turn inward to rebuild their economies. However, conflict between those preferring free trade and those favoring greater central government control of the economy emerged early in the postindependence period. International demand for primary products—foodstuffs, nitrates, fertilizers, and industrial ores—grew as Europe and North America industrialized in the late nineteenth century. Landed elites and mining interests responded by promoting an export-import model of economic growth. Significant volumes of British and later American capital flowed into the region to finance the building of railroads and ports and the development of mines and food-processing factories.

The export-import model built the fortunes of the landed elites of the Argentine and Uruguayan pampas; coffee growers in Brazil, Colombia, and Guatemala; and U.S. and British mining, sugar, and fruit-growing concerns in countries ranging from Chile to Guatemala to Cuba. The middle and working classes grew as immigrants and country dwellers flowed into the burgeoning cities to service the growing economy. When the 1929 stock market crash depressed demand for Latin American exports, those urban sectors became the social bases for ISI, promoted by populist leaders Getúlio Vargas in Brazil and Juan Perón in Argentina, as well as by Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and then most other governments in South America in the 1940s and 1950s. The ISI model generated tension between those sectors favoring the export-import model, especially agricultural exporters who preferred free trade, and the industrialists and workers who would be protected by tariffs and other restraints on trade.

ISI proved successful in terms of replacing imports of consumer goods. Countries with small domestic markets sought to expand them by forming common markets such as the Andean Pact and the Central American Common Market. However, domestic firms proved resistant to tariff reductions, the ISI economies remained dependent on the advanced industrial

economies for capital goods imports, and the capital intensivity of Latin American ISI did not absorb the rapidly growing labor supply. Frequent balance-of-payments crises provoked the imposition of orthodox structural adjustment policies demanded by the IMF to resolve such external disequilibria, yielding little in the way of new economic growth but exacerbating political conflict in Argentina and Brazil. By the late 1970s, economic stagnation, a highly skewed income distribution, and growing external debt resulted, despite attempts by harsh authoritarian regimes to reinitiate industrial growth with both orthodox and heterodox stabilization programs.

Under military rule, Chile in the late 1970s adopted the neoliberal strategy of removing trade barriers, deregulating financial markets and inviting in foreign investors, cutting government subsidies to both consumers and domestic producers, and privatizing state-owned enterprises. While other countries initially sought to weather the debt crisis-induced regional depression of the 1980s through heterodox strategies such as wage-and-price freezes and the surprise introduction of new currencies, most eventually joined Chile in adopting neoliberalism, beginning with Mexico and Bolivia (1985), followed by Argentina (1989), Peru (1990), and finally Brazil (1994). The orthodox policy mix adopted by these nations came to be called the *Washington Consensus,* reflecting strong advocacy by the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury.

While neoliberalism's strongest performer, Chile, has experienced more than two decades of sustained economic growth, the diversification of its export products and markets, and increasing opportunities to invest in other Latin American economies, Chilean income distribution remains severely skewed. Mexico has maintained economic growth by yoking its economy to that of the United States via the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). However, hundreds of thousands of Mexicans emigrate to the United States annually because Mexico's national economy cannot create enough jobs to meet the growing labor supply. Argentina and Brazil decided to avoid the worst aspects of global economic competition by creating the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR). Argentina's pursuit of neoliberal policies came to an abrupt end in the economic crisis of 1999 to 2002, during which the IMF refused to bail out the nation it had regarded as an exemplar of orthodox policies after a decade of supporting its fixed exchange rate, arguably the source of that crisis.

CONTINUING CHALLENGES

Neither the trickle-down distribution model in force when liberalism has been in vogue nor the more direct redistributionist policies of populism had much impact on the pattern of income distribution inherited from colonialism. Education policies create too few highly trained scientists and engineers and too many barely literate individuals for the region's economies to effectively capitalize on investments in high-technology industries. Many elites continue to advocate free trade in the belief that only competition can force their societies to become efficient, but critics suggest that only those who already have capital or have benefited from a high-quality education, namely the elite itself, will benefit from free trade.

See also *Dependency Theory; Free Trade; Latin America and Globalization; Latin American Politics and Society; North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); Trade Blocs.*

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Latin American Political Thought

Latin American thinkers have always engaged themselves with the main intellectual currents emanating first from Europe and later from the United States, adapting them to their particular societies. After securing independence from Spain and Portugal, the region confronted the challenges associated with nation-building, while liberal and conservative parties, founded in many countries, provided contrasting views. Early Latin American liberalism was infused with notions of republicanism and constitutionalism but gave them a philosophical foundation that generally departed from traditional social contract theory. Juan Bautista Alberdi, Argentina's most notable liberal thinker, argues in his *Bases y puntos de partida para la constitución política de la República Argentina* (1852) that each nation receives from God a particular nature and character, and therefore the role of legislators is to discover and reflect those traits in their constitutions.

In the final decades of the nineteenth century, ideas associated with European positivism swept the region. Order and progress became appealing principles to nations embarked in state building. Positivism provided a secular rationale for the government of the enlightened and educated, and while positivists had strong republican feelings, they rejected demands for universal suffrage and unfettered democracy with the argument that illiterate and poorly educated masses could not possibly serve as the foundation for a well-designed order. In Mexico, positivist thinkers known as *Los Científicos* (The Scientists) provided both the legitimizing ideology and the technocratic cadre for the despotic Porfirio Díaz regime

(1884–1911). Benjamin Constant Botelho, founder of the *Socie-dade Positivista do Brasil,* became influential among the military circles that eventually deposed the emperor and established the republic in Brazil. In Peru and Chile, positivist thinkers advocated in favor of strengthening public education.

LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The advent of the twentieth century brought new ideas to the region. The influx of European workers, the rejection of the consumerism and materialism that many thought characteristic of the United States, and the examples of the Mexican and Russian revolutions, among other factors, generated an unprecedented outburst of intellectual activity. In a clear rejection of the scientific outlook and faith in material progress of positivism, a number of influential thinkers advocated spiritual revival and humanistic values. In Cuba, José Martí offered a new foundation for Latin American nationalism based on a spiritual attitude toward life. But it was the Uruguayan José Enrique Rodó who personified this idealist outlook that ended up influencing so many of his contemporary fellow writers. In his memorable *Ariel,* Rodó confronted the materialism and utilitarianism of Caliban (that the United States represents) to the idealism and classical values and virtues embodied by Ariel. This contrast between the crass materialism of the north and the spiritual ideals of the south became a powerful undertow that influenced writers in the region such as José Ingenieros in Argentina, Antonio Caso in Mexico, and Alejandro Deústua in Peru.

While some found comfort in *Ariel*'s humanism, others embraced the emergent ideologies of anarchism and socialism. Latin American anarchism, influenced by Italian and Spanish anarchosyndicalism, is rightly credited with creating the labor movement in the region. One of the most influential anarchists was the Peruvian Manuel González Prada, who harshly criticized his nation's politics for being corrupt and out of touch with common citizens. His famous indictment in *Pájinas Libres* (1894), "Peru today is a sick organism: wherever you poke your finger, pus erupts," put into words the feelings of disaffection prevalent among many Peruvian intellectuals in the wake of their country's military defeat in the War of the Pacific (1879–1884). Other prominent anarchists were Mexican Ricardo Flores Magón, Argentine Alberto Ghiraldo, Brazilian Avelino Fóscolo, and Colombian Vicente Rojas Lizcano (aka Biófilo Panclasta).

SOCIALISM, APRISMO, AND LIBERATION THEOLOGY

Socialist thought also emerged with force during this period, and one of the most original thinkers in this tradition was Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui. After a short exile in Europe, Mariátegui founded the Peruvian Socialist Party and began to develop a Marxism that was dramatically at odds with the Soviet orthodoxy. In 7 *Ensayos de Interpretación de la Realidad Peruana* and *El Problema de las Razas en América Latina,* Mariátegui argued that the indigenous problem in Peru was essentially a social and economic problem, not a racial one, thus rejecting Soviet demands for independent indigenous republics. While less devoted to intellectual production, Luis Emilio Recabarren in Chile, Astrojildo Pereira in Brazil, and Aníbal Ponce in Argentina were also instrumental in developing socialist thought in the region. Julio Antonio Mella from Cuba deserves special mention for he, like Mariátegui, also clashed with the Soviets over policy disagreements. One of Mella's pamphlets, *Los Nuevos Libertadores* (1924), stresses that the main challenge socialists face is to adapt their doctrine to their own reality.

Decades later, socialist thought received a significant boost from the Cuban revolution and its most important theoretician, Ernesto "Che" Guevara. In his *La Guerra de Guerrilas* (1960), Guevara drew on his revolutionary experience to develop a new theory of revolution that came to be known as *foquismo.* According to this view, a small core (*foco*) of committed revolutionaries can create the subjective conditions for revolution when the objective conditions are absent. This theory, later expanded by Regis Debray, became an article of faith to many of the guerrilla organizations that sprang up in Latin America and Africa in the 1960s and 1970s.

An important ideological alternative to socialism came from the works of Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, a Peruvian who founded the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* in Mexico City in 1924. Haya defined *Aprismo* (as Haya's ideas came to be known) as a noncommunist Marxist movement that advocated regional unity to fight American imperialism and a national front of manual and nonmanual workers to demand the progressive nationalization of land and industries. Later on, when campaigning for the 1931 presidency, Haya tempered the most radical aspects of his ideology by proposing a "minimal program" that included state reform, redistribution of wealth, land, and tax reform, as well as free and universal education and social security. *Aprismo* influenced the programmatic outlook of key Latin American parties such as Venezuela's *Acción Democrática,* Costa Rica's *Partido Liberación Nacional,* and Bolivia's *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario.*

In more recent years, a highly influential progressive thought emerged from the fusion of Marxism and Catholicism, which came to be known as liberation theology. Leonardo Boff and Gustavo Gutiérrez, a Brazilian and a Peruvian priest, are among the most important representatives of this confluence. Liberation theology argues that salvation is not possible without achieving liberation from unjust social and economic structures. Thus, fighting poverty and adopting a "preferential option for the poor" become imperatives for the Catholic Church's evangelical mission.

See also *Latin American Politics and Society; Liberation Theology; Socialism.*

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Latin American Politics and Society

Latin America is composed of those twenty-one republics of the New World formed from the Spanish and Portuguese empires. Often former British, French, and Dutch colonies in or bordering on the Caribbean are included in the definition, although by culture and historical experience they are distinct. Because the scale of the nations ranges from continental-scale Brazil, with more than 190 million people, down to Panama, with about three million, generalizing about politics in the region proves challenging. However, the twenty-one nations speaking Spanish and Portuguese share the historical record of Iberian rule, including the culture the colonizers and colonized forged together during nearly three centuries of colonial rule; a common effort to achieve late economic development; and two centuries' experience of the economic, political, and now cultural influence of the United States. Political ideas and practices initiated in one or more countries of the region often diffuse across the continent due to these shared characteristics and the common familiarity with the Spanish language.

As of 2008, all of the Latin American states except Cuba had adopted electoral democracy. However, only Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela can boast a half century of democratic rule, and Colombia's record of civil war and Venezuela's constitutional discontinuity leaves only Costa Rica with an unambiguous record of more than fifty years of democracy. Independence came to Latin America as the result of the disruptions in colonial rule caused by the Napoleonic Wars (1799–1815). Although conservatives attempted to preserve most features of the colonial political regime—an established church, an inward-oriented economy based on the hacienda (a largely self-sufficient landed estate), and a highly stratified society based in part on racial distinctions—liberals in favor of free trade and universalistic norms won out after intense postindependence struggles. Nineteenth-century liberalism tended to be restricted to property holders and educated members of Latin American societies, however. Hence, most Latin American nations began the twentieth century governed by limited, oligarchical democracies, most of which fell to military coups in the 1930s. Democracy returned to the region in a populist, mass-based form after the Second World War (1939–1945), but it again succumbed to military rule in the 1960s and early 1970s before resurfacing in the 1980s and 1990s. Scholars such as Karen Remmer and Kurt Weyland consider today's democratic regimes more stable but less inclusive and responsive than the democracies of the postwar era.

CONTENDING MODES OF EXPLAINING LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS

Social scientists seeking to explain the rise and fall of democracy in the region and the public policy choices made by Latin American governments have typically approached the topic from four different approaches. A long-popular mode of explanation emphasizes Latin America's Iberian heritage, including the centralist traditions of its colonial administrations and the domination of the intellectual sphere by the anti-Reformation Catholic Church. Frequently, those writing about Latin America from a culturalist perspective, such as Howard Wiarda and Claudio Véliz, draw sharp contrasts between North America, with its British and Lockean liberal heritage that spawned democracy and freewheeling capitalist development in the United States, and Latin America's tendency toward authoritarianism, patrimonialism, and corporatism in the political sphere, along with a rigid, hierarchical class system and a preference for mercantilist policies that have hindered economic development. Culturalists typically draw pessimistic conclusions about the prospects for democracy's quality and longevity or for rapid economic development in Latin America, or they conclude that inequality and undemocratic practices reflect cultural preferences. Political scientists studying Latin America in the 1950s (e.g., William Stokes and Merle Kling) argued that political violence in the region was rooted in its political culture. More recently, Lawrence Harrison attributed Latin America's difficulties in achieving democratization, economic development, and social justice to its Hispanic political tradition.

North American scholars uncomfortable with culturalist modes of explanation adopted modernization theory's more optimistic perspective in the 1960s and 1970s. Modernizationists such as Martin Needler saw in Latin America's rising middle classes and the region's more educated youth the basis for an emerging commitment to democracy and the adoption of the North American economic model. Events in the region proved unsupportive of modernization theory's optimistic predictions, however, and Guillermo O'Donnell's critique, the theory of bureaucratic authoritarianism, drew heavily on dependency theory to propose that in the context of late industrialization, economic modernization could be inhospitable to democracy. Dependency theory, the third approach, although influenced by the writings of Karl Marx and V. I. Lenin, grew out of the reflections of Latin American intellectuals on the constraints posed to democratic politics and economic development given the region's place in the global capitalist economy. Dependency writers put emphasis on class conflict as the driving force in Latin American politics, including the transnational character of ruling class interests and the role of the United States in perpetuating the dominance of economic elites. For these theorists, understanding the historical roots of contemporary underdevelopment and nondemocratic practices is central.

Since the early 1990s, scholars studying Latin American politics have sought to draw on the insights of the new institutionalism in political science to explore electoral politics and party system development, executive-legislative relations, and federalism and decentralization in the region. Although recognizing and sometimes lamenting the prevalence of presidential regimes in Latin America, these scholars have tended

to draw out the differences among the cases in the region as much as their similarities in contrast to the rest of the world. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart, for instance, argue that the strength of presidents rests on both specific constitutional authority and partisan powers, and hence that presidents vary considerably in their capacities across Latin America. Institutionalist scholars have created a rich body of empirical research on the operation of Latin American political systems.

CYCLES OF DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM

Many scholars have observed the cycles of democracy and dictatorship noted in this article's introduction. Modernization and dependency thinkers both have sought to connect Latin America's political evolution to phases in its economic development. In this approach, the mercantilism that characterized the Spanish empire and that conservatives sought to reconstitute in the newly independent republics in the nineteenth century—with its limitations on free trade and its desire to control the economic activities of individuals—made the emergence of liberalism—with its preference for separation of church and state, for representative institutions, and for federal structures—difficult. Those favoring an outward-oriented, free-trade strategy of development preferred democratic institutions, but with representation limited to those holding property. Oligarchical democracies emerged to accommodate this largely landholding or natural resource–extracting, export-oriented elite in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, while in other countries "order-and-progress" dictatorships promoted their societies' integration into the globalizing international economy of the late nineteenth century. Mexico's Porfirio Díaz, nominally a liberal, led the region's most successful order-and-progress regime from 1876 to 1910, profoundly integrating the Mexican economy with that of the United States while suppressing the resistance of peasants, miners, and indigenous peoples who were marginalized in the process.

The success of the export-import economic model beginning in the last quarter of the nineteenth century produced an emergent urban middle class as well as a growing working class. In the first decades of the twentieth century, the oligarchs met demands for political inclusion by these rising classes by co-opting the middle class through the modest expansion of the franchise while continuing to exclude workers and peasants from the ballot by restrictions based on property, literacy, or citizenship. Even so, middle-class parties such as the radicals in Argentina and Chile gained power, threatening agrarian elites' control of their societies. Labor mobilization brought incipient class conflict in the 1920s. Tensions caused by the difficulties of integrating these new actors into the political game in oligarchical democracies came to a head with the onset of economic crisis, during which traditional agrarian elites turned to the military to help them preserve the export-import model by excluding the rising urban middle class and the nascent working class from power. Governments in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Peru fell to the military at the Great Depression's outset.

The depression and the Second World War (1939–1945) had the consequence of provoking many trade-dependent countries to adopt import-substituting industrialization (ISI), with varying degrees of success. The global prestige of democracy at the war's end helped diffuse competitive regimes to Latin America, with most of the larger nations adopting or readopting democratic regimes. The small nations of Central America (other than Costa Rica), Haiti, and Paraguay remained ruled by despots, however. The combination of ISI and democracy created the conditions in which populist leaders could easily emerge. Populists built coalitions of the beneficiaries of industrialization—industrialists and the urban middle and working classes who would staff their firms—and led their followers against the landed elites who allegedly stood in the way of both modernization and justice for the people. Prominent populists like Argentina's Juan and Eva Perón and Brazil's Getúlio Vargas defined the terms of political discourse in their nations for many decades after they were forced from power by militaries who felt threatened by popular political agitation. Populist coalitions also contained the seeds of their own demise because they included both industrial employers and their employees; populist leaders found it difficult to resist turning their mass followings against industrialists once ISI had initial success. Those industrialists joined landed elites in inviting the military to end the populist experiment in the 1960s.

Unlike the military regimes that ruled in the 1930s, those that seized power in the 1960s and early 1970s settled in to rule as institutions, with the goal of ridding their nations of what they saw as feckless populist politicians and the subversives that their rhetoric encouraged. Harsh anticommunist regimes emerged in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, while in Peru a progressive military enacted preemptive land reform in an attempt to undermine the bases of rural rebellion. These regimes outlawed parties and generally sought to depoliticize their societies. They saw limitations to the ISI model, particularly in that domestic demand for consumer goods was restricted to the size of the internal market and ISI had not reduced dependency on rich nations like the United States but instead had replaced imports of consumer goods with imports of capital goods and industrial inputs. These bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes set about pursuing economic policies that would be inviting to foreign investors and permit a "deepening" of the industrial structure, including suppressing labor unions and relaxing restrictions on foreign investment. Arguably, only Brazil succeeded in building a deeper industrial structure, which owes much to the scale of its internal market compared to other countries in the region. Recognizing the limitations of its internal market, Chile promoted export diversification, although mostly of primary products.

These harsh military regimes killed or disappeared tens of thousands of their populations. In this respect these regimes were no different from the personal dictatorships of Central America and the Caribbean, where despots like the Somoza family in Nicaragua or Haiti's Duvalier family or the militaries of El Salvador and Guatemala killed thousands of rebels

and suspected insurgents. Across the continent human rights and democratic movements began to demand that the military release political prisoners or reveal what happened to those who disappeared. The most prominent example of such movements was Argentina's Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. Underlying the military's decision to leave power in the 1980s was its own inability to manage the economy, but in the event a variety of circumstances brought democracy back to Latin America, including Argentina's failure in its war with Britain over the Falklands (Malvinas) in 1982 and General Augusto Pinochet's loss in a plebiscite about remaining in power in Chile in 1988.

Though many observers expected the new democracies that emerged in the 1980s to be fragile, they have proved more durable than earlier experiments in democracy in the region. Most Latin American militaries, discredited but for the most part not prosecuted for their human rights abuses, have preferred to stay on the sidelines. The depoliticization the military sought to achieve was accomplished to a considerable extent, so that popular political participation in the early 2000s tends to be low, in activities ranging from signing petitions to confrontational acts like blocking traffic, occupying buildings, or taking part in unauthorized demonstrations. Mexico, which has not had a military regime since the end of its revolution in 1917, became democratic by means of a protracted transition in which the opponents to the long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) built up the nation's respect for electoral democracy as the opposition built its own capacities to govern. Democracy has proved more fragile in countries that avoided the bureaucratic-authoritarian phase; two examples are Colombia and Venezuela, with the former struggling with a long civil war having roots going back to the 1950s and earlier and the latter experiencing a failed military uprising whose leader, Hugo Chávez, was elected in 1998 as a populist president after his release from jail and has rewritten the constitution to allow him to remain in power until at least 2012.

FEATURES OF LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS

A key characteristic of Latin American politics has been a preference by elites for corporatist interest intermediation. Some scholars, such as Wiarda, trace this inclination to the organic statist political philosophy inherited from early modern Spanish philosophers, such as Francisco Suárez and Francisco de Vitoria. Others, such as Alfred Stepan, emphasize a more instrumental use of corporatist theory by elites to allow political and economic leaders to better control the organizations of the peasantry and the working class. Prominent examples of corporatism in the Western Hemisphere include the sectoral organization of Mexico's PRI, corporatist labor legislation under Vargas's Estado Nôvo and the military regime (1964–1985) in Brazil, and the Peruvian reformist military's effort (1968–1975) to coordinate the political participation of land reform beneficiaries.

Clientelism is another common feature of politics in the region. Political machines such as Mexico's PRI and the

Argentine Justicialist (Peronist) Party have often employed patronage targeted to individuals and small groups as carrots to attract electoral support. Within such parties, political recruitment and upward mobility have taken place via tight patron-client relations. In many contexts, rural Brazil being a prominent example, local economic elites serve as patrons to their social inferiors, often intervening with local or national authorities to secure private goods for their clients, cementing their local power in the process. Although progressive political activists recognize that clientelism can entrap their organizations in a reliance on patrons for discrete material benefits rather than an improvement of the structural relationships of power, patron-client relations prove difficult to circumvent in societies in which the state lacks the resources or the will to provide universalistic benefits. Because clientelism emphasizes the distribution of discrete benefits from the state to individual beneficiaries and indirectly contributes to the sense that politics involves the private appropriation of public resources, the perception of corruption is widespread among citizens of Latin American countries and those outsiders doing business there.

Scholars like Véliz, Wiarda, and Richard M. Morse place great emphasis on centralism as a key enduring feature of Latin American politics. Concentrated centralized power manifests itself in three ongoing struggles in the region. First, in the mid-twentieth century, urbanization, partly promoted by ISI, aggravated tensions between rural elites and the urban coalitions put together by populist leaders. In many Latin American countries, that urban-rural divide is accentuated because of the concentration of the urban population in the capital city—for example, Buenos Aires (Argentina), Caracas (Venezuela), Lima (Peru), and Santiago (Chile). Urban-based elites promoted land reform (Chile and Peru) and imposed high export taxes on agricultural products (Argentina) that prompted sectoral conflict.

Second, the proponents of centralized power have at times made formal federalism a fiction. From the time of independence, advocates of federalism and state and municipal autonomy have struggled against those favoring the centralization of state power. The military and other nondemocratic rulers, including Mexico's PRI, have tended to erode the autonomy of state and local governments. Democratic regimes have often coincided with the reassertion of decentralized authority. Since the 1980s, the World Bank and other multilateral organizations have promoted decentralization to overcome the barriers to development posed by excessively centralized bureaucratic power. The larger countries, especially Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, have had more effective federal structures than the smaller countries of the region.

Third, centralized rule has often come at the expense of indigenous peoples' autonomy. Indians have occupied the lowest rung on the ladder of social status since the conquest by Europeans. Liberal constitutions have made little or no allowance for the special circumstances of indigenous groups. Even postrevolutionary regimes that have celebrated the indigenous heritage of their populations, such as Mexico, have tended to treat Indians no differently legally than other poor people

while the reality of racism has made their conditions the worst of all social groups. The 1992 Columbian Quincentenary gave focus to a hemispherewide social movement of indigenous peoples seeking to claim constitutional rights to autonomy within their communities. Guatemalan Rigoberta Menchu, recipient of the 1992 Nobel Peace Prize, emerged as the most successful proponent of indigenous rights. The 1994 uprising of the Zapatista National Liberation Army in Chiapas, Mexico, effectively promoted the cause of indigenous autonomy internationally, although the Mexican state proved unwilling to grant special status to indigenous groups. More recently, Evo Morales, president of Bolivia, rose to power partly on the basis of an appeal to ethnic solidarity among indigenous Bolivians.

While populism defined the politics of mid-twentieth-century Latin America, the inclination to populist-type relations between charismatic leaders and the masses has often reasserted itself throughout the region's postcolonial history. Salvador Allende's socialist regime in the 1970s had distinct populist features, including the adulation of the leader and a redistributionist ideology. In the 1990s and 2000s, Argentina's Carlos Menem, Bolivia's Morales, Peru's Alberto Fujimori, and Venezuela's Chávez, have developed populist-type relations between themselves and their followers. These individuals have at best paid lip service to constitutional procedures and the rights of minorities, with Chávez, Fujimori, and Morales all convening constituent assemblies to write new constitutions in which executive prerogative was increased while institutions that might protect minority interests were weakened or eliminated. Populists claim to be the voice of the people yet often refuse to accept the verdicts of democratic institutions. Prominent examples include Fujimori's closing of the Peruvian congress in 1992 when that body refused to grant him the powers he sought to pursue the Shining Path rebels or to radically restructure the economy, and the refusal of Mexico's Andrés Manuel López Obrador to accept his presidential electoral defeat in 2006 despite rulings against him by the nation's independent electoral agency and its electoral tribunal.

INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNANCE

Latin American nations have chosen presidential forms of democracy. Serious suggestions to replace presidentialism with parliamentary regimes have been few; the most recent attempt, which came when Brazil wrote a new constitution in 1988, met defeat by old-time politicians. Because many Latin American countries have multiparty systems, often abetted by proportional representation, presidents can come to power with nothing near a majority of the popular vote, as Allende did in Chile in 1970 (36.6 percent) or Felipe Calderón in Mexico did in 2006 (36.7 percent). The Allende example encouraged many newly democratizing regimes in the hemisphere to adopt runoff elections so that a new president could claim to have taken a majority of the vote in a popular election.

Multiparty systems also lead to legislatures in which no party has a majority. While a strong coalition has allowed Chile's center-left *Concertación* parties to rule as if a majority party, few parties in any of the larger Latin American countries have held majorities when one of their leaders sat in the presidency. Building coalitions to govern proves extraordinarily difficult for this reason, and frequently presidents do so on an issue-by-issue basis, with legislators requiring various types of payoffs for their support. Not surprisingly, in those countries that allow them, the presidential decree has found frequent use.

Only Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela are federal republics. In the former two countries, however, state-level actors have proven to be key veto players, with governors embarking on fiscal strategies that have undermined central government efforts at financial discipline, helping to precipitate, for example, the Argentine economic crisis in 2001 and 2002. Mexican and Venezuelan federalism has been less robust, although Mexico's National Action Party embarked on a successful strategy in the 1990s of taking power nationally by winning governorships and ruling effectively in those states.

Weak judiciaries and the failure of legislatures to hold presidents accountable have yielded what many regard as low-quality democracies in the period since the military ceded power in the 1980s. Even where judicial review formally exists, courts without effective independence have failed to check executive power. In many countries, notably Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, narcotics traffickers have corrupted the police and the courts, often killing those law enforcement officials who refuse to be compromised. The weakness of legislature and the courts in the face of presidential power has created what Guillermo O'Donnell labels "delegative democracy," in which presidents rule virtually unchecked during their terms of office.

REVOLUTION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

While the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of South America effectively eviscerated national urban guerrilla movements, the revolutionary tradition has proven deep-rooted in the Andes and Central America. Fidel Castro's success in taking power via guerrilla insurrection in Cuba in 1959 has since inspired similar attempts across the hemisphere. Peru nearly succumbed to the Maoist Shining Path before Fujimori's government arrested the movement's leader in 1992. Colombia has fought a four-decade struggle against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In 1979, guerrillas toppled the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua, setting an example that Salvadoran and Guatemalan revolutionaries sought to emulate. Revolutionary movements in the hemisphere often expressed ideological sympathy with socialist regimes, communist China, or the Soviet Union, and thereby incurred the enmity of the United States, which committed considerable resources to defeating rebels in Central America in the 1980s, including overturning the Nicaraguan regime.

Those eschewing violent revolution have turned to social movements to promote political change. A continentwide indigenous rights movement has won land demarcation agreements from the Brazilian government, contributed to the downfall of two Ecuadoran presidents, and brought

Morales to the presidency in Bolivia. Rebels in Mexico's state of Chiapas have capitalized on indigenous rights themes as well as the antiglobalization movement. During the economic crisis that gripped the hemisphere in the 1980s, many neighborhood-level popular movements emerged in the slums of the continent's largest cities—Lima, Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, among others—and banded together in broader social movements to demand utility services, subsidies on staple goods and public transportation, and democracy. The hemisphere's largest social movement, Brazil's Landless Workers' Movement, has seized underutilized lands and settled them with thousands of landless families who then cultivate them cooperatively. Political parties and formal representative institutions often ignore social movements, but those movements have succeeded in calling attention to the deficits of contemporary Latin American democracy.

See also *Autogolpe; Bureaucratic Authoritarianism; Caciquismo/ Coronelismo; Class and Politics; Clientelism; Clientelistic Parties in Latin America; Critical Juncture; Dependency Theory; Drug Cartels; Latin America and Globalization; Latin American Political Economy; Latin American Political Thought; Military Rule; Presidencialismo; Revolutions, Comparative.*

. . . . JOSEPH L. KLESNER

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Latino Partisanship and Ideological Orientations

Latino partisanship in the United States, as measured by voting behavior, has typically favored the Democratic Party by a two-to-one margin. This preference is due in part to Latinos holding a more positive image of the Democratic Party—specifically, as being more receptive to the needs of economically and socially disadvantaged groups and supportive of ethnic and racial minorities. However, their allegiance to the Democratic Party is considered more variable than the strong Democratic affiliation of African Americans.

This lack of cohesion is due in part to the partisanship differences among Latino national-origin and religious groups. Most Latino national-origin groups, such as Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Central Americans, are solidly Democratic in party orientation and have traditionally had a strained relationship with the Republican Party. In contrast, Cuban-origin Latinos are considered the Republican-leaning exception. Cuban Americans have had a more positive experience with the Republican Party, specifically because of GOP support for a strong anticommunist and proembargo agenda. The Republican Party also has benefited from a growing number of evangelical Protestants and Pentecostals among a traditionally Catholic Latino population, as the latter are more likely to vote Democratic.

In exploring the factors that influence Latino partisanship, research suggests that traditional variables of influence work differently for Latinos. When examining the effect of political ideology on party identification, ideology does not appear to correlate as strongly among Latinos as whites. Latinos are more likely to classify themselves as conservative, but under closer analysis they appear more ideologically complex. Latinos tend to be socially conservative, but are liberal on economic issues, making it difficult to root Latino partisanship within a single left–right continuum. Some scholars suggest that this ideological complexity has not strained Latinos' affiliation with the Democratic Party because Latinos do not tend to base their party affiliation on Republican "family values" issues. Latino partisanship appears to be more political in nature, driven by policy preferences that favor a more activist government.

Debate has been considerable over the strength and stability of Latinos' attachment to the Democratic Party and the potential for Republican gains. In U.S. presidential elections, Democrats have received solid support from Latinos, typically averaging 65 percent of the Latino vote. However, Republican presidential candidates have at times made inroads with Latinos, leading some to consider Latinos a "swing group." In 1980 and 1984, Ronald Reagan captured a substantial 37 percent of the Latino vote. Republicans would not again reach such a high level of support until the 2000 election, when George W. Bush received 35 percent of the Latino vote. In 2004, his support further increased to an unprecedented 40 percent of the Latino vote. Evidence from the 2008 presidential election suggests, however, that Bush's gains among Latino voters were most likely candidate-specific and temporal in nature, as Latinos went back to a Democratic candidate, favoring Barack Obama over his Republican rival, John McCain, by the traditional two-to-one margin. Overall, while findings suggest Latinos' attachment to the Democratic Party to be somewhat malleable, a Latino realignment is seen as an unlikely prospect.

See also *Latino Politics; Realignment, Partisan; U.S. Politics and Society: Latino Political Participation.*

. . . .   JOANNE IBARRA

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Latino Politics

Latino politics refers to the political values, attitudes, and behaviors of the Latin American–origin populations in the United States. This includes how they engage U.S. political, economic, social, and cultural institutions, as well as how these institutions respond to Latinos.

DEFINITION

Latinos (also known as Hispanics) are U.S. residents who have personal or ancestral ties to Latin America. They can descend from the indigenous peoples of Latin America, the Caribbean, and the American southwest as well as from arrivals to the Americas from across the globe, including Europeans, Africans, and Asians. However, the definition typically excludes individuals from non-Spanish-speaking nations, such as Brazil,

and there is some debate about whether it should include individuals born in Spain. As this suggests, such categorizations are not always clear, consistent, or compelling.

Furthermore, Latinos include contemporary legal and unauthorized immigrants as well as the long-standing and historically rooted Mexican and Puerto Rican communities, which were incorporated into the United States in the nineteenth century as a result of American territorial expansion. The story becomes even more complex when relatively recent Latin American immigrants—such as Cubans, Dominicans, Salvadorans, and Colombians—are added to the picture.

Therefore, instead of a single Latino group, there are numerous national-origin groups, varying racial and ethnic self-identifications, different legal standings, a variety of expanding regional U.S. contexts, different pathways to incorporation into the polity, and varying receptions and treatments.

It is also important to note that *Hispanic,* the U.S. census term chosen in 1970 to identify these populations, is rejected by some individuals, activists, and scholars. They argue that *Hispanic* has conservative ideological implications and overlooks the presence of indigenous groups—although the word *Latino* poses its own difficulties. However, the Latino public at large uses a variety of panethnic (e.g., Latino, Hispanic) and national-origin group (e.g., Mexican American, Puerto Rican) identifiers, and Latino political organizations similarly use diverse terminology (e.g., Congressional Hispanic Caucus, League of United Latin American Citizens, National Council of La Raza, Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund).

What is most essential to any definition of Latino politics is that it is about politics in the United States. While this may extend to Latin America vis-à-vis foreign policy, migration, and transnationalism, it does not focus on the core issues confronting Latin American polities.

GROWTH OF LATINOS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Historically, the academy and political science in particular have shown little interest in Latino politics. The *American Political Science Review* (APSR) published its first article on what we now call Latinos in 1930, eighty-two years after the end of the United States–Mexico War (1848). More generally, political science has only recently engaged in the serious and sustained study of Latino politics.

This historic disinterest may reflect the fact that the Latino vote was electorally insignificant until the 1960s. Two exceptions were northern New Mexico and south Texas, locations that were not coincidentally the setting for the first two *APSR* Latino articles.

Another problem was a lack of Latino political scientists for much of the twentieth century. Few Latino scholars therefore were available to critique ill-informed research or to bring fresh perspectives reflective of Latino experiences to the discipline. This changed with the ferment of the 1960s as more Latinos (and non-Latinos) began to research Latino politics.

Before the 1960s, no article on Latino politics was written by a Latino scholar. By the 1990s, approximately half of

such articles were written by Latinos, and this growing Latino authorship is evident in the highly ranked journals. In the big three journals, a single Latino authored the four Latino politics articles published before the 1990s. In the decade of the 1990s, by contrast, four of the seven articles in the big three had at least one Latino author.

The above also illustrates that Latino politics research is becoming more prominent in these journals. In addition, several interdisciplinary social science journals and respected but lower-tier political science journals have long served as important research outlets. The pattern is similar with book publishing: the relatively few monographs and edited volumes from the 1970s to 1990s are now joined by a growing number of new books by major presses.

KEY ASPECTS

One of the key political science developments in the twentieth century was the behavioral revolution that began in the 1950s. One can argue that this made the study of Latino politics more difficult. As the discipline increasingly emphasized the analysis of large data sets, scholars were increasingly constrained to study topics for which data were available, and there were almost none on Latinos prior to the 1990s. The pathbreaking Chicano Survey (1979) was somewhat relevant to political research, but the Latino National Political Survey (1989–1990), the Pew Hispanic Center surveys, and the recently completed Latino National Survey provide today's political scientists with political data of the highest quality. The availability of these recent surveys parallels the growth in the number of published Latino politics articles and tenured Latino political scientists.

In terms of content, the most researched topic is behavior (voting and participation), followed by public opinion and public policy (immigration was the main interest in the early decades of the field). In addition, the first panethnic reference does not appear in a political science article title until 1981, but by the 1990s, many of the articles examine Latinos or Hispanics more generally, as well as specific national origin groups.

This recent increase in publications notwithstanding, one challenge to the field is the distinctively complex character of the subject. This leads to a core question: In light of so much diversity, is the study of Latino politics even possible?

One response is that a sense of panethnicity may emerge over time through political elites, government terminology, Spanish language media, business marketing, and reactions against nativism. In addition, there are several potential components to a Latino-Hispanic research agenda. The first is a literature that better takes into account intra–Latino differences while not fractionalizing into narrow literatures on the various national–origin groups. Second, while the tendency in political science is to study phenomena nationally or at the highest level of aggregation, valuable opportunities to learn about Latinos exist at local levels. Third, more research should compare Latinos and non-Latinos. Fourth, it is essential to examine how immigrants affect Latino politics. Finally, the influence of unions, religious groups, and state institutions could usefully be studied through American political development approaches.

See also *Latin American Politics and Society; Latino Partisanship and Ideological Orientations; Panethnicity; U.S. Politics and Society: Latino Political Participation.*

.   .   .   .   RODOLFO O. DE LA GARZA AND DAVID L. LEAL

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Law, Administrative

See *Administrative Law*

Law, Comparative

Comparative law is the study of different laws, legal cultures, and legal systems. The study of comparative law can be traced back to the earliest studies of law and politics. Plato's *Laws,* for example, centers on a stranger's quest to examine the laws of the different cities of his traveling companions to determine the best legal system. Many centuries later, Charles-Louis Montesquieu focused a great deal on understanding different legal systems in *The Spirit of the Laws.* Alexis de Tocqueville, John Locke, Henry Sumner Maine, Friedrich Karl Von Savigny, François Geny, and many other great legal and political thinkers have focused on comparative law as a crucial part of understanding how to create the best government, the best state, and the best society. After World War II (1939–1945), however, the study of law and the study of politics split apart. As a result, while the study of comparative law continued as an integral part of the study of law, it lost its role as a key component of the study of political science.

Recently, however, interest has been renewed in the study of comparative law within the field of political science. In the same way that scholars study the effects of different executive and legislative structures within states, it is possible to study the role different legal systems play in shaping state behavior, both domestically and internationally. The study of comparative law sheds light on our own legal system and also furthers our understanding of other states and peoples around the globe.

PURPOSE OF COMPARATIVE LAW: SUBJECT VERSUS METHOD

There is often debate over whether it is more appropriate to think of comparative law as a subfield to be studied or as a method to use to address particular research questions. In many instances, however, comparative law serves as both a subject and a method. Understanding the differences and

similarities among legal systems allows us to reflect on our own system, as well as to better understand other cultures. For example, a U.S. lawyer whose client is arrested in France will be better able to represent the client if that lawyer understands the differences present in the criminal justice systems of the two countries. Similarly, a U.S. scholar considering the effect interest groups have on judicial decisions would greatly expand the potential universe of cases if, rather than engage in a unitary case study of the U.S. Supreme Court, that scholar considers cases from other judicial systems.

COMPARATIVE LAW, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS

Comparative law as a field may take on a number of meanings within the disciplines of law and political science. The first, and traditional, meaning of comparative law refers to a comprehensive examination of the different legal traditions that make up the legal culture and shape the legal institutions of a state. Closely related to this more broad-based conception of comparative law as a field of study are the subfields of comparative constitutionalism and comparative judicial institutions. While comparative law as an examination of legal traditions includes both constitutions and institutions, each of these has become significant in its own right.

Comparative constitutionalism considers the elements of state constitutions and a comparative analysis of the effects of these constitutions within the state context. This subfield may focus on the issue of rights protected or omitted from a state constitution, as well as the effect of the presence or absence of such rights on the citizens of a state. Another area of focus for comparative constitutionalism is the institutional setup present within constitutions, particularly centered on the concept of judicial review. In both cases, comparative constitutionalism often uses court decisions on constitutional matters as a main component of comparative discussion.

Contrary to comparative constitutionalism, comparative judicial institutions focus on the institutions that comprise the judiciary rather than the law itself. Topics include the independence of the judiciary from other branches of government, the court structure within a state from local courts, through appeals courts, to high courts, and the different types of high courts within a state. The study of comparative judicial institutions also may consider the role that nonjudicial parties are allowed to play in judicial decision making, such as intervenors or amicus curiae.

THE WORLD'S MAJOR LEGAL TRADITIONS

Comparative law research begins with the foundational components of the world's major legal traditions. While highly generalized, these traditions—also called *legal families*—provide an initial basis to begin addressing questions of comparative law. The legal tradition present within a state shapes not only the legal culture and societal understandings of law within a state, but also the types of laws and legal institutions that a state develops. For example, whereas the revolutionary origins of the U.S. legal tradition produced a legal culture focused on the protection of individual rights, a strong constitution, and a clear separation of powers with significant power for the judiciary, the religious origins of the Egyptian legal tradition results in the maintenance of the relationship between church and state and a respect for the authority of sharia law and a court system that combines secular courts and religious courts to decide different issues.

Six legal traditions are outlined below, including an overview of the origins and major characteristics of the tradition, as well as a list of states with that legal tradition.

COMMON LAW

The common-law legal tradition traces its origins to the arrival of William the Conqueror in England in 1066. Once established as king of England, William set up a legal system based on a hierarchical system of courts, in which the judges were responsible for rendering decisions in the cases before them and for synthesizing the varied customary laws found throughout the English territory. By collecting these "common" laws, early judges solidified the prominent role of the judiciary in the common-law system and made judicial decisions a primary source of law.

States with the common-law tradition share a number of specific characteristics. Given that the foundations of the legal tradition are centered in early English court cases, judicial decisions remain the focus of the legal system. This has led to a general understanding of law as a tool for the individual, a system within which individuals have rights and may redress grievances against one another or against the state. Rather than being viewed as an overarching code of conduct (see the civil-law tradition below), the common-law tradition focuses on practical outcomes to individual problems.

This prominence of the judicial branch has led, in many common-law countries, to the creation of judicial review, although the strength of such review varies. For example, judicial review is very strong in the United States, where the U.S. Constitution gives the Supreme Court the power to review legislative and executive actions for conformance with the Constitution and strike them down if necessary. On the other hand, in England, the power of judicial review is much weaker. The High Court of England may only strike down Acts of Parliament in very limited circumstances.

Today, countries with common-law systems include England and Wales (Scotland has elements of the common law, but they are mixed with the civil-law tradition), Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. A number of other countries—many members of the British Commonwealth—also have significant elements of the common-law tradition incorporated into their legal systems. These include India, Nigeria, South Africa, and a number of Caribbean islands.

CIVIL LAW

The civil-law tradition dates to the time of the Roman Empire and the Corpus Juris Civilis and has three main periods of influence: Roman law, Canon law, and the *jus*

commune. The Corpus Juris Civilis was compiled by Emperor Justinian in the sixth century CE. The Corpus Juris Civilis was a comprehensive compilation of Roman law into a single, codified written form. This is the foundation from which the core of the civil-law tradition—written law and codification—originated. After the disintegration of the Roman Empire, much of Europe entered into the Dark Ages—a period in which legal systems were largely absent and law was predominantly customary. The Catholic Church's power, however, kept the Roman writings on law alive, and scholars such as Augustine and Aquinas even added to these laws, incorporating elements of morality and a communal purpose into the largely secular Roman laws. In the eleventh century, the university at Bologna began to revive the study of law. A group of scholars, known as the glossators, began to lecture on Justinian's codes; more importantly, they began to recodify the law in a manner that made it applicable to Renaissance Europe. The new law was called the *jus commune* because it was to be a law that was common to all of Europe. This was possible because scholars from all over Europe came to study law at Bologna, and when they left they took the *jus commune* with them, incorporating it into their own legal systems. This is the reason that the countries of continental Europe have such similar legal systems.

Modern civil-law systems maintain significant ties to this historical development, and many are even further linked as a result of the spread of the Napoleonic Codes. One of Napoleon's primary accomplishments was to consolidate French laws into a number of comprehensive codes. These codes were then transplanted to those countries under the French empire. In other countries, particularly those in South America, the Napoleonic Codes were used as guidelines for their own legal systems.

Codes are the foundation of the civil-law tradition. Codes are designed to be all-encompassing, providing not just a list of legal obligations, rights, punishments, and remedies, but also an overall guide for people on how to conduct their daily lives. Civil-law systems are, therefore, more communal in their focus than common-law systems. Much of this can be traced back to the influence of the Canon law on the civil-law tradition, an influence that incorporated ideas of morality into the law. This communal purpose, however, also can be traced to the minimal role that the judge plays in the civil-law tradition. The role of the judge in the civil-law tradition is to apply the laws, as written by the legislature, to the facts of the case under consideration. Because the codes are so detailed, there is little room for judicial interpretation, and even less for judicial law creation. This is very different from the common-law system described above. Moreover, given the clear delineation of lawmaking authority, judicial review is not often found in civil-law systems.

More countries around the world have civil-law systems than any other system. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and most of the other countries of western Europe maintain civil-law systems. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and most of the other countries of South America also maintain civil-law systems.

Also, many states have adopted civil-law systems and mixed them with other legal traditions. These include Cambodia, Egypt, the states of French west Africa, Morocco, Russia, Tunisia, Turkey, and Vietnam.

ISLAMIC LAW

The Islamic legal tradition is the most dominant of the religious legal traditions today. The Islamic legal tradition stems from the religion of Islam and began with the preaching of Muhammad around 613 CE. As a religious legal tradition, the Islamic tradition is founded on a number of beliefs that are very different from those of the secular traditions described above. These include the belief that law comes from Allah and, because of these origins, law is unchangeable by man. Moreover, because law comes from Allah, the role for the judge is minimal, and breaking the law means more than a fine or jail—it is a sin. Islamic law also focuses on the duties, rather than the rights, of the individual.

The purpose of an Islamic state is to assist Muslims in living according to the tenets of Islam. The whole body of Islamic law is called the sharia, which encompasses the rules that Allah laid down for Muhammad. The sharia consists of a number of specific sources of law. The first of these is the Quran, which is the book containing Allah's revelations to Muhammad. A second source of law is the *sunna*, which is the record of the words and deeds of Muhammad during his lifetime, which are to be emulated by all Muslims. The third source of law are the *ijma*, which are those doctrines and laws on which the majority of Islamic scholars agree. The fourth source is the *Qiyas*, which is a method of analogical reasoning used to fill in gaps when the other three sources of law do not touch on a particular issue.

The extent to which each of these sources of law are used varies according to which branch of Islam (Sunni or Shia) and which school of Islamic thought (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali) are present within a state. Islamic scholars disagree on the relative importance of these four sources. Most recognize the preeminence of the Quran and the *sunna*, but disagree over the validity of the *ijma* and the *Qiyas*. For example, the Hanafi school allows for consideration of all four types of law, and in some Hanafi countries, such as Egypt, *ijmas* and *Qiyas* have been used to incorporate civil-law and common-law components into the legal system. Other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, which follow the Hanbali school of thought, discourage the use of both *ijmas* and *Qiyas* and maintain much more traditional Islamist legal systems.

The Islamic legal tradition is the primary legal tradition in a number of countries including Afghanistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. The Islamic legal tradition is also a major component, mixed with common law, civil law, customary law, or other religious traditions, in many countries throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, including Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Nigeria, and Syria.

HINDU LAW

The Hindu legal tradition can be traced as far back as 2500 BC. The Hindu tradition is based on dharma, which is the

belief that there exists a universal order inherent in the nature of things. Like the sharia in the Islamic legal tradition, dharma is designed to guide all of an individual's behavior and does not distinguish between religious duties and legal obligations. Any concept of individual rights is foreign to the Hindu tradition, which focuses instead on maintaining balance and harmony within the community.

One belief that distinguishes the Hindu tradition is that the duties and obligations each individual must carry out vary according to each person's status. The Hindu tradition divides people into three primary social groups, each with its own rules and obligations. These include the scholars and priests, the warriors and merchants, and the artisans and tradesmen. This division is necessary in the Hindu tradition to ensure proper balance.

Historically, in the Hindu legal tradition, rules were primarily enacted, implemented, and enforced at the local level. The village *panchayat* was responsible for hearing and deciding legal disputes on the basis of religious laws and existing local custom. Given the diversity that existed throughout the Indian subcontinent, there could be a significant difference between the laws as applied in the local communities.

The primary sources of law in the Hindu legal tradition are the religious texts (the *sastras* and *sustras*) and the accepted interpretations of these works by religious scholars (the *vedas*). One distinguishing characteristic of the Hindu tradition, however, is its flexibility in terms of the recognition of new laws. Unlike some other religious traditions, in which change to the laws is very difficult to achieve, the Hindu tradition accepts change as a natural part of life. The dharma always has accepted that new laws will have to be made by men to govern their current situations. Whether the laws are created by custom, legislation, or judicial decision, the Hindu tradition accepts manmade law as an essential component of a functioning social order, while at the same time recognizing the transient nature of this law and the fact that it will continue to change as circumstances and societal needs change.

Hindu law, both historically and today, has largely been centered in India. The legal system of India today is no longer purely Hindu law; it is a mixed system incorporating common law, customary law, and Islamic law, but Hindu law does remain a part of the legal system and is dominant in the area of family law. The Hindu legal tradition also has had some influence in a number of other countries in Southeast Asia, including Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan.

CUSTOMARY LAW

For centuries, throughout Africa, legal rules came in the form of customary laws. The basic tenet of this customary tradition is that law stems from respect for the traditions of one's ancestors. The binding nature of law in these societies came from the pressure of the group and not wanting to act against the group for fear of shame and banishment.

The customary legal tradition centers on social groupings such as tribes, castes, villages, and bloodlines. These social groupings are thought to endure through time, and therefore no laws can exist that adversely affect either past or future generations. Because of this, certain Western conceptions of law do not have a place in the African tradition. For example, personal property rights are generally not found in customary legal traditions because property was thought to belong to one's ancestors and descendents as well as oneself. You are merely entitled to use the property during your lifetime. Corresponding to this focus on the group, the law is ordered primarily based on individual obligations to the community rather than individual rights.

Colonialism had a significant effect on the customary legal tradition, and today most African states maintain mixed legal traditions, with some elements of customary law still existing alongside civil law, common law, and religious law traditions. In many states, local and family issues may still be handled through customary law. For example, in Nigeria, a country where the national legal system is founded on the British common law, both local and national judges still refer to local customary law to decide issues related to property and marriage disputes.

Countries that still maintain elements of customary law include Burma, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nepal, Nigeria, Rwanda, Togo, and Uganda, among many others throughout Africa and Southeast Asia.

ASIAN LAW

A number of characteristics bind individual Asian states' legal traditions together into a legal family. One of the primary components of the Asian legal tradition is that law, historically, was not considered a means of promoting peace and stability. As with the religious and customary legal traditions, the Asian tradition relies on something other than legal rules to maintain order in society; formal legal rules are considered secondary. Like the customary tradition, the community plays a significant role in the Asian tradition, and the focus is on consensus and mediation, rather than the determinative outcome of an adversarial legal procedure. In many Asian countries, even today, seeking resolution in the legal system is considered shameful. Disagreements are still handled within the community, and in resolving disputes the focus is on the outcome that will best restore harmony to the community rather than solely punish an offender or provide a remedy to the victim.

Many Asian countries, China in particular, also have been influenced by Confucianism. Within the Confucian tradition, society is structured according to a natural order, in which each person has a designated place (in a manner very similar to the Hindu tradition). Society is hierarchical, with the family as the primary unit, followed by the village, then the region, and then the country. Disputes are resolved under this hierarchy as well—first within the family, but if that is not possible then within the village. Resorting to regional or statewide solutions is frowned upon.

As with the other legal traditions described herein, however, these general characteristics vary from country to country, depending on the particular historical development and societal characteristics of that country. China, for example, has been strongly influenced by Confucianism, but also in more

recent times by socialism. Japan, on the other hand, while sharing the historical influences, has been influenced also by its Shinto tradition and, particularly after World War II, the Western traditions of the civil and common law.

States that reflect evidence of the Asian tradition include China, Japan, and South Korea.

CONCLUSION

The six legal traditions described in this entry are commonly identified as the primary legal families that have developed across the globe. Largely this is due to our ability to trace the origins of today's current legal systems for most countries to one of these traditions. As mentioned, however, these classifications are a starting point for further study and understanding of comparative law. Today, the legal traditions of very few states remain "pure," meaning a state that can trace the origins of its legal tradition back to only one of these major legal families. The vast majority of legal systems found in states today are mixed systems—legal systems that have incorporated two or more of these legal families into their current legal structure. In some instances this mixing was the result of conquest or colonialism. In other cases it was the result of borrowing from successful systems in an attempt to improve one's own. Even the United States, one of the classic examples of the common-law tradition, maintains traces of the civil-law tradition through the Napoleonic Codes that are still part of the laws of the state of Louisiana. Most of the countries of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East are mixtures of three or more systems including Western-style secular law, religious legal traditions, and customs.

Despite this mixture, however, understanding the primary characteristics that form the origins of the world's major legal traditions helps us to understand the perceptions and understandings of law that exist in different countries around the world. This understanding makes the field of comparative law such a vital and important one.

See also *Asian Political Thought; Civil Law; Common Law; Constitutional Systems, Comparative; Hindu Political Thought; Islamic Political Thought; Judicial Systems, Comparative; Law and Society.*

. . . .   DANA ZARTNER

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Law, Constitutional

See *Constitutional Law*

Law and Politics

See *Law, Comparative.*

Law and Society

The phrase *law and society* refers to three interrelated phenomena of relevance to political scientists. First, the phrase signals the general tradition of interdisciplinary sociolegal scholarship that developed over the past half century around the globe to analyze how law, politics, and social forces or practices are interrelated and influence one another. Second, the phrase evokes more specifically the interdisciplinary, international (but North American centered), social science–oriented Law and Society Association (LSA) and various other national and regional associations around the world, which since the 1960s have provided organized leadership promoting this type of scholarship. A third referent is the manifestation of these previous two phenomena within the discipline of political science, especially in the Law and Courts section of the American Political Science Association (APSA), but also among political scientists throughout the world, and increasingly in related fields of comparative politics and international human rights. This entry begins by outlining the institutional history of the interrelated academic traditions (second connotation), and then discusses the types of law and society scholarship that have been most prominent among political scientists.

PROFESSIONAL ACADEMIC HISTORY

Law has long been a topic of research and teaching by political scientists. In the half century before the 1950s, law was implicated in a wide range of studies. The study of public law by political scientists in the United States prior to World War II (1939–1945) included constitutional law, administrative law, business regulation, and international relations. Amid the polarized cold war era that gave birth to the positivist, behavioral revolution in social science, all this changed. International law became almost meaningless, while studies of international organization and international relations developed in directions more attentive to the interests and interplay of key actors. Administrative law and regulatory law likewise were exposed as formalistic facades obscuring the behavior of interested public and private parties. Finally, traditional attention to constitutional structures and discourse was substantially shrunk to a focus on the U.S. Supreme Court, which was too important to discount. And even in

this domain, study shifted from matters of jurisprudence to judicial behavior, and especially to questions of why justices voted as they did and to what effect. As Martin Shapiro has noted, "public law and judicial behavior thus dwindled into a marginalized constitutional law-Supreme Court ghetto of little interest to other political scientists" (1993, 366).

During the period before World War II, law schools in the common law–based United States and, even more, in civil-law countries showed little interest in political science. In the 1960s, however, a loose alliance of individual law professors around the United States began to embrace newly developing social science approaches in an effort to invigorate the realist debunking of formal law taught in law schools that began in earlier decades and to marry sophisticated study of legal practice to the liberal social engineering schemes initiated during the New Deal and expanded by the Great Society. Select law professors and social scientists during this era found common cause in collaborative use of empirical study to make law "work better," to promote making legal justice serve the ends of social justice. The primary thrust of the newly emerging scholarship was behavioral, positivistic, nominally quantitative, and policy oriented.

Sociologists and sociological inquiry led the initial wave of law and society collaboration, which was formally initiated with the birth of the Law and Society Association in 1964. By the 1970s, though, a number of political scientists became active in LSA and started to publish in the *Law and Society Review,* introducing a wider range of sociolegal inquiry into public law scholarship. Political scientists at Berkeley, Northwestern, and Wisconsin in particular developed small centers of sociolegal scholarship connected to the growing LSA intellectual community. These initiatives developed as confidence in social scientific research flourished, boundaries distinguishing national legal systems seemed relatively stable, interest in legal culture was confined to mass behavior and opinion, and scientific analysis provided a basis for policy prescription. Interest in joining sophisticated social science to the study of law began to grow beyond the United States, especially in the English-speaking world, leading to regional associations of scholars committed to the study of law and society.

These developments were uneven, halting, and mixed in implications, though. By the 1980s, very few law schools in the United States had hired political scientists into their faculty, and political scientists still largely dismissed law schools as havens of old-fashioned formalism. Indeed, the primary reason for inclusion of public law scholars in most political science departments was to serve the high demand expressed by undergraduate students for classes in constitutional law, civil liberties, and the U.S. Supreme Court. And while sociolegal scholarship was widely respected in the Law and Courts group, the latter subfield itself remained a relatively marginal, low-profile area of research activity in the broader discipline. Conversely, when law schools did begin to hire social science–trained scholars in 1990s, it was mostly in law and economics, an approach that never carved out much place in the law and society community. If institutionalists in sociology and political science once connected with law professors for the study of law in positive states of the global North, the rapid, widespread saturation of law schools with law and economics both paralleled and supported diminishing political commitments to the social welfare state.

Overall, the relationship between political scientists in the Law and Courts section of APSA and sociolegal scholars identifying with LSA has weakened since the early 1990s. One often cited reason was the influx of humanities-oriented scholars and the related "interpretive turn" in LSA. This pushed sociolegal scholarship in the direction of postrealist, postpositivist, and noninstrumental directions that offered little for the types of causal explanation or policy prescription valued by mainstream political scientists, at the very moment that the Law and Courts subfield was struggling to prove its social science credentials. Also relevant was the strong impulse to regionally informed, non-U.S.-centered comparative and global study among sociolegal scholars. This expanded law and society professional affiliation and intellectual focus around the world much more quickly and substantially than among U.S. political scientists in the Law and Courts subfield. Yet another factor was the resurgent refocusing of interest on the U.S. Supreme Court by political scientists, which was welcomed but not a prominent part of the sociolegal tradition. Thus, while a number of leading scholars and graduate programs kept sociolegal scholarship alive among U.S. political scientists, the linkage diminished in visibility and significance relative to previous decades.

Even so, the options for publication in interdisciplinary law and society journals and with good academic book presses, as well as for access to funding from the Law and Social Science Division of the National Science Foundation, have sustained the professional interconnections. Moreover, the alliance of political science and law and society outside the United States—in Australia, Europe, Israel, Latin America, and parts of Asia—prospered and grew. The recent growth of empirical legal studies, a classic form of mostly positivist, quantitatively oriented social legal scholarship, has won support from many LSA, law school, and political science scholars alike, so it has become a new source of vital interaction.

SUBSTANTIVE AREAS OF INQUIRY

Interdisciplinary law and society scholars traditionally have tended to define their work more by the domains of legal practice that are studied than by the epistemological or methodological approaches that they bring to those topics, although in some ways sociolegal studies have increasingly come to congregate in separate methodological camps much as in the disciplines. Most efforts to map sociolegal scholarship do focus on analytical frameworks for making sense of law in action, and that approach will be replicated here. Seven substantive areas of sociolegal inquiry to which political scientists have contributed are worth noting.

COURTS

As noted earlier, the Law and Courts section of APSA has been fixated on federal court judges and, especially, on U.S.

Supreme Court justices. This focus has been replicated by political scientists outside the United States as well. Much of the attention has aimed to explain what judges and justices do and why, or the relationship between high courts and other government branches. Scholarship has divided generally among three separate approaches: (1) analyses of how individual judge's attitudes or values shape or determine judicial behavior; (2) studies that build on game theory to address the strategic calculations of judges relative to other political actors, and (3) institutionalist analyses of high courts, which draw heavily on traditions of "new institutionalism" and American political development in political science. Scholars in all three camps are active in LSA, but none of these approaches, all of which are very centered on courts and the nation-state generally, have been prominent in the sociolegal tradition.

A second area of inquiry is judicial impact studies, a topic in which political science and sociolegal studies share more in common. It is significant in this regard that a classic essay by political scientist Robert Dahl contributed a major thesis—that the Supreme Court is not highly independent and typically follows other national branches—which much contemporary study still takes as a central question or point of reference. A third area of inquiry has concerned mass perceptions of federal courts, both as a measure of institutional "legitimacy" and as an ongoing process of producing institutional legitimation.

Studies of U.S. judicial behavior have influenced some comparative cross-national study of non-U.S. courts in ways that are routinely debated among sociolegal scholars with strong regional grounding; this is an area of research growth in both LSA and political science, with a fair amount of crossover, enlisting scholars from around the world. Study of lower trial courts and of state appellate courts thrived in the 1970s and still occupies some prominent scholars, but it has been somewhat marginal in both political science and sociolegal study.

DISPUTING AND LEGAL MOBILIZATION

One of the most innovative developments in law and society scholarship began from complementary studies of ordinary disputing among individuals—over personal injury, contracts, workplace discrimination, divorce, and the like—*in* society. Anthropologists and sociologists pioneered influential approaches to the topic, but one major study enlisting a number of political scientists in the United States had enormous impact on the field of law and society. The key contribution of this study was to decenter courts and even lawyers, focusing instead on everyday disputes in society and the inclinations of citizens or social groups to "mobilize" legal norms and rights in "naming, blaming, and claiming" practices. Frances Kahn Zemans's theorization of legal mobilization by ordinary citizens as a distinctive, widespread, and important form of democratic political participation put a uniquely political science spin on this type of inquiry. Much of the early study was highly behavioral and represented quantitatively, but such studies raised questions about how legal knowledge "constituted" legal subjects and generated a

"legal consciousness" of citizen subjects that encouraged, even required, more qualitative study. This generated a great deal of sociolegal study beginning in the 1980s but, not surprisingly, relatively little by political scientists.

The biggest impact of disputing studies for political scientists was around the subject of group disputing, whether framed as studies of law and social change, law and social movements, or legal impact. The earliest and most conventional inquiry centered on the impact of reform litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court. Study of reform litigation and group politics—whether interest groups or social movements—led to a wide range of approaches to organized legal mobilization. These two general frameworks, sometimes categorized as top down (judicial impact) and bottom up (legal mobilization) approaches, remain vital areas of study and debate among political scientists in the sociolegal tradition. The legal mobilization approach to group struggle also stimulated much study about politics constituted by rights-claiming specifically, which often is bound to a focus on law's constitutive power; this inquiry also has enlisted some political scientists.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND REGULATORY POLITICS

Both political scientists and sociolegal scholars have undertaken considerable study of law and politics of administrative and regulatory state institutional practice. However, there has been surprisingly little direct overlap, in part because the topic does not fit the "court-centric" thrust of the Law and Courts section while law professors have tended to dominate sociolegal studies in this area. That said, some very prominent political scientists have contributed important sociolegal studies of administrative and regulatory politics. Many of them have been associated with the Center for Law and Society at the University of California, Berkeley, where a strong tradition of policy-oriented and institutional study of the welfare/regulatory state has thrived since the 1970s.

CRIMINAL PROCESS

Attention to lower criminal courts, criminal plea bargaining practices, and the overall institutional structure of criminal justice in the United States was a hallmark of sociolegal studies in the 1970s and 1980s. A number of prominent political scientists made important empirically grounded analytical contributions to such inquiry. This area of inquiry generally has engaged fewer political scientists in the past several decades, and its place in the Law and Courts section has diminished. The scholarly legacy continues to thrive, however, and some innovative inquiry among younger scholars has developed in recent years.

POLITICS OF LAW AND POLICY AGENDA SETTING

Another area of robust inquiry among sociolegal scholars has concerned the macropolitics of agenda setting and policy discourse regarding criminal, civil, and constitutional law matters. Political scientist Murray Edelman's work on symbolic politics was a critical catalyst and template for much of this scholarship, which has been dominated by sociologists as well as political scientists. This scholarship often combines

attention to elite political discourse, media coverage, public opinion, and, increasingly in recent years, mass entertainment media (e.g., movies, TV, novels). The primary contribution has been to show how legal policy discourse and knowledge is at once generated and reconstructed in mass culture, producing a politics of law that is far less rational and empirically grounded than much policy-oriented discussion assumes. Most of this research by political scientists has concerned the symbolic politics of either the Supreme Court or crime discourse and reporting, but much recent attention has been directed to civil law as well.

LEGAL PROFESSION AND CAUSE LAWYERING

Sociologists have, not surprisingly, dominated study of the legal profession. Still, political scientists have conducted a fair amount of study of lawyers in the criminal process and, especially, in civil matters of divorce, torts, discrimination law, and other ordinary disputes. Studies have probed how lawyers wield power, how lawyers relate to clients and represent their causes, and how lawyers organize themselves politically around various professional interests. One very robust area of sociolegal study led but hardly monopolized by political scientists has been directed to cause lawyers, who represent movements for social justice, civil rights, and human rights in the United States and around the world. This work has produced at least five volumes of essays and one original book at the time of this writing.

COMPARATIVE CROSS-NATIONAL LAW

Shapiro, an eminent political scientist, long has been a leader in advocating comparative sociolegal study. Nevertheless, study of law beyond the United States has lagged among political scientists, and the recent spurt of interest has been devoted almost exclusively to high courts, much of it relying on models generated to make sense of the U.S. Supreme Court. However, an impressive cohort of creative political scientists also active in LSA has begun to develop interesting comparative studies of high court politics that integrate institutionalist approaches with historical, political, cultural, and economic knowledge of regional contexts. And some comparative studies of cause lawyers, the role of lawyers in democratic development, legal reform politics, regulatory and administrative law, and constitutional structure have been undertaken by political scientists well connected to the larger sociolegal community.

CONCLUSION

The contributions of political scientists to studies of law and society have varied widely in different periods over the past fifty years. Since the 1980s, the once-vital relationship between political scientists in the Law and Courts section and LSA in North America have become less firm, even somewhat strained. Interdisciplinary sociolegal studies associated with the LSA have continued to proliferate in a variety of different substantive and methodological directions, expanding an ever bigger tent whose boundaries are blurred to include a plethora of increasingly unconnected intellectual subgroups. In this regard, sociolegal studies both in North America

and beyond have gravitated toward inclusion of the diverse epistemological and methodological frameworks, including humanities as well as social sciences. Austin Sarat has rightly labeled the trend "vitality amidst fragmentation." By contrast, political scientists, in North America and beyond, have not expanded or altered very much either their court-centered substantive agenda or methodological orientations beyond traditional disciplinary boundaries in recent decades.

Moreover, interdisciplinary sociolegal scholars tend to remain more substantively oriented toward comparative cross-national and transnational legal developments as well as globally connected through professional networks than political science scholars, although the latter seem to be slowly developing greater global awareness about high courts and constitutions. For several decades, some leading political scientists have been urging and even predicting the latter trends. However, much interesting study of law and politics recently has taken place among political scientists aligned with comparative politics, international relations, and human rights, often with little reference to U.S.-focused scholarship by political science specialists in the Law and Courts subfield. At the same time, the rapid rise of interest in law and economics by law schools has provided incentives for such study of law among political scientists, thus pushing away from the diverse perspectives of approaches familiar among law and society scholars. Perhaps the ascendant orientation most likely to reconnect some political science scholars of Law and Courts to sociolegal study is related to the empirical legal studies movement—a realist-inspired, positivist-oriented, quantitatively leaning movement of scholars in many ways representing a return to the earlier era of behavioral study that initially joined the two camps.

See also *Administrative Courts; Law, Comparative; Political Sociology; Trial Courts.*

. . . .   MICHAEL MCCANN

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Lazarsfeld, Paul F.

Mathematically trained Paul Felix Lazarsfeld (1901–1976) was a leading empirical sociologist who is celebrated for his contribution to, in the words of Jonathan Cole in his 2004 keynote address at a symposium honoring Lazarsfeld, "scholarly revolutions that catapulted American research universities to positions of preeminence."

Lazarsfeld was born in Vienna, Austria. He was an active academic and taught at a gymnasium. Lazarsfeld also helped establish a research institute at the University of Vienna, headed by German psychologist Karl Bühler. This would be the first of four institutes Lazarsfeld established in his lifetime. His position at the gymnasium came to an end in 1933 as the Nazi regime forced many Jewish academics from their positions.

After the loss of his post in Austria, Lazarsfeld went to the United States on a Rockefeller Foundation traveling fellowship after having attracted the foundation's attention with a study on unemployment in an area close to Vienna. Lazarsfeld quickly became well established in the United States. By the end of the 1930s he had set up a research center at the University of Newark in New Jersey and became the director of the Office of Radio Research, working with sociologist and philosopher Theodor Adorno. In 1940, Lazarsfeld moved to New York and began to teach at Columbia University. The Office of Radio Research also relocated to Columbia University and became the Bureau of Applied Social Research, with Lazarsfeld still serving as its director. Eventually, he became president

of the American Sociological Association and was elected to the American National Academy of Sciences.

Fascinated with methodology, Lazarsfeld is perhaps most known for combining qualitative and quantitative methods. He came up with the panel study or panel analysis, an innovative new way of surveying. By taking the same panel, or group of people, and interviewing them at intervals, Lazarsfeld found it was possible to identify changes in personal preference regarding any number of issues. Using this method, Lazarsfeld found that it was also possible to comment on the role of the media in influencing preference. The method was applied to a study of presidential election campaigns, and the results were published in *The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign* (1944) and *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign* (1954), both of which continue to be instrumental in the contemporary study of public opinion surveying and election polling.

Lazarsfeld's research challenged the popular notion that society was composed of completely individual-minded and autonomous actors who were directly influenced by the media. His two-step flow of information model showed that opinion leaders were largely responsible for interpreting the flow of information from the media and diffusing it to larger societal groups.

The methods and ideas Lazarsfeld brought to the social sciences have continued to be influential since his death in 1976 from cancer. Tributes in the form of symposiums, conferences, and publications dedicated to his work are a testament to the value of the contribution he made to disciplines as diverse as mathematics, history, psychology, sociology, political science, and mass communications.

See also *Adorno, Theodor W.; Empiricism; Media and Politics; Media Effect; Panel Studies; Political Sociology; Political Theory; Polling, History of.*

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Leadership

Leadership refers to a social relation in which one actor influences numerous supporters in a lasting and systematic way. Definitions of leadership highlight actors' abilities (e.g., talent,

virtues), personality features (will, determination), relational characteristics (trust, charisma), functions (directing, transforming), and social status (aristocratic background) as bases for holding lasting influence over followers. Political leadership is typically discussed in the context of power structure and political leadership skills. The former focuses on hierarchies of positions infused with power; the latter includes a broad range of abilities attributed to incumbents of these positions.

Some scholars restrict the notion of leadership to voluntary following and see it, as Dwight Eisenhower put it, as "the art of getting someone else to do something you want done because he wants to do it." "True" or "authentic" leaders are expected to generate loyalty and voluntary subordination. Such leaders also are credited with strengthening group integration, cohesion, and identity. However, most observers also agree that authentic leaders are rare. They are expected to have popular appeal, as well as persuasive skills, vision and determination, and realism and passion.

In microlevel organizational literature, leadership is contrasted with management and analyzed in its formal and informal aspects. Thus, according to Warren Bennis, leaders innovate, inspire, show new directions, and develop new strategies, while managers administer, follow routines, maintain order, and control systems. In the micropolitics of organizations formal leaders, the incumbents of authority positions, are contrasted with informal leaders, whose influence reflects social status and informal networks.

Macrosocial and political perspectives focus on national political leaders: presidents, prime ministers, and leaders of national movements. Social and political historians like Thomas Carlyle locate such leaders in a broad historical context. Political psychologists and sociologists like Vilfredo Pareto typically focus on personality features of leaders and elites. In political sociology, leadership is seen embedded in complex power relations that link leaders with wider groups: elites, ruling classes, and state-governmental organizations. These differences in disciplinary perspectives reflect divergent explanations of leadership: in terms of distinctive and unique personality traits, superior motivation and drive, superior social status, conducive historical circumstances, response to collective demands, and reflection of group or organizational functional needs.

TYPES OF POLITICAL LEADERS

Popular typologies of political leaders follow these discipline-specific accounts of leadership. Perhaps the best known are Max Weber's typology of leadership and authority, Kurt Lewin's typology of leadership climate, and social-psychological typologies derived from Niccolò Machiavelli's and Pareto's personality types. Weber distinguished three bases of authority: traditional, legal-rational, and charismatic. They correspond to three types of leaders. Traditional leaders—kings, chieftains, and *pater familiae*—are followed out of respect for sacred traditions. In contrast, modern bureaucratic leaders—presidents, prime ministers, cabinet members, party bosses, and top government officials—rely on respect for laws and formal (mostly constitutional) rules. Charisma, or the "gift of grace," rests on the followers' devotion to "the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained" by the leader (Weber 1978, 134). While both traditional and modern forms of leadership are institutionalized and stable, charismatic leadership is "revolutionary" and transient. Charismatic "heroes" are capable of overcoming both sacred traditionalism and bureaucratic inertia. Napoleon, Adolf Hitler, Martin Luther King Jr., and Nelson Mandela are examples of such transformational charismatic leaders. But charisma is personal and fragile. It evaporates after failures, and it cannot be transmitted through office; therefore charismatic leaders are succeeded by bureaucratic officials and statesmen.

Lewin's typology of dictator, autocrat, and participatory and laissez-faire leaders combines psychological and social characteristics. Each type creates a distinctive leadership climate, culture, and style. As mentioned earlier, some scholars exclude dictators and autocrats from the ranks of "leadership proper" because such figures rely on involuntary following. They are said to rule and govern, rather than lead. Others extend the notion of leadership to all cases of mass compliance. One such broad typology follows the classic distinction between "lionlike" and "foxlike" leaders and elites popularized by Machiavelli and elaborated by Pareto. According to Pareto, great political leaders are endowed with dispositions that are either "leonine"—showing determination, bravery, faith, and loyalty—or "vulpine"—showing intelligence, flexibility, negotiating skills, and cunning. This typology has been embraced by contemporary political leadership literature informed by studies of authoritarian personality, by Erich Fromm, and revolutionary elites, by Harold Lasswell and his collaborators. They focus on leadership styles and personality types (e.g., authoritarian-liberal, cautious-risk taking, conventional-innovative), as summarized in James Burns's 1978 book *Leadership*.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP

Most students of social and political leadership stress the historical evolution of its form from premodern, typically based on traditions and status conventions, to modern, meritocratic, formalized, differentiated, and based on rules. Modern leaders are typically incumbents of leadership positions that combine clearly defined social roles and rules of operation. They are progressively differentiated: political-parliamentary leaders are distinct from state-administrative, corporate, religious, and cultural leaders. While all modern leaders are selected on merit, this does not eliminate privilege, but rather changes the way privilege is transmitted. Similarly, formal rules and democratic conventions do not prevent arbitrary exercise of power. Strong democratic leaders are capable of bending and changing rules to fit their power needs. It is widely recognized that leaders shape institutional rules as much as rules shape leadership styles.

One of the major contemporary debates is on the relationship between political leadership and democracy. Some

political analysts see strong leadership as inimical to partici-patory democracy, and they point to charismatic authoritarian leaders such as Napoleon, Joseph Stalin, and Hitler, who undermined democratic processes. Others stress that democratic representation relies on strong and legitimate leadership, and point to the importance of charismatic leaders such as King Juan Carlos in Spain, Lech Walesa in Poland, Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia, and Nelson Mandela in South Africa as key agents in recent transitions from dictatorships to democracy. Leadership, it seems, can be democratic and autocratic, depending on the orientations of the leaders.

See also *Autocracy; Caesarism; Charisma; Executive, The; Pareto, Vilfredo; Political Psychology; Stalinism; Weber, Max.*

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League of Arab States

See *Arab League.*

League of Nations

The League of Nations was founded as a result of the Treaty of Versailles that ended World War I (1914–1918). The League's primary goal, to prevent war, would be accomplished through collective security, the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations, and ensuring good behavior of nations through the application of sanctions against those that violated international law or threatened world peace. While initially successful, the League could not halt the aggression that culminated with World War II (1939–1945), and the organization officially ceased to exist in April 1946.

ORIGIN OF THE ORGANIZATION

The League of Nations emerged from the carnage of World War I. The first truly "total war" in Europe, more than 8.5 million soldiers were killed in action and 21 million more were wounded, with another 10 million deaths among Europe's civilians. Called "the war to end all wars," many political leaders turned to the question of how to avoid a future catastrophe. The idea of a League of Nations was raised by American president Woodrow Wilson in his Fourteen Points for Peace,

which were proposed before a joint session of Congress on January 8, 1918: "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."

Following the armistice ending World War I, Wilson attended the Paris Peace Conference where the Treaty of Versailles was negotiated. The proposal to create a League of Nations was agreed to, and the organization was established by Part I of the Treaty. On June 28, 1919, forty-four nation-states signed the covenant creating the League of Nations. The League would have three objectives: pursue collective security, facilitate international cooperation, and execute the mandates of the peace treaties.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE LEAGUE

President Wilson, who received the Nobel Peace Prize for his work at the Peace Conference, attempted to secure American approval of the Treaty and entry into the League. However, he was opposed by Republicans in the U.S. Senate (notably Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts and William E. Borah of Idaho), who believed that joining the League would threaten American sovereignty. Facing opposition in the Senate, Wilson attempted to rally public opinion by going on a national speaking tour, traveling eight thousand miles (12,900 kilometers) in twenty-two days and giving thirty-eight speeches. He experienced bad headaches and collapsed in Pueblo, Colorado. His train took him back to Washington, where he suffered a stroke that left the left side of his face and body paralyzed.

Senator Lodge proposed ratification of the Treaty but demanded the inclusion of reservations that he believed would preserve American sovereignty. Wilson refused, claiming that ratification by the Senate with conditions would be repudiating what each nation had signed. If the United States demanded changes, then why could not the Germans also? Wilson asked his supporters to vote against ratification with reservations, and the Treaty was never ratified by the United States.

On January 16, 1920, President Wilson formally convened the Council of the League in Paris in accordance with the League provision for the summoning of the first council and assembly by the president of the United States. It would be the last official participation by the United States in the League of Nations. The League, which the United States was expected to lead, lost much of its credibility without the American power.

HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE

In November 1920, the League established its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. The first meeting of the General Assembly convened in the Palais Wilson on November 15, 1920, with forty-one nations taking part. Eventually, assembly meetings would be held in the Batiment Electoral in Geneva, with meetings of the council being held at Palais Wilson. In 1936, the League moved into the Palais des Nations.

Membership in the League fluctuated, with the high point reached between September 28, 1934, and February 23, 1935,

when fifty-eight nations participated in the organization. Germany was originally barred from the League because it had been deemed, by the Versailles Treaty, as the aggressor in World War I; it was allowed to join in 1926. Costa Rica (1920–1925), Brazil (1920–1926), Japan (1920–1933), Germany (1926–1933), Haiti (1920–1942), and Luxembourg (1920–1942) all withdrew from the League. The Soviet Union, which had been prohibited from joining the League because of the Bolshevik takeover, was admitted in 1934. In December 1939, the Soviet Union was expelled for aggression against Finland. This was one of the League's last acts as it stopped functioning due to World War II.

In its early years, the League successfully mediated a number of border disputes that had not been settled by the Treaty of Versailles or by the San Remo Conference of April 1920. The settlement of the dispute between Sweden and Finland over the Aland Islands (1921) was the first international agreement made through the League. The League also intervened in an armed conflict between Greece and Bulgaria in October 1925, with Greece accepting the League's resolution that it withdraw from Bulgaria and provide compensation.

However, the League would suffer a number of failures that would eventually lead to its demise. When the League condemned Japan for its 1932 invasion of Manchuria, Japan withdrew from the League. The League could not halt Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935. Notwithstanding the League's efforts to encourage disarmament (including the 1932 World Disarmament Conference convened in Geneva by the League), Germany, Italy, and Japan continued their arms buildups. The collective security functions of the League, which should have been mobilized during the Manchurian and Abyssinian crises, were not because the United Kingdom and France were unwilling to go to war.

World War II began on September 1, 1939, and the last significant action of the League was to expel the Soviet Union after it invaded Finland in December 1939. At the 1943 Tehran Conference, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin agreed that the League would be replaced by a new organization at the conclusion of the war, the United Nations. The final meeting of the League Assembly was held in April 1946 in Geneva for the purpose of dissolving the organization and liquidating its assets. The Palace of Peace (the headquarters of the Permanent Court of International Justice), located in the Hague, and the League's Archives were transferred to the United Nations. The League ceased to exist on April 20, 1946.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The League of Nations had four principal organs: a secretariat, a council, an assembly, and the Permanent Court of International Justice. The League secretariat was the administrative arm of the organization, responsible for preparing the agendas for the council and assembly and publishing reports of meetings. The secretary-general headed the secretariat, and the British diplomat James Eric Drummond was the first secretary, serving until June 1933. He was replaced by Joseph Louis Anne Avenol, a French diplomat who had served as

under-secretary-general (at the Paris Peace Conference it had been agreed that the first secretary-general would be British and that he would be succeeded by a French national). Sean Lester, an Irish diplomat, succeeded Avenol and served as the last secretary-general from August 31, 1940, to April 18, 1946.

The assembly, which met annually in Geneva each September, was composed of three delegates from each member-state. The League council was to consist of the five Allied powers that won the war, but without the United States this became Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. Four other nations were elected by the assembly for a three-year term on the council. Initially, Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece were selected. In later years, the number of nonpermanent members would vary. In 1922, the number was increased from four to six. In 1926 the number was increased to nine. When Germany joined the League in 1926 it became a fifth permanent member of the council (giving the body a total of fourteen members). After Japan and Germany withdrew in 1933, the number of nonpermanent members of the council was increased to eleven.

Any member could go to the council with a concern and was allowed a vote at the council on that issue. League decisions were recommendations for the states to follow, but no state could be legally bound against its consent and thus maintained sovereignty over its own decisions. The council held 107 public sessions between 1920 and 1939. In September 1921 the Permanent Court of International Justice with nine judges was established at the Hague, as the League covenant was amended.

OTHER LEAGUE ENTITIES

The League also had responsibility for a number of other bodies created to deal with international issues. These included the Disarmament Commission, the Health Organization, the International Labor Organization, the Mandates Commission, the International Commission on Intellectual Cooperation, the Permanent Central Opium Board, the Commission for Refugees, the Committee for the Study of the Legal Status of Women, and the Slavery Commission. The Permanent Mandates Commission, established in February 1921, supervised the nation-states that were given the authority to govern the territories of the German and Ottoman empires that were determined to be incapable of ruling themselves. Belgium, France, and Great Britain were responsible for governing the territories, subject to oversight by the Mandates Commission.

The Governing Commission was established to supervise the Saar Territory for a fifteen-year period. A plebiscite would be held to determine the region's sovereignty. On January 13, 1935, 90 percent of the residents voted for Saar to be reintegrated into Germany; that took place on March 1, 1935.

See also *United Nations (U.N.).*

. . . .   JEFFREY KRAUS

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Le Bon, Gustave

Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931) was a French medical doctor and psychologist who had a major impact on the study of crowd psychology and mass political behavior. Le Bon was a prolific writer and a popular fixture in French intellectual society in the early years of the twentieth century. His work defends an elitist view on the behavior of social classes and non-European societies. In his book *La psychologie des foules* (*The Crowd*), published in 1895, Le Bon was very critical of the tendency toward democratization and mass behavior in contemporary societies. He argued that an individual could act rationally, but that unconscious powers took over when the individual was submerged in a crowd or another form of collectivity. In his view, crowds led to a regression toward primary instincts, emotional behavior, and group hysteria. This rejection of mass behavior, which during Le Bon's time referred mainly to the emerging labor movement, was not uncommon among conservative intellectuals in western Europe.

Le Bon's theories were highly influential. Well-known Austrian psychologist Sigmund Freud further developed the idea that the rational force of the individual could be undermined by subconscious powers and emotions that emerge when the individual is submerged in a mass. Le Bon's work was quoted widely in the field of mass behavior until the 1950s. It was assumed that mass gatherings constituted a major threat to democratic and social stability, and authors also stressed that crowds could easily be manipulated by movement leaders or agitators. After the 1950s, however, a new, more positive paradigm for the study of collective behavior emerged.

Le Bon went on to apply his ideas in his book *The Psychology of Socialism* (1898), arguing that socialism amounts to a rebellion against the natural and rational order of society. According to his view, socialist movements are inspired by a feeling of resentment among members of the labor class, as they are envious of the riches enjoyed by the well-off in society. This group envy leads to an attack on the legitimate power position of the social and intellectual elite and on the social order the elite embodies. Le Bon further suggested that maintaining civilization and protecting social values were mostly the work of this ruling elite.

Le Bon was widely quoted by various authoritarian authors and movements during the 1930s. He also tried to apply his insights in a comparative manner, examining the national psychological characteristics of nations in Europe, Asia, and the Arabic world.

See also *French Political Thought; Mass Political Behavior; Political Psychology; Socialism.*

. . . . MARCUS E. HOOGHE

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Left

The left-right dichotomy is a conceptual tool to describe and classify political parties, actors, ideologies, attitudes, and specific policies along a spectrum. Historically, the terms *left* and *right* refer to the seating positions in the National Assembly, during the French Revolution, of pro– and anti–Ancien Régime members. The terms became part of the mainstream political language in the nineteenth century and are still used to describe opposed political affiliations—notwithstanding debates on the contemporary relevance of the dyad.

Positions on a left–right axis are relative and not absolute. The left is not monolithic and one can distinguish between extreme, moderate, or center lefts. The substantive content of the term *left* varies according to the political, social, cultural, or historical contexts, which explains that several disputed criteria have been put forward to differentiate the left from the right.

Very often the left has been defined as more in favor of change (seen as social progress), of collective (as opposed to individual) rights and responsibilities, of some forms of government or social interventions in the economy, and of redistributive social programs in order to reduce (or eliminate) inequalities construed as (largely) socially constructed. In contemporary political discourse, the left often refers to variants of communism, socialism, social democracy, and in the United States, liberalism.

See also *Communism; Contagion of the Left; Liberal Parties; Marxist Parties; New Left; Right.*

. . . . GEOFFROY MATAGNE

Left, Contagion of the

See *Contagion of the Left*

Legal Profession

Since the founding of the United States, law and politics have been clearly intertwined. Alexis de Tocqueville reported that, in the United States, most legal issues become political issues and vice versa. Tocqueville also stated that lawyers were the American aristocratic class, influencing both law and politics in this country. Many of the signers of the Declaration of Independence and the writers of the Constitution were lawyers. Today the United States has one of the highest numbers of lawyers per capita in the world and has a very high number of lawyers in elected and appointed government positions.

A BROAD AND POROUS PROFESSION

The legal profession in the United States is quite broad and flexible, especially when compared to most other countries. American lawyers provide a wide range of services, work for a wide range of entities, and have the ability to enter and leave the profession quite easily. In other countries, lawyers are usually restricted to specific roles while American lawyers can perform many tasks done by nonlawyers elsewhere. Law degrees are graduate degrees in the United States, requiring that the student complete a four-year university degree before entering law school. American law schools tend to use similar teaching methods and a common substantive curriculum. The goal of law schools is to teach students to "think like a lawyer," and many scholars argue that lawyers thus share a common worldview, decision-making style, and other aspects of professional socialization to a higher degree than found in many other professions.

Because the legal profession is so amorphous in the United States, it is a challenge for the political scientists who study it. Some political scientists study the relationship between lawyers and their clients; some study law firms or other collections of lawyers; some study lawyers who handle a specific type of case, such as divorce lawyers, environmental lawyers, or death penalty lawyers; some study the role of lawyers in settling disputes without resorting to the courts; some study lawyers at the trial level courts; some study appellate lawyers; some study the role of lawyers in interest groups or social movements; some study lawyers who work for the government in various capacities; some study lawyers in elected offices; and some study lawyers as judges. In general, then, political scientists either study the impact of lawyers in the legal system or the impact of lawyers in the broader political system. Sometimes these two areas merge.

LAWYERS IN THE COURTS

In the legal arena, many lawyers work hard to keep their clients out of court (for example, tax lawyers, corporate lawyers, professional sports agents, trusts and estates lawyers). Some lawyers focus mainly on litigation in the trial courts (for example, criminal prosecutors and defense attorneys or personal injury lawyers). While litigators make up a very small percentage of U.S. lawyers, they often get the most attention because their work can be effectively dramatized in novels, television, and the movies. Litigators must present facts, evidence, and witnesses to a trial judge and perhaps to a jury. The main job of litigators is to persuade the legal fact-finders (either judges or juries) to accept their version of the facts in a live public performance in the courtroom. Thus trials determine unique questions of fact that probably do not have many applications to other cases.

Appellate lawyers, on the other hand, do most of their communicating in writing. In the United States, appellate courts have multiple judges hear a case, but no juries. The panel of judges (three, five, seven, or nine at the U.S. Supreme Court) must determine questions of law, which can have enormous impact on future court cases. The appellate lawyers must write legal briefs on the questions of law at issue, with oral arguments serving as the mechanism for lawyers to explain the arguments they already made in writing. Appellate lawyers must help the courts determine how the current case should be decided, but more importantly how future cases should be determined. Because appellate courts make a great deal of public policy in the United States, appellate lawyers play a key creative role in helping courts shape those eventual policies.

At both levels, sometimes lawyers merely represent the best interests of their clients and sometimes the lawyers have an independent legal and perhaps even political influence on the process. Lawyers certainly translate their clients' legal needs into legal language and help them navigate the legal process, but lawyers also can bring their own ideas, goals, and values to the case. Cause lawyers may care more about the broader political nature of the case than they do the specific needs of their individual clients. Repeat players, or parties who frequently use the legal system, may have more control over the actions of their lawyers than do so-called one shotters, who depend more on the legal expertise and experience of their lawyers. Some political scientists would argue that clients with more financial resources receive better legal representation than those with fewer resources. Lawyers often adapt their legal approaches to the norms and needs of communities of practice. Political scientists have linked the effectiveness of lawyers in both negotiations and in litigation to their reputation and to their reliability.

LAWYERS IN THE BROADER POLITICAL SYSTEM

In addition to their roles in the courts, lawyers also affect governmental decisions in other ways. Many lobbyists in the United States are lawyers, and they often draft legislative and regulatory proposals for the interest groups who employ them. They attempt to convince governmental decision makers to enact policies that their groups support. They also may lobby the courts by bringing politically charged cases to the judiciary. Lawyers also serve as important leaders of various social movements in this country.

A great deal of work has been done on lawyers as judges, because almost all judges in the United States are recruited from the legal profession. Because judicial selection methods for both federal and state judges are highly political in nature, judges must have had some political contacts to become judges. There is also some scholarly work on lawyers as elected or appointed governmental officials in the executive and legislative branches. Many U.S. presidents have had law degrees, while a large percentage of the U.S. Senate and a smaller proportion of the U.S. House are lawyers. Lawyers also dominate many state legislatures.

Lawyers have a variety of advantages when running for elected office in the United States. Some elected offices at both the state and federal level, such as district attorneys or attorneys general, are only open to candidates with law degrees. These offices are often stepping stones to higher elected office such as governors or legislators. Because political parties are generally weak in the United States when compared to those in other countries, candidates for elected offices tend to be individualistic political entrepreneurs. They need the public

speaking skills, negotiation skills, and decision-making skills that lawyers usually possess and that are necessary in both campaigning and governing in the United States. Some practicing lawyers, especially in some state legislatures, use their elected offices to recruit clients for their law practices if they can do both simultaneously. Lawyers also come and go from the practice of law quite easily, which makes it easier for them to take the risks of losing an election. With so many lawyers in various governmental positions, American voters seem quite comfortable electing more lawyers. Some individuals with political aspirations actually attend law school simply to enhance their chances of eventually getting elected into political office. Thus Tocqueville was quite right in referring to lawyers as the political class in the United States.

See also *Lobbying; Tocqueville, Alexis de.*

. . . . MARK C. MILLER

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Legal Realism

Legal realism, as an approach to politics and law, developed in the early twentieth century. It arose in response to the mechanistic view that the law was objective and unchanging, not influenced by external events, and was distinct and separate from politics. This mechanistic view of the law was known as *formalism*. The formalistic view of the law required that judges apply the law, objectively, without reference to political ideology or policy considerations.

During the 1920s, a group of legal philosophers and judges developed what is known as *legal realism*. These people included several famous judges such as Benjamin Cardozo, Roscoe Pound, and Oliver Wendell Holmes. Eminent legal philosophers Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank were intimately involved in the movement. The formal recognition of the movement has been thought to be a discussion in journal articles and correspondence between Llewellyn and Pound.

From the 1920s to the 1940s, legal realism developed into a force to be reckoned with, but there has been no unified theory concerning it. There were several aspects to legal realism, although not all of the purported legal realists agree on what constituted it. Indeed, what appeared to bind the legal realists together was more of a rejection of the formalistic view of the law in the search for something better that would address the problems of formalism.

The first basic aspect of legal realism was a rejection of the absolute nature of legal rules. Though legal realists, as a practical matter, would recognize that statutory laws exist and have at least some influence on the application of the law, the statutes, themselves, did not absolutely determine the outcome of any particular case. Indeed, any statute simply could not account for all of the possibilities concerning the prohibited conduct. Essentially, the statutory law was considered to be indeterminate. Many other factors could enter into any judicial decision. These factors could and did include social, economic, and political considerations.

The second aspect of legal realism was the recognition of judicial power. Judges had extraordinary power in the exercise of judicial discretion. Judges were the final authority in the application and interpretation of law. As such, they could and did (and, based on their office and duty, were required to) make decisions to, if for no other reason, address those circumstances that the statutory law did not address.

The third basic aspect was that the law was an instrument to serve social ends. In other words, both policy and ideology could be implemented through the law. Social ends were within the power of the judges. Progressive political agendas were within the power of the judges. The purpose was to mesh both policy and law for the benefit of society.

The fourth basic aspect was that the law was a profession that should be improved through legal education and making the law and the outcomes of cases more predictable and certain. The application of the law was considered to be a social-scientific endeavor. Though judges had the authority to bring other factors into the decision-making process, this did not mean that such decisions should be arbitrary and capricious. The law was the guide and not an inflexible mandate.

The final basic aspect was that the law was a result of competing social, political, and individual interests. Thus, the law was malleable and the best agency to balance these interests was the judges. But this did not mean that the legislatures were without purpose.

In contemporary times, the principle of legal realism has been subject to significant criticism in both the legal and political arenas. This is especially true concerning the power of judges to inject their own political views into the decision-making process, which has been, correctly or not, labeled as *judicial activism*. Another significant contemporary criticism of legal realism is its use of the courts as an agent for social change. However, this does not change the fact that the school of thought of legal realism had a profound impact on the practice of politics and its relationship to the judiciary as an agent of political and social change. Legal realism influenced the development of contemporary approaches in political science, including law and society, empirical studies in judicial behavior (e.g., the attitudinal model), and critical legal studies.

See also *Judicial Behavior; Jurisprudence and Legal Theory; Law and Society.*

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Legislative Drafting

Legislative drafting is the process of writing a text with the aim to enact it as legislation. In most democracies, legislation is an important medium through which law is expressed. Before a document can function as law it needs to be enacted in some form or other. Most of the time, the constitution of a country will define the proper procedures for enactment (or promulgation) of legislation by a legislature (i.e., the enacting authority). There are two sorts of legislative procedures: first, ones involving a representative body (e.g., a parliament), often resulting in primary legislation (e.g., acts of parliament, statute law); and second, ones without direct involvement of representative bodies, usually enacted by the administration or executive branch of government, resulting in secondary legislation (e.g., regulation, delegated or subordinated legislation, statutory instrument, executive order, decree).

Legislative procedures determine how legislation is drafted. In some constitutional systems, proposals for legislation (bills) can only be tabled by the members of a representative body itself, as is, for instance, the case for the U.S. Congress. Members often seek the assistance of specialized consultants at law firms for the actual drafting. In other systems, the administration or executive branch can suggest, propose, or even table bills for primary legislation as well. Usually ministerial departments and administrative units can pool their resources (legal expertise and skills) to come up with good quality drafts. The quality of a draft—and ultimately legislation—is dependent on the legal quality (does it fit in existing law?), the political quality (how are trade-offs between opposing interest fixed?), the instrumental quality (will the set objectives be met?), the democratic quality (enough popular participation, transparency?), symbolic quality (does it communicate and reaffirm public morals, values, and goods?), and technical quality (is the text clear, readable, understandable, and accessible to the addressees?).

Over the past decades, a lot of countries have set up programs to improve the overall quality of legislation. These programs aim to reduce administrative or economic burdens of legislation and have affected the way in which legislation is drafted.

Drafting legislation is complicated because it requires legal expertise and specialized skills. Typically, specialized units in departments or cabinets (e.g., the British Parliamentary Counsel) come up with first drafts of legislation. It is good practice to consult interested parties or the public on drafts in order to have their input. Increasingly, drafts are subjected to impact assessment (i.e., ex ante reviews on the economic, societal, or environmental effects a draft might have). Once a draft is submitted (tabled) to parliament, it is called a bill.

The skills and expertise required to draft legislation are mostly not taught in academic curricula but trained on the job. A lot of countries use drafting manuals to transmit the necessary skills. Of late, some dedicated training institutes for legislative drafting have been established (e.g., European Academy for Law and Legislation at the Hague; Institute of Advanced Legal Studies of the University of London; International Legislative Drafting Institute of Tulane University, in New Orleans) to offer some form of academic training to professionals.

See also *Legislative Systems; Legislative Systems, Comparative.*

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Legislative Hearings

Legislative hearings are the primary institutional mechanism for collecting information about policy-related issues from a variety of actors, including Congress, the executive branch, interest groups, and citizens. Most frequently conducted on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC, witnesses run the gamut

from executive branch officials to interest group lobbyists to academic experts to current and former congressional members and staffers to ordinary citizens. Preparation for legislative hearings on the part of witnesses as well as committee staff members typically is intensive. Staffers prepare notebooks of pertinent information for committee members and interview prospective witnesses.

Some interest groups, such as the American Medical Association, testify fairly routinely before Congress. While many hearings garner relatively little attention except from the interested parties, others have made witnesses and congressional committee members household names. These include Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North of the Iran-contra hearings in 1987 and U.S. senator Sam Ervin (D-NC), who chaired the committee that investigated campaign finance activities related to the 1972 Watergate break-in. Republican Richard M. Nixon of California parlayed his questioning of witnesses appearing before the House Un-American Activities Committee into a path to successful bids for the U.S. Senate, vice presidency, and presidency. U.S. senator John F. Kennedy (D-MA), as a member of the committee chaired by U.S. senator John McClellan (D-AR) that investigated labor racketeering, gained much favorable publicity that assisted his successful 1960 presidential bid.

Television coverage of legislative hearings first became prominent in 1952, the same year television sets became fixtures in one-half of U.S. households. U.S. senator Estes Kefauver (D-TN) parlayed his chairing of crime hearings into the 1956 Democratic vice presidential nomination. More than twenty years later, ranking Watergate committee member U.S. senator Howard Baker Jr. (R-TN) became famous to millions of television viewers for asking, "What did the president know, and when did he know it?" Baker went on to unsuccessfully seek the Republican presidential nomination in 1980. Fred Thompson, minority counsel to the committee, went on to later fill the U.S. Senate seat previously held by Baker and to make a bid for the 2008 Republican presidential nomination. Other memorable televised legislative hearings included the 1991 confirmation hearings for the nomination of Clarence Thomas to fill the position of associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court made available by the retirement of Thurgood Marshall. Sexual harassment allegations lodged against Thomas by Professor Anita Hill made for riveting television in sessions chaired by U.S. senator Joseph Biden, who went on to be vice president of the United States.

More legislative hearings are conducted at the subcommittee level than at the full committee level. The prospect of a bill being enacted or a resolution adopted by a legislative chamber will be enhanced considerably if it is scheduled for a hearing by the chair of the committee within whose jurisdiction it falls. The power of committees to issue subpoenas to witnesses enhances the oversight and investigatory capacities of committees. Effective testimony at a hearing can mightily enhance a bill's chances of becoming a law or a resolution's being adopted by a chamber of Congress. For example, the U.S. House of Representatives heard testimony from three former "comfort women" from Korea, who had been girls forced into the sexual service of members of the Japanese military during the Japanese colonial period that ended with the conclusion of World War II in 1945. Thanks to their testimony on February 15, 2007, House Resolution 121 called on "the government of Japan to apologize for its war crime enslaving over 200,000 girls and women during World War II as 'comfort women.'" This resolution was followed by others from Canada, the European Union, and the Netherlands.

Testimony also can be perilous for the careers of witnesses. Alberto Gonzales resigned his position as U.S. attorney general and subsequently retained defense counsel because of his testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee concerning matters including the firings of U.S. attorneys, warrantless wiretaps, and the detention of "enemy combatants" in 2007.

In addition to helping Congress perform its oversight of the executive branch function, information gleaned from hearings is important for establishing legislative histories. An excellent example is when U.S. senator Tom Connally (D-TX) secured the agreement of U.S. secretary of state Dean Acheson that the NATO treaty did not confer the power of unilaterally taking the nation to war on the president. Such a record buttresses arguments, such as those put forth by Louis Fisher, that Congress has subsequently unilaterally abdicated for all practical purposes its constitutional responsibility to declare war to the peril of the United States and the rule of law. Representative government is made possible by the information that legislative hearings make available about government to the citizenry.

See also *Oversight; Public Policy Development.*

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Legislative Systems

The term *legislative system* refers to the institutional arrangement for enacting laws, centered usually on one or two deliberative assemblies that claim to represent the nation. Those bodies may be called the *legislature* to denote their

lawmaking function, or the *parliament* to denote their deliberative character, or the *assembly, congress,* or *diet* to denote that they are organized as a meeting of one house or of two chambers constituting a *bicameral* assembly.

Political science refers to a legislative *system* because the institutional arrangement consists of interrelated parts, usually including committees among which the legislative work is subdivided; political party groups, which organize partisan differences among members; one or two chambers, which represent the nation in different ways; and individual members, whose behavior is related in a system of roles defined by formal rules and informal norms.

Legislative systems can trace their ancestry to the parliaments of medieval Europe. Parliaments were originally consultative bodies called by monarchs at irregular intervals. They consisted of leading notables from the territorial constituencies that made up the nation. Their members bargained with the monarch, exchanging consent to the monarch's need for revenue and soldiers for legal favors to their constituents. In modern times, parliaments exist in one form or another in every country in the world except in two or three countries where they have been temporarily suspended by dictatorial rulers. Most contemporary parliaments were established in the twentieth century in the wake of the proliferation of independent nation-states, although the most influential parliaments have a much longer history. The Inter-parliamentary Union lists 191 parliaments, 114 of them unicameral and 77 bicameral.

Legislative systems are therefore both very old and very widespread political institutional arrangements, signifying that they serve some general political functions, among which representing the nation and legitimating its laws are the most universal. Yet there are also enormous differences among them. The structure of the core institution of the legislative system has some defining characteristics but varies greatly in detail. The size of legislatures ranges from the fourteen-member Congress of Micronesia to the 2,987 membership of the National People's Congress of China. The size of a legislature is not directly related to the size of a country's population, but is the consequence of the electoral system used to select the members.

Though all legislatures participate in the enactment of laws, the importance of that participation ranges widely. In the United States, at both the national and state levels, legislatures play a more important part in lawmaking than in any other country. However, even in the United States the executive branch of government has increasingly drafted important legislation, although bills are introduced by individual members of the legislature and the final enactment of all bills, wherever drafted, is significantly influenced by the legislature. In political systems in which leaders of the legislature simultaneously hold ministerial positions in the executive branch of government, the role of the legislature in the enactment of legislation consists chiefly of responding to executive initiatives. In many European countries, that response is the product of intraparty and interparty bargaining, either within parliament or by party leaders in the cabinet. Latin American legislatures were historically subordinated to powerful executives. The consolidation of democracy beginning in the 1990s, however, has tended to transform these legislatures into institutions that insert themselves variously into the policy-making process, depending on electoral systems, constitutional powers, and members' career ambitions. Where a single party dominates the assembly, as is true in many African and Asian countries, the participation of the legislature may be merely symbolic.

Legislatures have some common organizational characteristics, regardless of the varying influence they have on the enactment of legislation. They must be able to transform the often contentious views of their individual members into collective decisions, whether in the form of law, of declarations of opinion, of selecting leaders, or of overseeing the executive. To achieve collective decisions requires coordination, a division of labor, and agreed procedures. Although their members are formally equal in their representational status, informal leadership hierarchies develop within them, as does a division of labor among committees and consensus on procedures for determining the sequence of action.

REPRESENTATION

The capacity of a legislative system to legitimate legislative enactments depends on its claim to represent the nation. At one time that claim was justified by the stature of the citizens whom the monarch called to meet in parliament. In contemporary authoritarian states it is justified by the presumed authority of a dictator or of leaders of a dominant party to appoint the members. The claim to representativeness is justified by the extent to which the members reflect the full range of that society's relevant ethnic, racial, religious, and class characteristics, as well as the distribution of members between the genders. In contemporary democracies, representativeness is conferred by competitive elections. Legislatures predate democracy. Democratizing them consisted of extending the right to elect their members from a franchise limited to property holders, to "universal" manhood suffrage, to suffrage without regard to gender, race, or ethnicity, and to the vote for eighteen-year-olds. This development began in the United States early in the nineteenth century, in Great Britain with the first reform of parliamentary representation in 1832, and on the continent of Europe after the revolutions of 1848. It was completed in most countries in the second half of the twentieth century with profound consequences for the composition and internal organization of legislatures.

Democratic legislatures retain the medieval notion that a country consists of geographic communities and that the members therefore should be chosen in territorial constituencies each electing one or a small set of representatives. In a few small countries, there is a single national constituency in which all members are chosen by proportional representation. Political parties, successors to the factions that existed within predemocratic parliaments, organize electorates. Unlike factions, parties work outside of legislatures as well as within them, linking groupings of like-minded members with their

voters. Parties nominate candidates, mobilize voters, formulate electoral programs, and attempt to hold the elected members accountable to their constituents. The electoral connection between members of the legislature and the population provides the incentive for members to be individually responsive to their voters. The frequency of legislative elections varies from the two-year term of the U.S. House of Representatives to the modal four-year and five-year terms of most of the world's legislatures. In parliamentary systems the legislature can be dissolved before the end of its term and new elections can be held under constitutionally prescribed conditions.

To the extent that voters respond to parties rather than to individual candidates, the electoral connection provides the incentive for members to vote in the legislature cohesively by party. This is particularly true in European parliaments in which the electorate is strongly influenced by party labels. Party discipline on roll-call votes exceeds 90 percent in most democratic legislatures outside the United States, except on matters of individual conscience. Since the last quarter of the twentieth century it also attained this level of cohesion on important issues in the U.S. Congress even though members contest their seats far more as individuals than as party members. In parliamentary systems, party discipline in parliament adds to the authority of the executive when the prime minister and the cabinet consist of leaders of the party or parties holding a majority in the assembly. In the U.S. presidential system, where the presidency and Congress are often in the hands of different parties, party discipline may make for "divided government" in which the presidential veto becomes an important source of executive influence over the legislature.

Broadening the right of the population to participate in the selection of members of parliament and broadening eligibility to membership do not necessarily ensure that the composition of legislatures will appear to be representative of the population. A few hundred representatives cannot fully mirror a large population, but democratic publics do expect representative institutions to look like themselves in salient respects. All countries expect that the membership of the legislature should reflect the geographic diversity of the population and most expect that the party composition of the legislature should bear a reasonably close relationship to the distribution of the vote by party in the electorate. Although the nomination of candidates by the political parties is the mechanism by which the composition of the legislature is made to correspond to public expectations, that mechanism is imperfect. The sensitivity of the parties may lag behind voter expectations and election outcomes may in any case be governed by the accidents of the distribution of votes across constituencies and by the electoral system used to translate votes into seats. The very slow increase in the number of women in legislatures exemplifies many of the lags in the mechanism by which changing cultural expectations are translated into changes in the composition of legislatures. Over time, however, legislatures do tend to mirror the expectations of the electorates regarding what constitutes "representativeness."

ORGANIZATION

The diverse composition of a legislature that makes it representative of a nation also makes it difficult for the members to reach decisions. The legislative system requires organization that is not overtly hierarchical, which distinguishes it from bureaucratic institutions. It must provide coordination among a large number of members, a division of labor that reflects the different interests and different skills of members, and an agreement among all members on procedures beginning with the formulation of an agenda and ending with a decisive vote.

There is commonly a party organization within modern legislatures that results from the method of selecting their members. This produces a leadership hierarchy in each party, consisting of the set of party leaders presiding over party committees, caucuses, or factions. This leadership structures the pattern of negotiation among the party groups, shapes the agenda of the legislature, and guides the sequence of action. In parliamentary systems of government, party leaders occupy the principal positions in the cabinet. In systems where there is a separation of personnel between the executive and the legislature, notably in the United States, the parties within the legislature usually choose their own leaders. Parallel to the party leadership, legislatures also have a formal leadership structure prescribed by their rules, consisting of a presiding officer or officers of the assembly, a steering committee, and chairs of committees. The holders of these offices interact with party leaders in shaping the agenda of the legislature and the pattern of policy negotiation among the party groups.

Legislatures delegate their work to a set of committees, usually specialized by subject matter. Committee organization varies across legislatures, reflecting their varied involvement in the details of lawmaking. In the United Kingdom, which long resisted specialized standing committees, a public bills committee is now appointed *ad hoc* for each bill introduced in Parliament and there are nineteen standing oversight committees, one for each government department. In the U.S. House of Representatives there are twenty-two specialized standing committees and 135 subcommittees engaged in both the legislative process and in departmental oversight. Most legislatures have a committee structure between these two models. Ten to twenty specialized standing committees are the usual number, and subcommittees are seldom used outside the United States.

Geographically defined constituencies and committee specialization clearly help legislators to identify the special interests of their constituents and to serve them. However, this emphasis on particular interests presents obstacles to the formation of collective decisions. One way members overcome these obstacles is by trading votes with one another. Relying on differences in the intensity of their various preferences, members exchange support on matters of indifference to them for support on matters they care about deeply. This is the basis of "pork barrel" legislation, typically reflected in appropriations providing individual benefits for every member's constituency. This is the pattern called "distributive politics" or "log rolling," in which everyone appears to win but the collectivity is ill served. But committee specialization also

enables legislatures to compete effectively with the specialized knowledge of executive departments, and the deference that legislative committees show to each other is to some extent also respect for expertise.

PROCEDURES

The collective decisions of the legislative system are channeled by written rules of procedure, by interpretations and precedents based on these rules, and by informal norms of conduct. Although legislatures generally have the authority to make their own rules, in practice there is great continuity of procedure over time and substantial similarity across legislatures. Most newly established parliaments borrow the procedures of long-established parliaments in other countries, recognizing the value of the experience of others in designing ways of reconciling the wills of the members of a large assembly.

On the surface it would seem that legislative decisions should be procedurally straightforward, requiring only an agreement on whether decisions be made by simple or qualified majorities. Such an agreement, however, is by itself inadequate for reaching conclusions in legislative systems. Because the system may consist of two houses, a leadership occupying ministerial offices, committees having procedural privileges, and constitutional courts with the power to nullify legislative enactments, a legislative system has many veto points, and bargaining among the veto players does not follow simple voting rules. Even within a single legislative institution, conclusive votes are not easily achieved. Unlike voters in general elections, members of a legislature vote on a constant stream of related issues. As they do so, they interact with each other, taking a variety of interests into account and negotiating compromises. As soon as there are more than two alternatives on which legislators must vote, each successive pairing of alternatives may have a different result, possibly leading to an endless cycle of majority votes with different outcomes. If alternatives are not paired but are presented in a particular sequence, the choice of the voting sequence will affect the result. The varied preference orderings of a group of legislators choosing among many alternatives will not naturally lead to a single decision. Subsidiary rules must determine the sequence in which alternatives are considered and the point at which a vote is final. That sequence will affect the final outcome. Experienced legislators, who often acquire great skill in exploiting particular sequences to their own advantage, have always recognized its importance. Informed observers can distinguish between "tactical" and "sincere" voting.

The impression that legislatures spend too much time dealing with seemingly basic procedural questions overlooks the importance that procedures have for affecting decisions. Rules are not neutral in their effect on outcomes and that is why they can be controversial. They allocate authority among committees and between them and the whole house, between majorities and minorities, between decisions taken at different points in time, and in parliamentary systems between the leaders of parliament in the cabinet and their "backbench" followers.

In the legislative system the lawmaking process begins with the introduction of bills, either by individual members (as in the U.S. Congress), by the cabinet (as in parliamentary systems of government where the cabinet consists of leaders of parliament), by the component states in a federal system (as may occur in Germany), by voters in the form of an initiative (as in Switzerland and some of the states of the United States), or by committees (as in half of the world's legislatures). Early in the process, bills are nearly everywhere referred to committees. In most countries, committees must send bills to the parent chamber for a final decision. In the Italian parliament, committees may actually enact legislation. Elsewhere committees may revise bills in limited ways, as in Great Britain, or substantially, as in Germany, or even more extensively, as in the United States. In the United States, a committee often fails to report a bill to the whole House. The extraordinarily simple process that allows each member of the U.S. Congress to propose unlimited numbers of bills results in a volume of more than five thousand bills in each biennial Congress, far in excess of the workload of any other legislature. Procedures determine the sequence by which bills are reported back and prescribe restrictions on their further amendment on the floor. In the U.S. House of Representatives, a rules committee proposes a special rule for each important bill to govern the particular circumstances under which the whole chamber will consider it. In the U.S. Senate the sequence of business must be negotiated among the party leaders to achieve the unanimous consent of all one hundred members, because senators are unwilling to delegate this important matter to a committee. Restrictive rules govern final consideration of bills in most legislatures. The appropriation of public funds follows special procedures everywhere, in recognition of the technical expertise required to formulate a national budget and of the temptation of legislators to appropriate funds in excess of what they are willing to vote in taxes.

Where bicameralism exists, it adds to the complexity of the legislative process. When legislatures consist of two houses, as in Australia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the United States, and altogether seventy-seven countries, special procedures govern the ways in which their separate decisions must be reconciled. In the U.S. Congress, a joint conference committee consisting of sometimes more than one hundred members of the two houses, and at times also divided further into subcommittees, attempts to formulate a compromise that can be identically adopted by each house. This committee's role late in the legislative process gives subject matter specialists who dominate conference committees important influence on the final text of legislation. In other countries, such as Australia, Canada, and France, bills shuttle back and forth between the chambers in a process with the French name *la navette*. Most of these legislatures grant the directly elected house the last word, giving it power depending on the number of shuttle trips permitted and the patience of each chamber.

Thus, parliamentary organization and procedure produce informal hierarchies and asymmetries by which assemblies of equal members are turned into working bodies capable of

decision making. This is also an accomplishment of the subtle, implicit codes of courtesy and good conduct among members that are often called informal norms. In most effective parliaments there is a reciprocity in interpersonal relations that consists of courtesy even in the face of sharp substantive differences, of keeping promises even in the face of intense tactical maneuvering, of cooperation even in the face of competition. Members learn that they must work with each other, learn to respect each other's burden of work, and learn that even the fiercest political differences are best acted out when they are depersonalized. These norms of conduct or "folkways" contribute to the transformation of a collection of individuals into a corporate body.

See also *European Parliament; Legislative Drafting; Legislative Hearings; Legislature-court Relations; Lower Chamber; Ombudsman, Parliamentary; Oversight; Parliamentary Discipline; Parliamentary Government; Pork Barrel; Rules of Order; Unicameralism and Bicameralism; Upper Chamber.*

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Legislative Systems, Comparative

Legislatures come in as many varieties as political systems. Most contemporary states, including authoritarian ones, have at least the facade of formal elected assemblies. All but a handful of countries, whether democratic or authoritarian, have some form of legislature. Of 192 states belonging to the United Nations (UN) in 2006, 189 national parliaments were listed by the International Parliamentary Union. While the terms *parliament* and *legislature* have specific meanings in each country, these English-language terms are used interchangeably in this entry. *Deliberative assembly* is a frequently used descriptive term as well.

Many provinces in unitary systems, as well as states within federations, have their own legislatures. Though municipalities and other local units also may have elected deliberative bodies, the formal study of legislatures has concentrated on national and provincial levels. Though executives, and the judiciary to a lesser degree, may be elective, in most countries the legislature is both the main representative organ of the state and at least the formal source of statute law. As representative bodies, legislatures potentially embody society's diversity of people and opinions. Although competitive elections to parliament were the main initial transitional event as communist systems fell two decades ago, in other societies, legislatures are mainly passive symbols to legitimize authoritarian rule. In some regions and eras, democracy and legislatures have been episodic, interrupted by coup or insurrection.

ATTRIBUTES AND GENERIC FUNCTIONS

While legislatures have many specific tasks, varying through time and by societal conditions, they all potentially have two basic generic, intertwined functions: representation of the people and interaction with the executive. Representation has a purpose: minimally to debate and also to approve, modify or disapprove of what the executive—royal, military, or elected—would either do or wish to do in the absence of the assembly. While the main models of the executive-legislative relationship in democracies are the British Westminster system, the American congressional–presidential system, and the continental European pattern, there are many variations in practice. In the Westminster system, the prime minister, elected through parliament, remains a member of parliament, while in the American system, the president is neither elected by nor a member of Congress. In the continental European pattern, prime ministers are elected by parliament but relinquish their own parliamentary membership during their service in the cabinet.

To accomplish their two generic functions, legislatures have five defining characteristics, with many variations: plural, with many members; selection through peaceful means, usually elective; constitutional existence; a complex internal structure among members who are equal in status; and decision making through voting procedures.

PLURAL

Though a country has only one chief executive, assemblies, to be representative, have always had more than one member. The size of legislatures varies roughly with the population size of the country. Small nations, for example, often have fewer than fifty members, while India, the world's largest democracy, has 545 members in the Lok Sabha. In bicameral parliaments, the second chamber is usually smaller than the main chamber. The Nigerian lower house, for example, has 360 members, while the Senate has 109.

SELECTION

Though executives can seize power through coup or insurrection, legislatures are selected mainly through elections. The members of early medieval European parliaments were aristocrats, selected through inheritance or royal appointment. Some assemblies, especially in colonies and traditional monarchies, have been created by decree and filled through appointment. In bicameral legislatures, appointment and indirect elections are sometimes used to diversify the political and social composition of the main chamber.

In the aftermath of World War I (1914–1918), a broad suffrage became the norm among democratic states. The slow change from a selectorate of the few to the electorate of millions, created the conditions for the emergence of mass political parties that have transformed executives and legislatures and their elections. The two main types of legislative election systems are single-member districts with plurality voting (Britain, Malaysia, and the United States) and multimember districts with proportional voting (Indonesia, Sweden). Some countries use a mixed system (Germany, Hungary, and Japan).

CONSTITUTIONAL EXISTENCE

Historically, parliaments have often disagreed with monarchs, who have frequently either dissolved assemblies or have refused to call them into session. Constitutions now frequently limit the capacity of the executive to either call or dismiss legislatures and stipulate that legislatures meet according to a schedule. Members of legislatures often have immunity from prosecution in the exercise of their office.

INTERNAL STRUCTURE

Legislatures have a flat structure in that all members are equal in status and rights, though in many countries, government ministers either belong to parliament or at least may participate in parliamentary proceedings. A complicated division of labor among the members, however, results in a complex structure of committees, parties, and leaders. To manage the process of decision making, legislatures define specific procedures, ranging from how a bill is introduced to how and when a question is decided in a final vote. Organization and procedures expedite work, protect the rights of each member against all others, and are intended to protect the legislature against the executive.

DECISIONS BY VOTING

Decisions by voting among equal members are a continuation of the broader democratic principle of elections. Just as citizens cast votes, so legislators vote to make collective decisions about policy and government.

CHANGING LEGISLATURES IN A CHANGING WORLD

In the rapidly changing post–cold war world, legislatures appear in three new settings, which together potentially increase both the number and variety of institutions called *legislatures.*

First, the rapid formation of new countries leads to the equally rapid formation of new legislatures. In some cases, such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia, a legislature had already been developed at the subordinate republic level within larger states. In others, such as East Timor, prior legislative bodies were rudimentary at best. Some potentially independent states, such as the Palestine Authority, have developed elections and a legislature as part of the process of becoming independent, as former African colonies did.

Second, secessionist provinces, such as Chechnya within Russia or Abkhazia within Georgia, conduct their own elections to create new, but internationally unrecognized governing structures of presidents, prime ministers, and parliaments.

Third, bodies that begin to look and act as legislatures are emerging at the international level. While the Parliament of the European Union is the best example, other international associations, such as the World Health Organization, are developing legislativelike institutions and practices as well.

Over centuries of experimentation and adaptation and across continents, legislatures have proved to be remarkably resilient bodies. In both authoritarian and democratic political systems, legislatures present at least the symbol of, and potentially the opportunity for, independent representation against the executive.

See also *Legislative Systems; Parliamentary Government; Unicameralism and Bicameralism.*

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Legislature–court Relations

The relationship between courts and legislatures in the United States is sometimes cordial but often strained. Most court-legislative interactions are routine. For example, courts regularly interpret statutes written by Congress. If Congress is unhappy with a federal court's statutory interpretation decision, the legislature can simply enact a new statute. Under their power of judicial review, the federal courts also can declare an act of Congress to be unconstitutional. If Congress is unhappy with a constitutionally based court decision, in theory the legislature must pass a constitutional amendment to override that ruling. Sometimes Congress will pass a mere statute in an attempt to overturn a court decision, but Congress may be trying also to convince the court to change its ruling on its own. Louis Fisher (1988), among others, argues that the courts do not have the last word on the meaning of the Constitution, but instead constitutional interpretation is achieved through an ongoing conversation or dialogue among the branches of government.

Another routine interaction between Congress and the federal courts occurs annually when Congress provides all funding for the judicial branch. The Constitution prevents Congress from lowering the salaries of federal judges and they serve life terms, but it does not require annual cost-of-living raises. Recently federal judges including chief justices William H. Rehnquist and John Roberts have been quite vocal that judicial salaries are too low. Congress also can create new judgeships or change the boundaries of the U.S. Courts of Appeals. At times, Congress threatens to express its displeasure with particular court decisions by withholding pay raises for judges or by making other changes in judicial branch funding. For example, in 1964 Congress gave Supreme Court justices half the cost-of-living increase that it gave to lower federal judges. Finally, the U.S. Senate must confirm all presidential judicial appointments. Congress can use its confirmation power to attempt to influence the future decisions of the courts.

Sometimes the relationship between the federal courts and the Congress becomes tense. Members of Congress regularly criticize federal court decisions with which they disagree. But Congress also has the power to attack the judicial branch in other ways. For example, Congress can determine the jurisdiction of the federal courts, which means that Congress can decide which cases the federal courts can and cannot hear. Preventing the federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, from hearing a class of cases is called *jurisdiction stripping* or *court stripping.* Members of Congress have long threatened to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over a variety of cases, such as those dealing with abortion or religion or the Pledge of Allegiance, but have rarely done so. Beginning in the late 1990s, however, Congress did pass various statutes limiting the ability of the federal courts to hear certain types of cases. Congress had not enacted court-stripping legislation since the Civil War (1861–1865) era. It is unclear whether the U.S. Supreme Court will declare such actions to be unconstitutional.

Congress also has threatened to increase its oversight of court decisions and practices. Congressional oversight of executive branch activities is considered routine because those decisions are clearly political in nature. However, Congress has generally refrained from excessive oversight of the courts because judges must be able to make impartial decisions based on legal considerations. The House Judiciary Committee in 2006 passed legislation that would have created an inspector general for the federal courts. An inspector general for the federal judiciary would be an extraordinary step that opponents said would weaken the key principle of judicial independence.

Congress also has the power to impeach federal judges and then remove them from office. Congress has not impeached a federal judge except for high crimes or misdemeanors since the highly political impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase in 1803. Chase was not removed from office in a close vote in the Senate. Many interest groups recently have called for the impeachment of judges because of their decisions. Congress has opened several impeachment investigations recently, but no federal judges have been removed from office to date except for illegal activity. Thus, when Congress is extremely upset with the federal courts, it has a variety of tools at its disposal to attack the courts as an institution.

See also *Judicial Independence; Judicial Review; Judicial Selection and Nomination.*

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Legitimacy

Legitimacy is one of the most enduring concepts in modern political science, going back to the opening question of philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Social Contract* (1762) of whether "there can be any sure and legitimate rule of administration." It is a concept that spans both empirical and normative political science, and it is one that is widely invoked in everyday political debate.

Legitimacy is often used interchangeably with the terms *political trust* and *political support.* However, it is a distinctive form of trust or support. Legitimacy refers to the rightfulness of a political object. The word *rightfulness* refers to whether something is consistent with a set of norms prevalent in a given political community. In particular, political rightfulness has been defined by David Beetham in his 1991 book *The Legitimation of Power* as consisting of three distinct subtypes: whether a political object accords with the rules and laws of a political community, whether a political object accords with the values and morality of a political community, and whether a political object has secured the willing consent of a political community. Bruce Gilley refers in his 2009 work *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy* to these three subtypes as legality, justification, and consent, and shows how they can be measured empirically using a combination of attitudinal and behavioral data.

OBJECTS AND SUBJECTS OF LEGITIMACY

The political objects of legitimacy can take many forms: states, governments, regime types, specific institutions like courts, public policies and laws, political rhetoric, political leaders, or international organizations. While such objects are analytically distinct, in practice the legitimacy of one may exert an impact on the legitimacy of another, as when an unpopular government shakes faith in a state itself.

The relevant subjects of legitimacy range from all global citizens to just a single individual, depending on how the concept is being used. If we are concerned with how legitimacy affects the durability of authoritarian regimes, we may consider new economic classes or military rulers as the most salient subjects. More broadly, such subjective or positive approaches may include all citizens of a given political community, or even all global citizens. For political philosophers, the most salient subject is the philosopher themselves, or more broadly the community of learned individuals engaged in logical reasoning about the meaning of political rightfulness. Such objective or normative approaches thus select their relevant subjects as those holding the most valid set of reasoned arguments. Finally, legitimacy can be treated as a dichotomous or a continuous variable.

The term *legitimacy crisis* is frequently used by political commentators as well as political scientists when discussing the public response to political power. In general, claims of legitimacy crisis have tended to overpredict actual legitimacy crises, suggesting the need for both historical and cross-national context. Many of today's developing countries, from Bangladesh to Egypt, as well as most states in Africa, are frequently described as facing a legitimacy crisis, even as they endure year after year. In particular, it is necessary to distinguish between legitimacy and justice. While *justice* refers to particularistic views of the good society and how political object can serve that end, *legitimacy* refers to a broader consensus on the appropriate uses of political power and the feasibility of alternatives to the given political object.

LEGITIMATION

Five main schools of thought exist on the question of what generates legitimacy. One might be called *localism,* the view that legitimacy is a context-specific concept without universal features. Another is *sociopsychological,* stating that legitimacy is derivative of the social or psychological features of the citizenry. A third school, *developmentalism,* finds the sources of legitimacy in the economic and welfare attainments of the political object. A fourth, *liberalism,* stresses the overarching importance of the provision of an extensive range of rights and freedoms, including democracy. Finally, *bureaucratism* emphasizes the effectiveness and rationality of the object.

The legitimation process is an interactive process in which there are competing evaluations of how well the political object has responded to the demands of a pluralistic society in terms of its rightfulness. The legitimacy of a massive hydroelectric dam project, for example, may derive from its development impact as well as its being a manifestation of democratic policy making and effective bureaucratic implementation. These "sources" thus generate legitimacy by being legal, justified, and consented to.

For the critic of legitimacy, the process of legitimation is marred by the hegemonic influence of certain powerful or better off groups that shape not only the evaluation of a political object but also the basis on which such evaluations are made. Legitimacy is thus a result of some form of "false consciousness" or "fettered imagination."

Closely related to the latter question is the question of why legitimacy matters. German sociologist Max Weber, who pioneered the empirical study of legitimacy, believed that legitimate power, also known as *authority,* was necessary for the modern state because of its extensive regulation of society.

Both defenders and critics of the legitimation process often agree that legitimacy is critical to sustaining certain political objects—philosopher Karl Marx believed that falsely implanted legitimacy was central to the preservation of capitalism while political scientist Freidrich Hayek argued that capitalism's genuine popularity was critical to its durability. Marx and Hayek differed only on the normative defensibility of legitimacy. This "strong hypothesis" about legitimacy is that it is a central, if not the central, force in determining political outcomes, whether domestic or international.

EFFECTS OF LEGITIMACY

In line with the strong hypothesis, legitimacy has been invoked to explain state-building, democratization, and social revolutions, as well as international outcomes such as propensity for war and international cooperation. In this view,

legitimacy is the motive force in politics without which the structural or voluntaristic factors often invoked to explain various political outcomes would be rendered inoperable.

A weaker hypothesis about legitimacy's effects is that while its direct consequences are uncertain, it is nonetheless a critical concept in structuring political argument and debate. Here, the study of legitimacy is directed mainly to "unmasking" certain rhetorical claims found in the political arena.

Finally, for the philosopher, as well as the sociologist, there is a *normative hypothesis*: legitimacy is a great moral good. People are happier, and their position is morally superior, when they relate to political objects on the basis of a shared morality rather than as strategic or interest-maximizing agents whose behavior is subject to "command and control" by the state. To know whether a political object is legitimate is thus an end unto itself.

See also *Hayek, Freidrich August von; Ideologies, Political; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Social Contract.*

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Legitimate Violence

Legitimate violence emerged as a core theme in social science with the lasting contribution made by German sociologist Max Weber in the early twentieth century. Initially known as (legitimate) use of physical force, the concept became a central contribution in modern sociology and more particularly in the definition of modern states. This line of thought was continued by a number of theorists who described the process by which states, at least in western Europe, became more centralized, impersonal, authoritative, and resourceful. The interest in the capacity of modern states to control violence is a recurrent theme in social science today as numerous societies are affected by illegitimate, public, and private types of violence.

LEGITIMATE VIOLENCE AND THE WEBERIAN SOCIOLOGY OF THE STATE

Max Weber's sociology is central to the explanation of social phenomena and institutions illustrating the various configurations of power, legitimacy, and authority. The importance of these basic processes makes Weberian thinking clearly distinct within the classical sociological contributions. Only in this analytical context can the functioning of political and nonpolitical associations be understood. By Weber's definition, "a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force*" (*Gewaltmonopol des Staates*) within a given territory. This definition indicates that legitimate use of physical force in the form of violence is a distinctive instrument of modern states but is nonetheless limited in usage and not the only instrument used. Weber considers states, or any other social organization, unable to be defined in terms of function as this range is extremely diverse. Instead, the states should be defined in terms of their specific *means,* that is, the use of physical force.

According to Weber, other types of groups, such as kinship and household groups, medieval guilds, and churches, have historically used violence against their members and external entities to attain their objectives. The physical force used by the state is different, however, in that it is exercised over a continuous community and territory. And even though the use of violence by the state is a specific instrument, it is not an exclusive one. It is a potential and last resort that a political institution may use to attain its goals.

Yet while this is a common characteristic of state action, there exists a huge variation in capacity. Despite their general claim and legitimacy, some states are more successful than others in monopolizing the use of physical force. A key variable describing this capacity is the development and functionality of the administration put in place to enforce binding decisions and use physical force against the members of the community or other states if needed.

For Weber, the nationalization of the legal order and the monopolization of the legitimate use of force developed gradually, starting in late western European Middle Ages. It required the dismantling or embedding of military forces into the political order and purposeful action by agents of the latter. The use of mercenary and nobility-sponsored forces was replaced by professional and national armies supported and funded by the central state. Groups and organizations primarily defined by their economic and peace interests supported the state in this process. Others demonstrated a natural resistance to this monopolization—groups such as the nobility, which previously had the power to use violence for its own purposes, resisted the ultimately successful effort to centralize the political system and contain private violence.

LEGITIMATE VIOLENCE AND THE NEO-WEBERIAN SOCIOLOGY OF THE STATE

A significant number of social scientists accepted political violence and its containment by the state as constitutive to the modern political processes taking place primarily in western Europe starting with the seventeenth century. Following Weber's initial insights, they developed more detailed explanatory frameworks to capture dynamics and relevance of violence in modern politics. Norbert Elias places the centralization of political power and monopolization of violence in a larger process of "civilizing." Bertrand de Jouvenel explains how the power of the state is permanently increasing, allowing

central governments to use without control violence against their own citizens. Charles Tilly puts the capacity of states to organize coercion at the core of the process of state formation in Europe. As state agents and structures stripped other entities of their rights and capabilities to use violence, states, in turn, had to extend their security apparatus and offer external and internal protection services to client domestic groups. Michael Mann defined successful modern states as having two types of power—despotic and infrastructural—both converging to offer stability to the national political order. Anthony Giddens indicates that internal pacification is a key dimension of state action as part of a larger process of increasing its administrative power. Other authors highlighted the potential superior capacity of states to control and organize social interaction. Michel Foucault, for instance, departing from the Weberian primary focus on monopolization of violence, initiated a research agenda dedicated to the advance of state capacity as "governmentality" starting with the eighteenth century.

THE CONTINUOUS RELEVANCE OF LEGITIMATE VIOLENCE IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

Legitimate violence is a recurrent theme in the social sciences. Violence and state capacity are central in three topical areas. First, the emergence of totalitarian/authoritarian regimes in the twentieth century highlighted the dangers of unaccountable political and military power. In the cases of these types of regimes, the ability to monopolize violence is secured to such an extent that it becomes the main instrument and support of political rule. At the other end of the state power spectrum are countries that experience civil conflicts and state weakness and failure. These phenomena were present especially in countries gaining independence after colonial rule and the countries facing violent regime change and state dissolution after the end of the cold war in the early 1990s. In this latter case, the role of violence was related to the difficulties of building a recognized and efficient political center able to contain violence and project a legitimate form of it. Third, the institutionalization of human rights regimes created a normative obstacle against illegitimate state violence. The human rights regime is supported by specialized national and international institutions and justifies external intervention in conflict situations, especially after the end of the cold war.

See also *Civil-military Relations; Protests and Demonstrations.*

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Lenin, Vladimir Ilich

Vladimir Ilich Lenin (1870–1924) was a major Marxist theorist who put his ideas into practice by leading the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and bringing communist government to Russia. His political philosophy, called Leninism or Marxist-Leninism, inspired communist movements throughout the world in the twentieth century.

Lenin—born as Vladimir Ulianov—was drawn to revolutionary activity after his brother was executed in 1887 for participation in a plot to assassinate the tsar. Lenin was expelled from Kazan University, where he studied law, for his involvement in radical organizations. He was exiled to Siberia in 1895, where he took the *nom de guerre* Lenin from the nearby Lena River.

After his release from internal exile in 1900, he left Russia and joined a Russian Marxist circle in Switzerland. He helped found the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) in 1898 and together with fellow radicals Julius Martov and Grigorii Plekhanov edited the journal *Iskra* (*Spark*), which was smuggled into Russia to promote a socialist revolution among workers.

In 1902 Lenin wrote *What Is to be Done?*, in which he argued that revolution would only be brought about by an elite party of professional revolutionaries, not by workers. This was a major departure from the beliefs of German philosopher Karl Marx, who maintained that the workers would attain class consciousness and revolt. Lenin believed that workers, if left to themselves, would develop a trade union mentality and attempt to reform, not overthrow, capitalism. In 1903 he put this idea into practice by forcing a schism in the RSDLP, creating the more radical Bolshevik (from the Russian word for majority) Party. He advocated an immediate and violent revolution to overthrow the tsar and capitalism in Russia, but, as an exile, he lacked the power base to achieve this goal. Instead, he engaged in polemics with other Marxists in Europe and later produced major works extending Marxist analysis, including *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916) and *State and Revolution* (1917). He emphasized that communism would not mean a "withering away" of the state but instead would require a dictatorship of the proletariat, which he equated as rule by a communist party. He split with the Socialist Second International in 1914 over the question of socialist support for World War I (1914–1918), which he opposed.

Lenin did not return to Russia until April 1917, after the tsar had been overthrown. Once there, he argued for another revolution to bring about communism. The Bolsheviks were weaker compared to other political groups, but Lenin's radical

position helped win more converts, including Marxist theorist Leon Trotsky, as the political, economic, and social situation in Russia deteriorated. In November 1917 (October in the old Russian calendar), Lenin convinced his fellow Bolsheviks to seize power from the provisional government. They succeeded, and afterward the Bolsheviks established a Soviet (communist) government in Russia.

Lenin became leader of the Soviet state, fighting off challenges from noncommunist opponents in the Russian Civil War (1917–1923) while attempting to bring about a rapid transformation to communism. He later altered course in 1921 with the New Economic Policy, which envisioned more gradual change. He died in 1924 without naming a successor, and questions about his true intentions as to how to build communism remain debated. His ideas about party organization and the need for violent revolution became the basis for most communist movements in the twentieth century.

See also *Bolshevism; Communism; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Political Philosophy; Russian Political Thought; Trotsky, Leon.*

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Leninism

Leninism is a political philosophy associated with Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924), leader of the 1917 Bolshevik (Communist) Revolution in Russia. Lenin considered himself a Marxist, and much of Leninism is grounded in Karl Marx's observations about politics, economics, and society. Compared with classical Marxism, Leninism gives a greater emphasis to the role of revolutionary "toilers" (both workers and peasants) than the working class per se, to underdeveloped or semicolonial countries than to advanced capitalist countries, and to the leading role of a vanguard party over the spontaneous activity of the working class.

One of Lenin's major innovations to Marxist thought was his belief, expressed in *What Is to Be Done?* (1902), that the workers, by themselves, would not produce a socialist revolution. Instead, the best that workers could do is develop a "trade union consciousness" that would seek merely to reform, not overthrow, capitalism. Hence Lenin argued for the creation of a party of professional revolutionaries that were committed to Marxist ideas and the raising of class consciousness among workers. In so doing, he built upon a tradition in nineteenth-century Russia of revolutionary activity within small party cells. Moreover, the party would be subject to the principles of democratic centralism, meaning that members would participate in the formation of policy and election of leaders, but

after a policy has been decided, all party members would be commanded to loyally carry it out. In Lenin's view, only such a well-disciplined, committed organization could succeed in fulfilling Marx's vision of a socialist society. Armed with such an idea, he forced a split in the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1903, which eventually led to the creation of the Bolshevik Party.

Leninism was also mindful of the international nature of capitalism. In his work *Imperialism, the Highest Form of Capitalism* (1916), Lenin argued that capitalism inevitably gives rise to imperialism, as capitalists in more developed states search for more markets and opportunities for profits. Capitalism thus becomes a global phenomenon. The uneven development of the world economy—split between a developed core and a less-developed periphery—created, in Lenin's view, grounds for conflict among imperial powers and favorable conditions for socialist revolution in less-developed countries, where the nascent proletariat outnumber the native bourgeoisie. Arguing that Russia was the "weak link" in international capitalism, he agitated for socialist revolution there, believing, unlike Marx, that it would not occur first in the developed capitalist world because capitalists there can take advantage of their excess profits from imperialist ventures to placate the demands of their own working class. The fact that socialism can be brought to less-developed states necessitated a role for the peasantry in creating socialism, and Lenin encouraged an alliance of workers and revolutionary peasants, although in practice state and party officials were the dominant and privileged force within the Bolshevik Party and later the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Lenin committed the Bolshevik Party and, later, the early Soviet state to establishing a "dictatorship of the proletariat," under which the party would represent the true interests of the working class. In practice, this meant a single-party state and the ruthless suppression of other political movements and social organizations. In his lifetime Lenin also imposed a ban on factions within the party. Leninism thus became associated with the rule of the Bolsheviks (communists) in the Soviet Union, and, during and after the Russian Civil War (1917–1923), it was associated with the use of force against its political opponents in order to pursue its ideological objectives.

By virtue of Soviet influence on communist movements elsewhere, Leninism became both an ideological prism for understanding political and social relations and a mode for advancing the revolutionary cause. Lenin's inclusion of the peasantry as a revolutionary force would influence (among others) Chinese, Latin American, and Vietnamese communist movements, and the idea of a one-party state would remain political orthodoxy until the waning days of the Soviet Union.

Critics of Lenin, such as Rosa Luxemburg, objected to his stress on centralization and control at the expense of working-class spontaneity, and later opponents of Stalin, such as Leon Trotsky and his followers, would claim to be the true practitioners of Leninism or Marxist-Leninism. In the West, Lenin's ideas on the nature of capitalism and his ability as a party organizer were admired by some on the left, but most social

democrats rejected Leninism, seeing it as both based too much on violence and as an application of Marxism to a country with little or no democratic traditions and low levels of capitalist development.

See also *Bolshevism; Communism; Lenin, Vladimir Ilich; Luxemburg, Rosa; Marxism; Russian Political Thought.*

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Lerner, Max

Max Lerner (1902–1992) was an influential journalist, scholar, and public intellectual who made contributions to American political thought and culture. During his career, he held a number of faculty positions at leading colleges and universities. He resided the longest at Brandeis University, where he was on the faculty of the American Studies department for twenty-five years. Lerner published more than a dozen books and edited volumes on a wide range of topics. He also wrote introductory essays for a number of others. Lerner served as political editor at *The Nation* from 1936 to 1938 and contributed articles to a host of other magazines, journals, and newspapers.

Born Mikhail Lerner in Minsk, Russia, on December 20, 1902, Lerner immigrated to the United States with his family in 1907. He was a gifted student and received a BA from Yale University in 1923. After graduating, he enrolled in Yale Law School, but left after less than a year. He began reading the work of sociologist and economist Thorstein Veblen, which inspired him to begin studying the social sciences. Lerner earned a masters degree from Washington University in 1925 and his PhD from the Robert Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government in 1927. After receiving his PhD, he served as managing editor for the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.*

Most of Lerner's early work concerned the U.S. Supreme Court and its role in the New Deal and Great Depression. Two of his most prominent articles at the time were published in the *Yale Law Journal.* Each article was considered politically radical at the time. Both articles, "The Supreme Court and American Capitalism" (1933) and "Constitution and Court as Symbols" (1937), were indictments against the Supreme Court's economic jurisprudence and what Lerner considered indifference to socioeconomic issues affecting the country.

Lerner wrote pieces on a number of Supreme Court justices. Louis D. Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. occupied most of his attention. Lerner's edited volume, *The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes* (1943), helped to cement Holmes's reputation as a judicial heavyweight. Similarly, Lerner's work on Brandeis helped the justice to increase his stature in popular culture and the legal community.

Lerner's most well known and influential work was *America as a Civilization* (1957), a two-volume commentary and analysis of American culture, politics, and history. He made the claim that America is a distinctive and new civilization. The reception to the book was mixed. Some hailed it a great scholarly achievement, while others considered it muddled with no clear thesis.

From 1949 to 1992, Lerner was an outspoken liberal columnist for the *New York Post.* During that time, he wrote several thousand articles on a wide range of subjects. Commentators have noted that Lerner began his career on the left of the political spectrum and gradually moved toward the right. In his later years, Lerner became much more conservative, or as he termed it, "liberal centrist."

Despite his contributions, much of Lerner's work is no longer widely read. He passed away on June 5, 1992, after a long battle with cancer.

See also *Veblen, Thorstein.*

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Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Movements, Comparative

Concerted activist challenges to the oppression of sexual minorities date from the late nineteenth century, intensifying in the decades following World War II (1939–1945), and broadening across the globe from the 1990s on. From its beginnings, the movement has been based primarily in large urban centers, where anonymity and economic independence from family are more likely.

EARLY ACTIVISM

Scattered calls for legal reform and public acceptance emerged between the 1890s and 1930s, mostly in Europe. Germany's Scientific Humanitarian Committee was the preeminent campaigning organization, and Berlin the epicenter of cultural expression, until Nazis repression.

The brief period of political progressivism immediately following World War II spawned new gay activist energy in several European and American cities, resulting in groups like the Dutch Cultuur en Ontspannings-Centrum (Center for

Culture and Leisure) and the Mattachine Society and Daughters of Bilitis in various U.S. cities. The political, cultural, and religious changes of the 1960s opened up additional space for activist challenge, though still cautious and modest in scale.

LIBERATIONIST RADICALISM AND MAINSTREAM EXPANSION

A major activist surge under the banner of gay liberation swept over several North American and European cities from 1969 through the 1970s, more confrontational in its strategy, ambitious in its agenda, and successful in mobilization than anything before. The movement was influenced by feminism, parts of it by libertarianism, and, in Europe especially, by socialism. Most lesbians avoided male-dominated groups, working either through feminist groups willing to embrace sexual diversity or lesbian-specific groups. Despite the early influence of arguments that gender categories were socially constructed rather than fixed, significant parts of the movement mobilized on the basis of distinct gay and lesbian identities. This was most widely characteristic of the U.S. movement, but less pronounced in countries where class and other divisions were more politicized, such as in France and southern Europe.

Reformist activism did not disappear, but its objectives were broadened by liberationist visibility. That side of the movement grew slowly in the early 1980s in Australia, Canada, northwestern Europe, and the United States as modest political openings appeared in local politics and as leftist parties prepared to move from purely class-based frameworks and look for new constituencies.

AIDS RADICALISM AND POLITICAL MAINSTREAM

The devastation of the first AIDS epidemic threatened the limited gains made through the mid-1980s. At the same time, movement agendas and opportunities for intervention were expanded. By the next decade, impatience with slow response sparked a new wave of radicalism centered on AIDS. It was soon followed by a short-lived but influential wave of "queer" activism, making new demands or reinforcing long-standing ones with theatrical and confrontational tactics. The mid-1990s also saw more visible trans activism, forming distinct groups and claiming more than token recognition of gender identity issues within established groups.

By this time, in Western countries with long-standing lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) visibility, mainstream and reformist activism had overtaken transformative radicalism, though many groups contained elements of both. Activism had spread also into religious communities, labor unions, academic institutions, professional associations, media outlets, and ethnic minority communities. Few LGBT movements, however, displayed the institutional proliferation and the mobilization of resources so evident in the United States. In parts of Canada and Europe, new human rights frameworks and much-weakened church authorities allowed for the application of comparative modest resources to effect significant change.

GLOBALIZATION

The 1990s and 2000s saw dramatic growth of activism beyond the West. The catastrophic spread of AIDS in the global South was mostly fueled by heterosexual activity, but sometimes provided an important lever for lesbian, gay, and trans activists, dramatically so in Brazil. Transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy in the Iberian Peninsula, Latin America, South Africa, and Taiwan also created opportunities. In eastern and central Europe, the slow and partial incorporation of sexual orientation and gender identity into the European Union's rights framework created additional leverage for activists, especially in countries seeking EU membership.

Political networks have emerged even in the most dangerous of settings, in some cases aided by diasporic communities in the West. State repressiveness has intensified in parts of eastern Europe and Southeast Asia and in most of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Middle East. These governments and religious authorities frequently dismiss homosexuality as a Western intrusion and defend what they portray as national traditions.

Local activists usually blend indigenous frameworks with those gleaned from the experience of Australian, European, North American, and other movements. Some self-identify as lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgendered in roughly the same way as their Western colleagues; others eschew those categories or blend them with more contextually specific characterizations of sexual difference.

There have been considerable similarities in the cultural and political agendas of activist groups around the globe, though in many countries, state repression or popular prejudice focuses attention on countering violence, eliminating legal or de facto criminalization, and claiming the right to meet or organize publicly. Movements have campaigned against media prejudice, demanded protections against workplace discrimination, and sought recognition of family rights, though marriage has not generally been as much at the center of such campaigns as in the United States and a few other Western countries. Trans rights are now widely included in these agendas.

The global spread of LGBT movements has been aided by the formation of transnational networks, the first of them spawned by the urgency of international responses to AIDS. Apart from AIDS, the most institutionalized transnational activism is in Europe, sustained by the EU's expanding human rights framework and subsidies for LGBT groups like the International Lesbian and Gay Association. Most other international networks remain small or fragile, though they have shown some capacity to mobilize when, for example, LGBT representation is needed in discussions or conferences sponsored by the United Nations. Established groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have added sexual diversity to their mandates, emphasizing the transnational profile of these issues.

Activist political claims have been most successful in Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, and Spain. Significant gains have been made in most other countries in western Europe, a few in central and eastern Europe, and several in Australia, Israel, Latin America, New Zealand, South Africa, and Taiwan.

See also *AIDS, Politics of; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Politics; U.S. Politics and Society: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Political Identity.*

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Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Political Participation

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons participated in electoral politics as voters, activists, and candidates. Of these activities, voting in elections is the most widespread form of political participation of all citizens in liberal democratic societies. The study of how both individuals and groups in society vote (for whom they vote and why) is the study of voting behavior.

Related to voting behavior are the questions of how LGBT candidates and issues have fared when facing the electorate and how state referenda seeking to extend or curtail gay rights have fared. Since the 1930s, electoral voting behavior has been analyzed by comparing certain demographic characteristics of voters and their patterns of support or opposition for issues and candidates. Some of the most common demographic characteristics included by political polls are race, ethnicity, gender, income, education, class, and religion. Historically, what were not included were questions regarding a voter's sexual identity or sexual orientation.

LGBT CANDIDATES

It is impossible to know historically how many LGBT elected officials have served in office in any nation. But in the 1970s, as public attention to gay rights grew, more LGBT candidates presented themselves for election. As early as 1961, José Sarria ran for the San Francisco Board of Supervisors and lost, but his candidacy helped to encourage greater LGBT involvement in politics. Some sixteen years later, Harvey Milk would win a seat on the same Board of Supervisors. In 1974, three years prior to Milk's election in San Francisco, Kathy Kozachenko was elected to the Ann Arbor, Michigan, City Council, making her the first openly gay elected official in the United States. Elaine Noble followed a few months later as the first openly gay state legislator, serving in the Massachusetts legislature from 1975 to 1979. In 2008, in Silverton, Oregon, voters elected the first openly transgender public official when they chose Stu Rasmussen to serve as town mayor.

As of 2009, there were currently three openly gay U.S. House members (eight others have previously been elected), and the number of LGBT elected officials grew from less than fifty to more than 450 in less than two decades. The Gay and Lesbian Victory Fund, established in 1991, has helped many of these candidates with fundraising and professional campaign support. In 2009 alone, they endorsed seventy-six openly LGBT candidates, the largest in their history. To receive support, candidates must demonstrate community support and a realistic plan to win; support federal, state, or local LGBT civil rights legislation; and, via the legislative or regulatory process, support privacy and reproductive rights. Between 2006 and 2008 more than 70 percent of the candidates endorsed by the Gay and Lesbian Victory Fund were elected, a percentage that has been growing since the mid-1990s.

While each year more LGBT candidates join the ranks of the more than five hundred thousand elected officials in the United States, they continue to face significant obstacles to election including explicitly homophobic campaigns. Despite significant progress in electoral politics, very few districts remain in which LGBT candidates are safe from such antigay attacks.

ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION

In the past twenty years, LGBT participation and activism has grown at the federal, state, and local levels. Beginning with the 1992 campaign for president, LGBT activists began to organize and fundraise for then-candidate Bill Clinton, who had pledged to end the ban against gays and lesbians in the military. He was the first major party candidate to add an openly gay advisor to his campaign team, and LGBT citizens came out to work on his campaign as they had never before. Some survey data suggest that the LGBT vote helped Clinton to win in Michigan and New Jersey, as well as gave him a comfortable margin of victory in California and New York.

A new hopefulness for the future LGBT inclusion in mainstream politics quickly faded, however, as President Clinton failed to lift the military ban and in 1996 signed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), defining marriage as an act exclusively between one man and one woman. DOMA also provided that "no state needs to treat a relationship between persons of the same sex as a marriage, even if the relationship is considered a marriage in another state."

This second provision fueled an already ongoing explosion of LGBT activity at the state level as gay activists sought to pass civil liberties protections at the local level at the same time that anti-LGBT activists began to attack such provisions and outlaw future civil rights protections for gays through ballot initiatives and referenda. In 1992, in both Colorado and Oregon, voters were asked to codify a denial of equal protection for LGBT citizens into law. Although the Oregon measure failed and the Colorado amendment was declared unconstitutional by the Colorado and U.S. Supreme Courts, states continue to put the civil rights protections for LGBT citizens to a vote of the population. Six months after gay couples began to marry in Massachusetts in May 2003, eleven states voted on election night to ban gay marriage in their states. By 2009, thirty states had passed bans against gay marriage either through referenda or state legislative action, including a stunning 2008 state referenda defeat in California where gay marriage had previously been legal. More than any other minority group in history, LGBT persons in the United States have had their civil rights protections put to popular vote. Despite the high percentage of the population that tell surveyors that they believe in civil rights protections for gay people, in specific ballot questions, the anti-LGBT activists have continued to strip away or prohibit the passage or expansion of such protections.

LGBT VOTING BEHAVIOR

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as increasing numbers of candidates identifying as LGBT emerged, pollsters, potential candidates, elected officials, newspapers, and researchers all began to argue for the inclusion of sexual identity as a demographic category in political surveys. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, many major polls began to include these questions, but the data generated often came with serious caveats—some of which still exist today. The first problem paralleled a debate in LGBT scholarship that raged throughout the 1990s, when concerns emerged about what this new gay/lesbian/bisexual (GLB) variable measured. Was GLB a measure of personal identity, sexual acts, political coalition, or a combination of these factors? The second and more enduring problem is that it is probable that many LGBT persons are unwilling to identify themselves as sexual minorities to pollsters visiting the neighborhood polling stations where they live, creating a conjectured undersampling of their political perspectives and viewpoints, while possibly simultaneously skewing the results reported by heterosexual voters. Problems remain today: only 3 percent to 5 percent of voters identify themselves as GLB to pollsters. Most surveys do not include transgender as a demographic category, still further compounding any efforts to include transgender voter preferences. As a result of these problems, very few studies of LGBT voting behavior have been undertaken. The data that do exist are revealing, however. In national exit polls from 1992 through 2004, GLB voters were significantly more liberal in their social attitudes and reported votes than their heterosexual counterparts. Within this GLB group, lesbians are the most liberal, and, in one 1996 study of voting behavior, this has been attributed to the impact

of feminism. There was little difference between lesbians and gay men who identified as feminists while lesbians who did not identify as feminist held opinions that were much closer to their nonfeminist gay counterparts.

Recent polling data continue to suggest that GLB respondents are among the most progressive on social issues and are much more likely to support Democratic Party candidates. While Barack Obama won the presidential election with 52.9 percent of the vote, exit polls show that more than 70 percent of GLB voters chose him to be president. In a 2008 American National Election Studies Time Series survey of likely voters prior to the election, more than 80 percent of GLB voters preferred Obama. In the same poll, 58 percent of GLB voters supported national health care compared to 50.6 percent of "straight" voters. A significant 47.5 percent of GLB voters supported abortion under any circumstances compared to 39.5 percent of non-GLB voters. And most significantly, 68 percent favored a citizenship process for illegal aliens, while only 48 percent of their heterosexual counterparts favored such a process.

LGBT voters, activists, and candidates continue to be a growing part of the American political landscape. In some cities and urban areas, it is not possible to win election without their votes. As anti-LGBT referenda and ballot questions persist in the politicization of sexual orientation, group solidarity and political mobilization of LGBT voters will remain high, resulting in increased political activism, political participation, and fund raising within LGBT communities.

See also *Civil and Political Rights; Equality and Inequality; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Movements, Comparative; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Politics; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender U.S. Legal Questions; Voting Behavior.*

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Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Politics

The lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) movement is a modern coalitional movement of people with a same-sex or bisexual sexual orientation, transgender people, and their allies. The movement has legal, social, cultural, and political

dimensions. Those who identify with it seek a wide range of ends that include equal protection under the law, social recognition, and self-determination in their intimate association. The dimensions and practices of the movement have changed considerably over its history, and in addition, they vary globally by nation and geographical region. A wide variation of laws, policies, cultural representations, and social attitudes affect LGBT people worldwide and make it difficult to draw conclusions that characterize either the state of the LGBT movement or the welfare or rights status of LGBT people.

Social and political activism on behalf of people with a same-sex sexual orientation began in Germany in the mid-nineteenth century. Activism emerged in Great Britain soon after, and by the early decades of the twentieth century a variety of groups and individuals advocated for social tolerance and the decriminalization of same-sex relations. Not all of these advocates were homosexual; psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud and the political philosopher John Stuart Mill were prominent Europeans whose attitudes toward same-sex sexuality were relatively tolerant for their time. However, the modern lesbian and gay movement did not begin until after World War II (1939–1945). The homophile movement of the 1950s and early 1960s was motivated by a diverse set of ideas, but it was assimilationist in its objectives when compared with the liberationist activism that followed. A key moment in LGBT rights history occurred in New York City in 1969 when police raided the Stonewall Inn and patrons fought back. Their resistance became a touchstone of an uncompromising gay liberation movement that influenced LGBT people in the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in Europe.

A decade after Stonewall, the first mass public rally for gay and lesbian civil rights was held in Washington, DC. The demonstration was largely ignored by mainstream media and policy makers. However, by the mid-1980s the movement became more visible because of its activism associated with the AIDS epidemic and the unresponsiveness of governments in the face of the epidemic. By the late 1980s, a social and political backlash inspired by the AIDS epidemic matured into a coordinated movement to contest civil and human rights claims lodged by LGBT people. In the 1980s and 1990s, groups such as OutRage!, ACT UP, and Lesbian Avengers practiced a confrontational form of political activism that relied on spectacle and rejected interest group politics.

Since the 1980s, the dominant mode of LGBT activism in many Western nations has invoked liberal philosophic ideals of toleration and individual rights as grounds for equality claims. Activists for LGBT rights have come to rely on an ethnic model of sexuality that treats minority gender and sexual orientations as immutable. This immutability thesis is strongly contested, albeit for different reasons, by some LGBT people and by religious conservatives who oppose gay rights. Another model of LGBT activism is associated with a "queer" movement that for many is allied with the academic subfield of queer theory. Taking its name from a common English-language epithet for homosexuals of both sexes, queer theory repudiates the status of heterosexuality as a binary referent for

a stable homosexual identity. As a result, queer theory and its related conception of political practice reject a lesbian and gay rights paradigm that is premised on the idea of stable sexual identity and that seeks social and political inclusion.

Some lesbian feminists reject queer theory and the political struggles that may be perceived to arise from it, understanding these as masculine-identified and potentially antifeminist. Many lesbians have pointed out that, although lesbians, gay and bisexual men, and transgender people have common interests in ending discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identification, women who partner with women also have interests that diverge from those of other groups. Some issue areas in which women's and men's political interests have diverged are parental rights, sodomy laws, and women's health.

One complication in considering LGBT people as a group or as the subjects of a political movement is that many individuals engage in same-sex sexuality or gender-variant behavior but do not understand themselves as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender. Scholars argue that although same-sex desire has existed throughout history, the identity *homosexual* is a relatively recent one that is the product of social and economic changes in modern life. In some cultures same-sex sexuality may be socially acceptable under prescribed circumstances, but this reality does not imply the existence of a movement that advocates for the civil or human rights of homosexuals or bisexuals as a group. An LGBT movement rests on two premises: the conceptualization of LGBT people as people who possess a stigmatized—if not immutable—identity, and the willingness of people to be characterized as bearers of a particular kind of identity for the purpose of advocacy in the public sphere. Many people who might be classified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender are skeptical of the collective conception of gender or sexual identity upon which rights claims are predicated. As a result, the existence of a "movement" of LGBT people is uneven around the world at the same time that human rights organizations advocate globally on behalf of LGBT people.

In addition to supporting the rights claims of LGBT people, feminists link rigid gender role expectations with normative heterosexuality and, thus, with opposition to LGBT rights. Feminists analyze the ways in which the maintenance of gender hierarchy and male dominance requires the suppression and stigmatization of same-sex sexuality. Besides gender, in heterogeneous societies, LGBT movements have had to confront identity differences of race, ethnicity, and religion among those with an LGBT identity. These differences challenge LGBT organizations to diversify their leadership as well as to recognize the ways in which people with dominant forms of identity may find it easier to use the movement to enact their political interests. In the United States, for example, African Americans have criticized the disproportionate influence of white people in LGBT institutions.

Bisexual and transgender people have always been part of the movement, but it was not until the late 1990s that the gay and lesbian movement began to explicitly incorporate such members and issues. Bisexuals argued that the traditional aims

of a lesbian and gay movement did not encompass the particularities of bisexuality and challenged lesbians and gay men to acknowledge bisexual identity and to incorporate bisexuals' interests and perspectives into the movement's agenda. Likewise, transgender people—a category that includes people who have undergone sex reassignment surgery, those who transgress traditional gender regimes, and some intersex people—have worked to expand the goals of the lesbian and gay rights movement beyond sexual orientation. Transgender rights activism is apparent around the world, most notably in Europe, North and South America, and South Asia.

OPPOSITION TO GAY RIGHTS

Like the LGBT movement itself, opposition to social recognition and rights claims has taken many different forms. Those who oppose rights and recognition for LGBT people most often point to traditional values, authentic cultural or national identity, or religious belief as grounds for their position that discrimination is a social good. Opponents of LGBT rights engage in a variety of practices that are consistent with the social contexts in which they are located. These include lobbying government officials, executing grassroots campaigns to influence law and policy formation, organizing public campaigns against same-sex sexuality and transgender identity, creating instructional materials that instruct followers in their view of same-sex sexuality and transgenderism, and engaging in formal and informal kinds of violence against LGBT people.

The most common foundations for opposition to LGBT rights emerge from the traditional wings of many world religions, including Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. An important political innovation in religious organization is that by the 1990s, opposition to LGBT rights encouraged an unusual degree of transnational cooperation between groups from these faith traditions to inhibit state recognition of LGBT identity and to uphold forms of legal discrimination. One public forum for gay identity that has come under criticism in many nations is the gay pride march, an event usually held in major cities. In 2006 alone, government officials in Latvia canceled a gay pride march after protests and threats of violence by a conservative Christian political party, and march organizers in Jerusalem bowed to violence and threats of violence by ultraorthodox Jewish protesters, substituting a rally outside the city for a march. In cases such as these, social pressures, rather than formal legal processes, are brought to bear to discourage mass demonstrations that either highlight LGBT identity or advocate for rights for LGBT people.

In some nations, opponents of gay rights operate in social and political environments in which rising tolerance for LGBT people threatens traditional forms of gender identity and heterosexual dominance. Hence, these social and religious conservatives work to reinforce the stigma associated with same-sex sexual behavior and identity and with nonnormative gender identity. The degree of stigma attached to LGBT identity varies widely. In the United States, some forms of tolerance have been rising, especially support for protection against discrimination in housing and employment. However, the lessened stigma associated with LGBT identity has not translated into public or official demand for laws such as the Employment Non-discrimination Act, first introduced in Congress in 1994.

In the United States, those who oppose LGBT rights mobilize supporters to influence public opinion as well as political processes. One component of the struggle against LGBT rights and recognition is the ex-gay movement, which advertises its ability to rehabilitate homosexuals and transgender people and return them to normative gender identity and heterosexual functioning. This movement is central to the struggle for LGBT rights because proponents of reparative therapies tend to decry the 1973 decision of the American Psychiatric Association to reclassify homosexuality from a mental disorder to a sexual orientation. In addition, leaders of the movement reject the legitimacy of both LGBT identity and civil rights. The ex-gay movement began in the United States in the 1970s, but branches are now active throughout North and South America and in many other parts of the world, including Brazil, the Caribbean, Germany, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Scandinavia, and the United Kingdom.

THE CURRENT STATE OF LGBT RIGHTS

In the United States, the struggle for LGBT rights takes place simultaneously at all levels of government in a federal system, with local ordinances and state and federal laws and court decisions constituting the multiple battle grounds for progay and antigay forces. Two Supreme Court decisions have had a profound effect on gay rights in recent decades. In 1986, in *Bowers v. Hardwick,* the court declined to find a Georgia statute outlawing sodomy unconstitutional. However, in 2003, the court issued a decision in *Lawrence v. Texas* that reversed the *Bowers* decision and located a right to sexual privacy in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The *Lawrence* decision was a factor in mobilizing social conservatives to campaign against "judicial activism" and to pass laws and state constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage.

Today, LGBT groups campaign for a broad array of issues: the repeal of discriminatory legislation, equal treatment in public institutions such as the military, hate crimes legislation, protection of LGBT youth, and equality in family policies and public entitlements. Around the world, LGBT people confront discrimination in employment, housing, education, public accommodations, and medical care. A principal arena for the struggle over gay rights in many democracies is same-sex marriage. Proponents of same-sex marriage point to a variety of grounds for extending marriage to same-sex couples: the central place of the institution of marriage in democratic citizenship; the importance of marriage—and the stability it fosters—for long-term adult relations and for the rearing of children; and the role of marriage in some countries in sponsoring eligibility for social welfare entitlements.

In the United States, a majority of citizens oppose extending marriage to same-sex couples, including some critics within the LGBT movement. For example, some queers and political supporters of LGBT rights have linked a political

interest in marriage with gay shame or with a moralism that stigmatizes nonconforming individuals. And some feminists have sounded a note of caution about same-sex marriage, arguing that enrolling same-sex partners in marriage as it is currently constituted threatens to reinforce social hierarchies and exclusionary forms of intimate association. These critics do not campaign against the right to same-sex marriage as a matter of policy but, rather, encourage members of the LGBT movement to be aware of the ways in which rights claims may result in the secondary marginalization of vulnerable members of LGBT communities.

In 2010, seven countries permit legal marriage between same-sex couples: Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, and Sweden. In the United States, same-sex partners have the right to marry in Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Washington, DC. However, there remains vigorous opposition to same-sex marriage in the United States. The Defense of Marriage Act (1996) guarantees that American states are under no obligation to recognize same-sex marriages performed in any state that permits same-sex marriage. And in 2008, voters in the state of California supported Proposition 8, reversing a court ruling that had permitted same-sex marriages in that state.

Today, LGBT people enjoy the most legal protection of their rights in some states of the European Union. In early 2006, the European Parliament issued a resolution condemning member countries that do not protect gay rights. Members of the European Parliament from states that have legislated against lesbians and gay men remained intractable in the face of parliamentary criticism. Some countries of eastern Europe are sites of antigay harassment and open antigay mobilization on the part of political parties. By contrast, the United Kingdom's Civil Partnership Act of 2004 confers on same-sex couples parity of treatment on legal issues with opposite-sex couples who enter into civil marriage. A variety of other nations and jurisdictions, including some U.S. states, provide some version of civil union as a substitute for marriage for same-sex couples. Though civil unions provide many of the same benefits as heterosexual marriage, they are often contested by those who oppose LGBT rights, as well as by some LGBT people who believe that the civil union alternative to marriage stigmatizes same-sex couples and institutionalizes second-class citizenship for LGBT people.

Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International track violations of human rights that involve LGBT people. For example, sodomy laws criminalize same-sex sexual behavior in many nations, but LGBT people may be punished for a range of other offenses as well. Currently, LGBT people in many countries are at risk of legal punishments, including torture and the death penalty, for engaging in same-sex sexual behavior, being a transgender person, advocating for LGBT rights, or engaging in HIV/AIDS activism. Some countries, such as Bahrain, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Lesotho, Namibia, Nigeria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Zambia, only criminalize sex between men. In addition to formal legal sanctions for LGBT people and activism, LGBT people are frequently subjected to informal threats and violence from individuals and groups. At times, transgender people have been subjected to forcible sex reassignment surgery or subjected to violence because of their gender identity or expression. To commemorate and protest violence against transgender people, November 20 is recognized in cities around the world as an International Transgender Day of Remembrance.

Some nongovernmental organizations support the rights and welfare of LGBT people in the societies in which they operate and in international forums. However, organizations that advocate for LGBT people often do not occupy the same status as organizations that advocate against the interests of LGBT people. One site of struggle over LGBT politics has been the Non-governmental Organization Committee of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which has often voted to deny consultative status to national and transnational organizations that advocate for LGBT rights. While organizations that oppose the interests of LGBT people have attained consultative status with the ECOSOC and used the status to advocate for conservative morality politics at the United Nations, countries whose antigay practices have been criticized by organizations such as the International Lesbian and Gay Association have often opposed consultative status for LGBT groups.

The LGBT movement continues to publicize and confront the forms of discrimination and violence that affect the lives of LGBT people. The movement also provides support to LGBT people and their families. To these ends, members engage in a wide variety of activities that include lobbying and legal advocacy, marches and community events, therapies and support groups, and the production and dissemination of news and culture.

See also *Homophobia; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Movements, Comparative; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Political Participation; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender U.S. Legal Questions; Queer Theory; U.S. Politics and Society: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Political Identity; Women's Rights.*

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Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights

Gay rights are also referred to as LGBT rights or LGBTQ rights to encompass lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer identities within gay communities. The gay rights movement in the United States can be traced from 1924 with the first known gay rights organization, the Society for Human Rights in Chicago. An objective of the Society for Human Rights was to draw together gay communities and to educate lawyers and lawmakers on gay-related issues.

Since 1924, gay rights in the United States have witnessed setbacks and achievements. In 1951, the Mattachine Society was formed by Harry Hay, a worker on the Henry Wallace presidential campaign. Hay likened the plight of homosexuals in America to an oppressed minority. Though the concept of gays and lesbians as minorities is still debated today, the "minority concept" brought cohesion to the gay rights movement. The Mattachine Society and its pioneering lesbian counterpart organization, The Daughters of Bilitis, are credited as being the first national gay rights organizations in the United States.

After the formation of national, organized groups, there was civil unrest within gay communities for recognition. The Stonewall riots in 1969 in New York's Greenwich Village moved gay rights from a localized effort and focus to a more widespread movement for gay civil rights, equality, and societal acceptance. Approximately four years after Stonewall, the American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from its list of mental disorders in 1973 and issued a strong statement supporting gay rights. Twenty years later, the U.S. military established the policy of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," allowing gays and lesbians to serve in the military but banning the open practice of homosexuality.

The politics of gay rights in the United States is played out by various actors, including legislators, individual actors, the state, and the courts. In the early 1980s, for example, the state of Wisconsin was the first to include *sexual orientation* in the list of prohibited discrimination. Supreme Court cases have had a particular impact on the gay rights movement in terms of setbacks and triumphs. In *Bowers v. Hardwick* (1986), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia sodomy law that criminalized oral and anal sex between consenting adults in private when applied to homosexuals, but seventeen years later, in *Lawrence v. Texas* (2003), the court struck down a Texas sodomy law, thereby overruling *Bowers v. Hardwick*. The *Lawrence v. Texas* ruling invalidates laws in the United States that criminalize oral and anal sex between consenting adults acting in private, whether homosexual or heterosexual. In *Romer v. Evans* (1996) the Supreme Court banned a Colorado state constitutional amendment that would have prevented sexual orientation from being included in lists of prohibited discrimination under Colorado law.

While much of the battle for gay rights has been contested in courts, states also have been actively involved in shaping the legal rights of LGBT persons, especially in regards to the question of marriage. In 2000, the state of Vermont was the first state to recognize and legalize civil unions between gay or lesbian couples, giving them entitlements to the same benefits, privileges, and responsibilities as spouses. Several states have followed Vermont in recognizing same-sex civil unions, including Connecticut in 2005. Other states have pushed beyond civil unions to recognize same-sex marriage, beginning in 2004 with the state of Massachusetts. As of 2010, the federal government seemed to prefer to leave the issue to individual states, although Congress did approve a law legalizing same-sex marriage in the District of Columbia, the nation's capitol.

This increase in gay rights has brought on a conservative backlash led by religious activists, particularly opposing the "redefinition of marriage." Referenda to legally recognize gay marriages have been repeatedly defeated. As of 2010, thirty states have passed amendments to their state constitutions to ban same-sex marriage, including California, where voters narrowly overturned a prior California Supreme Court ruling. States like Arkansas have adopted measures to bar gay men and lesbians from adopting children.

As authors Haider-Markel and Meier discuss in "The Politics of Gay and Lesbian Rights: Expanding the Scope of Conflict" (1996), as the scope of the conflict of gay rights expands in the United States, then we most likely will see a morality politics model (where policy is a function of religious forces, party competition, partisanship, and education) where political influence is played out at the ballot box.

See also *Homophobia; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Movements, Comparative; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Political Participation; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Politics; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender U.S. Legal Questions; Queer Theory; U.S. Politics and Society: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Political Identity.*

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Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender U.S. Legal Questions

The 2003 landmark case of *Lawrence v. Texas* is perhaps the most important U.S. Supreme Court case concerning gay and lesbian rights and liberties to date. Although the 1996 case of *Romer v. Evans* was pathbreaking in its own right, ensuring that state referenda could not preempt localities from recognizing gays' and lesbians' civil rights if they so chose, *Lawrence* justly has been deemed the *Brown v. the Board of Education* of the gay and lesbian movement. In *Lawrence*, the U.S. Supreme Court found unconstitutional a Texas law that criminalized private same-sex sodomy (i.e., anal or oral sex). In doing so, the court overturned *Bowers v. Hardwick* (1986), which held that the court would defer to the states on all such questions, having the effect of upholding laws criminalizing sodomy in twenty-five states. Relying on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as important privacy precedents such as *Griswold v. Connecticut* and *Planned Parenthood v. Casey*, the court declared in *Lawrence* that the right to privacy included nonpublic, same-sex intimate conduct between consenting adults.

The victory in *Lawrence* reignited gay and lesbian demands for equal marriage rights, which had been sought in the United States since at least the early 1970s. This first wave of demands was uniformly rejected by various state courts on the grounds that marriage was reserved for one man and one woman and that as such all citizens could participate in it if they so chose. The second wave emerged during the early 1990s in Hawaii, whose courts recognized the right to same-sex marriage, only to be overturned by a constitutional amendment passed by a referendum that had the support of an overwhelming majority. In apparent reaction to the possibility that one or several states might soon recognize same-sex marriage, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996 to clarify that the federal government would not recognize them. Many states also passed similar statutes and constitutional amendments to that same end, which have sometimes been called "mini DOMAs." The third wave began in 1999 when the Vermont Supreme Court declared in *Baker v. State* that gays and lesbians should have equal access to the same rights and benefits as heterosexual couples. This led the state legislature to institute a parallel system of civil unions for gays and lesbians. In 2003, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts declared in *Goodridge v. Department of Public Health* that denying marriage licenses to gay couples violated the state constitution. To date, none of the many attempts to amend the Massachusetts Constitution to overturn this ruling have been successful.

Because earlier cases such as *Stefan v. Perry* (1988), which excluded gays from openly serving in the military, were largely based on the criminalization of sodomy upheld by *Bowers*, there has been some speculation in the wake of *Lawrence* that Congress might lift the ban. This speculation increased when the United States initiated a war with Iraq (as military exclusions of other minority groups have historically been relaxed when there is a greater demand for troops), and again in 2006 when the Democrats took control of Congress. Public opinion polls also indicate that a majority of the U.S. public favor overturning the current policy. Informally known as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," it has been upheld in federal court several times since its inception in 1993. It allows gays and lesbians to serve in the military, but only if they are not open about their sexual orientation, on the grounds that open service would undermine morale and unit cohesion.

Transgender issues also have been important in the LGBT movement for equal rights. Earlier concerns included arrests for cross-dressing, while more recent cases have addressed a variety of family concerns (such as marital status and child custody), public funding for sex reassignment surgery, and discrimination in employment. While the transgendered have been included in earlier versions of the Employment Non-discrimination Act (ENDA), a bill that was originally introduced in Congress in 1976 to protect gays and lesbians against workplace discrimination but has yet to pass, the most recent version has excluded transgendered people from protection, despite the fact that all of the principal LGBT legal organizations have lobbied against such an excision.

See also *Discrimination; Homophobia; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Politics; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights; U.S. Politics and Society: Lesbinan, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Political Identity.*

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Liang Qichao

Liang Qichao (1873–1929) was a scholar, journalist, translator, reformer, and historian in China during the Qing Dynasty. His works are a commentary on one of the most eventful eras marking the transition of China from monarchy to republic.

After obtaining his juren degree in 1889, Liang became a student of scholar and intellectual Kang Youwei. He worked

closely with Kang throughout the Reform Movement of 1895 to 1898, editing important journals related to the movement and serving as academic director of its flagship *Shiwu Xuetang* (*Academy of Current Events*). After the conservative coup of 1898 that ended the movement, he was exiled to Japan where he remained for fourteen years while continuing to promote a constitutional monarchy in China. He edited the journals of the Society to Protect the Emperor, *Qingyi Bao* (*Topics of the Day*) and *Xinmin Congbao* (*New People*). Liang's lucid style of writing made him extremely popular, and more than fourteen thousand copies of *Xinmin Congbao* were smuggled into China every week from Japan. However, Liang's influence declined after 1905 and his commitment to gradual evolutionary change lost its appeal to Chinese youth. By 1911 he was calling for the overthrow of the Manchu rulers, whom he had supported until then. He returned to China in 1912 after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty and served in the cabinet of Yuan Shikai, the first president of the Republic of China. In 1913 Liang led the formation of the Progressive Party (*Chin-pu-Tang*). However, when Yuan attempted to declare himself an emperor in 1916, Liang helped to force him to relinquish his throne and restore the republic.

Liang retired from politics in 1917 to pursue his academic interests. In 1920 he became a professor of history at Nankai University in Tientsin. He was one of the most prolific men of letters in the late Qing and early Republican era, writing on everything from Buddhism to modern fiction. His complete works were published as *The Collected Works of Yinbingshi* (1936).

The early twentieth century was one of the most tumultuous periods in Chinese history. The Chinese empire was in its death throes and China itself faced dissolution at the hands of Western powers. At this time, Darwinian ideas were beginning to permeate Chinese intelligentsia and Liang became a powerful voice for Darwinism, calling on the Chinese nation to adapt itself to adverse environments. One of his favorite words was *new* and he tried to portray the necessity of making everything new. He also promoted the theory of survival of the fittest during his tenure as editor of the newspaper *Shiwubao*. He defended the Manchus, who were thoroughly detested by the Chinese, and spoke for the monarchy against those who advocated its overthrow. Later in life he split with Kang, who considered Confucianism essential to maintain China's cultural integrity. Liang, on the other hand, saw Confucianism as the obstacle to modernization.

See also *Asian Political Thought; Chinese Political Thought.*

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Liberal Democracy

The term *liberal democracy* usually refers to a system of representative government involving the rule of law; competitive multiparty elections for office; limited government powers; protections for private property and for basic individual rights such as free speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion; and a sphere of civil society that is distinct from the sphere of politics. The use of the words *liberal* and *liberalism* in politics dates from the postrevolutionary period in France, when writers such as Benjamin Constant applied a term that had been used to describe a certain sort of religious belief to politics. These writers used the term *liberal* to refer to a platform that was primarily concerned with individual liberty, that was open-minded about new institutional solutions to secure this liberty, and that avoided the extremes of both reactionary monarchism and Jacobin republicanism. Liberalism was then associated with constitutional monarchy, and even today most people would classify monarchies such as those found in the United Kingdom and Spain as liberal democracies.

Today the single most common criterion used to determine whether a government is a liberal democracy is whether fair and competitive multiparty elections are held at set intervals. But many observers have suggested that there ought to be a more robust set of criteria. Suggestions abound as to what those criteria should be, but one influential theory was advanced by political scientist Robert Dahl, who elaborated a concept of *polyarchy* based on a number of different and intersecting scales with which to evaluate a particular country's success in meeting the broad goals of liberal democratic government.

During the twentieth century it was common to explain major world conflicts as wars between liberal democracy and the alternatives of fascism and communism. With the end of the cold war, it therefore became possible to entertain the Hegelian thesis that there were no serious alternatives to liberal democracy left, as Francis Fukuyama suggested in his much-discussed article "The End of History?" Controversy about liberal democracy has not abated, however. Critics continue to suggest that it is a bourgeois form of government in which an oligarchic minority uses its resources to gain access to political office, protect their own property interests, and rule over the majority. Also, the emphasis on individualism implicit in a liberal scheme of rights has been associated with a particular cultural heritage, one that may not be appropriate for all societies. In particular, societies with strong communal traditions may regard the individualism that is a premise of liberal democracy as a threat to the cohesiveness of their community groups. In some cases, such as India, a liberal democratic set of institutions has been modified and adapted to allow for a greater degree of communal control over some parts of the law, as for example when civil law recognizes particular minority communities as distinct subjects and allows traditional courts to adjudicate some matters of dispute.

Perhaps the most interesting theoretical questions about the term *liberal democracy* concern the relation between the

two words: liberalism seems to constrain democracy because a majority is not empowered to violate either the individual rights or the procedures enshrined in the constitution. In addition, the importance of delegation and representation in liberal governments can seem at odds with a democratic interest in widespread political participation beyond the mere act of voting. Indeed, elections were viewed in ancient Greece as an oligarchic or elitist institution because they selected a few citizens to rule the rest. On the other hand, liberal democracies are often justified in the language of popular sovereignty and equality, and political life within such systems of government is filled with claims and counterclaims about which policies adequately and accurately represent the popular will. Both liberty and equality are essential values in liberal democracies, and if they sometimes seem to come into conflict with one another, that conflict is partly constitutive of the form of government itself.

A final area of interest is the question of what sorts of religious beliefs and practices are most compatible with liberal democracy. While some scholars accent the Judeo-Christian roots of this form of government, others argue that there are traditions in Islam and in various religions of Asia that should be equally congenial to liberal democratic rule. The question of whether liberal democracy is a form of government suitable for all societies, or whether it is historically, culturally, or religiously specific, remains an open one.

See also *Democracy; Liberalism, Classical; Liberal Theory.*

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Liberalism, Classical

Many Americans associate the term *liberalism* with, for good or ill, such emotionally charged topics as big government, welfare, socialism, and civil rights. It is axiomatic that the meanings of political labels can change over time. Liberalism is no exception to this rule. This entry briefly reviews the origins of liberalism and what constitutes *classical liberalism* as it was generally understood at that time, which is different than its meaning in recent American politics.

ROOTS AND BRITISH PIONEERS

Liberalism has a long and distinguished history, starting with the philosophers of ancient Greece and Rome. In the development of the understanding of politics throughout Western history since the time of ancient Greece and Rome,

political philosophy has considered the place of the individual in a society or political system. In many, if not most, political philosophies, the individual has been sacrificed or has been subordinate to the good of the state. However, the good of the individual has occasionally been considered central; it is this focus on the individual that characterizes the common thread of liberalism in all its forms. This common thread can also be described as the value of liberty (both *liberty* and *liberalism* come from the Latin root *liber*, meaning "free") and the minimization of government interference in civil society. Associated with liberalism is the concept that humans have an inherent goodness and rationality.

During the European Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the threads of liberalism began to coalesce into a somewhat coherent political philosophy. Enlightenment philosophers emphasized reason and the nature of the individual man and society, which formed the basis for liberal thought. A number of philosophers epitomize this search, beginning with Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), a British philosopher. In his masterpiece, *Leviathan*, Hobbes posited that life in a state of nature was "brutal, nasty, and short." Nevertheless, he recognized that man was an individual prior to society, one of the first philosophical recognitions of man as an individual. Hobbes argued that those individual men, through handing their self-rule over to the sovereignty of the government, formed a social contract for their mutual protection.

Hobbes was followed by John Locke (1632–1704), a British physician and philosopher commonly known as the "father of liberalism." Locke's most famous political work was the *Two Treatises of Government*. Like Hobbes, Locke advocated a social contract theory of political life, where men formed governments to ensure peace, but he placed a greater emphasis on individual liberty. In his "Essay Concerning Human Understanding," he expanded on the notion that men were individuals and that they had inherent value separate from the state. Locke presented a natural law theory that men had the natural rights to life, liberty, and property.

Following Locke and Hobbes were a number of continental philosophers who characterized the focus on the individual during the Enlightenment. Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1788), a Genevoise philosopher, wrote *The Social Contract*, describing the creation of a society in which men formed governments for the befit of all men, which became a great influence. Baron Montesquieu (1689–1755), a French political philosopher, penned *The Laws*, advocating the separation of powers in government to protect the people, which heavily influenced the American Founders in the writing of the U.S. Constitution. The Scottish Enlightenment included philosopher Adam Smith (1723–1790), whose book *The Wealth of Nations* helped launch the modern discipline of economics, through his theory of a free market, where individuals pursued their own self interest in such as way that would benefit all society.

LIBERALISM AS A LABEL SPREADS

These accomplished philosophers, who lived prior to and during the Enlightenment, were the forerunners of what is known as classical liberalism. Until the early nineteenth

century, the political philosophy of liberalism was not so-named and was a reaction to the abuses of the clerical system of rule and feudalism. The term *liberalism* did not come into use until the early 1800s in Spain, when a general opposition to the clerical establishment developed. From Spain, the label of *liberalism* traveled to the continent and then to England.

From the Enlightenment, some authorities recognize that liberalism, as a political philosophy, went through several stages. Initially, the middle class was in a form of revolt against the established political and economic powers. The middle class had increased its share of the economic wealth but had not had a corresponding increase in its political power. At that time, the middle class began to seek more say in the economic and political affairs of society. This period generally lasted until the early 1800s. The period between approximately 1830 and 1865 is considered the heyday of classical liberalism as a philosophy. Classical liberalism is based on the idea that individuals are independent beings and have free will. This concept of liberty is explained by John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), a British philosopher, in his classic work, *On Liberty*, which illustrates that the notion of liberty is not just freedom from the government but from other people, too. It explains the idea of human individuality and independence.

Classical liberalism is associated with the idea that human beings must be free and subject to the barest minimum of restrictions. Thus, government could be considered evil if it excessively intruded on individual liberty. For John Locke, government should only be allowed to impose regulations to protect a person's life, liberty, and property. It is interesting to note that in classical liberalism, property was very important, as opposed to the more recent variants of liberalism, which focus less on property rights. For Adam Smith, who opposed government regulation, government should be limited to three activities: (1) protect society from external violence and invasions, (2) maintaining internal peace and order and a reliable system of justice, and (3) maintain certain public works to assist individuals in society in their pursuit of their individual interests.

EVOLUTION OF THE TERM

From 1865 until the early twentieth century was the period of *democratic liberalism,* when a greater number of people (the middle class) began to be involved and claim their rights and power in politics with the concept of the individual and liberty as a prime concern. Since the start of the twentieth century, liberalism developed into what is known as *welfare liberalism,* wherein the government is assumed to be responsible for the well-being of individual people through such programs as: pensions, minimum wage, limited work hours, and free education. As welfare liberalism considers the state responsible for the moral and material welfare of the people, its conservative critics compared it to socialism, and even in the early twenty-first century, many Americans consider the term *liberal* an insult or even synonymous with communism. Ironically, however, many contemporary conservatives, at least in the United States where the American founding is revered, are actually liberals in the classical sense.

CONCLUSION

In sum, classical liberalism is based on the works of John Locke and the thinkers of the Enlightenment. Thus, classical liberalism is very different from welfare liberalism and closer to the contemporary perspective of libertarianism. It is a political philosophy that maximizes individual freedom and minimizes government regulation. It is not a philosophy in which the government is considered to be a protector and benefactor of individual morality and material needs.

. . . . WM. C. PLOUFFE, JR.

See also *Bill of Rights; Counter-Enlightenment Political Thought; Enlightenment Political Thought; Freedom; Freedom of Speech; Hobbes, Thomas; Human Rights; Liberal Parties; Liberal Theory; Libertarianism; Locke, John; Scottish Enlightenment.*

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Liberal Parties

The term *liberal* is often ambiguous. In the United States, the expression *liberal parties* refers to left-wing social democrats or socialists, whereas in Europe, the term applies to the centrist parties grouped in the European Parliament and the Liberal International. In the latter usage, the parties include the German Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP), the UK Liberal Democrats, and the French Radicals, among others. These parties are more like the U.S. Democratic Party than socialists, and they support a free market and European integration. However, there is a division between those with an interventionist and welfare agenda, such as the Liberal Democrats, and those that are more aggressively free market, such as the FDP. In the nineteenth century, liberals were the parliamentary parties pioneering representative institutions and developing constitutional human rights, but those positions are now common to all mainstream European parties. However, they remain important parties and potential components of government coalitions in most of the European Union states.

SECOND INTERNATIONAL AND SOCIALIST PARTIES

Second International social democratic "liberal" parties developed with industrialism in the nineteenth century and evolved as emanations of the working class, although expressing a socialist creed that was disseminated by evangelists across the continent. The socialist parties, which are now present on all continents and in most open systems, do not take orders from the Second International, which is more of a forum than a political institution. Socialist parties had emerged having strong links with the working class through

institutions such as trade unions and working people's associations, as well as through newspapers and books that disseminated the socialist message. Most socialist parties—apart from those in the former British Empire and Israel—initially adopted Marxism as their ideology, defining themselves as revolutionary working-class parties. Electoral success and the deficiencies of Marxism meant that in the early twentieth century, most had muted—or dropped—the revolutionary aspect and sought electoral alliances as a way into parliament and eventually government with the intention of influencing policy.

SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

At the time of the Russian Revolution (1917), the split between the revolutionary communists and the reformist social democrats was consummated with Bolshevik parties taking their orders from Moscow Communists. Social democrats took up the original socialist issues of employment conditions, social insurance, and discontent with the cycles of boom and recession that characterized the market economies, but they had no blueprint for how their aims could be achieved. By the 1920s, most were established parties and the major ones, including France, Germany, and the UK, had been in government or offered positions in government, but their lack of concrete policy found them struggling to respond to the Great Depression. By the 1940s, the social democratic parties had adopted Keynesian ideas about economic management and welfare state systems, although these should not be seen as exclusively socialist. The main difference between the social democrats and the other parties was the emphasis on equality, not the "equality of opportunity" that characterized the centrist liberal parties. By the middle of the past century they were the dominant parties or the main opposition in most western European states. In Greece, Portugal, and Spain they were in government shortly after the fall of the dictatorships in the 1970s. They were vote-seeking parties but also the principal parties of the working classes and the poorer sections of society, although large sections of the working class in Europe voted for conservatives and middle class support was always sought by socialists and usually found.

In postwar Europe, the left-right competition led to the description of these parties as "catch-all" parties, eclectically sweeping up votes from various sectors of society and not just from the working class. They were proponents of the postindustrial lifestyle issues of the late century, such as environment and women's rights, although these were not always welcomed by their core supporters. However, the parties needed to have a wide appeal if they were to enter government, and that necessitated some extensive ideological adjustments. Then with the inflation of the 1970s and the problems of unemployment and industrial restructuring in Europe, the parties were forced onto the defensive in economic management and many espoused free market ideas. New Labour is the most well known of these parties, but they had muted their antibusiness rhetoric by that time and had embraced privatization.

ANALYSIS

The swing toward free market ideas is in keeping with the idea that the parties would be unable to retain their position as working-class parties and attain electoral success. To have wide appeal, they had to drop their class aspects, which would alienate their core support. The change in the social makeup of Western society in which the manual and skilled working class was a diminishing force and the middle class was rising meant the social democratic parties were in terminal decline. In Europe, the idea of "dealignment" of the working class and the socialists has gained some support; however, they remain major forces in all European countries.

These parties have lost some of their connection with the working class. While the union link remains in most societies, it is weakened, and the institutions that bound the workers to the socialists have lost their force in the new consumer and mass societies of western Europe. In Europe, their vote has diversified and they have captured the new middle class vote that has, to an extent, compensated for the loss of the working class vote. In many European countries, the rise of the extreme right has made inroads into the traditional voting patterns. However, they remain the main working-class parties, and within that, the parties of the public service workers. This is a generalization across the continent and some exceptions stand out, such as the southern states of Spain, Portugal and Greece. European liberal parties are still well placed to become governing parties, so their capacity for making governing alliances remains undiminished.

See also *Conservative Parties; Democratic Theory, Parties in; Green Parties; Liberal Theory; Marxist Parties; Political Parties; Social Democracy; Third Way and Social Democracy.*

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Liberal Theory

Since its emergence in early modern Europe, the liberal tradition of political thought has spawned three major families of theory. The oldest, going back to the seventeenth century or earlier, comprises a set of ideas about political institutions. A second family, which originated in the eighteenth century and reached a zenith of sorts in the nineteenth, focuses on economic arrangements and social relations. The subject of

the third family of theories is the normative principles used to evaluate the other, more concrete subjects that are of interest to liberal theorists. Since the publication of John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* in 1971, the third family, which this work exemplifies superbly, has overshadowed the others, at least in academic political theory. Yet the oldest of these families remains the most powerful and defensible member of the liberal clan.

EMERGENCE

As a recognizable doctrine, liberalism first developed as a theory of political institutions along with, and in response to, the territorial consolidation of political control that resulted in the formation of modern states. Two of the most prominent aspects of that consolidation were the replacement of relatively dispersed, overlapping, and warring centers of power by a high degree of concentrated power held and transmitted via dynastic principles, and the enforcement of uniform standards and rules in place of highly diverse local practices. The tradition of writing now recognized as liberal is united by the aspiration to limit the concentration of political power in order to prevent the emergence of tyranny. Liberals proposed to accomplish this objective in part by subjecting state officials, including monarchs, to a distinct set of rules and in part by securing protection for other, social centers of power that could challenge the power of the state. This strategy led to the development of theories of constitutionalism, including the separation of powers; to the idea of the rule of law; and to theories of individual rights.

EXPANSION TO ECONOMICS

In the eighteenth century, liberal writers extended the skein of their ideas to include economic arrangements. This extension was animated by two motives that overlapped with, but were distinct from, those that drove their forbears. Both motives are in plain view in the most celebrated representative of this second family of liberal theories, Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* (1776). First, Smith aimed to show how legal and regulatory reforms could lead to the generation of much greater wealth than could be produced through the economic arrangements that had prevailed in the past. Second, he argued that the same reforms would undermine the relations of domination and servility that had prevailed under the old order, clearing the way for the emergence of a new mode of social relations based on norms of reciprocity and legal equality. Smith called the legal and regulatory regime he envisaged the "system of natural liberty."

In the nineteenth century, this combination of economic liberalism and a distinctively liberal conception of social relations blossomed into a powerful ideology. To its advocates, it seemed self-evident that the basis of human relations should be voluntaristic, so that human beings acquire obligations only through their own consent. The idea of a contract between independent and nominally equal agents became the dominant model of social relations. By the late nineteenth century, this ideal had given birth among historians and social scientists

to powerful narratives about the shift from ascribed status to freely agreed contracts that cast that transformation as the conclusion of a teleologically driven evolutionary process. At the same time, philosophers and other writers celebrated an idealized conception of persons to serve as a companion for this voluntaristic conception of social relations. According to this ideal, people are (or should be) autonomous individuals who form themselves and therefore are responsible for their characters as well as for the many decisions that determine the course of their lives. This ideology has been subject to challenges from the time of its inception, yet it remains highly influential today.

NORMATIVE THEORIES

The third family of liberal theories is united by a common interest in a more abstract subject, namely the normative principles that should be invoked to evaluate or justify institutions and other social arrangements. Since the 1960s, a great deal of academic writing about liberalism has sprung up from within this family, which has generated two principal approaches to the justification and criticism of political institutions and social arrangements. The *deontological* approach assumes the idea of society as a framework of rules within which individuals are or should be free to make decisions for themselves and to act freely, and then seeks to articulate principles that can be used to determine whether those rules are as they should be. Rawls's highly developed version of this approach is based on the idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation among free and equal persons. In contrast, a prominent *teleological* approach borrows from the voluntarist ideology described above to identify an ideal of persons as autonomous individuals as the basis for evaluating and criticizing actual institutions and practices. This approach to political philosophy is goal-oriented, with the cultivation of personal autonomy as the central goal, as distinct from deontological liberal theories, which are typically rights-oriented.

As powerful as it is, the liberal ideology of voluntaristic social relations and autonomous individuality is beset with difficulties. It underestimates the importance and positive value of relationships and obligations whose roots cannot plausibly be described as the results of voluntary choices by those on whom those obligations rest, such as the obligations of children to parents or of siblings to one another. Nor is there any evident reason to accept its claim that a life of individual autonomy is the uniquely highest and best kind of life a human being can have. Moreover, the history of the twentieth century suggests that the problems of concentrated power, and the value of contributions by theoretical writers to efforts to disperse power, are far from obsolete. Liberal theories are at their strongest when the motives that were at work at the origins of the liberal tradition remain within their sights.

See also *Counter-Enlightenment Political Thought; Freedom; Liberal Democracy; Liberalism, Classical; Libertarianism; Normative Theory; Public Good; Rawls, John; Smith, Adam.*

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Liberation Theology

Liberation theology is a movement born in the Latin American Roman Catholic Church out of the formation of the Roman Catholic bishops' conference, the Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano (CELAM) in 1955, which helped the church to develop a new awareness of the problems of injustice and development across Latin America. Liberation theology received its formative manifestation with the publication in 1971 of *Teologia de la liberacion* (*A Theology of Liberation*) by the Jesuit priest Gustavo Gutierrez. This groundbreaking theological treatise built on the growing movement for openness and change spawned by the theological and political theorization in Europe following World War II (1939–1945), and by the major shifts in thinking and practice initiated in the Roman Catholic Church by the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965).

Gutierrez brought together new theological understandings of the role of the church in the world with modern developments in the social sciences to create Latin America's first indigenous theology. The core concept of Gutierrez' work and that of subsequent theologians such as Leonardo Boff, Juan Luis Segundo, Jon Sobrino, and Protestant theologians Rubem Alves and Jose Miguez Bonino is that Christian faith should be dedicated to fighting injustice and siding with the poor. Reflecting on the theme of liberation found in the story of the Exodus, liberation theology developed the idea that the poor and oppressed must be liberated from their condition through confrontation of the structural injustices of society, in particular those found in the underdeveloped countries of Latin America. The central tenet is that the praxis (practice) of faith in contemporary society, prophetically critiquing social injustice, should be the basis for theological reflection and, ultimately, the doctrines of faith. Liberation theologians applied a class analysis to understanding injustice, seeing structural foundations embedded in society as the root causes needing identity and radical change, including the possibility of class conflict and violence as necessary means of changing unjust social structures. This analysis borrows significantly from Marxist social and economic analysis, which places class conflict and alienation at the core of social structures and the primary cause of injustice.

The movement grew as Latin American clergy, bishops, and laity began to embrace the concept of challenging the injustices of their societies. Conferences of CELAM held in Medellin, Colombia, in 1968 and Mexico City in 1975 brought together liberation theologians, clergy, and bishops to continue development of the concepts into a more formalized set of doctrinal commitments to the poor.

Liberation theology influenced a number of political and social movements in Latin America, including the formation of Christian Base Communities, dedicated to grassroots efforts to raise literacy through bible study in poor urban and rural communities. The most significant example of a successful political movement was the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, which overthrew the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza in 1979, and included the leadership of Ernesto Cardenal, a priest and expositor of liberation theology. The radical transformation of Archbishop Oscar Romero of El Salvador from establishment clergy to advocate for the poor also is credited to the influence of liberation theology (Romero was assassinated by a right paramilitary death squad while celebrating Mass in 1979). Death squads also assassinated six Jesuits, their housekeeper, and her daughter in 1989; those martyred included liberation theologians Segundo Montes and Ignacio Ellacuria.

The movement spread beyond Latin America. North American theologian James H. Cone developed black liberation theology, interpreting scripture from the perspective of slavery and the oppression of African Americans and persons of color in the United States. The Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians was formed in 1976 at a congress in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, serving as a forum for discussion of developments in liberation theology.

Liberation theology began to experience criticism from the church hierarchy under Pope John Paul II. During the CELAM conference in Puebla, Mexico, in 1979, liberation theology was criticized by the pope during his visit. His critique, informed and enforced by the Prefect of the Congregation of the Faith, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI), centered on rejection of the notions of class conflict and other Marxist elements found in liberation theology. Cardinal Ratzinger subsequently suspended Leonardo Boff from teaching and writing, making clear that liberation theology was not supported by the Vatican. Despite efforts to limit debate, elements of liberation theology continue to influence social movements globally, including continued work by theologians and activists in Europe, India, Latin America, Sri Lanka, and the United States.

See also *Boff, Leonardo; Class and Politics; Latin American Politics and Society.*

. . . .   THOMAS C. SUTTON

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Libertarianism

A modern extension of the classical liberal tradition, libertarianism is the political ideology of voluntarism, a commitment to voluntary action in a social context, the rule of law, and the free exchange of goods, services, and ideas. Most libertarians tend to reject the left-right divisions of conventional politics; it is typical to find libertarian thinkers and sympathizers opposing government intervention in both the economic and social spheres. For example, Chicago school economist Milton Friedman was a strong free market advocate, a position often identified as right-wing, but he was also in favor of legalizing prostitution and the sale of illicit drugs and was among the foremost critics of military conscription—positions often identified with the left-wing.

Despite its unique challenge to the left-right political spectrum, libertarianism includes a diverse array of thinkers: old right critics of the New Deal such as John T. Flynn, H. L. Mencken, Albert Jay Nock, and Isabel Paterson; Austrian-school economists such as Freidrich A. Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, and Murray Rothbard; objectivist philosopher Ayn Rand and those neo-Aristotelians who were influenced by her, including Douglas J. Den Uyl, Tibor R. Machan, and Douglas B. Rasmussen, among others.

Many contemporary libertarians draw inspiration from the classical liberalism of John Locke and the American founders, and their stress on the individual's rights to life, liberty, private property, and the pursuit of happiness. Others, such as Hayek, draw from the evolutionary insights of Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, such as Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, and David Hume, conservative thinkers such as Edmund Burke, Austrian theorists such as Carl Menger, and systems theorists such as Herbert Spencer, all of whom saw the free society as a spontaneous order, the emergent product of social interaction but not of deliberate human design.

Hayek argued further that free markets were necessary to rational economic calculation. He indicted socialism and central planning as constructivist rationalist systems dependent on a pretense of knowledge. In such books as *The Road to Serfdom* (1944), Hayek maintained that state intervention undermines individual choice and personal responsibility. When the state exerts a decisive influence over the direction of social life, state power becomes the only power worth having, and this must necessarily lead to the dominance of those who are most adept at wielding such power.

Mises was even more adamant in his opposition to state interventionism. An Austrian-school economist, Mises advocated laissez-faire capitalism, viewing private property and free markets as indispensable to the rational assessment of relative scarcities and to the flourishing of entrepreneurial innovation. He saw government intervention in the economy as destabilizing the market price system and the delicate, interwoven structure of production. His theory of business cycles rooted the phenomena of inflation and unemployment in government manipulation of the money supply.

The profoundly influential libertarian Murray N. Rothbard, a student of Mises, further developed the Misesian business cycle theory, focusing on its class dynamics. For Rothbard, central banking creates a structure of class privilege, in which systematic inflation of the money supply causes not only the boom-bust cycle but also a fundamental redistribution of wealth to some groups at the expense of others.

Rothbard sought to construct a science of liberty. He integrated Austrian economics with a neo-Aristotelian view of human nature and a neo-Lockean perspective on individual rights, grounded in the right of self-ownership. On the basis of a nonaggression axiom that no one has a right to initiate the use of force against others, Rothbard argued that the state was a fundamentally aggressive institution, opposed to individual rights as such. He advocated an anarchocapitalist alternative in which even judicial and defense services were provided by market forces, regulated only by an overarching libertarian law code barring the use of initiatory force from social relations. (An alternative form of anarchocapitalism is endorsed by David Friedman, son of Milton Friedman, whose 1973 book *Machinery of Freedom* advocates anarchism on consequentialist, rather than natural law, grounds.)

Rothbard's anarchism was influenced by a nineteenth century strain of individualist anarchist thought, which includes theorists such as Lysander Spooner and Benjamin Tucker. Spooner, a lawyer and abolitionist, argued that the U.S. Constitution had no authority; Tucker opposed state-sanctioned monopolies and was an advocate of unabridged free trade. Rothbard also integrated insights from an array of old right critics of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal, all of whom have had various degrees of influence on contemporary libertarianism. The old right thinkers (including John T. Flynn, Rose Wilder Lane, Albert Jay Nock, H. L. Mencken, and Isabel Paterson) repudiated the New Deal's massive intervention into American economic life. Nock's distinction between state power and social power, in particular, influenced Rothbardian and other libertarian perspectives on the essential polarity between state and market. The old right thinkers were also typically antiwar and anti-imperialist, crafting an opposition to the welfare-warfare state that was echoed in later years by certain new left revisionist thinkers, who also exerted a certain degree of influence on modern libertarianism.

Rothbardian libertarianism had a crucial impact on Robert Nozick, whose 1974 book *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* was written partly as a response to anarchocapitalist arguments. In this book, which won the National Book Award in 1975, Nozick defended not only the libertarian minimal state but also all capitalist acts between consenting adults.

Another important influence on contemporary libertarianism is novelist and philosopher Ayn Rand. Author of *The Fountainhead* (1943) and *Atlas Shrugged* (1957), Rand formally rejected the libertarian label, not only because she was a critic of anarchocapitalists, but also because she believed that libertarians failed to appreciate the larger philosophic and cultural context necessary to the achievement of human freedom. Her

defense of capitalism as an unknown ideal views freedom as an intellectual, political, cultural, and economic achievement. Her antipathy to libertarianism notwithstanding, Rand still had a decisive impact on a whole school of neo-Aristotelian libertarian writers, such as Den Uyl, Machan, Rasmussen, and others, who have carried on her legacy as advocates of both free minds and free markets.

See also *Hayek, Freidrich August von; Liberalism, Classical; Nozick, Robert; Rand, Ayn; Rothbard, Murray.*

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Li Dazhao

Li Dazhao (1889–1927), also known as Li Ta-Chao, was the cofounder of the Chinese Communist Party and the mentor of Communist leader Mao Zedong. After studying at Waseda University in Tokyo, Li became an editor of the magazine *Hsin sch'ing-nien* (*New Youth*). In 1918 he was appointed chief librarian of Peking University and in 1920 he became concurrently professor of history. Inspired by the success of the Russian Revolution in 1917, Li became a Marxist and hailed the Bolsheviks in his 1918 articles "The Victory of Bolshevism" and "The Victory of the Masses." In turn Li influenced many of his students, one of whom was Mao Zedong, who was then employed by Li as his library clerk.

When the Marxist study groups he led evolved into the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, Li was instrumental in carrying out the orders of the Communist International and acting as the liaison with the Kuomintang. He was also one of the leaders of the May Fourth Movement, the followers of which sought reform of China's traditional culture. Li's leadership role was limited to North China. In 1927 he was seized at the Soviet Embassy in Beijing, where he had taken refuge, and he was hanged by Manchurian warlord Chang Tsolin.

Li was more of a theoretician than a strategist. He was intensely nationalistic and was unwilling to wait for the international proletarian revolution to liberate China. Therefore, he played down the doctrine of the proletarian class struggle. The communist revolution, in Li's thinking, was a populist revolution led by the peasantry against the exploitation and oppression of foreign imperialism. His ideas formed the core of the communist philosophy that inspired Mao Zedong's successful struggle against the Kuomintang. After his death Li became a venerated martyr in communist hagiography.

See also *Asian Political Thought; Chinese Political Thought; Communism; Marxism.*

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Lieber, Francis

Francis (Franz) Lieber (1798–1872) was an immigrant to the United States, yet he conceived, edited, and largely wrote the *Encyclopedia Americana* (1829) in the early nineteenth century. Born in Berlin, Germany, Lieber fought in the Prussian army during the Napoleonic Wars (1799–1815) and was wounded at the Battle of Waterloo on June 18, 1815. After leaving the army, he completed his doctorate at the University of Jena. Afterward, having acquired a reputation in Germany as a liberal agitator, he found it prudent to decamp with a crusade to liberate Greece from Ottoman rule. He returned from that abortive mission and attempted to enter academic professions in Prussia, but he was sufficiently suspect to be frequently imprisoned. He left Prussia, initially settling in England before relocating again to Boston, Massachusetts. Not quite two years after his arrival he began the *Americana,* becoming America's interpreter of itself. He then allied with French historian and philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville and French statesman Gustave de Beaumont, translating and annotating their 1833 *On the Penitentiary System in the United States.*

Lieber became a professor of history and politics at South Carolina College (University of South Carolina) in 1836 and remained there until 1856. This was a period of enormous productivity for him, but the approaching Civil War (1861–1865) forced him to navigate between his liberal and antislavery principles and his growing influence within state academic and political establishments. During these years he published *Legal and Political Hermeneutics* (1837), *Manual of Political Ethics* (1838), *Essays on Property and Labour* (1841), and *On Civil Liberty and Self-government* (1853). The last of these major works tacitly replied to Southern politician John Calhoun, whose *A Disquisition on Government* and *A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States* provided the intellectual foundation for the secession movement. In his July 4, 1851, "Address on Secession" Lieber argued in principle against secession but without making an antislavery argument. At that point the debate was between South Carolina acting with cooperating states or acting alone. Lieber bolstered the argument of the cooperationists, who later prevailed.

Lieber's avoidance of direct commentary on slavery and his ownership of a few house slaves hid an antislavery perspective. He wrote an enthusiastic review of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* in 1853, but it remained unpublished, doubtless because of the sensitivity of doing so in South Carolina. However, his true beliefs emerged once he left the state for Columbia College in 1856. He became a strident defender of the Union and a voice against slavery.

Lieber coined the word *publicist* in application to himself. An active public intellectual, he advised on education, penal reform, "codes of war" (the Geneva Convention), arms sales, jury procedures, economic policy, and copyright law. He lobbied for in-depth statistics in the census and as a tool in political science. He was a philosopher, political economist, historian, and legal scholar. His best writings are perhaps his inaugural addresses at South Carolina College and Columbia College, describing the purposes of political economy and political history.

Lieber also maintained a private, philosophical correspondence in which he embraced Hegelian metaphysics (though not historical determinism) and had a more qualified view of religion than his public professions suggested. Author Walter Haushalter charges that Mary Baker Eddy, the founder of the Christian Science movement, plagiarized much of the content of the movement's primary text, *Science and Health,* from an unpublished Lieber manuscript, "The Metaphysical Religion of Hegel."

See also *Hegel, Georg W. F.; Tocqueville, Alexis de.*

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Limited Vote

City council members in the United States until the late nineteenth century were elected by a single-member or multimember ward plurality electoral system that facilitated boss and machine control. Reformers were disturbed by control of all council seats by one political party and commenced to advocate alternative electoral systems.

A number of city charters were amended to provide for an at-large or multimember election wherein voters are limited to casting fewer ballots than the number of contested seats. This system, currently used only in the United States, guarantees direct representation for members of the largest party or group with the representation dependent on the size of the council and the number of candidates for whom a voter may cast a ballot. Each vote for a candidate carries an equal weight, and a voter by casting additional votes may contribute to the defeat of the favorite candidate. Hence, the system encourages bullet or single-shot voting—voting for only one candidate.

The system was used by New York City commencing in 1963 to elect two members in each borough and resulted in one Democrat and one Republican elected until 1969 when three Liberals were elected to replace Republicans. Because the boroughs differ in population, the city abandoned the system following the U.S. Supreme Court's one-person, one-vote dictum in *Reynolds v. Sims* (1964) and *Wesberry v. Sanders* (1964). Nevertheless, the system currently is employed in several southern local governments. As of early 2010, the system was used in several Connecticut municipalities, several Pennsylvania counties, one county (Beaufort) in North Carolina, and twenty-one towns in Alabama.

See also *At-large Election; Electoral Formulas; Electoral Rules; Machine Politics; Proportional Representation.*

. . . .   JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN

Lincoln, Abraham

Abraham Lincoln (1809–1865), sixteenth president of the United States, was born February 12, 1809, on his parents' farm in Kentucky. In his early twenties, he moved to New Salem, Illinois, where he worked as a storekeeper, riverboat pilot, postmaster, and surveyor. Lincoln served as a militia captain in the Black Hawk War of 1832 and was elected as a Whig to the Illinois State Legislature in 1834. He was reelected in 1836, 1838, and 1840; in 1837 he began a law practice in the new state capital, Springfield. Lincoln married Mary Todd in 1842 and won election to the U.S. Congress in 1846. He declined to run for reelection to Congress two years later, in keeping with a Whig arrangement to rotate officeholders, and returned to Springfield to practice law.

Although primarily focused on helping build the nascent Republican Party organization in Illinois and tending to his increasingly successful law practice during the 1850s, Lincoln was drawn back into electoral politics, motivated by several important events, including Senator Stephen Douglas's

sponsorship of the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 and the Supreme Court's 1857 *Dred Scott* decision. Lincoln's famous "House Divided" speech launched his 1858 senatorial campaign against Douglas, a campaign that represented the culmination of twenty years of political and personal rivalry between the two men that reached back to the state legislature and the courtship of Mary Todd. Though Lincoln lost the Senate campaign, his performance in contesting one of the nation's most prominent politicians put him on the national political map. The Cooper Union speech of February 1860, and the East Coast lecture tour of which it formed a part, put his name and the Republican approach to slavery—maintaining it where it was already established, but refusing to allow its spread into new territories and states—before a still wider audience. Lincoln garnered the Republican nomination for president in Chicago, Illinois, that spring and defeated three rivals to win the presidency in November 1860.

Lincoln faced a crisis from the moment of his election: ten Southern states had left him off their ballots entirely, and seven had seceded and formed the Confederate States of America before he was even sworn in. Hostilities erupted when Confederate troops fired on Union attempts to resupply Fort Sumter, off the South Carolina coast, in April 1861. Lincoln and the nation were shocked by the fiasco at Bull Run in July 1861, in which outnumbered Confederate forces routed Union troops. The year 1862 saw the president increasingly disillusioned by the inaction of General George McClellan and displeased with the lack of response from border states (Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri) to his offer of compensated emancipation. In April 1862, Congress approved legislation ending slavery in the District of Columbia, but Lincoln was looking to make a more serious move against slavery, which he increasingly saw as incompatible with the future of the United States as a nation where all men were created equal. The Emancipation Proclamation, which took effect on January 1, 1863, freed slaves in Confederate territories in rebellion against the national government. In July of that year, the tide of the war finally turned after the Union victory at Gettysburg, and after nearly four years and more than six hundred thousand combined casualties, the Civil War (1861–1865) ended when Confederate General Robert E. Lee surrendered to Union General Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Courthouse in Virginia, on April 9, 1865. Just four days later, Lincoln was shot by Confederate supporter John Wilkes Booth while watching a performance at Ford's Theater in Washington. He died the next morning.

Despite an elementary-level education, an undistinguished early political career, and his own apparent lack of Christian faith, Lincoln crafted some of the most memorable speeches in the American political tradition and displayed a deep appreciation for the ability of religious imagery to provide comfort and meaning in the nation's darkest hour. Three of his speeches—the Cooper Union speech (1860), the Gettysburg Address (1863), and the Second Inaugural (1865)—have occasioned scholarly treatments all their own, and Lincoln's commitment to the ideals of the American Union continues to inspire struggles for liberty in the United States and around the world. African American activist and civil rights crusader Martin Luther King Jr., for example, acknowledged the importance of delivering his noted "I Have a Dream" speech in the shadow of the Lincoln Memorial in 1963.

See also *Civil Wars; Secession; Slavery.*

. . . . ANDREW MURPHY

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Linear Model

Due to their simplicity, linear models are easy to understand and interpret, which makes them the basis for most of the statistical analyses used in applied political science and social research. The simplest way to understand them is with a two-variable case. Suppose that Y is a response variable (or dependent variable) and x is an explanatory variable (or independent variable). A straight line relating Y to x has an equation of the form:

$$Y = a + b\,x + e$$

In this equation, b is the slope, the amount by which Y changes when x increases by one unit, while a is the intercept—the value of Y when $x = 0$. The value e is the error term; i.e. the expression that captures the difference between the data observed and the model that fits the data. Linear models can be used to understand the relationship between the two variables and to predict the response of Y for a specific value that the explanatory variable x might assume. A more complex linear model would assume multiple independent variables as predictors of the response variable. The linear model is the foundation for the t-test, analysis of variance (ANOVA), analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), regression analysis, and many of the multivariate methods including factor analysis, cluster analysis, time series, and others statistics that are constantly used in political science and other social sciences.

See also *Logistic Regression; Multilevel Analysis; Regression with Categorical Data; Statistical Analysis; Time-series Analysis.*

. . . . MARCIO A. CARVALHO

Linguistics and Politics

See *Language and Language Policy*

Lipset, Seymour Martin

Seymour Martin Lipset (1922–2006) was an American political sociologist whose work won numerous awards. Lipset was born in New York City and earned his bachelor's degree from the City College of New York in 1943 and a doctorate in sociology from Columbia University in 1949.

Lipset entered college intending to become a dentist and switched to sociology after being convinced by a fellow member of the Young Socialist League that sociology could lead to a career in social work—a job that Lipset believed would always be in demand. While Lipset was one of a number of leftists at City College in the late 1930s, he later resigned from the Socialist Party in 1960 and became a very influential figure among neoconservatives.

Lipset taught at the University of Toronto in Canada from 1946 to 1948 while completing his doctoral dissertation on the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) in Saskatchewan, which he published as his first book, *Agrarian Socialism* (1950). He also was on the faculty at the University of California (1948–1950); Columbia University (1954–1956); the University of California, Berkeley (1956–1966), where he was also the director of the Institute for International Studies (1962–1966); and Harvard University (1966–1975), where he was the George D. Markham Professor of Government and Sociology. In 1975 he left Harvard to become the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science and Sociology at California's Stanford University from 1975 to 1990. After leaving Stanford, Lipset became the Hazel Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University in Virginia, a post he held until his retirement in 2004. Lipset was also a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution from 1975 until his death.

Lipset is the only person to serve as president of the American Political Science Association (1979–1980) and the American Sociological Association (1992–1993). He also served as president of the International Society of Political Psychology (1979–1980), the Sociological Research Association (1983–1985), and the World Association for Public Opinion Research (1984–1986).

Lipset's major works were in the fields of political sociology, trade union organization, social stratification, public opinion, the sociology of intellectual life, political extremism, and conditions for democracy from a comparative perspective. In this area, Lipset was an early proponent of the *theory of modernization,* which linked economic development and democracy.

Lipset received many awards, including the MacIver Prize for *Political Man* (1960), which sold more than four hundred thousand copies and was translated into more than twenty languages, and the Gunnar Myrdal Prize for *The Politics of Unreason: Right Wing Extremism in America, 1790–1970,* which he coauthored with Earl Raab. In addition to the many books he authored, Lipset edited twenty-four others and published more than four hundred articles.

See also *Political Sociology; Public Opinion.*

. . . .   JEFFREY KRAUS

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Lipsius, Justus

Justus Lipsius (1547–1606), a Flemish humanist, philosopher, and classical scholar, was the founder of *neostoicism,* a key school of European thought in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Born near Brussels, Belgium, Lipsius was educated at the Jesuit College in Cologne, Germany, and the Catholic University of Leuven [Louvain] in Belgium, where he studied law and Latin classics. His early publications of criticism and emendation of notables such as ancient Roman philosopher Cicero garnered Lipsius an appointment in Rome as Latin secretary to Cardinal Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle, one of the most influential church leaders and diplomats after the emergence of Protestantism in Europe in the mid-sixteenth century. While there, Lipsius's studies of philosopher Seneca, historian Tacitus, and Roman stoicism initiated a lifelong philological and philosophical obsession that subsequently led him to Austria and Germany, where he obtained a chair of history at the Lutheran University of Jena and also spent some time in (Catholic) Cologne. In the late 1570s, he went to teach history at the newly founded Calvinist University of Leiden in the Netherlands, where he spent the most productive period of his scholarly life, publishing, most notably, *De Constantia in Publicis Malis* (*On Constancy in Times of Public Calamity,* 1583–1584), or *De Constantia* for short, and the *Politicorum Sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex* (*Six Books on Politics or Civil Doctrine,* 1589)*,* known more simply as the *Politica.*

De Constantia, Lipsius's first neostoic work, was a Senecan dialogue set in the violent religious and political struggles of the Netherlands that combined stoicism and Christianity in a new philosophy to help individuals cope. Repackaging stoicism as an antidote to the religious and political passions of the day and transforming stoic fate into divine providence,

Lipsius' brand of neostoicism became suitable for Christians. Effectively a work of practical psychology, *De Constantia* went through many editions and translations. Embodying elements of militant Calvinism as well as Jesuit arguments on free will, it became common cultural property during the Baroque period and influenced scholarship, poetry, and art until the Enlightenment.

A sequel to *De Constantia,* Lipsius's *Politica* instructed rulers how to govern principalities in an ethical context, just as the former instructed citizens to endure and obey. The *Politica* combines a wide range of classical, medieval, and Renaissance sources. Its six books are devoted to virtue and prudence (book one), the purpose (civil concord) and forms of government (book two), political prudence of prince and advisors (book three), the prince's military and civil prudence in matters human and divine (book four), and defense, just war, and civil conflicts (books five and six). In controversial sections dealing with the difficult relationship between state and church and religious tolerance, Lipsius expresses his views that peace and unity depended on a one-religion-per-polity approach; that the prince, without religious authority of his own, had the duty to ensure the unity of the church; and that peaceful religious dissidents were to be tolerated while those instigating civil unrest deserved no mercy. A supporter of monarchy and moderate absolutism, at least when based on stoic virtues, Lipsius thus, decades before English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes, placed political stability above civil liberties and personal freedom.

The *Politica* was most enthusiastically received in France, Germany, and Spain, but also provoked both Protestants and the Roman Inquisition, which placed it on the Index of Prohibited Books in 1590. Lipsius, seeking to avoid the resulting controversies, returned to Leuven in 1592 and, reembracing the Catholic faith of his youth, taught and wrote at the university until his death in 1606.

See also *European Political Thought; Hobbes, Thomas; Political Philosophy; Religion and Politics; Roman Political Thought.*

. . . . DOREEN K. ALLERKAMP

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Literature and Politics

See *Politics, Literature, and Film*

Lobbies, Professional

Lobbying might be defined as an attempt to influence the government decision-making process and to secure certain outcomes via individuals or firms (lobbyists) who act on behalf of a person or a special interest group. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution bars Congress from abridging the right of people "to petition the government for redress of grievances." Thus, for Americans, lobbying in the broadest sense of the word is a fundamental legal right.

It is important to distinguish professional lobbying from other efforts to influence public policy. In the United States, professional lobbying firms, located in what is called the K Street corridor, are companies that various groups or firms, usually called *special interest groups,* hire to lobby.

Other efforts to influence public policy are performed by groups that do not fall under the legal designation of lobbying firms in the United States and the European Union (EU). These include advocacy groups, business groups, labor unions, and farmers' organizations. Especially important in the United States are public policy research organizations, called *think tanks,* that are classed as nonprofit, nonpartisan, tax-exempt entities under section 501(c)3 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. Such groups by law are not allowed to lobby government, defined as calling explicitly for lawmakers to vote a certain way on legislation. But they are often funded by special interests groups—for example, labor unions or businesses. Such organizations can issue studies and reports, organize conferences and meetings, or have their scholars appear in the media to point out the advantages and disadvantages of particular government policies.

For many people, the word *lobbying* has a negative connotation. Many people picture special interest groups that act in some way that is opposed to the public good. For example, specific labor unions and companies might persuade policy makers to protect them from foreign competitors by imposing trade restrictions. Of course, one person's *special interest group* is another person's "deserving workers" or "crucial nation industry."

A deeper insight into lobbying is summarized as *concentrated benefits, diffused costs.* A company might secure millions of dollars in extra profits and workers might secure millions in higher wages through trade barriers, but the costs of trade restrictions to any given consumer for some product might only be a few dollars. Thus, a given consumer won't have the means or the incentive to lobby lawmakers for free trade, but a union or company would have both.

In such cases, the fact that governments have the authority to grant such favors is considered by many to be the root of this problem. But others would point out that lobbying is simply part of the competitive political process.

MEASURING LOBBYING
Lobbying can be difficult to measure because it often takes place precisely in "the lobby," (i.e., behind the scenes and hidden from public scrutiny). The measuring problem is especially serious in connection with unregulated lobbying, which is the

current state of affairs in the EU. Why, for example, do Chinese shoe producers face barriers to entry in the European market? Here, the responsible bureaucrat in the European Commission can collect information from the lobbyists of the shoe industry in southern Europe (who will argue in favor of protecting their own workplace) and from consumer organizations (who, in contrast, will argue in favor of the lowest possible shoe prices). In this way, the bureaucrat or the politician can obtain support to reach a solid basis for decision.

Still, the small groups (shoe producers) are more likely to hire a professional lobbyist and influence the political decision maker than the large groups (shoe consumers). Asymmetrical and nontransparent lobbying in favor of producers at the cost of consumers may explain the elaboration of distorting EU policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy in the EU.

In the absence of mandatory registration for lobbyists in Brussels, it is impossible to establish the actual number of professional lobbyists. The European Commission guesses that the number is around fifteen thousand, and acknowledges a need for formal regulation of the area.

In contrast, in the United States, where about thirty-five thousand professional lobbyists are currently registered, lobbying is far more transparent and measurable. The number of registered lobbyists in Washington, DC, has more than doubled since 2000 to more than 34,750 in 2005.

The Lobbying Disclosure Act was passed in 1995, replacing the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act from 1946. The point is that in the United States the representatives of many special interest groups are legally required to register, and they have to report their activities to the authorities every six months, including areas of their lobbying activities, bureaucrats contacted, names of employed lobbyists, and total lobbying expenses. The reports also must be available to the public. For example, a search on the energy giant Halliburton from Texas shows that it spent $250,000 on lobbying between January 1 and June 30, 2004, in connection with, among other things, asbestos legislation, promotion of power-related aspects in the ongoing World Trade Organization negotiations, and continued cooperation with the U.S. armed forces. Due to the strict regulation of lobbying in the United States, lobbyist activities are much more directly measurable there than in the EU.

The political arenas of the United States and the EU can be characterized as pluralistic systems with free competition among the lobbying groups. This is in stark contrast to the Scandinavian corporatist model, for example, with its formalized rules for incorporating all affected interests—both producers and consumers—in the decision-making processes. Rational producers may in fact prefer pure pluralism and free competition among lobbyists to corporatism, which automatically involves the consumer side as well.

Lobbying plays an important role in a pluralistic system, and it is crucial for any interest group to hire the best lobbyists and build a base in, for example, Washington, DC, or Brussels. We know that most interest groups represent producers. Approximately 70 percent of all lobbyists in Brussels represent producer groups. Ten percent of all lobbyists work for consumers and nonprofit interests, whereas the last 20 percent represent regions, cities, and international institutions.

LOBBYING STRATEGIES

Professional lobbyists for industries or companies may operate with at least six different types of strategies that they may apply according to the specific circumstances. The first and most aggressive strategy may be called the *gunboat strategy,* which uses all possible threats; e.g., if the lobbyists do not have their way production will be relocated to countries outside the country. At the same time, lobbyists may run tough media campaigns. The second strategy, called the *Trojan horse,* implies that the lobbyist succeeded in getting inside the walls and at close quarters with the decision makers. Through this close contact and dialogue, it is possible to reach a negotiated settlement. The third strategy, the *good and the bad,* is applied if other competing lobbyists are acting like roughnecks. Then there is an opportunity to act nice and friendly yourself and to establish trust. The fourth strategy, the *dentist,* is applied when a producer group does not like a bill. It may try and pull out the worst tooth first and then come back after the rest later on. The fifth strategy, the *third party,* indicates a reaching-out strategy to nongovernmental organizations and unions to find a compromise on a disputed issue. The sixth and final strategy, the *donkey,* is a mixture of carrot and stick approaches according to which producer groups seek to win over political decision makers by understanding their interests and offering economic or careerwise reward or sanction; in the worst case, they try bribery.

In perspective, it is crucial to establish clear rules for lobbying in any country to ensure measurable and democratic control of how various professional lobbies influence political decision makers.

See also *Advocacy Groups; Business Pressure in Politics; Farm Lobby; Lobbying; Interest Groups and Lobbies; Public Interest Groups; U.S. Politics and Society: Minority Interest Groups.*

. . . .   GERT TINGGAARD SVENDSEN

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Lobbying

Lobbying is the practice of trying to influence a government policy by actors outside that particular government. The term arose from the practice of advocates gathering in the lobbies outside the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives so that they could plead their cases to officeholders. While

all forms of government experience some form of lobbying, capitalist democracies, with their economies largely in private hands but subject to public-sector regulation and their governments concerned with public opinion, spawn entire industries aimed at influencing public policy.

LOBBYING IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

Lobbying grew rapidly in the United States after the Civil War (1861–1865), with the development of a modern industrial economy and the public sector playing an increasing role in regulating that economy. Railroads, banks, and other corporations sought favors from the federal and state governments—or found themselves "shaken down" by politicians—and the Gilded Age became notorious for its scandals.

The early twentieth century saw lobbying become increasingly professionalized. Overt bribery became less common, and lawyers gradually became the main actors in influencing government. Technical expertise became particularly important as progressivism, the New Deal, and the Great Society imposed regulation on business, and the "revolving door" became institutionalized as each presidential administration generated sets of well-connected insiders eager to capitalize on corporations' need for access.

The 1960s and 1970s marked a further explosion in government advocacy. The Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations greatly expanded Washington's role in civil rights, environmental, energy, health care, and consumer issues. A variety of mass movements mobilized millions of citizens as new technologies such as direct mail and computer databases greatly lowered the cost of forming large membership organizations. Large transfers of funds from Washington to state and local governments gave birth to a new industry of intergovernmental lobbying. The business-dominated culture of mid-century Washington collapsed, and corporations responded by increasing their lobbying and public relations efforts.

LOBBYING GROUPS

Despite the growth of citizens' groups, business remains the most important force in Washington lobbying, but these businesses rarely act as a coherent whole. Corporate lobbyists are often concerned with winning on narrow, low-profile issues in which conflict and publicity are minimal. Many of the most heavily lobbied issue areas—telecommunications, financial services—feature conflicts among corporations and highly technical matters that do not easily fall along ideological lines. Other issues—environmental regulation, tort reform, workplace standards—come closer to traditional liberal-conservative divides.

Trade associations usually focus on broader issues that affect most or all of their membership. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association (PhRMA) spent millions of dollars on lobbying and public relations to shape the Medicare prescription drug benefit passed in 2003. Professional associations take a broader focus than do corporations. The American Medical Association (AMA) claims to speak for all American physicians, and it dominated health care policy through the 1960s but failed to stop the creation of Medicare in 1965. The rise of specialty societies undermined the AMA's ability to speak for the entire medical profession, and today, the health care industry is fragmented in its representation.

Peak business associations claim to speak for the entire business world and usually speak out against government intervention in the economy. These groups are especially close to the Republican Party; the U.S. Chamber of Commerce often serves as a mouthpiece for Republican administrations. This group led the most expensive lobbying campaign in recent history in support of tort reform, leading to the passage of legislation in 2005.

Labor unions have long enjoyed a close relationship with the Democratic Party. Citizens groups, such as the National Rifle Association and the Sierra Club, often take a more ideological stance than do corporations and are more willing to mobilize their members as activists.

HOW LOBBYISTS DO THEIR WORK

Washington lobbyists include many former elected officials, government appointees, and political staffers. These individuals can trade in skills and connections developed in the relatively low-paying public sector for the far higher salaries of the lobbying world while maintaining an interest in partisan politics. Both at the federal and state levels, lobbyists focus their efforts on the legislative branch. Legislatures write laws and offer more access to outside actors than do the executive and judicial branches.

The most important commodity lobbyists can provide to policy makers is information. Members of Congress often confront legislation of which they know little. Lobbyists, by contrast, may have spent decades working on one particular issue and can transmit that knowledge to officeholders. Lobbyists also acquire information, however, whether it is through reading legislation, studying the *Federal Register* and other publications, or attending committee hearings or through personal contacts or reading journalistic accounts. Lobbyists often focus their efforts on congressional committees, known as the "workshops of Capitol Hill"—committees write the bulk of legislation, and their members and staff often know more about their specific issues than anyone else in Congress.

Much of lobbyists' time is spent building the relationships necessary to make their case on behalf of clients. They need to ensure that their phone calls are returned and that their requests for appointments are received favorably. So lobbyists attend the fund-raisers, they frequent the bars patronized by congressional staffers, and they throw the parties that can attract the "right" people.

Once in members' offices, lobbyists must make their case effectively. They need the technical expertise to understand legislation, and they need to be succinct. Above all, lobbyists need to engender trust. A member of Congress needs to know that any advice received from a lobbyist is, if not unbiased, at least reasonably accurate. Lobbyists who make the overloaded lives of members and staffers easier may become trusted advisers and be consulted on matters outside their narrow purview.

Lobbyists can raise money for members of Congress, through political action committees, through individual contributions, and by "bundling" the contributions of other donors. They also may contribute to party committees and think tanks and foundations with ties to important policy makers.

Academic studies of lobbying rarely show it to have profound influence despite lobbyists' strongest efforts; PAC contributions seem to only buy access, and lobbyists seldom dominate the legislative process. Their influence cannot compete with those of party, ideology, or constituent opinion. For this reason, much lobbying activity is defensive in nature, fending off legislation that might damage a client's interests.

Lobbying the executive branch poses challenges different from those found in legislative advocacy. In the executive branch, many of the key decisions are in the hands of career civil servants. Due to this, lobbying the executive branch must rely on policy arguments far more than personal affability. Among the most heavily lobbied entities in the executive branch are regulatory agencies and commissions, including the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission. These agencies make decisions that can be worth millions of dollars to corporations and trade associations, and they are notorious for their "revolving doors," with lawyers and other employees putting in a few years to gain the necessary expertise, and moving onto lucrative positions in the private sector.

LOBBYING THE EUROPEAN UNION

As the European Union has gained power (especially after the Single European Act of 1987 and the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties), lobbyists have increased their activity in Brussels. As a means of providing greater democratic legitimacy for the EU, the European Commission (the community's executive body) has encouraged the growth of interest groups, both through direct funding and widespread consultation on policy making. The commission itself attracts the most attention from lobbyists. It drafts all legislation that will be considered by the European Parliament (EP); lobbyists especially seek to influence the early stages of this process, when many details are worked out. The commission has a highly fragmented structure, with thirty-eight directorates general and countless advisory committees allowing for multiple points of access. The commission also is chronically understaffed, giving lobbyists wide opportunity to exploit technical expertise.

The EP, once dismissed as inconsequential, acquired more power during the 1980s and 1990s. If lobbying the commission is much like lobbying the American executive branch in the emphasis on the low-key exchange of technical expertise, then lobbying the EP resembles working with the U.S. Congress in its embrace of public opinion and political horse-trading. Few lobbyists can gain access to COREPER (composed of member states' permanent representatives to the EU), the Council of Ministers (foreign ministers), and the European Council (heads of government).

Lobbying the European Union traditionally was dominated by large, well-connected peak business associations such as the Union of Industrial and Employer's Confederation of

Europe (UNICE), the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), and the EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM-EU). European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) spoke for organized labor. But since the 1980s, a much broader variety of interests have emerged, including environmentalists and consumer activists, while an increasing number of individual firms now have offices in Brussels.

See also *Advocacy Groups; Business Pressure in Politics; Farm Lobby; Interest Groups and Lobbies; Lobbies, Professional; Political Action Committee (PAC); Public Interest Groups; U.S. Politics and Society: Minority Interest Groups.*

. . . . RICHARD SKINNER

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Local Politics

The term *local* may assume different meanings. As clarified by Nancy Ettlinger, it can indicate a neighborhood, town, or metropolitan area in the context of a region or nation; it can refer to a region in the context of a nation; and it can signify a nation or even a multinational region in the context of the global economy. Yet a common element exists among these: local politics expresses a political tension between autonomous multiple centers entitled with a certain degree of freedom and a legitimate power structure. Therefore, the concept is strongly tied to the dimension of centralization-decentralization in a given territorial organization of power—two poles of a continuum along which lie many experiences of center-periphery relations.

THE CONCEPT OF LOCAL POLITICS

The formation of the modern state has represented a process of evolving centralization of power that has reduced the level of fragmentation of politics. Before its rise, power was divided territorially among empires, kingdoms, principalities, cities, and other self-governing entities, as well as functionally

among the political, religious, and economic spheres. The slow and incisive process of state formation exerted normative and structural pressures to centralize cultural, political, administrative, and economic regulation capacities within societies. The principle of local liberty was never meant to be an obstacle to the national government's entry into local affairs. Yet state-building has been unable to conduct to a complete homogenization of political space. As Stein Rokkan has noted, the state is not distant from the notion of territory as a delicate combination of centers, the gathering places where the major decisions are made; peripheries, the areas controlled by these centers; and transactions among the centers and between the centers and the peripheries. Although the state provides a centered hierarchical system control over territory, this framework does not exclude the existence of local actors.

In the early twenty-first century, local politics remains an essential dimension of modern political life that represents an essential and integral part of existing nation-states. Locality is the main locus of citizen identification and participation, representing the institutional context closest to citizens. This is a position that partly echoes the assumption made by nineteenth- and twentieth-century theorists on local self-government. For instance, John Stuart Mill wrote that the very object of having a local representation is so that those who have any interest in common that they do not share with the general body of their countrymen may manage that joint interest by themselves.

Such a position was based on two main arguments. First, local elected institutions are essential because they widen opportunities for political participation and educate citizens in the practice of politics and government; second, these local institutions oversee the affairs of the locality—based on local knowledge, interest, and expertise—so that local services are provided more efficiently and effectively than if they had to come solely from a distant central government. Based on this normative view and ideological premises, the spread of democratization has emphasized the values of autonomy and self-determination rather than external direction from a central government.

This valorization of local government has continued, as institutional reforms in many Western countries have allocated competencies and powers to the municipal and regional levels. Since the 1980s especially, nation-states that in the past showed a more centralized model of administration have been evolving toward a more decentralized governmental system. For instance, Belgium arrived at a federal arrangement in 1993; the process of French *décentralisation* was begun in 1982; and Spanish local autonomies were strengthened in the early 2000s even in the presence of constitutional dispositions written in 1978. Also, the Italian case can be considered as a paradigmatic example, as at the beginning of the 1990s the valorization of local politics occurred through the introduction of direct election of the head of local executives. The strengthening of majors and regional presidents has provided a more immediate identification of local political power by producing a shift from collective to individual control over the formulation of governmental programs and from collective to individual accountability.

These trends are not limited to the Old World, where reduction of the role of central governments is functional to the state members' participation in the framework of the European Union. In the United States, the debate over federalism and the role of government is a prominent component of the political agenda. In this context there has been a revival of decentralization from the federal government to state and local governments. The influence and power of the national government grew continuously in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; in the early twenty-first century the pendulum began to swing back toward the states. Locality also has become a focal point of democratic political development in formerly communist countries in central and eastern Europe, central Asia, and Latin America. The establishment of local institutions in these countries has been seen as a way for democratic self-determination rather than top-down direction.

FROM COMMUNITY STUDIES TO CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH

Despite the centrality of this object of analysis, local politics has not been conceived as an autonomous field of research. Some classical contributions on power in the United States have been conducted at the microscale by considering local politics as the mirror of the whole society, and case studies by political scholars such as Robert and Helen Lynd, Floyd Hunter, and Robert Dahl concentrated attention from the 1930s to the 1960s on specific towns to study of power structure within given communities as well as in the United States. For instance, in their pioneering work on Middletown, the Lynds considered such specific aspects of social life as employment, maintaining a home, raising children, leisure, religion, and community activity. Middletown—an invented name for Muncie, Indiana—was selected by the authors as representative of the United States because it was of manageable size, ethnically homogeneous, and fairly self-contained. Given that it was a "typical city," it was argued that the findings of the Middletown study could be applied to other cities or to life in the United States in general with few reservations. Especially in the Lynds' second volume, *Middletown in Transition* (1937), the theme of social change was faced, analyzing the dramatic effects of modernization that between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries produced a growing separation between the business and working classes, undermining community solidarity and weakening consensus. Although the authors explained how the methodological features of their works did not permit inferences from the single case of Middletown to be made for the entire country, the spirit of their work nonetheless suggested that despite some local and sectional peculiarities, Middletown was the country in miniature, almost the world in miniature.

Also in other studies, local politics was not considered an autonomous field of study, yet a mirror of national politics. For instance, following the Lynds, in 1953 Hunter in *Community Power Structure* studied the regional city of Atlanta, Georgia, and reflected on the consequence of the presence of a power elite on the American democracy. According to the author, only

community studies permit scholars to observe power relations with precision and assess the strong connection between economic power and political influence. Hunter's analysis of the demographics of Atlanta sustained the ruling elite hypothesis that asserts that within some specific political system there exists a group of people who to some degree exercise power or influence over other actors in the system. He looked for the "real" holders of power rather than those in obvious official positions, by using the so-called reputational method, which consists of finding a panel of citizens believed to be knowledgeable about the community and asking them to rank the names of the most influential people in the community.

Dahl's 1961 *Who Governs?* focused on another American community, New Haven, Connecticut, but reached different conclusions from either the Lynds or Hunter. Dahl's book became the basis for an influential theory of pluralism that stated that participation in the decision-making process was rather widespread, at least widespread enough to preclude the characterization of the political process in New Haven as controlled by a ruling elite of social and economic notables. Dahl's student, Nelson W. Polsby, would subsequently pursue Dahl's line of reason further. In 1963 he published *Community Power and Political Theory,* which extended Dahl's conclusions on New Haven to other cities and even to the national level. That same year another scholar, Aaron Wildavsky, published an account of Oberlin University politics under the title *Leadership in a Small Town* (1964).

However, although Dahl himself encouraged comparison between more communities that show a different level of pluralism, rarely have community studies been dedicated to the comparison of communities within different national contexts. The study of local politics has been confined by national boundaries, and even the most theoretically oriented studies have not aimed at formulating generalizations beyond the limits of a single national system. It has only been since the late twentieth century that a body of political science literature has been dedicated to the comparative analysis of center-periphery regimes. For instance, Edward Page and Michael Goldsmith focused on a range of seven unitary states to demonstrate the differences between two center-periphery regimes: the northern countries regime, including Britain, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden; and the southern countries regime, including France, Italy, and Spain. Three aspects are regarded as particularly important in these regimes, namely the functions of local government, the discretion under which these are performed, and the access of local decision makers to central government. Countries in the first category show more functions and a higher degree of discretion in terms of regulation, controls and tutelages, and financial power and capacity. In particular, Britain represents the clearest example of dual politics, for its evident separation of central and local government, as opposed to France, which provides a sort of osmosis between central and local political powers. Italy and Spain subordinate local authorities to the upper level of government, despite institutional reforms to alter this equation. Starting from a cross-national comparison, some models of local governments also

can be identified. Goldsmith has proposed a classification based on three ideal types that signal different political cultures: the patronage model, which aims at allocating resources to specific individuals or groups, especially developed in southern Europe; the economic-development model, the main function of which is fostering economic development, with a neoliberal approach to market regulation (Australia, Canada, and the United States are closest to this ideal type); and the welfare model (empirically corresponding to the local government systems of Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia), which is particularly engaged in satisfying social rights through the provision of public services to lower classes.

Such contributions help overcome one of the main limits of literature on local politics, which according to Jerzy Wiatr refer to within-nation rather than to between-nations comparisons, with the result being a narrowness of theoretical perspectives as well as of a tendency to present local political phenomena as if they were totally specific for every nation. Yet showing differences in terms of local politics—within or between nations—opens inevitably the debate on factors explaining such variance.

EXPLAINING VARIANCE IN LOCAL POLITICS

In the 1960s a new approach was defined that stressed a new role for political culture in determining political and economic performance. In some cases specific subcultures were investigated to explain the absence of political and economic growth. Edward C. Banfield's study of the southern Italian regions, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (1956), concentrated on a specific community, Montegrano. This was done to show an explicit contradiction between the social conditions of Montegrano's inhabitants—poverty, ignorance, exploitation by the upper class, conservatism, distrust of the state and all authority, and fatalism—and the lack of initiatives of collective action, with significant absence of voluntary associations, scarce value attributed to political parties, an underdeveloped local press, and no lobbying activities directed toward improvement of community life. Citizens seemed to be directed only to maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family and assume that all others would do the same.

In the early 1990s, Robert Putnam and his colleagues compared fifteen Italian regions from their inception in 1970, based on the assumption of different administrative capabilities. Through a composite index of performance comprised of twelve indicators of institutional success and failure that combined qualitative and qualitative methodological instruments from elite and population surveys to statistical data analysis, Putnam measured different levels of performance of Italian meso-governments. They arrived at the paradoxical conclusion that regional reform appears to be exacerbating, rather than mitigating, the historical disparities between Italy's northern and southern regions. Discrediting the common economic determinist argument, they attributed the underdevelopment of southern Italian society to a lack of a culture

promoting civic engagement, trust, and ability to cooperate. Indeed, they traced the reasons for current disparities among Italian regions back to different historical paths—southern Italy was dominated in the Middles Ages by an autocratic and feudal government and a powerful church, whereas northern Italy showed traditions of *civic republicanism*.

If studies tied to the concept of political culture present the merit of questioning the relevant theme of the relationship between individual agents and political structure, they also conversely show some limits in presenting a restricted conception of social change. It can be argued that they propose a vicious cycle from which a territory with a given political culture cannot transform itself.

Other approaches better recognize how institutions shape politics. For instance, examining the ways in which institutions structure social and political behavior, *new institutionalism* argues that policy, politics, and behavior can only be understood in the context of the institutions in which they take place. According to this view, politics presents a certain degree of autonomy and may influence values, norms, identity, and roles. Indeed, as structures that regulate human interaction and define the incentives that determine the choices that individuals make, institutions also determine the performance of societies and economies over time. Such an approach has been applied in many fields of research, including local government: an example can be found in the Francesco Kjellberg's 1975 study of two Sardinian communities. Neoinstitutional perspective must be appreciated for its opposition to the tendency to portray politics as a reflection of society, political phenomena as the aggregate consequences of individual behavior, and action as the result of choices based on calculated self-interest. Yet some critics also have affirmed that neoinstitutionalism, tending to avoid monocasual explanations, has yet to produce a clear theory of political change.

CONCLUSIONS: LOCAL POLITICS AS UNITS OF ANALYSIS?

Literature on local politics has not been sufficiently developed as of the early twenty-first century. More particularly, three deficiencies can be identified in scientific contributions relative to this area. First, notwithstanding some classical political science works dedicated to the local dimension, contributions on the subnational level have shown little cumulativeness of results. Frequently, studies on local dimension have been used to test hypotheses on the functioning of the political system as a whole, and as a result, they approach scenarios from different perspectives and therefore reach incompatible conclusions. For instance, sharp distinctions exist between the elitist and pluralist schools in the field of community studies, and these provide very different interpretations of local decision making and politics in general. Arnold Rose noted that *The Power Elite* was almost a bible for a younger generation of new leftists, underlining a focus more on the "I believe" than on proof search activity (Pranger, 1969).

The second deficiency of the study of local politics is the low number of analyses devoted to cross-national research.

As noted earlier, adoption of a comparative research strategy has been limited, so that it is very difficult to generalize research results and to be certain that social-structural regularities are not merely particularities, the products of some limited set of historical or cultural or political circumstances.

Moreover, probably the main weakness of the study of local politics concerns the lack of autonomy of this field of research. Only rarely have local systems of government been adopted as an independent unit of analysis, yet, local politics is more than a component of national politics and possesses its own rules and functions. Following Frank Bealey's work, it is not difficult to recognize the relevance of some subfields, such as the organization of local institutions and their developments; the electoral politics of local councils, their meetings and decision making, their contacts with local interests and pressure groups; party organization; local elites and their exercise of power; center–periphery relations; and, in particular, the efforts of local politicians to obtain benefits for their localities by approaching central authorities. Future trends in local studies may concern several areas of interest for political science, shifting attention more fully onto a significant sphere of political life.

See also *Center-periphery Relations (Federalism); Centralization, Deconcentration, and Decentralization; Community Power; Devolution; Federalism; Inner Cities; Local Politics; Mayor; Megacities; Municipal Government; Panchayat; Regions and Regional Governments; Urban Economic Development; Urban Housing; Urban Inequality and Poverty; Urbanization; Urban Land Use and Town Planning; Urban Migration.*

. . . .   FORTUNATO MUSELLA

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Locke, John

Known as the founder of modern liberalism, political philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) was born in Somerset, England. His greatest contributions were in the fields of political philosophy, as articulated in the initially anonymous work *The Two Treatises of Government* and in epistemology as presented in *Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* both published in 1690. In response to the tumultuous nature of British politics of the period, Locke rejected the theory of divine right and offered a radical reevaluation of the individual's role in governance. He contended that rational individuals have a God-given right to initiate a contract of governance and retain the right to rebel if the government ceases to honor the terms of the contract.

In *Two Treatises,* Locke rejects English political theorist Robert Filmer's philosophy of divine right and patriarchy. Locke believed that each individual owns the result of his labor. This notion, radical for its time, was embraced by Enlightenment theorists and is inherent in the development of classical liberalism and modern political thought.

Although Locke's ideas in *Two Treatises* were not initially popular in Europe, they were instrumental in the formation of American political thought. His theories of *natural rights* were written into the Declaration of Independence in 1776 by statesman Thomas Jefferson, who identified them as the right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Locke continued to be a major influence on American democracy when the U.S. Constitution was written in 1787.

Locke's *Essays on the Laws of Nature* was published in 1663, the year before he was named as Censor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford University. In 1664 Locke enrolled in medical school at Oxford. Before receiving his degree, he accepted the position of medical advisor to Lord Ashley, the future Earl of Shaftesbury. Locke's connection with Ashley continued for eight years and was responsible for his appointment to several minor political positions. The relationship also placed Locke in the company of leading English radicals. Locke was exposed to other innovative thinkers when he spent three years in France after completing his medical degree in 1674. He returned to England in 1681 but was forced to follow Ashley, who was accused of conspiring against King Charles II's brother, to the Netherlands to escape arrest. Locke's reputation was restored in 1686 and he returned to England.

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, considered by many scholars to be Locke's most significant work, proved to be a watershed in English philosophy and launched the school of British empiricism. Locke used this work to express his support for King William, who had succeeded to the English throne with his wife Mary after the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

William and Mary introduced religious toleration in England, a notion heartily endorsed by Locke. In order to avoid expected controversy, Locke's *Letter Concerning Toleration* was published anonymously in 1689. *A Second Letter Concerning Toleration* was released in 1690, followed by a third in 1692. The letters expanded on Locke's support for the right of individuals to choose how they worshiped. Locke continued his examination of religion in *On the Reasonableness of Christianity* and *A Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity,* both published in 1695.

Locke's interest in a wide range of disciplines was evident by some of his other works, including *Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest* (1691), *The Raising of the Value of Money* (1692), and *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1693). During the year before his death in 1704, Locke worked on *Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman.* After his death, *Paraphrases on the Epistles of St. Paul* (1705) and *Fourth Letter Concerning Toleration* (1706) were published.

See also *British Political Thought; Empiricism; Filmer, Sir Robert; Liberalism, Classical; Natural Rights; Political Philosophy; Political Theory; Religion and Politics.*

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Logistic Regression

Logistic regression is a multivariate statistical technique used to study the relationship between a set of exogenous or independent variables on a binary endogenous or dependent variable. Sometimes called a logit regression or a logit model, a logistic regression is a special case of a discrete regression and is closely related to the probit model. The dependent variable in a logistic regression is usually an indicator variable that takes on one of two values. Logistic regressions are used to study the factors that predict candidate choice (Democrat versus Republican) in two-candidate elections, outcomes (alive versus dead) of medical trials, the causes of employment (employed versus unemployed), and so forth. The logistic regression is based on the logistic curve, a mathematical function that maps the real line into the unit interval. There are many extensions of the basic logistic regression, and these extensions are found in modern statistical software packages. Some of the more common extensions include the multinomial logistical regression, in which a categorical dependent variable of interest takes on multiple categories as opposed to only two; the ordered logistic regression, in which a categorical dependent variable of interest takes on multiple categories that have a natural ordering; and the conditional logistical regression, a model used to study individual choice in which features of the discrete options under consideration are modeled jointly with features of the individuals who are making choices.

See also *Statistical Analysis.*

. . . . MICHAEL C. HERRON

Lowell, A. Lawrence

A. Lawrence Lowell (1856–1943) was an American lawyer and educator. He wrote two major studies of European political institutions: *Government and Parties in Continental Europe* (1896) and *The Government of England* (1908). In 1909 he became president of the American Political Science Association and in the same year president of Harvard. Lowell was a Republican and a Unitarian. He endorsed the League of Nations.

At the time of the expansion of the right to vote and the growing importance of competitive elections, Lowell pioneered the comparative study of the role of parties in government. To advance the understanding of party systems different from the Anglo-American two-party model, he examined continental European countries with multiparty systems: Austro-Hungary, France, Italy, Germany and Prussia, and Switzerland. While Lowell's books were atheoretical, they were informed by discussions with politicians involved in these systems and carefully documented. The appendix to *Government and Parties in Continental Europe* included the texts of constitutions in French, German, or Italian because he claimed much of value could be lost in their translation. His books remain relevant in providing a comparative understanding of how parties operated in the new circumstances of competitive elections that were also very different from those of the contemporary democratic political system.

Lowell's examination of politics in England occurred at the end of almost a century of gradual evolution from aristocratic government to party government dependent on success in competitive popular elections. As Lowell stated in *The Government of England,* it was a system in which the upper classes retained political privileges and ruled "by the sufferance of the great mass of the people and as trustees for its benefits." Prefaces to subsequent editions of the book showed an awareness that the debate over the governance of Ireland, imperial issues, and the presence of working-class Labour representatives in Parliament were creating pressures for the system to adapt.

After becoming president of Harvard, Lowell pushed through measures raising its standard of education, introducing residential accommodation that followed the Oxford model, and calling for more attention to research as was found in the German university model. He endorsed Harvard maintaining a quota restricting the admission of Jews and blacks. Lowell retired as president of the university in 1933 and died in 1943.

See also *European Politics and Society; Political Parties.*

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Lower Chamber

Legislative studies specialists argue that legislatures, in democratic settings, perform representative, legislative, and oversight functions. Of the three types of representative functions, the first is sociological. A parliament represents society because the social characteristics of parliamentary members resemble those of the population. Second, parliaments represent by being given a mandate to stand for and make decisions on behalf of the population. Third, parliaments represent by making decisions intended to promote the well-being of society. In addition to representative functions, parliaments also perform legislative, or lawmaking, functions as they have the power not only to discuss, amend, and approve government-sponsored bills, but also generally have the power to introduce bills and initiate the lawmaking process. Finally, parliaments perform oversight functions by monitoring the implementation of government policies and programs.

Legislative scholars have noted that while legislatures perform these three functions regardless of whether the political system in which they operate is parliamentary or presidential, legislatures in parliamentary settings also perform a fourth function: that of making and breaking governments.

Legislatures differ from one another depending on the number of chambers. According to the Inter-parliamentary Union (IPU), 60 percent of the world's legislatures are unicameral, while the remaining 40 percent are bicameral. In bicameral settings, spatial metaphor is employed to distinguish between two chambers: lower and upper. The distinction between the two applies only in the context of bicameral legislatures. Lower chambers are always elective and, hence, closer to the people, whereas upper chambers have generally been more insulated from the population.

Lower chambers differ from upper chambers in three basic respects. First, lower chambers are, on average, much larger than upper chambers. The data provided by the IPU on seventy-five bicameral legislatures show that the average size of upper chambers is 92.6 seats, and they vary from a minimum of 11 seats in St. Lucia to a maximum of 732 seats in the British House of Lords. The average size of lower chambers is 228 seats, and they vary from a minimum of 15 seats in Grenada to a maximum of 646 seats in the British House of Commons.

Second, the average terms differ between lower and upper chambers. Terms in lower chambers are typically shorter than those of upper chambers. The IPU data reveal that lower chamber terms average a duration of 4.5 years, with a range from two years, as in the case of the U.S. House of Representatives, to six years, as in the case of both the Liberian and Yemeni houses of representatives. Upper chamber terms are longer. According to the IPU, the average term of upper chambers is 5.3 years and varies from a minimum of four years, which is the duration of the term in 25 percent of the upper chambers for which the IPU collected information, to a maximum of nine years, as in the case of the Liberian Senate and the Moroccan House of Councillors.

Third, legislative studies specialists have shown that lower chambers are usually more powerful than upper chambers, with the exception of those whose formal powers are equal to those of lower chambers (such as the Italian and the U.S. senates). For example, lower chambers usually have the power to override upper chambers' vetoes. But lower chambers also have greater powers than upper chambers with regard to the making and breaking of governments. In bicameral systems in which the distribution of power across the two chambers is not symmetrical (such as in Australia, Austria, the French Fifth Republic, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Japan, and Spain), lower chambers have the power to affect the survival and the duration of the government by granting or revoking the confidence to the executive branch. Upper chambers do not have such power. These differences between lower and upper chambers exemplify how bicameral legislatures were institutionalized. Lower chambers were created as chambers of popular representation, while upper chambers were created, according to Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart, "to serve as a conservative brake on the more democratically elected 'lower' houses."

Legislative oversight is one area in which the power differential between lower and upper chambers is remarkably less evident. In 2009, the IPU collaborated with the World Bank Institute to produce the *Survey on Parliamentary Oversight*. The survey's eighty questions addressed such issues as chambers' ability to oversee policy implementation, chambers' role in the budget process, the use of motions, chambers' ability to dismiss and impeach the executive, and the presence or absence of ethical regulations such as codes of conduct and disclosure rules.

The questionnaire asked respondents from the 120 chambers surveyed to indicate whether their legislatures had any of the oversight tools about which information was sought. All the lower chambers for which information was collected reported to have two or more tools; almost 90 percent of them had five tools or more and the lower chambers included in the sample had an average of 6.02 oversight tools—a value slightly higher than the average recorded, admittedly with a different survey questionnaire in 2001 and across both lower and upper chambers. These values are not much different, and are actually slightly lower, than the values registered in the upper chambers: all upper chambers had at least three oversight tools; 95 percent of them had at least five and upper chambers had an average of 6.55.

The evidence generated by this survey suggests that while it is true that lower chambers are larger, and traditionally more democratic, representative, and powerful in the government-selection and in the policy and lawmaking processes than upper chambers, they are equally, if not less, powerful in terms of their formal capacity to exercise legislative oversight.

See also *Legislative Systems; Oversight; Unicameralism and Bicameralism; Upper Chamber.*

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Lukács, Gyorgy

Gyorgy Lukács (1885–1971) was a literary critic and Hungarian Marxist philosopher frequently considered to be one of the founders of Western Marxism. He made major contributions to Marxist thought and was an important figure in the Hungarian Communist Party.

Lukács was born in Budapest into a wealthy Jewish family. He studied at the universities of Budapest and Berlin, receiving a PhD from the latter in 1906. As a youth he was attracted to socialist ideas, and in Germany he made the acquaintance of figures such as sociologist and political economist Max Weber,

philosopher Ernst Bloch, and sociologist Georg Simmel. Lukács began publishing literary criticism in 1910, and on his return to Budapest in 1915 he led a left-wing intellectual circle that included social theorist Karl Mannheim and economic historian Karl Polanyi. His *The Theory of the Novel* (1916) is a seminal work in literary theory and the theory of genre.

After World War I (1914–1918) and the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, Lukács turned to Marxism, joining the Hungarian Communist Party. He became part of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic of Bela Kun, serving as People's Commissar for Education and Culture. When this government fell, he fled to Vienna, Austria, before settling in Berlin, Germany. He published several works on Marxist and Leninist thought, including *History and Class Consciousness* (1923). This book contributed to debates concerning Marxism and its relation to sociology, politics, and philosophy. It highlighted Karl Marx's theory of alienation before many of the works of the young Marx had been published. Lukács's work elaborates and expands on Marxist theories such as ideology, false consciousness, and class consciousness. For Lukács, ideology was a projection of the class consciousness of the bourgeoisie, which functions to prevent the proletariat from attaining its own real, revolutionary consciousness. Moreover, he emphasizes the concept of reification, in which, due to the commodity-based nature of capitalist society, social relations become objectified, precluding the ability for a spontaneous emergence of class consciousness. Rejecting dogmas attached to Marxist thought, he argued that Marxism was inherently dynamic, as it is based on dialectical materialism.

Although his work was attacked by Soviet leaders, Lukács left Berlin for Moscow in 1933, staying there through World War II (1939–1945). After the war, he was active in the creation of a communist government in Hungary and helped lead an assault against noncommunist intellectuals. He was, however, more liberal than others in the party, which led to him being purged from it in 1949. During the Hungarian revolution of 1956 he became a minister in the short-lived government of Imre Nagy. After the Soviets invaded, Lukács was exiled to Romania, but he, unlike Nagy, managed to avoid execution for his previous activities. Lukács returned to Budapest and professed his loyalty to the new government, although his defenders argued that his works such as *The Young Hegel* (1938) and *The Destruction of Reason* (1954) demonstrated his criticism of the Soviet version of communism. His final, unfinished manuscript, published in English in 2000 as *A Defence of History and Class Consciousness,* is considered one of the more important "discoveries" in Marxist thought in recent years.

See also *Bloch, Ernst; Communism; Mannheim, Karl; Marxism; Polanyi, Karl; Political Philosophy; Russian Political Thought; Weber, Max.*

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Lusophone Africa

The term *lusophone* is closely associated with the Portuguese sphere of influence. It is used to refer to people and states across the world with a cultural background and language significantly influenced by the Portuguese. The spread of Lusophone culture can largely be attributed to the Portuguese explorations and colonial conquests around the world dating back to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Presently, Portugal's former colonies continue to hold a keen cultural affinity with their former colonizer; most notably the Portuguese language remains the official language for many countries today, including Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and São Tomé and Príncipe.

Lusophone Africa specifically refers to the five Portuguese-speaking African countries once colonized by the Portuguese: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe. These countries are members of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries, an organization created in 1996 to foster friendship and unity among Lusophone states throughout the world.

Of all the European powers involved in colonialism, the Portuguese were the first to seek territories in the African continent. Using trade as a motive and driven by the need to acquire riches for the crown, Portuguese sailors combed newfound territories in search of wealth for their small European homeland. On August 21, 1415, Portuguese seafarer Henry the Navigator landed at Ceuta, which is presently a Spanish territory enclave near Morocco. After Henry's arrival in Ceuta, further excursions along the west African coast followed as explorers sought gold and slaves. Portuguese Guinea, also known as Guinea-Bissau, became a Portuguese colony and a major source of slaves in 1447. In 1462 the uninhabited islands of Cape Verde off the west African coast were colonized. Slaves from the neighboring west Africa were shipped to the island to serve as a labor force. Next in line was Mozambique, a strategically situated nation on the east African coast, colonized in 1510. Other colonies included the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe, which served as a stopping place for long-distance Portuguese voyages headed to Brazil. Lastly, the resource-rich Angola was colonized in 1576.

Portuguese colonization in Africa would last for a total of 560 years, the longest surviving out of European colonies. The formal partitioning of Africa among European nations, widely referred to as the Scramble for Africa, was established during the Berlin Conference (1884–1885), which regulated European colonization and trade on the continent and helped to legitimize Portugal's hold over its African colonies for several centuries. Despite Portugal's reluctance to grant independence to the African states, unforeseen political events eventually forced the country to give up its African colonies in quick succession between 1974 and 1975.

Beginning in the 1960s, independent movements and armed guerrilla warfare in Angola and Mozambique hindered Portugal's ability to govern with ease. Further, a successful coup in 1974 ended Antonio Salazar's rule, as his regime was supporting an unpopular war against anticolonists in Africa. His overthrow brought a new administration that favored the idea of independence for the African colonies. In 1974, Portugal granted independence to Guinea-Bissau, followed by Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Sao Tomé and Príncipe in 1975. Angola gained independence on November 11, 1975, bringing to a close the long chapter of Portuguese colonialism in Africa.

Despite hundreds of years of control, the Portuguese failed to build political institutions or economic mechanisms to effectively assist the colonies' transition from colonial rule to independence. Without any viable industrialization and limited infrastructure, the former colonies experienced extreme poverty, corruption, and armed conflicts. Both Mozambique from 1975 to 1992 and Angola from 1975 to 2002 became submerged in ideological civil wars, which were drawn into the cold war as former rebels were supported by communist governments sponsored by the Soviet Union against insurgents groups supported by the U.S. and African cold war allies.

While Lusophone Africa is still relatively underdeveloped compared to other nations with European colonial roots, the end of the civil war coupled with the discovery of oil in Angola has rejuvenated the quest for development in that country. Likewise, the islands of Sao Tomé and Príncipe have benefited from oil resources located in the Gulf of Guinea, while Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau remain largely dependent on donor assistance. Cape Verde, on the other hand, relies mainly on the service industry, especially tourism, along with foreign donor assistance and support from its diaspora to sustain its economic growth. Notably, after centuries of governing Lusophone Africa, Portugal today has no substantial role in the governance of any of its former colonies.

See also *African Political Economy; African Political Thought; African Politics and Society; African Union; Anglophone Africa; Authoritarianism, African; Francophone Africa; Horn of Africa; Pan-Africanism; Postindependent Africa, Politics and Governance in.*

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Lustration

Lustration derives from the Latin word meaning "purification." In political and legal literature, this concept usually refers to the means by which countries deal with past experiences such as war and government regimes. For example, after 1989, in post-Soviet eastern Europe, those who aspire to obtain public positions are screened through specific procedures. This is done to exclude from public office former Communist Party functionaries and secret police collaborators. By the early twenty-first century, most countries in the region, including the Czech Republic, the former East Germany, Hungary, and Poland, had adopted some form of lustration.

At its center, lustration shares the normative and functional characteristics of the transitional justice measures: investigating and reporting on key periods of the recent past; transforming the military, police, judiciary, and related state institutions from corrupt instruments to instruments of public service; and raising moral consciousness about the past. In this context, lustration contributes to the improvement of the democratic consolidation process and to institutional change.

Lustration has been carried out in different ways across central eastern Europe. Its most systematic pursuit took place in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Other countries, such as Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania, have had large public support for lustration, but the political elites did not act as forcefully as the public wanted. In these countries, given the fact that the postcommunist policies have not managed to exclude from the political scene the actors linked with the previous regimes, many lustration legislative projects were discussed, but none of them passed. For instance, during Romania's first postcommunist decade, the country's parliamentary political parties did not openly oppose the bill to access the former communist police (*Securitate*) files, but they proved through their votes that they preferred limited public access to the *Securitate* files. Therefore, in this case, in spite of public support of lustration, the political elite avoided the issue.

CONCEPTUAL APPLICABILITY

Among the countries that managed to implement lustration per se, the Czech Republic stands out. After 1991, the Czech Republic took an early interest in lustration and adopted a radical version of it. Accordingly, to avoid charges of revenge-seeking, lustration emerged as a mechanism for defending the fragile new Czech democracy. In this case, the purpose was to prevent former communist officials from gaining public positions in the new regime and not to criminalize activities that were legal in the communist era. Consequently, starting in 1991, lustration operated by excluding former communist civil servants and collaborators with the communist secret police from a range of public offices: the upper levels of the civil service, the security services, and top army positions, and from the management of state-owned enterprises, the central bank, and academic institutions. However, due to the loophole in the laws that regulated lustration in the Czech Republic, the screening process did not cover all sectors: candidates for the legislature did not have to be lustrated, and ministers from communist governments were not on any blacklist.

In contrast with the Czech Republic, Poland began relatively late to work on a lustration law. In 1997 the *Sejm,* or the lower house of the Polish parliament, passed the law and thus created the necessary procedures for screening people seeking public office. In addition, a lustration court was created. Its purpose was to verify whether top officials served

or collaborated with the former communist secret police. The court, made up of appellate and provincial court judges, has unlimited access to civil and military archives. Moreover, those found guilty of false statements are banned from public office for ten years and, depending on specific cases, sentenced up to five years in prison for perjury.

In Hungary, after its negotiated transition to democracy, there were immediate demands for lustration. In 1994, two months prior to the national elections, the country's parliament adopted a law in this regard. However, the Hungarian Constitutional Court removed particular provisions considered to be vague and arbitrary. Consequently, the parliament enacted a new law in 1996 that stated that all persons born before February 14, 1972, must be screened prior to taking an oath before parliament or the president. Moreover, the law stipulated that if an official was found carrying out activities for the former state security service, that official would be asked to resign within thirty days. If the official refused to step down, the findings were to be published in the *Hungarian Official Gazette*. Additionally, although the legislation was initially to expire in 2000, it continued to be extended until 2004.

Another former communist country, East Germany, made considerable efforts to create and implement a lustration law to give access to the former Secret Security Police (STASI) archives and bring in front of the Judicial Court persons accused of crimes in the communist era. According to German law, employers receive a summary on the individual's file from the Gauck Authority—the special ministry created to oversee STASI files. In this context, the employer makes an individual decision. However, if not satisfied, the employee can appeal to the labor courts. As a result of the lustration law, at the end of June 1996 the Gauck Authority had answered more than 1.7 million vetting inquiries.

THE LESSONS OF LUSTRATION

We can glean a number of lessons about lustration. On the one hand, in those countries in which lustration was fairly effective, such as the Czech Republic, it had a relevant impact on economic and political transformation. First, the law of lustration prevented the involvement of the former *Nomenklatura* members in the privatization process and in the liberalization of the market. Second, the enactment of lustration blocked former communist officials from crucial decision-making positions in the new regime, and the influences of the former political and security networks over the political parties were seriously diminished. As a result, the communists' loss of influence on the policy agenda allowed a consistent development of democracy; therefore, it can be argued that a positive relationship exists between lustration and the transition to a consolidated democracy.

On the other hand, the absence of a lustration law, combined with the complicity of the new authorities with the structures of the former communist state, has led to a series of political and economic failures. For instance, in some nonlustrated countries, such as Romania, many former communist officials have become highly influential in political life and managed to control the government policy agenda, with negative effects on administrative reform. Moreover, due to various influences of former communists on the privatization process, the economic transition to a free market took more than fifteen years. Consequently, it can be argued that the lack of a lustration law adversely affected the transition to a successful liberal market and consolidated democracy.

See also *Emerging Democracies; Postcommunism; War Crimes.*

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Luther, Martin

Martin Luther (1483–1546) was a German theologian, pastor, and professor. His public rejection of the Catholic Church's practice of selling indulgences ignited the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, which led to a permanent schism in the church. Luther's actions and beliefs exerted great influence over subsequent theories on the nature and scope of secular authority and the right of subjects to resist their rulers.

Luther enrolled at the University of Erfurt in 1501. In 1507 he entered the Observant Augustinian house in Erfurt, where he took vows as a monk and undertook theological studies in the nominalist tradition. He received his doctorate in theology from the University of Wittenberg in 1512. That same year he took up a faculty position as professor of scripture at Wittenberg, a position that he held until his death. Between 1517 and 1521, Luther definitively rejected the path to salvation mapped out by the medieval Catholic Church in favor of his belief that salvation was attained by faith in God alone. This resulted in his break with the Catholic Church and his renunciation of the priesthood.

Luther's theological ideas had important implications for the social and political underpinnings of western Europe, and from the early 1520s until his death Luther grappled with these

implications. One key idea present in his early works was the rejection of a separate clerical estate and with it all ideas of the church's temporal authority. Instead he defined the church as nothing more than a congregation of the faithful. Luther conceived an expanded role for secular authorities in this power vacuum. In 1523 he turned to the nature of such secular authority in his tract *On Temporal Authority.* Drawing heavily on the teaching of St. Paul, he argued that secular authorities are ordained by God to keep the external peace and that even tyrants should not be resisted. However, he was also clear that secular rulers have no authority to intrude into the personal relationship between a believer and God. In this separation of spheres of influence lay Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms.

While *On Temporal Authority* was to remain Luther's most coherent statement on the topic of secular authority**,** radical social and political ideas advocated by some reformers forced Luther to further define his ideas in the 1520s. Luther wrote several works that held steadfastly to his understanding of the teachings of the New Testament as requiring absolute submission to temporal authorities in the maintenance of public order and public peace. The most famous of these tracts, *Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants* (1525), legitimated the use of military force to suppress the insurgents in the Peasants' War (1524–1525). The peasants justified their rebellion in part through an alternative interpretation of the New Testament that emphasized the equality of all believers under Christ.

In the early 1530s, Luther returned again to the issue of legitimate resistance to secular authority, this time in response to the deteriorating political situation in the Holy Roman Empire that left the Reformed princes under increasing military threat from the Catholic emperor. In this case, Luther further refined his thinking by pronouncing a set of views that supported the rights of lesser princes to resist the emperor in their role as inferior magistrates.

See also *European Political Thought; German Political Thought; Political Theory; Protestant Political Thought; Reformation Political Thought; Religion and Politics; Secularism.*

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Luxemburg, Rosa

Born in Zamosc, Poland, to assimilated Jewish middle-class parents, activist Rosa Luxemburg (1871–1919) demonstrated remarkable intellectual achievement and a highly rebellious nature from an early age. As a teenager she joined Proletariat, one of the first Polish Marxist groups. Forced to leave Poland in 1889, she enrolled at the University of Zurich and earned a doctorate in political science in 1897. Throughout her career Luxemburg opposed independence for Poland and other countries on the grounds that it was a diversion from the struggle for socialism.

Upon moving to Berlin in 1898, Luxemburg became the leading critic of Eduard Bernstein, leader of the German Social-Democratic Party (SPD) and Marx's literary executor, over his effort to "revise" Marxism. Although she endured underhanded attacks by some SPD leaders because of her gender and ethnicity, her *Reform or Revolution* (1900) was soon heralded as a Marxist classic for arguing that the apparent stability of capitalism was a temporary phenomenon. The height of her influence in the Second International (a federation of socialist parties and trade unions) was reached in 1904, when she was closely associated with August Bebel and Karl Kautsky in formulating policy.

Luxemburg followed up her involvement in the 1905 Russian Revolution by applying its lessons to western Europe in *The Mass Strike, the Party, and the Trade Unions* (1906). This led to her estrangement from the SPD, which became lukewarm about her enthusiasm for revolutionary spontaneity. She openly broke from Kautsky in 1910, when he declined to risk losing electoral support by forcefully opposing imperialism. She also played a central role in debates within Russian Marxism, critiquing Vladimir Lenin's organizational centralism while supporting the Bolsheviks against the Mensheviks when it came to emphasizing the leading role of the proletariat in any forthcoming revolution.

Luxemburg held that imperialism was an inevitable result of capitalism's tendency toward limitless production regardless of the amount of surplus product that could be consumed by the market. Her *Introduction to Political Economy* (1907) and *The Accumulation of Capital* (1913) attempted to show that continued capital accumulation depends on the exploitation of noncapitalist strata. Her detailed analyses in both works of the destruction of precapitalist communal formations in Australia, India, South America, and southern Africa are unique among Marxists of the period.

Luxemburg was actively engaged in the German women's movement and wrote for several of its publications. Jailed for opposing World War I (1914–1918), she helped organize the antiwar Spartakusbund political group and wrote *The Crisis of European Social-democracy* (1916) and *The Russian Revolution* (1922). The latter contained a sharp critique of Lenin and Leon Trotsky for dismissing democracy as a "cumbersome mechanism." After being freed from jail, she helped found the German Communist Party in December 1918. On January 12, 1919, she was murdered following a failed left-wing revolt against the SPD-led government. Her declaration, as stated in *The Russian Revolution,* that "freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently" has made her a beacon for those defending political and economic liberty.

See also *Bernstein, Eduard; German Political Thought; Lenin, Vladimir Ilich; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Marxist Parties; Russian Political Thought; Trotsky, Leon.*

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Lu Xun

Lu Xun (1881–1936) is generally acknowledged as China's greatest twentieth-century author. His sardonic humor, literary skill, and sense of the absurd made him an effective advocate of Chinese nationalism, the rejection of a self-satisfied traditionalism, and the need to embrace a pragmatic program of modernization. Communist leader Mao Zedong was an admirer of Lu Xun, and after Mao's victory in the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949), Lu Xun became "the chief commander of China's cultural revolution." This embrace by political power made him an ambiguous icon of the spirit of political and social criticism.

Born and raised in Shaoxing, Jiangan, as Zhou Zhangshou, Lu Xun belonged to a prominent family in financial decline. This made the less-expensive Westernized educational opportunities afforded by the Jiangan Naval Academy and, later, the School of Mines and Railways attractive educational opportunities for the young man.

During his scientific education from 1898 to 1904, Lu Xun mastered a technical curriculum and became familiar with various Western writers such as John Stuart Mill, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Sir Walter Scott, and evolutionary theorist Thomas Huxley. A hybrid of Darwinism and romantic idealism played a major role in Lu Xun's concept of nationalism.

Lu Xun studied in Japan from 1902 to 1909, which was important in reinforcing his commitment to nationalism. He initially studied medicine but became disillusioned with that career as he became more and more aware of the spiritual illness he perceived to plague the Chinese nation. Lu Xun prescribed art and literature as the medicine most likely to cure such an ailment of the spirit, and he abandoned medicine for a literary career. During this time, German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche's *Thus Spake Zarathustra* inspired him, which led to Lu Xun penning "On the Power of Mara Poetry" (1908), a creative piece about the power of demonic writers to transform society.

When Lu Xun returned to China, his vision of the transformative artist set the tone for how he would confront the failings of the revolution of 1911 to remedy China's weakness. Some of his most appreciated short stories, including "A Mad Man's Diary," "Medicine," and "The True Story of Ah-Q," were written during this turbulent period. His criticism of Chinese tradition as being cannibalistic and his endorsement of pragmatic action made Lu Xun an icon of the sociopolitical May Fourth Movement that began in 1919. He also supported patriotic movements throughout the 1920s, including the May 30 (1925) and March 18 (1927) movements.

Through observing the dynamics of these movements, Lu Xun began to perceive the insufficiency of the creative superman and the forces of evolution to lead to progress in China's political situation, and he began to explore the usefulness of class struggle as a path to national survival. He engaged in various literary battles that forced him to forge a more solidly Marxist-Leninist identity and developed the political essay as his primary literary art form. The political positions he took during this period, particularly his support of Mao Zedong, would determine his legacy. Lu Xun died in 1936 of tuberculosis.

Despite the fact that he never joined the Chinese Communist Party, Lu Xun became a communist "saint" after his death. His spirit of attack and reform was invoked by Chairman Mao and found similar polemical use by a variety of future political reformers. Recent scholarship has focused on situating Lu Xun in the Confucian tradition of remonstrance, understanding the relation of evolution to his thinking, discerning the meaning of individualism in his thought, and clarifying his relationship with Marxism-Leninism.

See also *Asian Political Thought; Chinese Political Thought; Communism; Confucian Political Thought; Maoism; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Marxism; Political Philosophy; Political Theory.*

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Lyotard, Jean–François

Jean-François Lyotard (1924–1998) was a French theorist known for ushering the concept of *postmodernity* into the philosophical discourse. He gained international acclaim for his book *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (1979). This volume, as well as other lesser known but equally sophisticated works such as *Just Gaming* (1979) and *The Differend* (1983), firmly planted Lyotard in the pantheon of significant and influential continental philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century.

Lyotard was born in France and went to the Sorbonne. His first academic position was in Algeria, and his experiences there helped inform his understanding of the complications of French colonialism. Thereafter, he attained a PhD and taught for nearly twenty years in Vincennes before teaching in the United States at the University of California-Irvine and Emory University, among many other universities.

The key aspect of Lyotard's work, and the one that made him famous to some and infamous to others, was his identification of a new philosophical perspective that expressed an "incredulity toward metanarratives." This statement from *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* forcefully questions the explanations that have usually guided and bounded philosophical inquiry since the Enlightenment. Lyotard rejects the assumption in Enlightenment philosophy and science that universal explanations to vexing moral and political problems exist. In Lyotard's view, the world is too complex and groups of individuals vary too greatly for the simplistic and universalistic arguments to carry the day. Further, Lyotard builds upon Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of *language games* as a defining element of so-called postmodernity. In this view, varying streams of meaning and competing theories of ethics and of the good life cannot be adequately judged against a single moral code. Instead, Lyotard encourages the use of a multiplicity of perspectives in coming to terms with what constitutes just action.

Lyotard's views have been subject to much criticism. The first criticism is that his position is relativistic and, therefore, one society cannot judge another's behavior to be unjust. This angers supporters of absolute conceptions of justice, such as proponents of the work of German philosopher Jürgen Habermas. This critique is not without merit as Lyotard does use the rationality of the Enlightenment in his attempt to question it.

However, Lyotard sees this as a necessary step to understanding cultural difference. Another trend in criticism is to marginalize Lyotard's work as unintelligible or incomprehensible language that is not rigorous enough to be thought of as philosophy. In this case, the philosophers who assert this are unwilling to engage with Lyotard's work because of its nonuniversalist conclusions and dismiss it based on its differing philosophical style.

Overall, Lyotard's legacy to political thought is substantial because of his expansion of the debate of justice, ethics, and politics. Even if orthodox liberals and communitarian political philosophers question his applicability to their specific conversations, his work challenges the assumptions on which many of those debates are executed.

See also *Enlightenment Political Thought; European Political Thought; French Political Thought; Political Philosophy; Postmodernism.*

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Machiavelli, Niccolò

Poet, raconteur, diplomat, historian, military and political theorist, and secretary to the short-lived Republic of Florence (1498–1512), Italian Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) was much more than the author of *The Prince,* although this work, written in 1512–1513 but published posthumously in 1531, remains the centerpiece of his political legacy. All of his other works, covering Florentine history, poetry, political calculation, drama, military theory, and the primacy of republican values, have their essence concentrated in this slim volume.

The most controversial claim against *The Prince* is that it is at odds with the admiration for Roman republicanism exemplified in Machiavelli's *Discourse on Livy* (1532), but a careful examination reveals that in both works Machiavelli highlights the impossibly corrosive nature of monarchical rule, leaving republicanism as the only alternative. As he explicitly states in his *Discourse on Remodeling the Government of Florence* (1519–1520), a wise prince should protect his family and friends while he lives, yet provide for a republican government to assume control on his passing, thereby offering him temporal glory and eternal life in the histories of the state. That he offered eternal life to a sitting pope is only one example of Machiavelli's sly wit. Like his republican sentiments, it is rarely (outside of the *Discourses*) in plain sight, but the details are never buried so deep that a careful reader could fail to discover their fresh and irreverent bite.

Born in Florence to an established but poor family with no obvious political connections, Machiavelli's greatest political triumph—how an underage, political nonentity managed to become second secretary to the Republic of Florence—remains concealed from history. His skills as a political observer and diplomat kept him in office, but it was not until his banishment at the hands of the returning Medici family that he became a serious author, producing *The Prince* and *Discourses;* several plays, including *Mandragola,* which is considered a centerpiece of Italian drama; a military discourse favored by Napoleon; and a history of Florence completed in 1525 for the Medici Pope Clement VII that signaled Machiavelli's return to the favor of Florence's ruling family. However, by 1527 the Medici were overthrown again, and the new government, suspicious of Machiavelli's ties to the previous rulers, rejected his offer of service. Machiavelli died with his dream of an independent republic in ruins once again.

Although they are unable to agree on its underlying purpose and generally unwilling to endorse its precepts, nearly every critic agrees *The Prince* is a masterful composition. Whatever the focus of contemporary critical controversy, the historical fact remains that with it Machiavelli dislocated the stable political morality of the Middle Ages while at the same time exposing the public hypocrisy of the emerging mercantile elite. Political theorists and actors alike would never again be able to pretend that a political realm could exist free from the "dirty hands" of politics.

See also *Italian Political Thought; Political Theory; Republicanism; Republicanism, Classical.*

. . . . EDWARD KING

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Machine Politics

Machine politics refers to politics in which votes are exchanged for discrete benefits. Under machine politics, voting is driven by a direct exchange between voter and political candidate rather than by opinion or ideology. (Hence, the term *machine politics* is related but not equivalent to *political machine.* The latter is a generic term for a tight political organization and does not specify its mechanism of mobilization; machine politics refers thus to a specific type of political machine.)

While machine politics was common in American cities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the two most famous examples were Tammany Hall in New York (from the 1790s to the 1960s) and the Cook County Democratic Central Committee in Chicago (from the 1930s to the 1970s). In some settings, machine politics has been substituted by patronage that relies no longer on voters through the distribution of

welfare and payroll but rather on corporate interests through the distribution of contracts and favorable policies—a form of exchange also known as pinstripe patronage.

The term *machine politics* is typically deployed for analysis of U.S. cases, yet the phenomenon of machine politics is found also in other countries: Central and South America, southern Italy, and Japan offer especially rich literatures. The term commonly adopted to signify the phenomenon of machine politics in the comparative context is *clientelism*. However, clientelism is different from machine politics in two important respects. First, it is more specific than machine politics, because it focuses on a dyadic exchange (i.e., an exchange between two individuals), while machine politics can involve dyadic or collective exchange. Second, clientelism is more generic than machine politics, because the latter limits the exchange to votes for political office, while clientelism includes social exchange in realms outside of politics. Thus, the term *political clientelism* is a better equivalent to machine politics.

DEMOCRATIC MERIT OF MACHINE POLITICS

If the exchange under machine politics is dyadic—that is, two parties in the exchange can be isolated as the only beneficiaries, then it is hard to make the case that machine politics is democratic due to a lack of democratic accountability. This is exchange of rivaled and excludable private goods, for example, a job in exchange of a vote, and accountability is not to the electorate but to the specific individual with whom the political candidate made the deal.

The question is more complex if the beneficiaries are groups, such as lobbies or factions. In these cases, the exchange involves goods that are either nonrivalrous (club goods) or nonexcludable (common goods), for example, if in exchange for their support neighbors receive a new paving of their street. This exchange can be accountable to the public and thereby democratic. Indeed, factions' pursuit of their interests constitutes a basic feature of democracy. Therefore, the extent to which machine politics is democratic is undefined.

THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF MACHINE POLITICS

Politicians in machine politics seek to maximize their network of voters ready to exchange votes for particularistic benefits. The result is a hierarchical pyramid that links voters at the bottom and the political candidates at the top through mediators, who recruit and deliver the votes.

Machine politics faces diseconomies of scale, because each additional favor is more costly to satisfy. Politicians distribute all sorts of goods. In addition to jobs, they offer food (especially food packages before festivities) the payment of utility bills, and money according to established price lists; the amount depends on the tightness of a given race. In some cases, politicians directly purchase voter identification cards. Often, though, persuasion and fear are all that machine politics needs to function: Politicians are able to induce in voters the belief that their expected payoff depends on their individual voting choices—and this, in the mind of the voters, is a credible threat.

Fear of detection depends on the extent to which voters believe that mediators and politicians can learn about their voting choices. This is achieved in several ways; for example, mediators can personally accompany voters to the polls and thus make them feel observed. Machine politics develops interlocking clusters of votes around concentrated areas—neighborhoods, blocks, or even individual tenements—and this allows politicians a great degree of micromanagement. In the tight-knit communities that host such clientelistic machines, everyone seems to know everything about everyone else. Organized crime often manipulates this knowledge to exercise power over local inhabitants. Intimidation, perceived lack of alternatives, and the resulting grip that mediators have on their networks of voters are the most important obstacles to electoral reform.

UNDERMINING MACHINE POLITICS

Machine politics often emerges as a vehicle for political enfranchisement for marginalized communities (primarily immigrants, and outside the United States, also rural voters and the urban poor). Thus, a large part of the literature understands machine politics as the product of economic marginalization and advocates increasing local wealth and redistribution in order to break clientelistic machines. However, this strategy is rarely available in disadvantaged socioeconomic contexts. Moreover, if incentive structures are unchanged, this strategy can be counterproductive, because by feeding the networks of exchange, funding reinforces rather than undermines machine politics.

Other scholars believe that economic resources influence machine politics in the opposite direction. They argue that machine politics inevitably produces political and fiscal crises by expanding voter participation and the expenditure necessary to deliver favors to voters. Fiscal crises can undermine machine politics by prompting the emergence of reform movements mobilized by private actors with high stakes in the soundness of municipal finances. Inflationary pressure can also result from electoral reform, for example, through the introduction of direct mayoral elections, because of diseconomies of scale: The more votes a candidate needs to win, the more relevant the cost of acquiring support becomes, to a point where machine politics is no longer an effective strategy of vote mobilization.

Finally, machine politics can be undermined through cultural change when voters no longer conceive of politicians as offering services only with the expectation of personal reciprocity but rather because transgression would lead to disapproval or sanction by citizens, or because the service should be provided for intrinsic (ideological) reasons, regardless of sanctions. This change in culture can be due to a variety of factors—for example, reform, revolution, or electoral change that allow voters to perceive meaningful alternatives to the use of clientelistic channels for coping with problems of economic survival.

See also *Clientelism; Mobilization, Political; Organized Crime and Mafia; Patronage; Patron-client Networks; Voting Behavior.*

. . . .   ELEONORA PASOTTI

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Macpherson, Crawford Brough (1911–1987)

Crawford Brough Macpherson (1911–1987) was a Canadian political theorist educated at the University of Toronto and the London School of Economics. After completing his studies in London, he returned to the University of Toronto, where he spent his academic career. Each year the Canadian Political Science Association awards the C. B. Macpherson Award for the best book written by a Canadian political theorist.

Macpherson, who wrote from a democratic socialist perspective, was a strong critic of liberalism and liberal democracy, particularly of their historical conflation with capitalist markets. In his political theory, he sought to retrieve the democratic elements of liberalism from the excessive influence of individual rights and commodification of social life.

Macpherson's most well-known contribution to political theory is his notion of "possessive individualism," which he contrasted with a more radical vision of democracy. By studying English political thought from the seventeenth century onward—particularly that of philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke—Macpherson attempted to uncover an "underlying unity" of a view of humanity as possessive individuals. The tensions in liberal democratic thought and problems of legitimacy in liberal political systems are, Macpherson argued, due to the underlying assumption that individuals are fundamentally possessive.

Working from this critique, Macpherson developed a novel and controversial interpretation of Hobbes and Locke. Both, Macpherson contended, thought they could observe the characteristics and motivation of individuals in a market and infer from them the characteristics of the state of nature. The possessive picture of individuals entails that the individual owns himself and his capacities, owes nothing to society, and is free so long as this ownership is respected. Society is, thus, an aggregate of self-owning individuals, which reduces social relations to exchange relations. The purpose of the state is to protect property and provide a framework for exchanging. From this concept of independent and self-interested individuals, free of society, justice, and natural law, the extent of political rights and obligations are deduced. Thus, the constitutive elements of liberal democracy—freedom, rights, obligation, and justice—bear the influence of the unifying foundation of possessive individuals.

According to Macpherson's theory of political obligation, the self-interest of possessive individuals held until the middle of the nineteenth century, when growing socioeconomic inequality undermined the possibility of shared perceptions of some fundamental equality. The opportunity to vote was extended to the working classes, who experienced a growth in class consciousness and visions of alternate forms of social organization. These changes undermined the stability of institutions based on the self-interest of possessive individuals.

Macpherson contrasted the political culture of possessive individualism and competitive theories of democracy with a view of democracy freed from its liberal baggage. He advocated a neorepublican view of life and politics in which the development of "truly" human capacities, such as rational understanding, moral judgement, aesthetic appreciation, and emotional ties, was the primary goal. With this sort of democratization, Macpherson believed society could acknowledge its interdependence and replace competition with social cooperation.

See also *Democratic Socialism; Hobbes, Thomas; Liberalism, Classical; Locke, John; Political Theory.*

. . . .   NEIL HIBBERT

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Macroeconomics

Macroeconomics is a branch of economics that studies the economy as a whole. The "economy as a whole" means the aggregation of the activities of all economic actors and its subsequent treatment as if it were one unit. It can also analyze the economy's major parts, such as the government, the private sector, or households, but in aggregation. For example, all government agencies of a state are grouped together and treated as one unit called "government." The aggregating approach of macroeconomics differs from the other level of economic analysis, microeconomics, which examines the disaggregated choices of individual consumers, firms, or government agencies.

Macroeconomics attempts to uncover consistent relationships between such nationwide phenomena as total aggregate

expenditures, total unemployment, inflation (aggregate prices), total income, total output, and total investment using sophisticated mathematical models. Governments use both fiscal (spending) and monetary instruments to develop a macroeconomic policy in order to produce sustainable growth and higher living standards as well as to guide the economy out of recessions or depressions. Voters concerned with their living standards assess the performance of national economy by examining such macroeconomic indicators as gross domestic product (GDP), the rate of inflation, unemployment rate, and the relationship among them. For example, high inflation (rapidly rising prices across the economy) can significantly decrease purchasing power of some economic actors, particularly those whose savings are held in currency.

See also *Economic Policy Formulation; Fiscal Policy; Keynesianism; Labor Policy; Monetary Policy.*

. . . .   TATIANA VASHCHILKO

Madison, James

James Madison (1751–1836) was an American politician and the fourth president of the United States. Born into a prosperous family of planters in Virginia, he was the eldest son of Nelly and James Madison. As a student, Madison excelled in history and had a keen interest in law and government. In 1769 he entered the College of New Jersey in Princeton. Here he studied the works of the great philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment and graduated in just two years. In 1772, Madison returned home, where he focused on politics and an emerging political career.

Madison made the acquaintance of his lifelong friend and mentor, Thomas Jefferson, due to his involvement with the Virginia House of Delegates. Although Madison lost his first bid for election to the House, he was chosen in 1779 to represent Virginia at the Continental Congress in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Madison returned to Virginia and was elected to the Virginia House of Delegates in 1784. In 1787, at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Madison submitted a proposal to abolish the Articles of Confederation and institute a new constitution. Often referred to as the "father of the Constitution," he was active in the subsequent debates, and his notes of the deliberations remain the most complete record of the proceedings. After taking a leading role in formulating the new constitution, Madison worked tirelessly to ensure its ratification. Together with fellow congressional delegates Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, he secretly wrote a series of articles advocating the benefits of the proposed constitution that became known as the *Federalist Papers.*

In 1789 Madison was easily elected to the newly created U.S. House of Representatives and served until 1797. He then returned to his home, Montpelier, with the intent of retiring from public service. However, he was unable to ignore national politics and accepted Jefferson's nomination to serve as secretary of state after Jefferson was elected president. In this capacity, Madison not only served as Jefferson's key advisor but also was recognized as his heir apparent.

In 1808 Madison was elected the nation's fourth president. As president, he faced a challenging international climate. He successfully acquired the western coast of Florida from Spain, which gave the United States control over the Gulf of Mexico. By June 1812, relations with Britain had deteriorated to the point that Madison asked Congress for a declaration of war. After his election to a second term in 1812, however, he found the prosecution of the war to be a daunting and difficult task, and, with American prospects looking dim, he was eager to end the hostilities. This was accomplished with the Treaty of Ghent, negotiated in December 1814. Madison focused on domestic affairs toward the end of his presidency, and in 1817 he retired to Montpelier. Active even in retirement, Madison occupied himself with the operation of his plantation and was involved in the founding of the University of Virginia. Upon Jefferson's death, Madison became the university's second rector. Madison died at Montpelier on June 28, 1836, at the age of eighty-five.

See also *Articles of Confederation; Constitutions and Constitutionalism.*

. . . .   RICHARD M. YON

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Mafia

See *Organized Crime and Mafia.*

Maghreb

The *Maghreb* refers to the North African countries of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, which formed the Maghreb Empire from the Arabization of these lands in the tenth century CE. The majority of people in the region share a common Arab identity, and Berbers represent the most significant non-Arab population. In the 1500s, Algeria was integrated into the Ottoman Empire, during which time its modern borders were established, and it remained nominally a part of the empire until its 1830 colonization by France. Morocco evaded Ottoman and Spanish conquest under the Alouite Dynasty (1666–1912) until it was colonized by France in 1912, while Tunisia was ruled from the 1700s until 1957 by Turkish governors (*beys*), notwithstanding its colonization by France in 1881.

The independence of Morocco (1956), Tunisia (1956), and Algeria (1962) from France continues to shape the contemporary political and economic landscapes of the countries.

Since independence, Algeria has been ruled by the same party, remaining tethered to the legacies of the anticolonial struggle. Morocco, while enjoying limited democratic participation, has been governed by a familial monarchy. Tunisia adopted a Republican system and has been ruled by the same party since 1957. Despite distinctions in governance, the countries continue to share similar sociocultural and linguistic characteristics.

See also *African Political Thought; Gulf States; Mashriq; Middle Eastern Politics and Society.*

. . . . SAMER ABBOUD

Magna Carta

The Magna Carta, or "Great Charter," consists of a preamble and 62 clauses that English barons extracted from King John (1167?–1216) at Runnymede in 1215 in a fruitless effort to avoid civil war. Later monarchs, including John's immediate successor, Henry III, reaffirmed this document that lies at the root of both English and American ideas of constitutionalism.

Although many of the barons' specific concerns are now dated, other legal privileges that they wrested from the king became the basis for the liberties of all English citizens, especially as later jurists like Sir Edward Coke (1552–1634) interpreted them. Provisions 14 and 61, establishing representation of the barons, provided impetus for the development of the English Parliament. During the American Revolution, the English used the Magna Carta to support their claim of parliamentary sovereignty, whereas Americans distilled from it the principle of "no taxation without representation."

Provisions of the Magna Carta are tied to modern provisions for habeas corpus. For example, Article 39 provided that "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any way harmed . . . save by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." The latter phrase has long been associated with American ideas of due process and trial by jury. Article 40 further provided that "To none will we sell, to none deny or delay, right or justice." Long after the demise of King John, the document's principles remain timeless.

See also *Due Process; Habeas Corpus; Rule of Law.*

. . . . JOHN R. VILE

Maistre, Joseph Marie de

Joseph Marie de Maistre (1753–1821) was a conservative writer, diplomat, and lawyer best remembered for his opposition to the French Revolution (1789–1799) and his defense of throne and altar. For the first half of his life, he lived in provincial obscurity as a lawyer and senator in the independent kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia. Then the armies of revolutionary France invaded his homeland in 1792, and he fled into exile. He spent the next quarter century abroad in the service of his king, most of it (1803–1817) as ambassador to the court of Tsar Alexander I in St. Petersburg, Russia. There he was a popular *salonnière* who, at the zenith of his influence, briefly acted as an advisor to both the tsar and the exiled Louis XVIII of France. He returned to his homeland in 1817 and died not long afterwards.

Maistre's first major published work was *Considérations sur la France* (*Considerations on France,* 1797). Although its immediate purpose was to rally support for royalist candidates for the French Directory, it links events in revolutionary France to much broader themes and higher purposes that take it well beyond politics. It also displays Maistre's considerable stylistic talents as a writer, for which he was much admired, even by his opponents. *Considérations* is only superficially a counterrevolutionary work. Maistre situates the violence of the 1790s within a providential framework to reveal its true nature as divine punishment for the sins of the Enlightenment. In that sense, he welcomed the revolution as a way to expiate the crimes of modern civilization. He also describes bloodshed and conflict as the norm in both natural and human history, making the revolution quite unexceptional in that regard. What was distinctive about it for Maistre was its campaign to destroy Christianity, which he regarded as a political and spiritual disaster.

Du Pape (*On the Pope,* 1819), Maistre's uncompromising defense of papal authority and infallibility, was initially coolly received by the Vatican, although it enjoyed considerable posthumous popularity and influence under the conservative pontificate of Pius IX (1846–1878). Just as the only alternative to political authoritarianism for Maistre is political chaos, so the only alternative to a centralized religious authority is religious anarchy, which he called Protestantism, "the *sans-culottisme* of religion." Maistre understood papal infallibility to mean that the pope is the final court of appeal for Catholics in religious matters.

Les Soirées de St. Pétersbourg (*The St. Petersburg Dialogues,* 1821) is Maistre's most philosophical and imaginative book and the work of which he was most proud. While it ranges far and wide, its central theme is the problem of the existence of evil in a world created and governed by God. Maistre depicts the world as pervaded by violence, bloodshed, and sin, in which countless innocent victims are sacrificed to expiate the crimes of the guilty. Beneath this surface appearance of cruelty and injustice Maistre discerned the hand of Providence at work in ways inscrutable to man. For him, humans only have the appearance of agency; the events of this world are really guided by a divine will that is beyond ultimate human comprehension.

See also *French Political Thought; Religion and Politics.*

. . . . GRAEME GARRARD

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Majority, Tyranny of the

See *Tyranny of the Majority and Minority Rights.*

Majority-minority District

Majority-minority districts are political wards in which racial minorities compose the largest voting block. The districts are created to ensure that minority votes are not diluted and to increase the number of minority officeholders. In the United States, the 1982 Voting Rights Act requires that such districts be created where feasible. Guidelines on the creation of majority-minority districts were refined by the Supreme Court case *Thornburg v. Gingles* (1986). The case mandated that majority-minority districts should be compact and geographically coherent. After the 1990 census, a significant number of majority-minority districts were created in the United States and the number of minority officeholders at the federal, state, and local levels subsequently rose dramatically, including the election of an additional thirteen African American members of Congress. However, because the districts concentrated minority voters, the redistricting resulted in electoral gains for the Republican Party, which secured an additional ten seats in the House of Representatives in the 1992 and 1994 elections because of the new districts. In 1993, the Supreme Court ruled in *Shaw v. Reno* that race could not be the only determinant in creating new districts, but it could be a factor.

See also *Gerrymandering; Redistricting.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

Malatesta, Errico

Errico Malatesta (1853–1932) was an Italian anarcho-communist whose writings remain influential within contemporary anarchist movements. Initially an advocate of an insurrectionary approach to social change emphasizing the agitational work of small bands of activists in fomenting uprisings or revolution, Malatesta came to argue that anarchists should be most active mobilizing within working-class communities. A writer and theorist in addition to a militant organizer and revolutionary activist, Malatesta edited several popular anarchist newspapers, presenting his views on unions, revolution, farm work, and peace.

Malatesta was born in Santa Maria Capua Vetere in southern Italy. His first arrest came at the age of 14, for writing a letter to King Victor Emmanuel II critical of local injustices. He went on to study medicine at the University of Naples but was expelled in 1871 for participating in a demonstration. A supporter of the Paris Commune, he joined the Naples section of the International Workingmen's Association (the First International).

In 1872 he met the great anarchist Mikhail Bakunin while participating in the St. Imier congress of the International. During the following four-year period, Malatesta was arrested twice for agitational work on behalf of the International.

In 1877 he was forced to flee Italy due to surveillance by authorities, beginning a lengthy period of exile. During this time Malatesta journeyed to Geneva, Switzerland, an anarchist center, where he met leading anarchists Elisee Reclus and Peter Kropotkin and helped in the production of the anarchist newspaper *La Revolte.* Expelled from Switzerland for his work, he made his way to London. Following his involvement in the 1881 congress of the International, he helped give rise to the Anarchist International, reflecting the growing split with Marxists in the First International and anarchist rejection of authoritarian socialism.

After a stint fighting British colonial troops in Egypt in 1882, Malatesta returned to Italy and founded the anarchist newspaper *La Question Sociale.* Fleeing a prison sentence, he once again left Italy, landing in Argentina in 1885. In Buenos Aires he resumed publication of *La Question Sociale* and helped to found the first radical labor union in Argentina, the Bakers Union. Malatesta's work with the Bakers Union would help lay the groundwork for a lasting anarchist influence on the union movement and working class organizing in Argentina.

Upon his return to Italy in 1889, he founded the newspaper *L'Associazione* before again fleeing to London, where he would live for the next eight years. His significant, and still published, pamphlet *L'Anarchia* was published during his time in London.

In 1907 Malatesta participated in the International Anarchist Congress of Amsterdam, an anarchist alternative to the Marxist party–dominated Second International, or Social Democratic International. During the congress, Malatesta took part in a significant debate with Pierre Monatte on the character of syndicalism and the relationships between anarchism and trade unionism. Monatte, a radical trade unionist, considered syndicalism to be revolutionary, providing the suitable organization for ushering in postcapitalist society.

For Malatesta, syndicalism itself is not sufficient for creating the conditions for social revolution. In his view, unions are typically reformist, seeking bread and butter gains for workers within the constricted framework of capitalist social relations and waged labor. The point is instead to end those relations and abolish the system of waged labor itself.

Even worse, unions were often conservative, working with employers as a low level management layer that served to impose the conditions of contracts and to discipline workers between bargaining periods. Unions served to divide workers

by trade, workplace, or skill set, with some workers using unions to maintain their relative privilege over other workers.

Malatesta advocated the development of explicitly anarchist organizations to sustain a unity of theory and practice that would encourage the revolutionary work of anarchists and support the theoretical and tactical development of anarchism, rather than succumbing to concerns over immediate day-to-day issues that come to dominate trade union work. He maintained a principled perspective of anarchism as a revolutionary theory and argued that violence, rather than a moral issue, was a necessity of working-class efforts to gain emancipation.

With the outbreak of World War I (1914–1918), Malatesta found himself opposing his comrade Peter Kropotkin, who had argued for the victory of French culture over German barbarism. For Malatesta, bourgeois wars were no option for working-class people who would be massacred in defense of the interests of one ruling class over another.

Malatesta died in 1932 in fascist Italy. His works have been picked up by activists in the contemporary alternative globalization movements, making him among the most influential anarchists within contemporary anarchist movements.

See also *Anarchism; Anarchy; Communism; Marxism.*

. . . . JEFFREY SHANTZ

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Mandarins

Mandarins were political, military, and judicial officials of the Chinese Empire. The term was coined by the Portuguese from the Malay term *mantra* or councilor. The mandarins were classified into 18 different ranks and gained office through a series of rigorous examinations that could last six weeks. Many who aspired to become mandarins began training and preparation as young as age five. The mandarin system was the world's first merit-based bureaucracy and provided a high degree of social mobility. Nonetheless, the offspring of mandarins or other elites typically had an advantage over commoners. The mandarin system was based on Confucianism and was responsible for the stability of the empire. Mandarins enjoyed status and privilege, and the higher-ranking officials became substantially wealthy.

However, in the empire's later years, the mandarins became increasingly reactionary and blocked reform efforts. In the twentieth century, the term *mandarin* was applied to a new class of political leaders and officials whose careers were based on merit and educational credentials. Noam Chomsky's *American Power and the New Mandarins* presented a highly critical appraisal of liberal intellectuals, such as Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who supported U.S. participation in the Vietnam War (1959–1975).

See also *Asia Pacific Region Politics and Society; Asian Political Thought; Executive, The; Governance; Regime.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Mandates, Federal

See *Federal Mandates.*

Mandate System

The mandate system was an innovative international procedure to assist the transition toward independence of former colonies and dependencies after World War I (1914–1918). The mandate system was established by the founding treaty of the League of Nations (1919) and represented a compromise between the new liberal principles of international politics, promoted mainly by American president Woodrow Wilson, and the assertions of influence by the countries that emerged victorious from the war. The Covenant of the League of Nations acknowledged the right of the people of these territories to self-government but made this conditional on their capacity to support statehood and sovereignty.

Under the mandate procedures, Germany and the Ottoman Empire lost all of their territorial possessions in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. Mandates were divided into three categories according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances (League of Nations Covenant, Article 22, paragraph 3). The territories previously under the authority of the Ottoman Empire were included in Mandate A, as they had homogeneous and politically organized populations, and became *de facto* sovereign. Under Mandate A, national elites had the authority to self-organize and the right to choose their own mandate country, which was required to assist the territory in gaining independence. Most of the former German possessions in Africa were included in Mandate B, as they were considered to be less developed. The territories with sparse and small populations were included in Mandate C and were considered part of the territory of the mandate country.

Great Britain became the mandate country for the Mandate A territories Iraq and Palestine, including Transjordan (1992), and the Mandate B territories British Cameroon, Tanganyika, and a part of Togoland. France became the mandate country for the Mandate A territory Syria (including Lebanon) and the Mandate B territories French Cameroon and part of Togoland. Belgium became the mandate country for the Mandate B territory Rwanda-Urundi. Great Britain together with Australia and New Zealand became the mandate country for the Mandate C territories of Nauru, Australia for New Guinea, Japan for several South Pacific island groups (Carolinas, Marianas, Marshall Islands, and Palau), New Zealand for Samoa, and South Africa for South-West Africa.

The mandate countries had to be involved directly in the mandated territories' administration but only to assure the "freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals" (League of Nations Covenant, Article 22, paragraph 5). The arrangements were coordinated through the league's specialized body, the Permanent Mandates Commission. The commission had the right to set the policies for each mandated territory if they were not specified in the treaties, and each country taking responsibility for a mandated territory had to submit an annual report to the commission. The mandate system, formally terminated in 1945 upon dissolution of the League of Nations, was replaced by the trusteeship system organized under the newly formed United Nations. The majority of mandate territories included in categories B and C, with the exception of South-West Africa, retained their semi-independent status under the new system. The Mandate A territories gained their independence: Iraq (1932), Lebanon (1943), Syria (1944), Transjordan (1946), and Israel (1948).

The significance and impact of the mandate system remain disputed. It was both a continuation of imperial/colonial practices in international politics and a recognition of the right of self-determination and the growing illegitimacy of colonial rule. Most of the territories included in the mandate system eventually became independent, but it is not clear to what extent the mandate system contributed to their overall stability and development.

See also *League of Nations; United Nations.*

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Mandate Theory

The mandate theory of representation states that an elected representative should behave as a true agent to his/her principal, the constituency. Representatives are therefore expected to serve the interests of their constituents. Hence the theory requires that the policies adopted by incumbents be those preferred by voters. The theory also requires that political campaigns convey information to voters such that voters can make an informed choice between alternative policies. In addition, policies proposed in political campaigns should be those in the interest of the voters.

The theory rests on of a number of assumptions in order for representation to work properly. First, representatives must believe that they are obliged to behave according to the preferences found in the constituency or to have the same interests as their voters. If this requirement is not met, the constituency needs a credible sanction mechanism that can be used to induce the representative to act according to the interests of the constituency. One mechanism is electoral defeat of the representative, but with years between elections, this is a rather blunt and inefficient mechanism. Representatives may choose to breach campaign promises early in a term in hopes that voters will have forgotten by the next election.

A second assumption is that politicians should want reelection. Without such a desire, it is difficult, if not impossible, for constituents to sanction representatives. Hence, if term limits are imposed, it should be expected that representatives in their last term are much less representative than their first-term counterparts.

Third, it should be possible for a representative to get information on what constituents' preferences are on various issues. If this information is not available, either through the press or advocacy groups, it is extremely difficult for the representative to act appropriately. Furthermore, information asymmetries may cause problems: Information must be of sufficient quality that it reflects the distribution of preferences in the constituency. Deciding which information to rely on is therefore important, since a representative could be misled by his sources of information.

Finally, politicians must be concerned with the credibility of their promises. Since promises about the future are what opposition politicians have to offer, they must be able to credibly propose policies that voters believe will be enacted should the candidate gain office. Candidates need this credibility to send signals that their promises in campaigns can be trusted, and their signals must contain information on which choices between candidates can be based. Candidates who cannot send this signal cannot convince voters that their policies are in the interest of voters, even if this might be the case from an objective point of view.

See also *Constituency; Constituency Relations.*

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Manifesto

A *manifesto* is a document that details the values, principles, and goals of an individual or political organization. Manifestos are generally written as public documents and provide people with information about a group or movement, but manifestos can also be secret and designed to provide internal guidance for an organization or government. Manifestos are often

issued to explain policy changes or to accompany the launch of a new political party or grouping. Examples of influential political manifestos include the U.S. Declaration of Independence (1776), the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), the *Communist Manifesto* (1848), and the Contract with America (1994). For instance, the Declaration of Independence promulgated the founding principles of the U.S. political system, while the *Communist Manifesto* was instrumental in the development of communism as a political ideology. During election campaigns, parties and candidates typically develop manifestos that highlight policy stances and provide an overview of their legislative agendas. In the United States and other countries, such manifestos are commonly referred to as party platforms. Extremist groups and marginal political factions often endeavor to use manifestos to garner publicity.

See also *Communism; French Political Thought; Political Party Platform.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Mannheim, Karl

Karl Mannheim (1893–1947), was a Hungarian-born sociologist. He is considered one of the leading figures in the development of sociology as a discipline and is regarded as the founder of the sociology of knowledge.

Mannheim, originally named Mannheim Károly, was born in Budapest, which was then part of the Hapsburg Empire. He studied in several cities before completing his doctoral dissertation, "The Structural Analysis of Knowledge," in 1922. From 1922 to 1925, he worked at the University of Heidelberg under Alfred Weber, the brother of German sociologist Max Weber. In 1926 Mannheim started teaching sociology courses at Heidelberg.

In 1930 Mannheim was appointed professor of sociology and economics at the University of Frankfurt. In 1933, as part of the Nazi regime's persecution of Jews, he was fired from his position at Frankfurt. Forced to flee Germany, he was invited to England by British political scientist Harold Laski. Mannheim became a lecturer in sociology at the London School of Economics, where Laski taught. In 1944 Mannheim joined the University of London's Institute of Education as a professor of education and sociology. He was appointed chair of education at the institute in 1946; he held this position until his death the following year. During his years in London, Mannheim edited the *International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction* series.

Mannheim is best known for his work on the sociology of knowledge. In 1929 he wrote *Ideologie und Utopie* (published in English as *Ideology and Utopia* in 1936). He believed that knowledge could not be isolated but was related to its social context. Mannheim called this approach "relationism," and it took into account the influence of social factors, status, and class. The objective is to explain how people frame, perceive, and interpret information. Knowledge is not conveyed to people unfiltered—they interpret knowledge though filters based on culture, position, interests, and ideologies. Mannheim distinguished between two types of ideology: particular and total. A particular ideology is composed of the ideas that reflect an individual's own specific interest. Total ideology is how people see the world around them.

Ideology was not a concept invented by Mannheim. He acknowledged German philosopher Karl Marx's theory of ideology. However, Mannheim was critical of Marx's belief that ideologies involve the conscious intention to distort reality and questioned Marx's view that ideologies emerged only from social classes. While Mannheim agreed with Marx that class stratification was a source of ideology, he believed it was not the only source.

After his move to England, Mannheim began to consider education and democratic social planning as critical to the survival of democratic society. *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (1940) and the posthumously published *Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning* (1950) reflected this concern.

See also *Ideologies, Political; Marx, Karl; Political Philosophy.*

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Maoism

Maoism refers to the body of thought and practices associated with Mao Zedong (1893–1976). As the leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Mao led the party to victory in 1949 by defeating the Nationalist Party under Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) in a protracted civil war that dated back to 1927. Maoism was thus inextricably linked to the Chinese Communist revolution.

When the CCP was first founded in 1921, it was directly under the command of the Comintern (1919–1943), an international communist organization founded in Moscow, and followed its prescribed Leninist-Stalinist revolutionary strategy. This entailed a temporary alliance with the Nationalist Party under the first United Front in 1924 in order to stage a bourgeois national revolution that aimed at forging national unity. But the alliance was short-lived. Chiang Kai-shek, who succeeded Sun Yat-sen as the leader of the Nationalists in 1925, launched a full-blown attack on the Communists in 1927. However, this major political setback for the party was to pave the way for the rise of Mao as its paramount leader, with his own distinctive brand of communism.

Performers in Beijing stand before a giant poster of Mao Zedong, the founder of communist China. Maoism adapted Marxist-Leninist thought to suit China and relied heavily on peasant participation.

SOURCE: AP Images

MAOISM AS A REVOLUTIONARY DOCTRINE

Under Mao, Marxism–Leninism underwent two important modifications. First was the systematic recruitment of the peasantry as a revolutionary class that was vital to the communist movement. Partly out of disillusionment with the workers, and partly because of firsthand experience in rural China, Mao provided a powerful account of what he considered to be progressive revolutionary acts of the peasantry in his well-known work, "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" (1927). Second was the appropriation of what should have been an internationalist movement for a nationalist cause. As Mao put it, there is no such thing as Marxism in the abstract. Rather, there is only "concrete" Marxism, which is the "application of Marxism via a national form" (Mao, "On the New Stage," 1938).

These modifications were officially adopted by the CCP under the banner of Mao Zedong Thought in its 1945 Party Constitution. Mao Zedong Thought as such was Marxism-Leninism adapted to the Chinese reality, which entailed the fact that China was a premodern agrarian society. Moreover, since the mid-nineteenth century, its sovereignty had persistently been encroached upon by Western and, eventually, Japanese imperialism. But more important, underlying these modifications was a strong determination by Mao the leader to bring about a fundamental remaking of the Chinese polity and society in accordance with what he took to be the Marxist historical trajectory. Having been chased out of the Jiangxi Soviet (1931–1934) by the Nationalists and survived the Long March (1934–1935), Mao appeared to be more convinced that the human will, if engaged methodically, could overcome any obstacles that came into the way of this revolutionary endeavor.

Human will aside, Mao was also an astute strategist. Not only did he subscribe wholeheartedly to the Leninist notion of a vanguard party led by professional revolutionaries like himself, Mao was convinced that "political power grows out of the barrel of guns" (Mao, "Problems of War and Strategy," 1938). Maoism is thus known for its skillful deployment of guerrilla tactics, which capitalized on effective use of limited resources, including recruiting civilians for small-scale military operations. In addition, along with his chief military comrades, Zhu De (1886–1976) and Peng Dehuai (1898–1974), Mao built the legendary People's Liberation Army, which was marked by its ideological commitment to the revolutionary cause and its solidarity with the people. In short, strategic deployment of localized military operations and grassroots political work were all part of a larger war strategy. These elements of Maoism were widely adopted for colonial struggles in Asia and Africa after World War II (1939–1945) and continue to fuel insurgency in countries such as Peru and India.

MAOISM AND DEVELOPMENT

As a development strategy, however, Maoism has a much more troubled legacy. It was characterized by three elements: (1) a voluntaristic approach to change by mobilizing the people on a mass scale (*yundong*), often to the level of frenzy; (2) a commitment to level the differences between the city and the countryside, the peasants and the workers, and mental and manual labor; and (3) the conviction that socialism is capable of generating its own class enemies. Together, these factors were instrumental in orchestrating two of the largest human-made disasters of the twentieth century—the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1969). Tens of millions of lives were lost as a result.

See also *Asia Pacific Region Politics and Society; Asian Political Thought; Communism; Chinese Political Thought.*

. . . .   THERESA M. LEE

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Marcuse, Herbert

Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979) was a German-Jewish social theorist and political activist. He was a member of the majority faction of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) between 1917 and 1919. After World War I (1914–1918), he participated in Berlin's revolutionary Soldiers' Council. However, he resigned from both the SDP and the council, ending his only organized political affiliations, and in 1919 resumed studies in German literature, philosophy, and political economy at the University of Freiburg, where he earned his doctorate.

In 1928 he began work as an assistant to well-known German philosopher Martin Heidegger. In 1933 Marcuse became a member of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research at the institute's Geneva, Switzerland, branch. The following year he immigrated to the United States and continued his work with the institute at Columbia University in New York City. Between 1942 and 1950, Marcuse was a research analyst for the U.S. government. His first permanent academic position was at Brandeis University in Massachusetts. After his retirement from Brandeis, he became a professor of philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. Between the mid-1960s and his death, he attained his greatest fame as both an advocate and critic of new left theories and practices. He died in Starnberg, West Germany, in 1979.

Marcuse's first published works dated to his period with Heidegger. Marcuse attempted to synthesize Marxism with existential philosophy. When he joined the Institute for Social Research, he participated in the collective effort to develop a "critical theory of society." His primary task was the philosophical articulation of the fundamental principles of this critical theory, which culminated in his book *Reason and Revolution* (1941). When Marcuse resumed his academic career in 1950, one of the thrusts of his work was the analysis of the ideological obstacles to revolution. His book *Soviet Marxism* (1955) traces the Soviet transformation of Marxism from a form of critical thinking designed to guide revolutionary political practice into an ideological prop to the existing status quo. His controversial 1965 essay, "Repressive Tolerance," analyzes the degeneration of the liberal idea of tolerance. The masterpiece of Marcuse's ideological criticism was *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), his most famous work. Here Marcuse describes the smooth and comfortable totalitarianism of advanced industrial societies—including the development of the welfare and warfare state,

the mass media, and modern technology—which he believes has engendered a mass conformity and suppressed the development of genuine alternatives to the status quo.

If Marcuse's criticism of ideology emphasized the obstacles to revolution, the Freudian-Marxist thrust of his postwar work raised the stakes involved in revolution. In *Eros and Civilization* (1955), he put forth the belief that true revolutionary emancipation went beyond political and economic change to include the social, sensuous, and sexual emancipation of the instincts. Marcuse's critique of society exerted some influence on the protean movement of dissent known as the new left. The new left was opposed by the old socialist and Communist lefts and disavowed by most established intellectuals. But in *An Essay on Liberation* (1969) and *Counterrevolution and Revolt* (1972), Marcuse took a more favorable view. He never minimized the power of the forces opposed to revolutionary change, nor did he uncritically endorse the new left, but he was attentive to the spark of genuine human emancipation in the movement's goals.

Marcuse's last works explored the theme of art and revolution. He argued that art preserved an image of human freedom and happiness. His last book, *The Aesthetic Dimension* (1978), combated the orthodox Marxist tendency to trivialize art by reducing it to the status of a mere ideological reflection of social classes.

See also *German Political Thought; Heidegger, Martin; Marxism; New Left; Political Philosophy; Radicalism; Revolutions, Comparative.*

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Marginal District

A marginal district is a legislative district in which the electorate is closely divided between supporters of opposing parties. The relative electoral fortunes of the parties in marginal districts serve as indicators of national trends, because the narrow margin of victory renders them more susceptible to change than so-called safe seats. These volatile districts also serve as test cases for theories of representation. For example, members of Congress elected from marginal districts seem more likely to be concerned about their electoral future than those elected from safer districts. Thus, marginal members' activities and success toward securing their seats provide insight into legislative behavior.

The decreasing number of marginal districts—traditionally defined as districts whose representatives have won their seats with less than 55 percent of the vote—has sparked debate among political science scholars. Explanations for this phenomenon include gerrymandering, increased constituency services by incumbents, and declining party affiliation in the electorate, resulting in an increase in the personal vote and incumbency advantage. Other scholars maintain incumbents' safety is no greater despite the increase in their average vote percentage since the 1960s.

Because the number of marginal districts is ostensibly linked to the number of seats likely to change partisan hands in an election, the decline of these competitive districts has inspired concern among commentators. In this view, an increase in safe seats deadens the electoral impact of shifting public opinion. Other scholars note that razor-thin victories produce a greater number of citizens dissatisfied with election outcomes compared to constituents in more lopsided districts.

See also *Districting; District Magnitude; Electoral Geography.*

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Mariátegui, José Carlos

José Carlos Mariátegui (1894–1930) was a Peruvian activist, political theorist, and writer. He was born in Moquegua in 1894. His father abandoned his family, creating economic difficulties that were further exacerbated by a serious injury to Mariátegui's left leg that left him in poor health for much of his life. Mariátegui entered the newspaper trade as an errand boy, ultimately taking on the position of a writer. In 1916

he began working for a leftist newspaper, *El Tiempo,* before establishing his own newspaper, *La Razón,* two years later. *La Razón* published many articles on university reform and defended the young labor movement in Peru. This drew the attention of Peruvian officials, who invited Mariátegui to cease publication of his paper in favor of travel abroad.

Mariátegui traveled throughout Europe and settled in Italy for two years, long enough to gain exposure to Italian trade union activism and experience the dangers of nascent fascism first hand. He returned to Peru in 1923, committed to political action, and began forming connections with populist movements. In 1924 Mariátegui nearly died from a tumor in his left leg. The leg was amputated, and for the rest of his life he relied upon others to carry him and provide for his physical mobility. This episode seemed only to catalyze his intellectual energies, however, as he founded a new journal, *Amautu,* in 1926 to advance discussions of socialism and culture in Latin America. Two years later he founded what would become the Communist Party of Peru.

In 1928 Mariátegui published *Seven Interpretive Essays in Peruvian Reality,* which is his best-known theoretical work. In it he synthesizes his political experiences and observations into powerfully written and widely accessible essays. The work includes a lucid analysis of the particular economic legacies of different stages of colonialism in Peru. Mariátegui argues that indigenous practices had been a form of socialism that had largely been replaced by Spanish colonizers, who imported the structures of feudalism. While pockets of the old communal economies remained, Peru had "developed" into a feudal economy in the modern era, and further economic development would only exacerbate inequality, unless all feudal remnants were eradicated.

Mariátegui also examined the impact of Spanish colonial attitudes as they persisted in the universities. In *Seven Interpretive Essays,* he also argues that the universities guarded prestige and encouraged the study of rarified knowledge, with no concern for pragmatic education or progress of any kind. He states that the attempt to reform the universities in 1921 had failed because the colonial economy was still intact, claiming, "The problem of education cannot be understood in our time if it is not considered as an economic and social problem. The mistake of many reformers has been their abstract and idealistic methods and their exclusively pedagogical approach."

This discussion of education exemplifies Mariátegui's unique practice of Marxism: He combined materialist principles with the specifics of Peruvian colonial and cultural history and rejected abstract programs in favor of localized analysis. His work provides guidance and a methodology for political activists interested in land reform, indigenous peoples, and education. Mariátegui died in 1930 of complications from his earlier illnesses.

See also *Latin American Political Thought; Marxism; Political Theory.*

. . . . KEALLY MCBRIDE

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Maritain, Jacques

Jacques Maritain (1882–1973) of France was one of the most influential Catholic thinkers of the twentieth century, and he dominates Catholic social thought as a defender of human rights and freedom. Born in Paris, he was brought up as a liberal Protestant but converted to Catholicism in 1906 at the age of twenty-four. He was a professor of the Institut Catholique from 1914 to 1940, and thereafter he taught at Columbia, Princeton, and the universities of Toronto and Chicago. The author of more than fifty books, he was a preeminent interpreter of philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas and a creative thinker in his own right on such topics as metaphysics, moral philosophy, social and political philosophy, the philosophy of art, and the theory of knowledge. The main focuses of his writings were the defense of Catholic humanism, Thomism, and human rights.

Maritain's primary work in epistemology was *Distinguish to Unite: Or, The Degrees of Knowledge* (1932). Maritain insisted on the priority of epistemology over metaphysics and maintained that the structures and methods of the various sciences were determined by the nature of the object to be known. He called this view "critical realism," and it holds that what the mind knows is identical with what exists. When it comes to a knowledge of sensible objects, the mind has both a passive role (receiving sense impressions) and an active one (constructing knowledge from these impressions). Maritain's epistemology also sought to explain the nature of knowledge found in religious faith and mysticism. He believed there are degrees of suprarational knowledge that are beyond natural knowledge, such as revealed mysteries, theological wisdom, and mystical theology. Theological wisdom is built on faith and mystical knowledge or unmediated knowledge communicated by the deity.

Maritain's moral and political philosophy lies within the Aristotelian-Thomistic natural law tradition, which holds that there is an unwritten law remaining within nature derived from eternal law. Such a law is coextensive with morality and has a teleological character in which the end determines the function. Maritain held that a single natural law governs all beings, and it is known connaturally through a process called *synderesis.* Knowledge of this natural law varies according to a person's capacities and abilities and is progressively and incrementally appropriated by an individual.

Maritain's moral philosophy cannot be considered independently of his analysis of human nature. A key notion in his moral philosophy is freedom. He perceived the idea of freedom not as the license of pure autonomy but as harmony with the essential nature of each human being. He distinguished between a human being as a part of the human race and as a person who is an object of dignity. By virtue of their individuality, human beings have obligations to the social order, but by virtue of their personality, they cannot be subordinated to that order.

Maritain defined his political philosophy as "integral Christian humanism." The object of it was to outline the conditions necessary to make the individual more fully human and to bring all the dimensions of human personality together without diminishing the value of any. For Maritain, the best political order is one that recognizes the sovereignty of God. He proposed a theocentric humanism based on the recognition of all human beings as material and spiritual beings at the same time.

Maritain envisaged a political society under the rule of law. He distinguishes four types of law: (1) the eternal, (2) the natural, (3) the common law of civilization (*jus gentium*), and (4) the positive (*droit positif*). The natural law is universal and invariable and deals with rights and duties, but it is not founded on human nature. Instead it is rooted in divine reason and in a transcendent order written into human nature by God. Natural law becomes obligatory only because it is part of divine law. The *jus gentium* is an extension of natural law applicable to human beings as social beings. Positive law is the system of rules and regulations that assure general social order. It varies according to the stage of economic and social development. Neither *jus gentium* nor positive law can act against natural law, although they are not deducible from natural law alone.

Maritain's vision was that of Christian commonwealth, a new Christendom where Christian faith, by the integral character of its theocentric humanism, could unify, without denying the distinctiveness of, the temporal and the spiritual and could provide a positive framework for a personalist, communal, and pluralistic democracy. He called for a new integral humanism that would recognize all that is irrational in humans, in order to tame it to reason, and all that is suprarational, in order to have reason vivified by it and to open humans to the descent of the divine in them. Its main work would be to cause the Gospel leaven to penetrate the secular structures of life and sanctify the temporal order.

Maritain held that the natural law theory entailed the establishment of human rights. He believed since the natural end of each person is to achieve moral and spiritual perfection, it is necessary to have the means to do so and no one should be deprived of the rights necessary to achieve a good life. However, since such rights are not universally recognized, they can be acquired only gradually and incrementally. Because rights are fundamental and inalienable, they are superior to civil law. Rights are grounded in natural law in relation to the common good. It is this common good, not rights, that is the basis of the state. Maritain favored a democratic and legal theory of the state that was personalist, pluralist, and Christian. Thus a true democracy represents not merely the will of the people,

but the will of God. True and positive freedom comes from the equality of all, the rulers and the ruled, under a sovereign God and the use of the common goods for the common good. An ideal polity will consist of a number of civic fraternities founded on freedom, inspired by virtue, and exercising discipline and democratic values. In a global society, such a polity would consist of a network of a federation of such fraternities.

Maritain's works have been translated into twenty languages, and he continues to be influential in the early twenty-first century. The University of Notre Dame is home to the Jacques Maritain Center, which fosters the study of his work. Three journals are devoted to his work, *Etudes Maritainiennes/ Maritain Studies, Notes et Documents,* and the *Cahiers Jacques et Raissa Maritain*. There are also national associations in his name, including the International Jacques Maritain Institute in Italy.

See also *Natural Law; Natural Rights; Thomas Aquinas; Thomist, Scholastic, and Medieval Political Thought.*

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Market Socialism

Market socialism is a political economic system employing the marketplace to distribute goods and services while still adhering to the basic egalitarian values of Marxism. Market socialism arose as an alternative to the centrally planned economy in the Soviet Union.

Karl Marx criticized capitalism and the use of markets to distribute goods and services for several reasons. In his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* and *The German Ideology* (1845–1846), Marx leveled a philosophical and sociological attack on capitalism. Capitalism destroyed the essential bonds that connected individuals, producing a sense of alienation from oneself, others, the process of production, and nature. These initial philosophical criticisms matured into economic arguments in the *Communist Manifesto* (1848) and in several volumes of *Capital* (Volume 1, 1867).

In his economic critique, Marx contended that capitalism involved the exploitation of the workers or proletariat by the bourgeoisie. While the proletariat was the source of all value, their labor power had been purchased by the bourgeoisie, who owned the means of production. This extracting of what Marx called the "surplus value" from the workers impoverished them, and, over the long term, the development of capitalism would increase the size of the proletariat at the expense of the bourgeoisie. Capitalism, as Marx described it in the *Communist Manifesto,* produced the seeds of its own self-destruction. Overall, Marx and Marxists depicted capitalism and the use of markets as producing social alienation; class warfare; and economic misery, inefficiencies, and inequalities.

Because of Marx's attack on capitalism, the Marxist-socialist tradition was critical of markets. However, market socialism arose from three distinct sources. The first traces itself back to early efforts to revise Marxism to accommodate the theory to events that occurred after Marx died. One notable effort was by Eduard Bernstein in *Evolutionary Socialism* (1898). Bernstein's democratic socialism is not to be confused with market socialism. Bernstein essentially accepted Marx's criticism of capitalism and markets, yet the former's efforts to accommodate parliamentary democracy with communism left open subsequent attempts to make other revisions to Marxist theory and practice.

A second source of market socialism occurred in the early 1920s after the 1917 Russian Revolution. Here, Vladimir Lenin, following the revolution and the instability flowing from the transition to a centrally planned and controlled economy, instituted in 1921 the "new economic policy" (NEP). NEP allowed for some private ownership in agriculture and industry as a way to encourage production. Following Lenin's death in 1924, Nicholas Bukharin, another leading communist official, advocated many of the NEP reforms. In 1928 Joseph Stalin ended NEP and the use of markets when he instituted the first of several five-year plans.

Perhaps the most important theoretical arguments for combining Marxism or socialism with economic markets are in the works of Polish economist Oskar Lange (1904–1969). Rejecting Marx's labor theory of value, Lange sought to combine neoclassical economic theory, especially its concepts on pricing, with some of the central planning concepts of Marxism. In his most famous book, *On the Economic Theory of Socialism* (1936), Lange argued that central planning boards (CPBs) should set general pricing and goals for a national economy but that markets could be used to direct production. The state could run an efficient economy with markets that furthered socialist goals. It is this combining of macro socialist ideas and CPBs with markets that constitute the core concept of market socialism.

The most elaborate efforts at implementing market socialism came in Yugoslavia in the 1950s and 1960s under Josip Tito. The state had a CPB setting investment policies and goals, with workers' councils managing enterprises that competed against one another in the marketplace. Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, under Communist Party head Alexander Dubček, also experimented with market reforms while still under communist control, with varying economic success. Even the Soviet Union began to liberalize its economic policies to allow for some market reforms in the late 1980s before its breakup.

Today, the vestiges of market socialism may be found in European welfare states such as Austria and the Scandinavian countries, which combine the use of economic markets for some items and an extensive public sector delivery of basic goods such as health care and other necessities.

See also *Marx, Karl; Marxism; Socialism; Soviet Union, Former.*

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Marshall Plan

The Marshall Plan was a broad package of economic and commercial aid that the United States granted to European countries in the aftermath of World War II (1939–1945). The aid was intended to provide Europe with money to restart international trade in food, to avoid starvation, and to buy from the United States food, fuel, and capital goods to rebuild the continent's devastated industrial base. It was also an effort to avoid the problems created in the aftermath of World War I (1914–1918) caused by a combination of high reparations imposed on the defeated Central powers and a wave of rising protectionism during the late 1920s and 1930s. The initiative, named after Secretary of State George Marshall and formally known as the European Recovery Plan (ERP), operated from 1948 to 1952 and was a cornerstone of the comprehensive foreign policy of the administration of Harry S. Truman in the opening days of the cold war.

The ERP was developed in reaction to proposals such as the Morgenthau Plan that argued for European reconstruction based on the extraction of resources from Germany. Marshall came away from the 1947 Moscow Conference convinced that the Soviet Union and the United States would not be able to reconcile their foreign policy priorities, and, therefore, it was imperative that the Truman administration undertake dramatic measures to rebuild Western Europe so that the region would be able to resist Soviet continental expansion and contribute to the larger needs of transatlantic security. The outlines of the plan were developed by U.S. Department of State officials, including George F. Kennan, and the proposal was approved by Truman despite concerns that Congress would be unwilling to provide the reconstructions funds. Marshall promulgated the plan at his commencement address at Harvard University on June 5, 1947. Truman was able to work with leading Republicans in Congress, including Senator Arthur Vandenberg, to gain bipartisan support, and he signed legislation authorizing the ERP in April 1948.

Multilateral planning for the Marshall Plan began in July, when all of the states of Europe, with the exception of Spain, were invited to a conference to discuss terms and conditions of U.S. aid. The Soviets declined to participate and prevented those states of Eastern Europe under their control from attending. Soviet concerns were based on U.S. demands for economic openness as a precondition for participation and the potential that the ERP could undermine Moscow's control in Eastern Europe.

Negotiations resulted in an agreement whereby the United States would provide aid and loans to sixteen countries in exchange for economic reforms, including tariff eliminations, and oversight by an American agency, the Economic Cooperation Administration. The multilateral Organization for European Economic Cooperation was created to coordinate planning and aid distribution. (The body later became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). Over a four-year period, the United States provided more than $13 billion in aid to Western Europe. The ERP was critically important in rebuilding the shattered economies of Western Europe and binding those states to the United States during the cold war. The participating states experienced an average increase in gross domestic product of more than 30 percent and an increase in their industrial output by more than 40 percent. Subsequent U.S. efforts to develop similar multilateral or regional aid programs never met the level of success of the Marshall Plan.

See also *Foreign Policy Role; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Strategic Interest.*

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Marsilius of Padua

Marsilius of Padua (1275–1343) was an Italian scholar, educated as a physician, whose intellectual outlook was typical of the secular, educated classes residing in the Italian city-states of his time. His major political work, *The Defender of the Peace* (*Defensor Pacis,* 1324), addressed such questions as the nature of the secular state, the idea of popular sovereignty, and the causes of political order and disorder. But his most important contribution was his account of the separation of secular and religious authority and his claims regarding popular sovereignty.

Marsilius was influenced by Aristotle, particularly the *Politics,* but also by later Averroist philosophers. The influence of Aristotle is reflected in his secular understanding of politics in the temporal world, the importance of empirical observation, and his suspicion of claims to dogmatic obedience to established belief. Like many medieval political thinkers, Marsilius accepted Aristotle's three-fold division of regimes into those that embody rule of one, rule of the few, or rule of the many. Each type of regime may exist in either its ideal form or a corrupted version. Hence, rule of the one can be either a monarchy or despotism;

rule of the few aristocracy or oligarchy; rule of the many either constitutionalism or mob rule. What distinguishes any type of regime is whether those in authority rule in the common good (the ideal form) or whether they rule in their own interests at the expense of the community (the corrupt version). This distinction became one of the defining criteria for distinguishing between tyranny and just political systems.

Marsilius also showed the influence of Aristotle when he argued for a radical separation between reason, philosophy, and knowledge on the one hand and faith and theology on the other. The latter, being nonrational, were irrelevant for temporal issues. Temporal affairs are known through human reason and governed by positive, that is, human-made law enacted by the body of citizens, its "prevailing part," or its representatives. In contrast, divine and natural law comes from God directly and concerns punishments and rewards in the world to come. Hence, Marsilius argued for limitations on the authority of the church in temporal affairs. Indeed, Marsilius actually claimed that one of the primary threats to civil peace came from those "Roman bishops" (i.e., popes) who sought to extend their coercive jurisdiction to temporal matters.

The distinction between natural/divine law and positive law further led Marsilius to emphasize the importance of the legislator with regard to temporal, secular affairs and highlighted two functions. The first is that of the "primary" or "absolute" legislator and refers to the source of ultimate or final constitutional authority. The second lies in the making of specific laws. Marsilius argued that the former lies with the people as a whole. In the making of specific laws, the people play a role in ratifying or rejecting laws passed by their representatives. In both cases the people as a whole are likely to make better decisions than a small minority alone, and their authorship of the laws is likely to guarantee greater compliance.

In separating reason and faith, limiting spiritual power to nonworldly affairs, and emphasizing the role and consent of the people in political matters, Marsilius helped lay the foundations for the separation of religious and secular authority and representative government that would subsequently be found in the works of modern thinkers, including Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.

See also *Aristotle; Church and State; Hobbes, Thomas; Locke, John.*

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Martial Law

Martial law consists of transitory rule by military authorities of a designated area inhabited by civilians during periods of emergency. In theory, martial law is temporary, but a state of martial law in a jurisdiction may persist indefinitely (as observed in Egypt, which has been under martial law for several decades.) Martial law is not to be confused with military law, which is a collection of legal principles and regulations that apply only to members of the armed services. Military law coexists with civil authority and does not override it—martial law, alternatively, does suspend civil authority and constrains both civilians and the military.

Under martial law, absolute power is placed in the military commander to reinstate security and safety to an area disrupted by violence or some other serious disturbance, such as a war, natural disaster, a political or economic crisis, or a widespread riot. With martial law, the decisions of military leaders and institutions of the armed services reign supreme and supersede those of all civil courts and civil laws—routine civilian administration of justice and law is deferred until normal conditions are restored and allow the military to return authority to the regularly constituted government. Typically observed in martial law is suspension of habeas corpus (wherein a judge rules upon the validity/legality of a detention), the imposition of curfews requiring persons to be in their homes for a set period of time during the day and night, and the banning of public protests and demonstrations.

Mere utilization of military forces by a civilian government to maintain order does not constitute a system of martial law. The legal status, specific declarations, and particular manifestations of martial law differ from nation to nation and state to state, but they all generally involve the suspension of citizens' normal civil liberties and civil rights and the placement of ordinary civilians under military law and military justice. The regularly constituted civil courts do not engage in judicial review of the decisions of military tribunals as organized during a period of martial law.

In the American context, the U.S. Constitution does not directly enumerate the authority by the federal government to proclaim martial law. The Constitution does imply this authority by granting the federal government the duty and obligation to protect the states from external invasion or internal insurrection, found in both Article I, Section 8, and Article IV, Section 4. Thus, the power to proclaim martial law rests with the U.S. Congress and the respective state legislatures. (A strong majority of state constitutions allow their governors to declare martial law within the state.) Such declarations can legally occur only during times of bona fide emergency, and martial law must terminate when the crisis has passed. Civilian government continues to exist during a period of martial law but does recede into the background until it can once again return to effective functioning.

The military's actions need to conform to constitutional requirements in the process of maintaining order, preserving lives, and protecting property. As the U.S. Supreme Court

held in the case of *Ex parte Milligan* (1866), military tribunals cannot try civilians for nonmilitary offenses if civil courts are still operating. Military commanders must conscientiously and properly exercise their authority to make sure individuals' rights are not illegally trampled. If they do not, criminal charges can be brought against offending troops and their military leaders. The most famous invoking of martial law in the United States occurred in some areas in the Northern states by President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War (1861–1865) and in several sections in the South after the war.

It is important to recognize that martial law is not the same thing as military government. Military government is essentially government run by the armed forces on a relatively permanent basis and institutionalized as such, typically operating through a small group composed of the chiefs of each of the military branches (conventionally referred to as a junta) and normally brought about by a military coup d'état. Examples of this type of government have been found in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The power of such military regimes derives from the use or threat of force. Martial law generally presupposes a near and eventual return to civilian-led government after emergency circumstances have come and gone, while military government does not.

See also *Civil-military Relations; Military Courts; Military Rule.*

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Marx, Karl

Known as the father of socialism, political theorist and economist Karl Heinrich Marx (1818–1883) was born in the Rhineland area of Prussia (Germany) near the French border. Marx's Jewish family converted to Christianity and moved to England where he became a radical. In England, Marx met philosopher Friedrich Engels, and the two became close friends and collaborators. In 1848, after Marx returned to England from a failed revolution in Germany, he and Engels published *The Communist Manifesto,* in which they provided a rationale for class revolution. Marx ultimately produced over 100 works.

Marx subsequently turned his attention to political economy, publishing *Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy* in 1859. He and Engels further articulated Marxist theory in *Das Kapital,* published in three volumes: *Volume One: The Process of Production of Capital* (1867), *Volume Two: The Process of Circulation of Capital* (1885), and *Volume Three: The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole* (1894).

Although Marx's ideas led to revolution in economic thought and to the development of socialist/communist governments in parts of Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, his ideas were not original. Marx was directly influenced by German economist Georg W. F. Hegel and particularly by Hegel's contention that history provides answers to all philosophical questions. Marx used Hegelian theory to develop his argument that the mode of production is responsible for all the ills of given societies, which are prone to repeating the same mistakes throughout history. He presented socialism as the answer to the problem.

Marx lived during an intense period of industrialization, and he wrote to discredit raging capitalism and to refute classical liberal thought. Ironically, he was heavily influenced by some of the British thinkers he rejected. Marx owed particular debts to philosopher John Locke and economist David Ricardo. Locke's contention that workers should own the fruits of their labor provided the foundation for Marxian theory. Ricardo argued in *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (1919) that the value of any product was dependent on the labor used in producing it, stating in the "iron law of wages" that the wages of any given period tended to stabilize around the subsistence level. Marx believed that expanded profits for capitalists and mere survival for workers were bound to lead to alienation and political unrest.

Although Marx accepted that worldwide revolution might be possible to overthrow capitalism, he believed it would be unnecessary. He insisted that alienation from the capitalists (the bourgeoisie) would eventually cause the workers (the proletariat) to rebel against the capitalist system. The result, according to Marx, would be the destruction of capitalism and the creation of a temporary state that would wither away after establishing a worker-controlled market.

Karl Marx envisioned his socialist revolution taking place in his homeland of Germany, but it was in Russia that his ideas bore the most fruit. In 1917 Bolshevik revolutionaries overthrew the monarchy. After the Bolsheviks were absorbed into the Communist Party under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin, Marxist-Leninism provided the foundation for the creation of an all-powerful state. Contrary to Marxist theory, however, the communist state refused to wither away. In 1922 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was created. Communism continued to expand, aided to a large extent by concessions made during peace talks at the end of World War II (1939–1945). The resulting cold war between democratic and communist nations lasted until 1991, when Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika precipitated the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, leveling a death blow to Marxist-Leninism in most of the world.

See also *Bolshevism; Communism; Communism, Fall of, and End of History; Engels, Friedrich; German Political Thought; Lenin, Vladimir Ilich; Marxism; Russian Political Thought.*

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Marxism

Marxism is an ideology that derives from Karl Marx's (1818–1883) critique of capitalism. As the third child in a middle-class Jewish family, Marx studied law at the University of Bonn and wrote his dissertation, *The Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature,* in 1841. Aristotle, who Marx referred to as that "towering genius," would play an inspirational role for many of his ideas on nature. Aside from these ancient thinkers, many modern thinkers also exercised a profound influence on Marx's thinking. Of these, Georg W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) was unquestionably the most important to framing Marx's critical social theory.

Marx's great achievement, in this respect, was to reformulate Hegel's dialectic (*Aufhebung*), which held that freedom was an idea whose concrete realization was manifested in the struggle to reconcile the contradiction or difference between one's given knowledge of the world (subject) and the objects in the world (institutions, property, and rules). In this way, Marx theorized about the workers' consciousness and material struggle to overcome the conditions of social deprivation and to establish the beginnings of a communist society.

NEO-HEGELIANISM AND HISTORY

In the aftermath of Hegel's death, a great struggle would ensue over the meaning and legacy of Hegel's ideas. The result was the creation of a new philosophical movement in the 1830s and 1840s called Young Hegelianism, featuring such thinkers as Moses Hess, Arnold Ruge, Max Stirner, and Bruno Bauer. The more conservative Young Hegelians argued for the compatibility of reason and religion that would reinforce the liberal bourgeois state. In *The Essence of Christianity* (1989), for instance, Ludwig Feuerbach argued that human imperfections were unique to the species, and the essence of humanity was the infinite joy that came with being conscious of oneself as the object of God's graces. Religion in this sense objectivized the human consciousness by providing a source of feeling that was needed to overcome the narrow tendencies or limitations associated with the human species (e.g., pride, glory).

Marx, however, largely dismissed these religious underpinnings of materialist thought, arguing that the essence of a human was what he or she produced. His famous dictum that "religion is the opium of the masses" suggested that religion had no place in the substratum of the workers' consciousness (of their own needs). Indeed, much like the state, religion remained a (culture) tool of the bourgeois class to oppress the proletariat (workers). It thus induced the proletariat to participate passively and preconsciously in their oppression, while at the same time it deflected attention away from the more crucial objective: the active promotion of a unified workers' consciousness.

For Marx, neither value explained the actual production of the commodity. Nonetheless, the purpose of theory was not simply to interpret society, but, as he famously stated in *German Ideology* (1845), "to change it." To this day, the motto remains an important feature of social action and historical materialism, the latter referring to how social and economic relations have evolved through various modes of production (i.e., feudalism, capitalism, and socialism). Driving this evolutionary process have been the many episodes of class conflict or the antagonism between labor and capital, whereby the bourgeoisie used its ownership of the means of production (property, capital, interest, and rent) to force the proletariat to work without due compensation.

The exploitation of workers, then, was not simply a fact of life in capitalist society; it also constituted the overlooked, yet vital consequence of the free market ideology of liberalism. Adam Smith (1723–1790), for instance, theorized that a free market was based on the maximum allocation of resources, or the unhindered exchange between buyer and seller (*laissez-faire*). Thus, if the seller and buyer, in this case, were allowed to trade freely on the market, the market would yield an optimal price for goods and services.

In his critique of liberalism, Marx theorized that surplus value was generated from the false exchange of the value of commodities, or rather how the price of commodities failed to register the actual value of labor power. His social theory of value was based on the structural forces of the base (economy, production, capital) that determined the content and value of the superstructure (culture, religion, rights, and laws). Marx expressed these material elements/divisions in terms of worker (self-) alienation or the worker's separation from the production process. In the *Communist Manifesto* (1848), Marx argued that the bourgeoisie used its ownership of the means of production to isolate or marginalize the proletariat from what the proletariat produced. More often than not, this involved lost compensation (surplus value) or work wages, which Marx referred to in terms of relative and absolute surplus value. According to Marx, the only way to emancipate the worker was to dissolve collectively the very class arrangement that allowed the bourgeoisie to exploit the worker. Communism, as he states in the *Communist Manifesto,* "deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society: All that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labor of others by means of such appropriation."

ALIENATION AND LABOR POWER

Nonetheless, while the Marx of the 1840s focused on the alienation of the production process, the older, more mature Marx turned to scientific thought to formulate his systematic critique of capitalism. In *Capital,* Marx (1867/1978) distinguished between the use value of labor ("production activity of definite kind and exercised with a definite aim," 309) and exchange value to explain the relationship between surplus value and the fetish of commodities. As the political

intellectual leader of the Communist Party, Marx would help to found and organize the First and Second International movements of workers, the platforms/agendas for the international struggle of workers. The First International (1848–1889), for example, met annually to discuss and adopt new goals for advancing the workers' movement and was born from the revolutionary and reactionary events of 1848. Marx fought vigorously to defend his radical and, at times, uncompromising views of the revolution, often referring to the competing views of revisionists and anarchists, such as Ferdinand Lassalle and Pierre Joseph Proudhon, as petit bourgeoisie. Such angry dismissals represented the many tensions not only between and among socialists but also within Marxism itself.

No one tension was perhaps greater than the role of national culture. Marx, in fact, believed that cultural factors should not determine the content of the worker's revolutionary goals. As noted above, his distinction between base (economics) and superstructure (culture) was designed to show how the meaning of the latter could be reduced to the former. Still, it would be remiss to say that Marx sought to oppose *tout court* the constitutive role of national culture. If nothing else, his views on the Jewish question and, even more important, his ambivalent position on the question of Irish independence, suggest that he had remained sympathetic to certain cultural factors throughout most, if not all, of his life.

Marx's tacit acceptance of nationalism would inform many of Lenin's views, which he expressed in *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination* (1914). Lenin, for instance, believed that the rights of nationalities needed to be framed as a tactical right of workers, albeit much to the dismay of Rosa Luxemburg, who remained steadfast in her denial that national or cultural rights could be subsumed under Marxism. The debate, however, became an important focal point of the Second International (1889–1914) and would turn on the issue of whether nationalism could play a practical role in advancing the goals of the revolution. In particular, the issue pitted the leading Austro-Marxists of the early twentieth century, namely Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, who argued that the proletariat had a right to cultural autonomy, against Lenin himself, who contended that all worker nations possessed an equal right to secession.

Lenin criticized Bauer's views of cultural autonomy, insisting that workers needed to organize into homogeneous national units. In his *Critical Remarks on the National Question* (1916), Lenin argued that the tactical alliances between workers and the local/national bourgeoisie were necessary to promote the right to self-determination of oppressed nations of workers, and that all national movements of workers were entitled to the right to secede from their oppressors. His views on the right to national self-determination thus remained a crucial part of his thinking on capitalism, especially with regard to his thesis that imperialism represented the last stage of capitalism.

MARXIST-LENINISM

Lenin's thesis on imperialism contains four main tenets:

1. The most powerful nation-states had divided the world into areas of colonial or territorial possession.

2. Financial or lending capital had led to the rapid overseas expansion or the monopolization of overseas resources.
3. Cheap labor was sought overseas to generate greater profits.
4. A worldwide revolution would result from continuing global expansion of capital and colonialism.

Marxist-Leninism, or Lenin's view on self-determination and imperialism, would resurface at the third meeting of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (1948), where the Soviet bloc members insisted on an equal right to self-determination of all colonial peoples, while the Western bloc states maintained that the right of self-determination in the colonies was neither justiciable nor enforceable.

In 1960, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 1514, which recognized the colonial peoples' right to determine their political destiny. This, however, did not immediately end the colonial wars at the time, including the French-Algerian War (1954–1962). One of the most brilliant leaders and thinkers of the Algerian resistance, Frantz Fanon (1925–1961), brought together many of Lenin's ideas with the existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre to formulate a third world revolutionary model predicated on the idea of the absolute means of violence, or the synthesis of armed resistance and self-determination of all colonial subjects. The Third International (1919) was defined largely in terms of the right to self-determination of the oppressed, colonial peoples.

Still, the new Marxist-Leninism orthodoxy was not without its critics. In fact, not long after Lenin's victory, some Marxist thinkers would return to Hegel's holism or notion of totality to challenge the reductionism and positivism of orthodox Marxism. Western Marxism, as the reformist movement would come to be known, featured the contributions of Georg Lukàcs, Karl Korsch, and Antonio Gramsci and was one of the first intellectual movements to break with or to criticize Lenin's victory and the state of Marxist-Leninism in the early 1920s. More than anything, the movement constituted a vital link between the first-generation theorists of the Frankfurt school and Marxism. Lukàcs's return to Hegelianism, for instance, posited that orthodox Marxism had relied on the inert immediacy of facts to validate its laws and concepts. Lukàcs sought to relate these facts to a broader, more dynamic understanding of society as a whole. Much like Lukàcs, Gramsci sought to revise Marxism by demonstrating that civil society, rather than being subordinate to the state, was in fact autonomous from the state. His solution to class/cultural conflict or the dialectical tensions between the state and civil society was to formulate a counterhegemonic civil society (historical bloc).

FRANKFURT SCHOOL

The Frankfurt Institute of Social Research (Frankfurt school), which was established in the mid-1920s and which many consider the second stage of Marxism, built upon these ideas by theorizing about the themes of political and social oppression, in particular, totalitarianism and consumerism. The three most noted thinkers—Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer,

and Theodor Adorno—understood that power of technical or instrumental reason constituted a distinctive feature of twentieth-century society, and that the totalitarian state (Nazism) represented its most virulent political form (ideological). An equally oppressive form of instrumental logic was consumerism, or the manipulation of cultural life and values by the so-called culture industry. In these two contexts, instrumental logic and reason had subverted the political consciousness.

The purpose of critical theory, then, was to expose the reification of societal relations, that is, to examine the social genesis of facts and the ideological dynamics of political structures. In his 1937 essay "Traditional and Critical Theory," for instance, Horkheimer argued that positivist science, which treated facts and values as separate, was based on a false objectivism that obscured the social content of facts and ideas. This would be a theme that would later inform Horkheimer and Adorno's 1947 work, *Dialectic of Enlightenment,* and their rejection of the liberating potential of the Enlightenment principles of freedom and rationality. By championing the negativity of dialectical thought, Adorno and Horkheimer believed that they were exposing the totalizing elements of instrumental reason. Whether there was a constructive lesson to be learned here, however, was never quite clear. As has already been suggested, Adorno was never a self-proclaimed political thinker, nor did he wish others to appropriate his own ideas. This might explain why he and Horkheimer preferred to expose the totalizing elements of society without offering an alternative that could unite theory with social action. Ultimately, their negative critique raised the following question: How were the oppressed to resist the status quo power that had fully colonized their own consciousness?

Jürgen Habermas's answer to this question was to resituate reason in an intersubjective, communicative framework. For him, to recover the lost, critical elements/dimension of reason was to uncover its cognitive dimension: communicative reason. In his view, when we struggle to reach mutual consensus, we also apply or draw from our existing cultural understandings of the world. These cultural understandings exist prior to and are communicated through our exchange of ideas, thereby reflecting a repository of cultural understandings. Habermas refers to this repository as lifeworld: a holistic and creative social force that is constantly shaping our views and determining how we rationalize.

This rationalization process can take many forms, but generally, it reflects the differentiation of systems functioning or the implementation, enforcement, and reproduction of rules, norms, and principles through institutions and political structures. When existing social institutions or mechanisms fail to respond to our interests and needs, this unleashes what some contemporary Marxist thinkers have referred to as a second stage of Marxism.

But the critical and innovative framework of the Frankfurt school also contained a dark side or deep skepticism concerning social progress. This would prove, in many ways, self-prophetic. Rather than endorsing a critical social theory of emancipation in the twentieth century, the first generation of Frankfurt school theorists would end up embodying the very nihilism that it sought to overcome. This negativity, combined with Habermas's revisionist account of Marx's theory of social value, would ultimately dampen interest in the Frankfurt school.

The Paris student riots of 1968, however, marked the resurgence of Marxism. By this time, Marxist thinkers had returned to the state to address its structural determinants (power and ideological function). Most notable of these thinkers were Louis Althusser, Ralph Miliband, and Nicos Poulantzas. For them, the question was not so much that the state would disappear but rather how Marxists had failed to realize the functional role of the state in advancing the interests of workers. As this structuralist turn suggested, Marxist thinkers had not explicated the relationship between the state and societal transformation. Accordingly, Marxist thinkers first needed to rethink the changing design and purpose of the state with regard to building social solidarity or a socialist society, because it was precisely the welfare state that had absorbed so much of the energy of the radical left. This statist trend would also be complemented by the rise of Marxism in international studies, most notably Immanuel Wallerstein's world systems theory, one of the first systematic theories of the international division of labor, which addressed the accumulation of capital in the metropole, semiperiphery, and periphery.

POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND GLOBAL POLITICS

Another challenge facing Marxist thinkers at this time was whether the social determinism of Marxism had eroded the radicality of Hegel's thought. Here the central question was whether the historical determinism of dialectical thought had undermined the capacity to locate (the margins of) the meaning of difference or the radical contingency of social arrangements. Indeed, by the 1970s and 1980s, the advent of poststructuralism would mark an important departure from many of the fundamental tenets of Marxism (i.e., Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault), including the workers' consciousness, class division, and dialectical materialism, hence the Enlightenment ideals of reason, rationality, and dialectics. In valorizing difference and decentering the meaning of truth and the subject, therefore, poststructuralism sought to destabilize the universalist meaning of political structures. Critics have argued that this strategy works against the social empowerment of groups; that it disempowers the very oppressed groups whose difference and identity it sought to valorize.

Whether or not the politics of difference signaled the growing fragmentation of the radical left, it is important to stress the resilience of Marxist ideas. Indeed, while it could be said that the fall of the Soviet Union has diminished the prominence of Marxism, it has not undermined Marxism as a source of thinking in international politics per se. In fact, Marxism has continued to have a profound impact on the developing world with development theory and with the works of Raul Prebish, Gunthur Franck, and Fernando Cardoso. Most important, Marxism continues to play an important role in defining the

underlying issues of trade, health, poverty, and debt relief in the developing world. The rise of Hugo Chávez, the socialist populist leader of Venezuela, illustrates, for the most part, the continued importance of drawing on Marxist ideas to address the effects and structural problems of global capitalism and Western imperialism. What this should suggest is that Marxism remains influential in the developing world; that its spirit, as Jacques Derrida would later state in his political writings, still pervades society.

See also *Communism; Frankfurt School; Hegel, Georg W. F.; Imperialism; Leninism; Marx, Karl; Proletariat; Self-determination.*

. . . .   STEVEN C. ROACH

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Marxist Parties

Karl Marx said little about the political party as such. Marx assumed that the party was the essential means of expression of the proletariat, the class he saw as having a vocation to usher in a new world. In the first chapter of his 1848 *Communist Manifesto,* Marx stated that the organization of the proletariat into a class "that is to say into a party" is continually being upset but continually remade. In Marx's theory the proletariat needed to be aware of its own interests, and this would be the work of the political party. Ultimately, the party organization would tip the balance of forces in favor of the working class and of revolution. As to the program of the party, this was equally vague and is confined to a few points in the *Communist Manifesto.*

But in the middle of the nineteenth century, Marx appeared to have provided the burgeoning workers' parties with a powerful theory about the nature of industrial society and of the forces that would lead to the socialist revolution and to establishment of the reign of the working class. These parties had extensive organizations associated with them, including unions, cooperatives, newspapers, and self-help societies. With only a few exceptions in Europe (including Britain and other countries of the British Empire), these parties rose on the back of the new industrial working class coming into existence. They expressed a belief that there would be a proletarian "revolution" and that it would be socialist.

By the 1900s, however, this belief had come under attack; the principal parting of the ways came with the Russian Revolution. On the one side were the mass parties of industrial Europe that saw parliamentary systems, human rights, and above all reform as the way forward, and on the other were the Marxist-Leninist communist parties that endorsed the revolutionary vocation. For the Western European parties, the idea of revolution was being diluted by the 1920s, turning the term from "violent uprising" to "big but benevolent change," and most had abandoned it altogether by the 1950s.

COMMUNISM

What are usually called Marxist parties today are the communist parties that signed up to the "21 Conditions" of membership of the Third "Communist" International (founded by Lenin after the Russian Revolution in 1919). These were revolutionary organizations run by the Moscow Third International (and then directly by the Soviet Union). They were, as befits "revolutionary" parties with a quasi-military discipline, hierarchical (the top being in Moscow), run by a caste of professional revolutionaries (permanent employees of the party), and secretive. The party core was the professional apparatus, but the lowest unit was the "cell," a group of members that would be organized in the workplace (the emphasis was on the industrial, not electoral, struggle) or district, and they were given orders from above through the centralized command structure known as "democratic centralism." This organization was well adapted to infiltration (of unions, for example) and to clandestine operations under, for example, dictatorships, when other parties were eliminated. These parties were set up to make possible the control of the state and to pervade civil society once they gained power. Their discipline and hierarchy were both the image of the future communist society and the means of controlling and running such societies.

Not the least of the ironies of communism is that its history is at odds with the direction predicted by Marx. Russia, in 1917, was not an industrial society; the communist parties did best in peasant and underdeveloped societies and made little progress in advanced western countries. In the mid-twentieth century, Finland, Italy, and France were the only industrial societies that had mass communist parties. There they found support in industries such as steel, mining, and metalworking (destined to decline in the late twentieth century) and in rural areas such as Alantejo, central France, and northern Finland. However, there were large communist parties where the system had been imposed by the Red Army (in Eastern Europe) and also in the third world (China, Vietnam, and Cuba, for example).

Two further splits among communist parties must be mentioned. The Sino–Soviet split of 1963 led to the creation of

"Maoist" parties of the same organizational form but taking their orders from Mao Zedong and the Communist Party in Peking. The Trotskyites belonged to parties set up by the devotees of Joseph Stalin's most important rival in the USSR, Leon Trotsky, and these parties were, if anything, more disciplined than the communist parties the Trotskyites despised. Their view, not obvious given Trotsky's complicity in early communism, was that if Trotsky had been in control rather than Stalin, the workers' utopia would have materialized rather than the Stalinism of the USSR. Trotskyites remained a marginal irritant on the far left, usually trying to outflank the communist parties in revolutionary zeal in strike movements and uprisings, but they did have some electoral success (notably in Sri Lanka) and have remained as a distinctive—albeit small—component of the far left in many European countries.

MARXIST PARTIES TODAY

With the collapse of communism and the end of the world communist movement, most communist parties have dissolved or transformed themselves into left wing defenders of welfare and workers' rights against globalization and the advance of the neoliberal ideology. This group of parties, among which can be counted the French Communist Party, the Portuguese Communist Party, the Italian Rifondazione Communists, and a number of Indian parties, refer back to the work of Marx but have little of the revolutionary ardor that animated the Moscow-run parties. Other parties reference Marx as a theorist and the predictions made in Marx's works (notably about "crisis") but those, too, are marginal aspects of current politics. Marx's value as a prophet seems, with the collapse of the socialist systems, to be played out. Former communist parties of the communist bloc, when confronted with free elections, had to change radically to avoid compete obliteration and retained little of their Marxist origins.

There are still some other groups for whom the Marxist outlook is important (notably the French Socialist Party, antiglobalization movements, and some green parties), but these are more moral condemnations of the capitalist system than plans of action. Maoist parties have been prone (more than other Marxists) to splits and rivalries but have continued in some societies as splinter or terrorist parties (like Shining Path in Peru) and in others as critical minorities within the left. Only perhaps Cuba and North Korea remain as authentic communist regimes, although in China the party remains in control despite a move away from central planning and state control of the economy.

See also *Communism; Democratic Centralism; Lenin, Vladimir Ilich; Leninism; Marx, Karl; Political Parties; Soviet Union, Former.*

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Mashriq

The Arabic word for "the East" (literally, "where the sun rises"), the *Mashriq* (sometimes written "Mashreq") is a vague geographic term specifically used, particularly in modern times but in varying ways by earlier Arab geographers, for the eastern part of the Arab world. This sometimes extends as far west as Egypt and the Sudan and always includes the countries of the Fertile Crescent (Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq) and the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait), as opposed to the Maghreb (from *Maghrib,* literally, "where the sun sets"), which includes the Arab countries of North Africa lying west of Egypt (or, at least, west of Libya). While the term *Maghreb* is widely used in English, the word *Mashriq* occurs less often. More common and essentially synonymous terms are *Arab East* or *Arab Middle East*, although the latter does not always exclude the Maghreb countries. The word *Levant* (of French origin and also meaning "rising [sun]") has a similar meaning, although in its broad usage it refers only to the region bordering on the eastern Mediterranean, sometimes including the non–Arab countries, while the term *Levant states* was used specifically for Syria and Lebanon during the period of the French mandate.

See also *Gulf States; Maghreb; Middle Eastern Politics and Society.*

. . . .   GLENN E. PERRY

Mass Immigration

While human beings have migrated across the planet in large numbers for millennia, political concerns about immigration arose following the emergence of the modern nation-state, which increasingly desired to define its territorial boundaries, regulate who entered, and conscript and tax citizens. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, enormous population movements became a salient global phenomenon. Defined as the large-scale entry and usually permanent settlement of people in countries of which they are not native, mass immigration is characteristic of globalization in the twenty-first century.

Mass immigration, a corollary of mass migration and mass emigration, occurs for a wide variety of reasons, many of which are beyond the control of individual sending and receiving states. People leave their home countries en masse due to war, famine, poverty, underemployment, political oppression, religious persecution, natural disasters, forced expulsion,

overcrowding, lack of opportunity, and wanderlust. They enter and settle permanently in other countries for equally diverse reasons, including economic opportunities, political freedoms, hope for a better life for their children, and sometimes because they are forcibly moved. Often the combination of powerful global push and pull forces and the great difficulty of controlling vast borders make it nearly impossible for governments to stop large-scale immigration. Consequently, in 2000 there were an estimated 56 million immigrants in Europe, nearly 50 million in Asia, over 40 million in North America, and 5.8 million in Oceania.

Drawing a conceptual line between immigration and mass immigration is largely a subjective endeavor, raising the question of precisely when the former turns into the latter. On the historical spectrum of great population movements resulting in permanent settlement, the most prominent have been characterized by the immigration of millions of people over decades and centuries. Modern international migration can be classified into the mercantile (1500–1800), industrial (1800–1914), interwar (1914–1945) and postindustrial (1960 onward) periods. There is a distinction made between mass immigration before and after 1945, with an emphasis on post–World War II (1939–1945) immigration from less economically developed to highly economically developed countries.

PATTERNS OF MASS IMMIGRATION

Patterns of mass immigration vary in nature and scope across time and space, but the European settlement of Oceania and North America stands out as particularly significant. The United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are referred to as classic countries of immigration, because mass immigration was instrumental in the nation-building process and profoundly affected the culture, society, politics, and national identity of each country. Further examples of mass immigration resulting in lasting demographic change include European immigration to Latin America, in particular Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina; the forced immigration of approximately ten million African slaves to the Americas between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries; the legal and illegal Mexican immigration to the United States from 1848 to the present; and post–World War II immigration within and to Europe.

The United States, which until the 1880s had few regulations restricting entry, is among the world's most prominent countries of immigration. The country's general attitude toward most European immigrants was articulated by the celebrated author Herman Melville: "Let us waive that agitated national topic as to whether such multitudes of foreign poor should be landed on our American shores . . . if they can get here, they have God's right to come; though they bring all Ireland and her miseries with them" (Zolberg 2007, 455). An estimated thirty million immigrants came to the United States between 1860 and 1920, when the number of foreign-born averaged between 13 and 15 percent of the total population. In 2006, over 37 million (12.5 percent of the total population) were foreign-born, with approximately 1.1 and 1.3 million immigrants legally entering the country in the fiscal years 2005 and 2006, respectively.

Many European countries, once the source of mass emigration, are now recipients of mass immigration. The number of foreigners living in the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, rose from 548,000 in 1950 to nearly 7.3 million in the year 2000. Currently, nearly 20 percent of the total Swiss population is foreign-born, while immigrants make up approximately one-third of Luxembourg's population. Although immigration to European countries, the United States, and Australia has been on a large scale, it is also offset by simultaneous emigration. For every ten people who immigrated to the United States in 2001, three emigrated; for every three people who entered Australia and Germany in that year, two left, and in the United Kingdom, the ratio of immigrants to emigrants was five to two.

If mass immigration happens quickly, and if immigrants are racially, religiously, or linguistically different from the host population, this can stoke fears about rapidly changing national identity and lead policy makers to conclude that the country has reached its immigration capacity. German chancellor Helmut Kohl threatened to declare a state of emergency in 1992, in part because the entry of over 438,000 asylum seekers in one year alone created a widespread sense that the country was being inundated by immigrants. Similarly, in response to persistent mass immigration from Mexico and Central America, 59 percent of California residents voted in 1994 for Proposition 187, which proposed to withhold public benefits from undocumented immigrants, and in 2005 the U.S. House of Representatives recommended—in bill H.R. 4437—the erection of a 700-mile fence between the United States and Mexico.

Mass immigration is a manifestation of globalization and will, in the future, presumably change. Rather than Europeans settling in sparsely populated continents, as they once did, Africans, Asians and others will likely immigrate in large numbers to Europe. War, global climate change, and colossal humanitarian catastrophes may lead to unprecedented forms of mass immigration. Should the Netherlands be flooded by rising sea levels, will millions of Dutch immigrate to neighboring European Union countries? Will a warmer Greenland, Canada, or Siberia be future destinations of masses of immigrants? With the worldwide population expected to rise to as many as ten billion people by the middle of the twenty-first century, mass immigration is sure to persist as a significant global challenge.

See also *Globalization; Immigration, Effects on Intergroup Relations; Immigration, Politics of; Immigration Policy; Mexican Immigration; Migration; Transnationalism; Urban Migration.*

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Mass Political Behavior

Mass political behavior, mass action, and collective action for political purposes take place when a large number of people choose to participate in an action for political ends. While time, effort, and risk can be great, pressure may be needed to secure an individual's limited participation or contribution. Often groups have several goals, which require mediation, agreement, and coordination.

Various forms of mass political behavior exist. Elections represent the most common form and extend legitimacy to democratic systems: The public expresses its preference or will for a proposed decision in an institutionalized way. Citizens have power to shape issues and elect or remove their representatives—if to a limited degree. Elections can be general or national, as well as legislative on different levels, and direct or indirect, secret or open, truly competitive in democracies or noncompetitive in totalitarian regimes. Elections require less effort from participants than strikes, demonstrations, and citizen movements, and they limit political inequality.

Voters may be confronted with the dilemma of choice, they may not be well informed or apathetic, or they may vote in line with their parents, peers, social class, or party. Voting according to issues and political ideology has increased. Ethnicity, age, income, education, gender, and residence determine why some people vote. Voting behavior is more constant than often assumed. Although people can feel pressured to vote, voting is personally satisfying.

Another form of mass political behavior is direct action, which is usually a nonviolent way of asserting demands through noncooperation or obstruction. Greater state power, increasing demands for representation, the market economy, industrialization, new communication technologies, and the spread of democratic beliefs have led to more direct action. When people perceive a democratic deficit, direct action can empower them to resist oppression, gain basic rights, safeguard democracy, or raise marginalized issues.

Direct action can be internationally coordinated or gain transnational support. Usually, it is a visible and explicit, often symbolic, and at times dramatic way to spread a message and gain access to political debate. Strikes and boycotts have been partially legalized in democracies as legitimate means of protest and ways to protect citizens from business interests. Rallies, marches, and vigils are only symbolic, but if banned, they are acts of civil disobedience. Hunger strikes can be mass political behavior. Consumer boycotts also express the public's wants or needs. Direct action may initiate parallel or alternative institutions or services. Social or citizen movements influence public opinion, public policy, citizen access, social awareness, and sometimes a government's stability. To communicate with their members, groups use publications, mailings, mass media, the Internet, personal contacts, meetings, phone calls, and demonstrations. A movement's goals and its implementation may be shaped by those in power, different agencies and interests, or competition with other groups. In addition, money and political interest groups are important. Political advertising and attempts to secure political support from the public and shape public opinion have increased over the years and often face criticism.

See also *Group Relations; Political Psychology.*

. . . .   SYBILLE REINKE DE BUITRAGO

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Mayor

A mayor is the highest-ranking official of a city or municipal government. A mayor can wield extensive power in large American cities such as New York and Chicago or play a mostly ceremonial role in, for example, a modern English borough or town. In most countries, mayors are either appointed by the city council or elected by the voters to serve a term. In a U.S. city with a strong mayor and council, the voters usually elect the mayor, who acts as executive, administrator, and titular head of the city. In a weak mayor-council form of government, the city council has the ultimate policy-making power. In this case, the mayor may be selected from the council, not elected by voters. In the council-manager form, the mayor is primarily a ceremonial figure, and the manager performs the role of the administrator. In the People's Republic of China, a mayor may be the administrative head of any municipality from the provincial to the county level. In Latin America, mayors have increasingly relied upon their personal campaigns, rather than party organizations, to win elections.

A strong mayor helps set policy, serves as a chief executive, and often has legislative veto power over the council. A veto can be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the council. A mayor also appoints administrators to head various departments—the police, waste management, or education—and fills positions such as treasurer or city clerk. A mayor's appointments are not subject to council confirmation.

In some countries, mayors are appointed by a branch of the federal or regional government. In the United States, cities may share some political power with states, but they normally must yield to state power. In practice, this political balance can be very difficult for big cities, because the mayor and the governor must negotiate political boundaries.

The success of mayors is measured by their ability to draw support and provide services to their urban citizens. Bosses of U. S. cities in the early nineteenth century, for example, were successful because they helped provide jobs, supported their constituents, and were personable. In the modern information era, mayors are constantly in the public eye. Every city is unique, and some cities are more governable than others. In South Africa, the nation's first black mayor, Nceba Faku of the city of Port Elizabeth, helped heal the country of its long history of racism.

To evaluate mayors, scholars emphasize mayoral leadership styles and historical contexts. Reconstructive mayors are innovators who change the system. Articulation mayors uphold the legacy of the innovative or reconstructive mayor. Disjunction mayors serve when a system is under attack or failing. Finally, preemption mayors challenge the existing regime, sometimes successfully and sometimes not.

Fiorello La Guardia, mayor of New York between 1934 and 1945, is regarded as a successful preemption mayor; some rank him as one of the top mayors in history. Frank Rizzo, mayor of Philadelphia between 1972 and 1980, and Dennis Kucinich, mayor of Cleveland between 1977 and 1979, on the other hand, are often considered two of the worst mayors. Richard J. Daley, another successful mayor according to many academic studies, was the mayor of Chicago from 1955 to 1976 and governed with a machine politics style, in which the hierarchy runs from the precinct level to the top, or the mayor's office. His oldest son, Richard M. Daley, who became mayor of Chicago in 1989, has a much different style. He is considered one of the new breed of mayors, for whom partisan politics is less important than in the past. His takeover of the Chicago public school system in 1995 has been heralded as a success. Many other mayors, such as Mike White of Cleveland, have cut wasteful spending. While many U. S. Democratic mayors are turning to market forces to replace civil rights era social policy priorities, Republican mayors, such as Michael Bloomberg of New York, have turned to so-called liberal tactics. This blurring of the partisan line has changed mayoral politics. The candidates themselves and the issues are all important.

See also *Local Politics; Municipal Government.*

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McCarthyism

Senator Joseph McCarthy (1908–1957), a charismatic Republican from Wisconsin, became one of the most reviled and feared figures in the history of U.S. politics. His aggressive campaign to remove perceived communists from positions of influence during the anticommunist movement is known as *McCarthyism.*

McCarthy's campaign began with an unsubstantiated statement during a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, in 1950, when he held up a piece of paper that purported to be a list of 205 subversives employed by the U.S. Department of State. The irony of McCarthyism was that the heyday of American communism had ended with the outbreak of World War II (1939–1945). Droves of communist sympathizers in the United States had withdrawn support for the movement after the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany in August 1939, and then Germany invaded Poland.

"Tail-gunner Joe," as McCarthy was nicknamed, was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1946. By that time, the House Un-American Activities Committee had been operating for eight years. The committee's unrelenting probes into anyone suspected of even the slightest link to communism served as a model for McCarthy, who accused the American left, most notably presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, of selling out Eastern Europe, betraying China, and precipitating the invasion of South Korea. Another target was George C. Marshall, a former U.S. secretary of defense, five-star general, and Nobel Peace Prize winner.

The post–World War II period was an ideal time for McCarthy's brand of conservatism. In highly publicized trials, the U.S. Department of Justice had used the Smith Act of 1940, designed to prevent the spread of communist subversion in the United States, to convict eleven communists of trying to overthrow the government. The discovery that Alger Hiss, a state department employee, had sold secret information to the Soviet Union had further outraged the entire country. Loyalty oaths requiring government employees to attest that they had never been members of the Communist Party had become commonplace.

Following the 1950 election, in which McCarthy claimed credit for the defeat of four Democratic senators, the Republican leadership selected him as the chair of the Government

Operations Committee, in which it was believed he would be forced to keep a low profile. Instead, McCarthy used that position to pursue his highly publicized campaign. One of his early targets was the Voice of America. He claimed that American libraries overseas were filled with communist doctrine.

Television had entered the homes of most Americans by 1952, and party conventions were broadcast nationally for the first time. Always a showman, McCarthy used the Republican Convention to accuse Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson (1900–1965) of being a communist sympathizer. By 1953, McCarthy was insisting that communists had also infiltrated the Army Signal Corps. The Army-McCarthy hearings of the following year were broadcast on television, and by that time it was clear that McCarthy was on a witch hunt with few facts to back his outrageous claims.

McCarthyism lasted only half a decade. During that time, however, jobs were lost and lives were destroyed. Leftist Americans, particularly those in the entertainment and academic fields, were accused and convicted of seditious conduct in the minds of McCarthy and a segment of the public, without benefit of judicial process. It was only when McCarthy targeted the army that his own party turned completely against him and put a stop to his activities.

In December 1954, twenty-two Republicans and the entire Democratic delegation in the Senate censured McCarthy. His flamboyant political career was over. Afterwards, whenever he spoke on the floor of the Senate, his colleagues walked out. McCarthy's death, three years later due to alcoholism, was met with joy by many people. A British journalist wrote that America was made "cleaner" by the absence of McCarthy. On the other hand, the ultraconservative John Birch Society moved its headquarters to Appleton, Wisconsin, where McCarthy is buried, to pay homage to him.

Some scholars have tried to redeem McCarthy posthumously by pointing out that documents made public after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 have indicated that there were a number of communists in U.S. government positions in the 1950s, and they insist that activities of the Communist Party of the United States were financed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

See also *Communism.*

. . . . ELIZABETH RHOLETTER PURDY

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McKelvey, Richard

Richard McKelvey (1944–2002) was an American political scientist whose ideas influenced statistical methodology, game theory, coalitions, political information, behavioral economics, and the study of voting. Generally, he is best known for work that clarifies essential properties of democratic institutions. He received his degrees from Oberlin College, Washington University in St. Louis, and the University of Rochester. He taught at the University of Rochester and Carnegie-Mellon University before spending the majority of his career at the California Institute of Technology, where he was the Edie and Lew Wasserman Professor. He was a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Econometric Society, and the National Academy of Sciences.

McKelvey's work on majority decision making was of particular note. It was part of a broader attempt to understand the relationship between which policy outcomes individual voters want and which policy outcomes voting majorities choose. An early result, Scottish economist Duncan Black's 1948 median voter theorem, identified a stable relationship between individual preferences and majority-preferred outcomes. Such stability matters, because without it, the concept of "majority will" has little or no meaning. Subsequent studies showed that majority decision-making produces stability only under very restrictive conditions. McKelvey's work clarified how individual preferences can relate to majority-preferred outcomes when these conditions are not satisfied. He proved that voting agendas (rules that specify the order in which alternatives are voted on) exist such that majority decision making can produce almost any imaginable policy outcome from almost any imaginable set of preferences. This insight helped political scientists appreciate the importance of institutions—particularly those concerning control of voting agendas.

In the mid-1980s, McKelvey and Peter Ordeshook examined how limits in voter information affect popular elections. They developed a model in which voters knew little about candidates for office, and candidates knew little about what voters wanted. In one version of the model, interest groups knew what the voters wanted and where the candidates stood. McKelvey and Ordeshook identified conditions under which candidate endorsements by these groups provided enough information to allow candidates to choose policies preferred by the median voter (i.e., a voting majority) and allow voters to vote as if they knew the candidates' positions. Experiments showed that interest group endorsements had the effects that their model predicted.

During the 1990s, McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey studied the "centipede game," in which two people divide a growing sum of money. The game has exactly one *Nash equilibrium* (defined as a set of strategies such that, once played, give no one any incentive to change his or her strategy). In actual play, however, few people choose these strategies. McKelvey and Palfrey discovered an alternate logic that explains how many people play the game. It entails a seemingly small, but well-defined, deviation from pure rationality. Typically, game

theory supposes that each player assumes that all other players are purely rational. McKelvey and Palfrey asked what would happen if players believed that there was at least a small probability that other players would *not* play purely rationally—a seemingly reasonable assumption given that virtually everyone actually does not do so. With this slight exception to pure rationality, they were able to develop a new equilibrium concept (*quantal response equilibrium*) that flowed from these newly modified assumptions and that fit the data they got from observing people actually playing the centipede game. This concept became foundational in behavioral economics.

See also *Agenda Control; Game Theory; Voting Behavior.*

. . . . JOHN H. ALDRICH AND ARTHUR LUPIA

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Measurement Theory

Measurement—defined as the process of assigning numbers to objects in meaningful ways—is fundamental to the process of testing scientific theories. Measurement theory considers (1) the conditions under which such numerical assignments are possible, (2) procedures for making these assignments, and (3) appropriate interpretation of the resultant numbers, after the assignments have been made.

The first component involves establishing a one-to-one correspondence between objects in an empirical set and a subset of the real number system, such that differences between the numbers correspond to substantive differences in some attribute of the objects. The second component involves the scaling procedures (e.g., summated ratings, factor analysis, ideal point models, etc.) that are actually used to assign numbers to objects. The third component involves the levels (or "scales") of measurement (e.g., nominal, ordinal, interval, or ratio), as well as the validity (do the measurement values correspond to the attribute they are intended to represent?) and reliability (to what extent are the measurements affected by random errors?) of the measured values. In the social and behavioral sciences, measurement theory developed because of the need to measure attributes of objects that are not immediately quantifiable (e.g., attitudes, ideology, political involvement, power, status, etc.).

See also *Qualitative Methodologies; Quantitative Methodologies; Reliability and Validity Assessment.*

. . . . . DAVID CIUK, WILLIAM G. JACOBY, KURT PYLE

Media, Political Commentary in the

Political commentary, prior to the mass media age, was predominantly the preserve of poets and philosophers. Once the industrial age created the market and the means for mass communication, the demands of poetry on the reader led to it becoming increasingly marginalized.

For most of its existence, the term *mass media* was synonymous with newspaper coverage; newspapers traditionally offered commentary through their editorials. Newspapers were expensive businesses with generally limited commercial potential, so it was common for rich families, who enjoyed influencing political affairs through the manipulation of mass opinion, to own them. William Randolph Hearst, for example, initially tried to speak for the common man; he engaged in investigative reporting that uncovered municipal corruption and the vices of the rich and famous. Eventually, however, he fell to promoting the 1898 U.S. war with Spain, as well as his girlfriend's meager acting talents, which caused him to try to silence Orson Welles in the process. Less interfering proprietors, however, continued to act as gatekeepers, or interpreters of news, for their publics.

This bottleneck of editorial approval remained in place through the development of radio. The advent of television did little to alleviate it, although perhaps more power was given to legal departments to filter stories with potential liability for the networks. Television producers initially called upon public intellectuals from religious, academic or community institutions to comment on matters of public interest. These figures were presumed to be disinterested observers who spoke out of a sense of public duty. Unlike radio, however, television was a visual medium, and talking heads did not make for entertaining television.

The problem was compounded by the rise of twenty-four-hour news outlets, which unwittingly initiated opinionated, rather than ethical and insightful, cable news programming centered on controversial political commentators whose mandate was less about fairness and balance than it was about creating a sense of outrage in the viewer. Bill O'Reilly's *The O'Reilly Factor* is credited with starting this trend, and his show remains one of the most popular. According to results of a Pew Research Center survey (Pew Research Center 2007), 21 percent of Americans aged 18 to 29 turned to fake news outlets such as *The Daily Show* for news of the 2004 presidential campaign, while only 23 percent watched the networks.

The second problem was that, constrained by the imperative that the viewer not change channels, the already-narrow

window for in-depth commentary and analysis has become reduced as the news networks are pressed to entertain rather than inform. This created a demand for spokespersons who could be relied upon to provide a controversial sound bite in under a minute so that the news programs could return to more entertaining pictorial coverage. News editors discovered that authorities had trouble discussing complex political problems coherently in the time allowed, so programs gradually replaced them with professional pundits.

Despite several seismic shifts in technology, relatively few political commentators have interpreted the way in which citizens access the news media. However, with the advent of the Internet, exponentially more informed and unfiltered commentators have the opportunity to inform an engaged and growing audience on matters of specific interest to them. The true breakthrough in reviving the art of political commentary came with specialized blogs. Experts began to blog on their fields, and television news programs started to feature stories that broke on blogs. This practice, while it attracted a younger audience, threatened the networks' relevance.

Troubling as these issues are for Western democracy, the issues surrounding media in the developing world are of a completely different order. The historical foundation of the print-based culture of the West has been overlooked in much of the developing world, as illiteracy and the problems of rural isolation have combined to make radio the axiomatic medium for millions of people. In addition to relaying news and current events, radio is even used to teach literacy in eighteen developing countries in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and Australia (Bates 2005, 117).

More disturbing than the choice of medium is the fact that supplying the material to fuel it is an increasingly dangerous occupation. In the decade prior to 2007, the International News Safety Institute recorded 1,100 journalists killed on the job, with Iraq reported as the most dangerous places for a journalist to work, followed by Russia and Colombia (Clarke 2007). Despite the importance Western democracies place on the delivery of timely and unbiased information, the democratizing power of fearless and unbiased media in the developing world is underappreciated in the West and consequently poorly funded. UNESCO's International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC) is the only United Nations division to promote media access in developing countries, and it rarely donates more than $1 million per year across 137 countries (UNESCO 2005)

See also *Media and Politics; Media Bias; Television and Politics.*

. . . . EDWARD KING

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Media and Politics

This article first defines the media in the context of the rapidly changing contemporary environment and then reviews fundamental dynamics of media and politics within the framework of a three-way relationship among the media, politicians/government, and the public, paying attention to differences across political and media systems. It then briefly discusses key changes in the international media environment.

DEFINING MEDIA

At the outset it is important to realize that media systems vary across countries and political systems. Media are very much creatures of their political environment, taking on different characteristics in each society according to the development of literacy and other conditions that create markets for their products, the degree to which journalism has become professionalized in the society, the degree of political polarization within the society, and the degree of formal autonomy from government granted in that society. We therefore cannot easily generalize about the media's role in politics across different political systems.

The situation in the United States, where the fragmented structure of the political system requires politicians to win favorable attention from the mass media if they want to bring about major policy change, differs significantly from the situation in Russia, where political power is more concentrated and the media are not fully autonomous from the government, and it differs still more from the situation in North Korea, whose media have long ranked among the least independent in the world. Even across democratic political systems, we find substantial differences in, for example, media partisanship: While Americans typically expect news to be objective and nonpartisan, the citizens of many other democracies, from Great Britain to the Scandinavian to the Mediterranean states, are accustomed to news outlets that are openly partisan. This essay focuses primarily on the media's role in liberal democratic systems, especially the United States, while adding examples from other systems where relevant; we then explore the role of the increasingly globalized media industry—and its regional challengers in some parts of the world—in the international arena.

Defining the media has become rather complicated in an era when newspapers, magazines, radio, and broadcast television all compete with twenty-four-hour cable television and the Internet for the limited attention of the general public. Media can be defined as organizations that control the means of mass communication. In the United States, these organizations are mostly for-profit businesses; in other industrialized countries, fully or partially government-owned-and-operated media are more common, often operating alongside profit-oriented media. In

President Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke to the nation via "fireside chats" during the Great Depression to bolster public confidence in a difficult economic period. Reaching out to voters through the media, which today includes the Internet, plays an important role in political campaigns and elections.

SOURCE: The Granger Collection, New York

other words, "the media" are those who own and/or operate the technologies—the printing presses, airwave channels, cable networks—by which a society communicates with itself and with the rest of the world. This definition extends beyond the leading, mainstream media to cable networks and television shows that target particular audiences and subpopulations (such as Univision and Telemundo, the two largest Spanish-language networks in the United States) and to the millions of political websites on the Internet, some of which (those that tend to have the largest audiences) are owned and operated by the same corporations that dominate the mainstream media, and many more of which (with generally smaller audiences) are more individualized and user generated.

In democratic societies, the mass media carry a broad variety of political messages and information, ranging from news that is ostensibly independent of particular politicians to political advertising created by candidates, their opponents, political parties, and independent political groups. Thus, the media's role in politics also varies in terms of the types of

political messages the various media feature. When they produce independent political journalism and commentary, the media play a different role in politics than when they simply serve as a platform for various political actors' direct appeals to the public through political advertising or free air time for political speeches and events.

"News" has also become somewhat difficult to define. The lines between hard news and entertainment have blurred considerably over the past three decades, as economic pressures and audience changes have reduced the amount of airtime/space devoted to traditional hard news about elections and policy issues and increased coverage of "soft" news issues such as crime, health, and other human interest stories. The multiplication of media outlets, especially due to the development of cable television and the Internet, has fragmented the mass media audience so that various segments of the public are exposed to very different levels of political information. During U.S. elections, for example, elite newspapers like *The New York Times* carry a heavy dose of political news every day

but have a small national audience, while the evening network news has a much larger audience that sees less political news, and many local television news programs—the main source of news for many Americans—offer very little election news at all. In Great Britain, the publicly funded channel BBC One, which features high-quality reporting on public affairs, is a leading source of news, although the audience for the "broadsheet" newspapers and their serious news content is much smaller.

Meanwhile, competing sources of political news have arisen that challenge both the definition of news and the top-down, journalist-controlled method of producing it. Political websites and blogs (frequently updated interactive Web sites, often maintained by nonjournalists) and soft news TV shows such as *Entertainment Tonight* and *Access Hollywood,* now play an influential role in how citizens think about public policy and world affairs, while comedy and talk shows offer an alternative way for citizens to engage in politics. A significant number of young people in particular encounter politics through Internet-based social networking sites and on user-controlled media such as YouTube, where people can post everything from a candidate gaffe captured on their cell phones to professional-looking "ads" for their favorite candidates. The traditional media have responded in a variety of ways to the rise of user-controlled media. In Great Britain, for example, the BBC launched *iPM,* a version of its flagship radio program in which viewers were asked to "shape what you know" by determining the order of items on the program. At the same time, politicians in some countries are using entertainment formats to advance their political agendas. Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, for example, stars in his own weekly television program, *Aló Presidente* (Hello, President), in which he explains his government's policies, publicly embarrasses his critics, and even serenades his audience.

Thinking about the role of the media in politics therefore requires us to think in broad terms. *Media* is a plural noun that encompasses a wide array of organizations and individuals producing a wide array of content—some politically substantive, some less so, but all potentially affecting how citizens think about and engage with politics.

THE MEDIA, CITIZENS, AND GOVERNMENT IN ELECTIONS AND GOVERNING

To understand the role of the media in politics, it is useful to place that vast array of media organizations in the framework of a three-way relationship with the public and political leaders. During elections and during the course of day-to-day governing in today's industrialized democracies, the flow of most political communication passes through the mass media. A crucial question is the degree to which the media themselves make decisions about which stories and issues to cover and how to cover them. In liberal democracies, given the relative autonomy of the press from the government, the media become a filter through which most consequential political messages pass and an active mediator between the public and

political leaders. In authoritarian systems in which there is little meaningful media autonomy, the media are less a filter and more a megaphone for political leaders' policies, priorities, and pronouncements. These generalizations, however, gloss over the ways in which media organizations in authoritarian regimes may subtly seek to undermine the government's message (an interesting example is al-Jazeera, the Qatar-based network that has enraged authoritarian governments in the Arab world); such generalizations may also overlook the degree to which the media in liberal democracies may simply pass along government messages without much critical scrutiny.

In democracies in particular, the media's central position between the government and the public has important consequences for both elections and governing. During elections, the media play a central role in what voters learn about campaign issues and the candidates, who make their case to the voters primarily via the mass media, either through political advertising or by gaining news coverage (known inside the business as "earned" media). Indeed, the political consulting industry has grown dramatically in democracies around the world over the past two decades, as political leaders have had to learn how to communicate effectively via the mass media to voters. (Perhaps not coincidentally, voter disaffection with politics is on the rise around the world as well.)

The role of media in voter choice may not be as direct and powerful as is sometimes assumed, however. Decades of research have shown that in many cases, the main impact of media on voter choice is to reinforce people's preexisting attitudes rather than to change them. Very few voters with firm partisan commitments will be lured across party lines to vote for the candidate of the opposing party simply on the basis of exposure to political ads or election news. Rather, to the degree that they pay attention to politics, those voters' voting intentions will tend to be reinforced during the course of a campaign, because they will more readily accept congenial political messages while rejecting messages from the opposing side. This dynamic seems especially likely in countries like Great Britain and France, where the press is highly partisan, and voters often turn to news outlets that match their own political predispositions, thus making persuasion across party lines even less likely (a situation that some scholars argue increasingly pertains to the United States as well).

Thus the main *persuasive* impact of political ads and election news tends to be limited to that relatively small group of voters who pay attention to politics but lack partisan roots—the so-called swing voter. This media impact should not be dismissed, however. In many recent U.S. presidential elections, the margin of victory of the winning candidate has been relatively small, increasing the importance of swing voters and thus of persuasive messages in the media. Moreover, the media's role in helping candidates to *mobilize* their likely voters—getting voters interested and excited enough to turn out to vote—should not be underestimated.

The media play other important roles during elections, particularly in political systems like those of the United States in which campaign contributions play a vital role. Candidates

who win media coverage gain greater name recognition with the public—and thus improve their ability to raise campaign funds. The reverse also holds true: Candidates who cannot generate sustained media attention are unlikely to rank high in the opinion polls that help determine whether contributors will give them money. The tone, and not simply the amount, of media coverage is also important, since candidates who receive consistent, highly negative media coverage would be unlikely to gain broad voter support. Yet in this respect as well, the media's role in elections may not be simple. Indeed, in many U.S. presidential elections, the candidates who win the most media coverage are also subjected to increasing amounts of critical coverage as election day approaches. U.S. senator Barack Obama managed to buck this trend to some extent in the election of 2008—he was one of very few recent candidates to win generally positive news coverage throughout the election. But often, the winning candidate wins *despite* news coverage that is rather negative.

Ultimately, one of the most important implications of the media's role in contemporary elections is that the media can set the agenda of an election by determining which issues and candidate attributes will receive the most attention. In liberal democracies, the news media are expected to question and investigate candidates on behalf of the public, serving as the public's proxy in vetting the candidates and their policy positions. In reality, the issues and character attributes that dominate news coverage are largely determined by the media's professional and economic incentives. As competition among news outlets increases, news organizations need good *stories* that will draw the attention of an increasingly fragmented and distracted audience. Consequently, campaign news may be dominated by "horse race" coverage that focuses on who is winning and losing more than on complicated policy issues, and "character" coverage that focuses on candidates' personalities and campaign gaffes. In the United States, where voters' partisan attachments have become particularly weak and the political parties have decentralized the process of selecting presidential candidates, the media have become so central to elections that, it is often said, the road to the White House leads through the newsroom. Media-centered politics are not quite as pronounced in democracies in which political parties play a more meaningful role in structuring voter choice. One result of media-centered elections may be impoverished voter decision making. Ironically, media-centric elections may make it harder for voters to gain the substantive information that theorists of democracy often assume.

KEY MEDIA DYNAMICS

In the context of daily governing, we again find the media in a central position. In virtually all political systems, the general public will not learn about most of what the government does unless they learn of it through the media. In the United States, where there are no government-owned and government-controlled media whose job it is to disseminate governmental messages unfiltered, those in government who want to raise awareness about a public problem or mobilize public support for a new piece of legislation, or to defeat legislation, must win favorable media attention for their cause—no small feat in an era when most media organizations pay less and less attention to politics. Moreover, the American system of checks and balances, relatively weak political parties, and divisions of power among federal- and state-level institutions makes the media crucial to most major policy initiatives.

Conversely, the media may also communicate the public's views to political leaders. Thinking back to the three-way relationship proposed above, the media mediate communication traveling both down from government to the public and up from the public to government. Much of what politicians know about public opinion they learn through the media, especially through public opinion polls that the media conduct and/or report. Many of the same U.S. news organizations that transmit political news to the public also query the public on its views through public opinion polls (e.g., the CBS News/*New York Times* poll and the *Washington Post*/ABC News poll). Here again, the media's power to filter and shape political discourse must be noted, for media polls often reflect the issue agendas that the media themselves help to define.

Nevertheless, in most political systems, the primary direction of communication is from government through the media to the public. In authoritarian systems with little media autonomy, this process is rather direct. In more democratic political systems, political leaders must set the agenda by focusing public attention and political energy on the issues they want to address. To the degree that the media are autonomous from government, a crucial dynamic of media and politics arises, as various leaders and groups vie to win attention and support for their preferred policy agendas. While research shows that in many countries officials are the leading sources quoted in the news, the competition may extend to other political actors—interest groups, social movements, and activists—whose path to political influence also runs through the newsroom.

Research also shows that the public's sense of the important issues needing attention is significantly influenced (though not entirely determined) by media coverage. The public's agenda, in other words, reflects the issues portrayed most prominently in the news. Issues gaining heavy media coverage are also the issues most likely to influence how people evaluate their elected leaders. The first president Bush, for example, learned this law of media and politics when his public approval ratings dropped from historic highs when the first Gulf War (1990–1991) was the most prominent news story to lows in the mid-30 percent range once the war was concluded, and an economic recession became the main news story. As this example suggests, an additional challenge for elected leaders is to guide the media toward the issues that reflect best upon those leaders.

Another challenge for all those who would influence the news (during elections as well as in the course of governing) is to frame the issues to highlight particular attributes and concerns. The concept of framing is used to talk about how news stories emphasize or deemphasize different aspects of the reality they report on. Experimental research

has demonstrated that news frames can influence how people think about problems like terrorism, poverty, and racial inequality—for example, whether they view these primarily as problems of individual behavior or as problems affected and solved by governmental intervention. As with all media effects, however, framing effects are partial and contingent, and other research has shown that the public does not always adopt the frames emphasized in the news.

In most political systems, the frames found most often in the news are those put forth by political officials. One study of news coverage of conflicts in the Middle East, for example, concluded that Israeli political officials enjoy a metaphorical "royal gate" into the news arena, which gives them advantages over other groups that compete to enter the arena and frame the conflict. Even though in liberal democracies the media are formally independent from government, the media tend to follow the lead of high officials and limit news frames to those that elites are discussing and debating, particularly when covering matters concerning national security. Scholars call this dynamic, in which reporters tie the topics and slant of their stories to the views expressed by high political officials, "indexing."

Another powerful determinant of news framing of international conflicts is nationalism. We can see both indexing and nationalism at work in the differing coverage of the vexing issue of torture that arose during the war in Iraq (2003–). While many U.S. news outlets were hesitant to openly challenge the Bush administration's claims about the U.S. military's treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and other detention facilities, news coverage in European countries was routinely more critical. These examples remind us that across a variety of political systems, the media can be a powerful conduit of official messages and a key shaper of public perceptions of one's country and the world.

GLOBALIZED MEDIA AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

We cannot discuss the role of media in politics without also considering how the media matter in the international arena. In an era of globalization, in which national boundaries are less meaningful and the very concept of the nation-state seems in decline, the rise of global media conglomerates (most of which are Western owned) is significant. Indeed, these media conglomerates are often accused of colonizing local cultures, spreading (or imposing) Western political and cultural values, and subjecting the rest of the world to their "Western gaze." At the same time, the rise of nearly instantaneous global communication has profoundly impacted political decision making in the international arena, leading some to fear a "CNN effect" in which the hand of government is forced by media coverage of dramatic and disturbing events abroad. (The examples of U.S. interventions in Somalia and Yugoslavia in the 1990s are often given.) While research suggests that government policy has not followed media coverage in so simplistic a fashion, it is nevertheless true that citizens around the world, thanks to media technologies, are much more aware of one another's

plights than ever before, and governments must make decisions more quickly and deliberate less. (As former British prime minister Tony Blair once observed, leaders must now respond to international events "in real time.")

At the same time, old boundaries remain, especially around how national media cover their countries' perspectives on and involvement in international conflicts. Studies show that the U.S. media largely covered the initial phase of the U.S.-led war in Iraq (2003–) from a relatively uncritical perspective, focusing on the advancement of U.S. troops and the fall of Saddam Hussein. U.S. news coverage was considerably more favorable toward the war effort than were the German and British media, while Arab networks like al-Jazeera showed much more graphic imagery of civilian casualties and aired much more extensive criticism of the war.

See also *Media, Political Commentary in the; Media Effect; Television and Politics.*

. . . .   REGINA G. LAWRENCE

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Media Bias

Media bias is a tendency, subtle or overt, to advantage or over-expose one perspective (or selected person or point of view) when reporting any event, issue or debate, and/or to neglect

the other side. Media biases exist as well whenever journalists provide misguiding or incomplete coverage that can lead viewers or readers to a distorted conclusion, such as introducing some common clichés into evocative formulations that can automatically lead to a predictable conclusion.

In most western societies, the principle of objectivity in journalism implies providing a diversity of viewpoints, mixed sources of information, and a variety of perspectives to give a balanced view on current news, ongoing issues, election campaigns, and history. This postulate, frequently heard in democratic states, possibly finds its idealized origins in the agora of Ancient Greece, where free citizens could debate and be exposed to viewpoints other than their own. On the opposite side, media in totalitarian regimes (often under governmental control) tend to generate only one perspective or present the opposing views as without merit.

Media bias occurs whenever a medium tends to unfairly advantage one side of any topic, issue, or debate, either by offering unbalanced exposure or by retaining only the more positive comments from "neutral" experts or commentators. Apart from letters to the editor, editorials, some sport commentary, and some columns where writers may (and should) express their own views and opinions, general news coverage is expected to be neutral, so the audience can decide which perspective to adopt or reject.

MEDIA THEORIES

Like public opinion, the phenomenon of media bias is studied by sociologists, political scientists, strategists, political marketers, historians, and media experts. In their classic *German Ideology* (1846), political theorists Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels demonstrated that the thoughts and beliefs of the dominating class were imposed on the whole society through the dominant class's control over the production and distribution of news media. In this scheme, the perspective of the dominants was presented as representing the common good and therefore was proposed to become the ideology shared by a majority.

However, some non-Marxian observers argued that the media and journalists were often independent and free and therefore unlinked with the state. French philosopher Louis Althusser responded to this objection in his famous 1970 article "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" by demonstrating that even within the independent media, the elites who controlled the main media belonged to the same upper class as the rulers of the state. Thus, both elites (the rulers of the state and the media) had the same values, beliefs, and worldview; this dynamic was coined the "ideological state apparatus." Pursuing his critique of the Western world, Althusser believed that although educators do not belong to the ruling class, they also contributed in an unconscious way to reproduce the same dominant scheme. Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman adopted similar arguments in their 1988 book *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass*. As adherents of the "Frankfurt school" and continuing in the tradition of Marx and Engels, German theoreticians Max Horkheimer

and Theodor Adorno studied the propaganda and media bias that occurred during World War II (1939–1945). Using a neo-Marxist approach while working in Chile during the 1970s, scholars Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart have demonstrated in their research "How to Read Donald Duck" that the local Chilean newspapers carried a procapitalist ideology, even in the daily Disney comic strips.

French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu wrote many books about media bias, criticizing the dominating position of speakers on television shows who control questions, time limits dedicated to each guests' answers, and even who is invited to the show. Incidentally, political leaders can use a comparable selection process during press conferences. In his 1987 book *Distinction*, Bourdieu demonstrated that average readers of any newspaper were more or less buying a collection of opinions that corresponded to their own opinions and position in society; for instance, a liberal thinker would likely select a left-wing daily, while a right-wing citizen would read a right-wing newspaper. In France, some respected newspapers have a political trend that their journalists clearly acknowledge: *Le Figaro* is more right wing and *Libération* is left wing, while *Humanité* is linked with the French Communists. The monthly *Le Monde Diplomatique* is obsessively anti-American.

In *The News Shapers: The Sources Who Explain the News* (1992), American scholar Lawrence Soley states that if journalists in search of objectivity always use the same reliable sources, they will reproduce the status quo; however, varying the sources of information used in reporting will bring a healthy critique of the legitimized institutions in any society.

NEW MEDIA AND THE INTERNET

Although alternative media are less cohesive and grounded than other media, they can sometimes be a source of diverging opinions, contestations, and debates. With the Internet, citizens have more access to diversified points of view, but blogs can sometimes contain unreliable information or misinformation. By definition, blogs are not made to be neutral or comprehensive: Some writers of blogs are in reality partisans disguised as journalists.

UNDERSTANDING MEDIA BIAS

An easy way to observe media bias would be to observe occurrences of anti-Americanism in foreign newspapers and television. Analysts can study whether the bias is generalized or targeted only to specific issues, themes, people, or nations. A recurrent "anti" trend is common to biased media; an example is anti-Zionism in many Arab media. Elsewhere, Canadians often feel the U.S. Fox television network is recurrently satirical toward Canada.

In rare occasions, media bias can exist simultaneously in many media that do not belong to the same group: In his 2002 work, *The Black Book of English Canada*, Canadian journalist Normand Lester provided a critique of the current and sometimes not so subtle Quebec-bashing (toward French Canadian communities) frequently appearing in many English Canadian newspapers, showing that journalists can sometimes be aware of an ongoing bias within their own profession.

MEDIA BIAS IN SCIENCE

The media coverage of issues related to bioethics, science, and technologies can sometimes become debated and biased. Because most journalists are not experts or scientists themselves, they frequently rely on experts' opinions, although scientists do not always agree one with another and usually work with hypotheses rather than theories. Therefore, facts, data, and diverging opinions of scientists are often summarized and transformed into stories during the reporting. Another risk of media bias occurs whenever journalists consult and rely on the same experts for any given issue: a familiar activist for environmental issues, a retired politician for current affairs, and so forth.

Degrees are not essential for being recognized as an expert; when using strategy and rhetoric, celebrities and some politicians can adopt a cause related to science and the environment, even if the issue appears to be in the middle of a larger debate among scientists and within civil society. For instance, millions of viewers watched former vice president Al Gore in his 2006 documentary *An Inconvenient Truth*, in which he disqualified his opponents by labeling them as "so-called skeptics" questioning the scientific "truth," ending the debate between two divergent perspectives related to climate change.

In partisan politics and especially during election campaigns, it becomes difficult to give appropriate measure to minor events or out-of-context reflections made by candidates, as the media can amplify an anecdote to bigger proportions. The overdramatization of casualties, excessive negativity, and transformation of single, isolated events into scandals are also forms (or symptoms) of media bias, especially during periods of slow news.

See also *Bourdieu, Pierre; Campaign Advertising; Censorship; Disinformation; Framing and Public Opinion; Ideologies, Political; Internet and Politics; Journalism, Political; Negative Campaigning; News, Construction of; Propaganda; Public Opinion; Television and Politics.*

. . . . YVES LABERGE

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Media Effect

A media effect is a way in which the content presented by the mass media influences the interest, knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors of an individual regarding politics. Early theories suggested that media had what was called a "hypodermic needle" effect on individuals; that is, they immediately and uncritically accepted information presented in the media. Subsequent research in the United States focusing on vote choice and the decision to vote found that media have minimal effects on political behavior. Later research broadened the concept of the media effect to more subtle influences on the political opinions of the individual and found that media have conditional effects on individuals, depending on individual characteristics. Three widely recognized political effects of mass media on individuals are framing, priming, and agenda setting.

Other recent studies have found the media effects approach too narrow, because it focuses on effects of particular outlets or stories and because it attributes too much power to the individual. The recent studies have focused more on the overall media environment created by institutions, and individuals have less power than was previously assumed to choose the media content to which they expose themselves. Though disputes remain over theory and methods in studying media effects, the approach to the study of politics and media has been a fruitful area of research in political science.

See also *Media and Politics.*

. . . . JANET L. DONAVAN

Megacities

A megacity is a large urban agglomeration with ten million or more inhabitants, according to the United Nations (UN) definition. The term was first coined by the UN in the 1970s to designate agglomerations with eight million or more inhabitants, a threshold raised to ten million in the 1990s. *Megalopolis* and *megapolis* are two other terms often used to describe this same urban form. Despite the increase in the number of megacities over the past several decades, the proportion of the world's population living in these urban agglomerations continues to be small: In 2007, megacities accounted for only about 4 percent of the total world population and for 9 percent of the world urban population; for 2025, the UN predicts that they will account for around 10 percent of the world urban population (see Table 1).

Megacities have high population densities but are not presently among the fastest growing cities in the world, and in the future, the UN prospects point to a slowdown in the growth of the major megacities, both in developed and less-developed world regions. They have a spatial pattern defined, in the case of metropolitan areas, by a highly dense core surrounded by external and sprawling suburbs, or by several highly dense centers in the case of conurbations. In developing countries, megacities also have extensive informal structures (e.g., infrastructures,

TABLE 1: POPULATION LIVING AND PROJECTED TO LIVE IN MEGACITIES, SHOWING TOTAL NUMBERS AS WELL AS NUMBERS IN DEVELOPED AND IN LESS-DEVELOPED REGIONS (1975–2025)

	1975	2000	2007	2025
WORLD				
Total urban population (millions)	1519	2845	3294	4584
Population in megacities (millions)	53	240	286	447
Percentage of total urban population living in megacities	3.5	8.4	8.7	9.7
DEVELOPED REGIONS				
Total urban population (millions)	702	874	910	995
Population in megacities (millions)	42	85	89	103
Percentage of total urban population living in megacities	6.1	9.8	9.8	10.3
LESS-DEVELOPED REGIONS				
Total urban population (millions)	817	1971	2384	3590
Population in megacities (millions)	11	154	197	344
Percentage of total urban population living in megacities	1.3	7.8	8.3	9.6

SOURCE: Reprinted by permission from United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision.* New York: United Nations, 2008.

TABLE 2 – POPULATION IN MEGACITIES: 1950, 1975, 2007

	MEGACITY	POPULATION (MILLIONS)
1950	1. New York	12.3
	2. Tokyo	11.3
1975	1. Tokyo	26.6
	2. New York	15.9
	3. Mexico City	10.7
2007	1. Tokyo	35.7
	2. New York	19.0
	3. Mexico City	19.0
	4. Mumbai	19.0
	5. São Paulo	18.8
	6. Delhi	15.9
	7. Shanghai	15.0
	8. Calcutta	14.8
	9. Dhaka	13.5
	10. Buenos Aires	12.8
	11. Los Angeles	12.5
	12. Karachi	12.1
	13. Cairo	11.9
	14. Rio de Janeiro	11.7
	15. Osaka-Kobe	11.3
	16. Beijing	11.1
	17. Manila	11.1
	18. Moscow	10.5
	19. Istanbul	10.1

SOURCE: Reprinted by permission from United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision.* New York: United Nations, 2008.

housing) with the corresponding high levels of poverty and social fragmentation.

Besides this demographic and spatial quantitative dimension—responsible for new social, economic, and environmental challenges and different from city to city and from country to country—a megacity is also a new form of urban socialization in the twenty-first century and an important economic engine in both developed and developing countries. These challenges are associated with physical degradation, social problems, economic decline, environmental risks, lack of appropriate legal instruments to control the rapid urbanization process, and a huge demand for housing and urban public services—which, in many cases, national and local governments are unable to provide. Megacities require, from national and local governments, new approaches and new instruments in the field of urban planning and in urban politics more generally.

Table 2 shows the two UN-identified megacities that existed in 1950 (New York and Tokyo) as well as the three in 1975 (Tokyo, New York, and Mexico City), eighteen in 2000, and nineteen in 2007, of which eleven are capitals of their countries. Asia has eleven megacities, Latin America four, North America two, and Africa and Europe one each. For 2025, besides these nineteen, the UN listed, in its 2008 World Urbanization Prospects, eight new megacities: five in Asia, two in Africa, and one in Europe (Jakarta, Guangzhou, Lahore, Shenzhen, Chennai, Kinshasa, Lagos, and Paris).

See also *Urban Housing; Urban Inequality and Poverty; Urbanization; Urban Migration.*

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Menshevism

Menshevism refers to the beliefs of the Mensheviks, a Marxist faction that emerged in the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) in 1903. Menesheviks are often portrayed as more moderate than the rival Bolshevik faction, but they were unable to play an important role in the politics of revolutionary Russia.

Menshevism dates to the second congress of the RSDLP in 1903. One prominent member of the party, Vladimir Lenin, argued for a more centralized and disciplined party, whereas others, including Lenin's former colleagues Julius Martov

and Pavel Axelrod, favored a more decentralized, inclusive approach. Lenin's faction, through a series of political maneuvers, gained a majority in elections to the party's leading bodies, thus becoming the Bolsheviks (from *bol'shinstvo,* the Russian word for majority), whereas Martov and his allies become the Mensheviks (from *men'shenstvo,* the Russian word for minority).

Further differences between the two factions developed over time. In 1905, during revolutionary upheaval in Russia, the Mensheviks supported the idea that the working class could and should make alliances with the bourgeoisie to help produce revolutionary change in Russia. The Bolsheviks, in contrast, argued that the workers and peasants should be the leaders of the revolution and that they should establish a revolutionary dictatorship of the peasantry and proletariat. While Lenin's arguments appealed to many because they foresaw an immediate communist revolution, adherents of Menshevism argued that the working class in Russia was too small to lead any revolution and that, following Marx, communism could only be established after Russia experienced bourgeoisie democracy. In judging the disputes between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, many believe the Mensheviks represent the more orthodox interpretation of Marx. Prominent figures such as Grigorii Plekhanov and Leon Trotsky joined the Mensheviks.

Many Mensheviks left the RSDLP altogether after the failures of 1905 and joined legal opposition organizations. Lenin accused them of destroying the party, and in 1912 he formed the Bolsheviks as a separate party. The Mensheviks did the same, but in 1914 the Mensheviks split over whether to support Russia's involvement in World War I (1914–1918). Trotsky assumed leadership of the antiwar, internationalist faction of the Mensheviks in the Russian exile community.

After the overthrow of the tsar in February 1917, the Mensheviks, led by Irakli Tsereteli, demanded that the government pursue a "fair peace without annexations" but in the meantime supported the war effort under the slogan of "defense of the revolution." Along with the other major Russian socialist party, the Socialist Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks led, throughout most of 1917, the emerging network of *soviet*s (worker councils), notably the Petrograd Soviet in the capital. Whereas some argued for a reunification of the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, Lenin scrapped this idea upon his return to Russia in April 1917, when he took a more radical, antiwar position and refused to cooperate with the Russian provisional government. After the collapse of the first provisional government in May 1917, Tsereteli convinced the Mensheviks—over the objections of Martov who had returned from exile—to strengthen the government for the sake of a socialist-liberal coalition with Socialist Revolutionaries and liberal Constitutional Democrats. One of many socialist groups in Russia at that time, the Mensheviks had at least one representative in the provisional government until it was overthrown by the Bolsheviks in November 1917. However, the party, subject to a variety of internal struggles, was weak, winning only 3 percent of the vote to a constituent assembly in the November 1917 elections.

The Mensheviks condemned the Bolshevik seizure of power as an illegal coup d'etat, and the Bolsheviks refused to share power with the Mensheviks, dismissing the elected constituent assembly in 1918. Martov, however, did offer support for the Bolsheviks in 1918 as the Russian Civil War (1917–1923) began. The Mensheviks remained a small faction in Russia, gaining prominence in the region of Georgia, where they won over 80 percent of the vote in the 1919 elections. After the Bolsheviks occupied Georgia in 1921, many Menshevik leaders fled the country, setting up a government in exile in France. In 1930, Noe Ramishvili, one of the leaders of Georgian Mensheviks, was assassinated by a Soviet spy in Paris.

Menshevism was finally made illegal after the Kronstadt Uprising of 1921, although the Mensheviks themselves took no part in it. Many prominent Russian Mensheviks emigrated, eventually setting up a Menshevik newspaper, the *Socialist Messenger,* in New York, which published until 1965.

See also *Bolshevism; Leninism; Marxism; Socialism.*

. . . . PAUL JAMES KUBICEK

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Mercantilism

Mercantilism is an economic theory of strict government control of trade that dominated the thought of the major trading nations from approximately 1500 CE to the end of the seventeenth century. European countries, in particular, enforced a strict mercantilist system of foreign trade. The basic tenet of mercantilism was that national power and wealth were best achieved by exporting more than was imported and through the subsequent accumulation of bullion.

As a consequence of the Renaissance, the medieval, feudal society in Western Europe was deteriorating in the sixteenth century and being superseded by mercantilism (especially in England, France, and Holland). Medieval, feudal institutions were destabilized by the escalating use of money and by greater dependence on trade within the economy. Whereas kings had formerly relied upon nobles, they became increasingly dependent upon the bourgeoisie and nation-states to support them. Kings hired armies and navies to maintain peace and order, which led to greater prosperity and the continual growth of nationalism.

TRADE AND GOLD ACCUMULATION

Growth in travel during this period led inevitably to more capital for financing commerce and trade. Ship captains had

improved navigational ability due to new inventions and were safer due to improved vessel design and construction. The surplus of goods transported across the Mediterranean Sea increased wealth and the production of even more goods, as commercial centers were developed. Mercantilist thought gave prominence to the construction of export centers, developing the power of national states. Export became increasingly important, since a steady supply of exported goods would result in increased accumulation of gold and silver. Whereas the accumulation of gold had previously been viewed as a sign of covetousness (one of the so-called seven deadly sins), gold and silver were now positively regarded as the means to wealth and national power. The mercantilist position was "foreign trade produces riches; riches power; power preserves our trade and religion."

If mercantilists were to acquire gold and silver, which would maintain national power and also allow safeguarding of one's religion, it was absolutely necessary for national states to trade. The commercial and religious wars of this era demanded large revenues to finance armies and the escalating expenditures of civil government. Moreover, as the Protestant Reformation challenged the role and teaching of the Catholic Church, the civil role of the state expanded. Eventually, religious disturbances and desire for religious freedom would result in explorers seeking settlement in the New World.

Mercantilism was endorsed by the new nation-states, and the mercantilist nations were impressed by the universal demand for precious metals, especially gold, as the means for obtaining other commodities. Accumulating bullion and making large investments in trade supported mercantile theory and was an aspect of the new politics in the rise of the nation-state. Mercantilist nations began establishing colonies (which they exploited) and trading posts for the benefit of the mother country, since the settlements could provide raw materials for domestic manufacturing that would otherwise have required importation from other countries. The settlements in turn needed manufactured goods, which encouraged ongoing exchange. Kings were ardent supporters of mercantilist theory, and governments supported exploration of the New World as a means of further augmenting the mother country. Ships bearing the flag of the mother country (encouraging monopolization of colonial trade) could transport goods.

CHILD LABOR AND ENTREPRENEURIALISM

Mercantilists desired a sizeable number of low-wage laborers, including children, to manufacture exports. Even children as young as age four were sent to workhouses for a mere two hours of teaching, only to exhaust the remainder of the day working according to their ability, age, and strength.

Governments also wanted powerful entrepreneurs, or firms, traveling to foreign countries and exporting goods. To facilitate these entrepreneurial firms, the government would grant special favors. The firms were essential for acting upon existing opportunities, creating new opportunities, and creating innovation in the market. The accumulation of gold was the determining factor for financing future trade enterprises and allowing companies to borrow money. If there were a lack of credit, then companies would be forced to borrow money at high interest rates. However, gold and silver in the treasury increased a nation's wealth, thereby allowing companies to borrow money for investing in new business enterprises.

DEFENSE AND DECLINE OF MERCANTILISM

The primary exponent of mercantilism in France was Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619–1683). He held the position of minister of finance from 1661 until his death, under King Louis XIV. Colbert believed strongly in fixed government control over the country's economy, and his efforts made France stable financially. He upheld mercantilist beliefs regarding the expansion of commerce and the safeguarding of a favorable balance of trade as the means for creating and maintaining a wealthy nation. His policies, known as Colbertism, were all maintained according to mercantilist tenets. Colbert was responsible for the creation of a powerful navy that made France a tremendous power at sea. He was also responsible for sending explorers and colonists to America. Colbertism became synonymous with mercantilism, and Colbert's actions made it the most common European economic system of his day. Colbert sometimes used unscrupulous means to accomplish his purposes and was known for asserting the power of state.

Mercantilist thought did not decline until the advent of the Industrial Revolution and the rise of the laissez-faire physiocrats. Although mercantilist policies no longer dominate, the existence of large business subsidies, large trade surpluses, and low-wage workers demonstrate that certain characteristics of the theory remain prevalent.

See also *Free Trade; Laissez-faire; Protectionism and Tariffs.*

. . . . RON J. BIGALKE JR.

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Meritocracy

A meritocracy is a political, economic, or social system that rewards individuals because of talent and personal ability as opposed to factors such as class, nepotism, or race or ethnicity. Meritocracies typically require entrance exams or other measures to ensure that individuals meet minimum qualifications before they are appointed to public positions or the civil service. Promotion is subsequently based on merit.

The term was coined by Michael Young in his 1958 critical work *The Rise of Meritocracy,* but the principles of meritocracy have their roots in antiquity. Proponents of meritocracies include Plato and Confucius, who advocated ideal societies where wealth and status were tied to ability. Merit-based civil service systems were introduced in a number of countries in the 1800s as a reform effort intended to end cronyism and political patronage. For instance, in the United States, the 1883 Pendleton Civil Service Act created the modern U.S. civil service, based on meritocracy. Critics of meritocracy argue that structural advantages, including access to education, disproportionately favor wealthier classes. Opponents also assert that meritocracies reward groupthink and conformity rather than encouraging innovation. Consequently, they contend meritocracies tend to reinforce the status quo in societies.

See also *Civil Service; Confucian Political Thought; Plato.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Merleau–Ponty, Maurice

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) was a French philosopher mostly known for his work in phenomenology and existential philosophy. He attempted to maintain a political position that was neither communist nor anticommunist, and he spoke for the necessity of a philosophy of history for political thought.

Born on March 14, 1908, in Rochefort-sur-Mer, Merleau-Ponty attended the École Normale Supérieure in Paris. He was a devout Catholic, and his interest in politics developed slowly. In the early 1930s he joined the *Esprit* groups, which gathered left-wing Christians with the aim of developing different aspects of French philosopher Emmanuel Mounier's personalism. It was during his association with these groups that he first studied the work of German philosopher Karl Marx. Before earning his doctorate in 1945, Merleau-Ponty broke with his faith, read the works of Russian Marxist revolutionaries Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky, and made friends in nonorthodox Marxist circles. During the German occupation, he also took part in intellectual resistance groups, which led to a friendship with existential philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre.

Together with Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, another French philosopher, in 1945 Merleau-Ponty founded the journal *Les Temps Modernes,* of which he was the de facto political editor. As such, he published a great number of articles, mostly by noncommunists, strongly criticizing French and liberal politics. He himself wrote political editorials, and in 1946 he published a series of texts that were eventually published as *Humanism and Terror* (1947). In this work, he defines a noncommunist and humanistic Marxism that recognizes the inevitability of violence in politics and seeks to reorient violence toward achieving the recognition of man by man. He concludes by saying that since there is no immediate hope for a proletarian revolution, everything must be done to maintain the chances of the working class to once again become an important political force. Most important, war must be avoided. As long as the Soviet Union maintains and shows that it does not want war, liberal regimes must strive to coexist peacefully with it. Merleau-Ponty thus positioned himself to be able to end his sympathy for the communists if they were to seek war with the West. More generally, he adopted a phenomenological attitude toward politics, seeking to understand the present as completely as possible without prejudging its meaning. Instead he sought to find this meaning in the events and actions where it manifested itself and opened new possibilities for action.

In 1952 Merleau-Ponty was given a chair at the Collège de France. In his courses he defined a philosophy of history based on the concept of institution and on a new understanding of the dialectic. The reasons for his break with Marxism were published in *Adventures of the Dialectic* (1955). He defended then the idea of a new left-wing politics that would criticize capitalism as well as communism, abandoning the idea of revolution. He suggested an unending and progressive work against misery and exploitation, which would build on past political projects and make possible future radical critiques of capitalism. During this period he also grew closer to French politician Pierre Mendès France, with whom he collaborated.

In the preface to *Signs* (1960), Merleau-Ponty outlined the necessity of reading Marx as a philosopher and put forth the idea that philosophy and politics are interdependent insofar as through them, humans are in relation with others in the world. In manuscripts published posthumously as *The Visible and the Invisible* (1964), he sought to discover a new ontology aimed at understanding the foundations of such relations. Maurice Merleau-Ponty died in Paris on May 3, 1961, before finishing work on this project.

See also *Beauvoir, Simone de; Communism; French Political Thought; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Sartre, Jean-Paul.*

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Merriam, Charles E.

Charles E. Merriam (1874–1953) was an American political scientist, presidential advisor, and author. A long-time professor at the University of Chicago, Merriam began his academic career as a graduate student at Columbia University in New York under the tutelage of the creators of the graduate school of political science, John Burgess and William Dunning. It was here Merriam learned that one could both teach politics and be politically active at the same time, and he is believed to be one of the first to bring together academia and politics. An example of this was most likely set for him by the president of Columbia University during his tenure there, Seth Low, a man who made the switch between academic and politician very fluidly. Merriam was also known to incorporate research in the fields of psychology, sociology, and economics into his work. In 1925 Merriam became president of the American Political Science Association.

During his time at Columbia, Merriam frequently tried to get into politics. Twice he ran for mayor and was defeated. However, Merriam held a number of other governmental positions, including councilman. He was an advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt when Roosevelt was designing the New Deal, and many of the specifics of the policy program came from Merriam's advice. He was also a member of the President's Commission on Administrative Management, the National Resources Planning Board under President Roosevelt, and President Harry S. Truman's Loyalty Review Board at the beginning of the red scare.

In addition to all of his other accomplishments, Merriam was also a successful entrepreneur. He was excellent at raising money and creating and presenting research projects in a way that attracted affluent donors. His fundraising efforts helped in the creation of the Social Science Research Council.

Merriam often argued with educational theorist George Counts over the role of the university in preparing students to be true citizens. Merriam disagreed with Counts's idea to teach the students how to reform or to overthrow American capitalism. Merriam saw no reason to teach students to revolt against the country. He instead tried to guide them in how to adhere to the principles of behavior established by the citizenry of America.

Charles Merriam was a valued teacher who left a memorable impression on his students. He helped begin the custom of political science academics by not only teaching political science, but participating in real politics in the surrounding community. This custom continues to be practiced in the early twenty-first century.

See also *Education Policy, Higher; New Deal; Political Theory.*

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Mexican Immigration

Mexican immigration into the United States is increasing. In the 1960s Mexico lost some 27,500 people annually to its northern neighbor. With the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, migration increased in the second half of the 1990s to 360,000, and between 2001 and 2005, to 396,000 people a year. According to data of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Border Patrol, and the Mexican National Population Council, around 28 million people of Mexican origin were living in the United States in 2005, among them 10.6 million who were born in Mexico. Most are men (55 percent); 53.1 percent are between 20 and 40 years old. Though the majority of migrants have some primary or secondary school education, every third Mexican with a doctorate works in the United States.

The main reason for Mexican emigration is a relative lack of job opportunities in Mexico. The Mexican government considers migration a valve for its social and economic problems, and many families depend on remittances. In 2006, Mexican workers in the United States sent approximately $23 billion to their families in Mexico. After income from the oil business, remittances are the second largest source of income. Because of its huge demand for cheap labor, the United States still attracts Mexicans. In the United States, 80 percent of Mexican workers earn more than $20,000 a year, whereas in Mexico, 75 percent of them earn less than $20 a day.

Approximately six million Mexicans live as undocumented aliens in the United States. Annually, U.S. authorities deport one million immigrants back to Mexico. Between 1997 and 2005, over 3,100 Mexicans died attempting to cross the border illegally. This number increased after the United States reinforced border controls and constructed defense walls along its frontier with Mexico. Migrants try to cross the border illegally in dangerous desert areas between Mexico and the U.S. states of Arizona and Texas. Many die due to disorientation, hyperthermia, or human traffickers (so-called *polleros*), who charge migrants up to $3,000 to be smuggled into the United States.

There are many migration streams from Mexico to the United States: legal immigration, unauthorized or illegal immigration, and temporary immigration, which can be legal (through various temporary work programs) or illegal. Each of these three variants creates its own particular economic opportunities, relationships between the migrants and Mexico, and forms of migrant adaptation to the United States.

Many Mexicans opt for temporary migration, which is still high in spite of immigration restrictions. Approximately 380,000 people enter the United States to work temporarily,

principally in the agricultural sector. The majority are males (95 percent), 77 percent immigrate without permits, 41 percent contract a human trafficker, around 70 percent enter for the first time, 78 percent work illegally, and 60 percent get help from family and friends. Many come from central and rural areas of Mexico, such as Zacatecas, Michoacán, and Durango, to work primarily in California and Texas, and very often, they are part of new transnational social networks. Relatives and friends compose these communities, which permit cross-border mobility between the societies of origins and settlement. They offer mutual help and solidarity. Finally, they form new identities linking the two nations. According to anthropologists Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton, these "transmigrants," linked by two societies, permit a synthesis of mother and host country. Yet their identities are often fragile and can be further threatened by the actions of so-called self-defense organizations such as the Minutemen of Arizona.

Since the implementation of Operation Gatekeeper in 1994, migration and security have become important parts of the U.S.–Mexican bilateral agenda. U.S. attorney general Janet Reno announced the operation in order to restore integrity and safety to the border in the San Diego area. As a consequence, illegal migration shifted eastward. Just days before the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, U.S. president George W. Bush and Mexican president Vicente Fox were preparing a migration agreement. However, after 9/11, the fear of new attacks changed the national U.S. interests. The politics of border militarization and preventing illegal aliens from entering into the United States culminated eventually in different bills and proposals in the U.S. Congress. On September 14, 2006, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 6061, the Secure Fence Act, which was signed into law by President Bush. It authorized the construction of a double-layered fence along one-third of the 2,100-mile U.S.-Mexico border. The following year, the U.S. Senate's proposed Comprehensive Immigration Act of 2007, which sought opportunities for undocumented migrants to obtain legal status, failed to pass. In the 2008 presidential election campaign, migration was a nonissue. Though Bush's successor, Barack Obama, promoted a new citizenship act and a new employment eligibility verification system, he favored additional customs and border protection.

Early in the Obama administration, migration remained part of the security debate. The economic and financial crisis that began in 2008 did not support new legal initiatives for illegal migrants from Mexico. President Obama suggested actualizing NAFTA and strengthening cooperation with Mexico in addressing issues around migration, economy, and security, especially in regard to drug and human trafficking violence. Mexican immigration continues to challenge the United States' border security and economic future.

See also *Immigration, Effects on Intergroup Relations; Immigration, Politics of; Migration.*

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Michels, Robert

Robert Michels (1876–1936) was a European political sociologist who started out as a Marxist member of the late-nineteenth-century German Social Democratic Party and ended up a professor in Italy and a proponent of fascism. He is best known for propounding the "iron law of oligarchy," which held that nominally democratic organizations such as mass political parties end up being controlled by oligarchs. Thus, democratic parties not only faced opposition from external forces but also contained obstacles to accountability within their own structures.

Michels was born into a prosperous family in Cologne, Germany, in 1876 and studied in Paris, France; England; and Turin, Italy, as well as at three German universities. He became a follower of German sociologists such as Max Weber and Werner Sombart and was an active radical until he left the socialist party in 1907. Unable to gain academic advancement in Germany because of his politics, Michels taught at the University of Turin and then the University of Basel, Switzerland, until 1926.

In *Political Parties,* first published in German in 1911 and in English in 1915, Michels set out a theory explaining why organization leads to oligarchy. Organizations with many members require full-time personnel to carry out their activities. Their officials have the technical skills, information, and position to exert great influence on what the organization does. In order to protect their power base, party elites moderate their radicalism and oppose demands by party militants. If challenged, they can use their organizational advantages to retain control of the party as long as they remain united. Michels invoked a social psychological form of elite theory to argue that the mass of individuals, because of their lack of education, skills, and organization, could not carry out activities on their own and thus desired to be led. Oligarchs provide the leadership.

Michels's emphasis on the assimilation of new elites into the status quo was consistent with Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto's theory of the circulation of elites. However, by deeming his theory a "law," Michels made it overly deterministic. He neglected the possibility of a radical elite repudiating ruling elites and their institutions. This was the way in which Russian Bolsheviks and Nazi Germans seized power. Once in power, communist leaders exemplified the rule of oligarchies behind the facade of a democratic party of all classes chosen by popular (albeit one-party) elections. *Union Democracy,* published in 1956 and edited by Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin Trow, and James S. Coleman, showed that organizational elites could be subject to electoral sanctions by members, but the conditions in which this was possible were atypical of trade unions.

In the 1920s, Michels became an advocate of Italian fascism and professor at the University of Perugia. He asserted that Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, an exsocialist, had a charismatic appeal to the masses that provided a legitimate foundation for popular representation without the distortions resulting from the intermediation of party officials. Michels died in Rome in 1936.

See also *Oligarchy; Oligarchy, Iron Law of; Political Parties.*

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Microeconomics

Microeconomics is a subdivision of the field of economics. The field has two distinct subdivisions: microeconomics and macroeconomics. Unlike macroeconomics, in which the entire economy is studied as a whole, microeconomics studies how the individual components of the overall economy (households, firms, or individuals) interact and make decisions in markets. For example, while a macroeconomist may study the relationship between the unemployment rate and the inflation rate, a microeconomist would examine the decision-making process of a firm considering whether to increase or decrease its workforce.

Typically, in microeconomics, individual entities and their effects on prices within the market are studied in relation to the more basic theories of supply and demand. Microeconomics also studies how individual firms influence and interact with each other within the larger economy. For instance, microeconomics can explain how the formation of an oligopoly (a small number of firms that dominate market share and prevent entry) affects prices and consumer utility. It can even explain why firms form clusters of similar businesses within close proximity. Microeconomic analysis relies on the assumption of a rational, utility-maximizing behavior, often

aims at mathematical rigor, and is closely related to rational choice theory in the field of political science.

See Also *Macroeconomics; Political Economy; Rational Choice Theory.*

. . . . SUSAN MARIE OPP

Middle East Democratization

In the modern history of the Arab Middle East, there are four waves that can be identified with regard to constitutionalism: reform, liberalization, pluralism, and democratization (or the lack thereof). These are the pre–World War I (1914–1918) liberal tradition, the interwar period, the post–World War II (1939–1945) period, and the post–9/11 era. With regard to the literature on democratization in the Middle East, there are two contending schools of thought that can be identified as the exclusionary discourse and the compatibility discourse.

The exclusionary discourse of democratization advocated that the Middle East is an exceptional case and immune to democracy due to an alleged incompatibility of its political culture with the modern norms of democracy. Arab political culture and Islam are held responsible for the democratic gap in the region. The work of political scientists Samuel Huntington (1991, 1993) and Yehudah Mirsky (1993) represent this trend. On a foreign policy level, Ambassador Richard Haass acknowledged in a speech on December 4, 2002, that the U.S. government has for decades practiced "democratic exceptionalism" in the Muslim world, as it did in other regions and countries after the fall of the Soviet Union. Other Western democracies never deviated from this rule.

The compatibility school of thought advocated that Islam and the Arab political culture are not less compatible with democracy than other cultures and religions. Michael Hudson (1991), John L. Esposito (1994), Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1993), and other scholars and area specialists represent this trend. However, the most noticeable aspect of the third wave literature, as put by Tim Niblock, is that it extensively researches the "why" aspect of democracy rather than the "how." The research focuses on why the region is undemocratic instead of investigating how to bring about a successful process of transition to democracy in the Middle East and the Islamic world. This very element distinguishes the fourth wave—of democratization from the third—of pluralism.

The fourth wave's literature is more hopeful and relatively optimistic about the status and future of democracy in the region in comparison with the third wave's intellectual discourse. The following several trends can be identified within the fourth wave's framework.

• A literature that questions the very nature of the third wave's assumption and the rationale of the exclusionary thought. Alfred Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson (2004), Mark Tessler and Eleanor Gao (2005), and other political scientists examined the process of democracy in a more in-depth analysis, free from the dogmatic constraints of the clash of civilizations thesis and those of the third wave.

- An active Islamist intellectual involvement in the global debate over the universality of democratic values and the compatibility of Islam with democracy and modernity. Islamists in Turkey in particular have demonstrated the practical implementation of Islamist political discourse in governance, and there have been stunning electoral gains for Islamists across the Islamic world.
- An examination of the impact of external factors on the process of democratization in the region, and of the U.S. involvement in the process of transition to democracy in particular.
- Quantitative measurement of the advancements that have been made in the region toward the process of democratization. Several polling centers frequently measure public opinion, while scholars such as Saliba Sarsar (2006) have provided an in-depth quantitative analysis of democracy in the region.
- A questioning of the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict on political reform in the region. Since about the 1950s, Arab ruling elites have been postponing reform on the grounds that a state of war exists between Israel and the Arab world.
- An examination of the linkage between democracy and terrorism, devoting special attention to the role of indigenous democratic arrangements and their impact on the process of democratization in the region.
- An investigation of the impact of the American setbacks in Iraq on democratization in the region.

DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER 9/11

During its first eight months in office, the George W. Bush administration showed no significant interest in issues related to the Middle East. However, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 drastically changed American and European policy toward that region and the world. The Bush administration made democratization an integral aspect of its policy toward the Arab world. The European Union expanded the scope of its Mediterranean Partnership to the entire Middle East in 2003, and the partnership was declared to be strategic with respect to Europe's stability, security, and well-being.

Arab governments reacted in various ways to the fourth wave. While some governments responded to the pressure mounted by the Bush administration, others resisted political openness on security grounds. For example Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Tunisia, Yemen, and United Arab Emirates conducted symbolic parliamentary elections, which were viewed mostly as undemocratic and not free. Other countries such as Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority, and Lebanon conducted transparent elections, but this step did not contribute to political stability or substantial political development in any of them. Other countries such as Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria were only marginally affected by the fourth wave, as regimes in these countries continue to resist change.

CONCLUSION

The future of the fourth wave of democratization seems uncertain. While there are encouraging signs of change in the region, there is no solid commitment to the success of the fourth wave. The distrust among participants, the American setbacks in the war in Iraq, and the refusal of the ruling elites in the Middle East to expand the basis for political participation has hindered the democratic potential of the fourth wave as of the early twenty-first century.

See also *Democracy and Democratization; Foreign Policy; Middle Eastern Politics and Society; Post-9/11 Politics.*

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Middle Eastern Politics and Society

The term *Middle East* refers to the region at the crossroads of North Africa, southwest Asia, and southeastern Europe, but social scientists and practitioners do not always agree on the

An Iranian woman in a mass of demonstrators holds up a sign that says, "I'll die, but I will not accept humiliation." Protestors amassed illegally after the 2009 presidential election and were violently repressed. Democratization in the Middle East often meets opposition from authoritarian regimes.

definition. Nineteenth-century British strategists coined the term during the heyday of the British Empire to refer to the territories between India and what is now Turkey. Both *middle* and *east* are relational categories that depend on what is the center or viewpoint. The phrase, now used by people from the Middle East, refers to the region from Morocco to Iran (on a west-east line) and from Turkey to Yemen (on a north-south line). Some people exclude North Africa (*Maghrib* in Arabic) or prefer the acronym MENA for Middle East and North Africa. The Middle East is larger than the "Near East" (the Levant, or *Mashriq* in Arabic) and sometimes includes the Muslim-majority countries of Central Asia as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Characterized for a long time as the place where "Arabs," or those who speak Arabic, were concentrated, the term has been increasingly linked to a place where Muslims are concentrated, although this characterization is not accurate, because most Muslims live outside of the Middle East, notably in Indonesia, India, and sub-Saharan Africa, and because not only Muslims live in the Middle East.

Since the Middle East witnessed the emergence of the three revealed monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—the so-called Abrahamic faiths), it might be read in religious terms. *En vogue* theories such as that in Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* have further contributed to considering Middle Eastern politics in civilizational terms, whereby "the West" and Islam are fundamentally opposed. But it is incorrect to oppose a loose geographical concept, the West, to a faith, Islam. Instead, one should distinguish Islam, the faith, from Islamdom (a term historian Marshall Hodgson coined in analogy with Christendom)—the regions where Islam is the main religion.

It is also imperative to historicize Middle Eastern politics to avoid generalizations and essentialization (the reduction of various aspects of a given group into a very few characteristics that gradually become the kernel of their "essence"), which Edward Said critiqued in his 1978 classic *Orientalism*. Said distinguishes between studying "the Orient" and a style of thought that separates "the Orient" and "the Occident." In an "orientalist" reading, the Orient, or the Middle East, becomes the negative mirror of the Occident, or the West, and vice versa. No Orient exists, even geographically, if not as a reflection of the Occident. Many authors, sometimes unwillingly, fall into the trap of ethnocentrism by assuming that what is the case in the West either ought to be so in the Middle East,

or is lacking there because of so-called oriental characteristics, ideas, and norms. A neoorientalism that is a reactualization of older orientalist biases has put emphasis on the dead end of democratization in the region as well as on Islam as a total ideology—the political role that Islam is seen to play throughout the Middle East—and generalizes about the nature of Middle Eastern society to explain violence and political instability.

POPULATION AND DIVERSITY

Characterizing the Middle East according to geography is difficult, because landscapes, access to oil and hydrocarbons, and even rainfall vary tremendously across the region. Sparsely populated areas exist next to huge urban concentrations, such as Cairo, Tehran, and Istanbul, each host to more than twelve million people. Processes of modernization, urbanization, and massive production of oil led to profound reshaping of the social fabrics of Middle Eastern societies and a staggering contrast between high-tech service-providing centers and agricultural zones.

Contrary to neo-orientalist representations of the Middle East, its population is extremely diverse, not only between countries but also within each country, influencing local and regional politics. The diversity can be expressed in the following terms:

- *Religious terms.* Although Islam is the main religion in the region, the Middle East has historically been home to Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Baha'i minorities. Even within Islam, there exist many subgroupings within the Sunni and Shiite branches. The former branch is further subdivided into four different schools of jurisprudence, with more or less strict interpretation of religious texts, ranging from the puritan Hanbali (known at times as Wahhabism), to the Malaki, Shafeite, and more liberal Hanafi legal interpretations. There are also different orders of Sufism, a form of mysticism practiced in pyramidal units called *tariqa*s. The Shiite current is divided among Twelver Shiites (mostly represented in Iran and Iraq), Sevener Shiites (Ismailis), and Fivers, or Zaydis. Other Muslim splinter groups include the Druze of Lebanon, Syria, and modern Israel; Alevis of Turkey; Alawites of Syria, and Ibadis of present-day Oman. Some of these sectarian divisions have provided fluctuating and alternative social and political hierarchies. The divisions between the two main Kurdish factions active in Northern Iraq result from a long-term division between two historically contending Sufi orders, the Naqshbandi and the Qadiri. Similarly, much of the turmoil in Lebanon in the last five decades has resulted from sectarian strife and shifting political alliances among seventeen different communities that are legally recognized by the state. Of the non-Muslim communities, apart from the Jews of Israel, the Christian minorities are the most important, including the Copts of Egypt (about 5 percent of the total population), Maronites and Orthodox communities in Lebanon, and small Christian minorities in Palestine, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey.
- *Linguistic differences.* Semitic languages predominate. Arabic is the dominant language in the Maghreb (North Africa) and in the Mashriq (Levant), but there are significant non-Semitic linguistic minorities, most prominently Berber speakers (Tamazight) in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia and Kurdish-speaking minorities in Iraq and Syria. Hebrew, the other Semitic language, is used only in Israel, where Arabic is also a national language. Outside of the Arab Middle East, Indo-Iranian languages are predominant in Iran (Farsi or Persian, Baluchi, Luri, etc.), in Kurdish regions (Kurdish dialects), and in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Dari, Pashtu, Urdu, etc.). Turco-Mongol languages are represented by Turkish in Turkey and by Azeri, Turkmen, and other languages in Central Asia.

- *Ethnic terms.* Often, ethnic distinction is premised on or reinforced by linguistic differences (Baluchi as opposed to Persians, Armenians or Kurds as opposed to Arabs or Turks, etc.). There also exist groups who are no longer distinguishable by language but are distinguishable by geographical or ethnic origins: Circassians in Jordan, Tadjiks and Hazaras in Afghanistan, and Arabized Kurds. Ethnicity also plays an important role in the internal dynamics of Israeli Jewish society.

- *Putative kinship.* A final source of intrasocietal differentiation is provided by putative kinship, namely, in-group feelings based on common genealogy or clan structures. This type of identity derives from more or less real genealogy or from the reinvention of a common historical origin. In the first case, tribal groups descending from a common ancestor constantly recreate internal divisions vis-à-vis external groups, while other groups claim direct descent from the Prophet— for example, the Sayyed in the Shiite world, or from other important religious figures, in the case of Sufi leaders. In the second case, Maronites and other Christian Lebanese claim thus to be "Phoenicians," not Arabs (a term associated in such reconstruction with Muslims, albeit in a problematic manner). Anthropologists have shown the malleability of putative kinship and have confirmed that certain groups have changed identities, be they from one tribal affiliation to another, Sunni to Shiite, or Christian to Muslim. According to the circumstances, tribalism or adhesion to a Sufi *tariqa* can also be a means of upward social mobility, as much as it can entrap individuals into them. Therefore, one should take these affiliations into consideration when studying local politics but should not allow them to explain everything in Middle Eastern societies.

To refer to the diversity of the Middle East, many have used the metaphor of the mosaic, whereby religions play an important aggregating and stabilizing role. But this has been criticized for being too static a vision and for reifying modes of social differentiation. For example, it has become commonplace to refer to the Iraqi divide along sectarian or ethnic lines, as Shiite versus Sunni or Arab versus Kurd, but this hides multilayered and negotiable identities, such as mixed marriages and the strength of Iraqi nationalism, which cuts across sectarian identities. Political entrepreneurs, in Yemen and Iraq, for example, have taken advantage of ethnic, religious, tribal, and other forms of identity to maintain or challenge authority.

TRENDS IN MODERN POLITICS

In order to avoid neoorientalist distortions, Middle Eastern politics must be understood in a historical light. In the late

modern period, most of the region was in the hands of the Ottoman or Qajar empires, which the European powers fought bitterly to destroy and eventually managed to include in their colonial dominions, beginning with Napoleon's conquest of Egypt in 1798 and ending in the first half of the twentieth century. Great Britain and France were the most successful colonial powers, while Russia, Germany, and Italy had only temporary influence. All countries of the region, except Turkey and Iran, have experienced colonial rule. This translated first and foremost into the creation of artificial states modeled on the European nation-state.

Europeans tried to buttress national cohesion very often by playing minorities against one another. France created republics in Lebanon and Syria, and Britain favored the emergence of monarchies in Egypt, Transjordan, and Iraq. In all cases, colonial powers imposed secularized regimes, a feature that has remained reality in all Middle Eastern states, with the exception of Iran and Saudi Arabia. The colonial legacy in the Middle East can be seen on any map of the region: Straight-line borders were drawn with little consideration for local populations, and drastic changes in the ethnic make-up of these new countries have generated numerous internal conflicts, including those between Palestinians and Israelis and the civil war in Lebanon. Indeed, these two hotspots are the legacy of colonial decisions: The support given by the British Crown to the establishment of a Jewish national homeland in 1917, the Balfour Declaration, paved the way to the creation in 1948 of a Jewish state at the heart of a region inhabited by an overwhelmingly Arab majority, while the redrawing of Great Lebanon's borders in 1920 was pushed forward by the French mandatory power so as to tip the internal demographic balance in favor of the Christian Maronites.

In many Middle Eastern countries (as in many third world countries), once the euphoria of independence was over, the regimes focused on modernizing ideologies with nationalist overtones, and the military often played an important role. Socialism proved very popular from the 1950s to the 1970s, and regional ideologies, such as Pan-Arabism, made popular by Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser or by the influential Baath party in Syria and Iraq, never managed to change the map of the Middle East. Instead, rhetoric and import-substituting industrialization policies paved the way to increased intrastate tensions, which in turn reinforced the role of the military in Middle Eastern politics.

Overall, modernizing ideologies failed to deliver dividends to the masses, and popular discontent grew and was augmented, from the 1970s onward, by economic crises and important military defeats to Israel. In most Middle Eastern states, the main contenders for power come from Islamic militant organizations. Islamism, a political ideology that includes nationalist and socialist elements and fashions politics according to strong religious precepts, has been the most successful dogma in the last thirty years, because it comprises two interlinked levels of criticism. On the one hand, it wields domestic power through its effective alternative network of welfare (a feature on which ruling regimes have been weak in delivering). On the other, it

manages to tap into locally accepted collective symbols that are in clear contraposition with Western principles that appear to guide the action of ruling elites.

Democracy has been on top of the research agenda since the late 1980s. Some scholars have argued, often in a problematic essentialist mode, that Muslim and Arab cultures are inherently resilient to liberal values central to the spread of a democratic ethos, while others have argued that there are reasons linked to blocked political economies that have favored autocracy over democracy. Far from being the only game in town, democracy has had a difficult time establishing itself in the Middle East. (Turkey and Israel are the exceptions.) Economic liberalization still has to pave effectively the way to political liberalization.

Instead, authoritarianism has proved very resilient, especially in the Arab world, and scholars have explored the strategies of enduring regimes in the region. Recent Western campaigns and justifications for exporting democracy through just and preemptive wars have awakened old colonial demons in much of the region's collective imaginary. Democratization has proved difficult because of the deadlock over the control of resources and the role of the state's institutions in this process. Political actors, Islamists included, have fought more to control the state than to enhance mechanisms of accountability and good governance. The study of contemporary Middle Eastern politics has to take into account how the struggle for the state has been central in generating fluctuating alliances, has led to a spiraling of conflicts, and has impeded the establishment of a sound system of representation based on the notion of tax extraction. Scholars have thus produced seminal work on Middle Eastern rentier states and the mixed blessings of large oil revenues on political participation and enfranchisement.

Trying to understand popular protest and Islamic factions in terms of social movements has shed new light on many political formations that have been dichotomously defined along, for example, modernist-fundamentalist lines. It also allows students of the Middle East to capture less visible social transformations, or changes that are not directly related to the "high" features of politics (state, democracy, political economy). Looking at claims made by low-level organizations or lay people has produced recent valuable studies on social movements and bears witness to the broader impact of globalization and regionalization of politics. Similarly, so-called Islamic feminism, with which Muslim women fight patriarchal control by reappropriating religious texts from within, is another form of informal protest that sheds a different light on constantly evolving societies, away from neoorientalist discourses about a homogenous society resilient to democratic principles.

See also *Arab League; Arab Political Economy; Arab Socialism; Arab-Israeli Relations; Democracy and Democratization; Islamic Political Thought; Maghreb; Mashriq.*

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Migration

The general understanding of migration as a description of the relocation of people from one country to another, especially the move from a developing country to a more affluent country, has extended in meaning to the process of these migrants settling down in the receiving countries. Migrant families' continued stay in their new homeland has changed the focus on migration, so it is no longer thought of as a "temporary" situation. These two dimensions of migration—one as a move from one country to another, and the other as a permanent stay in the new country—bring new challenges for the receiving countries. At the same time, globalization processes increase migration dynamics and affect the sending countries, for which brain drain and the relevance of remittances are cardinal issues.

FROM TEMPORARY TO LONG TERM

Migration has become one of the central challenges for the future; therefore, its meaning needs reevaluation. Migration as a move from one country to another is, in general, linked to the demands of the labor market in the receiving countries. Since the late twentieth century, industrialized societies have recruited unskilled or poorly educated workers, often from other countries, mainly for low-level jobs in factories and agriculture. Host countries that signed recruitment contracts considered migration a temporary situation. For this reason, many host societies were not prepared for the extended stay of the new inhabitants and the need to address issues of the migrants' living conditions, education, and language skills.

When the labor market later became saturated with foreign workers, many nations decided to stop the recruitment process or allow their agreements to expire. The governments of the receiving countries expected the foreign workers to return to their home countries at the end of the recruitment period. It should be emphasized that the end of the recruitment process dramatically changed the relationship between the population of the receiving countries and the new inhabitants. Contrary to the political expectations of the receiving countries, most of the workers decided to stay in their new homelands. When describing the identities of the new inhabitants, in particular their descendants, experts often speak of "transnational inhabitants" because of their knowledge of both countries—receiving and sending—and their ability to live in the cultures of both.

Using outside workers to meet labor demands in specific areas changed the makeup of the receiving societies. This change has been accompanied by civil rights movements, which have sought equal rights for the underprivileged immigrant groups. One outcome of these movements has been the opportunity for those with foreign backgrounds to become naturalized citizens. However, the criteria for naturalization depend on the history of each country.

Throughout the recruitment process, migrant workers and their families were referred to by differing names within political and public discourse and in different countries. In Germany, as one example, the new inhabitants were originally referred to as "guest workers" to highlight the temporary character of their stay. After it had become clear the workers and their families would not return to their country of origin in the near future, they were called "foreigners" and later were given the name "migrants." The changing names for the new inhabitants are deeply linked to their place in society and the majority society's view toward their new cohabitants.

CULTURAL AND SOCIAL DISPARITIES

The term *migrant* is used for a specific group of people. *Migrant* embodies the majority societies' perception of the unskilled workers who have come and stayed and now can command a certain place in society. It should be emphasized that there is a distinction between unskilled workers who have come and stayed long term of their own accord (migrants) and guest workers recruited to come and labor but not live permanently.

Differences in cultural backgrounds increase the gap between the majority society and the new inhabitants. People coming from a different cultural background may be perceived as much more of a "risk" than people from a similar background. Thus, the extent to which migrant groups are accepted in a receiving country depends not only on the perceptions and prejudices of the population of the receiving country, but also on the relationship between the migrants' receiving and home countries. Furthermore, the relationship

between the majority society and its minorities, as well as particular prejudices against certain groups, is often influenced by political and economic circumstances within the country as well as internationally.

SKILLED AND UNSKILLED WORKERS

Unlike unskilled workers, highly skilled and well-educated people who go abroad to work are usually not described as migrants. They are instead seen as "mobile" people able to adapt very easily to varying circumstances. In terms of integration into the majority society, highly skilled workers do not attract as much attention. This labeling of new inhabitants and their descendents as "migrant" or "mobile" illustrates the distinction in prestige and the potential for problems in integration. This difference also indicates who is not seen as a threat to the culture of the receiving country.

The differing views on migrants are principally based on whether the concerned people are considered skilled or unskilled. This difference has been generated because of the permanent stay of unskilled workers, which has made them a visible component of the receiving country.

In the early twenty-first century, governments focus on strict regulation of migration. In contrast to the recruitment process of the twentieth century, the more recent effort of industrialized societies is focused on recruiting highly qualified and well-educated workers. Some countries have considered temporary work and residence permits for selected workers. In order to minimize the possibility of unskilled workers and their families residing long term in the receiving country, nations have developed programs, such as providing limited residence permits, to ensure that the stay of such workers is temporary.

THE FUTURE OF MIGRATION

Besides the demands of the labor market, which is one of the important components of migration, a new wave of migration is expected due to climate change, especially in developing countries. Dealing with this new aspect means rethinking concepts of migration and asylum. It is the old question renewed: Will the affluent parts of the world open their doors only for well-educated people, and if so, for how long? The living modalities for migrants and their descendents in these societies can tell us about the fears and the possibilities of each majority society. This will become one of the important indicators of how able these societies will be to face new challenges.

See also *Identity, Politics of; Immigration, Effects on Intergroup Relations; Immigration, Politics of; Labor Policy; Panethnicity; Transnationalism.*

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Miliband, Ralph

Ralph Miliband (1924–1994) was a Marxist political theorist. Born in Belgium of Polish-Jewish parentage, he fled the Nazis to England in 1940. There, at the graveside of philosopher, social scientist, historian, and revolutionary Karl Marx, he pledged what became a lifelong allegiance to the "workers' cause." A year later Miliband began his studies at the London School of Economics, which, though interrupted by a three-year stint in the Royal Navy, led eventually to a PhD on popular thought in the French Revolution (1789–1799) under the supervision of political theorist Harold Laski.

Although Miliband considered himself a Marxist during this period, he never joined the Communist Party. He did, however, become a key intellectual voice within the British new left after 1956. If the new left aimed to trace a socialist path independent of both Stalinism and Social Democracy, Miliband's first contribution to this project was through his classic study of the British Labour Party, *Parliamentary Socialism* (1961). In this, arguably his most important book, he claimed that the Labour Party was amongst the most dogmatic of workers' parties, "not about socialism, but about the parliamentary system." It is interesting that whereas the book was originally intended to underpin a call to transform the Labour Party into a socialist organization, in its second edition Miliband concluded that this was a hopeless task, as the party was "irrevocably rooted" in the capitalist system.

In the 1970s Miliband's attention turned from social democracy to communism. In the wake of a 1976 essay that linked these themes—"Moving On," published in *The Socialist Register* annual that he coedited with historian and new left comrade John Saville—Miliband published one of the most important critical surveys of Marxist political theory and practice: *Marxism and Politics* (1977). Subsequently, he extended both his critique of capitalism and his interpretation of Marxism in books such as *Capitalist Democracy in Britain* (1984) and *Divided Societies* (1991) and through powerful essays, for instance those collected in *Class Power and State Power* (1983), in which he fraternally but critically engaged with others on the left.

The 1983 collection includes his contributions to one of the most important disputes on the academic left in the 1970s,

the Miliband-Poulantzas debate on the nature of the capitalist state. Opened by Greek Marxist theorist Nicos Poulantzas's review of Miliband's *The State in Capitalist Society* (1969), the debate continued with Miliband's review of Poulantzas's *Political Power and Social Classes* (1973). Between them, these two books and the subsequent debate on the pages of *New Left Review* were undeniably the most important contributions to Marxist state theory in this period.

Later, in important essays such as "The New Revisionism in Britain" (1985), Miliband countered what he took to be a mistaken shift away from class-based politics by sections of the academic left in the 1980s. And although toward the end of his life he softened his criticisms of the reforming strategy embraced by those socialists who continued to work within the Labour Party, he reiterated his commitment to socialism in the posthumously published *Socialism for a Sceptical Age* (1994).

See also *Capitalism and Democracy; Class and Politics; Laski, Harold Joseph; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Poulantzas, Nicos.*

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Military Courts

Military units use special criminal courts to further discipline and order. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (1950, later amended), based on the U.S. Congress's Article I power to "make rules for the governance . . . of the land and naval forces," authorizes the military to create two kinds of military courts: courts-martial and military commissions.

COURTS-MARTIAL

Courts-martial exist in most Anglo-American militaries. They exist to try service personnel and not civilians; indeed, although defendants enjoy numerous procedural rights (including the right to know the charges, the right to present defense evidence, and the right to appointed military counsel and privately retained civilian counsel), the trials fall short of the requirements of the U.S. Bill of Rights. Courts-martial may try service personnel only if the offenses charged are "service-related."

Among these offenses are some, such as desertion or insubordination, that can be committed only by persons under military discipline. Others include ordinary crimes of violence or theft when committed by service personnel. The U.S. military processes some minor offenses through summary courts-martial, in which the accused self-represents before a single presiding commissioned officer. The accused can, however, refuse trial by

summary court-martial and instead go before a special court-martial, which includes a military judge (a specially trained military lawyer who presides and enforces due process requirements) and a panel of at least three members (officers or enlisted with no formal legal training who perform functions similar to those of civilian juries). Each of these courts includes limitations to possible punishments. General courts-martial must be convened for the military equivalent of felony trials and must include a judge and a panel of at least five members. These courts-martial can impose serious punishments, including death, for violations of crimes listed in the Uniform Code.

Convening authorities are commanders of large military units; they create military courts and assign personnel (both judges and panels) to them. The Uniform Code prescribes trial procedure in advance, including rules of evidence. After a conviction, the convening authority can order the sentence carried out, or decline to do so. If put into effect, the sentence is reviewed by a court of criminal appeals, staffed by military lawyers, that can reduce it. From there, the defendant may petition for discretionary review by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, staffed by civilians, and, extraordinarily, by the U.S. Supreme Court.

MILITARY COMMISSIONS

However, military commissions can be created in extraordinary circumstances to try civilians or, more recently, noncitizens accused of terrorism. They were common during the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865), when parts of the United States were occupied by military forces, the danger of enemy raids made the military's order-maintaining role important, and civilian legal institutions had difficulty functioning. Since then they had been little used before the George W. Bush administration attempted to employ them to try terrorist suspects. Congress retained them in the Uniform Code in case the military occupies some hostile nation whose own institutions of justice have failed. Although the Uniform Code does not specify trial procedures for military commissions, it gives the U.S. president the power to prescribe them, and it presumes that they will be similar to those of courts-martial. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that American citizens can sometimes be tried by such courts, the Bill of Rights notwithstanding, but only in wartime cases in which citizens have committed serious crimes that aided the enemy, and it is not clear whether its approval would extend to less serious cases.

After the Bush administration's military commissions were blocked, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 in order to try terrorist suspects outside the civilian court system. This proposal is similar to the use of international military tribunals, which have been conducted to try foreign nationals for war crimes (such as the Nuremburg Trials after World War II [1939–1945]). In the three years following the act, however, few defendants were tried, as opponents mounted a host of legal challenges, and the use of military commissions in this new role remained controversial.

See also *Civil-military Relations; Trial Courts.*

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Military-Industrial Complex

The term *military-industrial complex* refers to the intricate relationship between the governments, militaries, and defense firms of the United States, Europe, Japan, and other developed states. The phrase was popularized by U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961) in his 1961 farewell address, in which he warned of the dangers of the "military-industrial complex" that had created unheralded ties between the military and large defense manufacturers. Eisenhower asserted that the result was a security establishment that was compromised by the private sector and lacking an emphasis on national defense. The outgoing president warned that the social–economic–political triangle at the core of the military-industrial complex was seeking to develop weapons and armaments to benefit itself, rather than the nation it was supposed to serve. Many commentators would later see Eisenhower's remarks as a broad condemnation of bureaucracies that grew beyond the control or understanding of the citizenry.

ORIGINS OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

The rapid advance of military technology during World War II (1939–1945) resulted in a dramatic expansion of the defense-industrial base in the wartime powers, especially in the United States. By the end of the war, the defense sector employed more than 20 percent of the U.S. civilian workforce. Although there was a significant decline in military output after the war, the onset of the cold war led to new weapons programs and renewed defense expenditures.

Industrialized states responded to the increased military needs in one of two ways: In most western European states, defense firms were either state-owned, or the government had significant economic interests in them. For instance, Finland, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal to some degree owned national defense companies. The result was that the interests of these corporations became inexorably intertwined with the fortunes of government. Increased production by arms manufacturers meant corresponding increases in employment and wages. Countries such as France, Italy, and Germany actively encouraged arms exports and weapons transfers to benefit the domestic defense sector. Meanwhile, governments also became deeply involved in weapons production and military systems planning.

Within the United States and countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, governments did not have the degree of direct influence or ownership common among western European nations; however, significant connections emerged between the military and private industry as new requirements emerged for increasingly sophisticated weaponry and military technology. Through the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. defense industry steadily grew. In the post–Vietnam War (1959–1975) era of the 1970s, cuts in military spending prompted the defense sector to become more organized. President Jimmy Carter sought to reduce the ties between the defense companies and the national security establishment, but his overall defense strategy emphasized new weapons systems concurrent with reductions in man power, thereby continuing the importance of research and development of new systems and weapons. Meanwhile, firms created new lobbies to promote increased military expenditures on programs such as the American League for Exports and Security Assistance (ALESA). Defense corporations in the United States and Europe expanded in the 1980s. For instance, from 1981 to 1986, U.S. defense expenditures increased by $1.6 trillion. The end of the cold war ushered in an era of mergers and acquisitions. By the end of the 1990s, the three largest U.S. companies—Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, and Raytheon—accounted for almost one-third of all defense contracts in an industry that domestically employed 2.2 million people.

POTENTIAL DANGERS OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

Critics in the United States assert that the military-industrial complex has led to the emergence of an iron triangle—the U.S. Department of Defense, Congress, and corporations. Members of Congress and government officials support procurement programs that provide jobs or support industry in their home states or districts. Meanwhile, defense companies provide significant financial support for reelection campaigns—sometimes pay outright bribes—while cost overruns and delays plague the sector. Military officers and defense department officials offer broad support for new weapons and defense systems to improve capabilities or to gain lucrative jobs in the private sector. Scholars and reporters such as economist and industrial engineer Seymour Melman, sociologist Gregory Hooks, and journalist Andy Pasztor wrote about the problems and dangers of the military-industrial complex. Later critical works, including those by political scientists Rachel Weber and Chalmers Johnson, often linked the defense-industrial sector with increased militarism and an aggressive foreign policy.

By the late 1980s, there were more than fifty ongoing investigations into fraud and waste by defense firms in the United States alone. In addition, there was a series of sensational stories that emerged about cost overruns, including extravagant prices charged for common products—$40 for hammers and $600 for toilets. In response, the U.S. Congress enacted a series of procurement reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s designed to cut waste in procurement. The administration of U.S. president Bill Clinton promoted consolidation among defense contractors to preserve capabilities. The administration also embraced arms exports and weapons transfers to protect the industry and bolster U.S. exports. In 1995, Clinton made arms sales a national security priority and further stoked the debate over the role of the military-industrial complex. The wave of mergers within the industry spread beyond national borders as U.S.

and European firms acquired companies from other countries or from rivals. The result was the rise of large multinational defense firms, such as European Aeronautic Defense and Space (EADS), a joint Franco-German company, with British, Spanish, Dutch, Italian, and Polish subsidiaries and projects with a number of other countries.

Increases in military spending following the 2001 terrorist attacks drew attention to the military-industrial complex in the United States. U.S. vice president Dick Cheney's ties to the defense firm Halliburton highlighted the complex. In the 1990s, Halliburton was fined for illegally supplying dual-use nuclear technology to Libya and Iraq. Still, between 2003 and 2006, the corporation received contracts in excess of $18 billion to supply products and services for the occupation of Iraq. The iron triangle of the military-industrial complex will continue to influence policy formulation and implementation until there are stronger barriers between industry and individual national security establishments.

See also *Civil-military Relations; Cold War; Military Rule; War Powers.*

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Military Rule

Military rule has been quite frequent, widespread, and endemic throughout history. Sixty countries (twenty-two in Africa, nineteen in Latin America, thirteen in Asia, and six in Europe) have experienced military rule, including Egypt, Fiji, Myanmar, Libya, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Thailand. Military intervention in politics may take different forms, ranging from a one-party regime to a facade of democracy.

Military intervention must be distinguished from *militarism*. Military intervention means the constrained substitution of military personnel for civilian authorities; militarism means the acquisition of dangerous and sophisticated weapons. Militarism is a universal phenomenon, whereas the influence of the military differs from society to society, from minimal to total displacement of a civilian government with military rule.

In some cases, the military actually controls the political institutions; in others, it does not assume power directly. To establish military rule, the armed forces may carry out a coup to form a government whose main executive is a military officer. Much depends upon the relationship of the armed forces to the institutions. Under military rule, army leaders become the supreme decision makers.

The military can be classified into three types—personalistic, corporate, and socialist. Personalistic regimes center around a strong man, such as a *caudillo* (a Spanish word for an authoritarian political-military leader) in Latin America. In some Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Chile in the early 1960s, the military leaders were able to institutionalize their role by casting the political leaders as ineffective and corrupt. In the socialist type, in Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt (1956–1970), for instance, leaders aligned with the interests of the lower class rather than with those of the corporate world.

S. E. Finer, a renowned political scientist and the author of *The Man on Horseback* (1962, 3) identified four roles of the military in politics—"influence," "blackmail," "displace," and "supplement." In the first and the second roles, the military works through the civil authorities and remains in the background. In the third, it replaces one set of civilians with another. In the fourth, the military sweeps away the civilian regime and establishes its own rule.

THE MILITARY'S EVOLVING ROLE

Once the military regime settles, it finds itself confronting the same problems its predecessors faced—dealing with the same political groups and forces and shuffling the same limited policy options. Depending upon its political objectives, it may function as a constitutional caretaker, as a backer of civilian government, or as a reformer or revolutionary. For example, the military tried to set conditions for a civilian government in Brazil, was a constitutional caretaker in Syria, and was a revolutionary force in El Salvador.

Where the public attachment to civilian institutions is strong, military intervention in politics is rare. Military intervention takes place in societies with low political culture, where there are few widely accepted political values and where there is a division of opinion on the legitimacy of the regime or incumbents. In such regimes, military interventions take place because there are no moral constraints to prevent them. Usually, the governments are highly dependent on military support.

Samuel P. Huntington made an interesting statement about the evolving role of the military in consonance with socio-economic and technological changes. To him, the role of the military changes as society does. In an oligarchy, a soldier is a radical; in the middle-class world, he becomes a participant and arbiter; and in a mass society, he becomes the guardian of the status quo. According to Huntingdon, "The more backward a society is, the more progressive is the role of military" and vice versa (1962, 221).

However, many scholars have challenged Huntington's statement that military professionalism inclines the military toward a low political posture. Finer, for instance, maintains that the very nature of professionalism often leads to the military's collision with civil authorities. To put a check on the military, a society must have firm faith in civil supremacy. Similarly, Bengt Abrahamsson found that the Algerian coup in 1961 was carried out by some of the most professional elements in the French army.

Because military personnel are disciplined, organized, and have the best training possible, they can become the main agents of modernization. As a societal system, the military can also provide a framework in which traditionalism and modernism can be suitably blended. In a fragmented society, the military can serve as a focus of solidarity and nation-building. Through the military, developing countries may receive new ideas, values, skills, techniques, and strategies for political change.

However, sociologists such as H. D. Lasswell have challenged the idea that the army can be an agent of modernization. They feel that military regimes without civilian support are likely to reach an impasse sooner than civilian ones and to polarize soldiers and civilians. Moreover, modernization cannot be equated with Westernization.

See also *Civil-military Relations; Tyranny, Classical.*

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Military Strategy

See *Strategy, Military.*

Militias

Although its meaning has varied over time, customary definitions of the term *militia* typically describe an armed force composed of nonprofessional soldiers tasked with protecting a community during times of crisis. Traditional militias either (1) support a professional army in the midst of war, or (2) act alone against a foreign invader. In recent times, however, some militias—especially those found in the United States—have come to espouse doctrines revolving around perceived *internal*

security threats, including those seen as emanating from local and national authorities. Moreover, contemporary accounts of nonstate armed groups increasingly use the term *militia* to describe what some perceive as insurgent or terrorist groups. Thus an understanding of militias requires an appreciation of their historical purposes and their current manifestation in the twenty-first century.

For over two thousand years, militias have been a central pillar of community security. For most of that time, militias consisted of private citizens whose regular social obligations were augmented by military training and the perennial requirements of defending against invaders as well as conducting preemptive and punitive military expeditions. In addition to keeping their communities free from external subjugations, militia members often benefited from this arrangement via the booty and profit extracted from a vanquished foe.

In addition to territorial defense, militias have also been used to build empires, and, in some cases, they have consisted of fighters who were not ethnically or religiously similar to the larger military structure they were subsumed under. Both of these historical features of militias can be found in the Muslim Ummayad Caliphate (661–750 CE)—the second of four caliphates that arose after the death of Muhammad. Although it ultimately created the world's sixth-largest empire, early in its reign the caliphate's wartime efforts were hampered. Such was the case because many of its professional soldiers gave allegiance to their local tribes as opposed to the caliphate as a unit. The caliphate's eventual success in compensating for these internecine tribal-based conflicts was only achieved by creating ranks of non–Arab and non-Muslim militias.

More recently, militias have been used to gain independence from colonial powers as well as a means to safeguard state expansion into recently acquired territories. An example par excellence of these characteristics can be found in the history of the United States. Militias were used to extricate the North American colonists from British rule in the late eighteenth century. Distrustful of standing armies, the newly founded United States then used militias as a means to combat Native Americans and foreign powers as the new nation expanded territorially. When facing military defeat, states have also endeavored to use militias as a means of creating a stalemate. Nazi Germany, for example, unsuccessfully sought to use its militia—the *Volkssturm*—to stall Russian and Allied forces by transforming every city and village in Germany into a fortress, thus contributing to a military standoff.

There is considerable debate regarding the role of militias in contemporary U.S. society. Influential academics and private watch groups are almost unanimous in their belief that militia movements are a profound danger to social order. In addition, contemporary militias in the United States are perceived by most observers as being composed of not only dangerous but also deviant individuals with conspiracy-oriented ideologies. In contrast, defenders of U.S. militias often emphasize that creation of nonstate militias is a politically expressive conveyance of their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. Moreover, such advocates often emphasize that militias

serve as safeguards against perceived governmental trespass of individual rights. In defending U.S. militias, proponents also claim to be exercising their Second Amendment rights under their strict interpretation of this amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."

Finally, since the end of the cold war, nonstate armed groups have proliferated globally. Many of these groups—such as militants active in Indian Kashmir, Iraq, Nepal, and Pakistan—are often called militias. While they sometimes possess many of the attributes traditionally associated with militias—nonprofessional soldiers providing security in an area devoid of state control—these groups are perceived by many to be better described as terrorist or insurgent in nature.

See also *Authority; Autonomy; Bill of Rights; Citizenship; City-republic; Civil-military Relations; Civil Wars; Colonial Wars; Community; Consent of the Governed; European Political Thought; Federalism; Federalist Papers; Feudalism; Freedom of Assembly; Freedom of Speech; Freedom to Bear Arms; Insurgency; Kashmir; Libertarianism; Locke, John; Martial Law; Military Rule; Nonstate Actors; Radicalism; State Repression; States' Rights.*

. . . .   CHARLES P. BLAIR

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Mill, James

Scottish philosopher James Mill (1773–1836) occupies a major place in nineteenth-century British political thought. His writings covered not only the fundamentals of government, but also education, political economy, law, history, and prison reform. However, two of his contemporaries eclipsed Mill's standing as a political theorist: his friend and founder of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, and Mill's eldest son, moral philosopher John Stuart Mill.

James Mill was born on April 6, 1773, in Scotland. His mother, Isabel Fenton Milne, changed the family name to the more English-sounding "Mill" to give her first-born son greater social opportunities. It was she who supervised his daily studies in composition, arithmetic, Greek, and Latin (a regime he later imposed on John Stuart.) With support from a wealthy Scottish patron, James Mill attended the University of Edinburgh in 1790. It was intended that he become a minister, but he soon became disillusioned with his religious instruction and left Scotland to pursue a "career of authorship" in London, England.

In 1805 Mill married Harriet Burrow. To support his growing family, he worked as a journalist and editor, writing some 1,400 editorials and hundreds of essays. It was shortly after the birth of John Stuart in 1806 that he began work on the book that eventually established his literary reputation. Published in 1818, Mill's three-volume *History of British India* was highly successful and won him a post with the East India Company. However, the intervening years prior to the book's publication were no less important to Mill's development as a political thinker.

In 1808 Mill met Jeremy Bentham, with whom he formed a long intellectual partnership. Mill, Bentham, and their followers maintained that basic "scientific principles" of human nature, namely, the desire to maximize pleasure and to minimize pain, should be applied to economic and political affairs. Their philosophical creed came to be known as utilitarianism, but as they also believed that the aim of all government legislation should be to seek the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, the Benthamites were considered "philosophical radicals."

Although he was an enthusiastic propagandist of Bentham's utilitarian principles, Mill altered some of his mentor's views on political reform. He persuaded Bentham to shift his focus away from the British aristocracy as a force for social change and embrace instead a more radical democratic position. In Mill's *Essay on Government* (1820), originally written for the fifth edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* his arguments were mainly directed against "virtual representation," which, for Mill, resulted in a few aristocrats with "sinister interests" ruling at the expense of the majority's happiness. He maintained that only a representative democracy with frequent elections and an enlarged franchise provided a unity of interest between public officials and the community. That said, Mill limited political participation to the wise and virtuous members of society—educated adult males over the age of forty.

James Mill died on June 23, 1836. His *Essay on Government* had its critics, such as Whig historian Thomas Babington Macauley, who attacked Mill for using what he saw as bogus scientific claims to support radical political reforms, and the feminists who complained that Mill's advocacy of representative democracy excluded half the human race. However, the work remains a classic statement of utilitarian political theory.

See also *Bentham, Jeremy; British Political Thought; Mill, John Stuart; Political Philosophy; Utilitarianism.*

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Mill, John Stuart

John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) was one of the most influential political theorists of the nineteenth century. His defense in his essay *On Liberty* (1859) of the harm principle (which states the sole end for which power can be rightfully exercised over an individual against his will is to prevent harm to others) and his rejection of paternalism are cornerstones of modern liberalism.

The son of historian and economist James Mill, John Stuart received a rigorous education. Through his father, the young Mill met utilitarianism philosopher Jeremy Bentham. Mill says that reading Bentham's *Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789) was one of the turning points in his life. At age twenty he suffered a mental crisis that he recovered from after realizing that one needs a purpose beyond one's own utility and must concentrate on making others happy and improving mankind. A prolific young writer, Mill edited the *London and Westminster Review* while in his twenties. In 1843 he wrote *System of Logic* and in 1848 *Principles of Political Economy*. In 1858 Mill saw the demise of the East India Company, for whom he had worked for thirty-five years. From 1865 to 1868, Mill served as a Member of Parliament.

Mill had a number of theoretical commitments. He was a rationalist, insisting humans decide policy by appealing to reasons and not mere feelings, and a utilitarian, believing actions are right in proportion to the degree that they promote happiness. But unlike hedonists, Mill gave a marked preference to higher pleasures: Quality and not just quantity counts. Mill was also sympathetic to socialism, and his utilitarianism beliefs dictated that society ought to defend property rights only if doing so promotes general utility, which he believed in some cases it would not.

Mill was committed to representative government, by which he meant each citizen takes part in government by personally discharging some public function. He also believed, however, that important decisions should rest on knowledge and not be settled merely by large representative bodies, which he thought ill-suited to make laws. In his *Considerations on Representative Government* (1862), he proposed a commission of legislation, though the representative body would retain ultimate power.

Mill was also committed to individual liberty, evident not only in his defense of the harm principle, but in his support of the liberty of speech. He believed that even speech expressing dangerous or false ideas should be protected, in part because only by allowing the contestation of opposing ideas could truth prevail and humankind progress.

In defending liberty, Mill criticized the subjection of women. Mill believed there is no essential human nature. Subjection results not because women are naturally inferior but because males use laws and social institutions to exert power over them.

Mill did defend intervention into countries he regarded as uncivilized, such as India. While Mill did not think that the uncivilized were unprotected by the harm principle, he did rule out self-government for them until they were raised to a condition where they would respect the rights of others.

See also *Bentham, Jeremy; Freedom of Speech; Mill, John; Political Theory; Representative Systems; Utilitarianism.*

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Millennium Development Goals

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the countries that compose the United Nations (UN) agreed to eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which they pledged to complete by the year 2015. These goals were derived from the UN's *Millennium Declaration,* which was signed in September 2000. It is an attempt to create a cohesive development plan for the poorest nations in the international system and to link member states with international organizations such as the World Bank and World Health Organization. The UN member states promised to "free all men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty." Through realization of the MDGs, the UN predicts that the least-developed countries will be able to escape the poverty trap.

The eight MDGs are extensive in scope. Committed states agree to work toward eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary education; promoting gender equality and empowering women; reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability; and developing a global partnership for development.

The UN has developed eighteen targets that will determine if the MDGs have been met by 2015. These targets have each been associated with a given MDG. Goal One's targets include reducing by 50 percent the proportion of people who suffer from hunger and the proportion who earn under $1 daily. To meet Goal Two, all boys and girls must be able to complete a full primary-level education, and Goal Three is targeted to ending gender discrimination in primary and secondary education. Goal Four will be considered met when the mortality rate of children under the age of five has been reduced by 66 percent. Reducing maternal mortality by 75 percent is the target for Goal Five. Goal Six seeks to halt and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and malaria. Goal Seven has three targets: Sustainable development principles must be integrated into the domestic growth policies of underdeveloped countries, the proportion of the population who do not have access to safe drinking water must be reduced, and there must be fewer people who live in slum-like dwellings worldwide.

The UN Millennium Campaign claims that "for poor countries to achieve the first seven goals, rich countries must deliver on their end of the bargain with more and more effective aid, more sustainable debt relief and fairer trade rules." States must be willing to follow the rules regarding nondiscrimination. The UN also suggests that developing countries be granted leniency, such as a reduction of tariffs for their exports and debt relief for economic sustainability.

In conjunction with the UN Secretariat, Dr. Jeffrey Sachs, an economist from Columbia University, suggested the development of "millennium villages" in order for outside actors to help impoverished communities meet the MDGs. The UN has developed twelve villages (in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda) within distinct agricultural zones on the African continent to prove that development does not depend on the arability of land.

Many criticisms have been leveled at the Millennium Development program. The first is that the MDGs are nothing new. They were part of the "big push" programs of the 1950s and 1960s and the renewed UN development goals of the 1990s. The UN has also had a hard time getting developed nations to provide funds and materials. Finally, many economists claim that the MDGs will be of no use unless the root of the problem is solved—corruption of the governments of these least-developed countries.

See also *African Political Economy; United Nations (UN).*

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Miller, Warren

Warren Miller (1924–1999) was an American scholar who focused primarily on political behavior but also made great contributions to the field of social science as a whole. Born on March 26, 1924, in Hawarden, Iowa, Miller did his undergraduate and masters work at the University of Oregon, receiving his degrees in 1948 and 1950, respectively. Miller's doctoral dissertation on issue-oriented voting, completed at Syracuse University, used data that he helped collect for the first comprehensive presidential election survey. He spent two years teaching at the University of California, Berkeley, before moving to the University of Michigan, where he taught from 1956 to 1980.

Miller first drew attention with two books he cowrote on electoral behavior—*The Voter Decides,* written in 1954 with Angus Campbell and Gerald Gurin, and *The American Voter* (1960). *The American Voter,* cowritten with Angus Campbell, Donald E. Stokes, and Philip E. Converse, and their subsequent collaboration, *Elections and the Political Order* (1966), defined what is commonly called the Michigan school of political behavior. This school of thought coined the term *funnel of causality* to identify a model used to examine decision making among groups and explored the predictors of voter participation and choice. Miller and his colleagues also posited that party identification was a stable predisposition that shaped issue positions.

In 1962, Miller created the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), after he and his colleagues received numerous requests for data used in *The American Voter.* As the first executive director of ICPSR, Miller made the survey data readily available, and through the years the consortium continued to collect data, so much so that by the early twenty-first century, it housed the largest collection of quantitative academic data in the world. Under Miller's auspices, ICPSR also trained new generations of scholars in survey methodology and data analysis through its yearly summer programs.

After stepping down as the head of ICPSR in 1970, Miller directed the Center for Political Studies for eleven years. The center encompassed ICPSR as well as the newly developed National Election Study (NES). As the principal investigator of NES, Miller sought to increase the scope and participation of the Michigan surveys first administered in 1952 and to standardize the questions and collection of the data in order to facilitate comparability between surveys. In 1978, Miller managed to get National Science Foundation funding for NES, thereby creating a national archive of electoral data. During the same period, Miller was elected president of the American Political Science Association (1979–1980) and president of the Social Science History Association (1979–1980), which he founded. Miller also served as a consultant for ABC News, and it was while he was serving in this capacity that he coined the term *projection* to describe election forecasts.

In 1981 Miller relocated to Arizona State University and began writing a series of articles on U.S. elections that were

published in the *British Journal of Political Science*. These articles were eventually collected in his 1996 book entitled *The New American Voter*. He died of complications stemming from diabetes in 1999, shortly before his last book, *Policy Representation in Western Democracies* (1999), an edited volume, was published.

See also *Campbell, Albert Angus; Election Monitoring; Stokes, Donald; Survey Research; Survey Techniques and Design; Voting Behavior.*

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Mills, C. Wright

American scholar Charles W. Mills (1916–1962) was one of the most influential sociologists of the twentieth century. Although he died at the early age of forty-six, he left a body of work that has not been equaled for its breadth of analysis and intellectual honesty. Mills was paradoxical: He was a radical who broke away from radical traditions, both a pessimist and an optimist, a sociologist who had little patience with academic minutiae, and an intellectual who was skeptical of intellectualism.

Mills was born in Waco, Texas, and did his doctoral work in sociology at the University of Wisconsin, where he came under the tutelage of German scholar Hans J. Gerth. Gerth led Mills to study the sociology of knowledge associated with the Frankfurt school, and over the next decade the pair produced a number of works, including *From Max Weber* (1946) and the groundbreaking 1953 *Character and Social Structure*. At the same time, Mills's opposition to World War II (1939–1945) branded him as an antiwar radical; he held this stance that he held for the rest of his life.

In 1945 Mills moved to New York City to join sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld's Bureau of Applied Social Research and later the Department of Sociology at Columbia University. Here he joined forces with J. B. S. Hardman, veteran labor journalist, who inspired in Mills a brief interest in the trade union movement. Mills then moved to the most mature phase of his writing, producing three great works: *The New Men of Power: America's Labor Leaders* (1948), *White Collar: America's Middle Classes* (1951), and *The Power Elite* (1956). In *The New Men of Power* Mills contended that labor had effectively renounced its opposition role and had become a subaltern of the capitalist system. In *White Collar* he expressed the belief that bureaucracies had overwhelmed the working classes, robbing them of all independent thinking and making them mindless robots. Power was concentrated exclusively in an axis of evil: the military, corporations, and politics. Yet, Mills shared the hope with many of his militant peers that history was still open to human intervention and that there was nothing inevitable about the corruption of the body politic. A condemnation of America's economic, political, and military elites, *The Power Elite* explored the insular nature of groups in power and claimed that they were predisposed to use unwarranted military force.

Mills followed up these works with two polemical tracts: *The Causes of World War III* (1959), which assailed U.S. foreign policy, and *Listen, Yankee* (1960), which defended Fidel Castro's Cuba against attacks from the administration of American president John F. Kennedy. His last two scholarly books, *The Sociological Imagination* (1959) and *The Marxists* (1963), dealt with the cultural apparatus of the intelligentsia.

In Mills' *Sociological Imagination* (1959), he excoriated the tendency of sociologists (and political scientists) to be obsessed with grand theories and abstract empiricism. However, he had a high sense of mission himself, not only his own but that of intellectuals in general and social scientists in particular. He considered science and politics as vocations. Because all other classes were mired in mediocrity, it was up to the intellectuals to deploy reason and intervene in imposing social order. Political philosophers needed not only to analyze society but also articulate an ethic and formulate ideals. Mills was not cynical about the possibility of social regeneration and felt that humans needed more rationality and enlightenment.

The central category in Mills's social thought was that of power, especially the structures that helped to perpetuate it and the mechanisms by which it was achieved and retained by the elites. He was a state theorist to whom the elites were an institution in themselves. Although corporations possessed some autonomy, the state was the principal locus of power. Thus the three institutional orders that are closely linked, but spatially and historically independent, are the military, corporate, and political. Together these three constitute a ruling class whose interests coincide with that of the ruled.

Mills was also a pamphleteer and a radical journalist. In the last decade of his life, he concentrated on manifestos and indictments of the prevailing social and political order to the exclusion of scholarly works. He rejected the prevailing conception of the scholar as politically neutral and uncommitted. Mills was an unabashed partisan whose values infused his research and writing, although he continued to be dedicated to critical theory and dispassionate, empirical inquiry. He was an inveterate critic of "old ideas," among which he included communism, soft liberalism, and market economics.

Mills was the best social commentator on the troubled 1960s, an era that exemplified the best and the worst of the new radicalism. He articulated the function of the intellectual in a society that was undergoing upheaval, and his final exhortation was for the new left to fight against the tired orthodoxies of the past.

See also *Frankfurt School; Political Philosophy; Political Theory; Social Order; U.S. Political Thought.*

. . . .   GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN

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Milton, John

John Milton (1608–1674) is considered one of the great poets of the English-speaking world and was a prominent statesman during the English Civil Wars (1642–1651) and their aftermath.

Milton studied at Christ's College, Cambridge, intent on entering the Protestant clergy. However, he began publishing poetry, and, after finishing his studies, began a period of solitary study followed by a tour of Italy and France. His travels cemented his distaste for Roman Catholicism, and when he returned to England he began writing in support of the Puritan cause. His earliest tracts concerned issues of religious doctrine, and his defense of liberty of conscience would ground his justifications for liberty in later political tracts. All these works demonstrated elegance and learnedness, qualities that, when applied to his pamphlets on English politics, made Milton one of the most formidable spokesmen for the English republican cause.

Milton's first, and perhaps best-known, major political work was *Areopagitica,* which appeared in 1644. The treatise denounced a Parliamentary decree that required printers be licensed. Citing each man's right "to exercise his owne leading capacity," Milton argued against censorship of the press and expressed a concern about the effect that it would have on the acquisition of wisdom.

As secretary of foreign tongues, Milton was commissioned to write a Latin response to Claudius Salmasius's defense of the divine right of monarchy and attack on the English Commonwealth. Milton's response, the *First Defense,* is an extremely learned chapter-by-chapter rebuttal that demonstrated his erudition and scathing wit. In this work, Milton argues that regicide could be justified through English law, which acknowledges that "there are situations in which the law itself arms the vassal against the lord, and delivers the lord over to be killed." He also argues for the primacy of the citizens acting through Parliament, whose power he deems the "highest in the land." That Parliament, and the citizens who elect it, should have such political liberty is justified by the fact that all

people have human reason and the ability to acquire wisdom. Other well-known works by Milton include *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* (1649), *Eikonoklastes* (1649), and *Defensio Secunda* (*Second Defense,* 1654)

Later in his life Milton dedicated himself to the composition of the poems for which he is most famous. His deep and foreboding poetical engagement with evil and the lesser side of human nature received some political expression via the polemic *The Ready and Easy Way* (1660). In this work, he ruthlessly chastised the English people for abandoning "a just and noble cause for the mixture of bad men who have ill manag'd and abus'd it" and laid out a case for maintaining a popular government instead of reverting to monarchy.

While Milton's poetry can be seen as a return to the religious concerns that dominated his early life and writings, these works are also rife with commentary on the politics of his time. Scholars have focused on the odd inversion in *Paradise Lost* (1667), in which Heaven appears monarchical and Hell republican, and questioned Milton's dedication to republican principles in his later years. However, author Armand Himy argues in *Milton and Republicanism* (1995) that Milton ultimately concludes that "Christian liberty and republicanism cannot be separated," for Milton believed that the individual right to follow a well-developed conscience could only reach its fullest expression in a republican commonwealth.

See also *British Political Thought; Monarchy; Political Philosophy; Religion and Politics; Republicanism.*

. . . .   ALEXANDRA ELIZABETH HOERL

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Minimal Effects Model

The *minimal effects model* is a political science theory that argues that campaigns generally have only a minor impact on voter choice. It is based on the work of Paul Lazarsfeld in the 1940s. Central to the minimal effects model is the contention that most voters have clear, strong opinions on issues, and campaigns mainly serve to reinforce those attitudes. It is premised on the idea that candidates will have unambiguous positions on issues, which allows voters clear choices. People with strong partisan opinions are especially susceptible to campaign messages that link candidates with their biases. Partisan voters even tend to ignore or tune out information or messages that run counter to their beliefs and reject information from rival campaigns that seeks to change their preference or party affiliation. Consequently, the hypothesis contends that the most significant impact that campaigns can have is on voter turnout.

New research in the 1980s and 1990s questioned the microfoundations of the original minimal effects model. Such scholarship examined, for example, the role of issue relevance and the propensity of voters to discount public information sources versus private sources. Our understanding of campaign effects remains incomplete—there is convincing evidence that campaigns matter overall, but much less evidence of the effect or the effectiveness of their parts and mechanisms.

See also *Campaign Advertising; Campaigns; Party Identification.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

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Minimal State

The idea of the *minimal state* is associated with right wing political ideology and libertarian political theory. Its functions are limited to the protection of individual security and property rights along with external defense. Its ideal is the "night watchman" state. In a minimal state, the free market is the principal means of social organization and resource allocation. Supporters of the minimal state are generally most critical of the socialized elements and redistributive functions of the modern welfare state. However, the ideal of the minimal state is also without many of the regulatory functions of the modern state, such as modern environmental policies. And of course, any whiff of paternalism is noxious to supporters of the minimal state—seat-belt laws, for example.

It is useful to make a distinction between two types of defenses of the minimal state, call them contingent and principled arguments. It is important to note that the two types are usually presented together in a more general case for the minimal state. Contingent arguments make empirical claims and appeal to the consequences of different types of institutions in defense of the minimal state/free market system. To follow contingent arguments all the way to the minimal state entails a consistent belief in (1) the allocative efficiency of Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of the market in the organization of the production and distribution of virtually all goods and services and (2) the related allocative inefficiency of government, despite the apparent belief that it can successfully provide security for persons and property (thus distinguishing it from anarchism). The welfare state is criticized for creating dependency amongst recipients (as opposed to the independence that is thought to characterize satisfying needs and wants through market exchanges). The welfare state is thus argued to create the "moral hazard" of a diminished work ethic among its recipients, which has the effect of dragging down overall productivity.

Principled arguments for the minimal state, on the other hand, do not appeal to the consequences of institutions and come in prior to them. They do not appeal so much to the allocative efficiency of markets and the inefficiency of government as to the nature of legitimate political authority—the minimal state is the extent of justifiable public power. For libertarians, state control of different aspects of the economy, and other elements of social life, is political tyranny. It is this idea, the undermining of individual liberty through the creeping power of the state, that, according to F. A. Hayek, paves "the road to serfdom."

The political theory of John Locke provides the intellectual foundation for the minimal state as the extent of legitimate political authority. According to Locke, the ends of the state are the protection of life, liberty, and property. These limits correspond to the natural rights of individuals, which in the words of Robert Nozick constitute "side constraints" on political authority. By positing the notion of natural rights, Locke contends that individuals can acquire rights to goods and resources in the "state of nature"—that is, the situation preceding political society. The alternative to natural rights is viewing them as "conventional," created by the state and so imposing no prior limits on its authority. One of the primary purposes of Locke's *Second Treatise of Government* is to argue against the conventional view of rights. For Locke, individuals own themselves (the principle of self-ownership), and by mixing the right over themselves with the external world, they acquire rights to it as well. Over time, in the absence of central authority, individual natural rights become less secure, as the dispossessed increasingly violate them. As a result, individuals come together and consent to create a central authority in order to protect their natural rights. Any type of political authority that violates individual natural rights is considered illegitimate. It is the limitation to protecting prior individual natural rights that constitutes the minimalist nature of the minimal state.

Not all defenses of the minimal state, however, appeal to the natural rights of individuals. David Gauthier, for example, defends the minimal state from individual interests and the principle of mutual advantage amongst producers, thus leaving the nonproductive outside the scope of justice.

CONCLUSION

The proposal of the minimalist state owes its revival in the twentieth century in part to the backdrop of totalitarianism (as in the case of Hayek) as well as to the big government legacy of the 1960s (in the cases of Nozick and Charles Murray). It had a substantial impact on the 1980s conservative "revolutions" headlined by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in England and President Ronald Reagan in the United States. While both of those countries' policies are far from the minimalist state ideal, their states are noticeably less extended than the welfare states of continental Europe.

See also *Conservatism; Libertarianism; Locke, John; Welfare State.*

. . . . NEIL HIBBERT

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Mining Policy

Traditionally, mining policy dealt with ownership of extractive resources, including all minerals, metals, water, sand and gravel, and carbon-based fuels. However, by the end of the twentieth century in most countries, it had acquired a much broader scope, covering not only the ownership of the resources but also the surface needs of the mine or well developer, the safety of workers, the disposal of waste material, the consequences of water and air contamination plus their prevention, and taxation or royalties.

There are two broad approaches to extractive resource ownership and their regulation. In much of the world, the state reserves for itself ownership of all subsurface resources, and the terms for allowing resource exploitation include a percentage of production and/or profits for the state. A different conception of the subsurface is found in some common law countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia. In these countries, surface ownership includes most subsurface resources. Still, as most hard-rock metal mining in these three countries is done on public lands, national and subnational legislation controls access. With both approaches, there is some truth in the observation of Herbert Hoover, mining engineer and U.S. president (1929–1933), that people with political power can be identified in any society by locating who benefits from mineral wealth.

In the Spanish American republics, mining policy traditionally sought to produce revenue for the state, not promote economic growth. The discoverer of a mine could make a claim on the land of any owner, including use of the surface for mineral processing. If work on the mine were suspended for more than a brief period, anyone could take over the claim. Taxation averaged 20 percent of production, not profit. This meant that in a time of low prices, mine operators necessarily continued producing even if at a loss, or they risked losing everything. These early codes were designed for gold, silver, and copper—they did not cover oil and coal. With the rise of late-nineteenth-century industrial production, the old codes were replaced by so-called liberal codes that granted permanent claim to extractive resources through payment of an annual patent fee.

The "Spanish" codes were replaced in the newly acquired western territories of the United States soon after the United States–Mexico War (1848). Extensive mineral discoveries made on these now public lands initially were under governance at the mine district level. Eventually the federal General Mining Law of 1872 created uniform terms based on a variety of existing local laws. The 1872 law remains in force for metal mining and is among the last major statutory milestones from the period of U.S. expansion. The code enshrined the patent fee system and required no royalty payment. Reform of this law has been an ongoing matter in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

Mining is almost always a disruptive activity in terms of the land surface. Waste rock or material is normally disposed of on the surface. This has the potential for long-term groundwater contamination as minerals oxidize or weather. Often metals are found in combination with sulfur, and the traditional method for its removal involved burning. During the early Industrial Revolution, smoke and sulfurous fumes were accepted as a price of progress. Prior to the twentieth century, defoliation by sulfuric acid around copper smelters was the norm, and legal problems with neighbors were commonplace. Air pollution and water contamination in the processing of minerals is a matter of major dispute in modern times.

Until the last quarter of the twentieth century, regulations were weak on mine closings. Once minerals were gone, and thus the income stream was gone that might finance a closing with cleanup in mind, mines were abandoned. Any problem fell to the original surface owner. After the Love Canal disaster in New York state in the late 1970s, which was not mining related, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), known as the Superfund program, was signed into law in 1980. This legislation has become the prime mining policy for the cleanup of old mines. Cultural heritage programs often clash with Superfund projects. In old mining districts, retaining the mine head frames, buildings, and mine openings can conflict with the effort to improve drainage by extensive grading of the land, usually mountainous, into new contours.

See also *Environmental Policy; Public Policy.*

. . . .   WILLIAM W. CULVER

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Minority Representation

The concept of minority political representation can take many forms. Primarily, the reference "minority" can denote a numerical or marginalized group identifier. Given the predominance of scholarship that focuses on the legislative branch of government in the United States, herein minority representation is defined as the congressional responsiveness to minority and/or African American interests in the United

States. To examine that concept, this entry briefly highlights research concerning members' voting ideologies, the role of voting legislation and redistricting in responsive to minority interests, and, finally, how the representation of minority interests has evolved over time.

DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES

A main goal of minority representation is to empower minorities by enacting policy preferences deemed substantively significant to their sociopolitical lives. How best that empowerment occurs and by which mechanisms has long been debated. For some, when it becomes time to redraw congressional district lines, it is important to create and sustain districts that have a majority-minority population. Many such scholars claim that those districts are necessary to elect a sizable number of African American and Latino representatives. For these scholars, this matters, because the descriptive presence of minority representatives suggests that they are more likely to support minority interests. However, other scholars disagree and argue that in some instances (e.g., white Democrats versus black Republicans), the political party of the representatives is as important as (if not more important than) their racial identification in predicting how they may vote on issues that matter to minority interests. Finally, some scholars caution that what is often in the interests of minority representatives is not necessarily in the interests of or of interest at all to minority voters.

For other experts, to some extent, the effective representation of minority interests rightfully assumes an ideologically homogenous district. While that homogeneity need not be limited to racial identity or political party preferences, some norms of similar values and interests between the representative and his or her constituents is most likely to produce the effective representation desired. Thus, a representative gauging his or her level of responsiveness by considering constituents' opinions in their voting behavior determines effectiveness (as opposed to responsiveness being a measure of electoral success in a competitively political environment).

A BRIEF HISTORY

Still, minority representation encompasses more than policy preferences. The history of race and minority representation has a long track record with the U.S. Congress and particularly the House of Representatives. The Congress has had an inconsistent and at times contradictory or ambivalent stance on minority representation issues since the drafting of one of the country's founding documents, the Declaration of Independence. For example, the same institutional body that wrote that all men were created equal also sanctioned slavery and the institution of second-class citizenship. The same institutional body that guaranteed equal protection of the laws and said that all persons were entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of public accommodations stood largely silent when the U.S. Supreme Court legally sanctioned the concept of "separate but equal" accommodations in 1896. With the brief exception being the historical period of Reconstruction following the Civil War (1861–1865), not until the enactment

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 did Congress begin to establish a more consistent record of at least responding on the basis of preexisting law to the representation of minority interests in the United States.

A LOOK TOWARD THE FUTURE

More often than not, the protection of minority rights that are established in the 1868 ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment has been applied in a limited way to groups other than African Americans and Latinos. However, the U.S. Congress will be continually pressured to apply its previous protections of minority rights to an increasingly powerful number of American minority groups that extend beyond the realm of race and ethnicity with a look toward the global future.

See also *Majority-minority District; Race and Racism; Redistricting.*

. . . .   RAVI PERRY

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Minority Rights

See *Tyranny of the Majority and Minority Rights.*

Misogyny

Translated from its Greek roots, *misogyny* literally means the hatred of women. More broadly, misogyny refers to cultural beliefs that men are better, stronger, more rational, more capable, and more authoritative than women, especially in the public sphere. These beliefs contribute to the dislike or mistrust of women and the idea that gender hierarchy is natural or functional for society.

According to some arguments, the idea that women belong exclusively in homemaking and parenting roles is caused by, or is an example of, misogyny. The belief that women are naturally more nurturing than men can be used to justify barring women from seeking employment or participating in other aspects of public life. Some also argue that efforts to glorify women's domestic roles, or attempts to protect women from perceived danger, can actually be disguised as misogyny. According to this line of thought, when men venerate or shelter women, men might think they are helping or revering women. Holding a door open, paying for a date, escorting a woman to her car at night, or guarding a woman's sexual virtue is often motivated by good intent. However, these acts may be perceived as infantilizing or condescending, because they minimize women's agency and full range of capabilities.

For these reasons, well-intentioned kindness by men can result in confusion and misunderstanding.

MISOGYNY IN POLITICAL THOUGHT

Although not all cultures are misogynistic, misogyny is found in most patriarchal societies and throughout the canon of political thought. Major figures in political philosophy have described women as lacking the ability to reason, conflated women with nature, or defined women through their biological capacity to reproduce. Because these same theories also generally claim that rationality is required for political participation, and that the natural world must be conquered or suppressed, feminist philosophers critique these theories on the basis of their misogynistic presuppositions.

Confucius (551–479 BCE), for example, believed in a hierarchical family structure and the idea that women's status was naturally inferior to that of men. Although Confucius did not express explicit hatred toward women, he wrote that ignorance was a woman's virtue. Some argue that Confucius's ideas, like those of his counterparts, provided a cultural foundation for devaluing women and girls.

Aristotle (384–322 BCE) claimed that women's ability to reason was unformed and lacked authority. This provided a rationale for excluding women from political participation and for Aristotle's proposition that men naturally rule over women. Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) wrote that women lack a sense of justice and the ability to reason: Women are not meant for great mental accomplishment but, instead, are intended to obey men. According to Schopenhauer, women thus remain large children for their entire lives. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) argued that women are naturally dependent on men and are sexual objects that men control. According to G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831), while men are like animals, women are like plants; that is to say, women lack independence or distinct interests of their own. In *Beyond Good and Evil,* Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) frequently insulted women and controversially argued that higher forms of civilization involve stricter control over women.

CONTEMPORARY MISOGYNY

In contemporary culture, misogyny is expressed and reinforced through personal beliefs that women are naturally inferior, biased representations of women in popular culture, gender discrimination in the workplace, sexual harassment, sexual assault, or even femicide (the murder of women). Derogatory terms for women and women's genitalia are examples of misogyny, as are practices like female genital cutting or mutilation, "honor killings," or invasive cosmetic surgeries, including so-called vaginal rejuvenation. Music lyrics describing rape or sexual assault are considered misogynistic, as is advertising that hypersexualizes or objectifies women.

When popular media such as music videos, movies, or television shows depict women in submissive or subjugated roles, this creates a cultural climate that encourages men to think of women as inferior, and that enables the abuse and degradation of women. Patriarchal religion has also been a powerful vehicle for perpetuating misogynistic beliefs about women.

THEORIES ADDRESSING MISOGYNY

Addressing the sources of and solutions to misogyny is the primary focus of feminist theory. These theories address four general aspects of misogyny: First, feminist theory describes how misogyny justifies and maintains women's subjugation or domination by men. Second, feminism explains the ways in which misogyny, sexism, heterosexism, and racism are interrelated and reflect the dominant values in society. Third, feminist theorists argue that women who believe they are inferior, or who think they deserve to be objectified or abused, have internalized the cultural messages of misogyny. Finally, feminist theory explores how shifting misogynistic beliefs requires a willingness to challenge the social blueprint of cultures that encourage sexism and violence toward women.

Feminist thinkers claim that misogyny produces a diminished, one-dimensional image of women. According to some theories, contemporary pornography, for example, reflects this disregard by portraying women as existing only to satisfy men's sexual desire. As a result, misogynistic hatred is directed toward women for failing to uphold a culturally manufactured expectation that women are easy to control and naturally inferior to men.

See also *Feminism; Race and Racism; Sexism; Sex Workers and Trafficking; Women, Violence against.*

. . . .   SHIRA TARRANT

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Mission Civilisatrice

Mission civilisatrice ("civilizing mission") was the French colonization policy that emphasized efforts to transfer French political, social, and linguistic norms to subjected peoples. The approach was officially designed to "uplift" the lesser-developed peoples of the world and convert them into French citizens. The Portuguese empire also utilized a similar approach to its colonial territories.

The mission civilisatrice emerged in the late 1800s, concurrently with a renewed period of European imperialism that included the acquisition by France of new territory in Africa and Indochina. French political leader and two-time prime minister Jules Ferry was one of the foremost advocates of the mission civilisatrice. French citizenship was conferred on inhabitants of several colonies, including Dakar

and Saint-Louis in modern Senegal. These territories were subsequently incorporated along with other West African colonies into French West Africa, and the new formation was granted the right to elect representatives to the French National Assembly in 1946. The French view of colonialism differed from that of other colonial powers, who emphasized governance rather than integration of colonial peoples. The policy of assimilation was ultimately replaced by "association" in the late 1940s and early 1950s, in which the colonies were granted an increasing degree of autonomy in an effort to preserve the empire.

See also *Francophone Africa; Imperialism.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Mixed Method

Mixed method research involves the combination of qualitative and quantitative empirical methodologies within a single research design. (Although some consider the combination of quantitative theoretical methods with qualitative empirical methods to be mixed methods, the emerging consensus is that the term *mixed methods* refers to empirical analysis.) Political science long has used mixed methods—the study described in *The American Voter* (1960), for instance, used both statistical and qualitative analysis of survey questions—but specific acknowledgment of mixed methods has become increasingly popular in all sociobehavioral research in recent years.

One common claim is that quantitative research is useful for generalization about causality, and qualitative research is useful for the identification of mechanisms. Mixed method research can proceed concurrently (where qualitative and quantitative data are collected together), sequentially (where one type of analysis builds upon an already completed alternative analysis), or by converting data from one form to another for two separate analyses. Some mixed method research uses qualitative analysis, such as ethnographic or archival research, for the purpose of theory generation and then quantitative analysis for the purpose of theory testing. Nested analysis uses qualitative analysis of specific cases to either additionally test or else refine a theory already tested through large-N statistical analysis.

See also *Qualitative Methodologies.*

. . . . MATTHEW S. WINTERS

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Mobilization, Political

Political mobilization is the process whereby political actors encourage people to participate in some form of political action. In its concrete manifestations, this process can take on many different shapes. Political mobilizers may typically persuade people to vote, petition, protest, or rally, or to join a political party, trade union, or politically active civic organization. Less frequently, they may propagate violent activities such as rioting or ethnic cleansing. Political mobilization thus covers a broad spectrum of public action, from the covert to the disruptive, and from the institutionalized to the unconventional.

MEANS AND ENDS OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

The tools that are commonly used to mobilize audiences are widely diverse, too. They include classic electoral campaigning through billboards, mass conventions, postal mail, and various types of television and radio communication, but mobilizing political actors may just as well rely on door-to-door canvassing, pamphleteering, mobile phone communication, or social networking on the Internet. In nondemocratic environments, rulers or particular nonstate groups may sometimes use (military) force to push people into certain collective political behavior.

All political mobilization has in common that it is initiated by mobilizing agencies looking for adherents to a collective cause. These agencies try to persuade potential adherents to take part in public actions in order to defend that cause. Therefore, political mobilization usually has a distinctly collective dimension to it. There is strength in numbers, mobilizers know, and so they seek to change the behavior of large groups of citizens in order to achieve well-defined political aims. These aims, however, may vary. There are myriad types of public action that are considered to best serve these causes, and many strategies are used to persuade people to participate.

RESEARCH TRADITIONS

Political scientists have studied political mobilization in several ways. One important strand consists of scholars who examine the mobilization patterns created by electoral politics. Their research interest is thus in institutionalized mobilization. Especially in the study of established democracies, political mobilization is often understood as the actions that elites undertake in order to create a stable group of supporters and persuade them to express their support through the ballot box. Among the questions these researchers ask are the following: What determines voters' decisions? To what extent is the success of electoral mobilization dependent on existing affiliations, organizational capacities, or persuasive ideas? The study of ethnic mobilization, for example, may weigh the relative importance of different potential sources of ethnic voting: cultural affiliation, political manipulation by elites, and existing socioeconomic divisions that coincide with ethnic boundaries.

Political scientists would have only a narrow understanding of the process of political mobilization if they were to exclude from their scope those forms of political action that are outside the electoral process, ranging from peaceful protest to violent revolutions. This is the field of unconventional political mobilization, or as it is sometimes referred to, contentious politics. Many now view extraelectoral action as an inherent aspect of political mobilization. Political scientists argue that such unconventional expressions of politics do not diminish with the advent of modernization. In fact, they are

increasingly viewed as a "normal" characteristic of politics, even in advanced democracies.

According to some scholars, in the early twenty-first century, the importance of unconventional political action has grown. Long-term declines in election turnouts and membership numbers in political organizations show evidence of an increasing disengagement from the channels of political participation that are traditional to advanced industrial democracies. In their place, new forms of mobilization—globalized activism based on international norms, consumer boycotts, participatory networks through the Internet, and so forth—have emerged. Perhaps, some scholars argue, democratic engagement is not declining, but being reinvented and even reinvigorated.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

The study of political mobilization outside electoral politics has deep roots in political sociology and, in particular, in the study of mass protest and social movements. This sociological view on political mobilization has allowed analysts to look for factors beyond electoral campaigns. These studies have examined the way in which protest waves and social movements have emerged, how they have developed, and what impact they have had on policy outcomes or social change. They have brought several new dimensions of mobilization to the attention of political scientists: the social grievances underlying collective action, the importance of resources, the role of meaning manipulation and ideas, and the political context (the opportunities and constraints) shaping such action. For example, contemporary researchers do not simply view the American black civil rights movement as a spontaneous mass response to social grievances. They have examined the political opportunity structures that have shaped this movement, the resources that have supported it, and the global spread of human rights norms that has given the movement's ideas, claims, and demands a universal validity.

Social movement research has thus considerably altered political scientists' understanding of what is "political" in mobilization. Political scientists are now increasingly inclined to question the neat division social scientists once made between the political significance of political parties and interest representation in state institutions, on the one hand, and the social and cultural (but supposedly less political) weight of social movements, on the other. Of course, social movements have important cultural and social implications, but they are also inherently political. The mobilization of people into nonelectoral and noninstitutionalized types of public action should be regarded as a form of political mobilization, since these actions may be signs of newly emerging interest cleavages. These interest cleavages, in turn, may serve as a new basis of electoral mobilization. In the 1960s, for example, environmentalism in Europe was exclusively a form of grassroots activism, yet it was also inherently political. This activism created possibilities for a new type of electoral politics in later times. In the 1970s and 1980s, "green" political parties were established across Europe,

and in some countries, notably in Germany, green candidates received the support of a substantial part of the electorate. In many current European party systems, the greens represent a small but relatively stable political force.

CONCLUSION

Political scientists have moved toward a more inclusive definition of political mobilization, which includes electoral as well as extraelectoral politics. They have also become more aware of the ways in which electoral and contentious politics may coincide and interact. Interaction is often subtle and covert. In some cases, however, it is more conspicuous, in particular when contested election results become a focal point for new forms of public protest, as has been exemplified in postelection unrest and clashes in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), Kenya (2007 and 2008), and Iran (2009).

See also *Alienation, Political; Protests and Demonstrations.*

. . . .   PETER VERMEERSCH

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Modernization

Modernization theory is a term applied to several related social science theories that explain the process by which societies change from more traditional to more modern entities. Originating from classical social theory, including the writings of Max Weber and Karl Marx, U.S. social scientists built on the insights of classical social theorists of the 1940s and 1950s to understand the challenge of overcoming poverty in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In its heyday in the 1960s, modernization theory informed government policy in the United States, influencing foreign aid doctrines and the creation of the Peace Corps. Modernization theorists share an optimistic perspective on the prospects for promoting development; early writers of the school expected a convergence

in the economic, social, and political characteristics of the world's many societies. After the failures of U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia, revelations of misdeeds by transnational corporations, and the emergence in Latin America and Africa of theories that emphasized dependency and neocolonialism, modernization theory came under intense criticism in the 1970s and 1980s. In recent years, scholars associated with the World Values Survey (WVS), principally Ronald Inglehart, have revived and modified the approach.

CLASSICAL ORIGINS OF MODERNIZATION THEORY

Karl Marx's historical materialism provoked emulation and reaction from many later writers whose work became the basis of this approach to development. He argued that through structural conditions and change, every country could become modern. Marx's writing about successive modes of production, each more technologically advanced and materially productive, and his view that economic change shapes political, social, and cultural change, caused some later writers, such as Max Weber in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,* to search for cultural or attitudinal bases of economic change and inspired others to link closely the emergence of what they considered more advanced political regimes, such as democracy, with economic change. Internal Marxist critique, such as that of Russian leader Vladimir I. Lenin, recognized that imperialism kept some countries from modernizing.

The strong distinction drawn by modernization theorists between tradition and modernity has its roots in sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies's contrast between *Gemeinschaft* (traditional community in which kinship and other bonds sustain human connections) and *Gesellschaft* (modern society in which human linkages are mainly instrumental); historian Sir Henry Maine's contrast between an earlier world of *status* based on long-established group membership and modern societies in which autonomous individuals associated through *contract* and individual agency; and sociologist Emile Durkheim's discussion of change from *mechanical solidarity,* in which individuals' attachments are based on their similar, mostly agricultural occupations, to *organic solidarity,* in which connections are based on a more complex division of labor. American sociologist Talcott Parsons built on these conceptions to formulate a series of "pattern variables" that changed as a society moved from the pole of tradition to the pole of modernity. He expected variables to move from ascription, in which individuals are valued according to the social groups into which they were born, to achievement as the standard to determine social status; from particularism to universalism in political norms; from diffuseness to specificity in terms of social roles; from *affectivity,* or emotion-based attachments, to *instrumentalism,* or links based on utility, as the basis of personal relationships; and from a collective to a self orientation.

BASIC TENETS

Modernization theory tends to focus on the movement of whole societies from traditional to modern forms. Hence, writers in the school focused on urbanization, industrialization (with its attendant increase in the scale of investment), and the increasingly complex division of labor (with its consequences for specialization in occupations) as manifestations of development. However, modernization theory simultaneously emphasizes individual attitudinal change as the main driver of modernization. Formal education can serve as an instrument of attitudinal change; it is but the most obvious example of the diffusion of values to areas or social groups in which tradition prevails from regions or groups that have already modernized. The mass media are also effective in spreading modern values.

Diffusion is central to modernization theory. Early modernization theorists in particular accepted with little hesitation that individuals exposed to modern values would prefer them to traditional norms, with the exception of those who obviously benefited materially and politically from the traditional social structure. Modern values included openness to new experiences, independence from traditional authorities, a scientific outlook, ambition, punctuality and careful use of time, desire for civic engagement, and interest in public affairs. Some modernization accounts went so far as to suggest that traditional societies did not embrace modern economic rationality but saw modern values as widely shared in the West. Modernization implied diffusion of Western values and a cultural convergence of the already modernized West and developing countries.

Modernization theorists took as their unit of analysis the nation-state or individual national society. Aggregate individual change within a nation produced societal-level change. Modernization theorists did not heavily emphasize international forces, and to the extent they did consider factors beyond the individual society, they highlighted the positive roles that value diffusion and providing capital and technical know-how played in promoting development.

Although modernization theorists explored different dimensions of development, such as individual attitudinal change, urbanization and industrialization, political change, and economic growth, almost all agreed that modernization was a multifaceted process. Individual attitudinal change is a part of a larger process that includes shifts in social structure, the political order, and the economy. Hence, theorizing about modernization took place at a relatively high level of abstraction to avoid excluding any element of the process.

Two key processes of modernization were frequently identified as central: industrialization, which moved people from a seasonal agricultural existence dependent on weather to the assembly line with its time clock; and secularization, which separated an individual's spiritual life from his occupational, recreational, and political lives and undermined the authority of institutionalized religion.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES

Sociologist Alex Inkeles's work focused on individual modernity and argued that socialization in schools and industrial workplaces helped "make men modern." Perhaps the most

influential scholar of this approach was psychologist David C. McClelland, who emphasized the achievement motive, arguing that societies are more likely to realize economic development if a large portion of their population has a high "need for achievement," a specific psychological trait.

Scholars of the social psychological school tend to identify principles such as honor and the quest for glory as relics of traditional society. They regard values such as acquisitiveness, thrift, and ambition as essential to economic development, and attitudes of interpersonal trust, moderation, and egalitarianism as critical to the emergence of democracy.

ECONOMIC APPROACHES

Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth* (1960) drew the notice of policy makers who hoped to promote development in what by then had come to be called the third world. Rostow laid out five stages of economic development: traditional society, the preconditions for takeoff, takeoff, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption. Rostow's approach fit modernization theorists' tendency to identify development as the movement from tradition to modernity, which happened to resemble the course of U.S. and western European societies at the time he was writing. Unlike the social psychological modernization theorists, Rostow stressed the importance of political will to build the "social overhead capital"—for example, human capital development, such as education, and national cohesion—necessary for development. Rostow's work also highlighted the growth of savings and investment during the take-off stage. Such capital might be gained from many sources, but to many practitioners of development, foreign lenders and foreign assistance became increasingly obvious sources of investment capital. Critics found Rostow's theory too tightly drawn from the experience of British industrialization and too linear in its prediction of the stages that growth would follow. His "noncommunist manifesto" read very much like Marx's historical materialism.

While economists in the modernization school saw many opportunities for governments to promote economic growth, they tended to favor the market system. Instead of the state control of the economy exercised by communist countries, they preferred policies that would lead people to take risks and become entrepreneurs. They generally saw the transfer of technology through transnational corporations and foreign assistance as a positive way to provoke traditional societies to modernize. The Point Four Program of U.S. president Harry Truman and the Green Revolution exemplify policy efforts to transfer technology to promote modernization.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Modernization theorists approached political development with two different conceptions of what constituted political modernity. According to one view, political development more or less equaled democracy. Political sociologist S. M. Lipset identified economic development as a "social requisite of democracy" in an *American Political Science Review* article of that title. He suggested that political modernization rested on

prior economic modernization and that as societies advanced economically, democracy would follow. His colleagues cited urbanization, industrialization, and the spread of literacy as the sources of social complexity in urban industrial society. Social pluralism, including a literate, often self-employed middle class, promoted political pluralism and participation. Individual writers stressed specific intermediary mechanisms linking economic development to democratic participation. After a comparative study of Middle Eastern countries in the 1950s, sociologist Daniel Lerner charted what he saw as the ideal development sequence: urbanization, spread of literacy, growth of mass media, inclusiveness in economic development, and political participation. Democratic development is the final step in Lerner's process of modernization.

A second view of political development, advanced by political scientist Samuel Huntington, focused on institutional development, arguing that more developed political systems had institutions more able to withstand the challenges posed by newly mobilized societies. According to this perspective, economic development and the urbanization it spawns lead new social groups to make demands on government for services and distribution of state resources. The participation of new groups will overwhelm the state unless it has created participatory institutions and a bureaucracy able to meet their demands. Huntington thus came to advocate order over participation in most developing countries. He suggested that political decay would result if governments refused to control excessive participation.

CRITIQUES OF MODERNIZATION THEORY

The most sustained critique of modernization theory came from Latin America's dependency school and analysts of neocolonialism in the former European empires, many of whom wrote on Africa. By focusing on traditional values and culture as key causes of underdevelopment in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, modernization theorists engaged in a form of blaming the victim, argued dependency writers. This tendency was due in part to modernization theorists' use of the national territorial state as the unit of analysis. By only focusing on individual national societies, modernization theorists failed to note the imperial relationships—formal colonialism and informal neocolonialism—that had deprived poor countries of capital and their people of the opportunity to make autonomous decisions about their own development. Writers such as economic historian Andre Gunder Frank and historian Walter Rodney argued that European nations underdeveloped the newly independent countries they formerly ruled and that they and the United States similarly underdeveloped Latin America, literally making countries poorer than they were before the imperial relationship.

Dependency theorists placed developing countries in the network of the global economy, noting that the way in which an economy was incorporated into the global division of labor strongly shaped its developmental prospects, in a manner impossible to reverse. Part of the incorporation of peripheral societies into global capitalism involved class relationships

across national borders; economic elites in developing countries collaborated with captains of industry and finance in the world's metropoles to appropriate the surplus value generated by the peasantry and working class on the periphery. All individuals were perfectly capable of acting in economically rational ways; those who failed to engage in entrepreneurship or to save and invest simply lacked the incentives or the capacity to do so. People did not need to be made modern; they needed to be released from exploitative international economic relationships.

Sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, originally a student of African development, systematized the insights of dependency theory in his three-volume study, *The Modern World-System*. Wallerstein rejects modernization theorists' focus on development at the national level, arguing that since the sixteenth century, the world has had a single economy, the relevant unit of analysis of capitalist development, albeit existing alongside multiple political units. Strong core states exploit politically weak peripheral societies, whether as formal colonies or informal dependencies. World-systems theorists argue that semiperipheral countries like South Korea serve to deflect the revolutionary potential of the exploited periphery by giving the impression that convergence is possible for all while simultaneously providing locations of high investment yield for the core's capitalists. The convergence predicted by modernization theorists will not occur.

Political scientist Guillermo O'Donnell criticized modernization theory's argument that democracy would closely follow economic growth. O'Donnell observed that the wealthiest countries of South America fell to military regimes in the 1960s and early 1970s and suggested that the particular phase of industrialization through which they were passing demanded that these nations attract foreign capital and technology. However, the popular participation promoted by earlier industrialization threatened South American nations' capacities to attract foreign investment, with the result that both military and civilian elites preferred to impose harsh exclusionary regimes to quell labor mobilization and populist agitation. O'Donnell shared with dependency writers the view that the timing of economic development is central to the experience of modernization: Early industrializers faced different challenges than late industrializers, with significantly different consequences for modernization. Late industrializers required the state to promote economic development and could tolerate less labor unrest and popular participation. In essence, Rostow's model is empirically unfounded.

Postmodern scholars, like dependency writers, have criticized modernization theorists for ethnocentrism. By suggesting that development entailed movement from tradition to modernity and equating modernization with the industrial West, modernization theorists committed two errors. First, they implied that the West was somehow better. Second, by suggesting that all nonmodern societies were similarly traditional, they failed to differentiate among societies, which in many cases differed from each other more than they did from those in the West.

Some postmodernists take the argument further, arguing that by defining third world poverty as the problem, modernization theorists and Western policy makers following their lead devalued modes of living that have worked for millions throughout the ages. Problematizing poverty has imposed Western standards on other cultures, making it difficult for them to follow traditional ways even when they prefer them. The stress of conforming to Western constructs, which are the intellectual products of modernization theory, has profoundly disrupted the lives of people who never chose modernization.

REVISION OF MODERNIZATION THEORY

The World Values Survey's massive collection of attitudinal data about fundamental social values has allowed a reassessment of the conclusions of modernization theorists and their critics. Inglehart and his collaborators have posed a revised theory of modernization that places technological and economic change at the center and argues that changes in cultural values and political participation have followed economic development. The WVS, which has been administered in more than eighty countries on six continents, has produced comprehensive data.

Inglehart continues to argue, based on WVS evidence, that economic development promotes predictable changes in values, which he places at the center of his analysis and believes eventually lead to democratization. Where he differs from many modernization theorists is in his insistence that so-called traditional societies have distinct cultural attributes that do not disappear when they converge with a Western model of society and culture. Rather, he suggests that cultural differences continue to shape societies' responses to economic modernization. Change in the material conditions of life may cause change in attitudes toward authority, gender roles, sexual practices, and propensities to participate politically, but the changes take place in the context of preexisting cultures. Economic change will reshape values in Western Judeo-Christian, Confucian, and Islamic societies but will not result in one world culture.

Inglehart proposes that three dimensions of economic development produce cultural and political change. First, the growth of material productivity and the commitment of welfare states to supplement the consumption of the poor create levels of material security that allow individuals to prioritize values beyond those of earning money to buy food and shelter. Second, rising educational levels, the spread of mass media, and work in knowledge-based industries give individuals greater independence and desire for autonomy. Third, increasing social complexity causes individuals to become more socially independent. Inglehart argues that these processes have different impacts on what he calls the industrialization and postindustrialization phases of economic development. Under industrialization, these forces undermine the power of religion but often replace religious authority with state and industrial authority. In the postindustrialization phase, the dominance of secular authorities erodes before the demand for individual autonomy in all walks of life.

Based on the massive WVS, Inglehart's argument returns values to the center of the study of development, as a variable between economic development and changes in social practices and political behavior. Like modernization theorists, he argues that values do change in the process of development; unlike them, he does not assume that people abandon cultural particularities or that cultural zones will eventually disappear. He has built on the contributions of political science and sociology, particularly social psychology and political culture, to advance a sophisticated and empirically supported version of the argument made by Lipset half a century ago.

See also *Dependency Theory; Development, Economic; Globalization and Development; Marx, Karl; Weber, Max.*

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Monarchy

For much of human history, monarchy in one form or another was the primary system of government. A *monarchy* is a type of tyrannical regime in which all or most political power is concentrated in the hands of a single ruler, the sovereign. The monarch is generally the head of state and the chief executive. Historically, the sovereign and the state were seen as an indivisible entity. However, modern constitutional monarchies bifurcate power: The monarch remains head of state with a separate, usually elected, chief executive. This system has facilitated the survival of the monarchy in a largely ceremonial role, with a clear division between the state and the monarchy. In monarchial systems, power is typically hereditary, although some states elected sovereigns for life. Monarchies concentrate wealth, power, and privilege among a small, hereditary aristocracy whose members are bound to the sovereign by personal loyalty. Monarchies facilitated the rise of the strong central state in the countries of western Europe and Japan, but they also prompted democratic movements that either constrained their power or implemented alternative systems of government.

MONARCHY IN HISTORY

Throughout history, groups of humans were governed by the person who was the greatest warrior or especially skillful at politics. From early chiefs and tribal leaders, monarchial systems emerged as a means for a sovereign to transfer power to members of his or her family upon the monarch's death. Although elected monarchies were common at the dawn of the Middle Ages in Europe, they were gradually replaced by hereditary systems, with the notable exception of some of the German states, the early Holy Roman Empire, and the Vatican. By designating an official successor, groups or states could eliminate or minimize power struggles after the ruler's death. States subsequently developed complex rules of succession. In most areas, primogeniture, the transfer of power to the oldest male relative, became the norm.

Monarchs based their legitimacy and authority on a combination of military power and the personal loyalty of leading figures within the regime. This system of loyalty became increasingly codified through various versions of feudalism. However, the often-overlapping bonds that characterized the feudal system, by which an aristocrat's loyalty could be divided among multiple monarchs, also undermined the state. In response, sovereigns in kingdoms such as France and England increasingly sought to consolidate power through the Renaissance and Reformation periods. The growing authority of the central state necessitated an increase in resources, whether in the form of taxes or loans, in order to support larger militaries and growing overseas empires. The rise of colonialism reflected the emergence of mercantilism as an economic system driven by imperial rivalries between kingdoms such as France, Spain, and England. Meanwhile, the rising merchant class increasingly sought to limit expenditures by the monarch in order to concurrently constrain taxes. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648)

marked not only the rise of the contemporary nation-state, but also the beginnings of the end of the monarchial system. The growing merchant class increasingly sought greater access to political power and a legal framework that limited aristocratic privilege. In addition, as monarchs sought to limit the power of the Church, they also undermined the basis for their legitimacy.

TYPES OF MONARCHIES

Absolute monarchies grant the sovereign almost total control over the state and the populace. There are few legal or constitutional limitations on royal prerogative. Rulers justified such power by appealing to the divine right of kings and arguing that their authority came directly from God. Within absolute monarchies, there is no distinction between the ruler and the state; therefore, the resources of the nation are viewed as the personal property of the sovereign. One result was that colonies were often considered royal property and not components of the state. For instance, the Belgian Congo colony was the personal domain of King Leopold II (1835–1909) from 1865 to 1908, when he was forced to turn the area over to the national government. Proponents of absolute monarchy often refuted charges of tyranny by invoking the notion of enlightened despotism and the reign of philosopher kings as developed by Plato. Louis XIV of France (1638–1715) typified the ideal of the absolute monarch, while writers such as Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) contended that absolute monarchy was necessary to forestall anarchy. By the mid-1800s, absolute monarchy was on the wane in most of the European states, except for some empires such as Germany and Russia.

Most monarchial systems were limited in scope by powerful aristocracies or rival claimants for the throne. For instance, following the Battle of Runnymede (1215), English barons forced King John to sign the Magna Carta (Great Charter), which limited royal powers. This was followed in 1265 with the first meeting of the English Parliament. From these beginnings, the system of constitutional monarchy developed, in which royal power was constrained by legal, constitutional, and political factors. The English Civil Wars (1642–1651) marked the last significant effort to reimplement absolutism in Great Britain, and the country instead transitioned to a constitutional monarchy. John Locke (1632–1704) strongly argued against the divine right of kings, while later philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) asserted that governments should be based on a social contract, and the Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755) wrote in favor of divided government, with separate executive and administrative branches. Gradually, the notion that governments should operate for the common good and be based on popular sovereignty became increasingly accepted. These ideas propelled the rise of democratic government and the demise of monarchies through rebellions, such as the French and Russian revolutions, or systemwide conflict, such as the world wars.

CONTEMPORARY MONARCHIES

The percentage of people living under monarchial systems has declined from 55.8 percent in 1900 (with an additional 30.8 percent in colonial territories) to approximately 5 percent in 2000. There are thirty-two monarchies in the world today. Most rulers in these states are either constitutional monarchs or ceremonial rulers. For instance, European states such as Denmark, Norway, and Spain, as well as Japan, have monarchs who serve as ceremonial heads of state. The United Kingdom exemplifies the contemporary system of constitutional monarchy: The sovereign presides over ceremonies and state occasions. The king or queen has a consultative role with the prime minister, the nation's chief executive, and serves as the titular head of the military. However, the monarch has little real influence on legislation or the day-to-day operations of the government. Instead, the British monarch and its counterparts generally serve as a source of stability within the political system. Monarchs in Portugal, Spain, and Thailand were important in transitions to democratic rule, and the British monarch serves as a link between the United Kingdom and the sixteen Commonwealth Realms, including Australia and Canada. There are seven formal absolute monarchies left in the world—Bhutan, Brunei, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland, and Vatican City. Furthermore, monarchs in countries such as Kuwait, Swaziland, and Tonga continue to possess considerable political power and influence.

See also *Divine Right of Kings; Feudalism; Magna Carta; Sovereignty.*

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Monarchy, Constitutional

See *Constitutional Monarchy.*

Monetary Policy

Monetary policy is a set of actions taken by a government authority to influence the supply of money and credit in circulation. Research indicates that changes in the rate of growth of the money supply affect unemployment, output, inflation, and interest rates. There is also a substantial political dimension to monetary policy. In the past, political scientists studied the effects that political parties, executive and legislative branches, and elections have *on policy outcomes.* What has not been widely studied by political scientists, however, are two other important monetary policy research issues: (1) policy maker use of economic targets in both policy and outcomes, and (2) policy implementation.

In the academic literature (largely done in economics) policy target research questions center on whether to stress

unemployment (output) or inflation stabilization. On the other hand, policy implementation research focuses on the economic trade-offs associated with the use of discretionary policy (e.g., responding to current circumstances) versus following a predictable course of action (termed a *policy rule*).

POLICY TARGETS AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS

In the United States, legislation such as the Employment Act of 1946 and the Federal Reserve Act of 1977 mandated economic growth, employment, and inflation stability as objectives. During the same period, the most important legislation pertaining to policy implementation was the Accord of 1951. This "Accord" granted the Federal Reserve enhanced independence from political pressure. In their 1993 article, "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance," Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers find monetary authority independence leads to lower inflation. The Accord of 1951, however, is silent on mandating discretionary policy or a policy rule.

EVOLUTION OF POLICY TARGET EMPHASIS

Due to the research of economist A. W. Phillips, unemployment reduction became the early policy target priority. Phillips demonstrated an inverse relation between wages and unemployment: Higher unemployment was associated with lower wages, while higher wages were associated with lower unemployment. This relation was graphically demonstrated on what is now called the Phillips curve.

However, a critique soon emerged of the assumptions underlying the use of the Phillips curve *and* discretionary policy. Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps reasoned the Phillips curve was based on false assumptions about how people formed their expectations and, therefore, was bound to give incorrect predictions about inflation and unemployment. Friedman and Phelps argued that a stimulative policy reduced unemployment for a brief time if workers set their wage demands too low. This stimulative effect occurred if workers underestimated future inflation. Friedman and Phelps reasoned that workers could not be fooled for long; consequently, there could be no stable or predictable Phillips curve trade-off. The result would instead be a combination of higher and more volatile unemployment and inflation—a combination that came to be known as stagflation. During the late 1960s and for most of the 1970s, many industrialized countries ignored the Friedman and Phelps critique of the Phillips curve and, as a result, experienced stagflation.

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS: CONSEQUENCES FOR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Friedman and Phelps's critique and the subsequent validation of their predictions highlight the importance of accounting for the role of the public and their expectations. These insights had implications for policy discretion. Discretionary policy, because it responds to current circumstances and puts less emphasis on past conditions and public expectations, was thought to create greater uncertainty and greater economic volatility. The reason is that policy changes and the use of policy maker discretion are sometimes at odds with anchoring and stabilizing public expectations. Discretionary policy is undermined by the threat of *time consistency*, since "a policy that may be the best thing to do in general may not be the best thing to do at a particular time."

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON POLICY TARGETS AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: INFLATION TARGETING

Policy rules, whether they involve money growth or interest rates, account for public expectations and can minimize the time consistency problem. In addition, policy rules have now shifted to targeting inflation. A policy rule involving inflation targeting has the monetary authority adjusting money growth and nominal interest rates in response to deviations of inflation from a prespecified target (e.g., 2 percent). Since the 1990s, many industrialized countries have adopted inflation targeting. Inflation targeting is effective, because it helps coordinate and stabilize inflation expectations. When policy makers achieve and maintain inflation stability, the public can substitute what they think is an implicit or explicit inflation target for past inflation. In this environment, plans (i.e., contracts) now exhibit (price/inflation) stability. For these reasons inflation targeting—and emphasizing inflation stability—in various forms have resulted in a reduction in the average extent and volatility of inflation in advanced industrial countries.

There also appears to be a relation between achieving and maintaining inflation stability *and* output stability. One manifestation of this relation is the length of business cycle expansions. If we examine U.S. peacetime business expansions recorded since 1854, we find the average duration is approximately 30.5 months. However, when we examine the average duration of the two peacetime expansions between 1982 and 2002, a period of policy-induced inflation stability, the duration is 106 months. These policy successes—in contrast to the policy errors of the 1970s and the economic crisis ongoing as of early 2010—suggest political forces encouraging inflation stability have the most salutary economic consequences. A new literature indicates political forces influenced monetary policy to deviate from promoting inflation stability (e.g., keeping interest rates artificially low) and created the conditions for the housing bubble that started to burst in 2008.

See also *Central Bank; Economic Policy Formulation; Fiscal Policy; Monetary Union; Political Economy; State, Fiscal Crisis of the.*

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Monetary Union

A monetary union is an economic arrangement among states in which a single currency is adopted to replace various national currencies, and there is widespread cooperation on monetary policy. Monetary unions seek to stabilize fluctuations in the value of money in order to facilitate trade and economic cooperation. Through history, such unions have existed; however, in the more successful, monetary union has proceeded with political union. The contemporary European Monetary Union (EMU) of the European Union (EU) member states has significantly affected regional and global politics by redefining norms of national sovereignty and creating a currency capable of challenging the economic hegemony of the U.S. dollar.

THE FOUNDATIONS AND HISTORY OF MONETARY UNIONS

Throughout history, merchants and the commercial classes have sought means to ease trade with neighboring states. Even among the ancient Greeks and Romans, there were nascent efforts to create a single denomination of exchange for universal use. For instance, in 269 BCE, the *didrachm,* a Roman silver coin, was introduced to facilitate trade between Rome and the Greeks. It was later superseded by the *denarius,* which was widely used throughout the region. During the Middle Ages, there were more formal attempts to develop formalized monetary cooperation, including common currencies and reciprocal trade arrangements. These efforts were especially significant among the commercial cities and trade leagues of northern Europe and the Mediterranean, but these initiatives typically lacked the main features of modern monetary unions. In addition to a joint currency, a true union includes

Issued in 1999, the euro was developed to serve the monetary union of the European Union. It replaced the use of national currencies in EU member states.

SOURCE: Corbis

a central, supranational monetary authority such as a central bank. Consequently, there is a high degree of coordination in monetary policy and usually standard principles in fiscal policy, especially in regard to taxation, tariffs, and trade practices.

The first major initiative to create a modern monetary union occurred in the New England colonies beginning in the mid-1600s. Each of the four colonies—Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island—accepted the printed currencies of the other colonies as legal tender for economic purposes, including tax payments. The colonies also coordinated efforts to maintain the value of their respective currencies. However, by 1750, Massachusetts, the largest of the economies, found its currency devalued as its neighbors began to print large quantities of their notes to fund a variety of projects. Massachusetts withdrew from the arrangement, and the union collapsed. In the 1830s, France endeavored to promote a monetary union among the states of Europe. Successive French governments encouraged the adoption of the franc as a common currency. In 1865, Belgium, France, Italy,

and Switzerland created a franc zone that included a common currency and fixed gold-to-silver conversion rates, as well as limitations on the printing and coinage of currency to control inflation. Eighteen countries eventually adopted the franc and some aspects of the monetary union. World War I (1914–1918) led to the demise of the union, which was disbanded in 1926, although many member states had previously reinstituted national currencies at fixed exchange rates. One continuing manifestation of the union is the French Central African (CFA) Franc Zone among the former African colonies of France. Their franc is pegged to the French franc (now euro), and member states must abide by a series of common monetary principles. Notable failed efforts at monetary unions include the Scandinavian Monetary Union (1873–1924) of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and the East African Currency Area in the British region of Africa (1922–1972). In addition, efforts by Egypt to create a monetary union among Gulf states in the early 1990s failed, although Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia revived the project and sought to create a union by 2010.

The most successful monetary unions were those that accompanied political union. For instance, the consolidation of the thirteen semi-independent U.S. states from the Articles of Confederation to the 1787 Constitution paved the way for the adoption of a single currency and a central source for national monetary and fiscal policy (and a central bank). A similar development occurred among the German states and principalities beginning with the 1818 customs union, followed by the more formal Zollverein in 1834 and culminating in German unification in 1871 with the creation of a central bank (the Reichsbank) and a national currency (the Reichsmark).

EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION

The trade and tariff disputes of the post–World War I era marked the end for most supranational monetary unions, but the idea gained new support in the aftermath of World War II (1939–1945). After repeated efforts, EMU was accepted within the EU through the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. The effort marked the largest and most ambitious supranational monetary union in world history. EMU was achieved in three stages. First, states increased cooperation between central banks but continued autonomous monetary policy and financial transactions. However, the European Currency Unit introduced a means to undertake financial transactions between banks in different nations. Second, in 1994, the European Monetary Institute (EMI) was created. The EMI served as forerunner to the European Central Bank (ECB) and was given the task of coordinating policy among the respective national central banks. The second stage involved a moratorium on the extension of credit by central banks. (That role was undertaken by the EMI and later the ECB.) Third, the currencies became fixed to specific rates of exchange, and the euro, the EU's common currency, was introduced in 1999. In addition, the ECB became operational through the 1999 Growth and Stability Pact, which required member states to keep deficits

at 3 percent or less of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and national debts at less than 60 percent of annual GDP. Although many aspects of EMU have worked very well, in 2005, the Growth and Stability Pact had to be revised following the inability of major members France and Germany to meet the strict fiscal requirements.

The euro is the currency of EU members Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Denmark, Great Britain, and Sweden retained their national currencies. The ten countries that joined the EU in 2004 were required to adopt the currency when they met its economic criteria. The euro has been very successful at achieving its main goal—easing financial transactions between EU members. It has also redefined norms of national sovereignty, as the nation-states of the EU have surrendered a high degree of economic control to the supranational ECB. A secondary purpose was to challenge the global hegemony of the dollar in international monetary transactions. Successive U.S. administrations adopted a weak dollar policy in order to promote exports. As a result, the high euro-to-dollar value constrained European exports to the United States and hurt tourism markets in Europe but made the currency more attractive to financial traders.

See also *European Union; Foreign Policy; Monetary Policy.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

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Money Laundering

Money laundering is the process by which criminal organizations manage substantial and recurring illicit revenues to bring these monies back to the legitimate economy. It is traditionally understood as a three-step cycle: (1) the placement, in which the illicit funds are distanced from the crime that produced them and enter the financial system; (2) the layering, in which the origins of the funds are hidden through generally complex financial transactions; and (3) the reintegration, in which the money comes back to the economy appearing legitimate. Although it is particularly difficult to quantify the amount of money laundered around the world, an often-cited estimate from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the late 1990s suggested that 2 to 5 percent of global GDP is laundered yearly.

Traditionally, the banking sector has been the vector of most illicit financial activities. Other industries such as the securities sector, insurance and reinsurance, payday lenders, and currency exchanges are particularly vulnerable to illicit finance. Advances in technology such as Internet banking and trading have facilitated the process of washing the proceeds of crime. The continued existence of offshore finance is said to represent a major hurdle in combating illicit financial activities.

Governments around the world started to pay attention to the issue of money laundering in the context of the war on drugs. The United States adopted the Money Laundering Control Act in 1986, legislation that criminalized the laundering process. States around the world have now adopted similar legislation. The objectives of governmental intervention are both to minimize the threat from organized crime and to safeguard the integrity of financial markets. Public sector efforts rely on the participation of financial intermediaries, which must provide reports on large and suspicious transactions to financial intelligence units (who in turn may transmit relevant information to law enforcement agencies).

There is a large international regime that has been built to counter money laundering. This regime is particularly important, because it is generally assumed that one of the main reasons states have had difficulty in tackling this issue is the lack of collaboration among countries. The United Nations' Vienna Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in 1988 outlawed money laundering and mandated mutual legal assistance across states.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an offshoot of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), has become central to the regime against money laundering and is composed of more than thirty member states. The FATF has elaborated forty recommendations, revised in 1996 and again in 2003, that direct national legislation against illicit finance. The FATF ensures compliance through self and peer assessment, a process that led in the new century to a blacklist of uncooperative countries and territories.

Other important international organizations in the fight against money laundering include the IMF, the World Bank, the Bank for International Settlements, and the Egmont Group (whose members are financial intelligence units). The private sector created the Wolfsberg Group of Banks to establish anti–money laundering principles. Since September 11, 2001, domestic and international efforts against money laundering have been reinvigorated as a result of states' attempts to limit terrorism financing.

The fight against money laundering has been controversial. Critics of stringent anti–money laundering programs argue that measures infringe on individuals' privacy rights and that they impose a high cost of compliance on financial intermediaries. Morally, it is quite clear that criminals should not profit from the proceeds of their activities. Yet, it can be argued that transactions involved in the laundering process actually represent the appropriate use of the financial system, to make more money, and as such should not be criminalized.

The legitimacy of state action has also been contested. It has, for instance, been argued that the United States has used the international regime against money laundering to bully smaller states with lax financial systems.

Finally, the fight against money laundering has not always led to tangible results, raising questions about the efficiency of such programs. After all, as is usually the case when states attempt to target organized crime, the innovative criminal is always one step ahead of the authorities.

See also *International Monetary Fund (IMF); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Organized Crime and Mafia; Terrorism, Financing of; World Bank.*

. . . .   IAN ROBERGE

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Monroe Doctrine

President James Monroe's annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823, asserted a policy of opposition to colonization by foreign powers in the Western Hemisphere. This policy, known as the Monroe Doctrine, became the guiding principle for U.S. foreign policy in the Americas for generations. Specifically, Monroe stated,

> The American continents, by the free and independent conditions which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. . . . The political system of the [European] allied powers is essentially different . . . from that of America. . . . We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.

The Monroe Doctrine represents common ideas and beliefs long held by the United States prior to 1823 but still unrepresented in a formal policy. Actions taken by the Russians in exploring the west coast of North America and the British attempts to colonize Cuba posed a threat to the United States, which prompted Monroe to articulate U.S. opposition to new efforts to colonize the Americas. It is interesting that the Monroe Doctrine mirrored a British policy, enforced by the Royal Navy, that prevented European powers from colonizing in America.

See also *Colonialism.*

. . . .   RICHARD M. YON

Montaigne, Michel de

Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) was among the greatest thinkers of the French Renaissance. His most important intellectual achievements, which arose in reaction to the fanaticism and cruelty of France's religious wars, included ground-breaking views of skepticism, self-exploration, and toleration. Moreover, although he did not argue for democracy, separation of powers, or many of the political and civil rights associated with liberalism, his views played a key role in creating the ethos on which liberalism's institutions are based.

Montaigne published only one book, *Essays* (1575), in which he coined the current usage of the word *essay* (from the French "*essaier,*" to attempt or to try). The book is composed of a series of witty and erudite essays in which Montaigne tries to refine his judgment by probing human paradoxes and the contradictory character of humans. Famously dialogical, his essays explore several sides of every issue, often without apparent resolution.

Montaigne was the first great philosophical skeptic of modern times, but scholars disagree about the exact nature of his skepticism (academic, pyrrhonist, or fideist). He doubted humanity's ability to know God and the reliability of reason and the senses. This thoroughgoing doubt influenced French philosopher René Descartes, who followed Montaigne in turning to the subjective self as the basis for a contingent knowledge. But whereas Descartes used subjective perception as a building block for science, Montaigne doubted whether such a project would succeed. For Montaigne, if any knowledge was possible, it would only be subjective knowledge of the phenomenological self.

One of the earliest and most influential advocates of the characteristically modern subjective self, Montaigne called on mankind to accept the "human condition" (a phrase he coined), that is, to live with imperfect knowledge and not to despair. The source of human problems, he argued, is not in the economic system or the political regime, but in the self. A talented psychologist, Montaigne showed how reason and imagination conjure up fears, hopes, desires, and anxieties that lead people to embrace unverifiable doctrines to satisfy their longings for meaning and importance. Montaigne aimed to tame the hubristic and to expose vain claims. More important, he urged his readers to turn inward, to explore themselves, to go "home." Montaigne found nothing and everything in himself. What he thought he knew about himself dissolves under his (and the reader's) analytical gaze, but he also finds seeds of everything in himself such that he deemed self-exploration a never-ending source of wonder and delight and the greatest source of happiness for reflective individuals.

Montaigne's self-awareness led him to toleration. A self-knowing person identifies and empathizes with others, and Montaigne was extremely tolerant. He wanted to protect everyone, including religious believers of all kinds, ancient pagans, and the Indians of the New World. To protect individuals, Montaigne urged a separation of the private from the public sphere. He accepted some public conformity as necessary for peace and stability but insisted on freedom of conscience. He would give up the right to act publicly on his conscience in order to have his own *arriere boutique* (back room) in his soul where he could explore and judge freely. This call for self-cultivation and the creation of a private sphere of free conscience and free political judgment formed the kernel of liberalism as it was to develop.

See also *French Political Thought; Political Philosophy.*

. . . . ALAN LEVINE

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Montesquieu, Charles-Louis

Born in 1689 to a noble family, French political philosopher Charles-Louis Secondat (1689–1755), Baron de la Brede and de Montesquieu, was educated mainly in the law. He occupied a hereditary seat on the *parlement* of Bordeaux while also pursuing scientific research. He achieved enormous literary success with *Persian Letters* in 1721. This work combines a brilliant satire of French society, as observed by fictional Persian travelers, with an examination of the moral horrors of the Persian seraglio, which, in Montesquieu's eyes, represented despotism more generally. The success of this work gave him access to the highest society in France and other countries, including England, where he spent two years. Montesquieu published *Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and their Decline* in 1734, and his most important work, *The Spirit of the Laws,* in 1748. When *Spirit* was attacked on religious grounds, Montesquieu responded with his *Defense of the Spirit of the Laws* (1748). In spite of his efforts, however, *Spirit* was placed on the Index of Prohibited Books, a list of works prohibited by the Catholic Church.

Montesquieu's reputation as a political theorist rests primarily on *Spirit of the Laws.* The product of twenty years' labor, the work is sprawling and somewhat disorganized, but it makes enormous contributions. Montesquieu was a pioneering figure in the development of social science. *Spirit* has a strong claim to establishing the sociology of law. According to Montesquieu, there is no such thing as a good law, in the abstract. Good laws must fit in with the overall systems of their countries and so vary accordingly. He analyzes a wide range of factors—geographical, economic, and religious, for example—that combine to give rise to the "general spirit" of a country, with which laws (positive laws) must be in accord. Different societies fall into three rough classes: the republic, monarchy, and despotism. Each has a distinctive "principle," a moral passion that animates its legal—and larger social—system and determines which laws will be effective. The principle of the republic is

virtue, or the love of equality; of monarchy it is honor; and of despotism, fear. Montesquieu's enormous labors are evident in his analysis of how laws concerning specific subjects, such as education, inheritance, criminal laws, and treatment of women, vary in accordance with overall systems. His analysis is infused with fear that France was degenerating from monarchy into despotism. To address this problem, Montesquieu primarily recommended returning to a more feudal system, in which a strengthened nobility was able to check the king. However, aware of the complex interaction of the factors that dominate societies, he preached only modest reform. His attention to the complexity of social forms was an important influence on subsequent conservative thinkers.

Spirit also presents a classic analysis of the British Constitution and how its separation of powers and checks and balances between executive, legislative, and judicial branches prevents abuses by government. Although somewhat idealized, this analysis has also been enormously influential. Book XII of *Spirit* provides a penetrating analysis of the conditions that must be satisfied by a system of criminal law that will not intrude upon people's liberty. For these and other contributions to the defense of liberty, Montesquieu is generally viewed as a great figure in the liberal tradition, in spite of his political preference for the nobility and the fact that he did not argue in support of democratic government.

See also *French Political Thought; Liberalism, Classical; Political Philosophy.*

. . . .   GEORGE KLOSKO

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Moore, Barrington, Jr.

Barrington Moore, Jr. (1913–2005) was an American political sociologist who spent most of his career as senior research fellow at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University. Moore's interests and intellectual ambitions covered many areas beyond the Russian case, although that was where his studies began. His *Soviet Politics* (1950) and *Terror and Progress, USSR* (1954) both examined the role of terror in political relations and became worth revisiting in the post-1989 world.

Moore's most well-known work is *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966), which employs detailed historical and comparative analyses of Britain, France, Japan, India, China, and the United States as a way of developing and testing generalizations about how societies change. In this book, Moore argued that social interests and political structures that are declining may play an important part in structuring the new sociopolitical orders that take their place. The growth of large cities and the emergence of strong, centralizing states posed a major threat to great landowners and rural peasantry throughout Europe and Asia. They fought back or tried to avoid these changes. Moore studied how this happened and the historically significant choices that were made.

Moore showed that different responses to similar economic pressures led to very different political outcomes—democracy, fascism, and communism. He investigated the alliances that rural elites made with urban businesses and central governments. He also looked at the social structures of the peasantry and its historical fate. In some cases it was gradually eliminated (as in England). In others (France and China) it became a revolutionary force.

Unlike his friend, German-born political philosopher Herbert Marcuse, who treated bourgeois capitalism and totalitarian societies as being fundamentally in the same camp, Moore believed dictatorships and democracies were basically different in origin and structure. However, even this fundamental distinction was secondary to the basic question that guided his work: Which historical circumstances favor, and which inhibit, the making of modern societies that are decent and worth living in? The search for answers moved him to study anthropology, economics, history, and philosophy, leading to works of sustained analytical rigor and historical imagination such as *Political Power and Social Theory* (1958), *Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery* (1971), and *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (1978). Moore continued working after *Injustice,* producing books such as *Privacy* (1984), *Authority and Inequality under Capitalism and Socialism* (1987), *Moral Aspects of Economic Growth* (1998), and *Moral Purity and Persecution in History* (2000).

In his work Moore maintained the empathetic but detached stance instilled by his early training in Latin, Greek, and both classical and medieval history. He credited the works of sociologists William Graham Sumner and A. G. Keller for his continuing concern with inequality, authority, ideology, and the causes of human misery. Moore was always alert for indications of emancipatory forces that might work in favor of the creation of rational and decent societies. In all his work, he demonstrated that objectivity does not mean neutrality.

See also *Marcuse, Herbert; Political Sociology; Social Order; Sumner, William Graham.*

. . . .   DENNIS SMITH

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Moral Hazard

See *Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.*

More, Sir Thomas

Thomas More (1478–1535) was an English statesman and humanist. He was educated at St. Anthony's School in London, after which he entered into the service of the household of Cardinal John Morton, the archbishop of Canterbury. The archbishop had him pursue studies at the University of Oxford, presumably at Canterbury College (and/or St. Mary's Hall). While More was at Oxford, the 1519 publication of the second edition of the New Testament by Desiderius Erasmus caused a disagreement between two opposing communities. The so-called Trojans (primarily friars) opposed the revival of the biblical languages, since it was thought that such would negatively affect the influence of the Latin Bible, and that men would become pagans by studying Greek, and Jews by studying Hebrew. The so-called Greeks, conversely, embraced an entirely contrary view. Having been instructed by Erasmus, who was also an intimate friend, More supported the revival of the biblical languages and sought to suppress the Trojan movement. More returned to London by 1496 and studied law as a member of Lincoln's Inn.

In 1504, as a member of the Parliament at Westminster, More persuaded the House to moderate a grant to Henry VII in honor of the marriage of his daughter, Margaret (Tudor), to James IV of Scotland. More's actions earned him some political disapproval, which allegedly resulted in his father's brief imprisonment in the Tower of London until payment of a fine was made. Although the parliamentary achievement likely earned More both fame and favor in the city government, he would have been persuaded to leave England as a consequence of his opposition in Parliament to Henry VII's additional taxation, if the king had not died late in April 1509. When Henry VIII ascended the throne, More was regarded favorably by the new king and was allowed to hold a series of public offices with tremendous haste.

In 1523, when reformer Martin Luther began to question the dogma of the Roman Catholic Church and earned the ire of the king, More, then the speaker of the House of Commons, supported the king by writing *Responsio ad Lutherum*. However, his opposition to the king's divorce from Catherine of Aragon forced his resignation as Lord Chancellor in 1532. He returned to private life but continued a religious controversy with Protestant scholar William Tyndale.

More was imprisoned in the Tower of London in 1534 for refusing to swear the oath required by the Act of Succession, which sanctioned Henry's marriage to Anne Boleyn. During his imprisonment, he wrote *A Dialogue of Comfort against Tribulation* (1534) and experienced five interrogations. In the same year, he also opposed the Act of Supremacy, which established the English monarch as the head of the Church of England, and was tried at Westminster Hall for treason. More was condemned and beheaded on Tower Hill on July 6, 1535; his head was impaled on a pole and exhibited on London Bridge. In 1886, Pope Leo XIII beatified More, and in 1935 Pope Pius XI canonized him.

Sir Thomas More is renowned as a humanist during the Renaissance and for the 1516 publication of his influential work *Utopia.*

SOURCE: The Granger Collection, New York

More is regarded as one of the foremost humanists of the Renaissance, primarily due to his reputation from the publication of *Utopia* (1516) in London, which was translated into English by Ralph Robinson in 1551. *Utopia* is the description of an ideal city-state that is revered by both Catholics and communists as their exclusive property.

See also *British Political Thought; Luther, Martin; Religion and Politics; Utopias and Politics.*

. . . . RON J. BIGALKE JR.

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Morgenthau, Hans Joachim

Hans Joachim Morgenthau (1904–1980) was a German political scientist best known for his work on international relations theory. Born in Coburg, Germany, he entered the University of Frankfurt in 1923 and later attended the University of Munich, obtaining a doctorate in law. He pursued postgraduate work at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, and was admitted to the bar.

Between 1928 and 1931, Morgenthau worked as an assistant to Hugo Sinzheimer, a left-wing labor lawyer who was a leading Social Democratic Party member during the Weimar era. From 1932 to 1935, Morgenthau taught public law at the University of Geneva; then he moved to Madrid, Spain, for a year before returning to Germany. In 1937, fleeing Nazi persecution, he left Germany for the United States and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1943. Morgenthau taught at Brooklyn College in New York from 1937 to 1939 and then moved on to the University of Kansas City (1939–1944), the University of Chicago (1944–1971), the City College of the City University of New York (1968–1975), and the New School for Social Research in New York (1975–1980). He served as a visiting professor at Harvard, Columbia, Northwestern, the University of California, and Yale and was an adviser to both the U.S. State Department and the Defense Department.

Morgenthau, considered one of the founders of the "political realism" school of international relations, wrote *Politics among Nations* (1948), which is considered one of the seminal works in international relations theory. He contended that the power interests of nation-states were the driving force behind relations between them.

Morgenthau was an early critic of American involvement in Vietnam, arguing that the United States had put itself in a position from which it could not retreat without embarrassing itself. In a 1965 *New York Times Magazine* article, Morgenthau asserted that the U.S. intervention in Vietnam was intended to limit the influence of the Communist Chinese regime in Southeast Asia. However, he argued that "China is largely immune to the specific types of power in which the superiority of the United States consists—that is, nuclear, air and naval power." He suggested the only way to defeat China would be physical conquest, which he noted that no American president had ever suggested. Therefore, he argued, we in the United States "must learn to accommodate ourselves to the predominance of China on the Asian mainland."

After President Richard Nixon ordered the invasion of Cambodia in April 1970, Morgenthau was quoted in Robert J. Myers's 1980 article "Hans Morgenthau: the Quest for Justice" as follows:

> What will it avail us to save our face in a war without end if we cannot save our souls, if we cannot save ourselves as a nation worthy to be saved? And what kind of face would we be saving at the price of our souls and our purpose as a nation? I can see that face: ignorant, violent, brutal, lying, and mean—the face of some American Hitler.

Morgenthau provided a framework for understanding foreign policy. He adapted a European understanding of politics and foreign policy to the American experience and tried to explain the interrelationship between abstract moral principles and political necessities in world politics. Henry Kissinger, one of Morgenthau's students, wrote in his 1980 article "A Gentle Analyst of Power—Hans J. Morgenthau" that "Hans Morgenthau has turned contemporary study of international relations into a major science. All of us teaching in this field after him had to start from the ground he had laid."

See also *Foreign Policy; German Political Thought; International Relations; International Relations Theory; International Relations: Worldviews and Frameworks; Political Theory.*

. . . .   JEFFREY KRAUS

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Morris, William

William Morris (1834–1896) was one of the leading poets and prose writers of late Victorian England, an artist and craftsman, a translator of Norse sagas, a businessman, and one of the most important printers of his time. He was also a revolutionary communist who left behind him a rich and extensive legacy of libertarian socialist thought and practice. Morris's most original and lasting contributions to political thought were his critique of useless toil under capitalism and his utopian vision of a world in which all forms of labor, even the commonest, might be made attractive.

The most carefully considered and argued of Morris's indictments of capitalist society is that it promotes the treatment of labor as a commodity, and hence denies the greater part of humanity any pleasure in their work. According to his argument, artistic beauty and the pleasure of creation were natural and necessary accompaniments of certain forms of craft labor in the Middle Ages. Only with the evolution of specifically capitalist institutions were art and work separated. As capitalism has grown, the divide has deepened, and most people are now surrounded by ugliness and work and live in pain. The situation will be reversed only when artificial obstacles to pleasurable labor are removed, and all have the

opportunity to make their innate senses of beauty and value an integral part of their lives.

Morris developed his vision of a society in which work and art—and nature—blend harmoniously in a range of utopian writings, the best known of which is his socialist romance *News from Nowhere* (1891). "Nowhere," in this work, is a moneyless and stateless craft utopia, the most distinctive feature of which is the fact that nearly all the work done in it is pleasurable, either because of the hope of social honor, which causes pleasurable excitement; because it has grown into a pleasurable habit, as in the case of mechanical work; or, most important of all, because all people are artists insofar as they are able to take some conscious sensuous pleasure in the work itself. Unlike most literary works about utopias, *News from Nowhere* features a detailed and largely plausible account of how the changes it describes came about. The verisimilitude of this aspect of the narrative is no doubt due in large part to Morris's exceptionally active engagement in the English revolutionary socialist movement of the 1880s.

The most common criticism leveled against Morris by socialists and nonsocialists alike is that he was a backwards-looking thinker who failed to appreciate the labor-saving potential of modern machine technology. However, while Morris did indeed look back to premodern social and cultural values, he viewed them only as a source of inspiration for his utopian vision of the socialist future. And while he believed that the reunification of work, art, and nature in communist society would ultimately entail a resurgence of handicraft labor, he also recognized that the invention of modern factory machinery in the nineteenth century opened up tremendous opportunities for minimizing intrinsically unpleasant and painful labor—opportunities he felt were squandered by profit-driven manufacturers who used the new technology to save the cost of labor rather than labor itself.

Morris was for many years effectively dismissed as a sentimental and eccentric dreamer, but by the early twenty-first century, he had become widely acknowledged as a figure of major political importance. Over a century after his death, both his political writings and his personal example continue to inspire participants in a range of radical social movements, among them democratic socialism, anarchism, and radical ecology.

See also *Capitalism and Democracy; Political Philosophy; Utopias and Politics.*

. . . . LAURENCE DAVIS

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Mosca, Gaetano

Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941), was an Italian legal scholar and political theorist. He is known for having helped develop the theory of political elitism and described, in its context, the existence of a dominant political class. Mosca was also a politician and a journalist.

Mosca was born in Palermo, which was then part of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. (In 1861, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was annexed by the Kingdom of Italy.) Mosca studied at the University of Palermo and graduated with a law degree in 1881. From 1885 to 1888 he taught constitutional law at the university.

Mosca moved to Rome in 1887 and became the editor of the journal of proceedings of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, a position he held until 1897. He taught constitutional law at the University of Rome (1888–1896) and was the chair of constitutional law at the University of Turin (1896–1924). He returned as chair of public law to the University of Rome (1924–1933).

Mosca entered politics in 1909, winning a seat in the Chamber of Deputies as a member of the Liberal Party. He served as a junior minister in the cabinet of Antonio Salandra as the undersecretary for the colonies (1914–1916). After ten years as a deputy, Mosca was made a member of the Italian Senate by King Victor Emmanuel III in 1919. While many fascists regarded his work as an intellectual basis for their movement, Mosca rejected fascism and resigned from the Italian Senate in 1926. He was also a journalist, writing about politics for the *Corriere della Sera,* the most influential Italian newspaper of the day, and the *Tribuna* of Rome.

Mosca is best known for his work on elite theory. His works on this topic include *Sulla teorica dei governi e sul governo parlamentare* (1884); *Elementi di scienza politica* (1896, translated into English as *The Ruling Class,* 1939), and *Storia delle dottrine politche* (1936). Mosca contended that virtually all societies were ruled by a numerical minority, which he called the political class. According to him, the members of the political class possessed superior organizational skills that made it possible for them to secure power in modern societies. However, Mosca believed that the political class was not monolithic. Rather, it was divided, and its members competed against one another for power, resulting in what he called the "circulation of elites," where different groups of members of the political class would hold power for a time, only to be replaced by another group of members. He believed that political power was always in the hands of the elites but that they could be controlled by the rule of law.

Mosca maintained this ruling class justifies its power by developing what he called a "political formula," a guiding principle that follows the common ideals of the community. This political formula is the "myth of democracy," where the image of rulers and ruled working together toward a common moral or legal goal is offered as democratic freedom.

Mosca is considered part of the Italian school of elite theorists, along with Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels.

. . . . JEFFREY KRAUS

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Motion Pictures and Politics

From its inception, cinema, as an art form, has been political. The works of George Méliès, who voyages to the moon in *Le voyage dans la Lune* (1902), and the Lumière brothers, who, in their short films (circa 1895–1900) send their cameramen throughout the world, reveal two varied approaches to cinematic art. Méliès attempted to create a world and then destroyed it through the fictional Selenite aliens. The Lumière brothers seek to document the world in its diversity, using overtly colonial language, and find themselves unexpectedly impressed by the "actuality" of these areas as they already exist. Both Méliès's creative approach and the Lumière brothers' documentary show that politics is inherent in cinema.

EARLY YEARS

Beyond its artistic dimension, cinema has always required means, capital, and a theater circuit. Bureaucracies, power, ideology, and financial interests thus affect the entire filmmaking process, from production, censorship, and distribution to viewing. Cinema is deeply influenced by questions of race (Griffith, *The Birth of a Nation,* 1915), technology (Lang, *Metropolis,* 1927), morality (Buñuel, *An Andalusian Dog,* 1929; *The Golden Age,* 1930), fear and alterity (Dreyer, *The Passion of Joan of Arc,* 1927), capitalism (Chaplin, *The Tramp,* 1914), war (Gance, *J'accuse,* 1919), and subversion (Vigo, *Zero for Conduct,* 1933; *L'Atalante,* 1934).

Throughout history, cinema has been political and has sustained enormous political pressure. Politics voices itself through cinema (Leni Riefenstahl in Germany, *Triumph of the Will,* 1934; *Olympia,* 1938), attacks cinema (the Hollywood blacklist), and attempts to build consensus through cinema (Lenin describing cinema as the most important of the arts). Despite politics' sway over cinema, many film artists have managed to elude censorship (Vertov, *Cinema Eye,* 1924; *Three Songs about Lenin,* 1934; and Eisenstein, *Strike,* 1925; *The Battleship Potemkin,* 1925; *October,* 1928; *Alexander Nevsky,* 1938; *Ivan the Terrible,* 1945 [unfinished]) or escape the cinema of a regime. From Italy come Blasetti's *A Walk in the Clouds,* 1943; De Sica's *Shoeshine,* 1946, and *Bicycle Thieves,* 1948; Visconti's *Obsession,* 1943, and *The Earth Trembles,* 1948. And from Japan come Ozu's *I Was Born, But . . . ,* 1932, and *Tokyo Story,* 1953; Kurosawa's *No Regrets for Our Youth,* 1946, and *Rashomon,* 1950.

AFTER WORLD WAR II

After World War II (1939–1945), cinema began to represent the unrepresentable—the Holocaust and the horrors of wartime (Resnais, *Night and Fog,* 1955; *Hiroshima Mon Amour,* 1959; *Last*

Year In Marienbad, 1961; and Rossellini, *Rome, Open City,* 1945; *Paisà,* 1946; *Germany Year Zero,* 1948). The link between politics and cinema remains, and cinematic masters continue to be influenced by the tragedy of the postwar world and the cold war, producing graphic and relevant depictions of violence and destruction. Youssef Chahine (Egypt 1926–2008) depicts corruption and war in *The Sparrow* (1973), society's transformations in *Cairo Station* (1958), gender issues in *Alexandria . . . Why* (1978) and Muslim-Christian relations in *Saladin* (1963). Haile Gerima (Ethiopia 1946–) uses film in order to interrogate black life and culture in *Bush Mama* (1976), colonization and resistance in both *Sankofa* (1993) and *Adwa: An African Victory* (1999), and politics and violence in his recent film *Teza* (2008). Jean-Luc Godard (France 1930–) portrays Marxism and revolution in his films *La Chinoise* (1967) and *Weekend End* (1967) and colonization and war in his films *Le petit soldat* (1960), *Les carabiniers* (1963), and *Notre musique* (2004). Elia Suleiman (Palestine 1960–) engages the very political issue of Palestinian life under Israeli occupation in *Divine Intervention* (2002) and the history of the Arab-Israel conflict in *The Time That Remains* (2009).

DIALOGUE BETWEEN POLITICS AND CINEMA

A filmmaker's subtle challenge of the political conditions of a society and overt political attack on current values reveal a constant dialogue between politics and cinema. Cinema expresses resistance and revolution, directly or indirectly, through suggestion (Angelopoulos, Bertolucci), through more direct political discourse (Pontecorvo, Spike Lee), or through poetic narrative (Makhmalbaf, Straub-Huillet). In its capacity to expand, condense, or stop time; distort perspectives and alter distances; transform appearances; and create and destroy realities, cinema collapses art and politics. In *The Social History of Art,* art historian Arnold Hauser describes the essence of cinema as "the intermingling of the temporal and spatial forms of the film" (1958, 152).

The fluidity of space and time, the quasi-temporal character of space, and the quasi-spatial character of time characterize cinema as the epitome of subversive art. The inherent political character of cinema is apparent not only in a film's content, but also in its various subversive forms. For example, Bunuel's (Spain 1900–1983) *Un chien andalou* (1929) and *Viridiana* (1961), Fernando Arrabal's (Spain 1932–) *Viva la muerte* (1970), Dziga Vertov's (USSR 1896–1954) *Man with a Movie Camera* (1929) and *Three Songs about Lenin* (1934), Orson Welles's (U.S. 1915–1985) *Citizen Kane* (1941), *Othello* (1952), and *The Trial* (1962) all challenge and revolutionize the language of cinema itself, thereby producing political forms.

CONCLUSION

In the early twenty-first century, with the advent of cell phone cameras and user-generated video-hosting Web sites, a shift has occurred toward democratizing filmmaking. The big screen has begun to function as an outlet for today's youth, who record performances on their cell phone cameras and upload them to the Internet and, therefore, to the world.

Actor Orson Welles as Charles Foster Kane gestures during a scene from the 1941 movie *Citizen Kane.* Motion pictures may reflect the political conditions of a society or address contemporary political issues.

Cinema continues to redefine politics. In a communications-based economy that blurs the distinction between production and consumption, the very form of movie going—downloading films to cell phones, watching DVDs in cars or on airplanes—is political. Cinema, "the seventh art," and politics are utterly and completely bound.

See also *Censorship; Politics, Literature, and Film.*

. . . . .   FILIPPO DEL LUCCHESE AND SIMCHI COHEN

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Movement, Freedom of

See *Freedom of Movement.*

Multiculturalism

States and empires containing different cultural groups have existed for millennia; the word *multiculturalism,* however, is of recent origin. Possibly the first time it was used was in a speech by Charles W. Hobart, an American sociologist, to the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews in Winnipeg, Manitoba, in 1963. Hobart's speech, which congratulated Canada for its multiculturalism in contrast to America's "melting pot," was quoted extensively by Paul Yuzyk, a Canadian of Ukrainian ancestry, in a speech in the Senate of Canada on March 3, 1964. Yuzyk is sometimes regarded in Canada as the father of multiculturalism.

Canada in the early 1960s was intensely preoccupied with the relationship between its discontented French-speaking minority, mainly concentrated in Quebec, and the predominantly English-speaking majority of Canadians. In 1963 the Canadian government established the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to study this question, but its terms of reference were criticized by many Canadians of European heritages other than British, Irish, or French. In response, the Royal Commission's terms of reference were extended to include "the contributions of the other ethnic groups," and in 1969 it published a volume of its report devoted to that subject. Two years later, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau declared that his government was officially committed to multiculturalism, although it would retain official bilingualism, and in 1977 he appointed a minister of state for multiculturalism.

Many Canadians initially welcomed the concept, both as a means of celebrating Canada's increasing cultural diversity and as a means of distinguishing that country from the United States. Canadians had traditionally believed (on rather dubious evidence) that immigrants in Canada faced less pressure to assimilate to the majority culture than did immigrants in the United States. Before the word *multiculturalism* became popular, the expression "Canadian mosaic" had been used to indicate this belief. In 1982 a commitment to multiculturalism was incorporated into Canada's constitution. As Canadian immigrants by this time came mainly from Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean, the emphasis of the multiculturalism policy gradually shifted from the preservation of languages and cultures to the prevention of racism and the promotion of equal opportunity.

The first country other than Canada to adopt multiculturalism as a policy was Australia; it did this between 1972 and 1975. Subsequently, the word, and the concept, spread to the United Kingdom, whose support for multiculturalism is sometimes contrasted with the assimilationist policies of republican France, and to the Netherlands, Germany, and Ireland. It also spread to the United States, where the retreat from a commitment to the melting pot idea of immigrant assimilation had perhaps begun with President John F. Kennedy, who took pride in his Irish Catholic heritage and who published a book entitled *A Nation of Immigrants.* In the 1980s, the Reverend Jesse Jackson was one of the first prominent Americans to use the word *multiculturalism*.

In the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century, multiculturalism became increasingly controversial, particularly in the United States, but elsewhere as well. In the United States, the concept became associated with cultural relativism and political correctness, as well as with the controversial practice of affirmative action and the growing importance of Spanish as a second language. In Canada it has always been resented by Quebec nationalists, who view Canada as a binational state and argue that multiculturalism downgrades the significance of French-speaking Quebec as a distinct society. In all countries where the word is used, it is the target of increasing concern that immigrants, particularly those of the Muslim faith, are not integrating into the society that receives them and are retaining antiliberal attitudes and values. This concern has placed severe strains on the alliance between supporters of multiculturalism and supporters of other causes such as feminism and equal rights for homosexuals and lesbians.

Supporters of multiculturalism argue in response that it facilitates the integration of immigrants and minorities into the host society and that countries that reject multiculturalism, such as France, have performed no better in this regard than countries that accept it. The debate is not likely to end soon, particularly since both sides tend to define the word *multiculturalism* in ways that lend support to their own arguments.

See also *Assimilation; Culture Wars; Globalization; Nationality; Segregation and Desegregation*.

. . . .   GARTH STEVENSON

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Multilateralism

Multilateralism is "an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of 'generalized' principles of conduct," relying on the indivisibility of agreed behavior among the participating states (Ruggie 1992, 571) and is characterized by "diffuse reciprocity" (cf. Keohane 1986). Multilateral solutions are suitable when clear common interests are identifiable and market-driven processes fail to achieve acceptable results. The international multilateral system is based on the international legal order and consists of an institutionalized body of norms, regimes, and multilateral organizations. Beyond pure institutionalized multilateral cooperation, multilateralism as an ideology comprises a belief in the benefit of associative problem solving in a world of interdependence. In this spirit, authority is exercised through a multilevel polity of interlocking institutions, including partial transfers of competence to supranational bodies when functionally appropriate.

Roots of the multilateral structuring of international relations can be traced to the nineteenth-century conference diplomacy of the Concert of Europe. Based upon the European balance of power after the defeat of Napoleonic France, it was organized between the powers of the Quadruple Alliance and consisted of a short-lived practice of regular summitry to maintain the reactionary peace. The twentieth century, especially the period after the world wars, was characterized by the quick expansion of the multilateral system, including treaty-based regimes and a growing number of international organizations. At the

same time, imperial disintegration and decolonization led to growth in the number of nation-states and, consequentially, in the membership of the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations. Even though nation-states are legally equal, diverse decision-making mechanisms exist to reflect an unequal distribution of power, ensuring the effectiveness of the multilateral system. The permanent veto-yielding members of the UN Security Council and the distribution of voting power according to financial shares in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund serve as examples. Furthermore, the "minilateral" leadership of the most powerful actors characterizes many ad hoc arrangements and preparatory phases of vital negotiations under unanimity rule.

Most active states have traditionally been middle powers such as the Scandinavian and neutral countries that act as norm entrepreneurs and bear a high profile in the UN. To give just three examples, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland have often been identified among these relatively affluent countries that are convinced of the benefit of international law and orderly relations among nations. Through investing their diplomatic and financial resources in institutional reform initiatives, mediation, and peacekeeping, they strengthen the effectiveness and credibility of the multilateral order and simultaneously augment their status within the system. Regionally dominant actors and global powers occasionally capitalize on their relative power unilaterally or through coalitions of the willing. Unilateralism has been exemplified by the U.S. rejection of diverse multilateral arrangements, such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, and the International Criminal Court. Big powers are, nevertheless, essential actors in multilateral cooperation, because their support is vital for effective problem solving and rule enforcement, absent other institutionalized mechanisms. To give just one obvious example in the field of international security, any effective regime of nuclear arms control and disarmament has depended and will continue to depend on the initiative and compliance of the nuclear weapons states.

See also *International Cooperation; International Organization.*

. . . .   THORSTEN LUHDE

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Multilevel Analysis

Multilevel models are extensions to regression methods designed to explicitly take into account the grouped (or clustered) structure frequently seen in observed and experimental data. Examples of such data in political science abound. In voting research, for instance, voters are nested within districts, which themselves may be nested within states. In comparative political economy, country-years are nested within countries. The hierarchical structure of data such as these is one reason why multilevel models are also known as hierarchical models. It is important, however, to note that multilevel models can also have non-nested grouping factors (e.g., individuals may belong to parties that cut across districts). Other names for multilevel models include *random effects models, random coefficient models,* and *mixed effects models.*

The fundamental idea of multilevel modeling is that individual observations in any particular group or cluster are more similar to each other than observations across groups. Furthermore, even though one might include covariates in a model that explain variation across clusters, they are unlikely to explain all such variation. When this happens, correlation in the error structure is introduced. Multilevel modeling is one way to take into account this correlation while still allowing for explanatory variables at the different levels of the model. When using multilevel models in practice, it is important to understand that many assumptions underlie the method, and they should be taken into consideration when constructing and interpreting these models.

See also *Quantitative Methodologies.*

. . . .   EDUARDO LEONI

Multinational Corporation (MNC)

The *multinational corporation* (MNC), also called *transnational corporation (TNC)* or *multinational enterprise* (MNE), is a corporation with operations in more than one country. The most notable, and often controversial, scenario involves a corporation headquartered in a developed country (most of the world's over 63,000 MNCs are based in the United States, Europe, and Japan) operating their production facilities in countries with the lowest labor costs (the developing countries of the global South). Proponents of economic globalization hail these transnational operations as an important pathway to global economic prosperity, while critics warn of the risks MNCs impose on poor countries and on the international order of states.

According to one central tenet of globalization, the liberalization of trade, through the reduction and elimination of tariffs, allows for the most efficient allocation of global resources. Now a widely accepted premise and goal, it heralds an important and significant shift on matters of international politics. With the power to impose duties and enforce tariffs, states were once the uncontested arbiters of global commerce. In today's world of liberalized trade and open borders, it is the multinational corporation, the primary purveyor of goods and services, that often holds the power to influence and dictate the terms of trade.

Multinational firms are corporations from a legal perspective, but their transnational supply chains cause them to differ from domestic corporations in one important way: Because they operate across borders, state-level regulations are often inadequate to control their behavior. This presents a significant regulatory hurdle, because legislative coordination at the international level remains weak and unenforceable. MNCs cause a conundrum for scholars and policy makers alike. While they play a necessary role in global economic growth and development, their ability to skirt state regulation by shifting operations from one country to another makes them practically ungovernable.

According to proponents of globalization, economic development relies on transnational capital investments by MNCs, a phenomenon referred to as foreign direct investment (FDI). For the receiving country, foreign investment is an important and positive contribution to economic growth, which explains why leaders of various stripes strive to attract FDI. Yet critics insist that many issues plague the ideal of FDI-led prosperity, issues that reflect many of the broader critiques of economic globalization.

First, there is concern that the benefits of MNC foreign investment are unfairly distributed to the benefit of political elites rather than the middle class or the poor. Second, firms involved in commodity extraction export local resources for significant profit while returning little benefit to the local population. Third, MNCs own the majority of the world's patents and intellectual property rights, giving them significant control over the diffusion of technology and skills. Finally, developed countries vying for FDI are often forced to reduce or eliminate regulations and restrictions on firm behavior, the result of which is a "race to the bottom" by firms seeking the loosest regulatory framework within which to operate.

While some scholars question the empirical validity of a race to the bottom, international competition for FDI is undeniable. Countries are reluctant to put restrictions on MNCs, resulting in the reduction of standards on matters of international import, including environmental regulation and the rights of workers. Not only are less-developed countries forced to loosen regulations, but developed countries have little transparency or control over the foreign activities of the corporations ostensibly under their jurisdiction.

The debate surrounding MNCs will surely continue. Paralleling the questions and concerns surrounding globalization, the benefits of MNC expansion must be balanced by the sober analysis of the threats they may also present to the international system of states.

See also *Corporation; Transnationalism; World Trade Organization (WTO).*

. . . . RABIH HELOU

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Multiple Streams Theory

John Kingdon's (1995) multiple streams framework, which first emerged in the mid-1980s, is a model for understanding public policy agenda setting. Agenda setting is one of the stages of public policy process, even if "stagists" are criticized. Ever since Harold Lasswell's propositions of the 1950s, numerous authors have suggested various possible stages. In Vincent Lemieux's (2002) view, there are three recurring subprocesses: agenda setting, formulation, and implementation, with evaluation being more of a metaprocess.

Kingdon proposed a theoretical response to two questions often raised by those who wish to understand the process of setting public policy agendas: What shapes the emergence of certain ideas over others? And why are certain ideas used by governments to formulate public policies, and not others? To answer these questions, Kingdon used an approach defined by three streams. The framework was inspired by the "garbage can" model, in particular by the decision-making processes of organized anarchies, which are organizations characterized by problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation. According to Kingdon, public policies emerge when policy entrepreneurs seize windows of opportunity to couple a problem stream with a political stream. The policy stream is also present, but it is loosely coupled with the other two streams. Without this coupling, no policy can emerge. Problems remain unresolved; solutions may exist or be promoted by various stakeholders, but there is no receptivity to them. The national mood or current ideas cannot be capitalized on, because there are no recognized problems or solutions.

But when a window of opportunity appears in the problem or policy streams, a policy entrepreneur will do everything possible to couple these streams in order for a public policy to emerge. Problem solving is not utopian, as there must be known solutions for it to be possible, and so this third stream is not of secondary importance. Entrepreneurs may emerge from any of the streams, depending on the situation and the degree to which a certain stream predominates. Kingdon also states that the occurrence of a window of opportunity in a given area may increase the probability of another window opening in a related area. This is the concept of "spillovers." There is no longer any need to demonstrate the heuristic value of the framework or its related concepts.

However, the framework has only been validated in the context of wealthy countries for setting the agendas of national and international policies. Although policy implementation has been studied for thirty years now, few scholars have attempted to examine it using Kingdon's framework. Extending this interpretation, Lemieux (2002) suggests that while the policy formulation stage involves coupling the

policy stream with the political stream, implementation involves coupling the policy stream with the problem stream. In both cases, the third stream, that is, the politics stream, is always present but is loosely coupled. Although the scientific relevance and theoretical value of this extension have been demonstrated, they have only been empirically validated once in Canada.

In order to verify the proposition coming from the extension of the stream framework to understand an implementation gap in West Africa, a case study has been done in Burkina Faso. Empirical data confirm that the extension of Kingdon's multiple streams framework has been productive in explaining the failed implementation of a health policy in Africa. Although more empirical research needs to be done in order to definitively validate this theoretical extension, some research propositions have emerged from the study:

- Implementation of a public policy depends primarily on a coupling of the problem stream with the policy stream.
- If implementation does result from a coupling of the problem and policy streams, it can be completely successful only if the political stream is favorable to it.
- Institutions play an essential role in the political stream of public policies when policy agenda setting and formulation are international in origin.
- The occurrence and seizing of opportunities in order to find solutions to problems is a necessary but insufficient condition for successful implementation.

See also *Agenda Control; Agenda Setting.*

. . . .   VALÉRY RIDDE

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Municipal Government

Modern states have, in general, two or three levels of local self-government: The municipality is usually the lower tier, and the region or province is the middle level of government. Portugal has three levels, while many other countries in Europe and South America, for example, only have two subnational tiers of government. Countries differ from each other in the number and size of municipalities. Portugal and the United Kingdom have on average larger municipalities than France, for instance.

HISTORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Municipalities date back to the Roman Empire and developed unevenly across Europe during the Middle Ages, according to the political and social conditions of each historical period. At the end of the nineteenth century and in the early twentieth century, municipalities expanded their powers and resources to face the industrial revolution and the exponential growth of urbanization. In the last decades of the twentieth century, municipalities underwent a new wave of institutional changes, a shift from traditional and hierarchical forms of municipal administration to networks of local governance, a process that can weaken local political accountability and policy coordination.

Municipalities typically have an executive (a council, a mayor, or both) and an assembly that controls and scrutinizes the activity of the executive. The assembly is usually directly elected by proportional representation by local residents, and its members elect the executive council and/or the mayor. In some countries, both organs—the executive and the deliberative—are directly elected. As a result of this diversity of institutional forms, there are numerous models of municipal political leadership, and the way each model functions depends on a number of factors, such as the local political culture, the existence of a political majority behind the mayor, and the social and economic characteristics of the local community.

The recruitment of municipal councilors and mayors is conditioned by electoral rules, selection procedures, legal constraints, requirements for equal opportunities, and time. As a result of these factors, most countries tend to have municipal councils with an uneven social composition, with members drawn excessively from certain social classes.

Administrative powers can be defined in one of two ways: most commonly by the principle of general competence in which the municipality can do whatever is considered to be in the interest of the local community, or by the principle of specialty, in which the municipality does what is explicitly defined by law. Administrative competence and financial resources vary from country to country, depending on the degree of administrative decentralization and political devolution, but in all cases, the municipal government has fewer powers than the national government. For example, in Europe, the Nordic countries have a far greater share of public resources than countries in southern Europe. Nonetheless, they all provide urban and social services.

RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

Despite the autonomy of municipalities, they are under the control of the courts and under the tutelage of the central government, whose responsibility it is to verify compliance with the law. However, these control procedures are applied only afterward, and they are exclusively about the legality, not the merit, of political decisions.

The finances of municipal government usually come from within or from the state. Internal resources—generally favored—include local taxes, mainly taxes on immovable property, fees, revenues from municipal services, and loans. Transfers from the state budget can be made through a block grant, in which transfers are not assigned to specific expenditures. This allows elected municipal boards to decide what to do with resources. State monies can also be transferred conditionally, in which case the resources are assigned to specific expenditures.

Accountability, an important component of a fair municipal government, has two dimensions: internal accountability, carried out by the municipal assembly, members of opposition parties represented in the executive council, or an ombudsman; and external accountability, provided by a free press, citizen participation, and, ultimately, the courts.

Municipal or intermunicipal cooperation is a key feature of local government systems. There are basically two types of municipal associations: general purpose and specialized. In the first case, a board or third-party contractor implements specific municipal policies. In the second case, an association is created to carry out functions that the municipalities alone cannot do or are not interested in doing, for example, to use economies of scale. Municipal governments worldwide cooperate with each other, often through twin-city (or sister city) programs.

See also *Local Politics; Mayor; Regions and Regional Government.*

. . . . CARLOS NUNES SILVA

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Music, Political

Political music comes in two general varieties: representational and associational.

REPRESENTATIONAL POLITICAL MUSIC

With representational political music, the composer (who may or may not be the performing artist) uses the music to make a political statement. That is, the composer is expressing his or her political views musically, sometimes with lyrics and sometimes without. A good example of representational political music would be the 1813 Wellington's Victory (Opus 91) by Ludwig van Beethoven, in which Beethoven celebrates the military victory of Field Marshal Arthur Wellesley (the Duke of Wellington). Wellington had led a combined British, Portuguese, and Spanish army against French forces led by Spain's King Joseph Bonaparte, who was the brother of Napoleon I. This piece is unambiguous in its message, and the sounds of battle (cannons, guns, etc.) are clearly heard in the musical portrayal of the battle. Similarly, the 1985 song "Russians" by Sting is another example of representational political music, in which Sting explicitly argues against an anti-Soviet cold war nuclear mentality.

ASSOCIATIONAL POLITICAL MUSIC

Associational political music is music that individuals other than the composer associate with explicit political ideas for the purpose of promoting a political agenda. This normally happens after a composer is dead and incapable of correcting the political association. A famous example of this type of music is the creation of numerous myths about Beethoven in Germany, especially during the times of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, when it was argued by various groups that Beethoven "supported" widely diverse ideological viewpoints. For example, the Catholic Center Party was able to point to Beethoven's masses as "evidence" that Beethoven was a deeply spiritual person. The Social Democrats (SPD) saw Beethoven's support for republican government in works such as his Ninth Symphony, and the Nazis transformed the image of Beethoven from top to bottom to argue that he was essentially a fascist.

Bob Marley sings with a raised and clenched fist during a 1978 concert. Marley's music includes an activist political agenda against corrupt regimes.

SOURCE: Corbis

While it is common to argue that dead composers would not normally agree with after-the-fact political associations of their music, this is not a requirement for the associational political category. For example, following the collapse of East Germany and the Berlin Wall, Leonard Bernstein led performances of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony in East and West Berlin on the 23rd and 25th of December 1989, respectively, in which the word "freedom" was substituted for each instance of the word "joy" in the ending chorus, thereby transforming the "Ode to Joy" into the "Ode to Freedom." One could argue (as Bernstein did at the time) that—considering the circumstances—Beethoven would neither object to the verbal modification nor the political association given the original orientation of the work, and perhaps this is correct.

MANIFESTOS

Within the representational and associational categories are numerous subgenres of political music, which include everything from musically sublime works that convey complex political viewpoints to more mundane works with simple messages. Within the representational category, the most potent subgenre is political manifesto music. Political manifesto music conveys a complex and cohesive political point of view, or even an entire ideology. Two classic examples of political manifesto music are the four *Der Ring des Nibelungen* or "Ring" operas (as a combined set) by Richard Wagner as well as the extensive collection of political music by Jamaican musician Bob Marley. The complex political perspective of

the Ring operas was famously described by George Bernard Shaw in his 1898 *The Perfect Wagnerite,* while Marley's music mixes his spiritual Rastafarian perspective with an activist political agenda. It is interesting that both Wagner and Marley argue in their music that corrupt political regimes will collapse on their own in the absence of a psychologically "enslaved" mass following. Thus, revolutionary activities in these musical messages focus not on military attacks against the state but rather on a psychological process of awakening on the part of the masses such that the masses are freed from a condition of mental bondage.

PATRIOTIC MUSIC

Nationalist and patriotic music (in combination) constitute another subgenre of political music, and such works can be either representational or associational depending on the context. Nationalist music is the broader category of the two, since patriotic music is often considered a subcategory of nationalist music. Nationalist music arose within the Romantic period (roughly between 1820 and 1900) following the classical era, in which the Vienna school (e.g., Beethoven, Joseph Haydn, and Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart) dominated European musical styles. The primary force behind the birth of nationalist music was the emergence and maturation of new European nations and cultures and the desire of indigenous composers to create music that spoke to the cultural sensibilities of their domestic audiences. Examples of nationalist composers are Franz Liszt (Hungary), Giuseppe Verdi (Italy), Modest Mussorgsky

(Russia), Jean Sibelius (Finland), Antonín Dvořák (Bohemia/Czechoslovakia), Felipe Pedrell (Spain), Ralph Vaughan Williams (Great Britain), and Charles Ives (United States). Nationalist music is typically multidimensional in the sense that it reflects complexities in the indigenous culture with which it is linked. Bruce Springsteen is a modern nationalist composer in this respect.

Patriotic music differs from the broader nationalist category in that patriotic music is one-dimensional, expressing a straightforward defense of nation. Much of American Romantic composer John Philip Sousa's music can be viewed as falling within the patriotic category, as well as, say, American country singer Toby Keith's song "Courtesy of the Red, White, and Blue (The Angry American)." National anthems fall within the patriotic category as well. While most national anthems are mundane in terms of both lyrics and music, some anthems are politically potent mixes of revolutionary fervor, such as "La Marseillaise" and "The International."

LABOR MUSIC

An important category of political music that catalytically evoked a great deal of subsequent political music is labor music. Much of this category dates back to the music of political activist Joe Hill (a.k.a. Joel Emmanuel Haggland), who wrote songs to support the recruitment and protest activities of the early labor movement in the United States. Most of these songs used well-known melodies in combination with motivational lyrics penned by Hill. A great deal of modern protest music can be historically tied to this early labor music. However, in strictly modern terms, modern protest music finds its predominant origins within the American civil rights movement as well as the protests against the Vietnam War (1959–1975) that coincided with the civil rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s.

POLITICAL HIP-HOP

The most modern form of political music can be found in the hip-hop genre, or alternatively, rap or gangsta rap. The early evolution of hip-hop into a vehicle for conveying political and cultural messages can be seen in the lyrics for "The Message," released in 1982 and rapped by Melle Mel (a.k.a. Melvin Glover) with Grandmaster Flash and his group, The Furious Five. This musical form emerged from the activities of early deejays on both the east and west coasts of the United States. The growth of the gangsta rap's hyperrealistic focus on ghetto warfare followed the early "classical" period of hip-hop. Later strands of hip-hop extended to rebellious white suburban youth who were attracted to the vibrancy of rap's approach to musical expression. The hip-hop style of political protest music has a clear cross-national global reach today.

See also *Political Communication; Propaganda; Protest Music.*

. . . .   COURTNEY BROWN

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Mutually Assured Destruction

The concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) emerged in the cold war era of bipolarity as the Soviet Union began to challenge the United States' position as the world's preeminent nuclear power. MAD was based on the assumption that two states possessing nuclear capabilities could forge a relatively stable relationship and thereby avoid the possibility of war. Decisions to go to war using conventional weaponry depend upon weighing the prospects and benefits of victory against the likelihood of suffering defeat. The presence of nuclear weapons, however, forces policy makers to make a different calculation. With the sheer destructiveness of an enemy's nuclear weapons rendering one's own annihilation a genuine possibility, employing force against that enemy would become a simply irrational decision. In this light, it would not even be necessary to achieve equality or parity of nuclear weapons with one's opponent. Sufficient nuclear power to launch a retaliatory strike following an initial attack would be enough to prevent that first attack from ever occurring. For these reasons, advocates of MAD view the limited existence of nuclear weapons as an important stabilizer in global politics in their capacity to remove nuclear powers from the security dilemma of an anarchical world order.

See also *Arms Control; Balance of Power; Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation.*

. . . . LEE JARVIS

Mutualism

Mutualism is a political ideology on the fringes of anarchism, utopian socialism, and liberalism. Its central values are autonomy and equality of the individual, just exchange, and mutual support. These principles would empower people to govern their affairs unconstrained by market forces and a state. Mutualism favors cooperation based on a sense of community.

PROUDHON'S EARLY THEORY

The main proponent of mutualism was Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865). His system of liberty sought to remedy the evils of the two main political ideologies of the nineteenth century. In his 1840 book *What is Property? An Enquiry into the*

Principle of Right and of Government, Proudhon stated, "Communism rejects independence and proportionality; property does not satisfy equality and law" (1966, 280). Instead, society under Proudhon's view would be based on a network of contracts among free individuals without a central sovereign such as the state. Small producers who possess the means of production would exchange products on the basis of the amount of labor incorporated. A people's bank would offer social credit without interests. Proudhon actually tried to establish such a bank but had to cancel the experiment when he was sentenced to prison for his radical views on government.

Karl Marx was originally attracted by Proudhon's sharp attack on property but strictly disagreed with his simplistic labor theory of values, which saw injustice as emerging only in the sphere of distribution. Marx and Proudhon were also opponents on the issue of a violent seizure of state power. Mutualists believe that a natural sense of solidarity would guarantee social cooperation and observance of contracts. Mutualism rejects aggression and coercion; where more complex cooperation of individuals is required, it relies on voluntary association.

MUTUALIST ORGANIZATIONS

Mutual enterprises are part of the nonprofit economy. Unlike cooperatives, such mutuals consist of members instead of shareholders. Their capital stock is built by membership fees alone. Each member has equal voting rights, and profits are reinvested for their members' benefit. Their origin dates back to self-help preceding the welfare state, with the establishment of friendly societies, unions, cooperatives, and clubs to secure the individual against misfortune. Mutual building and loan associations emerged in England in the late eighteenth century and in the United States in the 1830s, and they flourished a century later. Originally these societies dissolved when every member had acquired a house; later they continued to function as agencies for borrowing and lending money. Today, besides mutual savings and loan associations, mutual organizations mainly exist as health and insurance companies.

Since the 1980s, a process of demutualization has reduced the number of mutual enterprises. The main reasons for this are changes in taxation, ownership problems in mergers, and the remoteness of management. Nowadays mutuals rarely constitute a face-to-face community. Modern forms of mutualism can also be found in nonmonetary exchange circles. Members of such networks organize voluntary engagement to support one another on the basis of cooperation and exchange. The European Commission tries to promote mutuals as part of the social economy of its member states.

CRITICISM

The main criticism of mutualism from the point of view of political philosophy is its harmonious approach. For Proudhon, private and collective interests are identical; he underestimates social heterogeneity and overestimates reason as a guide for behavior. A society based on mutual contract alone would need an agency to enforce compliance; eventually such contracts themselves also restrict absolute liberty of the individual.

Proudhon argued from the perspective of a preindustrial society of farmers, craftsmen, and artisans. These are settings of limited complexity, such as mutuals today. Although Proudhon's understanding of the economic function of money was naïve, and the idea to abolish interests through free credit unrealistic, mutualism can claim a certain moral superiority, as it tries to abolish economic injustice.

See also *Anarchy; Autonomy; Individual and Society; Individualism; Liberalism, Classical; Marx, Karl; Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph; Utopias and Politics.*

. . . .   PETER HILGER

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NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund

The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Incorporated (LDF) began as the legal department of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1940. The fund's activities focus on four areas: education, voter protection, economic justice, and criminal justice. The LDF's headquarters are located in New York City, and regional offices are in Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, California. The LDF has been involved in more cases before the U.S. Supreme Court than any other organization, with the exception of the U.S. Department of Justice.

At its founding, the NAACP was under the leadership of civil rights attorney Charles Hamilton Houston. Houston was the first black editor of the *Harvard Law Review* and vice dean of Howard University Law School. He joined the NAACP as part-time counsel in 1934 and played a role in nearly every civil rights case before the Supreme Court for over 25 years. Houston's plan to attack and defeat Jim Crow segregation was informed by his use of scholarly research about the damaging social and psychological effects of segregation on black children and showed the inherent inequality of the "separate but equal" doctrine. He designed a strategy of attacking segregation in law schools—forcing states to either create costly parallel law schools or integrate the existing ones. Houston sought to neutralize the age-old argument that allowing blacks to attend white institutions would lead to miscegenation or race mixing. His rationale was that by challenging segregation in graduate schools, the NAACP lawyers would bypass the inflammatory issue of miscegenation among young children. Houston's group of lawyers, most of whom had been trained at Howard, included future Supreme Court justice Thurgood Marshall. This group created precedents that ultimately led to the dismantling of *de jure* discrimination—laws enforcing racial segregation of public education facilities.

In 1938, Marshall succeeded Houston as NAACP special counsel; Houston returned to his Washington, D.C., law practice but remained counsel with the NAACP. Houston and Marshall were the architects of the LDF's most famous case; *Brown vs. Board of Education, Topeka* (1954) the landmark case in which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down racial segregation in public schools. In 1940, Marshall wrote the LDF charter and became its first director and chief counsel. The LDF became an independent organization in 1957.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the fund functioned as "the legal arm of the civil rights movement," representing Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Rosa Parks, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and local organizations whose activities included organizing sit-ins in North Carolina and Tennessee, the freedom rides to Alabama and Mississippi, and voter registration programs in the deep South.

In the aftermath of the Mississippi freedom summer of 1964 (during which civil rights workers Andrew Goodman, Michael Scherer, and James Chaney were murdered by local officers in Philadelphia, Mississippi), LDF opened a branch office in Jackson, which was led by Marian Wright, the first African American woman admitted to the Mississippi bar.

In 1961, President Kennedy appointed Thurgood Marshall to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Marshall was succeeded by Assistant Counsel Jack Greenberg, who served alongside Marshall as cocounsel during *Brown*. During his tenure, Greenberg argued or oversaw groundbreaking cases, including *Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education* (1969), which rejected the ethic of "all deliberate speed" used to stall desegregation efforts; *Griggs v. Duke Power* (1971), a test case for the application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; and *Furman v. Georgia* (1972), a landmark case that forced a countrywide reevaluation of capital punishment sentencing.

Under Greenburg's leadership, the LDF grew in size and resources, and the organization became involved in projects and litigation that broadened the scope of the LDF's mandate. Greenberg resigned in 1984 to become a professor at Columbia Law School. Julius L. Chambers was named director-counsel. Chambers was LDF's first intern and argued before the Supreme Court in *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education* (1971), which led to federally mandated busing, helping integrate public schools across the country. Under Chambers's leadership, the organization fought for civil rights legislation and affirmative action programs that began in the 1970s and 1980s.

LDF's current priorities include challenging efforts to undermine affirmative action in higher education, battling the resegregation of public schools, protecting minority participation in the electoral process, pursuing the restoration of

the voting rights of persons convicted of felonies, combating employment discrimination, seeking to bring justice to African Americans through fair jury selection practices and adequately funded defense systems for the indigent, and advocating for victims of Hurricane Katrina.

In 2003, the LDF represented African American and Latino student interveners in the Supreme Court case challenging the University of Michigan's undergraduate admission affirmative action policy. Through LDF efforts, the Supreme Court's ruling upheld the use of race in admissions policies at the University of Michigan Law School.

On May 1, 2004, Theodore Shaw became the fifth person to lead the organization in its sixty-four-year history. In July 2006, LDF filed a friend of the court brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit supporting Mumia Abu-Jamal's claim of racial discrimination in the selection of jurors for his 1982 trial for the shooting death of a police officer in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In 2008, John Payton, a prominent civil rights attorney, was appointed LDF's 6th director-counsel and president.

See also *Civil Rights Movement; Race and Racism; Racial Discrimination.*

. . . .   JAMAL DONALDSON BRIGGS

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Nation

Many studies exploring nations and nationalism have embraced constructivist or postmodern lenses, according to which belonging to a nation is seen as an erroneous belief in a myth that needs to be corrected. In the words of Aviel Roshwald (2006), "The stories peoples, communities, and movements tell about themselves are seen as masks that must be pulled away if their true faces are to be revealed." Nations have been portrayed as constructs, as "imagined communities" (Benedict Anderson's term, 1983) serving elites interested in manipulating the masses to obtain power. Such perspectives tend to ignore the role of the people in choosing which images to accept and which discourses to follow. In addition, they make it difficult to assess the tenacity of deeply rooted, historical traditions.

THE PRIMORDIALIST PERSPECTIVES

Recently there was a comeback of the so-called primordialist perspectives on nations and nationalism. Followers of scholar Anthony D. Smith tend to see national identity as an empirical fact, a social reality. They emphasize the stability of ethnic and national communities. Smith (1996) defined the *ethnie* (a feeling of kinship) as the core around which nations are built. According to Smith, "National sentiment is no construct. It has a real, tangible base. At its root is a feeling of kinship, of the extended family, that distinguishes the nation from every other kind of sentiment." Smith embraces a view of the nation as an enduring community of "history and culture, possessing a unified territory, economy, mass education system, and common legal rights."

Although Smith and his followers would probably agree that the majority of modern nations emerged during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—that is, "in the modern world inaugurated by the French and American revolutions"—they are likely to argue that the existence of ethnic origin myths, the mobilization of communities based on language, and similar phenomena suggest that modern nations have premodern ancestors. This is a major insight of the primordialist school of thought. According to this perspective, in order to understand modern nations, the development of nationhood must be traced over long periods of time, not associated with one particular historical period.

According to the primordialist theory, nations will never disappear. The main reason for the eternal livelihood of nations is their ability to build on the preexisting memories and ethnic myths that form the basis of every community. In short, to use a famous phrase coined by Ernest Gellner, nations as seen by Smith's school of thought have a "navel" or ethnie, which is unlikely to disappear any time soon. Globalization, the reemergence of regions, and the growth of international institutions, such as the European Union, are only going to strengthen the primordial sentiments that are at the core of modern nations.

ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO CONCEPTUALIZE NATIONS

An alternative way of conceptualizing nations is to explore them as the outcomes of modern social changes, as historically specific constructs, or as communities without "navels." Nations are perceived as constructs of historical, industrial, and communicative developments (i.e., the invention of mass media, print, and the spread of ideas). The modernists (included in this school of thought are also constructivists, postmodernists, and institutionalists) see primordialist approaches as "expressions of nationalism itself." Primordialist approaches are declared to be fundamentally flawed. Nations should be studied as ever-changing dependent variables, as outcomes of numerous complex historical processes, and as historical contingencies.

Scholars working within these schools of thought are likely to challenge the idea of a "unitary nation" and try to deconstruct the concept of the "nation-state." They are likely to point to the historical evidence showing that states have emerged without nations, and some nations certainly have emerged without the blessings of their own state. Nationalism strives

to make culture and polity (i.e., nation and state) congruent by providing a political roof for a culture, and the mythical imaginations of "nations" created by nationalists need to be destroyed.

The constructivist approaches are supported by the case studies conducted by Yuri Slezkine and Rogers Brubaker. Yuri Slezkine's 1994 path–breaking article "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism" argues that despite the russifying element in the Soviet nationalities policy, non–Russian Soviet nationalities managed both to gain some power and to develop their national cultures within the USSR. Slezkine suggests that the Soviet regime suffered from "ethno-philia"; it suppressed individual rights but consistently promoted group rights by supporting national cadres and allowing education in non–Russian languages. In his view, the USSR institutionalized "ethno-territorial federalism." Slezkine expressed it this way: "If the USSR was a communal apartment, then every family that inhabited it was entitled to a room of its own." His argument (that instead of destroying the nations, the USSR constructed them) is one of the most convincing case studies supporting the constructivist definition of a nation as the product of state policies.

Similarly, Rogers Brubaker's *Nationalism Reframed* (1996) defines a nation as an "institutionalized form." According to Brubaker, instead of asking, "What is a nation?" the students of nations should dwell on how nationhood is institutionalized within and among states. This way of thinking would help to separate categories of analysis from practical categories. Nations are practical categories, not categories of analysis, and, according to his argument, categories of analysis do not need to be invoked to understand the power of nations.

IS THERE A SOLUTION?

Movement toward a middle position has become acceptable in the study of nations. Smith's recent writings on ethno-symbolism are part of this trend. Ethno-symbolism acknowledges the insights of constructivism and differs from primordialism in that it highlights the role of historical memory and symbolism instead of dwelling on "biological," unchanging characteristics of nations. John Hutchinson's 2004 *Nations as Zones of Conflict* is a noteworthy contribution to this emerging paradigm. Hutchinson reconceptualizes the nation as "a field of conflicting interpretations," thus drawing attention to the role of conflict and traumatic memory in the construction of nations. According to this view, competing loyalties have always been part of the processes of nation construction. Global processes, such as empire building, inspired the consolidation of populations into smaller groups (such as ethnic groups or nations). Later, the newly formed groups, such as nations, became the backbone of broader, more encompassing networks.

Hutchinson's critics, such as Gerard Gelanty (Gelanty et al., 2008), point to the importance of civic conceptions of nations (which is reminiscent of Ernest Renan's definition of the nation as a "daily plebiscite") and the existence of multicultural nations.

Gelanty argues that supranational projects such as the European Union may change the quality of national identity by inspiring most nations in Europe to adopt a different ("European") dimension, although these projects are not capable of "killing the nation" as a locus of identity. This observation suggests that scholars are likely to continue to debate the definition of the nation and its influence in the near future.

See also *Nationalism; Nationalist Parties; Nationality; Nationalization; Nation-state; Stateless Nation; United Nations.*

. . . . DOVILE BUDRYTE

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Nation, Stateless

See *Stateless Nation.*

National Anthems

National anthems, songs, or hymns adopted by certain nations are performed at official functions of those governments or other public events (baseball games, concerts). Many evoke loyalty to the country or its head of state (king, queen). Text and melody are often written by two or more different people.

ORIGINS OF ANTHEMS

Occasionally there is a noteworthy composer, such as Josef Haydn (Austria, Germany), or Charles Gounod (Vatican), associated with a nation's anthem. The original Austrian anthem was composed by Haydn in 1797. Germany adopted this tune, applying the text in 1950. The current Austrian anthem, adopted in 1947, is attributed to Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, although evidence shows it was composed after his death.

Former colonies sometimes use the anthems of the countries that colonized them, and sometimes multiple countries

in geographical proximity have identical anthems (Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau). Some countries' anthems use words of the same author or poet: Rabindranath Tagore's text for the anthems of India and Bangladesh; Francisco Esteban Acuña de Figueroa's text for the anthems of Paraguay and Uruguay. Estonia and Finland use the same melody.

MUSICAL FORMS OF ANTHEMS

Today, there are five principal musical forms used in anthems, although others exist. Most tend to be in a duple meter (two or four beats per measure), and a few others in triple meter (three beats per measure).

1. *Hymns.* This form tends to be used in the oldest national anthems, including those of England, continental Europe, and their former colonies. Most noteworthy is Thomas Arne's 1745 rendition of *God Save the King,* the British hymn. Words have often been altered to reflect another nation's patriotism, as in America's version of the tune, *My Country 'Tis of Thee.* Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Russia, and Germany have also used this tune as their anthems. Liechtenstein does today. Until 1974, Australia used *God Save the King/Queen,* as did Canada until 1980.

2. *Marches.* France's *La Marseillaise,* adopted in 1795, is also the national anthem of nine other countries, from Martinique to New Caledonia.

3. *Folk music.* Cambodia's *Som pouk tepda* (*Heaven Protects Our King*), was adopted in 1941. Japan, Tibet, and Sri Lanka also based their anthems on folk music. Mauritania's national anthem, based on a traditional tune, is instrumental only.

4. *Fanfares.* These are often instrumental, without text. This form has been adopted by Middle Eastern nations, such as Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. For Belarus, the words are not in use today.

5. *Operatic anthems.* These are prevalent in Central and South America, that of El Salvador being one of the longest.

CONTENTS OF ANTHEMS

Anthems may evoke different emotions, based on their geographic origins. Countries in peace have generally chosen anthems that highlight their scenic or natural beauty. These extol the virtues of the land. Australia refers to the radiant Southern Cross, Barbados to fields, and Burundi to a gentle country. Chile extols its blue sky and snow-covered mountains. China highlights the Great Wall.

Some focus upon a national hero, such as Denmark's King Christian. Similar to that of the United States (*Star-Spangled Banner*), the anthem of Honduras salutes its flag (*Tu bandera es un lampo de cielo* [Your Flag is a Strip of Sky]). Others describe the colors and features of their flag in song (Costa Rica, Djibouti, Ghana, the Maldives). Some praise their freedom or liberations—Andorra's reflects on eleven centuries of freedom. Those of Angola and the Comoros invoke their days of independence. Others identify the name of the nation (Malawi, Kyrgyzstan, Papua New Guinea).

Several anthems are prayers, such as *God Save the King* of Britain. In religious overtones, Bhutan's extols the Thunder Dragon and Buddha, while Brunei's exalts Allah. Many others speak to their gods, while India's finds salvation in seven major religions. *La Marseillaise* served as a call to arms, not only for France, but to some extent for the Confederate States of America.

UNOFFICIAL AND CHANGING ANTHEMS

At times, unofficial anthems have inspired allegiance to a new cause or produced ire in a nation's opponents. During the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865), *John Brown's Body,* set to a melody of William Steffe, was assigned new text by Julia Ward Howe as the *Battle Hymn of the Republic.* This tune and the *Star-Spangled Banner* were also used in temperance songs, with altered text suited to that political issue. When the Confederate States of America formed, several songs became unofficial anthems, the leading one being *I Wish I was in Dixie,* by Daniel Decatur Emmett, a northern minstrel performer. Another song, *The Bonnie Blue Flag,* composed by Harry McCarthy and harmonized and published by A. E. Blackmar in New Orleans, so infuriated Union General Benjamin Butler that in 1862 he destroyed the publishing house of Blackmar and fined any one even whistling the tune.

During times of crisis, other national songs become unofficial anthems, as when, in the post-9/11 United States, *God Bless America* was sung during baseball games. Some unofficial anthems are covert. A national anthem of Tibet, based on ancient Tibetan sacred music and with words by Trijang Rinpoche, is not used inside Tibet.

Regime changes have caused several anthems to change as well. In 1941, Cambodia adopted *Nokoreach* ("Royal Kingdom"), which started with the phrase, "Heaven protects our king." But in 1970 the Khmer Rouge chose an anthem that began, "Khmers are known throughout the world as descendants of glorious warriors." From 1975 to 1989, Kampuchea (the renamed totalitarian state of Cambodia) used another anthem. In 1993, Cambodia reverted to the 1941 anthem. In 1978, during its Cultural Revolution, China attempted to change its anthem's words, but the original words were restored by 1982. Cuba's anthem has remained the same for nearly a century and a half, having first been sung in 1868 during the Battle of Bayamo.

See also *Music, Political.*

. . . .   RALPH HARTSOCK

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National Archives

A national archive is a government body charged with the storage, preservation, documentation, and general administration of governmental and historical records. National archives

may also store and preserve materials of special historic or cultural importance to a country, particularly if those materials are in the form of documents or other paper-based items that require special preservation techniques. The documents collected by the national archives are often kept in a central repository that is open to the public for research and general information; examples of such open repositories include the Public Records Office at Kew in the United Kingdom and the National Archives in Washington, D.C., in the United States. National archives may also have connections to national libraries, and both may even be administered by the same organization, as in the case of the Canadian government's Library and Archives Canada.

The history of the storage and preservation of important government papers for future reference dates back to the earliest written government records, and governments have been collecting administrative documents in central locations for many centuries. The Portuguese national archive, for instance, was established in Lisbon in the late fourteenth century. Yet the modern concept of national archives dates primarily to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In 1785, King Charles III of Spain decreed that all historical documents pertaining to the administration of the Spanish empire in the New World were to be brought to a central location in Seville, collecting the files that had been spread out across a number of other, smaller archives. During the French Revolution, the private and public collections of documents seized by the revolutionaries were brought together in the *Archives nationales* in Paris, which in 1800 became an autonomous government body. In the United Kingdom, the Public Record Office was established in 1838 to collect various government documents that had been scattered throughout smaller archives of varying quality, from Westminster Abbey and the Tower of London to private houses and collections. The U.S. government centralized record keeping in a newly created National Archives in the 1930s; before then, each federal government department had been responsible for storing its own files and records. Today, most national governments have some body or organization that is responsible for archival management, though different national archives have differing restrictions on the accessibility and availability of the documents stored in their care.

Viewing documents that are kept in national archives may be as simple as making the journey to the archive in question and obtaining a public researcher's access card, but access conditions vary depending on the type of document to be viewed. Particularly fragile or delicate documents may require special permission and advance arrangements to ensure that appropriate preservation conditions can be maintained. Files that have specific copyright restrictions may require researchers to have prior clearance before the documents may be viewed or referenced in publicly available research. Documents on matters that are considered politically sensitive—such as classified government files—may also be inaccessible to the general public and available only to those who have been cleared to view them. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the thirty-year rule prevents public access to selected files that are less than thirty years old, though a reappraisal of the sensitivity of the files can be arranged if a researcher submits a review request under the Freedom of Information Act.

Some countries have had to pass special legislation to ensure that government documents of importance and interest to historians and policy makers are preserved by their national archives. In 1974, American president Gerald Ford signed the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, which directed the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) to take possession of materials from the presidency of Richard Nixon to prevent documents and tape recordings from being destroyed. The ensuing controversy over the question of which of the Nixon materials could be considered government property was only partially settled by the 1978 Presidential Records Act, which laid out more specific distinctions concerning the kinds of presidential documents and materials that NARA was entitled to administer. The role of national archives and archival administration continues to be a topic of debate, especially with regard to freedom of information and public access to the records of government and administration.

See also *Freedom of Information.*

. . . .   SHANNON GRANVILLE

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Nationalism

A nation is a group that identifies itself as such, based on a shared understanding of a common culture, history, land, and descent. Nationalism is the mobilization of a nation in pursuit of political goals. These typically include national survival and self-rule (meaning that the rulers come from the same nation as the ruled). Self-rule usually means having a sovereign state of one's own. The state, according to German scholar Max Weber, is an institution claiming to exercise a monopoly of the legitimate use of force over a given territory, and it is recognized by other states. Most states are unitary, with a single center of authority, but some are federal—having a hierarchy of units with shared sovereignty. Ninety percent of the states currently in existence are unitary.

After state sovereignty has been achieved, "nationalist" politics may involve particular concern for national defense against threats external and internal, electoral appeals based on national purity and betrayal, or defense of the rights of

compatriots outside the state's borders. Nationalist policies may include state ownership of economic assets, purging the country of minorities, or placing restrictions on immigrants. Current novelties include "resource nationalism" (such as that of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela) and "consumer nationalism" (e.g., Indian pride in Indian products).

Nationalism has a bad name. It is a word that has strongly negative connotations in the English language. It implies an excessive, irrational commitment to advancing the interests of one's own nation at the expense of others. Adolf Hitler is the prime example of nationalism pushed to the extreme. When a journalist asked if he intended to nationalize private industry, Hitler famously replied that he intended to "nationalize" the German people. Fascism effectively stripped nationalism of its place in the liberal worldview. (The word *patriotism,* meaning love of one's country, has more positive resonance, at least for the mainstream of American society.) And yet the nation-state is still the basic building block of the international state system. It has beaten out rival formations, such as the small city-state and the multinational empire. In 1919, the new global community of states chose to call itself the League of Nations, and then in 1945 the United Nations.

Nationalism is compatible with a wide variety of political positions: forward looking or backward looking, liberal or illiberal, egalitarian or racist. Nationalism was born as a philosophy of liberation. In 1789 the French people rose up against their king and demanded the right to rule themselves. Prior to the existence of nationalism, people were aware of themselves as being from a particular place, being a member of a particular religious group, and being subject to a certain hierarchy of rule (typically, a dynastic monarchy). But they were not aware of themselves as a nation in the modern sense. As John Stuart Mill noted, in order for a people to rule itself (the literal meaning of "democracy" in Greek), you have to first define who are "the people." And the people were the citizens of France—the French nation. The American republic was born at about the same time, but that emancipatory project focused on the rights of the individual, and of the states, without a clear sense of a nation as a collective actor. It was only later that the Americans started to think of themselves as a nation—or, as Seymour Martin Lipset put it, the "first new nation," based on a written constitution and not a national community.

In the course of the nineteenth century, spreading the rights of man was linked to spreading the rights of nations to rule themselves. Even though Napoleon's attempt to redraw the map of Europe was rebuffed, the Napoleonic wars led to the formation of a wave of nation-states in Latin America. In the 1820s the Greeks won their independence from the Ottoman Empire, but the Holy Alliance of Austria, Prussia, and Russia managed to beat back the tide of nationalism in the 1848 revolutions. Nationalism triumphed with the unifications of Italy (1870) and Germany (1871). But increasingly nationalism was being used by conservative rulers to suppress the rights of national minorities and to build support for their regimes in the face of challenges from liberal and socialist popular movements.

The surge of nationalism in the European states coincided with their colonial expansion. A nation's right to rule itself apparently included the right to rule other peoples, especially if they were of a different race or religion. World War I (1914–1918) was a body blow to imperialism, knocking down the Ottoman, Hapsburg, German, and Russian empires. In their place, a dozen new nation-states sprang up in central Europe, in line with President Woodrow Wilson's recognition of the interests of peoples under imperial rule. Even Vladimir Lenin, sensing the spirit of the times, paid lip service to national self-determination, and the Soviet Union was created as a federation of sovereign republics. Anticolonial movements in the British, Dutch, and French empires rallied to the call of national liberation, but they had to wait until World War II (1939–1945) had weakened their colonial masters.

The charter of the United Nations, approved in 1945, recognized "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." The United States—a noncolonial power—was now the dominant world player, and it encouraged the European states to dismantle their empires. Independence came speedily in India and Indonesia, but not without bloodshed. In Vietnam and Algeria, it required protracted wars. During the cold war, both sides appealed to nationalism in a bid to undermine the sphere of influence of their adversaries. The United States protested the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, as exemplified by the USSR's crushing of the Hungarian revolution in 1956. The 1959 Cuban revolution against dictatorial rule took the form of a nationalist movement under communist leadership, endorsed by the Soviet Union.

THE END OF NATIONALISM?

After the cold war abruptly ended in 1991, the West expected that the nations formerly under Soviet control would become democracies, and the past century of polarizing nationalism and state conflict would give way to a new era of international cooperation and respect for human rights. That was not to be. Nationalism was in fact a crucial force in causing the Soviet collapse, and the shift toward democracy coincided with an increase, not a decrease, in nationalist mobilization. Polish resistance against Soviet rule, which took the form of the Solidarity workers' movement, was a direct continuation of the nationalist projects of the nineteenth century. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had been sovereign states after 1918 until their occupation by the USSR in 1940. Once glasnost started to take hold in 1987, they began agitating for their independence. Other nationalist conflicts erupted across the length and breadth of the Soviet Union: Kazakhs rioted because an ethnic Russian was appointed their party boss; Armenians living in the province of Nagorno Karabakh fought for freedom from rule by Azerbaijan.

A similar fratricidal logic played out in Yugoslavia in 1991. One after another, the republics of the Yugoslav federation declared their independence: Slovenia, Croatia, and then Bosnia. The Serbian minorities living in the latter two regions rose in revolt and received military support from the rump Yugoslavia. Brutal fighting caused 200,000 deaths while millions fled

their homes; finally fighting was stopped by a U.S.-led military intervention in 1995. A new phrase entered the English language: "ethnic cleansing."

The bloodbath in Yugoslavia forced Western elites to reexamine the question of nationalism. How was it possible, in this globally connected world, for this nineteenth-century philosophy to mobilize people to acts of extreme violence? The former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were not isolated examples. All around the globe, nationalist conflicts were erupting. The struggle for power between Tutsis and Hutus triggered the horrific genocide in Rwanda in 1994. There were secessionist conflicts under way in Asia (Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the Philippines) and Africa (Eritrea and Sudan). The Arab-Israeli conflict—a battle between competing nationalisms—showed no sign of resolution. The Gulf War (1990–1991) was fought to restore sovereignty to Kuwait and also created de facto self-rule for the Kurds of northern Iraq. Even Latin America was not immune to these trends. A new assertiveness by indigenous peoples fueled regional insurrections from Mexico to Bolivia.

THE QUEST FOR STATEHOOD

National self-determination is fine in the abstract. The problems start when it comes to deciding which nation gets sovereignty over which territory. There are more than 6,000 groups that can be identified as "nations" in the world of 2008 (based primarily on having a distinct language). But only 192 states are recognized as sovereign by the United Nations. Clearly, not every nation can have its own state. And what happens if two or more nations claim the same territory (as do the Israelis and Palestinians)? The global distribution of ethnic groups has a long tail: The eighty-three most commonly spoken languages are spoken in 80 percent of the world's population. The nation-state system is well established in Europe and East Asia, where more than 70 percent of the population belongs to the nation after which the state is named. In most states of the Americas and the Middle East, the largest national group ranges from 40 to 90 percent of the population. In Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, such national homogeneity is quite rare. In sub-Saharan Africa, the largest ethnic group often amounts to less than 30 percent of the population of a state.

For all the talk of self-determination, the international state system that emerged in the twentieth century was extraordinarily reluctant to permit secession. Only a handful of states managed to secede: Norway (1905), Iceland (1918), Ireland (1921), Singapore (1965), Bangladesh (1971), and Eritrea (1993). The vast majority of new states were born from the dissolution of multinational empires. The three socialist federations (the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia) broke up into the preexisting republics that had made up the federation. The sole exception is Kosovo, an Albanian-populated region that had been subordinated to Serbia and that declared independence in February 2008. There are four regions inside the former Soviet Union (Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Trans-Dniester) that have established de facto self-rule but have not been recognized as sovereign by any other country.

The largest group currently denied self-rule is probably the Kurds, whose twenty to twenty-five million members are scattered across Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. Taiwan has self-rule, but not international recognition. There are dozens of large ethnic groups within China and India that speak distinct languages, but they are not pursuing independent statehood. Secessionist movements are confined to proportionally small groups, such as the Sikhs in Punjab, Uighurs in Sinkiang, and Tibetans in Tibet.

Ethnicity can be defined as a subjective sense of group belonging. It is subjective in that it cannot be pinned down to objective criteria. If some people see themselves as a group and behave accordingly, the group exists. An ethnic group that develops political aspiration to self-rule becomes a nation. Ethnicity involves the perception of sharing the following characteristics: a specific territory (a homeland, which may or may not be where the group now lives), history (formative events, wars, heroes, what Austrian socialist thinker Otto Bauer called a "community of fate"), descent (links by ties of family, of "blood," perhaps extending to racial categories), culture (customs, food, rituals, clothing, etc.), language, and religion.

Any given nation will exhibit most but not all these attributes. For example, Irish nationalism was a potent force in the nineteenth century, even though by then 90 percent of the Irish spoke only English. Analysts disagree about whether these attributes constitute a "core" identity or merely an outward appearance. Are they innate or learned? Are they fixed or transient? Anthropologist Fredrik Barth argues that ethnicity is a boundary phenomenon, the product of interactions between groups rather than the expression of the group's inner core. Ethnic groups evolve through the selection of markers that serve to distinguish them from neighboring groups. David Laitin argues that language is a handy marker, because it is flexible (it can be learned) but not too flexible, (it takes time to learn).

COMPETING THEORIES

There is a broad spectrum of theories about nationalism. They generally agree about the facts in the historical record but disagree about how to explain the rise and persistence of nationalism.

1. *Primordialism*. Primordialism, now known as perennialism, is best represented in the works of Anthony Smith. Primordialists see ethnicity as an enduring and natural feature of human existence, one that preceded the arrival of the modern state. They cite evidence for the emergence of French and English identities as early as the ninth century. The term *nation* originated in the thirteenth century, when church delegates to the 1274 Council of Lyons were grouped by "nation." Nationalists themselves often invoke the premodern origins of their nations. Religious conflicts, such as that between Christianity and Islam, were key to the evolution of nations such as Spain, Poland, and Serbia. Primordialism has been criticized by writers, such as Robert Kaplan, who talk about "tribal hatreds" or "ancient enmities" when trying to explain modern conflicts. Ethnic identities are not fixed; they can shift quickly in response a changing political environment.

Walker Connor argues that all nationalists deploy the rhetoric of "blood" to some degree—a bloodline or blood sacrifice. This leads into sociobiological approaches, which see ethnicity as hardwired into our genetic code. Sacrifice for the kin group may be rational for evolutionary survival. Even nonhuman primates display intense group solidarity and xenophobia. Psychological experiments show an alarming propensity for human subjects to spontaneously develop group loyalty and antagonism toward the "other." However, in communities of more than 5,000 people, it is impossible to sustain links based on actual kinship, so people switch to mythical kinship, the nation.

2. *Structuralism.* Structuralists tend to explain away nationalism by treating it as a by-product of the functional requirements of some deeper social mechanism. Echoing Karl Marx, Ernst Gellner, and Eric Hobsbawm tie nationalism to the rise of capitalism. Gellner argues that industrialization requires a mobile workforce capable of learning new skills and trained through a public education system. It is more efficient to have one language. Hence, the state-sponsored education system forges a common national identity. Nationalism has the political advantage of diverting the workers from overthrowing capitalism into hostility toward other ethnic groups and nations. Michael Hechter notes the role that ethnicity plays even in mature capitalist economies in segmenting the workforce. Minorities who play a "middleman" role, such as the Jews in Europe, Indians in East Africa, or Chinese in Indonesia, have often been the target of pogroms.

Donald Horowitz argues that ethnic conflict in developing countries is driven by status anxiety, triggered by social changes such as urban migration that accompany economic development. Ethnic groups want to rule themselves, because it confers status and brings jobs and economic favors. It is often easy for the catchall anticolonial movement to be captured by the dominant ethnic group, who then rule in their own interest. In some societies, a multiethnic coalition may take root and survive for decades, as in Malaysia. In other cases, an ethnic minority that feels itself persistently excluded from power will rebel, as with the Tamils in Sri Lanka.

3. *Instrumentalism.* Instrumentalists see nationalism as a tool used by elites to pursue their own economic or political goals. In sixteenth-century England, monarchs appealed to nationalism to undercut the nobles and strengthen their own rule. Rising elites in nineteenth-century Europe used it to build a political coalition to dislodge the multinational empires. Jack Snyder notes that the spread of democracy has often coincided with an increase in nationalism. In countries such as Yugoslavia making a transition from authoritarian rule to competitive elections, it is easy for politicians to attract votes by appealing to the simple fact of ethnic identity. ("Vote for me because I will defend the Serbs.") If an excluded ethnic group turns to violence, then the logic of polarization becomes even more deadly. Those who favor compromise with the other side are condemned as traitors, perhaps even assassinated.

Rational choice theorists such as Hechter and David Laitin approach nationalism as a collective phenomenon rooted in the rational pursuit of individual self-interest. The incentive structures provided by political institutions are crucially important in channeling nationalism in one direction or another. For example, Russians living in the Baltic states after 1991 did not turn to violence to protect their group interests, because they faced strong incentives to assimilate and become citizens, which would bring higher living standards and a European Union passport. Nationalism is the product of social institutions and is not reducible to individual choices. For example, even though personal relations between ethnic groups in Bosnia prior to 1991 were typically good (with intermarriage quite common), the changing political environment forced most people to behave in new, ethnically exclusive ways.

4. *Deconstructionism.* Deconstructionists such as Benedict Anderson argue that ethnicity and nationalism are essentially artificial constructs, imagined communities that arose in the new media that accompanied economic modernization. The rise of mass literacy and the spread of newspapers made it possible for people to imagine nations into existence. In contrast to primordialists and structuralists, who stress the European roots of nationalism, Anderson points to the role of colonialism and the early emergence of nation-states in Latin America. He also draws on the case of Indonesia, which forged a new nation out of a vast, diverse archipelago and created a new artificial language for its colonial bureaucracy in 1928. But contra the postmodernists, it is important to note that Anderson is not describing "imaginary" communities. Once the community is imagined into existence, the social movements and states that result are real.

CURRENT DEBATES

Nationalism may be particularly hard for Americans to understand, since the United States is an immigrant society (where every group except Native Americans came from somewhere else) and unique in basing itself on a set of political principles, a social contract. These two factors mean that Americans tend to see national identity as voluntary and inclusive. Most nationalist conflicts around the world tend to be coercive and exclusionary. Rogers Brubaker and Liah Greenfeld have explored the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism—as in America, Britain, or France—is inclusive, based on the assimilation of people of diverse ethnic backgrounds into a common culture and including strong guarantees for individual rights. Ethnic nationalism, such as that of Germany or Japan, stresses the group over the individual and ties the nation to a specific ethnic identity, making it hard for immigrants to acquire citizenship. Critics argue that even the "civic" nations do in fact have an ethnic core—note the long denial of civil rights to African Americans in the United States and the problems that France is now encountering with absorbing its Muslim minority. Also, in recent decades, the two models have converged, with the embrace of various forms of multiculturalism. In the United States, there has been a shift from talking about the "melting pot" to the "salad bowl." The United Kingdom has pursued multiculturalism, trying to bring

A 1995 referendum in the Canadian province of Quebec came close to citizens voting successfully in favor of secession. While the French-speaking region peaceably exists within Canada's borders, other nationalist movements are plagued by violence.

SOURCE: Corbis

racial and religious minorities into the media, political parties, and educational system. France has stuck with its assimilation-ist approach, while Germany has generally pursued a "separa-tion" model, recognizing that the minorities (mainly Turks) are part of society but not adapting the national culture to bring them into the mainstream.

To what extent can a liberal society recognize and pro-tect group rights without violating individual rights (or the rights of other groups)? Will Kymlicka argues that society has a specific moral obligation to respect the rights of indigenous groups (now called "first peoples" in Canada) over immigrants. U.S. law has long recognized the "sovereignty" of the Native American nations, and similar steps have been taken in recent decades in Canada and Australia.

There has been a lively debate over whether skillful con-stitutional design can head off ethnic conflict. Does a federal structure give ethnic minorities the security they need? Or does it merely provide a framework for them to consolidate their political power and ratchet up their nationalist demands? Canada is still struggling to contain the demands of the French-speaking Quebecois, who came within a hair's breadth (0.58 percent) of voting for secession in a 1995 referendum. The ethnic federations of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union collapsed as soon as they started to democratize. India is the prime example of a multiethnic society that has

been able to satisfy group demands within a democratic fed-eration, though periodic outbreaks of "communal violence" between Hindus and Muslims continue to occur.

Arend Lijphart advanced a consociational model, based on the Dutch case, involving power sharing between the lead-ing groups. Such arrangements are difficult to craft and quite rare in practice. Often, politicians who propose power sharing lose the support of their own ethnic groups. The first edi-tion of Robert Dahl's influential *Polyarchy,* published in 1971, included Lebanon and Sri Lanka as successful examples, but this proved premature, as both countries descended into vio-lence soon thereafter. Belgium, another common example, is looking more and more precarious as the two communities of Flems and Walloons are politically deadlocked. South Africa seems to be turning out well, with elements of federalism and consociationalism, but the most important institution in South Africa is the single dominant ruling party, the African National Congress, something that does not feature in the consocia-tional or federal models. There are of course many cases of ethnic minorities living more or less peacefully and harmoni-ously within multiethnic states, but these minorities usually have little or no access to state power.

See also *Bauer, Otto; Colonialism; Sovereignty; Weber, Max.*

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Nationalist Parties

Nationalist parties are those political parties whose chief basis of appeal and whose raison d'être is to promote the interests of and emotional attachment to a nation. A *nation* refers to an aggregate of people who have a sense of common identity and some shared values or cultural distinctiveness, as opposed to a *state,* which organizes the institutions for selecting decision makers and making decisions regarding public policy. Conceived in this way, *nation* is a cultural concept, while *state* is a political one. The boundaries of a nation may or may not be congruent with the borders of a state; instead, the nation may exist as a subculture within a state.

Nationalist parties may promote the power and interests of a sovereign state, or they may promote the autonomy of subculture. Either type is concerned with the promotion of a distinct identity, a psychological attachment to a nation. Both types are considered in this essay to be nationalist parties that promote identity, rather than traditional mainstream parties, which have largely promoted class-based or religious issues. Both types of nationalist parties have increased their bases of support or vote share in the recent past, especially in countries where the opportunity structure facilitates the emergence of new parties.

RISE AND DECLINE OF PARTIES OF CLASS AND RELIGION

Some four decades ago, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argued that the cleavage structure of western democracies was based on class and religious issues, and hence the party systems of these democracies represented those cleavages. Party "families" dominated the political arena of most Western democracies: Christian Democracy or similar parties of the center right, labor-based or social democracy parties, and parties of classic liberalism. Typically, the first two families won the vast majority of the legislative seats in countries like Austria, Canada, Germany, and Great Britain. While the dominance of two parties was not as pronounced in countries with more fragmented party systems, in general significantly fewer parties garnered a significant share of legislative seats than in countries where two parties did not dominate.

In recent decades, however, these "major" parties have been losing vote and seat share throughout the industrialized West, and new parties have been emerging in the lacunae left by the weakening of the "major" parties. The extent of the success of the emerging parties in any given country is in part a function of what has been called "the opportunity structure." This recent trend toward the success of nationalist parties is a function of cultural change as documented in the seminal work of Ronald Inglehart, among others (Inglehart 1977, 1990). This body of research postulates the declining salience of issues regarding class and the status of religion. Class-based issues have declined in salience as a function of the unprecedented period of postwar prosperity. Issues regarding wages, hours worked, and working conditions have become less of a concern to working-class individuals than social issues such as the protection of conventional morality. Religious issues have declined in salience as part of the general trend toward secularization of the Western world. Because Catholics in Europe can no longer be counted on to vote their religion, for example, overtly Catholic parties in the Netherlands and Italy dropped or played down that basis of their self-definition in the early 1990s.

POPULIST MOVEMENT TOWARD NATIONALIST PARTIES

As the parties promoting identity with either the sovereign nation or the subculture emerged to claim the vote share lost by the traditional parties of class and religion, the political arena of Western countries was transformed. Class-based issues were to a large extent displaced by lifestyle issues such as environmentalism, feminism, national pride, and middle class morality. (Economic issues have regained some salience in the face of the 2008–2009 recession.) As certain segments of the

population were marginalized by modernization, these people protected their self-esteem by identifying with a sense of belonging to the backbone of a community or nation. Thus, peasants, shopkeepers, clerks, owners of small family farms, and unskilled labor whose socioeconomic roles were marginalized could take comfort and self-esteem from an identification with the folk that defined their nation. Such people tend to be less tolerant of those who are not accepted as part of the folk. The inhabitants of what is now Germany had a strong element of *volkism* running through their political philosophy; this took the place of the state that did not exist to provide an outlet for the sense of belonging to a German nation for almost two millennia. The absence of a political outlet for the sense of a German nation resulted in an exaggerated glorification of the idea of the German nation-state in the writings of such German intellectuals as Georg Hegel.

This exaggerated pride in one's nation in many countries was expressed in a movement of the less-educated and marginalized segments of the country. Such movements are generally known as populism. While parties expressing strong nationalist feelings are frequently identified as the extreme right (Ignazi, 2002), the radical right (Kitschelt, 1995), or the far right (Karapin, 2002), they do not place well on the traditional left-to-right party ideology dimension. The attributes that have been shown to characterize the populist right (i.e., rejection of out-groups and distrust of elites) are distinct from those that characterize the traditional mainstream right, such as protection of property, maintenance of public order, and promotion of religiosity. Hence, it may be more accurate to describe these emerging nationalist parties, some of which promote policies that would seem to be on the left, as populist parties. These nationalist and populist parties, as a product of the trend toward postindustrial societies, may now be a permanent part of the political landscape.

See also *Conservative Parties; Fascist Parties; Fringe Parties; Nation; National Anthems; Nationalism; Political Parties.*

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Nationality

Nationality is the object of identification emanating from the growing salience of nationalist sentiments. It may be, but is not necessarily, expressed through citizenship or emotional attachment to a state, or it may be expressed in cultural terms. A nation, in this perspective, refers to people united by a sense of common identification, sometimes a sense of a shared heritage, and some shared values. In other words, a nationality is a state of mind or a psychological fact. *Nation* is therefore a social and cultural concept, as opposed to *state,* a political concept referring to the constitutionally designated structures setting the rules for choosing decision makers and making policy decisions.

NATIONALITY VERSUS CITIZENSHIP

The geographic boundaries surrounding the people composing a nation in this sense may or may not be congruent with the boundaries of a state. Thus, one's citizenship may or may not coincide with one's nationality. For example, French-speaking residents of Quebec identify themselves as citizens of the Canadian federation, but their nationality is Québécois. The former Yugoslavia was a state that was made up of several distinct nationalities: Croatian, Serbian, and Bosnian—nationalities so distinct that Serbia attempted to wipe out the Bosnian nation. Similarly, Belgium is a state that has virtually evolved into a loose confederation of the distinct nationalities of Flanders and Wallonia. The record of such multinationality states with respect to regime stability and effectiveness is not encouraging, especially when the nationality differences are buttressed by the lack of a common language.

The question of whether one's sense of nationality coincides with one's political citizenship is an important one that affects the stability of effectiveness of the political system in question. Where they do not coincide, segments of the population of a state defined by their nationality may feel isolated and alienated from their fellow citizens of that state.

GROWING SALIENCY OF NATIONALISM

The salience of the concept of nationality has sharply increased in the post–World War II (1939–1945) era, driven by the growing salience of nationalism, one of the strongest ideological forces in that postwar world. Therefore, one cannot understand the importance of the concept of nationality without understanding the importance of the concept of nationalism.

An understanding of nationalism begins with its definition. Perhaps the classic definition was that of Hans Kohn over five decades ago. Kohn declared that "nationalism is a state of mind in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due the nation state" (1955, 9). As a state of mind, one's nationality is a cultural or psychological concept distinct from one's political citizenship. Nationality thus constitutes the way individuals define themselves.

Also five decades ago, eminent scholars were pronouncing "the end of ideology." The obvious weakening of the

ideological forces and principles that dominated political conflict in the Western world in the second half of the twentieth century was perhaps indicated by the declining vote share of the major political parties that had evolved to represent these principles. This weakening of the traditional ideological forces in the West accompanied the amelioration of the grievances these principles represented. Francis Fukuyama pronounced that the world was arriving at a consensus that our current form of liberal democracy constitutes the best form of government; hence, with the apparent triumph of the West, political evolution and even fundamental conflict would be a thing of the past. The unstated question raised by these end-of-ideology or end-of-history theories is whether the declining salience of the older classic ideologies will be accompanied by the emergence of new sets of principles.

POSTMATERIALISM AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY

This question was addressed by one of the most important and frequently cited bodies of research in recent decades, Ronald Inglehart's theory of the cultural transformation of Western countries from an orientation toward issues and conflict based upon class and materialist concerns to what he calls "postmaterialism." While Inglehart has not rigorously delineated the content of postmaterialist politics, lifestyle issues, such as tolerance of the counterculture that emerged in the United States in the 1960s, would seem to dominate the postmaterialist arena.

One of the most prominent issues of the postmaterialist world is identity. This could be expressed as identification with a sovereign nation-state or with a smaller subculture or nationality that seeks either autonomy or even secession from the larger nation-state. Therefore, parties that bitterly oppose one another within a given state might each be recognized as embodying a "politics of identity" focused on defending the interests and values of their particular nationality rather than on the state as a whole. The conflict between the populist Canadian Reform Party of the 1990s and the French Canadian Bloc Québécois epitomized this politics of identity, expressed in the conflict between distinct identities within a given state. Less-developed countries frequently contain several tribal nationalities. Nigeria, for example, contains over 300 distinct tribal identities speaking mutually unintelligible languages. Kohn and John Kautsky each stress the importance of a common language in building a shared sense of nationality.

The elites who lead these distinct nationalities within a state have a distinct interest in resisting their assimilation into a broader nationality or the nationality of the rest of the country. Thus, the leaders of the Scottish nationality have an interest in promoting Scotland's distinctiveness and autonomy from Great Britain and the government at Westminster. The growing pressure for devolution of power from Westminster to Scotland may threaten the coherence of Britain as a sovereign state. Although Great Britain and Northern Ireland may constitute a single sovereign state, England, Scotland, and Wales remain distinct nations.

CONCLUSION

Skeptics regarding the prospects of creating the political integration of Europe argue that the European Union constitutes an example of the failed attempt to create a European state without the prior development of a European nationality. The applicability of the United States as a model for Europe is limited by the fact that the residents of the thirteen colonies to a large extent shared a sense of a common nationality buttressed by a common language.

Thus, the growing salience of the new politics of identity in the face of the decline of classic bases of identity such as class and religion will continue to give prominence to the concept of nationality as a base of political conflict for the postmaterialist world.

See also *Citizenship; Dual Citizenship and Dual Nationality; Identity, Politics of; Nation; Nationalism; Nationalist Parties; Nation-state.*

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Nationalization

Although there is no universal agreement on how to define *nationalization* precisely, this term is used to describe the government's actions to exercise control or ownership over assets such as private property, industry, land, or financial/business institutions. Theoretical works focusing on nationalization tend to emphasize government control of private property, government influence over financial/business institutions, and degrees of government ownership of industry and land.

In political science and political sociology, the term has been used in several other contexts. Nationalism studies use this term to refer to language, citizenship, migration, and similar policies pursued by nation-states to integrate multiethnic regions into one body politic or, alternatively, to create a monoethnic state without integrating ethnic minorities. In studies of political parties, this term has been used to describe the "increasing similarity of geographic units" in terms of the resemblance of voting patterns. The so-called nationalization of the vote is seen as an indicator of how politically integrated a country is. This approach attempts to establish whether the constituents tend to vote for the same parties at the regional and national levels.

The term *nationalization* is often used in studies of communism and socialism. In this context, it refers to the process by which the government assumes various degrees of control over private property. The government is conceived as the primary owner of industry and land (but not necessarily of all private property).

NATIONALIZATION AS CONCEPTUALIZED BY COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST THEORIES

Communist and socialist theories of nationalization are based on Karl Marx's theories about the creation of a classless society, which, according to Marx, was the final evolutionary stage in the political development of humankind—a development that consists of a series of struggles between the haves (those who own the means of production) and the have-nots (those who do not own the means of production and are exploited by those who do). According to this theory, the stage when the government becomes the primary owner of industry and land (that is, the nationalization of the most important assets) is an important step toward the creation of a classless society.

A prominent critic of capitalism, Marx warned about the concentration of the means of production in the hands of one class (the bourgeoisie). He argued that this will lead to a revolution by the have-nots (the proletariat). Marx proposed the nationalization of the means of production as the strategy necessary to create a classless society. In *The Abolition of Landed Property* (1869), he wrote, "Leaving aside the so-called 'rights' of property, we affirm that the economical development of society … [renders] the nationalization of land a 'social necessity,' against which no amount of talk about the rights of property will avail." In *The Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1848), Marx (together with Friedrich Engels) identified the actors who will pursue nationalization—the working class (the proletariat). They will undertake this pursuit because "they have nothing of their own to secure and to fortify; their mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, individual property."

HUGH CLEGG'S CRITIQUE OF SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST APPROACHES TO NATIONALIZATION

In the late 1940s and 1950s, after the French and British governments took control of the coal, electricity, gas, and transport industries in their countries, nationalization attracted the attention of theorists and practitioners in Western democracies. During 1950 and 1951, Hugh Clegg, a former member of the British Communist Party and father of the Oxford school of industrial relations, published two works—*Labour in Nationalized Industry* and *Industrial Democracy and Nationalization*—that put forward a powerful critique of the Marxist concept of nationalization. *Industrial Democracy and Nationalization* outlined the expected benefits of nationalization that were predicted by socialist theories, such as better planning, better coordination, and happiness coupled with a feeling of freedom from oppression, which workers would experience because they would know that they were toiling for the public good. It pointed out major weaknesses in nationalization projects as conceptualized by Socialist and Communist theories—the lack of accountability, issues with productivity, and the difficulty of assessing the effectiveness of nationalized industries, because "their products are not fully determined by competition, [and] their accounts may be made to show profit merely by pushing up the price." Clegg made several suggestions about how to make nationalized industries more accountable to the people. These suggestions included creating national boards responsible to the appropriate minister and to Parliament as well as setting up special agencies. He also identified several other government strategies that might be able to achieve results similar to those expected by socialist theories of nationalization, such as the progressive taxation of incomes and the financing of social services from this taxation.

NATIONALIZATION IN PRACTICE

The best-known example of nationalization took place in Russia and the Soviet Union in the early twentieth century. During the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the Russian government nationalized numerous industrial and banking institutions. After the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922, the Soviet government became the primary owner of industry and land. Similar processes of nationalization took place in Soviet satellite states after World War II (1939–1945).

During the second half of the twentieth century, there were several famous nationalization projects that were aimed at getting rid of foreign control of industries and companies seen as vital to the national interest. These cases include the nationalization of foreign businesses by the Cuban government in 1960, the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by Egypt in 1956, and the nationalization of the oil industry in Venezuela in 1975–1976.

Recently, the nationalization of oil assets has received a lot of attention. In 2004, the Russian oil company Yuganskneftegaz (a subsidiary of Yukos) was de facto nationalized by the Russian government, at least partly for political reasons. Those opposed to the nationalization of oil assets pointed out the dangers (some of which had been pointed out earlier by Clegg): a decline in management standards, reduced productivity, and increased investment risks. Those in favor argued that the nationalization of oil assets could benefit the country's economy as a whole by providing raw materials at affordable prices.

In 2008–2009, in the public discourse in the United States, the term *nationalization* has been used to describe increased levels of government control in managing the financial crisis. Examples include arranging mergers for troubled financial institutions and investing significant sums of public money in the banking sector. These actions, however, do not constitute full government takeover of these financial institutions and exemplify only low levels of nationalization.

See also *Communism; Engels, Friedrich; Marx, Karl; Nationalism; Socialism*

. . . . DOVILE BUDRYTE

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National Security Policy

National security is a phrase that is used in many different ways. Classically, it has been defined as freedom from foreign interference or influence—military, economic, or political—in domestic affairs. Quite obviously, this definition primarily involves physical security from military invasion. However, national security involves not only the defense of a nation and that nation's safety but also protection of that nation's interests, whether they be political or economic. In order to understand national security, as noted by Tipson, these questions must be answered: Who is the foreign influence? What is being protected? What are the means of protection?

FOREIGN INFLUENCES AND ASSETS UNDER PROTECTION

Determining who is the foreign influence is not difficult. Historically, most authorities have defined a foreign influence as including any foreign nation. In the modern world, the "who" has been expanded to include nongovernmental groups with no legitimately recognized political or geographical identity, especially independent terrorist groups such as al-Qaida. National security in the early twenty-first century necessarily includes protecting a nation from the influence, attack, or dominion of such groups.

There are several basic categories of assets that must be protected as part of national security. The most basic of these assets is territory. National borders clearly define the territory of a nation (although some borders remain disputed and a source of conflict, such as the India-China border near Tawang). International law recognizes the right of a nation to be secure within its borders, as seen in Article IV of the United Nations (UN) charter. The second most important asset protected by national security policy is a nation's citizenry. International law extends protection to a nation's citizens. This protection usually applies whether the citizens are within that nation's borders or within a foreign country. Third, the safety and security of a nation's military forces, whether located domestically or in another country, has been recognized to be a legitimate concern of national security. The United States of America has entered into numerous treaties with other nations where its forces are located; these treaties are known as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs).

Further, although this claim is not recognized by all nations, the United States has maintained that access to certain militarily strategic or economically essential resources is a matter of national security. Finally, in the decision of *United States v. Robel* (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that national security includes the defense of American values and ideals. However, when other nations appeal to strategic resources or intangible values in their national security policy, they are actively opposed by more powerful nations. Thus, there is a question of relativity and power concerning these elements of national security.

MEANS OF PROTECTION

As to the means of protection, there are three basic methods: diplomatic means, legal means, and military means. Each of these means is usually instituted according to a policy.

Policy is an amorphous term and is used in many different contexts, especially in the realm of politics, but two meanings are helpful for understanding national security policy. First, a policy can be defined as a statement of the ultimate goals of a nation or government. For example, a government might announce that its nation's policy, as a matter of national security, is to protect access to vital and rare natural resources that are not located within the policy-making nation's borders but rather are found in a neighboring country. This would be a broad statement of policy goals.

Second, a policy can be defined as a coherent plan to guide specific decisions and actions, whose ultimate purpose is to implement broad goals. This definition of policy has been equated with the systematic procedures aimed at implementing the policy goals. To continue the previous example, one method to implement the policy goals of securing access to those vital and rare natural resources would be to diplomatically arrange a treaty ensuring such continuing access. Another method would be to enter into a contract, enforceable by international law or arbitration, that would ensure access to those resources. A third method would be to militarily invade the neighboring country and physically seize and secure the resources.

All policies have costs, some of which can make some policies untenable. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 to seize control of its oil supply, the world's military response was swift and devastating. In other cases, the costs are less tangible but lead to a policy being overturned. An example of such a policy would be the Bush Administration's use of techniques widely denounced as torture to further the national security interests of the United States. This national security policy including so-called enhanced interrogation was eventually deemed too costly for a variety of reasons (including legal actions by the victims, national opposition, loss of international reputation, and the possibility of retaliation by other nations). Thus, policy involves not only the ultimate goals of a nation but also how that nation executes and implements its policies.

METHODS OF DECIDING POLICY

There are many different methods of deciding upon policy, even within individual countries. In the United States, the

highest level of policy making lies with the Congress. The enactment of laws by the Congress is the highest statement of the legal policy of the United States. This is especially true of national security. For example, by the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Congress set the policy of the United States as accepting limitations on civil liberties to attempt to protect the United States from terrorism.

The executive branch, as vested in the president, is also a very important policy maker that can, at least for a time, bypass other policy makers. For example, the Bush Administration created and implemented the policy of torturing alleged terrorists, even though this policy conflicted with various domestic and international laws.

The judicial branch also contributes to policy. When the U.S. Supreme Court makes a ruling on the constitutionality of certain laws, it is, in essence, expressing policy. For example, when the Court invalidated the military commissions of the Bush Administration concerning Guantanamo Bay, it changed an important policy concerning national security.

The example of torture and Guantanamo Bay shows how the American "checks and balances" form of government can affect changes in national security policy over time. Most modern democracies similarly include mechanisms to avoid the long-term adoption of natural security policies that harm their citizens and violate international law. The international community faces a challenge, however, in countries like Iraq under Saddam Hussein, which claimed a right to resources beyond its borders, or North Korea, which claimed the right to develop nuclear weapons as a matter of national security.

See also *Cooperative Security; Foreign Policy; Homeland Security; Regional Security*

. . . .   WM. C. PLOUFFE JR.

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National Socialism

National socialism is a political ideology that rose to great popularity across Europe during the interwar period. National socialism espouses supremacy of the state's interests as defined by the leader and total obedience by all classes to the state. In most cases, national socialist parties and movements embraced racist and ultranationalist ideologies. Out of the chaos surrounding Germany's collapse at the end of World War I (1914–1918) sprang the German Workers' Party. This party, which would eventually become the National Socialist German Workers' Party, was formed on January 5, 1919, in Munich under the leadership of Anton Drexler and Karl Harrer.

RISE OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND ADOLF HITLER

Over the span of a few years, the German Workers' Party grew in size, attracting a heterogeneous following. One of the party's early recruits was Adolf Hitler. Between 1920 and 1921, Hitler established his complete authority over the party. He added the words *National Socialist* to the party's name (it became known as the Nazi Party) and adopted the swastika as the party's symbol and flag, and in February 1920 the party issued its official twenty-five point program. It called for the union of all Germans within a greater Germany, repeal of the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, establishment of colonies for Germany's surplus population, exclusion of Jews from citizenship, appointment of only competent citizens to official posts (without regard to party affiliation), state promotion of the welfare and economic activities of its citizens, an end to non-German immigration, improvement of national health and fitness levels through obligatory physical activities, and promotion of the common interest above self-interest.

With regard to economic issues, the party demanded abolition of the "thralldom of interest," confiscation of war profits, nationalization of syndicates and trusts, introduction of profit sharing in industry, improved old-age insurance, establishment and protection of a healthy middle class of artisans and merchants, implementation of land reform by means of "confiscation without compensation," abolition of interest on mortgages, and prohibition of land speculation. The twenty-fifth and final point of the program called for the establishment of a powerful central government, along with diets and vocational chambers to implement the laws proclaimed by the Reich and the various German states.

The Nazi Party polled a meager 2.5 percent of the national vote in the 1928 election. The first major Nazi electoral breakthrough occurred in the general elections of September 1930. The party received 6,400,000 votes, or 18.3 percent of the total, and gained 107 seats in the Reichstag. After the general elections of July 1932, the Nazis replaced the Social Democrats as the largest political faction in the Reichstag, with 230 seats. In the July 1932 election, the party received 13,750,000 votes, or nearly 38 percent of the total. The Nazi Party's exclusion from government ended on January 30, 1933, when President Hindenburg changed his thinking about a Hitler-led government and appointed the Nazi leader chancellor of Germany.

APPEAL OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM: PREJUDICE AND KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS

Examinations of the ideology of national socialism have focused largely on Hitler's writings in *Mein Kampf* ("My Struggle"). Thus, it comes as no surprise that most treatments of Nazi ideology stress the primacy of general nonmaterial themes such as racism, anti-Semitism, anticommunism, hypernationalism, and xenophobia. We must ask, however, whether millions of Germans would have supported a party that offered only vacuous promises and generalities. The party positions that were enumerated in the official Nazi Party programs have been too often ignored. Unlike the frequently vague and outlandish ramblings of *Mein Kampf* (which relatively few people read before 1933), the party programs taken together are characterized by a substantial degree of coherence and considerable emphasis on material themes. This is not to say that racism, anti-Semitism, hypernationalism, and xenophobia played no role in Nazi ideology; nor that many people found the Nazi Party attractive because of its stance on these themes. By themselves, anti-Semitism and other racist and nationalist themes would not have made the Nazi Party into the most popular party in Germany. The Nazi Party leaders were savvy enough to realize that pure racial anti-Semitism would not set the party apart from the pack of racist, anti-Semitic, and ultra-nationalist movements that abounded in post-1918 Germany. The Nazi success can be attributed largely to the economic proposals found in the party's programs, which, in an uncanny fashion, integrated elements of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century nationalist-etatist philosophy with twentieth-century Keynesian economics.

Nazi economics sought to create a "third path" between Marxist centralized state planning and laissez-faire capitalism. The Nazis were not the first in Germany to advocate or even to implement both nationalist-etatist and Keynesian economic principles, but they were the first to merge the principles of both schools in a seemingly coherent and innovative program. Nationalist etatism is an ideology that rejects economic liberalism and promotes the right of the state to intervene in all spheres of life, including the economy. Among the ideas that the nationalist-etatist school contributed to Nazi economic planning were state socialism, economic protectionism, and territorial expansion (*Lebensraum*). Nazi economists found much to their liking in Keynesian economics. John Maynard Keynes's *The Economic Consequences of the Peace,* which was critical of the Versailles treaty and the financial obligations it placed on Germany, brought Keynes to the attention of many members of the Nazi leadership as early as 1920. The Nazi Party agreed with Keynes that if governments and central banks hoped to maintain full employment and reduce the likelihood of economic recession, they should urge investment in new capital goods, ensure a cheap money policy, and initiate public investment. Much has been written about Franklin D. Roosevelt's adoption of the Keynesian notion of "pump priming" in the mid-1930s as a means to jolt the U.S. economy out of the Great Depression. What may be less well known is that the Nazi Party had urged the use of pump priming to start the German economy several years before F.D.R. used it in the United States.

Nationalist-etatist principles and Keynesian economics made for a good match. Autarky was realizable, according to the thinking in the Nazi Party, through government-initiated investment in the nation's infrastructure, including public works, residential reconstruction, resettlement, and reagrarianization. In the end, the marriage of nationalist-etatist thinking and Keynesian economics allowed the Nazis to design some rather novel but nevertheless concrete economic policies.

See also *Anti-Semitism; Keynes, John Maynard; Keynesianism; Nationalism; White Supremacy; Xenophobia.*

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Nation–Building

Nation-building refers to the general process of constructing a nation making use of the power and institutions of the state or the political community (polity). As an ideology and social mobilization, nationalism has often been attributed to earlier phases in the process of evolution of contemporary nation-states. Nation-building policies have generally been implemented so that a transition from traditional societies to modern polities could be realized.

Following a phase of boundary building and state formation, the process of nation-building generally seeks to socialize the people of the state into a nation. Such a task may take centuries, as the cases of Japan or the European nation-states illustrate, whereas in other instances (i.e., New World and postcolonial countries), developments were more rapidly implemented in contemporary times. However, nation-building is not merely a phenomenon associated with the past state formation. It continues to manifest itself in well-established states seeking to maintain their legitimacy and territorial integrity in the face of internal or external challenges. To this end, nation-building promotes national identity with the establishment of national symbols, such as anthems or flags, together with the (re)creation of historical myths or cultural markers.

A process of creating administrative and military centers and of consolidating territorial boundaries usually implies the enforcement of one central authority upon peripheral regions or subordinated political groups. As regards the case of Europe, there persists a controversy on whether the processes of nation-building were mainly the result of the French and Industrial revolutions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, or if their origins can be traced back much further (to around the High Middle Ages). Indeed, it would difficult to deny the existence of "proto-nations" before the Modern Age. However, it would also be awkward to regard nation-building phenomena as the product of history beyond the paramount impact of the modern processes of social,

economic, and political changes (bureaucratization, colonization, industrialization, and urbanization, to name a few). The term *nation-building* came into widespread usage in the 1950s with reference to the creation of newly independent states in postcolonial Africa. In more recent times, it has become more controversial, being associated with U.S. efforts at postconflict reconstruction in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq.

Among the main policies deployed by state centers to integrate peripheries and to create nation-states, four can be underlined: (1) the active presence of an administration (particularly the military and security forces) in all the territory of the polity, (2) a common system of education and the promotion of a state language, (3) the extension of communications, and (4) the configuration of a national labor market and related welfare arrangements.

In modern times, the most dynamic sectors of the bourgeoisie and some elites of the peasantry have made use of the ideology of nationalism to fight old aristocratic privileges. The concept of citizenship drafted by the English Revolution (1640–1660) and articulated by both the American (1776–1783) and French (1789–1799) revolutions became essential in the conformation of the nation-building programs put into place during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The aim was to consolidate nations where citizens would become peers with equal access to a set of universal rights and obligations. Countries forged by this type of nation-building were to become the embodiment of modernity.

In the post-Enlightenment epoch, the cornerstone of nation-building, primarily in the European tradition, has often been the creation of a common national identity throughout a specified territory under one central authority. This idea of "one state, one people," which was transported worldwide as a result of European colonialism, has been far from being accomplished in countries with long-standing traditions of internal diversity and strong ethno-territorial collective identities. All-embracing and exclusive nation-state identities have in many cases become problematic, particularly in those heterogeneous countries composed of diverse cultural communities and stateless nations. Since the late nineteenth century, those advanced industrialized countries of welfare capitalism have made use of the great nation-building potential associated with the development of social policy institutions. For them, welfare institutions embody a common heritage of shared risks and mutual commitment, and a common project for the future.

Reports of the death of the nation-state challenged from above by the forces of globalization and continental integration have been greatly exaggerated. Political developments at a supranational level, however, do not necessarily point toward a command-and-control model of vertical governmental action. Much of the legitimacy of the modern nation-state depends on the efficacy and sustainability of national-building policies that seek to keep pace with the socioeconomic changes in the new global order.

See also *Nation; Nationalism; Nation-state*

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Nation-State

The *nation-state* is the primary political unit in the contemporary global system. Nation-states have a near monopoly on sovereignty and the legitimate use of force under international law and custom. These political constructs emerged in early modern Europe as the result of the combination of both smaller political actors, including city-states and small kingdoms, and large empires, as well as the development of the strong central state. Meanwhile, nation-states competed with empires for power and influence within Europe and to ensure their own survival. Early nation-states such as France, Holland, and Britain concurrently sought colonial empires outside of Europe to counter the resources and power of the multinational Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. The rise of the nation-state occurred simultaneously with the decline of the Catholic Church as a supranational political actor following the Thirty Years War (1618–1648).

THE FORMATION OF THE NATION-STATE

The nation-state consists of a relatively homogeneous population (the nation) of individuals with similar ethnic backgrounds—including language, religion, culture, and traditions—who reside in a fixed geographic area (the state). Prior to the rise of the nation-state, political authority was diffused among many actors and often based on personal power. Monarchs and other elites typically had varying degrees of sovereignty that transcended established borders, and their reigns were often marked by multiple allegiances. The result was that national borders had little real relevance, and subjects had little loyalty to the state. Some city-states were able to elicit strong bonds of loyalty among their subjects, but these entities could not generate the military resources to defeat large empires (which had resources, but lacked loyalty).

In Europe, the broken geography and range of ethnic and linguistic nationalities precluded the rise of large empires and resulted in a collection of small feudal kingdoms during the Middle Ages. Almost constant war and strife prompted the development of ever stronger central bureaucracies that would allow governments to take advantage of an area's resources and mobilize populations. The nation-state emerged as the ideal European political organization, since it could combine the resources and size of the empire with the citizen loyalty, or nationalism, of the small city-states. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) marked the start of the era of the nation-state.

Nation-states were different from earlier political organizations in three main ways. First, the nation-state's political authority came to be organized as separate from and supreme to that of other social actors, including the Church. This provided the nation-state with its high level of authority and legitimacy. Second, nation-states developed a significant degree of self-identification and state loyalty among populations that led to the rise of modern nationalism. Third, nation-states developed concurrently with the rise of the merchant class in Europe. As a result, intricate class structures, which extended beyond elite-peasant systems, created opportunities for pluralistic government and nondiscriminatory legal systems, and hence, the eventual rise of democracy.

THE MODERN NATION-STATE
The nationalism of nation-states contributed to both the scramble for empires and the great wars of the twentieth century. Nation-states that had high degrees of homogeneity at home nonetheless developed multiethnic empires that failed to develop the same degrees of loyalty and attachment to the home state. That nation-states were at their core ethnic entities contributed to ongoing ethnic conflicts, especially as the consequences of imperialism were manifested by the redrawing of ethnic boundaries and the dislocation of populations. After World War I (1914–1918), the empires of Germany, Russia, Turkey, and Austria-Hungary were dismantled by the victorious allies, and their former territories were either granted independence or came under new colonial mandates by the remaining imperial powers, France, Britain, and Japan.

In the post–World War II (1939–1945) era, the nation-state came under increasing competition in the global system. The empires of Western Europe disintegrated due to a combination of self-determination movements, nationalism, cold war politics, and empire fatigue occasioned by the increased costs in terms of lives and resources of combating resistance movements. The break-up of colonial empires and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war caused the number of independent countries to increase from 75 in 1945 to more than 200 by 2000.

International organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) altered traditional notions of sovereignty and established competing centers of authority over political, economic, and security matters. For instance, in the early twenty-first century, the EU has taken over many of the functions formerly the domain of the nation-states, including monetary policy. The attractiveness of organizations such as the EU is that they allow small- to medium-sized nation-states to pool resources and magnify economic and security power. Nonetheless, this trend also undermines the nation-state's traditional role. In addition, the growth of multinational corporations (MNCs) has eroded the economic and political control of individual governments and offered new challenges to nation-states.

Contemporary scholarship remains divided on the role of the nation-state in the international system. Neorealists continue to assert that the nation-state is the main actor in global politics and that these entities are rational actors that seek to maximize power through cost-benefit analysis. Such scholars contend that international bodies are merely the reflection of the political preferences for the great powers and serve as a means to augment, rather than lessen, the power of the nation-state. Neoliberal-institutionalists counter that the nation-state is on the decline as global organizations and MNCs increasingly gain economic and political power. In addition, the growing interdependence among states has not only reduced nationalism and increased economic ties but fostered a nascent global culture that transcends traditional notions of self and ethnicities. Such manifestations of globalization are criticized by scholars who contend that the erosion of national norms and values undermines indigenous cultures and is a form of cultural imperialism.

See also *Nation; Nationalism; State, The.*

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Naturalization

Naturalization is a person's acquisition of the citizenship of a state whose citizenship he or she did not acquire at birth. Most individuals acquire citizenship automatically at birth through some combination of *jus soli* (citizenship based on place of birth) and *jus sanguinis* (citizenship based on parentage), the two elements present to varying degrees in every state's citizenship laws. By contrast, naturalization happens at some later point in time and involves an administrative decision or procedure.

Conditions for naturalization commonly include a minimum age, demonstrated time of residence, knowledge of the society as demonstrated by a test, language requirements, evidence of good character, and other evidence of integration such as family ties. Such conditions for individual naturalization are often relaxed or waived when state interests are invoked, and most states include provisions for accelerated naturalization in particular circumstances.

States extend or restrict citizenship for many reasons and alter their naturalization requirements accordingly. Most notably, naturalization policies tend to reflect the changing goals of immigration policy. In the United States, for example, naturalization was considerably easier until the 1920s, when both immigration and naturalization were restricted. Making citizenship harder to acquire is one way in which states can attempt to discourage immigration.

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY NATURALIZATION

Many definitions of naturalization describe it solely in terms of the intentional choice of individuals to acquire a new citizenship, but naturalization can be involuntary as well as voluntary and can involve groups as well as individuals. Historically, some states imposed citizenship on noncitizens in order to enforce civic duties, such as military service. Territorial and border changes such as annexation often included large-scale naturalizations of the resident populations, such as the forced naturalization of residents east of the Curzon line, who became Soviet citizens following annexation of their territory by the USSR after World War II (1939–1945). (Many Polish residents instead left or were deported, often resettling in Poland's "recovered territories," which had been vacated by departing Germans). Such mass naturalizations usually include provisions for individuals to opt out. State breakdown or mass migrations caused by war provide other triggers for large-scale naturalizations.

The opposite of naturalization is denaturalization, the loss of citizenship resulting from an administrative decision or procedure. An infamous example of denaturalization is the Reich Citizenship Law of 1935, which stripped Jews and others not "of German or kindred blood" of their German citizenship. In response to this and other denaturalizations, Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides both that everyone is entitled to a nationality and that no one may be arbitrarily stripped of his or her nationality. This does not prevent denaturalization: The laws of many states continue to provide for denaturalization, such as when a citizen acquires another citizenship through naturalization. Most citizenship laws also allow the voluntary renunciation of one's citizenship under certain conditions. Other states refuse to recognize naturalization of their citizens in another state.

There remains a gender component to naturalization flowing from the distinctions of citizenship law. Historically, it was commonplace for women (but not men) to automatically lose their citizenship when marrying a noncitizen. In their citizenship laws, many states continue to deny equality between women and men, although this is now uncommon in liberal democracies. Children are likewise a special category, including the question of the age at which a child becomes an adult capable of voluntary naturalization. The citizenship laws of many states provide for automatic naturalization through adoption or the recognition of paternity.

The distinction between supposedly natural citizenship acquisition at birth and non-birth-based naturalization becomes ambiguous as *jus sanguinis* is extended. For example, many states provide for repatriation or a right of return to coethnics abroad. Israel's Law of Return, which offers instantaneous naturalized citizenship to any Jew wishing to settle in Israel, was amended in 1970 to extend this right to "the child and the grandchild of a Jew, the spouse of a Jew, the spouse of a child of a Jew, and the spouse of a grandchild of a Jew." Other states similarly extend preferential access to naturalization on the basis of ethnic grounds (e.g., Italy's or Spain's privileging of emigrants and their descendants; Germany's policies favoring *aussiedler,* and Greece's policies favoring ethnic Greeks), linguistic grounds (e.g., Portugal's facilitating naturalization for people who speak Portuguese), or other grounds.

CROSS-NATIONAL VARIATION

Explanations for differences in naturalization rates include the costs and benefits of acquiring citizenship, the resources and networks of individuals, the bureaucratic procedures for acquiring citizenship, and the degree of political mobilization to encourage and facilitate naturalization.

The costs of acquiring citizenship often include the obligation to renounce one's previous citizenship. For example, when Germany eased its citizenship law in 2000 to allow dual citizenship, naturalization rates increased. Benefits of acquiring citizenship include the right to vote and access to more rights than noncitizens have. When the United States in 1996 restricted certain social benefits to citizens (previously, permanent residents also had access to many such benefits), applications for naturalization increased dramatically.

Declining mobilization by political parties and grassroots groups can be linked to falling naturalization levels, but institutional factors, such as differences in state intervention, also play a role. One case study comparing differential naturalization rates among Portuguese immigrants in Canada and the United States found that in Toronto, government bureaucrats and federal policy encouraged citizenship through symbolic support and instrumental aid to ethnic organizations and community leaders, while Boston area grassroots groups were expected to mobilize and aid their constituents without direct state support, resulting in lower naturalization rates.

The introduction of a supranational European Union (EU) citizenship does not constitute naturalization, because EU citizenship is acquired automatically upon acquiring the citizenship of an EU member state and is not a separate legal status. Some have proposed that EU citizenship should be granted based on residence rather than nationality of a member state, but this proposal has not been adopted. Nevertheless, the European Commission has promoted naturalization as a strategy for facilitating integration, arguing that immigrants should be helped to settle successfully into society through the acquisition of rights and citizenship of the member states.

Naturalized citizens generally enjoy the same rights as citizens who acquired citizenship at birth, though naturalized citizens are sometimes subject to denaturalization more easily than native-born citizens. The aim of policies favoring naturalization is generally to avoid the growth of large populations of long-term residents who do not possess citizenship.

See also *Citizenship; Dual Citizenship and Dual Nationality; Immigration, Politics of; Immigration Policy; Mass Immigration; Nationality.*

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Natural Law

Natural law is both a moral and legal theory that posits the existence of a law whose content is set by nature and therefore has validity everywhere. As a moral theory, natural law claims moral standards that govern human behavior are in some part objectively derived from the nature of human beings and the world; as a legal theory, natural law asserts that the authority of legal standards is in some sense derived from the considerations of the moral merit of those standards. While being logically independent of each other, the two theories do intersect with each other: Both claim that some laws depend for their authority on the relationship they have not to preexisting convention but to moral standards.

GREEK AND MEDIEVAL ORIGINS

Greek philosophers, particularly Plato and Aristotle, emphasized the distinction between nature (*physis*) and conventional law (*nomos*). While the content of law varies from place to place, the content of nature is the same everywhere. Natural law therefore not only functions as a standard by which to criticize the content of conventional law but also determines what the law said in the first place. As a result, the state is bound by natural law and becomes the institution directed at bringing its subject happiness, whether temporal or through other-worldly salvation. This classical conception of natural law was promulgated by the Roman Catholic Church as set forth by philosopher and priest Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274).

According to Aquinas, humans are social and political animals as well as naturally religious. The natural law applies to humans alone as conscious, rational, moral, and social creatures, teaching them to avoid ignorance and not to give offense to others. Through reason, all humans can naturally and equally know the one standard of truth in the natural law. But when it comes to particular conclusions drawn from the eternal moral principles of natural law, although the standard of truth remains fixed (primary precepts), the specific circumstances of its applications vary (secondary precepts). As history changes, the secondary precepts also change in particular cases, but the natural law is not altered but added to.

This concept of natural law had entered mainstream Western culture through the writings of medieval Islamic scholars like Averroes, whose Aristotelian commentaries influenced Aquinas's understanding of natural law. Averroes wrote that the human mind alone could know the higher intents of Islamic *sharia,* like the protection of religion and life, as well as the unlawfulness of certain offenses such as theft and murder. The concept of *istislah* in Islamic law also bears some similarities to Aquinas's natural law: Whereas Aquinas's natural law deems good that which is self-evidently known as it tends toward the fulfillment of the person, *istislah* calls good whatever is connected to the five basic goods of Islam. The largest Islamic school of thought that posits the existence of natural law is the Maturidi school, which teaches that the human mind can know the existence of God and the major forms of good and evil without the help of revelation.

MODERN NATURAL LAW AND LEGAL POSITIVISM

Aquinas's conception of natural law spread to the school of Salamanca, where, in the sixteenth century, scholars like Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) and Francisco de Vitoria (ca. 1483–1546) further developed a philosophy of natural law in the Catholic tradition. The Protestants Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694) also made significant contributions to natural law theory. Grotius based his philosophy of international law on natural law and insisted on the universal validity of the natural law even if God were not to exist. Likewise, Pufendorf based his theory of natural law not on God but on the sociability of humans and held that every person, on the basis of human dignity, had a right to equality and freedom.

In England, theologian and preacher Richard Hooker (1554–1600) adapted features of Aquinas's natural law theory into Anglicanism, and legal scholar and judge William Blackstone (1723–1780) used natural law in determining the contents of common law, although it was not identical with the laws of England. But it was English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) who had the greatest influence on natural law by seeking to replace it with legal positivism. According to Hobbes, law is not an expression of higher principles or morality but simply the articulation of the will of the authority that created it. Natural law therefore is subordinate to positive law: The natural law—how a rational human being could survive and prosper—could exist only if humans first submitted themselves to the authority that had created the law. For Hobbes, natural law was discovered by considering natural rights first, whereas previously it could be said that natural rights were discovered by considering the natural law first. The supremacy of legal positivism over natural law would be continued and advocated by such subsequent thinkers as Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), Hans Kelsen (1881–1973), and H. L. A. Hart (1907–1992).

There is considerable debate about whether John Locke's (1632–1704) conception of natural law was more akin to Aquinas's as filtered through Hooker or to a revision of Hobbes's interpretation. According to Locke, God's natural law provided that no one ought to harm another in life, liberty, or possessions, and it therefore gave each person a natural right to his or her life, liberty, and property. If the sovereign went against the natural law, people could justifiably overthrow the existing state and create a new one. The notions of equality under the law, limited government, and the state's purpose to protect life, liberty, and property would influence subsequent liberal thinkers and seminal documents, such as the U.S. Declaration of Independence.

CONTEMPORARY NATURAL LAW

Contemporary natural law jurisprudence has been undergoing a period of reformulation with John Finnis, Germain

Grisez, Robert P. George, and Joseph Boyle as its leading scholars. This new natural law school focuses on questions of the intrinsic value and incommensurability of basic human goods, the resolution of conflict as an evolutionary process, and the content of law as determined by moral principles. It is this last question about natural law that has been particularly revisited by scholars who are preoccupied with natural law as a moral as opposed to a legal theory. As it divided Aquinas's views from those of John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and Francisco Suárez, the question of natural law's intrinsic moral authority continues to be an issue between the likes of Grisez and Finnis, on the one hand, and Robert Adams and John Hare, on the other.

See also *Natural Rights; Positivism.*

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Natural Rights

Natural rights are a direct corollary to the theory of natural law. Natural law can be viewed from four perspectives: (1) as a function of the physical laws of nature, (2) as a function of religion, (3) as a function of the nonphysical realm, or (4) as a function of reason or rational determination. A primary example of the first perspective would be the philosophy of Aristotle. An example of the second perspective would be the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. The third perspective would be demonstrated by the philosophy of Plato and his theory of forms. The fourth perspective would be found in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. From a more political perspective, the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes would also be a good example of the fourth category of natural law. Natural law is, essentially, the law applicable to human beings that is not a result of a government act or social norm. Natural law exists independently and is not based on the positive law, which is generally acknowledged to be the written law enacted by humans, even though the positive law may recognize the natural law. Natural law is generally considered to be a universal principle.

Natural rights are a corollary to natural law. Natural rights exist because of the natural law. Although there are many theories of natural law, the best example of natural rights, for the purposes of American politics and jurisprudence, is found in the writings of Sir William Blackstone. Blackstone was a legal commentator in Great Britain around the time of the American Revolution. He wrote the *Commentaries on the Laws of England,* a four-volume treatise on the laws of England that had developed over the years. Blackstone is very important, as he was one of the primary influences on the founding fathers who wrote the Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and Bill of Rights, which express the essential political principles of the United States of America.

In this work, Blackstone presented three absolute rights under the natural law: (1) the right to personal security, which included the right to life, health, and reputation; (2) the right to personal liberty, and (3) the right to property. However, these rights were not automatically enforced by a worldwide police force. Political reality dictated that human beings sometimes had to defend themselves and enforce these rights.

Recognizing that these rights had to be enforced, Blackstone also recognized five auxiliary natural rights. These rights were essentially political in nature, in that they attempted to express practical principles to help ensure theoretical liberty.

1.   The first auxiliary right was that the legislative power had to be independent of the executive of the government. If the legislators were not free of the executive, a tyranny would exist. Legislators also had to be free from bribery and corruption to be able to exercise independent judgment.

2.   The second auxiliary right concerned the executive branch of government. Blackstone thought that a monarchy was the best form of government. However, he still felt that an unrestrained executive was improper and that an independent legislature was necessary.

3.   For the third auxiliary right, Blackstone felt that all the people should have the right to present their complaints to a neutral court for a quick resolution. Further, any legal action should be in accordance with previously ascertained laws.

4.   The fourth auxiliary right concerned unusual cases that could not be addressed by the courts. To address this problem, Blackstone presented the right to petition both the legislature and the executive for relief.

5.   The fifth auxiliary right was the right to keep and bear arms. This right was necessary both for personal self-defense and to prevent tyranny and oppression. Essentially, it was the right to revolt.

There are, of course, a number of other important philosophers and political theorists who have advanced explanations of natural law and the associated natural rights, which may differ somewhat from those presented by Blackstone. However, given that Blackstone was one of the primary influences on the founding fathers, who expressed fundamental American political philosophy in the Declaration of Independence,

the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights; and given that all of Blackstone's absolute and auxiliary natural rights can be found, in one form or another, in these documents; it follows that Blackstone's work provides an excellent example of the concept of natural rights in American politics.

It is important to note that the idea of natural rights is closely linked with the concept that such rights are inalienable, in other words, they cannot be removed by an act of human government. They are inherent in every person and are considered fundamental.

The concept of fundamental rights is also present in documents of international scope. For example, in the United Nations Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, many of these fundamental and natural rights are specifically recognized.

See also *Aristotle; Checks and Balances; Constitutions, Unwritten; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Hobbes, Thomas; Kant, Immanuel; Natural Law; Plato; Thomas Aquinas; Universal Declaration of Human Rights.*

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Nature, State of

See *State of Nature.*

Necessary and Sufficient Condition

Necessary and sufficient condition is a philosophical concept in the study of causation and the relationship between statements. A necessary condition is one that is required for a specific result. For example, a necessary condition for receiving an A in an academic course might be that a student earn an A on the final exam. Therefore, if a student does not earn an A on the final, he or she will not secure an A in the course. If a student receives an A in the course, he or she must have scored an A on the final.

A sufficient condition is one that if satisfied guarantees a result, but may not be the only path to that result. For example, a sufficient condition for receiving an A in a course is that a student earn an A on every quiz. Consequently, if a student receives an A on all of the class quizzes, he or she will secure an A for the course. However, achieving an A grade on all quizzes is not a *necessary* condition, because a student could also gain an A by receiving A's on all of the homework assignments.

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Negative Campaigning

Negative campaigning refers to a candidate's or party's campaign strategy that attacks an opponent on the basis of his or her past political record, with particular focus on the opponent's character flaws, in contrast to simply highlighting the candidate's or party's attributes, promises, and ideological platform. Negative campaigning is widespread in American political campaigns and has become prevalent in the U.K. and continental European elections as well. Negative campaigning was heightened in the United States during the 1988 presidential elections, when Republican George H. W. Bush ran against the then-governor of Massachusetts, Democrat Michael Dukakis.

Usually, negative campaigning takes the form of a series of thirty-second ads during the election campaign period. Political parties and candidates who utilize these tactics do so because they believe that negative campaigning is the best strategy for gaining the upper hand in a campaign, by forcing the opponent to be on the defensive. Thus far, however, the research on negative campaigning has been rather inconclusive. It is still not clear whether negative campaign attempts exert any influence on election outcomes, while the literature on whether attack ads shrink or mobilize the electorate provides a rather mixed view as well. The research on turnout and negative campaigning is discussed below.

In their pioneering work, Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) employed controlled experiments, and their results suggest that negative campaigning demobilizes nonpartisan electorates. Though the authors acknowledge that negative campaigning enhances political information for voters, they argue that the decline in political efficacy and civic engagement turns off people, resulting in higher levels of abstention. These results apply primarily to nonpartisan voters. Thus, elections that are particularly plagued by negative campaigns tend to be decided by voters with a strong sense of party identification, not swing voters. These conclusions, however, have been challenged by Wattenberg and Brians (1999). Using data from public opinion surveys, they report that negative campaigning *increases* participation. Wattenberg and Brians further argue that negative advertisements are a source of political learning and will not demobilize the electorate in the process. As they see it, negative campaigns encourage voters to learn about the candidates and enhance the saliency of the election, which in turn tends to increase voter turnout.

The studies cited above suggest that the relationship between negative advertisements and turnout is not straightforward. The relationship is likely mediated by the specific

content of the negative campaign ads. In their investigation of U.S. Senate campaigns, Kahn and Kenney (1999) found that voters have the ability to distinguish between appropriate and harsh negative advertisements. For example, the effect on participation is different when a party or candidate criticizes the opponent's policy proposals than when the party or candidate simply disparages the opponent's character and personal life. Another plausible expectation is that a curvilinear relationship exists: A small dosage of negative advertising may enhance political sophistication, but excessive amounts disengage citizens. If this curvilinear relationship exists, negative campaigning might have implications for political participation and representation.

See also *Advertising, Political; Media and Politics; Voting Behavior.*

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Negotiations and Bargaining

Negotiations are successive moves among two or more parties in order to resolve conflicts, address common problems, or change the behavior of one of the parties. Bargaining refers to the actual process or the techniques and moves within a negotiation and can involve persuasion, demands, and concessions. The classic paradigm of negotiations and bargaining is a car dealer selling a car to a buyer through persuasion. For the two parties to come to agreement, there must exist a zone of agreement, which is the set of outcomes to which they can agree. If the buyer is willing to spend up to $20,000 and the car dealer is willing to sell for as little at $15,000, then the zone of agreement exists between $15,000 and $20,000. The final price within that range will reflect the bargaining strategies

and tactics employed. In politics, negotiations occur among all kinds of political actors, from the grassroots level to international organizations. While negotiations can cost resources and time, they provide a superior alternative to coercion or use of force. When a zone of agreement exists or can be created through negotiations themselves, all parties are better off through agreement.

Negotiation theories derive their rationale from liberal political thought, insofar as liberal thought posits change in human behavior through interactions. Unsurprisingly, diplomacy (the formal process of interactions among nation-states) arises alongside liberal thought in the modern era as a move away from empires, where brute force or material power tended to determine outcomes among political units. A historical sociology of human interactions is necessary to understand the importance of diplomacy, negotiations, and bargaining in the modern era.

Bargaining power still matters, but its understanding in negotiations is nuanced. It is contingent upon reservations prices (such as those of the buyer and seller above), which are themselves contingent upon the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). If a buyer's best alternative to what a car dealer offers is a free car from a relative, then that buyer may not agree to even the lowest price from the dealership. Similarly, if Iran or North Korea feels that it has little to lose from developing a nuclear program, or that it has more to lose by capitulating to demand from the United States, then the incentive to not strike an agreement with the United States will be high. In the last example, the United States holds more power than either Iran or North Korea but cannot make either of them comply with its demands, because their BATNA is high.

The overall stance of a negotiation party may be characterized as a negotiation strategy, such as overly aggressive or hawkish behavior versus gentle or dovish behavior. Formally, the term used in negotiations theories to describe hawkish behavior is *distributive* or *value-claiming strategy,* where one party seeks to gain over the expense of the other. Dovish behavior in contrast, is an *integrative* or *value-creating strategy;* both parties gain. A *mixed-motive strategy* features elements of both integrative and distributive strategies. Strategies are also defined as the sum total of bargaining tactics, which include the following: attempts to influence agendas, framing demands in persuasive terms, making trade-offs and linkages among negotiation issues, coalition building with like parties or allies, and promoting various packages of agreeable outcomes.

Game theory offers a formal way of understanding strategic negotiations, especially the effects of particular strategies. "Players" are posited as involved in games of strategy involving, in general, collaboration or coordination for a solution (agreement or no agreement). The most common solution is called a *Nash equilibrium* (named after Princeton mathematician John Nash), wherein each player's move takes into account the moves of other players. A Nash equilibrium therefore captures important elements of strategic interaction inherent in any negotiation. While highly instructive in revealing the logic of negotiations, game theory is nevertheless critiqued for being

abstract and rigid and for requiring each player to have well-defined preferences and strategies. Game theory may be too abstract to capture the interactive complexity of learning, preference formation, and behavioral change within negotiations.

International negotiations in the early twenty-first century feature a multiplicity of actors and issues. While nation-states are still featured prominently, a negotiating table often also features international organizations, civil society groups, business firms, and/or experts. Furthermore, there are usually two levels to an international negotiation: the international level, where negotiators from different countries meet, and a domestic level, where these international actors must negotiate with the people they represent in order to understand, narrow, broaden, or ratify their negotiation mandates. A U.S. trade or security negotiator, for example, must negotiate simultaneously with her foreign counterparts as well as with Congress and/or domestic interest groups. International negotiations are thus complex; further complexity comes from the varieties of negotiations—they can be bilateral, plurilateral, regional, or international in scope.

Negotiations feature in every arena of global politics, including security, trade, human rights, and the environment. Negotiation scholars closely studied the security negotiations between the United States and the USSR in the cold war era, while trade negotiation scholarship attended to the World Trade Organization and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The list of security and trade negotiations continues to grow, and new issue-areas are gaining ascendance. The Montreal protocol phasing out the use of chlorofluorocarbons is an important instance of successful global negotiations on an environmental issue, while the International Campaign to Ban Landmines is an example of international civil society groups urging disarmament.

See also *Diplomacy; Gunboat Diplomacy; Public Diplomacy; Summit Diplomacy; Trade Diplomacy.*

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Négritude

The future President of Senegal, Léopold Sédar Senghor, was in Paris writing about themes of exoticism in Baudelaire when he met Aimé Césaire, one of the future leaders of Martinique.

Both were poets who were working on the journal *Étudiant Noir* when they developed the concept of *négritude,* which Césaire first used in 1935. Négritude is the belief that all black people, regardless of location, nationality, and background, share a common essence and outlook. Both Senghor and Césaire were exemplary scholars in the French education system, but their experiences in Paris made both of them acutely aware of their status as second-class citizens.

The intricate connection of négritude to French colonialism is best demonstrated by the fact that both Césaire and Senghor wrote in French: This was the only choice to bring their message of a persisting African identity to a transnational audience. French assimilationist policies meant that talented writers and artists around the world came to study in Paris, but it was this experience that provoked the clear recognition of the boundaries of assimilationist policies. At the same time, recognition of both the diversity and the commonalties of the French colonial experience gave birth to ideas of unified identity. Césaire comments on the collective discovery of négritude:

> It was simply that in Paris at that time there were a few dozen Negroes of diverse origins. There were Africans, like Senghor, Guineans, Haitians, North Americans, Antilleans, etc. This was very important for me . . . as well as an awareness of the solidarity among blacks. We had come from different parts of the world. It was our first meeting. We were discovering ourselves. This was very important. (Césaire 1943/2000, 88)

Négritude refers back to an imaginary past, a quality of African life that existed before colonization and through colonization and that will succeed colonization. One interpretation of négritude is that it is a form of primitivism; this view is supported by the fact that Senghor begins his discourse on négritude by presenting thirty pages of anthropological and archeological evidence about early inhabitants of the African continent. However, négritude is not simply primitivism; it also has a very real political utility. Négritude is a strategy of reinterpretation, offering a new frame of reference for understanding personal identity and collective patterns of behavior. Most important, it asserts that black people have not been entirely changed or defeated by the experience of colonization.

Suzanne Césaire, Aimé Césaire's wife, who was an integral personality in the movement, remarked that surrealism was the revolutionary element within négritude: "Thus, far from contradicting, diluting, or diverting our revolutionary attitude toward life, surrealism strengthens it" (Césaire 1943/2000, 15). Surrealism brought the reality of appearances into question— it asserts things are not always what they seem to be. This is important, because it allows advocates of négritude to claim that black people are not defeated or oppressed, despite how things may appear. Therefore, it became a way to assert pride in one's identity and renounce subordination.

Négritude also provided a new way of understanding the experience of colonial subordination. Senghor's work had two very different aspects: The first was a presentation of

historical research to provide empirical evidence of shared, African characteristics. The second was a proposal that négritude was accompanied by a unique theory about ontology (the nature of being). Senghor develops his theory of African ontology by contrasting it with a European one. Europeans use what he calls "objective intelligence" and approach the world in the spirit of distinction: "He first distinguishes the object from himself. He keeps it at a distance. He freezes it out of time and, in a way, out of space. He fixes it, he kills it" (Senghor 1965, 29). The political ramifications of this mode of being in the world are that the European views the world as subordinate to self; "he makes a means of it" (ibid., 29).

In contrast, Senghor claims that the African embodies a sort of internal rationality, whereby the self is discovered through convergence with objects, space, and others around him. "Our subject abandons his *I* to sym–pathize and identify himself with the THOU. He dies to himself to be reborn in the *Other*. He does not assimilate, he is assimilated" (Senghor 1965, 32). This description provides an alternative explanation for the processes of subordination and objectification that characterized colonialism. Instead of colonialism being a matter of power, inferiority, or superiority, the history can be understood as a distinction between interiority and exteriority.

African ontology also suggests the ultimate contribution that Africans can make to the development of what Senghor calls the "universal civilization." The African form of perception and being will combine with the European form of knowledge, and their synthesis will create universal culture. Senghor presents a new interpretation of the history of servitude, develops an argument for the shared strengths of Africans based upon this principle, and outlines their future role in world politics.

See also *African Political Thought; Pan-Africanism.*

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Neoconservatism

Neoconservatism is one type of conservatism, the others being traditional or Burkean conservatism, with its emphasis on custom, habit, and tradition; modern free market or individualist conservatism, with its emphasis on individual competition within the free market; and religious right conservatism, which accords the central place to religion in social and political life.

ORIGINS AND THEMES

Neoconservatism originated in the 1970s as a reaction to the radical politics of the 1960s counterculture and its hostility toward tradition and authority. Like traditional or Burkean conservatives, neoconservatives value custom, tradition, and authority. They pay particular attention to broadly cultural matters and media—art, music, literature, theater, movies, and television—because it is through these means that a society defines itself and its values. Neoconservatives contend that Western societies, including the United States, are increasingly defining themselves as amoral, adrift, and degenerate. Violent and sexually explicit plays, films, television programs, and video games are symptomatic of the degeneration of Western culture. Rock and rap music lyrics feature four-letter words that have lost their shock value. The neoconservative sociologist and U.S. senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan called this "defining deviancy down." Behavior once viewed as immoral and unacceptable is now accepted as normal. For example, unmarried couples who have children out of wedlock are no longer shunned by society. Illegitimacy has lost its stigma.

Neoconservatives contend that such laxity reveals a broader and deeper cultural crisis afflicting Western civilization. Some neoconservatives trace this crisis to the Enlightenment, with its penchant for questioning authority, criticizing religion, and undermining traditional beliefs. Others blame the adversary culture that grew out of the student, civil rights, and antiwar movements of the 1960s. And still others blame well-intended but misguided government policies that give certain groups a sense of entitlement without a corresponding sense of responsibility. Neoconservatives agree with religious right conservatives that the current cultural crisis is due in part to the declining influence of religion in many people's lives. People who lack a sense of something larger and more meaningful than themselves, something transcendent and eternal, are likely to turn to mindless entertainment, to drugs or drink, and to act selfishly and irresponsibly. Religion at its best is a social cement, holding families, communities, and nations together. At its worst, however, religion can be fanatical, intolerant, and divisive, tearing communities apart instead of uniting them. Most neoconservatives thus believe that separation of church and state is a good idea that has been taken too far by liberals bent on banishing religion from the public square; and this has in turn provoked a backlash from religious conservatives.

ECONOMICS

In economic matters, neoconservatives favor free market capitalism as an efficient means of allocating goods and services. They do not, however, share modern conservatism's unbridled enthusiasm for free market capitalism. As Irving Kristol puts it, capitalism deserves "two cheers," not three. This is because, as Daniel Bell contends, capitalism harbors "cultural contradictions" that undermine its own social and ethical foundations. This most powerful of economic engines presupposes a willingness to work hard, to save, to invest, and to defer gratification; at the same time, however, advertising and other marketing techniques encourage people to indulge themselves, to spend money they don't have, and to pay little heed to the further

future. Unregulated capitalism, moreover, creates great wealth alongside dire poverty. And since great disparities of wealth lead to class conflict, labor unrest, and political instability, such disparities should be reduced (though not eliminated) by means of a steeply graduated income tax, the modern welfare state, and other means. At the same time, however, neoconservatives warn that well-intentioned government programs can produce unintended and unfortunate consequences for those whom they are meant to help. Such programs can create dependency instead of independence and undermine individual responsibility. The aim of such programs should be to provide temporary or short-term assistance, not long-term dependency on the part of recipients. Nor should the goal of social programs and tax policy be to "level" differences between individuals and classes. Neoconservatives like to say that they favor equality of opportunity but not equality of outcome.

FOREIGN POLICY

In the area of foreign policy, neoconservatives emphasize military might and the willingness to use it to promote American interests abroad. Power unused is power wasted. Usually acutely aware of the danger of unintended consequences in domestic policy, many neoconservatives seemed strangely unaware of or unconcerned about unintended consequences in foreign policy. The unintended but disastrous consequences that followed the invasion and occupation of Iraq led some neoconservatives to question their ideology, at least with regard to foreign and military policy. Most neoconservatives, however, continue to emphasize the need for a militant and muscular foreign policy backed by armed force and a readiness to use it. They downplay the importance of "soft power" (e.g., diplomacy) in favor of "hard power" (especially military force) in the pursuit of American interests around the world.

See also *Religion and Politics; Religious Right; Social Conservatism*

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Neorealism

See *Realism and Neorealism.*

Nepotism

From the Latin *nepos,* meaning "nephew," *nepotism* is the practice of favoritism based on kinship. The term originally referred to the way relatives of the pope, often his illegitimate sons, were appointed, regardless of their merit, to the highest positions in the Vatican hierarchy. Nepotism, described as the undue preferment of relatives to other, better qualified candidates, is usually seen as a negative practice, because it implies that the person getting the job, promotion, or college admittance is usually not otherwise qualified enough to be effective in the position. Nepotism is typically found in political and educational systems, but it is also present in private business. In a democracy, nepotism is often looked at as a form of corruption. It is the public interest and those unfairly denied a position for which they were qualified that typically suffer as a result of nepotism. In any organization, nepotism can cause conflicts in loyalties within an organization, particularly where one relative is placed in a direct supervisory position over another. Laws regarding political nepotism vary from country to country, and also from state to state in the United States.

Nepotism is a common accusation in politics, even when the nominated person does have appropriate qualifications. For example, many cried nepotism when U.S. senator Frank Murkowski was elected governor of Alaska and appointed his daughter, state representative Lisa Murkowski, to fill the remaining two years of his term in the Senate. (Lisa Murkowski won reelection on her own in 2004.) John F. Kennedy was accused of nepotism for his appointment of his brother Robert Kennedy as attorney general in 1961.

Nepotistic practices are known to all ages and societies, and all ideologies and political systems. In fact, they have provided the basic organizing principles of politics for much of human history. Arguably, all aristocratic, dynastic, or ruling hereditary regimes share with nepotism the feature of elevating family members as successors regardless of their fitness for the inherited or bestowed position. Despite the spread of democracy in the twentieth century, in most of the developing world, notably in the Middle East, Africa, and central Asia, nepotism still exerts strong influence. Here family ties are essential for gaining access to power, state resources, and privileges, and they heavily skew the distribution of wealth and status. The Syrian hereditary dictatorship is based upon a family and tribal pyramid, as was Saddam Hussein's in Iraq. In North Korea and Azerbaijan, the sons of the highest leaders inherited their fathers' positions. The president of Maldives, Maumoon Abdul Gayyoom, once had thirteen of his brothers, brothers-in-law, and classmates as members of his cabinet.

CONTROVERSY

Similar to corruption, nepotism is perceived differently in different countries and cultures. "What would be considered as nepotism or shameless patronage in Britain, might be seen as fair practice or even a moral duty in other countries, including some countries of southern Europe" (Pujas and Rhodes 1999, 690) Although nepotism is seen as running counter to the principles of meritocracy and accountability due to the blurring of borders between the public and the private sphere, some social biologists have suggested that a tendency toward nepotism is a form of natural kin selection. According to another argument, in failed states where the government cannot provide security and justice, the common denominator

tends to be that the state structures organize around blood ties, since the highest level of trust is found within families.

Most European and North American countries, as well as international organizations (including the European Commission in the 1990s and the World Bank in the 2000s) have made nepotism a legal offense, through antinepotism laws, in explicit recognition that personal connections can be used to unfairly discriminate, distort, and corrupt. Also in the business world, some larger companies have instituted antinepotism policies, which prevent relatives from working together in the same department or firm. However, in many smaller, family-owned businesses, nepotism is viewed in more positive terms.

See also *Autocracy, Corruption and Other Political Pathologies; Meritocracy; Monarchy; Patronage.*

. . . .   JIRI S. MELICH

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Network Society

Network society, which some call *technological society* and others *virtual community,* is a society in which technological media shape the primary modes of social, economic, and even political organization. The rise of network society began with the telegraph, radio, and telephone, but the growth of ever more effective and pervasive forms of communication (cell phones, computers, iPods, webcams, etc.) at the dawn of the twenty-first century has led to an unprecedented ubiquity of connectivity. The global interconnection of computers through the Internet (or World Wide Web) provides a 24/7 (24 hours a day/7 days a week) link to the rest of the world.

The network society manifests itself economically in the burgeoning of online shopping, electronic banking, electronic bill paying, and the pervasive reshaping of the business environment as office employees do much of their daily work using the Internet. Socially, the network society is marked by constant electronic access to friends, colleagues, and like-minded affinity groups. New social networking platforms, from Facebook and MySpace to blogs and Twitter, can grow in months to household names and essential aspects of life for people (especially young people) in advanced economies.

IMPACT OF NETWORK SOCIETY ON POLITICS

The flowering of the network society has already begun to impact politics, making it a fertile area for future political science research. Most directly, many European governments as well as those of Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, and Venezuela have made it possible to vote and to pay taxes online. E-mail creates a new and possibly more direct point of access to politicians, and advocacy groups are able to coordinate online petitions and communication to candidates with greater ease. It is quite common for politicians and citizens to create movements, raise money, and organize major electoral campaigns via the Internet. What has come to be known as "information politics" shows the power of the network. Traditional movements have been enhanced by access to online methods of direct contact mobilization as in the case of fundraising for the Obama campaign, which made it possible to raise millions of dollars on the basis of $25.00 online contributions. There is also digital direct action, which makes possible the nonviolent aspect of global civil society that employs technology in its world campaigns. It is said that technopolitics makes it possible for the anarchist to have common cause with trade unionists, ecologists with farmers, intellectuals with church groups, and so forth. Yet, for the most part, even though network society seems to be inspirational and exhilarating, it is still only a minor irritant as a global movement.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY

Assessing the advantages and disadvantages of the network society began in the 1990s with the work of scholars like Castells, van Dijk, and Rheingold. One advantage of network society is that it seems to grant the individual more freedom to choose to which communities to belong, albeit virtually. Technological community or network society for some may be an enriching form of social interaction that allows for some commitment to the society but does not require the total commitment of being a face-to-face member of today's society.

Another advantage of the network society is the presence of up-to-the-minute information through a variety of sources, which should enable actors (including political actors) to make more informed decisions. This connectivity becomes especially important to evade government censorship in situations of oppression such as those in Tiananmen Square, Iran, and Myanmar; anyone with a cell phone can provide live camera footage of events as, or immediately after, they occur. Network technology can be a tool for citizens to ask government for better information and to become more involved in political decision making, thus bringing about the phenomena of *netizens* and *netizenship*—citizens of the network and network citizenship.

On the other hand, some analysts criticize the ideal of having the freedom to choose to become part of the virtual community, because individuals can easily opt out and thereby fail to form a genuine "society." In fact, the complexity of social networks and information can cause fragmentation, where each person finds a social niche and no longer needs to engage beyond it. If the more advantaged have the possibility to use their connectivity for political mobilization, they also have an unprecedented opportunity to use it for

diversion. Further, the scope of network society is limited by a digital divide that leaves many segments of society behind. The poor in advanced countries and the majority in developing countries have no access to the tools of connectivity and hence have no choice, and some argue this digital divide will continue through the twenty-first century with profound negative consequences.

Moreover, it is unclear what results actually come from the new technology. Despite all the faxes and text messages during the suppression of student riots in 1989 in Tiananmen, China still remains an authoritarian regime. In 2009, the opposition in Iran mobilized and was observed worldwide through network technology, but President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad remained in power. The segments of that country connected to the network society have not and maybe cannot generate a movement capable of regime change. More generally, if becoming part of the virtual community/network society is an individual choice, whether it translates to a strong enough force to bring about changes becomes a vital political question.

Further, the "freedom" of information and communication on the Internet is actually subject to substantial control in totalitarian regimes. Not only can governments monitor their citizens through all kinds of requirements for registrations and data mining facilitated by the computer, but large portions of the Internet are censored in countries like China, Burma/Myanmar, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Vietnam, according to the 2008 listing of the Kassandra Project.

Tapscott indicated that to not go online is to choose antiquation, anachronism, antiprogressiveness. And the choice may need to be made by the individual much sooner than later.

See also *Blogs and Bloggers; Cybersecurity; Digital Democracy; E-governance, E-voting, E-democracy, E-politics; Information Society; Information Technology and Politics; Internet and Politics*

. . . .   CECILIA G. MANRIQUE

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Neumann, Franz

Franz Neumann (1900–1954) was a German political activist and labor lawyer. He is linked to a school of other labor lawyers such as Otto Kahn-Freund and Hermann Heller who developed the "autonomous social law" tradition of legal scholar Hugo Sinzheimer. This was an attempt to materially institutionalize as actual legal practices the workers' self-governance provisions of the Weimar Republic Constitution.

This concept of autonomous social law ironically was influenced by German political theorist Carl Schmitt's jurisprudential concept of "complementary institution" (*Konnexinstitut*). The concept subsumed collective labor agreements, which forced into the background the principal institutions, such as the individual prerogative contract, which they originally intended to serve. The generation of collective bargaining agreements, labor courts, and works communities were understood as the vital institutionalizing undercurrent in social democracy. Neumann would go on to focus on the forces that defeated the movement for autonomous social law—a movement he saw as the next stage in the historically evolving project of the rule of law.

Neumann is chiefly remembered for his 1942 landmark study *Behemoth,* which depicts the synchronizing (*Gleichschaltung*) efforts of Nazi totalitarianism amidst the collapse of law as well as the absence of formal legal and state apparatuses in blanket clauses and discretionary decision making where classes and groups—not individuals—are referred to. The blanket clauses endowed "deformalized" state apparatuses with unlimited means to proceed against any and all opponents of the regime without the possibility of judicial review. Neumann is also known for the posthumous 1957 collection, *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State,* which included the 1937 essay "The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society." In this work he focused on how a civil society evolves its forms and procedures. Also included were his 1950s writings on irrationalization, the cognitive-volitional elements involved in freedom, and the impossibility of a complete legal containment of political power.

Of equal and even more lasting significance are Neumann's early social law writings and his 1936 London School of Economics doctoral dissertation, *The Governance of the Rule of Law,* supervised by English political theorist Harold Laski and Hungarian-born sociologist Karl Mannheim. These writings reflect creative attempts at a pluralist jurisprudence. These were perspectives comprehending the reality of autonomous associations as multiple regimes operating within and beside the sovereign state. Conceptualized here is a "pluralist legal ordering" that functions as distinct subsystems of knowledge and practice. Neumann sought to transcend communitarian myths involved in natural law theories. His focus was on the norm-generating authority of autonomous associations and its relationship to the concept of the "rule of law" (*die Herrschaft des Gesetzes*). He emphasized the making of rules and laws that goes on within the civil society, where all is subject to open-ended rational discussion. This is in contrast with the

perspective of Schmitt, who understood the only authoritative set of laws (*Recht*) to be those established by a centralized sovereign state.

After leaving London, Neumann worked closely with German philosophers Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno at the Institute for Social Research, currently located at Columbia University, but his affinities were closer to Laski and Mannheim. Just after World War II (1939–1945), Neumann assisted chief prosecutor Justice Robert H. Jackson at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal. He also participated in reconstituting the Social Democratic Party and the discipline of political science in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Neumann played a prominent role in efforts by the Rockefeller Foundation to make political theory a core component in the political science curriculum. In 1949 he was appointed to a continuing professorship at Columbia, where he and Robert Denoon Cumming developed a tradition of studying political theory as a sociologized history of ideas that remains relevant to theorizing.

In particular, Neumann probed the limits of the interpretive mode of collective labor law as the century unfolded as well as the emergence of practices of multipartite consultations and bargaining among plural associations. These practices characterize what political sociologist Gerhard Lehmbruch has labeled the "negotiated democracy" of advanced capitalism. Neumann's efforts also anticipated the idea of "reflexive law." This is a concept that classifies the norms, procedures, and rule making that those in plural associations design and establish to govern themselves and their relationships with other associations. They are what Adorno's student Jürgen Habermas referred to as the limitations that direct the self-steering governmentality mechanisms of social subsystems.

See also *Adorno, Theodor W.; Horkheimer, Max; German Political Thought; Laski, Harold Joseph; Mannheim, Karl; Political Theory; Schmitt, Carl.*

. . . .   RICHARD R. WEINER

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Neuroscience and Politics

The application of neuroscience to politics centers around the question of what political issues can best be addressed with biological, genetic, or cognitive neural approaches. Some common areas of investigation include sources of cooperation and aggression, the nature of altruism and punishment, and the potential heritability of important political and social preferences, including ideology. The field of cognitive neuroscience is primarily concerned with elucidating the physiological and neural architecture and functioning of the human brain. These processes include control over basic physical processes, such as breathing, as well as emotional responses centered in the limbic system, and more abstract cognitive processes involving memory, learning, language, and other analytic tasks. Better understanding of these processes can help inform specific political processes such as cooperation or status competition as well as larger questions such as how humans developed shared political and social environments.

Several research techniques exist in neuroscience. These include technologies such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG), and positron emission tomography (PET) scans. Advances in behavioral genetics and research into the action of hormones have also informed this area. Much of this research finds theoretical unity and synthesis through evolutionary models and approaches to human development and behavior.

A great deal of work has been done using fMRI technology to map the geography of the human brain. This technology allows a physical probe of living neural brain tissue, but the measures themselves actually provide an indirect measure of neural activity. Most MRI studies depend on analysis of the BOLD (blood oxygenation level dependent) signal. Findings rest on the assumption that brain activity consumes oxygen, and changes in oxygen level in the blood can therefore signal neural activity. Functional MRIs can provide spatial resolution within about three to six millimeters, so they provide a valuable map of brain activity. They do not, however, provide good temporal resolution. Electrical signals, such as those provided by EEG technology, provide vastly superior temporal information, but inferior spatial orientation, so a combination of MRI and EEG technology is becoming increasingly common. In MRI research, central research strategies include attempts to correlate brain activity with various personality trait variables or political attitudes in order to discern where in the brain a certain decision may take place. For example, if some activity arouses activity in the amygdala, the part of the brain associated with emotional processing in previous studies, researchers might then infer that the given task engages some affective process. For political applications, the problem with MRI technology is that the number of subjects tends to be low, and subjects often repeat tasks, raising concerns about generalization and external validity. But such technology can be used to study the relationship between cognitive and affective processes in strategic voting and political party identification, for example, as well as social processes such as trust and cooperation. However, MRI remains a very expensive technology.

Research in behavioral genetics offers another avenue of potential interest for political scientists. Brains are created and operated by genes interacting with environmental forces. Genes activate continually in the human body, as RNA

(ribonucleic acid) reads DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) to regulate a wide variety of activity. Such processes, for example, control the number of receptors an individual has for various hormones. Human behavior is set to turn on and turn off under certain conditions, the most notably universal of which is puberty, but such expression remains subject to reprogramming, including delay, based on environmental circumstances. The classic method of study in genetic research concentrates on twin studies, which examine the differences between identical (monozygotic) and fraternal (dizygotic) siblings. Twin methodology provides a natural experiment by allowing researchers to determine how much of behavior derives from genetic differences, shared environment, and unshared environment.

More recent advances in molecular biology such as PCR (polymerase chain reaction) technology, whereby a short strand of DNA can be replicated, allow researchers to take DNA from a subject using a cheek swab or a rooted hair sample. Attempts can then be made to correlate particular aspects of DNA with behavioral tendencies. As in all genetic studies, the central question revolves around the impact of particular genes on individual behavior. Hormonal studies can supplement such work as well, to examine individual differences in the number of brain receptor sites as well as differences in actual blood levels of particular chemicals, such as testosterone, oxytocin, or vasopressin.

Much of the work in the emerging area of neuropolitics involves the use of twin studies, experiments involving genetic markers, physiological or hormonal measures, and the use of fMRI technology to explore the nature of political and religious affiliation, ideology, various aspects of voting, and issues related to cooperation and aggression.

See also *Biology and Political Science; Cognitive Theory and Politics; Emotions in Politics; Political Psychology.*

. . . . ROSE MCDERMOTT

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Neustadt, Richard E.

Richard Neustadt (1919–2003) was an American political scientist born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1919. After completing an AB degree at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1939, Neustadt attended Harvard University and earned a master's degree in 1941. He then worked for a short while in the Office of Price Administration as an assistant economist and, beginning in 1942, served as a lieutenant in the U.S. Navy during World War II (1939–1945). After leaving the navy, he served as assistant director in the Bureau of the Budget and remained there until 1950. Neustadt became a special assistant to President Harry Truman in 1950, and held this position until 1953.

While working for Truman, Neustadt completed a PhD in government at Harvard University in 1951. In 1953, he joined the faculty at Cornell University as an assistant professor in government. One year later he left Cornell to join the faculty at Columbia University, and he was there until 1965. While he was a professor at Columbia, Neustadt supplemented his teaching responsibilities by serving as a consultant to groups such as the Democratic Platform Committee, the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, the Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, the Bureau of the Budget, the Ford Foundation, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of State, and the Rand Corporation. He also served as an advisor to president-elect John F. Kennedy. Neustadt solidified his reputation as an expert on presidential politics and further established his lasting legacy as a top authority on the presidency with the 1960 publication of his book, *Presidential Power.*

Neustadt was one of the first to articulate a new approach to the study of presidential power. Instead of focusing on the constitutional powers of the office, which was commonplace in political science, in *Presidential Power* Neustadt argues that a president's power manifests itself in his ability to persuade. He maintains that all presidents come to power with the same constitutional powers; however, the personal abilities of the presidents are what distinguish them from one another. Those presidents adept at persuasion prove more successful, because presidents need to rely on such informal powers in order to execute their duties. This seminal work challenged conventional wisdom at the time and ushered in the concept of the "personal presidency," which looked beyond the static constitutional powers of the office.

After the publication of *Presidential Power,* Neustadt took an active role in the founding of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and served as its associate dean from 1965 to 1979. He was also a professor of government at Harvard until 1989. In addition to *Presidential Power,* which was still being widely used in college classrooms in the early twenty-first century, Neustadt authored or coauthored several more books, including *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan* (1990) and *Preparing to be President: The Memos of Richard E. Neustadt* (2000). After a long and distinguished career, Richard Neustadt died in London, England, on October 31, 2003.

See also *Political Philosophy; Political Science, History of; Political Theory.*

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Neutrality

Neutrality is the act of remaining neutral and impartial and
not taking sides in a given conflict. The two main types of
neutrality are external and internal, and each refers to a dif-
ferent political sphere of action. Neutrality is most commonly
understood in the context of international relations. In this
arena, neutrality is external and understood as the act of not
engaging with warring parties through ideological, financial,
or military means. U.S. president Woodrow Wilson's appeal for
neutrality highlights this idea of remaining neutral in times
of war by arguing the American people should "remain neu-
tral both in thought and in action," as acting to the contrary
would be perceived as a preference for one of the parties in
the conflict. Wilson argued that

> America . . . should show herself in this time of peculiar
> trial a nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise
> of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the
> efficiency of dispassionate action; a nation that neither
> sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own
> counsels (Wilson 1914, para. 6)

INTERNAL NEUTRALITY

In domestic politics, neutrality is a normative consideration
geared toward impartiality in the daily workings of govern-
ments, whereby the government must remain neutral regard-
ing the conception of the public good as society struggles to
define it. For example, governments should not take punitive
action against minorities, whether racial, numerical, or ideo-
logical, in any given struggle and may not enter the debate
itself. A person should not get a traffic ticket from the police
because of personal beliefs about abortion, for instance. Yet
internal neutrality of action by governments does not mean
that the societal effects are the same for every citizen. The
personal situation of the ticketed person would alter the effect
of neutrality of the state; for example, if the ticketed person is
wealthy, the ticket might not have the same material effect it
would have if given to a person who is poor.

According to David Paris, "Internal neutrality (or impar-
tiality) involves the understanding and application of imper-
sonal rules and procedures within some specific or 'local'
cultural practice or set of principles" (2001, 912). This type of
neutrality refers mostly to the procedures applied internally
to organizations or groups that are in charge of applying a set
of rules in any given international or domestic setting. For
example, in the United States, the government is supposed to
fairly apply the law without prejudice toward its citizens, no
matter their ethnic background, religious beliefs, or linguistic

skills. Another example is that of a referee, in any game, who is
supposed to behave in a neutral manner toward teams or indi-
vidual competitors. In international organizations, there are
sets of rules that are specifically geared to neutrality, such as the
United Nations' (UN's) nondiscrimination rules in humani-
tarian and human rights cases. This type of neutrality does not
affect the outcome of whatever ruling is taking place. Yet while
the rules are neutral, the outcomes are not, and thus the results
may vary. A judge applying the same rules against disputants to
a claim can reach variable outcomes. Outcomes can be differ-
ent in games between competing teams in which the referee
applies the same rules. Naturally this is the case in humanitar-
ian law as applied by the UN or its members to human rights
abuses or humanitarian crises.

NEUTRALITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

External neutrality is what practitioners call *principled belief,*
and it "does not involve the context of a local practice or set
of practices. Neutrality in this sense means placing oneself
outside a practice or issue, suggesting noninvolvement, disin-
terest, or indifference" (Paris 2001, 913). At an individual level,
external neutrality means to observe competing positions; an
example is the role of international organizations that par-
ticipate in international politics and do not favor one political
group over another. An individual may remain neutral during
wartime, but usually the term *neutrality* is used for interstate or
interorganizational behavior during times of conflict.

The archetypal modern example of neutrality is Switzer-
land, which has been neutral in European and global interna-
tional relations for nearly six hundred years. Neutrality for the
Swiss, one could argue, originally resulted from the realization
that the country would be unable to protect itself against sur-
rounding major European powers such as France. Additionally
the Swiss lagged behind their neighbors in creating cohesive
central government institutions, which would enable them to
create a military and defense strategy. Starting with the Thirty
Years War (1618–1648), the Swiss remained out of Europe's
conflicts even at the times when the entire world seemed at
war in World War I (1914–1918) and World War II (1939–1945).
The Swiss attempted to solve their problems by arbitration
and were successful in codifying their neutrality in interna-
tional law in the Hague convention of 1907. Even though the
Swiss were active in global humanitarian operations, because
of their view of neutrality, they did not become a member of
the United Nations until 2002.

While the Swiss have been able to protect their strict neu-
trality, other neutral countries such as Ireland have had a more
difficult time. Ireland is a prime example of a neutral country
whose neutrality is more diluted than that of the Swiss. While
the Swiss prevent any military action from their soil and even
flyovers by aircraft of foreign countries, the Irish traditionally
have not only participated in wars such as the two world wars
but also have given assistance to warring parties such as the
United States. In addition, Ireland is a member of international
organizations such as the UN and the European Union (EU),

and this sometimes creates difficulties for remaining neutral. For example, a neutral country that is a member of the EU would have to opt out of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

Beyond interstate relations, there are international organizations that also have claims to neutrality. The prime example of an international organization which is considered neutral is the International Committee of the Red Cross. Maintaining that neutrality, however, has been a challenge for them as well, even in the strictest humanitarian operations.

See also *International Relations; Nonalignment.*

. . . . AKIS KALAITZIDIS

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New Conservatism

New conservatism—sometimes called the "new right"—is an ideological perspective characterized by a collection of "fusion" or "neoconservative" ideas within the larger context of conservative movements and parties generally, and it represents a departure from the conservatism that developed from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. Though the specific arrangement of fusion or neoconservative ideas varies depending upon particular popular or academic expressions of new conservatism, these terms have come to be widely used throughout North America and western Europe over the past thirty years to distinguish self-described "conservative" parties and political movements from the traditionalist conservatism of Edmund Burke and other eighteenth-century critics of emergent liberalism.

Most of new conservatism can be broken down into two basic types. The first is characterized by a fusion of socially conservative beliefs (usually grounded in explicitly religious—mostly Western Christian—assumptions) with fiscal conservative beliefs that emphasize individual economic opportunity and property rights. This combination of ideas has never been very stable, as many social conservatives are willing to conceive of the state as a promoter or defender of customary social and religious mores, whereas fiscal conservatives are generally suspicious of any kind of explicit cultural regulation or promotion. This dispute thus pits more traditional-minded, communitarian conservatives against those who have embraced the "creative destruction" of free market capitalism. Nonetheless,

this fusion has resulted in a very successful conservative movement in electoral terms in the United States (and, to a lesser degree, in some other democratic states such as Great Britain and Canada), primarily because during the cold war, both sides of this combination saw the Soviet Union, and communist ideology generally, as a threat to both religious belief and economic liberty.

The second grouping of new conservative thought is that associated explicitly with neoconservatism in the United States. Neoconservatism began as a response by certain disenchanted liberal thinkers in the 1960s and 1970s to the social damage they felt was being wrought by many liberal egalitarian programs of the day. Of particular concern to the neoconservatives was the negative cultural impact that they believed extensive state involvement in the economy was having on the work ethic and family structure of the most at-risk members of the population: racial minorities and the poor. They also worried about the international consequences of the pacifism of the new left and other liberal movements at the time of the Vietnam War (1959–1975). (While neoconservatives were not always strong defenders of the war, they were highly dismayed at the criticism of the United States that opposition to the war frequently involved.) As these thinkers began to align themselves with conservative movements more thoroughly, a new line of argument emerged. This argument was characterized by an openness to liberal programs but also a suspicion of them: a suspicion not driven by a libertarian commitment to fiscal responsibility but rather by sociological concerns about the collapsing of patriotism, civic bonds, and family stability. Their emphasis on strength and discipline in both domestic and international matters, and their belief that the experimentation and innovation of liberal social and economic policies was helping to undermine the state's cultural strength, fit very well with the other, aforementioned form of fusion conservatism. This affinity led to some neoconservatives in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain going so far as to embrace elements of the socially conservative Christian perspective, though new conservatism or the new right in some other states is notable, on the contrary, for its eschewing of any social or Christian conservatism.

Fusion conservatism has been a successful enough ideology that social and fiscal conservatives have mostly made their peace with it and embraced the movements and parties that have carried the ideology forward. Similarly, the arguments of neoconservatives along with those of social conservatives have evolved into a variety of civic-minded, "compassionate conservative" policies, such as faith-based initiatives that make use of churches and other religious organizations to administer social welfare programs. Most new conservatives bring to conservatism generally a greater concern for pursuing egalitarian goals, so long as this can be done without doing damage to the cultural virtues and foundations that a capitalist society requires. At the same time, their belief in the importance and integrity of the nation has led them to embrace an ideological commitment to the appropriateness of using one's national strength to promote certain values around the world.

See also *Burke, Edmund; Conservative Parties; Conservatism; Fiscal Conservatism; Neoconservatism; New Left; New Right; Property Rights; Religious Right; Rule of Law; Social Conservatism.*

. . . .   RUSSELL ARBEN FOX

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New Deal

One of the most crucial shifts in American social and political history, the New Deal was the name of a series of economic and social reforms as well as a new orientation of the U.S. federal government toward more active regulation of the national economy. Initiated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the New Deal programs were a set of policy responses to the massive economic crisis spawned by the collapse of the American economy in 1929 and the Great Depression that followed. Following his November 1932 election and with unemployment surging to nearly 25 percent in early 1933, Roosevelt proposed a set of reforms to stimulate economic growth and employment and to rebuild the structure of the American economy by expanding the government's capacity to regulate market activities.

The basic idea put forth by the New Dealers in Roosevelt's administration was that the Great Depression was not simply a blip in an ordinarily self-regulating economy that would soon correct itself. Rather, in their view, the problem was one of *too much* competition: Excessive competition within the industrial and agricultural sectors had the effect of lowering overall wages and prices. A key element of the New Deal was therefore to erect new government agencies and powers to regulate and coordinate economic and industrial activity in order to avoid catastrophic troughs in the business cycle and to insulate workers from the attendant economic hardships. This impulse to exercise greater regulatory authority over economic and labor markets had two main intellectual and historical roots that converged in the New Deal reforms.

ORIGIN OF NEW DEAL REFORMS

The first precursor was the steady drive for an expanded executive branch of the government during the Progressive Era, which was in part a response to the concentration of private, corporate power during the Gilded Age and political reform efforts that arose to restrain these corporate giants. President Woodrow Wilson had been one of the first presidents to expand the reach of the executive branch, and before Wilson, President Theodore Roosevelt had made an antimonopoly stance one of the core elements of his economic program. This trend in American political development had its roots in a new intellectual orientation that began in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth. This new approach to political economy was a decisive turn toward the creation of a more modern and expanded American state with the capacity to regulate the economy as opposed to the laissez-faire political economy of the nineteenth century. One of the central aims of progressive reformers was to empower the state to regulate the economy for democratic or public ends rather than for private benefit. Much of this populist and progressive ethos and regulatory impulse was embraced and refined by New Deal policy makers.

Organized labor, which had seen its power waning in the years of the Depression, was given new life under the New Deal. One of Roosevelt's central policy initiatives was the balancing out of the powers of capital and labor. Labor had largely failed for the previous fifty years to organize the bulk of the workers in major industries such as steel, textiles, mining, and auto manufacture. Ten years prior to 1933, the unionized workforce was approximately five million; at the start of Roosevelt's presidency, it had shrunk to about two million. Roosevelt's policies were designed to give new strength to unions, to collective bargaining, and to ability to unionize. These actions endeared organized labor to the Roosevelt administration and to the New Deal coalition for the next several decades, and this alliance had a major impact on the redistribution of wealth in American society.

A second influence on New Deal policy and thought was the economic theory of British economist John Maynard Keynes. Keynes's ideas were crystallized and published in 1936 in his *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,* in which he argued that in times of crisis, expanded public sector spending was crucial to stimulate economic growth. The central government had to infuse money into the macro economy, thereby creating what Keynes termed a "multiplier effect," with which money available for industry would spur employment, consumption, and broader economic recovery. This pump priming of the macro economy via deficit spending was not, however, accepted by many of the New Dealers themselves. Keynes viewed public deficits as a necessary and crucial component of such policies, but many New Dealers, including the treasury department's Henry Morgenthau, believed that balancing the federal budget was more important than following Keynesian policy prescriptions.

NEW DEAL IN ACTION

The New Deal was launched on March 3, 1933. The increased regulatory role of the state was evident in the first policies enacted. The Emergency Banking Act brought banks under the supervision of the treasury department, and the passage of the Federal Deposit and Security Act created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to insure bank deposits. The Agricultural Adjustment Act created the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA). The policies of the AAA

were also regulatory in nature: Prices were to be inflated by regulating the amount farmers produced. Farmers were paid to leave land idle, and the AAA set limits on the production of corn, wheat, rice, and pork. The reforms in both banking and agriculture were exemplary of the early ideas of the New Deal: that the federal government's central role is to regulate economic activity.

Yet another layer of New Deal policies was aimed at the reform of the industrial sector. Also created in 1933 was the National Recovery Administration (NRA). The reforms pursued by the NRA were sweeping: The limiting of the work week to 35 to 45 hours, the abolition of child labor, and the establishment of the minimum wage were all key reforms aimed at enlarging the power of labor and decreasing the hypercompetitiveness of the industrial sector, which Roosevelt saw as a key cause of the Depression.

Like other key New Dealers in his administration, Roosevelt was wary of running massive budget deficits, but he also saw the need for the state to become more than simply a regulator of economic activity. Roosevelt allowed certain budget deficits, and there was immense government spending; however, it was not as expansive and intense a pump-priming fiscal policy as Keynes had proposed. It is possible that the consistent requirement to balance the federal budget had much to do with the dull effect that New Deal policies had on stimulating economic growth. It is important to recall the general concerns that drove New Deal thought: Excessive competition, the weakness of labor's bargaining power vis-à-vis that of corporations, and the need for expanded federal regulation were the main elements of New Deal policy.

This was most evident in the last phase of the New Deal: Later New Deal reforms were less concerned with economic growth and more focused on support for labor and the protection of the public from economic insecurity. The Works Progress Administration (WPA), the Social Security Act, the creation of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and finally the Fair Labor Standards Act were all intended to strengthen the bargaining power and working conditions of labor and create a more economically enfranchised and protected working class.

IMPACT OF THE NEW DEAL

In hindsight, the New Deal was both controversial and successful. The NRA and AAA were struck down as unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court, and public support began to wane with the New Deal's apparent overreach into the economy. Although the New Deal did not succeed in reigniting prosperous economic growth (that would come with the war economy during WWII [1939–1945]), it did succeed in restructuring the American political economy. The notions that the state can and must intervene in economic affairs, play an active role in promoting equality, direct certain forms of development, and protect people from the harshness of market failures were all hallmarks of the New Deal. Many of its enduring programs—such as Social Security, the Securities Exchange Commission, and Fannie Mae—have been remarkably successful and enjoy enduring political support.

Despite these successes, the New Deal also had its critics, both then and now. The most prevailing critique of the New Deal while it was being enacted came from those who were fearful of the intervention of the state into society as a whole and into the economy in particular. Roosevelt utilized the newly expanded powers of the state, which had begun under the Wilson administration, in order to bring about reforms. Critics, however, saw New Deal policies as socialist and began to argue that it was an overreach of the executive branch. The big business community saw the reforms themselves, specifically the powers Roosevelt granted to labor, as endangering their own political and economic power. Today, these criticisms of the New Deal are still voiced, as is the charge that it did nothing to stimulate economic growth and is therefore, in economic terms, a failure. Nevertheless, there is no denying the changed pattern of American society and government after the New Deal reforms, especially in the way that it gave renewed power to organized labor as well as the new powers accrued by the state. In the end, it is this transformation of the orientation of government that makes the New Deal a seminal development in American political and social history.

See also *Keynesianism; Laissez-faire; Regulation and Rulemaking.*

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New Europe

From the point of view of European politics, the term *New Europe* is generally used in relation to the post–Communist-era countries of Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria. The New Europe theory emphasizes the support of this formerly communist Eastern bloc for the 2003 war in Iraq, although it is not limited to this. In contrast to the governments of some western European states, the governments of central and eastern European countries were sympathetic to President George W. Bush's hard policy line on Iraq. Additionally, in these countries, the Iraq war did not represent a major issue in domestic politics, nor did it generate significant protests. However, it should be noted that some western

European countries (e.g., Spain, Italy, United Kingdom, and Denmark) were also in favor of the war, but they were not conceived of as belonging to the New Europe.

According to Scott MacMillan, the New Europe concept can be further linked with the European Union (EU) integration. On the one hand, the central European states are viewed through the effort of national institutions and cultural identity preservation from the distant authorities in Brussels or from the Franco-German dominance. On the other hand, in the EU democratic and transparent institutional framework, central and Eastern European politicians attempt to take clear positions over the direction of the EU.

See also *Europeanization; European Union; Old Europe; Soviet Union, Former.*

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New Institutionalism

The renewed interest in institutions in political science over the last twenty years has been associated with a school known as new institutionalism. Institutions were marginalized in American political science during the 1960s and 1970s because of their association with a formal-legal style of scholarship ("old" institutionalism) that was criticized for being descriptive, a-theoretical, and parochial. In the context of the behavioralist movement, institutions seemed anathema to deductive logic, quantification, and grand theorizing or, in other words, to good and proper political science. New institutionalism emerged as a reaction against this orthodoxy and at the same time looked to take a broader and more dynamic view of institutions than the old institutionalism, which was focused on detailing their workings.

New institutionalism is not a coherent and unified theoretical school. Rather, it includes several branches that developed in relative isolation to each other: historical institutionalism and its idea of path dependency; rational choice institutionalism, which emerged as rational choice theorists increasingly stressed the importance of institutions in the strategic calculations of actors; and sociological institutionalism, which developed out of organization theory and stresses the cognitive dimension of institutions.

DEFINING INSTITUTION

One question that inevitably comes up with new institutionalism is how institutions are defined. The formal-legal scholarship understood institutions as material structures. They were constitutions, cabinets, parliaments, bureaucracies, courts, armies, federal or autonomy arrangements, and, in some instances, party systems.

This materialist definition is accepted by a great many new institutionalists. In *Structuring Politics* (1992), Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth spoke of electoral rules, party systems, the structure of relationships between branches of government, and trade unions. Rational choice institutionalists depart somewhat from this definition by focusing more squarely on the "rules of the political game," which tend to be associated with material structures but in themselves represent less tangible parameters.

A more significant departure from the materialist definition consists of conceptualizing institutions in terms of norms and values. This was the avenue chosen by James March and Johan Olsen in their *Rediscovering Institutions* (1989), where they defined institutions as collections of interrelated rules and routines. Sociological institutionalists go the furthest in defining institutions in a nonmaterialist fashion, speaking of beliefs, values, and cognitive scripts. Historical institutionalists are generally closer to the view that institutions are formal structures, although some have brought ideas into their framework. Therefore, there is some disagreement within new institutionalism as to what degree of rigidity is required to have an institution.

STRUCTURE AND AGENCY

Another issue raised by new institutionalism relates to the structure and agency dilemma. More specifically, new institutionalism brings up three types of questions relating to structure and agency. What are the mechanisms through which institutions shape action? What is the extent of the weight of institutions on agents? What is the depth of institutional influence on political processes—that is, is the weight of institutions felt only on strategies or also on preferences?

The issue of how institutions affect agency is viewed in two different ways. The first emphasizes path dependency. At the broadest level, path dependency refers to the importance of the early stages of a temporal sequence. It is the idea that once institutions are formed, they take a life of their own and drive political processes. From this particular perspective, most often associated with historical institutionalism, *when* an event occurs is as important as what this event is. The second new institutionalist view on the issue of how institutions affect agency says that institutions shape action, because they offer opportunities for action and impose constraints. This angle, stressed first and foremost by rational choice institutionalists, although not ignored by historical institutionalists, suggests that the weight of institutions is felt on outcomes insofar as it affects individual and collective decisions. In this context, the theoretical importance of institutions stems from their mediating effect on the calculations of actors.

The question of the extent of the weight of institutions on agency or, in other words, the level of structuralism involved in institutional analysis is also discussed in at least two different ways. On the one hand, new institutionalists who adopt a

more rationalist perspective on the nature of the relationship between institutions and agents argue that political processes are really driven by actors. Institutions represent a context for action rather than an autonomous force per se. Path dependency, on the other hand, suggests a more overwhelming quality to institutions, as the autonomy of actors may be severely limited by the logic of institutional development and reproduction. Structuralism is even stronger when institutions are conceptualized in terms of ideas, culture, and norms, such as in the sociological institutionalism and some versions of historical institutionalism, since they become internalized by actors. March and Olsen have argued that behavior is driven by other elements than utility calculations—namely internalized principles and values, cultural features, identity, and habit. For the "logic of consequences," in which actors behave in accordance with expected results, they substitute the "logic of appropriateness," in which actors behave so as to conform to existing rules or values.

INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE

The issue of the depth of institutional influence ties into the first two questions. For the more rationalist-minded new institutionalists, the impact of institutions is felt strictly on strategies. The interests and preferences of actors are formed independently of the specific institutional environment; they follow a logic of power maximization. From a sociological institutionalist perspective, as well as from a historical institutionalist one, institutions affect not only strategies and interests but also patterns of relationships between actors, preferences, objectives, identities, and, indeed, the very existence of actors. In other words, historical and sociological institutionalists tend to problematize more aspects of agency than rational choice institutionalists.

How do new institutionalists theorize institutional change? One explanation focuses on exogenous shocks. It suggests that international events such as wars and global financial crises, in disturbing the unfolding of domestic processes, break the cycle of institutional reproduction, thereby opening up opportunities for, if not forcing, institutional transformations and political change. From this perspective, institutions are not created endogenously. Some new institutionalists, primarily those of the rational choice persuasion, have adopted a more utilitarian view on institutional change. They suggest that institutions are transformed when they become dysfunctional or yield suboptimal results. Sociological institutionalists have tended to view institutional change in terms of convergence. The key idea here is that of isomorphism, which suggests that coexisting institutions, more specifically institutions in a similar domain, will tend to look alike, whatever the differences in their immediate environment.

CONCLUSION

New institutionalism is a prominent approach to politics and related disciplines—Elinor Ostrom and Oliver Williamson, two scholars with strong new institutionalist leanings, were awarded the Nobel Prize for economics in 2009. New institutionalism is also fragmented. Nevertheless, scholars have argued that there is a theoretical core to new institutionalism, since all three different streams view institutions as the single most important variable in explaining politics.

See also *Institutionalism, Comparative.*

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New Left

The *new left* refers to an international movement, composed principally of students and other young people, which arose in the developed capitalist countries during the 1960s. It was "new" in contrast to the old, Communist left, which new leftists believed to have become ossified by orthodoxy and ideological dependence on the Soviet Union. New left theorists rejected both Communist orthodoxy and the anti-Communist ideology of the leaders of the capitalist bloc.

The new left was inspired by the U.S. civil rights movement, the Cuban revolution, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and the writings of Herbert Marcuse, Ernesto "Che" Guevára, Régis Debray, Mao Zedong, and Ho Chi Minh. In the United States, its founding moment was the Port Huron (Michigan) conference of 1962 and its eponymous statement, which proclaimed that "people have a right to participate in the making of those decisions that affect their lives." The common element was an emphasis on politics from below, which was seen as more important than any particular formal democratic structure. The conference had been called by the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID), which was

refounded as Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). It indicated its rejection of cold war divisions by explicitly dropping SLID's ban on communists among its members.

SDS was only one part of the U.S. new left. Another important component, the free speech movement at the University of California, Berkeley, arose in the fall of 1964, when students who had taken part in the Mississippi freedom summer project of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) were barred from raising money for the civil rights movement on campus; the resulting protest convulsed the campus and raised many broader issues, most notably the call for student power.

As the war in Vietnam escalated, antiwar protests became the central theme of the new left, particularly in the United States. Campus-based activists developed the concept of *university complicity* with the war effort, through war-related research, on-campus recruiting by war industries, and the provision of military training to students through the Reserve Officers Training Corps. This concept led to campaigns of nonviolent resistance, sometimes culminating in building occupations, campuswide strikes, clashes with police, and massive arrests; 1968 and 1969 saw many such events.

The term *new left* most commonly refers to the movement of college students, most of whom were white. However, the core of the campus new left saw itself engaged in a common struggle with community activists, particularly among African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans, including the Black Panther Party, the American Indian Movement, and the Brown Berets, and to a lesser extent with radical activists in the labor movement. New left activists also saw themselves as part of an international movement, in solidarity with student activists in France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, and elsewhere, and with the national liberation movements in third world countries, most notably Vietnam. The French student-worker insurrection of May–June 1968 was a model for many in the U.S. new left.

The new left was only one part of the broader movement against the U.S. war in Vietnam. The latter was led by a coalition of liberals, pacifists, and the old left, and it sought to maximize participation by limiting its agenda to demands to "stop the bombing" and "negotiate now." The new left, in contrast, supported the concept of national self-determination for Vietnam. Different phrasings—from "immediate withdrawal" to "victory for the NLF"—reflected ideological divisions within the new left but posed an alternative to the slogans of the National Mobilization Committee and the later moratorium.

New leftists tended to prefer local actions over large national marches. However, many new leftists took part in the Chicago protests against the Democratic national convention of 1968, and in the presidential campaigns of Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy in 1968 and of George McGovern in 1972.

SDS's quarterly national meetings were marked by lively debate and growing factionalism, which came to a head in the Chicago national convention of 1969, where the organization split in two, between supporters of the Maoist Progressive Labor Party and a number of groups (notably Weatherman

and the Revolutionary Youth Movement) that identified with Ho Chi Minh and the Black Panther Party. Neither faction thrived after the split, but new left activists went on to play central roles in a wide variety of movements during the following decades.

See also *Communism; Left; Libertarianism; Marxism; Neoconservatism; New Right; Progressivism; Religious Right; Right; Socialism.*

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Newly Industrializing Countries (NIC)

The term *newly industrializing countries* (NICs) was used to describe a number of developing countries that experienced significant levels of economic development during the 1970s and 1980s. The key indicators that were often used to characterize the NICs included high rates of economic growth, rapid industrialization, and the expansion of exports in manufactured goods. The NICs became significant case studies in wider debates about the theory and practice of development. The question of which countries should be classified as NICs is not unambiguous, but the term has become most readily associated with the four "tiger" countries/territories in East Asia: Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. They managed to achieve high levels of economic growth and low inflation combined with significant progress in adult literacy rates and life expectancy.

Two distinct positions developed in the debate over the interpretation of why the East Asian NICs were able to achieve such spectacular levels of development. First, there was the neoliberal view, which tended to focus on the efficient allocation of resources and the export-led nature of those NICs' development strategies. This view sought to portray the NICs as supporting evidence for the types of development policies being promoted during the 1980s by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. The NICs were contrasted with many other developing countries that had followed the logic of dependency theory by protecting themselves from the international economy and following import substitution industrialization policies.

The second debate position is often termed the "developmental state" view. In contrast to neoliberalism, this view highlighted the political factors at play and in particular the

key role played by the state in the economic development of the NICs. Most of these countries were led by authoritarian governments that were involved directly in promoting the specific sectors of the economy selected for exports. The state invested heavily in education, training, transport, and communications. Trade protectionism and subsidies were also used to support the growth of exports.

Another issue that was debated in response to the rise of the East Asian NICs was the idea of "Asian values." Some scholars suggested that the NICs' success was chiefly the result of specific cultural factors. In particular, these scholars focused on Confucianism and how it encourages cooperative and consensual business relationships. This would make the achievements of the East Asian NICs hard to translate into a generalizable development model.

One of the problems with discussing the East Asian NICs as a group is that the diversity of their individual situations is lost. Hong Kong and Singapore, being small city-states, were able to follow more classic free market policies than South Korea and Taiwan followed; in these latter two, the state played a significant role, especially in land reform before the period of rapid industrialization. The external environment and historical specificities should also be acknowledged. In particular, the United States provided significant aid and access to its market as part of its broadened geopolitical interests during the cold war. The East Asian NICs can now be classed as "developed" with reference to any number of different indicators. However, the term has been replaced by other labels such as "emerging economies," which is often used to describe other developing countries that are currently experiencing significant economic development.

See also *Asian Political Thought; Economic Development, State-led; Economic Policy Formulation; Economic Systems, Comparative.*

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New Right

The *new right* refers to a set of political ideas or ideology that developed in the 1970s and that had considerable influence on political debate and public policy for over thirty years. In essence, the new right refers to the renewing and repackaging of classical liberalism as a response to the economic and political crises that affected many Western developed nations in the 1970s. In much of the West during the postwar period, governments developed increasingly interventionist economic and social policies that significantly increased the role and expenditure of the state. However, a combination of rising expectations, the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system between 1968 and 1973, and the rise of oil prices led to a sense that postwar economic intervention was failing.

The new right, in developing the work of thinkers such as Friedrich Hayek, Robert Nozick, and Milton Friedman, provided a critique of the Keynesian welfare state, arguing that government intervention exacerbated economic problems by distorting market signals. Consequently, they rejected the idea that economy could be stimulated through government intervention. Instead they suggested that government spending was creating inflation in economies by expanding the money supply and artificially increasing the level of employment. For new right economists, there was a natural rate of employment that was determined by the market, and intervention artificially increased the price of labor and distorted production.

The new right also believed that government expenditure was crowding out the private sector by soaking up too much money and not allowing the private sector sufficient funds for investment. Other new right thinkers such as William Niskanen argued that politicians and bureaucrats were not public servants but acting in their own, rational self interest. Consequently, they increased the size of the state, because it enabled the politicians to secure reelection and the bureaucrats to increase the size of their budgets and their status. The consequence was increasing welfare dependency amongst citizens who depend on the state rather than individual initiative to resolve problems.

The new right maintained the need for a significant reduction in the role of the state. Indeed, many on the new right believed the role of the state should be limited to maintaining property rights and order. Because the aim of the new right was to maximize the role of the market and to reduce the role of the state, the new right advocated cutting public expenditure, reducing taxation, disengaging the state from the economy (particularly through privatization), and reducing the scale and extent of welfare programs. The view of the new right was that markets could provide for the more effective coordination of societies and hence produce collective outcomes that were more efficient and did not impinge on individual liberty.

With the apparent failure of welfare states to deal with the economic problems of the 1970s and 1980s, the new right was influential, because it offered a clear and coherent alternative to social and Christian democratic parties. Particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom, new right ideas were highly influential, and leaders such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan promoted policies directly influenced by new right thinking. In Britain, Thatcher was elected in 1979 on a program of cutting public expenditure, reforming welfare, and reducing the role of the state, and Ronald Reagan was elected president in the United States in 1980 on the basis of a similar program. Both followed monetarist economic policy aimed at reducing the money supply and cutting taxation, and the Thatcher government implemented a long term policy of privatization. The liberal economic agenda became increasingly

influential around the world as the ideas of markets as the key organizing principle for the economy replaced the notion that the state could stimulate economic activity.

Nevertheless, the application of new right ideas in practice created significant problems. First, both the Republican and Conservative parties had highly conservative elements who rejected the liberalism of much new right thought. Consequently, new right ideas were married to traditional conservative concerns around issues of morality and social order. Second, rather than reducing the role of the state, the implementation of radical social and economic change often required strong state action, and there was little reduction in the overall level of state activity. Third, especially in Britain, the assault on the welfare state was severely constrained by the impact of economic policies that increased unemployment and the general high level of public support for many welfare measures.

Despite the problems of implementing new right proscriptions, new right thinking has become highly influential throughout the world. Many governments have accepted the importance of the markets and the need for welfare reform, and the managerial revolution has seen the implementation of market criteria in a range of public services. The establishment of the so-called Washington consensus has resulted in many new right policies being taken for granted, and Tony Blair and Bill Clinton both fashioned electoral success by accommodating their center left parties to new right policy prescriptions. Nevertheless, the financial crisis of 2008–2009 has led many governments to rethink the role of unfettered markets in economic coordination, and there has been an increasing backlash against the market-led approach to governance.

See also *Democracy; Economic Systems, Comparative; New Conservatism; New Left.*

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News, Construction of

Construction of news is the process by which information about events, people, and ideas is compiled into a format that allows it to be transmitted to an audience. The product of this process is the news, which the public consumes to varying degrees through media such as newspapers, magazines, television, radio, and the Internet. To view news as a construction is to believe that it does more than just reflect the objective realities of the world. Rather, from this perspective, the news emerges from a series of decisions, habits, and external forces; the product both reflects reality and, to some extent, constitutes reality. This conception of news has its roots in some of the earliest examinations of mass media and the public, including Walter Lippmann's *Public Opinion* (1922), and crystallized in scholarly thought during the 1970s with work such as Gaye Tuchman's *Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality* (1978). In many commercial media systems worldwide, the primary factors that influence the construction of news are economic forces, journalistic norms, and the strategic communication practices of politicians and interest groups.

ECONOMIC FORCES

Typically, commercial news media are owned by large corporate conglomerates and supported primarily by advertising revenue. As a result, those involved in constructing the news pay close attention to what information and presentation style is likely to generate the largest audience. Large audiences are desirable, because they generate more advertising revenue and, consequently, greater profits for news organizations and their parent corporations. As the corporations that own news media grow larger and audiences face a rapidly expanding range of news sources—trends facilitated by government deregulation of media companies and the growth of the Internet—the pursuit of profits through news becomes increasingly pronounced.

There is little question that economic considerations influence the construction of news, but there are different views as to the extent of that influence. Some feel as though the business side of news organizations is generally uninvolved with the news side, while others argue that the concentration of media ownership increases the pressures of commercialism and has a deleterious impact on the quality of the news. Some common concerns are that economic pressures lead journalists to rely too heavily on official sources, offer insufficient contextual information, and focus on a limited range of topics, especially emphasizing the problems of the public sector over those of the private sector. One well-documented outcome of modern economic constraints is that traditional "hard news," such as politics and foreign affairs, has given way to more "soft news," which emphasizes entertainment and human interest stories. Even in less commercially driven media systems, news construction is based to some extent on perceived audience interest.

JOURNALISTIC NORMS

Like the employees of other organizations, journalists engage in a series of routines and practices that help them do their job. These journalistic norms influence the construction of news, because journalists act as gatekeepers; that is, their decisions about which stories to present and how to present them fundamentally shape the news that much of the public will receive. Studies of the gatekeeping process demonstrate that journalists' views about what is newsworthy, stylistically pleasing, and ideologically acceptable all affect the form and content of the news. As cable news and the Internet have expanded options for news consumers in many countries, the gatekeeping function of the press has diminished. Nevertheless, journalistic norms continue to play an important role in the construction of news.

Norms vary by country and change over time. Among the more common and consequential of these norms are the presumption of objectivity or neutrality, including the expectation that journalists will remove themselves from the story by relying on sources to present both sides of a given story; the tendency to favor sources that are deemed authoritative, especially those in positions of power; an emphasis on dramatic stories or the most dramatic elements within a given story, including crisis, conflict, or scandal; and the desire to find exclusive stories or "scoops" that will differentiate a story, journalist, or news organization from competitors. Journalists also have traditionally worked with limited time and space, which has led them to use the "inverted pyramid" style of presentation. This style frontloads the basic factual information of the story and limits further analysis.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PRACTICES

Political leaders and interest groups often perceive favorable news coverage as crucial to achieving their objectives. Because of this, they work to influence the construction of news though various techniques. In countries with an independent press, such techniques include giving public speeches, holding press conferences, issuing press releases or video news releases, developing relationships with journalists, and serving as sources in journalists' stories. In countries that have more government involvement in the press, direct propaganda and censorship sometimes render such techniques unnecessary. Strategies for press management have become increasingly common and sophisticated over time, beginning in earnest during the early twentieth century and growing exponentially since then. Politics in particular are now practiced much more publicly than they were in previous eras, which has led politicians to devote a substantial amount of time and energy to news management.

Such attempts have mixed success. Journalists do use speeches, press conferences, press releases, and the like to generate ideas for stories. In some cases, news organizations will print such material in its original form. Further, in many news systems, journalists' tendency to seek out seemingly reputable or authoritative sources encourages a heavy reliance on official sources and ensures that political news coverage regularly gives voice to those in positions of political power. Nevertheless, journalists often reject overt attempts at news management, and voices critical of politicians and interests groups regularly find their way into news coverage generated in independent media systems.

There is no consensus as to which of these three factors—economic forces, journalistic norms, or strategic communication practices—exerts the most influence on the construction of news. Journalists tend to view themselves as fairly independent, though acknowledging the economic constraints they face and the symbiotic relationship they maintain with politicians and interest groups. Practitioners of strategic communication often assume their techniques are effective, though research confirms that the success of these approaches is highly dependent on context and often limited. Many scholars emphasize the economic structure of commercial news media as the decisive factor. Regardless of which is the most influential, each of the three factors contributes meaningfully to the construction of news.

See also *Framing and Public Opinion; Gatekeeping; Media, Political Commentary in the; Media and Politics; Media Bias; Political Communication; Press (The Fourth Estate); Television and Politics.*

. . . .   KEVIN COE

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New World Order

International relations realists and idealists disagree about whether the international system can be transformed from a conflictive anarchic realm to a *new world order* of peaceful cooperation. The meaning of system transformation varies by theory. According to structural realists, the international system is anarchic and will remain so unless all states surrender their sovereignty to a single world government. Marxists, by contrast, define the current order as capitalist and foresee its replacement by socialism.

Participants in the debate use different terms to describe themselves and the outcomes they foresee. E. H. Carr, for example, contrasted "realist" and "utopian" perspectives on the possibility of "peaceful change," while V. I. Lenin distinguished between "revolutionary" and "bourgeois" approaches to the "new economic order."

Debate about the new world order occurs in both academic and policy circles. Its most recent appearance on the public stage was at the end of the cold war, when U.S. president George H. W. Bush used the phrase to wrest the diplomatic initiative from Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev. In a speech to Congress on September 11, 1990, Bush called for "a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak."

See also *Idealism; International System; Leninism; Marxism; Realism and Neorealism; Utopias and Politics.*

. . . .   KAREN RUTH ADAMS

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Niebuhr, Reinhold

Karl Paul Reinhold Niebuhr (1892–1971) was an American theologian and political theorist best known among political scientists for his contributions to the classical realist school of international relations and particularly to its Christian branch.

Niebuhr was born on June 21, 1892, in Wright City, Missouri. The son of a German Protestant pastor, at age fifteen he decided to follow in his father's footsteps and began his theological studies at the *Evangelische Proseminar* (now Elmhurst College) in Elmhurst, Illinois. After completing his education at Eden Seminary and Yale Divinity School, in 1915 he was ordained pastor of the Bethel Evangelical Church in Detroit, Michigan, where he remained for thirteen years. In this period—recounted in the autobiographical *Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic* (1929)—Niebuhr's closeness to the city's working-class communities and his exposure to the injustices of early twentieth-century industrial capitalism (epitomized by the Ford factory) led him to abandon his early liberalism in favor of a growing sympathy with the principles of Marxism. His new convictions resulted in his becoming a leader of the Socialist Party of America.

In 1928, Niebuhr left his pastorate for an academic position at Union Theological Seminary in New York. There he began a twofold intellectual transition that would characterize his thought until the end of his academic career in 1960. First, he became even more interested in the problems and questions of international affairs. Second, from a fundamentally class-based view of society Niebuhr switched to a political realism founded on the idea of the original sin as a unifying and degrading element of humanity—a realism that, however, retained some Marxist nuances, especially when applied to issues of political economy. This vision of politics is expressed in the several works he published during these years, which placed him in the pantheon of classical realism with authors like E. H. Carr, Henry Morgenthau, and George Kennan. These works include *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (1932), *Christianity and Power Politics* (1940), the two volumes of *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (1941, 1943), *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (1944), and *Christian Realism and Political Problems* (1953).

In addition to his focus on the theory of international relations—and unlike many of his fellow realists—Niebuhr had a strong interest in the problems of morality and its application to political practice. *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* of 1935 is perhaps his main work in this field. He was also engaged as a public intellectual by contributing to periodicals such as *The New Republic, The Nation, Christianity and Crisis,* and *The New Leader.* Finally, throughout his academic years, Niebuhr remained active in politics as the leader of movements like the Fellowship of Socialist Christians and Americans for Democratic Action and as a consultant to American diplomat George F. Kennan's policy planning staff.

In 1952, Niebuhr suffered a stroke that gradually debilitated him and eventually led to his retirement from Union Seminary in 1960. After holding a few short-term positions at Harvard, Princeton, and Barnard College, he died in Stockbridge, Massachusetts, on June 1, 1971.

See also *International Relations; International Relations Theory; Marxism; Political Theory; Realism and Neorealism; Socialism.*

. . . .   PIER DOMENICO TORTOLA

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Nietzsche, Friedrich

German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) was born in Prussia in 1844, the son of a Protestant pastor. He attended Schulpforta boarding school and completed his PhD in classical philology in Bonn and Leipzig, where he became friends with composer Richard Wagner. In 1869 Nietzsche became a professor in Basel, Switzerland, and a colleague of Swiss art and culture historian Jacob Burkhardt.

In 1872 Nietzsche published *Birth of Tragedy,* which contained his analysis of art in terms of the Apollonian/Dionysian duality as well as effusive praise of Wagner. This was followed by *Untimely Meditations* (1873–1876), a study of European culture, and *Human, All-Too-Human* (1878), in which he explored such topics as religion, psychology, and social reality. In 1879 he retired from teaching for health reasons and lived for the rest of his life variously in Switzerland, Italy, and on the French Riviera, writing *The Dawn* (1881), *The Joyful Wisdom* (1882), his magnum opus *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883–1885), *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886), *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887), *Twilight of the Idols* (1888), *The Antichrist* (1888), *The Case of Wagner* (1888), and his autobiography *Ecce Homo* (1888). In 1889 he had a mental breakdown from which he never recovered, and he died in 1900. His sister rewrote portions of his works to reflect her own anti-Semitism, and in 1901 she published *The Will to Power,* a collection of his notes that she claimed was his magnum opus. Her distortions facilitated the reception of Nietzsche's thought by the Fascists and Nazis.

Nietzsche is best known for proclaiming the death of God in several of his works. He is also often identified with the concept of nihilism, a spiritual malaise that he believed was undermining European morality and would give birth to terrible wars. Much of his thought was devoted to explaining the

German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche devoted much of his career to explaining the origins of nihilism.

SOURCE: Getty Images

origin of nihilism, which he saw as a manifestation of declining life. Life, as he saw it, is will to power, a struggle between all beings for dominance over one another. In such a competitive environment, the strong flourish and establish themselves as masters, portraying themselves as "good" in contrast to the "bad" slaves. This master morality characterized the ancient world until it was overthrown by slave morality that portrayed the weak as "good" and the strong as "evil." This reversal of values began with the Greek philosopher Plato, was institutionalized by Christianity with its ascetic ideal, and culminated in modern social democracy.

With the death of God and the advent of nihilism, Nietzsche believed humanity faced a great decision—whether to return to a healthier way of life such as that of the Greeks or to pursue a pleasurable but aimless existence. The former choice leads to Nietzsche's famous superman, the latter to the last man. The superman, for Nietzsche, lives beyond good and evil, accepting the world as it is and rejecting all pity. The last man is driven and dominated entirely by his momentary desires. The path of the superman requires the acceptance and affirmation of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of all things, or what Nietzsche elsewhere calls *amor fati,* love of fate.

While many have affirmed Nietzsche's critique of modern society, there has been considerable disagreement about whether the struggle for power and the wars he predicts are real-world events or metaphors for spiritual struggle. Regardless, he exercised a profound influence on many of the greatest thinkers of the twentieth century.

See also *Fascism; Political Theory; Social Democracy.*

. . . . MICHAEL ALLEN GILLESPIE

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Nobel Peace Prize

The Peace Prize is one of five prizes endowed by Swedish chemist Alfred Nobel, who believed that the potential for devastation created by his invention, dynamite, would put an end to war. The first Nobel Peace Prize was awarded in 1901. Today it is worth about $1,650,000.

Over the years, the prizes have rewarded a variety of approaches to peace. The ninety-five individual prizes have been awarded to peace activists outside government, such as Jane Addams; to officials committed to international law, such as Dag Hammarskjöld; to opponents who agreed to negotiate, such as Anwar al-Sadat and Menachem Begin; and to those seeking justice and freedom in their own country but non-violently, such as Martin Luther King Jr. Twenty organizations have won, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has won three times. In nineteen of the years since 1901, the prize has not been awarded. In some years there have been multiple winners.

Until 1960, when Albert Lutuli of South Africa won, all winners but one were from the United States or Europe. Since 1960, the reach of the prize has become global. Twelve women have won; three were among the twenty American winners. Bertha von Suttner, the first woman to win, was an activist and author of the antiwar novel *Lay Down Your Arms;* she is credited with persuading Nobel to create the prize. Some prizes have rewarded accomplishment, some have encouraged further action, and some have provided protection for winners from their own government.

See also *Addams, Jane.*

. . . . JUDITH HICKS STIEHM

Nonalignment

Nonalignment refers to a policy of neutrality toward international security alliances. It is most commonly used to reference an organized movement of former colonies and developing nations formed during the cold war. A nonaligned country was by definition one that had no formal pact with either the

United States or the Soviet bloc, although in several cases, most prominently that of Cuba, this position was only nominal. The stark power difference between nonaligned countries and the cold war blocs forced many such countries to eventually take positions that challenged the movement's integrity, and in the opinion of some, undermined its effectiveness.

The earliest mention of the term *nonalignment* is credited to Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who used it during a 1954 speech on Sino-Indian relations. India's definitive nonviolent liberation movement provided Nehru the political capital to voice the antiimperial, anticolonial, and antihegemonic values of the developing world. Joined in leadership with Prime Minister Sukarno of Indonesia and President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Nehru convened a meeting in 1955 with the heads of 29 states—representing the first generation of postcolonial leaders—in Bandung, Indonesia, to discuss joint policies and positions on issues of international relations. Subsequent meetings held in Cairo in 1961 and Belgrade later in the same year formalized the organization of states and the objectives of the movement. In its eventual institutional form, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) expressed solidarity with principles beyond cold war neutrality, including independence, noninterference, support of national liberation movements, strengthening of the United Nations (UN), peaceful coexistence, opposition to colonialism and neocolonialism, and resistance to Western domination. These broad principles have allowed the organization to survive the cold war and continue to guide its positions on foreign policy and global economic issues.

Today, comprising 118 states and over half the world's population, the NAM provides a common international platform for most of the globe's developing nations. Although it is separate from the UN, the NAM focuses and coordinates much of its efforts through the UN. The rotating chair of the NAM—currently Cuba's Raul Castro—is passed to the nation hosting the organization's triennial summit. The chair is responsible for NAM administrative coordination, and that country's UN ambassador also acts as minister of nonaligned affairs at the UN. This revolving administration is said to reflect the equal and nonhierarchical spirit of the movement.

In addition to representation through the UN General Assembly, the NAM presents a common front at the UN Security Council, Human Rights Council, International Labor Organization, World Health Organization, UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and other non-UN multilateral venues. While the movement claims to play a crucial role in supporting an agenda of global justice, international cooperation, support for the underrepresented, and respect for human rights, its actual degree of influence on international politics is difficult to measure and remains questionable to some. Despite these concerns, the NAM remains the oldest organization designed to promote the collective political and economic interests of former colonies and developing nations.

See also *Cold War; Neutrality; South (Third World).*

. . . .   RABIH HELOU

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Noncombatant Prisoners

The term of *noncombatant prisoner,* while existing before, has expanded in meaning since September 11, 2001, and includes fighters not usually protected under international law. Noncombatant prisoners are typically not civilians but rather captured unlawful or illegal combatants or illegal enemy combatants—those who actively and willingly engage in fighting but do not follow all requirements for combatant status and therefore do not gain full rights of the Geneva Convention (GC) when captured. The term is contested and has not been formalized legally.

After the September 11th terrorist attacks, the idea of a new kind of war created a perceived need for new tools. Legal experts in the administration of U.S. president George W. Bush suggested that these attacks were not criminal acts but an armed conflict that required a response beyond traditional law enforcement. It was determined that under the 1949 GC (not signed by the United States), members of terrorist organizations like al-Qaida do not qualify as prisoners of war (POW). The presidential military order of November 13, 2001, classifies these fighters as unlawful combatants or illegal enemy combatants and, upon capture, as noncombatant prisoners. This decision was also applied to members of the Taliban, which had controlled Afghanistan and harbored al-Qaida prior to the U.S. invasion. It was argued that giving rights to illegal combatants could be seen as legitimizing terrorism as a just war tactic. The U.S. Military Commissions Act of 2006 gave the U.S. president broad discretion to determine the status of both al-Qaida and Taliban detainees. Since U.S. courts have no jurisdiction over enemy aliens outside U.S. sovereign territory, such as Guantánamo Bay, U.S. policy is controversial.

Critics see the U.S. war on terror being placed above international law. They are concerned about the potential for human rights abuses and question the correct application of the term *noncombatant prisoner.* Disagreement stems from different applications of *jus in bello* (law of armed conflict) and *jus ad bellum* (use of force). Armed conflicts exist when states (or national liberation movements) use and order violence against other states or movements to further their goals, even if they do not recognize each other's status. Irregular forces are only considered state agents if a state sponsors, directs, and supervises them on a level similar to that of a national army. *Jus ad bellum* is contested and applies only with difficulty to individual cases. An attack must be credibly attributable to a state, and perpetrators must be armed state organs. Since the Taliban controlled about 90 percent of Afghan territory, it arguably

exercised state powers. The United States, United Nations, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have invoked the right to self-defense since the September 11th attacks, and this stance may affect the concept of *combatant*. International law is now moving toward the granting of rights and obligations also to certain nonstate actors, in principle moving these fighters closer to combatant status and questioning U.S. policy.

The combatant-noncombatant distinction differentiates a soldier from a murderer. But difficulty in identifying combatants and their threat level have grown. To qualify for combatant and POW status, an irregular soldier must at a minimum openly carry arms or wear a recognizable sign. Guerrilla soldiers participating part-time in hostilities are combatants until fully demobilized. A combatant of a state participating in an armed conflict is protected from prosecution, except in the case of grave breaches. When the status is unclear, POW status is to apply until a competent tribunal decides on a definitive status. Legal suits have begun to challenge the current U.S. policy.

See also *Geneva Convention; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); Prisoners of War (POW); United Nations (UN).*

. . . . SYBILLE REINKE DE BUITRAGO

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Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are private sector associations based in civil society pursuing policy advocacy goals and project management. Most frequently the term refers to associations with a transnational agenda or operations (for instance, *Médecins Sans Frontières,* a.k.a. Doctors without Borders), although some NGOs are oriented toward activities within a single nation-state (for example, the Urban League). NGO overlaps with concepts such as private association, voluntary organization, nonprofit or not-for-profit organization, the third sector, and more broadly, civil society. It is not usually a term applied to private for-profit commercial enterprises. The label is commonly used within the context of international relations, where NGOs are frequently equated with international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), umbrella organizations based in more than one country. In the beginning of the twenty-first century, NGOs are widely regarded as agents essential for global governance, interacting in a transnational arena with states, international governmental organizations (IGOs), and private enterprises (corporations).

The term *NGO* entered the political vocabulary in connection with the Charter of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 (Article 71). In the UN context, the term takes on a legal quality and refers to organizations of special status. In particular, NGO status provides certain rights to different categories of organizations engaged in consultative relationships with the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC; a total of 3,052 organizations had consultative status in 2007).

Use of the term *NGO* has gradually spread from the context of the UN and international law to international relations and global public discourse at large. At present it is used in many different ways and often at variance with the formal UN usage. As an artifact of international relations discourse, wherein it confines and highlights the secondary role of private associations in state-dominated international relations, NGO lacks some precision. For example, by many current definitions, trade union federations—the type of organization the drafters of the UN Charter primarily had in mind when they stipulated Article 71—are excluded from NGO classification. There has been a notable tendency to restrict use of the acronym to organizations concerned with sustainability and development issues and sometimes to those organizations focusing on the issues of peace, human rights, and cultural exchange. In such contexts, NGOs tend to be cast as forces for good. In the context of developmental programs and issues, NGOs are often distinguished from private voluntary organizations (PVOs) driven by the donors of development aid. At the same time, there is the opposite tendency, whereby NGOs are viewed differently than grassroots organizations (GROs). Some activists reject use of the adjective *nongovernmental,* because it defines their organizations in terms of what they are not, rather than what they are. These activists suggest that governments should be labeled *NPOs* (non-people's organizations), in contrast to

organizations grounded in civil society. Nevertheless, others embrace the term *NGO* because they see particular merit in the broad attribute *nongovernmental,* and NGO continues to be a standard term of self-description.

Relevant legal provisions define the formal limits of what nongovernmental organizations can do in intergovernmental negotiations. The actual formal status that NGOs have in practice is conditioned by the legal requirements and practices within the (host) nation(s) where the NGO is based. These legal forms are various and include entities organized as charities, trusts, and foundations, not-for-profit companies or corporations, unincorporated associations, and legal entities that conform to specific local requirements to qualify for NGO or nonprofit status.

For NGOs engaged in issues on a global scale, the annual budgets can be large, often in the hundreds of millions or even billions of U.S. dollars. NGOs fund their activities in various ways, including membership fees, private donations, provision of goods and services, and grants from governments or international institutions. This last funding source highlights the ambiguous "nongovernmental" status of these organizations: While they usually do not permit direct government representation or control of their activities, the existence of government subsidy in some NGO budgets, and the contracting work some NGOs perform for international institutions, jeopardizes their independent status.

That there are multifarious types of NGOs is evident in the manifold extensions of the acronym, such as GONGO, QUANGO, BINGO, and MONGO (government-organized NGO, quasi NGO, business interest NGO, and my own NGO) that have sprung up to characterize their activities. Despite the obvious intent of discrediting the mission of certain NGOs, these acronyms do provide an illuminating characterization of the conflict and demarcation within the sphere of NGOs, and also of the different paradoxes and types of nongovernmental organizations. Evidently, the variety of NGOs blurs the elusive boundaries between the government sector, commercial interests, and the civil society sphere.

See also *Civil Society; Collective Action and Mobilization; International Organization; Multinational Corporation; Organization Theory; Quangos; Transnational Movements; United Nations.*

. . . .   NORBERT GÖTZ

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Nonproliferation

See *Arms Control; Arms Race; Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation.*

Nonstate Actors

Over the last two decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century, the concept of *nonstate actors* has become an indispensable part of the terminology of political science. The diffusion of finance and technology that has been fuelled by globalization has enabled nonstate actors to claim functions traditionally performed by nation-states. Both policy networks and policy arrangements have come to consider nonstate organizations as an intrinsic part of international relations. Given the empirical evidence, nonstate actors are increasingly involved in international affairs in various significant ways. Since they are part of the political and institutional arrangements, nonstate actors, negatively or positively, influence political discourse, agenda setting, law making, and decision making. In some cases, their information and expertise helps nation-states struggling with problems. The impact made by nonstate actors depends on several factors, such as the political or legal framework of which they are part, the organizational structures they have built, their network interactions, and their actual presence.

Nonstate actors are nonsovereign entities that exercise significant economic, political, or social power and influence at national, and in some cases international, levels. Nonstate actors come in various shapes and forms that operate transnationally. There is no consensus on the members of this category. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are the most well-known nonstate actors. NGOs are private, self-governing, voluntary, nonprofit, and task- or interest-oriented advocacy organizations. Within those broad parameters, there is a huge degree of diversity in terms of unifying principles, independence from government, operating procedures, sources of funding, and international reach and size. NGOs can implement projects, provide services, defend or promote specific causes, and seek to influence policy. Particularly after the end of the cold war, the growing emphasis on human security has underlined the social and humanitarian issues in which many NGOs have unique expertise.

In addition to NGOs, other nonstate actors include multinational corporations; international media; armed groups, including rebel opposition forces, militias, and warlords; terrorist organizations; criminal organizations; religious groups; and transnational diasporas. Most types of nonstate actors would be considered part of civil society, although some function within the context of the international economy.

Multinational corporations, one of the most influential categories of nonstate actors, are enterprises that manage production or deliver services in at least two countries. The traditional multinational is a private company headquartered in one country and with subsidiaries in others, all operating in accordance with a coordinated global strategy. Today, a growing number of multinationals based in emerging market countries such as China, India, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey have become influential in their own right.

The concept of the nonstate actor is not always positive, given the existence of many armed nonstate actors, for example, rebel opposition forces, militias and warlords, and terrorist organizations. They operate without state control and are involved transnationally in activities against state actors. The prevalence of these groups in armed conflicts has added layers of complexity to traditional methods of conflict management and resolution. The diversification of violence and prevalence of multiple armed groups complicates traditional conflict management and resolution and poses a significant challenge for international security governance more generally. Most contemporary conflicts are intrastate, involving by definition at least one nonstate actor, and many are fought without state involvement between two or more armed groups. Nevertheless, international laws and norms governing the use of force are still understood primarily on the state level. Hence, the existence of nonstate actors at the local and international levels has further complicated international relations.

The proliferation of nonstate actors in the post–cold war Era has challenged the traditional nation-state–based international system, nation-state borders, and claims to sovereignty. The relationship between nation-states and nonstate actors has paved the way for the reconsideration of traditional international relations theories such as neorealism, which views the state as the main unit of analysis and regards nonstate actors as being negligible in the anarchic international system. In reality, NGOs participate in international decision making and implementation processes and affect policy outcomes; the activities of transnational criminal or terrorist groups trigger international responses; multinational companies take positions and lobby regarding global issues. The significance of nonstate actors is seen not only in the ways they affect international relations but also in the ways they are institutionalized in political, legal, and policy terms. Today, nonstate actors are part of the institutional structure of international politics and policy making.

See also *Cold War; Militias; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Terrorism, Political; Sovereignty; Warlordism.*

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Nontariff Barriers to Trade

Nontariff barriers to trade (NTBs) are human-made barriers to trade other than simple tariffs. These restrictive practices are designed to evade free-trade rules imposed by regional or international agreement. They include obstructive customs practices, quotas, product standards that are often justified on health and safety grounds, requirement of licenses, government subsidies or procurement policies, and voluntary export restraints (VERs). What distinguishes NTBs from tariffs is a lack of transparency, which makes their use difficult to prevent. They have proliferated in recent decades, partly because the multilateral trading system has been quite effective, for manufactured goods at least, in reducing the use of tariffs. In response, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and more recently the World Trade Organization (WTO), guided by the principle of nondiscrimination in trade, has significantly extended the coverage of its rules to try to regulate NTBs.

THE GROWTH OF NONTARIFF BARRIERS

The multilateral trading system that resulted from the GATT agreement in 1947 did not originally identify NTBs as part of its mandate. It was only in the 1960s during the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations that they were first considered. During the 1970s, the world economy went through a recession, and the use of trade protectionism to save domestic jobs and industry became politically attractive. It was during this period that the use of NTBs grew at a significant rate, as countries sought to bypass the rules of the GATT. In particular they were used by countries in the West to discriminate against imports from the developing world.

During this period of economic turmoil, the use of VERs also increased substantially. They were usually developed as a response to political pressure from domestic industries that felt threatened by the growth of competitive imports. VERs were most often arranged on a bilateral basis with the exporting country "voluntarily" limiting the quantity of its exported goods to its trade partner. The United States, for example, had already been using VERs as part of its trade policy, but their use escalated in the early 1970s. VERs also began to be used for trade between developed economies in industries such as steel and automobiles. The Tokyo Round of the GATT (1973–1979) attempted to address the use of NTBs by creating six voluntary codes. However, these Tokyo codes, as they became known, were not very effective, because they were separate from the main rules of the GATT and applied only to those countries that chose to sign them. As a result, by the early 1980s it was clear that the GATT had become increasingly irrelevant in the face of these new forms of trade protectionism.

THE WTO AND NONTARIFF BARRIERS

The final round of the GATT led to the creation of the WTO at the beginning of 1995. This agreement made significant

progress on the regulation of NTBs. The Tokyo codes that had proved rather ineffective were developed and made compulsory for all member states. Because of this, the WTO is now increasingly involved with domestic policies and institutional practices. Examples include the agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and the agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). The latter tries to balance the need to ensure that food imports do not pose a threat to the health of consumers with the desire to make sure that health and safety standards are not being used to protect domestic producers. These standards tend to reflect those used in developed countries, and it is therefore developing countries that tend to bear the majority of the implementation costs. A similar problem faces developing countries in complying with the agreement on customs valuation. This aims to ensure a uniform procedure for estimating the cost of products when they reach customs. The Doha Development Round (named after Doha, Qatar)—the current trade negotiation round of the WTO—has stalled over disagreements on major issues, including NTBs.

Some critics of the WTO's regulation of NTBs are unhappy with the intrusion into areas previously considered domestic politics. One particularly contentious case relating to the SPS agreement is the dispute between the European Union (EU) and the United States over the European ban on beef imports from cattle that have been injected with a growth hormone. The ban was justified by the EU on scientific grounds that the meat posed a health risk to consumers. The WTO's Dispute Settlement Panel took advice from the World Health Organization and ruled that there was no health risk. The EU has continued the ban, and the WTO has allowed retaliatory trade measures by the United States and Canada.

See also *Free Trade; Protectionism and Tariffs; Trade Diplomacy; World Organization (WTO).*

. . . .   STEPHEN R. HURT

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Nontransferable Vote

See *Vote, Transferable and Nontransferable.*

Nonviolence

Nonviolence is both a moral principle and a pragmatic means of achieving social and political transformation. Nonviolence and pacifism are often considered synonymous ideas, but in fact they are conceptually and politically distinct. The preeminent scholar of nonviolent action is Gene Sharp, who identified the strategic principles and tactical methods through which nonviolent resistance can undermine oppressive systems of political power. Sharp defined the categories of nonviolent action as protest and persuasion, mass noncooperation (in economic, social, and political spheres), and nonviolent intervention. Commonly used forms of noncooperation and intervention include boycotts, strikes, illegal marches, blockades, and sit-ins.

Mohandas Gandhi, leader of India's nationalist movement, pioneered the method of mass nonviolent action, *satyagraha,* as a tool for resisting oppression and injustice and a means of applying pressure for political change. Most who participate in nonviolent action campaigns are not pacifists. They support nonviolent resistance in the manner of Jawaharlal Nehru, an acolyte of Gandhi, who wrote in his 1941 autobiography, *Toward Freedom,* "We accepted that method . . . not only as the right method but as the most effective one for our purpose" (80).

Gandhian nonviolence goes far beyond mere civil disobedience. It is a method of seeking and upholding truth through the application of social pressure and the interaction of contending forces. It follows a set pattern of action that includes the documentation of grievances, dialogue and negotiation with the adversary, the dramatization of injustices, disciplined training for followers, and the resort to nonviolent collective action.

The civil rights leader Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. and his followers famously applied Gandhian methods to advance civil rights for African Americans in the United States. Other examples of successful nonviolent transformation include the "people power" movement of the Philippines in 1986, the "velvet revolutions" in central and eastern Europe in the late 1980s, the flowering of democracy in Chile and other Latin American countries during the 1980s and 1990s, the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia in 2000, the so-called orange revolution in Ukraine in 2004, and the April 2006 overthrow of the monarchy in Nepal. Failures of this strategy for change also can be cited—the Tiananmen Square massacre of prodemocracy demonstrators in Beijing, China, in 1989; the isolation and collapse of nonviolent resistance in the Kosovo region of Serbia in the 1990s; and the as yet unsuccessful struggle for democracy in Burma—but the overall record of strategic success of nonviolence is impressive. Nonviolent resistance has been described by Ackerman and DuVall (2000) as "a force more powerful." The alternative to armed violence is not surrender or appeasement, but the fight for justice through nonviolent means. It is a third way, distinct from armed conflict and inaction, for addressing injustice.

Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth (2008) confirmed the advantages of nonviolent action in a major empirical study

examining 323 historical cases of resistance campaigns over a span of more than 100 years. The cases involved sociopolitical movements, sometimes lasting several years, that contended against governments to gain specific political concessions. The study showed that nonviolent means were twice as effective as violent means, achieving success 53 percent of the time, compared to a 26 percent success rate when violence was employed. Moreover, nonviolent action is also more likely to expand political freedom and democracy. An empirical study by Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman (2005) at Freedom House examined sixty-seven late twentieth-century political transformations and found that nonviolent revolutions were three times more likely than armed struggles to create conditions of increased political freedom.

The key strategic advantage of nonviolent action is the ability of disciplined unarmed movements to withstand government repression. Unjustified brutality against nonviolent action tends to backfire and generate public sympathy and support for the resisters. The repression of nonviolent movements by political authorities can create an atmosphere of disaffection among regime supporters and generate shifts in loyalty that make it easier for nonviolent campaigns to gain political concessions. Sharp emphasized the importance of winning the loyalties of third parties as the key to eroding the power base of corrupt and repressive political regimes. The presence of an audience is crucial to the workings of this third-party effect. Effective public relations and the careful crafting of media messages are therefore crucial to the success of nonviolent action.

The nonviolent method, Gandhi and King emphasized, is a strategy best employed by the strong, not the weak. To challenge injustice and stand unarmed against oppressors requires courage, endurance, fearlessness, and a willingness to sacrifice. It also requires well coordinated effort. Such traits are necessary to mobilize mass action and are keys to the moral and political effectiveness of the nonviolent action method.

See also *Civil Disobedience; Gandhism; Pacifism and Conscientious Objection; Political Prisoners; Protests and Demonstrations; Satyagraha; Social Movements, Comparative.*

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Normative Theory

The term *normative theory* gained currency in American political science in the post–World War II (1939–1945) period as a consequence of the behavioral revolution and the rise of positivist-empiricist political science. Behavioralists sought to draw a distinction between scientifically oriented political inquiry and evaluative forms of political inquiry that they claimed focused on questions of what the political system ought to look like. Hence, they claimed to distinguish between those forms of political inquiry that only describe the world in a value-neutral fashion, that is, empirical theory, from those that offered normative implications or recommendations about political life, including recommendations of which types of political systems were best, what the nature of justice is, and so forth. The impulse to enforce this distinction in political inquiry derived from the assumption that science was value neutral and that one sign of the scientific maturity of a discipline is the extent to which it has purged itself of normative influences. Scientists do not approve or disapprove of the nature of the objects under investigation; they seek only to describe them and how they operate, function, or behave.

NORMATIVE VERSUS EMPIRICAL THEORY

The dichotomy between empirical and normative theories was itself rooted in a philosophy of language borrowed from the philosophical movement called *logical positivism.* Logical positivists, drawing on the philosophies of David Hume and Immanuel Kant, held that statements could be of two types, meaningful and meaningless. Meaningful statements are also of two types, analytic and synthetic. Analytic statements are those that are true by definition (e.g., all bachelors are unmarried). Synthetic statements are those that make testable, empirical claims about the independent, objective world and may be either true or false. Statements that fit into neither of the above categories are deemed meaningless. These meaningful-meaningless, analytic-synthetic dichotomies were the foundation of another dichotomy, that between facts and values. Factual statements were deemed to be synthetic and therefore meaningful. Value statements are those that merely reflect the speaker's opinion or emotive preferences, but are otherwise meaningless. The assumption was that scientific inquiry must consist only of meaningful statements and exclude normative or value-laden statements (Ayer 1952). In the end, normative statements were deemed to be not rationally grounded, that is, they could be neither empirically verified nor demonstrated to be true through reason.

However, no sooner had this view of language become incorporated into the self-understanding of positivist-empiricism political science than it was shown to be unsustainable. Influenced by the later work of Wittgenstein, philosophers such as W. V. O. Quine (1953) and Wilfred Sellars (1956) challenged the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, the fact-value distinction, and what Sellars called "the myth of the given," that is, the idea that the world we can know exists independently

of our theories about it. In doing so, they undermined the very foundations of empiricism. Subsequently, Thomas Kuhn's work challenged the view of science rooted in the positivist and empiricist account of epistemology and philosophy of science. Unfortunately, these developments were either largely ignored or, in the case of Kuhn, largely misunderstood by the discipline of political science. Hence, the logical positivist account of facts versus values and empirical versus normative theory remains central to positivist accounts of political science (e.g., see Johnson and Reynolds 2008, 27–59).

Needless to say, the dichotomy between empirical and normative theory did not go unchallenged. Despite significant differences among them, a number of theoretical perspectives emerged to emphasize that there are inherent normative dimensions to all political explanation that can be traced to four factors. First, much of the language of explanation of politics itself is formed from a normative—that is, ethical, moral, or political—point of view, and it actually describes from a normative, moral, or political point of view. In other words, the point behind such terms is not only to render an evaluation of social and political practices but also to render a richer description that takes into account the moral dimensions to some forms of political phenomena. Hence, attempts to purge such vocabularies of their normative denotations are bound to fail or seriously disfigure the meaning of political-normative terms. The result can be a misunderstanding of politics and often issues in tacit moral commitments that are ignored.

Second, the terms of political discourse are often internally complex, connoting or denoting a family of meanings that overlap. In such cases, the terms in question are not reducible to any one of the common or intersubjective meanings associated with them. The attempt to reduce the meaning of such concepts to one operationalized meaning can be not only misleading but often is accompanied by a tacit normative commitment. For example, behavioralists tended to define political power in terms of overt, observable conflicts and events within the public realm. Such a definition ignores cases where those in a position of political subordination are so intimidated that they do not even venture to challenge those in political power, a situation common in the race relations in the United States after Reconstruction and through to the civil rights movement. Not surprisingly, behavioralists tended to see American democracy in Panglossian terms ("the best of all possible worlds") and often adopted a critical perspective on social and political dissent such as the civil rights movement. In addition, because of the internal complexity of the terms of political discourse and the normative implications of accepting one definition of a concept rather than another, many theorists argued that the language of political discourse was essentially contestable in ways that further undermine the dichotomy between empirical and normative political theory.

Third, the goal of political science is not simply the description of political phenomena but the explanation of them as well. The explanation of phenomena requires not only that one give an account of why some states of affairs pertain but also why others do not. Such an account is an interpretation of

why some states of affairs or political arrangements are natural, rational, reasonable, or normal, while others are less sustainable. Because any such explanation distributes the range of political possibilities one way rather than another, explanation by its very nature distributes the normative burden in favor of some states of affairs while denying others. For example, empiricists tended to interpret American pluralism as the most reasonable possibility for representative democracy, more inclusive forms of democracy being deemed irrational or unstable (Taylor 1985).

Finally, insofar as political explanation necessarily deploys a vocabulary that distinguishes between rational and irrational behavior, it is necessarily normative. For to say that a practice, institution, or mode of behavior is rational is to make a prima facie case for saying that it is desirable, and to say that it is irrational is to suggest that it should be changed or ceased.

PHILOSOPHICAL CHALLENGES TO A VALUE-FREE INQUIRY

Among the first to challenge the dichotomy between value-free and value-laden political science was Leo Strauss (1959). Drawing on the classical tradition and Plato in particular, Strauss argued that the explanation of political life requires a proper understanding of the nature of political knowledge. Acquiring such knowledge is the task of political philosophy, and it is by its very nature a normative enterprise. Specifically, political philosophy is "the attempt to replace opinion about the nature of political things by the knowledge of the nature of political things. Political things are by their nature subject to approval and disapproval, to choice and rejection, to praise and blame" (1959, 7–8). The political nature of things is not properly reducible to merely subjective evaluations. Rather, political knowledge of things, even if it is never perfectly attainable, can nonetheless be grounded in rational deliberation. From this perspective, the claim of positivist political science to have separated the description of political things from the evaluation of political things is both wrong and dangerous. It is wrong because such attempts must of necessity make choices about the nature of the political that in fact have evaluative elements to them. It is dangerous because in the end it denies that there is a natural, normative dimension to political society that is discoverable by reason, understood in the classical sense. This can lead to moral relativism that can be used by the most unethical forms of political life.

A second challenge to the dichotomy between descriptive and normative theory emerged in the work of Sheldon Wolin. Wolin (2004) argues that there is a distinctive tradition of political theory and philosophy that has among its primary tasks the definition of the political. Such an enterprise is not only normative but is also descriptive and explicative from a political point of view. Specifically, in advancing an account of the political and related concepts such as authority, power, freedom, consent, and so forth, the political theorist, and the study of politics generally, renders some political facts of more significance than others: "The concepts and categories that make up our political understanding help us to draw connections

between political phenomena . . . they create an area of determinate political awareness and thus help us to separate the relevant from the irrelevant." (2004, 7) Such an activity can never be politically or morally neutral. This leads Wolin to make a distinction between *vita methodica,* or methodism, and *bios theoretica,* or political theory (1969). The former is deflationary of theory and mistakenly presupposes that the choice of methods is value neutral. In point of fact, much of what passes for scientific accounts of politics is steeped in normative assumptions and implications that underwrite the political status quo. Political inquiry informed by the tradition of political theory, on the other hand, fully addresses the normative dimension of its explanations. It recognizes that "because facts are richer than theories, it is the task of the theoretical imagination to restate new possibilities" (1969, 1082).

Yet a third approach to political theory that challenged the distinction between description and normative theory emerged in the work of John Rawls. In *A Theory of Justice,* Rawls offers an account of the conclusions concerning political life that free and rational individuals would arrive at if they were placed behind a veil of ignorance, that is, placed in a situation in which they evaluated the alternatives for political life from a disinterested situation. Hence, the conclusions he draws about justice are not simply subjective preferences but rather are rationally grounded decisions that anyone in a similar situation would come to. Moreover, primacy of justice is not a question of mere opinion or subjective preference. Rather, it is the point behind social institutions in much the same way that the pursuit of truth is the point behind the pursuit of knowledge. "Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions, no matter how efficient and well-arranged, must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust" (1971, 3). In effect, Rawls argued that in a well-ordered society, there would be widespread agreement on moral beliefs and in particular on the primacy of justice over other political values, such as notions of the good. In subsequent work (1993) Rawls revised the theory of justice, arguing that liberal political societies committed to some form of representative democracy and characterized by reasonable pluralism would be united by a political conception of justice rather than a moral one. In this later work, Rawls attempts to answer the question, "How is it possible that deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live together and all affirm a political conception of a constitutional regime?" (1993). If Rawls's analysis is correct, the conclusion is not simply a matter of subjective choice or personal preference, it is a matter of the conclusions that rational individuals would come to in a pluralistic, liberal society.

POSTMETAPHYSICAL POLITICAL ACCOUNTS

In more recent years, a number of approaches to the explanation of political life have embraced the term *postmetaphysical* to describe their account of political explanation and evaluation.

Postmetaphysical refers to the claim that although all theories make ontological assumptions about the nature of human existence and political life, there is no one theoretical perspective that can deliver on the claim to represent what is essential or exclusively fundamental about social and political life. This means that no single perspective can offer the privileged or exclusive foundations of social and political inquiry. Thus, no single account can claim objectivity in the strong sense; each account is a prescription of how political life ought to be studied, what is most significant in the study of political life, and how that account of the political influences political practice. Among the most important perspectives that fall into this category are Habermasian discourse ethics, interpretive-hermeneutic political theory articulated by thinkers such as Charles Taylor, and genealogical perspectives exemplified by the work of William Connolly.

In his theory of communicative action and discourse ethics, Jürgen Habermas argues that although there is no single objective account of politics, any attempt at communication, that is, any speech act, necessarily presupposes three normative validity claims. In engaging in the act of communication, the speaker draws upon claims to sincerity or truthfulness, truth, and appropriateness. When normative prescriptions that meet these criteria are agreed upon by social agents, the decisions or behaviors that result can be deemed to be rational in a strong, noninstrumental sense of the term. Moreover, Habermas argues that these validity claims are universal, that is, they are pragmatically implicit in every act of communication. If Habermas is correct that there are universally valid criteria for judging the rationality of normative claims and actions, claims about statements meeting these criteria can be deemed to be true, though subject to revision.

Interpretive or hermeneutic approaches take a somewhat different approach to normative theory. Thinkers such as Charles Taylor argue that human beings are by nature self-interpreting beings. Much of the language of self-interpretation is conducted of necessity in moral and ethical terms. In addition, that self-interpretation often takes the form of what Taylor describes as strong evaluation. Strong evaluation is that which poses the choice between two alternatives in morally contradictory or competitive terms. This element of human being, that is, moral self-interpretation, is no less true of the practice of social science than it is of everyday political life. Insofar as social and political theory are attempts to make sense of our political world, to clarify the inchoate or imperfectly understood, they will sustain some established activities and undermine others. Hence, to offer an interpretation of social and political action is to endorse one set of political alternatives and to deny others.

The last perspective, sometimes unfortunately labeled *postmodernism,* is best described as genealogical social theory. Indebted to the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and William James, among others, thinkers such as William Connolly adopt genealogical approaches that embrace the idea of the "death of God" in the sense that no single theory can claim to offer an account of

political life that is exclusive and exhaustive without remainder. All theories involve gaps and blind spots and illuminate some aspects of our lives while denying others. Moreover, since social and political life is always in the process of development, even though subtle and slow at times, vocabularies that have explanatory purchase at one point do not have explanatory purchase at another. The result is that each theoretical perspective is sustained not only by evidence and argument but by an act of existential faith that one's account is correct. One ethical implication is that the proponent of any particular theory must of necessity look to engage other perspectives and cultivate an ethos of agonistic respect toward new perspectives and new ideas from alternative accounts of social and political life. Moreover, all must be attuned to the ways in which their own theories sustain some forms of political practice, morality, and behavior and undermine others.

NORMATIVE ACCOUNTS OF POLITICAL PHENOMENA

If the proponents of explanatory-normative theory are correct, then several implications would seem to follow. First, a good deal of what passes for science in political science masks an implicit normative and in some cases explicit normative account of political phenomena. Second, claims to have achieved a science of politics that is devoid of value positions must be taken with a dose of skepticism. Such positions are grounded in epistemologies and philosophies of language that were refuted long ago. Finally, in light of the normative implications of all theoretical perspectives, the cultivation of greater theoretical pluralism and not just methodological pluralism is warranted. In particular, it is incumbent upon political scientists to seek out critical, agonistic, respectful engagement with other theoretical perspectives. Such an approach enhances the possibility of becoming attuned to one's own normative commitments and of challenging contestable boundaries of the ethical and political, and the prospect emerges of forms of knowledge that enhance a deeper and broader understanding of politics.

See also *Liberal Theory; Political Philosophy; Political Science, History of; Political Theory; Strauss, Leo.*

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North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a regional agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United States to implement a free trade area—the world's largest, according to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. It was officially signed in 1992 and entered into force on January 1, 1994, with the final provisions fully implemented on January 1, 2008. With full implementation, the last remaining trade restrictions on agricultural commodities, such as U.S. corn exports to Mexico and Mexican exports to the United States of sugar and certain horticultural products, were removed.

A North American free trade agreement had been advocated for a number of years prior to NAFTA. U.S. president Ronald Reagan proposed a North American common market in 1981, and in 1985 Canadian prime minister Brian Mulroney announced that Canada would try to reach a free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States. Negotiations started in 1986, and a Canada-U.S. FTA was signed in 1988 that took effect the following year. In 1990, the United States and Mexico announced that they would begin discussions aimed at liberalizing trade between them, and in February 1991, U.S. and Mexican negotiations aimed at liberalizing trade officially became trilateral at Canada's request.

Trade negotiations among the three countries started in June 1991. NAFTA was officially signed in December 1992 by Mulroney, U.S. president George Bush, and Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gortari, subject to its final approval by the legislative bodies of the three countries. Key provisions cover market access for goods, protection for foreign investment, protection for intellectual property, easier access for business travelers, access to government procurement, and rules of origin. The NAFTA partners also negotiated two side agreements: the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation and the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation.

Various institutions work to implement and provide daily oversight of the agreement's provisions. The Free Trade Commission (FTC) supervises the implementation and further elaboration of NAFTA and helps resolve disputes arising from its interpretation. Canada hosted the FTC's twelfth meeting in 2007. In their joint statement, the ministers agreed to examine new and creative ways of further promoting regional trade and business opportunities. The FTC also oversees the work of the

NAFTA committees, working groups, and other subsidiary bodies. NAFTA coordinators are responsible for the day-to-day management of NAFTA implementation. Over 30 working groups and committees have been established to facilitate trade and investment and to ensure the agreement's effective implementation and administration. The NAFTA Secretariat is an independent agency responsible for the impartial administration of dispute settlement provisions.

According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, "NAFTA is one of the most successful trade agreements in history and has contributed to significant increases in agricultural trade and investment between the United States, Canada and Mexico and has benefited farmers, ranchers and consumers throughout North America." The World Bank has also stated that NAFTA has helped Mexico's development (though not enough to achieve economic convergence with Canada and the United States). However, there has been criticism of the agreement, including allegations that NAFTA has resulted in job losses, has harmed workers by eroding labor standards and lowering wages, has undermined national sovereignty and independence, has not helped the environment, and has hurt manufacturers and the agricultural sector. These allegations have been denied by NAFTA.

See also *Free Trade; Nontariff Barriers to Trade; Trade Blocs; Trade Diplomacy; World Trade Organization (WTO).*

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an alliance of twenty-eight countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with this treaty, NATO's fundamental role is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means. It also provides a forum in which countries from North America and Europe can consult on security issues of common concern and take joint action in addressing them.

HEADQUARTERS IN BELGIUM

The NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, is the alliance's political headquarters and the permanent home of the North Atlantic Council, NATO's senior political decision-making body. This council brings together high-level representatives of each member country to discuss policy or operational questions requiring collective decisions. Decisions are agreed upon on the basis of unanimity and common accord. All member countries participating in the military aspect of the alliance contribute forces and equipment, which together constitute NATO's integrated military structure. These remain under national command and control until they are required by NATO for a specific purpose. NATO does possess some common capabilities owned and operated by the alliance.

ORIGINS AFTER WORLD WAR II

The origins of NATO were shaped by the cold war. After World War II (1939–1945), anxiety grew in western Europe as Soviet influence spread and communist governments took power in eastern European countries. In March 1948, the Treaty of Brussels was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. It pledged them to establish a joint defensive system and strengthen their economic and cultural ties. The supreme body of the Brussels Treaty Organization was to be the Consultative Council, consisting of the five foreign ministers.

In July 1948, preliminary talks that led to the North Atlantic Treaty began between the U.S. state department and the ambassadors of Canada and of the Brussels treaty powers. The talks ended in September 1948 with a report to governments recommending inter alia that the proposed treaty should promote peace and security, express determination of the parties to resist aggression, define the area in which it should be operative, be based on self-help and mutual aid, be more than military, and provide machinery for implementation. The following month, the Consultative Council announced complete agreement on the principle of a defensive pact for the North Atlantic and the next steps in this direction.

The actual drafting of the treaty started in December 1948. On March 15, 1949, the Brussels treaty powers, Canada, and the United States formally invited Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal to adhere to the treaty. On April 4, 1949, the treaty was signed by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It was ratified by the legislative bodies of the member countries within five months.

Since 1949, NATO's membership has increased from twelve to twenty-eight countries. In 1952, Greece and Turkey acceded to the treaty, the Federal Republic of Germany joined in 1955, and Spain in 1982. In 1990, with the unification of

The twenty-eight member states of NATO share a mutual defense pact and also participate in peace missions around the world.

Germany, the former German Democratic Republic came under NATO's security protection. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined in 1999. In 2003, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia were invited to begin accession talks, and they formally acceded to the treaty in March 2004. Albania and Croatia formally became members in April 2009. Moreover, in March 2009, France submitted a formal request to rejoin the NATO command structure, which it had left in 1966. In July 2009, NATO announced the appointment of French General Stéphane Abrial as Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.

POST–COLD WAR MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

Throughout the cold war, NATO acted as a deterrent against military aggression. (NATO forces were not involved in a single military engagement.) With the cold war ending and the Soviet Union collapsing in 1991, NATO's role was reevaluated, and it became increasingly involved in peacekeeping and peace-support operations. According to NATO, it now deploys in support of the wider interests of the international community and works closely with other organizations to help resolve deep-rooted problems, alleviate suffering, and create the conditions in which peace processes can become self-sustaining. The NATO Response Force evolved from a 2002 U.S. proposal; it can be tailored to individual missions and deployed rapidly wherever the North Atlantic Council requires.

Since its first military intervention in 1995, NATO has been engaged in increasingly diverse operations. NATO's first three peace-support operations took place in Europe (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). As of April 2009, approximately 70,000 military personnel were engaged in NATO missions internationally. These forces were operating in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, the Mediterranean, and Somalia. NATO's operation in Afghanistan is the alliance's most significant undertaking to date. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was established by a United Nations (UN) mandate in 2001, has been under NATO leadership since August 2003. ISAF has some 55,000 troops from over forty different countries deployed in Afghanistan. Its mission is to extend the Afghan central government's authority to create an environment conducive to functioning democratic institutions and the rule of law. With regard to Iraq, the NATO Training Mission–Iraq was set up in 2004 to help develop a democratically led and enduring security sector.

ONGOING ISSUES

Various issues face NATO. One such issue is the development of a missile defense system to protect NATO territory. At a Bucharest summit in April 2008, allied leaders agreed that the planned deployment of European-based U.S. missile defense assets should be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defense architecture. The system has been opposed by Russia and created tensions. The United States said in September 2009 that it would no longer move forward with parts of the system being based in Poland and the Czech Republic, and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen called for a new strategic partnership with Russia. Similarly, the enlargement of NATO into Eastern Europe and the joining of former Soviet Republics have been sources of contention with Russia. There is also ongoing debate over the role of NATO in the "war on terrorism" and its operations in Afghanistan.

See also *Civil Wars; Cold War; Crime Policy; Foreign Policy; International Relations; International System; Iron Curtain; Soviet Union, Former; War Termination.*

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Northern Ireland

When Ireland gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1921 after two years of violent "troubles," six counties in the northern province of Ulster remained within the United Kingdom. Northern Ireland, with a population of around one and one-half million, was established to satisfy the demands of a Protestant Unionist minority in Ireland that wished to remain within the United Kingdom, but it included a sizeable Catholic and Irish nationalist minority composing one third of the population. The new entity enjoyed a high level of autonomy, and the Northern Ireland Parliament and government at Stormont, on the outskirts of Belfast, was insulated to a large degree from "interference" by the British Parliament. For the next fifty years, the Ulster Unionist Party, a party of Protestant unity, won every election and formed every government in Northern Ireland, while the Catholic minority was almost completely excluded from the exercise of power at all levels.

VIOLENT CONFLICT

In the late 1960s, a civil rights movement that enjoyed strong support in the minority community presented an innovative challenge to government control. A police force

The six counties of Northern Ireland remained under British control after Ireland gained its independence in 1921. Decades of violence ensued between loyalists preferring British control and republicans wanting unification with Ireland.

closely associated with the Unionist party and dominated by the Protestant community came into increasing conflict with protestors and rioters on the streets. Sectarian rioting compounded the conflict, and by August 1969 the breakdown of order was so severe that British troops were deployed on the streets. In 1970 the newly formed Provisional Irish Republican Army, recruiting among a freshly radicalized minority, launched a campaign of violence aimed at ending British sovereignty and reuniting Ireland. By 1972 violence had escalated dramatically, and in March 1972 the British government instituted "direct rule," suspending the Parliament and government of Northern Ireland.

A further two decades of low-intensity conflict followed, during which almost 3,500 people were killed, more than half of them by Irish Republican groups, mainly the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and almost a quarter by Ulster loyalist groups that sought to illegally augment state efforts against the IRA. Repeated initiatives to end direct rule and reestablish a stable form of regional autonomy that guaranteed participation in government to both Protestant and Catholic communities failed.

THE PEACE PROCESS

The IRA ceasefire of 1994, followed by a loyalist ceasefire, opened the way for inclusive negotiations on a political settlement involving the British and Irish governments with significant international support from the United States and the European Union. The 1998 Belfast Agreement, or Good Friday Agreement, established consociational structures for governing Northern Ireland and was accompanied by conflict resolution measures, including the early release of prisoners and radical reform of policing. The agreement was endorsed in separate referenda in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland, thereby addressing long-standing Irish nationalist demands that the Irish people as a whole should decide the future of the island. The agreement also established new structures to manage relations between the two Irish jurisdictions and relations between Ireland and Great Britain.

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

The current political settlement brings together Irish republicans, including former IRA activists, with their most outspoken Ulster loyalist opponents in a mandatory coalition that guarantees seats at the cabinet table to all significant parties. High levels of discontent with this compromise among a large section of the Protestant majority, and a resurgence of violence by "dissident" Irish republicans seeking to restart a campaign, pose ongoing challenges to the settlement.

The consociational arrangements have been criticized for embedding sectarianism in the structures of government and rewarding extremism, but it has also been argued that these agreements have in fact drawn the extremes toward the center and generated cross-community cooperation, at least at the elite level.

As a settlement that determinedly internationalizes Northern Ireland by creating interlinking internal structures and cross-border institutions within Ireland, the new structures of government are an innovative attempt to resolve an ethno-national conflict by simultaneously softening and securing a contested international border within a European Union context, in which borders between members states have shed many of the functions and meanings they used to have. It provides an example of conflict resolution through negotiation rather than military victory that has been frequently cited by actors and analysts in other conflict situations in recent years.

See also *Conflict Resolution; Détente; European Political Thought; European Union.*

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North–South Relations

The term *North-South relations* refers to the relationship between the advanced industrialized countries in the global North and the developing countries of the global South. It is used in contrast to the superpower conflict between East and West. Of course many parts of the global South became directly involved in the superpower rivalry of this period. In particular, the term is often used to describe the multilateral relations between these two groups. Historically, the key focus of North-South relations has been the various attempts made by the global South to alter the nature of the postwar international economic system. Since the end of the cold war, it seems that North-South relations, especially given the growing levels of poverty in the South, have moved higher up the international agenda.

DECOLONIZATION

During the 1950s there was dramatic change, as a number of former colonies became independent. A key meeting was the Bandung Conference held in 1955. In attendance were twenty-nine Asian and African states. This conference set the main agenda for North-South relations for the next decade.

Two key issues were most prominent. First, there was the need to continue the process of decolonization by putting more pressure on the old imperial powers. Second, many of these newly independent states wished to avoid taking sides in the cold war, and as a result, after Bandung, the Non–Aligned Movement (NAM) was formed.

As the process of decolonization continued during the 1960s, the focus of North–South relations began to change. The most important new issues were economic. This was demonstrated by the South's collective resistance to the dominance of world trade by the global North. The formation in 1964 of both the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Group of 77 at the United Nations (UN) gave the global South a more audible and coherent voice in the multilateral system.

INCREASING CONFRONTATION

The focus on economic issues became more significant in the 1970s. The global South became influenced by dependency theory and the view that the world economy was the main obstacle to their development. The oil crisis that saw prices quadruple between October 1973 and January 1974 also demonstrated to the global South the possibility of collective action. The raising of oil prices by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) stimulated the prices of other commodities and convinced other developing countries of the idea of "commodity power."

The result was the call by the global South for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974, via two resolutions in the UN General Assembly. The initial reaction of the global North was hostile, and the debate over the NIEO became a confrontational feature of North–South relations during the rest of the decade. The reforms demanded in the NIEO included changes in the terms of trade and greater access to markets in the global North, reforms to the major international financial institutions, and demands for more aid and recognition of the economic sovereignty of states, especially with regard to nationalization and greater regulation of multinational corporations. Although the global South secured some minor changes, in the main the NIEO was not implemented. It was clear that oil was an exception, and that commodity power did not really exist. The confrontational approach of demanding change had clearly not been a success. A number of key developments in the early 1980s were to end this period of North–South relations.

CRISIS

During the 1980s the global South went into retreat. The beginning of the decade marked a significant shift in the dominant economic ideology in the West. Neoliberalism, with its emphasis on free markets and its belief in export-led development, became popular. This approach was in direct contrast to the ideas behind the NIEO and its desire for intervention and redistribution in the world economy. The impact of this change was exacerbated by the debt crisis that profoundly altered the balance of power within North–South relations. With many developing countries facing high levels of indebtedness, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided loans that were conditional on following structural adjustment programs. Most developing countries began to follow liberal economic policies devised primarily by the United States, World Bank, and IMF—a situation that became known as the Washington consensus. These developments limited the independence of many developing countries and severely weakened the South as a coalition.

This fragmentation of the South as a united voice continued throughout the 1980s. The newly industrializing countries in East Asia achieved rapid growth largely by integrating into the world economy, welcoming foreign investment, and exporting manufactured products to developed countries. The interests of these countries increasingly departed from those of the poorer countries, especially in Africa, which experienced increasing poverty, resulting in a reliance on foreign assistance for their survival.

A NEW ERA OF PARTNERSHIP?

In recent years there have been attempts to develop North–South relations that are based on cooperation rather than simply Northern dominance. Since the end of the cold war, international development has moved up the agenda and is now regularly discussed within numerous multilateral institutions. In response to sustained criticism, the Washington consensus has been replaced by a less overtly neoliberal policy agenda. The World Bank, in particular, has sought to refocus its approach from economic growth toward poverty reduction. Rather than imposing conditionalities upon developing countries, it now seeks to formulate a development strategy in partnership with them.

During the last twenty years, another key issue that has been high on the agenda of North–South relations is the environment. Despite its contested nature, the term *sustainable development* has come to dominate much of the discourse. This was clearly demonstrated at the most recent UN World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg in 2002. However, achieving sustainability in the developed world would require a radical change in current patterns of production and consumption. The situation for developing countries is quite different. The logical implication of sustainable development is that the South should not follow the environmentally destructive development path that has been historically employed in the North. As a result, the question remains as to how the South can marry its development needs with the environmental pressures on the planet.

See also *Decolonization; Free Trade; International Monetary Fund (IMF); Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); Trade Diplomacy; United Nations (UN); World Bank.*

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Nove, Alec

Alec Nove (1915–1994) was an influential British scholar and one of the key founders of the discipline of Soviet studies. By the early 1960s, he was internationally recognized as the leading Western authority on the dynamics of the Soviet centrally planned economy. The author of eleven widely regarded books, he was an eloquent writer and an engaging lecturer. Apart from his economic expertise, Nove was also deeply immersed in Russian history, culture, and folklore.

Nove was born into a Russian Jewish family in St Petersburg, Russia, in 1915. His father, a member of the Menshevik faction that opposed the Bolshevik party, took the family into exile in London in 1922, changing their name from Novakovsky to Nove. Nove graduated from the London School of Economics and then served in the British army during World War II (1939–1945). After the war he worked for four years at the Board of Trade in London, where he learned the practicalities of economic planning. In the 1950s he began direct study of the Soviet economy, spending some time at the British embassy in Moscow. After teaching at the London School of Economics, in 1963 Nove was appointed head of the Institute for Soviet and East European Studies at Glasgow University in Scotland, a post he held until 1982.

Nove's most important works were *The Soviet Economy,* first published in 1961, and *An Economic History of the USSR,* which appeared in 1969. Each book went through several revised editions over the next twenty-five years. Unable to conduct work in the field due to the cold war, Nove mined the Soviet press and academic publications for insights into how the Soviet system really worked with regard to both industry and agriculture, and he was expert at dissecting the arcane and often misleading data put out by the Soviet statistics agency. He uncovered numerous telling examples of the informational asymmetries and perverse incentives of central planning. A typical example was a glass factory that produced very thick panes when its output targets were set by weight. When its output targets were changed to square footage instead of weight, it produced very thin panes, which shattered before they reached their customers.

Nove was wary of applying Western models and assumptions to the Soviet case. Despite the inefficiencies of Soviet planning that he exposed, he was prepared to grudgingly concede that the Soviet system had served the political objectives of the country's leaders and had propelled the USSR to superpower status. This argument over whether or not there was some sort of logical consistency to Joseph Stalin's modernization strategy was laid out in Nove's books *Was Stalin Really Necessary?* (1964) and *Stalinism and After* (1975). A true political economist, Nove had the great strength of being able to place economic activity in its political context. As the Soviet system began to reform after 1985, Nove was more cautious than most other Western experts in advocating a rapid shift to competitive markets. Nove himself was a social democrat, and in 1983 he published his own speculation about a possible alternative to both Soviet planning and Western capitalism, *The Economics of Feasible Socialism*. He also wrote a critique of the market criteria used in state-owned industry in Britain, *Efficiency Criteria for Nationalised Industries* (1973).

See also *Economic Policy Formulation; Economic Systems, Comparative; Economic Theories of the State; Russian Political Thought; Stalinism.*

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Novel, Political

American literary critic and political activist Irving Howe defines the political novel as a novel in which the dominant element is either political ideas or a political milieu. Howe's pioneering study, published in 1957, still serves as a point of departure for studies of connections between politics and literature (although the first study to include the term *political novel* in its title was published by American scholar Morris Edmund Speare in 1924).

One question is whether the political novel constitutes a distinct genre of fiction. Howe argues against the use of any inappropriately dichotomous classifications. Another important question is how the primarily literary aspects of the political novel are related to its political content. For some critics, the political novelist attempts to serve two masters—literary quality and political verisimilitude. In Howe's view, a sort of continuum can be arranged, with novels best illuminated by literary analysis at one end and novels best studied by means of ideological analysis at the other. Scholars who insist on at least some distinction of this sort appear to understand politics as a more or less determinate area of human experience, to be given its due in fiction, but which can corrupt and destroy fiction as well.

However, there are other scholars who understand politics to be all-pervasive. From this standpoint, as Marxist theorist and literary critic Frederic Jameson insists, since "everything is 'in the last analysis' political," it is pointless to identify some

works as political and others not (1981, 5). For theorists like Jameson, the problem of genre vanishes, because genre itself is no longer a useful concept in literary theory. Other scholars, such as John Whalen-Bridge, however, prefer to retain distinctions that permit articulations of relations between politics and aesthetics, without dissolving all differences between them.

It is often argued that political novels constitute a significant source for the public's understanding of politics. Literary critic Mary McCarthy contends, for example, that most Americans learn about politics from reading political fiction. For Bernard Crick, contemporary political thinking is as likely to be found in novels as in philosophical treatises, and in novels it is certainly in a more accessible form. Many of the questions addressed in political philosophy are present in some form in political fiction. Political fiction addresses questions such as the nature of authority, political conflict, the possibilities for and obstacles to political transformation, and the extent to which the past imposes decisive limitations on political action toward the conditions for a good way of life for human beings. The turn to political novels has been explained and defended as a potentially fruitful response to what some scholars see as the abandonment by both academic philosophy and academic political science of any significant intellectual interest in informing political thinking in the wider culture, a theme anticipated in part by American intellectual historian H. Stuart Hughes in 1958.

A TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL NOVELS

GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

Several different sorts of novels may be identified as political novels, although a number of the works listed could easily be placed in more than one category. Some are novels that have settings in political movements or institutions of government. Such novels began with nineteenth-century examples, including British statesman and writer Benjamin Disraeli's *Coningsby* (1844), Anthony Trollope's six Paliser or "parliamentary" novels (1864–1879), Henry Adams's *Democracy* (1880), and Robert Penn Warren's *All the King's Men* (1946). Among the more recent so-called insider novels are Allen Drury's *Advise and Consent* (1959), Billy Lee Brammer's *The Gay Place* (1961) Gore Vidal's *Washington, D.C.* (1967), Lynne Cheney's *Executive Privilege* (1979), Norman Mailer's *Harlot's Ghost* (1991), Richard Perle's *Hard Line* (1992), and Joe Klein's *Primary Colors* (1996).

Political movements across the ideological spectrum have been the settings for a number of well-known novels, such as Stendahl's *The Red and the Black* (1830), Ivan Turgenev's

British author Salman Rushdie found himself subject to an Iranian death sentence for the publication of his 1988 book *The Satanic Verses* due to its alleged disrespectful treatment of the Islamic prophet Muhammad.

Fathers and Sons (1862), George Eliot's *Felix Holt, the Radical* (1866), Fyodor Dostoevsky's *The Possessed* (1872), Henry James's *The Princess Casamassima* (1886), Joseph Conrad's *The Secret Agent* (1907), André Malraux's *Man's Fate* (1933), Ignazio Silone's *Bread and Wine* (1936), Ernest Hemingway's *For Whom the Bell Tolls* (1939), Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* (1940), Ayn Rand's *Atlas Shrugged* (1957) Yukio Mishima's *After the Banquet* (1960), Raymond Abellio's *The Tower of Babel* (1962), Dominique de Roux's *The Fifth Empire* (1977), and many others.

EXPERIENCES OF OPPRESSION OR MARGINALIZATION AND PROTEST

Many political novels are written from within or against experiences of marginalization, oppression, colonization, protest, nationalism, and revolution, and they include feminist, racial and ethnic, gay, and postcolonial fiction. A few examples of these are Joseph Conrad's *Nostromo* (1904), Upton Sinclair's *The Jungle* (1906), John Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath* (1939), Richard Wright's *Native Son* (1940), Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man* (1952), Graham Greene's *The Quiet American* (1955), Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* (1958), James Baldwin's *Another Country* (1962), Carlos Fuentes's *The Death of Artemio Cruz* (1962), Gabriel García Márquez's *One Hundred Years of Solitude* (1967), Alejo Carpentier's *Reasons of State* (1974), V. S. Naipaul's *A Bend in the River* (1979), Nadine Gordimer's *Burger's Daughter* (1979), Athol Fugard's *Totsi* (1980), and Salman Rushdie's *Midnight's Children* (1981).

The tangible impact of fiction on political change has also been explored in evaluations of such novels as Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (1852), Ivan Turgenev's *A Sportsman's Notebook* (1852), Upton Sinclar's *The Jungle* (1906), Ignazio Silone's *Fontamara* (1931), and Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses* (1988).

UTOPIAN AND DISTOPIAN NOVELS

Among the most popular of political novels are those identified as utopian or dystopian fiction, beginning with Thomas More's *Utopia* (1516), Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* (1726), and Denis Diderot's *Supplément au voyage de Bougainville* (1772) and including Samuel Butler's *Erewhon* (1872), Charlotte Perkins Gilman's *Herland* (1915), Yevgeny Zamyatin's *We* (1927), Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* (1932), George Orwell's *1984* (1949), William Golding's *Lord of the Flies* (1954), Ernest Jünger's *The Glass Bees* (1957), Monique Wittig's *The Guerillas* (1969), Thomas Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow* (1973), Margaret Atwood's *The Handmaid's Tale* (1985), and Kazuo Ishiguro's *Never Let Me Go* (2005).

Many utopian or dystopian novels overlap with science fiction, which has often been regarded as an important source of political novels. Kingsley Amis drew the attention of literary critics to this aspect of science fiction in 1960. A scholarly literature is emerging in which students of political theory examine science fiction. Such prominent science fiction authors as H. G. Wells, Frederik Pohl, Robert A. Heinlein, Ursula K. LeGuin, Philip K. Dick, and Kim Stanley Robinson are objects of critical discussion.

The American Political Science Association has a Politics, Literature, and Film section. An indispensable resource for the study of relations between politics and literature is a three-volume encyclopedia containing entries on authors, literary movements, issues, and critical perspectives published in 2005 by Greenwood Press.

The role of fiction as an expression of and commentary on the political conditions of human existence is both older than the political novel and continues to be exhibited in the political novel. As the twenty-first century unfolds, political novels will without a doubt continue to be vehicles by means of which the responses of persons to their political situations are articulated, and by means of which political thinking and action will be stimulated.

See also *Poetry and Politics; Politics, Literature, and Film; Satire, Political.*

. . . .   JAMES F. WARD

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Nozick, Robert

Robert Nozick (1938–2002) was a twentieth-century American political philosopher who worked at Harvard University. He is most well known for his 1974 book *Anarchy, State and Utopia,* in which he defends the libertarian ideal of the minimal state against utilitarianism, egalitarian, and socialist redistributive politics.

He famously questioned the utilitarian position of pleasure seeking and pain avoidance, or the priority of happiness, in human motivation, and so also of the principle of utility in ethics and politics. He asked if given the choice, would humans trade life in the real world for life in an "experience machine" that could flawlessly reproduce any conditions or experiences that resulted in happiness? His intuitive answer was that few if any persons would choose the unlimited happiness in the machine over the uncertain happiness of the real world. Life, then, must be about more than seeking pleasure and avoiding pain.

Nozick's main focus, however, was the redistributive politics of egalitarian liberalism and socialism, particularly that of his Harvard colleague, John Rawls. According to Rawls, the principles of equality and social justice require substantial redistribution of wealth. Nozick calls such a scheme a "patterned" theory of justice, since the just distribution matches some prior principle. Nozick preferred a historical view of justice and presented his entitlement account of a just distribution: So long as a current distribution and holding of goods is just, then whatever distribution results from personal exchange is also just, and political interference with that distribution (as in a patterned theory) is unjust. In identifying justice in initial acquisition, Nozick adopts British philosopher John Locke's proviso of "enough and as good," meaning anyone appropriating unowned resources or property would have to ensure the appropriation showed no prejudice to any other person. Nozick also borrowed Locke's principle of self-ownership, through which rights are extended to resources through labor.

He believed that once justice in initial holdings is established, the distribution resulting from the free exchange of individual holdings will be just, and redistribution in this new situation will be unjust—persons are entitled to their holdings resulting from exchanges in a just initial system. To explain the fairness of distribution resulting from free exchange, Nozick developed his famous "Wilt Chamberlain argument." When persons voluntarily give some portion of their just holdings to Wilt Chamberlain to watch him play basketball, Nozick argued that Chamberlain is entitled to this income. On the other hand, taxation for functions beyond those necessary to maintain the system of free exchange (security) is illegitimate, since individuals are entitled to their justly acquired holdings. Therefore, taxation amounts to forced labor. Individual rights are thus "side-constraints" on the range of the legitimate functions of the state.

Nozick's libertarianism is unique in the sense that it is based on the egalitarian foundation of equal moral worth and the inviolability of persons, which gives rise to the political demand of equal respect for individual interests. He shared this foundation with Rawls, although Nozick drew extremely different conclusions as to its implications for the demands of social justice.

See also *Libertarianism; Locke, John; Utilitarianism*.

. . . .   NEIL HIBBERT

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Nuclear Club

The term *nuclear club* is used in various ways. Before 1970, any state that developed nuclear weapons was considered a member of the nuclear club. Since the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) came into effect in 1970, the term has been used to refer to the nuclear states acknowledged by the treaty. Because a number of states obtained nuclear weapons after 1970, there is now a gulf between the members of the nuclear club authorized by the NPT and the group of states that possess nuclear weapons. India has especially challenged the fact that it has been excluded from the club.

According to the NPT, the only legal nuclear weapons states are those that had declared nuclear programs when the treaty was written in 1968, namely the United States (which developed nuclear weapons in 1945), Russia (1949), the United Kingdom (1953), France (1964), and China (1964). All other state parties to the treaty agreed to pursue nuclear programs only for energy, not for weapons (NPT 1968, Articles II and IV). In exchange, the five existing nuclear states promised under Article VI to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to . . . nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

Since 1970, a number of states have developed or otherwise obtained nuclear weapons, including Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Of those, only North Korea was ever a party to the NPT. North Korea ratified the treaty in 1985 but withdrew in 2003 in response to U.S. allegations that it was enriching uranium for weapons use. In 2005, North Korea declared itself a nuclear weapons state. In October 2006, it conducted a nuclear test. In 2006, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimated that North Korea had ten nuclear weapons and the capability to manufacture one per year.

In 1968, when the NPT was opened for signature, both Israel and India had made significant progress toward development of nuclear weapons. Neither signed the treaty. Pakistan, India's rival, also abstained. In 1999, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimated that Israel had approximately 70 nuclear weapons. In 2006, the NRDC estimated that India and Pakistan each had approximately 50 weapons.

Policymakers disagree about whether new nuclear states should be considered members of the nuclear club. In 1998, when India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices, U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright argued that neither was a club member. According to her, because their tests occurred after 1967, their nuclear weapons programs were illegitimate. By contrast, Jaswant Singh, a senior Indian policy advisor, argued that "India is now a nuclear weapons state, as is Pakistan. That reality can neither be denied nor wished away. This category of 'nuclear weapons state' is not, in actuality, a conferment. Nor is it a status for others to grant. It is, rather, an objective reality." In 2008, the United States took the latter view and lifted sanctions imposed on India after its first nuclear test in 1974.

Despite frequent discussions in the United Nations General Assembly, no progress has been made on general and complete nuclear disarmament. According to many observers, this raises questions about the legitimacy of the arsenals of the original five nuclear weapons states.

See also *Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation; United Nations (UN), Weapons of Mass Destruction.*

. . . . KAREN RUTH ADAMS

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Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation

Nuclear proliferation—the spread of nuclear weapons around the world—represents one of the central challenges to contemporary international peace and security.

DEFINITIONS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

The standard definition of *nuclear proliferation* was set by the 1968 *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,* or NPT. The NPT implicitly defines proliferation as the manufacture and explosion of a nuclear explosive device by any state (or, conceivably, by a nonstate actor) that had not done so beforehand. In short, proliferation occurs upon a state's first nuclear test.

This standard definition has been challenged from a number of perspectives. First, it is often remarked that in addition to the problem of "horizontal" proliferation, there is also the problem of "vertical" proliferation—the accumulation of nuclear weapons stockpiles by the existing nuclear powers. This argument may be intellectually valid, but in common parlance, *proliferation* is used exclusively to mean horizontal proliferation, and other terms such as *build-up* or *arms race* are used to mean vertical proliferation.

Second, some contend that proliferation might be better conceived more as a continuous process than as a discrete outcome. The so-called proliferation ladder ranges from the acquisition of basic nuclear scientific and technical skills to the development of a bomb-manufacturing capacity and finally to actual bomb manufacture, testing, and deployment. There has been a concerted push to roll the proliferation "red line" back from the first nuclear explosion to the production of fissile material. These efforts remain controversial, however.

CAUSES OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Broadly speaking, there are two competing explanatory camps for the phenomenon of nuclear proliferation: realism and idealism. The first, traditionally dominant realist camp takes the view that states are ultimately driven toward the bomb by the inescapable requirement of self-help in the anarchic international system. In short, in a dangerous world states must seek to arm themselves with the most dangerous weapons. But in contradiction to realist expectations, fewer than ten of the fifty or so states that are widely estimated to have the potential to have nuclear arsenals by now actually do have them. At present, the nuclear weapons states include the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and possibly North Korea. In addition, South Africa secretly held a few nuclear devices before destroying them at the end of the 1980s, and three post–Soviet successor states briefly inherited weapons at the start of the 1990s but quickly gave them up. Meanwhile there is no credible evidence that any terrorist group has ever been close to obtaining a nuclear weapon.

The persistent small number of nuclear weapons states has caused resurgent interest in the alternative, idealist perspective on proliferation. Different idealist theories focus on different levels of analysis. International-level idealists stress the effects of international norms of nonproliferation and nuclear nonuse on depressing demand for the bomb, with the caveat that these norms cannot restrain so-called rogue regimes that reject international society. Meanwhile, domestic-level idealists note that many important societal constituencies oppose nuclear weapons. Finally, individual-level idealists argue that going nuclear is a revolutionary act in world politics, which only oppositional nationalist leaders may have the motivation and certitude necessary to carry off.

EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

The vast majority of policy makers are convinced that proliferation is a source of world disorder, but academics are divided between nuclear proliferation optimists and pessimists. Proliferation optimists contend that mutual assured destruction prevented the cold war from descending into World War III. This experience suggests to them that a nuclear-armed world could actually be a more stable world. By contrast, proliferation pessimists argue that the nuclear stability of the cold war was more apparent than real, with numerous close calls due to miscalculation, misperception, organizational dysfunction, and sheer brutality. Moreover, they argue that whatever nuclear stability did exist during the cold war is likely to be unsustainable as the nuclear club expands—and will certainly break down if nonstate actors get the bomb.

EFFORTS AGAINST NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

There are numerous international efforts to rein in nuclear proliferation. At the center of these efforts is the multilateral treaty instrument of the NPT. NPT membership is almost

universal, with nearly 190 parties, even though membership can be costly to the non–nuclear weapon states. Under the NPT, non–nuclear weapon states are required to safeguard their nuclear facilities against military uses, subject to inspection and verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA's safeguards system was long criticized for being too lax, but it has tightened considerably over the years. Indeed, that tightening has caused a slowdown in the expansion of the global civilian nuclear energy market, which the NPT was supposed to protect. There are growing fears that treaty membership may become unattractive to non–nuclear weapon states if it does not help them to advance their civilian nuclear power ambitions.

In addition to the formal multilateral instruments of non-proliferation are the export control clubs, the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which include most of the main states engaged in international nuclear commerce. These clubs have also significantly tightened their rules over the years. Meanwhile, the important American initiative for "cooperative threat reduction," and more recently joint "global partnership" efforts by the G8 states, have tackled the difficult problem of reinforcing post-Soviet states' capacity to hang on to their nuclear materials and not seek income through dangerous technology exports.

In addition to supporting nonproliferation, the United States has also pioneered the development of counterproliferation efforts, which attempt to utilize the threat or actuality of military force to roll back nuclear weapons programs or at least to minimize their strategic value. Some aspects of U.S. counterproliferation policy have found widespread international support, notably the proliferation security initiative, which aims to interdict trade in nuclear and dual–use materials. Other aspects have been hotly contested, especially the deployment of ballistic missile defense systems and the Bush doctrine of preventive war against nascent nuclear weapons programs. Whether counterproliferation policy complements or detracts from nonproliferation policy remains an open question.

See also *Cold War; Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD); Nuclear Club; Soviet Union, Former.*

. . . .   JACQUES E. C. HYMANS

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Numeraire and Dollarization

Numeraire and *dollarization* are both terms that refer to a country's adoption of a foreign currency as a numeraire and/or legal tender instead of a national currency. Numeraire is a unit of account, against which all goods and services are valued and priced. The new foreign currency (typically, dollar, euro, etc.) becomes a measure of the relative worthiness of goods and services. As a result, the domestic medium of exchange, national currency, becomes different from the numeraire, the new adopted currency. The most-often adopted foreign currencies are the U.S. dollar and the euro.

There are three types of dollarization, official or full, semiofficial, and unofficial. Official dollarization is a complete substitution for a local currency of a foreign currency, which becomes the only legal tender in a country. Examples of official dollarization include Panama (1904, U.S. dollar) and Nauru (1914, Australian dollar). Semiofficial dollarization, or a bimonetary system, is characterized by simultaneous usage of national and foreign currencies as legal tenders. Examples of semiofficial dollarization include the Bahamas (1966, Bahamian dollar and U.S. dollar) and Bhutan (1974, Bhutanese ngultrum and Indian rupee). Unofficial dollarization is the use of a foreign currency in private transactions without official acceptance of the foreign currency as a legal tender. Many developing countries have experienced unofficial dollarization.

See also *Fiscal Policy.*

. . . .   TATIANA VASHCHILKO

Oakeshott, Michael Joseph

Michael Joseph Oakeshott (1901–1990) was a British political philosopher interested in the philosophical questions raised by the study of history. His first published work, *Experience and Its Modes* (1933), examined three modes of experience: history, science, and practice. He argued that each of these modes or perspectives afforded a comprehensive, albeit circumscribed, way of thinking about the world. Each, therefore, tells more about how humans think than about what they should do, a perspective very much in keeping with Oakeshott's view of philosophy, which held that people should be concerned with clarifying their own thoughts rather than trying to persuade, let alone convert, others.

Oakeshott studied history at Caius College in Cambridge and became a fellow in 1923. Amidst the turmoil of the 1930s, he enjoyed nonpolitical pursuits, including horseracing. With a Cambridge colleague, he coauthored *A Guide to the Classics* (1936), the aim of which was to pick Derby winners. While he publically defended the individual's right to refrain from political activity, Oakeshott volunteered in 1941 to serve in the British army's intelligence unit, Phantom.

Oakeshott returned to Cambridge after World War II (1939–1945) and completed his introduction to British philosopher Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1946) that established his reputation as a leading scholar on Hobbes. In 1951, Oakeshott succeeded political theorist Harold Laski as the chair of the government department at the London School of Economics and served until his retirement in 1969.

Oakeshott's best-known book, *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (1962), secured his place as a leading conservative thinker. Rejecting historical predestination, natural law, and other metaphysical abstractions, Oakeshott's conservatism, however, sprung from a deeply rooted skepticism. No golden age in the past or in the future beckoned him. On the contrary, one must "delight in what is present rather than what was or what will be." For him, this is what it means to be a conservative.

This skepticism, along with his "irredeemable secularism," set Oakeshott apart from other conservatives. But neither did it endear him to radicals who, for the most part, did not delight in the here and now. His political philosophy, they complained, presupposed a world not so different from the one Oakeshott inhabited, but very different from the one inhabited by most people.

Oakeshott, however, had his reasons for not entirely embracing any one political philosophy. To do so, he believed, would close himself off from the unexpected insights that might result from keeping a conversation ongoing. Conversations do not require that the participants share the same philosophy. What Oakeshott desired was for people to be able to differ without disagreeing. Conversations, he implied, may not bring the participants closer to the truth, but they may bring them closer to each other. Quite possibly this outlook is what made him such a revered teacher and colleague.

Oakeshott died in his nineteenth-century cottage in Dorset, England, on December 19th, 1990.

See also *British Political Thought; Hobbes, Thomas.*

. . . . RAMONA JUNE GREY

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Obligation, Theories of

Political obligation is one of the oldest and most persistent problems of political philosophy. The Greek tragedian Sophocles raised it in *Antigone,* first performed around 440 BC, and Plato's dialogue *Crito* recounts the philosopher Socrates's response to the problem, in the face of his own death, some forty years later.

Philosophers who maintain that most citizens or subjects of a reasonably just state have an obligation to obey its laws have advanced several different theories of political obligation. Socrates hints at some of them in the *Crito*—consent, utility, fair play, and gratitude—but the first to become influential in Western political thought was *divine command* theory.

Divine command theory holds that people have an obligation to obey the law because God (or the gods) commands

them to obey. In Christian political theory, this conviction is rooted in Paul's Epistle to the Romans (13:1–2). Problems arose, however, when the political authorities were hostile to Christianity. One response was to insist on obedience, for God must have given power to hostile or vicious rulers as a sign of his displeasure with a wicked people. Another response was to distinguish political authority from the persons in authority. That is, God orders humans to respect the office, but the officer who occupies it may be disobeyed or even deposed if the individual is a tyrant.

Since the Protestant Reformation, the *consent* (or social contract) theory has been probably the most influential. As developed by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and John Locke (1632–1704), in particular, this theory grounds political obligation in the individual's consent to be a part of a political society governed by laws. In response to the observation that few people have expressly consented to place themselves under a political obligation, consent theorists argue that most people have given tacit consent, perhaps by voting or, as Locke says, by traveling freely on the highways.

Dissatisfaction with this answer has prompted philosophers to devise other theories. According to the *utilitarian* view, one should obey the law because—or as long as—more good is likely to come from obedience than from disobedience. The other theories are less concerned with consequences, however, than with what the citizen owes to others. On the *gratitude* theory, someone is obligated to obey the law because this person owes a debt to the political society for the education, protection, and other benefits it has provided. The *fair play* (or fairness) theory rests on the claim that a reasonably just polity is a cooperative enterprise in which the participants receive benefits but must also bear burdens—especially the burden of obeying the law when one would rather disobey. Because the polity can produce its benefits only when most people cooperate, the person who receives the benefits owes a duty of fair play to the others to cooperate in turn by obeying the law. The *membership* (or associative) theory of obligation turns directly to considerations of belonging or identity. To be a member of a polity, and to think of oneself as a member, is to have an obligation of membership, much as being a member of a family entails an obligation to one's parents and siblings. Finally, the *natural duty* theory begins with the claim that everyone has moral duties, including a duty to support just institutions, without regard to such considerations as consent, membership, or fair play. Someone who belongs to a just polity or state thus has a duty to obey its laws.

Most political philosophers seem to agree that there is a moral obligation to obey the law, at least in a reasonably just state. There have always been doubters, however, and they have become increasingly prominent in recent years. Some of them are outright anarchists, who deny the existence of political authority, and therefore of political obligation. Most doubters, though, either associate themselves or flirt with *philosophical anarchism*. According to this view, one may admit that political authority is justified and yet deny that there is any moral obligation to obey its laws. There are good reasons to obey laws against murder and robbery, on this view, but there is no moral duty to obey a law simply because it is a law. Whether philosophical anarchism is persuasive, or whether there truly is a general obligation to obey the law, is now the subject of a lively debate.

See also *Anarchism; Hobbes, Thomas; Law and Society; Locke, John; Plato.*

. . . .   RICHARD DAGGER

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Occupation and Annexation

Occupation and annexation are central concepts in the study of international security. Both are common outcomes when military force is employed, yet both pose difficult practical, legal, and moral questions for states in international politics.

OCCUPATION

In general, *occupation* is legally defined as the effective control of a state, or group of states, over a territory to which that power has no sovereign title, without the volition of the sovereign of that territory. As opposed to annexation, occupations are, by definition, temporary. They can occur during war for the purpose of holding territory or they can occur after war for the purpose of transforming a former adversary. Military occupations can be divided into five unique types: security occupations, comprehensive occupations, restorative occupations, collateral occupations, and caretaker occupations.

TYPES OF OCCUPATIONS

Security occupations seek to prevent the occupied country from becoming a threat to the occupying power or to other states, as well as to ensure that the occupied territory does not become a destabilizing influence in its region. They refrain, however, from remaking the political or economic system of the occupied country, aiming instead only to prevent the occupied country from posing a threat to international security. For example, the Allied occupation of the Rhineland in the aftermath of World War I (1914–1918) was primarily intended to prevent the reemergence of a powerful Germany. While France initially advocated Rhenish independence,

none of the occupying powers ultimately hoped to install a particular government in the Rhineland; instead, their goal was simply to limit the ability of Germany to again pose a threat to their security.

Comprehensive occupations also seek primarily to secure the interests of the occupying power and long-term stability, but they are distinct from security occupations in that they also aim to introduce a stable political system and a productive economy. Thus, comprehensive occupations are closer to what might be thought of as state-building. The U.S. occupation of Japan and the four-power occupation of Germany after World War II (1939–1945) are the best-known examples of comprehensive occupation. More recently, the U.S. occupation of Iraq after the 2003 war is typical of a comprehensive occupation. In contrast, the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan has sought success without occupying all of Afghanistan, but the goals of the two missions share much with comprehensive occupations of the past.

Restorative occupations seek to restore order in another country without imposing a new political system. Often, the motive of these occupations is to protect either the security or the economic interests of the occupying country within the occupied state by bolstering a threatened leader. These occupations may pursue the replacement of an unreliable leader, but they are not intended to install an entirely new political system. The American intervention in Nicaragua between 1927 and 1934 to oust Augusto César Sandino is an example of a restorative occupation.

Collateral occupations hold foreign territory until some indemnity is repaid. For example, following the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), fifty thousand German troops occupied six departments of France until the French paid 1.5 billion francs in war reparations. When the French finished paying on September 16, 1873, the German troops withdrew.

Finally, caretaker occupations are designed simply to hold a territory until a long-term settlement of the status of the territory is devised. The only evident cases of caretaker occupations are the British occupations of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, Eritrea, and Somalia in the wake of World War II. In these cases, London had no intention of retaining these territories nor did they have particularly ambitious objectives while they controlled them. Instead, Britain simply was holding these territories until the United Nations (UN) could decide their postwar fate.

ANNEXATION

In contrast to occupation, *annexation* refers to the permanent acquisition of a territory by a foreign power. Unlike occupation, annexing powers usually have no intention of returning sovereignty to the people of the annexed territory. Many great powers have historically been built through the process of annexation.

For example, in the nineteenth century the United States grew from its origins on the eastern coast of North America to a continental power through the process of annexation. Some of this land, such as the Louisiana Purchase, was acquired through simple financial transactions while other land was more contentiously seized from other groups and powers.

OCCUPATION AND ANNEXATION AT ISSUE

Both occupation and annexation are at the center of important debates in international relations. These debates center on the practical impediments to successful occupation and annexation, the legal requirements of states undertaking occupation or annexation, and the moral dilemmas that the occupation or annexation of foreign territory pose. With regard to military occupation, some focus on the legality of military occupation under the Hague Conventions and the consequent responsibility of military occupiers during the time in which they occupy a foreign territory. Others focus on the reasons why military occupation has been more or less successful under certain conditions. In particular, in the wake of the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq after the 2003 war, scholars and practitioners alike have examined whether military occupation can be an effective tool for building stable and sustainable nation-states. This debate divides into arguments about the most effective ways to counter an insurgency, on the one hand, and whether postconflict military occupation is a wise instrument of foreign policy. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, debates continued in 2009 over whether more troops alone can enable an occupation to succeed. Finally, some scholars of international relations identify occupation as a potential cause of other important phenomena, such as terrorism. According to the logic of one argument, occupation breeds nationalist resentment that often manifests itself in violent attacks against occupying powers.

Debates over annexation largely focus on the value of annexation in the emerging postindustrial age. When economies were largely based on agriculture and traditional heavy industry, conquest and annexation could provide significant benefits to an annexing power. Arguably, the growth of information economies has undermined the value of traditional territorial conquest. For some, however, annexation continues to be viewed as a valuable way of increasing a state's material power.

In the future, debates about occupation and annexation are likely to continue. The complex practical, legal, and moral questions that they raise guarantee that they will remain contentious concepts.

See also *Civil-military Relations; Foreign Policy; Insurgency; International Relations.*

. . . . DAVID M. EDELSTEIN

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Ogg, Frederick Austin

Frederick Austin Ogg (1878–1951) was an American political scientist. He was the longest-serving editor of the *American Political Science Review* (1926–1949) and also edited *PS: Political Science and Politics.* Ogg developed both as flagship journals of the American Political Science Association (APSA) and as forums for the discussion of political ideas and theories.

In 1904, Ogg published his first book, *The Opening of the Mississippi: A Struggle for Supremacy in the American Interior.* Four years later, he received his PhD from Harvard University. He subsequently held academic positions at Harvard University, Boston University, and Simmons College, with his fields of interest encompassing American history, American politics, and comparative government. After publishing *Governments of Europe* (1913) and *The Life of Daniel Webster* (1914), Ogg relocated to the University of Wisconsin where he remained until his retirement in 1948. During this time, in 1941, he served as president of the American Political Science Association. Ogg was also the editor of the *Century Political Science* series, which included thirty books, many of them his own.

Ogg's political output was remarkable for its range and diversity. He wrote on medieval history, American history, the social and economic development of Europe, American and European politics, and government. His best-known work is *Introduction to American Government* (1922), written with P. Orman Ray, which provided a lucid survey of American political thought and institutions. It was a standard text in American political science classes and went through numerous editions. Ogg also published many major works on comparative government. His output consists of over sixteen works, including *Economic Development of Modern Europe* (1912), *American Council of Learned Societies Devoted to Humanistic Studies* (1928), *English Government and Politics* (1934), *European Government and Politics* (1934), and *Modern Foreign Governments* (with Harold Zink, 1949). Ogg was honored upon his retirement with *The Study of Comparative Government: An Appraisal of Contemporary Trends; Essays Written in Honor of Frederic Austin Ogg*, edited by Jasper Berry Shannon (1949).

Ogg represents a generation of distinguished political scientists in the interwar years who pursued descriptive politics. Unlike prescriptive politics, descriptive politics mapped the political terrain and its landmark political institutions in a comparative context. Ogg's knowledge of European history and politics enabled him to provide insights into the unique features of American political culture.

See also *European Political Thought; U.S. Political Thought.*

. . . .   GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN

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Okin, Susan Moller

Susan Moller Okin (1946–2004) was a feminist and political theorist who brought to bear the importance of the family on twentieth-century dialogues of justice. In criticizing contemporary theories of justice as overly focused on gender neutrality, she highlighted a neglected dimension of private life—namely, the domestic role of women—that must be attended to in order to establish a form of liberalism that truly included all of society's members. From these conclusions, Okin engaged the practical dilemmas of multiculturalism, arguing for more female and minority participation in public deliberation over, for example, the right of Muslim women to wear *hijabs* (headscarves) in the workplace in Norway and the proper distribution of World Bank funds in India.

Okin was born in Auckland, New Zealand, on July 19, 1946, and was linked to higher education for virtually her entire life. She graduated from the University of Auckland in 1967, earned a master's degree in philosophy from Oxford University in 1970, and received a doctorate degree in government from Harvard University in 1975. She taught at the University of Auckland, Vassar College, Brandeis College, Harvard University, and Stanford University prior to her last appointment at the prestigious Radcliffe Institute of Advance Studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Okin's writings could be polemical and provocative. Her first book, *Women in Western Political Thought* (1979), analyzed the work of major political philosophers, both ancient and modern, and their overall failure to include women in their political theories. Drawing on the overlooked division between political life and family life, Okin expanded on this initial evaluation in *Justice, Gender, and the Family* (1989), which focused on contemporary debates about the meaning of liberalism between advocates of strict neutrality and communitarianism. Okin trained her criticism primarily on leading liberal philosopher John Rawls. According to Okin, Rawls's renowned *Theory of Justice* (1971), in spite of its heavy emphasis on equal rights and opportunities, largely disregarded the private division of labor that often undermined such values. In Okin's eyes, a comprehensive expression of a just society demanded more attention toward the traditionally unequal divisions of gendered labor that invariably subordinated the social status of women. *Justice, Gender, and the Family* was widely acclaimed at the time of its publication, winning the American Political Science Association's Victoria Schuck Prize for the best book on women and politics.

Okin extended her focus on female empowerment into international politics, traveling with the Global Fund for Women in 2004 and calling attention to the need for the world to redefine how monetary funds were distributed and the necessity for full female participation in politics—respect for cultural traditions and norms notwithstanding. These pleas found expression in her final book, *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?* (1999).

Okin was also a devoted teacher, winning Stanford's Bing Teaching Award in 1994, the Allan V. Cox Medal for faculty

excellence in fostering undergraduate research in 2002, and numerous other accolades. Today, her name continues to recall one of the leading lights of feminist thought in contemporary political theory. She died March 3, 2004, in Lincoln, Massachusetts, of natural causes.

See also *Gender and Politics; Gender Issues; Women's Rights; Women's Studies.*

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Old Europe

Old Europe, which is often used in junction with or in comparison to New Europe, is a term used in 2003 by U.S. secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld to refer to those European countries that did not support the American military invasion of Iraq, especially Germany and France. He claimed that the center of gravity of Europe was moving eastward, to the New Europe, where the new democracies supported the U.S. actions in Iraq.

This divide between Old Europe and New Europe was increased with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member state expansion. The treaty, signed in 1949 by ten countries, including the United States, Canada, and ten European nations (Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom) that constituted the *Old Europe*, in Rumsfeld's assertion. The subsequent enlargement increased the number of NATO members to twenty-six and included Greece, Turkey, Germany, Spain, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

The cleavage between Old and New Europe also denotes the recent augmentation of the European Union's (EU) member states. From this perspective, Old Europe indicates the six EU founding countries and the next four waves of enlargement (1973, 1981, 1986, 1995), while New Europe includes the ten countries that acceded in 2004 and the later ones, which became EU members in 2007.

See also *New Europe.*

. . . . PETRONELA IACOB

Oligarchy

Oligarchy is a system of government in which power lies in the hands of a few individuals or a single class. The term *oligarkhia* comes from the Greek words *oligo* (few) and *arkhos* (rule). It entered the political science lexicon through its use in Aristotle's *Politics* (1981), in which Aristotle classified governments based upon the number of rulers and whether the rulers ruled in their interest or for the common good. Governments with rulers who ruled only according to their own interests were deemed "corrupt" or "debased" forms of government. An oligarchy is thus a form of government in which power is held by a small group of people (like an aristocracy) that rules only in its interest (unlike an aristocracy). Aristotle noted that oligarchies typically were led by the wealthy, although they could also be the product of heredity or be controlled by military elites; aristocracies, in contrast, were led by what Aristotle considered the "virtuous."

In more modern usage, an oligarchy, which is usually predicated upon a closed, narrowly based leadership, is generally taken to be the opposite of a democracy, which aspires for political openness, equality, and opportunity for all to participate in political life. However, many political thinkers have pointed to a gap between the rhetoric or ideal of democracy and its actual practice, which, in many respects, may resemble an oligarchy. On the political left, many writers have focused on the tendency for economic elites to emerge as powerful forces in capitalist, democratic states, thereby producing potentially deleterious effects for democratic government. German philosopher Karl Marx (1818–1883), for example, argued that the state in capitalist systems reflects the underlying economic reality of the unequal relationship between the bourgeoisie, or capitalists, and the proletariat, or working class; the state thereby becomes little more than what he referred to as the executive committee of the bourgeoisie. Therefore, in Marx's view, democracy in capitalist states is a sham. In the American context, sociologist C. Wright Mills in *The Power Elite* (1956) argued that democratic governance was being usurped by linkages between corporations, the military, and the government bureaucracy, all of which were not directly accountable to voters. These institutions, to Mills, hijack the government to serve their own narrow interests at the expense of the common good. Political scientist Charles Lindblom similarly argued in *Politics and Markets* (1977) that business interests invariably—thanks to their resources—play a "privileged role" in any democratic state, and the political and economic elites conspire to offer a limited number of choices to the public. Although many thought Lindblom went too far in his analysis, the goal of removing the influence of money from politics has been widely advocated, with campaign-finance reform a popular topic in many democratic states.

More general arguments regarding oligarchy were made by Italians Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941) and Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), both considered fathers of the elitist school of politics. In his *The Ruling Class* (1896), Mosca argued that any sizeable society will be ruled by a small minority, what he called the political class, which possesses superior organizational skills that enable it to take control of the state's bureaucratic apparatus. Pareto would make a similar argument in *The Rise and Fall of Elites* (1900), in which he took aim at contemporary ideologies for being smokescreens used to advance the interests of a self-interested elite. Pareto was a skeptic of

democracy, arguing that despite the claims by some groups to serve the common good, ultimately all political elites were interested in power only for their own purposes.

Perhaps the most widely cited employment of oligarchy in more modern times was made by German–Italian sociologist Robert Michels (1876–1936). In his classic work *Political Parties* (1911), he utilized the German Social Democratic Party as a case study and argued that there is an *iron law of oligarchy*. He maintained that all large organizations (e.g., political parties, bureaucracies, government institutions, and civic groups) tend to become oligarchic as power concentrates at the top, where leaders have access to information and funds and can thereby direct the organization to their own ends. The fact that Michels observed such a phenomenon in a party ostensibly committed to equality and democracy led him to suggest that real democracy, simply because of the organizational requirements of modern government, is impossible to achieve.

Whereas features of oligarchies can be found virtually everywhere, some political systems, arguably, were or are more obviously oligarchic than others. Apartheid South Africa, in which the minority whites ruled over the majority blacks, was a clear case. Iran, ruled by a small number of Islamic clerics, would also qualify, as would many states that have experienced military government in which a small, unelected clique of military officers runs the government. The term has also been frequently used to describe postcommunist regimes such as Russia or Ukraine where extremely wealthy individuals, or *oligarchs*, play a leading and often corrupting role in political life.

See also *Apartheid; Aristotle; Michels, Robert; Mills, C. Wright; Mosca, Gaetano; Pareto, Vilfredo; Politics, Comparative.*

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Oligarchy, Iron Law of

Iron law of oligarchy is a theory of organization first developed by German sociologist Robert Michels in his 1911 study of the German Social Democratic Party. According to the theory, no matter how democratic at the start, all forms of large-scale organizations—democratic or nondemocratic—eventually and inevitably lead to oligarchic governance with authoritarian and bureaucratic structures. Therefore, because of this iron law of oligarchy, any form of large organization is doomed to be dominated by a small, self-serving group of people.

MICHELS'S THEORY IN CONTEXT

The iron law of oligarchy, Michels argues, emerges from bureaucratic and technical necessities of modern times. Complex modern organizations cannot be run by the mass membership on a day-to-day basis. According to this theory, especially in large organizations, a small group of people is given the responsibility of decision making. Although, in theory, the leaders of the organization are subject to control of the mass members through delegate conferences and membership voting, in practice, under the iron law of oligarchy, the membership is too big and decision making too cumbersome for the mass membership to make most decisions. Therefore, because the success of the organization requires their expertise, leaders are able to consolidate and monopolize their power.

In his theory, Michels is heavily influenced by German sociologist Max Weber's argument that the differentiation, and probably isolation, of an organizational elite from their rank and file was a product of the technical division of labor necessary in complex mass organizations. Nevertheless, Michels challenged Weber's assumption that organizations would pursue official objectives in machinelike fashion by means of expert knowledge and bureaucratization. Rather, these individuals start using their power for their own interests instead of for serving the will of the people they represent. Michels advocated a second, subordinate law suggesting that, regardless of the purpose for which the organization is founded, preservation of the organization and its oligarchy will ultimately take precedence. For Michels, bureaucratization, centralization, and conservatism under oligarchic rule are inevitable ends for any organization. It is important to emphasize that the theory says nothing about the organization's relations with external entities. It is concerned with the situations internal to any single organization.

Michels's theory also assumes that bureaucracy and democracy do not mix. Accordingly, an autonomous and self-perpetuating leadership cadre is incompatible with true democracy. According to Michel, despite its democratic ideals and provisions for mass participation, the German Social Democratic Party in the early twentieth century is a good example of the inevitable process of bureaucratic conservatism. It is observed not only in leaders' wishes to maintain their prestige and influence, but also in the careerism of the self-interested salaried officials in the same organizations. Even the most radical and socialist parties and labor unions, which strive for equality between all individuals, experience this disparity of power distribution and bureaucratic conservatism. Communist parties in the Soviet bloc during the cold war era also serve as good examples of bureaucratic conservatism in party organizations.

Another premise of the theory of the iron law of oligarchy is that elites gain the ability to co-opt dissent through control over patronage as well as the media. The ability of elites to gather power, Michels continues to argue, is also strengthened by what is called a mass psychology of leadership dependency. According to this psychological approach, the masses have a basic psychological tendency or need to be led. Michels's

theories bear resemblance to other elitist theorists, such as Vilfredo Pareto, who mentions psychological and intellectual superiority obtained by elites in modern society; Gaetano Mosca, who characterizes elites as an organized minority; and Moisey Ostrogorski, who stresses the pathological tendencies of democratic mass parties toward bureaucratic-oligarchic organization. One possible flaw in Michels's theory is its attempt to generalize to all parties and organizations a process observed in one particular case, the German Social Democratic Party. Another is the degree to which it depends on controversial psychological claims: the universality of leaders' lust for power and of followers' willingness to be led. It should be noted that Michels's thought eventually led him to a strong commitment to fascism.

THE THEORY SINCE MICHELS

French thinker Maurice Duverger, while staying faithful to Michels's general view, uses a comparative approach that considers all types of parties and reaches the conclusion that the leadership of political parties tends naturally to assume an oligarchic form—an inner circle that is hard to penetrate. Duverger, however, stresses the extreme variability of the political party structure and challenges the theory of the iron law of oligarchy's homogeneous view of party organizations.

In his analysis of the German Social Democratic Party, Carl Emil Schorske argues, in his 1955 book *German Social Democracy,* that conservatism, which Michels attributes to bureaucratization, in fact reflected the dominance of a faction representing a certain constituency. Accordingly, it is argued that factionalism rather than bureaucratization is the structural basis for the indispensability of certain party leaders. Samuel Eldersveld, in his 1964 book *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis,* also contrasts the theory of the iron law of oligarchy with what he calls "stratarchy" by saying that in party organizations, political power is not accumulated in the hands of a centralized elite power, but is diffused across different levels of the party. Mayer N. Zald and Roberta Ash Garner, in their 1987 article "Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change," contend that oligarchy is only one possible outcome depending on the character of the leadership, the organizational structure, and membership participation.

Many other objections to the theory of the iron law of oligarchy can be cited, but it is especially important to observe the possibility of compatibility between modern organizations and the idea of institutional democracy, which Michels had denied. Accordingly, the contingent and plural nature of power in organizations should be emphasized as well. Judith Stephen-Norris and Maurice Zeitlin noted that in industrial unions, where there was a history of insurgency from below against craft unionism, internal democracy and democratic communication between the leaders and members had been prevalent. Therefore, the history of industrial unions suggests that internal democratic structure with open communicative channels and discourse between leaders and members can prevent any oligarchic tendencies or developments in organizations. However, it is Michels's contribution to organizational theory that, under certain conditions—such as lack of communications and discourse between the leaders and members and the absence of democratic mechanisms that effectively hold the governing power accountable—there always exists a tendency for oligarchic ruling in any given organization.

See also *Elite Decision Making; Michels, Robert; Organization Theory.*

. . . .   SEZGIN S. CEBI

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Olson, Mancur

Mancur Olson (1932–1998) was an American economist. After receiving degrees from North Dakota State University, Oxford University, and Harvard University, he started his academic career teaching at the United States Air Force Academy and then took a post at Princeton University. In 1969, Olson joined the economics faculty of the University of Maryland, College Park, and remained there as a distinguished professor, making frequent forays to think tanks, lecture platforms, and downtown Washington. He also established the Center on Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector at Maryland.

Olson used three social sciences—economics, political science, and history—to answer questions about how major institutions of society develop. From economics, he took certain concepts, such as the incentives for individual action, and a rigorous respect for the logic of cause and effect models. History provided him with evidence of big events that required explanation. From political science, he took a concern with institutions and power. Olson believed that the best way to advance intellectually was to break out of narrow disciplinary boundaries and make use of whatever intellectual tools were relevant to the problem at hand. He demonstrated this in his first book, *The Economics of Wartime Shortages* (1963), a study of why Britain won wars against opponents with more sophisticated military machines: His answer was that Britain had a better fiscal and administrative system for mobilizing the range of resources necessary to win a long war.

In his 1963 journal article "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," Olson contrasted sociologist Talcott Parsons's priority for social stability with the economists' preference for economic growth. In *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965), Olson demonstrated the importance of individual self-interest opposed to political values as a motive for people to join pressure groups; for example, membership can provide discounts on car insurance or travel. This logic was applied to trade unions and farm cooperatives. The approach was greatly expanded in a pathbreaking study, *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities* (1982).

In 1967, Olson was named deputy assistant secretary in the federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare, with responsibility for developing social indicators as a complement to economic indicators used in policy making. Olson's work in this capacity, *Toward a Social Report* (1969), drew on existing social indicators and stimulated worldwide action by governments to take into account social as well as economic indicators when evaluating the quality of life. Over the years, Olson sought to produce a unified system of indicators that went beyond the measuring rod of money, but this was never fully realized.

Just before his death, Olson finished writing *Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships,* which cut across conventional thinking to address the question of why some governments provide public goods that strengthen markets while others do not. The book mixed politics, economics, and history in striking ways.

Olson was a founder and past president of the Public Choice Society, which has influenced the development of the rational choice school of political science. Describing himself as an economics educator, his personal manner was well suited to this role; he was always willing to listen to and reflect on criticisms of his works as well as provide a clear and logical restatement of his ideas.

See also *Collective Action, Theory of; Pressure Groups.*

. . . . RICHARD ROSE

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Ombudsman

An ombudsman is an official, usually appointed by the government or by parliament, who is responsible for investigating and addressing public complaints reported by individual citizens. As an advocate for the citizens, the ombudsman can play an important role in checking possible abuse of power by government officials. Several countries have established the office of the ombudsman, as has the European Union (EU) and even nongovernmental entities such as newspapers, broadcast media, and corporations.

The origin of the word *ombudsman* comes from the Old Swedish *umbudsmann,* although officials similar to an ombudsman existed in ancient China and Korea and in early Islamic states. Modern use of the term comes from the Swedish experience, where the Swedish parliament established its parliamentary ombudsman in 1809.

The ombudsman functions as a supervisory agency independent of the government and was intended to advocate for citizens who pressed claims against the government. By ensuring that the public administration serves the public and that it is held accountable for its actions, the ombudsman performs an important role to safeguard rights and ensure that the government properly administers the law. The ombudsman can be thought of as a supplement to the judicial system.

Depending upon the office's precise mandate, the ombudsman—sometimes called the *ombudswoman* or just *ombuds*—may handle complaints on illegal government activity; denial of rights to citizens, especially with respect to discrimination; and maladministration, meaning problems such as bureaucratic carelessness, delay, or procedural irregularities. After a complaint is filed, the ombudsman investigates the validity of the charges. If a complaint is substantiated, the ombudsman publishes a report to that effect. The ombudsman may offer some sort of remedy to rectify the complaint and in many cases can give financial compensation to the harmed party. However, the ombudsman is not a court, and cannot impose legal sanctions. Any decision to initiate formal legal proceedings is typically not at the discretion of the ombudsman, although the ombudsman can support the aggrieved party by forwarding the findings to a court.

The major advantage of an ombudsman is independence from the state. However, the system relies heavily on the diligence of the individuals selected to serve in the office of the ombudsman and on the cooperation of at least some members of the state itself. Arguably, if the state functions well enough to have a strong and effective ombudsman, it may have less need of the ombudsman. Conversely, if the civil service is truly poor performing or corrupt, it is hard to imagine that the ombudsman alone will produce much of a difference. Perhaps for these reasons, outside Scandinavian countries such as Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Denmark, the introduction of ombudsmen has tended to produce somewhat less impressive results than initially hoped, and in nondemocratic settings, the actual influence of an ombudsman is quite limited. As they are primarily investigatory institutions, ombudsmen cannot substitute for the courts.

The first ombudsmen were in Sweden and in Finland, which created its own ombudsman in 1919. Today they exist in over seventy countries in the world. After World War II (1939–1945), well-established democracies such as Denmark, Norway, Great Britain, France, Israel, New Zealand, and Australia created ombudsmen as an additional means to protect citizens' rights and fight against various forms of discrimination. They have been an especially popular innovation in the newer

democracies that may have problems with corruption, lack of respect for the rule of law, a weak court system, and a political system with weak checks and balances among government institutions. Thus, ombudsmen were created as democratic government spread to southern Europe (e.g., Greece, Spain, Portugal) and to postcommunist Europe, where ombudsmen serve in Estonia, Poland, Macedonia, Romania, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Croatia, and Bulgaria. Among other states, the Philippines, Namibia, and South Africa also have ombudsmen. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 also established an office of ombudsman for the European Union, which provides a critical link between the citizens and the pan-European government and legal structures. In sum, ombudsmen exist on some level in over seventy-five countries in the world. In Canada, there is no national ombudsman, but they do exist on the provincial level. Similarly, the United States has no national-level ombudsman, although some states and local governments, as well as the U.S. Navy, utilize this type of system. Without question, however, use of ombudsmen is most firmly entrenched in Sweden, which has separate ombudsmen to prevent discrimination and advocate on behalf of gender equality, children's rights, the physically disabled, homosexuals, consumer protection, and ethnic minorities. There is also an International Ombudsman Institute, which promotes the work of national ombudsmen.

Other institutions besides governments use the office of an ombudsman. Ombudsmen can be found in private companies, universities, and the print and broadcast media. Like those associated with the government, organizational ombudsmen are supposed to be independent, answering to the board of directors and investigating complaints by those inside and outside the concerned institution. This type of ombudsman can assist with whistleblowers or employees who have concerns with management, mediate conflict, ensure standards of fairness and professionalism, and assist in customer relations. Ombudsmen working with the media are often charged with investigating claims of inaccuracies or alleged bias.

In addition to offices with the formal title of ombudsman, governments and public institutions may employ citizens' panels, outside reviewers, and other entities to provide expertise, investigate complaints, and evaluate the effectiveness of programs and policies. Some of these (e.g., the U.S. government panel to review social security in the 1980s or the 9/11 commission in the 2000s) can be quite high profile. These bodies, however, will be more ad hoc than a government ombudsman, whose office and scope of mandate is established by law.

See also *Civil Service; Discrimination.*

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Ombudsman, Parliamentary

A parliamentary ombudsman is an official who has been appointed by the state to supervise public authorities and receive and investigate complaints and charges of improper government activity. In most cases, these complaints are made by individual citizens against public officials or government bodies. The stated purpose of the ombudsman is to provide an extra level of protection for the rights of citizens against actions taken by the government.

The word *ombudsman* is of Old Swedish origin—*umbuðsmann,* meaning representative—and appears in similar forms in Norwegian, Danish, and Icelandic. Although observations on the potential usefulness of an ombudsman date back to the Roman era, the origins of the modern-day ombudsman lie in eighteenth-century Sweden. King Charles XII of Sweden created the office of supreme ombudsman in 1713, an office that would eventually become the chancellor of justice. The Swedish *Riksdag* would later establish the parallel office of parliamentary ombudsman, an institution that survives with some modification into its present form.

The ombudsman's role is to oversee investigations into citizen complaints of improper government activity. The ombudsman will first examine the complaint to ensure that it is not made with malicious intent and is substantial enough to stand up to further investigation, then issue a call for further evidence and evaluate the administrative action that is the subject of the complaint. If the ombudsman rules on the strength of the investigation that a particular complaint is correct in its charge of maladministration, unfair treatment, or unjust action, then the ombudsman's office will publish a report with the results of the findings. Yet even if the report finds that maladministration has indeed taken place, ombudsmen often do not have the power to prosecute, initiate legal proceedings, or even call for specific disciplinary action against the accused official or department. Financial compensation, or even any further action apart from the published report, is at the discretion of the existing laws of the country in question.

Outside of the Scandinavian countries, parliamentary or other legislative ombudsmen are relatively recent innovations and often face restrictions not found in the original concept of the position. The United States does not have an ombudsman or equivalent office at the federal level. The United Kingdom's parliamentary commissioner for administration, the equivalent of an ombudsman, cannot accept petitions directly from members of the public; all requests must be made through a member of Parliament, a practice which severely restricts the parliamentary commissioner's role as a forum for direct public complaint. In contrast to these circumscribed roles, ombudsmen are becoming more common

in local governments and in both the banking and health care sectors, serving as central clearinghouses of any complaints directed against these institutions.

Even though a parliamentary ombudsman may provide an essential service as an impartial official who safeguards the rights of individual citizens, the very fact that the office exists may pose problems for countries that wish to establish an ombudsman's office. The presence of an ombudsman suggests that established, traditional avenues of complaint are inadequate to deal with public complaints of maladministration, and by extension suggests that the existing system of administration itself is not capable of providing the necessary checks on government action. Another problem faced by countries or parliaments considering the appointment of an ombudsman is the selection of an appropriate individual. An individual who has existing ties or previous experience with the institution in question may have the necessary knowledge to evaluate complaints fairly, but those connections may leave the ombudsman open to accusations of leniency or insider dealings. An individual without such connections may possess a sufficient level of impartiality to inspire public confidence, but the lack of institution-specific knowledge may render the ombudsman unable to fully assess the merits of public complaints. Nonetheless, the appointment of parliamentary ombudsmen allows a government to demonstrate a commitment to proper administration and a willingness to remain open to public accountability.

See also *Accountability; European Parliament; Parliamentary Discipline; Parliamentary Immunity.*

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One-party Systems

One-party system is an imprecise term used to refer to a broad range of political phenomena, ranging from the communist states, such as the former Soviet Union, to party systems in which one party always dominates, as illustrated by Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) predominance in Japan. As Giovanni Sartori argues, when speaking in terms of *party* systems, a one-party system cannot exist since the concept of system implies multiple parts. When speaking of *political* systems or regimes, however, a one-party system suggests a regime in which only one political party operates. Despite these apparent definitional inconsistencies, scholars and political actors alike employ the term to refer to many political regimes in which one organization that labels itself a political party regularly occupies all or most important political positions in a given country.

ONE-PARTY STATES

One-party states are political regimes in which one and only one party is allowed to exist. Typically, this situation results from legal proscription of alternative parties or constitutional prescription of a leading role for the one party that does operate. The communist single-party states serve as the most common example, although the German Nazi Party and Baathist parties have also been parties of the state. In the communist states, such parties typically defined their role to be to serve as the vanguard of society, leading the citizenry rather than representing it. In its 1977 constitution, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was described as "the leading and guiding force of the Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system" while the Syrian constitution describes the Baath Party as "the leading party of society and state." Ideological conformity may be stressed more or less in one-party states, with the more ideologically unitary and totalizing regimes called totalitarian. In authoritarian one-party states, such as some African party states, ideology has been less central to the regime's self-definition.

In one-party states, where elections only serve to confirm the next occupant of an electoral position, parties nevertheless perform a key recruitment role. Career advancement in the communist regimes was often tied to membership in the party. At important moments, single parties have proved extremely effective at mobilizing the society to accomplish collective tasks identified by the leadership. However, because of the constant threat of repression of dissidence, single parties' capacities to provide their leadership with accurate information about their own societies tended to degrade over time, as party functionaries told their superiors just what they wanted to hear. This tendency became manifest in the rapidity with which the communist states as well as Iraq's Baathist regime collapsed.

HEGEMONIC-PARTY SYSTEMS

Observers have used the term *dominant party* imprecisely to refer to cases that fall into both hegemonic-party systems and predominant-party systems, as well as any situation where one party easily outpolls the others on a regular basis. More specifically, Sartori uses Jerzy Wiatr's term *hegemonic-party system* to refer to situations in which multiple parties exist but only one is permitted de facto to win most offices. The other parties exist to provide the semblance of competition; effectively they are licensed as minor parties. The governing parties in hegemonic-party systems may be either ideological or pragmatic in their orientation. Hegemonic parties play a key political recruitment role in their societies. Because they permit some pluralism of political representation, they allow for more effective political

communication to flow between elites and masses than do their counterparts in one-party states.

The Polish United Workers' Party, the governing party in communist Poland, despite claiming the "leading role" in that society, permitted two smaller parties to operate as part of its governing coalition. In Mexico, the long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) allowed several small opposition parties to exist, some of which offered genuine—though loyal—opposition, others offering nothing more than token opposition in return for congressional seats. For decades, the PRI resorted to fraud both to defeat genuine oppositionists and to create congressional seats for unpopular nominal opposition parties. Taiwan, under the Kuomintang (KMT), was initially a noncommunist one-party state but became a hegemonic-party system when the KMT began allowing opponents to operate in the 1980s. In Mexico and Taiwan, parties that were once token opposition eventually developed strategies that allowed them to take power from the hegemonic parties.

PREDOMINANT-PARTY SYSTEMS

Where genuine political competition exists but rarely wins office or fails to take a significant number of legislative seats, a *predominant-party system* may be said to operate. Examples include India under Congress Party dominance, Japan under the LDP, and postwar Italy during which the Christian Democrats led most governments. Some scholars would include state- or regional-level party systems in the United States, such as the one-party South. Observers often refer to such situations as one-party systems because those parties other than the one that dominates have little access to decision-making power. In such contexts, the politically ambitious will be naturally attracted to the predominant party and that party must serve as a so-called big tent. This gravitation of the politically ambitious to the regular winner reinforces other factors that favor predominant parties; these factors can include the ideological sentiment of the voters, the capacity of governing parties to distribute pork or patronage, and electoral rules that can encourage opposition fragmentation.

See also *Communism; Hegemony; Opposition Politics.*

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Open Government

The term open government indicates a governmental activity based on transparency and freedom of information. Although for centuries the principle of secrecy has constituted a pillar of public administration, more recently an innovative paradigm seems to be emerging. Starting in the late 1960s, and especially spreading in the Anglo-Saxon countries, a reform movement has struggled against government secrecy, considered as "a deliberate act on the part of those who govern to preserve or to add to the value of information that they possess by keeping the governed or parts thereof from knowing it at a given point in time" (Galnoor, 299).

Campaigns to reduce official secrecy have broad and ill-defined objectives, but share four basic values: to promote more ethical conduct, to enhance executive and legislative accountability, to advance more informed policy making, and to help individual citizens and groups advance particular rights and interests. Such campaigns have also led to the adoption of legal acts—such as the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of 1966—that provide legal rights for public access to government information.

In recent years, new instruments have been introduced to involve citizens in the deliberation process on which public policy is based. For instance, a wide range of *open-space meetings* and *town hall meetings* let citizens meet to exchange information and opinions on a theme of public interest. Such initiatives have often been based on intensive use of new information and communication technologies, which create additional spaces for public scrutiny and debate.

See also *Freedom of Information; Town Hall Meeting.*

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Opposition Politics

Opposition politics involves the various ways in which the opposition in a democratic legislature can influence what happens in government. In some countries, the opposition can influence legislation considerably, while in others the opposition is practically ineffectual. A strong opposition potentially prevents a government from realizing its first policy preference. While an opposition may not force a government to abandon its original proposal, a strong opposition can impose a more consensual legislative outcome. This reality challenges the conventional wisdom that the government always governs, while the opposition always opposes.

In parliamentary systems, in which the legislature and executive are fused, the executive offers bills that the legislature debates and amends before final voting. Presidential systems function somewhat differently, but the dynamics within the legislature, and their implications for opposition strength, should

still be relevant and valid. The key difference is that the president in the presidential system still retains an important veto on legislation passed in parliament. For this reason, opposition parties in parliamentary systems can be especially important.

In a party-free and rules-free environment, the median preference of the legislature—the position that divides the group into two equal halves—will most likely be the final decision. Any deviation from this median creates an alternate majority. Modern legislatures, however, are neither party-free nor rules-free. Individuals are often organized in several competitive parties that compete for electoral votes based on various political ideologies. Parliaments also function according to prespecified procedures and structures. As a result, the median outcome for a decision is not automatic. There may be opportunities for parties whose preferences differ from the median to influence the final outcome.

OPPOSITION STRENGTH

Opposition parties can and may exercise influence during the legislative process when certain political and institutional conditions are met. The most important of these include greater levels of ideological polarization and party fragmentation (party-system factors) and the presence of several decentralized institutional resources that allow parties and individuals access to the content of policy—specifically legislative committees, a second house of parliament, agenda-setting capabilities, generous amendment procedures during floor debates, and the ability to introduce private member bills (institutional factors).

When these conditions are present, two nonstandard outcomes that deviate from the standard notion of parliamentary practice may result. The first occurs when the party system encourages bargaining among different parties or when institutional conditions give parties access to important and decisive decisional mechanisms. In such cases, parliament itself becomes an important actor in the policy process and bills face scrutiny before final acceptance. For example, extreme party fragmentation within parliament may encourage shifting majorities for certain issue areas. Smaller groups can offer alternative proposals and potentially sway an outcome. Coalition building thus involves bargaining and compromise. These interactions empower opposition parties because they may abandon or join new majorities. Furthermore, extreme ideological polarization within parliament may compel governments to fashion broad policies to reflect as many interests as possible because competing interests could alter or sabotage a bill. In highly polarized parliaments, bills representing a minority of interests could face competing majorities. For these reasons, legislative fragmentation and party polarization potentially challenge the straightforward use of majority rule.

There are also several institutional arrangements that provide opposition parties opportunities for policy influence. Committees are important arenas for policy debate where opposition parties can challenge government bills or offer alternatives. Bicameral systems are designed to provide additional assessment for government policy and opposition parties in the upper house may find additional opportunities to scrutinize government policy. Some parliaments grant political minorities important rights during the agenda-setting process. Furthermore, minority groups may be procedurally permitted to initiate referenda or to introduce amendments and private member bills.

These particular attributes of legislative life—political and institutional—may encourage opposition parties to participate in normal legislative affairs to secure policy benefits within the legislature. Under such conditions, governments may face three undesirable outcomes: the content of government-sponsored legislation becomes vulnerable to external influence, government bills do not get passed at all, or private member bills that contradict government priorities pass without government approval. When this happens, an opposition is strong. Opposition activity may thus sway the fate of government legislation.

The second nonstandard scenario occurs when the party system and particular institutional conditions discourage party unity within government parties. Strong opposition parties may emerge when government party leaders cannot control government party members in parliament. In the modern conception of parliamentary practice, party members are expected to vote along predetermined party mandates. Developing clear voting mandates for party members produces stability and enhances outcome predictability. But governments are not always assured systematic, stable majorities in parliament because not all government members vote with their party every time a vote is taken. When this occurs, the opposition has the potential to secure periodic policy benefits in the legislature. Once government party members are available for policy negotiation with opposition parties, the government cannot guarantee that its policy will pass unaltered in the legislature, and numerous policy options become viable. Governments again face three undesirable outcomes: government bills are either revised, blocked, or the new majority passes a motion of its own. The final option depends on the opposition's willingness to compromise with rogue backbenchers from government parties to form a new, temporary majority for a particular policy benefit. In these cases, the opposition is also considered strong.

The amount of polarization and fragmentation in the party system and the presence of particular institutionalized rules and structures therefore combine to provide incentives for (1) opposition parties to participate directly in parliamentary affairs and (2) government party members to defect from party unity and align temporarily with the opposition. Both scenarios increase opposition strength in parliament.

Given these conditions, some opposition parties participate in normal legislative affairs rather than opposing the government at all times. In such cases, parliamentary roles are not simply predetermined by the occupants of the government and opposition or by the occupants of the government and legislature. Behavior and outcomes are not always predictable based on these roles alone. Specific attributes of the party system and specific institutional opportunities should be evaluated for a more complete picture of how legislatures function in a real-world setting.

See also *Legislative Systems, Comparative; Parliamentary Govern-ment; Party Systems, Comparative.*

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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a thirty-member international organization promoting economic liberalism and policy coordination amongst developed states. The OECD grew from the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) established in 1947 to administer American and Canadian Marshall Plan contributions to European postwar reconstruction. In 1961, the OECD was created with an expanded membership and policy portfolio. Traditionally, membership included democratic states committed to economic liberalism: Western Europe, the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In the 1990s, Mexico, Korea and a number of Eastern European states were added. In 2007, several states—including Chile, Israel, and Russia—entered formal membership negotiations. Brazil, China, India, and Indonesia have all been formally discussed as candidates for the next stage of enlargement.

A council comprised of representatives from member states and the European Commission governs the OECD. Council decisions, such as whether to support specific policy initiatives, are made by consensus. However, much of the real work is conducted by the more than two-thousand-member secretariat based in Paris. The secretariat provides most of the research and advice to the committees that oversee the OECD's activities in specific policy areas. The committees can include representatives of member states, drawn from relevant public agencies; representatives invited from nonmember states; and representatives of other organizations.

The OECD's founding convention gives it responsibility for researching virtually all areas of public policy, providing data and recommendations for best practices to member states based on policy experiences in other jurisdictions. In its more than 250 yearly publications, the OECD's goal is invariably to promote domestic economic liberalism and to coordinate domestic policies supportive of economic integration. However, the OECD is not simply a research organization. The OECD pursues several strategies promoting the adoption of OECD-recommended policies by member states—making it a key site of global governance.

At one level, based on its well-respected research activities, the OECD uses peer-review processes to measure the success or failure of member states in adopting OECD-recommended polices. This surveillance is intended to move reticent nations forward with OECD-recommended norms. The OECD also uses its research credibility to try to influence the broader international agenda. For example, it issues agenda-setting reports prior to major international trade negotiations trying to help states identify the basis for successful agreements that will remove barriers to trade and investment. Finally, although understudied, in a number of areas, the organization has created formal agreements that member states are obliged to adopt. These can include treaties, or at a lower level, recommended guidelines and models promoting standards for policy coordination.

While the OECD's policy portfolio is wide ranging, major areas of focus include social policy, primarily relating to education and employment; economic policy, particularly areas in which successful international markets require policy coordination; and issues relating to international finance. Indeed, the OECD's activities in promoting policy coordination of international taxation to avoid disputes amongst states, and thereby reduce the risks involved in international finance, are often cited as one of the more successful areas of OECD activity.

See also *G7/G8 and G20; International Monetary Fund (IMF); Marshall Plan; Transnationalism; World Bank; World Trade Organization (WTO).*

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Organization of American States (OAS)

The Organization of American States (OAS) is the intergovernmental organization of the thirty-five independent states of the Western Hemisphere. Founded at the Ninth International Conference of American States, held in Bogotá, Colombia,

in 1948, the antecedents of the OAS date back to the First International Conference of the American States convened in Washington, D.C., in 1889. The founding members of the OAS were the eighteen Spanish-speaking republics of South and Central America and the Caribbean, Brazil, Haiti, and the United States. Canada joined the OAS in 1989, and the former British, French, and Dutch colonies in the region came into the organization after they gained their independence. While formally a member, Cuba has been suspended from participation in the organization since 1962. The OAS is headquartered in Washington, D.C.

The OAS's institutional structure includes a general assembly that convenes annually, a permanent council made up of ambassadors from each member that meets regularly throughout the year, a general secretariat that runs the organization, foreign ministers' meetings called at the request of any member, a council for integral development promoting cooperation on economic development, a juridical committee coordinating the development of international law in the hemisphere, a human rights commission, and a human rights court. The OAS also has specialized agencies to address issues related to children, women, indigenous peoples, agriculture, and health.

From its origins until the mid 1960s, the OAS, following the leadership of the United States, emphasized mutual security concerns. In 1954, the organization adopted the Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States against the Intervention of International Communism. The subsequent 1962 suspension of Cuba took place in the context of Cuba's closer relations with the Soviet Union. In 1964, the OAS applied sanctions against Cuba, although Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay voted against the measure. The U.S. emphasis on mutual security against intervention from outside the hemisphere ran into resistance as the Latin American members stressed the principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states, especially from 1965 onward in response to the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic and its interference in Chilean politics in the early 1970s.

In the 1970s, the OAS turned to human rights issues, and in the 1990s to democracy assistance. Resolution 1080, passed by the OAS General Assembly in 1991, states that representative democracy is the only acceptable political regime in the Americas and sets forth defense and promotion of democracy as an OAS responsibility. While the OAS has established means to mediate during political crises in member countries, its most common way to promote democracy has been electoral observation. The OAS has sent teams to observe nearly one hundred elections in the Caribbean and Central and South America since 1990. As the result of this commitment to promoting democracy, the OAS—seemingly moribund in the 1980s when the United States ignored it while interfering in Central American civil wars—has found a new purpose and risen to new prominence in the hemisphere.

See also *Regions and Regional Governments; United Nations (UN).*

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Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)

The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is an intergovernmental organization with a membership of fifty-seven states. The organization was established in 1969 to facilitate cooperation among Muslim states in the political, economic, scientific, and cultural spheres. It is the only intergovernmental organization founded on a common religious ideology.

The OIC is composed of three main bodies. The highest authority within the OIC is the Conference of Kings and Heads of State and Government, which meets triennially to determine the OIC's policies. The Conference of Foreign Ministers meets annually to formulate policy implementation strategies and to review financial and programmatic matters. The General Secretariat is charged with the implementation of the policies decided upon by its other bodies. The organization consists of numerous committees, secondary organs, and institutions that address the cultural, scientific, economic, legal, and educational spheres, as well as the OIC's social and humanitarian activities. The OIC also has established several Islamic colleges and cultural centers.

The organization has achieved moderate success in the realms of technical and cultural cooperation over the years, but serious and protracted differences among its member states continue to be a formidable obstacle to its political progress. Despite frequent political stonewalling by its member states, the OIC has continued to take an active role in conflict prevention and resolution in recent years by sending delegations to mediate conflicts in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. It also funds various reconstruction and humanitarian aid projects throughout the Muslim world.

Despite its modest successes, however, criticisms against the OIC persist. In the five interstate conflicts it attempted to resolve, the OIC was unable to find a peaceful resolution. Until the OIC amended its charter in 2008, there were no formal membership criteria, and no significant movement could be taken on political issues without the unanimous consent of its member states. Further, its legal jurisdiction remains questionable, its countries often do not pay dues, and it does not maintain communication with some member states in order to encourage attendance at its conferences. OIC states rarely criticize each other within their own meetings, and until the recent announcement of its planned human rights body, its members seldom raised issues of human rights, fair elections, or women's rights.

In response to these criticisms, the OIC adopted its Ten Year Programme of Action in 2005, which outlines the

strategies needed to address the challenges facing the Muslim world. In accordance with its new mission, the secretariat has attempted to increase its capacity for peace building, human rights monitoring, economic cooperation, humanitarian aid, and good governance. Emerging issues such as combating Islamophobia and terrorism also have become increasingly high-priority areas for the OIC.

The OIC has gained greater attention in recent years, in part because Islam continues to take a more prominent role in international affairs. To date, however, the OIC has responded only to political crises that threaten to undermine the religious and political legitimacy of its member states, such as foreign occupation, Islamic opposition groups, or incendiary comments made by politicians and religious leaders against Islam. Nevertheless, the OIC represents an interesting example of how religious norms—in this case Islam's process of group consultation (*Shura*)—interface with the secular, state system.

See also *Arab League; Middle Eastern Politics and Society; United Nations (UN)*.

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Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is an intergovernmental organization founded in 1960 by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela to regulate the world supply and to stabilize the price of oil by unifying and coordinating members' petroleum policies through the establishment of production quotas. Venezuela first suggested such an organization in 1949 as a counterbalance to the market power of Western oil companies.

OPEC had seven additional members as of late 2009: Qatar (1961), Libya (1962), United Arab Emirates (1967), Algeria (1969), Nigeria (1971), Angola (2007), and Ecuador (1973–1992 and 2007). Previous members include Gabon (1975–1992) and Indonesia (1962–2009), which withdrew since it became a net importer of petroleum. As of 2009, Syria and Sudan were applying for membership, and Norway, Bolivia, Mexico, Brazil, and Canada have been invited to join.

In 1965, OPEC's headquarters moved from Geneva to Vienna, where it now holds its regular meetings each March and September, as well as extraordinary meetings as necessary. Resolutions are taken by unanimity—one state, one vote—provided that at least three-quarters of the members are represented.

Often defined as a cartel, OPEC institutionalizes the oligopoly in the oil production market; its members control an estimated two-thirds of world oil reserves and 40 percent of world production. OPEC uses its market share to protect the economic, and also political, interests of its members, whose economies heavily rely on oil export revenues. Saudi Arabia plays a decisive role, with its productive capacity in 2009 three times higher than Iran, the second most oil-producing OPEC member. The next countries in order of production were Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Nigeria.

The political power of OPEC reached its zenith in the 1970s, in part due to the formation of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) in 1967. After the Six-Day War (1967), the Arab members of OPEC joined with Syria and Egypt to form OAPEC with the aim to exercise pressure on the West against its support of Israel. This proved effective when, following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, OAPEC imposed an embargo on Israel's allies, causing a fourfold increase in the price of oil, inflationary spirals, and an economic crisis in the West. At the same time, OPEC joined the movement of developing countries calling for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the democratization of North-South economic relations.

However, after this period of influence, the organization's ability to exercise its oligopolistic power for political purposes has been steadily decreasing. OPEC's share of world supply has been affected by the discovery and developments of oil fields in the Gulf of Mexico, the North Sea, and the opening up of Russia after the end of the cold war. Alternative energy and environmental-friendly policies in a number of Western countries threaten to reduce petroleum demand in the future. Moreover, the divisions caused by the Iraq-Iran War (1980–1990), the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the Iraq War (2003–) have seriously damaged the cohesion of the organization. Member compliance with official production decreased significantly in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and in 2008 Saudi Arabia openly flaunted the quotas that OPEC had unanimously approved.

Despite sharp fluctuations in the price of the crude oil and the weakness of the dollar (OPEC currency of reference) in relation to the euro, the upsurge from less than $10 in the 1990s to more than $150 a barrel in 2008 caused a drastic increase in revenues. However, the fact that nearly all members were pumping close to capacity indicates that OPEC may no longer be able to control the supply and influence the prices as the twenty-first century continues.

See also *Arab League; Sanctions and Embargoes*.

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Organization Theory

Scholars of organizations are fond of pointing out the ubiquity of organizations in everyday life. As sociologist Amitai Etzioni elegantly put it in his 1964 book *Modern Organizations,* "We are born in organizations, educated by organizations, and . . . spend much of our lives working for organizations" (1). On top of this, people choose to belong to affinity group organizations, such as religious congregations, political parties, and recreational clubs; depend on organizations like the police, fire departments, and the military for their security; and are taxed and regulated by the government—a singularly large and multifaceted organization. Organizational theory provides an understanding for how organizations operate, both internally and in the larger environment, and thus is critical to understanding the dynamics underlying much of modern society.

The world of organizations is diverse. Organizations include both formal and informal groups, nonprofit and for-profit businesses, private entities, and the government itself. Partly because of this diversity, there is no single definition of what counts as an organization. Existing definitions vary in regard to how much emphasis they put on issues such as formalization, goal specificity, interdependence with other organizations, and internal culture, which in turn means that each definition tends to capture the essence of some organizations better than others. The study of organizations is also highly interdisciplinary. Organizational theory benefits from contributions of political scientists, sociologists, management scholars, and psychologists, among others.

THREE CLASSICAL VIEWPOINTS ON ORGANIZATIONS

In political science, where much current organizational work is carried out in schools of public affairs or public administration, the focus of research is often on institutional organizations such as political parties and legislatures, interorganizational relationships, and organizational form. Scholarship in political science also puts comparatively more emphasis on the study of public and nonprofit organizations than for-profit organizations. From these diverse perspectives, three viewpoints have emerged that at various times have dominated research on organizations: W. Richard Scott and Gerald F. Davis call these the rational, natural, and open system perspectives. Although all three perspectives inform current research in the field, they are also historically situated and loosely reflect the evolution of thought on organizations.

RATIONAL SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE

The rational system perspective emphasizes the utility of organizations, and definitions emerging from this perspective tend to highlight formal structure, specificity of goals, and purposeful action. In this viewpoint, organizations are seen as efficient solutions to managing complex tasks. They have clear objectives and are created to accomplish specific goals. Historically, this perspective is strongly associated with the early work that served to define the field of organizational theory, which began emerging in the late nineteenth century. The classic writings of Max Weber on bureaucracy come from a rationalist perspective, as does the work of Frederick Taylor and other proponents of scientific management, which attempted to use scientific methods to uncover the most efficient approach to accomplishing specific tasks, such as how to design a factory in order to produce minimum waste of time and materials. The work of Herbert Simon and James March on decision making in organizations and the work of Oliver Williamson on transaction costs and vertical integration also come from a rational system perspective.

NATURAL SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE

By contrast, the natural system perspective, which emerged partially as a critique of the rational system perspective, is more concerned with human interaction, informal structure, and social order. Definitions emerging from this perspective emphasize the collective nature of organizations and the goal of maintaining the organization itself, as opposed to accomplishing the output goals of the organization. Proponents have argued that this more holistic view, which takes into account nonrational behavior and interpersonal relationships, is more revealing of the real agenda and functioning of any given organization. Two influential schools of thought that emerged from the natural systems perspective are Elton Mayo's human relations school, which emphasized social cohesion and the work environment, and sociologist and legal scholar Philip Selznick's institutional approach, which looked at organizations as adaptive structures that, through the process of institutionalization, become "infused with value beyond the technical requirements at hand" (Selznick, 17).

OPEN SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE

Much of the historic work stemming from the rational and natural systems perspectives tended to overlook how organizations were impacted by the environment in which they operated and therefore either implicitly or explicitly viewed organizations as closed systems. The open system perspective emerged in contrast to that assumption. Most research done since the mid-twentieth century recognizes organizations as open systems, while also having a preference for the instrumental focus of the rational system perspective or the informal processes focus of the natural system perspective. An open system perspective recognizes that organizations are influenced by their larger environment and that they, in turn, influence that environment. This perspective has been greatly shaped by general system theory, which is a large interdisciplinary field with relevance to organizational theory in that it sees

organizations as one of many types of systems—social, biological, electrical—that can be studied scientifically. System theory has contributed to our current understanding of organizations as open, complex, goal-directed, and loosely coupled systems.

Definitions that have emerged from the open system perspective emphasize not the formal or informal structure of organizations, but rather their interdependencies and boundary-spanning behavior. According to an open system perspective, organizations are constantly changing to adapt to dynamic environments. For example, contingency theory, as articulated by scholars Paul R. Lawrence and Jay N. Lorsch, emerged from this perspective and is concerned with organizational form. According to this theory, there is no one "best" organizational form; rather, organizations should be designed in order to suit their specific environment. An open system perspective also recognizes that, while all systems are comprised of smaller subsystems and embedded in larger macrosystems, they cannot be understood by studying each part individually. System dynamics, best associated with the pioneering work of Jay Forrester, is a method of creating computer models that clarify the functioning of complex systems. System dynamics, used frequently in policy analysis and design, focuses attention primarily on feedback loops and information flows and has provided important insights on issues ranging from the U.S. economy to urban poverty to curricular design in public schools.

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

Methodologically, organizations have been studied in a variety of ways. There are studies on organizations that use experimental methods such as Mayo's classic research revealing the Hawthorne effect, large scale surveys, ethnographic case studies such as Rosabeth Moss Kanter's landmark 1977 book *Men and Women of the Corporation,* and innovative network models. The method chosen is generally related to both the theoretical framework of the study as well as the level of analysis of the study. These levels of analysis can be roughly broken down to three categories: microlevel studies of social psychology and intraorganizational relationships, studies of organizational-level structure and processes, and ecological or macrolevel studies of interorganizational relationships and the interaction of organizations with their larger environments. These categories are not exclusive and the boundaries between them are quite porous.

Research at the social psychological level has focused on individual participants in organizations, as well as group processes, team dynamics, leadership, and intraorganizational networks. This type of research looks at the organization as context and is concerned with the impact of the organization on individual or group members. Twenty-first-century concerns about job design and achieving balance between work life and home life often fall into this category.

Organizational level research looks at the structure and processes of organizations themselves. Research can focus on the whole organization, various departments or units within the organization, or how the organization interacts with its environment. This level of analysis focuses on such issues as organizational goal setting, the impact of organizational age and size, use of technology, and organizational structure. Contemporary concerns include how race and gender impact hiring practices, communication networks within organizations, and organizational innovation.

Research at the ecological level looks at groups or populations of organizations and tends to focus on how they interact with their environment and with each other. Studies of interorganizational networks, organizational fields, industry level beliefs, institutional logics, social movements, and markets are all examples of this level of research. The increasing boundary-spanning behavior of organizations is an area of contemporary concern, as is how organizations learn from one another, and changes in market development.

Many lines of research cross these boundaries, however. One of these areas is the study of organizational decision making—an area of research that has been particularly important to political scientists. For example, one of March and Simon's key innovations is the concept of bounded rationality. In their view, formalization—an organization level variable—produces rules, routines, and constraints on individual action and decision making. Rational behavior is thus bounded by the context in which it takes place. Jonathan Bendor has extended the notion of bounded rationality by investigating experimentally how norms and bureaucracy—the set of rules, structures, and procedures in place that guide administrative labor—ultimately help shape individual action.

DOMINANT STRANDS IN CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE

Several major approaches to studying organizations have been particularly influential since the 1960s and merit further discussion. Four in particular—transaction cost economics, resource dependency theory, network analysis, and new institutional theory—all recognize organizations as open systems and tend to focus on the organizational and ecological levels of analysis, rather than the social psychological. Although each has a different emphasis and they are often used alone, the theories are not mutually exclusive and there are many examples of research that have attempted to draw connections between them in order to further advance the field.

TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS

Transaction cost economics (TCE), based largely on the work of Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson, is concerned with questions of why organizations exist, how they draw and redraw boundaries, and how interorganizational relationships and organizational form are structured. Scholars of TCE see organizations as engaged in multiple exchange relationships with one another—indeed, from this perspective, organizations exist in part to manage complex exchange relationships. Two examples of an exchange relationship are the relationships between a manufacturer and a supplier of raw materials, and the relationships between the same manufacturer and the distributor of their finished product. These exchange relationships come with transaction costs—essentially, the costs

involved in contracting, planning, and monitoring these relationships with other organizations.

TCE asserts that organizations will always want to minimize transaction costs, which become higher either as transactions become more uncertain or frequent or as they must account for the opportunistic behavior of others. Such opportunistic behavior can occur when organizations are overly dependent on one another. If transaction costs become too high, organizations may opt for vertical integration, which is when one firm owns or controls multiple steps in a value chain, creating a hierarchy. For example, manufacturing is vertically integrated when the same company owns both the supply and the distribution chain. Government is vertically integrated when it provides mandated services or produces needed goods directly; it is vertically disintegrated when it contracts out for services to be provided or produces goods itself.

RESOURCE DEPENDENCY THEORY

Based on the work of Richard Emerson and explicated largely by organizational behavior scholars Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, resource dependency theory is concerned with how organizations negotiate the environment in which they operate, highlighting the interplay between the political and the economic as well as the importance of power. As with the TCE perspective, in this framework, organizations are seen to be in multiple exchange relationships with other actors in their environment. If these exchanges become unbalanced, in particular, or if organizations become too dependent on one particular source of resources such as a supplier or a funder, then power differences arise that can have a deleterious impact on the organization. To resolve this problem, organizations must constantly monitor their environment and find ways to reduce dependency and maintain power over providers of key resources.

Research using resource dependency theory highlights several tactics that organizations can use to help maintain control over their environment. One tactic is to attempt to control the behavior of other powerful players through what are known as bridging mechanisms, such as through the use of co-optation, which is incorporating outside stakeholders into the organization, or through mergers or alliances. This control can be accomplished by vertical integration. Alternatively, organizations can coordinate their action with others by joining or forming associations, such as trade associations or coalitions. By joining with others who face similar power-dependence relationships they can exercise more control over resources, share information, and take steps to heighten legitimacy. A third option is to try to influence government and other policy-making bodies to achieve beneficial legislation or regulatory changes. Some organizations can also try to reincorporate, change identities, or even move their base of operations. All of these are attempts to gain control over their environment, particularly to gain a power advantage in key economic and political relationships in ways that will allow the organization maximum flexibility and room for growth.

NETWORK ANALYSIS

Due to rapid improvements in computing power, as well as methodological advances, network analysis—more a methodological approach than a theory—has been a large growth area in organizational studies. Emphasizing the relational elements of the organizational environment, this line of research explores how an organization's position in a larger network of actors, as well as the structure of that network, can impact the organization and its behavior in a variety of ways. Network analysis can also usefully help explain interpersonal relationships inside of and across organizations. In network analysis, actors—organizations, people, or departments—are called *nodes* and those nodes are connected by *ties*. A tie can be defined in many different ways, from geographical closeness, such as who sits nears whom, to friendships, to financial connections. Looking at networks helps us understand how it is not just the characteristics or attributes of a node that matter for its behavior, but also its ties to other entities.

When looking at networks, specific features are often measured when analyzing the impact of network position. At the most basic level, these include (1) the distance between nodes—whether they are directly connected, or whether they are only connected through a separate node; (2) centrality in the network—how many direct ties a single node has compared to other nodes in the network; (3) clustering—how tightly connected everyone in the network is to each other; (4) and structural equivalence—two or more nodes are equivalent when they share a similar pattern of relationships, even if they are not connected directly to one another, such as in the case of competitors. Network models of analysis have been used to study many different kinds of issues that involve organizations. Some examples include the influence of network relationships on federal policy making, the role of interlocking members of boards of directors, and the coordination of government and nonprofit organizations in providing publicly funded human services.

NEW INSTITUTIONAL THEORY

The new institutional theory of organizational analysis, primarily associated with sociology but engaged by scholars in many different social science disciplines, relates to but is not the same as institutional theories in economics or the institutionalism talked about in positive theory or regime theory in political science. It is, however, arguably the most influential theory of organizations found in the modern literature. It arose partly in response to scholars Peter R. Berger and Thomas Luckmann's 1966 book *The Social Construction of Reality,* and it focuses on how cultural elements of an organization's environment impact and, to some extent, constrain its behavior.

Scholars working in this area argue that organizational fields—which consist of all organizations operating in a given functional area plus other relevant organizational stakeholders and exchange partners, such as funders, suppliers, and regulators—become highly structured and institutionalized over time in ways that decrease diversity and constrain action.

Institutional rules and expectations are thought to be enforced in three broad ways: (1) Regulative elements consist of material consequences or other sanctions, outlined in rules and laws, for noncompliance with institutional expectations. (2) Normative effects promote conformity through moral order and social obligation, such as when internalized ideas about appropriate action guide behavior. (3) Cultural-cognitive elements guide organizations and their leaders to act in culturally proscribed, taken-for-granted ways. This effect explains the process of how shared understandings lead organizations to discount some forms of action as inappropriate or impossible.

In a classic 1977 paper titled "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," sociologists John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan initiated this vigorous line of research when they pointed out that institutionalized rules regarding work practices, policies, and technologies function as myths in organizational fields, to which organizational members must conform. They argue that many organizations conform in ways that are more ceremonial rather than functional, however, create divisions between formal structure and everyday work activities, which are only loosely coupled.

This argument was followed up by an influential 1983 article by scholars Paul W. DiMaggio and W. W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," in which they explore why there is so much homogeneity rather than variation in organizational forms and practices. They argue that there are three different forms of isomorphism—the process by which organizations come to resemble one another—and that organizations are susceptible to each in their efforts to be seen as legitimate members of an organization's field. Isomorphism guides organizational practices and decision making even when it is not necessarily the most efficient course of action, because it confers legitimacy, which in turn helps grant the organization access to the resources it needs. The three forms are coercive, mimetic, and normative. In coercive isomorphism, pressure is exerted upon an organization by political influence, by other organizations on which they are dependent, or by cultural expectations that are impossible to violate. In mimetic isomorphism, organizations imitate the practices of other successful members of their organizational field. Organizations may frequently do this under conditions of uncertainty or goal ambiguity. In normative isomorphism, processes of professionalization occur; many organizational fields are dominated by professionals who have already been socialized into certain understandings of what legitimate action entails in a given industry.

Research in the new institutionalist tradition has largely focused on problems stemming from these arguments, such as how organizations acquire and maintain legitimacy, the process of social reproduction, and the impact of these processes on organizational and field-level practices. Over time, however, critics came to argue that new institutionalists did not explain sufficiently how organizational actors work to change their environment. Critics thus suggested new institutionalists

needed to engage more with the concepts of agency and power. More recent work has tried to address these concerns with the recognition that some organizational fields feature competing logics from which individual organizations can choose, as well as a recognition that organizations can and do often choose how to respond to institutional pressures, and they do not always do so in strictly isomorphic ways.

EMERGING FIELDS OF STUDY

This long and fruitful history of research and theorizing has produced a substantial body of literature on organizations. Sociologists W. Richard Scott and Gerald F. Davis, in their 2007 book *Organizations and Organizing: Rational, Natural, and Open System Perspectives,* point out several trends in the world of organizations to which scholars will need to pay increasing attention. These trends include an increasingly mobile workforce, increased interdependence between organizations, the breakdown of traditional distinctions between the non-profit, for-profit, and public sectors, and changing modes of communication due to changes in information technology. Improvements in transportation and an increased focus on global markets and development have made organizations themselves more mobile as well. These developments have resulted in the fact that organizations have changed over the years, as have the theories used to study them, but they have not diminished in significance. Organizations remain a singularly important component of economic, political, and social action, and their study remains an exceptionally productive and interdisciplinary line of social science research.

See also *Group Theory; Party and Social Structure; Party Organization; Political Parties; Simon, Herbert Alexander.*

. . . .   JENNIFER E. MOSLEY

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Organized Crime and Mafia

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime defines organized crime as "structured groups of three or more people acting in concert to commit one or more serious crimes for material benefit." However, many criminologists suggest that this definition is too simplistic, as street gangs and white-collar criminals could fit this description. Street gangs are usually not classified as a form of organized crime because they are not organized enough, nor are their primary aims to accumulate and reinvest capital. Likewise, white-collar criminals do not appear to use deliberate violence to maintain territorial dominance, nor are they structured in a manner that allows the continual perpetuation of their activities, even if certain members of the organization are arrested or otherwise removed.

Thus, a criminological definition of organized crime might add the following characteristics to the United Nations (UN) definition: the deliberate use of violence to maintain territory and protect interests, the accumulation and reinvestment of capital, and a hierarchical structure that allows for durability over time, regardless of the removal of certain members.

Transnational organized crime has globalized alongside the globalization of the world economy. Trade agreements and unions have created new markets as well as easier movement between these markets. A major feature of organized crime groups or syndicates is their adaptability to change. As the world becomes increasingly globalized, so does organized crime.

Despite the vast array of activities engaged in by organized crime groups in today's global world, four common activities appear to be trafficking illicit goods, extortion, human exploitation, and money laundering. Throughout history, organized crime groups have thrived from supplying illicit goods on the black market—including supplying alcohol during Prohibition to the current illegal trafficking of firearms, illicit drugs, stolen vehicles, people, and diamonds or gemstones.

Another central activity of organized crime groups, extortion, involves forcing individuals or businesses to pay portions of their profits in exchange for protection. If the individuals or businesses refuse or are unable to pay, they face threats of physical or financial harm. Extortion has been widely represented in mafioso films, whereby the local organized crime syndicate goes around collecting money from all of the businesses in their territory in exchange for protection or vigilante justice. A third common activity of organized crime groups is human exploitation, which can take several forms, including the trafficking of women and children for sexual purposes, worker exploitation, and debt bondage. According to the United Nations, the trafficking of human beings—the transportation and harboring of human beings by means of coercion and abduction, primarily for the purposes of sexual exploitation or prostitution—has become one of the most serious forms of crime in the modern world. Some victims, who are essentially enslaved through human trafficking, might be forced to work under exploitative conditions in workshops or agricultural settings. Debt bondage is one of the primary means by which people become enslaved into trafficking. Individuals, families, or businesses unable to pay back a high-interest loan from an organized crime group offer themselves, their wives, or their children to participate in prostitution or carrying drugs and other illicit goods across borders.

A final common activity of organized crime groups is the laundering of money. Through both legal and illegal enterprises, organized crime groups can generate millions, even billions, of dollars of revenue. However, to avoid the scrutiny of law enforcement these groups must ensure that money appears to have been legally earned so it must be passed through legitimate sources. Money laundering is done primarily through three main steps: placement, layering, and integration. Placement involves putting the dirty money into the legitimate market, such as buying an expensive painting or car in cash. Layering then involves moving further from the dirty money by selling the goods to buyers with legitimate money. This legitimate money can then be reinvested, which is what is referred to as integration.

See also *Sex Workers and Trafficking; Slavery.*

. . . .   CURTIS FOGEL

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Oriental Despotism

Throughout the history of political thought, non-European civilizations have become a part of major philosophical debates in Europe concerning government, economics, and religion. Within this context, the concept of oriental despotism was mainly developed by European thinkers to explain the economics and politics of non-European civilizations.

Since ancient Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle, the terms *despot* and *despotism* have been associated with either the relationship between master and slave or the forms of oriental political organization. Despotism, a form of government dependent on a single authority, is an obscure concept of the pre-twentieth-century political thought and is today considered an archaic concept in academia. However, the concept of oriental despotism as a despotic form of government that opposes Western tradition has continued to evolve in Western political thought.

The social thinkers of the Age of Enlightenment during the eighteenth century discussed oriental civilizations. During the Enlightenment, the core components of oriental despotism were the following: first was the idea of an agrarian despot emperor; second was the empirical belief that such despots were to be found only in the Orient. French political thinker Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, argued in his 1748 *Spirit of Laws* that of the three kinds of government—republic, monarchy, and despotism—all Asian societies were unequivocally in the last group. Following Montesquieu, most European thinkers commenting on Asia accepted the thesis of oriental despotism, and the concept became one of the commonplaces of Western political thought in the later Enlightenment. François Quesnay, the French leader of the philosophical school called the physiocrats, described China as an example of despotism in his work entitled *Despotism in China* (1767).

During the nineteenth century, theoretical attention focused on locating despotism and other political forms as stages in a scale of human progress. Within the context of evolutionist conceptions, despotism was regarded as a necessary step on the road to freedom. The location of despotism as an early stage in the evolution of societies was especially prevalent in late-Enlightenment German writings, such as those by Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottfried Herder, and G. W. F. Hegel. Kant described some of the Asian states as despotic and shared the emergent sinophobia of the late Enlightenment in Germany. On the other hand, Herder overtly associated agricultural work, and the prevalence of the agricultural phase of human development, with despotism. For both German philosopher Karl Marx and Hegel, despotism retained its negative connotations, particularly since Hegel's politics and philosophy are partially indebted to Montesquieu. Marx developed the idea of oriental despotism into his theory of the Asiatic mode of production, in which he asserted that there was no private property but rather a despotic, centralized state that controlled indispensable public goods like irrigation. Asiatic society was based on the idea of self-sufficient villages that preserved the unchanging mode of production. Marx's main examples for his theory were India and China. Britain played two contradictory roles in India, according to Marx. While destroying India through exploitation, Britain caused a social revolution and triggered the annihilation of the Asian mode of production in India.

In the twentieth century, German philosopher Karl Wittfogel revamped the concept of oriental despotism in *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (1957) by attempting to establish the idea of a distinctive, non-Western system of despotic power. He has interpreted communist totalitarian regimes as much more despotic variants of oriental despotism. Wittfogel argued that the transition from feudalism to oriental despotism was prompted mainly by the expansion and intensification of agriculture by means of large-scale irrigation, control that necessitated coordination by a centralized state. This so-called hydraulic hypothesis states that irrigation is a major cause of the emergence of centralized political authority and is thus a significant force in the development of early civilizations. Wittfogel developed this thesis in relation not only to China but also to the wider Marxist arguments about the Asian mode of production.

More recently, discussions over the concept of oriental despotism have been devoted to pejorative images of the Orient associated with the concept of despotism. Controversy has centered on Western philosopher Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978), which has been criticized as neglecting the history and function of despotism, both as a regime type and as a political concept.

See also *Asian Political Thought.*

. . . . BEZEN BALAMIR COSKUN

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Original Intent

Original intent, often used as a synonym for originalism, is the doctrine holding that judges have no power to interpret foundation documents or constitutions except in accordance

with the intent of the people who created them. In theory, while any court can use it as a method for interpreting any constitution, the doctrine has generated the most controversy more generally in terms of how courts should interpret the U.S. Constitution.

HISTORY

The Framers of the U.S. Constitution aimed for original intent to apply in courts and required the judges to be bound by it. Although they knew that this application of the document to specific cases would require interpretation of the text, they did not prescribe any specific interpretive method. From the beginning, judges often considered the intent of the Framers when they applied the Constitution, but they used other interpretive methods as well. Neither scholars nor judges gave much thought to interpretation in the abstract until the 1980s; only then, and only gradually, did the words *originalism* and *original intent jurisprudence* replace such synonyms as *interpretivism* and *intentionalism* in legal writing.

In the 1960s, the activist Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren declared certain common government activities unconstitutional, such as prayer ceremonies in public schools. To conservatives, it seemed unthinkable that the Framers intended to forbid such things; consequently, they called for a return to the original intent. If judges ought to be bound by that intent, then the school prayer decisions, and other Warren court innovations, were wrongly decided and a later court could overrule them. From the beginning, political figures such as former attorney general Edwin Meese III and former appellate judge Robert H. Bork led the originalist movement. Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas are other leading adherents of original intent as are many members of the Federalist Society, a conservative membership organization dedicated to legal reform.

SUPPORTING VIEWS

Originalists argue that constitutional interpretation ought to be controlled by original intent because the U.S. Constitution is a contract—a deal between the rulers and the ruled—and courts always interpret contracts in light of the intentions of their makers. Moreover, the Constitution is the social contract, creating the government, authorizing it to use some powers, and explicitly denying it the right to use others. The government, supporters believe, has no powers except what the Framers agreed to in 1787. A court decision not in line with the intent of the Framers risks giving government more power than it is supposed to have.

The most serious violation of original intent, originalists argue, is the expanded role of the U.S. Supreme Court itself. The Framers intended the three branches to be in balance, and the federal government to be in balance with the states. But in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court took on the power to strike down long established and popular state and federal laws (e.g., those requiring school prayer), greatly diminishing the power of the other branches and levels. Neither public opinion, nor constitutional checks and balances,

nor law itself could control this "imperial court." Instead of balance, originalists perceived judicial supremacy. They argued that since there were no external checks left on court powers, judges had to check themselves. Adopting a rule of original intent, they thought, would bring greater deference to Congress and the states, and a restoration of balance.

Edwin Meese III argues that the Framers had very specific views of how the government was to work, and they left evidence of those views in their voluminous writings. In 2005, Meese and colleagues edited *The Heritage Guide to the Constitution,* which examines the text on a line-by-line basis and tries to recover the intent behind each clause.

However, historians have demonstrated that the Framers were not so precise. They were fairly specific about many of the structural details of the government they were creating, but they left little evidence of the purpose behind some features. Although they recorded some of their views, they conducted the constitutional debates in secret; the deliberations, reconstructed from fragmentary notes, may have distorted or omitted some of their original intent. In some cases, they also disagreed on how the government was to work. Sometimes they used vague phrases such as "in accordance with due process" precisely because they could not agree. Finally, it is impossible to determine how they thought the government should relate to total war, space exploration, organ transplants, or other recent innovations.

Realizing these difficulties, most contemporary originalists follow Robert Bork in asserting that there are general principles that the Framers followed when they created the government rather than trying to find some literal meaning behind each clause. These principles, such as respect for individual autonomy, remain applicable. In Bork's view, the task of an originalist is to find and apply these principles to how the government deals with new problems. If the Framers expected their respect for individual autonomy to forbid unreasonable searches in the home, where people feel secure, then the rule can be applied to police searches of automobiles as well. In legal thought, *original intent jurisprudence* thus gives way to original principles, original values, original meaning, original public meanings, or objectified intent. In this form, it figures in contemporary debates over interpretation.

OPPOSING VIEWS

Scholars who generally support the idea of a living, or evolving, U.S. Constitution oppose the originalists' views. Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis, and also President Woodrow Wilson, are considered early advocates of the living Constitution. Justice William Brennan, who strongly endorsed the concept of the evolving Constitution, followed these early scholars. Evolutionists argue that the Constitution, as a social contract, is different from an ordinary promissory note. It is law, but it is also more than law; judges apply it, but it must win the allegiance of people who will obey it willingly and perhaps risk their lives for it in war. In the final analysis, evolutionists contend, the Constitution is not authoritative because Alexander Hamilton and James Madison swore

allegiance to it; it is authoritative because the generation now living accepts it. Therefore, the Constitution must adapt itself to the values of the living.

See also *Constitutional Law; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Judicial Activism; Supreme Court.*

·   PAUL LERMACK

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Ortega y Gasset, José

José Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955) of Spain was a leading philosopher during the first half of the twentieth century. He had a considerable influence on the works of other sophisticated thinkers such as German philosopher Martin Heidegger, but his ideas and publications were also accessible to larger sections of educated citizens not necessarily trained in technical philosophy.

Ortega was born in Madrid, Spain, into a family with a liberal and patrician background. He was educated at a Jesuit college and the University of Madrid, where he was awarded his doctorate in philosophy in 1904. He then went to Germany and spent the next five years in universities in Berlin, Leipzig, and Marburg. In 1910, Ortega was appointed professor of metaphysics at the University of Madrid, where he taught until the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), at which time he went into exile. He returned to Spain in 1945 and died in Madrid ten years later. In addition to being a prominent philosopher and social thinker, Ortega was also a prolific writer and an active journalist and politician during the Second Spanish Republic (1931–1939).

For Ortega, the task of the philosopher is to propose new ideas and to explain reality, leaving behind previously existing beliefs and prejudices. He put forward the idea that human beings are nothing without the social milieu around them, or, as he put it: "Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia" (I am myself and my circumstance.) In this sense, life is the result of the interaction between freedom and constraints. Humans ought to be active in order to create a "project of life" and, by so doing, avoid a conventional life of habits and preestablished structures.

In his *The Revolt of the Masses* (1929), Ortega's focus of attention is the *mass-man* and the new forms of meanness and brutal behavior that he saw as the result of changes in the social structure of contemporary times. As a consequence of these changes, mass-men lack the mediation of the traditions and institutions of civility and, in situations of acute crises, they engage in frenzied and destructive activism against the political parties they dislike, which is contrary to what creative action is meant to be. Mass-men take the state for granted and do not regard it as the creation of centuries of civilization and, in modern times, the product of a certain bourgeois rationality which seeks to guarantee freedom, privacy, and social variety. Mass-man is a barbarian, yet this barbarity is based on the technological phenomenon of the specialization of knowledge. There is a correlation between the increase of the aggregate body of knowledge and the increase of the relative ignorance of the human beings. For Ortega, the specialist as a "learned ignoramus," not the proletarian, is the epitome of the mass-man.

Ortega coined the expressions *razón vital* (vital reason), referring to a new dimension of reason that has life as its paramount basis, and *raciovitalismo* (rational vitalism), a theory in which knowledge is based upon the reality of life, one of the essential components of which is reason itself. To Ortega, reason is essential to plan and develop the project of life, and vital reason is also historical reason, as individuals and societies cannot detached from their past. It follows from this perspective that, in order to comprehend reality and create a future for themselves, human beings need to look into the past and understand their history.

See also *Heidegger, Martin.*

·   LUIS MORENO

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Orthodoxy in Political Thought

The contribution of Eastern Christian Orthodoxy to political thought is often either ignored or simply dismissed by Western scholars convinced that, because its historical experiences have

no exact parallels in the modern Catholic and Protestant traditions, Orthodoxy was unable to formulate a coherent position towards politics, law, and society. While Eastern Europe did not directly experience the Reformation or the Enlightenment, Orthodoxy did encounter modernity, totalitarianism, and democracy.

The meeting of Orthodoxy with modernity began in Russia during the reign of Peter the Great (1682–1725) and expanded once Russia emerged as a dynamic European cultural center and smaller Orthodox nations won their independence from the Ottoman Empire. As a result, a broad and rich discourse about church, state, and society was cultivated in Orthodox circles. Many leading Orthodox thinkers dealt with fundamental questions of law, politics, society, and human nature with novel insights, often giving distinct readings of the biblical, apostolic, and patristic sources. In the twentieth century, the advent of communist regimes in the predominantly Orthodox Russia, Ukraine, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria stifled intellectual debate, restricted religious instruction, censored religious publications, and thus deprived Orthodox thinkers of their audience. Orthodox churches were dismantled or co-opted by communist states, and many Orthodox theologians served long prison sentences for resisting state-sponsored antireligious campaigns. The collapse of the communist regimes in the Soviet bloc between 1989 and 1991 revitalized Orthodox intellectual debate regarding those countries' totalitarian past and democratic future.

Of all Orthodox countries, Russia has had the richest intellectual tradition, drawing on the writings of the church fathers or modern Western philosophy to wrestle with the situation of Orthodoxy in the global civilization produced by the scientific and political revolutions of the Enlightenment. The first Russian Orthodox modern theologian, Aleksandr Bukharev (1824–1871), was also the first to discuss the challenge modernity posed to the church as defender of the "right" faith. Philosopher Vladimir Soloviev (1853–1901) worked out an intricate philosophy of law that grounded law and political order in morality, anchored morality directly in a Christian theology of salvation, and mediated between Orthodox tradition and modern critical thought. An outspoken proponent of reconciliation, *sobornost*, between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches, Soloviev preferred social pluralism to the traditional Orthodox theology of theocracy, which tied church, state, and nation into an organic whole. Communist authorities were little inclined to tolerate independent intellectuals, so in 1922, prominent Orthodox thinkers Sergii Bulgakov, Nicholas Berdyaev, and Vladimir Lossky were driven into exile from Russia. Bulgakov (1871–1944) built on his experience as an economist to develop a comprehensive theology of God's humanity and a philosophy of economy. Some of his most important books were published in Paris and remain relevant for current debates on the engagement of intellectuals in political life; the theology of the wisdom of God, or *sophiology*; and even land privatization in Russia.

Berdyaev (1874–1948) worked out a complex new theology of human nature anchored in an ethic of creation, redemption,

and law, and an original theory of human dignity and salvation grounded in the Orthodox doctrine of deification, or *theosis*. Lossky (1903–1958) formulated a new theory of human dignity, freedom, and discipline anchored in the Orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, and he challenged the church, compromised by association with the repressive communist regime, to reclaim the freedom to discharge divinely appointed tasks. A significant, but lesser known, contribution to Orthodox thought was made by Romanian theologian Dumitru Staniloae (1903–1993), who drew on the works of the church fathers to build a theory of the meaning of human freedom and sinfulness, including the symphony of natural and supernatural sources of law and authority. Despite spending long years in communist prisons and suffering prolonged persecution, Staniloae had little to say about the political compromises of the Romanian Orthodox Church during communism and supported Romanian ethnic nationalism.

Since democracy has returned to formerly communist countries, theologians have debated the role of the church in democracy and the European Union (EU) enlargement process; the morality of new reproductive methods and the legalization of homosexual behavior; the proper relationship between church and state and between minority and majority religious groups; and the role of the state in defending traditional religions, while faced with increased competition from new religious movements. While Orthodox theologians from different countries have joined in the debate, to date none has proposed a coherent political theology. Orthodox theologians and Orthodox churches prefer to stress the persecution they suffered at the hands of the communist regimes and are reluctant to consider critically the role of the church in aiding and abetting repression and in persecuting smaller denominations.

During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the most vigorously debated topic within Orthodox circles was *symphonia,* the Byzantine concept of theocracy also known as Caesaropapism. The concept traditionally described ties between the state and the Orthodox churches, which faithfully upheld it after the collapse of the Byzantine Empire in 1456. Symphonia presupposed the existence of a Christian emperor who stood at the center of the Christian Empire and at the helm of the church. For Eusebius of Caesaria (260–340), the Christian emperor was God's representative on earth, a position reminiscent of the ancient Roman institution of the god-emperor, who played the role of *pontifex maximus* (high priest) in the state cult. On the one hand, the church recognized the emperor as protector of the church and preserver of the unity of faith, and limited its authority to the spiritual domain; on the other hand, the emperor was subject to the spiritual leadership of the church as far as he was a son of the church. While some Orthodox theologians maintain that symphonia is hardly appropriate for democratic, religiously pluralist countries— either because the society is unwilling to grant churches so much power or because a strong church-state relationship would benefit the state but compromise the church—other clergy members insist that the state should maintain privileged ties to the Orthodox Church leadership.

See also *Church and State; Communism, Fall of, and End of History; Russian Political Thought.*

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Orwell, George

George Orwell was the pseudonym of Erich Arthur Blair (1903–1950), a journalist, essayist, literary critic, and novelist. His writing career culminated in the dystopia presented in his novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1948), originally titled *Last Man in Europe.* Although *Nineteen Eighty-Four* received mixed reviews, it continues to be widely read and has contributed new words and phrases to the modern vocabulary of politics. These include *doublethink*, an ability to embrace two contradictory beliefs simultaneously; *newspeak*, a partisan tool for limiting thought by eliminating undesirable words or concepts; *Big Brother*, a name for autonomous, unaccountable governmental authority; and *Orwellian*, referring to any idea or action incompatible with a free society.

Erich Blair was born in India on June 25, 1903. Most of his youth was spent in a private preparatory school in Sussex, England. After attending Eton College on a scholarship, he took up his father's profession and joined the Indian Imperial Police force. However, his distaste for British imperial rule, coupled with an intense desire to be a writer, led him to abandon a career in the civil service. After resigning from his post in 1927, Blair lived in the East End of London and in the slums of Paris, the gathering places, he later wrote, as quoted in the 1956 *Orwell Reader,* "for eccentric people—people who have fallen into solitary, half-mad grooves of life and given up trying to be normal or decent." Poverty, he believed, had freed "them from ordinary standards of behavior, just as money frees people from work." These experiences living and working among the poor provided material for Blair's first book, *Down and Out in Paris and London* (1933). It was the first of his nine books published under the pen name George Orwell.

By the mid-1930s, Orwell had established himself as a journalist and political writer. In *The Road to Wigan Pier* (1937), he vividly described the poverty in England's industrial north. He also declared his commitment to the values of socialism, even while remaining critical of socialism's disciples. When war broke out in Spain, he set aside his political differences with fellow socialists and traveled to Barcelona to join the Marxist Workers' Party (POUM) militia in their fight against fascism. A few months later, when the communists began their purges of the leftist party, he was forced to flee Spain. After arriving in France in 1937, Orwell began writing *Homage to Catalonia* (1938). Fellow left-wing intellectuals, who regarded the

BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU

George Orwell's novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four* was adapted into a movie in 1956. The book describes a futuristic, totalitarian world.

SOURCE: The Granger Collection, New York

communists as war heroes, took issue with Orwell's account of events in Spain. Although a life-long socialist, Orwell continued to distance himself from the British radical intelligentsia, many of whom, he thought, had blindly accepted communist doctrines. His satirical novel *Animal Farm* (1945) used allegory to further attack the Russian Revolution (1917) and the Communist Party's subsequent betrayal of socialist ideals.

After World War II (1939–1945), the world appeared to Orwell to be headed for disaster, and he sought to change the course of events by inventing a language that might enable its inhabitants to better grasp their predicament. He started the first drafts of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* in early 1947, laying out a futuristic totalitarian world. After the novel's publication in 1948, it became, for many of his readers, not how far away society was from the physical and psychological brutality of Orwell's imaginary Oceania, but how close the approximation was. Orwell died from tuberculosis in a London hospital on January 21, 1950.

See also *Politics, Literature, and Film; Socialism; Totalitarianism.*

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Otsuka Hisao

Japanese economic historian Otsuka Hisao (1907–1996) was the founder of the Otsuka School of Economic History, which represents a convergence of Marxism and the sociology of Germany's Max Weber. The focal point of Otsuka's studies was the analysis, from an Asian standpoint, of the development of modern capitalism and the transition from a semifeudal society, as occurred in Japan, to capitalism. His studies were designed to provide a theoretical basis for understanding the distortions in Japanese political development that led to the country's ill-fated military adventures before World War II (1939–1945). In his university days, Otsuka came under the influence of Japanese religious philosopher Uchimura Kanzo and was converted to Christianity, which informs much of his scholarship. Otsuka served as a professor at Hosei University, Tokyo Imperial University, and the International Christian University in Tokyo.

Otsuka's scholarly studies went through five phases. His early studies are explored in his first book, *On the Category of So-called Early Capital* (1935), which describes the transformation of mercantile and usury capital common in underdeveloped societies to industrial capital found in advanced economies. In the second stage, Otsuka sought to establish the evolution of modern industrial capital by analyzing English economic history. In *Preface to the Economic History of Europe* (1938), he used the case study of weaving and textile making in English villages, towns, and manors to examine the reasons for the successes of the Industrial Revolution in England. He continued his studies on the genesis of capitalism in *The Ancestry of Modern Capitalism* (1946). Before the third stage of his studies began, Otsuka became an admirer of Max Weber's classic *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904), and he produced *The Position of Commerce in the History of the Development of Capitalism* (1941) and its sequel, *Introduction to the Economic History of Modern Europe* (1944). Otsuka pursued these ideas in two more books, *The Ancestry of Modern Capitalism* (1946) and *Religious Reform and Modern Society* (1948), in which he offered his own insights into the nature of not only Western forms of capitalism but also the Japanese state, which was becoming more hostile to liberal ideas.

In his fourth period, Otsuka concentrated on the intersection of economics and politics. In his *Basic Theory of the Kyodotai* (1955), he used the peculiarly Japanese concept of *kyodotai* (community) to investigate the basic processes that facilitate the division of labor in an economic society, along with the resulting emergence of economic classes within a primitive community. Here he reflected the ideology of the prewar communist faction, the Kozaha. In the 1960s, as he was nearing retirement, Otsuka was heavily involved in the protest movements against the United States–Japan Security Treaty. During this fifth phase, he published *Religious Reform and Modern Society* (1961), in which he combined German revolutionary philosopher Karl Marx's concept of alienation and Weber's concept of domination to produce a withering critique of the ossified bureaucracy that dehumanizes modern society. In *The Method of Social Science* (1966), Otsuka applied sociological analysis to the development problems of the third world.

Otsuka's last book was *The Spirit of Capitalism: The Max Weber Thesis in an Economic Historical Perspective* (1976). His complete works were later published in ten volumes.

See also *Asian Political Thought; Capitalism and Democracy; Marx, Karl; Weber, Max.*

. . . .   GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN

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Oversight

Ever since U.S. president George Washington recognized that "the House is an inquest" while Congress sought to review activities in the departments of the Treasury, war, and foreign affairs in the 1790s, Congress's right to oversee the executive branch has been common knowledge; that is, Congress reviews the decisions made and the processes used to make them. Oversight plays a potentially important function in a chain of accountability linking the public to public policy decisions; in theory, oversight can align the otherwise conflicting interests of legislators and agencies. Whether that potential is realized depends on when Congress performs oversight and on the effects it has on agencies.

OCCURRENCE AND FUNCTION

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 charged Congress with exercising "continuous watchfulness" over executive organizations carrying out the law. But conventional wisdom pointed to a dearth of oversight in practice. Two simultaneous currents in the literature, one empirical and one theoretical, challenged this view in the 1980s.

First, Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz's 1984 landmark paper, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms," distinguishes two types of oversight: *police patrol*, which they liken to a beat cop watching out for transgressions before problems arise, and *fire alarm*, which they compare to firefighters called to address problems only after they are recognized. McCubbins and Schwartz contend that legislators can and do empower interest groups to observe and participate in agency proceedings and trust these groups to "pull a fire alarm" to alert Congress to problems requiring congressional attention. They also argue that both the fire alarm approach and police patrol model can ensure agency

accountability, but the fire alarm approach is more efficient for Congress, given the opportunity cost of legislators' time.

Second, Joel Aberbach's important empirical analysis, *Keeping a Watchful Eye* (1990), established that on-the-record oversight, in the form of hearings of congressional committees, does in fact occupy a substantial and growing share of Congress's time. Aberbach's overall time series findings have held up well in subsequent analyses with more recent data sets and alternative statistical models, such as his 2002 article "What's Happened to the Watchful Eye?" and Sean Gailmard's 2007 paper "Oversight and Agency Problems in Legislative-Bureaucratic Interaction." This literature makes clear that time spent on oversight hearings increases under divided government and with increased federal bureaucratic activity (e.g., the volume of new regulations issued), while—controlling for other factors—resources such as committee staff have little effect. Nevertheless, even accounting for these factors, oversight activity strongly tends to increase over time for reasons not fully explained in the literature.

Oversight in congressional committees comprises one important channel of oversight. Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigations provide another. The GAO is a nonpartisan staff agency of Congress created in 1921 (originally as the General Accounting Office) to audit expenditures and analyze programs implemented in the executive branch. In her 2007 report, "Auditing Politics or Political Auditing?" Anne Joseph O'Connell documents that congressional requests for GAO studies increased dramatically in the 1970s and again in the 1980s. Together with Aberbach's work on committee hearing activity, these findings indicate a marked increase in congressional oversight of the executive branch from the 1970s to the early 2000s.

EFFECTS

Research on determinants of oversight does not in itself identify effects of oversight on executive organizations. Suggestions as to these effects are provided by (among others) Barry Weingast and Mark Moran in their 1983 article "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control: Policymaking by the FTC." In this work, they show that decisions of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) respond to changes in ideology on congressional committees with jurisdiction over the commission. There are a variety of tools Congress could use (e.g., agency or program funding, agency statutory authority) to assert its will in this sense following oversight, though evidence that ties effects on agencies, or their responses, specifically to congressional oversight is largely circumstantial.

Broadly speaking, oversight can reveal two types of information about agencies to Congress: it can bring to light agency actions that would otherwise be unobserved, and oversight can reveal information that agencies possess about benefits of alternative policy actions, or about costs of maintaining programs, to legislators. Regarding agency actions, if agencies anticipate negative repercussions from taking actions congressional overseers do not favor—actions that will be revealed in oversight—they are less likely to take those actions in the first place. Regarding

agency information, in their 1992 article "The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information," Jeffrey Banks and Barry Weingast contend that, by revealing information about agency costs of maintaining programs, oversight can limit inefficiencies. In their 1993 article "A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight," Charles Cameron and Peter Rosendorff note that oversight can also send information from Congress to agencies. They argue that oversight signals a committee's level of interest in a policy to the bureaucracy and therefore its commitment to follow up on implementation problems. This can itself motivate better agency performance.

Finally, Gailmard, in his 2009 essay "Discretion Rather than Rules: Choice of Instruments to Constrain Bureaucratic Discretion," and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson, in their 2007 "Regulatory Quality under Imperfect Oversight," note that oversight does not lead to greater agency accountability in any simplistic way. Gailmard points out that agencies anticipating oversight may have less incentive to reveal policy-relevant information through their regulatory policies than relatively insulated, "oversight-proof" agencies. Oversight can allow Congress to apply revealed information to meet goals the agency does not necessarily prefer, giving agencies incentives to conceal information more deeply. Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson contend that oversight can cause agencies to allocate effort toward observable tasks and away from unobservable ones—because only the former can inform the reactions of the overseer—but this can lead to lower quality policy than if there were no oversight at all.

See also *Accountability; Transparency.*

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Owen, Robert

Robert Owen (1771–1858) was a successful nineteenth-century Welsh industrialist, philanthropist, and social reformer who invested his large fortune in creating a workers' utopian community in America. Owen believed that factory workers were helpless victims of capitalist society. Nonetheless, his writings held out the hope that *rational* human beings could and would change their circumstances.

Owen was born in Newtown, Wales, on May 14, 1771. At the age of ten, he was sent to work in London. After his apprenticeship to a draper, he quickly moved up from a shop assistant to managing a cotton-spinning mill in Manchester. Owen then served on Manchester's board of health in 1786 and witnessed the inhumane working conditions of many factories, which reinforced his belief that bad social institutions corrupted human beings. He saw the factory workers as innocent victims of an industrial system that drove them to drunkenness and impropriety.

In 1812, Owen became the predominate manager and owner of the cotton mills at New Lanark, the largest textile factory in Scotland. He enhanced New Lanark's existing reputation as one of the more humanely managed factories in the British Empire by improving employment conditions for child laborers, who numbered nearly three thousand of the mill's roughly fourteen thousand workers. He stopped the practice of hiring pauper children, reduced the children's working hours, and saw to their education. He also required supervisors to maintain "books of character" on all factory workers. No pubs were permitted in the village, and fines were imposed for drunkenness. Within a short time, public interest in Owen's philanthropic paternalism grew, and the village and factories of New Lanark received thousands of visitors, including cabinet ministers and foreign dignitaries.

Despite his success at New Lanark, Owen was dissatisfied with the slow progress of reform. By 1817, he became convinced that the entire economic and social systems were corrupt, including the institutions of marriage and organized religion. He published his first utopian plan in a *Report to the Committee of the Association for the Relief of the Manufacturing and Labouring Poor* (1817). He called for the creation of workers' communities, where all shared equally in the wealth produced. In 1824, Owen left New Lanark and sailed for America, hoping to build a model community of unity and mutual cooperation in New Harmony, Indiana. Despite Owen investing nearly his entire fortune on the social experiment, New Harmony ended in disaster, and he left America.

After returning to England, Owen gained a new following among the literate working classes. For a few months in 1834, he led the national federation of trade unions and continued to draft proposals for a new society. The so-called Owenites, encouraged by their benefactor, publicized their socialist proposals in various journals, including the *New Moral Order.* At the height of Owen's influence during the 1830s and 1840s, *Owenism* was virtually synonymous with British socialism.

Toward the end of his life, Owen became a spiritualist and published *The Future of the Human Race* (1853), in which he predicted the coming of a peaceful revolution through the intervention of "departed spirits of good and superior men and women," including poets Lord Byron and Robert Burns, Thomas Jefferson, and the Duke of Wellington. Owen died on November 17, 1858, near his birthplace in Newtown.

See also *Labor Policy; Socialism; Social Welfare.*

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Pacifism and Conscientious Objection

Pacifism is the belief that humanity can live peaceably whilst rejecting warfare as a means of settling disputes. It is the belief that violence is morally wrong, and that conflicting interests can be mediated through exclusively nonviolent means. Conscientious objection to military service is the natural outworking of opposition to war and violence.

THE HISTORY OF PACIFISM

Pacifism has a long history dating back at least to the first century and the teachings of Jesus. In the Sermon on the Mount, followers are exhorted to be peacemakers, not killing or resisting "one who does evil" but rather turning the other cheek and loving their enemies (Matthew 5). The early church followed this instruction until becoming the official religion of the Roman Empire. Thereafter, mainstream Christian theologians, including Augustine and Aquinas, recognized the right of rulers to go to war but constrained the parameters for appropriate initiation and implementation of warfare. Just war theory prescribes the circumstances in which countries can go to war, *jus ad bellum,* and the conduct that is acceptable in war, *jus in bello.* This tradition provides the foundation for subsequent international treaties on warfare, including the United Nations (UN) Charter. This theory is anathema to pacifists, however, who contend that all war is wrong.

Anabaptists and Mennonites have upheld the Christian tradition of pacifism since the sixteenth century; they advocated separation from the world and nonviolence. In subsequent centuries, Quakers and the Brethren have joined these groups, arguing and campaigning for nonviolence and against war. The Quaker peace testimony, the denomination's response to war, has been influential in American and British society and includes active participation in peace and reconciliation initiatives throughout the world. Quakers worldwide and the American Friends Service Committee, for example, established the Quaker Peace Network Africa in 2000, dedicated to preventing violent conflict across the continent.

These earlier initiatives informed the establishment of the peace societies that emerged in the nineteenth century. These campaigns centered on five interdependent and interrelated concepts: peace could be advanced and defended by arbitration, treaties and clauses in treaties, international authority, codifying international law, and disarmament. Throughout the nineteenth century, pacifism made faltering progress, with the first International Peace Congress convening in London in 1843, and an Inter-Parliamentary Union in 1892. Both shared the goal to advocate for peace, but progress was frustrated by the prevalence of war throughout the century.

Christian organizations were joined by socialist antimilitarists in the second half of the nineteenth century, as the latter group declared that war was a vehicle of organized capital that was opposed to the interest of labor. Nevertheless, organized labor overwhelmingly responded to appeals to country, rather than class, in abandoning pacifism during World War I (1914–1918).

Conscription then led the peace movement to support conscientious objection. In addition, the horrific death toll during the conflict led to international calls for an end to war. President Woodrow Wilson then produced the Fourteen Point Plan, calling for the elimination of conflict; the League of Nations was also formed to maintain international peace. Pacifism thus experienced a renaissance and many nations agreed to renounce war as an instrument of policy and to settle disputes through exclusively peaceful means under the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928). In India, the independence leader Mohandas Gandhi demonstrated the efficacy of nonviolent resistance to British rule. Inspired by the pacifist teachings of Leo Tolstoy and world religions, Gandhi taught a doctrine of *ahisma,* nonviolence, that was later adopted by Martin Luther King Jr. in the United States.

However, unsuccessful policies of appeasement and the advent of another world war challenged pacifist values as leading advocates, including the English philosopher Bertrand Russell and the German physicist Albert Einstein, supported the war. After World War II (1939–1945), pacifists increasingly concerned themselves with disarmament and played a leading role in campaigns for nuclear disarmament across Europe and the United States. They became actively involved in the antiwar protests against the Vietnam War (1959–1975), and more recently the Iraq War (2003–).

ABSOLUTIST AND PRAGMATIC PACIFISM

Although all pacifists oppose war and advocate peace, there is considerable disagreement over the practical implications of

such a stance. It is probably most helpful to consider pacifism as a continuum with absolutists at one end and pragmatists at the other. Absolutists consider all forms of war and violence as wrong and unjustifiable. At the extreme, this may entail acceptance of violence and injustice suffered while practicing nonresistance, as exemplified by Mennonites and Amish communities. Other absolutists, including Gandhi and King, differentiate between pacifism and passiveness and advocate the use of nonviolent forms of resistance to overcome injustice.

Pragmatists prefer flexibility in their approach to war and violence. Some may oppose specific conflicts but acquiesce or support others—defensive wars in particular. While pragmatists adhere to the general principle of nonviolence, they are prepared to countenance war or violence where the consequences of nonresistance would result in a greater harm; for example, appeasement resulted in much of Europe being subjugated under fascism during World War II. Pragmatists, unlike absolutists, adhere to pacifist principles of nonviolence for themselves but do not insist on them for the rest of society.

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

Conscientious objection to military service is founded on a consistent opposition to all wars based on moral or religious reasoning. Alternatively, it can be prompted by specific objection to a particular war. The historic peace churches—comprising Mennonites, Quakers, and Brethren—have resisted military service throughout the major conflicts of European and American history including the Revolutionary War (1776–1783), U.S. Civil War (1861–1865), both World Wars, the Korean War (1950–1953), and Vietnam. In the earlier two conflicts, such conscientious objectors could buy themselves out of military service and were required to provide taxes, goods, and services to support the various war efforts. Many refused to do so and were imprisoned or pressed into service. By World War I, the historic peace churches were joined by other religious groups opposed to violence as well as socialists and humanists. In America and Britain, conscientious objectors were required to prove their opposition to all war and if convincing, were able to take part in alternative nonmilitary service. Absolutist objectors, who refused to participate in the war effort in any capacity, were court-martialed and imprisoned. By World War II, civilian public service programs were in place as an alternative to military service for objectors.

Until 1965, conscientious objectors were only excused from the draft if they could prove their belief in God. After 1970, this was extended to include moral and ethical objections, with conscription ending in 1973. Thereafter, regular servicemen and servicewomen have conducted U.S. military operations.

See also *Conflict Resolution; Democratic Peace; Just War Theory; Peace; Utopias and Politics.*

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Paine, Thomas

The words and deeds of author and revolutionary Thomas Paine (1737–1809) made him one of the most famous and, in some quarters, infamous defenders of liberty. As political writer and Paine's contemporary, Joel Barlow proclaimed, "The great American cause owed as much to the pen of Paine as to the sword of Washington" (cited in Bratton, 123). Paine, however, believed he was fighting not solely for American liberty, but for the liberty of people everywhere. "My principle is universal," he exclaimed. "My attachment is to all the world and not to any particular part, and if what I advance is right, [it is right] no matter where or who it comes from."

Thomas Paine was born on January 29, 1737, in Thetford, England, into a Quaker family. By the time he met Benjamin Franklin in 1774, Paine had failed to secure a steady job, lost two wives, and was penniless. Franklin advised him to settle in America and provided him with letters of introduction. Paine took this advice, and arrived in Philadelphia in 1774 and became editor for the *Pennsylvania Magazine.* He wrote many critical essays attacking slavery, the anachronism of monarchy, and British colonial rule. He quickly proved himself a popular social critic with a remarkable ability to explain complex issues in a language that ordinary people could understand.

Paine's most celebrated contribution to the American revolutionary cause was his pamphlet *Common Sense* (1774). Using simple arguments, common sense, and easily understood facts, he demanded complete independence of the American colonies from England. *Common Sense* sold several thousands of copies and inspired the Declaration of Independence. Paine refused to accept any money for his revolutionary pamphlet, and instead donated the royalties to General George Washington's army. To boost the morale of American troops during the American Revolution (1776–1783), Paine wrote a series of papers entitled the *American Crisis.* It was in one of these papers that the words "the United States of America" first appeared.

After the war, Paine returned to England in 1787, and turned his attention to defending the French Revolution (1789–1799). His book, *The Rights of Man* (1791–1792), defended the natural rights of individuals against intrusion from the state. He believed only authority resting upon the continuous consent of the people was legitimate. *The Rights of Man* became extremely popular among the common people, which made it all the more subversive. Consequently, Paine

Thomas Paine's pamphlet "Common Sense" urged Americans to declare independence from Britain.

SOURCE: The Granger Collection, New York

was charged with treason in an English court. On the eve of his arrest, he sailed for France, where he was granted citizenship, but later was jailed and nearly executed, this time by the Jacobin revolutionaries, for opposing the execution of the deposed King Louis XVI. While in prison, Paine wrote *The Age of Reason* (1795). Although it was denounced as an atheist manifesto, the work held that God had blessed human beings with the capacity to scrutinize any religious authority claiming a monopoly on truth.

After James Monroe, minister to France, secured Paine's release from the French prison, Paine returned to the United States only to find himself vilified in the popular press as a liar and a drunk due to the uproar caused by *The Age of Reason*.

Thomas Paine, a British subject charged with treason, a French citizen condemned to the guillotine, and an American patriot ostracized for supposedly being an atheist died on June 8, 1809, in New York City.

See also *Political Theory.*

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Palestine

The name Palestine historically traces as far back, at least, as the writings of Herodotus and applies to the territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River (part of a larger area sometimes called Syria). This now includes the state of Israel, which was established in 1948, following the adoption in 1947 by the United Nations General Assembly of a plan (never implemented in its original form) for the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state with an internationalized Jerusalem and the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip, both of which also came under Israeli rule in 1967 but, aside from East Jerusalem, have not been formally annexed. Proponents for making the whole area a permanent part of Israel sometimes call this, together with other areas ruled since 1967, "greater Israel."

The name, as is apparent from its Arabic form, *Filastin*, is derived from one of its ancient and long extinct peoples, the Philistines. They settled the coastal area in the thirteenth century BCE (at about the same time the Israelites, at least according to the biblical account, invaded the interior of what then was called the Land of Canaan). The variant word *Philistia* is applied in the Old Testament, specifically to the coastal region. Following the end of the Jewish rebellion in 135 CE, the Romans made "Syria Palaestina" the official name of what had been the province of Judea. In subsequent centuries, its precise geographical boundaries have varied considerably, but it has remained the usual term for that geographical region, otherwise known as the *Holy Land* and, by Jews, as the *Eretz Yisrael* (land of Israel), a term that sometimes has included parts of adjacent countries.

Following the Arab conquest in the seventh century, Palestine formed part of various Muslim empires, aside the interregnum of crusader control from the late eleventh century to the late thirteenth century. Its existing population (including Jews) gradually was Arabized, as was the case in adjacent countries, although it always had at least a small Jewish population. Palestine came under Ottoman control in 1516, but much of the country temporarily gained de facto independence during the eighteenth century, when the reach of Istanbul had grown too weak to control it. In the latter years of Ottoman rule, southern Palestine constituted the Sanjak (subprovince) of Jerusalem, while northern Palestine was part of the Vilayet (province) of Beirut.

Although there already had been a growing Palestinian identity among its people, Palestine as a political entity dates back to the post–World War I (1939–1945) peace settlement, when the country was assigned to Great Britain as a Class A mandate under the newly created League of Nations. The mandate included a provision for developing a Jewish national home in Palestine while respecting the economic and civil

rights of others (i.e., the Arab Palestinians, who constituted about 90 percent of the population).

Although the area east of the Jordan River (i.e., Transjordan) originally was included in the Palestine mandate, it was governed separately and came under the rule of the Hashimite Emir (and later the king) Abdullah in 1921. While Transjordan technically remained part of the Palestine mandate until its formal independence in 1946, the term *Palestine* came to be applied specifically to the area west of the Jordan River, and the only people in Transjordan (today's Jordan) known as "Palestinians" are those who originated on the other side of the river.

With the emergence of the goal of a "two-state solution" to the Palestine question, "Palestine" has sometimes come to be used specifically for the Arab Palestinian state that many expect eventually to emerge in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip. While representatives of the Arab Palestinians previously aspired to create a state that would include all of historic Palestine (and a few now espouse the idea of a unified, binational Israel-Palestine), the goal is now mostly limited to one in the West Bank and Gaza. Also, "Palestine" sometimes now refers to the Palestinian National Authority that was established in parts of this area subsequent to the Oslo Accords of 1994; the group hopes to develop into the government of a sovereign state.

Residents of Palestine, in general historically, were called "Palestinians." This was no less true of the Jews, whose numbers were growing as a result of immigration during the period of the mandate. Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Jewish Israelis no longer call themselves Palestinians. Instead, the term refers to the Arab Palestinians. Arab Palestinians include those in the diaspora, the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Arab minority in Israel proper.

See also *Arab Political Economy; Arab-Israeli Relations; Jewish Political Thought; Jihad; Middle Eastern Politics and Society; Ummah.*

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Pan-Africanism

Pan-Africanism literally means "all Africanism." It is a sociopolitical worldview as well as a movement, which seeks to unify both native Africans and those of the African Diaspora as part of a global African community. In recent years, continental pan-Africanism, the aspiration of political integration within the continent, has returned to the forefront of African politics and lies at the heart of many of the African Union's political projects.

Initially developed outside the African continent, the concept of pan-Africanism was meant to mitigate and reverse the impact of European colonialism on peoples of African descent. Heavily influenced and promoted by the activists Henry Sylvester Williams, Edward Wilmot Blyden, W. E. B. du Bois and Marcus Garvey, the movement gained momentum between 1900 and 1945. The fifth Pan-African Conference held in Manchester in 1945 adopted pan-Africanism as a rallying cry for Africa's independence from colonial rule and fostered African leadership of the movement, most notably in the person of Kwame Nkrumah.

When Ghana finally gained its independence in 1957 and Nkrumah became its first prime minister, he immediately began to promote the idea of complete political integration among the countries of Africa. However, many of these countries jealously guarded their newly won sovereignty and opposed Nkrumah's goal of establishing a United States of Africa with a centralized power structure. Following several divisive years, representatives from thirty-two African countries finally met in Addis Abeba in May 1963 and founded the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) as a loose federation of independent African states committed to the liberation of the remaining colonies and continentwide cooperation. For several decades, political differences among the independent states, the unfinished nature of the continent's liberation and external interference by non-Africans prevented collaboration on a continental level. Instead, countries increasingly cooperated in regional bodies, such as the Economic Community of Western African Countries (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

The end of the cold war and consequent geopolitical changes, however, helped to reinvigorate the pan-African idea. In response to the economic impact of globalization, waning superpower interest and the prevalence of humanitarian catastrophes on the continent, Africa witnessed revived pan-Africanism in the mid-1990s. Aided by the end of apartheid in South Africa and the all-African intervention of ECOWAS in Liberia in 1991, pan-Africanism was complemented by a process of continental self-emancipation. This process, coined "African Renaissance" by South African president Thabo Mbeki, led to increasing attempts to provide "African solutions to African problems" and eventually paved the way for a reappraisal of continental unity. As a result, the institutional limitations of the OAU, with its focus on regime security and noninterference, caused self-declared pan-Africanists, such as Libya's leader Muammar al-Gaddafi, to renew calls for a wider political union of the continent, based on Kwame Nkrumah's dream of a United States of Africa.

The resultant transformation of the OAU into the structurally more promising African Union (AU), with a focus on human security and nonindifference, fundamentally changed

Africa's institutional landscape. The modeling of the AU on the European archetype, the European Union (EU), marked a new drive for political integration in Africa. Ever since its foundation in Durban, South Africa, in 2002, the AU has based its political legitimacy on pan-Africanist ideology and has overcome many of the obstacles that hindered previous attempts at continental integration. In July 2007, the AU summit once again reviewed the establishment of a United States of Africa and formulated a framework for a AU government to serve as a transitional political arrangement towards a continental union. The AU also proposed to offer associate membership in this arrangement to all non-African states with a sufficient African population, and thus included the African Diaspora in the project to strengthen pan-Africanist ideology.

See also *African Political Economy; African Political Thought; African Politics and Society; African Union; Anglophone Africa; Authoritarianism, African; Francophone Africa; Horn of Africa; Lusophone Africa; Postindependent Africa, Politics and Governance in.*

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Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism

Since the advent of Islam, Arabs have been torn apart between their ethnotribal loyalty and their devotion to their faith. In pre-Islamic Arabia, poetry glorified tribal loyalty, the Arabic language, tradition, and history. However, the arrival of Islam on the Arabian Peninsula's scene altered the sociopolitical and cultural context of Arabia.

MUHAMMAD AND EARLY HISTORY

The prophet Muhammad (570–623 CE) delivered a message that suggested universal applicability, and called on Arabs to spread their religion to foreign lands. Islam replaced narrower loyalties with fealty to the ummah (global Muslim community) inspired by its universal mission. When Muslim Arabs displayed distinctively Arab culture in a racial fashion, the Prophet condemned it as "bigotry." The Quran states:

> We . . . made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other (not that you may despise each other). Verily the most honored of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And Allah has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things). (49:13)

During the era of the righteous caliphs (632–661), Islam continued to be favored over Arabism. Abu Bakr, close companion to Muhammad, fought Arabian tribes in the war of apostasy in the name of Islam. Arabian tribes believed that their loyalty was to the Prophet himself, and Islam had died with his death. However, Abu Bakr presented them with Islam as an enduring framework of governance, culture, and spirituality. The second caliph, Omar, expanded the realm of Islam, and argued that Muslim Arabs shouldered the greatest responsibility toward both Islam and Muslims. The third caliph, Othman, continued his predecessors' policies, but favored his relatives, most of whom were previous enemies of the prophet Muhammad. His nepotism led to widespread corruption in the government prompting disillusionment in the Muslim community. Othman was subsequently brutally murdered at the age of eighty-two. His assassination was indirectly responsible for the creation of the Sunni-Shiite divide.

Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, Ali, the revered Shiite martyr, succeeded Othman; he too was killed in 661. As Roy Andersen and colleagues observe, "The death of Ali was a turning point for Islam. The last of the Prophet's close personal followers was now gone. The initial unity of Islam was forever shattered" (28). Ali was succeeded by a cousin of Othman, named Muawiya, who declared Ali an illegitimate caliph for failing to prosecute his cousin's murderers. Those who supported Ali called themselves as partisans of Ali or *Shi'at Ali*, while those who supported Muawiya called themselves *Sunna*, or followers of the path.

Muawiya moved the capital of the Islamic Empire to Damascus, Syria and made it the center of Arab culture. He reversed Islam's views with regard to the concept governance and the ummah (nation) and narrowed it down to its Arab context (i.e., pre-Islamic Arabia). Under the Umayyad rule, Arabism flourished once again; Arabs were privileged, favored, and empowered by a wealthy royal court. Within less than a century, from 661 until 750 CE, Islam conquered two major contemporary empires, the Persian Empire and the Byzantine Empire. It later expanded further into Europe, central Asia, China, and Africa.

DECLINE AND REVIVAL

The collapse of the Umayyads in 750 gave birth to the Abbasid dynasty, which built the city of Baghdad and made it the center of their civilization. Though the Abbasids gave special attention to Arabic language and history, the general posture of their civilization was Persian, and multicultural, not Arab. This trend lasted from 750 until 1258, when the Islamic world succumbed to the Mongol invasion and the emerging threat of the crusaders. The decline of Arabism continued and was highlighted by the emergence of the Ottoman caliphate in Turkey, which marginalized the role of Arabs in the state, a condition that continued until the early years of the twentieth century.

For the thirteenth century until the twentieth century, pan-Arabism faced progressive erosion. The final blow came on the hands of Western colonialism, which countered pan-Arabism as well as pan-Islamism with its Westernization model of development and subordination.

In the nineteenth century, an Arab reform movement attempted to reconcile Western principles of nationalism with

Pan-Arabism aims for political unification of Arab nations in the Middle East.

Islam, reviving pan-Arabism in its Islamic context. They also believed that reviving Arab culture and language was essential to resisting colonialism.

The collapse of the Islamic caliphate in 1923 ended the political reality of the Islamic ummah. However, the collapse of the caliphate in response to Turkish nationalists suggested a new purpose for pan-Islamism. Muslims have become accustomed to the idea of being under different types of political arrangements, but they consider Islam as the unifying element to Muslims worldwide.

The modern Islamic movement in the Arab world and the Indian subcontinent followed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In 1928, Hasan Albana, an Egyptian schoolteacher, began preaching about the necessity of Islamic revival and the reactivation of Islam's role in the state and society. In less than a decade, Albana managed to establish the most powerful Islamic organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been integral to the politics of the Islamic world over the past eighty years. The Muslim Brotherhood, in its early years, was targeted by colonial powers, Britain in particular. The suppression of the group resulted in the assassination of Albana in 1949, but the group has remained influential to the present day.

SPLIT BETWEEN PAN-ARABISM AND ISLAMIST ARABISM

After World War II (1939–1945), a split emerged between Islamist Arabism, and the national socialist interpretation of pan-Arabism. At the time, socialism appeared to be on a collision course with Islam. Arab leftist forces waged a war against colonialism primarily on nationalist ground, highlighting the influence of ethnonationalism on the Arab national liberation movements in the postwar period. Egypt took a leading role when the Free Officers toppled the monarchy, and Abdel Nasser declared himself as the undisputed leader of Arab nationalism. He sought to control and exterminate the Muslim Brotherhood, though it was instrumental in the success of the military coup against the monarchy.

During Nasser's rule from 1956 until 1970, Islamists went underground to avoid the wrath of nationalism for no avail. The execution of Islamic philosopher Syyaid Qotb in 1964 represented the triumph of Arab nationalism over Islamism. However, it proved to be detrimental not only to Nasser and Egypt, but to the larger world as well. The resentment to the unjust execution of Qotb fueled bitterness among Islamists toward the nationalist state and created an extreme reaction that inspired current Islamically inspired terror. As American political scientist Monte Palmer explains:

> The message of Arab nationalism was both simple and powerful: The Arabs are one people united by a common history, a common culture, a common language, and for the most part, a common religion. Once powerful, the Arabs were now fragmented into a multitude of petty countries manipulated by Western imperialists and Israel. All that was required for a resurgence of Arab power was the reunification of the Arab people into a single state. (52)

Animosity and distrust between Nasserism and Western imperialism were mutual. Foreign policy scholar Shibley Telhami describes it neatly, stating, "During that period the United States and the West viewed secular national movements in the Middle East as the primary destabilizing political force in the region" (27). Nasser and Arab nationalists had also made the liberation of Palestine the cornerstone of their movement, and Arab masses believed in them. However, the utter defeat in the Six-Day War (1967) undermined Arab nationalism and its leaders. Since the late 1960s, a movement calling for a return to Islam has thus occurred. This led to the resurgence of Islam as a political force, expressed through the Islamic revival movement.

The Islamic revival movement was critical of pan-Arabism and held it responsible for the humiliating defeats in the wars with Israel. Therefore, Muslims across the world began a movement of return to the tenets of Islam. The mosque became the center of Muslims's lives. The Islamic movement led the Islamic project, and called for Islam as the only "solution" to challenges confronting Arabs and Muslims. In order to ensure the success of the Islamic project, the movement provided its own educational systems, an economic base, global charitable networks, and active political parties. The movement flourished in the 1980s, particularly in response to the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989) in particular. Islam was a close ally to the West, and Islamists assisted in securing the defeat of the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Islam was very effective in mobilizing global support for the Jihad Movement in Afghanistan, which rejected communism. However, the collapse of the Soviets put Islam in a direct collision course with the West.

Since 1991, the interests and objectives of Western civilization and Islam have diverged. Both the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1990) and the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent clash of civilization discourse underlined the weaknesses of the nationalist paradigm when Arabs not only sided with foreign forces, but also killed fellow Arabs. The most striking example was Syria's membership in the international coalition put together by the United States to fight a fellow Baathist Arab country, Iraq. Subsequently, some leading Islamists such as Hassan Turabi of Sudan called for serious dialogue among Islamists and nationalists. His call was well-received but did not lead to significant support to mend the historical division between the two sides. Given the limitations of nationalism for resolving enduring problems such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, governance, and development, Islam will continue to represent the most comprehensive framework for interpreting contemporary Arab-Islamic politics and culture.

See also *Al-Farabi; Arab League; Arab Political Economy; Arab Political Thought; Arab Socialism; Islamic Political Thought; Jihad; Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC); Women in Islamic Nations.*

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Panchayat

Panchayat refers to a village council commonly found throughout South Asia. The term is derived from Hindi meaning "five elders." In ancient times, this referred to a group of trusted village members who were responsible for resolving any conflict between village members or other villages.

The most well-known panchayat system is in India. The Indian constitution adopted in 1950 states that "the State shall take steps to organize village Panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government." However, it was not until the seventy-third amendment of the Indian constitution that the *panchayat raj* system was considered legitimate. Until then, several mandates for organizing panchayats were not fulfilled. Many that did exist were not organized effectively and elections were infrequent. The panchayat system continues to provoke controversy, as proponents note that the system has played a major role in granting women and members of the lower castes access to governance that they would otherwise be denied. Critics, however, counter that panchayats place power into the hands of a select few and therefore counteract the potential advantages of a system of decentralization.

See also *Asian Political Thought; Caste System; Hindu Political Thought; Indian Ocean Region.*

. . . . JEFFREY N. CARROLL

Panel Studies

Panel studies collect information from the same individuals, the *panel*, at two or more time points, or *waves*. Experimental research design incorporates a panel insofar as the same subjects are tested before and after application of the treatment. In survey research, panels of respondents are reinterviewed, and there is usually a good deal of continuity in the content of the questionnaire. Because panel studies follow the same respondents, they are well-suited to addressing such topics as individual-level attitude change and political learning. Panel designs can also help resolve questions of causal order among variables of interest and are generally considered superior to repeated cross-section designs for testing causality. Most panel studies in political science are based on a *prospective panel* design in which the first wave establishes a baseline for investigating subsequent change, such as increased knowledge about candidates. Some panel studies include a *retrospective panel* design in which respondents are questioned about a period prior to the initial wave.

Panel studies vary considerably in their number of waves and the time between waves. Some panel studies cover only a few days or weeks, while others cover many years. The American National Election Study (ANES) typically interviews a panel of respondents shortly before and again shortly after election day. For the 2008 presidential election, ANES conducted a six-wave panel survey from September 2007 through May 2009, which allowed researchers to track citizen assessments of candidates throughout the campaign. An especially ambitious panel study, known as the generations and politics project, followed high school seniors and parents beginning in 1965, with follow-up interviews in 1973 and 1982. The high school senior panel was contacted a final time in 1997. This is an example of a special kind of panel study, sometimes called a cohort study because it followed specific age cohorts—the high school senior cohort and the parent cohort—with repeated interviews. The long time span covered by the panel study has proven especially valuable in distinguishing between generational, life cycle, and period effects on continuity and change in political orientations. These effects are difficult to disentangle with repeated cross-sectional data.

Although panel studies can provide rich data and powerful leverage over longitudinal research questions, they can be difficult to execute. Simply keeping track of large numbers of panel participants can be a daunting administrative task. An inevitable part of panel studies is *panel attrition*. Respondents may drop out of a panel for a variety of reasons: they cannot be relocated, poor health prevents them from continuing, or they simply tire of being asked the same questions several times. Panel attrition can introduce biases into a study's sample if the respondents who fall out of the panel are systematically different from those who continue. Experience suggests that several types of respondents are more apt to drop out of panel studies: younger and older participants, as well as those of lower socioeconomic status and low political interest. Panel attrition can aggravate the biases that are introduced by initial nonresponse in surveys (i.e., refusals or noncontact), so researchers employ an assortment of techniques to preserve panel participation, ranging from gentle persuasion to cash payments. If panel attrition appears to be problematic, a *refresher sample* can be drawn from the same population and used to supplement the original panel.

Care should also be taken that panel respondents are not overly sensitized by repeated waves covering the same topics and asking the same questions. For instance, some respondents who report increased campaign interest over the course of a panel study may have been motivated to follow the campaign because of their study participation.

The analysis of panel data raises some special issues. For example, when a respondent is asked the same question in two panel waves, it is likely that the measurement error associated with that survey question in the second wave will be correlated with the measurement error associated with the question in the first wave. This *autocorrelated error* violates important assumptions underlying ordinary least squares regression. Thus, researchers may need to consider other analytic techniques,

such as two-stage least squares. Despite these caveats, a well-designed and carefully executed panel study will provide superior data for longitudinal research.

See also *Interview Techniques; Survey Research.*

. . . .   JULIO BORQUEZ

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Panethnicity

In the simplest sense, panethnicity means all ethnicities in a particular category. From this perspective, *ethnic groups* are usually collections of people with origins in the same nation-state: for example, Americans of Japanese descent would comprise one ethnic group, and Americans of Korean descent would comprise another. Members of those two groups, along with other Americans of Asian ancestry, could be placed together under the panethnic label "Asian American."

In some cases, however, groups may have roots in multiple nation-states (e.g., Kurds), while individuals with origins in the same nation-state are comprised of a wide variety of subpopulations (Asian Indians, for example), each of which can be considered to constitute a different ethnic group. Because of this, panethnic groups can be categorized differently, although the most common approach in the United States uses panethnic labels very similar to the ones used to identify racial groups—so, for example, "Asian American" and "Latino" are labels used both when referring to racial groups and when referring to panethnic ones.

DISTINGUISHING PANETHNICITY FROM RACE

The concept of panethnicity differs significantly from the idea of *race,* however: panethnicity is a chosen identity, while race has frequently been imposed. Implicit in this is the idea that a panethnic group can be thought of as a collectivity comprised of smaller groups. Group names that reflect this—for example, pan-African or pan-Asian—call attention to the fact that their members may choose to identify in different ways.

The concept of panethnicity helps to highlight that individuals can embrace or reject these broader identities. For example, some choose to identify as Mexican American rather than Latino. For many individuals, the choice may vary with the situation. An individual with ancestral roots in Cambodia might identify as Cambodian in certain settings, while in others, the same person might identify as Asian American.

In contrast, racial identity has been imposed by others and has been used to deny opportunities to certain categories of people. For example, for African Americans, the "one drop" rule—which declared that any African ancestry made one "black"—was part of an effort to deny opportunities by eliminating any chance of assimilation into the more privileged segment of society. When racial categories created for blacks and whites were confronted with significant immigration from China and then Japan, another category— sometimes labeled "Oriental"—was formulated and defined as "non-white," thereby making it easier for public officials to deny equal treatment to those of Asian ancestry.

When governments require individuals to use these broader categories, this is most appropriately defined as an act of racialization. Since many respondents would not voluntarily opt for labels such as "Asian American" or "Hispanic," asking them to choose only from among those labels is imposing an identity, even though the rationale may be to benefit those upon whom the identity is imposed.

Because the political behavior of those who choose the broader labels may differ in significant ways from those who do not, it is important to have terms that distinguish between these two groupings. Without terms to differentiate between someone choosing to identify with a larger category and someone who has a larger category imposed on them, there is risk of conflating subpopulations whose political behavior and attitudes differ in significant ways. For example, an American of Vietnamese ancestry who chooses to identify as Asian American may have significantly different political orientations from an American of Vietnamese ancestry who chooses to identify as Vietnamese, but government data will typically lump both of them into the category Asian American.

FACTORS PROMOTING A PANETHNIC IDENTITY

The concept of panethnicity highlights how immigrants may not categorize themselves the way that many native-born Americans would. Research has found that newcomers from Asia and Latin America usually do not identify panethnically, at least when they first arrive. Growing immigration from Africa emphasizes this point, as new African immigrants will often see many differences between themselves and African Americans whose ancestors arrived three centuries ago, despite the tendency of most Americans to lump them all into an undifferentiated "black" category. Recent immigrants are much more likely to choose national identities rather than panethnic ones—for example, Vietnamese rather than Asian American—although, over time, they may come to feel that they have some things in common with the larger panethnic group.

Some scholars suggest that politics can be an important factor in developing bonds that connect individuals to a panethnic group. Pei-te Lien argues that an Asian American identity has been greatly enhanced through political involvement, and Felix Padilla's study of Chicago Latinos concluded that a pan-Hispanic coalition was fueled by shared political goals. Since the larger panethnic constituency is likely to wield more influence than individual ethnic groups, political participation may encourage panethnic thinking.

The development of a panethnic identity is not certain, however. Although political pundits speak of the "Latino vote" or the "Asian American vote," implying panethnic unity, there is in fact considerable political diversity among Latinos and Asian Americans. African Americans do appear to have greater political similarities, reflecting conditions that have imposed a more powerful racial identity and given them a greater sense that their fate is linked to that of other African Americans. As immigration brings in growing numbers of people not familiar with the American notions of race and ethnicity, however, identification cannot be taken for granted, and understanding panethnicity will be increasingly important to understanding the politics of this country.

See also *Ethnic Parties; Identity, Politics of; Race and Racism.*

. . . . ANDREW L. AOKI

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Papacy

The papacy is the institution of the pope of the Roman Catholic Church, based in Rome. As the official seat of the head of the Roman Catholic Church, the papacy has historic prestige and global authority. The papacy has long boasted a unique role as both a religious and political institution.

According to Roman Catholic tradition, the apostle Peter was the founding bishop of the Christian Church in Rome. It also holds that Peter was appointed by Jesus Christ to lead the Christian Church based on a passage in Matthew 16:18, in which Jesus tells Peter that he is the rock upon which Jesus will build the church. This has been interpreted to mean that the office of the bishop of Rome is the ultimate authority of the Catholic (universal) Church. While the Roman Catholic Church maintains that this authority was implicit from the foundation of the church in Rome, historic evidence suggests that it arose over time, based upon the practice of appealing to the bishop of Rome for arbitration in disputes regarding doctrine and competing claims for authority.

Theodosius, in 381, recognized Papal preeminence, and by the sixth century, the practice of endowment of lands upon the death of parishioners had made the Catholic Church one of the greatest landowners in the Italian peninsula. The Catholic Church developed political power over large areas of Italian territory even as Roman power was in decline. Pope Gregory the Great (590–604) led the reorganization and reinvigoration of the Catholic Church, which spread to the barbarian regions of northern Europe. The political alliance of the papacy with northern European kings reached a high point with the establishment of the Carolingian dynasty under Pepin, king of the Franks. Pepin's intervention in Italy, in 756, led to the formal establishment of the Papal States, kingdoms under the temporal authority of the Pope, and the designation of Pepin's son Charlemagne as the new Holy Roman Emperor. This mixture of political and spiritual power proved to be damaging to the papacy. By the tenth century, the papal office had been captured by a group of venal aristocrats who brought it into great disrepute.

THE MEDIEVAL PAPACY

The papacy was reborn under a succession of activist popes during the eleventh century. Under Leo IX (1049–1054), the Eastern Orthodox Church finally split from the Roman Catholic Church in the "great schism." In response to the erosion of Roman authority in the east and the expanding threat coming from Muslim invasions of Asia Minor, Pope Urban II called for the first crusade in Clermont in 1095. Several more followed over the next three centuries.

From 1309 to 1377, the popes were compelled to take up residence in Avignon in response to political instability in Rome. The Avignon papacy ushered in a period of intense controversy over the papal office. The Italian popes of the fifteenth century restored the stability of the papal office but also oversaw a church that had not reformed despite the growth of education and culture that took place during the Renaissance. From 1517, a growing number of opponents to papal authority followed in the footsteps of Martin Luther, bringing about the Protestant Reformation. The Reformation challenged the supremacy of the Catholic Church throughout Europe, with tremendous political and religious consequences. The power of the papacy was undermined by Protestant claims that the church had no authority to forgive sins or to mediate the relationship between God and believers. Protestants countered the legitimacy of leadership through apostolic succession from Peter with the claim that justification before God was through faith alone.

Under Paul III (1534–1549), the Council of Trent was convened to respond to the theological challenges of the Reformers and to codify Roman Catholic teaching. During the attendant Counter-Reformation the Catholic Church refashioned itself to constrain the growth of the Protestant Church. Perhaps most notable of these developments was the establishment of the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits) by Ignatius of Loyola (1491–1556) in 1534. This religious order dedicated itself to extending Roman Catholic presence through missionary and educational work, thereby limiting the spread of the Protestant Reformation.

THE MODERN PAPACY

The following four centuries saw the gradual rollback of papal authority in both spiritual and political spheres. The Peace of Westphalia effectively limited the authority of the church in favor of raisons d'état, or national interest. Reformation teaching likewise strengthened the notion of the separation of church and state. Internal divisions within the church arose due to pressures from state authorities, leading to the suppression of the Jesuits from 1769. Throughout Europe, anticlerical attitudes pervaded Enlightenment philosophy and charged the revolutionary movements of the day. The introduction of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in 1790 brought severe constraints against the church in France. Under Napoleon in 1798, French troops invaded Rome and abducted Pope Pius VI, who died in custody in 1799. His successor was likewise imprisoned by the French, later to be restored to his authority in Rome after Napoleon's defeat.

Italian nationalism arose as the next challenge to the power of the papacy. While the Papal States had been defended against annexation by threatening neighbors throughout the 1800s, the defeat of France (then defending Papal States's independence) and the Italian annexation of the Papal States's territories in 1870 brought an end to the independence of the Papal States. However, it was not until Pope Pius XI signed the Lateran Treaty with Mussolini's government in 1929 that the Papacy negotiated its final status in Italy. Under the treaty, the Pope was granted a small independent state known as the Vatican City inside the city of Rome.

The modern papacy is shaped strongly by the limitations and rights of the Lateran Treaty. The institutions of the papacy are granted both spiritual and temporal importance by virtue of representing both the worldwide Roman Catholic Church and the Vatican City. The pope, once elected by a conclave, becomes the ex officio ruler of the Vatican City. The bureaucracy of the Holy See known as the Roman Curia support the pope's role, and he is represented abroad by official legations and permanent special representatives known as nuncios. The Holy See maintains observer status at the United Nations and several other major international gatherings.

In the last three decades, the papacy has been increasingly involved in international diplomacy. It has played an important part in mediating conflicts in areas such as the Middle East and South America and has lent support to democratic transition in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia. Recent popes John Paul II and Benedict XVI have enjoyed worldwide renown as promoters of ecumenical dialogue and conservative social doctrine.

See also *Anticlericalism; Church and State; Clericalism; Concordat; Confessional Parties; Religious Parties; Roman Catholic Social Thought; State Church.*

. . . .   PAUL S. ROWE

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Parametric Statistical Model

Parametric statistical model, or a set of assumptions, is a family of distribution functions indexed by a set of unknown parameters. In other words, parametric statistical model is the distribution derived from the set of probability distributions that corresponds to the set of variables reflecting the variables' relationship in the model.

It is assumed that the set of parameters uniquely identifies the resulted distribution, parametric statistical model, and the estimates of parameters are based on data from the resulted distribution, parametric statistical model. For example, the normal parametric statistical model is the normal distribution, one of the important probability distributions in statistics. Other examples include the exponential model (the exponential distribution), the log-normal model (the log-normal distribution), the Weibull model (the Weibull distribution), and the gamma model (the gamma distribution).

The main advantage of parametric modeling is the availability of the estimators based on the assumed probability distribution, which makes statistical inferences easier. However, a parametric model might not accurately represent the true distribution of data, which could lead to the biased estimates of parameters and erroneous statistical inferences. By contrast, nonparametric statistical model is distribution free, and therefore could capture better the true distribution of data, though not without some drawbacks: it is less efficient or powerful than parametric models and unable to extrapolate beyond the available data sample, which prevents making strong quantitative statements.

See also *Qualitative Analysis; Qualitative Methodologies; Quantitative Analysis.*

. . . .   TATIANA VASHCHILKO

Pareto, Vilfredo

Vilfredo Federico Pareto (1848–1923) was an Italian sociologist and economist. He is known for helping to develop the theory of political elitism, as well as many concepts in the field of economics.

After receiving a degree in mathematics and a doctorate in engineering, Pareto began writing on economic problems

and studying politics and philosophy. During time spent in Florence, he was politically active in opposing the ruling Italian Democratic Party. His views reflected classical liberalism, rejecting government intervention in the free market. He was considered, along with French Swiss economist Leon Walras, the leader of the Lausanne school, a school of microeconomics based on equilibrium theory. This theory states that in the free market, prices of all goods, including the price of money and interest, are interrelated.

Pareto joined the faculty of the University of Florence in 1886 as a lecturer on economics and management. After resigning from this position, he began writing and speaking against the government. His critiques made it impossible for him to obtain another academic position in Italy and the police often disrupted his public lectures. He became chair of political economy at the University of Lausanne in Switzerland. In Lausanne, Pareto continued his criticism of the Italian government's economic policies through his column in the journal *Giornale degli Economisti*.

Though Pareto was never a member of the Fascist Party, his ideas were admired by Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, who had attended some of Pareto's lectures at Lausanne, and Mussolini's followers. After Mussolini came to power, he nominated Pareto for a seat in the Italian senate and designated him as a delegate to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Due to poor health, Pareto declined these appointments but did, through written correspondence, offer Mussolini advice on economic and social policy.

Pareto was a significant contributor to the fields of economics and sociology. He published *Cours d'economie politique,* a three-volume work (1896, 1897), which was a compilation of his lecture notes. In this work, he offered Pareto's law of income distribution. According to Pareto, the distribution of income and wealth followed a logarithm: $\log N = \log A + m \log x$, where N is the number of income earners who receive incomes higher than x, and A and m are constants. Pareto also questioned the concept of utility, suggesting that when people make economic decisions, they are guided by what they think is desirable for them, not what necessarily corresponds to their well-being. He developed what has become known as Pareto optimality. The Pareto optimal allocation of resources occurs when it is not possible to make someone better without making someone else worse.

In 1916, Pareto wrote *Trattato di Sociologia Generale* (English translation published in 1935 as *The Mind and Society)*. In this work, he contends that human activity could be reduced to what he called residue, referring to actions based on nonlogical sentiment, and derivation, which stood for the logic people offered for their actions after the fact. It was also in this work that he explained his idea of "circulation of elites," whereby governments were in equilibrium when there was an equal number of what he considered class-1 people (those who favored innovation) and class-2 types (conservatives) serving in the government. Pareto believed that when the government is dominated by one of these classes of people, eventually the opposing class will take power.

Along with Italian philosopher Gaetano Mosca and German sociologist Robert Michels, Pareto is considered part of the Italian school of elite theorists.

See also *Elites, Political; Elite Theory; Italian Political Thought; Liberalism, Classical; Michels, Robert; Mosca, Gaetano.*

. . . .   JEFFREY KRAUS

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Parliamentary Democracy

The central feature of parliamentary democracy is the interweaving of the executive and legislative branches. Candidates from two or more parties contend for election to the legislature. The resulting legislature chooses the executive from the leading party or coalition. The executive members remain in the legislature, present their policies to the legislature, and stay in office only as long as they retain the support of the legislature.

A secondary feature is the separation of functions between the governmental leader (i.e., prime minister or chancellor) and a mainly ceremonial monarch or president. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution considered adopting this model. In deciding instead on separate elections for the executive and legislative branches, they created a system that is lauded for its ingeniously contrived balance between power and constraints. Critics of the system charge that, on the one hand, it established legislative gridlock, and on the other hand, it created an "imperial presidency."

Though parliamentary democracies avoid the particular problems of the American presidential system, they still face the fundamental democratic dilemma of how to provide for effective action yet set appropriate limits to power. Of the various efforts to address this problem, most fall into one of two contrasting types.

THE WESTMINSTER MODEL
In this original version of parliamentary democracy, typified by the British political framework, a *first past the post* voting system allows the two dominant political parties to control the parliament. The division of power is exemplified by the physical design of the legislature, in which the government party sits on one side, confronting the opposition parties across a divide.

Power is concentrated in the prime minister and a cabinet selected by the prime minister. This leadership is supported by strong party discipline, the prime minister's right to call an election any time within five years, the weakness of parliamentary

committees, a second chamber able to delay but not to veto, and a unitary system placing many regional and local decisions in the hands of the national government. A mostly unwritten constitution is subject to changes by simple acts of parliament.

The model is admired for its ability to take fast, effective action based on clear policy choices. Yet it is criticized as unfair to all but the two leading parties and it commonly produces governments based on pluralities. It is also sometimes described as an "elective dictatorship," with too much power concentrated in the hands of a one-party executive dominated by the prime minister.

This latter argument overlooks the vigorous pluralism embedded in British political culture. Nonetheless, the criticism has led to changes in the British system itself, including devolution to Scottish and Welsh parliaments, which are elected according to proportional representation. The executive's power has been further limited by the acceptance of European Union (EU) jurisdiction over several aspects of individual rights and social and economic policies. While some of the essential features of the Westminster model have been adopted by former British dependencies, federalism is the rule in Canada, Australia, and India.

THE EUROPEAN MODEL
In the version adopted by several Western European states, proportional representation voting produces legislatures with multiple parties that bargain to produce governing coalitions. The legislatures' semicircular designs contrast with the confrontational layout of the British parliament. Committees of the legislatures exercise considerable power. Parliaments are bicameral with an influential, but less powerful, upper chamber. Federal systems divide power between central and state governments. Written constitutions are enforced by judicial review.

Admirers of the Westminster model see the European versions as slower to act, requiring incessant haggling behind the scenes, and producing unstable, constantly changing governments. After World War I (1914–1918), German and Italian governments underlined the potential consequences of instability in the system. However, others see the European model as much fairer, more consensual, and more representative than the Westminster system. While it has produced upheaval in some countries, there are also examples of long-lived coalitions and rotations of power that have retained policy continuity for issues upon which there is a consensus, such as in the management of energy resources, economic transition, or key relationships in foreign affairs. This continuity is sometimes achieved through retaining cabinet ministers from the previous coalition.

See also *Cohabitation; European Parliament; Parliamentary Discipline; Parliamentary Government; Westminster Model.*

. . . . LEONARD FREEDMAN

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Parliamentary Discipline

As purposive political actors, legislators or members of parliaments in democratic legislatures typically join and work within political parties. To talk about parliamentary discipline is then to talk about *parliamentary party* discipline. Parties offer legislators the possibility of structured collective action with like-minded copartisans, identification with a brand name that can enhance their electoral prospects, and access to potentially significant legislative resources (e.g., promotion to committee and leadership positions, patronage, etc.). For their part, political parties are meaningless entities unless they act collectively with reasonably well-defined policy and electoral goals, organize the legislature or parliament, and behave cohesively in the electoral and legislative arenas to promote their brand and interact with the executive or government. In parliamentary systems—where executive and legislative powers are fused—single or multiparty governments cannot survive without disciplined parties; in presidential or separated systems, presidents' bases of legislative support become less stable when legislative parties are not cohesive.

While most legislative scholars view "party" as crucial to understanding legislative politics, some dissent. Most notably, Keith Krehbiel insists that party cannot be disentangled conceptually and empirically from legislators' preferences, because party cohesion or discipline is nothing more than preferenceship within the host chamber. Krehbiel's trenchant critique has, however, not been generally accepted by most legislative scholars who see legislators agreeing with one another either because of shared policy preferences (cohesion) or as a result of persuasion or coercion (discipline), although in practice the effects of cohesion and discipline are indistinguishable.

LEGISLATIVE PARTY COHESION AS SHARED POLICY PREFERENCES
Those who interpret intraparty legislative or parliamentary cohesion primarily as shared policy values and preferences emphasize the influence of copartisans' prior ideological convictions, emotional loyalties, party solidarity, socialization, and moral commitments. Thus, studies demonstrate that even when legislative parties are not subject to tight discipline—as on many free or conscience issues—intraparty cohesion and interparty positions are underpinned by shared policy preferences. Other studies point to the reinforcing impact

of common party nomination and selection processes, and legislative leaders' activities in promoting shared values and preferences in many legislatures. However, conversely, in the national legislatures of Italy, Japan, or the United States, electoral mechanisms and the parity of central party campaign resources combine with the reelection motive to discourage legislators from cohering ideologically and identifying strongly with a national party.

PARTY DISCIPLINE AS A CONSEQUENCE OF LEADERSHIP INTERVENTION

When legislative party members do not gel on a specific issue, legislative leaders or whips in a democratic legislature—and especially, majority party or coalition leaders—resort to strategic incentives and coercion to reach intraparty accommodations that keep the party together and facilitate promotion of the party's brand and collective goals. They use their tactical skills to structure debate by emphasizing specific votes and political messages that tap copartisans' shared values and preferences; buy off dissidents; limit policy side payments (e.g., pork barrel, regulatory relief, or special executive interventions); truncate legislative deliberations through control of parliamentary timetables, special rules, and votes of confidence; reward loyalty and punish disloyalty through preferential distribution of significant political resources (e.g., committee assignments, executive positions); or insist on casting all party votes for their party. These strategies and tactics, however, are not bound to succeed. Achieving legislative party discipline may be impossible; if cohesion is irreparable, invoking discipline becomes too risky and, therefore, unenforceable, as, for example, in the Italian Camera dei Deputati in the late 1990s, when the imposition of discipline was always qualified by the real risk that legislators would quit their parties if discipline were too strict. Only where the ideological, cultural, or pragmatic basis exists for constructing a winning intraparty coalition will copartisans be willing to grant their leaders disciplinary powers to promote the party's collective interests.

Legislative parties create disciplinary regimes of varying strengths across systems and time. These range from strong systems, where legislators are expelled from the party (e.g., the postcommunist Polish Sjem) or dissent is suppressed when issues threaten party unity or generate discomfort for the government (e.g., the African National Congress [ANC] in the National Assembly of South Africa), to weak ones, where sanctions are rarely imposed effectively, as in the U.S. Senate and the Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados and Senado. Between these poles lie most other systems. But, even where fairly strong disciplinary powers are available, as in the British House of Commons, the degree to which they are invoked and are effective depends on the specific policy issue and other situational factors, including the position of the opposition parties.

IDENTIFYING AND MEASURING LEGISLATIVE PARTY UNITY

Most studies of legislative party unity analyze single legislatures or, as in the United States, rely almost exclusively on analysis of roll call votes. In consequence, the disparate findings derived from analyzing different legislatures—exhibiting diverse rules and decision-making styles, technology, patterns of legislative organization, and party competitiveness—are often difficult to reconcile or synthesize. Regardless of methodological difficulties, the overwhelming body of research on legislative party unity shows that most legislators in most democratic legislatures accept the benefits of joining and organizing legislative parties, and most cohere strongly with their copartisans. The most prominent outliers are the national legislatures of Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Estonia, Guatemala, Honduras, France (1945–1968), Italy, Japan, the United States, and Uruguay.

EXPLAINING VARYING LEVELS OF LEGISLATIVE PARTY UNITY

Comparative analyses show that the incidence of legislators sticking with their parties is related to their strategic environment, which includes the nature and structure of their national political and party system, electoral rules, and party leaders' control over access to and orderings on ballots. Simply being part of a parliamentary system, which ostensibly requires disciplined governing parties to facilitate enactment of their program, patronage, and sustaining the government in office, does not necessarily induce greater legislative party unity than in presidential or separated systems, which purportedly generate fewer incentives to value collective party goods or provide legislative support for the executive. Similarly, being part of a federal system does not necessarily depress unity levels, as studies on Australia, Canada, or Germany demonstrate. Much more critical is where, and to what extent, different political actors exercise veto power over decision-making processes and policy choices, and how executives in both parliamentary and presidential or separated systems encourage intraparty discipline through policy appeals, pork barrel, patronage, and other resources that are highly valued by legislators in pursuit of their goals.

Party level and situational factors also account for variations in unity levels both across and within systems. Some parties are less unified than others but neither the ideological complexion of a party, whether or not it is a majority or governing party or coalition, nor the size of a party or coalition's majority in the legislative chamber is apparently significant. However, highly salient issues to the electorate, and important to a party or coalition or different groups of constituents, tend to generate high levels of intraparty unity. When, as well as which, issues reach the agenda is also important.

See also *Parliamentary Government; Party Discipline.*

. . . . JOHN E. OWENS AND REUVEN Y. HAZAN

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Parliamentary Government

Parliamentary government refers to a specific system of governance found across many parts of the democratic world. Most stable democracies have parliamentary systems of government, including Australia, Canada, India, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and most Western European countries. The United Kingdom's Westminster model is an example of parliamentary government. Among newer democracies, parliamentary forms of government are dominant in southern, central, and Eastern Europe, and have been adopted by former British colonies such as Malaysia and Jamaica. While parliaments or similar types of legislative assemblies may function under authoritarian rule, they do not generally constitute the supreme governmental authority in nondemocratic regimes.

PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE

Parliamentary government has at least four distinguishing, interrelated features that set it apart from presidential forms of government. First, unscheduled general elections are held periodically, allowing voters in a parliamentary system to elect the legislature or parliament. They do not directly elect the government or core executive. Second, the government is then formed out of the dominant group in parliament, generally made up of one or more political parties, with the consent of the legislature. The resulting overlap in membership between parliament and the government means that there is no formal separation of powers between legislature and executive, as with presidential systems of government. Generally, a separate, independent head of state—often a constitutional monarch or

British prime minister Gordon Brown speaks in the House of Commons in 2009. The British parliamentary system, known as the Westminster model, possesses two chambers, the House of Commons and the House of Lords.

figurehead president with a limited set of ceremonial rather than substantive powers—formally approves the new government. Governments in parliamentary systems may either hold a majority or a minority of seats in the legislature. Minority governments are most likely in situations where no one party receives more than fifty percent of the seats in parliament, but conditions favorable for forming a coalition government are lacking. Governments in parliamentary systems may also be either single party or multiparty in nature, with multiparty or coalition governments common in countries where the electoral system tends to lead to more than two or three political parties represented in the parliament.

Third, the core executive in a parliamentary system, referred to as the cabinet, is plural in nature. This means that it is formed out of a designated number of parliamentary representatives belonging to the governing party or coalition, and consists of a prime minister or chancellor as head of government, and a number of other cabinet ministers who take on primary responsibility for specific policy areas. In parliamentary systems, the prime minister or chancellor has historically been considered the "first among equals" in the cabinet, rather than a supreme leader, although there is an observable tendency in a number of countries toward the "presidentialization" of parliamentary politics in which power is increasingly concentrated. Fourth, since there is an overlap in membership between the legislature and the executive, and government power rests on the consent of the legislature, parliamentary governments can be dismissed by a no-confidence vote on the part of the legislature. A dissolution of government is more likely if the governing party or coalition forms a minority government or has a slim and unstable majority in the parliament. Consequently, unlike presidential systems, there are no fixed election dates in parliamentary systems. However, most countries with parliamentary systems of government hold regular general elections every three to five years, depending on what is mandated by electoral legislation, with the possibility of early elections occurring in the case of government collapse.

Parliamentary systems may be unicameral or bicameral, meaning that they may have either one or two chambers of parliament. In many parliamentary systems, the upper house has comparatively less influence over legislation than the larger, lower house of parliament. Over time, there has been an increasing tendency in such parliamentary systems to abolish the upper house or limit its powers. New Zealand opted to abolish an already weak and ineffectual upper house in 1952, while the United Kingdom has recently moved to replace its traditionally hereditary House of Lords largely with politically appointees. In some federal countries with parliamentary systems, including Australia, Canada, Germany, and Malaysia, the upper house represents subnational units such as states or territories, much as is the case in the United States, and is thus less vulnerable to attempts to further limit its powers.

VARIATIONS AND CRITICISMS

An important variation on parliamentary government, usually referred to as semi-presidentialism, blends elements of parliamentarianism and presidentialism, creating a hybrid system in the process. Semi-presidential systems divide executive powers between the prime minister and cabinet on one hand, and a separately elected president on the other. This model is most closely associated with the constitution of the French Fifth Republic, adopted in 1958, with similar models also adopted in Portugal and Finland. The Republic of Ireland is also sometimes considered a case of semi-presidentialism after the French model, although none of these three European countries has gone as far as France in concentrating power in the hands of the president. A number of the new democracies in central and Eastern Europe have also opted for semi-presidentialism.

Critics of parliamentary government argue that since voters do not directly elect the political executive, there is a lack of direct democratic accountability, since it is usually possible for political parties or cabinets to replace their leaders, and hence the prime minister or chancellor, in such systems. Second, it is argued that since there is an overlap in membership between the legislative and executive branches of government, parliamentary systems are not based on the concept of a separation of powers and thus lack the strict system of checks and balances attributed to presidential systems. Advocates of parliamentary government counter this by arguing that this helps avoid political deadlock, which is frequently experienced in presidential systems. Third, critics argue that parliamentary government, since it lacks fixed electoral cycles and makes governments dependent on the confidence of the legislature, is prone to instability. However, regular government collapse ahead of scheduled general elections rarely happens in mature parliamentary democracies, and disintegrations often reflect upon a fragmented party system rather than the parliamentary mode of government itself. Some countries, most notably Italy, have reformed their electoral systems in order to reduce the number of parties represented in parliament, and thus the likelihood of instability. Advocates of parliamentary government also argue that the system is superior to presidentialism since, especially in situations of minority or coalition government, it encourages compromise between political parties or factions and increases policy flexibility as a result.

See Also *European Parliament; Legislative Systems; Ombudsman, Parliamentary; Parliamentary Democracy; Parliamentary Discipline; Parliamentary Immunity; Parliamentary Privilege; Parliamentary Rhetoric; Upper Chamber; Westminster Model.*

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Parliamentary Immunity

Parliamentary immunity is the privilege of legislators to be free from partial prosecution while they are in office. Either legislative action or a superior court ruling can usually revoke this privilege. The practice was developed to ensure the executive could not exert undue pressure on the legislature by targeting individual members for investigation or prosecution in order to persuade voting outcomes. The origins of parliamentary immunity date to efforts by the British House of Commons in the late 1300s to protect members from prosecution by the Crown.

Parliamentary immunity usually includes nonliability, sometimes known as nonaccountability, for speech, motions, votes, or other official acts while in office. Political systems in the United States, the United Kingdom, or the Netherlands, limit parliamentary immunity to speech and charges of libel and slander. However, some systems, such as France, Belgium, and Spain, offer inviolability or freedom from arrest or detention for criminal or civil matters without prior consent of the courts or legislature. Exceptions to inviolability exist if the parliamentarian is caught in the act of a crime. Critics of parliamentary immunity assert legislators often abuse the privilege and it elevates parliamentarians to a superior status from other citizens, placing them above the law they are intended to support and protect.

See also *Executive Privilege; Freedom of Speech; Parliamentary Discipline; Parliamentary Privilege.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

Parliamentary Privilege

Parliamentary privileges refer to a collection of rights and immunities held by legislatures and their members, meant to allow a legislature to function effectively without outside interference. Although these privileges have ancient origins, they remain controversial in their scope and application. At their heart, they pit the legislature against the executive and the judiciary, declaring certain areas of activity in which legislators claim full protection from interference from the other branches of government.

Some parliamentary privileges create immunities that shield against laws that would otherwise impose penalties for wrongdoing and responsibilities in the treatment of others; as such, these immunities run the risk of protecting corruption or oppression instead of protecting legislative independence. As well, many legislatures claim the power to punish those held in contempt of the legislature, including fines and imprisonment. The most controversial aspect of modern parliamentary privileges is whether they must yield to the courts' enforcement of the constitutional rights of citizens.

ORIGINS OF PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE

The origins of parliamentary privilege are usually traced from British history, with claims of immunity from arrest dating from at least the mid-fourteenth century. Some of the privileges, particularly punishing for contempt committed against either house, arise from the British parliament's historical origins as a court. The High Court of Parliament enjoys the powers of a superior court to control proceedings, compel attendance of witnesses, the production of records, and punish contempt. While these powers may have once had judicial origins, they are more practically thought of in the modern era as powers necessary for parliament to function effectively in its legislative capacity.

Freedom of speech is considered the bedrock for meaningful parliamentary debates in a democracy. For legislators to speak freely, they must be protected from defamation suits that might otherwise have a devastating chilling effect on forceful debates and questions. This privilege was embodied several centuries ago in the 1688 British Bill of Rights. Section 9 proclaims "that the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament." The legislatures in former colonies of Britain enjoy many of the same range of privileges as the British parliament. While still colonial legislatures, their privileges were considered to be only a subset of those of the Westminster system, although a few legislatures, such as Jamaica's, successfully challenged this distinction as early as the eighteenth century. Modern legislatures in former British colonies now enjoy a wide range of privileges. Some countries, such as Canada and Australia, have entrenched privileges equivalent to the British parliament's into their constitutions. A number have enumerated specific privileges, such as the freedom of speech, but not all the British equivalents into either constitutional or statutory law; for example, India protects free speech in parliament in Article 105 of their constitution but leaves other matters of privilege to statutory law. Free speech and a limited immunity from arrest are protected for members of both houses of the U.S. Congress by the debate clause of Article I of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that members of Congress "shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their Respective Houses, and in going to and from the same, and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place." Several jurisdictions, such as California, however, still rely on the common law inherited during the colonial era as a base for some privileges and immunities.

IMMUNITIES

A separate tradition of parliamentary privileges grew through the experience of the French Republic and spread to a number of other countries. A big difference between the French and British models of parliamentary privileges relates to the scope of immunities enjoyed by legislators. The French developed a concept of inviolability when the National Assembly declared in 1789 that "the person of each deputy shall be inviolable." In this tradition, criminal charges can only proceed against members with the permission of the National Assembly. Legislators have no immunity against criminal charges in the British model. Other countries have

adopted the French concept of inviolability to shield their legislators against criminal charges. At times, immunity from criminal prosecution can have very dubious applications. For example, the prime suspect in the 2006 murder of Russian exile Alexander Litvinenko in Britain won a seat in Russia's lower house in 2007 and consequently enjoyed immunity from any potential prosecution; in theory, however, the Duma can strip this immunity from one of its members.

In the British tradition, legislators do enjoy immunity from arrest in civil matters, but this is more theoretical than practical since civil arrests are virtually unheard of in the modern era. A more tangible immunity is the right not to be compelled to be a witness in a civil trial during a parliamentary session, and for a certain period before and after a session. Some jurisdictions extend this immunity to legislators who are lawyers in civil matters. In both instances, the notion is to ensure that legislators are not prevented from attending to state business because of vexatious lawsuits designed to tie up the legislators' time and attention. However, this immunity can also be misused. For example, a frequent tactic for delaying a trial for months in Texas is to enlist a lawyer who is also a member of the state legislature; in 2005, there were 319 continuances filed for this reason.

CHALLENGES FROM THE COURTS

The definition and enforcement of parliamentary privileges must inherently pit the courts against the legislatures in an ongoing contest for the final say of what immunities and special powers, beyond the ordinary law, should be enjoyed by legislatures. The most famous showdown occurred when the British House of Commons decided in 1836 to publish a report that an indecent book by John Stockdale was circulating in prisons; Stockdale then sued the printer of the report for libel. The 1839 *Stockdale v. Hansard* case held that no privilege protected this report's publication. Parliament replied with the Parliamentary Papers Act in 1840, which granted immunity to anything published under its authority.

The courts have a necessary role to play in defining the reach, although perhaps not the application, of constitutionally entrenched privileges. However, there is a more controversial role for the courts when they have to decide whether common law or statutory privileges conflict with the constitutional rights of others. The European Court of Human Rights heard a seminal case in 1991, when they ruled in *Demicoli v. Malta* that the Maltese parliament had infringed the rights of a magazine editor when it held him in contempt of parliament for an article he published. The court concluded that the legislature's decision to fine the individual essentially constituted a criminal charge and was, as a result, subject to the European Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, the Court held that Parliament had not acted as a fair and impartial tribunal to hear the case.

See also *British Political Thought; Legislative Systems.*

. . . . ANDREW HEARD

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Parliamentary Rhetoric

For the famous English journalist Walter Bagehot, parliamentary government was a "government by discussion." The rhetorical procedure of comparing alternative policies, or speaking *pro et contra,* is the key activity of the parliamentary deliberative assembly. The parliamentary procedure offers regular chances to persuade the adversaries or become persuaded by them, as argued by the Austrian scholar Josef Redlich in 1905. Free elections, the free mandate, and the free speech of parliamentarians form rhetorical conditions for the working of a parliament.

Classical rhetoric served as a model for parliamentary speaking. According to William Gerard Hamilton's maxims in *Parliamentary Logick* (1808), which was derived from the practices of the eighteenth-century English parliament, speakers employ "words [which] often bear more than one sense, and are true or false according to the sense which they are taken." A main persuasive strategy is the rhetorical redescription that revalues or devalues a concept: "Run a vice into a virtue; and vice versa," as noted by Quentin Skinner when discussing *paradiastole* in 1996.

The eighteenth-century Westminster master speakers—such as William Pitt the Younger, Edmund Burke, and Charles James Fox—carefully prepared their speeches in advance. Later, the parliamentarization of government altered the style of parliamentary speaking in the nineteenth century. Speeches became largely spontaneous and improvised interventions in the debate, mixed with replies to opponents and interruptions from the floor. In the course of the parliamentarization of government and the democratization of elections, the rhetorical competence of parliamentarians has advanced the professionalization of the occupation, as argued by Max Weber in *Politik als Beruf* in 1919.

Parliamentary eloquence forms both a rhetorical genre and an inherent part of parliamentary politics, especially in Britain and France, as discussed by Louis-Marie Cormenin (pseudonym Timon) in *Le livre des orateurs* (1844) and Earl Curzon in *Modern parliamentary eloquence* (1913). The National Assembly of the French Third Republic was the purest example of a *parlement de l'éloquence,* with some scholars, including Nicolas Roussellier in 1997, arguing that persuasive speaking in the

plenum regularly altered majorities and dissolved governments. Still, as illustrated by Thomas Mergel in 2002, the regimes were not necessarily unstable, but followed different political principles than purely electoral regimes, such as Weimar Germany.

In the postwar parliaments, governmental stability was more highly valued than lively debates. Parliaments were frequently seen as negotiating rather than deliberating assemblies. However, for example, due to the new interest in rhetoric and the increasing personalization of politics, the role of deliberation and debate has again grown in the practices of contemporary parliaments.

See also *British Political Thought; Deliberation; Deliberative Democracy; European Political Thought; French Political Thought; Parliamentary Government; Rhetoric.*

. . . . KARI PALONEN

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Parsons, Talcott

Talcott Parsons (1902–1979) is regarded as the most significant American sociologist during the 1950s and 1960s, and is considered the founder of the functionalist school of sociology. He viewed society as an organism where the parts of the social body have a role in maintaining its equilibrium.

Parsons was born in Colorado Springs, Colorado. He studied at Amherst College, receiving a BA in 1924, and he majored in biology. However, he decided to pursue graduate study in economics, studying at the London School of Economics from 1924 to 1925 and the Ruprecht Karl University of Heidelberg, from which he received his PhD in 1927.

Parsons then returned to the United States to teach economics, joining the faculty at Harvard University as an economics instructor in 1927, and remaining there until his retirement in 1974. He was elected president of the American Sociological Association in 1949 and served as secretary from 1960 to 1965.

In *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), Parsons asserts that social action is one of society's four *subsystems*—the others being culture, personality, and behavior. According to Parsons, the structural-functional approach to sociology is the way to develop a systematic theory of social action for the field as the four subsystems *interpenetrate* one another. In this book, Parsons also introduced the work of French sociologist Émile Durkheim and German social theorist Max Weber to American sociologists.

In 1951, Parsons published *The Social System,* where he presented his theory that society could best be understood by the researcher asking what the functions were of its social institutions, and understanding that these institutions contribute in some way to the maintenance of stability of the social system. This contrasted with structuralism, the idea that humans can discern the underlying structures behind the changing appearances of social reality. His later writings include *Structure and Process in Modern Societies* (1960), *Social Structure and Personality* (1964), *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives* (1966), *Sociological Theory and Modern Society* (1967), *Politics and Social Structure* (1969), *Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory* (1977), and *Action Theory and the Human Condition* (1978).

See also: *Durkheim, Émile; Functionalism; Structuralism; Weber, Max.*

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Partial Least Squares

Partial least squares (PLS) is a structural equations modeling (SEM) technique and, therefore, allows simultaneous testing of the measurement and structural models. In PLS, constructs can be modeled as reflective or formative. Formative constructs refer to situations in which the observed variables *cause* the latent variable and each of the corresponding indicators represents different dimensions of the construct. They are similar to indexes. In contrast, reflective constructs represent situations in which the observed variables *are caused* by the latent variable and indicators are unidimensional and correlated with each other. They are similar to scales. The following three equations illustrate a formal specification of the PLS model, as given by Jan-Bernd Lohmöller (1989):

$\eta = \beta_0 + B\eta + \upsilon$ (structural relation)

$y = \pi_0 + \Pi\eta + \varepsilon$ (measurement relation for reflective constructs)

$\eta = \omega_0 + \Omega'y + \delta$ (measurement relation for formative constructs)

Where:

η = latent variables (LVs)

β_0 = location parameters for LVs (structural relation)

B = path coefficients

υ = inner residuals (structural)

y = manifest variables (MVs)

π_0 = location parameters for MVs

Π = loading pattern coefficients

ε = outer residuals (measurement for reflective constructs)

ω_0 = location parameters for LVs (measurement)

Ω = weight coefficients

δ = validity residuals

PLS minimizes the differences between observed and calculated data values. It assesses how well the variance of the dependent variables is accounted for by their corresponding independent variables. In contrast to covariance-based structural equation modeling, PLS can be used for exploratory as well as confirmatory analysis. PLS can also work with small samples and is less sensitive to deviations from normality. In fact, some observed variables (or indicators) can be categorical. However, the model should be recursive (all arrows in one direction). PLS is also useful in situations where the researcher works with a complete population instead of a representative sample.

PLS does not have well-accepted overall model fit measures. Instead, the model should be evaluated by examining the size and significance of (1) loadings from reflective constructs to their indicators, (2) weights to formative constructs from their indicators, (3) standardized regression coefficients between constructs, and (4) coefficients of multiple determination (R-squares) for endogenous constructs (dependent variables).

Finally, there are several conditions in which PLS is preferred over covariance-based SEM. Some examples are: (1) when a strong theory about the phenomenon does not exist, (2) when the model will include some categorical manifest variables, (3) when there is some degree of unreliability in manifest variables, and (4) when data come from nonnormal or unknown distributions.

See also *Structural Equations Model (SEM); Qualitative Analysis; Qualitative Methodologies; Quantitative Analysis.*

. . . .   J. RAMON GIL-GARCIA

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Participant Observation

Participant observation is a qualitative research method that researchers use to collect data in group settings. Researchers are active participants in a group and become thoroughly immersed in group activities. In this way, the researcher gains an in-depth understanding of the group members, members' activities, and organizational nuances. Researchers interview group members informally, record and detail events that take place in the group or the organization under study, and then interpret their activities. An effective participant observer needs to gain an appreciation about individuals within the group, learn about the ways in which the group as a whole functions, and understand the organizational culture as well as any other factors that allow the observer to develop a relationship and become an accepted member of the group.

Through participant observation, researchers often gain insights missed when using other research methods. Participant observation has several advantages: it allows researcher to collect data more easily, and it may be less expensive than other methods of collecting data. On the other hand, it is also fraught with disadvantages. It may take a researcher an excessive amount of time to collect data, and the researcher may lose objectivity in collecting data, thereby possibly affecting the overall outcome of the process.

See also *Qualitative Analysis; Qualitative Methodologies.*

. . . .   JOSEPH C. SANTORA

Participatory Democracy

The notion of participatory democracy indicates a form of democratic theory that emphasizes the active involvement of citizens in all aspects of decisions that affect them. Much like advocates of direct democracy, those who favor participatory democracy reject the adequacy of contemporary forms of representative government as largely undemocratic as well as authoritative or centralized forms of social and cultural control. The ideas of participatory democracy drew on the work of twentieth-century theorists as diverse as C. Wright Mills, Hannah Arendt, John Dewey, and members of the Frankfurt school.

Precursors to modern understanding of participatory democracy might include ancient Greek notions of assembly democracy, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's conception of direct democracy. In the former, all citizens could actively participate and make decisions as an assembly. In the latter, all citizens met periodically in order to discuss, approve, or reject laws. However, both of these models of direct democracy depended on smaller communities, as well as the theoretical assumption of a community sharing a common republican ethos.

Modern theories of participatory democracy rose with the influence of the new left in the 1960s and 1970s. Advocates of participatory democracy are committed to individual rights as well as modernist ideals of self-realization through individual creativity and self-expression. Under this ideal, political solidarity is not achieved through a preexisting ethos but through the ongoing cooperation of like-minded individuals.

C. Wright Mills's observation of the decline of public life in America influenced new left founders such as Tom Hayden. The

Port Huron Statement of Students for a Democratic Society, the first statement of the new left, criticized American democracy as largely undemocratic. The new left charged that "representative democracy" in America was, in most respects, not very representative at all, and that it isolated individuals from both government and community. Proponents argued that U.S. democracy rested on the creation of a passive citizenship, despite the view of the United States as an international model for democratic states.

Political theorist Arnold Kaufman is generally credited with coining the term *participatory democracy* to describe forms of democracy in which each citizen has a direct responsibility for decisions. Kaufman's radical liberalism joins with developmental democracy in advancing the notion that democracy is to maximize the development of individual powers and individual responsibility in order to maximize social solidarity. This radically modernist version of developmental democracy defines theoretical participatory democracy. Drawing on the civil rights movement, it aimed to reestablish the action-oriented participation as the norm.

Ideas of economic democracy were central to the early vision of the new left. Later, theorists like Carol Pateman drew upon Rousseau and John Stuart Mill to elaborate a view of participatory democracy that stands in contrast to the competitive elitist conception of democracy, and an American postwar pluralism that ostensibly undermined popular participation. Participatory democracy in this view linked to extensive economic democracy and worker's control. The Praxis philosophers of Eastern Europe, who stressed worker's democratic participation in production, also informed this line of thought. Developing another line of thought, the American professor Jane Mansbridge contrasted adversarial character of Western parliamentary representation and elections with a model of unitary democracy, based on consensus building, that employs direct and informal methods of decision making.

Elements of participatory democracy have also been an important component of environmentalist political theory. Green parties often laud grassroots democracy, which stresses participation and small-scale organization. Many ecological political theorists— such as Murray Bookchin, Robert Paelke, and Douglas Torgerson—have been advocates of participatory democracy.

Critics of participatory democracy question its viability in larger, more complex societies, and express skepticism about the capacity and commitment of ordinary citizens to sustain extensive participation. Many U.S. democratic theorists reject populism or popular democratic theory. Notable alternatives include pluralists, who favor balancing large interest groups; rational choice theorists, who argue that politics of the general will are impossible; and neoconservatives, who see participatory democracy as making excessive and unwieldy demands on the political system.

See also *Bookchin, Murray; Direct Democracy; Greek Democracy, Classical; New Left; Participatory Democracy.*

. . . . BRIAN CATERINO

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Party and Social Structure

Political parties are the main interlocutors between citizens and government in all modern democracies, making them a central concern for political scientists. In the first half of the twentieth century, the study of the relationship between society and political parties was minimal, given the prevailing view of parties as reflections of negative factionalism or the oligarchic expression of self-interested elites. Following World War II (1939–1945), the study of parties was taken more seriously and parties were viewed through a less negative and more scientific lens. Parties became recognized as essential agents of representation that were not only functional, but also essential to the operation of democracy.

The modern study of the relationship between society and parties began with the evolving notion that parties emerged organically from deeper social divisions in society. Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan's work on social cleavages is the most classic and concise elaboration of this idea. They argue that social divisions generated by early stages of national development in Europe crystallized in the form of political parties. The national revolutions that occurred with the foundation of nation-states and the industrial revolution were central to creating the social divisions that eventually underwrote

European party systems. Furthermore, they went on to assert that the party reflections of these social divisions remain beyond the existence of the social divisions themselves.

Other scholars questioned the centrality of social cleavages in explaining the emergence of parties and criticized Lipset and Rokkan's idea that cleavages become "frozen." Some contended that cleavage literature ignored the possibility that political parties were actually independent variables that shaped the preferences of the electorate, others pointed to a good deal of electoral volatility, undermining the argument for the persistent of older cleavages, while still others contended that the freezing argument left theorists unable to explain party change. Nonetheless, cleavage analysis left a long-term imprint on the study of parties, and was employed by scholars who later analyzed value change, democratic transitions, and the existence of distinct cleavages in the developing world.

Electoral realignments in the United States and increasing volatility in Western European party systems led to a shift in the study of the society-party relations, with an increasing focus on value change. Ronald Inglehart developed a much used dichotomy that distinguished materialist from postmaterialist values, arguing that generational change combined with growing affluence led to changes in the values of the citizenry, translating into different types of divisions that could explain party change. While materialists tended to be concerned with the traditional left-right ideology and the role of the state, postmaterialists were more concerned with noneconomic social issues like the environment, abortion rights, and issues of equality of gender and sexual orientation.

While debates rage as to whether parties will continue to perform their roles as the main connections between the governed and the governing, there is a general consensus that while forms of representation are in flux, parties continue to be the main agents of democratic representation. Further, while the basic cleavages underlying what are customarily considered the right and left are subject to debate, the idea that social and value differences translate into different types of party systems remains.

See also *Agenda Control; One-party Systems; Realignment, Partisan; Party Membership; Party Systems, Comparative.*

. . . .   PETER M. SIAVELIS

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Party Discipline

Party discipline is an essential feature of modern democracy and government, and refers to the efforts parties exercise in monitoring their members—keeping them as a cohesive group rather than as disparate individuals. Party discipline reinforces party loyalty among members who may otherwise be capable of independent action and be tempted to act individually. While party discipline may also describe a given party's disciplinary efforts in extraparliamentary contexts or mere intraparty decision making—basically with regard to administrative sanctions for actions harming the party—it most commonly refers to the mechanisms involved in maintaining party cohesion in a parliamentary context. More precisely, it relates to the way and manner party leaders exercise control over the legislative members of a party in order to guarantee unified voting in parliament by party affiliation.

INVOKING AND UPHOLDING PARTY DISCIPLINE

There are various methods for parties to invoke party discipline. By way of sanction, these include, for example, the disciplining effect of whips or other officers responsible for keeping party members informed and requesting them to toe the party line, sometimes under threat of expulsion from the party organization or denial of speaking or question time. Other means to uphold party discipline known to all parliamentary systems include the denial of promotions, the cutting of resources or, ultimately, the withdrawing of support in the preselection of the seat at the next election and expulsion from the party.

In addition, there are also more positive reasons for conforming to party discipline; these stem from either the individual party legislative member's interest in policy influence; career advancement; and reelection, an interest that the representative sees as intrinsically tied to the party's need for cohesion (as a necessary condition for electoral success); or a strong belief in norms of intraparty solidarity, loyalty, and teamwork. There are thus two main approaches to explain party discipline: (1) the rational institutional approach highlights the self-interested nature of an individual's option to conform to the party line arising out of organizational and institutional constraints and incentives, and (2) the behavioral or sociological approach emphasizes norms and roles (e.g., solidarity) as responsible for legislators acting in unison. The former is more closely linked to Westminster parliamentary systems where government is much more dependent on legislative voting and, consequently, party discipline tends to be "strong," while the latter is better suited to explain party discipline and unity in congressional and presidential systems with a more autonomous executive where party discipline is "weak." The evolution of disciplined parties in the United Kingdom, for example, is largely the result of what Walter Bagehot labeled the "efficient secret" of the English constitution: to affect legislative action, parliamentarians had to unite themselves to one or other of the major parties with a chance to form the government; their incentive

was the cabinet's control over the legislative agenda of parliament. In contrast, the evolution of parties in the United States is often referred to as a *norms-based outlier* in a deliberately antipartisan environment, even though authors such as John Aldrich show how party loyalty and discipline developed as a rational response to instability in voting, mass mobilization, and organizational demands.

THE RATIONALE FOR PARTY DISCIPLINE

Maintaining party cohesion through party discipline is seen, within certain limits, as a necessary condition for a smooth functioning of parliamentary systems. As Shaun Bowler, David Farrell, and Richard Katz argue:

> Cohesion and discipline matter in the daily running of parliaments. The maintenance of a cohesive voting bloc inside a legislative body is a crucially important feature of parliamentary life. Without the existence of a readily identifiable bloc of governing politicians, the accountability of the executive to both legislature and voters fall flat. It can be seen, then, as a necessary condition for the existence of responsible party government.

However, tightened or even legally established party control over elected representatives can be dangerous for electoral accountability. It also potentially undermines a key principle of parliamentary democracy and competitiveness: the latent threat to and control of the government by the capability of elected representatives to express dissent. Thus, many see party discipline as distorting the Burkean notion of a parliamentarian's independence and freedom of conscience.

The lack of party discipline in countries such as India or postcommunist Poland has brought legislatures to the brink of collapse and in some cases triggered the introduction of antidefection laws. In contrast, many see the absolute party discipline required from African National Congress (ANC) members in South Africa as contradicting the principle of electoral accountability and executive oversight.

FREE VERSUS IMPERATIVE MANDATES

The most fundamental way to conceptualize the debate over whether party discipline is a necessary condition for stable and responsible party government or whether it is a distortion of the elected representative's free will relates to the question of accountability: To whom is a parliamentarian primarily responsible? To whom does the seat of an elected candidate "belong"? In all parliamentary systems, there is a tension between multiple responsibilities of the sitting member of parliament (MP). The tension splits between responsibility to the voters, to the party, to the MP's conscience, and the so-called common good.

The basic principle in representative democracy trying to resolve this tension is the decision for or against giving an elected candidate a *free mandate* or an *imperative mandate*. In the case of a free mandate, representatives are not bound by any mandate whatsoever, whether originating from the electorate or from the party. They are free to exercise the mandate in the national interest and are bound only by their conscience. In contrast, under an imperative mandate, representatives are bound by the mandate they receive from the electorate and can thus be forced to resign if they do not act in accord with the party that nominated them for election to the legislature.

PARTY DISCIPLINE AND THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

The legitimation for imposing an imperative mandate or granting a free mandate to a legislator ties to the prevailing electoral system. In a list system of proportional representation, parties are elected, rather than individual candidates. Consequently, it is the party that is accountable to the electorate and "owns" the seat and not the individual candidate, who is considered a mere unit on a party list. In contrast, a constituency system puts more weight on the representative's individual accountability to the electorate or constituency; this justifies to the representative's right to abandon the party line whenever if deemed in the interest of individual accountability. The electoral formula prevailing in a given system is an additional factor impacting whether campaigning takes place on a personal rather than party reputation.

John Carey and Matthew Shugart rank electoral systems from most party centered to most candidate centered. They link this to the control-party leaders exercise over access to their party's label (open vs. closed lists); the extent of vote pooling; the type of vote (single partisan, multiple, or single subpartisan vote); and district magnitude. Accordingly, a closed-list system, where votes are pooled across the whole party and voters cast a single vote for one party, enhances personal rather than party-based vote seeking.

See also *Parliamentary Discipline.*

. . . . CLEMENS SPIESS

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Party Finance

Party finance refers to all funds spent in order to influence the outcome of party competition, be funds expended on individual election campaigns for any public office, or on the maintenance of party organizations, nationally and in the field. This includes all funds raised from individual citizens, interested money (e.g., businesses or trade unions), public subsidies or—occasionally even—corrupt exchanges. The term *campaign funds*—preferred by many American authors—is too

narrow for cross-national analysis. Alexander Heard's 1960 text, *The Costs of Democracy,* highlights the expense side of the subject. Many scholars have also studied the notion of *political financing*. In particular, Arnold Heidenheimer, Khayyam Paltiel, Herbert Alexander, and Arthur Gunlicks advanced cross-national comparisons.

POLITICAL SPENDING

The concept of political party helps to identify the manifold orbit of political competitors, and party finance offers a term to summarize or aggregate all items of expenditures on political competition. Although most dimensions of political spending (e.g., a variety of campaigns, a party organization with national headquarters and local chapters) are common to all democracies, detailed features are quite specific. The mix of voluntary party workers and paid staff, expenses for offices, and public relations and communication vary considerably and data are rather patchy.

Among the democracies for which the costs of political competition can be established, there is a considerable spread of per capita spending totals for party competition. Austria, Israel, Italy, Japan, and Mexico spend about ten times as much as Australia, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, as illustrated by Karl-Heinz Nassmacher in *The Funding of Party Competition*. Many democracies operate at an intermediate level of political spending, including Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Most countries have not changed their level of political spending in about five decades.

The earlier a democratic government was established, and the more a country can afford economically, the less likely it is to spend much on its democracy. Party activity in (majoritarian) Anglo-Saxon style democracies is less expensive than it is in the multiparty (consensus) democracies of continental Western Europe (and in non-Western countries). Generous government expenses and government regulation of the economy go along with higher party spending.

Many observers believe that paid TV advertising, new campaign technology, or a growing party apparatus with full-time staff have caused unavoidable financial needs. Per capita expenses for some decades, however, reveal that current levels of political spending fall short of earlier peaks. Competing parties may sink lots of money into new items just because they can afford to do so—due to citizens' generosity, public subsidies, or corrupt exchanges.

PARTY REVENUE

Popular financing can be an important source of political revenue, but it is not a constant and reliable one. Just like voters, party members and small donors are volatile sorts of citizens. Grassroots revenue will never suffice to cover all costs of politics. However, this source of funding can supply large amounts if parties and candidates put in some organizational effort. Various alleys have been explored successfully to raise voluntary contributions from individuals: recruiting party members, direct mail drives, neighborhood solicitation, lotteries, and social events at the local level.

The free flow of money into political competition is both a hazard and a necessity for democratic politics. The financial support of policies, politicians, and parties is an expression of economic and political freedom. However, as plutocratic financing, influence peddling, and corrupt exchanges happen, the flow of political funds needs transparency. In most democracies, cash contributions from trade unions, which are rare in many countries, as well as contributions from the business community (i.e., "corporate donations") have declined and are widely substituted by public funding. Public disincentives to discourage the flow of interested money into political competition (e.g., disclosure, limits, and bans) reinforce this trend. However, there are still relevant cases of political graft, among them the abuse of public resources for partisan purposes and the extortion of private business.

In general, public subsidies are neither a mere stopgap nor an all-purpose solution to funding problems. Some countries apply rules to enforce the legitimacy of this source of political revenue, especially the matching principle, while others issue a specified responsibility for transparency. Very few modern democracies forgo state aid as a means of political funding. Party organizations, caucuses, or candidates receive public support. There is indirect funding (i.e., subsidies-in-kind and tax benefits) as well as cash aid. If subsidies are allocated, access needs to be fair and distribution takes party size into account. Taxpayers in Europe and non-Western democracies provide higher amounts toward party activity than Anglo-Saxon countries. Many party headquarters cover between 40 percent and 60 percent of their annual budget via public grants.

IMPACTS

If money is a means to succeed in political competition, the candidate who, or party which, is able to spend the most should be the winner—at least most of the time. However, empirical data does not consistently support this plausible hypothesis. The same applies to the more sophisticated theory that public subsidies lead to an ossification of the party system. New parties have entered the party system in many democracies. Established parties have lost and gained electoral support with and without state aid. An arrested distribution of power between parties of government and parties of opposition has occurred solely in Japan, but not in Austria, Germany, Israel, Spain, or Sweden—which, due to a high level and long duration of public subsidies, are the likeliest candidates for such suspicion.

Traditional sources of political revenue such as membership dues and small donations provide linkage between parties, candidates, and their local supporters. Public subsidies are expected to interrupt these links. The most important evidence on both sources of income is that public subsidies have not destroyed grassroots linkage across the board. Available data suggests that the present situation is more mixed than a one-dimensional cause-and-effect relationship suggests.

In general, there is a shift of party activity toward professional operation at the center and in the field. As a consequence, the distribution of power within party organizations

will continue to move toward all units that wield the purse strings, especially those able to raise additional funds—be it from individual supporters, corporate donors, public funds, corrupt exchanges, or by assessment of officeholders.

See also *Campaign Finance; Political Parties.*

. . . .   KARL-HEINZ NASSMACHER

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Party Identification

Party identification is the psychological allegiance by a voter to a political party. While a debate continues to rage over how stable party identification is, most political scientists continue to conceptualize it as a long-term commitment, opposed to shorter-term factors such as candidate and *retrospective evaluations*. Retrospective evaluations are subjective judgments by voters on the performance by a party or officeholder in power. Common subjects for retrospective evaluations include the economy, war, and scandal. In the conventional view, first expounded at the University of Michigan in the 1950s and 1960s (most famously in *The American Voter*), citizens form their allegiances in young adulthood, and then mostly remain loyal to their party. The pattern of *political generations* reflects this, where cohorts may reflect their era of political socialization for their entire lifetime. For example, in the United States, the "New Deal generation" who grew up under Franklin Roosevelt remained heavily Democratic throughout their lifespan, while the "Reagan generation" that came of age in the 1980s remains the most Republican age-group in the electorate.

More recently, Morris Fiorina and other scholars have offered a competing, *retrospective perspective* to explain party identification as a "running tally" of experiences with Democrats and Republicans. This school is more open to the possibility of change over time. There is some evidence from recent political history to support the retrospective view. For example, Republican Party identification fell during the unpopular impeachment of Bill Clinton, soared with George W. Bush's popularity after 9/11, and fell again during George W. Bush's second term.

However, all scholars of political behavior unite in their belief in the centrality of party identification. It is the single strongest predictor of vote choice. For example, in both the 2000 and 2004 U.S. presidential elections, more than 90 percent of self-identified Republicans and Democrats voted for their party's presidential nominees. It serves, then, as a central organizing principle in voters' understanding of the political world, telling them who the "good guys" and "bad guys" are, and helping them decide which information to accept and which to reject. Party leaders give *cues* to voters as to what the "correct" views are for Democrats or Republicans. Especially in this polarized era, Democrats and Republicans differ systematically in their assessments of the political world, including the most basic facts.

Party identification is generally measured along the seven-point scale. This is derived from a two-stage series of questions. First, respondents are asked whether they normally think of themselves as Democrats, Republicans, or none of these. (Studies have shown that very few citizens identify with a minor party.) Those who identify with one of the major political parties are asked whether they identify strongly or weakly. *Strong partisans* almost never desert their party. Those who do not identify with a party are asked whether they "lean" towards one party or the other. The *leaners* behave much like *weak partisans*, usually supporting their party, but not as consistently as strong partisans. Leaners behave so much like party identifiers that they are often called *closet partisans*.

Hence, the seven-point scale includes:

Strong Democrat

Weak Democrat

Democrat-leaning Independent

Pure Independent

Republican-leaning Independent

Weak Republican

Strong Republican

Citizens who identify with a political party consistently vote and otherwise participate in politics at a higher rate than do independents. They tend to be more interested in politics, more informed about current events, and more likely to hold coherent views on a variety of issues.

The Michigan school placed party identification at the heart of U.S. politics, downplaying the role of ideology and personality. Indeed, early studies of political behavior found exceedingly low levels of political knowledge among voters, little impact from media exposure, and almost no capacity for issue-based voting, let alone ideological constraint. Accordingly, the Michigan researchers adopted a rather nonideological notion of party identification, seeing it as an almost ascriptive identity usually acquired through parental socialization. While this fit the placid politics of the 1950s well, it failed to account for ideological turmoil of the 1960s and

1970s, which also saw a significant decline in party allegiance. By 1976, in *The Changing American Voter*, Norman Nie, Sidney Verba, and John Petrocikthe were challenging the Michigan model, instead emphasizing the role of ideology, candidate evaluations, and retrospective voting.

More recently, there has been a revival of interest in party identification, both due to developments in the academy and in the political world. Bruce Keith and colleagues show, in *The Myth of the Independent Voter,* that many leaners are indeed closet partisans, not behaving like the fickle "ticket splitters" they were assumed to be. The 1980s and 1990s saw a revival of partisan voting, this time with a more ideological cast; 2000 and 2004 saw the highest levels of party loyalty on record. Larry Bartels and Marc Hetherington, among others, have demonstrated that partisans have become more loyal and that party identification is based more on perceived ideological differences than it once was. There is even some evidence that the percentage of strong partisans has risen and the number of pure independents has fallen.

While many of the conclusions of *The American Voter* have come under criticism in recent years, its essential insights about the importance of party identification remain intact. Party identification may be the single most important opinion held by American voters, driving them to the polls and shaping the decisions they make, structuring their worldviews and helping them understand the political universe.

See also *Political Parties; Voting Behavior.*

. . . .   RICHARD SKINNER

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Party Law

Party law, in one sense, refers to governmental regulations concerning the organization, operation, and activities of a nation's political parties. A contrasting definition sees party law as internal rules formulated by individual political parties to govern themselves. As nations have increasingly regulated political parties, scholars have increasingly focused on the legal aspect of party law.

PARTY LAW AS AN EMERGENT FIELD

Systematic cross-national study of how governments regulate political parties through legal instruments is relatively new to political science. The nineteen-volume *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1968) did not list party law in its index, nor did the nine-volume *Handbook of Political Science* (1975). When studied at all, party law was cited to explain how a country's legal framework uniquely shaped its party politics. Scholars began to study how legal frameworks could affect party systems in general after the mid-1980s, when the world was swept by a wave of democratization.

In the 1990s, cross-national analyses of party law appeared in works by Wolfgang Müller, F. Leslie Seidle, and Dan Avnon and in publications by U.S. governmental agencies charged with aiding democracy abroad, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). By the 2000s, the definition of party law as government regulation occurred in writings by Richard Katz and Kenneth Janda, and cross-national surveys of government regulations of party activities also emerged. By 2006, the one-volume *Handbook of Party Politics* accorded party law a chapter of its own.

INSTRUMENTS OF PARTY LAW

Nations govern political parties through various legal instruments. Some nations have comprehensive statutes—such as Germany's law on political parties and Jordan's political parties law—that prescribe how parties must organize and operate. Often these statutes are formally or informally known as the nation's party law. When used as a proper noun, "Party Law" is narrower than party law as a common noun embracing the entire body of legal instruments governing party politics that derives from a nation's Party Law (if it has one) and from legislative statutes, administrative rulings, court decisions, or even national constitutions.

Sometimes nations enact separate statutes to govern elections, campaigns, and political finance. Codified *electoral, campaign,* and *political finance laws* are often studied separately from party law, but they typically regulate party politics and thus overlap with party law. A great deal of party law derives from electoral laws—especially legislation that specifies how parties get on the ballot and how votes are counted for election. A considerable overlap also occurs between party law and campaign finance laws—especially limitations on how parties can raise and spend money. Less overlap occurs between party law and campaign laws. Rules specifying how individual candidates can campaign lie outside party law—but not rules about parties' conduct in election campaigns.

Among the various sources of party law, national constitutions deserve special discussion. Scholars always allowed that national court rulings, by citing constitutional principles, shaped party politics, but they downplayed the relevance of constitutions themselves as a direct source of party law. Later research found that constitutions often contain highly detailed provisions concerning political parties—especially constitutions of developing countries.

MODELS OF PARTY REGULATION

Some scholars developed models of party regulations to encapsulate the legal frameworks that govern political parties across nations. These models are idealized conceptions; nations may not follow any one of them exactly in making party law, and specific laws may fit different regulatory policies. One model uses criteria of *regulatory intensity* (from minimalist to maximalist) plus both quantitative controls and qualitative controls to reflect formal requirements and ideological compatibility. Another model contends that nations tend to follow policies that proscribe, permit, promote, protect, or prescribe parties and party activities. Nations that proscribe parties forbid parties by law from operating; nations that permit parties allow them to operate freely; nations that promote parties actively support them; nations that protect parties favor certain ones over others; and nations that prescribe for parties seek to control how they operate.

It is easy to identify nations, often in the Middle East, that proscribe or forbid parties. Yet it is difficult to summarize how well nations fit the other five models. One-party states, of course, protect the ruling party by law, but some democratic nations also protect certain parties. For example, a framework of state laws in the United States protects its two major parties. Many democratic nations promote parties by subsidizing them or having electoral laws that encourage multiple parties. Increasingly, nations with little experience with competitive party politics have taken to prescribe, in great detail, how their parties must organize and operate. Often, these prescriptions are enshrined in national constitutions, making them very difficult to change. When applied to emerging democracies, the prescription model of regulation can have a chilling effect on party politics.

REGULATING VERSUS ENGINEERING PARTY SYSTEMS

Party laws in Germany and Jordan illustrate two purposes of party law: *regulating* party systems versus *engineering* them. Regulating a party system through party law comes after observing the system in operation—thus party law becomes responsive, or reactive. Engineering a party system through party law brings the system into being—thus party law is anticipatory or proactive. Party law can produce unanticipated or undesirable consequences in either instance, but democratically dysfunctional outcomes are more likely when engineering a system.

The comprehensive and prescriptive German Party Law was enacted in 1967 after five elections (1949, 1953, 1957, 1961, and 1965). Based on more than thirty-five years of party politics, it qualifies as regulating parties informed by feedback, and Germany has maintained its competitive party system since. The comparably detailed and prescriptive Jordanian Party Law was enacted in 1992, when legal parties did not exist and had not existed since King Hussein banned them in 1957. When Jordan's first multiparty election since 1956 was held in 1993, more than twenty parties registered under the law's stringent requirements. However, only 18 percent of the candidates explicitly represented parties, and parties only won small minorities in the 1997 and 2003 elections. Nevertheless, the law seemed to satisfy the Hussein regime. The Jordanian law did not seek to regulate political parties as much as to engineer an acceptable party system. Having detailed party law does not ensure having competitive party politics.

See also *Political Parties.*

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Party Membership

Early cadre or elite political parties included members of legislative chambers who met to choose leaders, participate in the organization and management of the chamber, and perhaps to coordinate or procure resources for their

electoral campaigns. With the expansion of the right to vote, the attendant need for extensive campaign organizations, and particularly the rise of parties of extraparliamentary origin, the concept of party membership is now applied less to elected officials (who remain members of party caucuses or other similar organizations, but who are more often identified simply as "Social Democrats" or "Conservatives") than to those who have joined an extragovernmental organization.

In most countries, party membership is acquired in the same way that membership is acquired in other voluntary organizations: the would-be member applies for admission, is accepted, and accepts both the rights and obligations of the party. Most common among the obligations is the payment of a membership fee, but others (frequently ignored) may include a number of hours of party work or public support of the party's nominees. Most common among the rights of membership is the right to participate, either directly or through internally elected representatives, in such party decisions as the selection of candidates, the choice of party leaders, and the formulation of the party manifesto. In many cases, formal party membership—often of some specified duration—is a prerequisite to nomination as a party candidate for public office. For example, the rules of the major Australian parties require that anyone seeking a party's nomination for office must have been a paid-up member for between six and twelve months (depending on the party).

In addition to individual members, some parties also have corporate or affiliated members—those who are regarded as members of the party by virtue of their membership in a related organization, for example a trade union affiliated with a Social Democratic Party. In some cases, members of the affiliated organization must *contract in* before they are considered party members, while in others they are given the opportunity to *contract out*. While affiliated members may have the same rights within the party as individual members, often they are represented by their organization's leaders rather than participating in party governance directly.

Parties in the United States are exceptional in that they are often surrounded by *party clubs*, which, while they do have formal membership, are not formally part of the party itself. For example, the Central Baltimore County Democratic Club is a membership organization; it has *Democratic* in its name and is made up of Democratic Party supporters; but, legally it is not part of the Democratic Party of Maryland. Rather, U.S. party membership has been identified with electoral support and institutionalized in state-run systems of partisan registration. Party registrants are different from members, however, in that they do not have any obligations to the party, and the party cannot refuse their membership or expel them. In states without partisan registration, the idea of membership is even more vacuous, given that the quintessential party decision, candidate selection, is made by primary elections in which any registered voter can participate. In a number of cases, parties outside of the United States are adopting more American-like practices (e.g., the use of party-organized primaries to choose candidates) and allowing individuals who are not formal members to participate, thus blurring the distinction between members and supporters.

Despite the importance of party membership to the self-conception of many parties and the sometimes considerable efforts made to boost membership, levels of membership generally are both low and declining. At the end of the 1990s, on average less than 5 percent of the electorates of twenty European countries were party members, ranging from a high of 17.7 percent in Austria (the only country in which the figure was as high as 10 percent), to under 1.2 percent in Poland. Ten of the twenty countries showed figures under 4 percent. Moreover, in fifteen of the countries, the proportion of the electorate who were party members had declined over the previous two decades (or less in the case of the new democracies), and in many cases this decline may be better described as a collapse, with the median case showing a decline of more than 25 percent in the raw number of members, even as the pool of individuals eligible to become members increased.

See also *Participatory Democracy; Party and Social Structure; Party Discipline; Party Identification; Party Systems, Comparative; Political Participation; Political Parties; Politics.*

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Party Organization

Political parties are inevitable in representative democracies, and both their organization and activities influence the functioning of democracy. Organizations are not formally required for parties to present candidates at elections for public offices, their main assignment, but in practice, all parties have some kind of organization. However, the sizes, structures, degrees of institutionalization, and various other characteristics of these differ. Organizational characteristics vary over time, among countries, and among parties due to—among other factors—differences in political systems, regulation of party finance, electoral systems, party size, party leadership, and the ideological base of parties.

THREE FACES OF PARTIES

Party organizations are not unitary actors, but make up a political system in themselves. Richard Katz and Peter Mair distinguish between three faces of a party. First, there is the party on

the ground, that is, the party as voluntary membership organization. Second, there is the party in public office, or the party as governing (or opposing) organization. Electing representatives to public offices is, according to most party definitions as well as parties in practice, the essence of what parties do. When assessing the party organization as a governing organization, focus is on the party's representatives holding public office, for example the parliamentary groups. Third, there is the party in central office, that is, the party as bureaucratic organization comprised of staff such as secretaries, personal assistants, policy advisers, economists, journalists, and other communication and marketing specialists. In general, party headquarters grow, hence contributing to party professionalization.

MULTILEVEL ORGANIZATIONS

The relationship between and within the party on the ground, party in public office, and party bureaucracy may be structured in several ways. The formal structure of the party is laid out in party statutes. In many parties, the national congress is the highest authority while the national executive takes care of organizational matters between congresses. At the most local level, branches hold meetings and campaign. Party organizations are multilevel organizations conducting party activity at several levels such as the local, regional, national, and maybe even the international, as seen within the European Union (EU). The territorial pervasiveness of party organizations is, among other things, affected by the ideological stand and size of the party. Smaller parties might not be able to establish an organization or fight elections across the nation to the same extent as larger parties.

The competencies and assignments of the various levels of the party organizations vary; party organizations vary in the degree of decentralization or centralization of internal decision-making procedures. In some parties, the party leadership makes all the important decisions, while in other parties members have a say on everything. Important decisions and tasks include the selection, or election, of party leader or leadership and candidates for elections to public offices; the formulation of party platforms, election manifestos, and party statutes; and campaigning for public offices at the various levels of government.

PARTY TYPES

Parties and party organizations thus vary in their characteristics, and this variation influenced the development of various party models or party types. Some types are "ideal types" developed on the basis of, for example, party goals or genetic origin, whereas other types are more or less successful attempts to sum up the major empirical characteristics of parties and their organizations at a particular time. Naming these various party types emphasizes different aspects of party organizations. However, the plethora of types may be summed into fewer groups with common if not completely identical, characteristics in terms of organization.

Elite or cadre parties, common in the nineteenth century with limited franchise and a dominance of bourgeois parties, include a group of notables or selected citizens and no permanent organization. Mass parties are formal, permanent organizations, characterized by citizen mobilization and influential party membership. Classic mass parties are the class-based labor parties of the twentieth century. Catch-all or professional-electoral parties have dominant party leadership and professionalization of both the campaign efforts and the party organization. Cartel parties are weakly anchored among citizens and strongly anchored in the state—blurring the distinction between members and supporters—and depend on public financial support for the party organization. Business-firm parties, franchise organizations, and entrepreneurial parties create ad hoc organizations, or political entrepreneurs overtake the organization for the purpose of gaining election (e.g., Canadian parties and Forza Italia).

While many of these party types are unclear on the exact empirical parameters to assess characteristics and changes in parties, they provide types to summarize the organizational variety of party organizations. The party types thus inspire further theoretical and empirical studies of the character and development of party organizations.

THE THESIS OF PARTY DECLINE

The thesis of party decline is a recurrent theme within party research, and some of this research focuses on the organizations and vitality of parties. However, analyses of party organizations allowing for the diversity of party types indicate that party organizations are changing rather than declining. How parties change depends primarily, but not only, on party ideology, leadership, and available resources such as members and money. Parties with access to greater financial resources accommodate for declining membership figures by professionalizing the party bureaucracy and engaging in more capital-intensive campaigns. Organizational adaptation and change counteract the tendency to decline when organizational forms become less adequate due to societal changes and changes within parties themselves.

DEMOCRATIC IMPLICATIONS

To what extent party organization is a democratic necessity depends on the normative concept of democracy on which the party and the political system is based. Organizations assist parties in the assignments, or functions, allocated to them either formally (e.g., in party law as in Germany) or in practice (e.g., due to the electoral system); functions may also emerge from the party's own ideology. Parties that enroll members, and allow them to elect the party leader and candidates for public offices and decide on the party manifesto, provide a channel of participation and hence support the participatory aspects of representative democracy. However, parties that do not seriously enroll members, but emphasize campaigning and vote structuring, support the competitive aspects of representative democracy. In sum, the extent to which party organizations contribute to various aspects of representative democracy varies not only among parties but also among political systems.

See also *Political Parties.*

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Party Systems, Comparative

A party system is defined as the collectivity of political parties, which participate in governing a democratic state. Thus, when studying comparative party systems, the system as a whole and its effects on society are analyzed rather than the individual parties that comprise the party system. Differences in party systems can have major consequences for a democratic state, as many deficiencies found within democracies trace to the way that the party system and the parties within it function.

DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH IN COMPARATIVE PARTY SYSTEMS

Debates over the structure of party systems date back to nineteenth-century England. Walter Bagehot was one of the first to voice concern that proportional electoral systems would increase political polarization, fragmenting society into extreme and opposing views. However, Bagehot's analysis was not comparative, as it was based only on England, and comparative studies began in the twentieth century. Classical works from an institutionalist perspective that emerged in the 1940s and 1950s include Ferdinand Hermens's *Democracy or Anarchy? A Study of Proportional Representation* and Maurice

Duverger's *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. Both authors argued that the primary factor in shaping a party systems was the nation's electoral system.

In the 1960s, Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan took another stance and argued traditional cleavages had shaped party systems in Western Europe. These systems were frozen along these lines. With the rise of behavioralism, political culture and attitudes were recognized as important explanatory factors. Party systems subsequently moved to the center of attention again in political science, during the 1980s and 1990s, as part of broader research on democratic transition and democratization. To conduct this research, political scientists developed typologies and a number of formulas to measure and compare different aspects of party systems.

MEASURING AND DESCRIBING PARTY SYSTEMS

For analytical purposes, party systems are often grouped in typologies. Giovanni Sartori proposes the best-known typology and includes seven types: (1) one-party (2) hegemonic (3) predominant (4) two-party (5) moderate pluralism (6) polarized pluralism and (7) atomized systems. Klaus von Beyme further subdivides this typology, distinguishing between moderate pluralism with coalitions, without coalitions, or those with grand coalitions or polarized pluralist systems with and without a center capable of governing. For each type of party system, three dimensions describe and distinguish a system from one another and compare them: fragmentation, polarization, and institutionalization.

FRAGMENTATION

Fragmentation refers to how splintered a party system is, and is measured by the number of individual parties which exist within a system. This is an important indicator of a state's stability and system functionality, since a highly fragmented party system comprised of numerous parties may inhibit the development of a stable government. Fragmentation can be measured in different ways. The simplest method counts every party at face value; however, this method does not account for differences in size. Sartori proposes counting only those parties that have potential influence on government formation or execution, but it can sometimes be difficult to define which parties actually have such influence, as a party's power can fluctuate.

Taking party size differences into account, Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera's index of effective party numbers is the most common way to describe and measure fragmentation. This is calculated by squaring each party's share (a_i), summing the results and inverting the sum, as the result is a number that gives larger parties more weight than smaller ones:

$$F = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i^2 \right)^{-1}$$

Fragmentation can be measured both with vote shares and parliamentary seat shares.

Disproportion effects of the electoral system cause differences between a party's vote share and seat share. In almost all cases, they concentrate on the voter's choice and lead to a lower fragmentation on the seat level compared to the vote level. The only possible exception is when parties run in alliances but act individually in parliament, in which case fragmentation on the seat level may be higher than on the vote level. The degree of disproportionality can be measured through Gallagher's index by subtracting the vote share (v_i) of each party from its seat share (s_i), squaring the results and summing them, dividing the sum by 2 and taking the square root:

$$D = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} |(v_i - s_i)^2|}$$

Similar to Laakso and Taagepera's index, this gives a large deviation a bigger weight than many small ones. The index runs from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating increased disproportional rates.

POLARIZATION

Polarization describes the ideological bandwidth of a party system from one extreme to another. The greater the polarization, the less accordance between parties. While polarized systems are usually fragmented, the reverse it not always valid; fragmented systems are not necessarily polarized. The direction of competition connects to the question of polarization. Competition can either be centripetal, meaning the parties within the system compete for the political center, or centrifugal, meaning the parties try to outbid themselves by advocating extreme positions. Centrifugal competition is considered highly problematic for the stability of a party system.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The last dimension used to describe a party system is its degree of institutionalization. This concept emerged with the so-called third wave of democratization starting in the 1970s. Researchers noted many parties in these young democracies were detached from society, and party systems as a whole were volatile. Parties appeared, disappeared, or changed their positions frequently. Institutionalization, then, measures this degree of volatility of a party system by focusing on the change of vote shares over two election periods. One way to measure volatility is to use Pedersen's index. A party's share ($p_{i,t}$) at one election is subtracted from that party's share at the previous election ($p_{i,t-1}$). The results for all parties are summed and divided by 2:

$$V = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} |p_{i,t} - p_{i,t-1}|$$

This is, however, only a vague approximation for the complex concept of institutionalization.

Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully define a number of qualitative criteria for institutionalized party systems: Parties should have some stability in their existence and in their patterns of competition with other parties. Parties should also be anchored in society with a core group of supporters and voters, and be ideologically consistent—meaning they should not make radical realignments in a very short time. Party leaders should accept elections as the only method of gaining power in a country, and last, parties should not be solely dependent on a single leader, but have a solid apparatus and well-defined structures.

CONCLUSION

Using these tools of analysis has not settled the debate; there remain two main theories in political science to explain what determines the structure of a party system. The first theory still sees institutional factors as key, primarily the electoral system. The other theory emphasizes societal causes, such as the number of cleavages or divisions within society. Empirical evidence shows neither of these theories alone explains the structure of a party system; rather, the explanation derives from interaction of both institutional and societal factors. Further investigation on the interaction between institutional and societal factors in determining party systems is a continuing question for future research.

See also *Democratic Theory, Parties in; New Institutionalism; Party and Social Structure; Political Parties; Third Way and Social Democracy.*

. . . . MATTHIAS CATÓN

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Paternalism

From *pater* (the "father" in Latin), paternalism refers to a state's authoritative tutelage or guidance. In a broader sense, any welfare state might be considered paternalist, as it provides services to its citizens to meet some of their basic needs. However, the term is mostly reserved for political and socioeconomic systems in which the state not only provides minimal unemployment or social assistance and health care, but also creates the whole network of services (of whatever quality), rules, controls, and expectations. These provisions make the citizens dependent on the state, without giving them adequate rights and responsibilities.

Typically associated with states in the former communist Soviet bloc, such a dependency is often the purpose of the system in the first place. This type of tutelary—or an overprotecting state that thus limits its citizens' life choices—contrasts with a state in which everyone takes responsibility for their own fate. Since virtually any state is paternalistic in the sense that it is interventionist and protects its citizens, a rational democratic state's soft paternalism is widely considered as justified.

See also *Communism; Welfare State.*

. . . .   JIRI S. MELICH

Path Dependencies

Path dependency is a concept of social analysis that tries to capture why history and context matter in politics. A path dependent analysis shows how early incidents and factors play an important role in shaping later, even seemingly unrelated events. These incidents and factors help condition political actors, their decisions, and the contexts that affect events later in history. Path dependent accounts closely link to historical institutionalism in political science and stand in contrast to much neoclassical political economic theory, which seeks to explain political behavior based on the rational calculations of individuals acting for their own benefit.

CLASSIC EXAMPLES

Path dependent analyses have been employed in economics, biology, and political science. The classic example of path dependency is the choice of which side of the road to drive on—from a rational point of view, the choice is arbitrary, but either driving on the left or right becomes cemented in a state's institutions. Another famous example to demonstrate path dependency with an "irrational" outcome is the story of the QWERTY keyboard, as told by Paul David. The current, standard keyboard on computers and typewriters is not a function of efficiency. Rather, according to David, this style of keyboard and letter arrangement came about because early typewriters jammed if the keys were struck too fast. The QWERTY keyboard slowed typing by placing commonly used letters further apart, thus preventing keyboard jamming. QWERTY became the industry standard, as more and more firms bought QWERTY machines. While this style was made for people who used early typewriters, it persists in the modern era.

The QWERTY keyboard, according to David, remains in use because the decision to use alternative keyboards would require individual decisions against a status quo. The QWERTY keyboard became the de facto standard, and remains so because the decision to change the industry standard is decentralized. Individuals have little incentive to learn another style of keyboard if they or their firm alone use it.

The QWERTY keyboard illustrates technological changes that are path dependent. The QWERTY keyboard came about through earlier technological changes, and gained popularity within the industry. Rational individuals chose the QWERTY-style keyboard because it offered superior performance. However, firms and individuals continued to use it even after its original advantage became irrelevant with later technology. Even though there is no threat that computer keyboards will jam, people continue to use the QWERTY keyboard because the costs of coordinating a new arrangement are perceived as too great compared to the potential benefits. This is referred to as *lock-in* phenomenon.

REINFORCING TRAJECTORY

A path dependent analysis traces a particular process and identifies important moments and evolutionary steps in the process' development. Prior events help structure how later events unfold, and typically, earlier events are more important in an outcome than later ones. Also, the initial events create a self-enforcing set of conditions that increase the likelihood of later events or factors occurring, and therefore more deeply entrench a particular historical trajectory or institution.

Proponents of path dependency argue that outcomes may not be determined a priori, but that the likelihood of an event increases with successive choices along a path of decisions. Small and seemingly trivial events or factors that occur early on may prove to be important in later development. These events or factors may accumulate through time and then later alter an existing institution or help create institutions of their own.

Many authors relate path dependence to the idea of increasing returns. The idea of increasing returns is comparable to "like attracting like": a minor event early on in a process may reoccur and draw similar factors until it is systemwide and it has reached an equilibrium point. Increasing returns help perpetuate a process, creating a self-reinforcing effect. However, the sequence, timing, and context of the event are all critical in determining what factors become important and influential and which ones do not. Not every event or historical actor proves to be important, and not every process is equally susceptible to how factors or events might change its historical trajectory.

CRITICAL JUNCTURES

The instance where important events shape development trajectories is called a critical juncture. A critical juncture occurs when the circumstances that place an institution's development along a given path take shape, as well as when the mechanism that creates increasing returns forms or becomes important. These increasing returns allow the institution to

exist even after the initial conditions that created it deteriorate or disappear. The path is, in part, structured by earlier events and factors, but solidifies during the critical juncture. Path dependent and critical juncture analyses provide a broad diagnostic lens to apply to different social questions; therefore, they do not point to particular actors or mechanisms. Rather, they provide a framework with which to qualitatively evaluate events and consequences.

A path dependent analysis allows similar investigations for other inquires and in other disciplines. Further, by employing a path dependent analysis and developing counterfactual examples, an analyst may ask if a process is the most efficient possible. Analysts can examine the historical record to find alternatives and possibly increase its performance. Indeed, in path dependent solutions, the most efficient and most desired outcome does not necessarily persist. Institutions may persist because costs of altering the process are inhibitive, because the sequencing or timing of different factors have obstructed another development path, or for a variety of other reasons. Path dependent analysis investigates causal paths and conditioning factors that contribute to the history of a process.

CRITICISMS

Path dependency has critics in each of the disciplines that use it. In political science, critics of path dependency argue that it is overly deterministic. These critics take issue with a seeming lack of efficacy to individual actors to make individually rational choices, independent of history and contingent outcomes. Also, critics of path dependency argue that it is too broad to be a formal theory, and that attempts to formalize it have not succeeded. As a full theory, path dependency lacks a specific unit of analyses and also fails to select particular mechanisms through which networks of path development are to operate.

A last potential problem with path dependent analyses is that they lack the ability to be falsified. Political scientists must be able to somehow show that the causal arrangement outlined in path dependent analyses is true. However, history has only one empirical output, and it is impossible to alter past events to understand what causal mechanism or set of events lead to a particular outcome. In an effort to better understand the importance of processes and events, scholars who employ path dependency rely on counterfactual arguments to confirm an instance is a critical juncture or that certain early permutations of events were important.

See also *Critical Juncture; Formal Political Theory; Historical Interpretation; Historical Method, Comparative; Institutionalism, Comparative; New Institutionalism; Punctuated Equilibrium; Rational Choice Theory.*

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Patriarchy

Patriarchy is the government of fathers. In ancient Greece and Rome, the patriarch—or male head of household—was considered to have the "natural" authority to make family decisions. His family included all dependents: wives, children, relatives, servants, and slaves. Although philosophers and officials debated the unlimited or limited nature of his authority, they agreed that the family patriarch set the rules for family life, enforced them, and punished family members for any infractions. The patriarch's main obligation was to enhance the welfare of the family and protect it from internal strife and external threats by whatever means he found necessary. He enjoyed extensive discretion. The main restraint on his governing powers was the common expectation that he would use his authority for the good of his household rather than as a tool of malice or vengeance.

HISTORICAL LEGITIMATION AND LIBERAL CRITIQUE

The history of Western political theory offered three main ways by which the patriarchal authority of family fathers was used to legitimize the political authority of ruling monarchs. *Anthropological patriarchy* suggested that primitive family associations evolved into larger societies and, simultaneously, the male heads of the households evolved into the heads of kingdoms. Family fathers became reigning political patriarchs. *Moral patriarchy* was based on the premise that political authority belonged to the original generation of fathers, such as the biblical Adam, and they bequeathed to their successors the right to rule. Authority passed from fathers to sons. This was the argument of Sir Robert Filmer who, in seventeenth-century England, published the most famous defense of political patriarchy, *Patriarcha: A Defence of the Natural Power of Kings against the Unnatural Liberty of the People.* Finally, *ideological patriarchy* involved using the language, metaphors, and images of fatherhood to claim political authority. Teachers, masters, employers, and magistrates assumed the role of fathers, portrayed themselves as fathers, claimed the authority of fathers, and sought to parlay individuals' loyalty towards their households' fathers into citizens' obedience to their political fathers.

Seventeenth-century social contract theory, especially John Locke's *Two Treatises of Government,* disputed the legitimacy of patriarchal political authority. Locke's social contract theory

argued that the natural authority of family fathers did not transfer to political rulers. Adult sons had natural rights rather than any obligation to obey their fathers. To protect their natural rights, men consented to submit to a limited government that would maintain order and settle disputes. For Locke, the convention of consent legitimized political authority and the defense of individuals' natural rights was the main guideline and limit for the exercise of political authority. By the late eighteenth century, particularly in America, social contract theory provided the intellectual foundation for an emerging liberalism that emphasized individual rights, a free market economy, and limited constitutional government. This classical liberalism rapidly gained influence at the expense of patriarchal reasoning and institutions.

PERSISTENCE DESPITE LIBERAL REFORM

Nonetheless, important elements of patriarchy persisted even where liberalism thrived. First, the liberal idea that all men were political equals was counterweighed by the patriarchal belief that particularly "masculine" men deserved to govern other men and were usually successful in doing so. The Australian social scientist R. W. Connell identifies the emergence of a modern male hierarchy with at least three main elements: "hegemonic masculinity, conservative masculinities (complicit in the collective project but not its shock troops), and subordinated masculinities" (110). Even when congresses replaced kings, some men continued to proclaim their dominance and persuaded other men to recognize and respect it.

The second patriarchal element that persisted stemmed from the social contract that left the subordination of women to men intact. Carole Pateman suggests that a "sexual contract" preceded the social contract. The sexual contract was an agreement among men to maintain male authority over all women; the men deemed these women deficient in the qualities necessary to grant consent and exercise independent citizenship. Only after men agreed that women were to be sequestered and subordinated in patriarchal households did the theorists make their case for a social contract—this contract contested the patriarchal authority of kings and sought to replace it with a fraternal society in which equal rights, free market transactions, and limited government constituted the basis for male interactions.

A third element of patriarchy was due to the Anglo-American jurisprudence that contained common-law guarantees for husbands' authority over their families and, equally important, for governments' patriarchal authority to intervene in society to ensure "the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom." English legal scholar Sir William Blackstone explained, "The individuals of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners; and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations" (162). When citizens did not conform to the norms of good behavior, officials had a fatherly duty to intervene. Political leaders invoked this duty when they sought to regulate virtually all aspects of people's lives.

CONCLUSIONS

An understanding of patriarchy—whether as the government of kings over subjects, or as the rule of hegemonic men over subordinated men; or as the dominance of men over all women; or as the intervention by public officials in the lives of citizens—has a significant impact on one's historical analysis. For example, was the American Revolution (1776–1783) an "antipatriarchal" revolution? Most historians would answer in the affirmative. They focus on the weakening of fathers' powers in their families and on the defeat of the British monarchy. They highlight the rise of liberal norms and institutions that emphasize liberty, equality, and opportunity. Where they find traces of prerevolutionary patriarchy, they treat these phenomena as vestiges of the past or as anomalies doomed for extinction. Other historians are more reticent to declare the defeat of patriarchy. Those who are interested in gender often see little change in patterns of male domination or in relevant laws (e.g., "coverture") after the Revolution.

Scholars who focus on state and local governments in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries often note that U.S. civic leaders and political officials' concerns about individual rights and government limits were quieted when confronting issues crucial to community welfare. The rise of liberalism notwithstanding, patriarchy as a concept and as a practice persisted in the centuries following the American Revolution. Globally, it continues in all of its varied aspects in many nations. Its remarkable durability in the face of widespread modern opposition contradicts the Enlightenment belief that the world is progressing toward greater liberty, equality, and democracy.

See also *Authority; Chauvinism; Equality and Inequality; Family Values; Feminism; Nepotism; Orthodoxy in Political Thought; Paternalism; Roman Political Thought; Sexism; Social Conservatism.*

. . . .   MARK E. KANN

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Patriotism

See *Nationalism*.

Patronage

Patronage is a commonly legal but ethically questionable practice of using state resources to provide jobs and services for political clientele by those in control—the so-called patrons—in return for support. Patronage shares a common factor termed *clientelist linkage* with other criticized exchanges, such as pork barrel politics and spoils in the bureaucracies of several developing and developed states of the world. In many studies, the terms *patronage politics* and *political clientelism* are used interchangeably; in fact, patronage is a form of clientelism.

The established anthropological usage of the clientelism mostly refers to the reciprocal and dyadic exchange between notables and dependents. Its use in political science is distinct because it is not based on traditional roles or socioeconomic dependence. In a clientelist structure, patrons provide access to benefits and favors, and their clients are expected to provide returns politically or otherwise in a reciprocal and asymmetric exchange. The clientelist relationship is asymmetric, as there are more clients than patrons; the relationship is reciprocal because the exchange is essential. There is inequality as a result of the unequal status of wealth and influence of the parties to the exchange.

In political clientelism, political support is traded between voters and politicians in democratic political systems and it is associated with the privileged use of party and public resources. The clients provide political support in the form of voting, working in party organizations, attending party meetings and rallies, distributing propaganda texts, and providing personal help to their patrons or brokers. In modern democratic systems, the clients are in huge numbers and the patrons need "brokers" who act as go-betweens to arrange the exchange of benefits to run the patronage network. The work of the broker links dyadic clientelist relations and contacts between patrons and clients; it thus helps to build the patronage network. The patrons provide benefits and services such as government jobs, public contracts, public or personal loans, funds, and access to better education and health care. Herbert Kitschelt and Steve Wilkonson argue that politicians must decide what resources they can offer to clients in exchange for electoral support. The authors further explain, that to underline the importance of confidence between patrons and clients, politicians "must construct organizational devices and social networks of supervision that make direct individual or indirect group based monitoring of political exchange relations viable" (8).

Patronage refers to the aim of this exchange and it is a limited form of the distribution of benefits and services in exchange for votes in a more apparent method than clientelism. As a limited form of distribution, patronage can be used as a proxy for clientelism. The state and parastate resources are directed toward a particular electorate in exchange for political support. Academic Susan Stokes writes that in patronage, the patron holds public office and distributes state resources; but in clientelism, the patron or broker may or may not hold public office and as a result may or may not be able to realistically promise to secure public resources (opposed to, for instance, party resources) for the client. Political jobbery and state development projects are good examples of patronage. Political scientist Scott Mainwaring argues that patronage can be seen as the primary glue that holds modern clientelism together.

A more restricted definition limits patronage to a particular policy in the distribution of public jobs. Politically motivated groups demand favors in hiring decisions for public employees: in 1990, Robin Theobald cited an estimate of four million patronage positions in state and local government in the United States through the early 1980s.

The general conclusion is that power of patron-client networks correlates with the conditions of low productivity, high inequality, starkly hierarchical social relations, political culture, and the size of the public sector economy. Patronage politics dominates the politics and government as a system of patron-client ties and networks, and this contrasts with the norms of universal rationality. It is related to the loosening of moral standards, and thus provides encouraging conditions for corruption with its vast network, which includes politicians and civil servants.

Some scholars argue that the creation of an ideal or rational bureaucracy will be the end of clientelist relations, or at least of patronage. However, patronage changes and adapts to new structures, and thus survives even in developed states. While clientelism and patronage run counter to universalistic standards, several scholars emphasize that patronage politics serve as a tool to mobilize masses, with clientelist relations providing a sense of political participation for the people. If an individual chooses not to be a part of the system, that person will be barred from a distribution network of benefits contrary to the unconditional sharing of public goods. Yet, the patronage mechanism is the best way to access public goods and services in several societies. As Ayşe Ayata notes, the patronage system brings flexible solutions oriented toward individual needs, takes private concerns into consideration, and also integrates everyday concerns as public issues. Jorge Gordin adds that it is incorrect to consider patronage as an abnormality in the political system; on the contrary, it would be more realistic and theoretically more productive to consider it as a key element.

See also *Clientelism; Clientelistic Parties in Latin America; Civil Service; Corruption, Political; Corruption and Other Political Pathologies; Democracy and Corruption; Nepotism; Patron-client Networks.*

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Patron–client Networks

Patron–client networks are formed between individuals of unequal social status for mutual gain. Patron–client ties involve two-person, face-to-face relationships in which individuals of higher social status or political power (the patron) use their resources or power to give material benefits or provide security to individuals of lower social status or influence (clients). In return, as a condition of the relationship, clients offer political support such as votes and services such as unremunerated labor to the patron.

Political recruitment and upward mobility within political organizations often takes place through hierarchical networks of patron–client relationships, with aspiring politicians and persons newly elected to local or even national office serving as clients of more established politicians, and those established politicians themselves supporting those higher in the organizational hierarchy, such as party leaders. Camarillas of the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and factions of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are prominent examples of patron–client networks. These networks eventually reach down to the individual voter.

Patron–client ties are built on both instrumental and affective considerations between the partners to the relationship. Scholars debate the extent to which these links are built on a norm of reciprocity, with clients valuing the personal and ongoing character of the relationship and expressing deep feelings of loyalty to the patron, or on the basis of the client's fear that benefits distributed by the patron may be disrupted if the patron fails to provide support. Patron–client relationships are both voluntary and, because of the asymmetric character of the bond, exploitative. In contrast to formal citizenship norms in modern political regimes, which stress universalism and equality of access to public resources, patron–client ties are highly personal and particularistic; indeed, patron–client relationships have value precisely because they allow individuals to circumvent the universalistic rules of modern societies and gain access to public resources on advantageous terms.

Patron–client networks operate most effectively where the patron—whether an individual or an organization, such as a political party—can verify that the client has fulfilled the quid pro quo, whether that be to vote for the patron's preferred candidate or to support the patron's faction in an intraparty leadership contest or to campaign for the patron's party. The secret ballot, if truly confidential, can thoroughly undermine patron–client networks. However, because patrons often have multiple clients—often unknown to each other, since the relationship is vertical and dyadic—they often have means to confirm whether particular clients provided the requisite support. Patron–client ties become more important when ideological divisions fail to motivate individual political choice (i.e., where parties do not differ much programmatically, they may have to call on their patron–client networks to buy votes).

Patron–client networks imply that the clients' support can be bought, which suggests that clients are more likely to be poor. As a parallel point, patrons or the organizations acting as patrons (e.g., parties in government) must have significant divisible resources to distribute selectively. Mexico's PRI found its capacity to maintain its clientelist networks eroded when the state pursued neoliberal economic policies after 1985, selling off many of the sources of clientelist distribution, such as jobs. In Japan, the LDP's capacity to reproduce patron–client networks has been reinforced by the incapacity of local governments to generate significant revenues, hence leaving them reliant on local politicians elected as national legislators to act as brokers for discrete distributions to the locality. Well-connected client politicians in the LDP more effectively gain such distributions from party leaders who control the legislature than do opposition party representatives.

Certain political institutions favor patron–client relationships. The personal vote, practiced in Japan and Brazil, has been linked to the clientelism rife in those societies. The lack of civil service professionalization allows parties to use public jobs as the patronage they can distribute to clients; the latter is particularly likely if the franchise was broadened before civil service rules came into force.

Political parties that are little more than unions for legislative cooperation—run by politicians operating patron–client networks—tend to be ideologically inconsistent, politically fragmented, and subject to defections when in opposition. They tend to favor the creation of publicly funded private goods—those they can distribute via their networks in lieu of public goods provision.

See also *Civil Service; Clientelism; Clientelistic Parties in Latin America; Corruption, Political; Corruption and Other Political Pathologies; Democracy and Corruption; Latin American Politics and Society; Nepotism; Patronage.*

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Pax Americana

Pax Americana (Latin for "American peace") describes the absence of world-scale war as the United States emerged as the major economic, military, and political power in the world following World War II (1939–1945). The term is a play on *Pax Romana*, or Roman peace, used to describe a period of relative peace in the Mediterranean area in the early years of the Common Era.

From the early twentieth century, the United States exerted strong influence in Latin America. After World War I (1914–1918), U.S. president Woodrow Wilson challenged Europe's hold on their Asian and African territories under the banner of self-determination of peoples. That campaign, conducted most specifically in the context of the Versailles conference that followed World War I, has been variously analyzed as an exercise in idealism and as an effort to break into the markets represented by the French and British colonies.

PROJECTION OF INFLUENCE AFTER WORLD WAR II

After World War II, the United States replaced the European powers as the dominant outside power in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. It even stationed troops in Europe itself, becoming the preeminent military force there. As Torbjørn Knutsen explains in a chapter titled "Pax Americana" in his book *The Rise and Fall of World Orders,* the United States, by 1965, had 375 major military bases and 3000 minor military installations around the world. The United Kingdom's commonwealth states, like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, came to ally as much with the United States as with Britain. When these expansions of influence were added to the previous U.S. predominance in Latin America, the United States, and in particular its multinational corporations, attained what some scholars call *global reach.*

The cold war fueled the U.S. projection of military, political, and economic power. The United States viewed itself needing to ensure against an expansion of influence by the Soviet Union. As civil war raged in Greece in 1947, President Harry Truman put the United States in the position of supporting pro-Western elements against those who appeared to side with the Soviet Union. Truman proclaimed that the United States would defend nations threatened by outside forces. "It must be the policy of the United States," he told Congress, "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressure."

National Security Council Document 68, issued in April 1950, called for military buildup and military engagement, with a level of "military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, as indispensable support to our political attitude toward the USSR, as a source of encouragement to nations resisting Soviet political aggression, and as an adequate basis for immediate military commitments and for rapid mobilization should war prove unavoidable" (289). In June 1950, Truman extended the reach of this pledge to east Asia when he intervened militarily in Korea.

Motivation the military intervention has been identified variously as relating to concern about expansion by the Soviet Union, a need for access to raw materials for an expanding economy, and idealism reflected in a desire to protect foreign nations. Following Truman's lead, President Dwight Eisenhower expanded U.S. commitments and activity. In Latin America, the Central Intelligence Agency intervened covertly in Guatemala in 1953 against a government that had taken measures against the U.S.-owned United Fruit Company. In the Middle East, Eisenhower moved against perceived Soviet influence under what came to be called the Eisenhower Doctrine. As embodied in a 1957 resolution of the U.S. Congress, the Eisenhower Doctrine held:

> The United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation . . . requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism.

In 1958, Eisenhower sent the U.S. Marines to Lebanon to counter a perceived effort by Syria to promote leftist elements. In Indochina, the United States replaced France in opposing nationalist elements friendly to the Soviet Union and China.

In Latin America, the United States continued the control it had exerted in earlier times. President Lyndon Johnson intervened successfully in the Dominican Republic in 1965 to restore to power friendly military elements who had overthrown the country's president, but were in danger of being removed by civilian elements seeking to restore the overthrown president. A few years later, an unsuccessful intervention followed this incident, commenced by Eisenhower and continued by President John Kennedy to try to overthrow the Soviet-oriented government of Cuba.

Other countries were encouraged to orient their economies to the United States and the West, rather than to the Soviet Union. They were encouraged as well to follow U.S. political principles rather than those of the Soviet Union. Despite all this political and military activity, the United States managed to avoid direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union, hence justifying use of the term *Pax Americana.*

IDEOLOGICAL USE

Supporters of the U.S. posture, its critics, and analysts who took no particular stance, but simply sought to describe the role of the United States in the world, all used the term *Pax Americana.* Supporters of the U.S. posture regarded the U.S. approach as beneficial to the United States economically, and also viewed it as helpful in opposing what they viewed as an expansionist Soviet Union. For example, Jan Prybyla views Pax Americana as improving life around the globe. Prybyla credits implementation of the concept as having brought "theretofore unmatched prosperity and overall … peace to those willing and able to work together on this vast undertaking and accept the not overly demanding prescripts for the attainment of the desired ends."

Critics use Pax Americana as shorthand for what they see as neocolonialism—the United States seeking to replace France and the United Kingdom in the unfair exploitation of resources and labor in the poorer countries of the world. Critics view the stated aim of opposing the Soviet Union as a cover for expanding economic and political influence. Aleksandr Iakovlev, a Soviet analyst, contends that Pax Americana signifies the aim of the United States to gain a new "world empire" by military means.

Even though the term *Pax Americana* is associated with the cold war, it survived the demise of the Soviet Union. It applies to the unipolar situation thus created. Nonstate actors who engage in acts of violence against the United States challenge Pax Americana, as reflected in the attacks of September 11, 2001. The United States subsequently declared a war on terror, and military actions were undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some analysts view U.S. hegemony as beneficial to the Middle East, while others regard American use of military force as counterproductive and destabilizing.

See also *Détente; Foreign Policy; International Relations; Iron Curtain; Soviet Union, Former.*

. . . . JOHN QUIGLEY

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Peace

Peace is a transversal concept with a long history of theorization. It is perceived as a plurality and regarded as a state, a process, a value, or an aim associated to the absence of violence and the satisfaction of human needs.

HISTORY

As early as in the Roman time, *pax* was interpreted as *absentia bellum* (absence of violence) through order and unity based on the power of the center. This conception was to be reconsidered by the theological system that dominated Europe from the end of the Roman Empire until mid-seventeenth century. Peace—as conveyed by Pierre Dubois, Dante Alighieri, and Pope Gregory VII—was to be attained through a "Christian empire" with no necessary separation between temporal and spiritual power. This was related to the *pax ecumenical* or *pax ecclesiae* of the Christian commonwealth, outlined in Augustine's *De Civitas Dei.* It was also during Christian political dominance that the idea of *just war* flourished. First developed by Aristotle, and further conceptualized by Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Francisco Suarez, the doctrine determined whether a war could be justified from a moral standpoint.

The Christian vision of peace was shaken during the Renaissance and Reformation. The most enlightened representatives of this era, Erasmus Rotterdamus, Thomas Münzer, Sebastian Franck, Crucé and Grotius, initiated the idea that peace is more than lack of war; it means the improvement of life and the achievement of social justice, freedom, and equality.

These ideas paved the way to an unparalleled debate, during Enlightenment, over the concept and the attainability of peace. William Penn's "An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe" (1692), Saint-Pierre's "Project for Setting an Everlasting Peace in Europe" (1713), Jean-Jacques Rousseau's "A Project of Perpetual Peace" (1761), Jeremy Bentham's "A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace" (1786), along with Immanuel Kant's "Perpetual Peace" (1795), tailored a new trend toward creating a global federation based upon the national independence and sovereignty of states. This has led some authors to assert that it was during the Enlightenment that peace was "invented." Although visionaries throughout history have aspired for peace, "it has been regarded by political leaders as a practicable or indeed desirable goal only during the past two hundred years" (Howard, 2).

The outbreak of two World Wars dominated the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. The peace projects during this period were developed on distinct political ideologies. Whereas Marxists made peace contingent on *social reorganization*, liberals urged for democracy and free market economy. Also in the twentieth century, Gandhi articulated a vision of peace in which justice is an inherent and necessary aspect. The American civil rights movement later extended this idea.

Outside the Western sphere, peace has been regarded somewhat differently. In the Hindu tradition, the word *shanti* is understood as a well-ordered state of mind. In the tradition of Buddhism, a step forward is taken from *ahimsâ* (noninjury to all living beings) to an interpretation in terms of compassion,

good works, and reconciliation. Similarly, the Confucian doctrine directed the attention inwards; it was unconcerned with the outside world and peace was associated to the inner state of mind and the inculcation of personal virtue in the individual. Finally, the Japanese concept of *heiwa* (and its parallel, *wahei*) has a double meaning that implies adaptation to a social order, both in social action and in state of mind. In the Japanese tradition, social order has a nationalistic and pyramidal connotation.

PEACE THEORY

Despite its centrality, it is only in the twentieth century that peace received the trappings of a scientific framework, based upon empirical and theoretical assumptions. In the beginning of the century, political scientists such as Theo Lentz, Quincy Wright, Lewis Richardson, and Pitirim Sorokin contributed heavily with new theories of war and peace.

Following the original work of these authors, peace research was further developed in the United States, and primarily in Scandinavia. In the United States, Kenneth Boulding accompanied by Anatol Rapoport, Herbert Kelman, and Robert Angell, created the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* in 1957, and subsequently founded the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution in Michigan in 1959. In Scandinavia, Johan Galtung, a mathematician and sociologist, founded the Oslo International Peace Research Institute in 1959 and the *Journal of Peace Research* in 1964, which was followed by the 1966 establishment of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Arguably the most important doctrinal innovation of this period is the distinction between *negative peace* versus *positive peace*. Negative peace refers to the absence of direct and physical violence, whereas positive peace is associated to the successful transformation of structural violence. According to Galtung, structural violence occurs whenever people are disadvantaged by political, legal, economic, or cultural traditions; or, as Galtung puts it, structural violence refers to any constraint on human potential due to economic and political structures.

Peace research embraces a wide range of issues and its borders are constantly expanding. This wide embrace, which could be a symptom of lack of cohesiveness and theoretical solidity, is, in fact, quite the opposite. It is a notable indicator of the fruitfulness, importance, and richness of the discipline and the progress occurring.

From a methodological point of view, peace research is approached both from a quantitative and qualitative point of view. Databases such as the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, International Crisis Behavior Project, and the Correlates of War are well-established quantitative sources in the study of peace and conflict.

DEMARCATION OF PEACE

Despite the kaleidoscopic nature of peace, some aspects are generally accepted as key demarcations. First, peace can be seen as having a both passive and active component. As early as during the Roman Empire, peace was conceived as absence of direct violence, or negative peace; it had a passive component, in the sense that peace's existence was contingent on

the nonexistence of something else. During the Renaissance, violence was not only related to the infliction of physical harm but also encompassed a structural component. In this context, peace and social well-being could only be attained with positive peace, occurring when the forces that administered economic, political, and social injury were successfully transformed. More recently, peace is gradually surpassing its initial passive component. Beyond a state that is achieved when violence (direct and structural) is no longer inflicted, peace is increasingly gaining an active orientation and a life of its own. Peace can therefore be interpreted as enabling—as making something happening. By being at peace, one is bestowed with the capacity to amplify and project well-being.

A second key demarcation of peace is that it is positively value loaded. To be at peace or to feel secure is, indeed, considered positive, a state that individuals aspire to attain—something that most authors regard as "good." During the Greek era, philosophers characterized peace as "the greatest good." The categorical favorability of peace is so tangible that resorting to violence, when not promptly criticized, is generally acceptable only on the condition that it would serve as a means to ultimately attain peace. Within peace studies, this leaned on the *positivity* of peace with the idea of positive peace entering the political discourse, enriching a narrow concept with material prosperity, humanism, democracy, and social justice. This has roots in the seventeenth century, as Thomas Hobbes posited that in a world without peace and security, life would be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."

A third distinguishing characteristic of peace is that it is a derivative concept—meaningless in itself. To have any meaning, peace necessarily presupposes something to be in peace; as a realm of study, it cannot be self-referential. Moreover, although it is used to characterize an object, peace reflects a relationship between at least two objects. In a globalized world where processes and agents are tightly interconnected, to be at peace presupposes that violence (physical or structural) would not be inflicted on "the other." To Galtung, this relational ingredient of peace is fundamental. According to Galtung, in the West, peace is seen as "something pertaining to relations within the in-group, and war is something referring to relations between in-group and out-group" (184). This possibly derives from the Greek concept of *eirene,* which reflects and may be translated by "in-group harmony."

See also *Buddhist Political Thought; Democratic Peace; Hindu Political Thought; Just War Theory; Kant, Immanuel; Neutrality; Pacifism and Conscientious Objection; Public Good; Social Order.*

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Peace Corps

On March 1, 1961, United States president John F. Kennedy signed an executive order establishing the Peace Corps. The mission of the Peace Corps includes three goals: helping the people of interested countries in meeting their need for trained men and women; helping promote a better understanding of Americans on the part of the peoples served; and helping promote a better understanding of other peoples on the part of Americans. Nearly 200,000 volunteers have served in 139 host countries to work on issues ranging from HIV/AIDS education to information technology and environmental preservation. According to the Fallen Peace Corps Volunteers Memorial Project, as of November 2009, over 270 volunteers had died serving.

Five years after the Peace Corps was established, over 15,000 volunteers were working in the field, the largest number in its history. In 1971, President Richard Nixon moved the corps and several other federal volunteer programs into a new federal volunteer agency, and by December 1974, there were corps volunteers in sixty-nine countries. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter signed an executive order that granted the Peace Corps full autonomy, and in 1981 it became an independent federal agency. The following year, the number of volunteers fell to 5,380 (the lowest number since 1962), but by 1986 had increased to 6,264. In 1989, President George H. Bush announced that volunteers would go to Hungary, thereby establishing the first Peace Corps program in an Eastern European country.

Changes continued into the 1990s and twenty-first century. In 1992, the first group of volunteers left for the former Soviet Union to work in small-business enterprise projects in Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. The first group of English teacher volunteers left for China in 1993 and the Crisis Corps, a new program allowing returned volunteers to provide short-term assistance during natural disasters and humanitarian crises, was launched in 1995; this program was renamed the Peace Corps Response in 2007. By 1996, nearly 7,300 volunteers were serving in ninety-four developing countries. Volunteers were deployed domestically for the first time in 2005 when the Crisis Corps aided relief operations in the Gulf Coast region following Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita. That year, volunteer numbers reached a thirty-year high with 7,810 Americans serving in the Peace Corps in seventy-seven countries.

In September 2009, there were 7,671 volunteers and trainees. The average age of volunteers was twenty-eight years and 60 percent were female. The highest percentage of volunteers worked in education (35 percent), health and HIV/AIDS (22 percent), business development (15 percent), and the environment (14 percent). In December 2009, Peace Corps's members served in seventy-six countries, particularly in Africa (37 percent) and Latin America (24 percent). Under the directorship of Aaron S. Williams, the Peace Corps's fiscal year 2010 budget was $400 million.

The Peace Corps has occasionally been a target for criticism. In October 1961, protests arose in Nigeria over a letter written by a volunteer who described primitive living conditions in the country. In 2008 Robert L. Strauss, a former Peace Corps country director, said that the organization lacked a strategy, volunteers were rarely sent where they were most needed, and the quality of volunteers was questionable.

See also *AIDS, Politics of; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Transnationalism.*

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Pentecostalism

Pentecostalism describes a diverse group of Protestant Christians, distinguished theologically by a particular emphasis on the role of the Holy Spirit. Allan Anderson, in his *Introduction to Pentecostalism,* defines Pentecostal as "all churches and movements that emphasize the workings of the gifts of the spirit, both on phenomenological and on theological grounds" (13). Pentecostalism also frequently reflects local culture through adapting distinctive regional elements to its practice of Christianity. While some scholars suggest that Pentecostalism should be considered a third form of Protestantism distinct from the traditional division of mainline and evangelical, Pentecostalism is traditionally considered a subsection of Evangelicalism.

Two key factors can help distinguish Pentecostals from other Evangelicals. Most notably, for Pentecostals, spiritual authority and authentic experience as a Christian come from direct interaction with the Holy Spirit. Pentecostalism takes its name from the events of the Day of Pentecost recorded in the second chapter of Acts, which recounts that an outpouring of the Holy Spirit on the apostles allowed them to preach the gospel to a crowd in the native languages of the listeners.

In contemporary practice, signs of the presence of the Holy Spirit within an individual serve as evidence of faith. Practice from church to church varies widely. It may entail visible external signs of the Spirit, such as speaking in tongues, healing, ecstatic movement, and prophesy, or be demonstrated through prayer, meditation, and fasting. Further, Pentecostal theology tends to be developed through experience and personal revelation of the Spirit rather than being mediated through the interpretation of sacred texts. Rather than theological training, the blessing of the Holy Spirit is the most important quality of a Pentecostal leader. In terms of ecclesiastical organization, Pentecostal churches frequently exhibit great independence even when working within a denominational structure. In contrast to the majority of evangelical and mainline Protestant churches, which possess highly organized denominational structures and

parachurch organizations, many Pentecostal churches have only tenuous, if any, links to a central governing body and largely operate independently. Rather than a denominational convention or synod, the independent megachurch is a hallmark of Pentecostal organization.

This loose organization results in significant differences between different Pentecostal denominations, in terms of both theology and practice. To the extent that a central authority structure exists in Pentecostal movements, this authority frequently relies on personality-driven leadership from a powerful individual or a small group of leaders. Particularly in the developing world, Pentecostal leaders often exercise tight control over their congregants, claiming sweeping authority from the anointing of the Holy Spirit.

Pentecostal Christianity is one of the fastest growing religions in much of the developing world, including Latin American, sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of Asia. In some areas of Africa, Pentecostal Christians likely form a majority, whereas in many other cases they comprise a strong minority of 10 to 25 percent of national population. Huge individual congregations are common; indeed, the largest Christian congregation in the world is currently a Pentecostal church in South Korea. Pentecostalism has also made relative gains in some parts of the developed world.

The interaction between Pentecostalism and politics is a complex relationship that depends greatly on both the dynamics of individual denominations and particular regional circumstances. Many Pentecostals embrace political activity, either through participating in faith-based political parties or by seeking to influence traditional political parties. However, such political participation is not a given. The American Foursquare Church, a large American denomination with significant ties to missionary-planted churches overseas, eschews political involvement on behalf of the church. There is no prohibition on political participation of individual members, but the church as a whole will not take political positions. Some large denominations in the developing world hold more radical positions, for example, the Brazilian Christian Congregation, which proscribes the political participation of members, but such a position places the denomination in a small minority of churches.

One factor that decisively shapes the form of political involvement of Pentecostals who desire such a role is the numerical and social strength of Pentecostals in a given country vis-à-vis other faith positions. In the developed world, Pentecostalism is rarely the dominant expression of Protestantism, and in areas where Pentecostalism is strong, its numbers are usually a small minority of the general population. Possibly due to this situation, it is often difficult to distinguish the political activities of Pentecostals from other evangelical groups with similar beliefs in developed nations.

In the developing world, the state of Pentecostal politics reflects the great variety in the status of Pentecostals from country to country. A variety of common political tactics include affiliating with traditional political parties, forming a Pentecostal political party, or creating parachurch political organizations.

Often, the great diversity of Pentecostal churches leads different groups of Pentecostals to compete politically within one country. Political structures and alliances frequently shift; for example, a party formed along Pentecostal religious lines may later ally with a major party, as in the case of the Camino Cristiano in Nicaragua, or a formally powerful parachurch political organization that brings together many different Pentecostals and other Evangelicals, such as Brazil's Evangelical Association, may lose its influence. The importance of personality-driven leadership among Pentecostal religious leaders leaves the Pentecostal political landscape particularly susceptible to frequent change.

Class also plays an important role in shaping political involvement. The majority of Pentecostals in the developing world are members of the working class, and thus are often excluded from the top levels of leadership in traditional parties, which are frequently the domain of the elite (though important exceptions exist in traditional parties). However, in cases such as Guatemala and South Korea, where members of the elite or the upper-middle class have joined a Pentecostal movement in significant numbers, Pentecostal leaders have taken prominent positions within existing political parties.

The diversity of Pentecostalism has understandably spawned a variety of political goals. Pentecostal churches have a tendency to be conservative doctrinally, particularly by literally interpreting Christian scripture. This conservatism is often reflected in social goals such as strong opposition to abortion and homosexuality, positions that a majority of evangelical Protestants share. However, while conservative social norms are common, other political positions vary widely. For example, Nordic Protestant parties with a strong Pentecostal representation tend to favor a stronger welfare state and additional proenvironment policies, whereas prominent Pentecostals in the United States have called for limited government. Some Pentecostal leaders have worked with prodemocracy movements, as in South Korea, while in Guatemala, the Pentecostal elite closely identified with the authoritarian regimes of the 1980s.

Such a diversity of political practices and political goals suggests that understanding the politics of Pentecostalism requires a deep understanding of both the local milieu of a Pentecostal denomination and how it specifically believes its faith should interact with politics. Pentecostalism's global growth suggests that the relationship between Pentecostalism and politics will continue to have great importance. The loose composition of Pentecostal churches and denominations, along with the wide range of models of political action and beliefs about the integration of faith and politics among Pentecostals, imply that this relationship will remain fraught with complexity.

See also *Religion and Politics; Religious Parties.*

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Perestroika

Perestroika was the slogan that came to symbolize Mikhail Gorbachev's effort to reform the Soviet Union. The fifty-three-year old Gorbachev was appointed general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985 because the leadership in the ruling committee (Politburo) wanted a young, energetic leader who would tackle the country's mounting problems. By 1985 the Soviet economy had almost stopped growing, and the country was dependent on imports to feed its population and to renovate its aging industrial base. Additionally, Moscow felt threatened by the arms buildup launched by United States president Ronald Reagan and by the ongoing war with Afghanistan.

In 1985, Gorbachev launched a crackdown on alcohol consumption and tried to boost economic growth through investing in new technology imported from the West. He encouraged the media to criticize bureaucratic inertia through a campaign of *glasnost,* or openness. In 1986, he initiated the more ambitious program of economic restructuring, *perestroika* in Russian—the word *reform* was unacceptable because in communist ideology, a *reformist* is someone who has abandoned the revolutionary path.

With these new endeavors, Gorbachev called for a decentralization of decision making, with responsibility shifting from central planners to factory managers. A new May 1988 law on cooperatives subsequently lifted some of the restrictions on individual entrepreneurship, and a wave of small businesses sprang up in Soviet cities. However, perestroika did not envisage the privatization of state-owned business or the creation of competitive markets. Most factory directors abused their new freedom and avoided plan targets while paying themselves, and their workers, higher wages. Slack financial discipline and a fall in the world oil price—the Soviet Union's main source of export revenue—led to inflationary pressures. Because prices were still controlled, this pressure manifested as shortages in goods. By 1989, rationing was introduced in many regions for basic food products, and workers were starting to protest their declining living standards.

On the political front, perestroika meant competitive elections—at first for positions inside the Communist Party, and then for local and national legislatures. Gorbachev tried to separate the role of party functionaries from state officials and to hold the latter accountable through the competitive elections. A new Congress of People's Deputies was elected in March 1989. Gorbachev's problem involved growing instances of political issues that had nothing to do with his economic agenda now dominated the debates in the now-free media and the new congress. Primary among these issues were the demands of nationalists in the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania for more autonomy, if not outright independence, and a territorial dispute that erupted between the republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Gorbachev tended to side with conservatives in suppressing these nationalist protests, and this alienated him from the rising Russian Democrats—whose support he needed for his economic reforms. By the time Gorbachev was willing to compromise with the nationalists, in 1991, it was too late to save the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev had introduced perestroika with the goal of improving the Soviet economy, thus ensuring that the country would preserve its role as a preeminent world power. Ironically, his reforms unleashed economic and political instability, which brought about the rapid collapse of the Soviet system—precisely the opposite of what he had intended.

See also *Russian Political Thought; Soviet Union, Former.*

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Performance Management

Performance management is the use of resources to create the environment and the potential to achieve organizational objectives in an efficient manner. Resources may include personnel, finance, and technology for achieving the organization's goals through strategic planning. The need for good governance, accompanied by outsourcing and privatization, has led the public sector to increasingly demand an emphasis on performance management.

An effective evaluation of performance focuses on results, rather than the traditional focus on productivity. However, in the public sector, where organizations provide services to citizens rather than make a product, it is difficult to measure performance. In public sector organizations, the results may be judged by the quality and the accessibility of the service delivery system, with the goal of performance management in the public sector to provide government services in an efficient manner.

Performance management differs from performance evaluation, in that the latter emphasizes individual performance, rather than the organization as a whole. Performance management, or measurement, requires continuous monitoring of progress through frequent and efficient diagnosis of any shortcomings. Performance management in the public sector involves first determining goals and objectives, and then identifying the measure of performance. Organizations can then assess the following six elements: (1) development potential, (2) performance incentives, (3) performance culture, (4) public values, (5) technological competence, and (6) customer orientation.

To begin, an organization first determines the organizational goals against which performance will be measured. These goals are best identified through full participation of

the employees. Although voters' representatives determine broader public sector goals, respective agencies can set specific goals. Once goals are established, specific measures for evaluating performance are chosen and clearly communicated to the employees. The measures should be achievable based on the available resources.

Addressing areas for potential development includes diagnosing poor performance and steps to eliminate the causes of poor performance through training and other development options. Ideally, there should also be adequate incentives for good performance so that the motivation is continuous. Effective incentives encourage both the individual and the wider organization to achieve the goals set before them.

Organizations can next develop and promote a performance culture so that the employees in the organization socialize into performance management. A successful performance culture in an organization helps to eliminate any possible employee resistance and engenders acceptance of performance measurement.

For optimal performance management, employees in public sector organizations should be aware of the values of public service. These values include accountability, participation, social equity, and efficiency. Transparency, rather than traditional bureaucratic control, ensures accountability. Both vertical and horizontal participation with the stakeholders is also important. Taking account of the strategic plans for recruiting and promoting diverse employees promotes social equity, which can in turn influence improved efficiency for delivering services. Successful performance measurement also addresses adaptation to technology, and how technology, particularly e-government, can make services more effective.

While customers in public sector organizations cannot withhold the services because they are the beneficiaries, the quality of the service delivery is still subject to constant improvement. In order to improve performance, public sector organizations can solicit feedback from the citizens on the services provided. This feedback from the public is a good indicator of performance.

In the face of limited resources, public sector organizations need to constantly improve performance, particularly in times of economic crisis. When jobs are scarce, people demand more justification for each dollar spent by the government, resisting projects that could add to the budget deficit. For example, the Tea Party movement the United States illustrates public resentment against government spending and lack of accountability. Performance management, however, can help legitimate government programs. The critical task for the organization is to develop feasible and reliable methods for performance management. The measures need to correspond to the goals and mission of the organization that are established in the beginning. Through performance management, organizations can improve their responsiveness to the public.

See also *Bureaucracy; Good Governance; Governance; Knowledge Management; Open Government; Program Evaluation and Auditing.*

. . . .   HAROON A. KHAN

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Peronism

Argentina's Peronist movement was founded in the mid-1940s by Colonel Juan Domingo Perón. Organizationally, Peronism has usually involved a personalistic leader (Perón from 1945–1974, Carlos Menem from 1988–1999, and Néstor Kirchner from 2003–2007), a group of powerful labor unionists, and a political party (the Partido Peronista before 1955; neo-Peronist parties from 1955 to 1973, and the Partido Justicialista since 1973). Until the 1970s, Perón and the unionists overshadowed the politicians, but Perón's death in 1974, coupled with a deep economic crisis in the 1970s and 1980s that weakened the labor movement, ultimately expanded the role of the politicians.

Peronism's ideology, *justicialismo*, is summarized in its motto "social justice, economic independence, and national sovereignty." Diverse policies are compatible with these ideals, and the movement's personalist leaders have always had considerable leeway in choosing among them. Perón admired aspects of Mussolini's Italy, where the army sent him to study from 1939 to 1941; Peronism, like fascism, was personalistic and anticommunist. Unlike fascists, however, Perón and his allies were not explicitly anti-Jewish or racist. Their policies were in most respects prolabor, and they restricted but did not suppress organized opposition.

After building worker support as the labor secretary in a military government (1943–1946), Perón won the presidency in 1946 in a fair election and again in 1952 in an irregular one. The death in 1952 of Eva ("Evita") Duarte de Perón, Perón's charismatic wife, weakened the government, and in 1955 Perón was deposed in a military coup. From 1955 to 1973 Perón lived in exile, mostly in Madrid. In Argentina, meanwhile, the military dissolved the Partido Peronista and passed a law that prevented Peronists who took orders from Perón from assuming the presidency or important governorships. With Perón out of the country and with Peronist party activity constrained, factions of Peronist union leaders and neo-Peronist politicians competed to gain the blessing of the exiled leader and to control the movement's resources in Argentina. In the 1960s Peronism spawned violent groups on the extreme right as well as on the extreme left, some of which had overlapping memberships. From abroad, Perón skillfully used and even encouraged conflicts among his followers to avoid being reduced to a symbolic figurehead.

Argentine president Juan Peron casts his ballot during a 1948 constitutional election. Among the characteristics of Peron's rule, known as Peronism, is a strong labor movement.

SOURCE: AP Images

A military coup in 1966 banned all political parties, not just those associated with Peronism. In late 1969 the economy began to falter and violence involving guerrilla groups, including the Peronist Montoneros, escalated. In 1972 the military allowed Perón and his third wife, Isabel, to return to Argentina, hoping that he could tame the guerrillas, and in 1973 Perón won the presidency again in a fair election. In 1974 Perón died, however, leaving the presidency to his vice president, Isabel, whose government had shadowy ties to death squads. Hyperinflation and rising political violence led to another coup in March 1976 and to a harsh military regime that became notorious for human rights violations. When civilian rule returned in 1983, Raúl Alfonsín of the Radical Civic Union won the presidency and Peronism split. On one side were "renewalists" who wanted to democratize the Partido Justicialista, to prosecute military leaders accused of human rights violations, and to suspend payment on the foreign debt. "Orthodox" Peronists opposed these policies, and in 1988 Carlos Menem, the swashbuckling Peronist governor of La Rioja, drew on orthodox support to defeat a renewal candidate in the Partido Justicialista's first-ever presidential primary. A bout of hyperinflation

before the May 1989 presidential election gave Menem an easy win over the candidate of the incumbent Radicals.

Menem had run as a Populist, but hyperinflation persuaded him to enact free market economic reforms, setting aside the statist and nationalist model that Perón had initially favored. Menem's reforms initially improved the economy, but the currency became overvalued and the country grew more dependent on skittish short-term foreign capital. Economic discontent allowed Fernando de la Rúa, a Radical, to win the 1999 presidential election, but ongoing economic turmoil forced him to resign. In 2003 Néstor Kirchner, a Peronist, won the presidency, enacted more nationalist and statist economic policies, and renewed the prosecution of military leaders accused of violating human rights. During his presidency from 2003 to 2007, Kirchner combined Perón's (and Menem's) predilection for personalistic leadership with center-left domestic and foreign policies, and in 2007 he supported his wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, in her successful campaign to succeed him as president. In the first decade of the twentieth century, Peronism remained a heterogeneous political movement with a personalistic leader supported by a shifting coalition of ideologically diverse union leaders and politicians.

See also *Latin American Political Thought; Latin American Politics and Society; Leadership.*

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Persecution

See *Religious Persecution.*

Petition

A petition is a formal request to a political official or governing body. Petitions typically request that officials address complaints or grievances, take action on an issue, or confer a special dispensation. The right for citizens to petition the

government has roots in the English Magna Carta (1215) and was more formally codified in the 1689 English Bill of Rights. In the United States, King George III's failure to take action on a series of petitions developed by the colonists is cited as one of the reasons for the Declaration of Independence. The right to petition was subsequently enshrined as part of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and incorporated in state constitutions.

In contemporary political systems, petitions are used to place candidates or referendums on the ballot. Such petitions generally require a minimum number of signatures. Often a means to express public displeasure toward a government policy or action, petitions may also be part of the recall process to force officials from office; they are used in the legal system to seek court action.

See also *Oversight; Legislature-court Relations; Public Good; Public Policy.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Peuchet, Jacques

Jacques Peuchet (1758–1830) was a French political philosopher who was highly influential in shaping public administration in his country. It is likely that he coined the term *bureaucratic* around 1798, approximately a decade after the word *bureaucracy* was first introduced.

Born in Paris, Peuchet matriculated at the College of Louis-le-Grand. He followed his classical studies with study in law. After graduating, he assumed legal and administrative posts, prior to and continuing throughout the French Revolution (1789–1799), with intervals of self-imposed exile during periods when he felt he was in danger. He came to focus upon political economy as the chief area of his contribution and successfully introduced substantial systematic statistics to French administrative procedure.

Peuchet produced two notable works, *Statistique élémentaire de la France* (1807) and *Description Topographique et statistique de la France* (1807). In these works he labored to develop a disciplined approach to public administration, laying thereby the foundation for the discipline to emerge. His influence is reflected in German philosopher Karl Marx's translation of Peuchet's treatise on suicide from Peuchet's *Mémoires tirés des archives de la police de Paris* (1838), which Marx viewed, in *Marx on Suicide* (1818–1883) as holding the "great advantage of having placed in evidence the contradictions and the monstrosity of modern life, not only in the conditions of particular classes but in the entire sphere and form of the actual social relations."

Peuchet's greatest contribution is perhaps his authorship of entries in the *Encyclopédie Méthodique* (1782–1832), most significantly those in the ninth volume, the 1791 *Dictionnaire de police et municipalité,* under the heading "Jurisprudence." Also to note, the "Police" entry contributes two important concepts. The first clarifies the meaning of "public opinion," which had become a vital part of the thinking of *les idéologues* of the French Revolution era and had also influenced the

thinking of politician and philosopher James Madison in the United States. The second contribution applies to the meaning of the term *police* itself. Peuchet presents the single, most comprehensive account existing in the literature of political science on the topic, examining the word from its broadest meaning as constitutional and moral order all the way to the maintenance of public order, health, and safety.

Peuchet's influence extends from political economy and public administration to fictional literature. His worked as a publicist and also edited the *Gazette de France* and the *Mercure.* His service as archivist for the Préfecture de Police led to the publication of memoirs that provided the inspiration for Alexandre Dumas's novel, *The Count of Monte Cristo.* In addition, Peuchet authored the fictional work *Mémoires de Mademoiselle Bertin sur la reine Marie-Antoinette, avec des notes et des éclaircissements* (1824). This pseudonymous account (which draws upon the factual record contained in an earlier work of his on Marie Antoinette) served to complete Peuchet's transition from a representative in the general assembly during the 1789 revolution to a royalist quietly sympathetic to the executed queen.

See also *Political Economy*

. . . . WILLIAM B. ALLEN

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Pillarization

The phenomenon of pillarization is commonly associated with the social, political, and cultural organization of society into separated strata—along different religious denominations and ideological attachments—that manifested in the Netherlands and Belgium during the first half of the twentieth century. The term *pillarization* derives from the idea of a society consisting of pillars. This concept may have first been coined in the late 1930s by Dutch civil servants who invented the word *pillars* as shorthand for designating groups in society whose interests had to be accommodated in a party-political negotiation process. Since then, it grew into common usage and came to be studied as a self-standing concept in academia.

Pillarization may be roughly defined as the process whereby social interactions are separated into various cultural, religious, or political spheres where each has its own institutions. These include churches, political parties, schools, sports clubs, and

the media. Within a society characterized by vertical pluralism, pillars coexist in the same geographical areas. Certain zones are predominantly Catholic or Protestant, while certain cities may be known as socialist bulwarks. It would be a misunderstanding to see the separations within society among different strata as creating a kind of segregation where one pillar dominates the others. The idea is that pillarization preserves a given diversity and that alterations in relative size or political differences between pillars do not immediately transpire into social tensions.

One of the questions that occupies social scientists, political theorists, and historians is to what extent pillarization impacts politics. Pillarization is not constitutionally anchored unless freedom of religion and political opinion are viewed in this light. Yet, its capacity to impinge on democratic representation has led to considerable debate. On the one hand, some writers interpret pillarization as galvanizing democracy, by virtue of its capacity to bridge gaps between contrasting views in different pillars on morally laden or otherwise controversial topics like abortion, labor and wage politics, and child care benefits. On the other hand, critics question the scientific methods used by these writers as lacking rigor; these critics instead argue that consociationalism, by its very nature, is undemocratic and is a tool of the elites to exercise control. These critics argue that, since the 1960s, the process of depillarization clearly exposed the consociationalist reality behind pillarization.

The question of whether pillarization optimizes political accommodation in a democratic fashion or whether it is a cynical tool to exercise political control echoes the original guise under which sociologists consider the subject. Early academic outlooks on pillarization focused on the idea that it was a problem—a barrier to modernity and a hindrance to national state-building. The counterpart to this view was that religious pillarization serves as a control mechanism to appease the working classes. Pillarization, on both counts, was seen as a perversion of an ideal course of history; it either stood in the way of normal national state development or of a proper unfolding of the class war.

Rather close to the first view is the popular idea that, historically speaking, the principles of pillarization, neocorporatism, and the welfare state can be traced back to the time of the Republic of the United Provinces. Only recently have historians researched the subject and found that actual manifestations on local levels of early twentieth-century pillarization hardly corresponded to the kinds of functions ascribed to it for decades. It appears that a historically sensitive approach to pillarization, developed against a longer background of the transformation of European political discourses, may not only result in new insights on the origins and nature of pillarization, but also provide a relevant perspective on the current crisis of Dutch social democracy and the welfare state, precisely by opening up late nineteenth-century centralized state-building theories.

See also *Consociational Democracy; European Politics and Society.*

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Plato

Plato (427–347 BCE) was a highly influential Greek philosopher and writer. In his autobiographical *Seventh Epistle* (ca. 350 BCE), he describes his early desire to enter into politics, but his disillusionment with what he viewed as unjust regimes that came to power in the period at the end of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE). He goes on to say that, given the corrupt nature of existing societies, the only hope for a good society is one in which philosophers rule as kings.

Plato's main works are in the form of dialogues, generally featuring his revered teacher, Socrates, as the main spokesperson. There are continuing questions of authenticity in regard to various works, although the combination of philosophical and literary brilliance of most dialogues, including the major political ones, leaves no doubt about their authorship. However, Plato's use of the dialogue form has resulted in irresolvable issues of interpretation, including the extent to which Plato's "Socrates" represents the historical Socrates, opposed to being a vehicle for Plato's own ideas.

Many of Plato's contributions to philosophy center upon his theory of forms (or ideas), which represent perfect moral, epistemological, and metaphysical standards. These exist beyond the phenomenal world and are accessible only intellectually. Plato's political theory revolves around repeated contrasts between corrupt existing political systems—including Athenian democracy—and visions of reformed polities, in which people achieve their full moral development. Plato's withering

criticisms of Athenian democracy in the *Gorgias* (ca. 385 BCE) and to a lesser extent in other works, such as the *Apology of Socrates* (ca. 395 BCE), culminate in detailed exploration of a completely just city in the *Republic* (ca. 375 BCE), Plato's best-known political work. In order to further an inquiry into the nature of justice, Plato's Socrates develops a complex system based on a three-class division: farmers, auxiliaries, and philosophers. For the two latter classes, both property and families are communal, to allow them to more easily devote their lives entirely to the welfare of the city. In keeping with Plato's long-held aspiration, the philosophers rule as philosopher-kings, in accordance with knowledge of the forms, which they alone possess. Their main task is to oversee an all-embracing system of education, intended to raise all members of society to the highest levels of justice possible for them. The just city of the *Republic* provides a timeless model of an ideal city, in regard to both the nature of just institutions and the costs they incur.

Plato's later political works, the *Statesman* (ca. 360 BCE) and *Laws* (ca. 347 BCE), evince far greater interest in existing Greek political institutions and how they could be reformed. In *Laws,* his last and also longest work, the main speaker, an unnamed "Athenian Stranger," discourses on laws and institutions for a new city to be founded on Crete. The political system in this "second best" city is based on the government of laws, rather than of philosophers, in the form of a modified democracy with a complicated system of checks and balances preventing political abuse. Ideals of community of property and of family have given way to more traditional Greek institutions for all citizens, including the rulers, although again, enormous attention is paid to education.

Ever since ancient times, Plato's works have been the focus of intense scholarly and popular interest. The history of European political philosophy may be viewed as Alfred North Whitehead famously described it in his 1979 work, *Process and Reality,* as "a series of footnotes to Plato."

See also *Greek Democracy, Classical; Greek Political Thought, Ancient: Political Philosophy; Political Thought, Foundations of; Socrates.*

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Plebiscite

A plebiscite, also known as a referendum, is a direct vote where the electorate in question is asked to accept or reject a government policy, piece of legislation, constitution or constitutional amendment, or the recall of an elected official. In the context of legislative inaction, public demand for a plebiscite is also known as an *initiative.* A plebiscite can be politically obligatory or advisory. It is a form of direct democracy, which emphasizes the importance of citizen involvement and direct political participation. In contrast, representative democracy stresses the role of elected representatives.

However, a mutually exclusive differentiation of the two forms of democracy is not accurate, since plebiscites have been included successfully in representative democracies. Within complex systems of representative democratic institutions and processes, the use of government-initiated plebiscites at the national level has continued to increase in many Western democracies. Citizen-initiated plebiscites are still much less common. This is not necessarily an indication of increased democracy through direct measure, but rather, it could be indicative of strategic decisions and motives of governments. Governments may be motivated to consolidate power, resolve internal party divisions, pass legislation that would otherwise not be passed, or secure public approval of policies so as to avoid damage to government legitimacy.

With regard to the increase in government-initiated plebiscites, there is greater demand for citizen access to political decision-making processes. This focus on increased citizen action relates to increasing resources and political skills within the given electorate. Electorates who are more "adept" can be reliably involved in complex, political decision making and democratic processes. At the same time, there is a growing level of public cynicism toward government and government officials. This trend has resulted in greater disaffection toward politics and political institutions, ultimately resulting in reduced public confidence in traditional modes of democracy. Consequently, plebiscites are used increasingly as protective mechanisms for the public. In other words, plebiscites help to ensure that citizens' rights are secured while their opinions and demands are conveyed to their political leaders. By extension, the use of plebiscites may have increased based on *faux populism,* wherein various political groups and interest groups see plebiscites or referendums as new devices to "bend the use of popular political action to their own narrow purposes" (Craig, Kreppel, and Kane, 25–26).

Despite the increase in plebiscites, the outcome of these direct votes is still relatively uncertain. A few comparisons with elections are useful in this regard. For instance, the issue position of voters with regard to ballot content or its underlying political ideology is important in both plebiscites and elections, as is public trust in leaders and government. However, in plebiscites, political parties may align themselves with different sides of the debate, often in unexpected ways and ultimately complicating voter choice, especially given voters' party identification. This can cause a greater degree of volatility and uncertainty for the outcome of plebiscites, since voters do not have the expected partisan *cues* that are normally present during elections.

Additionally, various campaign effects and media coverage can result in greater levels of volatility and uncertainty in plebiscites than in elections. When plebiscites deal with issues that are familiar to the public, and which fall along previously defined ideological cleavages and core beliefs in society, the

outcome tends to be more certain. Where issues are unfamiliar or complex, increased volatility and uncertainty result.

Overall, plebiscites that deal with public policy issues or legislation are more likely to receive public support than those that revolve around constitutional changes or implementation. Plebiscites on constitutional issues are very different from policy plebiscites; the former deal with fundamental changes to government and institutional structures, while the latter are often relatively minor in nature. As a result, constitutional changes through plebiscites are more likely to fail than plebiscites that deal with other matters.

See also *Agenda Control; Constitution Amending Procedures; Direct Democracy; Electoral Rules; Initiative and Referendum; Voting Behavior.*

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Plekhanov, Grigorii Valentinovich

Grigorii Valentinovich Plekhanov (1856–1918) was a Russian writer and political activist often considered the "Father of Russian Marxism." Plekhanov began his revolutionary career during his university studies, joining the Land and Liberty organization, which hoped to foment revolution among the Russian peasantry. When this organization split in 1879, Plekhanov helped found Black Repartition, which rejected terrorism and advocated socialist propaganda campaigns. He was forced into exile in 1880, and in Europe he helped introduce Marxism into Russian revolutionary circles.

In 1882, Plekhanov published a translation of German philosopher Karl Marx's the *Communist Manifesto,* which included a foreword by Marx himself. A year later, Plekhanov cofounded the Emancipation of Labor group in Geneva, a Russian Marxist organization that turned away from the previously popular idea of peasant-based socialism and instead emphasized the potential for Russia's nascent working class as a force for change.

Plekhanov subsequently became the intellectual leader of the Russian Marxists. He insisted that a successful communist revolution in Russia would require two stages. Recognizing that Russia was not a leading capitalist state, he argued that the country would have to pass through a democratic-bourgeoisie revolution to eradicate remnants of feudalism and autocracy. Then, once working-class structures had developed more fully, Russia could produce a socialist revolution. Recognizing the weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie, he asserted that the country's working class would have to take the lead in both revolutions. To this end, he helped create the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) in 1898. In 1900, together with Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin, Plekhanov began publishing *Iskra* (Spark), a journal that was smuggled into Russia in attempt to convince Russians of the need for a socialist revolution.

A split occurred in the RSDLP at its second congress in 1903. Lenin argued for the creation of a small vanguard party of professional revolutionaries to bring a socialist revolution to Russia. Plekhanov, taking the mass-based Social Democratic Parties in the West as his model, disagreed. Lenin then formed his own party, the Bolsheviks, with Plekhanov joining the Mensheviks. Afterwards, Plekhanov used *Iskra* to attack Lenin for what he viewed as radical and dangerous ideas, predicting that Lenin's course would lead to a communist dictatorship over the Russian people.

After his hesitant support for the 1905 revolution in Russia, Plekhanov's influence in Marxist and revolutionary circles waned. In 1914, again in contrast to Lenin, he spoke in favor of Russia's involvement in World War I (1914–1918), and he returned to Russia only in March 1917 after the tsar had been overthrown, giving his support to the bourgeoisie-dominated Provisional Government. He condemned Lenin's seizure of power in November 1917, arguing that thrusting such power upon the Russian working class would lead to calamity.

Plekhanov's influence was most widely felt in his innovations to Marxism, and many would rank him as Russia's foremost Marxist intellectual. He produced works such as *Anarchism and Socialism* (1895) and *Fundamental Problems of Marxism* (1908). His *Development of the Monist View of History* (1895) traces the evolution of modern social thought and emphasizes the influence of German philosophers Georg W. F. Hegel and Ludwig Feuerbach on Marx, leading Plekhanov to be the first to characterize Marxism as a form of dialectical materialism.

Plekhanov asserted that this method could be applied to social, philosophical, and literary studies. Defending Marx's fundamental insights, he rejected the efforts of German political theorist Eduard Bernstein and other revisionist thinkers to "improve" Marx. Despite his disagreements with Lenin, many of Plekhanov's writings on Marx were held in high esteem in the Soviet Union, where his works were widely read.

See also *Bernstein, Eduard; Hegel, Georg W. F.; Lenin, Vladimir Ilich; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Political Theory; Russian Political Thought.*

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Pluralism

The notion of pluralism emerged in England and the United States during the early twentieth century as a conceptual response to the increasingly associative character of society, the rise of governmental interventionism, the lobbying activities of organized groups, and the nascence of immigrant subcultures. Pluralism may be defined as both a descriptive, or positive, theory and a prescriptive, or normative, theory of individual participation by social association in the political process. Positively, the concept establishes (1) the existence of a plurality of interests and corresponding social groups which, as latent centres of power, may organize into associations; and (2) the transformation of this diversity into public policies by means of pressures exerted on each other and on governments. Normatively, the concept endorses the formation of interest groups as subjects of democratic politics and the sequence of group conflict, bargaining, and compromise that characterize the shaping of public policies, on the condition that basic rights and principles of justice remain respected and protected.

TWO EARLY VARIETIES: SOCIOPOLITICAL AND ETHNOCULTURAL PLURALISM

British Labour Party intellectual Harold J. Laski gave the name *pluralism* to the approach in 1915. He borrowed the term from the pragmatist philosophy of William James, who had used it to describe the character of a "distributive" reality, contrasting with monist ideas, particularly Georg W. F. Hegel's, about a unified "block universe." Likewise inspired by James's philosophy, Horace M. Kallen introduced the term *cultural pluralism* into the American debate in 1924. Starting from the premise that unequal social resources will translate into unequal political resources, both Laski and Kallen advocated for reformist programs. Laski, in *Grammar of Politics* (1925), focused on diminishing the discretionary exercise of organizational power by economically powerful minorities. Kallen, in *Culture and Democracy* (1924), aimed at doing away with assimilationist pressures by culturally privileged majorities discriminating against immigrant ethnic groups.

Both agendas favored a politics of inclusion, in the sense that policy making in pluralist democracies should embrace, on an equitable basis, as many societal interests as possible. However, cultural pluralism should not be perceived as an exact analogue of political pluralism. The "identity-bearing communities" of the former contrast with the voluntary associations, or groups "by choice," of the latter variety. A potential conflict exists here between group life and the development of individual capacities, which is absent from political pluralism, and which public policies need to take into account.

Both varieties were rediscovered—in substance, if not through explicit recourse—after World War II (1939–1945). American political scientist Robert Dahl revived Laski's variety; Dahl, in his later works (*Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy,* 1982; *Democracy and its Critics,* 1989), returned to pluralism and the democratizing dimension that the British thinker had first supplied. This included industrial self-government and an employee-controlled economy as the main prerequisite of a more participatory democracy.

A succession of theorists rediscovered Kallen's notions; these theorists include Tariq Modood in Britain and Will Kymlicka in Canada, who both supported progressing toward multicultural acceptance, and avoiding both fragmentation and conformity. They promoted a plural state, informed by a *politics of recognition*, as the vehicle for achieving true multicultural citizenship.

GROUP THEORY AND ITS REEMERGENCE WITH THE COLD WAR

Even before Laski and Kallen, Arthur F. Bentley had presented an approach in 1908 that essentially reduced human behavior to group action. If the immediate impact of his book *The Process of Government* (1908) was negligible, that situation changed after a considerable number of pressure group studies were published in the United States between World War I (1914–1918) and World War II, and after the New Deal had finally established organized labor and organized agriculture as political players alongside business in bargaining for political benefits. Bentley's work was resuscitated in the 1950s by David B. Truman (*The Governmental Process,* 1951), Earl Latham (*The Group Basis of Politics,* 1952), and others who judged that organized interest groups made up the principal ingredient of present-day government. At the same time, against the backdrop of the cold war, the need was felt for a comprehensive theoretical perspective designed to explain and justify the political systems of the "free world," meaning the United States and Western Europe. Stripped of most of its prescriptive implications, elevated to the status of an antitotalitarian public philosophy, the concept of pluralism seemed to serve the purpose perfectly. The 1950s to 1970s were the heyday of the academic and political discourse on pluralist democracy.

Both Truman and Dahl, even in his early works, conceded that political activity, including control of group leaders and access to government, was determined—to a considerable extent—by income, education, and status. Cross pressures, resulting from conflicting group loyalties, might lead to political apathy. Political resources were unequally distributed between business and labor. Capitalist democracies thus offered extensive opportunities for "pyramiding" such resources into structures of social power and political influence. In view of these limitations, beginning in the mid-1970s, two avenues for further theorizing suggested themselves.

NEOCORPORATISM VERSUS DEMOCRATIZATION OF ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

One avenue to structure social power and political influence was to unequivocally embrace "realistic" Schumpeterianism,

fitting groups into a model of elitist democracy where governments would explicitly privilege the organizations of capital and labor as partners in policy making over associations with weaker political resources. Group leaders would manufacture consent for policies resulting from interest intermediation. Group members would consequently be controlled from above. Such liberal conceptions *neocorporatism*, as they came to be labelled, were particularly developed in, and focused on, Western Europe, with Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehm-bruch (*Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation,* 1979) in the forefront of neocorporatist writers.

The second alternative, according to Dahl, consisted in raising the normative question how one might remedy the so-called defects of pluralism. Looking for possible solutions to what "authority in a good society" might be like, Dahl—ever more critical of institutional rigidity, social inequality, and political apathy—suggested a "radical" alternative to the present status quo. The large business corporation became the major target for structural, participatory reforms, aimed at enfranchising blue- and white-collar employees.

Largely evolving separately from the debate on sociopolitical pluralism, discussions of ethnocultural pluralism have raised a number of thorny problems, not least among them the question of how to balance individual against group rights. Any determined movement in the direction of group rights might work to endanger individual autonomy, and bar individuals from opting out of their group by adopting ideas and practices running counter to their ethnocultural heritage. To be effective, policies of differentiated group treatment (e.g., affirmative action) may need to show an awareness of the connection between economic and cultural power. A more equitable distribution of social and political resources could, then, help individuals to make meaningful choices—including the choice to exit a group perceived as confining.

Put in a nutshell, what might be termed *successive pluralist research* has amounted to nothing less than a persistent inquiry into the theory and practice of democracy under changing socioeconomic and sociocultural conditions.

See also *British Political Thought; Political Participation.*

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Poetry and Politics

The relationship between politics and poetry predates written poetry with Homer's critical view of the Trojan War. However, its public policy significance was dormant until Plato theorized the benefits to society of banning poets in the *Republic.*

Plato was reacting to the unacknowledged yet real authority retained by Homer as offering the only communally accepted version of epiphanic moments in Greek social and political history. Plato goes so far as to describe poetry as "crippling to the mind," since its persuasive powers rest on the received pleasure of the reader rather than philosophically rigorous renditions of "the truth."

The view that the poet is the "unacknowledged legislator of society" is borne out of the view that the poet had historically legislated the parameters within which the cultural—and thereby the political—imagination was permitted to function. Humans cannot act rationally before they imagine an action and its consequences within those social parameters. The issue for Plato is that people are vulnerable to influences on their imaginative faculties by a persuasive third party. Such third parties now operate principally through the television or the Internet. However, for most of Western history, poetry remained the most effective genre of imaginative persuasion. The diminution of the influence of poetry has more than superficial consequences for the quality of political imagining, since poetry demands much more engagement than any contemporary media.

POETRY AND POLITICAL THOUGHT

Direct narrative or analytical approaches are *monological* in their effect. Their criterion of value is that the singular thesis of the author transmits as cleanly and completely into the mind of the reader as possible. The reader is required only to accept or reject the thesis, not to contemplate consequences other than those that the author or auteur presents. The well-written monological piece delivers all of its insights on the first reading. Considered visually, a monological reader's experience over time resembles a cylinder, with each reading experience as circular as the previous one. Poetry, on the other hand, is *helicoidal,* or screwlike, in nature. It assumes that a reader will read a poem several times over a given period of time, and each time the meanings embedded in the poem will become more tightly focused for the reader. As the reader becomes more familiar with the poem, its meaning becomes clearer—eventually resulting in a fine "point" of understanding, resembling the point of a screw.

These meanings do not necessarily correspond to the intentions of the author, since the reader seeks answers to questions that may not have occurred to the author when the poem was written. However, an inspired and sensitive poet was expected to have spoken the truth on any given subject—and even in some cases, such as Dante or John Milton, to have been divinely inspired to do so. Therefore, any political actor could not fail to encounter something of value to them by rereading a poem several times over. Indeed, for the allegorical author, the reader was expected to impose an individual interpretation on the text, beyond the narrow range of clues that the author provided. A medieval reader of Dante, for example, expected to read the *Commedia* not only at the literal level, but also at the typological, (allegorical), tropological (morally instructive), and perhaps, if the text permitted, at the anagogical level, which is the moment of insight that recognizes the presence of God.

Medieval political allegory was not primarily about finding universally valid answers to politically contingent problems; rather, it intended to illustrate broad aspects of the human drama, allowing an investigator to examine an issue from a multitude of different perspectives. The process is similar to that which one undergoes in appreciating a cubist work of art. While there is a more or less coherent image on the canvas, only by tracing the multiplicity of perspectives and surfaces presented, and then recombining them in the imagination, does one gain a sense of the profound depth of the object studied. One may never gain the full perspective of the artist, but one cannot help becoming more engaged than is possible with a masterful "realist" rendition of an object.

By providing no finality of thought, end position, or conclusion, political poetry presages many of the perspectival and positional insights offered by advocates of postmodern epistemology. Through an ongoing process of contemplation, it allows new and uncertain outcomes to be continuously evaluated and best-case scenarios to be worked out in advance of an actual crisis.

THE PLACE OF POETS IN POLITICS

No one elects poets to their posts, although popular acclaim provides the democratizing limits to their influence. In the nineteenth century, politically attentive poets enjoyed the benefits of a dramatically increased level of literacy among the lower orders, which encouraged them to investigate the romantic allure of individual liberty, universal suffrage, and democratic rights. Included in this democratizing trend were William Blake, William Wordsworth, Samuel Coleridge, Lord Byron, Percy Shelley, and John Keats. Although historically the bane of authoritarian regimes, poets are not exclusively prodemocratic in orientation. Modernist poets such as W. B. Yeats, T. S. Eliot, and especially Ezra Pound formed a famously antidemocratic collective with some members consciously verging on the fascistic. This tendency likely reflected the twentieth century's growing popular disinterest in poetry in favor of more visual—and thereby passive—media, returning poetry to the hands of highly educated elites with more rarified political interests. However, in less developed societies, authors continue to threaten authoritarian regimes (e.g., Václav Havel) and occasionally still die for their trouble (e.g., Ken Saro-Wiwa). In the West, poetry has largely lapsed into the indulgence of self-expression, which negates the broader application Victor Hugo or Robert Browning might once have had.

See also *Chartism; Language and Politics; Music, Political; Novel, Political; Political Communication; Protest Music; Satire, Political.*

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Polanyi, Karl

Karl Polanyi (1886–1964) was a Hungarian historian and political economist. His pathbreaking critique of neoclassical economics is regarded as one of the most important contributions to social scientific thought in the twentieth century. Raised in Budapest and educated at the University of Budapest and the University of Kolozsvár, Polanyi obtained a doctorate of law at the latter in 1909. His participation in the socialist student movement—especially his capacities as president of the progressive student group, the Galilei Circle—helped shape his intellectual development. Polanyi's early political life, which included a position as secretary of the National Bourgeois Radical Party, was interrupted by World War I (1914–1918) and two years of active military service on the Eastern Front as a cavalry officer in the Austro-Hungarian army.

Severe illness resulting from his military service left Polanyi hospitalized for a time. Upon his recovery, he made a living in Vienna, Austria, as a writer and editor for various academic and journalistic publications until he was forced into exile for the second time in 1933, fleeing to London in response to the rise of fascism in East Central Europe. This period is often considered to be a formative one for Polanyi's thinking, as it was in Vienna that he first became interested in neoclassical economic thought. In his exchanges on socialist accountancy with Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises, Polanyi set out to formulate a socialist theory of price formation that he believed would serve as a feasible democratic alternative to capitalist price theories based on supply and demand.

A three-year research grant from the Rockefeller Foundation for the years 1940 to 1943 afforded Polanyi the time to complete his magnum opus, *The Great Transformation* (1944), in the United States. The book analyzes the breakdown of the nineteenth-century laissez-faire liberal market order—an era which Polanyi argued was the single instance where efforts to impose a self-regulating market on society became a historical reality. The success of the book led to an appointment as a visiting professor in economics at New York's Columbia University in 1947, a position he held until his retirement in 1953. Because of his wife's past involvement in the Communist Party, Polanyi and his family settled in Canada, obliging him to commute to New York.

In recent years, debate has proliferated over how to interpret Polanyi's argument in *The Great Transformation*. One position holds that Polanyi's main purpose is to demonstrate how the self-destructive process of disembedding the market from society—achieved by subjecting the "fictitious commodities" of land, labor, and money to market discipline—is inevitably met by a countermovement of social protection seeking to reembed the economy in social relations. Achieved historically with the post–World War II (1939–1945) emergence of

the Keynesian welfare state, this countermovement serves the essential function of stabilizing capitalist social relations.

Another position accepts that Polanyi's purpose is to illuminate the destabilizing tendencies of the self-regulating market, yet it offers a fundamentally different interpretation of his arguments about the relationship between social protection and that market. Rather than seeing social protection as a "taming" force under capitalism, this position argues that Polanyi wants to demonstrate how all historical countermovements for social protection in the laissez-faire context, such as the poor laws of the 1830s, only exacerbate crises if they do not lead to the complete decommodification of the three fictitious commodities.

These competing interpretations lead to divergent assessments of the normative character and empirical validity of Polanyi's work: the former regards Polanyi as a reformist who insightfully understood the necessity of social policies in capitalist societies; the latter sees him as a revolutionary who, given the relative prosperity and social consensus of the postwar "golden age," had underestimated the prospects for capitalist stability.

See also *Marxism; Political Economy.*

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Police Powers

In the United States, police power refers to the authority granted to state governments giving them the ability to make laws that maintain order and safeguard the health, morals, public safety, and welfare of state citizens. This term is interpreted expansively and does not refer simply to the narrow subject of law enforcement. The source of this type of state authority stems from the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which declares: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." In other words, this constitutional provision says that those powers not assigned to the national government end up residing with the states.

These so-called reserved powers as guaranteed in the Tenth Amendment operate to protect the states' role in the U.S. federal system. Police powers are an important aspect of these reserved powers. State legislatures exercise their respective police power by directly enacting statues as well as by delegating such authority to their subordinate governmental entities in the form of counties, municipalities, and special districts. Much of what state and local governments do is a function of their police powers' authority.

CLARIFICATION BY THE COURTS ON THE RANGE OF POLICE POWERS

The constitutionally acceptable range and reach of police powers is a challenge to precisely determine. It covers various governmental regulations of myriad activities and various relationships. Leading examples of the legitimate exercise of police powers include regulations placed on the following: speed limits on roadways, the licensing of professions and trades, zoning and land use, marriage, gambling, prostitution, discrimination, parking, alcoholic beverages, education, health, business and contracts, sanitation, the workplace, and crime. Disputes have inevitably arisen over how far government can go in the exercise of this power.

Generally speaking, in the last several decades, the courts have ruled in favor of the government when the laws in question are concluded to truly advance the public good. This comes with the recognition that the state must have the necessary discretion to determine for itself what constitutes the public need and the best way to reach that goal via its statutes. Thus, in the current era, the courts manifest some deference to the legislature in this regard—all levels of the federal courts have demonstrated a reluctance to strike down such laws, except for statutes seen as infringing upon free speech, free exercise of religion, and fair hearing procedural protections.

To be constitutionally acceptable, a particular exercise of the police powers by the state must be congruent with both the U.S. Constitution and the relevant state constitution, especially in terms of the protections as laid out in the due process clause found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Thus, if a law is enacted on the basis of police powers, and that law does not promote the health, morals, safety, or welfare of the public, it is more prone to be struck down as an unconstitutional violation of due process guarantees of life, liberty, and property. The typical grounds for such litigation is the contention that such a law constitutes the government's illegal "taking" of a private citizen's actual property or otherwise hinders the citizen's use of that property.

POLICE POWERS AND FEDERALISM VERSUS STATES' RIGHTS

According to traditional constitutional theory, the federal government does not possess police powers per se in the same way that state governments do. The federal government is considered one of the directly expressed or enumerated powers as laid out in the Constitution, coupled then with implied powers that allow the federal government to carry out those enumerated powers. The "necessary and proper" clause in Article I of the Constitution, then, has been interpreted by some as

serving as the functional source of federal police powers, with the qualifier that federal laws must find some relatively specific basis in the enumerated powers set out in the Constitution. State laws can find their legitimacy in the more open-ended notion of police powers, as part of a state's reserved powers.

State and federal court decisions constitute one of the primary sets of constraints on state police powers and the U.S. Supreme Court has played a particularly salient role in clarifying the extents and limits of police powers as well as the nature of federal-state relations in this regard. There is a dynamic and evolutionary quality to this area of jurisprudence, as membership changes on the high court bring about differing perspectives and subsequent legal precedents on such state regulations. Before 1937, dominated by business-friendly and conservative justices, the Supreme Court was quite willing to strike down as unconstitutional many state laws that drew their inherent police powers as their authority. A prime example is *Lochner v. New York* (1905), when the Court rejected the "liberty of contract" as an abridgement of a New York state law that limited the number of hours bakers could work on a weekly basis— this "liberty" abridgment for the Court was a due process violation. This trend abated when membership on the Court changed and President Franklin Roosevelt was able to appoint more liberal justices who abandoned the prior orientation and started to uphold such state laws.

This remains an ongoing legal and societal debate in the current era about what constitutes the appropriate extent of state police powers. Contemporary examples include political controversies and court cases revolving around regulation of smoking in public areas, regulation of pornography online, and government surveillance after the attacks of September 11, 2001. The question over the proper level of tradeoff between individual liberty, on one hand, and the ability of government to ensure order, on the other, remains at the heart of police powers debates and discussions.

See also *Federalism; State, Functions of the; States' Rights.*

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Police State

Police state signifies a highly centralized form of government, with the state pervading virtually all components of society. Political dissent and opposition are aggressively suppressed, and the populace's fear of and intimidation by the government are a constant. For police states, governmental authorities' control over society is at a premium and any means available to do so are used with no regard for individual civil liberties or fundamental human rights—including unconstrained mass surveillance, no free press, meaningless elections, detention without trial, and the use of state terror on its own people. Governmental power is extraordinarily concentrated, state propaganda is at its most cultivated, and ruthless repression is essential. Police state is generally considered as a disparaging synonym for totalitarianism.

Political scientists Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski promulgated the now classic and widely accepted definition of the police state, or totalitarian, pattern in their seminal 1956 work *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy.* Their totalitarian criteria consist of the following primary elements: an official, dominant state ideology with the purpose of bringing about an improved and ultimately perfected set of conditions for society; a dictator who commands a single ruling political party; an all-powerful secret police whose methods include terror; government monopolization of the mass media; government monopolization of the possession of arms; and complete state control of the national economy.

Leading examples of police states include both fascist and communist dictatorships, such as Italy under Benito Mussolini, from 1922 to 1945; Germany under Adolph Hitler, from 1933 to 1945; the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin, from 1930s until 1953; Romania under Nicolae Ceausescu, from 1974 to 1989; and North Korea under Kim Il-Sung and followed by his son Kim Jong-Il, from 1948 until the present. Leaders in these police states commonly attempt to take on a heroic, almost divine, aura around them as they symbolize, personify, and represent the incarnation of the state. Brutal repression and silencing of any political opposition is a given in this type of statist regime.

As adduced, a police state or totalitarian regime has a specific and technical political science definition. In more common parlance and daily political discourse, the term is more readily bandied about when a critic wishes to denounce actions taken by a government that are interpreted to intrude upon individual liberties or political expression. There is no strict tipping point or threshold that directly determines whether a nation can be considered as a police state per se; that is, there are degrees of being a police state depending on the governance dimension under examination, but the historical examples are clear manifestations of a police state in operation. A country possessing police state attributes in some aspects does not necessarily fall into this category—the totality of the governance structure and regime orientation must be assessed before the political science categorization can be accurately applied.

Political activists, in their rhetorical choices as part of their own country's or international political debates, are much less

The North Korean military parades through a square in Pyongyang to mark the anniversary of the nation's founding. President Kim Jong-Il represents himself as an incarnation of the state and exacts brutal repression to maintain his regime.

SOURCE: Corbis

constrained when using this term, such as accusations that the United States is becoming a police state in its use of warrantless mass surveillance in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, or its use of indefinite detention without trial or *habeas corpus* of suspected terrorists. Invoking the term *police state* with the past specters of Nazi Germany or Stalin's Soviet Union shadowing such rhetoric is intrinsically incendiary and emotively powerful. Recipients of such political expression or analysis must evaluate the speaker's accuracy or relevance of such categorizing pronouncements.

See also *Autocracy; Civil-military Relations; Communism; Fascism; Police Powers; Predatory Government; State Repression; Totalitarianism.*

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Policy Analysis

Policy analysis is a method of inquiry to examine governmental activity that provides a systematic way to assess the consequences of past policy actions and the alternatives available to address societal problems. Hence, it can be used for both retrospective and prospective purposes.

The field of policy analysis has evolved considerably. Early policy research focused almost exclusively on the economic elements of governmental actions. Over the years, policy analysis expanded to incorporate a wider range of factors, drawing from such fields as political science, sociology, and geography. A number of factors have driven the development of policy analysis research, including advancements in analytic techniques, greater citizen demands for more systematic information about government, and the wider availability of relevant data. As of the early twenty-first century, policy analysis incorporated an array of different analytical procedures and methodological approaches.

One of the main questions about policy analysis concerns whether it should be performed by those who make or implement policy decisions—such as legislative staffs and administrators—or by those who work outside of the policy process—such as consultants, academics, policy advocates. Internal policy analysis can produce more useful, detailed

information, but it might also be less independent and comprehensive. On the other hand, external policy analysis may yield more objective information, but it may be less useful, timely, and relevant for policy makers.

Another question is whether policy analysis should focus only on the technical aspects of a problem and avoid any political elements. Some question whether policy analysis can be apolitical. Although it aims to provide an objective, systematic account of governmental activity, it can also be used for political purposes to generate support for existing governmental programs and future policy proposals. Hence, it is difficult to separate the technical and political components of policy analysis.

Policy analysis has become an integral component of the contemporary policy-making process. It produces information that allows assessment of the consequences of past decisions, and helps determine the merits of future governmental actions.

See also *Policy Evaluation; Policy Innovation; Public Policy.*

SAUNDRA K. SCHNEIDER AND
. . . . REBECCA E. BROMLEY-TRUJILLO

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Policy-centered Entrepreneurship

Policy-centered entrepreneurship, or simply policy entrepreneurship, refers to opportunity-driven activity with the aim to influence policy. Policy entrepreneurship is a discrete and observable process in politics consisting of recognizing an opportunity to change policy, acting on the opportunity, and, consequently, materially affecting policy.

The policy-entrepreneurship process begins with any sort of political actor—be it a politician, civil servant, interest group, a citizen activist, or anyone with a stake in a particular policy—being alert to an opportunity to influence policy in some meaningful way and then seizing that opportunity. The recognized opportunity must be acted on; simply being aware of an opportunity is not by itself sufficient to constitute policy entrepreneurship. There is little evidence that policy-centered entrepreneurs are a select group. Rather, policy-centered entrepreneurship is better characterized as a universal behavior that can be carried out by any political actor in the policy process, ranging from "street-level" bureaucrats and lobbyists to legislators and presidents. The nature of the opportunity to change policy can be objective (e.g., becoming aware of new needs of a community or demands from a constituency) or subjective (e.g., realizing that sudden attention to a policy area or a shift in the political winds makes it the right time to introduce specific policy change). Some well-known examples of policy entrepreneurship in the United States include Robert Moses leading the establishment of the New York Port Authority, William Mulholland setting up the water supply system for Los Angeles in the early 1900s, and Admiral Hyman Rickover's reinvention of the U.S. Navy. The idea of policy entrepreneurship in political science and policy studies has evolved differently than the modern conception of entrepreneurship in economics, though there are some recent indications of possible convergence in the future.

THE MODERN CONCEPTION OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN ECONOMICS

The modern conception of entrepreneurship in economics principally derives from the work of three economists: Joseph Schumpeter, Ludwig von Mises, and Israel Kirzner. In his two major works *The Theory of Economic Development* (1934) and *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (1950), Schumpeter conceives of *creative destruction*, in which entrepreneurship consists of new combinations of existing resources that drive economic development, such as introducing a new good or a new method of production, opening of a new market, taking over a new source of supply of raw materials or half-manufactured goods, and carrying out the new organization of any industry.

The other two economists—Mises and Kirzner—belong to what is usually considered the Austrian school of economics. In his magnum opus *Human Action* (1949), Mises identifies entrepreneurship as a behavior universal to all activity. Entrepreneurship, he writes, "is not the particular feature of a special group or class of men; it is inherent in every action and burdens every actor." Consciously expanding on Mises's conception, Kirzner in his primary works on entrepreneurship theory—*Competition and Entrepreneurship* (1973), a book chapter in *Method, Process, and Austrian Economics: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises* (1982), and a journal article in *Journal of Economic Literature* (1997)—locates entrepreneurship as the driver of all market processes in that entrepreneurial market participants acquire "more and more accurate and complete mutual knowledge of potential demand and supply attitudes," thus *equilibrating,* or stabilizing, a market by moving it closer to equilibrium between supply and demand. Only a few recent political scientists—including Mark Schneider, Paul Teske, and Adam Sheingate—explicitly incorporate the modern conception of entrepreneurship in economics into their research involving policy entrepreneurship.

ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLICY STUDIES

The idea of policy entrepreneurship in political science and policy studies originated independently and evolved separately from the modern conception of entrepreneurship in economics. The earliest conceptions of policy entrepreneurship appeared in the 1960s and continued through the 1970s as largely public choice conceptions. For example, Richard Wagner in his review of Mancur Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action* identifies political entrepreneurs as the broad group of individuals who supply collective benefits for an unspecified "political profit." For another example, Norman Frohlich, Joe Oppenheimer, and Oran Young amplify this public choice conception by arguing that public sector entrepreneurs should be considered economic actors, rationally calculating the personal costs and benefits of providing public goods hoping for later political payoff. These earliest conceptions of policy entrepreneurship are significant in recognizing that there is significant public sector activity with material policy impact not adequately accounted for with the available stock of political science and policy studies terminology and concepts.

The idea of policy entrepreneurship began to solidify into a powerful theoretical construct with the work of William Riker and John Kingdon in the 1980s as they both developed distinct functional conceptions. Riker endows his conceptualization of policy entrepreneurship with the function of destabilizing previously stable voting situations, culminating in *The Art of Political Manipulation* (1986) and its notion of *heresthetics* as the art of "managing and manipulating and maneuvering" a voting situation in order to accomplish a desired policy outcome. Kingdon in *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (1986) offers an influential conception of policy entrepreneurship with the function of *coupling*, or joining the streams of problems, policies, and politics either by promoting preferred policy alternatives or by "[lying] in wait for a [policy] window to open." Riker and Kingdon also can be jointly credited with conceiving of the term *policy entrepreneurship*.

Since the 1990s, political scientists and policy researchers continue to develop Riker and Kingdon's construct of policy entrepreneurship while pushing the idea in new directions. Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones explicitly build their theory of policy entrepreneurship for punctuated equilibrium theory on Riker and Kingdon's previous work. In *Agendas and Instability in American Politics* (1993), policy entrepreneurs seek out alternative, more receptive institutional venues for their policies in the hope of favorably influencing the policy image. Daniel Carpenter devises a theory of *bureaucratic entrepreneurship*, which he defines as "the incremental selling of new program ideas through experimentation and piecemeal coalition building," in order to account for the forging of bureaucratic autonomy. In addition, Adam Sheingate renders political entrepreneurs as "individuals whose creative acts have transformative effects on politics, policies, or institutions." Sheingate's political entrepreneurship is one of the recent works that incorporates Schumpeter and Kirzner, potentially indicating some future convergence between the modern conception of entrepreneurship in economics and policy-centered entrepreneurship in political science and policy studies, as well as providing a boundary for the term.

See also *Policy Innovation; Policy Theory.*

. . . . GORDON SHOCKLEY

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Policy Evaluation

A policy evaluation is the last step in the policy-making process, after agenda setting, policy formulation, decision making, and implementation. It refers to the use of empirical social science research methods to assess the success or failure of policies for feedback or termination.

A policy evaluation can be conducted within a government, by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), by think tanks, or by researchers in academia. The purpose of an evaluation is to determine the effectiveness of a policy. In other words, an evaluation must ascertain the extent to which a policy has reached its stated, as well as its unstated, objectives. Conclusions about this can only be reached through the solid understanding of the logic or theory underlying the policy.

The concept of effectiveness must be understood in a broad way to refer both to the policy's outcomes and its efficiency. To effectively measure outcomes, researchers take into consideration the policy's outputs as well as its short- and medium-term impact. Responsiveness to the policy, or the way it is being received by the targeted audience, are also part of a thorough evaluation. In order to measure efficiency, some form of cost-benefit analysis is most often employed. When

considering efficiency, the evaluation may also refer to the efficiency of the policy process itself and focus particularly on implementation.

Policy evaluations can be done using either qualitative or quantitative research methods or a combination of both. Although experimental designs were preferred in earlier years, pluralist and participative approaches have since gained in popularity.

At the very least, two practical issues arise when conducting an evaluation. First, policy objectives, as well as the policy logic, are not always clearly stated or obvious. This lack of clarity is compounded in cases where the policy has been in effect for many years and the policy logic is assumed but not clearly explained. Second, there are difficult methodological issues pertaining especially to the use of quantitative methods that arise when attempting to measure outcomes and efficiency. In particular, it is complicated to control for all relevant intervening variables, which makes it difficult, though not impossible, to determine the long-term impact of a policy.

The most important impediment to proper policy evaluation, however, is political. There are no fixed criteria for defining policy success. The results of evaluations rest with decision makers who decide on the appropriate course of action to follow in responding to them. Ultimately, decision makers also react to current political circumstances. In an age of intense popular and media scrutiny, governments are hard-pressed to acknowledge errors and recommend appropriate changes. Opposition parties believe that it is their role to highlight policy failures. An evaluation is, therefore, and often unavoidably, tainted by partisan considerations. Although evaluations aim to be neutral, the results can also reflect the policy preferences of the researchers. These considerations suggest that it may be better to think of policy evaluation as policy learning—an essential element of policy debates.

Policy evaluations, along with audits and program evaluations, reflect the continued trend towards ever-increasing governmental accountability.

See also *Policy Analysis; Policy Theory; Public Policy; Public Policy Development; Qualitative Analysis; Qualitative Methodologies; Quantitative Analysis.*

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Policy Innovation

Policy innovation refers to a political system's adoption of a policy that is different from past policy actions. Although other jurisdictions may have already initiated similar measures, policy innovation occurs when a government enacts a policy that is new to that particular governmental unit. This definition derives from the ideas of some of the first social scientists to examine this topic, such as Lawrence Mohr, Jack Walker, and Everett Rogers, and it continues to encompass key elements of contemporary research on policy innovation.

A number of models explain why policy innovation occurs. In many of these frameworks, the causes or stimulants of policy innovation are divided into two categories: internal characteristics and external pressures. Internal determinants are factors within a governmental jurisdiction that stimulate innovative activity. These incorporate political characteristics such as executive leadership, bureaucratic professionalization, citizen ideology, governmental structure, and partisan competition, as well as socioeconomic factors, which can include financial resources, physical capacity, and the demographic characteristics of the population.

Policy innovation can also occur because of external factors that originate from outside of a political system. These external determinants often deal with the actions of other governmental units, either within the same political system or in other political systems. Some scholars contend that external factors help to simplify policy making, allowing decision makers in one political system to copy or emulate the actions of others; other scholars believe that external determinants create a competitive environment in which comparable governmental units compete against each other to adopt certain policies quickly; still others think that the process works "horizontally" with governmental jurisdictions at higher (or lower) levels exerting influence on others within the same political structure.

Much of the political science research on policy innovation focuses on the adoption and spread of public policies within the United States. Although the findings of this research vary somewhat from study to study, there are some consistent results. States are more likely to innovate if they are in good fiscal health, if they have professional bureaucracies and legislative systems, and if they possess the political will to do so. External determinants are also quite important. However, scholars present different conclusions about which external stimulants are most relevant and how they operate across different policy areas. Some scholars believe that regional factors are most important (i.e., the proximity of neighboring states that have already adopted a policy), while others identify the influence of the national government on state-level behavior. Still others focus on channels of communication that exist between state-level actors as the key determinants of subsequent policy adoptions.

Policy innovation is also examined using different conceptualizations of the process (i.e., interactions between governmental jurisdictions within the same political system) and within different political systems outside of the United States. This research indicates that national-level actions can spur innovativeness at the state and local levels. Similarly, subnational actions can propel national governments to pursue new policy initiatives. Also, the policy innovations of one nation can stimulate other nations to adopt similar policies.

Many unanswered questions remain about the process of policy innovation. Part of this is because scholars use different approaches and methodologies, focus on different types of variables, look at different policy areas (e.g., welfare, health care, energy, environmental regulation, and taxation), and focus on different aspects of the process (i.e., the initial adoption of a policy, the sequence of subsequent adoptions, or the spread of adoptions). As a result, it is difficult to synthesize this research, derive generalizations across policy areas and political systems, and present clear explanations about the process of policy innovation.

There are still many aspects of the process that require further study. How should one measure and analyze policy innovation? Should one look at aggregate-level factors of a political system or individual-level attributes of decision makers within a governmental jurisdiction? Should a researcher incorporate both internal and external determinants within the same analysis? Does policy innovation work the same way across political systems as it does within a given political system? Does policy innovation vary across program areas? Does policy innovation operate differently at different points in time? What impact will contemporary pressures, constraints, and problems (i.e., globalization, economic recessions, internal domestic conflicts, international tensions, etc.) have on the propensity of governmental systems to innovate?

See also *Policy Evaluation; Public Policy.*

SAUNDRA K. SCHNEIDER AND
. . . . REBECCA E. BROMLEY-TRUJILLO

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Policy Meta-analysis

Policy meta-analysis is a research method that involves the quantitative analysis of independent data sets or other studies. It seeks to develop a synthesis of existing information and conclusions. The approach typically uses quantitative software or other computer programs to conduct large-scale reviews of primary studies or sources, or existent databases.

Policy meta-analysis was created in an effort to apply a strict methodology to reviews of literature and secondary sources. Nonetheless, it is difficult to achieve true objectivity since shared research biases or subjectivity in the original studies can shape of influence the outcomes of policy meta-analysis, often referred to as *garbage in, garbage out*. In addition, flaws or mistakes in the original data will be replicated in any resultant meta-analysis. Any inherent bias or subjectivity of the meta-analysis can color the outcomes. For instance, researchers make decisions on the size, boundaries, and scope of the analysis. Critics also assert that many meta-analyses bring together disparate studies that should not be analyzed together.

Policy meta-analyses do, however, provide a number of benefits to researchers. The approach allows scholars to identify trends or phenomena across multiple studies that may not have been apparent in the original analyses.

See also *Statistical Analysis.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Policy Networks and Communications

While there are several definitions of policy networks, there is widespread agreement among scholars that these networks are formed by the patterns of relations between interdependent actors—most commonly identified as politicians, interest groups, public citizens, corporations, or foreign figures—involved in processes affecting the design or implementation of public policy. By definition, the interdependency characterizing these relationships requires actors to engage in communication exchanges with one another. Hence, the study of policy networks always goes hand in hand with the study of the communication processes occurring within those networks.

Earlier sociological studies on interorganizational theory produced in the 1940s and 1950s, as well as by the work of resource exchange theorists dating to the 1960s, influenced research on communication and policy networks. The underlying assumption in resource exchange theory is organizations or individuals do not have the totality of resources they need to guarantee their own survival or reach their political goals. As a result of such scarcity, organizations or individuals engage in exchanges with their peers, and attempt to acquire scarce resources in exchange for those they hold in abundance. The exchange of resources rests in the establishment of clear communication channels between the actors in the network.

EVALUATING SOCIAL NETWORKS AND COALITIONS

Despite its early roots, the first explicit efforts to systematically study communication in policy networks did not take place until the mid-1980s. Edward Laumann and David Knoke's (1987) seminal study on the U.S. energy and health policy domains presented the first detailed exploration of how communication inside policy networks affect the behavior of the individual components of those networks. Furthermore, this study also evaluated how communication impacted the overall performance of these policy networks. Using social

network analysis (SNA) techniques, the authors demonstrated how communication between parties unfolds, capturing the frequency and duration of such communication exchanges and then observing the effects on organizational behavior.

Through SNA, it was established that observed lengthy communication channels between parties can help identify potential coalition partners, and successful collective action depends on the trustworthy transmission of information from each party. Additionally, Laumann and Knoke reported the common finding that communication among some nodes in a network was only possible due to the mediating role of one or more central organizations that formed the core of the network. When considered together, these findings point to information flows affecting policy outcomes, and to the importance of certain actors in some circumstances as regulators, brokers, or managers of communication flows.

This research tradition impacted newer theories and frameworks that study policy processes. For example, the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), developed by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith in 1993, proposes actors in policy subsystems form coalitions based on shared policy core beliefs that will translate to specific policy views. The establishment of clear communication channels among the members of a coalition is critical to maintain its stability, as well as its capacity to influence the policy-making process. However, communication does not happen inside coalitions alone. In fact, coalitions must remain informed about the policy positions and potential moves of their opponents, therefore communication between coalitions must also be secured.

Policy brokers are usually the ones in charge of securing such communication. In general, this proposition agrees with the empirical results obtained from the initial studies of policy domains. In addition, students of the ACF's emphasis on brokers echoes other work in political science that has unearthed the importance of brokers in policy systems as the main facilitators of collaborative relationships among the actors that partake in policy networks.

EXAMINING SPECIFIC LINES OF COMMUNICATION

Communication in policy networks is also discussed in the realm of public management studies, which pay special attention to how communication in policy networks affects the performance of actors who are active in fragmented decision-making systems. However, despite the interest of scholars regarding communication processes in policy networks, it is not common to see precise descriptions of how such communication processes unfold. A notable exception from a conceptual standpoint is the 1997 work of L. Schaap and M. J. W. van Twist, which portrays communication as a complex double process, where exchange of information occurs between each individual actor and the network as a whole but also between actors on a dyadic level.

The former type of communication simply occurs when an actor makes its presence known to others in the policy domain. This facilitates the process of *subjectification* of the

actor, or its recognition as a legitimate part of the network. The second type of communication between actor to actor is much more specific because it involves two parties. In this second variant of communication, actors expose each other to their *frames of reference*, or the cognitive filters used to process and understand reality. This exchange nurtures the building of coalitions and the construction of common identities. There are clear parallels between this proposition and the process of coalition building described by Sabatier and his colleagues.

Finally, researchers who explain the diffusion of policy innovation also make an important contribution to the study of communication in policy networks. For instance, Michael Mintrom and Sandra Vergari find policy entrepreneurs in the United States are highly active in policy networks and more likely to achieve their goal of promoting education reforms at the state level because their participation in the networks allows them to: (1) gather novel information about innovative policy responses to problems, and (2) communicate the need for such reforms more effectively to policy makers who can affect change. The role of communication channels on the diffusion of innovation has also been studied in other policy domains. For example, Jacqui True and Michael Mintrom found the transnational networking activities of nonstate actors is the primary force driving the diffusion of gender mainstreaming bureaucracies in many countries.

Despite the abundance of research studies on how communication unfolds in policy networks, the field still lacks a comprehensive theoretical structure. Further research needs to present precise hypothetical relationships linking communication structures in the networks to individual behavior and policy outcomes. This remains the task for the next generation of policy networks' scholars.

See also *Advocacy Coalition Networks; Policy Theory; Political Network Analysis; Public Policy Development; Stages Model of Policy Process; Transnational Movements.*

. . . .   RAMIRO BERARDO

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Policy Theory

Policy theory is the set of principles and rules regarding public policies. Such definition immediately highlights the product of political action. Indeed, according to Harold Lasswell and Daniel Lerner's classical 1951 definition, policy represents "a systematic attempt to shape the future" (ix).

THE PRAGMATIC PERSPECTIVE OF POLICY ANALYSIS

Policy sciences have developed only recently, when the necessity of state intervention for correcting economic deficiencies—the presence of what Alfred Chandler termed in 1977 the *visible hand* in market activities—has led to the formation of a field of research aimed at locating data and providing interpretations relevant to the policy problems. In the United States, Roosevelt's New Deal in 1932 was one of the first political programs to require allocative rationality, contributing to the affirmation of a scientist approach to problem solving.

Thus, as far as the ideological roots of policy theory are concerned, John Dewey's pragmatism and Rudolf Carnap's logical positivism constituted natural attitudes for a political scientist. Also, a normative and quasi-ethic dimension often combines with such a rationalist tendency, considering that policy analysis seems to represent a practical philosophy that guides public action to design better systems of government. Consequently, "changing the world with knowledge" represents an implicit objective of policy analysis.

POLICY SCIENCE IMPERATIVES

Describing policy science in a few statements includes three main imperatives: (1) a belief that the consequences of governmental action are important and predictable, (2) a holistic approach to political processes, and (3) the idea that knowledge may be useful for improving public decision making and for the quality of democracy.

Theodore Lowi's contributions to policy science reflect such imperatives. He considers public policies as an instrument for political action, the first imperative, defining them in 1972 as "deliberate coercion-statements attempting to set forth the purpose, the means, the subjects, and the objects of coercion" (86). Some years later, in 1985, Lowi clarified that such statements are rules "formulated by some governmental authority, expressing an intention to influence the behavior of citizens, individually or collectively, by use of positive or negative sanctions" (70).

Lowi's attempts to formulate a classificatory definition of public policy denote an encompassing approach to political process—reflecting the second public policy imperative of holism. This aspect is present in Lowi's classical articles, which

have provided the most relevant effort to analyze public policies, based on two variables: likelihood of coercion, which may be concrete or remote; and proximity of governmental coercion, which may be connected to individual or environmental application. In his view, different areas of policies—regulatory, constitutive, distributive, or redistributive—are capable of producing specific "arenas of power."

In this way, Lowi's categorization explains the rich and scarcely cumulative literature of case studies diffused in the American political science literature up until his work emerged. Instead of attempting to find relationships that hold across the entire range of public policies, he argues that one should focus investigation within one of the four policy classifications. This is because relationships among important concepts or variables that may be quite strong when policies of one kind are involved may be much weaker, or even totally absent, when other types of policies are concerned. For the first time, the hypothesis "policy determines politics" is introduced—an important and alternative way to look at the political life.

James Wilson presented a similar approach in 1980, although his public policies typology focuses mainly on cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, his classification represents the base for defining four types of politics: interest group politics, client politics, entrepreneurial politics, and majoritarian politics. Yet according to some critics, such taxonomy leads to underestimation of the classical themes of political research—power, conflict, consensus—for leaving the place to cost-benefit considerations.

THE PRESCRIPTIVE DIMENSION

Other theories seek to unpack public policy process in developmental stages. Interpreting policy as a problem-solving activity, most authors find a forerunner in John Dewey and his pragmatic philosophy when they break up decision making in several steps: problem identification, research of solutions, decision, implementation, and evaluation. A research strategy helps to analyze complex processes and cope with the multiplicity of involved actors. Although the stage model accompanies the institutionalization of political science as a discipline, descriptions of policy cycle are often criticized as depicting a sequential model process when, in fact, policy making is complex and interactive.

Although public policies are determined by the continuous interaction between various actors, public and private, in each phase of policy process, policy theory tends to reduce political complexity, concentrating on the solution for problems that is perceived as publicly relevant and thus requires a *collective solution*.

The third imperative of policy science is its constant reference to the improvement of democratic policy making. Indeed, another core element of policy studies is that they present a frequent tendency to translate what Hugh Heclo considers "theories into concrete policy guidance, or short of guidance, into 'methodological' advice about policy making." Policy studies are about the production and application of multidisciplinary knowledge *of* and *in* policy: for this reason

"speaking the truth to power" remains their main mission—and promise.

More generally, the development of policy theory strongly ties to a pragmatic conception of democracy, which emphasizes the dimension of responsiveness by giving centrality to outputs of a political system and to its capacity for problem solving. It pays attention to themes of political performance more than to competition, social conflict, and ideological contraposition. Rediscovering its functionalist basis (i.e., the sociological paradigm that considers all parts of society necessary for the survival of society as a whole), policy theory denotes a sort of satisfaction with political systems: the real question seems to be how to improve social life, ignoring the problem of how to change it.

See also *Policy Analysis; Political Theory; Public Policy; Public Policy Development.*

. . . .   FORTUNATO MUSELLA

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Political Action Committee (PAC)

In the United States, political action committees (PACs) allow individuals to band together to contribute money to candidates. Federal law never actually mentions political action committees, which it instead refers to as *multi-candidate political committees.* Such a committee must have at least fifty-one members, have been registered with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) for at least six months, and must contribute to at least five candidates. Such a committee may collect up to $5,000 from any individual per campaign cycle and may give $5,000 per candidate per campaign. PACs may be nonconnected, or they may be sponsored by another organization, such as a corporation, trade association, or labor union; however, corporate treasury funds and union dues may not be contributed to a PAC.

Political action committees arose as a means to circumvent restrictions on political contributions by corporations and labor unions. In the late nineteenth century, political parties became increasingly dependent upon big business for financing electoral activity, which led to calls for reform. The Tillman Act of 1907 and the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 both banned corporate contributions to federal campaigns; neither law had much effect, as corporations found numerous ways around them. During the New Deal era, labor unions became major financial supporters of Franklin Roosevelt and the Democratic Party, and in 1943, Congress passed the War Labor Disputes Act—usually known as "Smith-Connally" after its sponsors—which forbade direct contributions by labor unions to federal campaigns.

In order to circumvent Smith-Connally, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), the more politicized of the nation's two labor federations, created the CIO Political Action Committee, which could solicit contributions from union members. Soon, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) founded its own PAC, and by 1968, there were thirty-seven labor PACs, spending $7.1 million in that year's elections.

Few corporations found it advantageous to create political action committees, but this changed dramatically in the 1970s because of the actions of organized labor. A federal court decision, the so-called Pipefitters case, threatened unions' ability to operate PACs. Organized labor persuaded Congress to add provisions to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 that formally recognized the right of corporations and labor unions to form political action committees. FECA and the Supreme Court's overturning of the Pipefitters decision led to a boom in corporation PAC formation. After the fundraising abuses of the Nixon campaign of 1972, Congress revisited FECA in 1974, restricting individual contributions to $1,000 per candidate per campaign. Donors could give up to $5,000 to PACs, which could, in turn, give the same amount to candidates. In 1975, the Federal Election Commission informed Sun Oil that it could use corporate treasury funds to pay for the administrative and overhead costs of its PAC, and this action accelerated the PAC explosion, particularly among corporations. From 1974 to 1986, the number of PACs almost quadrupled, from 1,146 to 4,157 and their contributions surged from $12.5 million to $105 million. Since then, the number of PACs has leveled off, but contributions continue to grow. According to the FEC, PACs contributed about $310 million to federal candidates in the 2003 to 2004 cycle. In recent years, PACs have contributed about one-quarter of all funding for congressional campaigns; about two-thirds of such contributions come from PACs sponsored by corporations or trade associations.

PACs may pursue either legislative strategies, using contributions as an adjunct to lobbying, or electoral strategies, using contributions to sway the results of elections. Most PACs pursue legislative strategies, courting influential incumbents, such as party leaders or committee chairmen. PACs sponsored by corporations and trade associations usually follow such a path, and they tend to favor Republicans, though not overwhelmingly.

Labor and ideological PACs typically pursue electoral strategies, concentrating their giving in close races, and often giving to challengers. They also usually favor candidates of one party—unions contribute almost exclusively to Democrats. Members of Congress often operate leadership PACs, which allow them to contribute to other officeholders and party committees, employ staff, and fund travel. Lobbyists may give to leadership PACs as a means to court powerful legislators.

Many journalists and reformers have alleged that PACs buy Congress votes, but political science research has mostly found such claims to be overblown. PACs tend to reward friends, rather than seek converts. Compared with the influence of party, ideology, and constituency opinion, the effect of PAC donations appears to be slight—but not nonexistent. It appears to be greatest on narrow, technical issues, such as provisions of the tax code or government contracts, that do not cut along partisan lines or arouse the feelings of voters, but which may be critical to a corporation or trade association. Above all, PAC contributions help lobbyists establish the relationships that can give them the necessary access to make their case to legislators or staff.

See also *Advocacy Groups; Business Pressure in Politics; Campaign Finance; Democracy and Corruption; Farm Lobby; Interest Groups and Lobbies; Lobbies, Professional; Lobbying; Public Interest Groups; U.S. Politics and Society: Minority Interest Groups.*

. . . . RICHARD M. SKINNER

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Political Agents

Political agents are actors within the political arena who possess a special role and capability for advising elected or appointed policy makers. Many political agents are individuals with unique accessibility to politicians, often representing a specific agency or corporation, or some specific cause. By consulting with policy makers on their personal or representational political viewpoints and influence, political agents are, to a varying degree, indirectly involved in the process of political decision making. A political agent's influence and involvement can be individual or collective, as in organizations or unions.

MOTIVATION
The most important political actors or agents are political parties, interest groups, government bureaucrats, and parliaments' committees and commissions. Agents are specialized to act on behalf of those they work for or represent. All political actors follow the current trends, interests, and strategies of politicians to take part in political decision making. By doing so, they follow an individual politician's value orientation, goals and preferences, as well as contextual capacities. They can choose different strategies to guide policy makers who approach them for problem-solving techniques, mediating, or negotiating offers; they also rely on persuasion. The emphasis on seeking consensus or resolving a potentially conflicting situation varies, depending on the interests or parties involved. The decision-making processes and the political context shape relations among political agents, which can take the nature of competition, coalition, or a network.

A political agent is motivated by a certain goal. Usually, there is more than one goal and these are prioritized. In choosing how to act, an agent may encounter a conflict between private interests and collective, shared interests; at times, political agents use their personal emotions or ideas to guide their degree of policy influence. The view on the relevant factors of influence is divided between that of a *homo oeconomicus* and of a *homo sociologicus.* The homo oeconomicus is assumed to make decisions solely based on individual cost-benefit calculations and ability to prioritize preferences, while social norms and expectations guide the homo sociologicus.

DIFFERENT TYPES
Political representatives, voted into office by their public, are political agents. They are to act on behalf of the constituents they represent and channel their public interests. The public perceives these representatives to oversee the government. In government, the representatives organize into committees to address specific issues. The government at large is then the largest political agent of a nation, interacting with other foreign national leaderships.

Political leaders serve as principle political agents for their followers as long as these followers see the particular leader's performance as satisfactory, creating a codependency. Leaders are to coordinate and secure the goals and interests of their followers, similar to political representatives, but with a larger constituency. They also manage group activities and defend the group against opposition. However, at times, leaders work for private or personal gains superseding the public interests. Given this type of political agent's concern for public reputation, in order to guarantee reelection and maintain popular

support, this agent may be susceptible to outside control or pressures when protecting or sustaining the public image.

Political parties are another form of political agent. They not only produce government candidates but also mobilize support for and influence key political agenda issues. Political parties within the political system of a state manage and control their government. They do so by following the ideas shared by their party members. They have officeholders and activists and they influence their electorate. Parties inform the electorate of decisions in a democratic political system and create participatory expectations; as with representative democracies, they strongly mobilize the public.

As political agents, an interest group may form to redress a deficit felt by a private or public organization. This type of political agent, then, serves on behalf of the shared of that organization. Interest groups are to influence public opinion and policy making by increasing political participation. For example, labor unions may use public rallies to inform their constituents, or potential sympathizers, of a certain preferred electoral candidate, or a cause specific to their union's members.

Finally, social movement or grassroots activists pursue reforms in the social, political, or economic realms to promote certain causes. These are found globally and such movements are not limited to appealing within a single state; some also advocate for increased international oversight or widespread global change. These types of political agents are powerful in influencing public opinion and public policy via their tactics to strengthen citizen access, increase social awareness, or challenge governments. These tactics may include publications, mailings, mass media and the Internet, personal contacts, meetings, phone calls, and public events, such as demonstrations.

See also *Accountability; Bureaucracy; Computational Modeling; Constituency Relations; New Institutionalism; Principal-agent Theory.*

. . . . SYBILLE REINKE DE BUITRAGO

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Political Anthropology

Political anthropology emerged through intellectual engagements between the disciplines of political science and anthropology. Political scientists working in this area first developed the field through an engagement with Clifford Geertz's interpretive approach to the study of culture. Drawing on interpretive methods, political anthropologists have developed new understandings of political behavior, producing a wide range of scholarship that has contributed to a rethinking of central paradigms in political science, including the politics of identity, social movements, political and economic transitions, and the state.

GEERTZ AND THE STUDY OF CULTURE

Clifford Geertz's *The Interpretation of Cultures* (1973) is a foundational work that shaped the emergence of the field of political anthropology in the discipline of political science. Within the discipline of anthropology, political anthropology has a much longer intellectual history. However, political scientists have shaped the field of political anthropology in distinctive ways through an engagement with Geertz's work. Geertz argued that the study of culture required an in-depth analysis of the system of meanings that shape people's identities and actions. According to Geertz, culture is defined as a set of complex *webs of significance* that provided the context necessary for understanding social and political systems in comparative contexts.

Geertz's approach differed from existing approaches that political scientists used at the time to study political culture. These approaches viewed political culture as an independent factor or variable that casually shaped patterns of behavior and political processes. For instance, scholars studying political culture sought to measure civic culture in comparative contexts and argued that the strength of civic culture explained the relative success or failure of democratization (e.g., Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's *The Civic Culture,* 1989). Geertz, on the other hand, argued for an approach that focused on systematically analyzing the signs and symbols that make up the webs of significance of specific societies. Culture, in Geertz's view, is fundamentally public because the meanings that make up such webs are shared by societies. Actions carry meanings only when such meanings are shared and understood by groups. The task of the political anthropologist, then, was to sort out these structures of meaning in a particular society.

This approach, or what Geertz called *thick description*, is one of the central methods adopted by political anthropologists to study political behavior and processes. Contrary to what the term implies, thick description does not simply involve accumulating comprehensive empirical details about particular societies in a purely descriptive manner. Rather, thick description involves a method of interpretative analysis in which political anthropologists decode the signs and symbols through which social relationships and structures of authority function in various societies. In this endeavor, political scientists have used ethnographic methods (the central methods used by anthropologists) to engage in the close, in-depth qualitative study of specific cultures. Ethnographic data can include quantitative forms of research (e.g., collecting census data and carrying out surveys in villages). However, ethnography usually involves long-term participant observation in which the anthropologist lives in the context being studied. The ethnographer interacts with the subjects being studied over an

extended period of time and observes and participates in local activities. Observations gained through this process provide the data for the analysis of the structures of meaning of the society in question.

ETHNOGRAPHY, INTERPRETIVE METHODS, AND CONCEPT FORMATION

Political scientists use interpretive methods to inform studies of political behavior, institutions, and identities. Early work in political science used ethnographic methods to rethink some of the central concepts in the discipline. For instance, one of the classic examples of political anthropology is James Scott's *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (1987). Scott used an in-depth ethnographic study of a rural village in Malaysia to fundamentally reconceptualize existing conceptions of social movements and political resistance. Conventional studies of social movements at the time focused primarily on large-scale or organized protest movements. Scott argued that such studies were narrowly focused on movements that either were marked by formal organizational features (e.g., formal leaders and institutional structures) or were able to mount large-scale protests that challenged the state.

Drawing on two years of extended field research in rural Malaysia, Scott demonstrates that patterns of social conflict and resistance did not take this form. His systematic observations of village-level behavior show that class conflict occurred through daily conflicts and acts of resistance that were usually anonymous. Marginalized villagers could not afford to overtly challenge their landlords and resorted instead to "everyday acts of resistance" such as work slowdowns and ideological challenges through culturally specific languages (e.g., rumor and folk stories).

Scott's study illustrates the contributions of political anthropology in terms of both the methodological and conceptual significance of the research conducted. Scott's extended ethnographic research on everyday practices and politics in a particular village in Malaysia provided him with a view of the daily forms of resistance that were being missed by scholars. Existing research had assumed that an absence of political protests by rural villagers meant that peasants were a politically compliant social group. Scott's immersion in the social and political life in rural Malaysia enabled him to challenge this understanding. For instance, by observing the everyday meanings used to express class politics, he was able to demonstrate that poor rural villagers engaged in resistance through localized, daily practices that could not be measured by membership in formal organizations. This use of interpretative methods enabled Scott to both challenge existing depictions of peasant political behavior and, more significantly, to provide a new conception of political resistance.

Scott's ethnographic approach is an example of one of the central methods that political anthropologists use to produce interpretive studies of social and political behavior and processes. However, other political scientists use other methods and forms of qualitative research to engage in the interpretive study of politics and culture. Scholars of comparative politics, for instance, use mixed methodological approaches to produce new understandings of political phenomena and theoretical concepts. These scholars use historical and sociological data instead of ethnographic research to provide an interpretive understanding of the cultural signs and symbols that shape political life in comparative contexts. Two of the foundational examples of these approaches are studies that emerged as classic texts on modernization and on modern nationalism.

One of the earliest examples of this approach is Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph's *The Modernity of Tradition* (1967). These researchers used a combination of sociological and historical data on political behavior in India to rethink the paradigm of modernization. Modernization was one of the central paradigms that scholars were using to understand and study non-Western societies and political systems. Most scholars of modernization at the time were basing their models and approaches on the assumption that one of the central challenges that newly developing societies in non-Western countries faced was the ability to move beyond old cultural traditions and embrace modern forms of economic development and political institutions.

Drawing on an interpretative analysis of sociological data on caste associations and historical data on Gandhi's culturally rooted organizational strategies in India, Rudolph and Rudolph illustrate the ways in which such traditional forms of organization provided the institutional foundations for modern forms of behavior. For instance, they argue that caste-based associations allowed particular caste groups to press for social equality in ways that integrated them within modern democratic political institutions in India. Drawing on this analysis, they challenged scholars to rethink concepts such as modernity and tradition.

A second foundational text in the field of political anthropology is Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (1983). As with work by political scientists such as Rudolph and Rudolph, Anderson drew on a combination of forms of research methods including historical analysis and ethnographic observations. Drawing on such research, Anderson traced the rise of the modern nation and argued that the primary characteristic of the modern nation was that it represented a formation that rested on horizontal links between people who imagined that they were part of a single cultural identity.

Anderson was also interested in using interpretative methods that had often been used to focus on specifically rural or local cultural practices to understand and explain broader modern political phenomena. Anderson, for instance, focuses on explaining why the nation had emerged as the universally legitimate political unit by the twentieth century. As Anderson notes, even the Marxist revolutions in countries such as China and Vietnam had defined themselves in national terms and had thus rooted themselves "firmly in a territorial and social space inherited from the pre-revolutionary past" (12). Drawing on a Geertzian-style analysis, Anderson points to the ways in which modern monuments such as war memorials serve as

the cultural symbols that produce the shared cultural identification between people who otherwise do not share kinship ties. Thus, Anderson argues that nationalism operates differently from traditional political ideologies such as Marxism and liberalism. He argues that nationalism is a cultural formation rather than a political ideology. National identity is formed through a set of cultural symbols that make people imagine that they are members of a distinctive community. The cultural roots of nationalism thus explain the power of this identity and its ability to move millions of people not just to kill, but also to willingly die for their nations.

A shared approach to the study of politics characterizes the classic examples of studies in the field of political anthropology such as those by James Scott, Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, and Benedict Anderson. These researchers all use interpretative analysis to rethink central concepts in political science. While such approaches contribute to the discipline's interest in producing explanations of particular outcomes, they do so primarily by interpreting the data to refine categories and concepts used by political scientists. For instance, by rethinking the concept of resistance, Scott provides an alternative explanation of peasant behavior as rooted in everyday protest rather than consent to authority. This approach to social science explanation is distinct from competing approaches within subfields, such as comparative politics, that have focused on developing causal explanations by isolating and identifying independent variables that can explain a particular political outcome. Some scholars have sought to combine interpretive approaches associated with political anthropology with this model of causal explanation that has been dominant in fields such as comparative politics.

POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND CAUSAL SOCIAL SCIENCE EXPLANATION

A well-known example of a combined approach is David Laitin's *Hegemony and Culture* (1986). Laitin's study uses fifteen months of extended ethnographic research conducted in Yorubaland, Nigeria, to intervene in political science debates that sought to explain when and under what conditions ethnic and religious conflicts occur. Laitin sought to explain a particular puzzle in the Yoruba case—why there had been religious tolerance despite the existence of social forces that usually produced religious conflict in other contexts. Laitin argues that an explanation of this anomaly required a conception of what he calls the "two faces of culture" (12). The first face of culture draws on Geertz's conception of the symbolic webs of significance, which Laitin argues reveals how cultural meanings shape the ways in which social groups order their political priorities. The second face builds on an instrumentalist understanding of cultural identity as a political resource. Such a rational actor approach focuses on how groups or political actors instrumentally manipulate cultural symbols and people's cultural identities. Laitin argues that a successful explanation of a political culture characterized by nonpoliticized religion must account for both faces of culture.

By combining these two approaches, Laitin also sought to combine the interpretive depth of Geertz's conception of culture with social scientific concerns with the development of systemic causal explanations that could be tested and falsified. He demonstrates that neither the rational actor approach nor the Geertzian understanding of culture adequately explains or predicts the nature of religious politics among the Yoruba. Laitin argues that his ethnographic study thus contributed to the creation of a theory of politics and culture that was based on social scientific objects of causal explanation.

The question of how political anthropology fits within this model of social science explanation is a central area of debate among political scientists. Critics of political anthropology question both whether the findings of single case studies based primarily on ethnographic research can be generalized, and whether interpretive methods can contribute to theory building when the explanations cannot be falsified. Scholars drawing on such methods respond in a number of ways. Some scholars combine ethnographic research with other methods. They build on the kind of model exemplified in Laitin's work, seeking to produce mixed methods and often use ethnographic research to supplement other forms of data. Other scholars argue that political anthropological work provides a distinctive approach that is best able to address particular kinds of research questions. Rogers Smith, for instance, argues in his chapter in *Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics* (2004) that understanding the politics of identity requires methods that draw primarily on interpretive approaches based on ethnographic methods.

SUBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE

While Smith argues that interpretivists such as political anthropologists must address how their work contributes to the objectives of social scientific explanations, some scholars contend that political anthropology challenges scholars to rethink some of the disciplinary conventions of political science. In their 2003 article, "Engaging Subjective Knowledge," Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph argue for new approaches that more consciously address various forms of subjective knowledge. Drawing on an analysis of an extended historical diary by Amar Singh, a colonial subject who wrote about his experiences living under British colonial rule, Rudolph and Rudolph argue that this subjective diary can be treated as a form of ethnography. In their view, such forms of subjective knowledge deepen understandings of identities, conceptual categories, and the politics of recognition. They note that such forms of subjective analysis provide a unique form of access to marginalized groups who may remain outside the public sphere of politics, or as they put it, "those whose behavior is not easily observed or counted by objective political science" (689). This kind of political anthropology, they argue, blurs the line between subjective and objective knowledge and also challenges political scientists to question what counts as knowledge.

New approaches in political anthropology elaborate on the ways in which such interpretative approaches can provide

understandings of political phenomena that other social science approaches may be less well-equipped to grasp. In this endeavor, they move beyond Geertzian interpretative approaches to the study of politics and culture. For instance, political anthropologists note that Geertz's approach to culture as a complex set of webs of significance rests on an assumption that the inhabitants of the cultural context implicitly accept or consent to these meanings. They argue that Geertz generally failed to explore the ways in which such meanings are often disputed or rejected by particular social groups.

While Geertz tended to think of culture in more consensual and normative terms, scholars now focus on how cultural meanings are contested. Political anthropologists are now concerned with analyzing the ways in which such multiple and contested cultural meanings provide new understandings and explanations of political behavior. For instance, Geertz discussed the ways in which ritual was an embodiment of various forms of authority. However, more recent work shows how rituals are often interpreted in different ways by different social groups, and are also often the source of culturally specific forms of resistance. For example, scholars illustrate how social movements have used religious rituals as means to express political protest.

POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION

These new approaches converge with the rise of social constructivist approaches to the study of political phenomena. Social constructivist approaches broadly address how concepts, categories, and knowledge are constructed or created by social relations. For instance, political anthropologists such as Michel Foucault (1980) build on poststructuralist approaches that call attention to the relationship between power and knowledge. Poststructuralist theorists argue that texts both reflect and produce relationships of power. Drawing on this theoretical approach, political ethnographers seek to show how an adequate conception of political power requires an interpretative analysis of various cultural texts (e.g., films, television programming, political cartoons, novels, and advertising images). Scholars working in this tradition treat these texts as the cultural signs and symbols through which relationships of power are expressed and produced in modern and postmodern contexts. At one level, such texts make up the political languages of authority and protest. At another level, political ethnographers argue that these texts do not simply reflect underlying relationships of power but also "produce" these relationships.

In her study of authoritarianism in Syria, Lisa Wedeen argues in *Ambiguities of Domination* (1999) that the state uses visual spectacles (e.g., state festivals, royal rituals, and state-sponsored mass demonstrations) to discipline citizens. Such spectacles are not simply reflections of state coercion; these spectacles shape people's identities as citizens and "regiment their bodies" in ways that produce obedience to the state (19). State power, in this approach, is exercised not only by coercion and ideological manipulation, but also by teaching citizens the

acceptable political scripts and behaviors they can use in public. Such visual spectacles thus "produce" citizens.

CONCLUSION

Political ethnographers have pushed political scientists to expand their definitions of what counts as empirical evidence when studying the nature of power and politics in modern nation-states. Scholarship in political anthropology now encompasses a broad range of methods, forms of research, and theoretical approaches. With this, political anthropologists use interpretive analysis and ethnographic methods to rethink theoretical categories and concepts, provide alternative explanations of political phenomena, and challenge definitions of social science knowledge.

See also *Field Experiment; Historical Interpretation; Qualitative Methodologies; Political Culture; Social Movements; Social Order.*

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Political Attitudes and Behavior

Political attitudes are mental positions about political objects, such as political leaders and parties, policies and proposals, or political groups and institutions. They are relative, enduring evaluations containing a cognitive and an affective component. The study of political attitudes engages with themes like political ideology, egalitarianism, support for democratic values, political tolerance, racism, political efficacy and political alienation, political trust, nationalism, and patriotism. It also involves the study of dispositions like political information and party identification, which lead to political behaviors.

The study of political behavior, on the other hand, focuses on actions or intentions of action and also covers a large span of activities: from passive acts, such as staying informed about politics and media attentiveness, to citizen engagement

activities, such as working to solve community problems or raising money for charity. Political behaviors can be conventional political participation activities that occur near election time, like voting, donating money to a candidate, fundraising, or even running for public office, but they can also be nonconventional activities like attending a public protest or demonstration, or boycotting commercial products.

SIGNIFICANT DEBATES IN RESEARCH

Behaviorism dominated the analysis of political attitudes in the 1960s, proposing a stimulus–response model of political behavior, while the cognitive revolution dominated the analysis in the 1980s, focusing on information processing and the structure of cognitive systems. As David Sears and his colleagues explain, social cognition studies using self-reports and thought listing find that, while some attitudes are generated from cognitive elaborative processes, others are created without much thinking, but rather rely on affective processes.

While research on political attitudes is, at heart, concerned with the process of decision making, research on political behavior is mostly interested in predicting its outcomes, particularly voter turnout. The act of voting is often used as a proxy for other political behaviors, and organizational membership provides evidence of involvement with nonelectoral groups. In addition, new domains, such as consumer activism and cyberspace, provide opportunities to record novel political activities.

Political attitudes are studied to understand how the attitudes change systematically or randomly over time and through different contexts. Since attitudes are not directly observable, scholars turn to their qualities. Attitude *accessibility* indicates the speed or easiness by which an attitude can be brought from memory or, in other words, its response latency. Attitude *strength* research finds that strong attitudes demonstrate persistence and stability over long periods of time, resistance to opposing arguments, and impact on cognitive processes and behavior or behavioral intentions. Attitude strength is often confused with another feature of attitudes, their *extremity*. An extreme attitude is positioned at a high distance from the midpoint, either toward the very positive or the very negative end of the attitude continuum. On the other hand, attitude *ambivalence* generates on the basis of positive and negative evaluations of the same attitude object, which are independent of each other. In addition, *uncertainty* denotes how confident or sure individuals are about their attitudes. Finally, *salience,* or importance, is the degree of personal significance of the object under evaluation.

One of the central debates in political attitudes research is that of their stability, which was raised by Philip Converse in 1964 after examining the American National Election panel data from 1956 to 1960. He suggested that the majority of citizens do not hold stable ideological attitudes, but seem to provide opinions at random on the basis of the considerations that are salient at that point in time. These opinions were labeled *nonattitudes* and were shown to be prevalent among the nonsophisticated segments of the electorate.

Converse's work on belief systems is now a classic segment of the political attitudes' research, as it generated serious concerns

on the public's political abilities. His controversial conclusions set in motion a series of studies during the next forty years that offered methodological or historical counterexplanations to his original pessimistic findings of nonattitudes in the United States. Revisionist scholars blamed the inadequate measures rather than the citizens. Others argued that social modernization generated higher levels of sophistication. This contextual explanation aligns with Western European studies showing that the ideological positions of citizens are more stable. As Russell Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingermann show, European publics appear overall more consistent in their political attitudes. The jury is still out, and some studies show the glass half empty while others show it half full, often drawing on the same data sets.

Political schema, a related controversy, provides an alternative conceptualization of the way citizens think about politics. Schema scholars argue that people use abstract categories like religion, social class, or race to make sense of the complex political world. James Kuklinski and his colleagues assert that citizens handle information via these organized and interconnected memory structures that allow for efficient and economic processing, but also introduce biases in citizens' judgment processes.

John Zaller, who was interested in how attitudes are made, also challenged the ideal of a fully informed and rational citizenry. Zaller argues that citizens construct attitudes on the basis of a sample of considerations that are available in their memory at that point in time. When they are tasked with providing a judgment, people recall what they like and dislike, and on the basis of these considerations, they provide an answer. However, not everyone agrees. The *online model* proposed by Milton Lodge and Charles Taber argues that evaluations form automatically when new information is received, and they are stored in memory as a running tally of the target object. When citizens are asked to provide a favorable or unfavorable evaluation, they are able to do so, despite the fact that they often have forgotten the pieces of evidence that made up its cognitive content.

MEASUREMENT APPROACHES AND DATA

Surely, the study of attitudes does not send a single message, and as in most matters, no model or study is a cure-all, particularly in such an interdisciplinary and data-rich field. The World Values Survey (WVS), the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) provide globewide, cross-national survey questions on political attitudes and behavior. Regional surveys like the Afrobarometer, East Asian Barometer, Latinobarometer, and the New Europe Barometer include a large number of countries. In addition, comparative data are available from the Eurobarometer survey, which includes all member states of the European Union (EU). Scholars in search of measurement instruments can consult the *Measures of Political Attitudes* series, edited by John Robinson, Phillip Shaver, and Lawrence Wrightsman, which contains reviews of about 150 attitude measures.

THE COMPLEX ATTITUDE-BEHAVIOR RELATIONSHIP

The investigation of the relationship between attitudes and behaviors is not without its own caveats. First, researchers cannot directly observe attitudes, and must rely on self-reported measures that contain some form of interference. As James Kuklinski notes, when people are asked to express themselves, "pure" attitudes do not exist. Survey researchers often experience citizens offering "improvised" positions when trying to relay their attitudes toward public matters.

While most behaviors are observable physical things, limitations similar to those with attitudes occur when measuring *intentions* of behavior. Intentions might not truthfully reflect behaviors when social desirability concerns are in place. Citizens are motivated to appear virtuous and report having engaged in desirable behaviors, even when they have not done so, or done so less often. Characteristically, voting turnout in surveys is consistently overreported by ten to fifteen percentage points.

Relying on memory and recall also creates problems, particularly when a behavior occurred a long time period before the measure is taken. An additional complication is that several attitudes might drive a particular behavior, and political researchers have to identify which is the right one. Another acknowledged limitation is the reciprocal causal relationship between attitudes and behaviors, with attitudes determining the behaviors, and behaviors influencing the attitudes.

Scholars will continue to debate these issues and seek solutions. The expansion of theoretical and empirical knowledge toward new fields like neuroscience, genetics, evolutionary psychology, and research on political emotions offers rich opportunities for exploring exciting puzzles and new debates on political attitudes and behavior.

See also *Emotions in Politics; Political Participation; Voting Behavior.*

. . . . TEREZA CAPELOS

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Political Change

Political change often occurs as major events—such as wars, economic crises, and sudden electoral shifts—lead to punctuated *turning points*, which are then followed by enduring ideological, institutional, or coalitional transformations. Indeed, across international and domestic contexts, whether one addresses security crises like those that marked the commencement of the cold war or war on terror, economic crises such as the great crash of 1929 or subprime crisis of 2007 to 2009, or the critical elections that transformed U.S. party systems in 1932 or 1968, certain moments in *political time* stand out as having a particular impact. These events often lead to lasting changes in international relations, economic policy, or coalitional alignments. In addressing these sources of change, scholars have sought to not only identify the key mechanisms through which such events acquire a particular significance, but also highlight broader implications for agency, policy progress, and reform.

Over the past several decades, as scholars have addressed such mechanisms of change, a basic theoretical divide has given rise to a broad debate. From the former vantage, *materialists* highlight the exogenously given, preinterpretive sources of change, such as shifts in the distribution of power, economic recourses, or demographic trends. Where shifts in such relative power relations alter the balance of power among state and societal actors, materialists argue that they help to determine the outcomes of international or domestic struggles over "who gets what, when, and how." In justifying this approach, materialists assume that political agents make efficient use of information in reacting to military, economic, or societal changes, and that those who do not correctly act on their real interests will be "selected out" of their competitive systems.

In contrast, from the latter vantage, *constructivists* highlight the social sources of change—rooted in shifts in shared ideas, economic ideologies, or cultural understandings. Constructivists assume that ideas of these sorts matter because agents are plagued by what John Maynard Keynes termed the fundamental *constraint of uncertainty*. With respect to a number of important potential developments (e.g., the price of oil in ten years, the likelihood of a terrorist attack) agents simply cannot form any meaningful expectations, and so must fall back on "conventional" judgments for guidance. In other words, agents must interpret crises before they react to them. Moreover, as agents interpret events as legitimating ideological changes, this can lead to transformations of their own interests—or beliefs about how to meet needs—in ways that assume lives of their own. Put differently, from the constructivist vantage, political struggles do not simply pertain to who gets what, when, and how, but also involve arguments over the meaning of events in ways that can reshape agents' views of who they are and what they want.

To be sure, materialist and constructivist perspectives are not monolithic, and—given these broad assumptions—varieties of each exist. For example, from the materialist vantage, while realist approaches cast hegemonic wars as mechanisms

that restore equilibrium to the balance of power, alternative Marxist frameworks highlight the role of wars and crises as sources of dialectical change from more imperialist orders to more emancipatory or socialist alternatives. Likewise, constructivist frameworks vary from those stressing the role of more elite-based, paradigmatic ideas to those stressing the preconscious, affective influences on a wider range of agents.

Nevertheless, setting aside such differences, the underlying debates over material or social forces prove quite enduring, having broad parallels in economic debates between classical and Keynesian perspectives, and psychological controversies over the importance of behavioral incentives or socialization processes. In the largest sense, these perspectives reflect different views of the human condition, as to whether agents are materially or socially constructed, whether material constraints limit possibilities for change, and whether ideas can assume evolving "lives of their own."

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: FROM HEGEMONIC TO CONSTITUTIVE WARS

In the security realm, scholars have long noted the association between major wars and postwar settlements that reshape international orders. Perhaps most prominently, Robert Gilpin argues that hegemonic war serves as "the principal mechanism of change throughout history." In this view, periodic hegemonic conflicts, reinforced by postwar conferences and accords, determine which "states or states will be dominant and will govern the system." Questions arise, however, about how a victorious hegemon might define its interests—along more conservative or liberal lines, or in more benign on more predatory fashions. Materialist approaches, at a systemic level, are likely to be underdetermining.

One materialist solution offers a supplemental stress on domestic material influences, rooted in the domestic institutional and societal characteristics of major states. For example, G. John Ikenberry concedes that "historical junctures . . . come at dramatic moments of upheaval and change within the international system, when the old order has been destroyed by war and newly powerful states try to reestablish basic organizing principles." However, Ikenberry elaborates, "Democratic states have greater capacities to enter into binding institutions" and that hegemonic settlements established by democratic regimes can support more stable, legitimate orders. Nevertheless, despite its merits, Ikenberry's legal shift to the domestic realm fails to offer a fundamental solution to theoretical problems of how institutional agents define their interests. Even the meaning of democracy itself is variable, and no theoretical fundamental precludes the emergence of violent differences over the meaning of democracy itself—as between the United States and Germany in World War I (1914–1918).

In a broader sense, materialist arguments remain wanting to the extent that the meaning of power and the nature of institutions are always endogenous to a social context. First, "major" asymmetries in the balance of power cannot be abstracted from the social context of, for example, friendship or enmity between states. While rivals or enemies may shift alliances to prevent any single state from attaining dominance over the system, states enjoying socially grounded ties of friendship may simply ignore the ostensible incentive structure of the distribution of power. As Alexander Wendt argues, U.S. policy makers view North Korean missiles differently than they do British missiles. Secondly, even "major" wars occur in meaningful contexts, as when Harry Truman cast the cold war as a struggle over "ways of life" or when George W. Bush emphasized the implications of the ostensible war on terror for the United States's "deepest beliefs." Conversely, even apparently "minor" crises can carry disproportionate lessons during periods of uncertainty, as when the post–cold war "Black Hawk down" incident in Somalia prompted an isolationist backlash. In this light, even wars that fundamentally disrupt the balance of power cannot be understood outside some social context.

To the extent that uncertainty complicates the interpretation of material incentives, constructivists have stressed the need to more directly examine the understandings that give wars and crises meaning. Providing the foundation for such an approach, John Ruggie argues that hegemonic wars might often be better seen as *constitutive wars* that can reshape notions of sovereignty itself. Indeed, Ruggie argues that the emergence of the sovereign state system can itself been seen as having "resulted in part from a transformation in social epistemology" following from the Thirty Years War (1618–1648) and Peace of Westphalia (1648). From this vantage, Ruggie argues that pre-Westphalian *epistemes* and "the mental equipment that people drew upon in imagining and symbolizing forms of political community underwent fundamental change." As Ruggie puts it, "the very ontology of the units—that is to say, what kind of units they would be" provides the focus of constitutive wars. In contrast, in *configurative wars,* the nature of the units is accepted, though "their territorial configuration remain[s] contested." Finally, Ruggie defines as *positional wars* all of "the familiar strategic and tactical wars ever since."

However, to the sense that the Westphalian era has been characterized by continued debate over the meaning of sovereignty—whether to advance the rights of monarchs, nations, workers, or theocratic designs of varied sorts—wars might still be seen as having ongoing, constitutive significance. For example, Bruce Cronin and J. Samuel Barkin suggest that modern struggles from the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) to the cold war have played a key role in reconciling tensions between *statist* or *nationalist* views of sovereignty, which alternately locate authority in "the territories over which institutional authorities exercise legitimate control" or in varied "communities of sentiment."

In this view, it is not shifts in power, but tensions over prevailing understandings that drive war and change in world politics. Indeed, such social understandings provide the focus of debates over the lessons of conflict, most recently in U.S. settings in cold war–era debates over the lessons of Vietnam. What Vietnam "meant" with respect to definitions of vital or peripheral interests had important implications for policy debate during the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations. In more recent post–cold war debates over the meaning of

the war on terror, the shift from the Bush to Obama administration can similarly be seen as accompanying a shift from a view of the September 11 attacks as highlighting the need for a more unilateral or multilateral definition of the national interest. In the absence of mechanisms for managing systemic change, wars and threats do not "speak for themselves," but must be given meaning to advance state and societal change.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: THE MEANING OF CRISES

Paralleling these views of wars as revealing shifts in the distribution of power or in prevailing ideas, scholars of the international political economy have engaged in an ongoing debate over views of crises as disrupting the economic distribution of power or prevailing ideological frameworks. From the materialist vantage, *hegemonic stability* theorists like Gilpin cast the rise and fall of great powers as the most important factor in explaining stability. However, as in the security realm, other materialist scholars have recognized the indeterminacy of systemic incentives and argued for a greater stress on domestic incentives. Indeed, Gilpin himself concedes the role of ideology and stresses the need for a "dominant liberal power" to enable economic cooperation. From this vantage, in the nineteenth century, British hegemony might be seen as having supported the classical gold standard, until interwar British collapse undermined the classical order. Likewise, in the twentieth century, the post–Great Depression rise and (as some argue) decline of U.S. hegemony might explain international monetary change, from the Keynesian Bretton Woods fixed-exchange rate system to the current order.

More explicitly highlighting the material sources of domestic preferences, Peter Gourevitch stresses the effects of economic crises—defined as "major" economic downturns and shifts in the "geographic distribution of production"—on domestic preferences and transnational support for international regimes. Given some fluctuation in relative factor endowments, political agents will apply their reallocated resources to successfully (or unsuccessfully) defend their policy preferences. Gourevitch argues that material shocks alter the bases of *domestic* coalitions, as "social actors, affected by their situation, evaluate alternative policies in reaction to the likely benefits or costs." Thus, to explain post–Great Depression Keynesian cooperation, Gourevitch stresses the effects of the crises of the 1930s on the relative position of capital and labor, arguing that labor-led coalitions advocated the adoption of Keynesian policies as alternatives to austerity.

Offering a somewhat greater stress on the autonomy ideas from a comparative vantage, scholars like Elinor Ostrom and Douglass North provide a more nuanced view of the interplay of power and ideas. They cast competitive pressures as often mediated and constrained by formal institutions (e.g., constitutions, rules, and laws) and informal structures (e.g., conventions, norms, and standards of behavior). To be sure, such institutions, even if they can exert a path dependent effect on behavior, still leave the fundamental material impediments to collective action in place.

In this light, despite their merits, these international and comparative analyses ultimately remain wanting for the same reason as basic materialist theories of hegemonic war. First, the effects of the distribution of capabilities in abstraction from the social context are indeterminate. Where states share a sense of the common interest, no hegemonic capabilities may be needed to maintain stability. Conversely, where such positive identification is lacking, no level of capabilities may be sufficient to guarantee stability. Second, the shift to a focus on domestic interests and practices does not resolve the problem of the indeterminacy of incentives, since domestic incentives are often equally unclear. For example, neither firms, nor unions, nor representatives of civil society can identify their "true" interests in abstraction from some intersubjective setting. Through much the era following the depression, for example, representatives of business and capital came to recognize the existence of shared interests in rising wages as a means to bolster demand. Finally, concerns for "major" crises run aground on the inability to precisely define what counts as a "major" change. Even exogenous shocks must be interpreted in a larger context, requiring a more explicit stress on paradigmatic debate over varied Classical or Keynesian economic theories.

In light of these objections, constructivists have stressed the importance of the social context to stability and change. Ruggie has once again played a key role in developing such arguments, reflected in his stress on not only "power" but also "purpose" in explaining the rise of the Bretton Woods system after the depression, in which the state assumed an active role in advancing shared corporate and labor interests in rising employment, demand, and output. Mark Blyth builds upon Ruggie's insights, introducing a dynamic stress on the construction of crises to explain "great transformations" in economic arrangements in international and comparative settings. Blyth rejects frameworks that treat international political development as progressing through a series of self-apparent exogenous shocks. He instead defines crises in terms of their intersubjective impact, arguing that they occur during periods of uncertainty, when agents "are unsure as to what their interests actually are, let alone how to realize them." Blyth argues that, given uncertainty, state and societal interests can only be defined in terms of the ideas agents themselves have about the causes of uncertainty.

Drawing on the insights of Keynes, constructivists thereby cast uncertainty as a condition under which there is no scientific basis to form any calculable probability. In this light, economic crises matter as they reshape the terms of policy debate. In other words, as Keynes once put it, "the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else." Indeed, reactions to the subprime crisis of 2007 to 2009—as it drove the Bush and Obama administrations alike to engage in Keynesian "lender of last resort assistance"—cannot be understood outside an understanding of Keynes's own ideas. The subprime crisis did not "speak for itself" in compelling such policies, but

rather spurred debate over the role of the state in society and has legitimated a renewed acceptance of deficit spending and the need for financial reform.

CONCLUSIONS

Scholarly debates over the sources of political-scale change broadly concern the importance of material or social forces. From materialist perspectives, while agents might adapt with greater or lesser degrees of skill to exogenous shifts, they cannot fundamentally evade the exogenous constraints of the balance of military or economic power. In contrast, constructivist perspectives highlight the influence of the shared ideas that shape interpretations of material incentives. Perhaps more important, these frameworks have important implications for the scope of agency, progress, and reform. Materialist approaches arguably obscure the full scope of agency, limiting it to mere adaptation. These approaches suggest that agents can only respond to material shifts with differing degrees of skill, and that efforts at transforming international or domestic systems in fundamental ways are likely to be frustrated as proponents are selected out of the system. In contrast, constructivists highlight the role of agents in giving meaning to material changes, in ways that can reshape shared understandings, state and societal interests, and institutional possibilities. In this sense, the materialist-constructivist debate is rooted in enduring controversies over not simply the nature of structural constraints, but broader questions of agency, progress, and change.

See also *International Political Economy; Keynesianism; Punctuated Equilibrium.*

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Political Communication

The term political communication is used to refer both to a set of practices and a well-developed interdisciplinary field of research. Although closely tied to political science, the theory and practice of political communication is truly interdisciplinary, drawing from varied traditions in political sociology, political psychology, public opinion research, political marketing and advertising, campaign strategies and management, rhetorical studies, and media studies.

The boundaries of the field vary in breadth, depending on the empirical and theoretical definitions used. Much of the research on political communication focuses on political reporting and on the political institutions and media institutions that shape messages about political actors. Indicators of the large footprint of political communication studies include divisions dedicated to the subject in major academic associations in political science and communication, and the influential interdisciplinary journal *Political Communication*. Widely used texts in the contemporary study of political communication include those by W. Lance Bennett and Robert Entman (2004), Doris Graber (2007), Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini (2004), Brian McNair (2007), and Pippa Norris (2000). As a profession, the field of political communication employs many highly skilled media strategists, public opinion pollsters, and campaign managers and activists who are experts in the communicative practices of politics.

The role and function of the nation-state is central to the vast body of political communication research, particularly through emphasis on the strategies and practices of those who govern and those who seek public office, along with research about effects on the political judgment of citizens, as measured by such outcomes as opinion formation and voting behavior. A major area of research literature on political communication focuses on the relationship between mediated political messages and voter preferences. A classic early work in this tradition was Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet's groundbreaking study in 1944, *The People's Choice,* which revealed the limited effects of newspapers and radio in influencing voter behavior. An unanticipated but often-cited finding of the study revealed that many people make their voting decisions on the basis of the personal influence of opinion leaders and not as a direct result of their media consumption.

Not surprisingly, scholars have maintained a steady interest in the effects of media on voter decisions ever since, developing increasingly elaborate methods for gathering and analyzing data,

testing more complex models, and arriving at more sophisticated conclusions. An important subfield of political communication research has focused on the agenda-setting function of the media by demonstrating correlations between the political priorities of the media and those of citizens. The field of public opinion research focuses largely on how political influence is exercised through the uses of the means of communication and how such influence manifests in forming political will.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Although the term *political communication* is used primarily in reference to contemporary political practice and related research in advanced societies, the range of practices and scholarly awareness of their importance has a much longer history. The Greek historian, Thucydides, highlighted the masterful skills of oration used by Pericles (495–429 BCE), the powerful Athenian statesman and general. Aristotle's *The Politics* and *The Rhetoric* discuss strategies, techniques, and illustrations of effective political communication. The Roman statesman Cicero (106–43 BCE) is considered to have been one of history's greatest and most influential orators. The Roman rhetorician, Quintilian (35–100 CE), wrote twelve volumes on the subject of rhetoric, *Institutio Oratoria*. In Book 12, Quintilian fondly quotes Cato, who describes a good orator as "a good man, skilled in speaking." In this context, a "good man" is a citizen who engages in ethical speech. Quintilian notes that eloquence can be pernicious if the tools of rhetoric are forged "not for a soldier, but for a robber." The Western tradition of political oratory remains vibrant and continues to be a subject of scholarly attention, with canonical contemporary texts now including the speeches from John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King Jr., Ronald Reagan, and Barack Obama.

Alongside the deep tradition of political oratory is the history of the power of political publishing. Canadian historian and political economist Harold A. Innis demonstrates how the means of communication, particularly various forms of writing and printing, have been integral to the rise and fall of empires. Other historians, most notably Lucien Febvre (1976) and Elizabeth Eisenstein (1986), have examined closely how the printing press and the book became powerful tools in the standardization of vernacular languages in Europe and how the increased availability of printed texts correlated with the spread of literacy, marking a broad shift of political power from the clergy and nobility to the bourgeoisie.

Eisenstein emphasizes the essential role that was played by the printing press in the spread of Enlightenment thought, and how printed texts became means by which the Protestant Reformation challenged the power of the Catholic Church, particularly as it was exercised through a monopoly over the dissemination and interpretation of religious texts. According to Eisenstein (1968), Martin Luther referred to the printing press as "God's highest act of grace." Febvre's account of the history of the book demonstrates how, once the European market for texts published in Latin was relatively saturated, "the geography of the book" was a matter of publishers finding the broadest possible markets for texts published in a particular vernacular language. Benedict Anderson (1991) takes Febvre's account further by arguing that the rise of a sense of national identity and nationalism in early modern Europe was shaped, in part, by the rise of print capitalism.

Political communication was fundamental to the European Enlightenment. Immanuel Kant's 1784 essay, "What is Enlightenment?" emphasized the importance of the public use of reason by which citizens put ideas to the test of public scrutiny and debate. In multiple accounts of the public sphere of the Enlightenment, the printed word functioned to sustain what Jürgen Habermas called "the literary public sphere." As well, the salons, table societies, and coffee houses of eighteenth-century Europe were themselves means, or channels, through which political thought was conveyed and debated. With the rise of industrial capitalism, the technologies of communication also became industrialized. The early nineteenth-century invention of the steam-driven rotary press made it possible to mass-produce newspapers at an unprecedented scale and speed, and at lower cost. These developments occurred in Europe as well as North America and, with the rise of commercial advertising, newspaper ownership became big business. The fact that the class interests of the owners of the major means of communication were those of the rest of society's elite lends support to Karl Marx's often-quoted statement that "the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force" (Marx, 172).

The role of the press in industrial modernization, and the urbanization that accompanied it, was a matter of some interest to classical social theorists besides Marx. In *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft,* Ferdinand Tönnies characterizes the community life of premodern Europe as rooted in locality. However, while he compares the rural agrarian community with urban industrial society, he also sees *gemeinschaft*, or community, as actually and potentially translocal. Tönnies was aware in his own time that communications media were used to bind space beyond the local community, to maintain communities of interest, and to pose a challenge to the autonomy and sovereignty of nation states. In 1887, Tönnies asserted that the means of communication could, and eventually would, contribute to a variety of forms of transnational political identification, referring to nations as "but a temporary limitation of the boundaryless Gesellschaft" (221). In his comments on the press, he writes that the press "can be conceived as its ultimate aim to abolish the multiplicity of states and substitute for it a single world republic coextensive with the world market, which would be ruled by thinkers, scholars, and writers and could dispense with means of coercion other than those of a psychological nature (221). This is not far removed from the cosmopolitan vision articulated in Kant's "Perpetual Peace" (1795), or that of his contemporary heirs.

Similar to Tönnies's reflections about a German and a global gesellschaft, John Dewey emphasized the distinction between the categories of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft, or society, in the United States, a country described by Tönnies as "the most modern and Gesellschaft-like state" (221). But unlike Tönnies,

Dewey sounds more of an alarm about such a condition. In *The Public and Its Problems* (1927), Dewey worries over whether the accelerating mobility of the "great society" of the United States, a paragon of modernity, threatened to destroy the stable and democratic public life of local communities. As the antidote, Dewey envisions the "great community," which would rely on the press to sustain it: "Communication alone can create a great community" (142). In Dewey's view, the conditions of modernity necessitated a material and conceptual shift in the scale of political community: "We have inherited, in short, local town-meeting practices and ideas. But we live and act and have our being in a continental national state" (113).

In addition, Dewey saw the press as the means to bind a national community. Opposing the view of Walter Lippmann in 1922—who dismissed what he saw as a misguided romantic conception of an "omnicompetent citizen" who would be capable of knowledgeable and effective political engagement in a complex modern society—Dewey believed that the civic competence of the average citizen is worthy of cultivation and trust rather than suspicion and underestimation. In Dewey's argument, the right and the ability to participate as listener and speaker in public debate is essential to competent citizenship, and he believed it could be mobilized on a national scale. This famed Lippmann-Dewey debate remains at the core of normative judgment about the possibilities and limitations of democratic political communication. Unfortunately, Dewey's idealism did not anticipate the destructive, racist *volksgemeinschaft* that emerged and prevailed in Nazi Germany, which was mobilized by a powerful media propaganda machine that generated a crude but effective nationalist populism. Lippmann's pessimistic view goes further to explain it.

Although the research literature on political communication has tended to focus on rational ideals of citizenship and the public sphere, political art and entertainment have been vital means of creating public knowledge and stimulating political passion and engagement. The comic plays of Aristophanes (446–386 BCE) were believed to have had significant consequences for the lives of those who were ridiculed in them. The eighteenth-century French philosopher and satirist Voltaire had a similar effect in his country, so much so that he was forced into exile in England. Similarly, Jonathan Swift used his wit to condemn many policies of the British government. Today, television is a principle medium through which the foibles and judgment of politicians become fodder for public consumption and ridicule. Fake news shows that satirize actual news programs, and late-night talk show hosts supply an endless stream of often well-researched commentary and exposé about the weaknesses and failures of political leaders.

PROPAGANDA

There is a significant body of literature about the uses of advanced means of communication as tools of propaganda, particularly as it pertains to politics and war. The term *propaganda* tends to be associated pejoratively with manipulation and deception. For example, Walter Benjamin argues that when the industrialized means of communication are used for the aestheticization of politics and the depoliticization of the class structure, it is an expression of fascism: "The logical result of Fascism is the introduction of aesthetics into political life" (141). One of the great legends of political propaganda is based on reports of an exchange during the Spanish-American War (1898) between American newspaper magnate, William Randolph Hearst, and illustrator and correspondent, Frederick Remington. Remington was sent to Cuba to report on supposed great battles between Spanish rulers and Cuban locals, but he reported to Hearst that he had found no evidence of war and wished to return home, to which Hearst replied, "Please remain. You furnish the pictures and I'll furnish the war." Whether or not it is accurate, this account is used often in education to illustrate the use of mass media as tools of political propaganda.

Propaganda analysis has tended to point to harmful effects, particularly in the form of populist appeals to bigotry and hatred, and government manipulation as a means to marshal public support for military aggression. Controversies of this nature implicate media institutions for their collusion with government agendas and their failure to provide accurate accounts of war opposition. By contrast, Jacques Ellul, in 1965, acknowledged the great potential for harm posed by propaganda, but he does not infer that this is a necessary outcome. Rather, propaganda is a means by which political beliefs and messages are made palatable and popular in a technological society; this is essential for forming political will, but it does not necessarily result in harmful effects. For Ellul, the technical mastery that characterizes propaganda in modern society is a cause for ambivalence, because propaganda is not only an instrument of public manipulation and deception, but as he defines it, propaganda is a necessary means by which institutions are able to match the scale of major societal problems. In either case, propaganda is properly understood as a modern manifestation of instrumental reason.

The creator of propaganda's biggest challenge is not to decide whether a message is correct or good; rather, the challenge is how to make the message effective. This conception of political communication is one in which there is a clear hierarchy and distinction between media producers and media consumers, the latter of whom are viewed as objects of political control by competing political actors. In a harsh 1979 critique of the field of public opinion research, Pierre Bourdieu argues that there is no such thing as public opinion. Rather, there is only mobilized opinion, often among those who lack sufficient knowledge, let alone previously formed opinions, about an issue. For Bourdieu, the valorization of polling data in turn becomes itself a means by which other forms of group formation and opinion formation, such as strikes and political protests or demonstrations, are made to seem less valid as indicators of public opinion, political consensus, and political will.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Contrasted with this view of a hierarchical relationship between media producers and media audiences is a belief

in the value of breaking down the distinction to enhance democratic deliberation and political participation through innovative uses of communication. Recalling the Lippmann-Dewey debate, rather than assume that public knowledge about social issues and participation in the process of public deliberation is beyond the cognitive capacities of the average citizen, a combination of political will and innovative uses of "old" and "new" media has contributed to enthusiasm about the potential for enhancing citizen engagement. For example, the civic journalism movement of the late 1990s was an attempt to make newspapers into more responsive facilitators of public deliberation about issues of local importance, although this movement has lost much of its luster and momentum in light of the commercial imperatives that motivate the business decisions of newspaper publishers.

More expansive conceptions of political communication take into account a wide range of discursive practices, including media strategies aimed at contesting the power of nation-states, intergovernmental organizations, and corporations. Under authoritarian governments in central and Eastern Europe before 1989, there was an active underground system of publishing and distributing political literature. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 relied heavily on mobilization through the use of such small media as mimeograph machines and audiocassettes. In the United States and many other parts of the world, radical media have been shown to be vital means for mobilizing and sustaining many alternative and oppositional movements.

Citizens now use the Internet to reach large audiences as a means to promote a wide range of political causes. In recent years, the growth in political importance of the Internet has led to experimentation with electronic democracy, and recently has attracted attention to the uses of social media like Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, and YouTube to involve citizens more directly in the selection, framing, mass dissemination, and deliberation about political news. In addition, political leaders and their supporters are finding ways to make use of these same media to reach target audiences with well-defined messages.

See also *Advertising, Political; Communication, Two-step Flow of; Debates, Political; Framing and Public Opinion; Jeremiad; Music, Political; Political Discourse; Political Science Journals; Propaganda; Protest Music; Spin.*

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Political Correctness

Early twentieth-century Marxists pioneered the concept of political correctness, or PC, using it literally and positively to denote the single correct stance, or line of action, on a specific political issue under prevailing conditions. A seminal example is Chinese revolutionary Mao Tse-Tung's 1927 speech "On the Rectification of Incorrect Ideas in the Party," which begins by criticizing "various non-proletarian ideas which greatly hinder the carrying out of the Party's correct line."

In the 1980s, conservatives in the United States, Europe, and Latin America appropriated the term from the Marxists in an ironic critique of dogmatic tendencies of liberal and leftist groups. Purporting to be open-minded and tolerant, conservatives came to satirizing these groups for claiming to have discovered the single correct view on a wide range of controversial issues, including affirmative action, crime, parenting, multiculturalism, hate speech, feminism, welfare, economic regulation, and environmental protection.

THE ESSENCE OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESS

Conservatives thus deflected longstanding criticism of themselves as rigid and intolerant, invading the traditional liberal turf of reasonableness, flexibility, and tolerance. However, despite its leftish connotations, political correctness is best conceived as an ideological narrowing, intolerance, and silencing of dissent all across the political spectrum. Although conservatives have succeeded in exposing small-mindedness among "progressives," the latter have countered that conservatives exhibit their own PC.

A telling sign of all PC is its tendency, especially among activists and ideologues, to discourage rather than engage diverse opinions and to proscribe offending topics as off-limits for open and frank discussion. A common example of left-wing PC is depicting critics of affirmative action as necessarily racist or sexist. On the right-wing side, after the 9/11 attacks, PC conservatives portrayed critics of U.S. foreign policy as unpatriotic and even treasonous. Similarly, PC centrists often depict any views that stray from the middle of the road as inherently flawed and "extremist." In a sense, PC is a thoroughly democratic tool available all across the ideological spectrum, as anyone can use it—or derision of it—to pummel adversaries without requiring any special authorization.

PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESS

In the 1970s, a smattering of the new left self-critically referred to their own politically correct tendencies—a critique of the left virtually taken over by conservatives a decade later. By the late 1990s, an increasing number of progressives were expressing renewed doubts about left-wing PC among their peers. An awareness grew that PC, while providing clarity and comfort for the like-minded and according respect to the marginalized, could also undermine one's own cause by limiting one's field of vision and discouraging self-correction.

For instance, after Republican president Richard Nixon used the racial preferences of the 1969 Philadelphia Plan for affirmative action to divide and conquer the Democrats's two main allies—labor unions and civil rights groups—liberals' increasing support for affirmative action in the 1970s and 1980s may have unwittingly promoted the conservative agenda. By stifling dissent about group preferences and their divisive effects, liberal PC possibly played into the hands of supporters of the socioeconomic status quo.

Similarly, conservative PC within George W. Bush's administration arguably damaged the long-term electoral prospects of the Republican Party by silencing internal critics of the Iraq War (2003–) and of deregulative, supply-side economics, leading to the Republican electoral catastrophe of 2008. More generally, the ideological blinders of PC narrow the alternatives and possibilities under consideration by whoever uses PC to stifle debate and promote political uniformity. This pattern suggests a self-defeating cognitive and behavioral process reflecting Harold Lasswell's psychological formula for political activism: unresolved personal conflicts displaced onto public objects and rationalized in terms of the public good.

This analysis, if accurate, suggests the counterintuitive inference that political groups might do well to tolerate or even encourage the PC proclivities of their opponents while striving to reduce their own. Ironically, Mao's iconic speech promoting PC within the Communist Party of China offers, perhaps unwittingly, a corrective to the excesses of PC. While anchored in Marxist scientism alleging a single correct conclusion, Mao also criticized dogmatism and urged his comrades to engage in open and vigorous debate within the party—to be followed by strict party discipline in enforcing the view that ultimately prevailed. He explicitly discouraged the currying of favor with one's political associates by politely taking safe positions in public.

THE PRICE OF CHALLENGING AND ENFORCING POLITICAL CORRECTNESS

Throughout history, the politically incorrect have paid a heavy price for their deviation from accepted norms. Socrates, for instance, paid with his life for encouraging Athenian youths to think for themselves in opposition to the thinking of powerful individuals and groups within their society. Since the 1980s, conservative organizations such as Accuracy in Academia have targeted numerous examples of political discrimination against conservatives who spoke or acted "incorrectly." In 2002, Bill Maher's network television show *Politically Incorrect* was canceled after Maher denied on air that group behind the 2001 attacks were cowards. In 2008, Christopher Buckley was fired from the conservative magazine *National Review,* founded by his father, William F. Buckley, for crossing party lines to endorse liberal Barack Obama for president.

Less often noted is the price paid by those who enforce PC, a point stressed by John Stuart Mill in his 1859 classic, *On Liberty.* Opinions are seldom completely right or wrong, Mill

argued, and open discussion is the only way for partially correct opinions to come nearer to the truth. Even if a particular view happens to be correct, he went on, "if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth." It is the group, or the entire society, that suffers most by shielding itself from a wide and potentially enriching diversity of "correct" and "incorrect" views.

POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND RELATED PHENOMENA

It may be helpful to connect, yet distinguish, political correctness and four related phenomena. First, PC is a historically situated special case of *political dogmatism*. Second, the *culture wars* of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries exhibit a good deal of PC from both the right and the left, but conservative defense of traditional values, like progressive promotion of multicultural ones, can be conducted in either an intolerant and dogmatic, PC, or open-minded and tolerant, non-PC, way. Third, PC constitutes a form of *censorship,* but unlike official or legal censorship, it works in mostly informal and even unconscious ways, as Lasswell, Eric Hoffer, and others have implied in hypothesizing neurotic bases of political zealotry. Finally, many laypersons think of PC as a form of politeness, either appropriate or excessive, that militates against using offensive language or derogatory names, especially regarding groups with history of discrimination against them.

POLITICAL CORRECTNESS: THRIVING BUT CHALLENGED

As the first decade of the twenty-first century gave way to the second, references to political correctness continued to abound in the mass media. A 2009 Google search yielded millions of current or recent references to political correctness. The most widely read satirical periodical in the United States, *The Onion,* returned to Mao's legacy by devoting an entire issue to contemporary Communist Chinese political correctness. The lead article, "China Strong," reads satirically:

> According to all sources, the People's Republic of China is strong. The nation is united, the military unmatched, the economy vibrant, and the people ever joyful. Similarly correct sources verified that China has always been triumphant. In other news, the Chinese government is fair, all-knowing, and wise, propelled by the strength of two billion loyal hands, all pulling together as one under the Great Celestial Bureaucracy high above. Experts all agreed that there can be no question of this claim, as this claim is the truth.

Despite the partial accuracy of this mock claim, twenty-first–century Communist Chinese authorities have in fact been facing tens of thousands of grassroots rebellions annually all across the country—a warning, perhaps, of the costs of substituting political correctness for political correction.

See also *Censorship; Culture Wars; Maoism; Marxism.*

. . . .   MICHAEL S. CUMMINGS

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Political Culture

Political culture, in one classic formulation of the concept put forward by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, refers to the deeply held orientations that people have toward their political system. In this conception, which reflects the behavioralist approaches of 1960s modernization and political development scholarship, political culture is a product of the history of a given nation as shaped by important events (for instance, a violent conflict such as a civil war, a revolution, or major social upheaval), and peoples' characteristics, shared values, beliefs, and perspectives. This approach, which identifies the attitudes of individual citizens as the important indicator to be measured in the aggregate and then compared across political systems, has framed much of the subsequent research in comparative politics on the relationship between culture and politics. In its most essentialist form it has become a frame for arguing that conflict between macrocultural patterns, or civilizations, is driving global political change. In more nuanced studies, these cross-national indicators have been used to help explain how national political cultures may change over time with changes in other social, economic, and political indicators.

More recently, scholars such as Lisa Wedeen have adapted critical approaches from cultural anthropology to argue for a more interpretive framework for studying political culture. In this framework, political culture is conceived as a relational or dialectic process in which political meaning is constructed in the interplay between the practices of political agents and the language and symbolic systems in which they are embedded. This approach is less focused on citizens' psychological attributes (that is, attitudes) or orientations toward government. Rather, it focuses on how language and systems of symbols (semiotics) may operate to create and reproduce political meaning and how choices and actions by political agents can alter or construct meanings with demonstrable political effects. Empirical investigations using this approach require the use of mixed–methods research to uncover the most salient symbols within a particular context, to map the discursive and symbolic practices at work, and to capture the dynamics driving change in them.

POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY AND POLITICAL CULTURE

Almond and Verba's book broke ground for the concept of "political culture" as being important to the study of comparative political systems. Their work was a product of the political sociology prevalent in postwar scholarship that sought to catalog and reproduce the conditions for the spread

of representative democracy. They argued that five attitudinal dimensions were most salient for assessing political culture: a sense of national identity and attitudes about the self's participation in politics, attitudes toward fellow citizens, attitudes about the government's performance and output, and attitudes about and knowledge of decision-making processes. Almond and Verba defined several types of political cultures, and these are still widely cited.

One of these types is a parochial political culture, which in its most elementary form involves the least formal kind of political rule, such as an African chief or a shaman in other societies. This could be likened to Somalia in the early twenty-first century, where warlords rule without an established central authority. During the same time period in Afghanistan there have been attempts to meld warring tribes into a central political system.

A second type is the subject political culture, in which there is a specialized governmental authority with no voice from citizens. Feudal societies are illustrative this category. Citizens are "subjects" with duties, but few rights. They pay taxes—and perhaps are called on to fight in a war—but they have no voice in deciding these matters.

A third type is the participant political culture. In this culture the citizen is an active participant in the political process, expressing support for or rejection of government decisions. This type is associated with "democracy."

These three main types have numerous variations. African nations as well as Asian, Latin American, and even European countries move in and out of these different categories. For instance, attempts to move from a parochial to a participant culture can be seen in several African societies. And in 2006 there was a military coup in Thailand that resulted in an apparent move to free and open democratic elections to determine political leadership. Latin American nations slip into and out of democratic experiments and military rule. Chile in the early twenty-first century is rated as a free political system, but this comes on the heels of a military dictatorship. France is now in its Fifth French Republic—in which the people rule—but it has slipped into emperorship and external occupation in past iterations of its republics.

Almond and Verba acknowledge that there is no pure participant political culture and describe the United States as a civic political culture in which parochial, subject, and participant types are mixed in the society. Americans can be categorized as apathetic, subject, and participant. The apathetic may rarely get involved in politics and may not even register to vote. These citizens tend to come from the less educated and lower income segments of society and may be candidates for protest movements if they are convinced that such actions will improve their circumstances. The subject citizens are trusting of the political process and are oriented toward dutifully paying their taxes, serving their nation during times of war, and voting. These individuals generally are not overly active in interest groups, and the subject citizen would hardly ever get involved in protest movements. Participants are usually more highly educated, with upper middle to high incomes, and they perceive their political involvement as a rational way to preserve their status in society. Many nations besides the United States would fit the mixed or civic culture model to varying degrees, but any such society would need a minimum number of participants to become a democratic nation. As of the early twenty-first century, Freedom House listed approximately 46 percent of the world's nations as free. These nations have civic cultures sometimes referred to as civil societies. A civil society is one in which there is citizen and interest group autonomy from government and unhampered citizen and nongovernment organization (NGO) involvement in running the government.

Almond and Verba define the process of political socialization as shaping national political culture. The political socialization experience shapes the kind of adult citizen who exists in a particular nation. This socialization includes latent and manifest experiences that children undergo as they mature. Latent political socialization includes informal experiences with, for example, family authority patterns, whereas manifest political socialization includes overt attempts through, for example, family efforts to inculcate specific political orientations such as political party affiliation.

POLITICAL CULTURE AND WORLD POLITICS

In *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* Samuel P. Huntington claims that since the end of the Cold War the major cleavage framing military and ideological conflict in international politics is conflicting cultures, expressed as competing "civilizations." Civilization is a cultural concept that includes the values, intellectual endeavors, and moral qualities of a society, standing in contrast to "barbarism." There are Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic (Chinese), Hindu, Orthodox (Eastern), Buddhist, and Japanese civilizations.

In Huntington's account, the world is now divided into these civilizations instead of the two opposing superpowers of the Cold War world order, and globalization has brought these cultures into closer contact. The West often is viewed as being in conflict with the Islamic and Chinese cultures; less so, but nonetheless still, in conflict with African, Hindu (primarily India), Orthodox (primarily Russian), and Japanese cultures; and not at all with Latin American cultures. The Islamic world frequently is seen as being in conflict with most of the other groups, but less so with China and Latin America.

In Huntington's world there are "fault lines," lines of demarcation between different groups and civilizations. For example, such a division currently exists between Western/Central and Eastern Europe. The Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania); parts of Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, and Bosnia; and all of Central Europe (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic) and Western Europe are on one side of a cultural fault line with the rest of Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Russia. Western Christianity, ideas of democracy, and higher economic development contrast with the Orthodox religion, more authoritarian rule, and less economic development.

The divide is partially illustrated in the memberships of international political and military alliances. When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) first began expanding from its original membership in the late 1990s, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland were the first former communist countries given approval to join, in part because their culture, political, and economic systems were the most in line with those of existing member countries. The fault line continued to shift as other former communist countries became more Westernized; however, Turkey is the only country east of the current fault line to be approved for NATO membership. Despite this, Turkey is not a member of the European Union (EU). While the EU has included many formerly communist Central European nations and the Baltic States and may be extended to include others in the future, Turkey has serious human rights violations with its Kurdish ethnic minorities, a severe penal system in which torture is still practiced, and an ongoing struggle acknowledging equal rights for women. Yet the inclusion of nations on both sides of the European fault line may bring more cooperation among the various nations.

That the culture clash between the West and parts of the Islamic world is a reality can hardly be debated after the September 11 attacks on the United States and the U.S. response. That it will always be "clash" instead of cooperation remains to be seen.

FROM THE MODERN TO THE POSTMODERN WORLD

Ronald Inglehart's 1997 *Modernization and Postmodernization* argues that culture developed by political socialization is a major variable in explaining movement toward democracy and postmodernization. This major cross-national study, however, includes no Islamic nations and few nondemocratic nations (the totalitarian People's Republic of China and authoritarian Nigeria). Nevertheless, the study yields important information about the role of culture in politics and the trajectory of change for the more developed nations.

The findings, based on aggregated surveys in these nations, indicate that Northern European countries; the English-speaking nations of Canada, Britain, the United States, and Ireland; and Catholic Europe, including Belgium, France, Austria, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, are moving toward a new set of cultural, political, and economic values. A mix of shifting cultural norms and values, developed economies, and democracy are producing this change. The resulting postmodernization is a rejection of traditional values and forms of authority associated with the rise of a modern, industrial age. Postmodernization embraces a preference for nongovernmental organizations to influence politics. It is a more direct participatory form of democracy in which there is a distrust of traditional political institutions. Abortion, divorce, homosexuality, prostitution, extramarital sexual relationships, euthanasia, suicide, and soft drugs are more widely accepted under the purview of postmodernization, and postmodernists are less attached to formal religions and are less likely to attend church and state that God is important in their lives. They also are less concerned with economic well-being; that is, they are postmaterialist as well. It is interesting that postmodernists express a seemingly contradictory belief in two-parent households as best for raising children given that this is normally seen as a "traditional" value. Postmodernists enjoy a democratic political environment and economic security born of highly successful economies, and their values generally are not embraced in nondemocratic, less economically developed, and/or tradition-oriented nations.

It is also evident that within postmodern nations, especially in the United States, there is a reaction against the loss of what are considered traditional values. Age is a major factor in this regard. Inglehart gives a political socialization generation interpretation to his findings. Youth in general are embracing postmodern values, whereas older individuals frequently reject them. Other, more recent surveys show the same trend. Polls in the United States, for example, show that among Americans age 55 and older, relatively few accept same-sex marriage, whereas many who are 30 years old and younger do accept it.

The Inglehart data indicate that Nigeria, South Africa, India, Turkey, and the former communist states of Central Europe are more oriented toward scarcity values. Individuals in these countries are more concerned with making a living than with experimenting with postmaterialist values. Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Mexico fall somewhere along the spectrum of scarcity values, traditional authority, and postmodernization. China, Japan, and South Korea have in common a high achievement motivation along economic lines, but they differ greatly on democracy rankings, with Japan and South Korea moving more toward postmodernization values.

POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

For scholars who approach the concept of political culture from an anthropological perspective, the concept of political culture advanced by political sociologists downplays the importance of culture in analysis. Moreover, it incorrectly categorizes the role of political culture as a reflection of individual attitudes. For cultural anthropologists, political cultures are dynamic systems of meaning that shape and constrain perceptions of people who interrelate in political contexts. Looking at aggregated survey data may not be the best indicator of how meanings are constituted in a particular political system or subsystem or even across political systems. Moreover, the political sociologist's tendency to treat political culture as a more or less fixed national attribute directs attention away from the variations within a nation and impoverishes the ability to explain cultural change within a polity or variations across polities with similar social or economic characteristics.

Lisa Wedeen's conception of a critical approach to political culture is reflected in her field research in Syria and Yemen. This research attempts to explain how Yemenis form strong national attachments in the absence of strong state institutions and how Syrians under the Asad regime reinforced obedience to the autocratic leader even when they shared a recognition that the required rituals of obedience were not genuinely performed. She argues that such an interpretive approach helps

uncover the semiotics at work within a cultural context. This involves using a range of qualitative methods to identify which practices, symbols, and rhetorical frames are politically significant and to narrow the range of possible meanings of those practices, symbols, or frames. The benefit of this practice-oriented cultural approach is greater explanatory power for new and persistent puzzles in political research, such as how political identities are generated, how symbols and rhetoric can generate compliance or conflict, why some political appeals work more than others, and why some ethnic identities become radicalized and others do not. "By paying attention to the ways in which certain meanings become authoritative while others do not," she argues, "political scientists can use this [method] to help explain why recognizable events or empirical regularities occur" (714).

This line of inquiry is relatively new in political science and thus is not as established compared to the frameworks of Almond and Verba and Inglehart. Nonetheless, by paying attention to emerging puzzles and variations within type, deploying mixed-method research designs, and carving out an interpretive position on how to study the nexus between cultural and politics, it generates new and provocative questions not easily addressed by the classic approaches.

See also *Almond, Gabriel; Clash of Civilizations; Cultural Policy; Cultural Relations; Cultural Rights; Culture Wars; Democracy and Democratization; Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; Endangered Cultures; Multiculturalism; United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)*

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DANIEL B. GERMAN WITH
DOUG GOLDENBERG-HART

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Political Discourse

Political discourse is a dimension of, and a tool for, political action. Discursive acts are a significant and indispensable part of political practices. A political scientist is therefore often led to analyze political discourses, broadly defined as sets of ideas and processes of policy formulation and communication. These can take the form of oral communication (e.g., electoral speeches, radio or television interviews, parliamentary questions and debates, etc.), written communication (e.g., political platforms or manifestos, bills and laws, etc.), as well as meaningful symbols (e.g., demonstrations, commemorations, flags, etc.).

The nature and the role of political discourse can be construed in different ways. Some research designs informed by theoretical approaches focusing on other explanatory factors—such as preferences, political and institutional capacity, or policy legacies—tend to see discourses as epiphenomena with no autonomous or significant causal influence (e.g., rational choice theories, historical neoinstitutionalism). Opposite theoretical approaches stress, on the contrary, that discourses and ideas exert a key causal influence (e.g., social constructivism). Some pluralist approaches argue that studying discourses, when combined with other factors and perspectives, helps complete an understanding of political processes and outputs.

Several distinct or complementary functions have been assigned to political discourse, including transmitting information and exchanging views on political issues, political agenda setting, altering public opinion as well as behavior (notably electoral behavior), and politically socializing citizens. Most of these functions connect with two intertwined political imperatives: on the one hand, the legitimization of political actors, systems, and policies; and, on the other hand, the shaping of perceptions of reality.

Discursive acts are inherent in the practices of power. According to Murray Edelman, "The employment of language to sanctify action is exactly what makes politics different from other methods of allocating values." Political power is never exclusively based on might and constraint, as asserted by Jean-Jacques Rousseau: "The strongest is never strong enough unless he turns might into right and obedience into duty." Political discourse contributes to legitimizing political action and political actors. Because it presents political actors and political decisions as the driving forces of social life, it legitimizes political action as such. Political actors also use it strategically, willing to gain or retain political support and legitimacy. Those in power claim that they are responsible for current positive developments while promising future achievements. On the other hand, the opposition and advocacy groups criticize those who govern or put forward alternative courses of action.

Political discourse is not a neutral way to pass information to rational actors in order to help them make informed decisions. It aims at making specific interpretations of political issues prevail. It influences the way people think about and perceive political life. It makes social life intelligible by reducing complex and multidimensional issues to a limited number of options and a few unidimensional oppositions (e.g., the left versus the right, or ecology versus productivism). Within a political system, some symbols, words, and arguments are associated with political ideologies. Using those meaningful signs, political discourse takes a part in building and reinforcing political identities. It asserts and helps identify actors' political positions and preferences.

Several elements constrain political discourse—notably, the role and status of the speaker, the audience, and the media as well as the political, social, or economic context. The political status or aspirations of the speaker influence the style and the content of the discourse. Within a political culture, different public roles (e.g., president, member of parliament, mayor, etc.)

raise different expectations. For instance, high profile mandates attract more numerous, more contradictory, and more intense demands, which decrease the margins of maneuver.

Political actors seeking electoral support have to adapt their discourse to their audience. Depending on its homogeneity (e.g., general public, specific interest groups, etc.), the discourse can be designed to address specific demands or remain general and flexible enough in order not to alienate one's potential supporters.

The development of new communication technologies since the nineteenth century (e.g., the press, radio, television, Internet) has dramatically modified the dynamics of political discourse. Information can transmit almost instantly and reach large and heterogeneous audiences through mass media. Political discourse has become an endless and highly interactive process, and political actors must make statements under the pressure of current events. In contemporary mass-mediated societies, political discourse is omnipresent. The study of its production, its content, and its effects is a vast and continuously renewed field of research.

See also *Information Technology and Politics; Political Communication.*

. . . . GEOFFROY MATAGNE

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Political Ecology

Political ecology is a relatively new interdisciplinary field. It initially developed through the merger of cultural ecology with political economy.

ORIGINS OF THE FIELD

The central concern of cultural ecology in the 1950s and 1960s was to introduce the theoretical constructs of biological ecology into the study of preindustrial cultures. Scholars soon began to question the foundations of cultural ecology, noting that few societies functioned as independent, autarkic systems. Nature and society relations in agrarian cultures, it was argued, are best understood through political economy, focusing on the social relations of production under capitalism. A broadly Marxist political-economic scholarship guided this reorientation, originating from several fields and disciplines. In particular, Marxian development studies in the 1970s increasingly questioned prevailing demographic explanations of developing countries' environmental degradation, offering an alternative political-economic explanation that focused attention on wealth distribution, social patterns of accumulation, interclass relations, and the role of the state.

Out of this political economy approach to environmental degradation emerged a set of methods and questions that provided the foundation for a new field. Although the term had been used in other contexts, two geographers, Harold Brookfield and Piers Blaikie, are widely recognized for initially defining political ecology as linking ecology with political economy in their 1987 book on land degradation. Their central premise was that environmental problems are fundamentally social and political problems, not technical or managerial, and therefore demand a theoretical foundation for analyzing the complex social, economic, and political relations in which ecological change is embedded. Because of the complexity of the phenomena under investigation and the interdisciplinary character of the field, there is no single methodology or set of theoretical concepts that could be used to define political ecology. Nonetheless, political ecology is distinguishable in its particular blend of multiscaler, ecological, political-economic, historical, ethnographic, and discourse analyses.

THEORETICAL EVOLUTION

Political ecology became a distinct field during a period of revolutionary theoretical shifts in both the social and biophysical sciences, specifically the rise of poststructural social theory and nonequilibrium ecology. Political ecology was soon caught up in poststructuralist debates, especially those addressing the social construction of nature. The phrase, "the social construction of nature" highlighted the role of representation, discourse, and imagery in defining and framing knowledge of the natural world.

Political ecologists have staked out the middle ground between extreme relativist and extreme realist views of nature. The prevailing position, borrowed from critical realist philosophy and feminist science studies, accepts the existence of a material world independent of human consciousness and sensory perception, while at the same time recognizes that knowledge of that world is always situated, contingent, and mediated. Poststructuralism introduced the role of discourse analysis in exploring the ideological roots of claims about the causes of environmental change. Since the early 1990s, it has become widely recognized within political ecology that material analyses cannot be conducted in the absence of, or separately from, discursive analyses.

Biological ecology, almost simultaneous with the emergence of poststructuralism in the social sciences, experienced its own revolutionary theoretical shift. For most of the twentieth century, the dominant view of environmental change was that ecological communities progressed through a linear series of stages, which ultimately culminated in a final, climax stage

of stable equilibrium. Any force—natural or anthropogenic—that altered the normal equilibrium state was characterized as a disturbance. In the twentieth century, the equilibrium view of ecology came under increasing scrutiny as more and more empirical findings contradicted it. A new ecology—nonequilibrium opposed to equilibrium—subsequently emerged, which rejected the assumption of stability as the norm for all ecological communities. The new ecology replaced assumptions of equilibrium, predictability, and permanence with instability, disequilibria, nonlinearity, and chaotic fluctuation. Disturbance is not viewed as anomalous or as an event from which a system recovers, but rather it is considered commonly integral to the system's functioning. Finally, the linearity and predictability of ecological change can no longer be assumed in complex natural systems that are highly sensitive to initial conditions.

In the wake of these theoretical developments, political ecologists have identified convergences in nonequilibrium ecology and poststructuralism that can provide the basis for a synthetic treatment of nature-society research. Four themes emerged among these efforts at synthesis. First, researchers are combining nonequilibrium ecology and critical social theory to demonstrate the weakness, or in some cases, the complete absence, of scientific evidence to support widely accepted claims about nature-society interactions. A second theme emphasizes how incorporating the insights of nonequilibrium ecology can bring a renewed focus on nature's agency in shaping nature-society interactions. A third theme highlights the importance of temporal and spatial scales in both nonequilibrium ecology and social theory, underscoring the nonlinear and noncyclical character of environmental change. Finally, advances in social theory and nonequilibrium ecology have produced a new appreciation for localized resource management systems in environments defined by extreme spatial and temporal variability.

RECENT TRENDS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Political ecology is rapidly expanding beyond rural concerns and developing countries into new research contexts and new areas of theoretical and philosophical inquiry. First, a strong focus on urban political ecology has developed in recent years, partly in recognition of the rapid urbanization of large regions of developing countries and the consequences of globalization. Urban environments are characterized as hybrid forms, requiring vast inputs of capital and labor, yet still linked to and dependent upon biophysical processes. Second, political ecologists have recently developed a potent critical assessment of environmental security thinking, along with a cogent argument for an alternative analysis of the relationship between environmental change alongside war and armed conflict. Third, recent developments within and outside of the academy suggest that engaging with formal ethics—including social justice, animal rights, bioethics, and consumer responsibility—will provide an important trajectory in political ecology.

Finally, debates over indigenousness, property rights, and stewardship have sparked a range of work that more deeply probes the relationship of identity and environment, raising new questions about how to theorize culture and nature. Future political ecology studies will need to be aware of the instabilities and cultural constructedness of group self-identification, while at the same time remain sensitive to the validity of local historical narratives, practices, meanings, and attachment to place.

See also *Agrarianism; Biology and Political Science; Climate Change Conferences, United Nations; Environmental Policy; Environmental Political Theory; Farm Lobby; Globalization and Development; Political Geography; Sociobiology and Politics; Structuralism; Urban Land Use and Town Planning.*

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Political Economy

Political economy means different things even to informed scholars. Like a Rorschach ink blot, one's favored definition reveals much about one's background and interests. For some, it means Marxism, derived from Aristotle's conceptions of the moral foundations of exchange and production. For others, it means neoclassical economics, with a focus on choice and efficiency, expanded to account for political outcomes that shape, and are shaped by, market processes. There is merit in each view.

Until the late nineteenth century, political economy was the joint study of politics and economics. John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx exemplify scholars who combined the study of politics and economics, but the study of politics and economics later became separated, both in focus and method. Recent developments in each field have moved toward new connections.

Any society, at any time, must come to grips with the central political economic questions: What activities will be collective, organized either through command or democratic choice, recognizing that individual incentives still matter? What activities and rights will be individual, focused on self-interested, private voluntary exchange, recognizing that collective consequences still matter? The theories of markets and market failure provide one framework for analysis and understanding, but political economy is much older than the theory of market failure.

THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

Aristotle believed that in a just exchange, each party receives equal value. Yet, questions remain about what constitutes "value," and how one might judge if it is equal. In Chapter 5 of Book 5 of *Nichomachean Ethics,* Aristotle claims that exchange establishes communication and social connection among citizens. Political relations are thus closely tied to exchange relations, which create a consciousness of cooperation in society.

Aristotle then raises a problem, however—one that still vexes modern scholars. Voluntary exchange may often yield unequal rewards, as one party benefits more than the other. Over time and across many exchanges, especially if some citizens come to specialize in trade, these differences create social and political distinctions that are powerful but morally arbitrary. Aristotle concludes that "nothing . . . can prevent the product of one of the parties being better than that of the other, and in that case therefore *they have to be equalized*" (143).

Unfortunately, this is logically incoherent. If exchange is voluntary, then what each party receives is strictly better than what is given up. One questions what essential value there is in transactions, other than the value parties subjectively attached to the commodities. Alternatively, if money is value, then the only way to ensure justice is to exchange equal monetary values. Yet, this is true only if money is exchanged for money. What about an exchange of money for bread? Are the values equal? Is the exchange just? Aristotle recognized the problem, but never solved it. Thomas Aquinas, in question 77 in *Summa Theologica,* inquires as to "whether it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth?" (1507–1508). But again, "worth" appears intrinsic, and objectively observable. Aquinas is unable to make a coherent claim for why value differs from whatever price a buyer is willing to pay and a seller is willing to accept.

This formulation of *just price* preserves the contradiction of whether price and monetary value, in the judgment of those trading, are or are not the true "worth of things." The question was finally answered fully only by Karl Marx. In *Capital,* Marx argued that equal labor values could balance just transactions. However, exchange in capitalist wage labor systems is not balanced. The buyer of wage labor derives disproportionate benefits from the transaction, and is able to accumulate large quantities of capital. Further, just as Aristotle claimed, these disparities have social and political implications. Over time, profits for capital engender disparities in social and political

class and constitute the basis for a system of domination of both the economy and the polity.

Further, Marx recognized the great power of capitalism to create wealth and amass capital—a key stage in the development of any nation. His unique contribution rests in his conception of the metastasis of disparities of economic power into political and social control of the nation. Vladimir Lenin extended this idea in powerful ways to account for what he saw as the international expansion of capitalism through colonialism and imperialism. The argument concludes that capitalist nations and the capitalist system will, over time, tend toward greater instability, and ultimately an eschaton where the internal contradictions of capitalism are resolved in favor of a more just and economically sustainable system of exchange and allocation.

Therefore, while many scholars conclude that view defining value as labor is unworkable as a purely economic theory, the core elements of the Marxist-Leninist theory of economic history remain important elements of modern political economy. Modern scholars have extended this synthesis, both correcting some problems in the framework and applying the framework to problems that Marx did not explicitly foresee, such as globalization and culture.

NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS AND SUBJECTIVE MARGINALISM

Neoclassical economics, beginning with William Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger, and Leon Walras, solved the defining-value problem very differently. As Menger frames it in *Principles of Economics*: "Value is thus nothing inherent in goods, no property of them, nor an independent thing existing by itself. . . . Hence value does not exist outside the consciousness of men" (120–121).

Subjectivism unshackles price from intrinsic value, and allows both production cost and product demand to be accounted for in the calculus of price determination. Even in the subjectivist world of modern microeconomics, the cost of production is still the core concept because, under perfect competition, the price will always be driven to the cost of production. Jevons, Menger, and Walras were the first to argue specifically that a subjective concept called *utility*, not objective physical or moral goals, drove economic actors. Indeed, they went further, and claimed that the economics of consumer choice was properly the study of utility at the margin.

Alfred Marshall formalized the intuitions of subjectivism and marginal utility and combined them with the optimization conditions now learned in basic economics classes. Marshall's unique combination of talents allowed him to describe the foundations of economic theory clearly and precisely. It is difficult to imagine modern economics without Marshall's contributions, which, for individual actors, parallel the mathematical achievements of Walras at the level of an aggregate economy of many actors. In fact, Marshall was either the last political economist of the normative school or the first true economist of the mathematical and positivist tradition now found in university economics departments all over the world. Not until the innovations in mechanism design at the end of

the twentieth century were the ancient interests in political institutions and the economy reconnected.

In Marshall's benchmark world of perfect competition, the stylized *invisible hand* of Adam Smith reconciles competing goals and directs resources to their highest valued use. Every exchange makes both traders better-off, and in equilibrium, there is no feasible additional trade that could make anyone better-off. The first and second welfare theorems capture the normative properties of this mathematical world.

Such proofs illustrating the welfare consequences of operating perfect markets represent important contributions by Walras, Kenneth Arrow, and others. The static and dynamic forms of the theory of *competitive equilibrium* have an important place in the pantheon of scientific political economy, and they continue to play a role in many areas. While this is not a world that many observable markets resemble, it is the basis for a strong presumption in favor of markets by many economists and citizens.

However, for decades, a parallel school—including Austrian economists such as Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek— argued that the focus on equilibrium, with abstract assumptions invoked simply as a means to prove equilibrium results, were a distraction from real-world market processes. In fact, beginning with Adam Smith's simple pin factory example, assumptions like perfect competition and decreasing returns appear suspect. Smith's division of labor, with its resultant specialization and economies of scale, is the motor that creates wealth and improves the human condition.

The title of Book 1, Chapter 3 of the *Wealth of Nations* contains a dynamic challenge to the same static competitive equilibrium theory for which Smith himself was the inspiration. The chapter title is "That the Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market." Smith envisioned that the use of production lines and specialization creates a surplus of trade goods. To transform this surplus into wealth, distant people who had no previous connections now began to trade those surpluses and to become more interdependent. Still, there are downsides to this increase in prosperity. Real markets—driven to expand by division of labor and returns to scale in production, innovation in transportation technology, and improvements in product packaging and durability—have proved to be enormously corrosive of local customs and traditional exchange relations.

Joseph Schumpeter identifies and analyzes the role of the entrepreneur. Though driven by profit, the entrepreneur is also an innovator, the force that animates the story that Adam Smith told about division of labor, expansion of markets, and increases in wealth. Schumpeter describes the process of *creative destruction*, where new products and cheaper production processes expand consumers' menu of choice and society's prosperity. Schumpeter's *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* reflects an instinct that the study of economics implies a study of politics, but he does not take it very far.

There are signs, however, that the integration of these two fields is accelerating. Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast point out that developed societies always have developed economies and developed polities, and that this suggests that the connection between politics and economics must be a fundamental part of the development process.

THE MARKET FAILURE PARADIGM

The so-called market failure paradigm brings government back into markets in a focused way. It takes the competitive equilibrium model as a starting point, assuming that markets and private allocation of scarce resources organize activity efficiently. Government action is justified when markets fail to produce efficient outcomes. Where Marxists see markets as inherently exploitative, market failure theorists view markets as the engine of prosperity, though in need of direction when the assumptions are not met.

Along with an unstated underpinning of law, property, and order, competitive equilibrium theory makes the following four assumptions: (1) all goods are private; (2) there are no negative externalities; (3) there are so many buyers and sellers that no one can influence a price; and (4) information is free and universal.

Violations of these explicit assumptions are the market failures. Taking these in turn, many goods are not private, but are collective goods in that they are jointly supplied and those who do not pay cannot be excluded from their enjoyment. National defense is the canonical example. Because of the temptation to *free ride* on the contributions of others, less than optimal amounts of collective goods will be supplied. One solution to this market failure is to have the government provide national defense.

Negative externalities are the costs over and above the price paid by a buyer to the seller, and suffered by people who are not party to the transaction, such as air pollution. Possible government solutions include regulation of the process producing the pollution, taxing emissions, or a cap and trade system that creates tradable rights to emit, but imposes the full social cost on polluters.

In regard to the many buyers and sellers, violations of the condition that no single actor can influence a price are not easy to resolve. The efficiency of markets rests on active competition in both the static and dynamic senses. In the static sense, competition implies that products are priced at their cost of production, satisfying Marshall's marginality conditions and Aquinas's intuition about just price. The difference is that economists have demonstrated that there are costs, termed *deadweight loss*, associated with monopoly and market power on the producer side. In the dynamic sense, competition requires new investment and innovation, and it is not clear how firms in a classical competitive environment with zero profits can take on the implied research and development.

Once the need for innovation is recognized, the problem of competition policy is harder to solve. In the presence of sharply increasing returns to scale, competition may result in a winnowing out of firms with only a few survivors, each possessing the power to raise price above marginal cost. There are two implied government actions to prevent this trend toward concentration from becoming too extreme. First, antitrust

policy may seek to prevent the extreme concentration of economic power when it can be avoided, as in the case of trusts. The second implied government action is regulation in cases when a few producers is the most efficient result, as in the case of long-run economies of scale, such as utility companies.

The last category of market failure is information asymmetry. It may be difficult or expensive for consumers to learn whether a product or service is safe or effective. Further, the harmful consequences may be large enough to make ex ante, rather than ex post, sanctions necessary. Free market advocates tend to favor ex post sanctions, such as personal injury lawsuits, for fraudulent claims or harmful products. Liberal consumer advocates, on the other hand, gravitate toward ex ante regulations, including licensing of providers, health inspections, and lengthy clinical trials before a product can legally be offered for sale.

In all four cases of market failures, there are questions of what, how much and where. How much national defense is enough? When are negative externalities big enough problems to merit government intervention? When should government deal with the competition problem with antitrust, when with regulation, and when should it just leave well enough alone? When should government protect consumers from real risks to life and health, and when should it allow markets and the reputations of businesses to work in resolving information asymmetries? There are no right answers because these questions are matters of political belief, ideology, and partisan competition. However, while there may be no identifiable best practice, there is no assurance that government will make the best decisions, even in the absence of overt corruption.

THE POSSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT FAILURE

Arthur Pigou, one of the high priests of market failures, noted in 1920:

> It is not sufficient to contrast the imperfect adjustments of unfettered enterprise with the best adjustment that economists in their studies can imagine. For we cannot expect that any State authority will attain, or even wholeheartedly seek, that ideal. Such authorities are liable alike to ignorance, to sectional pressure, and to personal corruption by private interest. (296)

Typically, market failure was a basis for government intervention to correct the failure, but there was an inconsistency between the selfish motivations assumed in markets and the benevolent and public-spirited motivations assumed for government. The public choice movement resolved this inconsistency by assuming that government officials are, like economic agents, selfish utility maximizers. Putting the institutions on an equal footing with respect to the assumed motivation of key actors led to considering the possibility that government may not solve market failures, and may even make them worse. There are thus three components to the public choice response. The first is the information problem; the second is the incoherence of majority rule; the third is the problem of limits.

As Hayek pointed out, markets depend on very widely distributed information about demand and willingness to pay. No central planner or government can possibly have as much information as is aggregated in the millions of choices made daily in consumer, labor, and financial markets.

Since Condorcet, it has been known that under many conditions, majority rule is cyclical. Arrow, who helped identify the conditions under which competitive markets fulfill the theorems of welfare economics, proved there is no voting method that satisfies some innocuous conditions, such as universal admissibility of preference orderings and nondictatorship. This means that any complex social-decision rule must have elements that are incoherent or arbitrary.

The third problem of government intervention is that majority rule is not self-limiting. James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock point out that once public decisions are rooted in the will of the people, whether expressed directly or through their representatives, constitutions are needed to protect individual rights and to limit the arbitrary scope of majority rule.

BRINGING POLITICS AND ECONOMICS BACK TOGETHER

In December 2007, three economists, Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, and Roger Myerson, gave separate acceptance speeches, acknowledging the Nobel Prize for mechanism design as an innovation in economic theory. Each recognized, in different ways, that the reintegration of political institutions with market institutions was largely accomplished. A mechanism is a process for determining outcomes—whether it is a game, a set of rules, or some social convention. Pure markets are a mechanism and so are utopian collective farms.

Myerson gives an explicit account of why a focus on economics is necessary, but incomplete in isolation. He argues that mechanism design expands the scope of analysis beyond technical and resource constraints into the realm of incentive constraints. Any social institution is a mix of incentives and a mix of political and economic considerations. Good social institutions foster communication and coordinated collective action in the face of adverse selection and moral hazard problems.

The bifurcation of economics and politics, in the public mind and in academic research, has been fruitful because generations of scholars working independently have constructed and tested separate analytical frameworks. Yet, the separation has never made sense from a practical perspective because neither politics nor economics exists separate from the other. The road toward a full reunification, toward the creation of a comprehensive theory that deals seamlessly with incentives and constraints in both politics and markets, has now been opened. It will likely be well-traveled in both directions.

See also *Centrally Planned Economy; Development, Economic; Development, Political Economy of; Globalization; Globalization and Development; International Political Economy; Political Economy, Comparative.*

WILLIAM R. KEECH AND
. . . . .MICHAEL C. MUNGER

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Political Economy, Comparative

Comparative political economy (CPE) studies how political determinants influence socioeconomic outcomes and how economic determinants shape political behavior. The political economy of the welfare state is a particularly interesting area for illustrating CPE, as it both shapes socioeconomic outcomes and is shaped by them.

MODERNIZATION AND THE ORIGIN OF THE WELFARE STATE

Without the presence of socioeconomic influences, the welfare state in today's advanced, industrialized democracies would probably not have emerged. Modernization—encompassing industrialization and democratization, and specifically involving rapidly changing working conditions and the emergence of the free labor contract—is the central factor here, as it led to the loss of income security among weak groups and to unemployment. Since neither the market nor the family provided the collective goods to cope with these new insecurities, large parts of population turned to the state to demand social protection. The increasing concentration of people in factories and cities and the extended means of communication enabled the population to mobilize itself through protest or establishing social and political organizations. In a nutshell, industrialization dislodged masses of people and made them dependent on the whims of the labor market. In turn, they demanded more socioeconomic security, to which the welfare state is a response.

A socioeconomic factor (modernization, or more specifically the establishment of a full-fledged labor market) thus shapes a political outcome (welfare state development), illustrating why a political economy perspective is so helpful for studying welfare state development. Interestingly, the common experience of modernization did lead to different outcomes.

It is here where *comparative* enters political economy. A comparative political economic analysis examines to what extent socioeconomic factors relate to political ones in different cases, and vice versa.

VARIOUS MODELS OF THE WELFARE STATE

Due to modernization, all advanced, industrialized democracies introduced social security programs such as sickness insurance, old age pensions, and accident insurance during the nineteenth or twentieth century. However, the countries differ substantially in the degree to which the different insecurities are covered and who is eligible for a benefit. Welfare states come, so to speak, in different flavors.

In the 1950s, Richard M. Titmuss proposed a typology of welfare state models or regimes. First, there is the *residual welfare model,* which offers social protection only once the private market and the family fail to fulfill the needs. The welfare states in Anglo-Saxon countries are an empirical example of this model. Second, there is the *industrial achievement-performance model,* which links welfare rights and benefits to the employment relation. The continental European "male-breadwinner" countries such as Germany and the Netherlands in the last century typify this model. Finally, there is the *institutional redistributive model,* in which social welfare institutions are integral parts of society and which offer universalist services outside the market when needed. The Scandinavian countries exemplify this model.

There is a considerable overlap between this typology and the one proposed by Gøsta Esping-Andersen in *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (1990). In this seminal book, Esping-Andersen distinguishes three welfare state regimes—*liberal, conservative,* and *social-democratic*—and these correspond largely to Titmuss's residual welfare, industrial achievement-performance, and institutional redistributive models.

A particular type of welfare state regime or model emerged because the socioeconomic changes of modernization depended, among other factors, on whether or not the middle class was included in the pro–welfare state coalition and, if the middle class was included, how this came about and was arranged politically. A comparative political economy perspective —one that examines the interplay between socioeconomic determinants and political ones—is thus crucial for understanding the origin and subsequent development of the different types of welfare states.

VARIATION IN POVERTY AND EQUALITY

Comparative political economy also proves valuable for understanding the variation across countries or types of welfare states in socioeconomic outcomes, such as poverty and equality. Many recent empirical studies, for example, show that the type of welfare state regime matters for the level of poverty and equality in a country. There seems to be a consensus that the most pronounced effect derives from the degree of univeralism. The mechanisms behind this are manifold. For instance, good benefits and services—especially

education and health care—that tailor to the standards of the better off rather than to the poor are good for the poor and help to increase social mobility. Moreover, fragmented, targeted, or particularistic systems (i.e., separate systems for separate groups) reinforce inequality rather than reduce it. How universal social programs are varies across the types of welfare state regimes. A political determinant—how the welfare state is organized—affects the socioeconomic outcomes of poverty and equality.

The welfare state is but one of the topics upon which comparative political economy focuses; other topics include voting behavior and the relation between economic development and democracy. Regarding voting behavior, comparative political economic analysis assesses to what extent economic considerations influence election results. Why, for instance, did the economy have such a large effect on the 1980 presidential election in the United States but hardly an influence twenty years later? With respect to economic development and democracy, comparative political economic analysis studies to what extent economic development fosters, or hinders, democracy and to what extent the reverse may be occurring (i.e., democracy stimulating or retarding economic development).

See also *Political Economy.*

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Political Geography

Political geography is a field of inquiry concerned with the geographical organization of government, the ways in which geographical imaginations figure in world politics, and the spatial basis to political identities and associated political movements. Geography is often understood as the distribution of such physical features of the earth as mountains, rivers, and oceans, but it also includes human reactions to and impacts on the physical environment—from settlement and economic-development patterns to human-induced climate change.

Political geography is that part of human geography involved with politics. Compared with political sociology and political science, political geography is less concerned with the politics of social groups and the political preferences of individual persons and more with how social groups and people organize and orient themselves in space for political purposes. Examples of this include the field's long-term focus on such phenomena as the dynamics of interstate borders, the history of modern statehood, electoral geography (including the geographical organization of elections), and the strategic ranking of world regions in foreign policies. Historically, the field has focused on the links between space, regions, and the natural environment, on the one hand, and politics (and polity), on the other. Such linkages were important to ancient and early modern political theory but have weakened in recent political theory, as its practitioners have tended to become largely state focused. Political geography, therefore, recalls a historically more integrative and perhaps more wide-ranging approach to understanding political phenomena.

TRAJECTORY, 1890 TO PRESENT

As a modern field of study, political geography dates from the 1890s as initially an "aid to statecraft" in organizing their empires and confronting their adversaries on the part of the great powers—Germany, Britain, France, the United States, Russia, and Japan. Largely analogous to what was also known after 1899 as *geopolitics,* this political geography took contemporary national political identities and reason of state as givens. The "needs" of territorial states, and their relative location on the earth's surface alongside the resources available in driving and determining the outcome of competition between the states, were the main concerns of the field. Lurking in the early history of political geography is the history of thinking about how nature relates to nation-state as inherited from the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment and the early nineteenth-century Romantic reaction against it. If the idea of levels of development associated with different national territories comes from eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought, then that of hierarchies of national territories on a racial-natural basis competing with one another for domination comes out of nineteenth-century German idealism.

This intellectual trajectory long dominated the field. Indeed, until very recently, many political geographers were either cameralists—advocates of state-based economies that maximize their self-sufficiency and minimize their transactions with others—or imperialists—promoters of empire-building and controlling distant territories). There are still some of each around, even if many advocates of cameralism now think of themselves as on the political left rather than on the nationalist right. Changing times can produce strange bedfellows, but over the past twenty years, liberal perspectives that pit states against markets, and social perspectives that look to a plurality of forms of governance, have tended to become more influential. Of course, disputes among cameralists (both nationalist and state socialist), imperialists, liberals, and romantic localists have deep roots in many genres of modern political thought.

However, it is not only the range of implicit political projects informing the field that has changed. The intellectual attitude has moved 180 degrees. Since the 1960s, a more independent and critical approach has begun to develop, acknowledging the need to critically question rather than actively serve the particular interests of the political geographer's "home state."

At the same time, the empirical scope of the field has widened to consider questions about the origins, spread, and support for political movements and parties, the links between places and political identities, and geographies of nationalism and ethnic conflict. Along with many other parts of political studies, political geography has gone from presuming that states, particularly one's own state, are everything to seeing "the political" as everywhere. This intellectual leavening of the field has simply transformed political geography from a particularly state-centered field at its origins to one interested in the range of ways in which geography intersects with the broadly construed sense of the political: from the material and discursive construction of states and their interrelations to the connections between places and political identities.

GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

A good case can be made that the geopolitical context of the time has been crucial for the emergence political geography over the past one hundred years. The field has not evolved simply as the result of an internal dynamic, as one paradigm simply replaced another because of intellectual fancy or academic competition. It is not that such considerations have been absent, but they have been relatively less salient to the making of the field than the nature of the world that political geography has claimed to directly report on and interpret. The time of modern political geography's founding in the 1890s was one of burgeoning interimperial rivalry and arms races between a set of great powers that reached its twin peaks in the two world wars. This period gave rise to the political geography that privileged the role of physical geography and relative global location in determining or conditioning state prospects and limits. Major features of political geography during this phase included arguing for control over oceanic sea-lanes and articulating geopolitical pretexts based on the relative propensity of different states to expand.

The cold war from 1945 to 1991, with its emphasis on global ideological competition between two models of "modernity"—the democratic capitalism of the United States and the state socialism of the Soviet Union—initially produced a diminished interest in the study of political geography. The field as it had existed before World War II (1939–1945) did not seem to offer much food for thought in the new circumstances. Of course, the period did encourage freezing political boundaries and a seemingly permanent standoff between the two sides. Ideology, not geography, was what mattered. Nevertheless, even during this period, geopolitical claims to spheres of influence and the definition of *buffer states* between the two "sides" were important parts of the overall conflict. As the cold war slowly eroded, however, political geography underwent something of

a revival in the United States and elsewhere, as questions of state territoriality and electoral geography emerged from the long sleep of the postwar period. The social upheavals of the 1960s focused on civil rights and the Vietnam War (1959–1975) provide something of the context for this shift.

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, a geopolitical context is emerging in which states, however mighty, confront shadowy networks of discontented and fanatic groups often based in *failed* or *quasi states*, following this or that utopian objective, often of a religious or ethnic nature. As this new world disorder—and other dimensions of it such as increased worldwide flows of money, goods, and people—take geographical shape, political geography can be expected in turn to change its shape to address the changes.

FROM NATURALIZED TO CRITICAL KNOWLEDGE

Political geography had a history before the term itself came into more widespread use in the 1890s. For example, the seventeenth-century Englishman William Petty's idea of *political arithmetic,* and his book *Political Anatomy of Ireland* (1672), are historical precursors of late nineteenth-century political geography. In mid-eighteenth-century France, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot used the term *political geography* to refer to the relationships between the facts of geography, seen as all physical and human features of spatial distribution, and the organization of politics. It is also apparent that many of the great figures in the history of political thought—from the ancient Greeks Aristotle and Thucydides to the early modern Florentine Machiavelli and later writers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Charles-Louise Montesquieu, A. R. J. Turgot, James Madison, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Georg F. W. Hegel, and Karl Marx—had ideas about political territoriality and the effects of geographical location and access to resources on conflict and war. These ideas can be regarded as basic elements of political geography. They picked up on the practical realities facing political elites and offered their solutions in the context of the historical periods in which they lived. Thucydides's great work, *The Peloponnesian War,* concerns the two decades of war between Athens and Sparta (431–411 BCE) and forms the first example of use of the opposition between sea and land powers that later political geographers such as Halford Mackinder (1861–1947), in his famous work on control of the Eurasian heartland, used as a basic organizing principle of world politics.

The founders of modern political geography could therefore draw upon many centuries of relevant thought to inform their research and writing. Yet they were also creatures of their time. An important continuity across the early twentieth century is the naturalized understanding of knowledge that tended to dominate geography in general and political geography in particular. The university field of geography as a whole was invented in the late nineteenth century, in part, as an offshoot of the growth of national geographical societies devoted to exploration, collecting information about exotic peoples, and the opening up of foreign lands to commerce

or conquest (or both). The other part of its origins lay in detailed mapping and portrayal of the regions and landscapes of national territories. This allowed communication of the material basis of national identity in the burgeoning elementary schools of the era. In this respect, geography was one of a panoply of subjects with ancient roots that were reinvented under their old names to service the needs of statehood and empire-building: from anthropology's measuring of physical differences between human groups and literature's capture of national literary genius, to history's telling of distinctive and noble national histories. New fields such as sociology, economics, and political science acquired their own niches in the national service.

An increasingly prestigious and dominant thrust in all of the new disciplines, however, was toward a *naturalization* of knowledge claims. This is the tendency to want to explain human and social phenomena largely, if not entirely, in terms of natural processes, either physical or biological. In other words, scholars wanted to use processes assuredly not of mental construction outside the questionable "human" realm in which values, interests, and identities were all subject to divergent interpretations, and hence less amenable to "expert opinion." The German thinkers who initially dominated the field, such as Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), were particularly given to this sort of approach.

Naturalization of knowledge claims had two vital intellectual preconditions. One was the separation of the scientific claim from the subject position of the particular writer. Claims were made to universal knowledge that transcended any particular national, class, gender, or ethnic standpoint. So, even as a particular "national interest" was addressed, a perspective that put it into the realm of nature, rather than that of politics or society, framed it. This "view from nowhere" was by no means new, but it was very important to the new university fields in supporting their assertion of expertise and relevance to addressing the problems of the age.

The second precondition was preference arguments drawn from the natural sciences to explain social and political phenomena. Thus, Charles Darwin's principle of natural selection filtered down into popular culture, and into fields such as geography, largely in terms of the idea of survival of the fittest. This not only encouraged organic conceptions of nation-statehood (i.e., the state as a type of organism) but also stimulated ideas about racial competition, degradation, and dominion. Much of what passed for social Darwinism, however, was inspired by the older evolutionary ideas of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744–1829). Compared to Darwin's reliance on variation over extended time periods, these were both more open to the immediate effects of the physical environment on social processes and, crucially, to the impact of *will*, or intervention, in creating more successful organisms. This allowed packaging seemingly contradictory elements into a single study, such as races as biological categories arrayed according to their superior "consciousness" for which there was no natural basis whatsoever. Such ideas were widely shared among elites, not least the new academic ones, across all of the great powers.

After World War II, such ideas began to fall into disfavor, particularly in the United States. There had always been those who thought such logic limited or fallacious. However, particularly in light of the way supporters of German and Japanese expansionism in the interwar period expropriated the term *geopolitics*—undoubtedly influenced in their reasoning by precursors such as Mackinder—political geography was tarred with the brush of a now defeated geographical determinism.

Political geography thus went into somewhat of a slump. It started to recover under two influences in the 1960s and early 1970s: One was the attempt to bring to bear classical concerns with territory back into political geography, but without the biometaphysical bias. Crucial to this innovation were such figures as the French American geographer Jean Gottmann (1915–1994) and his 1973 *The Significance of Territory,* and the Norwegian political sociologist Stein Rokkan (1921–1979) in a 1980 article titled "Territories, Centers, and Peripheries." The emphasis on state territories as the outcome of historically institutionalized and geographically variegated processes involving sovereignty claims and nationalism marked a break with previous biological conceptions of territory. Later work, such as Robert Sack's *Human Territoriality* (1986), both deepened appreciation for this contribution and extended it theoretically in new directions.

Another influence came from a revival of electoral geography, first explored by Andre Siegfried in France in the early 1900s, with its focus on geographical patterns of election results and what they said about how people came to vote in the ways they did. Kevin Cox, Ron Johnston, and Peter Taylor were particularly influential in this regard. This later developed into a more fully articulated connection between popular political views and the place settings or contexts in which people live, particularly as presented in John Agnew's 1987 *Place and Politics*. If the approach of Sack and others tended to intersect heavily with positive political theory, electoral geography related more to research in fields such as political sociology and political science. In both cases, however, knowledge was seen as the outcome of human agency rather than of the direct effect of natural process.

Perhaps the most important theoretical departures, however, date from the 1980s when, respectively, Marxist ideas about statehood and capitalism, and feminist and postmodern ideas about the discursive construction of geopolitics and political identities, acquired increasing influence. In identifying the central role of the state in global capitalism and the social construction of political identities as a process beyond the realm of what was conventionally considered "politics," these self-consciously critical approaches to knowledge called into question both the restriction of the "political" to a separate sphere and the independence of the state from broader economic and cultural considerations.

As a result, political geographers referred to the limits of thinking about states in purely territorial terms, argued for thinking about geopolitics in "critical" discursive terms, and refused to separate the economic from the political, although often with a tendency to privilege the former. Much of

political geography's renewal in the late twentieth century owes to factors including: explicitly normative critiques of the modern state system and the competitive war machines that drive it, proposals for transnational democracy, and increased attention to looming global environmental disasters for which the geography of existing political arrangements seems ill-prepared to respond.

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

Three general approaches tend to dominate the field today even though the lines between them are not hard and fast. Indeed, more innovative research tends to work across them. The first, spatial analysis, involves the correlation of spatial patterns showing how a dependent variable, such as a vote for a specific political party, covaries geographically with various presumed independent or predictor variables. These variables include class, ethnicity, religion, and age. Stressing empirical data collection and analysis, this is akin to much of quantitative political science except, crucially, the emphasis is on how geographical variance fundamentally affects the nature of the correlations; closer locations are more highly related to one another than to more distant ones. Debates about important theoretical–methodological questions, such as the dependence of individual political preferences and behavior on spatial context (e.g., the local economy); the "levels" or geographical scales at which variance is more or less concentrated (i.e., whether differences are local or regional); and the clustering of different political phenomena (e.g., votes, riots, strikes, civil wars, territorial disputes, diffusion of different political institutions) in different places, tend to animate the approach. The popular idea of a United States divided up into so-called red and blue states reflects a primitive version of the notion that where one lives can have an independent effect on how one thinks and acts. This notion treats location as politically separate from simple demographic indicators added up irrespective of how they intersect in people's everyday lives in particular places.

A second approach more clearly commits to political-economic analysis that foregrounds the geography of uneven development at a variety of geographical scales—from the global to the metropolitan. From this viewpoint, geographical space constitutes a surface on which processes of capital accumulation and political resistance are inscribed but which also, over time, become embedded. These factors thus contribute to the difficulty of resolving inequalities in wealth and power between different places. The cycles of global economic expansion and contraction are seen as particularly influential in structurally shifting geographical patterns over time, as new places are incorporated and old ones shed their historic roles. By way of example, political parties can be viewed as arising to represent distinctive political-economic interests; these groups tend to cluster in different places because of the history of uneven development.

Finally, a third perspective tends to reject the overt rationalism of the first two perspectives. In a register that emphasizes the role of the observer, the world is seen as written about, rather than discovered or explored. Although writers under this rubric differ in the degree to which they see an "external world" as having an independent reality, the commonality is the rejection of the simple correlation and cause-effect relationships that are the basis to the other two. In a postmodern vein, language and discursive strategies become the focus. So-called critical geopolitics, for example, involves deconstructing the representational and communicative strategies employed by politicians in constructing foreign policy crises, situations, and wars. From this viewpoint, these things never "just happen." Some of the narratives help anchor national identities, whereas others relate to the global agendas of elites in pursuit of this or that interest or policy.

See also *Cold War; Electoral Geography; Geopolitics; Spatial Analysis.*

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Political Law

The term political law refers to a growing branch of the study of the state and of governing that (1) compiles all the legal and other types of instruments dealing with the structure of the state and the processes of governing besides the constitution itself; (2) examines the interactions among law, public policy and administration, and politics; and (3) investigates the influence and impact of law on the other forces at work in democratic governing. Political law transcends the intellectual boundary between law and political science and draws on both social disciplines. In a related context, political law

describes the area of practice of some law firms addressing legal matters pertaining to statecraft.

RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER FIELDS

Political law is intrinsically linked, first, to constitutional law and administrative law. In another direction, political law clearly ties to political science and to public policy and administration. While it is related to these fields, it is conceived of as a self-standing, interdisciplinary, and comparative field of study of democratic governing—distinct from each of these sources.

Democracy is more than a system in which citizens elect their government through free and fair elections; rather, it is best understood as an entire regime of government in which public institutions are established and function on the basis of rules for the public interest. The most fundamental type of such rules is the law; thus, the cornerstone of democratic governing is constitutionalism and the rule of law. In democracy, every component of governing includes a legal aspect and law is an indispensable factor. In a modern state however, laws are not the only types of rules. Other rules emanate from public policy and administration; these are often based on the use of authority or discretion allowed by law. Yet other rules arise from politics and deal with the use of power allowed by law. The various types of rules are set out in instruments of governing and constantly interact.

Law, public policy and administration, and political science or politics all look at the state and at governing from within their respective fields. The essence of political law is that it analyzes the relationship among legality, discretion, and power through the use of the governing instruments emanating from each. Following developments over the last few decades, a number of academics have addressed the trends of the increasing legalization and judicialization of politics and the politicization of law, but most have continued to view law and politics as separate and parallel societal forces. Because the study of law and politics no longer seems adequate to address the social phenomenon, some scholars, including Canadian Gregory Tardi and American David H. Rosenbloom, have proposed political law as a new manner to look at the legal aspects of the state and governing. As governing comprises the selection and use of legal, policy, and political instruments, the approach now taken in *political law* thus goes beyond treatments of *law and politics*. Thus, a unified, integrated perspective on statecraft contributes to knowledge of the democratic state. The aim of political law is analysis leading to better understanding of the rule of law and of the role of law in democratic governing; it is not to propose a particular ideology.

The need for political law arises, first, from the incomplete vision that law, public administration, and political science each offer for statecraft. It is also meant, specifically, to address the difficulty in understanding democratic governing, arising from politically motivated challenges to the rule of law. One of the fundamental issues at stake is that democracy is flawed if it relies on political will to the detriment of the rule of law. In the context of such discourse, political law aims to shed light on the importance of the legal aspects of government and governing.

COMPILATION

The first necessary step in the study of political law is establishing its contents and parameters. While the traditional subject matter of constitutional law is well-known, the survey of legal instruments, other than the constitution itself, that deal with governing is far less common. In a modern state, the plethora of such instruments consistently increases in number and complexity. Study, analysis, and comprehension of the law of democratic governing requires not only that the relevant laws, regulations, orders, and jurisprudence be catalogued, but also that they are ordered in a way that is useful for looking at the structure and functioning of the state.

The legal elements of democratic governing can thus be enumerated in the following broad categories so as to subsequently enable study of their interaction, influence, and impact:

- defining the legal components of democracy;
- creating a legal framework for the electoral system and process;
- balancing law and politics in the legislature as a branch of government and in the legislative process;
- applying the general law to legislative institutions, and integrating the general law and the legal rules specific to legislative institutions;
- choosing legal or other instruments for governing;
- accommodating the law with other types of instruments to manage the executive branch of government;
- enforcing the law through legal means of electoral, political, or policy promises;
- determining whether and when the use of judicial process, litigation, prosecution, or judicial inquiry is warranted and appropriate;
- relative weighting of legal, policy, and political influences in staffing the judicial branch of government, in adjudicating judicial disputes public governing issues, and in prosecutions involving political issues;
- combining law, public policy and administration, and politics in the constant reform of government institutions and process.

This method of classification deliberately varies from the traditional categorization of subject matters (e.g., torts or obligations, contracts, property and civil status) in the study of law and is more suitably adapted for an interdisciplinary study of the state. These categories are thus more closely akin to a political science perspective on legislative, executive, and judicial functions of the state.

Bearing in mind that the legal instruments are not the only authoritative ones setting the norms, terms, and conditions of governing, an even more comprehensive survey could, to the extent possible, also comprise policy and administrative instruments such as governmental institutions' policies, guidelines, directives, and programs; as well as political instruments, such as government's annual or sessional declarations of intent; the budget; legislative branch committees or governmental

commissions' recommendations; and political parties' constitutions, platforms, and resolutions.

Compilation enables comparison and contrast of the characteristics proper to each type of instrument of governance. The ground for such comparison is the binding nature of each type of instrument. As their title indicates, legal instruments have the force of law and are therefore inherently binding. They entail necessary compliance, enforcement, and sanction in case of breach. Most important, legal instruments apply generally, as they impact the governors and the governed alike.

By contrast, policy and administrative instruments apply more particularly. Public institutions, rather than the legislature, determine these rules, designed to affect their own internal functioning and conduct. They are meant to be binding, but on a different basis, with different methods of compliance, enforcement, and sanction. Applying policy and administrative rules can be characterized as more limited than that of legal ones; they are subordinate to the law.

The political aspect of democratic governing is also not based solely on expediency. It also comprises rules and instruments, albeit more flexible and fluid than those of a legal or policy and administrative nature. The binding characteristic of political rules and the instruments that contain them is based on the use of power. It is therefore least binding of all. The essence of democracy still requires, however, that political instruments be subject to law.

Compiling instruments is also useful for mapping the evolution of issues over time. As topics arise in the public life of democratic states, they are often initially dealt with through politics, gradually becoming the subject matter of policy instruments and eventually becoming enshrined in legislation. For example, rules of ethics for public servants and parliamentarians often emerge first as policy admonitions to address individual circumstances. Over the course of time, sets of ever more complete and binding guidelines evolve, which eventually become formally legislated.

INTERACTION

Within the parameters of political law, one of the fundamental questions concerns the interaction among legal, policy and administrative, and political influences in democratic governing: How do law, public policy and administration, and politics interact in the work of legislators, elected public officials, and appointed public servants? A certain number of criteria come into play in the attempt to respond to this question.

Based on the doctrine of the rule of law, the most important criteria in the analysis of this interaction are the objective ones. The constitution, the laws, regulations, orders, and jurisprudence are independent of politics, inherently applicable and determinative of the issues they rule. Legality should therefore be given primary consideration. Whatever the permutations of any fact pattern, the adage that ignorance of the law is no excuse always applies. In democracy, all those in public life are deemed to be aware of, and knowledgeable about, legal rules and instruments, even if only through the advice of counsel. There can be no democracy without legality.

Criteria are also necessary to take account of the characteristics of public policy and administration, and political rules and instruments. This includes examining whether other rules and instruments, less binding than legal ones, exist to deal with the issue at hand. If they do, the interaction among the various types of rules is greatly affected by whether the relevant instruments of different types are complementary or conflicting.

While the professional obligation of everyone involved in public affairs is alternatively defined as "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" in the United States or as "peace, order, and good government" in Canada, every individual undertakes one's own tasks in the public domain on the basis of a personal background. Subjective criteria therefore also play a large role in the interaction of the instruments as applied and administered. The most prominent factors include personal beliefs and political ideology, education, profession and professionalism, secularism, attitudes vis-à-vis the state and democracy in general and for any particular issue. Even when a legislator or an official objectively accepts the primacy of law, these subjective personal influences affect the individual in determining whether and how to interpret, weigh, and apply the law. One of the aims of pure democracy is to restrict the importance of subjectivity in public decision making, but such subjective criteria cannot be eliminated from human nature.

A set of criteria closely related to subjectivity is loyalty both to democracy and to the ideal of the rule of law. Going beyond the personal considerations, a public official's acceptance or rejection of legal goals, requirements, and norms greatly influence the interaction of law, policy and administration, and politics. Often, such acceptance, circumvention, or avoidance reflects the struggle between loyalty to a particular institution and willful adherence to democratic forces and the rule of law. This dilemma can be prevalent in institutions with a strong, self-enclosed, or hierarchical *esprit de corps,* such as the armed forces and the police. It may also be prevalent in processes for legally mandating disclosure of state information that may be considered detrimental or embarrassing to one's institution. In this context, freedom of, or access to, information has become a powerful tool in supporting not only legality in government, but even more extensively, for supporting democracy itself. Custom, established practice, precedent, and administrative inertia thus act as restraints on legality.

The specific facts of any issue at hand also affect the interaction among the various types of instruments used to deal with the issue, as does the environment of the case. Observers must look at the significance of the issue to the government of the day, to the citizenry, and to the electorate. The more difficult the resolution of an issue is perceived to be by public decision makers, the greater the potential for conflict among the law, the brokerage of institutional authority, and the use of power. Similarly, the more urgent, controversial, or divisive an issue, the greater is the strain against legality and in favor of other forms of resolution.

A further set of criteria relates to public decision makers' risk assessment. In modern democratic systems, legislative time is scarce and energy is difficult to marshal. Resort to litigation,

while popular in some countries, is increasingly expensive. Resolution of issues through legal rules and instruments involves formalism and greater distinction among options than resort to policy and administrative or political ones. Moreover, the risk of noncompliance with existing legal instruments is greater than noncompliance with other types of rules. By contrast, resolving public issues and problems through rules and instruments other than law is often perceived as more flexible, alterable with time, cost-effective, and low risk (in case of breach). Accommodation and negotiation are thus often more viable alternatives than using the law.

Examining the criteria that influence the interaction of legal instruments with other types of rules and governing instruments invites additional questions that are fundamental to a better understanding of democracy. First, is law a source or a consequence of governmental decisions, or both, or sometimes one and sometimes the other, depending on circumstances? Second, is law a goal in itself in democracy, a means to an end, or both, or sometimes one and sometimes the other, depending on circumstance? The answers to these broad underlying questions are likely variable on a case-by-case basis, much like applying the criteria for the interaction of types of instruments.

INFLUENCE AND IMPACT

Examining the interaction among law, public policy and administration, and politics enables observers to gauge the rule of law and to affirm its role as a factor in the conduct of governing. By contrast, examining the influence and impact of legality affords the opportunity to assess whether and to what extent the rule of law is actually applied in the state, or the extent to which law plays a role in governing.

What is the evidence of law's influence and impact? In short, it is the consistent practice of democratic legality and the presence or absence of residual legal dispute. Governments, political parties, voters, and citizens all hold views on how the state should function and on various issues of public life. Most often, these views are founded on belief, ideology, experience, self-interest, and other factors, rather than on points of law. Resolving and accommodating the divergent views held by public actors in government, and in society, can often be achieved through politics and sometimes by means of instruments of public policy and administration. However, in states adhering to the rule of law, when stresses and conflicts in public society cannot be resolved by other means, the law is the last resort—thus demonstrating the importance of the rule of law as the cornerstone of democracy; the law can be seen as the final arbiter of disputes relating to governing.

In democratic states, the influence and impact of legality means that enacting legislation or rendering a final judgment in litigation is more determinative of an issue than any other form of public decision making. This does not mean that a statute or a court judgment definitively resolves every public debate and controversy. Issues of public governing evolve over time and often continue or reemerge. The use of law does mean, however, that in a democracy, at the time a decision of

a legal nature is made, it is more formal and public, it is better reasoned and justified, it is more likely to be definitive and permanent, and it is perceived by the state and by the citizenry as being more resolutive than if policy and administrative or political resolutions had been achieved. The evidence of law's influence and impact comes from systematic observation of state practice. Observers must look to see in what instances laws are enacted. On what occasions is litigation conducted to its end? More generally, by what means, how permanently, and how extensively are issues of public affairs resolved in a legally valid manner?

This portrayal of the rule of law's impact and influence must be put in further context. If the role of law was less, and if the law did not rule with primacy over other types of instruments, what would be the alternatives? Rule of administrative fiat, rule of power, rule of ideology, rule of class, and an absence of any rule are all possible models for a state. Indeed, there are states that, in the early twenty-first century, espouse each of these ways of governing, but only rule by law provides the circumstances necessary for democracy to flourish.

States that consistently make governmental decisions on the basis of their so-called vital national interest, to the exclusion of legal norms and standards, seek to justify their actions on the basis of the doctrine of *raison d'état*. Democracy requires, rather, that states apply a doctrine that could be entitled *raison de droit*—a legal imperative, in order to retain their democratic nature. Indeed, raison de droit is the necessary requirement for there to be an *état de droit*. This requirement holds true whether a state espouses the doctrine of the rule of law, of état de droit, or of *Rechtsstaat*.

While it is incontestable that democracy requires the influence and impact of law to be greater than that of the other types of instruments, it is also important to have a wider perspective on the proper role of law in governing than the true claim of democratic theory that legality is primarily a restraint on the use of governmental power. Law is, and ought to be, perceived in a more positive fashion as a vehicle for the proper use and application of power by the state. Legality does not block the use of power; it channels it. There is greater danger for democracy in government's nonobservance of the law than in government's too strict adherence to the law. This also entails that law cannot displace public policy and administration or politics. It is best used by government as its most important, but not sole, type of instrument.

ACCOUNTABILITY TO LAW

All those involved in governing must draw two conclusions from analyzing the interaction of law with the other types of instruments of governing, and also from examining the influence and impact of law on these instruments. The first is that as a system of rules and instruments, law differs from both policy and administration, and from politics, in that it is compulsory rather than optional. Public officials may not choose to apply the law or ignore it at will, without entailing legal consequences. The second is the general application of law. Legal rules regarding public institutions are as applicable to

the state itself, to its institutions, and to its officials as are those upon citizens that aim to regulate their conduct. An integrated manner of expressing the duty of those involved in governing flows from these conclusions: as a core part of their professional mandate, all public officials owe accountability to the law.

First, this is a matter of democratic principle. Moreover, it is also a matter of quid pro quo. In current times, popular culture places great emphasis on the civil and political rights of citizens. Both within the internal logic of legal systems and in terms of political analysis of the state, it must be underscored that rights cannot exist without commensurate obligations. Thus, if citizens or voters have civic and political rights, the public officials who operate the state owe their citizens civic and political obligations commensurate to their rights.

This accountability comprises several elements. The most obvious is respect for legal rules, norms, and standards in the face of policy and administrative convenience and necessity, and in the face of political will. Furthermore, all public officials are required, either on their own or on the basis of the advice of counsel, to have some basic knowledge of those elements of the legal system that relate to their work. Likewise, in order to apply the primacy of legal instruments, they need to have sufficient awareness of, and sensitivity to, the role of law vis-à-vis other types of instruments that guide the execution of their tasks. Ideally, public officials should also voluntarily and willfully abide by established legal norms to be proactive in their compliance with the law. The fact that officials occasionally do not fulfill these requirements is one of the factors leading to litigation. A positive application of the role of law depends on a perception of legality as an organizational factor of the democratic state and for governmental action, rather than as a hindrance to the achievement of political or partisan goals. Finally, senior officials have the obligation to make their subordinates responsible to the rule of law.

As part of the notion of accountability to law, government lawyers who are bound by these obligations have an additional duty. They must integrate their legal advice into the public policy and administration plans and into the political projects devised by government, as fully as feasible.

See also *Accountability; Bureaucracy; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Freedom of Information; Judicial Activism; Political Party Platform; Raison d'État; Regulation and Rulemaking; Rule of Law.*

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Political Network Analysis

Political networks are defined as all those networks that are politically relevant. Networks are specific types of relations (e.g., communication, support, influence, command and control, self-organization, persuasion, coalition, trade flows) between actors—individual, collective, corporate, private, public—and between actors and objects (e.g. issues, court sentences, committees, candidates, events), and between objects (e.g. semantic networks, cognitive maps). *Politically relevant* means that the contents of these relations refer to collectively binding decisions—be it in the pre- or postdecision phase. Hierarchies, markets, as well as any other governance form of self-organization can be conceived as networks. The analytical divide is, therefore, not between hierarchies and networks, but between different network structures representing politico-administrative hierarchy and self-organizing networks.

Public network analysis (PNA) accentuates the interdependent nature of individual expectations and choices—instead of assuming atomistic actors. Instead of reifying macrophenomena, it traces the microfoundations of their often unintended emergence. Thus, PNA focuses on the structure and dynamics of networks of individual actors (so-called ego-centered networks), of whole systems, as well as of subgroups within systems.

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL NETWORK ANALYSIS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

For years, sociology and graph theory nearly exclusively provided a constant inflow of network concepts to be applied in political science. Most of the early work remained descriptive—such as

centralities, subgroups, or connectivity—rather than hypothesis testing, which entails networks as dependent and independent variables, respectively. Since the 1990s, several new trends cross-fertilized network analysis in political science. Some of these trends include theoretical progress in physics and informatics, availability of analytical statistical procedures and respective software packages, and availability of large-scale data sets. PNA is meanwhile an acknowledged original pacemaker in applied network analysis. New questions include: how do multiple networks (e.g., trade or organizational membership) interact and coevolve? How do networks emerge as the result of stochastic individual choices? Which impact does the specific structure of networks have on diverse dependent variables (e.g., individual choices, organizational performance, international conflict)?

In his 1955 dissertation, Peter M. Blau, one of the forgotten pioneers in PNA, recorded the informal pattern of collaboration and communication in two government agencies. This type of network analyses of public administrations is a precursor to quantitative, partly large-scale comparative studies on the structure and performance of administrations, relating them to formal and informal organizational features.

In retrospect, electoral research, community studies, and international relations (IR) applications proved to have the most extensive impact on the development of PNA. Inspired by the group approach of the Columbia school of electoral research, Robert Huckfeldt and collaborators translated its implicit research program into a veritable network approach to voting behavior. In their famous 1995 South Bend study, Huckfeldt and John Sprague were able to determine the impact of discussion networks on voter turnout and voters' choices. Their main research questions still continue to inspire current investigations, for example, under which communication structures persuasion is effective, and why preferential disagreement and opinion diversity persistently occur. More recently, the increasing complexity of these research questions (i.e., varying heterogeneity of environments, varying credibility of discussants, varying network structures) led to new designs requiring the application of laboratory experiments and agent-based simulations.

The other influential stream of research has been community power and community influence studies. One of the most prominent studies was Edward Laumann and Franz Pappi's 1976 analysis of community decision making in a small German town. The study detected closed subgroups, such as cliques, that were considered able to act collectively.

This type of local policy studies successively extended to the national and the international level, inducing a series of theoretically, as well as methodically, more elaborated quantitative policy case studies. Edward Laumann and David Knoke's 1987 pathbreaking study on the U.S. energy and health policy in the Carter era during the late 1970s took into account the whole set of relevant organizations in order to detect the differing structures of so-called policy domains. Thus, PNA allows context-specific fluidities and dynamics of policy making and precludes popular reifications.

Analytical questions focused on the comparative causal impact of factors like relative interest, with regard to issues versus network position for involvement and mobilization effectiveness of the organizations. Identification of central groups, the specific structure of conflict, the detection of differently institutionalized coordination patterns, and the explanation of outcomes are only few of the many targeted research objectives. Meanwhile, availability of process-produced data led to ingenious and sometimes spectacular new perspectives. In this respect, James Fowler conducted one of the most stimulating analyses in 2006. Fowler investigated the whole cosponsor network of legislative proposals in U.S. Congress for the period from 1973 to 2004. Thus, it is possible not only to depict the most influential legislator, but also cross-validate the impact of the connectivity of the resulting network on roll call choice.

For the area of international relations, in the 1960s Steven J. Brams had already proposed to take the prominent system concept seriously, and to operationalize it via PNA. In his sophisticated 1966 study, he investigated three different kinds of transaction flows: diplomatic exchanges, trade, and shared memberships in intergovernmental organizations. Numerous follow-ups in the next two decades tried to identify the block structure of international trade in order to detect dependency structures and sources of international inequality. Only more recent studies used the emerging international network structures as the independent and dependent variable, respectively (e.g., in order to explain the formation of transgovernmental networks or to predict militarized interstate conflict). Meanwhile, IR seems to be the most dynamic sector in inventing new research questions related to issues such as terrorism and counterterrorism, proliferation, alliances, and fungibility of different sources of power and designs.

See also *Advocacy Coalition Networks; Balance of Power; International Relations; Network Society; Policy Networks and Communications; Power Cycle Theory; Systems Analysis; Systems Structure; Systems Transformation.*

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Political Obligation

The term political obligation generally means a moral requirement to obey the laws of one's country. Such a requirement must encompass more than self-interested or prudential considerations, especially concern that one will be punished for violations. In addition, political obligations are generally viewed as requirements to obey the law because it is the law, that is, because of the authority of the lawmaking body as opposed to the content of particular laws.

HISTORY

Throughout much of the world and for much of Western history, the dominant view has been that political authority is part of the God-given or natural order, simply to be obeyed. Ideas along these lines dominated medieval Europe, based especially on the belief—forcefully expressed in Chapter 13 of St. Paul's *Epistle to the Romans*—that every soul must submit to political authorities, which are instituted by God.

Questions of political obligation assumed a central role in Western political theory in roughly the sixteenth century, with the rise of liberal political theory and its criticisms of what were viewed as unjust governments. Within the liberal tradition, obligations have been traditionally believed to be rooted in the consent of the governed, which is closely related to the theory of the social contract or contract of government, into which citizens supposedly entered upon leaving the state of nature. Opponents of political authority commonly argued that if individuals have not consented to government or if the conditions of their consent have been violated, political obligations either do not exist or cease, and resistance is justified.

CONSENT THEORY

In the locus classicus of consent theory, *The Second Treatise of Government* (1689), John Locke argues along these lines, in order to justify resistance to the English monarchy. Strongly affirming individual freedom, Locke argues that political authority can be based only on consent—and the consent of each individual, as opposed to a one-time agreement at the founding of society. Locke recognizes that few members of society have "expressly" consented to government. He therefore introduces a doctrine of *tacit consent*, according to which individuals can incur obligations through additional means, such as owning property in the community or merely being within the state's territory. However, David Hume called tacit consent into question in his essay "Of the Original Contract" (1752). Hume argues that poor peasants, who know only the language and customs of their own country and are without financial resources, lack the means to leave their own country for another. Because they do not voluntarily choose to reside in their own countries, continued residence can hardly constitute consent.

Since Hume's time, theorists have struggled to explain how people have consented to government. A range of additional actions have been proposed as constituting consent, such as voting or otherwise taking part in the political system, but all of these are subject to criticism. In the late eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant achieved a considerable theoretical advance in viewing the contract of government as purely hypothetical, rather than an actual historical occurrence. According to this line of argument, the decisive consideration is that one *would* consent to government, if given the opportunity.

CONSEQUENTIALISM

With actual consent called into question, theorists have attempted to provide other bases for political obligations. The *consequentialist*, or utilitarian, tradition, epitomized by Jeremy Bentham, bases requirements to obey on the benefits of obedience. According to this approach, people are bound to obey the law in most cases, even though they have not agreed to do so, because a smoothly working society requires obedience. However, this account has difficulties requiring the compliance of given individuals. In many cases, the consequences of some individual's disobeying the law are undetectable, while the individual receives tangible benefits from disobedience. Consequentialist reasoning, then, will often require that people disobey.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In the light of problems with consent and consequentialist explanations, scholars have introduced additional lines of argument to account for political obligations. Recent years have witnessed new theories of obligations based on principles of consent and also gratitude, while additional arguments have been developed based on a so-called natural duty of justice and, simply, the fact that one is a member of a given community. In 1955, H. L. A. Hart developed an influential line of argument based on the principle of fairness, or fair play. According to this view, if individuals receive benefits from the cooperative efforts of others, it is only fair that they make similar sacrifices themselves. Since everyone benefits from general obedience to the law, it is only fair that everyone obeys as well.

So-called philosophical anarchism has also highly influenced contemporary debates about political obligation. Unlike traditional anarchists, such as Mikhail Bakunin, who

declare themselves enemies of the state, these theorists support much that the state does, in spite of the absence of requirements to obey the law because it is the law. Although they reject political obligations, they argue that the state may still be *legitimate*, that is, justified in taking morally appropriate actions. These theorists argue that questions of obedience should be decided on a case-by-case basis. They contend that there are moral reasons to obey many laws, not because they are laws but because of the benefits of obedience, mainly so as not to harm or inconvenience other people.

In recent years, scholars have increasingly questioned the need for political obligations in the traditional sense. Many scholars now agree with the philosophical anarchists about the importance of distinguishing between a state's having *legitimacy* and *authority*. As noted, the former refers to the state's ability to take morally appropriate action, for instance, to aid people in need or to punish moral malefactors. Although in pursuing these tasks, the state cannot claim rights to anyone's obedience merely because it passes laws; people are morally required to comply with specific laws because of the value of the laws themselves. Authority adds to legitimacy the state's right to claim obedience because it commands this, without appeal to other moral considerations. These scholars argue that authority is not necessary, and that important state functions can be accomplished without political obligations in the traditional sense.

In spite of the influence of philosophical anarchists, scholars have come to criticize their approach. Theorists skeptical of political obligations generally proceed by criticizing the traditional theories from a particular perspective, examining and rejecting them *seriatim,* one after another. What this strategy overlooks is the possibility that general reasons to obey the law can be established by combining different principles, and thus overcome the weaknesses of theories based on a single principle. As scholars have moved away from traditional conceptions of political obligation, the future of the subject has opened to new possibilities.

See also *Anarchism; Consent of the Governed; Law and Society; Utilitarianism.*

. . . .   GEORGE KLOSKO

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Political Participation

Citizen participation is essential to democracy. It is difficult to imagine stable, ongoing democracy on a national scale without the citizens' right to vote for their political leaders and to take part freely in politics in many other ways. Through their political participation, citizens have an opportunity to control who will hold public office and to influence what policy makers do when they govern. When they are active politically, citizens in a democracy communicate information about their preferences and needs and generate pressure on public officials to respond.

THE AMBIGUOUS BOUNDARIES OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Voluntary political participation refers to citizen activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action, either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy, or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies. Citizens in a democracy who wish to have an impact have a variety of participatory options. They can communicate their concerns and opinions directly to policy makers, for example, by signing a petition, joining an organization that advocates on behalf of issues of concern, sending an e-mail, or attending a demonstration. Alternatively, they can seek to affect policy indirectly by influencing electoral outcomes by voting or supporting a favored party or candidate. As they engage in such activities, they can donate, on one hand, money, or, on the other, time, brains, and sweat. They can use conventional techniques or protest tactics. They can employ a variety of media ranging from face-to-face conversations to electronic means, including the Internet, to communicate with other activists or with public officials. They can work locally, nationally, or, increasingly, transnationally with others or on their own, in an informal effort or in the context of a formal organization.

Each of the three defining components of the domain of behavior known as voluntary political activity has porous, ill-defined borders with the result that the definition itself is contested territory. First, with respect to the *political* nature of this domain of endeavor, it is essential to recognize that the distinction between political and nonpolitical activity is by no means clear, and voluntary activity in both the religious and secular domains outside of politics intersects with politics in many ways. For one thing, because voluntary associations and religious institutions often take stands on public issues, organizational and religious activity can themselves be forms of political participation. In addition, participation in these spheres is, in many ways, a politicizing experience. Those who engage in voluntary activity outside politics may develop organizational and communications skills that are transferable to politics; they may make social contacts and, thus, become part of networks through which requests for participation in politics are mediated; they may also be exposed to political cues and messages—as when a minister gives a sermon on a political topic or when organization members chat informally about politics at a meeting. In addition, even those who engage in conventional participatory techniques may not be animated by political concerns, but may instead make a campaign donation to satisfy a friend who asked, attend a demonstration to have fun, or join a labor union to acquire job benefits rather than to support its political stands.

Furthermore, some activists deliberately choose extragovernmental means for seeking to achieve public purposes. They might take public positions aimed only indirectly at policy makers, for example, by wearing a political button, displaying a bumper sticker with a political message, writing a letter to the editor of a newspaper, or calling a radio talk show. Although not targeted explicitly at government officials, such acts have the purpose not only to express opinion, but also to persuade others and, thus, indirectly influence public outcomes. Some activists circumvent the governmental sphere entirely. For example, they may volunteer in a social service agency that aids the needy rather than press the state to deliver such assistance. Or, in an era when the behavior of multinational corporations may be regulated by many governments or none at all, some may engage in political consumerism, that is, deliberately make purchases, or refuse to make purchases, from a company on the basis of its employment practices or environmental sensitivity.

Activity that is *voluntary* is not obligatory and receives, if any pay at all, only token financial compensation. Once again, both aspects of the definition contain ambiguities. For one thing, the boundary between choice and coercion is indistinct. When a request for participation accompanies leverage—for example, when it comes from the boss—the boundary of the voluntary may be breached. Similarly, the distinction between voluntary activity and paid work is not always clear. It is possible to serve private economic purposes through social and political activism. Many people seek to do well while doing good, undertaking voluntary activity for which they receive no compensation in order to make contacts or otherwise enhance their careers, or to pursue policy goals with consequences for their pocketbooks.

Finally, with respect to *activity,* it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the point at which actually doing politics shades into being attentive to politics. Thus, working for a party or attending a peace march are clearly political acts. However, the line is not as clear for private communications, such as engaging in political discussions with friends or attempts to acquire political information by, for example, following political events on the Internet or watching public affairs programs on television.

THE IMPORTANCE OF DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

Discussions about democratic participation, and civic engagement more generally, are ordinarily conducted as if the reasons why it matters are self-evident. There are three broad categories of reasons for caring about levels of political activity: the creation of community and the cultivation of democratic virtues, the development of the capacities of the individual, and the equal protection of interests in public life.

First, political participation, and voluntary activity more generally, have implications for community and democracy. Those who make this argument stress several themes. When people work together voluntarily, whether for political or nonpolitical ends, democratic orientations and skills are fostered: social trust, norms of reciprocity and cooperation, and the capacity to transcend narrow points of view and conceptualize

the common good. Thus, when there is a vigorous sector of voluntary involvement—and the strong associational foundation that underlies it—it becomes easier for communities, and democratic nations, to engage in joint activity and to produce public goods. Communities characterized by high levels of voluntary activity are, in many ways, better places to live: the schools are better, crime rates are lower, and tax evasion is less common. Moreover, a vital arena of voluntary activity between individual and state protects citizens from overweening state power and preserves freedom. Those who are concerned about declining rates of civic participation in democracies emphasize these multiple beneficial consequences for politics and society.

The other two reasons for concern about levels of political participation shift attention from social benefits to individual benefits. Not only does the community gain when citizens take part but, as John Stuart Mill pointed out, individuals grow and learn through their activity. Political participation builds individual capacities in several ways: those who take part learn about community and society; they develop civic skills that can be carried throughout their lives; they can also come to have a greater appreciation of the needs and interests of others and of society as a whole.

The third rationale for concern about civic engagement acknowledges the conflicting interests of individuals and groups, and focuses on equal protection of interests. Through the medium of political participation, citizens communicate information about their preferences and needs for government action, and apply pressure on public officials to heed what they hear. Of course, public officials in democracies act for many reasons, only one of which is their assessment of what the public wants and needs. In addition, policy makers have ways other than the medium of citizen participation to learn what citizens want and need from the government. Nonetheless, what public officials hear clearly influences what they do.

The emphasis on equal protection of interests raises somewhat different questions than those raised by a focus on the nurturance of community and democracy, or on the development of the individual. First, the cooperative voluntary activity that promotes community and democracy, or fosters individual faculties, need not be explicitly political. In contrast, when equal protection of interests is at stake, the voluntary activity that counts is necessarily political. Furthermore, when it is a matter of the cultivation of democratic habits or the education of individuals, the aggregate quantity of civic engagement is critical. Questions of representation arise when moving from a conception of congruent community interests to one of clashing individual and group interests and, thus, to a concern with equal protection of interests. What matters is not only the amount of civic activity but its distribution—not just how many people take part but who they are.

QUANTIFYING POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Because the relevant surveys vary in terms of the number of countries and number of political acts they cover, it is difficult to make ironclad generalizations about levels of political participation across all democracies and all forms of political

activity. Nevertheless, it is clear that, for most citizens, political participation is episodic and relatively infrequent. Across democracies, there is only one political act, voting in national elections, in which a majority consistently takes part. For other kinds of participation, minorities of differing size are involved. More common participatory acts include signing petitions, contacting politicians or civil servants, and boycotting. Much less frequent are activities such as working for a political party or taking part in a protest, especially an illegal one.

Not only are there differences among activities, but there are also differences among polities with respect to the frequency of political participation. A nation's ranking with respect to the most frequent political act, voting, is not necessarily a good predictor of how politically active its citizens are when it comes to taking part politically in other ways. For example, the United States and Switzerland are widely observed to have both frequent elections and relatively low levels of voter turnout, but rank high when it comes to other forms of political participation. In contrast, one nation with compulsory voter participation and a high rate of electoral turnout, Italy, does not have notably high levels of nonvoting activity. In general, the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands tend to have high rates of participation across the board. Reflecting a variety of factors, some individual countries have relatively high rates of particular participatory acts. For example, France has a long-standing tradition of direct-action participation and ranks higher with respect to protest than it does to more conventional varieties of political activity. With a distinctive electoral configuration that includes weak parties, candidate-centered campaigns, and an absence of public financing, Americans are much more likely to make campaign contributions than are citizens elsewhere.

One area of controversy is whether there has been erosion in political participation over the last generation in stable, advanced democracies. According to one perspective, civic life in many countries has been characterized by a diminution in a variety of kinds of voluntary activity—not only political but also religious and secular nonpolitical—in particular among younger citizens. An alternative point of view stresses transformation rather than simple attenuation. Especially among the young, the mix of participatory acts has shifted to reflect decreased emphasis on addressing public problems through governmental action and, thus, a greater role for such forms of activism as political consumerism. A development with particular potential for altering the nature and volume of political participation is the Internet, which lowers the cost of acquiring political information and communicating with large numbers of people including like-minded citizens and public officials. While the full meaning of the Internet for citizen politics continues to unfold, it is clear that its impact will be much more substantial for new citizens than for their elders.

ACCOUNTING FOR DIFFERENCES IN INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION

Using multivariate statistical techniques, political scientists—especially in the United States where a number of detailed surveys of participation have been conducted and a deep federal tradition implies considerable variation in institutional arrangements—have had some success in explaining individual differences in activity. These inquiries demonstrate that, in the United States, the origins of political participation are complex and involve a variety of individual and contextual factors and that different kinds of participatory acts require different explanatory models. For example, strength of partisanship has a more substantial effect on voting than on getting involved in a community problem-solving effort. Income is also much more strongly related to campaign giving—and, in particular, to the size of the gift—than to working in a campaign. In addition, educational attainment matters more for contacting a public official than for protesting.

Models seeking to account for why Americans choose to take part in politics include a large number of individual characteristics as explanatory factors. Among them are such resources as time, money, and civic skills—those organizational and communications capacities that make it easier to get involved and that enhance an individual's effectiveness as a participant. In addition, several psychological orientations facilitate political activity. All else equal, individuals are more likely to participate if they are politically informed, interested, and efficacious, that is, if they know and care about politics and if they think that their participation would make a difference. Moreover, those who have intense issue commitments—for example, those who take a strong pro-life or pro-choice position on abortion—are, not surprisingly, more politically active. Furthermore, recruitment plays a role in political participation: those who have the wherewithal and the desire to take part in politics are more likely to do so if they are asked. Requests for political activity may come from politically motivated strategic elites such as party activists; from the leaders and staff of nonpolitical institutions; or from those who are familiar—relatives, friends, neighbors, coworkers, fellow organization or church members.

Studies of political participation across polities find an association between political activity and socioeconomic status—that is, income, occupation, and, especially, education. This association is particularly strong in the United States, where labor unions are weak and there is no social democratic or labor party to mobilize those of limited income and education into politics. Studies of political activity in the United States demonstrate why education is so central to the participatory process. Not only does education have a direct impact on political activity but, more importantly, education also has indirect effects through its consequences for the acquisition of nearly every other participatory factor. The well educated earn higher incomes on the job; are more likely to develop civic skills at work, in organizations, and, to a lesser extent, in church; are more likely to receive requests for political activity; and are more politically interested and knowledgeable.

With respect to the most common form of citizen participation, voting, the substantial cross-national variations in electoral turnout suggest that attention must be placed not only on the attributes of individuals, but also on the participatory consequences of electoral laws and arrangements. Many

practices not in place in the United States—among them holding elections on Sundays and, especially, making voting compulsory—are associated with higher levels of turnout. Within the United States, studies use the states as laboratories to consider various electoral reforms designed to raise turnout: among them, easing the requirements for registration and the casting of absentee ballots and permitting mail-in ballots and other forms of early voting. A number of institutional reforms have shown to have a positive, though modest, impact on turnout. Less permanent aspects of the political context also have potential consequences for participation. It is well-known that turnout is higher when there is a presidential contest at the top of the ticket. In addition, having attractive choices on the ballot seems to raise voter participation. Otherwise, empirical inquiries reach no consensus on how such attributes of elections as competitiveness, negative campaigning, or levels of campaign spending affect the propensity to go to the polls. Moreover, even when the context of electoral characteristics is favorable, turnout in the United States does not approach the levels that are common in other developed democracies.

IDENTIFYING CITIZENS ENGAGED IN COMMUNICATING WITH PUBLIC OFFICIALS

The processes by which people come to take part imply that, taken together, activists are in various respects not representative of the public and, thus, that public officials are disproportionately likely to hear from people with certain politically relevant characteristics. Across democracies, participatory input may be stratified not only by socioeconomic status but also by race or ethnicity, gender, age, and immigration status. Although there are variations across polities and across particular political acts, those who have high levels of socioeconomic status, men, members of the dominant racial or ethnic group, and the middle aged are especially likely to be politically active. It is often possible to account for such group differences in terms of disparities in such participatory factors as education and income, or political orientations such as political interest, information, and efficacy. However, understanding the origins of group differences in participation does not put the matter to rest. Knowing, for example, that disparities in participation among ethnic groups within a particular polity stem not from ethnicity per se but from group differences in participatory factors, most of which are rooted in class, does not obviate the fact that policy makers are hearing less from members of ethnic minorities. Members of such ethnic groups may have distinctive political preferences and participatory agendas: they may differ in their opinions on public matters and, when they are active, they may be concerned with a different mix of issues. That the sources of these group differences in activity lie in characteristics other than ethnicity does not vitiate the political significance of disparities in participation.

The same logic obtains for participatory differences rooted in groups defined by gender, class, age, or such politically relevant characteristics as dependence on government benefits.

Although policy outcomes inevitably hinge on many factors, only one of which is what policy makers hear from citizens, when the messages to public officials are skewed, then the democratic norm of equal responsiveness to all is potentially compromised.

See also *Citizen Knowledge; Civic Engagement; Democracy; Political Attitudes and Behavior; Voting Behavior.*

. . . . KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN

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Political Parties

Political parties have been described as the core institutions of democracy and necessary for its flourishing. Such claims echo earlier statements about democracy as unthinkable without parties. Even if the way in which parties function has received severe criticism, there is also a widespread consensus that parties are necessary and that it is difficult to imagine democracy without them. Hence, representative democracy has become the norm and a decline of parties is seen as detrimental to democracy.

Understanding of what is meant by a party must be established before entering the debate on whether and how parties

have changed. A minimal concept of a party entails a certain level of organization, a more or less coherent program, and a procedure to select representatives. A number of functions can then be added to this. These, however, are not strictly necessary to speak of a party, yet this does not imply that a party is explained from the functions performed, or its absence if certain functions are not performed. Most authors mention recruitment, aggregation, and mobilization as functions. In addition, parties have to find a balance between the goals of votes, office, and policy. This would mean that a party typically is defined by these goals simultaneously: winning elections, gaining representation, and being in government.

DEFINING PARTIES AND THEIR FUNCTIONS

One of the oldest and most famous definitions of party is that of Edmund Burke: "Party is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed" (40). Burke importantly assumes that parties strive for the same goals (i.e., the national interest), and only differ on the policies to achieve this. Taking this one step further, Anson Morse argues that a party advances "the interests and realisation of the ideals, not of the people as a whole, but of the particular group which it represents" (91). Hence, contrary to Burke, Morse claims that parties pursue their own objectives. These objectives are, first, distinguishing themselves from their competitors and, second, gaining a large share of the popular vote.

The well-known critiques of parties from Moisey Ostrogorski and Robert Michels give another twist to this debate on general versus specific interests. Both authors focus in particular on how parties operate as organizations and with what effects. Michels's description of the elitist and oligarchical tendencies within parties, or Ostrogorski's depiction of the vicious influence of the party "machine" and the caucus imply that parties evolve in such a way that the interests of the masses make way for the particularistic and narrow interests of the few.

After World War II (1939–1945), the discussion on the nature of parties reemerged, but it was more oriented toward conceptualization—especially the necessary features to speak of a party. This led to various typologies of parties and party models. For instance, Otto Kirchheimer's *catch-all* concept largely focused on the characteristics of mass parties, whereas Maurice Duverger distinguishes between *membership parties* and *cadre parties*. More recently, other types of parties have been put forward, like *cartel parties* and *business-firm parties*, where membership is less important and resources are derived from state subsidies or individual donations.

Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner define parties by a certain level of organization (locally and nationally) and by their office-seeking and vote-seeking characteristics. They distinguish the modern party from the "cliques, clubs and small groups of notables" (8) that can be identified as the antecedents of the modern political party. This combination of organization and programmatic goals is also found in Richard Rose's work, identifying a party as "an organization concerned with

the expression of popular preferences and contesting control of the chief policy-making offices of government" (3).

This conceptual and empirical development tends to blur the difference between what parties are and what parties do. A party will thus be defined here as an organized group of people who select candidates for parliament or government by participating in elections. This is the main function, or task, that sets parties apart from social movements, trade unions, or interest groups. Parties may perform all other functions, but they are not exclusive for a party.

PARTY FUNCTIONS

In his discussion of the role of parties in the political system, Morse distinguishes two main functions of political parties: the education and organization of public opinion, and the administration of government. Moreover, he introduces what has later become known as the *linkage* function of parties, or the integration of interests. His contemporary, Lord Bryce, distinguishes five functions. All parties share four of these functions: union (keeping the party together), recruitment (bringing in new voters), enthusiasm (exciting and rousing voters), and instruction (informing and educating voters). Interestingly, Bryce argues that a fifth function, the selection of party candidates, is rather unimportant for European parties, while it is central to American parties.

In the classic article, "Political Parties in Western Democracies," Anthony King provides an authoritative overview of the debate on party functions. Whilst being critical toward the functionalist approach, he does not suggest to do away with the study of functions altogether, but rather turns this into an agenda for empirical research. King's main problem with functionalism is that parties are considered to produce consequences, and this has two main flaws. First, if certain hypothesized consequences are absent, one might believe that the party is not present. Second, there is the risk of inferring the existence of a party from the presence of the consequences—a general critique of functionalism.

The literature in the years that followed King's contribution focuses less on party functions, but rather on the empirical study of how political parties performed in terms of vote-seeking, office-seeking, and policy-seeking actors within representative democracies.

EMPIRICAL DEVELOPMENTS

In spite of these critical notes, party functions have remained central to analyzing parties. In fact, many authors have incorporated the objections raised, but as Russell Dalton and Martin Wattenberg argue, it is a *functional* rather than a *functionalist* approach. Party functions are used to measure what parties do, but functions are not seen as the constituting or defining elements of what a party is. Party functions become tools to measure change, transformation, or adaptation of parties, thus following King in his advice not only to draw up a list of party functions, but also to critically examine if and when parties carry out these functions. Table 1 presents an overview of the functions that several authors have ascribed to parties.

TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF PARTY FUNCTIONS FROM 1969 TO 2000

1969, FROM ANTHONY KING	1985, FROM KLAUS VON BEYME	1995, FROM JEAN BLONDEL	2000, FROM PETER MAIR
– structuring the vote – integration and mobilization of the mass public – recruitment of political leaders – organization of government – formation of public policy – aggregation of interests	– goal attainment – interest articulation and aggregation – mobilization and socialization – elite recruitment and government formation	– general mechanisms by which conflicts are handled – institutions within which policies can be formulated – major part in recruitment of the "political class"	– integration and mobilization of the citizenry – articulation and aggregation of interests – formulation of public policy – recruitment of political leaders and nomination of persons to public office – organization of parliament and government

Table 1 illustrates considerable overlap with King's functions, but none of these amounts to as many as six functions. This is no surprise: if the environment of parties changes, new functions may emerge while others become less relevant. One example of this is the education, or information, function, which was crucial for scholars at the end of the nineteenth century, then moved into the background for a long period, but recently reappeared in a different form in an era of mass media and modern technology.

Jean Blondel's inventory has a slightly different presentation: rather than identifying functions, it basically describes group characteristics. Blondel speaks of mechanisms and institutions and refers to specific tasks that parties fulfill: handling conflicts and formulating policies. This inventory is parsimonious, as it leaves out specific reference to vote structuring, mobilization, and organization of government. Peter Mair stays closest to King's inventory: aggregation of interests combines with articulation, the role of parties expands to the organization of both parliament and government, and nomination of persons to public office is added to the recruitment function. The main difference is that Mair, like several others, leaves out the function of "structuring the vote."

On the whole, there is a striking congruence from the 1960s onwards. Most scholars assume that parties still perform roughly the same functions as they did thirty or forty years ago, even if the balance between these functions may have altered. On the basis of this overview, there are three essential functions:

- integrating and mobilizing the citizens to vote
- recruiting a political class to govern
- articulating and aggregating societal interests

This list contains functions related to both representation and governance, while it also refers to the tasks of a party in policy making and during elections. The functions emphasize the link between parties and voters, and the competition between parties. Finally, they allow for comparative analysis over time and across countries.

HOW PARTIES DEVELOP: DECLINE VERSUS TRANSFORMATION

A perennial debate concerns how parties have developed and continue to be omnipresent in Western democracies. Moreover, in many countries, parties have also been instrumental in the transition toward democracy and in providing legitimacy after its establishment. As Stefano Bartolini and Mair describe it, parties are important within a democratic political system since they concurrently "control political behaviour and harmonize different institutional orders" (342). In addition, the authors see no credible alternative to parties, which begs the question of what happens to democracy if parties no longer perform this political and institutional integration. After 1945 parties were regarded as indispensable for making democracy work.

The general idea that parties are essential for democracy still stands fast. Ian Budge and Hans Keman consider parties the "irreducible core" of democracy. José Montero and Richard Gunther state that parties are "essential for the proper functioning of representative democracy" (3), and they cite a number of other recent publications that put forward comparable claims. In other words, parties and democracy are seen as inseparable. A possible decline of parties—especially if this concerns functions of representation considered essential for making democracy work—is then often seen as a "crisis" of democracy. The often observed lower levels of trust in parties indicates this decline.

THE QUESTION OF PARTY DECLINE

Montero and Gunther point at a paradox in the party literature: an increased attention for parties at the end of the 1990s accompanies a claim that parties are in decline. Another interesting point is that writings on party "crisis" mainly stem from the United States. American scholars such as Tim Aldrich have been more alert in this respect, contrary to scholars in Western Europe. Yet, Hans Daalder in 1992 mentions possible causes of *party decline* as:

- The legitimate role of parties is questioned, since they are considered counterproductive (in problem solving by policy making that reduces "good governance").
- Selective perception of party competition: certain party systems are considered "good," others "bad."
- Redundancy of party: parties become irrelevant as other actors or institutions (e.g., interest mediation and representation) take over their functions.

In summary, it is argued that parties cannot exist or ought not exist (anymore). The first line of reasoning relates to what Daalder labels the *redundancy* of parties, while the second is seen as a result of distrusting parties.

These arguments come together in Joachim Raschke's claim that the limits of what parties can do have been reached and that there is party "failure" in various aspects. First, there is *overadaptation,* and parties are not vehicles for change but enhance the status quo. Second, *overgeneralization* causes parties to no longer represent specific interests. Third, *overinstitutionalization* broadens the gap between citizens and parties. This party failure would explain the lower rates of electoral participation and of dealignment of voters across Europe and the United States.

Likewise, Mair's analysis narrows the central aspects of party change to *identity* and *functions.* He argues that how parties present themselves to the electorate and the way they compete makes it increasingly difficult for voters to find ideological differences, or understand how these differences relate to their own interests. For the second element, party functions, Mair makes distinguishes representative and procedural functions and argues that the former type of functions—integrating and mobilizing the citizenry, articulating and integrating interests, and formulating public policy—have been drastically reduced. Conversely, the procedural functions—recruitment of candidates for office, organization of parliament and government—have remained important and may even gain significance. Thus, parties are changing from representative agencies into governing agencies: they have become parties of the state and are less part of society.

Aldrich considers the problem as emanating from a paradox where parties no longer match collective choice and related action by means of collective decision making. In the eye of the public and electorate, a party becomes redundant because they view "parties [that] are designed as attempts to solve problems that current institutional arrangements do not solve and that politicians have come to believe they cannot solve" (22). Hence, parties and their representatives are no longer capable to represent or to govern.

The conclusion can be drawn that the term *party crisis* concerns, in particular, the representative functions of parties. First, parties are less relevant for the information, education, and mobilization of the electorate. The role of cyberspace is but one example of how new technologies absorb this function. Second, parties are less successful in integrating interests. This problem relates both to the apparent inability of parties to adapt to new societal concerns and demands for other forms of participation, and the vanishing of ideological differences. Third, this development reinforces electoral volatility in many countries and points to processes of dealignment and realignment of individual voters vis-à-vis established parties or even departing from political life altogether.

PARTY ADAPTATION AND SURVIVAL

There are three flaws in the debate surrounding party crisis, or party decline. First, using the term *party crisis* implies a view on what a party is, or a standard against which parties can be judged. Yet, it is unclear what this standard should be, and whether or not such a standard might well be contextually dynamic. Paul Webb qualifies the arguments about party crisis in a very succinct way:

In the absence of compelling systematic evidence that parties' scope for autonomous action has diminished we would argue that most probably there never was a Golden Age of party government, and that it is therefore a misconception to speak in terms of "party decline" in this respect. (447)

Research on party crisis or decline should therefore start with a conscientious inventory of the roles and functions parties play. As Dalton and Wattenberg have argued in their "functional approach to party politics," certain functions may indeed have eroded, but this is compensated for by gaining others. Many authors tend to link the citizenry with the state as the crucial function of parties and from such a perspective, any loosening of this linkage is seen as decline. Yet, considering all party functions equal implies that a shift from representative functions to recruitment and governance is not the same as decline. Katz and Mair show that the main drawback of this perspective is that relations between parties and the state are ignored. Speaking of decline or failure is misconceived, and they see change as few signs that the role of parties has really diminished.

The third flaw in this type of reasoning is its emphasis on stability: it suggests that a party should remain more or less the same over time. Yet, the ability to change and adapt—to attract new groups of voters, to change the internal organization, or to renew the party ideology—can also be seen positively. This is Klaus von Beyme's *functional efficiency* argument: parties have been able to adapt their organization and role to new circumstances. In a traditional view—putting the citizen-party linkage at the center—this is, however, seen as party decline. Trends of increasing electoral volatility and decreasing membership demonstrate that fewer people identify strongly with one particular party, and that voters are increasingly volatile. Yet, calling this party decline is biased toward the status quo.

Several other authors have also consistently qualified the arguments of party crisis or party decline. Daalder is therefore right in warning against writing off parties too hastily, and he makes a plea in favor of analyzing their actual functions and how these may change. The challenge is to understand to what extent there is a response to external factors and in how far it signifies a deliberate strategy of parties. Thus, the adequate picture that emerges is not so much crisis or decline, but rather a *transformation* of how parties shift attention to different functions.

A potential answer to the question of party survival is offered by the cartel thesis. Katz and Mair contend that the problem of the literature on party crisis and party survival stems from the questionable assumption that parties should be "classified and understood on the basis of their relationship with civil society" (93). Parties move away from civil society and become part of the state, which is the vital point of the cartel model.

Probably the best way to describe the process behind the survival and adaptation of parties is proposed by Von Beyme's *institutional efficiency.* Some parties may disappear, other parties may emerge, but the organizations as such and the party systems in which they function stay put. Hence, both functional and evolutionary arguments are acknowledged: parties are

necessary for the functioning of democracy, and they manage to adapt to new circumstances.

See also *Democratic Theory, Parties in; Mobilization, Political; Party Discipline; Party Finance; Party Law; Party Systems, Comparative; Political Party Platform; Realignment, Partisan; Voting Behavior.*

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Political Party Platform

Political party platforms in the United States are drafted before the party convention and presented to convention for approval. Approval is not always pro forma, as debates have occurred on war and social issues. Platforms in the United States are not always read; in fact, presidential candidates and members of Congress may ignore them. The separation of powers system also makes party control difficult, if not impossible.

Platforms are instruments of ideology and party stands, and they reflect the views of those in control of the convention that year. Summarize and crystallizing the character of party coalitions, platforms are programmatic rather than ideological. Platforms may also be a way for party factions to agree on a common agenda. Writing in 1964, V. O. Key Jr. contended that platforms are "electioneering documents," not "blueprints for action." They indicate the party's general direction but ordinarily leave wide latitude for discretion after the election. The platform contains retrospective judgments and future pledges, with varying degrees of detail and specificity. During the campaign, the presidential candidate amplifies and amends the platform; this is especially true today when conventions occupy a lesser role in the election process.

Platforms provide useful guides to party positions on issues —such as taxes, health insurance, nuclear proliferation, education, abortion, and social security—and there is considerable consistency in their focus over the years. For example, Democrats look to government for solutions, while Republicans look to the private sector. The 2000 and 2004 platforms made exceptions for George W. Bush in areas where he strayed from traditionally conservative principles. By contrast, the 2008 platform accommodated John McCain's maverick positions on issues like immigration and climate change without accepting his views as the official positions of the Republican Party. On some issues, the party was less accommodating. The 2008 platform called for a constitutional amendment banning marriage between gays and lesbians, and a ban on all embryonic stem cell research, even though McCain did not favor either. Perhaps the most striking difference between the 2004 and 2008 platform documents is the removal of any references to the candidate running for office. In the 2004 document, Bush was mentioned more than 250 times, with the committee finding something about him to "praise," "commend," "hail," or "applaud" more than 70 times. By comparison, neither McCain nor Bush is mentioned at all in the 2008 documents, except in the preamble.

About 79 percent of platform promises become policy in one form or another, often involving partial opposed to complete fulfillment, yet the national plan is taken seriously and influences the policy agenda. Platforms in the United States can help vent group views and act as a safety valve. However, they may affect the party's broad-based appeal if interests not reflective of the party's broader constituency dominate.

The British parliamentary system, represented by Westminster and other systems, may provide an opportunity for elections to be about competitive programs. Electoral success is based upon approval of these platforms, and party discipline is needed to enforce the policies advocated. Strong party government, as in United Kingdom, provides a more accountable system of policy pledges because majority party members tend to vote as a bloc in fulfilling pledges in opposition to the other party. In this system, a majority of each party opposes the other. Even in the United Kingdom, where party platforms are known as manifestos, party conferences articulate policy, but it may not always be binding. However, the task is made easier because the prime minister is the leader of party and parliament. The party can deprive recalcitrant members of renomination, which tends to ensure greater compliance.

Party manifestos began with Robert Peel in 1834, and in 1906, the Labour manifesto was the first of its kind based on leader declarations. According to Richard Rose, election manifestos have become more specific in content over time; however, they may be rhetorical or doable. They no longer rely on single principles, but, once a party is in office, it may feel committed to principles it sees as impractical or undesirable.

Manifestos are an exercise in party management. Voters rarely consult them, but politicians may view them as an authoritative statement of party policy intentions and party collective responsibility. They result from a search for consensus within the party, and, in large measure, are a proclamation of what leaders want. They represent a statement not of what the party will achieve but what it intends to achieve. Most commitments are implemented into policy—90 percent for Conservatives and 73 percent for Labour. The manifestos may be adversarial, but not necessarily point-for-point oppositional. Most legislation is prepared apart from the manifestos, and often, parliamentary legislation represents consensus rather than adversarial party conflict.

See also *Campaigns; Party Law; Political Parties; Programmatic Party.*

. . . . JOYCE GELB

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Political Philosophy

Political philosophy is the branch of philosophy devoted to reflecting on the contents, values, and conditions of political life. Specific methods of political philosophy are distinguishable from other disciplines, such as political science and history, with various forms and varieties emerging in contemporary political philosophy.

THE OBJECTS OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

It is a common practice to define a discipline either on the basis of its specific *objects* or on the basis of its *methods.* By looking at its objects, political philosophy can be defined as the specific branch of philosophy devoted to the study of politics. The main questions that political philosophers then raise concern (1) legitimacy, (2) modes, and (3) limits of political power.

With regard to the first, the *legitimacy* of political power, the most fundamental questions that political philosophers raise surround the very existence of politics: Why should there be a political power in the first place? Why do people live under governments? Would it be preferable to live in a condition of anarchy? These are questions that touch on crucial philosophical problems and that have been raised at least since individual human beings realized that the political arrangements they live in are not eternal and unchangeable; rather, they are temporary and subject to the possibility of change. In antiquity, the typical answer showed that political power derived from the place of human beings in the chain of beings, whereas modern philosophers typically looked for a justification of power in the will of human beings. The typical example of the first approach is Aristotle (384–322 BCE), who in *Politics* famously defined the human being as a political animal, while Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679 CE) exemplifies the second approach. By grounding the existence of political power in a social contract that individuals stipulate in order to exist apart from the natural condition of war and anarchy, in *Leviathan* Hobbes justifies the existence of power in the will of individuals.

The second question concerns the *modes* of exercising political power. What fundamental values should uphold one's political life? What political arrangements best promote them? These are also crucial questions that political philosophy has been raising since its inception. An example of the typical answer in antiquity to the question is Plato's depiction of the perfect republic. Plato (427–347 BCE) argues in *The Republic* that justice is the most important value in human life and that it should be the ordering principle of political arrangements. Drawing on an analogy between the equilibrate soul ruled by reason and the just republic ruled by philosophers, Plato depicts an ideal political community by assigning a specific position to every social group and describing in detail each one's task. An example of the typically modern answer to this question is Niccolò Machiavelli's theory of the separation of politics from morals in *The Prince.* If the antiquity sees them in continuity, Machiavelli (1469–1527) argues that politics should

be autonomous from morals and should promote its own values. In Machiavelli's view, the best political arrangement to promote the liberty of individual human beings is the republican one.

Finally, there is the question of the *limits* to political power. Are there limits to what political power can legitimately do? If these limits exist, what are the criteria for defining them? The question has also been raised since the inception of political philosophy, but it gained prominence in the modern epoch. If political power is not derived from the position of human beings in the chain of beings, but is instead the consequence of their will, it follows that this very will is also entitled to set the legitimate limits to politics. Liberal philosophers have paid particular attention to this question. Among them, John Locke (1632–1704) argued in *Two Treatises of Government* that together with the limits posed by nature itself, every legitimate government is also meant to respect the fundamental rights of individuals, such as their life and their private properties.

THE METHODS OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

At this point, questions may still arise regarding the difference between political philosophy and other disciplines also devoted to the study of politics. As the question itself suggests, it is not sufficient just to look at the objects of political philosophy. It is only by considering its specific methods that a full-fledged definition of political philosophy emerges, setting it apart from other disciplines.

If political philosophy is a form of philosophical reflection on politics, then it follows that its methods can be as many as those that philosophy can actually provide. In the first place, the difference emerges between those political philosophies that are derived from entire philosophical systems and those that focus on a specific issue. An example of the first kind of political philosophy is Plato's already mentioned conception of the ideal polity, which derives from his more general philosophical views, while Machiavelli is an example of the second. Indeed, while Plato contributes to many fields of philosophical investigation (from ethics to metaphysics and theory of knowledge), Machiavelli's contributions to philosophy, aside from his political writings, are negligible. Furthermore, if in the first case, the difference between political philosophy and political science clearly emerges, the former the result of an entire system of thought and the second a discipline mainly focused on specific issues. In the second, there is a significant convergence. In exploring whether Machiavelli's *The Prince* is a work in political philosophy or in political science, in the context of works written before the emergence of a separate discipline of political science, a significant overlap between the two emerges.

The next task then involves identifying the difference between political philosophy and political science, methodologically speaking. If by Machiavelli's time, the two disciplines were still to a large extent intertwined, the difference emerges more clearly with contemporary examples. In the last century, political science has acquired a methodological status well distinguished from that of political philosophy. To a certain extent, its specific method is defined in opposition to that of political philosophy.

In the first place, as it is usually put, political philosophy is a *normative* enterprise, which reflects on how best to arrange one's political life. In contrast, political science aims to be value free, to simply describe and explain facts. The distinction goes back to the positivist distinction between three kinds of propositions: synthetic, analytic, and evaluative. The first are the propositions that describe facts (e.g., "there are 156 towns in this country"), the second are those that analyze the content of other propositions and therefore contain no advancement of knowledge (e.g., "the GDP is the gross domestic product of a country"), and the third are propositions that contain judgments of value (e.g., "justice is the most important political value"). The idea is that since philosophical propositions cannot be subsumed under the first two kinds of propositions, they must be evaluative. Many, such as Hilary Putnam, have questioned the distinction, in particular with observations that factual descriptions also contain more or less hidden judgments of values. For instance, going back to the earlier example, it could be sustained that the very definition of *towns* instead of mere *villages* contains a judgment of value.

Yet, the distinction still obtains between a discipline that primarily aims at describing the facts of one's political life (political science) and another, political philosophy, which directly aims at defining how to best arrange it. This does not mean that political philosophy is only normative; this is only one kind of political philosophy, and even in this case there are rarely only pure judgments of values. This means that the two disciplines have a different methodological attitude toward political life. Political science aims to tell how the world *is,* political philosophy aims to assess how it *should* be.

This also leads to another difference between political philosophy and political science. Whereas political philosophy could also do without a reference to experience, works in the field of political science are based on a systematic reference to the world how it actually is. Indeed, it is a striking characteristic of purely normative political philosophers that they often neglect actual politics in their works. Whereas political philosophers are offered this option—with another question about whether this is a good or bad political philosophy—this is unthinkable in the case of a political scientist. Both qualitative and quantitative methods in political science are based on a systematic and nonoccasional reference to the empirical world.

The normative character of political philosophy and its nonsystematic reference to the actual world also sets it apart from history. Although it is disputable whether a completely value-free historical research has ever taken place, it is a fact that the aim of a historian is primarily to tell how things have been, and not how they should be. Thus, although it is possible to have works in political philosophy that project in the metaphysical or utopian *no places*—first coined by Thomas More 1516 in his classical *Utopia*—this is unthinkable in the case of history. The historian looks at the past, although this research

can be more or less subtly guided by a certain view of the present and of the future.

MODERN VARIETIES OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

One of the most common distinctions proposed for grouping available political philosophies is that between analytical and continental political philosophy. Not only is the distinction geographical (the philosophy done in the Old Continent opposed to the approach prevailing in the United States), but it also aims to distinguish the sort of enlightened, science-oriented political philosophy done in the aftermath of authors such as David Hume, Gottlob Frege, and Jeremy Bentham from those who follow the philosophical style of authors such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Georg W. F. Hegel, and Friedrich Nietzsche. Many sides have questioned the distinction. In the first place, the term *continental* is misleading in as far as emblematic analytical philosophers such as Frege lived in the Old Continent. The term *analytical* is equally misleading because the works of alleged continental philosophers such as Rousseau and Hegel are also analytical if analytical simply means an enterprise devoted to the analysis of concepts. Thus, the distinction seems to be more a means to criticize philosophical adversaries than a conceptual distinction. The label of "continental" philosophy has often been used to accuse adversaries of lack of method and rigor, whereas the label "analytical" refers to accusation of offering sophisticated argument, but lacking any grip on reality. According to some, David West, for example, beyond such a distinction there is the ideological opposition between a "West" perceived as free, prosperous, celebrating human rights and the American way, and an "East" that has been totalitarian, stagnant, and oppressive.

A more fruitful distinction is that between the different methods of contemporary political philosophy, among which one can distinguish at least four: (1) the normative prescription of standards of conduct, (2) the construction of theoretical frameworks for the use of political concepts, (3) the deconstructive unpacking of concepts and paradigms, and (4) the history of political concepts. All are philosophical methods in that they aim to clarify concepts, be it through disclosing their normative potential, reconstructing the more general framework for their use, deconstructing overall, or reconstructing their history.

Normative political philosophy, after a long period of stagnation, was revived by the publication of John Rawls's *Theory of Justice* in 1971. Rawls's attempt to set the normative standards of a just society through the conceptual tool of a hypothetical social contract gave rise to a huge debate that did not cease to attract the attention of political philosophers. The only work comparable in influence is Jürgen Habermas's 1992 *Between Facts and Norms*. Habermas's attempt to ground democracy in the ideal conditions of speech and deliberation has attracted increasing attention on both sides of the Atlantic so that some authors speak of a deliberative turn in political philosophy.

However, the so-called normative political philosophy does not exhaust the entire contemporary scenario. If it is true that

political philosophy always contains a normative part, there are still political philosophers who do not see their primary task in setting the standards for conduct. Chiara Bottici's *Philosophy of Political Myth* (2007) offers an example of political philosophy understood as construction of philosophical framework for the use of political concepts (i.e., the second type). Whereas both Rawls and Habermas see human beings as primarily rational actors, Bottici argues that human beings do not only act on the basis of rational considerations, and therefore a philosophical framework needs to be constructed to adequately account for this fact. Hence Bottici's proposal of a philosophy of political myth explains both what political myths are, and why human beings should or should not make recourse to them. Together with the analysis of the conditions for public reason, political philosophy has therefore also been analyzing those for public imagination.

Yet, according to some authors, the primary task of political philosophy is not the construction of theoretical frameworks but rather their deconstruction (i.e., the fourth kind of political philosophy). The concept of deconstruction is primarily linked to the work of Jacques Derrida, and the main example of a political philosophy based on deconstruction is his *Politics of Friendship* (1997). In this work, Derrida deconstructs the concept of friendship by showing that brotherhood and fraternity have consistently served as the paradigm of friendship and political relations throughout the history of Western philosophy; the result is a systematic exclusion of women from all of them.

Finally, whereas Bottici distinguishes between the methods of history and those of political philosophy, according to some authors, political philosophy should be an enterprise essentially based on history of concepts. The main idea here is that political philosophy cannot be a free-floating intellectual enterprise, but must always reflect the contingency of the specific historical context in which it takes place. There are two main versions of this approach. The stronger one says that because it is impossible to transcend one's own historical context, political philosophy should be nothing more than conceptual history. The weaker form says instead that because there is no real progress in the discipline, but instead the perpetual recurrence of the same problems, rethinking the classical authors is a fruitful starting point for rethinking about more contemporary issues.

The four types of political philosophy are ideal types. Although it is possible to point to exemplary works for each of them, most of the time, works in political philosophy contain more than one single method. For example, Habermas's *Between Facts and Norms* contains both a political philosophy of the first and of the fourth kind, and Plato's *Republic* contains elements of the first and the second.

An epoch of rapid change often call the boundaries of the disciplines into question. Among the works that are on the forefront of questioning boundaries, at least three kinds of political philosophy stand out: (1) the poststatist, (2) the feminists, and (3) the green political philosophy. Although these kinds of political philosophy also make recourse to one

or more of the methods described earlier, they stand out in the contemporary panorama of political philosophy for their innovative and boundary-questioning potential. The poststatist political philosophy questions the centrality of the sovereign state in modern political philosophy, envisaging forms of justice and democracy beyond traditional state boundaries, as explained by David Held. Feminist political philosophy questions instead the traditional boundary between the public and the private sphere, arguing that such a distinction is a means to perpetuate the domination of men and segregation of women, especially as presented by Carol Pateman. Finally, green political philosophy challenges traditional ways of conceiving the boundaries between human beings and their natural environment, arguing that the latter can no longer be conceived as the mere passive theatre of human beings' political action. In the face of events such as climate changes, particularly as put forth by Val Plumwood, new political philosophies are necessary to assure not only justice among human beings but also their very survival.

See also *Idealism; Ideologies, Political; Political Theory; Political Thought, Foundations of; Power; Realism and Neorealism; Utopias and Politics.*

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Political Prisoners

Political prisoners are people imprisoned for political beliefs or political actions as a result of a government's criminalization. The government is one of political differences, and these differences are thought to threaten the established order of government; holding or articulating political views antagonistic to the state is thus seen as a crime. A closely related term is *prisoner of conscience*, which refers to those incarcerated because of their beliefs, color, sex, ethnic origin, language, or religion. At the shared definitional core of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience is their detainment by the state for the purpose of silencing dissent, or constraining opposition to orthodoxy as propagated by the state. Some political prisoners are simply arrested and incarcerated for an indefinite period of time, while others go through judicial proceedings before they are imprisoned. Extrajudicial killings and state-sanctioned "disappearances" are also observed.

POLITICAL PRISONERS AND CIVIL RIGHTS

A usual tactic seen with political prisoners is to charge or accuse them with contrived, nonpolitical, common criminal acts so as to help the state present a more acceptable facade of legitimacy for a prosecution or a jailing. Critics of such proceedings commonly invoke the pejorative terms *trumped-up charges, fabricated evidence, kangaroo court, show trial, sham trial*, and the like. The state's political motivations in bringing about such prosecutions and trials are an important element in determining whether a detainee is indeed a political prisoner. There is a level of inherent subjectivity in assessing the depth and influence of politics in such prosecutorial decision making, and these commonly remain issues of contention and debate between the state and supporters of the accused. For example, at what point does legitimate dissent from political orthodoxy become illegitimate treason and betrayal of one's country? Should there be a global standard to constrain governments, or should these concerns be more appropriately evaluated within a particular country's own values and perspectives?

In an effort to put forth an international standard to clarify these considerations and to prevent governments from rationalizing politically motivated prosecutions and imprisonments, the United Nations (UN) promulgated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. This was the first time in international law that all people were recognized as possessing rights that transcended a state's sovereign imperatives. According to this declaration, no person may be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or imprisonment—detention is understood to be arbitrary when there is no ostensible legal foundation for the detention or there are serious breaches of the right to a fair trial.

However, in the wake of these international legal provisions, a debate between Western and non-Western, or developing, countries emerged. Western states generally contend that political and civil rights are absolutely essential and critical, whereas non-Western detractors argue that political liberties are irrelevant and worthless if the fundamental needs of the people, such as freedom from hunger and basic security, are not provided. Thus, generally speaking, non-Western and developing countries show a lessened commitment to political rights as limned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Along with the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch are prominent watchdogs on the lookout for

potential violations of these human rights. However, even with these organizations at work, obtaining or collecting exact data on the number and treatment of political prisoners is extraordinarily difficult because of the lack of accurate self-reporting by states with problematic human rights records; there is also great risk involved in the preparation of such reports by internal nongovernmental actors.

POLITICAL PRISONERS IN OPPRESSIVE REGIMES

The presence of political prisoners in a country is an important indicator of the level of repression that government exercises over its people. Repressive governments work to reinforce their control over the populace by denying them fundamental political freedoms and curtailing individual civil liberties and rights. Interfering with people and group's ability to freely articulate and act on their dissident political beliefs is a prime tactic that authoritarian and totalitarian regimes use to help strengthen the survival of their regime, and examples of this have been readily observed in the modern era. Poland in the early 1980s prohibited the prodemocracy trade union of Polish Solidarity and anyone involved in it was subject to arrest. Soviet Union dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn were arrested and exiled by Soviet authorities for their respective public criticisms of the government. Solzhenitsyn's monumental work *The Gulag Archipelago* is an extensive first-hand account of the Soviet Union's prison camp system in which many Soviet political prisoners found themselves. A range of nations have held political prisoners in custody for extended periods of time or dealt with them in more summary ways, including South Africa, Cuba, Tibet, China, Indonesia, Chile, Haiti, and Pakistan.

Other regimes decide to place their political prisoners under house arrest—that is, restricting those people's liberty by confining them to their homes. This was a commonly used tactic of the South African government in its efforts to deal with activists fighting apartheid. One of the most prominent current examples of this politically restricting approach is in Burma, where the ruling military junta of Burma has had Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for fourteen years for her pro-democratic political activism.

See also *Civil and Political Rights; Freedom of Conscience; Habeas Corpus; Noncombatant Prisoners; Police State; Totalitarianism.*

. . . . STEPHEN R. ROUTH

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Political Psychology

The evolution and development of the subfield of political psychology began to take shape during the pre–World War II (1939–1945) period. This is when political science incorporated political psychology more directly; informed largely by psychoanalytic theory, this work focused primarily on leadership studies and the nature of attitudes. Such notions and interests became more peripheral to the broader fields of political science and psychology, as well as the larger world, in the wake of the behavioral revolution of the 1950s and 1960s. While some of these later methods and concepts remained part of U.S. politics, most of the central ideas and concerns of political science began to fall outside the purview of existing psychological models.

PSYCHODYNAMIC THEORY AND THE BEHAVIORAL REVOLUTION

The impact and importance of personality is what distinguishes political psychology from many other areas of political science: its specific and intensive focus on the individual level of analysis, and the central place held by individual decision makers in political processes.

Sigmund Freud's (1856–1939) psychological ideas drew on the model of the newly invented internal combustion engine, positing a primarily sexual and aggressive energy that drives the human psychic machine. Yet his notions were also heavily influenced by his overarching interest in archeology, and he assumed that uncovering core motives held much in common with sorting through the surface debris of an archeological site to find buried treasures. In Freud's view, children are born with hedonistic tendencies, the so-called id, and become socialized by society, primarily in the form of their parents, into civilization through the internalization of the superego, or conscience. The individual's successful attempt to integrate the id and superego into a functional ego represented the life's work, and failures to effectively synthesize these forces led to psychological pain and illness. Freud also speculated that a person's repressed internal drives will unconsciously manifest themselves in behavioral outcomes, in the forms of jokes, slips of the tongue, and other uncontrollable outbursts. Freud's propositions concerning human motivation and action remained definitive for half a century and continue to be influential, at least in some clinical and cultural settings, today.

While the most lasting and significant of Freud's insights remains his characterization of the unconscious, whether conceived in motivational or purely cognitive terms, his larger

belief in the dynamic conflicts between individual desire and larger societal constraints provided a powerful model of personality and action. As a flexible model of human character, psychoanalysis proved adaptable in a number of ways. In addition, Freud's ideas concerning socialization offered a comprehensive theory for understanding the interaction between the individual and the larger society, whether that exchange took place in a smaller family unit or within a larger cultural context such as the Catholic Church or the army. This model readily suggested many applications and implications for political science.

Freud's psychoanalytic ideas were widely adopted in various subfields in political science and quickly became embedded into the literature in various formulations of both group and individual behavior. The two main areas in which these ideas exerted their greatest impact involved leadership studies and work on attitudes and behavior.

Freud himself began the work on leadership studies, albeit outside of the political context, with his psychobiography of Leonardo da Vinci, wherein he attributed much of Leonardo's creative energy to his presumed homosexual desires, as manifested in a famous reported dream. Such analysis sought to locate the origins of individual accomplishment in childhood experiences and the source of personal pathology in repressed sexual and aggressive desires. Indeed, early experiments in the psychology of leadership were conducted on children. In perhaps the most famous of these studies, Kurt Lewin (1890–1947), a German Jewish refugee from Nazi Germany, sought to understand the power that Hitler had exerted over his compatriots. Lewin examined the impact of leadership style over group dynamics by randomly assigning one of three types of leaders to groups of boys. One displayed an autocratic style of leadership, a second a democratic style, and a third a laissez-faire style. In each case, the leader was a confederate of the experimenters. The results proved instructive. Boys in the autocratic group worked hard, but only while under supervision. Predictably, boys in the laissez-faire group simply goofed off, while boys in the democratic group emerged most efficient. More striking, however, was the fact that boys in the autocratic group displayed over thirty times more aggression than boys in either of the other groups. Boys in the autocratic group destroyed their own property and then blamed others for their misdeeds, displacing their anger, frustration, and aggression onto weaker boys. It is notable that Lewin went on to conduct some of the earliest work on persuasion and attitude change, systematically examining various factors, such as strength of argument and vocal intonation, to determine the sources of attitude change.

Knowing that such variables failed to achieve predictable effects, Leon Festinger (1919–1989) went on to develop his powerful model of cognitive dissonance, based on the discrepancy between perceived choice and external justification, showing that arousal encourages people to maintain consistency between their thoughts and behaviors. When perceived choice appears high, and justification remains low, internal attitudes exhibit the most change.

Harold Dwight Lasswell (1902–1978), a real father of the field of political psychology, was the first to translate these psychoanalytic notions into the explicit study of political leadership in several important works. Lasswell explicitly incorporated psychoanalytic theory into his studies of political behavior. Specifically, he argued that individuals project their psychological conflicts onto the external political world. Lasswell's seminal work substantively affected the direction of research in this area for decades by concentrating attention on the ways in which psychological processes in general, and pathological ones in particular, influence subsequent political development and expression. By establishing this unidirectional focus, Lasswell's research precipitated and modeled the development of subsequent work to concentrate almost exclusively on the effect of psychology on politics, paying almost no attention to the potential impact of politics on individual psychology. This directionality in political psychology continues today.

The application of psychodynamic theory to leadership and personality studies came to its most masterful fruition in Alexander George and Juliette George's psychobiography of Woodrow Wilson. In this work, George and George combined Freudian theory with Lasswell's notions to argue that Wilson used power as a compensatory mechanism to bolster his inadequate self-esteem. By documenting Wilson's deeply ambivalent relationship with his brutal father, a powerful Presbyterian minister, they showed that Wilson's later inability to compromise with powerful male authority figures was rooted in his unexpressed defiance of the father he both loved and loathed. In demonstrating the repeated nature of Wilson's battles of will as president of Princeton, governor of New Jersey, and president of the United States, the George and George elucidated the repetition compulsion that tragically forced Wilson to become the assassin in his own demise by refusing to compromise with Senator Henry Cabot Lodge over the League of Nations treaty upon which he had staked his political career.

Other work that used psychodynamic models to investigate the relationship between individual motives and societal outcomes included Lloyd Etheredge's study of actual senior Department of State officials. Using assessments of leaders' personality traits, Etheredge found that he could predict over 75 percent of their policy preference in forty-nine crises between 1898 and 1968. In particular, he noted that individuals who displayed high dominance behavior in their interpersonal interactions were much more likely to advocate the use of military force abroad.

By the late 1950s through the 1970s, the behavioral revolution began to supplant psychoanalysis as the dominant model in academic psychology and the broader intellectual world. No new theory of power and personality emerged in psychology that could explain the interaction of the individual with the group or larger culture in the same comprehensive manner as psychoanalysis; instead, the psychological study of personality progressed into a more *outside-in* model that examined the effects of social processes, such as conformity and obedience,

on individual behavior. This represents a complete reversal from the earlier Freudian notions that explored individual psychology from an *inside-out* perspective. In the absence of the development of an equally comprehensive theory of personality in psychology from within the behavioral paradigm, political scientists proved unable to develop their own alternative appealing theory for the relationship between personality and power, and psychological leadership studies more broadly floundered and tended to fall by the wayside.

A second notable example of the incorporation of psychodynamic notions into research in political attitudes arose in the context of the examination of attitudes and attitude structures. This pursuit found its fullest expression in work on the authoritarian personality. The early research, largely conducted by a group of Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany at the University of California, Berkeley, sought to explain the origins of fascism within individual personalities. These scholars devised an F-scale that ostensibly connected attitudinal traits including anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, and political and economic conservatism to public policy preferences and outcomes. High authoritarian individuals appeared preoccupied with power and status and demonstrated a low tolerance for ambiguity. The authoritarian personality argument rested on the psychodynamic assumption that interpersonal hostility would inevitably project onto the external world in measurable ways, which could then be correlated with predispositions toward hostile and punitive foreign policy stances.

These early attitudinal studies in political science were inextricably rooted in psychodynamic assumptions of human behavior—and rightfully so. Such models incorporated comprehensive and internally consistent theories of personality, attitude, power, and action. Moreover, they provided a systematic explanation for the interrelationship between the individual and the group that remains such a crucial aspect of any political context and that many other models, even more recent ones, often lack. However, this work faltered because little empirical evidence corroborated the central theoretical association between interpersonal attitudes, as elicited in self-report questionnaires, and policy preferences and behavior. Given the lack of support for this central contention, work on the authoritarian personality came under increasing attack for embodying inherent political motivation and bias. In particular, critics argued against the one-sided focus on right-wing authoritarianism to the exclusion of left-wing dogmatism.

The study of attitudes and attitudinal structure, however, unlike the work on leadership, survived in the face of the behavioral revolution precisely because political science proved able to develop theories of attitude and attitudinal structure that were not rooted in psychological models in general, or psychodynamic theory in particular. Taking advantage of methodological advances in survey research during the behavioral revolution pioneered by sociologists as well as psychologists, important and valuable new work in U.S. politics emerged. Early work in voting studies conducted by Paul Lazarsfeld and colleagues investigating applied social research at Columbia held to a more sociological formulation. Later work epitomized

by the Michigan approach displaced these models with a more psychological and attitudinal approach to voting.

The most notable and influential work in this regard quickly became a classic. Angus Campbell and colleagues' *American Voter* (1960) employed nationwide surveys of large samples to uncover the dynamics underlying public opinion and American voting behavior. This argument located the source of political attitudes and behavior in individual political party identification, which the authors suggested was largely socialized, and learned at the knees of a parent. Such a model posited implicit social processes of group identification but failed to specify the particular psychological mechanisms undergirding this process very carefully.

Later work, such as John Zaller's influential *Nature and Origins of Mass Opinions* (1992), elaborated this survey tradition in attitude research by describing the relationship between the mass media, the assimilation of information by the public, and their opinions in quite sophisticated fashion. This model has proved quite influential in demonstrating the relationship between exposure and assimilation in explaining the effect of the media on public opinion. Zaller's work with Stanley Feldman (1992) similarly provided important insight into the nature of framing and priming effects on response bias in survey questionnaires, where *framing* refers to the order or method of presentation of questions and responses, and *priming* indicates unrelated external cues that may influence responses. In particular, salience and accessibility effects appeared to stimulate response instability across time.

Attitudinal research thus became rooted in the methodological advances of behaviorism, most notably the widespread use of the survey instrument to elicit public opinion attitudes and responses. In this way, the behavioral revolution really brought the psychological underpinnings of political behavior to the forefront, and this type of research became largely incorporated into mainstream political science, while simultaneously shedding itself of any explicit association with psychological models. This work remained mostly restricted to the arena of U.S. politics in general, and the study of voting behavior in particular. However, when psychoanalytic theory collapsed as the dominant theory of human behavior in the wake of the behavioral revolution, the study of attitudes, action, and behavior did not fall away in political science in the same way that leadership studies had, precisely because of the incorporation of behavioral methods into the study of voting research.

THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY FOR OTHER SUBFIELDS

Because the study of psychology and that of voting behavior both rest on models of individual behavior, their integration proved a match made in heaven. In addition, to the extent that applications of psychology to other subfields in political science took place at the level of the individual, progress and success remained possible. Most notable and influential in this regard was Robert Jervis's seminal and definitive masterpiece, *Perception and Misperception in International Relations* (1976). However, many pressing questions in comparative and

international politics occur at higher levels of analysis, thus requiring larger group-based notions of collective behavior in order to fully explicate underlying causal processes.

Over time within psychology, research in personality psychology declined in stature as its dominant model, psychoanalysis, waned in influence. In many departments, personality psychology no longer exists as a subfield, and in many others its adherents have been folded into clinical subfields. This movement away from deterministic theories of personality and behavior was only strengthened by the backlash against behaviorism that arose in the late 1960s, with the rise of humanist and existential perspectives, such as those advocated by such luminaries as Carl Rogers; this humanist emphasis then lasted through the rise of the cognitive revolution in the mid 1980s, and the later neuroscientific revolution of the last 1990s. As a result, psychology itself has become increasingly fractured. It thus became more difficult both for political science to keep up with quickly changing models of human behavior and to use and justify contentious models of personality in developing and testing their theories of leadership, group membership, or behavior.

The real challenge for political science subfields outside of U.S. politics to adopt psychological models in a widespread fashion results from the paucity of applicable group-based theories within psychology. Indeed, work in sociology may have proved more fruitful in such a pursuit, and, in fact, work in that area helped to spawn the introduction of constructivist models in international relations in the late 1980s. To the extent that any consensually accepted model of group behavior has emerged in psychology with relevance for political science, it is social identity theory, developed by Henri Tajfel. This theory offered two important insights. First, social identity theory posited that people automatically divide themselves and others into categories as a way to organize their social environments. People engage in a process of social comparison to determine the extent to which they are similar to, and different from, others they encounter. Second, Tajfel suggested that human motivation to divide into groups derived from the important self-esteem benefits derived from such membership. There are implicit psychodynamic motivational underpinnings inherent in this model.

Numerous experiments in this vein have demonstrated that individuals form groups easily on the basis of the most minimal reasons, and that once such membership becomes established, predictable differences in the distribution of resources between in-group and out-group members arise. For example, Jonathan Mercer invoked this theory to explain why interstate relations remain inherently competitive. Because of the consistency and robustness of the finding of in-group privilege concomitant with out-group denigration, much of this work concentrated on uncovering the origins of prejudice and discrimination. Social identity theory has been largely supplanted in psychology by self-categorization theory, where researchers stress the ways in which individuals maintain agency through their active choice over the number and intensity of their group memberships and identifications.

Because many political scientists remain interested in large-scale questions and problems related to identity, culture, and other important manifestations of political action, the challenges posed by external validity have limited the applicability of many psychological theories and methods based on experimental research. In U.S. politics, this limitation has been surmounted in large part by the use of survey instruments and other field experiments, including the innovative use of experiments embedded in nationally representative survey samples, which use large numbers of subjects, thus assuring the external validity and generalizability of findings. Most psychologists do not feel a need to solve problems associated with external validity in their studies because they are more interested in underlying processes of human decision making within a laboratory setting, where internal validity is much more crucial in establishing the reliability and validity of findings. Although models of group association or influence might interest some psychologists, methodological differences limit the reverse adoption of ideas and questions from political science into psychology. A few exceptions exist, such as work on the impact of minority positions on majority opinion, but such work remains relatively rare.

THE COGNITIVE REVOLUTION

The behavioral revolution began to lose ascendency in psychology in the late 1960s precisely because of the larger political phenomena occurring in society at large, especially the Vietnam War (1959–1975). Such overarching political pressures on intellectual development in academia have not been unusual. Indeed, the close interrelationship between much behavioral research and the pressing social and political problems of World War II and the cold war provided the impetus for a great deal of work in political psychology, offering both challenging questions, as well as funding to attempt to find answers. In fact, the work of Lasswell and Lewin, among others, came out of government-sponsored projects.

As interest in information processing blossomed in the context of improvements in artificial computing, the domain of investigation shifted from behavior to thought. This new emphasis on the former "black box" of decision making sparked the cognitive revolution in psychology that characterized the main work of the 1980s. As the field of psychology reconstituted itself to address certain specified problems, such as the nature of human information processing, at the expense of others, such as basic human drives and motivations, prospects for political applications remained more amenable in some subfields than in others. In particular, the study of leadership moved into the investigation of individual decision making. This coincided with a movement in U.S. politics away from elite leadership studies in favor of concentrating on mass public opinion and political behavior.

This cognitively oriented research reached its apex with the seminal and definitive contributions of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in their work on judgmental heuristics and prospect theory. This work documented the importance of the kind of framing effects noted in Zaller and Feldman's work,

along with the systematic way in which people's estimates of probability and frequency become biased by assessments of similarity, availability, and anchoring. In work on prospect theory, which won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2004, Tversky and Kahneman showed experimentally that perceptions of gain and loss affect risk propensity in predictable ways, such that individuals confronting situations of loss appear much more likely to take risks than those more interested in consolidating gains. Prospect theory has been applied in political science most commonly in the subfield of international relations.

This cognitive work constituted the opposite end of the psychoanalytic pendulum, which located human action in motivated biases that unconsciously drive behavior. The cognitive model, working off the later-day machine analogy of the computer, instead delineated human biases that operated as a kind of bug in the psychological software, similarly unconscious in operation but divergent in their lack of motivation. Once people were told of the errors of their ways, they proved quick to recognize and admonish them, if not so capable of extinguishing them. Thus, "hot" motivated biases, rooted in primitive sexual and aggressive urges, were replaced by interest in "cold" cognitive biases, which predicted systematic errors in human decision making as the inherent side effect of largely effective and efficient cognitive strategies. More recent neuroscientific work has uncovered the artificial nature of this divide.

ADVANCES IN THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

In psychology, the pendulum began to swing back toward a renewed emphasis on emotion in the 1990s after Martin Seligman established a prestigious and lucrative prize for research in the area of positive psychology. This newfound concentration on the sources of happiness in particular coincided with the development and more widespread availability of new technologies, particularly functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which radically improved scientists' ability to uncover and locate the neural mechanisms of human brain functioning. These advances in cognitive neuroscience have sparked the dawn of a new revolution. In combination with similar technological developments in the field of behavior genetics in particular, new avenues for exploring the biological bases of human social and political attitudes, preference, and behavior have emerged. Some of these methods have also been used in concert with other noninvasive techniques such as implicit association tests (IAT) and electroencephalograph (EEG) technology, which both provide measures of reaction time among other outputs.

Many of the empirical advances in the domain of the cognitive neurosciences have taken place in the context of theoretical perspectives drawn from human evolutionary development and behavior. While some of the older evolutionary models in political science impaled on the stake of social Darwinism and associations with racism, sexism, and other prejudices, the modern variants in biology and psychology attempt to develop ecologically valid models of human thought and behavior that

remain rooted in evolutionary goals and strategies, but manifest empirically in demonstrable ways. The bottom-up empiricism of much work in the cognitive neurosciences finds an obvious theoretical exposition in evolutionary approaches. This interaction improves on previous models to provide a coherent theory of human thought and behavior. Also, like the perspective offered by psychoanalysis, evolutionary models provide comprehensive explanations for the interaction of the individual and larger society, rooted in essential reproductive tasks related to finding mates who are not relatives, and establishing coalitions to fight against those who challenge control over scare resources for survival. Although the nature and motives of the model differ, the comprehensive nature of their explanations should offer similar attractions for those who study political structures and behaviors. In combination with increasingly sophisticated work on the nature and manifestation of individual variance from within the field of behavior genetics, evolutionary models offer a theoretical and empirical basis to explore the nature of individual differences within a context of human universals.

See also *Group Theory; International Relations; Leadership; Political Attitudes and Behavior; Prospect Theory; Public Opinion; Voting Behavior.*

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Political Risk Assessment

Political risk assessment or analysis is a method of weighing the various political, economic, social, and cultural factors that must be taken into consideration when determining the feasibility of engaging in an endeavor, usually economic, in any country. Political risk assessment is often undertaken by entities, corporations, and organizations that would like to engage in operations in other countries with endeavors such as a multinational corporation planning to make a direct investment in a developing country. Analysis is done on the basis of factors that may be responsible for a sudden change in the stability of a nation that could lead to business losses.

Political risks are defined as any changes in the political environment that may adversely affect the value of a firm's business activities. Risk may imply the nonexistence of established order. It may also mean having some semblance of order but with a high probability of change. Or, it can mean a high level of stability and established order but with some probability of government intervention through expropriation or nationalization. The analysis of risks usually requires acquiring a quantity of data about a country's historical, political, economic, social, and cultural performance; this often requires time necessary to process such data into some meaningful assessment of the direction in which a nation is going. Corporations operating abroad usually try to avoid risk or shift the burden of that risk.

TYPES OF RISKS

In general, there are two broad types of risks: macropolitical risks that affect all firms, entities, or organizations in the country, and micropolitical risks that affect only a specific firm or firms in a specific industry in the country. There are also three categories of political risk of major importance to businesses. The first is ownership risk, occurring when confiscation or expropriation threatens the firm's property. The second type is operating risk, occurring when changes in laws, environmental standards, tax codes, terrorism, insurrection, or other shifts threaten the ongoing operations of the firms or safety of employees. The third type of risk is transfer risk, occurring when government interference with the firms curtails the ability to shift funds into and out of the country; this results from governmental action such as passage of laws that expropriate private property, raise operating costs, devalue the currency, or constrain the repatriation of profits.

Nongovernmental actions such as kidnapping, extortion, and acts of terrorism bring risk to any business endeavor as well. In fact, a broader list of examples of political risks also include nationalization or confiscation, campaigns against foreign goods, mandatory labor benefits legislation, and other forms of violence resulting from civil war, insurrection, or rebellion. In addition, there are also "hidden risks," which include cronyism, organized crime and fraud, unfair competition, counterfeiting and piracy, corruption, poor legal standards, and cultural differences. Beyond the risks themselves, the set of effects that result is most significant, such as the loss of profits or assets, increased costs, loss of sales, and decreased productivity.

MEASURING RISK

There are objective measures for identifying risk factors, but there are subjective measures as well. There are several approaches for evaluating and forecasting the existence of risk. One is the *grand tour*, which relies on the opinion of company executives visiting the country where the investment is being considered. In this method, the analyst engages in selectivity of information required to gauge risk. A second approach is the *old hands approach*, which depends on the advice of an outside consultant, serving as the expert whose input provides the basis for risk assessment. Another approach is the *Delphi technique*, which combines the views of independent experts who use various sets of indices and analysts in determining risk. It can use existing data from the Human Development Index, the Globalization Index, the Corruption Index, and the Freedom Index in determining a nation's level of risk.

Quantitative methods, such as multivariate analysis, can also serve as a means to assess risk. However, most analysts indicate preference for an integrated approach that systematically uses qualitative and quantitative dimensions. For example, the Eurasia Group produces a Global Political Risk Index that can be found in publications such as *The Economist*. Another company that offers political risk analysis is Political Risk Services, which uses a 100-point scale and rates a country on the basis of three factors: 50 points for politics, 33 points for economics, and 17 points for society.

Many different independent dimensions influence a nation's political destiny, including domestic instability, foreign conflict, political climate, and economic climate. Politically, a nation needs to ensure leadership success to avoid crisis. There are several factors that can undermine political success in any country: the erosion of middle-class support for the regime, corruption, work stoppages, ideology or religion, the likelihood of civil disorder and terrorism, military unrest, border disputes, and social revolution. Based on these dimensions and factors, a nation's risk rating can be any of the following: "very high," meaning it will happen; "high," meaning it could occur in the short-term; "very possible," meaning there is a likelihood of it happening; "possible," meaning there is a 50 percent chance of the scenario occurring; "low," meaning there is little chance of occurrence; and "very low," indicating an unlikely occurrence.

According to one method of assessing country risk, Table 1 and 2 show the top ten countries with the least risk and the bottom ten countries that pose the greatest risk.

TABLE 1: TOP TEN COUNTRIES, COUNTRY RISK RANKING AND OVERALL COUNTRY RISK INDEX (AS OF SEPTEMBER 2006)

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE
1	Luxembourg	100
2	Norway	98
3	Switzerland	98
4	Denmark	95
5	The United States	94
6	Sweden	94
7	Finland	93
8	Ireland	93
9	The Netherlands	93
10	Austria	93

Source: "Country Risk Methodology." *Euromoney Magazine,* March 2007, www.euromoney.com/article.asp?ArticleID=1243012.

TABLE 2: BOTTOM TEN COUNTRIES, COUNTRY RISK RANKING AND OVERALL COUNTRY RISK INDEX (AS OF SEPTEMBER 2006)

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE
176	Micronesia (Federal States)	19.28
177	Congo	17.83
178	Liberia	17.58
179	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	16.41
180	Marshall Islands	12.10
181	Cuba	11.75
182	Somalia	11.11
183	Iraq	5.17
184	Afghanistan	4.24
185	North Korea	3.65

Source: "Country Risk Methodology." *Euromoney Magazine,* March 2007, www.euromoney.com/article.asp?ArticleID=1243012.

Political risk analysis thus examines the possibility that political decisions, events, or conditions in a country, including those which may be referred to as social, will affect the economic environment in such a way that investors would lose money or have a reduced profit margin. The results of such an assessment can determine whether a company, entity, or organization will decide to operate in a particular country based on these factors.

See also *Corporation; Corruption, Political; Nationalization; Transnationalism.*

. . . .   CECILIA G. MANRIQUE

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Political Science, History of

The idea of politics as a subject of science is as old as Aristotle's *Politics,* but, as British political theorist Bernard Crick stressed, political science, as a distinct academic discipline and branch of social science, originated as a uniquely American invention. Although there were, in many respects, functionally equivalent studies of politics in other countries, the history political science, from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, was primarily a story of the "American science of politics." Notwithstanding its universal scientific aspirations; its emigration and export to other countries, especially subsequent to World War II (1939–1945); and the waves of foreign influence that have at times significantly contributed to shaping the field, political science has borne a unique relationship to American political life and American democratic ideology. Although the history of the discipline could be written from many perspectives, an important dimension of that history is the democratic narrative. The field has always been committed to creating a truly scientific study of politics, but, despite changing images of science, there has been a consistent search for a discipline that would contribute to realizing and enhancing democratic values and institutions. In this respect, as well as with regard to matters of methodology, the genetic imprint of the American form has remained manifest in the extended speciation that now characterizes so many other countries within which the field has taken root and evolved.

It has often been suggested, however, that the simultaneous commitments to science and democracy have not always been in harmony. Although this tension has, in part, involved the problem of reconciling scientific and political criteria of judgment, it has also been the consequence of a longstanding assumption that only by remaining aloof from politics and establishing its claim to scientific objectivity could the discipline gain the cognitive authority to facilitate practical purchase. Consequently, it is not surprising that some have suggested that the discipline has, at times, become alienated from the realities of political life. However, self-consciousness about its relationship to politics has significantly informed political science's successive crises of intellectual identity. Despite sometimes contradictory claims about the extent to which claims about politics and government produced by political science have influenced political ideas and behavior, the images produced by the discipline have, in various ways—such as through diverse levels of pedagogy and through their influence on a variety of media—been reflected in the practices of citizens and political actors.

There was, from the point of the formation of the U.S Republic, a theoretical paradox that has been a central axis in discussions of popular government. This paradox, which was bequeathed to the field of political science, emerged with respect to validating American democracy—and validating America as a democracy. While it was assumed that a republican or democratic regime was predicated on the existence of an intelligible and autonomous people, it was, at the same time, difficult, after the American Revolution (1776–1783), to

identify any such entity. This search for a "people," and for democracy, was, and has been, through the end of the twentieth century, confronted, and conducted, in two distinct ways. One approach is to argue that, despite great social diversity, there is an American people that has been the author and subject of democratic government. The other approach argues that the existence of such a national community is not necessary to achieve the ends of popular sovereignty. One persistent aspect of the democratic vision in the United States, represented in both of these approaches, is, however, its accomodational character. The tendency adapts the concept of democracy to changes in the perceived realities of American politics.

This paradox of democracy is first exemplified in *The Federalist Papers,* which were devoted to a defense of the proposed 1787 Constitution. While the authors maintained that the Constitution, manifesting the accrued wisdom of Western political thought regarding a science of politics, created a popular government that was republican, or representative, rather than purely democratic, they had difficulty clarifying and defending their continued allegiance to the basic idea of popular sovereignty. The concept of a people that had been at the core of revolutionary ideology, as well as essential to the arguments of certain Anti-Federalist criticisms of the new document, seemed to have an anomalous ring when juxtaposed to the images of American politics advanced by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton. The Federalists and Anti-Federalists shared the worry that there was not an identifiable American people, which transcended the smaller communities of the various states.

From one perspective, the genius of the authors of *The Federalist Papers* was to invent the very idea of a unified people that encompassed more local constituencies and that was to be represented in and by the new national government. To the extent, however, that the oft-mentioned "people" had a concrete meaning for Madison, as voiced in *Federalist* No. 10, it seemed, in the end, to refer either to the sum of self-interested individuals or to diverse and divisive factions that were characterized by their attachment to their own, rather than a public, good. In place of the traditional republican notion of an organic people, Madison conceived of a virtual people that would arise out of an institutional and social balance of conflicting interests. He argued that the disease of republican, and now American, government was factionalism but that it could transform its own cure through an intricate constitutional design combined with fortuitous demographic and geographical circumstances. Political discourse and commentary, however, kept alive the civic republican image of a people capable of, and the subject of, popular government, which lay beneath the surface of American diversity. The origins of political science were closely involved with vouchsafing that image.

THE SCIENCE OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE

During the nineteenth century, academic publicists produced their own version of the people, which was represented in the concept of the *state.* While today many tend to look back on this concept as an archaic formalistic and legalistic artifact, or as an intellectual reflection of American state-building, it was in fact the nucleus of a theory of American democracy. Apart from a reference to the American states, the word *state* had, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, little currency in the language of American politics.

The introduction of the concept of the state was largely through the work of the German émigré Francis Lieber, beginning about the time that his acquaintance, Alex de Tocqueville, visited America. Tocqueville had noted that the new world of American democracy demanded a "new science of politics," and Lieber can reasonably be designated the founder of American political science. There was already a nascent program of civic education within the traditional American college and university curriculum; Lieber focused on expanding this field of study by integrating German philosophy and images of world history, particularly with his *Manual of Political Ethics* published in 1839. He applied that philosophy to the circumstances and traditions of the United States and to devising a solution to the perennial democratic paradox of a people ruling themselves and yet being ruled by a central government. His adaptation of the German philosophy of the state in his 1853 *Civil Liberty and Self-Government* paralleled the work of individuals such as the German theorist Johann K. Bluntschli, who wrote *The Theory of the State*, and, for nearly a century, it provided the intellectual, institutional, and professional foundation of academic political inquiry in the United States.

In 1857, Lieber was appointed the first professor of political science at Columbia College in New York. Second generation theorists perpetuated and refined his work, including Theodore Woolsey at Yale, Herbert Baxter Adams at Johns Hopkins, and, above all, John W. Burgess, who was Lieber's successor at Columbia. Lieber, and the later American state theorists, who were educated abroad and imbibed the German paradigm of *Staatswissenschaft,* created the image of a democratic people as well as a history of democratic institutions that sprung from ancient Teutonic origins, passed through English government, and culminated in the American polity. Although Americans had at first been wary of the word *democracy*, it had, by the middle of the nineteenth century, been largely divested of its radical overtones and become a general term of approbation in the United States as well as in many places abroad.

Unlike some of his European counterparts and correspondents, such as Edouard Laboulaye in France, as well as the American historian George Bancroft, who all commented extensively on American political society and contributed significantly to the nineteenth-century democratic narrative, Lieber still feared "democratic absolutism" and, like Toqueville, majoritarian rule. He inveighed against ideas such as women's suffrage and tended to eschew the word *democracy* in favor of phrases such as *self-government* and *hamarchy,* by which he basically meant representative institutions. His vision of the state, however, was essentially that of an associationally and institutionally diverse but organic people and its pedigree, which gave theoretical substance to the idea of democracy.

Although the "state talk" of nineteenth-century political inquiry, as well as that of public intellectuals such as Orestes Brownson and Elisha Mulford, paralleled the discourse of democracy in political life, it remained, like many later constructions of political science, far removed from the language of politics in the United States. The most essential feature of the concept of the state during this long and formative period in the evolution of American political science was that it did not refer either to forms of government or to the institutions of government, but rather to a primordial community whose voice expressed a will and interest represented by the agency of government but which preceded, in both time and authority, both the Constitution and the government.

This vision often reflected and abetted the conservative ideology of theorists such as Burgess, who wished to propagate and justify limited government as well as to curtail democratic populism while maintaining the ethic of popular sovereignty. It was also, in some ways, both inspired by, and functioned to legitimate, the cause of the Union before and after the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865). However, social scientists on the political left also embraced this vision, such as the economist Richard Ely, who perceived the state as authorizing government intervention in social life. The theory of the state provided a scientific identity for the discipline and sublimity for its subject matter, but, above all, it offered a distinct answer to the congenital paradox of American democratic theory. It was an answer that extended well into the Progressive Era after the turn of the century.

In *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law* (1891), Burgess validated this picture with a singular and ingenious account of American history. He argued that modern states, and particularly the United States, were prime examples of those founded on a national unity and that they represented a self-conscious democracy that was the apex of political history. Nations, as ethical and geographical units tended, at least in the West, to become states; that is, a people with a government—and the highest examples of the latter were those that had achieved the popular or democratic form.

The aim of Burgess's interdisciplinary School of Political Science at Columbia (1880) was both to educate an American administrative and political elite and to influence government policy. The imprint of this curriculum is still evident in contemporary political science programs, and Columbia produced the first professional journal of political science, *The Political Science Quarterly* (1886), which was devoted to the assumption that the "domain of political science" was the study of the state and that among the social sciences concerned with this subject, political science occupied the dominant position. Similar institutional developments took place under Herbert Baxter Adams at Johns Hopkins University, which published *Studies in History and Political Science* and was the site of the first professional political science association. In Europe, institutions such as École Libre des Sciences Politiques in France and the London School of Economics in Britain were established. By this point, political scientists were still not always clearly distinguished from historians and economists, but the theory of the state primarily bound them together.

The third generation of political scientists, which included Bernard Moses at the University of California at Berkeley, Woodrow Wilson at Johns Hopkins and Princeton University, and W. W. Willoughby at Johns Hopkins did much to institutionalize the field of political science in American universities during the last years of the nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth century. By the last decade of the 1800s, however, a significant theoretical transformation began to take place. Theorists such as Wilson (*The State,* 1889), continued in many ways to affirm some aspects of the traditional theory of the state, but they also began to blur the line between state and government. The problem, in a country of great and increasing complexity and multiplicity, was to specify the locus of the invisible community that putatively constituted the American people, and, eventually, no one did more than Willoughby (*An Examination of the Nature of the State,* 1896) to empty the word *state* of its original theoretical meaning and transform it into an analytical or juristic category and synonym for government. This, however, precipitated a crisis in democratic theory.

Although it is often assumed that there was a fundamental break between the state theory of the nineteenth century and the conceptions of both political inquiry and politics embraced by early twentieth-century political scientists, the continuities in many respects exceeded the innovations. One might very well ask how the largely conservative academic culture that dominated nineteenth-century universities, such as Columbia, produced the progressive reform-minded scholars, such as the historian and political scientist Charles Beard and, particularly, Charles Merriam, who might well be considered the father of twentieth-century political science and who contributed so significantly to transforming the discipline. In addition to retaining commitments to the idea of scientific inquiry and its application to practical ends, one thread of continuity was a persistent belief in, and dedication to, the national state as encompassing both government and community. During the early part of the twentieth century, Progressive politics and political and social thought continued to be predicated on the belief, such as in the case of the sociologist Charles Horton Cooley in *Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind* (1909), that there was an incipient national political community or, like Herbert Croly in *The Promise of American Life* (1910), that such a community could be created and mobilized, and in whose name government could legitimately and authoritatively act. It was, however, from both traditional state theory and the Progressive vision that a new account of democratic government in America emerged. The decline of the state as a theory of democracy paralleled the beginning and evolution of the theory of democratic pluralism and the account of science and forms of research that the latter entailed.

During the last years of the nineteenth century, professional social science associations began to break away from the umbrella of the American Social Science Association (ASSA) and to affiliate more directly with academic institutions, under the assumption that this would provide scientific authenticity and authority. The American Political Science Association (APSA), under the leadership of individuals such as Willoughby

and its first president Frank Goodnow was formed in 1903, when it broke from the American Historical Association, and the *American Political Science Review* (*APSR*) began publication in 1906. The practical concerns of the previous generation were perpetuated in the creation of this organization, but it represented an emerging progressive ideology and a commitment to endowing the discipline with greater scientific authority. This was achieved by embracing what were viewed as the methods of modern empirical science. For individuals such as Wilson and Goodnow, who were dedicated to more efficient and effective government, these goals were still ultimately practical. There was, however, something of a theoretical hiatus regarding democracy and the nature of politics as the original concept of the state continued to wane, and, at the same time, departments of political science and government continued to emerge at major university systems such as California, Illinois, Wisconsin, Harvard, and Stanford.

PLURALISM AND THE LIBERAL SCIENCE OF POLITICS

The demise of the theory of the state was in part a reaction—in the context of World War I (1914–1918)—to its German origins, but it was also a consequence of the dimming Progressive hope to awaken or create a democratic public that could rise up and take power back from corrupt politicians and a capitalistic economic hegemony. Social scientists, in the wake of immigration and growing cultural and class differences, became overwhelmed with evidence of social and economic diversity and contentiousness. There was an increased sense that there was no homogeneous American public, but rather only complex congeries of interests and groups. In 1907, Harvard historian Albert Bushnell Hart noted that even though the idea of the state as the basis of a theory of popular sovereignty seemed to still hold sway, it really did not fit the present circumstances of American politics. Although he expressed faith that America was a democracy, he could no longer account for it theoretically.

To provide such an account was thus the task of pluralist theory as it evolved during the first third of the twentieth century. Individuals such as Lawrence Lowell (*Public Opinion and Popular Government,* 1913), and, later, Walter Lippmann (*The Phantom Public,* 1925) questioned the existence of an actual public or even the reality of a public opinion that commentators such as James Bryce (*The American Commonwealth,* 1890) had emphasized as constituting the heart of democratic society in America.

Despite the publication of William James's *Pluralistic Universe* in 1904, the term *pluralism* had not entered the discourse of American political science in any substantial manner by the early twentieth century. Although Arthur Bentley's pointed critique of the concept of the state and his analysis of interest groups as the essence of politics, in his 1908 *Process of Government,* would become a central reference for later pluralist theory, it had very little immediate impact, and Bentley never employed the term *pluralism*. It was during Harold Laski's brief sojourn in the United States after World War I that the

term was introduced as part of his attack on the idea of state sovereignty and centralized authority, and his propagation of the notion that the state was merely one association among many in society. Laski's principal concern, as in the case of Tocqueville, was his own country, but he, as well as other English theorists such as Ernest Barker and A. D. Lindsay, helped instigate a debate about pluralism that focused on whether political reality consisted of anything more than an endless process of group interaction, with the government functioning as an arbiter, and whether this could add up, empirically and theoretically, to democracy. It was difficult, however, for American political scientists to give up the idea that the state was nothing more than government and that government was not the agent of a general popular will.

Charles Merriam embraced certain democratic values associated with cultural diversity and political pluralism, but he was equally impressed with the divisiveness inherent in such difference and with the antidemocratic sentiments and practices of certain groups. He retained the assumption that democracy ultimately required unity, even if, in his view and that of his student Harold Lasswell, it was necessary to introduce it from the top down through social control, civic education, and even the judicious use of propaganda. They transferred their hopes for a democratic society to the actions of governmental elites informed by social scientific knowledge, but no articulate image of American democracy and the American political system appeared, for example, in Merriam's principal work of this period, particularly *New Aspects of Politics* in 1925, even though he sponsored much of the research and modes of inquiry that seemed appropriate for a changing image of politics.

The strongest riposte to the normative theory of pluralism associated with Laski and other writers of the period, as well as to empirical political scientists and sociologists whose work increasingly lent support to the notion that politics was irreducibly pluralistic, was the work of William Yandell Elliott in *The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics* (1928). He spoke for many of his generation when he argued that to give up the concept of the state as an organic public was, in effect, to give up democracy as well as the autonomy of political theory and political science. Elliott did not reject the reality of pluralism, but he believed that it tended to undermine the communal basis of democracy. He argued that in an age dominated by empiricism and pragmatism, as well as by the threat of fascism and communism, it was still possible to perceive and believe in what he called a *co-organic* community in American political life, which was the basis of constitutional government. It was difficult, even for someone such as John Dewey (*The Public and its Problems,* 1927)—who along with Laski, Elliott perceived as a purveyor of relativism and its destructive implications for democracy—to sever the idea of popular government from the existence of a national community that transcended the complexity of modern "great society."

By the end of the 1920s, however, the concept of pluralism had become Americanized and formed the basis of an empirical account of American politics and a normative image of democratic practice. This closely connected to work by G. E.

G. Catlin, a transplanted British scholar who championed both pluralism and the work of Merriam, in *The Science and Method of Politics* (1927). For the first time since Madison, a description of social diversity and conflict and of group pressures on government was transformed into a theory of popular government that would provide much of the content of a new and widely embraced image of democratic identity.

The group theory of political reality subsequently became deeply entrenched in political science as it evolved into an argument about how the process of interest group politics constituted a form of democratic interaction and representation. This had been implied by the early research of individuals such as Pendleton Herring (*Group Representation Before Congress,* 1927), but, during the late 1920s and early 1930s, a number of individuals such as Peter Odegard (*The American Public Mind,* 1930) and John Dickinson ("Democratic Realities and Democratic Dogma," *APSR,* 1930) elaborated a pluralist theory of democracy containing all the essential theoretical elements that were rearticulated and reconstructed a generation later in the work of individuals such as David Truman and Robert Dahl.

At the core of this theory was the claim that all societies consisted of groups seeking their own self-interests and that this, at any stage of social evolution, required mechanisms for compromise and adjustment. In the context of modern society, such adjustments were achieved through the medium of government, which functioned as an umpire acting in response to the needs of the situation and with respect to matters of intervention and control. It was through participation in groups that individuals realized their goals and achieved identity, and it was through groups gaining access to influence, more than through formal institutions, that democratic representation was most essentially effected. Stability in society was achieved through a balance of conflicting social pressures constrained by appropriate enabling institutions and a basic consensus on the rules of the game. Majoritarian democracy was viewed as a myth that belied the fact that majorities were little more than aggregations of individual preference that were democratic only in the sense that they had the capacity to effect a circulation of elites through elections.

From the 1920s to the 1940s, political science continued to be institutionalized and expanded as a part of higher education in the United States, and during this period, membership in the APSA tripled. The work of Merriam and Lasswell at the University of Chicago represented the most important developments in the field, but early forms of political science were emerging in England, France, and Germany. During the latter part of the 1930s, there was little in the way of a further explicit statement or elaboration of pluralist theory, but it became, in both politics and the academy, the basis of an account of the United States as a democratic society, and it was advanced as distinguishing the American polity from the growing number of totalitarian regimes, which seemed to be characterized by excessive unity. The name for this new democratic identity was liberalism, and the manner in which pluralism was transfigured as liberalism is a crucial chapter in the story of the evolution of democratic theory in American political science.

Although common in Europe, the term *liberalism* had seldom been systematically invoked in either U.S. politics or political science before the 1930s. Politicians such as Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt began to court this label for a variety of policy initiatives, and everyone eventually adopted this synonym for democracy. A variety of individuals, including Herbert Hoover, claimed to be the "true" liberal, but Roosevelt won the title, and his opponents eventually accepted the name he had originally pejoratively bestowed upon them—conservatives. The term *liberalism* gravitated into the language of political science, often via those such as Dewey who were sympathetic to the New Deal, but eventually political theorists such as George Sabine in his paradigmatic *A History of Political Theory* (1937) emptied the concept of its concrete political meaning and began writing the history of Western political thought and institutions as a story of the progress of liberalism. This story found full expression in American society despite the temporary aberrations of totalitarianism. Although there continued to be a certain correspondence between the academic and lay visions of liberalism, two quite distinct traditions of discourse began to evolve as liberalism, in the language of political science, was reified, provided with a philosophy and history, and reimposed as a description of American politics.

To the extent that liberalism had a definite conceptual meaning in the literature of political science and political theory, other than a name for American government and society, it tended to be pluralism and attending values such as individualism, social freedom and difference, bargaining, and compromise. Philosophers such as T. V. Smith (*The Promise of America,* 1936) took the position that what characterized democracy was less any absolute doctrine and regime than a commitment to toleration and the propagation of diversity within a procedural framework for settling conflicts. By the early 1940s, the basic elements of this vision were extracted from the research of mainstream political science, systematized by individuals such as Pendleton Herring, and presented as the *Politics of Democracy* (1940). Herring saw his task as taking all that was often considered bad about politics—from pressure groups to bosses and soft money—and demonstrating that they were all, if understood scientifically, part of a democratic process. One reason for the rearticulation of pluralism qua liberalism was to provide a response and counterideal to the doctrines of totalitarianism. For Lasswell, political science continued to be part of what he titled in a 1942 essay "The Developing Science of Democracy."

THE BEHAVIORAL ERA AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY

Even as the discipline of political science was expanding in the United States after World War II, it was proliferating abroad. In 1949, the International Political Science Association formed in Paris, which brought together national associations from numerous countries in Europe and elsewhere. The emerging national forms of the discipline were in many respects increasingly responsive to and reflective of the social and cultural

milieu in which they were situated, even though the American commitment to empirical and quantitative studies was widely accepted and promulgated along with more traditional historical and institutional forms of research. In the United States, David Easton's *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science* (1953) set the agenda for the next decade by defining political science as the study of the "authoritative allocation of values" and making the case for moving beyond mere factual research and historical and traditional institutional forms by advancing empirical theory and adopting the methods of natural science. The behavioral "revolution," for which Easton was often the principal spokesperson, transformed the practice of political science and increased the substantive and methodological contributions on a variety of subjects, including survey research and voting behavior. It was, however, less a revolution in many respects than a recommitment to the visions of both the scientific study of politics and liberal democracy that had informed the discipline for nearly a half century; it was also, in part, a response to the first significant challenge to those visions.

By the 1950s, the academic image of liberalism had become increasingly dominant as such individuals as Daniel Boorstin (*The Genius of American Politics,* 1953) and Louis Hartz (*The Liberal Tradition in America,* 1955) set out to demonstrate that although there might not be an American public, there was a historically rooted liberal value consensus and tradition that gave credence to the concept of *e pluribus unum*. This notion of a liberal consensus that transcended and reconciled group differences became an essential element of the revived group theory of politics. The continuing attempt to give meaning to the idea of liberalism, and to equate liberalism with democracy, was, however, catalyzed and galvanized by a persistent but often still somewhat submerged attack on liberalism. This began to influence what had been, since the 1920s, a thoroughly American political science. By the 1950s, liberalism became a highly contested concept in American politics because of both doubts about interventionist government and events such as the McCarthy hearings. For quite different reasons, it was also losing its positive valence in academic discourse as a critique of liberal democracy and political science began to infiltrate the discipline and form a counterpoint to the postwar behavioral movement in political science, and its rededication to a scientific study of politics based on emulating what was assumed to be the methods of natural science.

This critique, largely conceived and mounted by émigré scholars, was gaining a place in the literature of political theory, and it was manifest in journals such as the *Review of Politics,* with its theological antiliberal perspective, as well as in the perspective of University of Chicago president Robert Hutchins and those involved in the Committee on Social Thought at the institution, who set themselves directly against the traditional Chicago image of social science. A new mode of political theory emerged that eventually led a number of scholars to choose between political science and political theory. The confrontation between this critique and the reconstituted pluralist account of liberal democracy in political science comprised the dialectic of democracy in the postwar generation. At this point, what separated mainstream political scientists from political theorists was less a commitment to science opposed to a commitment to normative theory than two quite different ethical positions revolving around the issue of democracy.

The predominantly German scholars who emigrated to the United States beginning in the 1930s were in many respects a philosophically and ideologically diverse group that included Hans Morgenthau (*Scientific Man and Power Politics,* 1946), Eric Voegelin (*The New Science of Politics,* 1951) Leo Strauss (*Natural Right and History* 1953), Hannah Arendt (*The Human Condition,* 1958), and members of the neo-Marxist Frankfurt school such as Herbert Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, Otto Kirchheimer, and Max Horkheimer. They shared a suspicion of liberalism, which they believed was philosophically flawed as a political theory and an inherently pathological political form that represented political institutions. These institutions historically were the threshold of totalitarianism, as in the case of Weimar Germany. This form of antimodernism, rooted in the politics and intellectual context of early twentieth-century Germany and in various transcendental philosophies and socialist thought, was a strange and difficult body of ideas for Americans to absorb. These theorists, who rejected scientism and were wedded to images of the decline of Western civilization, represented a profound challenge to a conception of democracy based on commitments to empiricism, relativism, liberalism, and historical progress. These commitments had characterized American political science for half a century. By the end of the 1950s, the work of these foreign scholars largely began to define the subfield of political theory, which heretofore was an integral dimension of mainstream American political science and the principal vehicle of its vision of democracy. This challenge, coupled with the continuing concern about presenting a coherent image of democracy as a counterpoint to totalitarianism, prompted the postwar reconstitution of group theory and the pluralist account of democracy.

David Truman's *The Governmental Process* (1951) and Earl Latham's *The Group Basis of Politics* (1952) revived the relevance of Arthur Bentley's work, and Robert Dahl's *Preface to Democratic Theory* (1955) established the genre of empirical democratic theory, which was devoted to vouchsafing the image of pluralist democracy. The latter work was in one respect less a "preface" than an "epilogue" and codification of ideas that, during the 1930s, had become an essential part of the identity of political science. Dahl returned to Laski's and Barker's term *polyarchy* as a synonym for a form of democracy that Dahl contrasted both with majoritarian, or *populist*, types and with what he claimed was Madison's excessive emphasis on constitutional checks and balances at the expense of adequate attention to the informal and social dimensions of group interaction where, in effect, minorities ruled. In *Who Governs* (1961), Dahl explicitly embraced the term *pluralism*, and his theory of pluralist democracy was offered in part as a counter to the claims about elitism and the structure of community power advanced by individuals such as C. Wright

Mills in *The Power Elite* (1956) and various sociologists such as Floyd Hunter. Yet it was also an attempt to systematize and accentuate an image of Western liberal democracy during the cold war that supported the faith of those who opposed the political ideas and institutions of the East. Dahl, like those after him such as Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (*The Civic Culture,* 1963), argued that study should begin by examining the character of those countries known to be democracies and by extracting an empirical basis for a normative theory that, Dahl claimed, was most fully represented in the "American hybrid."

A wide range of political theorists in the 1960s, however, perpetuated the critique of liberalism and pluralism. The "end of ideology," that had been proclaimed by sociologists such as Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset as the future of the dominance of pluralist liberal democracy, failed to materialize. While the debate precipitated between political theory and behavioral political science during the 1960s is often represented as a conflict between "scientific" and "traditional" theory, the underlying issue was the nature of democracy. The émigré-inspired critique was at this point joined by theorists such as Sheldon Wolin (*Politics and Vision,* 1960) as well as by the persistent progressive statist countertradition that had remained alongside pluralist theory in political science. This was now represented in a new form by individuals such as E. E. Schattschneider (*The Semisovereign People: A Realist View of Democracy in America,* 1960). Schattschneider argued that interest group politics had an upper-class bias as well as a corrosive effect on party democracy. Grant McConnell (*Private Power and American Democracy,* 1966) and Theodore Lowi (*The End of Liberalism,* 1969) mounted sustained attacks on what they claimed were the democratic and institutional pathologies of the theory and practice of *interest-group liberalism*. Despite their similarities, the critiques of behavioralism and liberalism that were inspired by the émigré theorists and those that were rooted in the American tradition were sometimes uneasy allies, such as in the Straussian-inspired *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics* (1961). Yet, a growing intellectual split between political theory and mainstream political science characterized the 1960s and evolved through the 1980s.

FROM POSTBEHAVIORALISM TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Although Dahl had proclaimed in 1961 that it was possible to write the essay "An Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest" with respect to the behavioral movement, both the commitment to pure science and the pluralist theory of democracy continued to be the target of widespread criticism from political theorists and a number of more mainstream political scientists. This dissatisfaction sprang, in part, from what seemed to many to be political science's lack of relevance for, and attention to, political events such as the Vietnam War, the crisis of American cities and problems of civil rights, and cold war politics. The Caucus for a New Political Science challenged the authority of the APSA, and in 1969 Wolin pitted the "vocation of political theory" against what he claimed was the apolitical "methodism" of behavioral political science.

At the same time, APSA president-elect Easton repudiated the tenets of much of what had represented the behavioral movement when he announced a "new revolution in political science." This was to be a *postbehavioral* revolution, which would recognize the deficiencies of the pluralist theory of democracy and embrace a new "credo of relevance," giving precedence to research on pressing contemporary political issues rather than to the immediate advancement of scientific theories and methods.

By the early 1970s, concerns about practical issues led the mainstream discipline to seek an identity for the postbehavioral era with a return to what Lasswell had championed as policy science. A more ecumenical spirit was apparent as the debate about behavioralism wound down and the issue of maintaining professional inclusiveness became more prominent. Although the controversy about behavioralism had created an intellectual breach between mainstream political science and the subfield of political theory, it also had the effect of relocating, or dislocating, the discussion of American political identity and democratic theory. While political science continued, in various ways and degrees, to validate the traditional liberal vision, it tended to concede to political theory the role of normative theorizing after the 1970s. The conversation about democracy and liberalism increasingly became the property of the interdisciplinary and relatively autonomous enterprise of political theory. It subsequently absorbed into an eclectic conversation, determined more by reigning academic philosophical authorities than by any direct relevance to the particularities of American politics. Debates about liberalism became a large part of the focus of political theory, while political science as a whole and political theory as a subfield became increasingly pluralized.

By the mid-1980s, it was increasingly difficult to speak in general of political science as a discipline and of the history of the field as a whole. Although the debate about behavioralism had fractured the field, it had also constituted the terms of a common conversation that in some respects defined the discipline. The need to recognize the growing distinctions among national practices of political science accentuated the centrifugal forces of specialization, increased concerns about social and gender diversity within the profession, and other internal tendencies toward pluralization in the field. In 1982, the IPSA Study Group on the Comparative Sociology of Political Science was formed, and in 1986 the International Committee for the Study of the Development of Political Science supplemented it. These two groups merged in 1988, forming the IPSA Research Committee for the Study of Political Science as Discipline, which was formally recognized as an IPSA Research Committee 33 (RC 33) in 1989. Since its formal establishment, RC 33 has been active in all of the IPSA congresses, and it has also undertaken a number of intercongress workshops, conferences, research projects, and publications devoted to the study of the history and character of political science in various countries and to features common to the field as a whole. The research sponsored by this endeavor clarifies that political science is no longer simply the American science of politics.

The beginning of the 1990s was a watershed for political science. The public policy orientation inspired by the events of the 1960s had begun to fade, and many believed that the growing popularity of what Anthony Downs had referred to with the title of his 1957 book *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957), and what came to be referred to as *rational choice analysis,* promised a new methodological basis for disciplinary identity as well as a reconstruction of democratic theory. This trend, however, was paralleled and challenged by those who had begun to advocate new directions in institutional and historical research, such as Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpo in *Bringing the State Back In* (1985). There were calls for more diverse approaches to the study of politics as the enthusiasm for rational choice declined, illustrated with Kristen Monroe's compliations in *The Economic Approach to Politics: A Critical Assessment of the Theory of Rational Choice* (1991). The collapse of communism and the bipolar world of the cold war also heightened the sense of plurality as the basic condition of politics and political science, and it catalyzed a renewed concern with the theory of democracy as a variety of national communities sought to define and redefine themselves as democratic societies. In this context, pluralism emerged once again as a dominant theme. Not only had politics become internationally more diverse, but concerns about multiculturalism and philosophies such as postmodernism accentuated the value and reality of diversity.

After its intellectual estrangement from mainstream political science, a unifying and driving force in the increasingly dispersed conversation of political theory continued to be a critique of the liberal and pluralist visions of democracy and an attempt to resurrect some version of participatory democracy. By the early 1990s, however, there was a subtle, but in some ways quite fundamental, shift in perspective. Although the idea that democracy must be rooted in unity was still evident in the work of individuals such as Robert Putnam in *Bowling Alone* (2000), who stressed the importance of "social capital" and a communal basis of democracy, the concept of pluralism once again appeared in the discourse of political theory as the centerpiece of the democratic imagination. The concept was seldom that of the interest-group liberalism of the 1950s, but theorists such as Dahl and Charles Lindblom maintained their faith in social diversity as the ultimate value of democracy. Both Rawls (*Political Liberalism,* 1993) and Jürgen Habermas (*Facts and Norms,* 1992) manifested an increased acceptance of the social realities of liberal democracy, and the many and various versions of deliberative and radical democracy embraced the ethic of pluralism.

The new pluralism, like the emergence of the old pluralism, seems in large measure to be a response to the realities of the sociology of contemporary society. Dahl took it as a virtue that in a polyarchial society one might say that no one governs or that minorities govern, but the problem always was that if this is the case, then it also means that democracy, as the mediation of public decisions through the general citizenry, is difficult to identify. Plurality, one might argue, is surely a necessary condition of any realistic concept of democracy, but it may not be a sufficient condition. In the last analysis, the philosophical reconciliation of pluralism with democracy has been no easier than it was at the time of Madison.

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, it was difficult to discern any clear basis of unity in the discipline, despite a persistent faith that there is an overall identity attaching to the field. This is illustrated by editors Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Ingram, in *Political Science: The State of the Discipline* (2002), and by the end of the first decade, it was still not easy to specify what trends may be most significant. The subfield of political theory continues to be quite intellectually disjoined from the mainstream discipline, and a subfield such as international relations often seems to embrace a relatively independent agenda.

In the United States, concerns about methodological diversity and practical relevance surfaced once again in what came to be known as the *perestroika* debate, but the issues often appeared more professional than intellectual and political. The discipline's origins were closely tied to a definite practical mission of political reform and political education, and the relationship between political science and politics remains unresolved. In addition to noting the continuing tendencies toward specialization within and among subfields, as editors Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann put forth in the 1996 *A New Handbook of Political Science,* it is necessary to recognize that in taking account of the history and current practices of the field, the story of political science, despite some continuing intimations to the contrary, is no longer simply the story of the American science of politics.

See also *Democracy; Liberalism, Classical; Pluralism; Political Theory; State, The.*

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Political Science Associations

Political scientists began to organize in professional associations in early twentieth century, and the oldest political science association in the world is the American Political Science Association (APSA), which was founded in 1904. At present, APSA includes more than fifteen thousand members in more than eighty countries. APSA's principal objectives are to expand awareness and understanding of politics, and to support political science education and professional development of political scientists. APSA's membership is individual, departmental, and institutional, and the association publishes a number of professional publications. APSA more recently emphasizes teaching political science, a global professional trend that recognizes the importance of not only political knowledge, but also the most efficient transmission of that knowledge.

The International Political Science Association was founded under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1949 in Canada, and it has consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (UN) and with UNESCO. Its annual conference brings thousands of participants together to discuss current global themes and issues in politics and political studies.

The European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) is another major international political science association with a membership of eight thousand political scientists in more than three hundred institutions throughout Europe and beyond. It offers workshops, conferences, research sessions, and summer schools, and it produces numerous professional publications. ECPR includes standing groups, including one on international relations and the recently associated European Political Science Network (*eps*Net) that works to develop political science teaching in Europe. This launched in June 2001 as a successor to the former European Thematic Network in Political Science and is designed to promote political science in Europe, and to cater to the interests of individual political scientists, academic institutions, and other bodies concerned with teaching of the discipline in Europe. The principal professional achievement of the European Political Science Network has been providing a coordinated core political science curriculum within the European Bologna reform of higher education.

The trend of organizing at the continental level has also gained ground in other countries. Africa recently founded the African Political Science Association, which has similar objectives to other international professional associations in political science. Similarly, the Asian Political and International Studies Association promotes research, teaching, and cooperation in political and international studies. There is also a Latin American Political Science Association. Some international political science associations focus on a particular subdiscipline within political science, such as the International Studies Association or the Network for European Social Policy Analysis, and political science students also have their own international association called the International Association for Political Science Students.

There is a national political science association in the majority of countries, but these associations differ in membership, ambitions, and activities. For example, the British Political Studies Association has several thousand members, while smaller countries with fewer universities have national political science associations that include only a few dozen professionals and political science alumni. In the European Union (EU), several national political science associations have recently founded a standing conference upon the initiative of the European Political Science Network to discuss common professional issues and explore synergetic solutions for the Bologna reform, professional accreditation, research funding, the situation of women political scientists, and other issues. The Central European Political Science Association also organizes annual professional conferences where political scientists from the region discuss relevant academic and professional issues. The Nordic Political Science Association represents a similar regional attempt at cooperation of national political science associations in Europe.

Several competitive international political science associations provide welcome alternative options for political scientists worldwide to connect, find forums to present their academic findings, and join international projects and initiatives. International political science associations make it easier to discern trends in the discipline and compare various approaches to political science research and teaching. Via international political science associations, political scientists worldwide are able to compare their professional situations, learn about good practices to adapt to their specific professional environments, and jointly influence political decisions related to scientific research and the educational sphere.

See also *International Relations Theory; Political Science, History of; Political Science Journals; Political Theory.*

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Political Science Journals

Whenever political scientists read newspapers, they are working—that is, doing their job by gathering facts and declarations related to current public affairs and trying to understand the mechanisms and formations of public opinion. But apart from these easily accessible media that reach a wide audience, there are, as in any discipline, academic journals in the field of political science.

Political science journals are distinct from political magazines and newspapers because these academic publications usually try to understand political phenomena or governance in theoretical, comparative, or historical terms. The methodological dimensions of a given research—quantitative, qualitative, or comparative—are also highlighted in every article. All manuscripts submitted to these journals are usually peer-reviewed, that is, read, evaluated, criticized, and finally approved or rejected anonymously by colleagues in the field. This evaluating process, borrowed from the exact sciences, is the guarantee for scientific accuracy and renewed knowledge in the discipline; it is seen as the best way to avoid personal conflicts and local cliques.

In terms of accessibility, hard copies of academic journals in political science typically are not found in newsstands or general bookstores, but usually in university bookstores, specialized libraries, or through subscriptions. The Internet allows potential readers to browse selected pages from a given journal at no cost through a publisher's Web site or through a library that subscribes to a group of selected journals. Of course, readers who are willing to pay can download articles from many academic journals.

Usually, most countries with universities have at least one national political science journal, labelled as such. For example, there are the *British Journal of Political Science* and the *Australian Journal of Political Science,* but there are also many bilingual publications that offer wider perspectives like the *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique,* which carries articles and book reviews in English or French. The *Swiss Political Science Review* offers articles in four languages: French, German, English, and Italian. Even though English is not an official language in Nordic countries, the journal *Scandinavian Political Studies* is published in English. Of course, a national journal does not automatically exclude foreigners from submitting manuscripts to them; but in some cases, national journals are likely to prefer submissions related to their own country when coming from abroad, while considering almost any related topic from their "insider" authors.

THE RISE OF PRIVATE PUBLISHERS

The last twenty years have witnessed the expansion of many private publishers, such as Routledge, Routledge, and SAGE, which compete with university presses like Cambridge, Oxford, and Duke in creating dozens of new interdisciplinary academic journals in specific domains related to globalization, public opinion, international relations, or political theory. For example, some Routledge journals such as *Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations* and *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* offer more intersections with other dimensions like culture and ethnicity. In recent years, some new electronic journals, such as the *European Journal of American Studies,* are available exclusively through the Internet, which means there is no equivalent version published in hard copy. However, these high-standard e-journals that are sometimes accessible for free often follow the same peer-reviewing process as their predecessors.

While many academic journals fight with limited resources and require efforts from volunteers, others benefit from generous financial support or are published through governmental agencies. This was the case for the journal *Problems of Communism,* a professional publication about communist regimes produced since 1952, with the financial help of the United States Information Agency. Copies were sent free of charge to many libraries and samples of the journal were available in some U.S. consulates. Since 1992, this publication changed its name to *Problems of Post-Communism.*

Some political science journals have an enviable reputation because they are considered more influential, mainly because of their severe criteria for selecting manuscripts, or because they are more often quoted by scholars. Academic journals are like the battlefields of the "publish or perish" motto that hinders many scholars. Many academics in political science are especially obsessed with the place where their articles appear—they value the journals that have an international audience, that are often quoted, that receive high levels of funding, and that emerge from prestigious universities. Some scholars even argue that an article published in a very prestigious journal is more important in terms of achievement, visibility, and promotion than if the same text had appeared in a lesser-known, peer-reviewed publication. There are even statistics relating to a journal's visibility, its circulation, and the reference tools and databases that index its articles. As a consequence, some high-profile journals receive a very large amount of submissions and their ratio of acceptance remains minimal; this phenomenon intensifies the urge of some scholars to have their papers published in the journal that keeps only the top papers.

DISTINGUISHING ATTRIBUTES

Many political science journals also include book reviews, while others only focus on peer-reviewed articles. Because publishing peer-reviewed articles is valued in the academic community, in terms of funding and academic promotion,

some other aspects related to journals are seen as less important, such as being the editor of a journal, doing peer reviews, or writing book reviews.

A scholarly journal offering a handful of trendy articles may have many strong points, but a book review section can be seen as an essential window to the academic world. Because scholars cannot buy or even read everything that is published in their domain of expertise, they can rely on the recommendation of other colleagues. Carrying a generous and diversified section of book reviews can make the difference between the average journals and some upper-grade publications. Academic journals that carry only peer-reviewed articles focusing on tiny aspects of the current research may not be as valuable for the audience; readers, students, and scholars benefit from being informed about what colleagues write and which theoretical trends they are borrowing, criticizing, or adopting. Book reviews are essential not only for the concerned authors and publishers, but also for academic life itself, as they remain the best way for a political scientist to be aware of what is going on inside the discipline and outside usual networks. Given their short format, most book reviews can provide a neutral perspective on a book, which is useful because most bookstore employees and librarians are often too busy to operate this type of preselection of ideas, essays, and thesis.

Apart from book reviews, a journal may offer review essays, comparative articles among books on a related theme or by the same author. The advantage of a review essay is that it offers multiple book reviews, followed by an evaluation of the appropriate audience for each title, providing indications about how each book may complement the others. Other journals may offer a forum section in which several scholars review one book, followed by comments written by the book's author. Although book review sections are complicated to manage in terms of correspondence and deadlines, these examples illustrate how scholarly journals can be more than just a juxtaposition of cutting-edge articles between two covers.

See also *Journalism, Political; Political Science Associations; Political Science, History of.*

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Journal of Transatlantic Studies
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Scandinavian Political Studies
Swiss Political Science Review
Journal of Information Technology and Politics
Politics & Religion
Journal of Political Science Education
The Law and Politics Book Review
Legislative Studies Quarterly
New Political Science
Party Politics
Policy Studies Journal
Political Analysis
Political Communication
Political Behavior
Politics & Gender
Publius
State Politics and Policy Quarterly
Urban Affairs Review

Political Sociology

Political sociology is politics studied sociologically. More specifically, it is politics as the practice of power, as this has typically been defined sociologically, that is, in terms of social relations. Most famously, Max Weber (1968) defined *power* as a probabilistic social relation between hypothetical actors A and B, as the chance of A realizing A's will over the resistance of B, despite B's resistance. In so defining power, Weber defines it as a social relation and, thus, in terms of a defining concept of sociology.

More generally, the social relational study of politics encompasses both aggregate dyadic relations, such as the impact of society on state, and more complex relational patterns involving relations among multiple political actors, such as the differential impacts of actors on each other via the consequences of their differential impacts on the state. It further involves not only interrelations of discrete actors but also consideration of such interrelations in the context of institutions and social structures themselves, conceptualized as patterns of social relations.

SOCIOLOGICAL DEFINITIONS AND THEORIES OF POLITICS

Prominent alternative sociological definitions of politics that have not been explicitly social relational tend to emphasize power as a capability and then highlight organizational or group capacities, or they tend to study actors as incumbents of political institutions. Psychological approaches and other centrally individualistic approaches to the empirical study of politics, such as some economic ones, tend to be social psychological; that is, they typically examine people in terms of their roles within particular social contexts (e.g., as voters in polyarchal electoral systems). Economic theories of politics likewise do not escape specification of action to particular institutional settings. However, these enter as rather broad conditions for choice.

Commonly, sociological theories of politics tend to reflect specific forms of social relations in particular societies, institutions, and organizations. They are often "societal" in the sense that they trace causes of states and the actions of state incumbents to forces in the societal contexts of states, for example, to Marxian classes or Weberian parties, groups or voters, and economic or cultural forces in the state's environment. Sociological theories of politics also are often sociological in the sense that they have state or polity theories centered on states as substantially autonomous social institutions. This is true both for an older, *classical* perspective on institutions like

that of Philip Selznik in 1949 that tended to view institutions as formal organizations (social relationally conceived) at the service of values. More recently, the *new institutionalist* perspective pioneered by Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell in 1991 conceptualizes institutions in terms of rules and cognitive schema. Often they are sociological in their concentration on the interplay between sociologically conceived attributes of states and societies, for example, state policy and societal inequality.

Sociological theories of politics are often *institutional* in the sense that they focus on the sociocultural and organizational characteristics of state social structures. State-centered institutional approaches have much in common with institutional approaches in political science, but they differ from institutionalists in political science in some respects. In regards to the so-called neoinstitutionalists in political science, sociological institutionalists differ dramatically in that they use little or no neoinstitutional theory from economics and public choice theory. Sociological new institutionalists tend to focus on state and political institutions with both less historical precision and more theoretical self-consciousness than *historical institutionalists* in political science.

Despite certain distinguishing characteristics, differences should still not be drawn too sharply. First, although increasing use of rational choice theoretical models in political science distances political science work on institutions from sociological work on institutions, persistent political science reference to sociological theories of institutions narrows the gap. Second, overlapping academic subfields about welfare states and political economy sustain much cross-fertilization and communality across the sociological and political science disciplines. For all the centrality of societal and state theoretical touchstones in political sociological theory, emphasis on these reference points obscures a distinctive sociological emphasis on cultural—and, to a lesser extent, historical—approaches. To their disadvantage, students of politics in other disciplines (e.g., political science, philosophy) would miss this emphasis.

ORIGINS AND TRENDS

Modern U.S. political sociology traces to three lines of work, and reactions to them, that arose before the Vietnam War (1959–1975). The tradition of voting behavior studies that stressed voter social networks and contexts constitutes one of these lines. This line of work waned during the 1960s due to a marginalization of political sociological interest in voting issues during the Vietnam War era. However, it has been continuously sustained, most recently by the collaborative efforts of Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza.

The class-centered pluralism of the pre-Vietnam works of Seymour Martin Lipset constitutes a second line. This line of work waned because reactions in the 1970s and 1980s against the reformist stress in its treatment of class moderation, as well as because of the manifest conservatism of Lipset's Parsons-inspired work on value traditions. However, a focus on reformist activities of pluralistic class actors has returned in the form of power resource theory.

A pre-Vietnam dialogue between elitist and pluralist interpreters of urban ("community") and national political power, and the neo-Marxist reaction to it, composes a third line of work. The elite side of this debate is virtually Marxian in its skepticism about the representativeness of American democracy and in its considerable stress on *economic elites*. Floyd Hunter and C. Wright Mills's studies of urban and national Atlanta city politics and national elites are seminal works in this line, and responses to these by Robert Dahl and such notable collaborators as Nelson Polsby also proved influential. The debate first evolved as a refutation of claims for the oligarchical power of the few with arguments for the relevance, in democratic contexts, of more dispersed and plural rule. Neopluralists next articulated pluralist-elitist syntheses of elite and pluralist elements, followed by neo-Marxist inspired incorporations of structuralist arguments. Several more distinctive sociological thrusts emerged in the late 1960s, and these innovations are often associated with the intellectual unsettling of sociology following the full onset of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

First, with the radicalization of sociologists accompanying the social movements of the Vietnam War era, sociological elite and neopluralist work was repudiated and replaced by new systematically Marxian structuralist, or class-analytical, approaches to the analysis of politics. Structuralist variants of the Marxian turn emphasized the power of structural constraints to shape action, while other, class-analytical approaches unequivocally accommodated the causal powers of agency as well as structure. The innovative work of G. William Domhoff in 1967 revitalized elite-theoretical cases for economic oligarchy in new class-analytical terms, while James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin's *Latin America: Reform or Revolution* (1968) and Barrington Moore Jr.'s *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966) advanced theories of class conflict as well as hegemony, and revolution as well as domination. These works also helped usher in the eventually ascendant historical-comparative method in political sociology. A two-pronged Marxian development of political sociology emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s, one prong stressing structure and the other action (and conflict). This remains influential today.

A turn to Marxist structuralism helped bring students of politics important conceptions of systemic and structural power. From French structuralists, it imported a conception of power as an effect of structure that may pressure for outcomes favorable to a particular class or group beneficiary, unaided by conscious striving after the outcome by the beneficiary. As Axel Van den Berg and Thomas Janoski detail, the conception is rooted in the Marxist structuralism of Louis Althusser and Nicos Poulantzas, which tends to treat human agency as epiphenomenal.

Fred Block offered extensions of Marxist structuralism, reconciling policy-maker agency, if not ruling-class agency, with structural effect. Block treats policy-maker decision making as a social mechanism linking structural constraint cause to policy effect. For example, no political action (e.g., lobbying) by "capital" is needed for policy-making politicians to lower an interest or tax rate to stimulate economic activity because

the public approval of politicians, as well as the prosperity of capitalists, depends on economic performance. Block's reading appeared at the same time as Charles Edward Lindblom's parallel formulation of the "privileged position of business."

With its assimilation into rational choice formulations, the structural conception of power becomes more strategic and less manifestly sociological. Still, underlying conceptions of class institutions that link economic distributions and processes to political cost and benefits are substantially sociological. While this is true, many social-structural and institutional factors may be treated by nonsociologists as ad hoc additions to, rather than core elements of, their theories. Not only did the structural conceptions of power at issue come to influence political science, but underlying class and institutional conceptions also entered into political science via such avenues as sociologist Wolfgang Streeck's early investigations with Phillip C. Schmitter into neocorporatist institutions and Gøsta Esping-Andersen's 1991 delineation of his three worlds approach to study the welfare state. A turn to class analysis, stressing agency as well as structure, and familiar collective political agencies (e.g., unions, parties) as well as abstract theoretical formulations, shifted emphasis from structures that constrain the action of nondominant classes (e.g. private control of investment) to organizational agencies that empower such classes (e.g., labor parties). Walter Korpi's groundbreaking work on *power resource theory* became widely employed and variously elaborated. Interestingly, on the terrain of twentieth-century European reformist politics, power resource transformation of neo-Marxist thinking on class converges with pluralist thinking on interest politics.

During the Vietnam War era, a second distinctive sociological thrust emerged. Social movement theory gradually emerged from the recent, repudiated precedent of collective behavior theory, with its emphasis on irrational behavior. This new move was oriented not toward the analysis of institutional politics like voting legislation, but instead toward the analysis of relatively uninstitutionalized modes of politics, such as protest and self-help. However, this shift did not preclude attention to such institutional contexts as religious institutions or such institutional consequences as organizational reform and new public policies.

Powerful new tradition of social movement studies emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the work of Charles Tilly, John McCarthy, Meyer Zald, Doug McAdam, and others. This work centered on resources and tactics of politically oriented social movement. In particular, resource mobilization theory began to differentiate a distinct social movement theory from collective behavior theory. This distinction emphasized specific goals opposed to diffuse grievances; rational action rather than irrational behaviors (e.g., panics, outbursts, crazes); organizations instead of unstructured masses; specialized instead of amateur organizational personnel; and reasoned tactics instead of spontaneous disruption. Increasingly, social movement theory attends to the study of outcomes, especially political ones.

Social movement theory remains large despite revitalizations of interest group theory by theorists of interest intermediation, policy networks, and interest groups as crystallized social movements. Theoretical cohesion around the organizational and mobilizational core of resource mobilization theory was followed, first, by theoretical elaborations concerning tactics, strategies, and political opportunities, and subsequently by ones concerning culture (e.g., frames, identities). The sociological commitment to social movements as an area of study has deepened into the substantively focused field of analytical history on topics like the civil rights movement, the labor movement, and the women's movement, and it now ventures into new substantive domains such as terrorism. With works by political scientists and historians, as well as sociologists, the new social movement theory evolved by the 1980s into an interdisciplinary specialty. Indeed, social movement theories' chronicles of its own development and branches, such as that by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly in 2001, are now often multidisciplinary.

A turn to historical political sociology—historical-comparative sociology for the most part—provided a third new direction. The historical turn in sociology emerged at the same time as the Marxian one. The "historical" thrives in sociology not merely as an arena for studies of the past, but also as a central laboratory for small-n qualitative studies. It is also an approach that stresses the importance of antecedent events and their sequences of occurrence to the explanation of many outcomes, and it is an orientation that claims a historical, time-dependent nature for the social world. Historical comparativists argue for the historical constitution of the social world, the centrality of historical conditions, and the valid identification of theoretical domains. In fact, one of the great historically oriented works of post–World War II (1939–1945) sociology, Michael Mann's multivolume *The Sources of Social Power* series, offers a political sociology of world history that, among much else, sequentially arranges key theoretical domains for sociological theory. Historical comparativists thus stress the importance of national historical processes within nations to the comparison of nations.

In some cases, historical sociology is simply conventional historical interpretation of other times completed with a particular attentiveness to the sociological theory, as when Michael Mann stresses intensive and extensive models of imperial power in his treatment of the fall of the Roman Empire. In other cases, it stresses a combination of historical subject matter with the methodologies of systematic comparison, for example in Torben Iversen and David Soskice's 2009 analysis of distribution and redistribution in modern capitalism. In still others, it has morphed philosophically as well as methodologically into a self-consciously realist, or even interpretive, social science at odds with positivist social science.

In the interpretive—or interpretivist—case, covering law explanations must be rejected by the social scientists because meanings are both integral to human action and too psychologically, culturally, and historically heterogeneous and volatile for explanatory patterns that are stable over time. This complicates the theoretical task for already highly contingent open systems, leaving scholars with more prospect to come up with

potent causal mechanisms that might assemble into compelling post hoc explanations of particular events. These prospects are higher than for those that capture determinist explanatory formulas for general classes of social events. Although this antipathy to generalization may seem antithetical to philosophical and methodological canons of political science, it may resemble the skepticism of many survey researchers—perhaps in the area of voting behavior—to claims for external validity much beyond the spatial and historical perimeters of the data at hand.

The interpretivist variant of the historical turn overlaps with a fourth major political sociological innovation—the cultural turn. This development has numerous sociological precedents: microinteractionist theories ranging from symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology in the United States (e.g., Herbert Blumer, Howard Garfinkel, Anselm Strauss, Erving Goffman) to hermeneutics, phenomenology, and historicism in Europe (e.g., Edmund Husserl, Alfred Schutz, Paul Ricouer, Hans-Georg Gadamer). The epistemological basis for this new interpretivism lies in the meaning created in small contexts, with their strands dissipating as it moves beyond the original context to other situations.

Although employing cultural variables in a positivist mode, George Steinmetz documents a preponderance of interpretivist approaches to the cultural analysis of politics in the new political sociology of culture. Where history and culture are concerned, sociological precedents of great potential interest to political scientists abound. On the historical side, Michael Mann's work on world history comes most to mind, but the works of Theda Skocpol and Edwin Amenta and collaborators on American political development help illustrate the variety offered by historical–comparative sociologists. As Julia Adams, Lis Clemens, and Ann Orloff extensively catalogue, the cultural facet of comparative and historical sociology ranges across organizational, national, and transnational institutions in a generally constructionist and sometimes interpretivist mode.

NEW CROSS-FERTILIZATION
Questions now arise regarding whether political sociology's turn toward social movements, class-analytical, cultural, and historical–comparative approaches to the study of politics will continue to influence political science. In the area of class analysis, power resource theory is at least one strong continued response from within the class-analytical tradition. For example, Korpi's 2006 take on class politics impacts Iversen and Soskice's 2009 analysis of distribution and redistribution in late twentieth-century advanced capitalism. In the area of social movements, political science is beginning to figure prominently, as the centrality of political scientist Sid Tarrow documents.

Some influences from historical-comparative approaches, especially in the subfields of American political development and comparative politics, are also apparent. In addition, cultural approaches prevail as strong interdisciplinary work along traditional methodological lines. Despite some culturally framed theory and research, such as the studies of

international relations associated with the initiative of Peter Katzenstein in 1996, more interpretive, cultural approaches imported from sociology into political science proceed slowly.

See also *Class and Politics; Elite Theory; Historical Method, Comparative; Political Economy; Pluralism; Power; Social Movements; Voting Behavior.*

. . . . ALEXANDER HICKS

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Political Theology

The earliest antecedents to speaking of political theology might be found in the distinction, current among the Stoic philosophers and followed by Varro, then disparaged by St. Augustine in his *City of God*, between mythical, physical, and civil theology.

In its most influential meaning, however, political theology refers to Carl Schmitt thesis in his seminal *Political Theology* (1922): "All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts." According to Schmitt, it could hardly be otherwise considering that "the metaphysical image that a particular age forms of the world has the same structure as that which appears most self-evident to it as a form of political organization." Schmitt's analysis is especially concerned with the theological origins of the concept of *sovereignty* and of the exception that, in Schmitt's view, defines it: "He is sovereign who decides on the exception." Thus, for Schmitt, "the exception, in jurisprudence, has a meaning analogous to that of the miracle in theology." Revisiting the question half a century later in his *Political Theology II* (1970), Schmitt reaffirms his thesis and vehemently rejects as a "myth" the notion that political theology may be considered obsolete.

Leo Strauss, one of the most renowned proponents of the study of political philosophy in the United States after World War II (1939–1945), considered facing the challenges of theology a primary responsibility for the philosopher. Thus Strauss concludes *The City and Man* (1964) with an exhortation to "be open to the full impact of the all-important question . . . *quid sit deus*?" (What would God be?) By his own profession, Strauss had found himself "in the grip of the theologico-political predicament" from his earliest days as a scholar when he was grappling, from 1925 to 1928, with his study on Baruch Spinoza's *Theologico-Political Treatise.* "The theologico-political problem," he declared in his preface to the German edition of his *Political Philosophy of Hobbes* (1965), "has since remained *the* theme of my studies." For Strauss, philosophy as the highest way of life can justify and give meaning to its ultimate demands only by meeting head-on the strongest, most radical challenge that can be put to it, which Strauss took to be the challenge posed by the life of strict obedience to divine revelation.

The theological-political problem arises from the fact that such a confrontation is as dangerous as it is indispensable to the philosophical way of life, as the death of Socrates had demonstrated for the ages. While it cannot be avoided if philosophy is to remain true to itself, it is not clear that the political-theological problem can be brought to a satisfactory resolution, and modern theologico-political treatises since Hobbes and Spinoza appear guilty, to Strauss, of declaring victory prematurely, to the ultimate detriment of philosophy as a serious way of life. Carl Schmitt's affirmation of the political in general, and of political theology in particular, was for Strauss an affirmation of the seriousness of human life, and it is surely in this where he found the greatest affinity with his own thinking.

Among Strauss's adherents, Heinrich Meier has perhaps shown most interest in the question of political theology. Thus

Meier, who in an earlier work stressed the connection between Schmitt and Strauss, offers the most sustained study to date in his *Leo Strauss and the Theological-Political Problem* (2006). The revised and expanded 2009 edition of the work is also the best source for some of Strauss's shorter, less well-known and accessible, but also most topical, writings on the theological-political problem, and it includes an essay by Gerhard Krüger, whom Strauss credited with being the only reviewer to have properly grasped the meaning and importance of his book on Spinoza. Meier's own conception of what constitutes political theology develops in Chapter 3, and was first published in *Interpretation.* Meier sees political theology as the core, the unifying center, of Carl Schmitt's oeuvre, and stresses the polemical purposes that motivated him in deploying as a weapon a term he had taken from Mikhail Bakunin. According to Meier, "The obedience of faith is the raison d'être of political theology in the best sense," and thus Saints Paul and Augustine, Martin Luther, and John Calvin may all be included "among the most important representatives of political theology in the history of Christianity." For Meier, a connection may even be made between political theology and postmodern thought, for example in Jean-Francois Leotard use of the divine commandment bidding Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, and Abraham's faithful obedience.

The reverse of Schmitt's thesis, thus not that all political concepts are at bottom theological, but that all theology must be political, is also sometimes meant by political theology, for example in the work of Catholic theologian Johann Baptist Metz, an important influence on the development of liberation theology. Jürgen Holtmann is prominent among those Protestant theologians of the immediate post–Vatican II period who wrote on political Theology, offering his own understanding of liberation theology. Two of the earliest examples of twentieth-century theologians giving prominence to the term *political theology* in their writings are a book by Protestant Alfred de Quervain published in 1931 and an essay by Catholic Karl Eschweiler published in 1931 to 1932. Among the earliest original treatments of political theology in English are studies by Julian Obermann on *Political Theology in Early Islam* (1935), Ernst Kantorowicz on mediaeval political theology (*The King's Two Bodies,* 1957), and J. Deotis Roberts on *Black Political Theology* (1974).

The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology, published in 2003, straddles different usages when it purports, with its wide-ranging collection of newly commissioned essays, to demonstrate both the "inherently political" nature of Christian theology and its impact on contemporary ideologies and "present-day political issues." Speaking more loosely still, political theology may be applied today to nearly any study of the interplay between political and religious questions. Thus the journal *Political Theology,* which published its first issue in 2002, defines its mission simply as one of investigating and examining religious and political issues from an interdisciplinary perspective. In popular usage and on the Internet, political theology can refer to anything remotely connecting politics and religion.

. . . . DANIEL PELLERIN

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Political Theory

In the lead article of the first issue of *The Journal of Politics* in 1939, George H. Sabine posed the question, "What is political theory?" This subject has, to this day, remained persistently contentious. The difficulty is, in part, that while political theory is professionally attached to the discipline of political science, it has, intellectually, since at least the early 1970s, evolved as a relatively autonomous interdisciplinary field of study allied more closely to academic practices such as philosophy and history.

When Sabine's article was published, the domain of political theory, as exemplified in Sabine's own work, consisted primarily of the study of the history of political thought, that is, the exegesis of, and commentary on, a classic canon extending from Plato to Marx, which, in turn, was still an integral dimension of American political science. As a generic form of discourse conducted in diverse ways and settings by university scholars as well as by political actors, political theory is apt to be conceived as a relatively universal endeavor. However, as a self-ascribed and institutionally differentiated academic field, political theory refers to a form of discourse that was a nineteenth-century American invention. Although it is possible, and common, to identify, in various countries and eras, what might be considered as functional equivalents and prototypes of this academic practice, it was largely a creation of American political science.

POLITICAL THEORY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN SCIENCE OF POLITICS

The work of authors such as Aristotle, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau were already important texts in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century American college curriculum in moral philosophy. A Scottish Enlightenment perspective dominated this course of studies, which included practical ethics and was taught by Protestant clergy. This iconic literature, which became the core of a classic canon, was viewed not only as the progenitor of the ideas embodied in American institutions but also as containing principles that should be inculcated in citizens and political leaders.

Although political science, as a particular discipline, was, as Bernard Crick so notoriously put it in 1959, a distinctly "American science of politics," this United States setting did not entail a lack of European influences. The person most reasonably credited as the discipline's "founder" is the German émigré Francis Lieber (ca. 1798–1872), who grafted German philosophical history onto the political dimension of American moral philosophy and made the concept of the state the subject and domain of political science. From the point of his earliest writing on the study of politics (*Manual of Political Ethics,* 1838), Lieber also situated the already canonical authors, from Plato onward, as central actors in a Kantian and Hegelian vision of history, which was the story of the state and its evolution toward institutions of civil liberty. Lieber believed these institutions were most fully manifest in the American nation-state. Lieber designated the classic authors, beginning with the ancient Greeks, as the predecessors of the field of study that he was attempting to institutionalize, and the history of politics culminated in American self-government where the existence of a sovereign people overrode diversity. The emerging discipline, as a whole, was devoted to justifying American government as the ultimate realization of popular sovereignty, and the study of the history of political thought validated that putative body of knowledge by attaching it to an illustrious lineage. The history of political ideas was conceived as, at once, the history of political science and the history of the theory and practice of the state, and thus as providing a provenance for both the discipline and its subject matter.

Lieber's successor at Columbia, John W. Burgess, and the latter's colleagues and students, most fully institutionalized the discipline of political science as part of the American academy, and this included both the theory of the state and the attending study of the history of political ideas. More than any other work, it was Archibald Dunning's three volumes on *A History of Political Theories,* written over a period of two decades (1903–1920), that established the history of political theory as a consciously recognized academic literature and a defined element of the university curriculum. Although Dunning broadened the perspective beyond the earlier Germanic accounts, he continued to stress the claims that the history of political theory was the past of contemporary political science, that politics were the subject of history, and that political change was a product of a dialectical relationship between political ideas and their social context.

The work of W. W. Willoughby at Johns Hopkins University paralleled that of Dunning. Willoughby emphasized the importance of theory in political life and, even more than Dunning, the immanence of political ideas in the context of

political fact in his *Political Theories of the Ancient World* (1903), but he also stressed the difference between political thought in politics and political theory as an element of political science. He was one of the principal actors in founding the American Political Science Association and in designating political theory as a recognized subfield, and he claimed that the history of political theory should also be viewed as a repository of concepts for scientific political inquiry.

POLITICAL THEORY AS THE HISTORY OF LIBERALISM

For early exponents of a more naturalistic scientific study of politics, such as Charles E. Merriam, who along with his colleagues in the Chicago school fundamentally changed the character of the discipline during the course of the 1920s, the history of political theory remained an important element of political science. Despite the new emphasis on political theory as an element of an empirical science of politics, the history of political thought continued to dominate the subfield of political theory. The history functioned as both the story of democracy and an account of the development of political science. What had also taken place, however, beginning in the mid-1920s, was an Americanization, and Anglicanization, of the literature. This was in part a consequence of the turn away from German philosophy after World War I (1914–1918), and there was also greater intercourse with England and the influence of a number of British scholars. But although the more strictly Hegelian elements that had characterized the American adaptation faded, the essential characteristics of the form, such as the relativity of ideas leavened by an idealist image of progress, persisted.

The crisis of democratic theory in political science during the 1920s ended with the demise of the theory of the state as an account of democracy based on the belief in the existence of a homogeneous American public. However, the history of political theory continued to flourish as a justification for the new theory of democratic pluralism, as well as for the changing image of political science. The political polarization of the globe in the 1930s and an inferiority complex about the articulation of democracy, or liberalism, as an ideology provided incentives for moving that history yet further in the direction of justifying American democracy. The image of a great tradition political thought became, more than ever, the past of both American politics and political science. Works such as C. H. McIlwain's *The Growth of Political Thought in the West* (1932) did much to solidify the assumption that the classic works were pivotal elements of an actual historical tradition, but, among the proliferating number of texts during the 1930s and 1940s, which served to underwrite liberal democracy as well as the discipline devoted to studying it, Sabine's *A History of Political Theory* (1937) became the most paradigmatic. Although Sabine claimed that political ideas were relative to their context, depreciated the assumption that political theory had anything to do with ultimate truth, and stressed the danger of all transcendental perspectives from natural law to Marxism, he sustained the image of progress in both ideas and institutions. He

claimed that the logic of the experimental method, which lay at the heart of both science and liberalism, ultimately ensured their survival and doomed the aberrational absolutist lapses of totalitarianism.

Although it is often assumed that the behavioral revolution in political science, which defined the discipline during the 1950s and 1960s, involved a rejection of the history of political theory in favor of what it characterized as the emulation of the methods of the natural sciences and the development of scientific theory, a radical change in the literature associated with the history of political theory instigated, in part, the behavioral movement. Behavioralism was in many respects a reaffirmation of and a recommitment to both the account of liberal democracy and the methods of studying politics that had dominated the discipline for a generation.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL THEORY

Between the late 1930s and early 1940s, a significant number of German émigré scholars arrived in the United States and, for various reasons, gravitated toward the field of political theory. By the mid-1950s, these scholars had brought about a fundamental sea change in the discipline. This group included, most notably, individuals such as Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt, Eric Voegelin, and Herbert Marcuse. They were, in several respects, a philosophically and ideologically diverse group, but despite their differences, ranging from Marxism to conservatism, they embraced some common principles and assumptions.

For Americans, who had for a generation been relatively insulated from foreign influences, their arguments appeared both similar and unfamiliar. There were some American partisans who aided in the penetration of the genre, and, by the early 1960s, with the publication of what many saw as the principal successors to Sabine's book—Sheldon Wolin's *Politics and Vision* (1960) and Strauss and Joseph Cropsey's edited *History of Political Philosophy* (1963)—a basic intellectual shift had occurred. The quite sudden behavioralist depreciation of the study of the history of political theory was in large measure a consequence of this literature increasingly becoming a rhetoric now devoted to undermining, rather than defending, mainstream political science and the pluralist vision of democracy that had become emblematic of political science as well as of American public philosophy. The classic articulation of this alienation was Wolin's account of "Political Theory as a Vocation" (1969), which he advocated as an alternative to the "methodism" he ascribed to the behavioral program in mainstream political science. Wolin claimed that this calling, represented in the texts comprising the classic canon, was one to which academic theorists should and could aspire, even if only by interpreting and teaching this literature.

The antimodernist work of individuals such as Martin Heidegger, Oswald Spengler, Stephan George, and Carl Schmitt influenced many of the émigré theorists, as well as others who followed their lead. Political theorists began to propagate images of a crisis of the West and the decline of political thought. Since they all saw relativism in its various manifestations as a precursor

of philosophical and political nihilism, they reacted negatively to American pragmatism and subscribed to some version of transcendental and foundationalist philosophy. In short, they could not, in most respects, have been more at odds with the substantive content and purpose of the field of political theory as it had heretofore been conceived in the United States.

The form of this intellectual vessel was, however, more congenial and familiar. The tale of the tradition, as told by political philosophers such as Strauss, became a much more dramatic and structured trope. Authors such as Niccolò Machiavelli were cast as romantic or demonic protagonists in a plot containing distinct points of beginning, transformation, and, even, end. Although the new literature was addressed, at least obliquely, to contemporary society, issues surrounding the cold war, and the viability of democratic institutions, it represented a kind of philosophical politics in which actual events resonated more as exemplars than objects of investigation. Also, finally, the subfield became increasingly alienated from the very discipline in which it was professionally situated. The new synoptic account of the tradition that took shape after World War II still told the story of political science and liberalism, but it was now a tragic story of their entwined flaws and irrelevance. At the same time, however, the narrative singled out the "vocation" of political theory as surviving the defects of modernity and recovering a lost remnant of truth.

By the late 1960s, the estrangement between the subfield of political theory and mainstream political science resulted in a partition of political theory into what were designated as *empirical, historical,* and *normative* domains, with the latter categories becoming the principal property of the emerging interdisciplinary field of political theory and its professional outpost in political science. The appearance of the journal *Political Theory* in 1971 exemplified the relative autonomy of political theory that increasingly became defined by a series of conversations, such as those surrounding the work of both foreign scholars such as Jürgen Habermas (*Knowledge and Human Interest,* 1971) and Americans such as John Rawls (*A Theory of Justice,* 1971) and Robert Nozick (*State, Anarchy, and Utopia,* 1974). There was also a significant shift in the study of the history of political thought.

Debates in the 1960s about such matters as whether the whole tradition had been based on a logical mistake, and consequently whether political theory was "dead," were largely manifestations of philosophical controversies about the implications of philosophical positivism for normative claims about politics. Even this discussion, however, continued to assume the existence of the tradition as a piece of historical reality. The invocation of the great tradition, now as the past of contemporary academic political theory rather than mainstream political science, was in many ways the last gasp of the history of political theory as an epic story encompassing two millennia.

THE NEW HISTORICISM

By the 1970s, the study of the history of political theory had become simply another element in a highly pluralized world of academic specialization, but the genre was vulnerable at the core of its self-ascribed identity—history. It was, at this point, quite thoroughly criticized on the grounds that it was a discourse about the past that was inadequately "historical" with respect to both method and substance. Several scholars, although hardly agreeing completely either about alternatives or the criteria of historicity and interpretation, advanced quite extended critiques arguing that an analytically and retrospectively constituted canon had, for a century, masqueraded as an actual tradition. As much as this literature had been studied, it had been approached in terms of, and encased in, a framework that often obscured the meaning and significance of both texts and contexts, as well as their actual political character and potential relevance for the present. The attachment to the idea of the sole tradition had also inhibited the capacity to recognize and study a variety of actual historical traditions.

The study of the history of political thought originated as a rhetorical discourse devoted both to vouchsafing the identity of political science and to establishing it as a body of knowledge with practical significance, and, for a century, it functioned as such a discourse. The principal goal of the "revolution" in the theory and practice of the study of the history of political thought initiated, more than a generation ago, was devoted to transforming this literature into a more credible body of historical research. Scholars exemplifying this goal include Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock, who, among their cohorts, rejected what they characterized as philosophical and ideological renditions of past political thought in favor of what they claimed was an authentic historical recovery of the meaning of past texts. This task was to be accomplished in part by a careful reconstruction of the political context and form of discourse in which the authors were situated.

If the transformation initiated by the émigrés had not alienated political theory from mainstream political science, some speculate whether the study of the history of political theory would have remained a rhetorical adjunct. Isolated from the discipline, however, it became increasingly exposed and susceptible to criticism. Despite the growing popularity of arguments, such as those of H. G. Gadamer, that challenged the idea of objective accounts of history as well as somewhat similar conclusions advanced by various strains of poststructuralism and postmodernism, the *new historicism* associated with the Cambridge school claimed that there was something beyond varieties of rhetorical and "presentist" history. Those who embraced this approach claimed that it was preferable to earlier work because it deployed a method that yielded an objective recovery of the past, and an authentic understanding of the texts and their authors.

THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY

Seeking some general identity for political theory as well as considering how it relates to political science has, during the past quarter century, remained a significant concern. Simply charting this now highly pluralized discursive realm is a formidable task. Its foundations are often still assumed to be in some manner historical, but the field today tends to reflect a

variety of philosophical perspectives and political concerns. Mainstream political scientists tend to emphasize their scientific and empirical approach, whereas political theorists stress their commitment to normative claims. However, the distinction is, in practice, not so easily parsed. Nevertheless, although political theorists sometimes direct critical attention toward the discipline of political science, and although issues relating to the nature and status of democracy occasionally prompt an intersection of these once closely allied domains, the contemporary intellectual distance between political science and political theory is quite pronounced.

See also *Catlin, George Edward Gordon; Lieber, Francis; Political Science, History of; Political Thought, Foundations of; Sabine, George Holland; State, The; Tradition.*

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Political Thought, Foundations of

The foundations of the way in which people think about political life can be reconstructed and assessed through three primary models of foundations of political thought. These include the classical antiquity model, the medieval model, and the modern one. Contemporary perspectives continue to question the foundations of political power, and sustain relevancy in modern society.

GREEK CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY

It is often stated that both philosophy and democracy were born in ancient Greece between the seventh and the fifth centuries BCE. In particular, the city-state of Athens in the fifth century BCE presents a model of democracy that continues to exercise its influence today. Although the thesis of the Greek birth of philosophy and democracy has recently been subject to much criticism by pointing toward the existence of multiple civilizations, the political thought then elaborated has nevertheless been highly influential in Western thinking. It, legitimately, laid the foundations for Western political thought.

The classical model is based on a strong conception of the common good. Against the challenge of the Sophists, who argued that politics and language result from mere conventions, the major thinkers of the classical antiquity argued that political life aims to attain the good within the community. The good of each human being was not seen as opposed to that of the community, but as homogeneous with it. This is because the political life was conceived as the natural condition for human beings, as the result of their specific place in the cosmos. Aristotle (384–322 BCE) famously argued that the human being is a political animal by nature. Living in common is so innate that Aristotle stated that those who can live outside political communities are either beasts or gods.

Plato (427–347 BCE), Aristotle's master, had put forward similar views. In his *Republic,* living in common is the result of the very nature of human beings, who are not enough to themselves and need the collaboration of others to provide for their own needs. The society derives from a division of labor, with each person doing only one thing at the time, according to natural disposition, and relying on others for the necessities of life. Politics is thus the supreme and most important art, and its task is that of orienting all the other arts and therefore also the life of the community as a whole.

This is why Plato asserted that rulers must be philosophers or philosophers must become rulers. A just society is a society where every segment of the society performs its specific task in harmony with the others. Like the soul must be ruled by reason, so the polity must be ruled by philosophers, who are the only individuals who know the common good and can therefore orient the whole society toward its attainment. Philosophers do not seek material goods and honors, but only pursue the good of the community.

Aristotle followed his master in this view and also maintained that the political community aims to attain the common good. Aristotle gave this thesis a strong teleological connotation: since the human being is by nature a political being, the state comes before the individual itself. Conceptually speaking, the whole of a body comes before its parts, because without the whole, it does not make sense to speak of a hand or a foot. In his view, equally natural is the relationship of subordination between slaves and masters, women and men. As within the individual the soul dominates the body, so men dominate women and the most intelligent men dominate those who have only physical force and can therefore serve as slaves.

With the decline of the political system of the city-states and the rise of the large empires and monarchies of antiquity, a new model began to emerge. Greek democracy was based on the systematic exclusion of women and slaves from politics. Stoics argued that every human being is endowed with reason, and thus implicitly criticized Aristotle's conception of natural subordination. Furthermore, in contrast to the ideal of the city-state or *polis*, they supported the ideal of a *cosmopolis* where all people can live in peace because they are all equally subject to the law of reason.

THE MEDIEVAL MODEL

The rise of Christianity marked a rupture with the classical model, but an element of continuity also characterized the shift. This continuity occurs because both models are based on the idea that politics derives from the specific place of human beings in the cosmos, and therefore conceives of politics in a teleological way. The major difference is that the ordering principle is no longer a reason immanent to the cosmos itself, but the transcendent will of the God of Christianity. This generates problems specific to the medieval model.

In this respect, the Christian message stands in contrast to the classical model. Whilst the latter emphasized force and intelligence and argued for the superiority of the strong over the weak, the Christian message offers a subversion of these values, by evaluating weakness and the equality of all individual human beings in the face of the omnipotence of God. Although the message has a potentially revolutionary content, Christendom did not fully realize this message in political terms. The prevailing idea is that the full equality is an ideal to be realized in the spiritual world, but not necessarily in the earthly one. Jesus's saying, "Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's," became the object of a lively debate about the relationship between Christianity and secular authority.

In particular, after the creation of a sacred Roman Empire, the problem became that of the relationship between the authority of the emperor and that of the pope. Questions arose whether the temporal authority of the ruler was autonomous, or whether the spiritual autonomy of the pope superseded it. For highly religious thinkers, the prevailing idea is that of the superiority of spiritual authority. Differences, however, emerge with regard to the degree of autonomy recognized in the temporal authority and politics.

According to Saint Augustine (354–430 CE), for instance, without the Christian message, there cannot be justice, and, without justice, there cannot be a legitimate polity. As he argued in the fourth book of his *De Civitate Dei,* without Christian justice there cannot be a union of citizens under law and for the attainment of the common good. As he provocatively puts it, without justice, a political community is in no way different from a mere association of bandits, which are united just to burgle and then share the loot. Although Augustine's position was more nuanced on this point, his name became associated with the view of the subordination of temporal power to the spiritual one.

After the diffusion of the Latin translation of Artistole's *Politics,* a different position emerges. Authors who had been inspired by Aristotle, such as Thomas Aquinas and Marsilius of Padua, recognized the autonomy of political power. Following Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225–1274) argued that politics is deeply rooted in human nature. In a more radical way, Marsilius of Padua (1275–1343) argued that peace cannot be guaranteed unless political authority is recognized without any superior power. As he wrote in his *Defensor Pacis,* the law must derive from the will of the citizens or of the prevailing part—both in quantitative and qualitative senses. By rooting the law in the will of individual human beings, Marsilius's theory anticipates the modern model.

THE MODERN AGE

The modern model stands in contrast to both the classical and the medieval one. While the latter grounded politics in the idea of a *cosmos* teleologically ordered for the common good, where every being is assigned its specific place in the hierarchical chain of beings, the modern model places the foundations of politics in the *will* of individual human beings. The ancient world is by nature closed and hierarchically ordered, yet the world depicted by the modern science is open and infinite, so that human beings can stand in a position of free equals within it.

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) offers the clearest view on this. His political philosophy accompanied the emergence of the modern system of sovereign states, providing a powerful justification for its existence. Hobbes's phrase *autoritas non veritas facit legem* (it is the authority and not the truth that makes the law) marks the decline of a model of political thought that had prevailed for centuries. The foundation of political power consists no longer of pursuing a common good, but in the will of the citizens themselves. According to Hobbes, and all the other thinkers who endorse the contractarian model, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) and John Locke (1632–1704), a contract that human beings stipulate among themselves—in order to exist in the natural condition of absence of government—justifies political power. Through such a contract, human beings cede part, or all, of their sovereignty to a common power in order to receive from it the protection of their fundamental rights. The conception of such rights varies in the different thinkers, ranging from the mere right to survival (Hobbes), to political freedom (Rousseau), or to private property (Locke), as well as diverge in the forms of government they envisage—an absolutist (Hobbes), a democratic (Rousseau), and liberal one (Locke).

Notwithstanding all those differences, which ultimately derive from their different conceptions of the state of nature, understood as a brutal condition of potential perpetual war (Hobbes) or as a condition where the rights are simply not enough guaranteed (Locke), all these thinkers share the premise that political power derives from the will of individuals. The contractarian model of political order accompanied the rise of European modernity, with its institutions of an emergent system of sovereign states and capitalist economy. While the

model did not fail to provoke severe criticism, it also exercised a deep influence on Western political thought.

The criticism raised by German idealists at the beginning of the nineteenth century contributed to the crisis of the contractarian model. In particular, Georg W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) sharply criticized contractarianism for grounding the state in the contract—a category of private law. In his view, grounding the existence of the state in the mere accidental encounter of individual wills amounts to misunderstanding its deeply ethical nature. The state is the reality of an ethical idea, the culminating point of the objective spirit of an epoch. As such, it transcends, in the sense of the German *aufheben*, not just private law and morality, but also other inferior incarnations of the objective spirit such as the family and civil society.

Hegel thus endorsed the idea of a separation between the civil society and the state—a view that still exercises its influence today. Whilst contractarian thinkers work with the simple opposition between a state of nature and a civil society, thinkers influenced by Hegel maintain a sharp separation between the two. In his critique of the bourgeois society, Karl Marx (1818–1883) radicalized such a distinction by arguing that the state is part of a superstructure which is separated from, but also reflects the relationships of, domination taking place in the economic structure: the exploitation of the proletariat by a capitalist bourgeoisie. In this view, political power is a means for the bourgeoisie to sustain its system of exploitation, and contractarian theories are the mere ideological covering of such a system of exploitation.

The rise of the capitalist economy was accompanied by a new awareness of the deep economic inequalities and forms of exploitation that sustained it. Radical thinkers such as socialists and anarchists saw in political power a means for domination to be expropriated and put in the hands of the proletariat (communism) or to be abolished altogether (anarchism). Anarchism represents the most radical answer to the question of what constitutes the foundation of political power. In this view, the state always implies a form of asymmetry of power so that a minority of the people—those who are part of the state apparatus—dominate over a majority. Anarchists, therefore, see no possible reform of the system of the sovereign states: it must be abolished. In their place, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865) and Michail Bakunin (1814–1876) proposed a noncoercive political system based on the free federal associations deriving from the specific needs of the society. In their view, only through a bottom-up organization of society can the freedom of individuals be guaranteed.

CONTEMPORARY TRENDS

A useful way to group contemporary approaches is according to the answer given to the question regarding whether there are foundations for political power. Among those who provide a positive answer, and therefore stand in the tradition of modern political thought, is John Rawls. By reviving the contractarian model after a few centuries of decadence, Rawls argued that a just society is the society that people would chose if put in an hypothetical original position. In this place, known as

the veil of ignorance, they do not know their specific position in the society, their comprehensive doctrines, and natural talents. In Rawls's view, such a society would be based on two principles that provide for (1) the maximum freedom for every individual compatible with a similar system for all, and (2) the arrangement of social and economic inequalities so that they are both to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and attached to offices and positions open to all.

While Rawls's theory envisages a method for the discovery and the justification of the just form of political power, postmodern thinkers tend to see no possible foundations for it. By criticizing the very attempt to provide rational foundations for the existence of political power, postmodern thinkers argue that the Western canon of political theory is nothing but a myth—the myth of the white man. The very attempt to provide rational foundations for the existence of political power is seen as a result of a logocentric practice, which is the hallmark of Western tradition. Together with questioning the possibility of rational foundations, the merit of postmodernism has been that of casting doubts on the adequacy of the Western models of political thought as a whole. In a world that must accommodate diversity and pluralism of histories and worldviews, there is the possibility that the Western canon is only one among many possible stories.

An intermediate answer is that of authors who work in the tradition of a critical theory of society. Jürgen Habermas's deliberative democracy attempts to propose a form of democracy that can account for the possibility of public deliberation in a postmetaphysical setting and a condition of pluralism. His attempt to ground democracy in the ideal conditions for speech and deliberation has attracted so much attention that some authors have spoken of a deliberative turn in political philosophy.

The activity of boundary questioning thus deeply contributed to repositioning the foundations of political thought. In a global age, it is not only the possibility of foundations of political thought that is called into question, but also that of its traditional boundaries. Poststatist political theory questions the boundaries between the sovereign states by arguing that in a globalizing world, a form of democracy beyond the traditional state boundaries must be found. Feminist political theory questions the traditional boundaries between the public and the private sphere by arguing that this is a means for perpetrating the domination of males in the former and segregation of women in the latter. Finally, there is a variegated set of approaches that point toward a new form of green political theory. Such approaches question traditional ways of conceiving the boundaries between politics and the natural environment, arguing that the latter is not the mere background of the former. In an epoch of artificially induced natural catastrophes, the foundations of political thought must be rethought in order to assure both justice among human beings and their survival.

See also *Anarchy; Aristotle; Deliberative Democracy; Democratic Theory; Freedom; Greek Political Thought, Ancient; Hegel, Georg W.*

F.; Hobbes, Thomas; Liberalism, Classical; Locke, John; Marx, Karl; Plato; Political Philosophy; Political Theory; Public Good; Rawls, John; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques.

. . . . CHIARA BOTTICI

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Politics

There are two main concepts of politics: politics as a sphere and politics as an activity. The history of the concept is present in the contemporary conceptual struggles, and the disputes surrounding the concept form an inherent part of the concept itself. With the principle that the "political life itself sets the problems for the political theorist" (Skinner, xi), the language of political agents gains priority over that of theorists. The conceptual history of politics emphasises breaks and turning points in the process of conceptualization.

THE STUDY OF THE POLIS

The ancient Greek *polis* was formed in opposition to the despotic *oikos* of traditional monarchies. The rise of an egalitarian and participative regime among the male citizens in the classical Athens provoked new conceptualizations of the polis among the historians, playwrights, Sophists, and philosophers.

The *Politics* of Aristotle refers to a discipline of studies on the polis, its regimes, and its citizens. For Aristotle, the polis refers to a distinct type of community, and he analyzed the Greek political practice in terms of *politiké techné*, as an art, opposed to the "science" of the polis. In his *Rhetoric,* Aristotle opens another line of conceptualization calling "political" the deliberative speech in the assemblies dealing with contingent issues of future. The phronesis and deliberation aspects were close to the political analysis of Greek Sophists and playwrights.

The study of the Roman city-republics was called *scientia civilis*, and since the twelfth century, many Italian authors emphasised the similarities between autonomous city-republics with the ancient poleis. Translations, such as William Moerboke's thirteenth-century Latin translation of Aristotle's *Politica,* transferred the Greek vocabulary into Latin. In the universities of early modern monarchies the subject matter of *Politica* extended to all kinds of rule—government and the state.

Politica and its vernacular translations referred to a discipline, a science, or an art. The early modern discipline of politics covered an umbrella of governmental and administrative questions. The "science" of politics was confronted with the arts of phronesis, emphasizing "politic, clever, or cunning" measures. In the sixteenth century, the gradual formation of the state contributed to the practice to call politics a normative doctrine. In the Westphalian regime after 1648, the interstate relationship almost became a paradigm of political questions.

The vernacularization of the political vocabulary also contributed to conceptual shifts. In English, the adjective *politic*, or *political*, refers to three nouns: policy, polity, and politics. Originally, *policy* alludes to the regime, and with the coinage of *polity*, policy was left to a normative doctrine. In *Oceana,* when James Harrington calls Machiavelli "the only politician," he still refers to a thinker of *politics*.

FROM THE DISCIPLINE TO THE PHENOMENON

Once no polis or autonomous cities existed anymore, the umbrella discipline of politics contained nothing outstandingly "political." The academic disciplines differentiated in the eighteenth century according to their subject matter. A residual sphere outside ethics, law, or economics was left to the discipline of politics. In this situation, however, new proposals for interpreting the autonomous political sphere were offered. For example, to John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "political" referred to the metaphorical space of contractual relations, opposed to the state of nature.

After the late eighteenth century, a process of contamination between the discipline of politics and its subject matter took place, and speaking of politics as a separate phenomenon gradually replaced the discipline of politics. In the course of the nineteenth century, the discipline became completely obsolete, and the English noun *politics* turned from the plural into the singular.

This horizon shift from the discipline to the phenomenon is visible in both the sphere and the activity concepts of politics. The origins of the latter are detected in that the English nouns *policy* and *politician* received a temporal connotation. The normative discipline of policy was transformed so that policy became a line followed in the diplomatic and governmental activity.

The activity of politics was initially located within the sphere of politics; however, during the nineteenth century, it became possible to speak of the activity of politics independently of spheres. The spatial and temporal concepts offer partly competing interpretations of what is decisive in politics and

refer partly to different levels of abstraction. According to the spatial concept, everything that belongs to the political sphere is politics, but the temporal view requires a further qualification of the distinctively political activities. The two concepts regularly appear in different combinations with each other. For example, Hannah Arendt insists both on the public sphere and the performative activity as essential aspects of politics.

POLITICS AS A SPHERE

The spatial concept of politics concerns the demarcation of the sphere of politics. Many scholars contend that spheres like religion, morals, law, and economics are better known than politics. The reason lies in the tacit assumption that these spheres manifest a higher degree of constancy and regularity than politics. In other words, politics as a sphere has remained both diffuse in its borders and vague at its core.

The residual character of politics has practical consequences and legal issues. Since the first half of the nineteenth century, issues such as the status of political crimes, prisoners, and associations rose to the agenda. At the 1899 Hague peace conference, a vote was even held on the question of which issues are political in international relations.

The distinction between the public and the private sphere forms the traditional core of the spatial concept of politics. The strong tendency to identify the political with the public still holds for thinkers like Arendt, Michael Oakeshott, and Richard Rorty. However, making this distinction renders the borders between the private and the public endlessly interpretable and subject to conflicting demarcations. Thinking of politics in terms of a sphere is also a target of criticism among many feminist scholars.

In the course of the twentieth century, more abstract spatial terms to conceptualize politics have risen, and the key metaphor of academic political science has been the political system. The metaphor relies on the interconnectedness of the parts in a whole and has been challenged. For example, Ulrich Beck's concept of subpolitics insists on the crucial political role of the margins of the sphere. Spatial metaphors of politics may also separate the focus from its background. Regarding politics as an arena, forum, stage, or theatre renders the distinction between the sphere and activity concepts fluid, because these metaphors also allude to performing an activity.

The abstraction the political has become popular in recent sphere concepts. Hans Morgenthau systematized this notion in the juridical debates of Weimar Germany, as did Carl Schmitt with his *Der Begriff des Politischen* (The Concept of the Political). In the postwar era, post-Schmittian thinkers from Julien Freund to Chantal Mouffe continued this line. Mouffe follows Martin Heidegger when distinguishing the *ontological* category of the political over the merely *ontic* category of politics (Mouffe, 8–9). French scholars such as Régis Debray or Pierre Rosanvallon insist, along with Schmitt, on the stability of the political over the fluidity of mere politics.

POLITICS AS AN ACTIVITY

"Politics is an activity," not a thing, writes Bernard Crick (36). The historical links of the temporal contingency of politics to the deliberative rhetoric are evident. Nonetheless, the activity of politics results from drawing new horizons for politics in a complex process of conceptualization since the nineteenth century. Early works such as Carl von Clausewitz's *Vom Kriege* (On War) and Alexis de Tocqueville's *De la démocratie en Amérique* (Democracy in America) use the activity concept of politics fairly consistently. The democratization and parliamentarization of politics served as historical conditions for a more systematic thematization of the contingent, contested, and controversial activity of politics. Different *topoi* (themes, conventions, rhetorical figures) regarding the interpretation of the crucial moment of politics can subsequently be constructed.

Competence, prudence, and judgment all have direct links to the criteria of suffrage in the context of the political in the personal capacity. The type of political leader in democratized regimes is also analyzed in terms of judgment, using, for example, tact, craft, or approximate judgment as the key to politics.

Policy refers to a conception of politics emphasizing the continuity between single measures. This allows some authors to distinguish between politics or to denounce all opportunism. The core of a policy lies in the balancing of teleological expediency and normative demands. For example, in the twentieth century, the reason of state has been singularized into the best possible policy line.

Different stages of the political process—including deliberation, commitment, or contestation—also offer alternative topoi for conceptualizing politics. The parliamentary style of politics accentuates the rhetorical moment of deliberating between alternatives. According to Max Weber, a deliberating parliamentarian can judge the effect of the words, and Albert O. Hirschman sees, in the manifestation of a voice, the core of politics. The deliberation on issues is combined with the persuasion of the adversaries, and for Arendt, the politician appears as analogous to the performing artist for whom "virtuosity of performance is decisive" (153).

For William Kay Wallace, politics is commitment, "a means of realizing the aims and plans of an individual or general will" (15). Hans Morgenthau sees, in a Nietzschean manner, the aims of politics based on "a desire to maintain the range of one's own person with regard to others, to increase it or to demonstrate it" (192). Carl Schmitt's authoritative distinction between the friend and the enemy radicalizes the commitment through a decision.

The topos of contestation is directed toward the opening moment of the situation. Max Weber insists, in his famous 1919 lecture *Politik als Beruf,* on the link between politics and struggle against adversaries. Before World War I (1914–1918), German expressionists presented contesting demands of politicization of various phenomena. The contestation of the existing order lies in the core of politics for many movements since the 1960s.

Another cluster of topoi of politics operates with time and contingency. The *realpolitik* and the Bismarckian "art of the possible" try to minimize the possible and absolutize the reality. Several interpretations of politics soon opposed these as "art of the impossible." For Max Weber, the concepts of

chance and objective possibility illustrate how an acting politician's judgment of the possibilities is more crucial than the factual reality. Oakeshott's famous slogan on politics as sailing on a "boundless and bottomless sea" similarly reevaluates the opportunities.

The topos of the situation now combines the judgment of the possible with the use of rising occasions. Seizing the unique situation is decisive for politics. According to Henry Fairlie, the regular and recurrent occasions in a parliamentary democracy offer a party leader the possibility to wait for the right time and then "to seize real opportunities when they present themselves" (68). For Walter Benjamin, the play with deadlines and meetings is the distinctive mark of a politician, and he sees, more generally, in this unique situation a dramatic priority of the present as the proper time of politics.

The metaphors of play and game also offer together another key topos of politics. Eugène Pierre understands how, for the politician, the game is an end in itself, and Philip Cambray analyzes politics in terms of strategic games. For Oakeshott, the playful component is "nowhere more present than in the various levels of political activity" (111). Jean-Paul Sartre in *Critique de la raison dialectique* (Critique of the dialectical Reason) regards politics in the subversive terms of *déjouer*, the derailing of adverse policies and outplaying of the adversaries.

POLITICS IN THE CONTEMPORARY LANGUAGE

Contemporary politics and politicians do not always have positive reputations. Nonetheless, any phenomenon can be politicized in the sense of rendering it contingent, controversial, or contested. Since the late 1960s, numerous waves of politicization have emerged. Simpler forms of speaking of politics as a separate sphere are now obsolete, when the point is to read and to specify the political aspect in any phenomenon from different perspectives. Also, the activity concept may be challenged by its application to the phenomena of everyday life, where the question is less of an explicit opposition between agents and their projects than of a clever use of situations and occasions.

A construction of a repertoire of topoi for both the sphere and activity concept of politics may help clarify present and past controversies on the concept of politics. It directs attention to the formal aspects of the concept, to the history of its conceptualization, and to the possibilities of the mutual combination of the topoi for different purposes. It also serves as a tool of a pluralistic and historically oriented mode of political literacy.

See also *Class and Politics; Contentious Politics; European Political Thought; Greek Political Thought, Ancient; Local Politics; Political Theory; Politics, Comparative; Politics, Literature, and Film; Realism and Neorealism.*

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Politics, Comparative

The field of comparative politics addresses a large number of questions. A small fraction of these include: Why are some countries democracies and others dictatorships? Why do some governments tax and spend more than others? How do electoral institutions shape the outputs of government? Why does ethnic conflict happen in some places but not others, and why is ethnic identity salient in some places but not others? Why do some political parties make programmatic pitches to the electorate, while others rely on clientelistic relations with voters? Why is there so much variation across countries and regions in the extent to which religion plays a role in politics? Why are women better represented in elected office in some

countries than others? Why are governments corrupt in some cities but not others?

While fascinating, neither these particular questions nor the countless others of importance in the discipline today are the essence of comparative politics. The precise questions that motivate comparative political scientists vary tremendously in response to events of the day, the desire to impact public policy, and intellectual fads. Instead, it is the approach to understanding and explaining causal relationships in the social, political, and economic worlds that defines comparative politics. Two aspects of the approach distinguish the practice of comparative politics from other academic disciplines: first, the use of social scientific methods to assess causal relationships, and second, what it is that comparativists compare. On one hand, the emphasis on causal relationships distinguishes comparative politics from conventional history, journalism, and some portions of other social sciences that aim primarily to describe particular countries, communities, people, or events. On the other hand, using the comparison of countries, regions, communities, and such as a means to understand causal relationships in the political world distinguishes comparative politics from the hard sciences and some social sciences.

COMPARATIVE POLITICS, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND CAUSAL INFERENCE

Comparative politics is thus a branch of political science that attempts to draw descriptive and causal inferences about the political world on the basis of evidence from more than one setting. A descriptive inference uses evidence on one case or set of cases (e.g., countries or ethnic groups) to learn about other cases not directly observed. Therefore, a comparativist might study Iraq and Afghanistan, both religiously and ethnically heterogeneous societies, in order to learn something descriptive about other societies that resemble them—how ethnic groups are likely to get along, the difficulties of developing state capacity in divided societies, and the like. Causal inference, on the other hand, involves using information about a set of cases to make claims about causal relationships in the political world. Thus, analysis on Afghanistan, Iraq, and perhaps a host of other cases may be a means to test a causal proposition about the conditions under which foreign intervention by a great power produces civil war. Causal inference is the holy grail of comparative politics.

Drawing causal inferences requires two things: first, a theory about what causes what in politics, and second, a method for testing the theory. Simply stated, a theory involves a causal argument from which one can draw testable hypotheses. A test of a theory involves examining the evidence relevant to the hypotheses generated by the theory. If the evidence supports the hypotheses, there is evidence in support of the theory; if it does not, there is evidence contrary to the theory. These features of comparative politics are consistent with the method of scientific inquiry applied in the hard sciences, such as physics, and in other social sciences, such as economics. It is the application of these social scientific principles to comparisons in the political world that defines comparative politics.

Research in comparative politics begins with theory just as it does in other social sciences and the hard sciences. Historically, there was a stark divide between comparativists who valued deductive theorizing—or beginning with very abstract theoretical principles, deriving empirical implications, and then seeing how the real world matched theoretical expectations—and comparativists who emphasized the worth of working inductively—or beginning with observations of the world and trying to work backward to develop theoretical explanations for what is observed. Over the last decade, this debate has subsided as many researchers in comparative politics have come to recognize the value of both deductive and inductive approaches to theory development. Most now acknowledge that a sharp distinction between the two is oftentimes difficult to sustain.

ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS

If most researchers in comparative politics value both deductive and inductive approaches to theory development, the actual content of the theories tends to be the subject of more contention. Though the discipline has seen theoretical schools of thought come and go, four are particularly prominent today. Rational choice theories, which draw strongly from economics, begin with the assumption that individuals, for example, voters or politicians, are utility maximizers. Such theories then define what it is that the relevant actor seeks to maximize and examines how this actor behaves under different constraints. Such theories have been particularly useful for providing insight into the behavior of political actors when they operate under a set of stable institutional rules, be they electoral, economic, or otherwise. One prominent example is Douglas North's 1990 text, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*.

Cultural theories, on the other hand, seek to explain how community-level norms develop and shape political outcomes, such as the prospects for democracy or development. While in rational choice theories of politics the individual is always the building block of causal accounts, cultural theories place local, regional, or national communities at center stage. A particularly noteworthy example of such work is Robert Putnam's 1993 study of social capital in Italy, which emphasizes the importance of rich social networks for explaining variation in the robustness of democracy across Italy's regions.

Third, class-based theories of politics, long rooted in Marxist thought, suggest that the key actors in societies are classes, where classes are composed of individuals who share a similar place in the process of production. Such theories assume that class relations are inherently conflictual, as in Gösta Esping-Anderson's influential account in 1990 of the rise of the welfare state in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Class-based theories of politics have recently been reborn, illustrated by researchers such as Carles Boix, who in 2003 aimed to link the behavior of classes to the underlying interests of their individual members.

Fourth, there has recently been an explosion of interest in constructivist theories of politics. Such theories, rather than assuming the preferences of actors, are interested in explaining the ways in which the preferences of actors are constructed by their social environment. In some cases, such theories build on work in psychology and behavioral economics, both of which emphasize the diverse ways in which people understand and pursue their interests. Constructivist theories are particularly prevalent in the booming literature on comparative ethnic politics, which, like Hale's work in 2008, is interested in explaining why individuals define themselves as members of groups with some ascriptive characteristics but not others, and how group membership affects political behavior. As Jan Elster notes, these different theoretical traditions can be compatible in some instances, but comparativists typically think of them as competing schools of thought.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS

If considerable theoretical diversity characterizes comparative politics, practitioners also employ a diverse array of methods to test the hypotheses that emerge from theory. Establishing a causal inference requires that identifying the precise causal mechanisms through which one variable affects another. As James Fearon explains, testing such causal mechanisms is, in essence, an exercise in comparing one or several counterfactuals. Suppose, for instance, one is interested in testing the causal claim that authoritarianism contributes to economic growth in China. Testing such a claim requires considering whether China would have grown as quickly in recent decades if it were a democracy. Since China was not a democracy, this is a counterfactual, and comparativists must figure out means of entertaining such a counterfactual. As a practical matter, practitioners of comparative politics live in a world of counterfactuals.

The most venerable approach to counterfactuals and empirical testing in comparative politics involves the use of qualitative, or *small-n*, methods whereby a single or small set of countries (or whatever the unit of comparison might be) are analyzed in detail with an eye toward testing the implications of a theory. Such tests, particularly in the context of a single case study, are based on the notion of a *crucial case*—one that either has all of the characteristics that theory says should produce an outcome or, contrarily, one that has none of the characteristics that theory posits ought to produce an outcome. To return to the Chinese example, this might imply a study of a country (e.g., post–World War II Russia) that has all of the characteristics of authoritarianism that seem to contribute to growth in China to see if those features also contributed to economic growth in that country. Recent work in historical institutionalism, for example, by James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer in 2003, contributes to the use of such methods; this work emphasizes the value of close attention to the precise historical processes that connect causes with outcomes.

A more tenuous approach to using small-n cases to test hypotheses in comparative politics relies on the notion that one can "control" for important alternative causes by carefully selecting cases. A control variable is one that might cause the outcome of interest but that is not the subject of theorizing. Small-n research designs can try to control for alternative explanations by carefully selecting cases that are very similar with regard to alternative explanations. With such an approach, the carefully selected case or cases are meant to serve as counterfactuals to each other. Controlling for alternative causes, however, is exceedingly difficult with a small number of cases. It is very hard to know, for instance, if Sweden developed a large welfare state because it had a powerful labor movement opposed to some other feature of Sweden, if the research design only includes Sweden and, for instance, the United Kingdom. With such a research design, the number of potential causes exceeds the number of countries under analysis.

A more promising approach to the challenge of controlling for alternative causal factors is the statistical analysis of data on a large number of observations. In this *large-n* approach, the unit of analysis can vary from individuals (e.g., the use of survey data) to states within countries to countries themselves, and the comparative political scientist gathers data not just on the variable of theoretical interest, but also for other factors that might impact the outcome of interest. When properly conducted, such large-n studies have the advantage of providing more robust tests of the correlations between the causes and outcomes of interest, exactly because it is possible to come closer to controlling for alternative explanatory factors.

Large-n studies have two costs, however. First, data shortcomings often limit the extent to which comparativists can examine the precise causal mechanisms of interest. Second, using large-n studies to make causal inferences requires strong assumptions. Some of the more important assumptions include that the sample available for analysis is representative of the population as a whole, that the observations are independent of each other, and that causal effects are the same across the units (i.e., individuals, countries, etc.) under analysis. There are reasons to believe that these assumptions are sometimes violated, that for instance, the cost of political participation varies according to the resources a person has (e.g., it is harder to vote if one has a boss who will not allow time off or if one does not have a car to drive to the polling place), and that a financial crisis in the United States has implications for financial markets and politics in other countries (i.e., these countries are not independent of each other). As Adam Przeworski notes, there are ways to correct these problems, but the corrections can themselves be problematic, and oftentimes researchers simply do not know if the assumptions underpinning statistical analysis are violated or not.

To address the concerns associated with reliance on either large-n or small-n research designs, many researchers employ both. While statistical analysis is oftentimes used to establish the plausibility of a correlation among variables, qualitative analysis is used to examine whether the causal processes at work are actually those the theory has proposed. Methodological concerns with the traditional approaches to research

in comparative politics have also fueled the growth of experimental work. Researchers conduct such experiments in labs or in the "field," or setting in which they are interested.

One excellent example of such work is James Habyarimana and colleagues' 2007 study of ethnic identity and public goods provision. In an attempt to uncover why ethnically heterogeneous societies seem to provide fewer public goods, the authors conducted a series of experimental games in Kampala, Uganda, that provide evidence that while members of ethnic groups cooperate thanks to dense social networks, the absence of such networks between groups reduces such cooperation. In the absence of cooperation, public goods suffer.

Such experimental studies offer comparativists a new means of analyzing the individual-level dynamics of decision making, but they too suffer shortcomings. Most importantly, it is difficult to know if experimental settings sufficiently approximate the real world to reveal much about how politics actually work.

THE SUBSTANTIVE FOCUS OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Many of these scientific methods are also used in other hard and social sciences, but it is *what* researchers aim to draw causal inferences about, and the settings for their comparisons, that distinguish comparative politics from the hard sciences and other social sciences. The settings for comparisons in comparative politics are almost as varied as the field's research questions. Comparisons range from individuals to neighborhoods, to cities to states or provinces within countries, to countries themselves to regions of the world.

Any case can even be compared with itself through time. Something general can be studied and learned, for instance, about each of the iterations of the U.S. Congress. The 110th Congress is different from the 109th Congress, which is different from the 108th, and so on. Because the overarching institutions of Congress are stable but the rules governing committee decisions and citizen preferences change through time, the Congresses can be compared with each other through time, and each Congress becomes the unit of comparison. If the goal of such an investigation is simply to describe how Congress evolved through time, practitioners of comparative politics would not be interested. Such a study only becomes comparative politics when the goal is to make inferences about the functioning of legislatures around the world. Thus, if the U.S. Congress is totally unique, it is not in the least bit useful for comparative politics—it cannot provide a means for generalizing about legislatures elsewhere. If, on the other hand, the U.S. Congress shares key characteristics with other legislative bodies around the world and can, therefore, provide evidence generalizable to those cases, its study has important implications for comparative politics.

Even with these diverse types of comparisons and the wide array of methodologies, comparative political scientists have a great deal of difficulty being confident in the inferences drawn from the countries, regions, cities, and other places that are compared. This results primarily from the fact that researchers are left to analyze the world as it is. Experiments cannot be conducted to see what would happen to the level of democracy in a society, if a researcher were to change its underlying social structure in the same way that a scientist can conduct experiments to measure, for instance, the precise temperature at which water boils. As such, comparative political scientists can never be sure that the causes inferred from their conduct of comparison are the result of the theoretical mechanisms they have proposed, or something idiosyncratic to the particular countries, citizens, or whatever can be observed. Indeed, so many theories in comparative politics underscore both the complexity of the political world they study and the difficulty of falsifying their theories.

Comparative politics has nevertheless produced some important findings in recent decades. A couple of noteworthy examples include findings that: majoritarian electoral systems link with the prevalence of two-partyism, political participation increases with a citizen's resources, democracy is associated with wealthy societies, revolutions are more likely when societies are poorer and governments are weaker, strong ethnic and religious identities are associated with smaller governments and stronger distributive conflicts, and that parties of the left are associated with more fiscal redistribution in the OECD. At the same time, there is not a lot of agreement on the causal factors underpinning some of these findings. It is not certain, for instance, whether societal wealth causes democracy by increasing the size of the middle class, as discussed in Carles Boix's *Democracy and Redistribution* (2003), or alternatively, if democracies emerge for random reasons but simply are more likely to survive at higher levels of income, as Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi discuss in their article "Modernization: Theory and Facts" (1997). This disagreement has produced a renaissance in the study of democratization, and it is common that new findings spur new debates and produce new research frontiers in comparative politics.

Currently, there are a number of major research frontiers. There is an ongoing attempt to assess the causal impact of political institutions on outcomes ranging from electoral competition to economic growth at the same time that researchers recognize that institutions themselves are the outcomes of political struggles. A related, emerging body of work focuses on the political underpinnings of authoritarianism and asks why some authoritarian regimes build robust institutions, such as political parties like the Communist Party of China, while others systematically destroy institutions. This research ultimately aims to explain the varying stability and longevity of authoritarian regimes. Quite different is an ongoing attempt to understand the underlying processes that drive group-based identification, be they religious, ethnic, or regional, and the political implications of group-based identities. Societies with heterogeneous group identities seem to be associated with preferences for less redistribution and smaller government, for instance, but it is not yet understood why this is the case. A similar concern drives a reborn interest in examining the link between citizen interests and collective action, and between collective action and government action via the political

process. This angle is particularly robust in recent attempts to understand when and why political parties have programmatic, opposed to clientelistic, links to citizens and the implications of these different kinds of links for how politicians behave and the prospects for democratic accountability.

Finally, there is an emerging interest in political geography. Geography seems to shape processes as diverse as economic development, ethnic conflict, distributive conflicts, the design of constitutions, the mobilizational incentives of political parties, the dynamics of social protest, and the preferences of voters. The territorial distribution of political preferences and key political institutions, such as electoral systems, also seem to strongly condition the impact of geography. Untangling these complex relations will require the best of comparative politics—precise theorizing, many different types of empirical evidence, and a rich array of methodological approaches.

Clearly, comparison is fundamental to any scientific attempt to uncover causal relationships. Without carefully designed comparisons between, for instance, smokers and nonsmokers, one cannot know if smoking tobacco causes cancer. Contemporary comparative politics is the social scientific design of comparisons aiming to uncover causal relationships in the political world. To the extent other areas of political science, such as international relations or American politics, are interested in making causal claims, they too engage in comparisons. In international relations, great powers might be compared with each other or the systemic characteristics of the international system are compared through time. In American politics, the U.S. political system is compared with itself through time in a quest for general insights into the factors that cause policy in democracies. In the absence of such comparisons, these other areas of political science cease to be social scientific, and contemporary political science, therefore, really is comparative politics.

See also *Causal Inference; Constructivism; Counterfactual; Democracy; Field Experiment; Inference; Political Culture; Political Geography; Rational Choice Theory.*

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Politics, Literature, and Film

Unlike the law and literature movement, which credits *The Legal Imagination* (1973) by James Boyd White as its epiphanic text, there is no such author or coherent institutionalized approach that speaks to the effect of literature or film on politics. This is likely because until the nineteenth century, there was no serious doubt that authors, and especially poets, spoke authoritatively on political issues.

The common thread that runs unbroken between the political impact of literature and film is the narrative. Narratives become political when the stories they tell have the potential to alter the social and cultural assumptions informing the viewer or reader's political imagination. Not all literature, and even less film, has overt political significance defined in terms of audiences altering their political imagination upon contact with the artwork. However, when works do have such an impact, it is usually as profound as it is immeasurable. Empiricists therefore usually consider literary thinking to be peripheral and dispensable, an activity reserved for recreation and certainly not as the basic functional unit of the mind. In *The Literary Mind* (1996), Mark Turner makes just this bold yet persuasive claim. Without narrative, one cannot imagine one's self in the future, one cannot plan, predict, or explain what one has predicted. In fact, rational capacities rely on an individual's ability to construct a narrative in which the individual, and all the surrounding human beings, can be ordered and acted upon coherently and humanely. Since humans think in narratives—even when engaged in quantitative analysis, scientific endeavors, or mathematical constructions—literary constructions are revealed as the most persuasive way to gain access to the human mind. That said, there is little theory that effectively engages in a sociohistorical critique. The dominant approaches remain the new historicist and the Marxist methods.

NEW HISTORICIST AND MARXIST APPROACHES

New historicism sees the sociopolitical context as a fruitful and potentially life-altering context against which to set a human drama. The contextual background provides a series of "markers" that indicate how the reader is to understand the broader meaning of the character's utterances. German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) identified the problem that the "contemporary audience" sees historical contexts as too far removed to be understood, leading the author to either grossly romanticize the past or use the historical background as merely a colorful backdrop against which to address contemporary issues.

For the politically focused critic, this is much less of a problem, but for this very reason, new historicism has little explanatory work to do outside of the literary critic's circle. If a modern work about black soldiers in the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865) confronting and overcoming their racist officers is historically anachronistic, it is less important than the impact that such a novel has on the contemporary debate over race relations in the United States. This problem surfaced in the 1989 film *Glory* and in 2007 with *The Lives of Others,* which featured an East German Stasi officer working to save a suspect he was spying on after being moved by the music of Beethoven. The director of the memorial at Hohenschönhausen prison, Hubertus Knabe, refused permission for filming at the original location because there was no record of a Stasi officer ever being inspired to aid a dissident, by Beethoven or anyone else. Nevertheless, audiences did not care enough to have their enjoyment of the film compromised, and the film went on to win an Oscar, as had *Glory* two decades before.

The Marxist approach focuses more on the problem of production of a work than its consumption or, as Terry Eagleton states, the task of Marxist literary criticism "is to show the text as it cannot know itself, to manifest those conditions of its making (inscribed in its very letter) about which it is necessarily silent" (43). A Marxist reader explores how the text reveals ideological oppression of a dominant economic class over the exploited worker(s).

While more explicitly political than new historicism, this rather limited concern highlights how neither critical approach offers much in the way of analytical breadth to understand the political impact artists have on their audience. To ask whether Jane Austen's *Emma* (1815) affirms or resists bourgeois values is to miss the potential epiphanic moment of recognition that a sympathetic reaction to the character Emma's own understanding can create in a reader. Neither approach illuminates the truism of *Emma*'s opening lines: that "the real evils of Emma's situation were the power of having rather too much her own way, and a disposition to think a little too well of herself" cannot be simply stated in order to be understood. The reader needs to walk a metaphorical mile in Emma's shoes before any real understanding can take place. Filmmakers have recreated the characters in *Emma* thirteen times since 1932, not counting 1995's *Clueless,* to successive generations of filmgoers. There were no complaints of transgressing new historicist criteria, but the filmmakers did manage to analyze contemporary problems such as social class barriers, materialism, solipsism, and race.

FROM POETRY TO NEW MEDIA

Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792–1822) declared the poet to be the "unacknowledged legislator of society" on the grounds that the poet had historically demarcated the parameters within which the cultural—and thereby the political—imagination was permitted to function. Although unelected, poets maintained their influence for as long as they articulated the public's mood in times of social, political, or economic unrest. By the nineteenth century, poets were enjoying the benefits of a dramatically increased level of literacy among the lower orders, encouraging them to investigate the romantic allure of individual liberty, universal suffrage, alienation within the urban landscape, and democratic rights.

By the twentieth century, growing interest in more visual—and thereby passive—media such as television and film meant that political poetry, such as it was, returned to the hands of highly educated elites with more rarified ambitions but dramatically reduced political influence. In the West, post-nineteenth-century poetry has largely lapsed into the solipsistic indulgence of autobiographical exegesis, which negates the broader political influence once enjoyed by Victor Hugo, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, or Alexander Pope.

Canadian philosopher and educator Marshall McLuhan (1911–1980) insightfully noted that the content of a new medium is the preceding medium's output. Speech is the content of literature, literature is the content of film, and film is rapidly becoming the content of the Internet. An inevitable consequence of this rule is, as Marshall McLuhan noted in 1964, that those who strive for a deeper content always end up enmeshed in the tropes of an earlier medium (23). This is as true for political film as it is for all other genres.

Political films fall into three broad categories: they either undermine or satirize social stereotypes (e.g., *Bob Roberts,* 1992; *Wag the Dog,* 1997; *Erin Brokovich,* 2000); they allegorize social and political phenomena such as the fascism (e.g., *Lord of the Rings,* 2001–2003; *Star Wars,* 1977–2005); or they confront an audience with a social or political reality that they only feel safe examining from the discrete distance of a movie theatre seat (*Boyz 'n the Hood,* 1991; *Trainspotting,* 1996). Political literature is similarly demarcated: Social stereotypes are challenged in *Les Miserables* (1862) by Hugo and satirized in *The Eagle's Throne* (2002) by Carlos Fuentes. Political allegory is highlighted in George Orwell's *Animal Farm* (1945) or Salman Rushdie's *Midnight's Children* (1980), and confrontational social exposés are the basis for Charles Dickens's *Oliver Twist* (1837) and Gustave Flaubert's *Madame Bovary* (1857). Although journalists have supplanted the latter form with a concomitant lessening of their long-term effects, it is alive and well in the drama departments of the film and television studios.

LITERATURE, SATIRES, AND ALLEGORIES

Pedagogically speaking, it is much easier to teach students who are uncomfortable with how new concepts challenge their preconceived notions of how the world works; it is a technique called *pedagogical disequilibrium*. Skilled authors with a political message inevitably resort to this method when persuading a reader of the value of a previously maligned or misunderstood member of society. This disruption of social stereotypes is a prominent feature of Dickens's *Hard Times* (1854), a novel of class division in a factory town. The happily married, socially solid factory owner and the shiftless, politically radical worker were social stereotypes that Dickens's own factory experience had caused him to doubt. That he had to almost overemphasize the natural nobility of Stephen

Blackpool in the face of extreme systemic indifference to his happiness or personal goals speaks to the distance cultured nineteenth-century readers had to cover to appreciate the humanity of the workers who were responsible for their elevated wealth and international status. The three failed or failing marriages in the novel serve to critique the social conventions that kept even the elevated classes in loveless unions against their will. The savage attack on the charity schools, symbolized by the pedagogical prejudices of Thomas Gradgrind, caused questions to be asked in parliament and reforms to be undertaken across the country.

Hard Times was titled "Black and White" in some early drafts, and as Karen Odden has noted in her 2004 introduction to *Hard Times,* it is this very concern with Dickens's fellow Victorians's binary approach to social and political matters that make it an exemplary novel of the political imagination. Dickens is profoundly disturbed by the absence of human pity, sympathy (in the Smithean sense), and compassion that lie outside the purview of the capitalist enterprise—all that has made everybody materially wealthy yet spiritually bankrupt. The socially concerned novelist makes a quest to humanize the characters that other forms of media have turned into cartoon scapegoats, such as single mothers, criminals, immigrants, and the dispossessed.

Satire has retained its edge even as poetry has lost its relevance, and this longevity is worth investigating. Jonathan Swift's *Tale of a Tub* (1704), *Gulliver's Travels* (1726), and *A Modest Proposal* (1729) satirize religion, technological progress, and human society, along with the state and most of its citizens. However, a sneaking suspicion remains that the satirist is only capable of half of the job of "constructive criticism." Orwell describes Swift as "a Tory anarchist, despising authority while disbelieving in liberty, and preserving the aristocratic outlook while seeing clearly that the existing aristocracy is degenerate and contemptible," all of which might equally apply to Greek playwright Aristophanes and to English actor and comedian John Cleese. However, several noble exceptions have overcome the tendency to toothless criticism, including Maurice Joly's 1864 pamphlet *The Dialogue in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu,* which uses a satirical dialogue between the Frenchman and the Florentine to effectively expose the political ambition of Napoleon III.

In its simplest form, allegory is a literary device that clothes abstract concepts with the exterior form of human beings, objects, or animals in order to allow that concept a temporal and spatial presence in a narrative. In this way, the virtue of chastity might take on the form of a pure and naive maiden, perspicuity might be represented as an eagle, and knowledge as a book. The value of such a literary move is that the author can create an extended metaphor, permitting the reader to extract a broad range of meanings that lie outside of the overtly literal details of the story itself. The political author can make social and political statements by having these anthropomorphicized figures interact with human characters in a narrative. The allegory remains a rich genre for political subversion for the simple reason that unpacking an allegory makes demands on the reader that inevitably lead to a greater degree of engagement with the potential results of such a labor. Political allegory is rarely about finding universally valid answers to politically contingent problems; instead, it illuminates aspects of broader, potentially critical, political probabilities and encourages an investigator to examine them from a multitude of different perspectives on at least three levels.

Political allegory was at its zenith in the Renaissance when readers expected a complex layered narrative structure. The most obvious narrative was at the *literal* level, which presented a variety of characters of differing personality or social status interacting with a given allegorical figure that had assumed some recognizable form. For example, in the opening of Niccolò Machiavelli's *L'Asino* or *The Ass* (1517), the hero wakes up in a dark and frightening wood and meets an allegory of politics in the shape of a servant of Circe.

The second, or *typological*, sometimes confusingly called *allegorical*, level develops new layers of meaning when associations caused by other literary works resonate with the reader and are then read "between the lines," as it were, of the literal narrative. An earlier Florentine poet, Dante, who wrote in exile after being falsely accused by his political party, opens his *Divina Commedia* (ca. 1308–1321) with the terrified author waking up in a dark wood. Later in canto 13, the reader sees Dante enter a second dark wood, this time made up of trees embodying the spirits of souls who had committed suicide. Dante speaks to one, a Pier della Vigne, who was a courtier before his suicide.

Each typological exercise might present different outcomes, through which the *tropological* or moral level of the text can be explored. Tropologically speaking, one interpretation is that both Machiavelli and Dante began their literary self-examination in a state of suicidal despair brought about by a political wrong. However, like Pier della Vigne and unlike Cato, whose presence on the shores of purgatory means that he will be saved despite his suicide, both Dante and Machiavelli have made the mistake of contemplating suicide on the basis of a temporal loss of money, honor, or political reputation. The political lesson derived from the combination of the previous two levels is that one should never allow the temporal and pecuniary side of politics to cause one to lose one's focus with respect to the grander and timeless aspects of life.

The fact that commentary on Dante's master allegory has not failed to produce a major contribution to the critical corpus in every decade since it was first published in 1308 suggests the almost infinite number of literal, typological, or tropological reads that are possible when intelligent readers engage with an allegorical text. Through an ongoing process of contemplation, it allows new and uncertain outcomes to be continuously evaluated and best-case scenarios worked out in advance of an actual crisis. This constant working out of possibilities, testing of defensible hypotheses, bringing to bear of one's past experiences, failing when the stakes are low, and preparing for success through endless speculation is the correct pedagogical approach for both the prospective ruler and the allegorical reader.

FILMS, DOCUMENTARIES, AND POLITICAL THRILLERS

Following from McLuhan's dicta, in one sense cinema simply updates the narrative possibilities of literature, despite the claims of film critics such as Pauline Kael and Jonathan Rosenbaum that movies stand alone as purveyors of identity and desire. Notwithstanding that there are important differences in the reception of film to literature, especially for a generation for whom a book is an increasingly curious artifact, there is little fundamental difference between the range of narratives expressed in films and those employed by literature. However, there needs to be a strong imperative to separate the *figure* from the *ground* if that new media content is to be properly recognized. It is telling, for example, that film allegories have rarely been accepted or even noticed as such by the general public. Readers of Dante's *Commedia* did not need a mediator to tell them that they were entering a world of allegorical significance, yet it took Mike Rogin to point out to America the disturbing allegorical subtext at the heart of *Independence Day* (1996) or *King Kong* (1933). Film is much better than literature at directly featuring politicians, lawyers, or members of the general public engaged in political action (*Bulworth,* 1998; *A Civil Action,* 1998; *The Insider,* 1999). Most of these works were originally written for the screen or adapted from autobiographies rather than from novels, so to amend Kael and Rosenbaum's assertion, film presents some aspects of the content of literature in a much more compelling manner than literature could ever do alone. Two of those more compelling genres are documentaries and the political thriller.

Documentaries really became politically relevant in the 1960s and 1970s with the work of Frederick Wiseman. He was the first filmmaker to document the power relationships between people and institutional authority. Eschewing music, commentary, or sound effects, he offered grainy monochromatic glimpses behind the walls of a *High School* (1968), *Hospital* (1970), and *Juvenile Court* (1973). Despite the real-time social situations, he understood the rhetorical effect of framing nonactors engaged in their everyday lives, naming his works "reality fictions" rather than documentaries. However, his *cinéma vérité* style was impossible to ignore, and his films were cited as motivations for change in several of the institutions he documented. He is the cultural ancestor of contemporary political documentarians, such as Michael Moore or Morgan Spurlock, in that he was the first to demonstrate the political impact of real people confronting the systemic horrors of postindustrial institutional ideologies.

The political thriller came into its own with the jittery sensibility that defined the politics of the 1970s. After Watergate, citizens believed that the technologies of the cold war, including listening devices, the computer, and the telephoto lens, were being turned inward on the population they were supposed to protect. Even nonradical cinema goers noticed the increasingly intrusive bureaucracy that controlled their lives. Costa Gravas probably instigated the 1970s political thriller with the widespread commercial success of *Z* (1969),

which criticized the Greek military's cover-up of the murder of a prominent leftist. Francis Ford Coppola's *The Conversation* (1974) tapped into a public sensibility that anyone could be under surveillance at any time without their knowledge. *Three Days of the Condor* (1975) confirmed the belief that agents of the state could eliminate anyone with impunity if they posed even a tangential threat to state security. Films such as these created the cinematic language seen in *Enemy of the State* (1998), *Syriana* (2005), and the *Bourne* trilogy (2002–2007).

See also *Marxism; Media and Politics; Poetry and Politics; Rhetoric; Satire, Political.*

. . . . EDWARD KING

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Polling, History of

The genesis of opinion research traces to 1824, when *The Harrisburg Pennsylvanian* conducted its presidential *straw poll*, showing Andrew Jackson leading John Quincy Adams. As a "man-on-the-street" poll, such opinion measurement did not employ the scientific rigors used in modern survey research. However, it laid the cornerstone of modern practice for forecasting election outcomes. Through the next one hundred years, this type of straw polling increased in popularity; yet it remained local, usually a citywide exercise.

Before the straw poll, a more rigorous method of social measurement had been in use for more than a generation. Beginning in 1790, the U.S. Bureau of the Census operated on principles that would become standard practices in social research firms not until the 1940s. As early as the 1820 census, the secretary of state's report indicates that census takers used standardized forms detailing "the interrogatories to be put forth at each dwelling house." This report indicates that census takers followed a method of deciding whom to interview, and how to pose questions. Simple as they seem, these are standard features required of today's large-scale survey research efforts. As is the case today, the census takers in the 1820s made multiple visits to a dwelling in order to speak with a specified respondent, as would field interviewers would do today. Like the three prior censuses, the 1820 census acquired information on all household inhabitants by age, gender, and slave or free status. Unlike the prior census, it collected information on

occupations and thus was the first in the United States to go beyond simply enumerating the population, and began economic and demographic measurement.

The early census data collection efforts were conducted face-to-face. As such, these surveys were succinct. Concerned with literacy levels, it would not have been feasible to conduct the census by mail as much of the census is done today. The labor-intensive face-to-face methods of the census would have been cost prohibitive for most newspapers or magazines. Consequently, newspapers of the day used local *intercept* samples or so-called man-on-the-street interviews for timely feedback on topics of the day.

THE PHILOSOPHERS

The history of monitoring *public opinion* begins in antiquity. Aristotle (384–322 BCE) saw a place for public input and expressed the view that a collective wisdom would cancel individual ignorance: "All when they meet together, are either better than the experts or at any rate no worse." Later Italian political operative Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) shifted the discussion from the place of opinion in a good society to the manipulation of it. In *The Prince,* Machiavelli advised his audience to manage, manipulate and control public through threats and rewards. John Locke (1632–1704) suggested that consensus is essential to forming a government. Out of self-interest, people form a social contract requiring each to surrender some unfettered liberty in exchange for security. Similarly Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) echoed Aristotle, saying that the "organic will" of the people was greater than the sum of its individual parts.

THE EARLY 1900s: BEYOND THE STRAW POLLS

Scientific research began in the 1900s, with Harvard president Abbott Lawrence Lowell publishing *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (1913) and *Public Opinion in War and Peace* (1923). Lowell sought to define the concept of public opinion, and chart its formation by beginning with an understanding of how individual preferences form. He observed "violent temporary emotions" in Britain after the World War (1914–1918). At about this time American news journalist Walter Lippman noted the power of symbolism in opinion formation. He instructed to recognize "the triangular relationship" between an event, the individual's interpretation of an event, and the observer's reaction to that event. Similarly Harold Lasswell observed the importance of symbolism and ideas that helped keep a few in control of the many. Leaders intervened in the interpretation to shape behavior.

A major methodological breakthrough for nonfederally funded social research came in 1916, when the *Literary Digest* conducted the first national survey (other than the U.S. Census). With this endeavor, the *Literary Digest* mailed postcards to its wide readership and counted the returns. Using this readership sample, the *Literary Digest* called the following four presidential elections. In 1936, the *Literary Digest* went wrong. Despite its sample of two million subscribers, it was a generally affluent readership and tended to lean Republican. The *Literary Digest* did nothing to account for this and misreported that Alf Landon was leading Franklin D. Roosevelt by a wide margin.

GEORGE GALLUP AND THE GROWTH OF A SCIENCE

At about the same time, George Gallup conducted a far smaller, but more scientifically valid, survey. By polling a demographically representative sample, Gallup accurately predicted Roosevelt's 1936 victory. Later Gallup demonstrated that even rigorous methods must acknowledge a *margin of error*, as his organization predicted Thomas Dewey would win the 1948 presidential election. Only with the rise of sampling methods like Gallup's could privately owned and operated survey research organizations afford to perform valid social research. Moreover, the introduction of methodological and statistical rigors allowed for the systematic examination of public opinion. Gallup's use of a probability sample reduced the costs of conducting nationwide research between censuses.

After the 1936 election, Gallup launched a subsidiary in the United Kingdom. Using statistical methods, Gallup correctly predicted Labour's 1945 victory, to the dismay of nearly every other pundit, who expected incumbent prime minister Winston Churchill's Tories to win. In the late 1940s, Gallup and his colleagues Angus Campbell, Paul Lazarsfeld, Elmo Roper, and others brought widespread professionalism to survey research and organized the American Association for Public Opinion Research. The significance of this move was to create a body that advocated rigorous methods, and shared and published sound research and experimental findings on questionnaire features and sampling methods, and promulgated *best practices* in the conduct and reporting of survey research. They subsequently established a peer-reviewed journal, *Public Opinion Quarterly.*

As data collection methods matured, so did statistical sampling techniques. One of the more enduring probability selection methods was introduced in 1965, when statistician Leslie Kish published *Survey Sampling.* Kish described a method of rostering household members and then selecting one for inclusion. This reduced bias in the sampling process. Another innovator of this era was Gertrude Cox, who, with W. G. Cochran moved the world of experimental design in the 1950s by emphasizing the importance of methodological rigors and the centrality of randomization. Later in life she stressed the importance of ethics in social science.

TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES

Advances in communication combined with population concentration in North America meant that survey research became less expensive and more common. With this, sociologists, psychologists, economists, political scientists, and market research firms all saw opportunities to conduct sample survey research.

For many years, opinion polls were conducted face-to-face, in homes. They still are for major public health and economic surveys, and even political surveys such as the National

Election Studies in Britain, Canada, and the United States. Using paper and pencil less frequently, such surveys today are recorded using laptop computers and more recently, handheld devices. Computer assisted interviewing (CAI) programming ensures that appropriate follow-up questions are posed and can catch inconsistent entries. CAI records time to complete surveys and individual question times, thereby helping to detect interviewer fraud. Phone banks, where computer assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) is used, employ this same type of technology.

Today's computerized personal interviewing allows for multiple modes of data collection by posing sensitive questions using audio devices running on a laptop computer. In-person interviewing remains widely used, but in some countries telephone data collection has overtaken it, because telephone data collection can be conducted faster and more affordably. Telephone interviewing has been used since the 1960s, but two features emerged in the 1970s and 1980s that increased its utility. The first was random-digit dialing (RDD) the other is CATI technology. The RDD sampling method selects phone numbers randomly using known area codes and exchanges. This helps minimize bias of using phone directories. With this growth of cellular phone use comes concerns over sampling cell phones in household surveys. Because of the common practice of telemarketers selling products under the guise of a telephone survey and the proliferation of residential call screening devices, do-not-call lists, and use of cell phones, response rates for some phone surveys have plummeted. With these innovations, the adequacy of telephone survey research is being closely scrutinized.

Warren Mitofsky is credited with creating the first RDD methodology while serving the U.S. Bureau of the Census. After leaving this position for a career in political polling for news media, he developed another modern practice: the *exit poll*. In the late 1960s, he initiated the use of brief, in-person interviews with voters as they left voting places. This allowed broadcasters to anticipate outcomes before the votes could be counted. This practice was criticized as polluting the election process and discouraging voting especially in western time zones. By the 1990s, Mitofsky, with cooperation of major news outlets, performed these through his Voter News Service, VNS, avoiding the problem and cost of having competing services deluging voters at polling places. News agencies then, by consensus, agreed not to forecast election day outcomes until polls close.

Another quickly growing computerized data collection method is Web-enabled interviewing. Programs with standardized forms can be purchased that permit anyone with a Web page to create a Web-enabled survey. This new technology raises sampling issues since older and some less affluent people do not own home computers. Use of e-mail lists is also treated with trepidation, as these also attach to an individual rather than household. Concerns center as well on the ease with which addresses become obsolete as people change providers or e-mail is screened. Technological advances have also led to emergence of polling services such as Survey Monkey and Zoomerang. These "off the shelf" systems provide stock questionnaires and an online response system available to paying customers.

More sophisticated online panels have been another innovation in the survey marketplace. Knowledge Networks (KN) and Harris Interactive (HI) are two examples of "sampling" through panels since the late 1990s. A panel, or group of survey respondents representing people with various demographic or other features, participates in surveys at multiple points in time. KN and HI sell access to these panels, maintain contact information on them, and carry out "maintenance" to evaluate the representative qualities of the panels and keep panelists participating and provide analytical support. The reliability of panel research is an area of ongoing study.

Technological advances permit easier, more secure, and faster data collection. At the same time, researchers do take caution in measuring the effects of technology on coverage, response rates, and bias due to modality.

See also *Public Opinion.*

. . . . SEAN O. HOGAN

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Polsby, Nelson

Nelson Polsby (1934–2007) was an American political scientist who studied the presidency and Congress. Born in Norwich, Connecticut, Polsby earned a bachelor's degree from Johns Hopkins University in 1956, a master's degree in sociology from Brown University in 1957, and a doctoral degree in political science from Yale University in 1961. His dissertation was published as *Community Power and Social Theory* (1963). He argued a single ruling group did not dominate cities, but that there were different dominant groups in different areas and that this pluralism was compatible with democracy.

Polsby taught at the University of Wisconsin-Madison from 1960 to 1961 and Wesleyan University from 1961 to 1967. He joined the faculty at the University of California, Berkeley in 1967 and served as the director of the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University from 1988 to 1999.

Polsby was the managing editor of the American Political Science Association's *American Political Science Review,* the

discipline's most important journal, from 1971 to 1977. In 2002, he received the association's distinguished service award.

Polsby wrote or edited fifteen books on American politics and a number of articles. He first gained attention by asserting that much of Senator Joseph McCarthy's success was due to support he received from the Republican Party. Polsby later analyzed, in *Consequences of Party Reform* (1983), how changes in the electoral rules of the Democratic Party after 1968 changed presidential politics. The changes, while giving increased representation to African Americans and women at the Democratic Convention and giving single-issue groups greater influence in the party, made it difficult for the Democrats to nominate a candidate with broad-based support that would allow them to win elections. He also explained how the House of Representatives had become a more complex institution and how policy entrepreneurs impacted major initiatives in American political life after World War II (1939–1945). His 1968 article, "Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," was listed in 2006 as one of the twenty most influential articles to be published in the *American Political Science Review* during its first one hundred years.

In 1964, Polsby and fellow political scientist Aaron Wildavsky published *Presidential Elections.* This book became the leading textbook on the topic and was published every four years, with Polsby serving as the sole author after Wildavsky's death in 1993. The twelfth edition was published posthumously in July 2007, a few months after Polsby's death.

Polsby's scholarship was not limited to American politics. In 1981 he and Geoffrey Smith, a writer with the *Times* of London, coauthored *British Government and its Discontents.* Polsby had spent time as a visiting professor at the London School of Economics and as the Olin Professor of American Government at Oxford.

See also *Community Power; Electoral Rules; Political Theory; Wildavsky, Aaron.*

. . . .   JEFFREY KRAUS

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Polyarchy

Polyarchy, or rule by many, is a representative democracy in which all social classes and demographic groups regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, or gender have roughly equal political access and power within the government. The concept was developed within political science by Robert A. Dahl in a series of publications that began with his 1956 work, *A Preface*

to Democracy and was later refined in his 1971 book, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition.* Dahl argued the United States was the first nation to develop as a polyarchy. Polyarchies vest policy control and decision-making procedures in elected bodies or through explicit public referenda. People in turn accept the authority and legitimacy of elections and elected bodies.

Conditions necessary for a polyarchy include regular, free and open elections, universal or near-universal suffrage for adults, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press. Polyarchies are also marked by the healthy competition of ideas between groups and interests. Critics of the concept, including Dahl in some of his later works, point out even if a country meets the main criteria of a functioning polyarchy, the system may still disenfranchise segments of its population. For instance, disadvantaged groups, such as those with lower incomes or the impoverished, may not have the same political access as other groups within the society. Also, groups excluded from citizenship or the full rights of citizenship are unlikely to possess the same political rights as the rest of the population.

See also *Consociational Democracy; Monarchy; Oligarchy; Representative Democracy.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

Polybius

Polybius (ca. 200 BCE–120 BCE) was a Greek historian who was born in Megalopolis. When Rome conquered Greece and Macedon in the Battle of Pydna in 168 BCE, Polybius was one of one thousand Achaean hostages taken to Rome, where he was detained for seventeen years. He managed to become friends with members of noble Roman families, including General Aemilius Paulus, the victor of Pydna, and his son, P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus. The latter, whom Polybius tutored, and with whom he became lifelong friends, was later the conqueror and destroyer of Carthage, and the most important political figure of his time. Polybius was by Scipio's side as Carthage burned and Scipio wept for fear that the same fate might one day befall Rome.

Polybius's main work, the *Histories* (1922–1927), examines Rome's rise and conquest of "nearly the whole inhabited world." Most of the work's original forty books are lost. Among the surviving portions, however, is much of Book 6, in which Polybius describes the success of Rome as stemming mainly from the form of its constitution, which he viewed as "mixed."

Polybius begins from the traditional classification of constitutions—good and bad forms of rule by the one, the few, and the many. He asserts that constitutions move in a cycle, each form changing into the next, continuously. He begins with kingship. Although the king rules well, his sons grow up in luxury, which causes them to become selfish and to rule in their own interest rather than that of the city when they succeed to power. Thus kingship gives way to tyranny, the oppressiveness of which leads the best citizens to band together to overthrow the tyrant and establish an aristocracy. A similar process leads to the corruption of the next generation, and thus to a general

revolt by the people. The people install a democracy, which in turn becomes corrupted and so requires overthrow and the establishment once again of a kingship. According to Polybius, each of the three simple forms of constitution has an inherent defect, as iron is susceptible to rust.

It is possible, however, to arrest the cycle by combining the different simple forms in a mixed constitution. Polybius attributes the success of the ancient Greek city-state of Sparta to a constitution along these lines, which combined monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements. Its constitution contained a double kingship, a council of elders, and a popular assembly. The same principle was responsible for the success of Rome, in which consuls, the Senate, and the popular assembly represented the three elements. Because of this complicated mixture, a person looking at the Roman constitution would not be able to tell if it were a monarchy, an aristocracy, or democracy.

Central to Polybius's analysis is the way different institutions work to counteract possible abuses by others. Although he does not use the terms, his theory presents an important early version of checks and balances. However, his theory is subject to obvious criticisms. In addition to the clear historical fancifulness of his cycle, his analysis of constitutions is purely formal, focusing exclusively on the number of rulers in each form of state and failing to take into account wider social and political factors that affect political stability and instability. In spite of its problems, his theory held great attractions for subsequent theorists, including Marcus Tullius Cicero and, more surprisingly, Niccolò Machiavelli. In addition, the idea of combining institutions that represent rule by the one, the few, and the many is present in the U. S. Constitution, which thus also exhibits Polybius's influence.

See also *Cicero, Marcus Tuillius; Constitutional Systems, Comparative; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Greek Political Thought, Ancient; Machiavelli, Niccolò.*

. . . .   GEORGE KLOSKO

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Pool, Ithiel de Sola

Ithiel de Sola Pool (1917–1984) was an American political scientist. He earned his doctorate in political science in 1952 from the University of Chicago, where mentors such as Harold Lasswell helped influence a fertile intellectual environment. His initial collaborations with Lasswell on propaganda, the role of the press, and the influence of communications led to a distinguished and pathbreaking career in research methods, the interaction of technology and politics, and social change.

As a founder and chair of the political science department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Pool's leadership and talent made the program one of the best in the United States and in the world. He had a formidable research output of twenty-four books and several hundred articles, and maintained a rich consulting advisory role for governments around the world. In terms of general contributions to the study of politics and social processes, Pool pioneered the use of content analysis to study written communications and symbolic messages, the role of elites in social communication and influence, and the use of modern information technologies to enhance social science research. In this latter area, Pool developed simulation models of complex social processes, such as effects of issues and candidate strategies in electoral outcomes.

Through these studies, Pool was able to discern how symbols are used in totalitarian and open systems of government as tools of coercion and persuasion; understand the recruitment and selection of elites to better understand who attempts to gain power, who attains it, and what attributes such persons have; and observe how people and information circulate and interact in a social networking context. There is evidence that Pool was one of the first social researchers to understand the dynamics of social networks, even estimating the smallest number of linkages to connect two random persons in what has become known as the *small world* or *six degrees of separation* phenomenon.

Pool's research into the interaction of human communication and technology is another major contribution he made to political science. Pool was highly sensitive to the political implications of fast-developing digital information and communications technologies, and their implications for democratic governance and the survival of freedom. His last work, *Technologies of Freedom,* published in 1983, advanced the argument that freedom of speech as traditionally understood could only be guaranteed in modern society if the underlying information and communication technologies were also themselves free. In this sense, Pool saw connections between political power and technological controls that had not previously been articulated so vividly. This book remains relevant and thought provoking in the early twenty-first century, touted by advocates of Internet freedom and opponents of censorship.

Pool's insights into human communication have also had important implications for political theory in the areas of the nature of political participation, the role of trends affecting the degree of human liberty, the intersection of civic and scientific questions, and political reform and revolutionary movements. Pool's papers and other research data he collected over his career are available primarily through the MIT archives in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

See also *Content Analysis; Freedom of Speech; Lasswell, Harold Dwight; Political Theory.*

. . . .   ERIC NOVOTNY

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Popper, Karl Raimund

Karl Raimund Popper (1902–1994) is widely regarded as one of the twentieth century's most influential philosophers of science. Born into an intellectual Viennese family of Jewish descent, he earned a PhD in philosophy at the University of Vienna in 1928. After leaving Europe to evade Nazism, Popper taught at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand and subsequently at the London School of Economics, remaining an active public intellectual even after his retirement in 1969.

Popper advanced his view of science in *Die Logik der Forschung* (1934, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery,* first translated in 1959). He developed the notion of *falsifiability* as his demarcation criterion between science and nonscience, inspired by German physicist Albert Einstein's revolutionary—and risky, because improbable *and* falsifiable—theory of relativity. According to this criterion, a theory incompatible with possible empirical observations (i.e., data derived through observation or experiment) is scientific, while theories compatible with all such observations are unscientific, if not necessarily meaningless nor irredeemable. Because all empirical observations are selective, conditional, and fallible, science cannot be distinguished from nonscience on the basis of methodology; but to use falsifiability for this purpose instead, a distinction must be made between its *logic* and its application. Concretely, while testing a scientific theory means attempting to refute or falsify it, in practice, no single counterexample nor even accumulating counterevidence may be enough to reject it, especially in the absence of alternatives. Thus, although it is logically impossible to conclusively prove or verify a theory, one can amass a convincing amount of corroboration for it. But at the same time, a theory can always be superseded by a better theory that explains more. Unlike traditional empiricists, Popper holds that experience cannot shape theories, but it helps to eliminate false theories and choose, among the remainder, the best available in terms of explanatory and predictive power. All human knowledge, therefore, is hypothetical and provisional.

The normative implications of Popper's critical rationalism—the importance of academic freedom and openness to new ideas as well as the dangers of dogmatism—tie in with his argument for an *open society*. His works *The Poverty of Historicism* (1944) and *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1945) form a powerful defense of democratic liberalism against the principal

philosophical presuppositions underpinning totalitarianism: holism, which posits that social groups shape their members and are subject to specific laws of development, and historicism, which, on this basis, interprets history as teleologically developing to a predetermined end. Popper counters these ideas, and the resulting attempts at large-scale social engineering (e.g., under such totalitarian regimes as in China, Cambodia, and the Soviet Union), with the indeterminist view that social groups are no more or less than the sum of their members, and that history is the predominantly unplanned and unforeseeable result of individual interactions, based on the fact that an infinite number of therefore unknowable factors predates any event. His is thus not a moral, but a deeper, logical argument for liberalism.

In the ideal open society, the state progressively develops policies for actual social problems, aiming to minimize suffering—negative utilitarianism—while the creation of social and personal happiness is left to individuals who may or may not act collectively toward this end. Popper's theory of science and his political philosophy are linked by the key idea of fallibility: just as scientific progress depends upon constant theoretical scrutiny, social progress is made possible through constant political scrutiny, both requiring an open setting that allows modification or rejection of falsified theories and faulty policies, as well as bold new ideas.

See also *Liberalism, Classical; Political Philosophy; Totalitarianism.*

. . . . DOREEN K. ALLERKAMP

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Pork Barrel

Pork barrel is a commonly used metaphor in the United States to refer to the spending of public money for a specific group's benefit in return for political support. More specifically, pork barrel is a derogatory term used to describe spending attached to federal appropriations' bills that are designated for a very specific purpose or program that benefits a small, select group while distributing the costs across all taxpayers. It is thought that the legislators able to attach "pork" to appropriations bills will be aided in securing reelection because they are "bringing home the bacon" to their individual district. The securing of pork by legislators is often accomplished by logrolling—that is, the exchange of favors among policy makers.

The metaphor is believed to have originated in the southern United States, where the remnants of pigs were put into

a barrel. These pork barrels were given to slaves, and the rush of slaves to eat from the pork barrel is likened to the rush of legislators attempting to secure money for their local district. The Bonus Bill of 1817 is one of the earliest examples of pork barrel politics. The Bonus Bill was introduced by John C. Calhoun and was directed at constructing highways to connect the east and south with the western frontier.

See also *Lobbying.*

. . . . SUSAN MARIE OPP

Position Taking

Position taking refers to a type of electorally motivated behavior in which legislators publically express a stance on an issue of concern to constituents to increase their chances of reelection. This behavior is often regarded as an inexpensive—in terms of time and effort—means of policy intervention in favor of constituent interests, in that it may simply involve issuing a public statement or participating in a roll call vote rather than producing a solution.

Position taking may be risky on controversial issues, despite the actual ease of the process. Fear of defeat may spur legislators to adopt innovative issue stances to broaden electoral support in the constituency. However, the effectiveness of such entrepreneurial position taking depends on factors such as the heterogeneity of the constituent population and risk of offending existing supporters.

Due to the potential risk of alienating voters, candidates representing districts with diverse and conflicting interests may avoid position taking on polarizing issues to avert potential electoral hazards, such as creating unnecessary opposition. In addition, politicians facing decisive situations may seek to mitigate risk by offering a nuanced explanation of their opinions on the issue, though this option may be less effective in the face of a roll call vote.

See also *Campaigns; Constituency Relations.*

. . . . BRENT M. WILL

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Positive Discrimination

Positive discrimination refers to the broad range of deliberate, time-bound (voluntarist) policies intended to facilitate the integration of historically deprived social groups that were hitherto discriminated or disadvantaged either by government policy or social prejudice. The principle of positive discrimination aims to reduce de facto inequality and gives preferential treatment to people belonging to groups whose past and actual discrimination in a given society is tied to ascriptive characteristics such as gender, race, ethnicity, region, language, caste, or religion. It is thus a form of discrimination that actually benefits the actee or recipient of discrimination

and aims to achieve equality of outcome or results, as well to enhance the diversity of a society and redress the material conditions of the deprived group. The end goal is to bring them in line with the average standards already being enjoyed by society as a whole.

Positive discrimination is enacted primarily in areas of employment, education, and business, in order to increase the representation of historically excluded groups in the workforce. This is accomplished through specially designed admission or recruitment policies (i.e., the selection of a candidate for a position on the grounds of race, caste, or gender rather than merit alone). However, positive discrimination strategies can also cover other areas characterized by the underrepresentation of certain social or political groups. For example, in the area of political representation, some countries have introduced positive discrimination policies setting mandatory group quotas for the selection of candidates from, or the reservation of constituencies for, such underrepresented groups (e.g., women, ethnic minorities).

Positive discrimination is an elusive concept with no clear definition. Policies based on the principle of positive discrimination are known by a variety of terms such as *affirmative action* in the United States, *reservation* in India, (black) *economic empowerment* in South Africa, *temporary special measures* in international law, *indirect discrimination* in European law, and *positive action* in the United Kingdom. The latter, however, is based on the distinction between positive action, aimed at ensuring equal opportunity through, for example, targeted recruitment campaigns, and positive discrimination as preferential treatment at the point of selection.

Forms of implementation include targeting funding and financial assistance for underrepresented groups, building awareness and capacity, removing practical barriers that disadvantage certain groups, creating legally established (mandatory) quotas for political representation, intraparty selection, public sector as well as corporate recruitment, and admission to institutions of higher education.

The term as such, contradictory in itself, remains controversial because the notion of discrimination, independent of the objective of redressing inequality, implies that the measures it describes run against equality and, consequently, against the principle of formal justice. Positive discrimination could therefore eventually mean *reverse discrimination*. The principle of positive discrimination is no less controversial. On the one hand, it is argued that all discrimination is negative and that, especially with regard to recruitment, positive discrimination violates the principle of meritocracy leading to less able applicants filling positions, and thus causing resentment among those who were rejected, hardening existing discriminatory attitudes. Instead, the focus should be on improving access to education for all. On the other hand, positive discrimination levels the playing field for disadvantaged groups, empowering them to surpass the obstacles put on them by a long history of exploitation, exclusion, and deprivation. It helps bring to the fore the untapped potential of so far underrepresented groups, thus furthering the extent of diversity, representativeness, and

fairness in a given society. Beneficiaries of positive discrimination could act as role models for future generations and, in the ideal scenario, contribute to alleviating existing racist, sexist, or casteist attitudes to the extent that the temporary measure of positive discrimination would no longer be necessary.

Ultimately, the question of whether positive discrimination is a useful instrument to work toward a more just society must be addressed from a standpoint of morality. It is a question of compassion, and the preservation of a collective morality of humanity based on a historically derived moral obligation to compensate for the effects of past discrimination and exploitation, effects, and wrongs that otherwise risk occurring undiscussed and unaddressed.

Apart from philosophical investigations into the ethical underpinnings of positive discrimination, current empirical research on the matter concentrates mainly on whether measures of positive discrimination undertaken worldwide have had any impact at all and on what the best institutional devices are to make positive discrimination a useful and successful instrument. Results are ambiguous and do not always point in a positive direction. However, changing deeply ingrained discriminatory attitudes and redressing inequality is a difficult and long-term task, which is not only a matter of policy and institutional innovation.

See also *Affirmative Action; Discrimination; Race and Racism; Reparations; Reverse Discrimination.*

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Positive Theory

Positive political theory is the study of politics based on the assumption that goal-oriented individuals behave rationally. A rational individual ranks the alternative actions available, taking into account personal preferences and beliefs about the possible outcomes associated with those actions. The rational individual then chooses the action that ranks highest. Positive theory is a political theory because it is explicit about its fundamental assumptions concerning political behavior and because it formally derives the implications of those assumptions using the theorem-proof method used in mathematics. It is positive because it attempts to explain and predict what happens when individuals find themselves in political settings, rather than assess these outcomes in terms of what is good or right.

ORIGINS OF POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY

If William H. Riker is the father of positive political theory, then Anthony Downs may be considered its godfather. Downs's *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957) made the rational choice assumption the foundation of a theory of democratic elections. Although his book contained virtually no economics, presumably he labeled his approach an economic theory because, by that time, the rationality assumption had become so completely identified with that discipline. Riker was responsible for wresting that assumption away. His use of the qualifier *positive*, in turn, reflected the extent to which political theory had become so closely identified with normative evaluation. In particular, Riker's *Theory of Political Coalitions* (1962) exploited results from game theory, which had been developed by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, to predict the characteristics of coalitions that would form in legislatures and in international settings. For example, he demonstrated the conditions under which legislative coalitions would contain just enough members to pass the legislation their members desired.

In *The Calculus of Consent* (1962), James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock revisited a central question of modern political philosophy by investigating why rational individuals would create coercive political institutions like legislatures in the first place. They reinvigorated a very old analytic device, the thought experiment imagining individuals in a so-called state of nature, and recharged it with a more explicit and careful use of the rationality assumption. In studying the design of institutions, Buchanan and Tullock showed that democratic political goals were not as clear-cut as many had thought. Thus, they argued that the principle of majority rule did not deserve its special status in political theory. Rather, it was only one of many voting rules individuals would fashion to achieve their complex and competing goals.

Individuals may want political institutions, but in *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965), Mancur Olson recognized the difficulty of mobilizing the collective energies of individuals even when they share a common goal. Thus, positive theory brought into question the sociologist's typical assumption that common goals automatically produce united action. This so-called collective action problem continues to be an area of extensive research.

By the 1970s, under Riker's original intellectual and then institutional leadership at the University of Rochester, positive theory became the foundation of a broad and increasingly influential research program. One important strand of this program focused on the spatial theory of voting associated with Downs. Positive political theorists investigated modifications and the limitations of Downs's median voter theorem, the prediction that in two-candidate single-issue elections, candidates will converge to the median voters' ideal position so long as all voters participate, their utility declines monotonically away from their unique ideal position, and candidates are only concerned with winning. Modifications included the reconsideration of candidate motivations, possible abstention by voters, and, perhaps most important, election campaigns involving platforms that cannot be described in terms of a single dimension. In the latter case, initial theoretical results suggested the likelihood that there will be no equilibrium, which threatened to empty spatial theory of some of its empirical content. More recent work has discovered empirically plausible ways to restrict the range of likely outcomes.

Another important strand of research examined the legislative process within governments. In this context, voters directly consider policies rather than the candidates representing them, so the typical problem that votes do not automatically translate into policies does not directly arise. However, the potential instabilities involved in voting remain. Addressing this concern, researchers have found that institutional structure plays a significant mediating role between legislators' preferences and policy outcomes. When legislative committees are given different jurisdictions over policies, for example, more stable or different policy outcomes can emerge than would prevail in an institution-free setting. Similarly, the sequence in which policies are decided can have an important impact on what is decided. Even potential instability in voting outcomes can have specific empirical consequences insofar as it opens the door to agenda setting by legislative leaders.

PRACTICAL USES

Increasingly, the positive theory of elections and legislation has been integrated into comparative politics, turning to multicandidate elections, proportional representation schemes, and coalition building in parliamentary democracies. Positive theory's attention has also expanded beyond democracies. Dictatorships and oligarchies have proved to be a fertile area of research, including the determination of why some societies become democratic and others do not, and why some are stable and others are not. Positive theory has also played a major role in international relations, the study of interactions among governments. Positive theorists have shown how different environments can lead the same rational leaders to war or peace.

In its relatively brief history, positive theory has had an extraordinary impact on political science. It also has generated, and continues to generate, substantial intellectual opposition. Questions have been raised about the use of mathematical methods to study human behavior, the restrictive nature of its deductive techniques, and its empirical adequacy. In truth, positive theory has not definitively resolved even the basic problem of explaining turnout in mass elections. Perhaps most contentious of all is the theory's underlying idea that individuals behave rationally. As these debates unfold, it is important to recognize that the rationality assumption is deeply embedded in the way scholars think about individuals. Absent this fundamental assumption, political science would somehow have to discover a way to ascribe to an individual specific preferences and beliefs that were not rationally connected to the very behavior providing the evidence for those inferences.

See also *Coalition Theory; Collective Action, Theory of; Empiricism; Olson, Mancur; Rational Choice Theory; Riker, William.*

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Positivism

See *Empiricism; Positive Theory.*

Post–9/11 Politics

The 9/11 attacks dramatically altered domestic politics in the United States and other states. The strikes led to alterations in national security policy in a number of countries as issues such as immigration, nacro-trafficking, and cyber crime were included in broad definitions of homeland security. Meanwhile, the codification of a homeland security doctrine increasingly caused new restrictions on civil liberties. As time progressed, however, concerns about personal and societal rights led to the repeal of some post-9/11 security measures and greater attention on government security programs in the United States and other states.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the administration of George W. Bush initiated the global war on terror which included Operation Enduring Freedom (the invasion of Afghanistan), direct military operations against various terrorists and training facilities, and increased security and economic support for key allies such as Pakistan, the Philippines, and the Central Asian Republics. These measures enjoyed broad public and congressional support. The administration concurrently launched a series of domestic security reforms.

Central to these new initiatives was the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act, which expanded the surveillance and detention powers of national security bodies, including the Department of Justice and the National Security Agency. Components of the PATRIOT Act were criticized and in some cases, challenged in court, because of concerns over civil liberties. The administration also adopted a policy to detain suspected terrorists who were not U.S. citizens. These persons were designated unlawful enemy combatants, and the majority placed in captivity at the military facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. These detainments were criticized by even some of the closest allies of the United States.

The second major domestic initiative of the Bush administration was the creation of the Office, and later Department, of Homeland Security. The new body was the greatest reorganization of the federal bureaucracy since World War II (1939–1945), and it brought together twenty-two agencies and 180,000 federal employees. The department was created to bridge the gaps in domestic intelligence sharing and counterterrorism efforts that existed before 9/11 and coordinate domestic security programs. The 2002 act authorizing the new department passed with overwhelming public and congressional support (it passed 295 to 132 in the House and 90 to 9 in the Senate).

The 9/11 attacks made security the major concern for U.S. voters. In 2002, the Republicans were able to counter historic trends in which the party in power in the White House generally lost seats in midterm elections and instead regain the majority in the Senate and add seats in the House of Representatives through a security-focused campaign. National security was also the major issue in the 2004 presidential elections in which Bush was reelected and the Republicans again gained seats in both houses of Congress. However, the administration's management of the Iraq War (2003–) became increasingly unpopular so that by the 2006 midterm elections, Iraq, the federal response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and a series of congressional scandals resulted in the Democratic takeover of Congress. The election marked the end of the short-term electoral cycle in which domestic security was the main national political issue. However, incidents such as an attempted attack on board a U.S.-bound airliner in December 2009 renewed concerns about homeland security. This and other episodes reinforced the continuing importance of homeland security as a domestic concern.

Throughout the world, the 9/11 attacks prompted new domestic security measures and increased counterterrorism efforts. A range of countries and international organizations offered security assistance to the United States in the aftermath of the attacks. For instance, sixty-eight countries increased intelligence and law enforcement cooperation with the United States and twenty-seven provided direct military assistance for the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. The attacks also forced a recalculation of global alliances. Pakistan's importance as a regional ally increased, while the United States forged closer ties with the Central Asian Republics and bolstered counterterrorism funding and military assistance for a variety of countries such as the Philippines, Georgia, and Yemen.

Many individual states adopted heightened internal security measures. In France, in November 2001, a new comprehensive national security measure was enacted that expanded the government's ability to monitor e-mail and other forms of electronic communication and made it easier to interdict terrorist financing. The United Kingdom passed the Anti-terrorism, Crime, and Security Act of 2001 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005, both of which broadened the counterterrorist powers of the government. In addition, Parliament also passed the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act to improve the ability of the government to respond to large disasters, including massive terrorist attacks. These examples demonstrated the global trend toward increased police, surveillance, and detention powers enacted by states in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

See also *National Security Policy; Terrorism, Political.*

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Postcolonial Theory

Postcolonial theory denotes a field of political theory that questions the universal character of modernity and takes into account the fact of colonialism to understand the relationship between the global North and the global South. The term denotes a field of theoretical analysis that focuses on the effects of colonialism in the history of Asian and African independent nations, and the problems that colonial practices bring about in the process of nation-building. Postcolonial theory, without the hyphen, analyzes the effects of colonialism during and after colonial rule, and it cannot be reduced to the theoretical analysis vernacular of something occurring after the end of colonialism. There has been some discussion about the effects of colonialism on Latin American nations, but Latin American scholars hold that postcolonial theory should be a term that denotes only the Asian and African experience; in its stead they have introduced the concepts of *coloniality of power* and *de/colonial theory* to address Latin American colonial and post-colonial history.

SOURCES
Postcolonial theory finds its sources in two bodies of research developed in the 1970s and 1980s. First, it draws upon the discursive analyses of Indian history and the emergence of the subaltern classes in Indian historiography in the late 1970s and early 1980s that led to the creation of the Subaltern Studies Group; this included Gayatri Spivak, Ranajit Guha, Dipesh Chakrabarty, and Partha Chaterjee, amongst others. These scholars questioned the kind of traditional history occurring and being taught in India and concluded that there was a need to take into account other experiences—those of the subaltern. By analyzing colonial subaltern experiences, they had to take into account British imperialism in the region and therefore the effects of colonialism on Indian identity. Second, Palestinian scholar Edward Said, using French philosopher Michel Foucault's analysis on the discursive history of human sciences in his book *The Order of Things: An Archeology of Human Sciences* (1969), analyzed the development of a particular field of studies, oriental studies. In 1978 in his book *Orientalism,* Said reached the conclusion that oriental studies told more about the West and its own self-perception than about the East. He held that orientalism is the discursive construction of a field of knowledge that is used to control and dominate the East (the Orient).

POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND MEMORY
Poststructuralism, which is a political analysis of language and knowledge, is central in subaltern and postcolonial studies because it helps foster understanding of the knowledge and

power practices of colonial subjects and how they have been discursively constructed. Indian scholar Ranajit Guha shows that subaltern classes are not present in the writing of the elites, but he holds that they can be found by taking into account what elites hide or what they oppress, a technique he calls *writing in reverse*. As American scholar John Beverley demonstrates, Guha means by this the prose of counterinsurgency "not only the record contained in the nineteenth-century colonial archive, but also the use, including the use in the present, of that archive to construct academic discourses (historical, ethnographic, literary, and so on) that purport to represent these peasant insurgencies and place them in a teleological narrative of state formation" (27).

The nineteenth-century archive, and the historical archive in general, becomes a central tool for remembering the past, not only in the historiographic sense but also as a history of the present, because as postcolonial scholar Homi Bhaba puts it, as quoted in Leela Gandhi's *Postcolonial Theory* (1998), "Memory is the necessary and sometimes hazardous bridge between colonialism and the question of cultural identity" (9).

In the 1990s, African scholar Valentin Mudimbe and Latin American scholars Arturo Escobar and Walter Mignolo built their theories about Africa, Latin America, and the developing countries on the foundations of Said's work. These authors also have used anticolonial discourse, and anticolonial scholars such as Frantz Fanon and Aimé Césaire have analyzed the colonial state to build a real post-colonial state and not one that replicates colonial domination but within the conditions of a politically independent state.

FRANTZ FANON

Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth,* published in 1961, is one of the most important texts in anticolonial analyses and shows the importance of the concept of the nation to the idea of colonialism. Fanon writes from the perspective of the colonial subject in a struggle for liberation who is trying to think about the post-colonial period. What makes Fanon's conception of the nation interesting is that he is not proposing a bourgeois or a Eurocentric nation. In his analysis, he shows that those bourgeois intellectuals who want solely to replace the colonizer cannot lead a nation. He also shows that it is precisely through the elimination of the bourgeoisie that the nation can be a reality. The real nation implies the participation of the people and the government made by themselves without intermediaries. For Fanon, the elites do not mediate the process of construction of a nation—it is not the elites' nation, as in the European process, but the people's nation.

Fanon shows how the colonizer likely dissolved the traditional forms of government and society existing in the colonized countries. The nation did not arise during colonization, but precisely in the moment in which the colonized identified themselves as oppressed and fought for their liberation. Fanon analyzes Algerian colonial history, and shows how post-colonial Algeria had a limited nation, for instance with regard to women's rights. The process is completely different from the one in Europe, in which elites built their nations. For Fanon,

it is in the struggle that the intellectual becomes part of the nation; it is the fight and not the discourse that makes the nation in underdeveloped countries. In this fight, nationhood and national culture emerges, and nationalism is put aside as a European product that needs to be eliminated.

AIMÉ CÉSAIRE

Writing from the perspective of a French Caribbean colonized subject, Aimé Césaire denounces the universalism of the European idea of knowledge, that is, the idea that the way European science works is the way scientific knowledge should be done, which Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gómez has called the *hybris of the point zero.* Césaire illustrates how European ideas are hegemonic in the composition of post-colonial nations and proposes in their stead a pluriversalism in which the history, ways of life, and knowledge of the colonized are taken into account in the development of new nations. According to Césaire, European universalism is racist and colonial, and political independence is not the end of colonialism but just a first step. Césaire proposes a nonracist and localized universalism that is the result not of a colonial imposition but rather of an intercultural dialogue among people who see themselves as equals.

CONCLUSION

Postcolonialism could then be defined as a theoretical and political position that embodies an active concept of intervention to end the oppressive conditions left by colonial domination. In that sense, the *post* of postcolonialism denotes a critique and a commitment to transnational social justice. It is an approach to colonial relations that recognizes the fact that colonialism is an important part of modern times that needs to be addressed and eliminated.

See also *Colonialism; Decolonization; Fanon, Frantz; Feminism, Postcolonial; Internal Colonialism; Nation-building; Said, Edward; State Formation; Structuralism; Subaltern Politics; Transnationalism.*

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Postcommunism

Postcommunism has at least two meanings; according to Richard Sakwa, the narrower one refers to the situation in countries formerly under socialist or communist rule, while the broader one can be a shorthand term for metanarratives of the world beyond the cold war. In its narrower, more common meaning, the term captures the unique period in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union between what is known as the *fall of communism* and a still uncertain horizon in the future when all major idiosyncrasies of communism disappear. In this meaning, the reference context for all postcommunist regimes is the structure and mechanisms of communism itself.

Characterizing the period of postcommunism are multiple transformations (e.g., political, economic, social, etc.), including the processes of building the market economy and democratic institutions—the scope and pace of which differ from one country to another. In some countries, there are also practices of *decommunization*, like disqualification of former Communist Party members from some positions in the public life.

Many lingering legacies of communism have affected the whole postcommunist period—such as undeveloped civil society, weak rule of law, persistence of communist elites, and environmental problems. Although the transition from communism was largely peaceful, in some parts of the postcommunist region (e.g., the Balkans and some post-Soviet republics) violent ethnic conflicts occurred in the 1990s, followed by so-called colored revolutions in the 2000s.

See also *Communism; Communism, Fall of, and End of History.*

. . . .   JIRI S. MELICH

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Postcommunist Transformation

Postcommunist transformation broadly encompasses the political transition to implementing democratic concepts and civil liberties, as well as an economic transition to developing a free market trade economy. The postcommunism transition is widely observed from 1989 to 1992—most commonly associated with the end of the cold war—as parts of Eastern and East Central Europe and most of the former Soviet Union underwent considerable transformations. However, earlier transitions in Greece, Spain, Portugal, and some Latin American states are also applicable to the study of postcommunism transformation.

In Eastern Europe, the political transitions varied from clearly organized, gradual processes to more sudden revolutions and regime collapses. With Poland and Hungary, the transitions were of the first type. In the late 1980s, the Polish government engaged in negotiations with the once suppressed, popular anticommunist labor union, the Solidarity movement. This resulted in semifree elections in 1989, and the Solidarity movement leading the government. In Hungary, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party effectively disbanded itself in 1989, opening the political arena to new and reborn parties of the precommunist era. On the other hand, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) established in 1949 witnessed something closer to regime collapse and the takeover of the central political space by a hitherto-repressed opposition. In the Balkans, an intraruling party coup ushered in moderate democratization. While in Romania, what may have begun as a military coup of the Communist president Nicolae Ceausescu's regime turned into mass public rebellion and chaos, eventually resulting in the drumhead trial and execution of Nicolae and his wife, Elena Ceausescu.

With the disbandment of the Soviet Union, fifteen states emerged from the largely peaceful dissolution process, which occurred from August to December of 1991. There were no regime collapses, as leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus dissolved President Mikhail Gorbachev's Soviet state. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—the Baltic states historically and culturally referred to as the westernmost of the former Soviet Republics—did not participate in newly established former USSR organizations, such as the Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS). These three Baltic states and Russia set themselves resolutely on the path of democratic reform in 1991, opposed to the Central Asian and Caucasus republics, which were more deeply mired in authoritarian pasts and political divisions. Notably, the CIS formed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, with twelve of the fifteen states, and is organized as a very loose association of states with few supranational powers, perceived as more symbolic than functional; yet regional powers coordinate on issues of trade, finance, security, and cross-border crime prevention. In 2008, Georgia withdrew membership from CIS.

Postcommunist transformations—opposed to those in the West—also involved the replacement of more-or-less similar versions of the Stalinist planned economy, which was implemented in the Soviet Union at the end of the 1920s with market designs and practices. Though questions of political-economic linkage and of appropriate phasing of different components of the market reform package persist even today, it seems clear that most states chose to engage in deep, and swift, economic reform on the basis of a reasonably broad political consensus.

Outcomes thus far are diverse and trajectories of individual postcommunist states differentiate in degree of transformative success, as measured by international yardsticks including think

tanks, Freedom House's political freedoms index, Transparency International's corruption perception index, the Heritage Foundation's economic freedom index, and the United Nations human development index. On the whole, East Central and Eastern European states, which experienced the imposition of communist political and economic structures for approximately forty years, have done better than most components of the former Soviet Union on these transformation scales.

Geographic and cultural patterns have also emerged reflecting which countries tend to fare better at implementing political and economic transitions. For instance, countries with a Western heritage or with large Protestant or Catholic populations, or that had previous influence from the historic Renaissance and Enlightenment movements, tend to outperform states of Eastern Orthodox or Muslim religious heritages. Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Slovakia, as well as Slovenia and to a degree Croatia, typically outscore Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and the other ex-Yugoslav states. Further, on most measures, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova enjoy an advantage over the five "-stans" of Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—and Azerbaijan. Finally, Georgia and Armenia, located in the Caucasus, typically place ahead of the three Slavic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—but usually fall behind the Baltics.

See also *Balkans; Communism, Fall of, and End of History; Democratic Transition; Democracy and Democratization; Postcommunism; Soviet Union, Former; Transitional Regimes; Transitology.*

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Postindependent Africa, Politics and Governance in

Sub-Saharan Africa's postindependent political experience has been largely a disappointing one. While there are a few exceptions, most African states have experienced broadly based economic stagnation or decline; generalized state weakness, fragmentation, or failure; military interventionism; poor governance and abuse of power by political leaders including personalistic and neopatrimonial rule; at times serious and violent communal conflict (ethnic, religious, regional); and, in some cases, long and violent civil wars and insurgencies.

The challenge for political scientists is to discern the recurring factors that underlie these manifestations of political failure. For example, many patterns of government that seemed important in the early postindependent era have been found to have little explanatory value. Much was made in the 1960s and 1970s of the differences between single-party *mobilization regimes*, and apparently "democratic," competitive party

systems; between socialist versus capitalist private-enterprise economies; and the differences stemming from Anglophone versus Francophone colonial rule. Yet, after several decades of history, it is clear that these once seemingly important differences have little to no association with African states' dysfunctions. Just about every type of political and economic "system" has experienced many or all of these problems.

Factors explaining Africa's situation still remain. While there is varying emphasis in the literature on several underlying factors, there is general convergence on several of them. These include:

- *Initial state weakness and distortions deriving from the colonial heritage.* This includes geographic artificiality; states made of multiple and fragmented ethnic groups; underdeveloped and distorted governance institutions; the organizational, normative, and spatial incongruence between states and indigenous historical and traditional political institutions; weak structures of accountability; the legacy of colonial legal and institutional systems focused on top-down control; poverty, economic weakness, and vulnerability to the world economy; and African states' acceptance by world institutions as *sovereign states* and governments without actually meeting historic norms of sovereignty.
- *Mobilization of ethnic, regional, and religious identities in order to compete for limited resources, and by elites to take and hold political power.* Generally these identities were latent in the precolonial era. Colonial policies and practices stimulated their emergence as active identities, and postcolonial politics generally stimulated their further development to where they have become problematic for the contemporary state.
- *Early establishment of regimes that survived economically by collecting rents.* These were taken from the agricultural and extractive industries. They paralleled political leaders' early maneuvers to dominate political and economic space and ensure that rent-generating peoples and regions were unable to challenge the governments through democratic or other institutionalized mechanisms. This also coincided with the strength of *inheritance* elites who received power at independence, and their establishment of lucrative lifestyles that could only survive by continued extraction of rents from rural areas and extractive industries. Also occurring were lucrative income streams from natural resources that incentivized violent rebellions, insurgencies, and criminal enterprises that the state could not suppress, as well as spillovers from regional conflicts based on these resources.

These patterns contributed to one another and created what became a near "perfect storm" for many African governments. This resulted in political, economic, and social decline for most of Africa's peoples.

INITIAL STATE WEAKNESS

Most African states achieved independence within ten years of the colonial powers' decision to grant it to them. A few

received it within a mere few months of those decisions. As a result of this and other factors, African states were generally unprepared for effective governance. Colonialism left many other challenges for these new states as well.

The institutional legacy of colonial rule was one particular challenge. Colonial regimes were essentially governments of military occupation. Colonial policy, at least until the late 1940s, was exploitative and minimalist; colonial powers sought to extract the maximum economic advantage from their colonial possessions with the least expenditure of resources. As a result, colonial states were developed only to produce and export goods of value to the colonizing powers. This led to distorted economies and infrastructure, such that the colonial states were highly specialized in a few, low value-added products such as cocoa, coffee, tea, pyrethrums, sisal and cotton, and raw minerals. They played little role in any value-adding processes. These left the independent states with narrowly based and internationally vulnerable economies, which generated relatively little wealth to stimulate domestic economic growth or to fund the state and its programs. It also left the state with a highly underdeveloped and extraction-focused internal transportation infrastructure, which hindered domestic and intra-African trade, and therefore economic growth. These factors, among others, reinforced deep poverty among most of Africa's peoples. They weakened the states' economic base, while the large sunk costs invested in them made it difficult to move to more broadly based, internationally resilient, and remunerative economies. State capacity was thereby reduced.

Other problems deriving from the legacy of the colonial state exacerbated the economic weaknesses. These included underdeveloped structures of accountability and interest articulation as well as weak bureaucracies. Civil society was underdeveloped, hindered by the economic underdevelopment caused by colonial mercantilist policies as well as the conscious policies of colonial governments to keep it weak. Small voluntary organizations were fragmented across many localities, while the independent governments easily co-opted or suppressed the few professional organizations and labor unions that did exist.

Finally, newly independent governments inherited small and weak managerial and service bureaucracies that were usually understaffed with trained and experienced personnel. A pattern often developed where one or two well-qualified personnel were surrounded by many with minimal qualifications and were overwhelmed by the difficulty of getting anything done. In contrast, political leaders strengthened the relatively stronger police and security apparatuses they inherited, as well as their control over major industries. They used the legal and institutional tools of top-down rulership that they inherited from the colonial states to maintain their hold on power. Executive structures had been overdeveloped during colonialism, primarily to work as mechanisms of social, political, or economic control, and had administrative and police powers to manage the economy and to suppress media freedom, assembly, protest, and dissent. Moreover, legislative bodies were relatively new, weakly institutionalized. With inexperienced personnel leading

them, they were vulnerable to the promises—and threats—of the executive. Legislative bodies quickly became rubber stamps for state leaders and structures for their members to pursue rents and other advantages. They never became effective structures of accountability and faded in relevance from the political arena. Lacking any institutionalized checks, the potential for government incompetence as well as abuse of power grew.

Africa's independence movement parties, again, were far weaker organizationally than they seemed at independence, and eroded rapidly as independence was quickly granted to leaders who in reality had narrow power bases. Ambitious rural and regional party personnel flocked to the capitals seeking their fortunes and to help staff the new governments, and whatever institutional capacity parties had declined rapidly. Furthermore, there was generally little that had held the parties together beyond the incentive to comply with colonial requirements for democratic elections to achieve independence, and the desire to capture power. They were frequently led by a charismatic leader and integrated through patron-client relationships that did not extend beyond party cadres and a few key regional, religious, or ethnic influentials.

In general, these movements' promise to the public was that economic opportunities would dramatically improve once independence was granted. They stood for little else, except as structures for some to grab and hold power. Their subsequent economic poor performance certainly eroded the legitimacy of the new governments. The early military coups reflected their unpopularity.

A less obvious, but perhaps no less important legacy of colonialism, is often referred to as Africa's *two publics*. Peter Ekeh argues that there are two spheres of moral discourse in Africa. One surrounds the contemporary state and grew from the behavior of the colonial state. This was essentially amoral in its workings, at least regarding its African subjects. It was absolutist, accountable elsewhere (to the metropole), and acted only in its own interests. Africans learned to deal with it and its amorality by behaving in opportunistic ways. Ekeh argues that this absence of moral expectations was quickly transferred to the independent state, which Africans, generally with good reason, saw in largely the same light.

However, there is a second public sphere where Africans expect moral behavior. This includes historical and traditional political institutions, extended family, and community or ethnic associations. This hypothesis, which appears applicable to most African states, though in varying degrees, helps explain these states' high levels of corruption, the largely opportunistic behavior toward them of their citizens, and their lack of effective and sustained penetration into social affairs. It partly accounts for the general weakness of African states, at least beyond their elites' ability to hold power. In most cases these states lack legitimacy, are rife with opportunistic behavior that erodes resources, and are ineffective in "capturing" the citizenry. Many thus look elsewhere for more accountable and productive governance arrangements, such as in the *economy of affection* and in patron-client relationships, as observed by Goran Hyden.

Carl Rosberg and Robert Jackson developed another argument, in the 1980s, for the persistent ineffectiveness and fragility of Africa's states. Jackson and Rosberg argued that the well-intentioned effort of the developed world to support newly independent states by redefining the term *sovereignty* led to unintended and quite negative consequences for those states. Historic criteria for recognizing governments emphasized a de facto definition of sovereignty, which expected governments to meet certain, minimal levels of performance regarding control of borders and maintenance of domestic law and order. However in the post–World War II (1939–1945) era, the concept of *juridical sovereignty* prevailed; it awarded recognition to a government merely because a colonial power had passed the title, regardless of its effective control of its space. Weak and ineffective states were given financial and other aid from the international community and were protected from secession and external challenge by the refusal of the international community to recognize any alteration in borders except by consent of the so-called sovereign state.

This system denied recognition to alternate but possibly more effective regimes such as developed in Katanga, Biafra, or recently in Somaliland. This introduced moral hazard for these political elites, where they were insulated and protected from the consequences of misrule, no matter how poor it was. Significantly ineffective, corrupt, and even abusive regimes such as Mobutu's Congo, Amin's Uganda, Moi's Kenya, Taylor's Liberia, Abacha's Nigeria, and now Mugabe's Zimbabwe, were recognized and sustained by their status as sovereign states and the support this brought from the international community. This was in spite of the substantial portions of their territory beyond their control, and that these were collapsing into famine and disease, and ruled solely through violence and terror.

COMMUNAL FRAGMENTATION AND MOBILIZATION

African states also entered independence hobbled by high levels of social fragmentation. This followed lines of ethnicity, religion, and region. While most of the world's contemporary states are multiethnic and multireligious, and many face regionalism as well, the majority of these states manage to maintain effective governance, economic progress, and largely peaceful relations among their citizens. However, a number of factors have made these differences a source of conflict in many, though certainly not all, African states, and contributed to state weakness and failure.

African states are almost without exception artificial creations. They are the remnants of agreements cobbled together among competing nineteenth-century imperial powers. As a result, at independence there was little holding together a state's citizens beyond their shared experience under British, French, Belgium, Portuguese, or Spanish rule, and the arbitrary borders those powers had defined. The states were not organized around or based on communities that were particularly well integrated along normative, economic, historic, linguistic, social, or political grounds. This legacy also left in place national political institutions and civil law systems largely

alien to the vast majority of Africa's citizens. These operated in European languages most of the public did not know, and were in the hands of small *inheritance elites* who were more or less fluent in the alien languages and institutions. These groups captured control over the new state as the colonial powers departed but did not provide an effective unifying structure.

Nonetheless, Africa's subnational divisions are best understood as latent ones where there are multiple communities and personal identities. These exist as potential lines of conflict among people who have usually lived in peace for many years, even centuries. They typically become overt, however, and mobilize people into conflict when access by one or more groups—ethnic, religious, regional—to critical resources seems threatened by other groups. The critical resources for survival in Africa are access to land, water, and state-controlled opportunities and resources. Conflicts have broken out when one group appears to monopolize or capture excessive amounts of one or more of these natural resources, or appears likely to capture control over the state and its resources to the exclusion of others. Recent conflict in Kenya can best be understood through this prism.

Land is usually regarded as the critical resource for survival for the large majority of poor Africans who still earn their living in agricultural or pastoral occupations. As Sara Berry has shown, land tenure rights are frequently ambiguous. Over several generations, persons from different groups have developed competing claims to plots of land, depending on more than one system of customary law, differing interpretation of those laws, and the actions of the state. Migrations of peoples into less well-settled areas have intensified this, as growing populations of *home* and *stranger* groups begin to compete intensely for the same land. Migratory pastoralists with historical and customary claims to land have had to compete for land and access to water which was once unclaimed or became subject to multiple and ambiguous traditional claims. Key natural resources that can be converted into income streams, such as diamonds, gold, or oil, play the same role, though for far fewer Africans.

Similarly, the state has controlled substantial resources—though fewer currently than in the past—such as employment in the modern economy; scholarships and access to higher education; location of schools, clinics, and roads; access to subsidized credit and foreign currency; tariff protections; directorships of the once numerous parastatal corporations. Also, the state can use its police powers at times to act in effect as the arbiter of land tenure and water rights issues, as well as to allocate shares of lucrative mineral resources.

This background of competition and conflict over land, water, valuable natural resources, and the potentially explosive consequences of control over the state and its powers sets the stage for communal conflict. Individual and community struggles to survive in harsh economic circumstances often mutate into perceived zero-sum conflicts. While these conflicts have frequently followed stereotypical ethnic lines, such as the conflicts among the Kikuyu and Kalinjin in Kenya over lands in the Great Rift Valley, or the Hausa and Southern Nigerian

peoples' conflicts over land rights in the Jos Plateau, they have also developed among community groups, such as the conflict between strangers and home peoples in Ife and Modakeke in Nigeria (who are all Yoruba); clan-based conflict among the Somali people; or so-called ethnic conflict among the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi. The latter is really caste conflict among people who share their same language, religion, and appearance.

In each case, the conflict has grown from competing claims for limited resources by individuals, into group conflict as similarly situated individuals mobilize along one identity, and join one another as allies in zero-sum competitions with others over these resources. These frequently turn into violent, negative-sum interactions. The enduring hostility between North and South in Nigeria essentially grows out of the competition over which region will capture the lucrative, oil-based rents controlled by the Nigerian state. These patterns developed over land, and now oil, in Sudan. Similar dynamics, even without oil, have recently sundered Ivory Coast effectively into two states.

Thus, poverty, limited resources, latent social fissures, and the state elites' critical role in the distribution of resources and opportunities, all combine to develop and then sharpen conflict among diverse peoples. These conflicts in turn weaken, discredit, and in some cases destroy African states. Of course, were African states strongly institutionalized, they might have been able to manage, contain, and arbitrate these conflicts, as has happened in a few cases. However, their initial weakness and the strategic choices of their elites to pursue rents and economic and political control above all else pushed this beyond most states' reach.

In many cases, the close alignment of ethnicity, region, religion, and economic opportunities intensified the differences. In West Africa, for example, coastal peoples were the first to make contact with the Christian missionaries and colonizing officials, and thus received the earliest education and career opportunities from European organizations. The hinterland frequently received late, little, or no exposure to these opportunities. Thus, coastal peoples were largely Christian, had experienced more economic investment and commerce, and had far more education. The hinterland peoples were largely Islamic, uneducated in European languages, and experienced little economic investment or opportunities. These fissures endure to this day and are part of the explanation for the civil war, which divided Ivory Coast in the early 2000s, the civil war in Liberia, the enduring conflict between North and South in Nigeria, and the cycles of coups experienced by Benin, Togo, and Congo (Brazzaville).

At times, political elites competing for power, or to hold on to power, have consciously intensified these divisions, and the fears that accompany them, to mobilize popular support. Nigeria's cycles of political violence can be explained by this, as can violence in Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Chad, and other states. While each of these tragedies followed its own script, their core dynamics are remarkably similar: competing political elites consciously intensified and manipulated latent fears of economic or political domination by other groups as a strategy to take or hold power, resulting in intensified violence.

RENT-SEEKING BEHAVIOR

As already noted, African states have been ineffective, weak, and at times fragile for many years. A key way these governments and their ruling coalitions survived in spite of this, and a major incentive for rulers to stay in power, was their ability to generate, consume, and artfully distribute rents they captured from their economies, and from aid from international organizations. Rents became the dominant currency of politics, displacing policy, program, performance, accountability, and, eventually, most legitimacy the governments might have had or developed. Where rents were inadequate, or funds ran short, governments used thuggery, intimidation, violence, and even murder to maintain their hold on power. Zimbabwe today is an example of this.

It is a reasonable to infer that the overall economic weakness of these societies both weakened economic and civil society and made them more vulnerable to the appeal of state-controlled resources. Offering few comparable economic opportunities outside politics, it also increased the incentives for those who held power to be ruthless in their actions to continue to hold that power. While many leaders moved to single-party systems to internalize the competition for shares of state resources, even two- and multi-party systems presented the same dynamics: winning coalitions denied resources to those outside of them, and allocated resources such as rents through patron-clientage to those whose support they needed.

Military regimes behaved much the same way. Not incidentally, patron-clientage substituted political considerations for efficiency or effectiveness in development programs, in location and management of state-owned industries, and in production of public goods. It increased corruption and waste, further delegitimizing the state, and slowed or reversed economic growth. This led to an even poorer and less effective state. This strategy extracted wealth from the public and from international organizations, and turned it into private goods for key members of that coalition. This was a far more lucrative strategy for the elite to hold power than to try to win general public support by expending vast amounts of state resources, trying to produce public goods to serve the population in general, resulting in little is left to the elite for personal consumption. The outcome is apparent at various times in many African states: Economic decline occurs as rent extraction reduces the incentive for production and depletes capital in productive industries. Then the state is more aggressive in capturing what it can from declining sectors and industries. This eventually leads to economic collapse and, at times, armed conflict. As early as 1962, René Dumont noted the growing cost of the burgeoning African state and argued it could not be sustained. However, the inheritance elites were economically and socially dependent on sustaining the extraction of rent.

Robert Bates, in his classic 1981 work, revealed the rent-based dynamic through which small political elites captured

vast sums by manipulating the price paid for cocoa to producers in Ghana. Allocations of undervalued hard currency and of opportunities in the "modern economy" were ways economic rents were distributed to the coalition that governed Ghana. Bates noted this would likely destroy the economic foundations of the Ghanaian state, but it was pursued nonetheless because the rents were so lucrative to the small group who captured them that the threat of economic and political collapse paled in comparison. In recent work, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues explain the dynamic that develops when a small and unaccountable group captures a state, and finds it highly profitable to transfer the wealth it generates to itself. The group needs to stifle broad-based discontent generated by the consequences of this economically destructive strategy, and thus it suppresses dissent through a variety of mechanisms such as single-party systems, co-optation of opponents, show charges and trials for dissidents, establishment of presidencies for life, rigged elections, and suppression of electoral challenges through violence and intimidation.

In many cases, factions of the military, as a subgroup of the elite, seized power directly if they felt threatened with marginalization or to ensure a larger share of rents for themselves. Most of the states functioned primarily to extract and distribute rents from the people and overseas aid organizations to members of a ruling class—clearly underlying both the poor performance and the survival of the African state. State elites were unconcerned with producing public goods, but determined to hold on to power one way or another, as it alone was their source of economic security and social reproduction. This led frequently to shadow or *soft* states, which had little presence beyond the capitals and a few urban areas to extract rents from their peoples.

A final dimension of the crisis in rents faced by many African states grows from the combination of state weakness and the opportunity to capture extremely profitable rents from raw materials such as diamonds, gold, oil, timber, and the like. As Reno shows, several African states have faced stubborn and violent insurgencies incentivized by income streams won by capturing control of these resources. This dynamic can explain lengthy and bloody civil wars in Angola, Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In the case of Liberia, Charles Taylor used his control over diamond mining areas to seize control of the state and then proceeded to export violence to Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast in an attempt to expand his control and personal wealth.

In Nigeria, while insurgencies in the southeast have not captured the ability to produce oil, their ability to disrupt production has led to an *indirect rent*, via ransom. If the shipping lanes off the coast of Somalia are considered another lucrative "raw material," Somali pirates have engaged in much the same enterprise. In each of these cases, weak states have failed to maintain control over their territories, enabling criminal elements to capture lucrative sources of wealth, which increase the latter's access to arms and ability to further challenge and erode the state. It can become a vicious cycle and spillover into regional disruption, as it did among Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ivory Coast as well as in the African Great Lakes, and potentially the Horn of Africa.

CONCLUSION

With but a few exceptions, postindependent Africa has fared poorly. The tragedy of the African state begins with an unfortunate institutional and economic inheritance from the colonial era, develops into communal conflict over politicized competition for control of limited resources, and into rent-based regimes that erode economic well-being as they weaken and delegitimize state institutions. Finally, weak states leave the door open for regional, warlord-led insurgencies focused on capturing control of lucrative income streams arising from a few valuable natural resources. The states further erode, and in a few cases, have completely collapsed.

A few African states have done better. Ghana, Mali, Benin, Botswana, and, in some measure, Tanzania have avoided, grown beyond, or at least better managed these challenges. A few, such as Liberia and Mozambique, appear to be on the mend. The prospects for South Africa are hopeful though still unclear. However, many other African states are deeply mired in these problems, or at least stand on the brink. It can only be hoped that they will fare better in the future.

See also *African Political Economy; African Politics and Society; Autocracy; Colonialism; Corruption and Other Political Pathologies; Coup d'État; Rent-seeking.*

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Postindustrial Society

As the importance of industrial manufacturing declines and economic development becomes more centered on the service sector, information technology, and knowledge-based growth, questions arise regarding what social, political, and cultural challenges advanced capitalist economies will encounter in the twenty-first century. These questions, concerned with the nature of postindustrial society, have occupied a central place in social scientific research for over three decades.

According to the pioneering work of American sociologist Daniel Bell, the movement toward a postindustrial society should be conceived as a historical progression gradually supplanting, without eliminating, industrial society. Bell forecasted, in 1973, that the reliance on information, technology, and services instead of material goods as the driving forces of the economy would lead to deep transformations in the underlying social structure—or what he referred to as society's *economic-technological-industrial order*. This in turn would have political and cultural consequences; the most significant of these would be the empowerment of a whole new class of technical elites using their knowledge and expertise to place new demands on the polity for rationalized planning "and the centrality of theoretical knowledge as the source of innovation and of policy formulation for the society" (Bell, 14).

Bell's work on the postindustrial society was not without its detractors. During the course of the 1970s, a range of scholars debated the merits of his approach. The main criticisms leveled against Bell for overstating the feasibility of universities replacing firms as the primary engines of technological innovation and economic growth. Additional criticisms accused Bell of portraying the transition to postindustrialism as a teleological process, and neglecting the social conflicts that underpin capitalist societies.

While the 1980s witnessed a retreat from, and in some cases even a rejection of, the notion of postindustrial society within academic discourse, it underwent a substantial revival in the 1990s. Although scholars from this second-generation debate tend to agree varieties of postindustrial society—also termed *information* or *network society*—now existed across the advanced capitalist world, they differed radically in their interpretations of its exact characteristics. Scholarship from this period tended to place less emphasis on forecasting future scenarios, and instead studied the actual conditions of postindustrial society in various contexts. Although Bell's predictions about the political rise of technical elites have been largely discarded, scholars on the whole have concurred with Bell's assertions that postindustrial development would transform many of the foundational institutions of industrial society (e.g., the welfare state, social class, nationalism, and political parties). In scrutinizing categories, such as the working class, more recent work on postindustrial society is increasingly bound up with discussions of the postmodernist philosophical movement and its rejection of the *metanarrative* of modernity.

See also *Consumer Society; Democracies, Advanced Industrial; Information Society; Network Society.*

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Postmodernism

Postmodernism is a philosophic and analytical perspective traversing multiple disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. Its roots—while perhaps found in early twentieth-century German idealism (Georg Lukács and Karl Mannheim), the Frankfurt school and its critical theory (Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer), and to a lesser extent phenomenology—is attributed primarily to various French scholars such as poststructural anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, deconstructionist Jacques Derrida, and social scientists such as Michel Foucault and Louis Althusser. While the major tenets of postmodernism have been intensely debated and disagreed upon by most proponents, an underlying agreement derives from the basic assumption that modernity—often considered to have begun sometime around the Enlightenment or the onset of Industrial Revolution in the seventeenth century—has passed in most developed societies; as such, a new conceptualization of postindustrial, postmodern societies is necessary.

DEVELOPMENT

Two types of postmodernist works prevail in the social sciences. The earlier work was a critical philosophy in its agenda (led by Jean-Francois Baudrillard and Jean Lyotard) and the more recent work either looks back at the early work self-reflexively or attempts to integrate the disparate scholarship of the earlier period. For instance, Zygmunt Bauman, in Craig Calhoun and colleagues' book *Contemporary Sociological Theory* (2002), asserts that postmodernity is, essentially, "modernity emancipated from false consciousness . . . [and is] marked by the overt institutionalization of the characteristics which modernity . . . set about to eliminate and, failing that, tried to conceal" (429).

More often couched in a critique of either modern society or the social sciences' attempts at positivistic methods, postmodernists prefer to see the social world as: fragmented and, therefore, not a clean system; constructed out of the efforts of individuals and not external and objective; and impossible to apprehend, test, or measure using scientific instruments. At the heart of this thread of postmodernism is an epistemological critique positing cumulative social sciences as an impossible task because culture, reality, and experience are relative.

More recently, Kenneth Allan and Jonathan Turner attempted to put forth a formal theory of postmodernism. They identify four phenomena of interest that crosscut postmodern theory: (1) the increasing importance of culture vis-à-vis the material world, which is considered more modern; (2) the destabilizing effects caused by the prominence and intensified penetration of culture; (3) the increasing importance of the individual; and (4) a decentering process caused by hyper-differentiated societies. Allan and Turner posit that certain capitalist processes contribute to the transformation of modern societies into postmodern universes. First, advanced capitalism leads to a mushrooming in the number, size, and level of penetration of markets, caused, in part, by the means of advertising. Second, as Marx once predicted and as the Frankfurt school cogently pointed out, advanced capitalism transforms everything into commodities further contributing to the growth of markets. Third, capital becomes less fixed in advanced capitalist societies, leading to its rapid movement across physical spaces and, consequently, deconcentration. Fourth, communication and transportation technologies grow so fast and so efficiently that time and space become radically altered in ways that are unnatural to human biology, leading to destabilizing, rapid changes as well as more effective economic penetration in everyday life. The world, in a sense, grows smaller, while human biological adaptivity does not change.

Finally, advanced capitalist, postmodern societies witness the rise of means of reproduction and the decline of means of production. Imaging techniques, the Internet, and television become the primary source of economic growth while manufacturing is "farmed out." The penetration of new mass media leads to new means of domination as well as exploitation. Everyday life speeds up. The number of roles a person can assume, or imagine assuming, exponentially grows. Some of the results include discombobulation, disorientation, and high levels of anomie, as well as newfound individual self-reflexivity and the elevation of the individual over the group and the community.

DEBATE

Whether or not postmodernism is a theory, a philosophy, a critique, or an amalgam of the three has been a key area of debate. On the one hand, there is widespread disagreement among self-proclaimed postmodernists as to what it is and what its major tenets should be. Moreover, as a critique of positive, cumulative science, it is difficult to conceive of how its propositions can be tested empirically—or whether testing would defeat the purposes of its practitioners in the first place. On the other hand, postmodernism offers a lens in the same vein as the Frankfurt school for comparing the so-called modern world and the arguably different structural elements of (post)industrial societies such as the United States, Germany, or Japan.

Finally, some question has been raised as to whether or not postmodern theory is or was a fad, as postmodernists rarely tried to create traditions or schools, focusing more on deconstructing those *metanarratives*—worldviews that encompass all of human or natural history—and rationalist theories already extant. While efforts like Bauman's or Allan and Turner's are directed toward synthesizing the disparate parts, the recent wars in the Middle East, the continued reliance on fossil fuels, and the continued prominence of industrial production in most of the world are stark reminders of the staying power of modernity. Thus, some have suggested that *postmodernity* is better termed *late modernity*.

See also *Althusser, Louis; Derrida, Jacques; Essentialism; Foucault, Michel Paul; Individual and Society; Structuralism.*

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Poulantzas, Nicos

Nicos Poulantzas (1936–1979) was a leading theorist on the capitalist state. Although widely regarded mainly as an exponent of the structuralist Marxism associated with Algerian philosopher Louis Althusser, Poulantzas's thought evolved through various stages to its culmination in a reexamination of Marxist tenets and an engagement with Eurocommunism. Contrary to his image as a jargon-laden theorist of abstract structuralism, Poulantzas remained focused on questions of political strategy throughout his career. His suicide on October 3, 1979, prematurely robbed Western Marxism of one of its most influential figures and marked the end of the great "state debate" of the 1970s.

Born in Athens, Greece, on September 21, 1936, Poulantzas lived through both the Nazi occupation and subsequent civil war. After studying law, he moved to Paris in 1960. Although originally attracted to the existentialism of French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, Poulantzas began reading the work of Italian political theorist and activist Antonio Gramsci, who would prove to be a lasting influence. An early article written by Poulantzas led Althusser to invite him to join his informal group of students. This, combined with the political ferment in Paris at the time—which later climaxed in the street protests of May 1968—led to the publication of Poulantzas's first book.

Political Power and Social Classes (1968) firmly established the state as an object of theorizing and analysis, following decades of neglect by social scientists of all theoretical stripes. Poulantzas portrayed the capitalist state as a relatively autonomous condensation of class struggles that functions to manage class contradictions such that the dominant class or bloc of class fractions can create and maintain the political conditions necessary for the survival of the dominant mode of production. Together with Belgian political theorist Ralph Miliband's *The State in Capitalist Society* (1969), which offered a more empirically based and instrumentalist portrayal of the state in contrast to Poulantzas's conceptual and structuralist treatment, the book stimulated a wealth of new research and theorizing.

Despite the degeneration of the Miliband-Poulantzas debate into a dispute over what constitutes correct "Marxist" methodology, Poulantzas constantly developed his ideas. Miliband's critique of structuralist abstraction met its response in Poulantzas's subsequent works of a more empirical nature. These focused on the experience of interwar fascism and the more contemporaneous European military dictatorships, such as that of Greece.

In *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* (1974), Poulantzas extended his structuralist analysis of the state, analyzing the "imperialist chain" linking formally separate states via the cross-border expansion of multinational corporations. The consequent reconfiguration of host countries' legal and political systems along American lines led him to portray multinational corporations as vehicles of U.S. hegemony.

State, Power, Socialism (1978) marked Poulantzas's shift away from both Althusserian structuralism and Leninist politics as he sought to respond to challenges posed especially by French historian and philosopher Michel Paul Foucault. Poulantzas saw Foucault's treatment of power as diffuse and pervasive as both suggestive of more fruitful inquiry and theoretically inadequate. Poulantzas depicted an expansive and expanding state, which, in contrast to the belief common in Leninism, was itself a site of political struggle, rather than something to be smashed from outside. However, he continued to acknowledge the state's relative autonomy. Among the various prescient contributions of this book, Poulantzas observed trends toward authoritarianism and the growth of new social movements that became much more pronounced in the following decade. He also anticipated much subsequent critique of Foucault.

See also *Althusser, Louis; Autonomy; Capitalism and Democracy; Foucault, Michel Paul; Gramsci, Antonio; Leninism; Marxism; Miliband, Ralph; Sartre, Jean-Paul*

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Poverty

The United Nations (UN) estimates that approximately 1.2 billion people in the world currently live in poverty, and one-half of those are children. Before 1950, definitions of poverty were generally based on the *bread basket theory*, which identified the poor as those who were unable to meet minimum food requirements for each family member for a month. Today the definition of poverty is based on the UN guideline of living below one dollar a day. More than one-sixth of the world's poor meets this stipulation, with the poorest people generally living in sub-Saharan Africa (46 percent) and South Asia (40 percent). In 2000, 189 members of the United Nations adopted the eight Millennium Development Goals designed to alleviate poverty and improve the quality of life within their borders.

Children play in front of a shack outside of Lima, Peru. One-half of all those in poverty are children, and many struggle to subsist in nations that cannot provide them with assistance.

However, poverty also exists in the richest nation in the world, Bermuda, with a per capita income of $69,000 and a poverty rate of 19 percent, and in the poorest nation in the world, East Timor, with a per capita income of $400 and a poverty rate of 42 percent. The differences in the quality of life among the poor in the richest and poorest nations may be vast. Developed nations offer social services that, at a minimum, provide food, clothing, shelter, and basic health care. In developing nations, people regularly die because governments either cannot or will not provide basic needs. The poorest countries are generally those in which subsistence agriculture dominates the economy. Scholars have argued that globalization is a key factor in increasing poverty levels in developing nations because industrialization has left some nations out of the loop, and increased gaps between the rich and the poor in industrializing countries.

International aid provides a large portion of national budgets in countries such as Niger, which, according to the United Nations Development Programme, has the lowest standard of living in the world. Government corruption in some poor nations results in withdrawal of international, regional, and national aid. Countries must meet strict World Bank and International

Monetary Fund requirements, including poverty alleviation and anticorruption measures, to qualify for acceptance into the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries program, which provides debt relief for twenty-nine of the poorest countries.

REALITIES

Poverty may be a result of many things, but most scholars agree that individual factors affecting poverty are sex, race, age, unemployment, divorce, number of people in a family, poor levels of education, and lack of job opportunities. On a broader scale, factors that increase the likelihood of living in poverty are national residence, poor governance, ethnic conflict, corruption, degradation, crime, violence, and absence of social services.

The poor are more likely than others in any society to be hungry, cold, malnourished, illiterate, sick, and unemployed. They have lower life expectancies and higher infant, childhood, and maternal mortality rates. The poor are also more prone to alcoholism and depression. They are also more likely to be outside political and legal systems, more likely to be convicted of crimes with which they are charged, and less likely to seek recourse when rights are denied.

Many of the poorest countries are located in areas where droughts, floods, earthquakes, and other natural disasters occur regularly with devastating results that disproportionately affect the poor. This phenomenon was made abundantly clear in December 2004 when a tsunami caused by the Sumatra-Andaman earthquake in the Indian Ocean wiped out whole communities, leading to the loss of more than 275,000 lives. Natural disasters can also have devastating results among the poorest people in the richest countries. Such was the case when Hurricane Katrina devastated America's Gulf Coast in August 2005 at a cost of approximately 2,000 lives. Tens of thousands of people from New Orleans were forced to flee to other states when levies broke in the wake of the storm. Many of those who returned remain housed in government-issued trailers, facing life in a city with a heavily damaged infrastructure.

Some of the poorest people in the world are those who live in refugee camps where they have migrated to escape from areas devastated by natural disasters, ethnic conflicts, oppressive governments, and extreme poverty. Large refugee populations also place enormous strains on the economies of host countries and may cut into funding for social programs designed to alleviate poverty among existing populations.

Many countries of the former Soviet Union struggle economically, and poverty is a major problem in these transition countries, which have an aggregate poverty rate of 27.1 percent. Individually, poverty rates range from 8.6 percent in Hungary to 80 percent in Moldova. Conversion to free markets has also increased income gaps between the rich and poor. According to the Gini Index of Inequality, which is the most common measure of inequality, income disparity is greatest in Armenia (41.3) and narrowest in Hungary (29.4). The European Union (EU) mandates poverty alleviation programs in transition countries seeking membership.

CHILD LABOR

In response to extreme poverty, parents in Asia, Latin America, and Africa sometimes sell young children as indentured servants. The UN International Labour Organization estimates that employers make as much as $10 billion each year from illegal child labor. The problem of child labor is most severe in Africa, which provides approximately one-sixth of all child laborers.

Indentured children generally live in appalling overcrowded circumstances where they are denied adequate nourishment and access to health care, education, and the joys of childhood. They receive only small pittances for their labor, and even these small amounts are often withheld for months at a time. Brutal employers frequently punish inattentive, sleepy, or slow children with beatings. Although some governments have passed antitrafficking laws, they are difficult to enforce. Outside entities such as the International Organization for Migration have been more successful in rescuing children from virtual slavery and placing them in shelters or returning them to their families.

SOLUTIONS

Scholars who study poverty agree that individual governments and international organizations must share the responsibility for alleviating poverty. Poverty alleviation programs generally consist of economic safety nets, increased job and credit opportunities, and programs designed to improve quality of life, education, and health care. Some scholars have found that placing women in control of the family economy in the poorest countries may be a factor in bringing children out of poverty. They maintain that increasing the discretionary spending of mothers leads to improved nutrition and health of children and makes children twenty times more likely to survive than when fathers control income.

Individuals and small organizations can also make a difference. In 2006, the Nobel Peace Prize Committee honored economist Muhammad Yunus of Bangladesh and the Grameen Bank for their pioneering work in instituting a program of microcredit in which small loans are granted to those who cannot secure loans from other sources. Recipients of these loans include penniless widows, abandoned wives, laborers, rickshaw drivers, sweepers, and beggars. With loans of only a few dollars, recipients raised themselves out of poverty with the purchase of milk cows, work tools, and merchandise for sale at small stalls. Yunus's work has inspired banks around the world to invest in similar projects.

See also *Children's Rights; Class and Politics; Globalization; Women's Rights.*

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Poverty, Feminization of

See *Feminization of Poverty.*

Power

Power, a central concept in political science, is the capacity to achieve values in collaboration with and in opposition to others. It includes the ability to act autonomously and to exercise influence or control over others. Power can be an end in itself, but it is primarily instrumental to the achievement of other objectives. Within a group or in relationships between a group and others, capacities tend to be distributed unevenly, so that more powerful people and groups have more autonomy than others, as well as more effect over others. When a distribution is extreme and persists over time, it is referred to as *domination*.

At the same time, less powerful individuals, groups, and political units may act autonomously to organize resistance to the demands of the more powerful and even seek to increase their capacities—both to act autonomously and to shape their environments. It is such contention and conflict that give politics its distinctive character, while interactions with others give power its essentially relational character. Power relations shape political activities as discrete phenomena, but they are often embedded perceptibly in institutions and invisibly in structures.

POWER IN POLITICAL THEORY

The classical political theorists concerned themselves primarily with concepts such as justice, the good life, equality, and so forth. At the same time, they also understood that power was instrumental to the achievement of these values. In *Politics,* Aristotle (384–322 BCE) used the distribution of power as the central criterion by which to distinguish governments of the one, the few, and the many. In his *History of the Peloponnesian War,* Thucydides (ca. 460–400 BCE) related, in the dialogue between the Athenians and the Melians, the aphorism, "The strong do what they will, and the weak suffer what they must," indicating the inequality of power and its consequences. Roman writers concerned themselves with gaining control of, managing, and regulating power.

As an analytical concept, power dates from the work of Niccolò Machiavelli, who devoted much of his writing (e.g., *The Prince,* 1532) to elucidating the uses and mechanisms of power. In *Leviathan* (1651), Thomas Hobbes held the view that power should be concentrated and institutionalized in a sovereign. John Locke, Charles-Louis Montesquieu, and the authors of *The Federalist Papers,* Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, devised their institutional arrangements of dividing, sharing, and separating power with the aim to avoid a concentration of power in the hands of any single individual, group, or institution.

In the twentieth century, writers sought to give more precise shape to the meaning of power, and they conducted extensive debates about its various aspects, its sources, its forms and manifestations, its uses, and its effects. In the primary modern discourse about power, shaped greatly by the writing of Robert Dahl and reactions to his ideas, democracy provided the central normative guideline. In parallel debates in international politics, a normative concern with stability primarily drove writers.

COMPONENTS OF CAPACITY

Capacity is built upon material resources—such as economic wealth and production facilities as well as military capabilities—and individual characteristics, social resources, and political arrangements. Accumulated wealth and current income can be used to purchase commodities and services that can be wielded to ensure autonomy, to gain the cooperation of others in amassing power, and to exercise power over others. Similarly, production facilities can be mobilized to extract, grow, and manufacture instruments for use in achieving political goals. In international politics but also in internal situations, military capabilities afford means for ensuring autonomy and exercising power, both through threats and through the actual use of military power to prevail in contested situations.

Some writers, such as Hannah Arendt in *On Violence* (1970), draw a sharp distinction between power and violence, whereas others, like Thomas Schelling in *Arms and Influence* (1966), have demonstrated the efficacy as well as the limitations of using violence to exercise influence. In maintaining a social order, the latent violence embodied in a police force proves an important component for ensuring domination, and sometimes the actual use of force conveys to society at large the power of the existing order and the high cost of opposition and resistance, thus gaining compliance.

Certain characteristics adhering to individuals also provide capacity. Max Weber, in *Economy and Society* (1978), analyzed the concept of charisma, an attribute of an individual that inspires others to defer to him, allowing the individual to amass power to achieve goals and to exercise power over others. Individuals also command respect and deference, and thus power capacity, by means of intellect and will, by use of knowledge, through rhetoric, by guile, and by the performance of brave and admired deeds.

The quality of personal magnetism provided for Weber one of three types of authority; the others were the traditional authority of inherited leadership and legitimate authority based in law and orderly procedure. These last two stem from social and political arrangements and are thus institutionalized. Whether derived from personal, social, or political characteristics, authority confers on leaders and officials the capacity to achieve values and to exercise power over others.

Social and political arrangements vary considerably in their allocation of authority and distribution of power. For example, monarchical political systems and aristocratic societies provide for inherited offices, titles, wealth, and privileges that confer power on those holding positions. In contrast, democratic electoral systems offer opportunities to many contenders to seek, win, and lose office, while capitalist economic arrangements are based on competition, with rewards for success and risks of failure. Patriarchal social arrangements place men in positions of power over women, whereas egalitarian societies aim for more nearly equal power for men and women. Slave societies structure power so that masters have nearly complete control over slaves. As slave revolts and political revolutions attest, those who are dominated sometimes resist and occasionally are able to overthrow a social and political order and

replace it with another. In both these cases, violence provides the instrument for maintaining and overthrowing systems of domination, although in both cases the violence is organized and wielded in the service of ideas and principles.

In less fundamental circumstances, individuals and groups contend to shape the behavior of those whose power derives from authority. Within polities, citizens, interest groups, and political parties contend over public policy and sometimes over constitutional arrangements. Within business organizations, workers and labor unions resist oppressive forms of domination and strive to control the structure of their working conditions and wages and benefits. Within markets, firms compete not only to gain greater shares but also to shape the rules and structures within which competition takes place. Within families, individuals contend to influence collective decisions and power structures governing family life.

The values human beings seek are countless. Political values include specific policy objectives but also more enduring concepts such as order and justice, equality and freedom, security and stability, and control and checking to avoid despotism and arbitrary rule. Aspirations to domination usually accompany some conception of a future order, but occur sometimes simply to achieve extrication from another group's domination and the achievement of autonomy. Because the future is contingent and others' intentions are uncertain, accumulation of power alone provides an important value in itself.

COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT

Collaboration is essential to gaining political power. Acting together with others through debate and deliberation to agree on common arrangements and objectives provides the basic dynamic for accumulating power. Although such collaboration can occur at many levels and in many ways, the most common comprehensive unit for composing political power in the contemporary world is the nation-state, with nationalism providing the impetus and identity and the state offering the mechanism for accumulating and exercising power. The state establishes the autonomy necessary for operating in a world in which the state form remains the fundamental political organization. Other institutions for political collaboration operate in a context of politics either within states or among them. Accumulated power provides the capacity to achieve goals, but objectives are more often than not achieved in the face of resistance by other centers of accumulated power, or by the actions of others who submit to a determined power wielder.

Thus, conflict characterizes political life as one group or political unit strives to achieve goals against others who may possess the values at stake or who hold incompatible values. Conflict occurs in greatly varied circumstances, ranging from local political issues like school bond issues and zoning decisions, to great matters of state within a polity that run the gamut from conflicts over the suppression of civil liberties and issues of war and peace to mundane issues such as allocating funds for road building, to struggles among states for regional or world domination. Each set of circumstances, to some extent, shapes the exercise of power. Within ordinary local and national politics in well-ordered societies, for example, space has been created to allow conflict to occur without overt violence. On the other hand, armed struggle commonly occurs in situations in which such space has not been insulated from violence, such as civil war situations and deep conflict over the control of territory and political arrangements in international relations.

EFFECTS OF DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

Although cultural and ideological considerations as well as political arrangements contribute to the circumstances in which political conflict occurs, the distribution of power itself shapes the manner in which conflict takes place and the instruments that are employed. In a hierarchical system, especially one in which government holds a monopoly on legitimate violence, conflict mostly occurs without war. In democratic polities, politics provides an arena for contention among groups that employ rhetoric, deliberation through constitutional means, resolution of conflict through legislative and judicial processes, and contested elections. The state exercises power by means of law and administrative routine and the latent power of police and its military monopoly, and it demonstrates its power through rituals, manipulation of symbols, and organizational practices. Other hierarchically organized societies concentrate power more in leaders or relatively small elites, leading to a more arbitrary exercise by the elites. Resistance cannot be channeled through legitimate means, but must be exercised through noncompliance, clandestine behavior, and violence. In such polities, the state usually employs violence more actively against its citizens than democratic polities do.

In anarchical systems, such as those that exist in international politics and civil war situations, power is distributed unevenly but still more equally than in a well-ordered state. The threat and use of force tend to be routine, although diplomacy, law, economic inducements, and institutional means also are brought into play. Distribution of power among more than two major powers in an international system results in greater uncertainty than occurs in a system with only two major powers. Balancing and checking tend to be routine activities in anarchical systems. In systems with a single state whose power greatly exceeds that of others, the leading state may be tempted by hubris in which it overestimates its potential to dominate the system, and resistance and checking are likely to be diffuse; they may also involve violence, even by nonstate actors, because no state or coalition of states may be in a position directly to confront the leading state. Still, the leading state is unlikely to be able to conquer the territories of other major powers whose autonomy remains intact. Structural distribution of power has other, subtler effects, as evidenced by the exponential growth of international nongovernmental organizations as the cold war ended and liberal states, whose ideology encourages nongovernmental political activity, assumed a position of hegemony in the international system.

Within domestic polities, structure results not only from the distribution of power, but also from constitutional or legal allocation of authority, processes, and capabilities. Structures are evident in such arrangements as the allocation of authority between national and provincial or state governments in a federal system and among different branches of government. They tend to be more obscure when they result from policy decisions, for example, tax policies that privilege certain groups who become more powerful over time and injure others who become weaker over time.

In the last part of the twentieth century and continuing into the twenty-first century, neoliberal ideology in favor of privatizing what had previously been public functions produced a trend toward allocating authority to private groups and firms, thus strengthening the structural power of nongovernmental institutions and weakening public ones. This devolution of power to private agencies encompassed not just functions such as cleaning and food provision services, but also police functions such as running jails and providing personal security to government officials in foreign combat zones. Aside from the implications for power, these arrangements diminished public accountability in democratic political systems.

EFFECTIVENESS AND CONTROL OF POWER

A paradox stems from the fact that power needs to be concentrated in order to be effective, while centralized power can easily be abused unless constrained. The problem of instituting means to control power has occupied thinkers who devise governing systems and practitioners who write constitutions. Limited terms of office and contested elections provide constraints in democratic systems, as do accompanying debates, a free press, and political parties. Other constitutional constraints, such as judicial review of executive decisions, have been employed. Governments employ surveillance in their exercise of power, but citizen groups watch over their public officials to hold them accountable. Elites contend for prestige, authoritative positions, and policy preferences, thus checking the power of incumbent elites. Since the rise of professional armed forces in the twentieth century, military leaders in some polities, such as Turkey, have regarded themselves as guardians of the state constitution and intervene against a government when they believe it to have exceeded or abused its power.

Without such mechanisms of control and constraint, authoritarian political leaders have provided many examples of the abuse of power. Abuses range from kleptocracy, in which a ruling elite appropriates the wealth of a country for its private gain, to despotic systems, in which small elites engage in repression of their citizens through torture, killing, and removal of populations on a large scale. In the late twentieth century, liberal governments and nongovernmental groups have organized internationally in attempts to control and constrain such abuses of power through the development of norms, treaties, and institutions as well as direct military intervention and the employment of economic sanctions.

Among international relations writers, there is some division between those who think that stability emanates from concentration of power and others who believe that it is more likely to be achieved through limited diffusion among great powers that check one another. Concepts of concentration of power include concert of power in which leading powers, on the basis of some principle, agree to cooperate in managing the international system. Another view, called power transition theory, holds that the system tends to be dominated by a single power, which is eventually supplanted through the rise of a challenger that replaces it. Similarly, hegemonic stability theory stresses that a dominant power provides the underpinning for an international political economy but that such a power may decline over time and be challenged by a rising power. In long-cycle theory, a system led by a dominant naval power is forged by consensus and rules until it is succeeded by the next power that commands the seas. Most commonly in international relations theory, however, balance of power is the prevalent conception and holds that great power is checked through the opposition and actions of other states that prevent, through diplomacy and war, the assumption of predominance by any single power, as did European powers that checked Napoleon, and the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States that checked Nazi Germany.

There are also debates among international relations scholars over the fundamental driving forces of power. As neatly summarized by John Mearsheimer in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001), there are three schools of thought: human nature realism, defensive realism, and offensive realism. In the first, an innate and universal quest for power drives human beings. The second holds that states seek limited power in order to maintain their positions in the international system. The third argues that the fear of domination leads states to seek unlimited power, which is checked only by inherent material limitations and others acting out of the same motivation. Other views include liberalism, which claims that power is controlled domestically through democratic political systems and internationally through cooperative institutions. Constructivists offer yet another perspective, arguing that international conflict is constructed through intersubjective understandings, thus a less conflictful system can be built through more cooperative discourse and less belligerent interpretations of the words and actions of others.

LEGITIMACY

Whether international or domestic, democratic or authoritarian, those who govern and impose system rules claim legitimacy for their domination, more often than not by asserting that the values that they embody are universal. In contrast, the weak, especially those who feel oppressed or who envision alternative governing arrangements, set forth claims for justice. Such disputes over values themselves form part of ongoing struggles for power. In general, dominant groups tend to stand for stability, whereas subordinate groups tend to advocate for change, and this pattern engenders a dynamic of politics. However, this tendency is not universal; dominant

groups sometimes advocate change to enhance their positions of domination or to bring additional groups within the scope of their rule. Revolutionary regimes frequently aim to spread their revolutions to other countries; but the United States, the leading country at the turn of the twenty-first century and a formidable stabilizing force in the world, has also endorsed changes of regimes from authoritarian rule to democratic rule and has taken actions that have destabilized certain countries and regions.

Legitimacy can be eroded by entropy engendered by incompetence of rulers and corruption within a political system, when a government no longer functions to achieve its declared values. In such conditions, a crisis can be brought on by economic failure, inept attempts to reform political arrangements, and outside pressures that illuminate government failure. In conditions of crisis, vigorous and sometimes virulent struggle occurs as new groups and new leaders seek to create a new order.

CONTINUING DEBATES

In academic debates about power, some writers have drawn attention to *nondecisions*, the fact that certain issues cannot arise in public debate because dominant groups have settled positions not allowing consideration of problems or values that some members of a polity would otherwise bring up. Another concern that has arisen in these debates involves the question of whether individuals and groups sufficiently understand their positions within a system of power to make claims for the values that would serve their interests. This is an unsettled area, but Stephen Lukes, a leading advocate of this view, in 2004 cast doubt on his own previous position, which held that subordinate groups did not understand their own interests.

With varied approaches and alternative interpretations of power, scholarly and public debates continue. Whatever disagreements about the meaning and place of power in politics may be, the use of material resources, individual skills, and social and political institutions in the pursuit of values remains a ubiquitous and universal characteristic of politics. Because individuals and groups aspire to achieve so many values, contention and conflict may be considered the essence of politics. Importantly, individuals and groups need to collaborate to enhance their power resources to achieve their values, and other individuals and groups with different values and objectives are certain to oppose them. Thus, the ancient concept, power, remains a central idea in political science today.

See also *Balance of Power; Constructivism; Hegemony; Legitimacy; Liberalism, Classical; Nationalism; Nation-state; Political Theory; Power Transition Theory; Realism and Neorealism; State, The.*

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Power Cycle Theory

Power cycle theory explains the evolution of systems structure and the concerns of statecraft, via the generalized cyclical dynamic of state rise and decline in relative power—the state power cycle. The theory discloses essential nonlinearities, or critical points, in the dynamic that affect government decisions about their foreign policy conduct. It explains how the actor and system go from normal periods of statecraft to rare intervals when structural undercurrents suddenly shift the trend on the state power cycle, shattering long-held expectations about future security and foreign policy and greatly increasing the probability of war or conflict.

Since its inception, power cycle theory has been replicated in numerous statistical studies. It provides a robust framework for causal analysis of international political behavior and a practical guide for policy makers assessing the ebb and flow of world power. Additionally, power cycle theory applies to analysis of the market power and behavior of the firm in international political economy.

Power cycle theory transformed the analytic understanding of the structural changes which fractured statecraft prior to World War I (1914–1918), undermining the thesis that Germany would have been master of Europe if it had not gone to war. During the years before the war, in the period of Germany's greatest achievements in terms of absolute power growth, its meteoric rise in relative power abruptly ended and, by 1914, the structural undercurrents turned Germany onto the path of relative decline. Power cycle theory thus exposes the conflicting messages and disturbing surprises in the evolution of the power cycle that make adjustments to structural change so difficult.

The state power cycles evolve as part of a single dynamic that maps the structural trends of history. The principles of

the power cycle explain how differential absolute growth sets the cycles in motion, creating a particular nonlinear pattern of change on each state's relative power trajectory. For instance, a single state growing faster than the systemic norm will initiate change on power cycles throughout the system, altering the systemic norm and the competitive relationships reflected on each state's power cycle trajectory.

When statespersons contemplate future change on a state power cycle, they form expectations regarding the state's future security and foreign policy role. There are five critical points of sudden, unanticipated change at which the statespersons' projected trend of relative power abruptly shifts, creating a crisis of foreign policy expectations. Each critical point on a state's power cycle corresponds to a time in its experience when the tides of history shifted in the international system, calling into question its foreign policy outlook and future security. The five critical points are:

1. Birth throes of a major power: a lower turning point, beginning the state's rise on its cycle.
2. Trauma of constrained ascendancy: an inflection point marking the shift from ever-increasing rise to ever-decreasing rise.
3. Trauma of expectations foregone: an upper turning point, where the rising state peaks and enters decline.
4. Hopes and illusions of the second wind: an inflection point where accelerating decline begins to decelerate.
5. Throes of demise as a major power: a lower turning point where further decline is halted.

What happens at a critical point is a complete deviation from the trend of projected expectations. Competition for power share creates powerful undercurrents that contour structural change via these critical shifts in the trend on state power cycles. Even at the moment of a state's greatest increase in absolute power, with its dynamism undiminished, the state may bump against the upper bound to relative growth and be pulled into relative decline by a much smaller but faster growing state. This tension holds large implications for the debate regarding absolute and relative gains.

Everything changes for the state and system when expectations regarding future security and role are shattered. Governments push and shove in these intervals of high uncertainty where the rules of the game are in flux and the stakes are so high, making wars of large magnitude, high intensity, and great duration statistically much more likely than in normal periods of statecraft, particularly for authoritarian governments. Empirical evidence confirms that a government tries to mitigate fears about security at a critical point by joining an alliance and forming bigger alliances. Militarized disputes, deterrence challenges, and an increased rate of deterrence failure are likewise much more probable in critical intervals.

This dilemma of peaceful change worsens since the role cycle lags behind the power cycle. As a state's relative power increases, other governments refuse to adjust or the state postpones role gratification. As relative power declines, allies demand security and elites want to retain prestige, causing

overextension for states that refuse to adapt. Power cycle theory proposes a dynamic equilibrium that matches strategies of opposition and balance, or of adaptation, to the trajectories of power change of potentially expansionist states.

See also *Balance of Power; Bandwagoning; Conflict Resolution; Equilibrium and Chaos; Foreign Policy Role; Power; Relative Power; Revolutions, Comparative; Systems Analysis; Systems Structure; Systems Transformation.*

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Power Indices

Since power is perhaps the most important concept in political science, it is natural that political scientists have been looking for correlates of power and, in that effort, found it important to measure it. However, the dispositional nature of the intuitive concept of power makes the measurement difficult. The difficulties encountered are akin to those faced within the study of causal relationships. Given this difficulty, some scholars have focused on the relatively clear-cut settings provided by voting bodies with unambiguous rules—decision rules—for determining which groups of voters form a winning majority. The first assumption made in these studies is that only winning groups—coalitions—of voters have power in the sense of influencing the voting outcomes. The second assumption is that these coalitions all have an equal amount of power.

One way to look at a voter's power in a voting body is to observe how often the voter is a member of a winning coalition. After all, it is the winning coalitions that determine the policies adopted by the body. The more often a voter is present in a winning coalition, the larger influence—it is assumed—the voter has on the policies. Before any coalitions have been formed, it is impossible to tell which kinds of winning coalitions will emerge and, consequently, in how many of them any

given voter is a member. In the *a priori* voting power indices, the concept of swing plays an important role. A voter has a swing in coalition S, for instance, if S is winning when the voter is its member, but nonwinning when the voter is not a member. The Banzhaf indices equate voting power of a voter with the number of the voter's swings when all coalitions are considered. The absolute Banzhaf index, also known as the Penrose-Banzhaf index, divides the number of the voter's swings by 2^{n-1}, while the normalized Banzhaf index uses the sum of all voters' swings as the divisor.

The Shapley-Shubik index, in turn, focuses on permutations of voters, i.e. ordered sequences of them. The total number of all possible sequences of n voters is given by $n! = n(n-1)(n-2)\dots 1$. Among these, a voter's power index value is obtained as the number of such sequences in which the voter has a swing when the winning coalition is formed by adding voters one at the time from the beginning of the sequence. This is the same as giving each swing of a voter in a coalition S with s members the weight $(s!)(n-s)!/n!$ and summing these numbers over all coalitions in which the voter has a swing

The two Banzhaf indices and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known indices of a priori voting power, but not the only ones. Another index, the public goods index shares the basic rationale of the Banzhaf indices, but instead of swings in winning coalitions, the number of swings in minimal winning coalitions is counted. Minimal winning coalitions differ from winning ones in that all members in them have a swing.

More recent indices are based on spatial voting games (i.e., they assume voter ideal points in policy space). A voter's power, according to these indices, is measured by the distance of (game-theoretic) equilibrium outcomes and the voter's ideal point.

See also *Coalition Formation; Coalition Theory; Power.*

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Power Sharing

Power sharing refers to a set of institutional arrangements that secures every major political force a position in government. Proportional representation, which encourages the coexistence of multiple political parties in the legislature, is a prominent example. Power sharing arrangements, however, are often a combination of mechanisms that ensure political diversity not only in legislatures, but also in executive offices—national or subnational.

Institutions of power sharing are almost always adopted as a response to actual or potential armed conflict, reflecting an attempt to manage violent rivalries of ethnic, religious, or purely political roots. Two or more parties share control of political power when the exclusion of one party would induce rebellions or escalate into civil war. Different combinations of power sharing institutions result from different types and territorial configurations of conflict.

The parliament was the main locus for power sharing in the earliest cases in the modern world—involving the introduction of minority representation in nineteenth-century Western Europe and Latin America. Such institutional innovation was oligarchic governments' response to divisions within the elite, or to the emergence of mass political parties. Power sharing at the level of the executive power has a subnational and a national formula: federalism, which is especially suited for managing conflict among geographically concentrated political forces, and grand coalition governments, which grant every significant party a position in the national cabinet and veto power over major decisions. Both mechanisms are core elements of various peace proposals in multiethnic settings in contemporary Africa.

See also *Federalism, Comparative.*

. . . . SEBASTIÁN MAZZUCA

Power Transition Theory

In international politics, power transition theory is a theory about the causes of major interstate wars. It emphasizes shifts in relative power among the dominant states as a primary catalyst for conflict. First set out by A. F. K. Organski in a 1958 textbook, power transition theory uses the metaphor of a pyramid to describe the hierarchy of states within the international system. At the top of the pyramid is a hegemon or a dominant power, whose supremacy is defined not only by a preponderance of material resources but also by political stability. Hegemonic ascendance is impermanent, however, and beneath the hegemon are a roiling clutch of *great powers*, or states that represent potential rivals to the hegemon and play their own part in shaping the international system, ever eager to assume the top spot. Beneath those are the middle powers, which may possess some regional significance, followed by the small powers.

According to power transition theory, the likelihood of stability and therefore peace, is greatest when a hegemon has

established a clear and credible dominance over the system. Hegemonic powers maintain global order; more precisely, they use their military and economic strength to set up global or regional regimes that increase their own security while promoting systemic stability. These regimes, which typically include a bundle of international political and economic institutions (but also, less formally, norms of global behavior), are designed to benefit both the dominant power and other states that agree to play by the rules of the hegemonic order. Such rule abiders are defined as *status quo states*, opposed to revisionist states that are dissatisfied with their place in the international order and wish to change the rules by which the international system functions.

Power transition theory emphasizes the dynamic and cyclical nature of international relations. Hegemons cannot stay on top for long—inescapable differences in rates of growth, institutional sclerosis brought on by the growth of vested interests at home, and the lure of imperial overstretch abroad all contribute to the eventual decline of the dominant power. According to power transition theory, the probability of war is greatest when a declining hegemon is being overtaken by a rising great power. Thus, if dominance keeps peace, a decline in dominance or confusion over the hegemon's status leads to war. In the dangerous period of power transition, the impulse toward war may come from either the hegemon or the challenger. The hegemon may see a benefit in waging a preventive war to thwart the challenger's imminent ascent; the challenger, meanwhile, may be eager to correct the perceived imbalance in the international system and give itself a place in the sun commensurate with its rising status. Either way, such hegemonic wars at the point of power transition usually create a new hegemonic power and a new order after the transition, leaving the hegemonic cycle to begin anew. Hegemonic wars alter the international system in accordance with the new distribution of power, eliminating the ambiguity that arises when a rising power challenges a dominant state.

Power transition theory is typically contrasted with balance of power theory, which arrives at fundamentally different conclusions despite starting with some common fundamental assumptions. Both theories emphasize the role of power and material interests in shaping international outcomes; both assume that states are the primary actors in global politics. Where the two theories fundamentally diverge, however, are on the consequences of power distribution. Power transition theory finds stability in the imbalance of power and argues that greater imbalances lead to greater stability. Balance of power theory, on the other hand, argues that stability is best achieved when power distribution is approximately symmetrical, precisely where power transition theory expects conflict to be greatest. While balance of power theory emphasizes the lack of order in the international system and the difficulty of hegemonic bids, power transition theory instead views international relations as episodes of stability within a hierarchical global system interrupted by bouts of hegemonic wars.

The two views may be usefully reconciled by noting that the likelihood of war may be greatest in times of transition between very imbalanced and very balanced systems—in other words, that both extreme inequality and extreme equality of power produce a degree of certainty, and thus decrease the likelihood of war, while systems between those two extremes are more prone to war. As a matter of historiography, balance of power theory traditionally focuses on European land-based military competition, while power transition theory often focuses on the international system as a whole, with a greater emphasis on naval superiority; this disjunction in scope may explain some of the disconnect between the two theories.

See also *Balance of Power; Hegemony; Power Cycle Theory.*

. . . .   VSEVOLOD GUNITSKIY

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Pragmatism

The term pragmatism refers to a theory of meaning, justification, and inquiry that was developed in the United States in the later nineteenth century. It has since enjoyed broad, if sometimes sporadic, influence in philosophy, political science, sociology, legal studies, and, more recently, in literary theory, and also the humanities more generally speaking.

MAIN IDEAS

Pragmatic thought begins with the so-called pragmatic maxim, which says, "There is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice." The pragmatist holds that any meaningful belief commits one to a particular set of expectations regarding the likely consequences of a given course of action. For example, if one believes that something (e.g., a diamond) is hard, then one is committed to the expectation that it will not be scratched by other substances under normal conditions.

If the meaning of a belief consists in the consequences that are expected to follow from acting on it, its validity depends on whether or not those expectations are met in practice. To the extent that they are not, one is said to be in a state of doubt with respect to that belief. For example, if one believes that a given stone is a diamond, and finds that it fails to scratch glass, then that belief will be thrown into doubt. Doubt for the pragmatist is always practical doubt; that is, to be in doubt is to be uncertain about what to do—just as to have a belief is to be disposed to do things in a certain way. The response to doubt is to posit a new belief—a hypothesis—that would account for the doubts, identifying the consequences that would be expected to follow if that belief were correct, and then acting—experimenting—in such a way to see whether those consequences follow in practice. The pragmatic theory

of inquiry is thus closely related to, and was in fact inspired by, the methods of modern experimental science.

According to the pragmatist, inquiry necessarily begins with the beliefs that one actually has—not from a self-evident, context-independent foundation—and when one or more of belief is thrown into doubt inquiry is conducted in order to arrive at better ones—better, again, in the sense of better answering the practical demands of a given context, not of meeting a universal or timeless standard of truth. The pragmatist is therefore not concerned to show how valid beliefs are possible in principle, but only to determine how one should go about revising beliefs once a particular doubt arises.

For the pragmatist, it is not beliefs themselves, but only changes in belief, that are in need of justification—just as for Galileo and Isaac Newton it is not motion itself, but only changes in motion, that are in need of explanation. In fact, doubt itself is only possible against a background of stable beliefs, just as motion can only be perceived against a background of stable reference points. Thus the pragmatist endorses fallibilism while rejecting skepticism: any one of an individual's beliefs might be called into doubt at any given time, but it is literally unthinkable that all of this person's beliefs might be called into doubt at the same time.

HISTORY
The philosopher and logician Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) first formally stated the pragmatic maxim in an essay titled "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," published in 1878. Peirce's work was largely ignored until his more famous friend, the philosopher and psychologist William James (1842–1910), drew on it in the lecture "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" that he delivered at Berkeley in 1898, and in a series of essays and lectures that he published over the course of the next decade. It was James who first publicly used the word *pragmatism* to describe Peirce's views, and by applying Peirce's maxim to controversial questions such as the existence of God, the reality of free will, the meaning of truth, and the implications of metaphysical pluralism, he brought the term to the forefront of philosophical debate.

The philosopher and educational theorist John Dewey (1859–1952) most systematically developed pragmatic ideas. Dewey extended these ideas into nearly all of the traditional areas of philosophical inquiry. Along with the sociologist George Herbert Mead (1863–1931), Dewey was also responsible for introducing pragmatism into the social sciences. The pragmatic tradition was largely neglected from the time of Dewey's death until the 1970s, when the philosopher Richard Rorty (1931–2007) drew attention to the connection between Dewey's work and some of the central themes in twentieth-century philosophy. Rorty's writings helped spark a rich and far-reaching revival of pragmatic thinking that continues to the present day.

INFLUENCE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
The four aspects of pragmatic thought that have had the greatest influence on the study of politics are (1) its antiessentialism about concepts, (2) its social theory of meaning, (3) its community-oriented theory of inquiry, and (4) its anti-foundationalism about matters of justification.

Pragmatists were among the first to argue that social scientists should study the actual practice of politics, rather than the formal properties of political institutions or the formal relationships between political concepts. Prominent examples of this line of inquiry include Oliver Wendell Holmes's legal realism, Arthur F. Bentley's process-oriented theory of governance, Harold J. Laski's pluralistic theory of sovereignty, and Dewey's functionalist theory of the state.

The idea that meaning is constituted through social practices has led some pragmatists to conclude that social life ultimately rests on communication oriented toward mutual understanding. This idea, which is most closely associated with the work of Mead, has been especially influential in recent German social theory, playing a prominent role, for example, in Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative action and in Axel Honneth's theory of mutual recognition.

The idea that knowledge is best acquired through experimental inquiry has given rise to a distinctively pragmatic strain of democratic theory. Dewey, for example, associates democratic citizenship with participation in an open and inclusive community of inquirers, and Habermas's defense of deliberative democracy, along with that of Karl-Otto Apel, relies heavily on Peirce's idea that truth is best thought of as the ideal endpoint of collective inquiry.

Pragmatism's antifoundational implications have been most influentially explored by Rorty, who argues that social criticism necessarily begins and ends with the *ethnocentric* self-understandings of a given community. His pragmatic weaving together of themes from postanalytic and postmodern philosophy has given rise to a novel and influential defense of liberalism and has also helped to inspire, among other things, a pragmatic jurisprudence and a pragmatic literary theory.

See also *Dewey, John.*

. . . . ERIC MACGILVRAY

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Prebendalism

Prebendalism is one form of decentralized patrimonialism. Patrimonialism refers to an organization, usually a state, in which the administration and military force are purely personal instruments of the ruler or leader. Prebendalism is a type of patrimonialism in which officials are supported by benefices, including provisions in kind from the personal resources of the ruler, rights to the use and profits from land, or the appropriation of property income, fees, or taxes. Other forms of patrimonialism include feudalism and rule by local notables. Centralized forms of patrimonialism include sultanism and patriarchalism, with more authoritarian state systems.

There are many historical examples of prebendalism, including income given to church administrators in the form of cathedral estates, land given to elites on the Ottoman Empire in exchange for military service, and various waivers of fees and taxes given to important clients of African states. Nigeria is a classic example of such exchanges for loyalty to the state. Prebendalism is sometimes an accepted practice, and at other times considered a form of corruption, depending on the legal setting. The main danger of prebendalism from the perspective of rulers is that they will lose control of the assets they have given as benefices, and thus their resources and power will devolve from the ruler to the benefice holders.

See also *Corruption, Political; Feudalism; Patronage.*

. . . . EDGAR KISER

Prebisch, Raúl

Raúl Prebisch (1901–1986) was an Argentine economist and politician. His seminal contributions to structural economics provided the inspiration for dependency theory and import substitution industrialization (ISI) in Latin America. As president of Argentina's Central Bank, director of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), and secretary-general of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Prebisch was instrumental in the formulation of Latin America's innovative trade and development policies during the mid-twentieth century.

Prebisch was born on April 17, 1901, in Tucumán, Argentina. He studied economics at the University of Buenos Aires from 1918 to 1922, and in 1923 began teaching political economics at the university, a post he held until 1948. During these early years, he demonstrated a strict adherence to free trade orthodoxy, a position supported by the booming Argentine export sector during the 1920s. However, with the devastation of Argentine economy during the Great Depression, Prebisch changed his position and became an advocate of Keynesian economics.

In 1935 Prebisch was appointed president of the Central Bank in Argentina. In this position, he and his colleagues began wrestling with the economic effects of the Great Depression. By reexamining British economist David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage, Prebisch noticed that supply conditions for primary products—those produced through farming, fishing, and forestry—were significantly different from those conditions that characterized secondary, or manufactured, products. The income elasticity of demand for secondary, or manufactured, products was greater than that for primary products. Specifically, as incomes rose, the demand for manufactured goods increased more rapidly than the demand for primary products. This notion is best expressed in the famous anecdote that as incomes rise, people will buy more cars, televisions, and stereos, but "they can only drink so much coffee." Consequently, countries exporting primary products and importing secondary, or manufactured, products would experience declining terms of trade. For Prebisch, this situation appeared to define the trade sectors of most Latin American countries.

In 1950, while serving as executive secretary of ECLAC, Prebisch made his significant breakthrough on the problem of declining terms of trade, in *The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems* (1950). The thesis argued that there was a growing gap between the incomes of less developed countries and advanced industrial societies because of a long-term decline in the prices of primary products, which happened to define the export sectors of developing countries. The reason for this long-term decline was due, in large part, to the difference between the income elasticity of demand for secondary products versus primary products. Consequently, countries exporting manufactured products and importing primary products (the advanced industrial core) were able to retain and reinvest savings from manufactured production in unions, higher wages for value-added production, and commercial institutions. In contrast, countries exporting primary products and importing manufactured products (the less developed periphery) had fewer and fewer savings from primary production to reinvest in wages and commercial development. In fact, peripheral countries were required to export more primary products in order to get the same relative value over time.

The implication of this idea was that peripheral states were being drawn into an increasing state of underdevelopment and dependency upon the core states through participation in international trade, where the peripheral states became the producers of raw materials for the core's lucrative manufacturing sector. Over time, the benefits of this international trading relationship would increasingly accrue to the core. Han Singer, a German economist, also independently arrived at a similar conclusion and, as such, this theory of declining terms of trade became known as the Prebish-Singer thesis. After this finding, ECLAC and Prebisch became the center of Latin American economic activism and the Latin American school of structural economics.

Although he still advocated continued trade with advanced industrial societies, Prebisch sought to encourage Latin American governments to stimulate domestic manufacturing in order to reduce their reliance on manufactured imports and primary exports. This idea was later used to justify a policy that became known as import substitution industrialization (ISI). He also advocated for regional economic integration, land reform, and political reform to reduce the income inequalities and overcome the structural impediments to the development of domestic

markets. By July 1963, however, as ECLAC and the policy of ISI began to show serious flaws, Prebisch left the organization.

Between 1964 and 1969, Prebisch served as the secretary-general of UNCTAD. In this role, he molded the organization into an advocacy body for development. Specifically, he adopted a trade-focused approach to development, with particular emphasis on regional integration and preferential access to markets for developing states. He also publicly criticized ISI for having failed to bring about proper development. Disillusioned with the bureaucracy and failures of UNCTAD, Prebisch resigned in 1969. In 1984 he returned to Argentina to work with the newly elected democratic government of President Raúl Alfonsín. Prebisch died on April 29, 1986, in Las Vertientes, Chile.

See also *Economic Development, State-led; Economic Interdependence; Economic Policy Formulation; Economic Systems, Comparative; Free Trade; Latin American Political Economy; Trade Diplomacy.*

. . . . MICHAEL MCNAMARA

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Precedent

A precedent is a judicial decision regarded as providing a new rule for deciding similar cases that may later arise. Precedents from higher courts are typically binding upon lower courts within the same judicial system. The doctrine of *stare decisis*, or "stand by things decided," directs a court to follow and uphold its own prior decisions as well; however, in many judicial systems, this is not an absolute duty. As traditionally formulated, precedent does not extend to the entirety of a prior decision but only to the considerations relevant to the result, otherwise called the *holding*.

The practice of following precedent is primarily associated with common law jurisdictions, such as Canada, England, and the United States. Some civil law systems, more commonly found in continental Europe, exhibit related, less stringent, practices of adhering to prior long-settled points of law. Justifications for the practice of following precedent include promoting stability and predictability, reducing decision costs, and constraining judicial discretion. In those exceptional circumstances in which a court overrules one of its precedents, the decision to do so is usually based on determinations that the precedent is no longer relevant due to changed societal or legal conditions, is obviously incorrect, or has proven itself unworkable in practice.

See also *Common Law; Judicial Review; Supreme Court.*
. . . . AARON-ANDREW P. BRUHL

Predatory Government

Predatory government refers to a condition in which corruption, inefficiency, and abuse of power mark political institutions. Predatory governments typically lack transparency or a system of checks and balances to prevent abuses by one or more government branches. Bureaucracies may be weak or ineffective, or they are highly powerful constituting the ruling class and often act unchecked or unaccountable to the population. Predatory governments typically allow only a low level of economic and personal freedom for its citizens, and often come in authoritarian forms, such as dictatorships or oligarchies. The ultimate form of predatory government is a *kleptocracy*, meaning "rule by thieves," in which political leaders use their positions and power to enrich themselves to the detriment of their citizens.

The notion deeply intertwines with traditional Western liberal criticisms of the potential power of the state. The growing size of modern government sectors, especially in the economic sphere, has led to charges of predatory government action in developed democracies. The use of regressive tax systems or fees is often cited as a manifestation of predatory governments failing to provide for the common good despite largely benefiting the elite classes. Another example is the use of large public expenditures to support projects of policies expected to have a limited impact on the citizenry, but beneficial to a leader's personal interests or personal contacts. In 2000, former Indonesian president Suharto was placed under house arrest for the alleged embezzlement of half a billion U.S. dollars from government donations to finance his own personal investments. By 2004, the German nongovernment organization, Transparency International, declared Suharto misused approximately $15 to $35 billion during his thirty-two years as president in Indonesia.

See also *Autocracy; Corruption and Other Political Pathologies; Police State; Totalitarianism; Tyranny, Classical.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Preemption

Many political scientists draw a major distinction between preemption and preventive war. Some define *preemption* as action taken when an enemy attack is imminent, such that the term should not be applied when an adversary poses a longer-term threat. Others point to the nature of the logic driving such actions, with preemption referring to situations where the offense is favored in warfare, such that either side will feel driven to attack if war is imminent, by the mere calculation of how to be a winner rather than a loser on the battlefield. The logic of *preventive war*, by contrast, is not driven by an offensive-favoring cast to military weaponry, but by forecast of the trends in military, economic, or demographic power, as one may be stronger than an adversary now, and weaker in the future.

MORAL VERSUS ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENTS

Leaving aside analytical disputes, an important part of the debate may instead derive from the world's strong moral preference for peace over war. Preemption, in this *moral* balance, is a situation where war is now inevitable, and the choice is then simply between one kind of war and another—the war that captures the advantages of striking first and the war where the other side gains this advantage.

Arms control experts and people in general lament the situation that drives opposing states into such a war and hope to avoid such situations by seeking *crisis stability* or *strategic stability*, by avoiding the weapons that favor the attack, and by stressing the kinds of weapons that reward sitting on the defensive. When wars are straightforward actions of preemption, they become *no-fault* wars, where neither side wanted war, but each wanted to avoid being defeated in a war. The situation of the adversaries is very much that portrayed in the game theory *prisoners' dilemma*, where both sides wind up in a bad situation, because they fear something even worse.

In this moral assessment, a preventive war by contrast amounts to a conscious choice to replace peace with war for the present. The world would remain at peace for months or years or decades into the future, while diplomatic means are explored for the resolution of disputes, while worst-case fears of future trends are proved or disproved. Rather than blaming the situation, the peace-loving audience condemns the national leader who makes the choice to launch such a war—a war that did not have to happen.

THE BURDENS OF LEADERSHIP

In defense of any leader launching such a war, however, is the heavy responsibility for protecting a nation's safety, so that worst-case assumptions are recognized as very real. If an adversary is rolling tanks toward a nation's border, the response of anticipatory self-defense is accepted as preemption. However, if this adversary is simply training new troops, or developing new military technologies, or merely growing in population and industrial strength, these scenarios challenge the parameters for defining first moves of a coming attack. Preemption may be characterized as the case where war was inevitable, so that there was no peace lost in the actions taken. But the national leader charged with looking far into the future may see such war as inevitable, and thus may feel that the decision for action does not reduce the total of world peace in the process.

NONMILITARY EXAMPLES

The phenomenon of preemption is hardly confined to military conflict, for it is found in many examples from ordinary life in law-abiding domestic society. The term most generally refers to an action taken in anticipation of an action by an opposing actor. The ploy of the preemptive bid in the card game of bridge serves as one familiar example.

While the occurrence of negative campaigning in any electoral contest in a democracy is generally deplored, the logic behind such negativity is often a calculation that one's opponent may score a point with some mudslinging the following morning; in this case, the candidate likely moves to beat the opponent to it with some such attacks the prior evening. If the electoral public is inclined to frown on whoever makes personal attacks in a campaign, the temptation to launch such attacks, and the fear that someone else is about to launch them, lessens, and the prisoners' dilemma disappears. When the public, however, tends to be titillated by such attacks and to believe that there must be some truth to the charges, it is very difficult to avoid the traps of preemption.

AMERICAN ATTITUDES IN THE PAST

With regard to international military conflict, those who want preemption confined to very narrow bounds likely cite what may be the most significant American contribution to international law, the Caroline doctrine developed in an 1841 note by Secretary of State Daniel Webster in response to an 1837 British preemptive attack on an American ship in the Niagara River loaded with arms intended for rebels in Canada. Ironically, supporters of the American incursion into Iraq today argue that one should not make too much of the Caroline doctrine, but the international legal community has often cited the parameters proposed by Webster, that a preemptive attack could only be justified if the opposing attack were immediately imminent, and that the preemption must be proportionate in scale to the attack being fended off.

Skeptics about such a standard emphasize that this doctrine emerged when Britain was dominant on the high seas, and America was weak, and when Britain had professed a willingness to engage in preemption or preventive war more generally if its naval preponderance was ever challenged. Such skeptics also cite the example of the Nazi threat of world dominance in the 1930s, and the prospect of terrorist attacks today with weapons of mass destruction, as arguments that a much broader array of preemptive attacks may have to be legitimate.

See also *War Powers; Weapons of Mass Destruction.*

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Preferential Voting

Preferential voting occurs within the framework of a particular type of ballot structure, used in both single-winner and multiple-winner elections around the world. Examples

include the alternative vote and single transferable vote systems. Unlike nonpreferential ballots where voters mark an *X* or checkmark next to their preferred candidate(s), preferential ballots have an ordinal structure, requiring that voters rank candidates in order of preference. Within this framework, voters mark a 1 next to their first choice candidate, 2 next to their second choice, 3 next to their third choice, until the required number of preferences are exhausted.

In determining the election outcome, ballot counting incorporates not only the votes for those ranked with 1, but also includes the rankings that follow. In the alternative vote system, for example, a candidate requires 50 percent or more of voters' support to win the race. If no candidate wins 50 percent of first preference votes, then the candidate with the fewest votes is dropped, and the second preferences on the dropped ballots are reallocated to all of the remaining candidates, and so on, until a candidate obtains more than 50 percent of the votes. Proponents of preferential systems argue that they allow for greater voice and participation for those preferring third party candidates and minority parties, whose votes would be "wasted" under other systems, since although their first choice candidate may not win the race, the preferences remaining on their ballots are transferred, and will play a role in the outcome of the election.

See also *Ballot Design; Electoral Systems.*

. . . . AMANDA BITTNER

Prerogative

Prerogative, according to the political philosopher John Locke, is "this power to act according to discretion for the public good, without the prescription of law and sometimes even against it." Locke's notion of prerogative has influenced the development and understanding of executive powers and responsibilities in modern constitutional government, and it is to Locke whom most refer when discussing this concept. Prerogative has a long, rather controversial, history and has been defined and used differently over time. As a result, it remains one of the most perplexing concepts to students of constitutional government.

The term stems from Latin *praerogativa,* which literally means "ask before," which was a procedure during the Roman Republic whereby a segment of the assembly (chosen by lot) would cast their votes first and thus influence the outcome of the vote. Prerogative later became associated with the privileges and powers of feudal lords in medieval Europe (those who were asked first before all others) and eventually with those of the European monarchs, with the royal prerogative of the British Crown emerging as the most well-known example. The royal prerogative was defined as the collection of powers and privileges belonging to the British monarch exclusively and not subject to review or repeal. Prerogative was entirely discretionary and included any act that the Crown, or its ministers, exercised without any consultation of Parliament. Prerogative powers separated the monarch from everybody else,

placing the king above the law. As the English jurist William Blackstone suggests, prerogative "can only be applied to those rights and capacities which the King enjoys alone, in contradistinction to others, and not to those which he enjoys in common with any of his subjects."

In his renowned study *The Constitution of England,* Jean Louis de Lolme offers a list of the British Crown's prerogative, which included granting titles of honor, coining money, performing as supreme judge or head of the Church of England, interacting with foreign nations (to include the prerogative to initiate war and sign treaties), and raising armies and navies and directing them in times of war. In exercising its prerogative, the king, accordingly, is "above the reach of all Courts of law whatever, and that his person is sacred and inviolable." Perennial conflict arose from the prerogative existing among the most important powers and privileges of the nation, vesting them solely to the monarch subject to no other body—and on occasion violent revolt—between the Crown and Parliament over the arbitrary exercise and abuse of this power and attempts to limit it.

Over time, as the power of the monarch within the British political system decreased, the residual prerogative has become associated with the unilateral powers exercised by the ministers and other members of the executive branch within British Commonwealth countries. Similarly, scholars of the American presidency have applied this conception of prerogative to refer to unilateral executive action exercised to accomplish particular domestic and foreign policy objectives. These prerogatives, though controversial, are usually contained within the interpretive purview of the president's powers.

In his *Second Treatise,* John Locke shifted the focus of prerogative away from the particular powers of the monarch to a broader framework of emergency powers within limited constitutional government. Prerogative, more specifically, emerges as a means to describe the extraordinary and extraconstitutional powers exercised by a government's executive branch in times of emergency.

Locke frames the exercise of prerogative power as a fundamental tension between a constitutional government's need for a strong and extraordinary executive power in times of danger while also aiming to prevent the abuse of such power and bound the executive by the rule of law. Locke, among others, recognized the disadvantages that legislative bodies would have in trying to prescribe laws to meet the various contingencies the political order might encounter. Therefore, Locke suggested that, in time of danger, the executive ought exercise extraordinary powers and even act outside of the legal order to preserve it, as long as such measures were done for the public good. The uncertainty of the dangers that a government might face from war, natural disaster, or other catastrophic event led Locke to conclude that the executive must be equipped with a potentially unlimited reservoir of power to ensure the safety and survival of the state.

Locke's expanded notion of prerogative, in essence, highlights the tension between natural and positive law in that the latter may, on occasion, be violated to realize the former.

Modern political philosophers, Locke among them, suggested that self-preservation was the fundamental tenet of the natural law. His argument was that, in times of danger, the executive must be able to take discretionary actions outside of the scope of the written positive law, and violate it if necessary, to preserve oneself. Due to its seemingly unlimited and arbitrary nature and the potential for severe abuse, prerogative poses problems for constitutional government and liberal democracies that seek to limit power and protect individuals. It may, in practice, be tantamount to nothing more than a mere veil to tyranny operating on behalf of the public good.

See also *Monarchy.*

. . . .   TODD R. LOWERY

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Presidencialismo

The Spanish term presidencialismo is common throughout Latin America and refers to the concentration of political power in the office of the presidency. This fact of political life has several explanations. First, Spanish colonies were ruled for more than three hundred years by absolute monarchs and highly centralized top-down hierarchical arrangements. Following the Wars of Independence in the early nineteenth century, politics was dominated by *caudillo* figures, or "strong men on horseback," who seized power through strength of personality or ruthlessness, and who bent legislators and judges to their will. Competing sources of power were largely absent. As electoral politics began to take hold in the latter part of the nineteenth century, political parties were for the most part personalist vehicles for individual leaders seeking the presidency, not consistent policies or ideologies.

During the first few decades of the twentieth century, more and more Latin American countries experimented with electoral democracy, but this frequently meant semidemocratic rule at best and sometimes harsh and brutal rule by presidents who cemented themselves in office through a variety of techniques, legal and illegal. Extreme personalist examples include Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay (1954–1989) and Rafael Trujillo of the

Dominican Republic (1930–1961). Such presidents often wrote (or had written for them) constitutions that gave them considerable power, but the question of how long such a president could rule remained unclear. A military *golpe de estado* or coup was one way to terminate a president's administration; another was constitutional proscription on immediate reelection, a legal device that had been used since the nineteenth century. But this period of experimentation came to an end starting in 1964 with a coup in Brazil that was followed by many others, until by the late 1970s only Colombia and Venezuela had civilian governments in South America.

Since the decade of the 1980s, all Latin American countries, except Cuba, have returned to electoral democratic rule, and the great majority did so under newly written constitutions. These documents in general carry on the tradition of a strong chief executive and give significant power to the president and, for the most part, much less to the legislature. As a rule, and there are many variations on this theme, presidents are given a great deal of formal and informal discretion; if they have a majority in the legislature, their power may be virtually unlimited. In addition, most Latin American constitutions give presidents the power to rule by decree; that is, they can issue laws when they wish to do so without consulting or the approval of the legislature.

There is considerable variation on the question of reelection. Some countries have strict no-reelection policies (e.g., Mexico); others allow it with an intervening term or two terms, while still others allow immediate reelection or reelection after an intervening term. A strong party can indeed be reelected time after time (e.g., again in Mexico from 1929–2000), but such dominance may be due more to party strength rather than a single individual. Whatever the case, these variations illustrate the tension between the tradition of a strong chief executive and the historical record of abuse of such strength.

See also *Latin American Political Thought; Latin American Politics and Society.*

. . . .   HENRY A. DIETZ

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Presidency and Women

Scholarship on the presidency and women was in its infancy until the 1980s. This is perhaps because the areas perceived as most visible in producing action on the part of women and tangible outcomes of research measurable through quantification (e.g., appointments) did not fully embrace the office of the presidency or women in a common or systematic direction until the presidency of Jimmy Carter. Although the field of public administration had already begun to look at women throughout the federal civil service, and historians had long taken note of the contributions of women such as Clara

Barton, it was only the occasional creative political scientist who took a fresh look at the role of the president vis-à-vis women. A focus on substance of legislation and actions of the president, rather than institutional and constitutional processes, would have produced a different outcome in the political history that commonly became reproduced in books and articles.

WOMEN PROTESTORS AND LOBBYISTS

Theda Skocpol's seminal work, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States* (1992), provides a deeper understanding of the vetoes on the part of presidents beginning in the late 1880s. Skocpol notes that the vast number of vetoes had to do with private bills passed by Congress seeking relief not only for civil war veterans, but also for widows of the six hundred thousand veterans killed on both sides of that war. The issue was centrally focused on the relationship between women and the presidency in the broad area of social policy. Political scientists who focus solely on the long-term struggle for power between Congress and the presidency, and the increased and then decreased use of vetoes in understanding shared and separated powers in the Constitution, fall short in their analysis without noting the substance of those vetoes, and the major constituent group—women—affected by policy decisions on pensions.

Clear documentation exists that women have been petitioning the president as lobbyists for over one hundred years. Early photos taken in the decade after the West Wing was added to the White House prominently show women in the lines of lobbyists, documenting their role in following their First Amendment responsibilities to petition government for a redress of grievances.

WOMEN IN GOVERNMENT ROLES

The rise of women's organizations, with a focus on labor interests, child welfare, and workplace safety, as well as the professional interests of women, became a major concern and received the attention of some administrations. Jane Addams lobbied President Theodore Roosevelt on behalf of children. Frances Perkins—later named by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the post of secretary of labor and the first woman appointed to a position as secretary in a president's cabinet—became acquainted with Roosevelt following the tragic Shirtwaist factory fire in New York City in 1911. Roosevelt, Robert Wagner, and Al Smith were all in the New York legislature at the same time and passed legislation to create the New York State Factory Investigation Commission, later formed with Wagner as chair, and Frances Perkins as the commission's secretary.

Structural barriers kept women from posts in the foreign service, and therefore women did not have many opportunities for involvement in foreign policy decision making until the late 1990s. Positions as ambassadors were also constrained, although presidents who drew from an appointment pool outside of the careerists in the foreign service were more likely to include women in their ambassadorial pool, and women have now been appointed as ambassadors since the 1930s. Therefore,

the management styles of presidents did reflect how women were included in an administration, as well as the president's perspective of the foreign service career. When appointments were drawn from the pool of careerists, few women would serve as ambassadors; when ambassadors came from a pool of political appointees, the percentage of women selected for the rank of ambassador increased.

There has been progress for women advancing to the highest ranks in the foreign policy decision-making apparatus of the White House. Madeleine Albright served both as the foreign policy adviser to Bill Clinton during his presidential campaign and later as the first female secretary of state during his second term of office. Condoleezza Rice served on President George H. W. Bush's national security staff, and then as foreign policy adviser and secretary of state in the second term of President George W. Bush. In addition, President Barack Obama selected Hillary Clinton as secretary of state, and she challenged Obama for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination. Nonetheless, until the 1990s, women did not make the same gains overall in serving in high-level positions in the areas of government foreign and defense policy. Women have long been actively discouraged from joining the foreign service through its examination and appointment policies, resulting in a number of lawsuits against the State Department.

The move to an all-volunteer army during the Nixon administration, coming coincidentally at the same time as the push for an equal rights amendment (ERA), created new opportunities for women and minorities to rise through the ranks. In order for an all-volunteer army to succeed with a sufficient number of recruits, a certain number of minorities and women were required. The linking of the two issues—support for equal rights for women and breaking down barriers for women and minorities in military service—eventually led to the service academies accepting applications from women, and positions long closed to women in the military began to open up. Once women gained combat experience in an official capacity, they moved up the ranks to serve in the highest posts in the Department of Defense.

With the growth of the executive branch and the establishment of the Executive Office of the President, some of the roles and activities of women within the White House became more formalized. The Office of the First Lady was established in 1978, which recognized the long-established working relationship between the president and his spouse. In addition, studies in the past ten years have focused specifically on the topic of the presidency and women, examining the broader role many first ladies played as true advisers to the president, with archival research offering much evidence of this.

WOMEN'S CONNECTIONS WITH THE WHITE HOUSE

Several decades ago, political scientist George Edwards, a prolific author of studies on the presidency, urged scholars to adopt a behavioral approach to their work. This led to some of the first work on presidents and women when the National Academy of Public Administration established

databases on presidential appointments. As scholars continued to add to this work, some aspects became the derided "bean counters" President Clinton harped upon as the numbers of women appointed and confirmed in each administration were counted, noting the cycle of appointments made to women. Also noting women's federal judgeships as well as titles and roles in the White House, the procedure accounted for the experience of these women in prior department or federal sector work; job experience in Washington; work on a congressional staff, interest group, or party organization; as well as lower-level posts. Another topic of studies focused on presidential speeches, along with choice of advisers and strategies for managing information.

In terms of policy, judicial scholars have begun to place attention on the solicitor general in texts on the presidency. The solicitor general, rarely the focus of presidency studies, has been highly important in setting the agenda of the Supreme Court in cases of particular importance to women in the past thirty years—such as reproductive rights, affirmative action, and equal opportunity. However, references to the bully pulpit and communications studies continue to omit an area rich in potential research. The suffrage movement and the ERA are areas in which presidential rhetoric could have some potential influence. Most studies that have focused on these topics, however, have not turned to the presidential archives for a detailed examination of the president's role in amendment processes, which is far more limited than the congressional or state legislative role. For example, the case of President Jimmy Carter is a good one for reexamining specifically what a president could do in passage and ratification of an amendment versus the major role a president can play in the policy process in general. Questions thus arise regarding what policy options were forgone with the focus in the late 1970s on the ratification of the ERA, and whether President Carter could have done more.

Also uncertain is whether the role of the president was fully understood by the time of the 1980 campaign. This issue is one that is particularly important for political scientists to turn to as various amendment drives take hold. Even the case of suffrage should be refocused with a critical examination of the role Woodrow Wilson could have taken. This would help clarify the separation of powers and a federal system, the rhetoric of a president, and the constitutional powers and limits on a president. It would also be useful in understanding larger issues such as war powers in terms of leadership and what presidents can and cannot do, as well as how they explain their role and choose their actions, and what constitutes the essence of their decision-making process. For amendments, what policy work a president chooses to not spend time on can also be examined. With the reintroduction of the ERA in the 110th Congress, these questions are relevant for the incoming administration, and for women in particular.

See also *Feminism; Feminist Movement; Gender and Politics; Gender Issues; U.S. Politics and Society: Women, Political Participation of; Women's Studies; Women's Suffrage.*

. . . . JANET M. MARTIN

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Press, Freedom of the

See *Freedom of the Press*.

Press/Fourth Estate

The term *the press* refers to the idea that the major news media outlets in a country, taken together, perform important functions necessary for governance, acting collectively as an important institution alongside the official governmental institutions. The phrase *fourth estate* first appeared in print from Thomas Carlyle in 1837 in reference to the revolutionary war in France, where Carlyle suggested that the "able editors" of the newspapers played an equal role to the recognized three estates of prerevolutionary French government: the church, the nobility, and the bourgeoisie or commoners. Carlyle attributes this phrase to Edmund Burke, who he quotes as saying there were three estates in the British parliament, but that the reporters' gallery was an estate more powerful than them all.

PRESS/FOURTH ESTATE IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

The phrase *fourth estate* has translated well into American politics, with the suggestion that in addition to the three official branches of government—the executive, legislative, and judicial branches—the press acts as a fourth branch of government. In this conception, the press is expected to provide a conduit of communication between the government and the people, relaying all-important information about government to the citizens, and also to be a watchdog, or provide checks and balances on the three official branches of government. There is some indication that the Founders of the United States shared this view, in that freedom of the press is provided for in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and subsequent court decisions have expanded the freedom of the press.

U.S. free press protections expanded on those traditional under British law in preventing the press' prior restraint on publication of information and allowing only for prosecution after the information was disseminated. Since this time, all major democracies have adopted protections of freedom of the press, in recognition that the media play important roles in

democratic governance. Despite these protections and perhaps the intentions of democratic governments to delegate these duties to the media, scholars have suggested that the media, and especially commercial media driven by profit motives, are ill-suited for performing these functions in a democracy.

MODELS OF GOVERNMENT AND PRESS RELATIONS IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

Scholars have identified three models of media as political institutions in Western democracies. The liberal model is the most prominent model, typified by the United States, Canada, and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom. In the liberal model, the government exerts very little influence over the media in terms of content, and, in the case of the United States, in terms of funding. In all liberal model countries, there are laws preventing the government from interfering in the production and dissemination of news, with the U.S. First Amendment protections the strongest in this realm. Political parallelism, or the connections between the press and the major political parties, is low in liberal countries, allowing the press to be independent and critical of all parties. In most cases, the press follows norms of internal pluralism—also known as the objective model—whereby the major viewpoints on an issue present in society are included within a story. Commercial media dominate in liberal model countries, though the government may make significant investments in public broadcasting, as occurs in the United Kingdom and Canada. Though fewer governmental restrictions and plentiful funding through commercial sources allow the mass media to be critical of government and to investigate government wrongdoing and corruption, research has demonstrated that government officials have a strong influence on the content of the mass media in liberal model countries.

A second model, the polarized pluralist model, is characterized by strong state intervention, both in terms of content and funding. The primary audience of the press in polarized pluralist countries is elites, and there is a high degree of political parallelism, with newspapers or television programs often representing the views of a particular political party. Reporters

The media mob British politician Margaret Thatcher during a 1979 election. In the British, liberal model of the media, the government exercises no control over press content, though it does invest in public broadcasting.

generally present only one viewpoint in their stories; external pluralism of views is provided at the level of the media system, with different outlets presenting differing views. Spain and Italy are examples of countries where the media institutions developed along this model. In this conception, the role of the media is to foster communication within political parties, and from the government to the people. The watchdog role is less prominent.

The third model scholars have identified is the democratic corporatist model. This model is characterized by a coexistence of government-sponsored media and commercial media. Sweden and the Netherlands provide examples of this model. In these media systems, the level of political parallelism is between that found in the liberal model and the polarized pluralist model, with newspapers and broadcasts representing the positions of particular social groups, rather than specific political parties. This system rejects the objective model and operates according to the norms of external pluralism, where each social group expresses its views through particular outlets. In democratic corporatist countries, discussions about the role of the media involve balancing the watchdog role with the role of promoting communication within and between particular social groups. To this end, the government provides heavy subsidies for public broadcasting and regulates media content in regards to issues such as hate speech in order to maintain civil dialogue.

All of these models represent different ways in which media can develop as a set of political institutions within a democratic system. In each system, the media perform critical functions of communicating information from the government to the citizens, from citizens back to the government, and fostering discussion among citizens about politics. These models vary in their focus on these roles.

CRITICISMS OF THE PRESS/FOURTH ESTATE CONCEPT

The idea of looking at the media as a fourth estate or at the press as an institution in government has been criticized for failing to take into account the wide variety of norms across media organizations in the same country, and for attributing motives to collective news organizations rather than to individual journalists.

See also *Media and Politics; Media Bias; Media, Political Commentary in the.*

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Pressure Groups

A pressure group is widely defined as a group of people who come together to influence policy on a matter of mutual interest. Other terms commonly used to refer to pressure groups are *special interest groups* and *lobbies*. Interest groups are found in every society, autocracies and democracies, in the world. They are distinct from political parties in that they do not field their own members for political office, but rather attempt to influence policy through the existing set of policy makers, including executives, legislators, political parties, dictators, ministers, bureaucrats, judges, and international organizations. Groups may be formally or informally organized; be interested in a single or a wide range of issues; and be temporary entities or permanent organizations with dedicated budgets, staff, and space. They organize across a range of issues and geographic locations. Some examples are the Beijing Software Industry Association, a local single-sector economic interest group; the American Civil Liberties Union, a national multi-issue social group; and Greenpeace, an international environmental group.

Pressure groups employ a wide range of resources and tools to influence policy, including legal and illegal financial donations to policy makers, technical and political information, media campaigns aimed at influencing public opinion, member demonstrations, and the votes of their members. Strategic decisions regarding whom to lobby, how to lobby and when to get involved in the policy process vary as a function of the nature of issues, characteristics of groups, and the institutional and regulatory environment of countries.

An active community of interest groups allows members of society to represent their interests and concerns to policy makers at all stages of policy making and allows policy makers, in turn, to benefit from the information and expertise of such groups. The belief that such interactions bring better representation, more equitable distribution of benefits and costs, and better policy in both democratic and authoritarian systems has led international organizations and aid agencies—such as the World Bank, the United Nations (UN), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—to promote civil society groups and business organizations as essential components of democratic and economic reforms. However, the evidence of success has so far been mixed.

In many countries, groups with money or political connections have frequently dominated access to policy makers. Critics argue that success in influencing policy and its consequences, therefore, has accrued primarily to these groups. Furthermore, by flushing the political system with money, rich pressure groups have also increased political corruption and constrained political competition. These critics thus argue that pressure groups have come to dominate the political process to an extent that they are undermining the integrity of the democratic process and need to be constrained.

Proponents point to the experience of many developing countries where pressure groups in favor of reform were critical to overcome the resistance of traditional elites and entrenched

bureaucracies who were opposed to beneficial economic and political reforms. Similarly, social interest groups in repressive regimes have successfully lobbied governments to increase social and media freedoms, release political prisoners, and redress public officials' infractions. These scholars argue that designing appropriate regulatory systems that require pressure groups to disclose their membership, the sources of their funds, and their lobbying actions, as well as instituting high penalties for illegal behavior, will minimize their costs without sacrificing their benefits.

However, without more evidence, the debate about the appropriate role of interest groups in society cannot be resolved. Most of the current knowledge about pressure groups is based on information from a few developed democracies like the United States, United Kingdom, and the European Union. For most of the world, there is little systematic evidence on basic questions about how pressure groups organize and lobby in these countries, whether they are able to exercise any influence on policy, and what their net impact on society has been.

See also *Advocacy Groups; Business Pressure in Politics; Farm Lobby; Interest Groups and Lobbies; Lobbies, Professional; Lobbying; Political Action Committee (PAC); Public Interest Groups; U.S. Politics and Society: Minority Interest Groups.*

. . . .   VINEETA YADAV

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Price and Wage Controls

Wage and price controls are government policies designed to restrict the movement of wages and prices to their natural equilibrium market values. In a free market, prices tend toward an equilibrium value that equates the supply of a good or service with its demand. In conditions of excess demand, shortages cause prices to rise, and in conditions of excess supply, surpluses cause prices to fall. If rising prices are an issue of economic and political concern, consumers may lobby the government for the imposition of price controls known as price ceilings. If falling prices are of concern, it is the producers who may lobby for relief in the form of price floors.

PRICE CEILINGS

Price ceilings are legally established maximum prices that prevent market prices from rising. The irony of such policies is that shortages will result if they are effective because shortages are the source of rising prices. Reductions in supply or rising demand in markets for goods or services in controlled markets will only worsen the shortage problem. History reveals many significant trials of price ceilings. The trials have nearly all yielded the same results: shortages, rationing, black markets, costly implementation and enforcement, and quality deterioration of products. Also commonly known as a price freeze, price ceilings have been used at times as an attempt to control inflation. It was believed that combining price controls with restrictive demand policies would reduce or halt inflation, when, in fact, it is the latter doing the work. Changing a price with a stroke of a pen does not solve the underlying problem of rising prices at its source, whereas reducing demand or increasing supply would.

A price ceiling imposed on gasoline at the beginning of the summer season provides an example of how price controls work. Rising demand from summer travel increases the number of consumers at the pump. An increase in the demand for gasoline increases the demand for the resources used to produce it. With a fixed price, rising costs, and falling profits, gas station owners may simply let the gas pumps run out. The Nixon and Carter gas price controls of the 1970s are well remembered by drivers of that era. Long gas lines, empty pumps, per diem gas purchase limitations, and other such forms of rationing were common. Lower U.S. domestic oil production and exploration were also direct results. In 1981, Ronald Reagan removed gas price controls as one of his first official acts. Gas prices rose immediately, as expected, to their equilibrium levels but then later declined as production increased and consumers found ways to reduce their gasoline use via smaller, lighter, more fuel efficient cars and such strategies as moving closer to work. Despite the lessons learned throughout history, price ceilings are still being implemented. Examples include the energy price controls behind the California energy crisis, rent controls in major cities such as New York and Los Angeles, threats to control health care prices, and the repealed gas tax in Hawaii.

PRICE FLOORS

In the case where falling prices are an issue of economic and political concern, producers are the ones who lobby the government for the imposition of price controls known as price floors. Price floors are legally established minimum prices that prevent prices from falling. Examples of such policies include minimum wage legislation and agricultural price supports. Price floors carry the same appeal as price ceilings, an active government intervention into a free market for the sake of

fairness. However, for a price floor to be binding, it must be set above the market equilibrium. Prices above equilibrium generate surpluses as producers that otherwise would have dropped out of the market expand production. In order to maintain a price floor, the government must buy the surplus at taxpayer expense. In the case of minimum wage, if it is raised high enough to be binding, individuals who otherwise may not have worked seek employment, and firms, facing rising costs and reduced profits, consider reducing their workforce. This surplus of workers now represents an increase in unemployment.

See also *Centrally Planned Economy; Economic Policy Formulation; Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; Farm Lobby; Labor Policy; Microeconomics.*

. . . .   JEFFERY L. OSGOOD JR. AND M. CATHY CAREY

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Priestley, Joseph

Joseph Priestley (1733–1804) was an English intellectual who wrote more than 150 books as well as numerous letters and sermons in the various disciplines of history, literature, theology, moral philosophy, politics, rhetoric, and physics. His discovery of oxygen and writings on electricity and chemistry gave him entrance to the Royal Society in 1766. He wrote comprehensive treatises about science, such as *The History and Present State of Electricity* (1767).

In addition to being a renowned scientist, Priestley was a rational dissenter. While a member of the "Club of Honest Whigs," an eighteenth-century discussion group of supporters of the American colonists, Priestley wrote his central political work, *Essay on the First Principles of Government* (1768). In *Essay,* which has been said to come directly from English philosopher John Locke's *Second Treatise of Government* (1689), Priestly argued for religious liberty, universal toleration, and separation of church and state. He also wrote *A Free Address to Protestant Dissenters* (1768), in which he argued for broader religious tolerance than Locke had advocated. Unlike Locke, Priestley believed atheists should be tolerated, and he rejected Locke's view of the integral relationship between civil and ecclesiastical authority. Priestley adopted the Socinian belief that Jesus Christ was only human, and, like most rational dissenters, he espoused the centrality of scripture and human reason

Motivated by his opposition to Scottish theologian John Brown's argument in *Essays on Shaftesbury's Characteristics* (1751) that government should play an important role in the moral formation and education of children, Priestley wrote *An Essay on a Course of Liberal Education* (1765), advocating civil liberty and government nonintervention, based on his belief in individual intellectual freedom. Making a distinction between civil liberty and political liberty, Priestley viewed society as an aggregate of individuals rather than a community. The role of civil power was to ensure individual freedom, which would result in the common good. However, his strong belief in civil liberty did not translate into political liberty. Priestley thought voting should be based on wealth, and he did not believe that equality and political participation were essential principles for reform.

Priestley's early and lifelong influence from English philosopher David Hartley's *Observations on Man* (1748) came to fruition in Priestley's conflation of matter and spirit. The multiple volumes of Priestley's *The Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion* were published between 1772 and 1774. In these volumes, he stated that God's will and plan for the universe governed how human liberty would be used. Priestley's writings became quite millenarian under his monistic perspective on divine causality. In *A Free Discussion of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity* (1778), he asserted his deterministic philosophy against his reformer colleague, Scottish minister and philosopher Richard Price.

Because of his support for the French Revolution (1789–1799), which he saw as a precursor to the millennium and the second coming of Christ, Priestley's house, laboratory, and church were destroyed. In 1794 Priestley and his wife left for the United States, where they were welcomed in Philadelphia by President George Washington. Priestley remained active in his intellectual and scientific endeavors, becoming a member of American statesperson Benjamin Franklin's American Philosophical Society. He kept himself out of politics in America as he had in England, and continued his work as a minister, scientist, and writer. Priestly established the first Unitarian church in America.

See also *Church and State; Locke, John; Religion and Politics.*

. . . .   JOANNE TETLOW

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Primaries

Primaries are preliminary elections to select a political party's candidate or candidates for public office. Primaries are a form of candidate selection with an inclusive *selectorate,* the body that selects candidates for an election. This contrasts with more exclusive *selectorates,* common in many longstanding

European democracies, where the party organizations, such as party leadership bodies or activists, typically select the candidates. Primaries are common in the United States where they are used to select legislative and executive candidates; while not the norm in the rest of the world, they are increasingly apparent.

TYPES OF PRIMARIES

There are several types of primaries, and can be distinguished by who is allowed to participate. Participation in *closed primaries* is restricted to members of a particular political party. In this case, for example, only registered Democrats would be able to participate in the Democratic Party primary. *Open primaries* allow voters to participate in any political party's primary regardless of formal party affiliation or lack thereof, and voters need not publicly declare in which primary they will participate. Using the U.S. example again, an independent or registered Republican could opt in the polling booth to participate in the Democratic Party primary, but would not be allowed to participate in another party's primary.

There are further variations in these procedures. Semiclosed primaries allow party members and voters who are unaffiliated with a party to participate, or allow voters to change their party affiliation on primary election day. Semiopen primaries require that primary voters publicly declare their choice of party ballot on primary election day.

The second important distinction is between direct and indirect primaries. In indirect primaries, like those for the U.S. presidency, eligible primary voters select delegates who have typically declared their commitment to a candidate and in some cases are legally bound to support that candidate. These delegates subsequently select the candidate at a party meeting or convention. Eligible primary voters directly determine the candidate or candidates for the general election in direct primaries. This is more common in Latin American presidential primaries.

USE OF PRIMARIES

Primaries are generally associated with candidate selection in the United States, where they have been employed the longest. However, while still not the rule, primaries are now used in a variety of countries, and there is evidence of their use increasing worldwide, particularly for selecting presidential candidates.

The trend toward presidential primaries is evident in Latin America. Presidential primaries have been held by at least one party in countries as diverse as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay. South Korea and Taiwan have also employed primaries to select presidential candidates, and in the Spanish parliamentary system, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) allows party members in some instances to select candidates for executive offices.

Primaries have also been employed to select legislative candidates in countries such as Argentina and Israel, and many European democracies, including the Labour Party and Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, have employed some form of membership vote to select legislative candidates. However, party membership in Europe, which requires paying membership dues and implies a stronger partisan commitment and perhaps activity, contrasts significantly with the limited requirements and obligations of party registration in the United States. Therefore, membership ballots and primaries in Europe to date tend to be less inclusive and more controlled by the party organizations than are primaries in the United States.

EFFECTS OF PRIMARIES

Because primaries permit more people to participate in candidate selection, they are often characterized as enhancing political transparency and openness and strengthening internal party democracy. Primaries open an additional arena to broader participation of citizens opposed to having candidate selection controlled by party activists or a more limited group of party leaders. In this way, primaries may also increase the legitimacy of those selected. Proponents of primaries argue that this broader selectorate makes public officials (successful candidates) more responsive to citizens. Some also argue that presenting a greater array of precandidates to the primary electorate produces better candidates in the general election; in effect the primary process rewards, or punishes, candidates based on their campaigning skills, political positions, and their ability to appeal to a large pool of voters.

On the other hand, primaries lengthen the electoral process and can prove expensive and exhausting for both the electorate and the candidates. Also because candidates from the same party compete with one another, primaries can divide the party and make it difficult for it to unite prior to the general election or to present a unified party platform. The primary process can also make representatives more beholden to campaign donors who candidates may need to win the primary election, and can make representatives less loyal to their political parties; the less the political party organization controls candidate selection, the less it may be able to count on elected officials' support for party positions, and party discipline in the legislature accordingly weakens. Primaries may thus create a style of politics that focuses on the individual characteristics of candidates opposed to party platforms and policies.

There is also much debate in the United States about whether primaries polarize politics. Despite allowing a greater degree of participation in candidate selection, voter participation in primaries tends to be low, and those who participate may be more extreme than the average party voter in the electorate as a whole. For example, more conservative-than-average Republicans may participate in the Republican Party primaries and more liberal-than-average Democrats may participate in the Democratic Party primaries, which can lead to candidates in the general election who are more extreme than the average citizen. Open primaries may better reflect the general electorate, but they can also give rise to strategic voting whereby voters support the perceived weakest candidate of another party to enhance the electability of their preferred party and candidate in the general election.

. . . .   BONNIE N. FIELD

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Prime Minister (Head of Government)

In a parliamentary system of government, a prime minister is the head of the cabinet that constitutes the executive branch of government. Instead of being popularly elected to the post, a prime minister holds office as long as the cabinet maintains the confidence of a majority of popularly elected members of parliament. As the name implies, a prime minister ranks first among ministers, but shares collective responsibility to parliament with other ministers in the cabinet.

BRITISH SYSTEM

In the United Kingdom, where a single party normally holds a majority of the seats in Parliament, the leader of that party automatically becomes the prime minister. In such circumstances, the government expects a parliamentary majority to endorse its legislative proposals. If members of parliament (MPs) in the governing party refused to give a vote of confidence in their own party leadership, this would split the party.

A prime minister is also responsible for leading the respective party to victory at the next general election. The concentration of media attention on the prime minister's campaign role is often described as leading to the *presidentialization* of politics. However, unlike a president, a prime minister's term of office is usually not fixed. The prime minister can be forced out of office in the middle of Parliament's term if opinion polls indicate the prime minister's government is unpopular and headed toward electoral defeat. In the past half century, the British prime minister has more often left office under midterm pressure from within the governing party than because of electoral defeat.

UNDER PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

In many parliamentary systems, a proportional representation electoral system results in no party having a majority in parliament. To gain office, a prime minister depends on support from members of parliament of parties that have fought each other at the preceding election. A coalition cabinet can distribute major offices between two or more parties that collectively have a parliamentary majority. If a large party is short only a few seats of a majority, then a larger party can be joined by a smaller party. For example, a "red-green" coalition could exist between a large social democratic party and an ecological party. If seats in parliament are widely distributed among half a dozen or more parties, a coalition cabinet may consist of three or more parties, as is usually the case in Belgium or the Netherlands. A large party can sometimes govern even though it has a minority of seats in parliament if opposition parties are so divided they cannot join together to defeat the government in parliament. A prime minister must be a political manager to maintain the unity of a coalition government and avoid some members quitting to force an election or a coalition under a different prime minister.

In a single-party government, the task is to manage frictions among competing interests and competing personalities, because the cabinet will contain several ambitious colleagues who aim to succeed to the top office. A prime minister can use the power of patronage to silence potential critics by giving them an important ministerial post, and those hopeful for a cabinet job can compete in showing loyalty to the prime minister.

POLICY RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CABINET

The chief policy responsibility of a prime minister is to represent the country internationally. For example, when the British prime minister is in contact with the U.S. president, the prime minister deals with the White House, while cabinet ministers of finance and defense deal with their opposite numbers in the U.S. Treasury or Pentagon. In the European Union's Council of Ministers, each prime minister meets with twenty-six other heads of government to deliberate on European Union issues.

Collectively, the dozen or more cabinet ministers responsible for departments concerned with the economy, social affairs, defense, law, the environment, and local government have far more time to deal with issues than the prime minister. They, and their civil servants, together form the core of the executive branch. The constraints of the clock limit the amount of time a prime minister can devote to any one issue. Therefore, the first decision a prime minister must make is whether to get involved in an issue—and on matters of little electoral importance, the prime minister may allow a cabinet minister wide leeway. The formation of a coalition government often involves a formal agreement acknowledging that different parties can take the lead in different ministries, thus creating "no go" fields where the prime minister cannot intervene.

A prime minister is responsible for balancing competing demands from cabinet colleagues, such as the desire of health and education ministers to spend more money on popular policies and of the treasury minister wanting to deliver popular tax cuts. In striking a balance, the prime minister takes into account how the government's taxing and spending measures will influence the electorate as well as the economy.

MIXED SYSTEMS

In a strictly parliamentary system, the formal head of government may be a monarch or president chosen in ways that deny that office electoral legitimacy. Countries such as France and Russia have a mixed system in which there is a president elected separately from parliament, as well as a prime minister leading the dominant party in parliament. General Charles de Gaulle devised a constitution for the Fifth French Republic in which the president was institutionally dominant. However, there have been periods when party control of the presidency and of the French Assembly and prime ministership have differed, creating an uneasy coexistence.

The Russian Federation Constitution, prepared by President Boris Yeltsin in 1993, not only gave many powers to the president, but also created the office of prime minister, appointed by the president but requiring the support of the Duma, or parliament. The presidency became even stronger under Vladimir Putin. However, because he was constitutionally prevented from standing for a third term, in 2008 Putin used his role as leader of the United Russia Party to become prime minister and nominated a young protégé, Dmitry Medvedev, to succeed him as president. This brought about a major shift in the balance of power between the offices of prime minister and president.

See also *Cabinets and Cabinet Formation; Chancellor; Coalition Formation; Coalition Theory; Cohabitation; Dual Executive; European Politics and Society; Executive, The; Parliamentary Democracy; Parliamentary Government; Semi-presidential System; Shadow Cabinet; Westminster Model.*

. . . . RICHARD ROSE

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Priming

Priming refers to the effects a stimulus has on a person's processing of future information. According to Lars Wilnat, "In essence, priming is built on the assumption that the frequency prominence or feature of stimulus activates previously learned cognitive structures and influences interpretations of an ambiguous stimulus." That is, priming makes the stimulus more accessible, which influences information processing.

Priming is used to explain media effects. For example, television news coverage has been shown to significantly affect the standards by which viewers judge politicians. For example, if the media focuses on the economy, the president will be evaluated on the state of the economy. Some scholars argue that media priming is a result not of attitude accessibility, but rather trust in the media.

Priming also figures prominently in the survey response literature. Survey respondents often base their answers to questions on what is most accessible in memory, which is the result of a prime caused by recent news reports, conversations, or even previous survey questions. Psychologists have explored the underlying mechanisms of priming, revealing that factors such as the intensity, frequency, and recency of the stimulus all affect how and whether a concept or issue can be accessed and applied to a new evaluation. It has further been shown that the priming of one concept will also bring to mind related concepts. Priming is frequently associated with agenda setting—and often dismissed as a variant of agenda setting, or vice versa—since both rely on similar causal mechanisms.

See also *Agenda Setting; Framing and Public Opinion; Survey Techniques and Design.*

. . . . YPHTACH LELKES

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Primitive Communism

The idea that humanity experienced a long period of primitive social equality prior to the formation of political communities and states has been a recurring theme in political philosophy since at least antiquity. Expressed most prominently in the idea of a *state of nature*, the notion of primitive social equality played a key role in theoretical systems of the various social contract theorists of Europe, beginning in the sixteenth century. Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau all argued that prior to the development of the state, humanity lived in a type of anarchy in which all people were responsible for their own personal security and well-being.

ROUSSEAU

The concept of the state of nature came closest to an idea of primitive communism for eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosopher Rousseau. In Rousseau's theory, the state of nature was a generally positive condition for humanity, in which equality abounded and people were free from the oppressive control of others. According to Rousseau, the founding of the political community was not a progressive

act, but a step backward for the human race in which some morally bankrupt individuals, interested in their own private wealth and advancement, ensnared the rest of humanity into what Rousseau considered to be the decadence of modern society. Rousseau, writing in prerevolutionary France, looked at the inequality around him—embodied by the decadent aristocracy—and harkened for a previous age of simplicity and equality.

MARX AND ENGELS

Rousseau's conception of the state of nature was a prime influence on the social, political, and historical ideas of the eighteenth century German revolutionaries Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Like Rousseau, Marx and Engels looked at the world around them and were disgusted by the social and economic inequality of a new burgeoning capitalist society. However, they argued that capitalism was but one transitory epoch in the historical evolution of human societies. Marx and Engels believed that capitalism was the last stage of class society in human evolution, followed by the emergence of a communist society in which class distinctions were eliminated and humanity lived according to its needs. Marx and Engels believed that capitalist society generated its own gravediggers in the proletariat—the industrial working class—who, because they had no property of their own to defend, could lead humanity towards the classless society.

However, Marx and Engels argued that the future stage of communism would not be an entirely new phenomenon. They believed that prior to the evolution of class societies in antiquity, humanity lived in a stage of what they called *primitive communism*. For Marx and Engels, under primitive communism humanity lived a stark existence in which small tribes were forced to battle nature, and often rival tribal groups, in order to survive. However, this daily fight for survival made it necessary for early humans to organize themselves in very tight-knit egalitarian communities, where social distinctions were absent or temporary. The theoretical idea of primitive communism allowed Marx and Engels to argue that the material and social inequality of their time was not natural or inevitable. Humans did not always divide themselves into classes or exploit one another for material gain.

For Marx and Engels, primitive communism foreshadowed the future postcapitalist society of *modern communism* in its social equality and its lack of class antagonisms. However, as materialists, Marx and Engels did not idealize primitive communism as Rousseau did in his version of the state of nature. Instead, they argued that primitive communism was a *communism of scarcity* and as such was unable to provide for the full development of human potential. They argued that the long historical period of class societies was necessary in order to develop humanities' productive forces so that a *communism of abundance* could emerge in the postcapitalist epoch. For Marx and Engels, primitive communism was thus the original stage of history that eventually leads to a new phase of communism in which many of the positive features of the primitive era are recreated in the context of material abundance.

The most famous reference to primitive communism in Marx and Engels's work occurs in a footnote Engels added to the *Communist Manifesto* (1848), in which he corrects a passage on the opening page that reads "…the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggle." Engels's footnote corrects this passage to acknowledge the existence of the primitive commune.

In later works, in particular Marx's *Ethnological Notebooks* (1880–1882) and Engels's famous *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884), the pair expand upon the idea of primitive communism. Marx's notebooks continue to be an important source for Marxist scholarship on non-European societies, while Engels's book continues to inspire Marxist and feminist debates on the family and the origin of the oppression of women. Their work on the primitive commune—Engels's work in particular—was inspired by the writings of the nineteenth-century American anthropologist Lewis H. Morgan, and his theories on kinship and relations between materialism and social structures based on studies of Native American Indians.

LEGACY OF THE MARXIST NOTION

While other approaches, such as anarchism and psychoanalysis, have taken up the issue, the Marxist idea of primitive communism—or the primitive commune—has dominated most discussion of this idea in modern political science. Political theorists have attempted to evaluate the veracity of this idea in the wake of anthropological evidence and historical experience. The idea remains the source of much controversy today. Some argue that the Marxist idea of the primitive commune does not escape the colonialist assumptions embedded in the theoretical dichotomy between *primitive* and *modern*, while others argue that it does not withstand the scrutiny of modern anthropological research.

See also *Communism; Engels, Friedrich; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Socialism; State of Nature.*

. . . .   MICHAEL F. GRETZ

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Principal-agent Theory

Principal-agent theory is based on a hierarchical notion of political relationships that traces back to the politics-administration dichotomy first enunciated by Woodrow Wilson in 1887. Politics involves deciding who gets what, while administration deals with how—and arguably, when—it is delivered. For Wilson, at least

rhetorically, the solution was simple: separate politics from administration, and develop a science to guide administrative matters. The reality, which Wilson recognized, is that administration requires grants of discretion, is often hard to monitor, and translates into political power. Principal–agent theory is thus interested in identifying the conditions under which agents, those who administer programs, can be expected to act as faithful instruments of political principals. Because those who decide the answer to political questions are often not those who administer the programs, *agency*—defined as "acting for"—is at the heart of principal-agent relations.

Originally developed in microeconomics, like theories of the firm and transaction cost economics, agency theory focused on shirking (or not working) by agents. Shirking was attributed to either of two possibilities: *adverse selection,* which involves choosing an agent that lacks the skills or resources required to complete the assigned task; or *moral hazard,* which involved choosing an agent whose goals were in opposition to the principals. In economics the central concern involves minimizing the cost of information acquisition so that one can avoid either adverse selection or moral hazard, or both. In adapting to fit the interinstitutional dynamic in a political setting, the primary focus has been on explaining and minimizing problems associated with moral hazard, while studies of elections and judicial selection tend to focus on adverse selection. As Terry Moe explains, adverse selection focuses on picking the right agent for the job, while moral hazard involves controlling agents after the selection process. This later task is particularly difficult, since it is often hard to determine what agents are doing and if their actions result in goal achievement.

CONTROL EFFORTS: THE PRINCIPAL SIDE OF THE MODEL

Some of the earliest efforts to use a principal-agent approach in political science involved those interested in investigating the conditions conducive to congressional control of bureaucracy. Early studies married agency theory with formal models to demonstrate that control is possible through a combination of *police patrols* in which congressional committees acted as overseers when engaged in oversight, or through *fire alarms* in which interest groups called congressional attention to bureaucratic drift. Critics of these studies used a combination of empirical work and formal models to demonstrate congressional control was far from certain, suggesting a number of factors unique to the political realm complicated the effort to apply agency theory in a political setting.

The efforts to develop a more accurate depiction, and parsimonious theory, focus on both the principal and agent parts of the model. On the principal side, the first modification includes multiple principals, notably the president, but also the courts and interest groups. With the addition of multiple principals, there is recognition that agent actions not in accordance with a particular principal's goals might not involve either moral hazard or adverse selection, but instead result from agent responsiveness to a rival principal. Rather than emphasizing control, recognition of the existence of multiple, often times

competing, principals moves the discussion to an investigation of the conditions under which the *influence* of agent's action are possible. These studies conclude that influence is a product of both issue salience (i.e., how visible an issue is and who pays attention to it), and issue complexity (i.e., how technically complex the issue is and how complicated the tasks required to realize goals are).

Quite simply, high salience issues have the potential to involve more principals, who in turn send mixed signals to agents. On the other hand, highly complex issues tend to limit participation and often result in greater levels of discretion granted to agents. The recognition that salience and complexity vary over time, and present different types of agency problems, also attracted the attention of those who are more interested in modeling the agent part of the model.

UNDERSTANDING MOTIVATION: THE AGENT SIDE OF THE MODEL

On the agent side, those who study bureaucracy insist that understanding agent motivation is the key to explaining why bureaucracy does what it does. The argument, in brief, is that bureaucratic actions are a product of a combination of factors—self-interest, previous experience, professional training, organizational culture, and clientele influence. An agent's choice of activity is more complex than simply choosing between the option of working or shirking borrowed from microeconomics. The choice to work, leisure shirk, dissent shirk, or engage in sabotage is a product of individual motivation, conditioned by the organizational and political setting. While most agents work, the possibility of leisure shirking fits well into the economic-based model. The latter two options—dissent shirking and sabotage—recognize that when agent goals clash with what they are being asked to do, they can choose to slow down their work effort (dissent shirk), or actually pursue a course of action designed to realize goals diametrically opposed to those of a particular principal (sabotage). Focusing on bureaucratic motivation suggests adverse selection is a potentially significant problem in agency.

A PROBLEM BY DESIGN

In the end, agency is especially bothersome because so much of what agents do, and the effects of what they do, is hard to determine. James Q. Wilson suggests that there are really four agency problems, distinguishable by whether a principal can monitor the outputs (work) or outcomes (results) of agent actions. William Gormley and Steven Balla propose that principals need to employ a mix of screening mechanism, institutional design, and oversight to mitigate these problems—but conclude all involve shortcomings if the goal is to achieve perfect control. This arrives back at the starting point, a principal's delegation of authority to an agent is at heart problematic, but also an unavoidable feature of any political system.

See also *Political Agents; Public Policy; Public Policy Development.*

. . . .   JEFF WORSHAM

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Prisoner's Dilemma

In political science, one of the most popular game theory tools, the prisoner's dilemma, is a nonzero-sum game in which two suspects of a crime are arrested and each given the option of either accusing the other prisoner—*defect*, in game theory jargon—or stay silent—cooperate. Jail terms attach to the four resulting combinations such that each player's order of preferences is: unilateral defection (DC) > mutual cooperation (CC) > mutual defection (DD) > unilateral cooperation (CD). This configuration makes defection the dominant strategy for both players.

The prisoner's dilemma describes and analyzes strategic political interactions characterized by the relative payoff structure, and its peculiarity is that the Nash equilibrium solution, DD, is a Pareto-inefficient point, as all players would be better-off if they could move to the unstable solution, CC. Put differently, this game illustrates domestic or international situations in which reciprocal cooperation is advantageous for all actors involved, but it is nonetheless difficult to achieve because of the incentives at work. Examples include disarmament, trade wars, and the provision of public goods.

Given the problematic nature of the prisoner's dilemma, political scientists have devoted much effort to studying the conditions under which stable cooperation is possible. Two of these are the intervention of a superimposed enforcing agency, such as the state, or the infinite, or indefinite, iteration of the game.

See also *Behavioral Game Theory; Cooperative Security; Game Theory; International Cooperation; Pareto, Vilfredo; Tragedy of the Commons.*

. . . .   PIER DOMENICO TORTOLA

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Prisoners of War (POWs)

Since ancient times, the status of prisoners of war has been an indispensable aspect of warfare and their treatment has oscillated between extermination, enslavement, ransom, and practices of exchange and parole.

The ethics of war have been a hotly debated feature of international relations since the seventeenth century. Hugo Grotius raised issues regarding the ethics of war in his seminal work, *The Law of War and Peace* (1625). Grotius examined the laws of war from two different perspectives: *jus ad bellum*, the law concerning the rights of states to engage in armed conflict, and *jus in bello*, the law governing how wars are to be fought once they have started. Generally the status of prisoners of war is covered by the principles of *jus in bello*. In the same period, the development of the idea of the nation-state after the 1648 Westphalia agreement shifted the control of prisoners of war from the individual captor to the sovereign. Consequently, the economic exploitation of war captives for labor or ransom was regularized.

In the nineteenth century, the *just war* tradition that Grotius discussed in *The Law of War and Peace* began to be formally declared as positive law. In 1862, a code of rules was developed for the conduct of the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865) in accordance with President Abraham Lincoln's directions. This code was known as General Order 100, or Lieber's Code, and was the first formal code of law to regulate an army's conduct toward enemy soldiers since ancient Rome. In this sense, the United States played a key role in developing humanitarian and legal doctrines concerning prisoners of war. About the same time, in 1863, the International Committee of the Red Cross was established in Geneva and an international conference adopted the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded Armies in the Field in 1906. Furthermore, a series of international conventions were held to contribute to the development of an internationally recognized law of war. These were formulated during conferences in Brussels in 1874, The Hague in 1899 and 1907, Copenhagen in 1917, and Geneva in 1929 and 1949.

The 1929 Geneva Convention concerned the treatment of prisoners of war. It completed the rules of the previous regulations by prohibiting reprisals and collective punishment

A captured Israeli soldier holds up a newspaper in a video made by militants in Gaza. Under Geneva Conventions, a prisoner of war is anyone who has fallen into enemy hands, though questions arose in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks as to whether non-state actors fall under the prisoner of war designation.

SOURCE: Getty Images

against prisoners of war. In 1949, after World War II (1939–1945), the Geneva Convention was revised and replaced with four conventions, each of which deals with different aspects of the conduct of war. The third Geneva Convention is primarily concerned with the treatment of prisoners of war. Nearly every state in the world has agreed to be bound by these conventions. Today, many provisions of the Geneva Conventions are considered as customary law.

Article 4 of the third Geneva Convention defines prisoners of war as persons who have fallen into the power of the enemy. Article 4 defines eight categories to classify prisoners of war: (1) members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; (2) members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps; (3) members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power; (4) persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members; (5) members of crews, including masters, pilots, and apprentices; (6) inhabitants of a nonoccupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces; (7) persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country; and (8) persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by neutral or nonbelligerent powers on their territory and whom these powers are required to intern under international law.

Prisoners of war were defined as being in the power of the government that held them prisoner and the captor government was responsible for the safety and humane treatment of prisoners. The Geneva Conventions provide that prisoners of war must be quartered in conditions that meet the same general standards as the quarters available to the captors' forces. Even though interrogation of prisoners is not prohibited, all forms of mental and physical pressures to elicit intelligence information are forbidden.

Recently, as experienced in the war on terror following 9/11, states have found themselves fighting with nonstate actors like international terrorist organizations. Consequently, the limits of the Geneva Conventions regarding the treatment of prisoners of war have become debatable. The treatment of Taliban and al-Qaida detainees in Guantanamo Bay has triggered debates over the status of al-Qaida prisoners, and human rights organizations have questioned the U.S. government's classification of captured fighters as unlawful combatants and therefore not entitled to protection under the Geneva Conventions.

See also *Geneva Conventions; Post-9/11 Politics; Terrorism, Political; Torture.*

. . . . BEZEN BALAMIR COSKUN

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Privacy

Privacy can be an elusive concept. Privacy sometimes refers to solitude or physical isolation, though residents of densely populated cities can lead private or anonymous lives. Privacy also refers to not having information about oneself revealed to others. In *Olmstead v. U.S.* (1928) Justice Brandeis captured these senses by referring to privacy as the "right to be let alone." The term is also used to refer to a right to be free to make decisions about one's life, such as whether to have an abortion, or what lifestyle to adopt. In *Roe v. Wade* (1973), the Supreme Court struck down a law criminalizing abortions by claiming it violated a right to privacy. Here privacy refers to autonomy, which is distinct from informational privacy or anonymity.

William Prosser identifies four distinct torts of privacy invasion: intrusion upon seclusion, such as eavesdropping;

public disclosure of embarrassing facts; publicity that puts one in a false light in the public's eye; and appropriation of one's name or likeness. Several of these torts can be seen as a violation not of privacy but of some other right: property rights, in the case of appropriation of one's name; or rights over one's person, including a right not to be defamed. The philosopher Judith Jarvis Thompson articulates the controversial view that the wrongness of every violation of the *right to privacy* can be explained by appealing to these other rights and that there is no need to refer to a right to privacy.

Invasions of privacy can be mere inconveniences, as when telemarketers or e-mail spammers intrude upon seclusion. They can also be more invasive, such as when employers monitor keystrokes or phone conversations, when the police search garbage or attach GPS devices to cars to track movements, or federal agents obtain electronic communication transactional records of those suspected of terrorism. If such invasions are permitted, individuals may be forced to shred their papers before discarding them, or restrict what they type or say, where they drive, or which Web sites they visit. Some intrusions upon privacy can be extremely invasive, such as when police conduct body cavity searches or require urine samples for drug testing.

Not everyone values privacy when it's understood as a state of limited access to a person. Privacy has been criticized as perpetuating inhibitions, deterring relations with others and preventing ties to one's community, and most importantly, providing a subversive shield for wrongdoers. Many economists argue that inhibiting accurate information flow encourages fraud and is inefficient. People, governments, businesses, and other organizations all have a need for information that must be weighed against the value of privacy.

THE VALUE OF PRIVACY

Some argue that privacy should be valued because privacy protects only deceivers and criminals and that innocent people should not care if information about them is exposed. However, there are reasons why even people with nothing to hide may value privacy. Charles Fried argues that the ability to selectively reveal information about oneself and keep secrets is essential for forming intimate relations with friends and loved ones. Fried also argues that respecting privacy is an important way to convey trust: "A man cannot know that he is trusted unless he has a right to act without constant surveillance so that he knows he can betray the trust" (212–213). Others argue that respecting a person's privacy is an important means to respect a person's individuality and autonomy. Alan Westin writes that a loss of privacy threatens one's core self. He points to instances of suicide and emotional breakdown that result from exposure by government or the media. Edward Bloustein and Jeffrey Reiman each argue that respecting someone's privacy is a way to respect an individual as a person. Invasions of privacy are an "affront to personal dignity" (Bloustein, 180) and privacy a "precondition for personhood" (Reiman, 310).

Members of different societies value privacy to different degrees. American attitudes toward privacy have been contrasted with those from Britain and Germany, and anthropologists note that in some societies, doors are left open all day and anonymity is virtually impossible. The privacy a person can expect is a function of architecture and social practices that vary across time and place. But even in societies with strong antiprivacy norms, such as colonial New England, privacy is valued to some degree.

LEGAL RIGHTS TO PRIVACY

Laws attempt to balance interest in privacy and the need for information. The Fourth Amendment protects the right of people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" and requires probable cause for a warrant to be issued. It was adopted largely as a response to *writs of assistance* that empowered officers and their assistants to search at will any place they suspected uncustomed goods to be; they were general warrants with no particular description of the objects of the search, and no probable cause was required for their issuance. In *Katz v. U.S.* (1967) the Supreme Court interpreted the amendment to mean that the government may conduct searches without a warrant if the search does not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.

People cannot generally expect privacy if they are in a public place, for example, although they may reasonably expect privacy in a conversation if they are whispering in an uncrowded marketplace, out of earshot of anyone else. The Supreme Court and other federal courts have upheld the aerial surveillance of a person's backyard (*California v. Ciraolo,* 1986), and use of beepers to track a vehicle's location (*U.S. v. Knotts,* 1983). Also upheld are searches of garbage (*California v. Greenwood,* 1988), prison cells (*Bell v. Wolfish,* 1979), the property of trespassers onto government-owned land (*U.S. v. Ruckman,* 1986), and persons in plain view. These searches and surveillance were said to violate no reasonable expectation of privacy and are therefore permissible even without a warrant. However, the court has invalidated searches using thermal-imaging devices to detect heat usage in homes (*Kyllo v. U.S.,* 2001) or electronic eavesdropping of conversations in public phone booths (*Katz v. U.S.,* 1967) because they violate reasonable expectations of privacy and therefore require a warrant.

See also *Abortion and Politics; Intelligence Services; Privacy Rights; Privatization; Public-private Dichotomy; Surveillance.*

. . . . MARK TUNICK

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Privacy Rights

In mainstream America, there is a cherished belief that everyone has a right to privacy. Most Americans believe that their home is their castle, and that it cannot be invaded. Unfortunately, many commonly held beliefs concerning a right to privacy are usually not based in reality. Indeed, the legal and political aspects of the scope of the right to privacy are still not settled.

CONSTITUTIONAL, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL LAW

Neither the Declaration of Independence, nor the U.S. Constitution, nor the Bill of Rights expressly recognize or mention "a right to privacy." However, such a right to privacy is implied in the Fourth Amendment, which provides protection against unreasonable seizures or searches of the people, their homes, their property, and their papers. In the famous U.S. Supreme Court case of *Griswold v. Connecticut* (1965), which concerned the privacy rights of married couples—specifically, to purchase contraceptives—the right of privacy was formally recognized as based in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights and the Ninth Amendment, which explains that other widely recognized fundamental rights not explicitly written in the Bill of Rights are nevertheless to be protected.

In tort law, which is the law of civil wrongs opposed to criminal wrongs, there are four aspects of privacy. These aspects are: (1) publication of private facts, such as personal sexual practices; (2) placing a person in a false light, by publishing information that would damage their reputation; (3) invading a private space, such as trespassing in a person's house; and (4) appropriation of another person's identity. In any of these instances, a person may sue another person for invading personal privacy.

Also, there are a number of statutes that provide for the privacy of certain information about a person. These statutes include but are not limited to: the Privacy Act of 1974, limiting the government's authority to maintain and disseminate records concerning individuals; the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), which limits access to a student's educational records; and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), which limits the release of a person's medical information. However, there are numerous exceptions to many of these statutory privacy protections for such purposes as law enforcement, which can have a significant impact on political expectations of privacy.

TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS

Technology also reduces the right of privacy of individuals. Government monitoring of computers and their use raises serious privacy issues. In the United States, the government's use of data mining programs such as CARNIVORE and TIA (Total Information Awareness) to mine the Internet for intelligence caused a serious public outcry. It is generally accepted that the U.S. National Security Agency monitors e-mails for certain keywords that might indicate terrorist activity. With the use of highly specialized technological equipment, the government can learn what is happening behind closed doors. For example, the use of certain night vision scopes can reveal otherwise private activity. In the case of *Kyllo v. U.S.* (2001), the Supreme Court required that a search warrant be obtained before using such equipment on a home.

In the context of politics, privacy is of enormous importance as an essential safeguard to prevent improper interference in political activities. Two of the more infamous examples of political interference in American politics by the violation of another person's privacy are the illegal surveillance activities by the FBI of the civil rights movement in the 1950s through the 1970s, called COINTELPRO, and the Watergate burglary to gain politically damaging information relative to the Democratic Party in the 1970s during the Nixon administration. Further, many historians recognize repeated invasions of privacy during the anticommunist political hysteria during the 1950s known as the "red scare," when Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin conducted congressional hearings against suspected Communists, a "witch hunt" that destroyed the lives of many American citizens.

Within the context of politics, there is the problem of drawing a line between legitimate political activities, which should be protected by a right of privacy and illegal terroristic activities, which are usually prohibited by law. Depending upon the nature of the political and legal system within which the issue of privacy is examined, widely divergent perspectives result. For example, in many autocratic, fascist, or tyrannical systems, any dissent or opposition is considered a crime and is granted no right of privacy. In contrast, in most free political systems, dissent and political opposition is usually tolerated, even if there are aberrations such as COINTELPRO and Watergate. In these systems, political privacy interests are given some protection.

However, depending upon political events, any political privacy is frequently sacrificed for the sake of expediency. For example, after the attacks on September 11, 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act was swiftly enacted through the U.S. Congress. This law significantly reduced the rights of privacy previously enjoyed by U.S. citizens. The law became more permissive in

allowing the government to intrude into the private lives of its citizens, including the ability to examine what books were being read, by whom, at libraries and bookstores. Telephone monitoring by the government was also more easily approved, and it was much easier to detain people only suspected of being connected with terroristic activity.

CONCLUSION

Privacy is also a serious concern internationally. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in contrast to the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights, specifically recognizes a right to privacy. Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights also guarantees the right of privacy. In the context of politics, individual and political privacy is an essential requirement for a free society. However, it is problematic to draw the line between vigorous political privacy and prohibited criminal activity deserving of no privacy.

See also *Autocracy; Freedom of Association; Freedom of Movement; Freedom of Speech; Intelligence Failure; Intelligence Services; McCarthyism; Privacy; State Repression; Surveillance; Terrorism, Political.*

. . . .   WM. C. PLOUFFE JR.

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Privatization

The debate initiated around the neoliberal themes of privatization, deregulation, denationalization, and destatization is based upon new political economy—economic politics applied to political markets. It signifies political action in economic markets with the definite aim of maximizing profit and utility—the underlying themes of neoclassical economics. Whether considered Thatcherism, Reaganomics, or the contributions of Milton Friedman, the confluence of two important political legacies of 1980s and 1990s—the renewed enthusiasm for the market economy, and the rolling back of the frontiers of the welfare state—led to the spread of privatization movement in the so-called first, second, and the third worlds alike, cutting the ideological barriers in recent history. Privatization can mean anything from sale of public enterprise to public-private partnership.

Etymologically speaking, privatization implies "withdrawal of the state from the production of goods and services or transfer of ownership from the public sector to the private sector." In the narrow sense, it may refer to the sale or leasing of assets, substitution of user charges for tax finance, and liberalization measures aimed at providing competition, efficiency, and wider choice. In the "de-ideologized" recasting of the concept, a variety of measures have sailed under the flag of privatization, such as contracting, leasing, imposing user charges, changing ownership through divestiture, liquidation, postponing proposals, and so on. It has been used as an economic device, political strategy, or administrative tool by different countries in different contexts.

RATIONALE FOR PRIVATIZATION

Privatization can be seen as an economic device to rehabilitate the market forces following an intellectual disillusionment with the Keynesian approach to economic management and failure of socialism as a serious intellectual force. It can be seen as a political strategy to eliminate loss-making public sector enterprises, curtail budgetary support, or retrench government employees through divestiture. At the heart of the privatization movement lies the assumption that the public sector is always wasteful, inefficient, and unproductive, and privatization can make it more efficient, competitive, and consumer friendly. It can be seen as an administrative tool useful for taking some of the load off the government.

Depending upon the motivation, privatization may take different forms in different countries. In advanced economies, it may attempt to reinvigorate a poorly run state enterprise through divestiture, or spreading ownership more widely by selling shares to the general public. In some countries, privatization may involve various measures toward liberalization, deregulation, and structural adjustments ranging from liquidation to leasing. Ancillarization could be another technique of privatization. In some countries, the government may encourage small-scale ancillary units to undertake production, provide certain services, or technical know-how.

Managing change through privatization requires a great deal of political sagacity and administrative expertise. No government can implement privatization programs and policies effectively without cooperation from the top bureaucrats, legal experts, and financial analysts. All privatization efforts require a lot of restructuring prior to privatization, such as selecting the enterprises or parts of it to be privatized, obtaining loans from official banks or financial institutions, establishing long-term guarantee programs in cooperation with private commercial banks, floating shares, converting bonds, creating debt-equity swaps, writing off liabilities, allowing flexibility in the valuation of public assets and "shares to be floated," and providing the regulatory framework. Contrary to the popular perception, the privatization drive initially may actually enhance the role of the government and the bureaucracy. It may also require additional resources.

The bureaucracy must play a proactive role in providing the necessary information, assistance, and support to the government in making privatization policies and implementing them effectively. The bureaucrats help identify the public enterprises, utilities, and services to be privatized. They suggest the modalities and time schedule. They also provide the necessary financial expertise in evaluating the value of public assets or fixing the price of a share to be floated. If these are overvalued, the privatization drive may be halted, and if these are undervalued, the government may be criticized for selling family silver at throwaway prices. Once the government decides to privatize a particular enterprise, a high level of administrative efficiency is required to assess the bids made by the potential buyers, arrange finance and insurance cover, provide a safety net for the staff retrenched, and deal with legal matters. An incompetent bureaucracy can never lead to economic efficiency—the hallmark of privatization.

Many believe that even after privatization, the role of public bureaucracy is not really reduced. The nature of its job merely changes. The bureaucracy now must regulate the privatized bodies in public interest. For example, privatization in the United Kingdom actually led to the proliferation of regulatory watchdogs, such as the Monopolies Commission and the Merger Commission to look after the interests of industrial customers of British Gas. Once a public enterprise, utility, or service is privatized, the cardinal values of traditional public administration are likely to conflict with the modern requirements of knowledge-based and technology-driven market economies.

SHIFT IN PARADIGM

With privatization, the very administrative culture, in terms of red tape, is replaced with a managerial and entrepreneurial culture. Instead of inputs, the focus is now on outputs and performance monitoring. Instead of autonomy, the focus is more on accountability. Instead of standardized procedures, the emphasis is more on innovation and flexibility. Under the traditional public administration, personnel are recruited either on the grounds of merit or seniority, under privatized administration; whereas with privatization, the stress is more on contractual arrangements.

Privatization can be regarded as an administrative tool, yet certainly not an end in itself. There may be conflict in values as far as the new role of entrepreneurial managers. While entrepreneurship requires autonomy, personal vision, secrecy, and risk taking behavior on the part of administrators-cum-managers, the democratic norms of the society may call for accountability, citizen's participation, openness, and transparency in policy making and stewardship. Therefore, privatization cannot be seen as a panacea to political, economic, sociocultural, or administrative problems. The more one is privatized, the less part one likely takes in collective actions or civic engagements.

See also *Bureaucracy; Deregulation; Nationalization.*

. . . .   ASHA GUPTA

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Process Tracing

In political science methodology, process tracing indicates the detailed and systematic empirical analysis of the causal mechanisms—or processes—linking political outcomes to their putative or possible explanatory factors. Based on a variety of sources such as interviews, memoirs, surveys, and historical documents, this procedure complements and reinforces more traditional correlational methods, which focus exclusively on the causal effect of independent variables (X) on dependent variables (Y). More precisely, process tracing allows the researcher to open the "black box" of causality and examine the path through which X leads to Y, thus gaining a better knowledge of its observable components (such as the intervening variables) and achieving a more reliable account of its unobservable parts. This makes process tracing an especially useful tool not only for testing hypotheses, but also for generating and refining them.

Process tracing is an in-depth methodological procedure. The requirements in terms of data, time, energies, and resources usually limit its use to small-n or single case studies. On the theoretical side, process tracing is compatible with all positivist research programs, and it is particularly useful in theoretically eclectic works where, in addition to the functions previously described, it can help delimit the domains of application of different logics of sociopolitical behavior.

See also *Qualitative Analysis; Qualitative Methodologies; Quantitative Analysis.*

. . . .   PIER DOMENICO TORTOLA

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Professional Lobbies

See *Lobbies, Professional.*

Program Evaluation and Auditing

The structure of policy making is a continuous multistage process during which programs or policies are designed, implemented, evaluated, and modified. Program evaluations are the part of the process focused on determining whether

intended objectives have been met. In this way, program evaluation is an institutional tool for implementing accountability and control. To a greater degree, program evaluation enables the policy process to be continuous by providing information on the necessity of program changes or modifications.

There are three general types of program evaluations—auditing, formative, and summative. The specific type of evaluation needed largely depends on the phase of the program and the requirements of the organization engaging the evaluation.

Auditing is a type of program evaluation focused on the accounting of procedures or funds used in the implementation of a program. In terms of procedures, auditing examines the activities of a program and verifies whether correct procedures were followed. Fiscal auditing accounts for the funds used in the implementation of a program and similarly determines whether they were used appropriately. Both types of auditing are tightly linked to the accountability and control aspects of program evaluation. Auditing may occur at any stage of a program's implementation.

Formative evaluations occur during a program's implementation. These evaluations periodically monitor the program's progress in achieving preset goals or objectives. Formative evaluations allow users to identify trends and cumulative effects. Moreover, they determine if changes in program delivery are necessary. In this way, formative evaluations aid in the development of programs by identifying whether changes in policies or procedures are needed.

Summative evaluations are different from formative evaluations based on the phase in which they are conducted. This type of evaluation is typically conducted at the end of a program or after a period of time during which the program should have achieved some level of result. Summative evaluations, the most common type of evaluation, provide information to decision makers on whether the program achieved its goals. Summative evaluations are an important tool in ensuring accountability, as they identify whether the funds used were an efficient or effective allocation of resources.

The literature reflects a lack of agreement on the purpose of program evaluations. Generally, program evaluations are seen as the process of measuring and assigning a level of merit or worth to a program. However, others disagree and see program evaluation as a branch of scientific inquiry interested only in results, leaving judgments of value and worth judgments to others. These distinctions are important as they guide the roles of the evaluator, which are classifiable into three categories—methods, valuing, and use.

The methods approach subscribes to the tenets of social inquiry. Evaluators using this approach identify program evaluation as an outgrowth of scientific inquiry. Therefore, these evaluators are concerned with generalizability and internal and external validity. They are also interested in the reduction of bias and errors. Those using this approach leave judgments of merit, value, and worth to the users of the information.

Evaluators following the valuing approach see themselves as having an additional role in the process. Unlike the methods approach, this category makes the distinction between evaluators and researchers. This approach views the role of the evaluator as not only researcher, but also as an evaluator of those findings. This is based on the belief that evaluators have the knowledge, skills, and abilities important to making valid judgments. This is contrary to the methods approach holding the evaluator as an objective participant. Evaluators using this approach are active participants in assigning a level of value or worth to the evaluated program.

Finally, evaluators employing the use approach are concerned with the entity receiving the information produced by the evaluation. These evaluators view themselves as both evaluator and teacher. Their focus goes beyond the actual conduct of the evaluation to include teaching the users how to evaluate and use the information in an effective way. This approach engages the users at every step of the process. While the methods category views the evaluator as an objective participant, and the values category views the evaluator as the source of decisions, this category aims to empower the users as decision makers.

See also *Public Policy; Public Policy Development.*

. . . . JEFFERY L. OSGOOD JR.

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Programmatic Party

Typological exercises to grasp the essential features of political parties are manifold in political science, and for nearly a century, new classification schemes evolved within the scholarly literature. Various criteria have been used to differentiate between worldwide party types. Among these, organizational, functionalist, and sociological types are the most prominent.

While the programmatic party has also been distinguished by its organizational structure, its social base of representation and the linkages it builds in its exchange relations with the citizenry to influence voters' electoral conduct are the most decisive characteristic for its classification. Consequently, the programmatic party is a political party whose rationale and reputation is bound to a distinct, consistent, and coherent programmatic or ideological agenda; it works, campaigns, and competes on the basis of clearly articulated programs and positions on issues of broad public concern.

The programmatic party thus stands in contrast to political parties rooted in clientelist strategies. It also differentiates from parties dependent on the charisma of individual leaders whose electoral appeal and exchange relations with the citizenry depend on durable patterns of loyalty linked with targeted transfers of services and obligations, or relations dependent on the personal charisma of the leader or principal candidate, who is portrayed as indispensable to the solution of the country's problems.

Often, the programmatic party commands a less elaborate and extensive party organization than the classical mass-based or the clientelist party, which have to invest heavily in their organizational structure to manage and monitor their exchange relations with the electorate. However, the programmatic party must work constantly and intensively to establish and maintain a common collective party program. This includes bundling the individual preferences of the party members with a view to changing preferences of their constituencies, seeking agreement on and compliance with its goals, and promoting its programmatic appeals and credibility in its electoral campaigning and government agenda. The programmatic party is primarily an electoralist party, meaning that its objective is to win office through its programmatic platform or vision, mobilizing its strengths at election time and using modern campaign techniques. Its social base varies, not the least depending on the institutional framework and electoral system within which it operates. In majoritarian systems, programmatic parties tend to amalgamate their programmatic agenda with catchall electoral appeals, whereas in proportional systems they often focus on a core constituency receptive to its specific program and issue positions.

THE ORIGINS OF THE PROGRAMMATIC PARTY

The concept of the programmatic party closely ties to the idealized model of responsible party government. This model dominated the scholarly contributions to the study of political parties and party systems since the 1950s and was decisive for the formulation of both rational choice and, to a lesser extent, historical-sociological explanatory approaches to the emergence and development of party systems and party competition. The responsible party model is based on the premise that political parties are basically engaged in integrating issue positions into programs or electoral platforms to be enacted if elected to office. Voters, as well as parties, rationally weigh a given party's issue position or voters' preferences with their policy or programmatic preferences. Vote choice, parties' programmatic orientation and, hence, the structuring of the party system, consequently depend on individual assessments of party performance, perception of variance in party position, and perception of voters' preferences.

While useful in determining the basic rationale of a distinct party type, modes of citizen-party linkages and patterns of party competition, the responsible party model and the concomitant conceptualization of the programmatic party type ignores several political realities: the unpredictability of political and economic constraints on party resources; the crucial role of candidates' personality attractiveness in electoral choice, reinforced by the advent of new campaign techniques and modern communication technologies, which have become the most important medium of political communication in all modern democracies; and the availability and persuasive power of alternative modes of citizen-party linkages, such as clientelist linkages.

The programmatic party is an ideal-type description of a political party derived from the study of West European parties. It's closely tied to the normative thinking within liberal theory, built on the idealization of programmatic linkages as the essence of democratic responsiveness and accountability. It is rarely found in a pure manifestation without traces of personalistic, clientelist, or other characteristics. It basically reflects political parties' functioning in established, affluent capitalist democracies. The concept is less able to grasp the logic of political parties' functioning in other parts of the world as well as more recent trends in party competition and party system development.

Apart from the typological literature, research on the programmatic party type focuses on the conditions conducive to the emergence of programmatic parties and programmatic party competition, and on whether programmatic parties have a significant influence on party system institutionalization, democratic consolidation, and public policy. The former line of research identifies various factors, such as a historical legacy of programmatic parties, the wealth level prevailing in a given context, or the existence of a high-quality bureaucracy as main determinants for the emergence of programmatic parties. The latter is more inconsistent in its assessment of the putative benefits of programmatic party competition. While the correlation is relatively straightforward that the pluralist and tolerant nature of most programmatic parties favors party system institutionalization and centripetal party competition, the nexus between the prevalence of programmatic parties and a government's public good orientation is less so. However, it seems that in the presence of programmatic parties, governments are less inclined to engage in rent-seeking and corruption.

See also *Party Identification; Political Parties; Political Party Platform*.

. . . . CLEMENS SPIESS

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Progress

The ancient philosophers were aware that the earliest periods of human history were primitive in nature, and that the more advanced social condition of the present arrived after a number of intervening stages of development. Aristotle, for example, traces social development through the clan, the village, and finally to the polis, while Thucydides is emphatic about how far the Greek cities of his time were in advance of the communities of earlier times. However, no matter how fully these thinkers believed society would come to understand the separation between the present and prehistoric times, the ancients nevertheless were not inclined to see the future as differing fundamentally from the present. They had a cyclical approach to time, tending to see history as an endless repetition of cycles running from utter devastation to rebirth and back again.

CLASSICAL AND MODERN PROGRESS

Although the idea of progress or development was known to the ancient philosophers, it is much more a distinguishing aspect of modern thought. Any study of such thinkers as Giovanni Vico, Marquis de Condorcet, Immanuel Kant, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill, Georg W. F. Hegel, and Karl Marx illustrates time meditating on the meaning of history to an extent not found in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Cicero, and Lucretius. Furthermore, the modern doctrine of progress suggests a prejudice in favor of the current time as being either the highest stage of civilization or closer to its full culmination. In line with the advancement of learning associated with names such as Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton, the modern thinkers tended to view past thought as more of an obstacle to, rather than a basis for, further knowledge, and as something that must be transcended, and perhaps even forgotten, if humankind's full development is to be reached. The moderns sometimes described antiquity as a period of humankind's childhood, while the closer people come to the present time the more grown up they are in understanding and insight. This attitude contrasts with a kind of backward-looking respect on the part of the ancients for the contributions of their intellectual predecessors.

Prior to the modern period, Christian writer Joachim of Fiore made a tripartite division of human history into the age of the Father (from Adam to Christ), the age of the Son (between the advent of Christ and 1260), and finally the age of the Holy Spirit (impending in 1260), when humankind was to come in direct contact with God. The modern philosophers picked up Joachim's thread and thus Vico presented his divine, heroic, and human periods; Hegel described his phases of oriental despotism, Greco-Roman aristocracy and Protestant freedom; Comte volunteered his theological, metaphysical and positive epochs; and Marx came forward with his feudal, capitalist, and communist stages of class struggle.

As in the earlier theological thought of Joachim, the modern view suggests the possibility of an *end of history* once humankind's capacity for progressive development has been unleashed and pent up energies have been allowed to play themselves out. With the hindsight that an end-of-history vantage point affords, all the limitations and distortions of the earlier stages come to sight as so many steps on the road to final resolution. Kant, for example, suggests that world history could end with a republic of humankind living in harmony and good order through some version of what is now known as the United Nations. Hegel's end of history takes the form of the modern Prussian state with its constitutional monarchy and professional civil service. Later, the end of history takes the form of the worldwide church of humanity for Comte and the dictatorship of the proletariat leading to communism for Marx.

QUESTIONS ABOUT PROGRESS

The philosophical question at the heart of the concept of progress is thus whether a final stage of history is possible, at which the most deforming contingencies that restrict human flourishing are removed from the lives of most human beings. Will a new human nature more pristine than the old make its presence felt when the constricting limitations of the past have been overcome? Are humans capable of leaving their beastliness in the mists of the past as they shape their own futures according to a new and higher standard? Or are humans condemned by a fatal flaw or original sin never to be able to rise above their innate depravity? Furthermore, there is the question that if progress is inevitable by a kind of law of human nature, it should make no difference whether it is sought deliberately and willfully, or simply by sitting passively and waiting for its unfolding. If the law of progress is the law of human nature, then attempts to resist it are futile. On the other hand, if progress is not inevitable but is more a product of human willing and striving, then human beings will have to put their shoulders to the wheel.

This ambiguity in the doctrine of progress is evident in many thinkers. Various liberal thinkers express skepticism about the possibilities for progress given that humankind is "crooked wood," as Kant phrased it, while conservative thinkers have not infrequently expressed their hope that human beings can improve themselves and their world. Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Edmund Burke come to mind here as emblematic of these paradoxical philosophical tendencies present on both the left and the right. Therefore, while it is fair to say that the idea of progress is akin to modern religion, it is important to note that it has its critics that hail from all points on the political compass.

Since the Enlightenment and the great age of Victorian progress, modern history has seen two world wars, totalitarianism, a cold war, regional conflicts, and now the rise of such nations as China and India whose fate was once determined in the capitals of Europe. Such developments have engendered grave doubts about the validity of the inevitable law of human progress, which had been adhered to in the West so firmly for so long. If the current era is sometimes characterized as the age of postmodernism or nihilism, it is in large measure attributable to the weakening of the idea of progress as an underlying philosophical principle of modern society. Yet, however spirited the rejection of the idea of progress becomes, it is impossible to deny its role in forming the sensibilities of the modern mind. The biblical tradition flowed into this mind with its story of historical redemption, relaying that there will certainly come a day when goodness and righteousness will prevail, all the while insisting that humans are fallen creatures forever crippled by original sin. At the same time, humans have been shaped by their Greco-Roman legacy with its humanistic teaching that through the use of reason, a human being comes close to the divine, with a constant reminder that hubris, or pride, "goeth before a fall," as was the case with Icarus. There is reason to believe then that the debate over the possibility of progress is coeval with the Western experience itself, and thus it will continue into the future.

See also *Communism, Fall of, and End of History; Development, Economic; Enlightenment Political Thought; Hegel,*

Georg W. F.; Human Development Index; Political Science, History of; Progressivism.

. . . .   COLIN D. PEARCE

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Progressivism

Progressivism is an ideological perspective broadly opposed to conservatism in regards to any number of political, economic, social, or moral issues. As such, it is often, though not always, premised upon a philosophy of history that affirms the continual possibility of progress toward improved conditions of justice in human consciousness and society. This conception of progress is usually not a perfectionist or utopian one, whether religious or secular, but instead emphasizes ameliorative reform and innovation in private behavior, as well as public matters and organizations. Since these reforms and innovations frequently clash with the traditional patterns of exchange and governance, religious and moral beliefs, or cultural norms and customs defended in a wide variety of ways by different forms of conservatism, progressivism has often come to be identified with the various liberal, egalitarian, and democratic movements that oppose conservative parties and tendencies in numerous societies around the world.

However, progressivism in the United States is also closely associated with a specific historical era of political, economic, business, and bureaucratic reforms and the policies established during that period. The extensive changes that took place during the twenty years covering the presidential administrations of Theodore Roosevelt (1901–1909), William Taft (1909–1913), and Woodrow Wilson (1913–1921) resulted in the first decades of the twentieth century often referred to as the *Progressive Era*. Some participants in various modern liberal, egalitarian,

and democratic movements in the United States today—most usually within or at least aligned with the Democratic Party, but occasionally as members of other, more narrowly focused or radical ideological organizations and political parties—have taken to looking back to that particular era as a source of benchmark measurements. They use these measurements to assess their own aspirations, goals, and approaches. (However, explicitly socialist or social democratic thinkers sometimes see the "progressive" moniker as signally too much willingness to accept and work within the modern liberal capitalist order.) Thus, those associated with the modern liberal, egalitarian, and democratic movements sometimes adopt the label "progressive" with the explicit intention to associate themselves with those historical reformers, in contrast to the more generally moderate "liberal" perspectives that are more common among opponents to conservatives in America today.

The basics of the progressive perspective in this more particular sense is a belief that the social and economic transformations that accompanied the Industrial Revolution—and which have only continued as the centrality of technology to modern life has grown—demand a rethinking of the traditional responsibilities of democratic government. The increasing pluralism of societies with significant migrant and immigrant populations also calls for reconsideration, in the sense of both large numbers of people moving from the countryside into the cities, as well as large numbers of racially, ethnically, and religiously diverse immigrants coming to the nation from foreign shores—both of which were the case in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century America, and which remains the case today. More specifically, the progressive perspective requires an expansion of the powers of state bureaucracies and regulatory agencies in order to control the exploitive practices of key economic actors, and to make democracy more accessible, effective, and accountable. The overarching goal is to empower American citizens by making mechanisms of participation available in an increasingly complex economy and in the government of an industrialized, urbanized state, as well as to streamline and make those same mechanisms more efficient.

The various liberal, egalitarian, or democratic accomplishments of the Progressive Era ranged from the constitutional accomplishments (e.g., the extension of votes to women, the direct election of senators, the foundation of a progressively scaled income tax) to the political achievements (e.g., the widespread establishment of the secret ballot, primary elections, state referendums and ballot initiatives, and the recall vote) to the economic feats (e.g., trust-busting, child labor laws, support for unionization, the minimum wage, and workers compensation). The legacy of this era of accomplishment inspires those who adopt the progressive label today to seek and use government agencies to achieve, within the context of liberal democratic capitalism, ever greater political and economic equality. This occurs through the expansion of the welfare state, the extension of public education and health care coverage, and so forth.

In some basic ways, these goals, both historically and today, parallel those pursued by various advocates of populism. In

fact, many of the reforms associated with the Progressive Era actually began through earlier populist agitation, from the 1870s through the early 1900s, and some influential populist leaders (e.g., William Jennings Bryan) came to affiliate themselves with the progressive movement. However, progressivism was from its beginning a more mainstream, urban, and middle-class (and upper-class) phenomenon, and much more willing to trust in the authority, language, and expertise of higher education—and the practitioners of such emergent fields as public administration or political science—than were the primarily agrarian and rural defenders of local populist sovereignty. This class divide, which also has a racial subtext, can be seen in the enthusiasm many progressives of that era had for Prohibition, for the urbane (and easily secularized) teachings of the social gospel, and for political reforms (e.g., civil service requirements) that disempowered ethnic and religions enclaves and parties. It is also evidenced in their favor for approaches to civil planning that privileged centralized management and mass production, thus breaking up small neighborhood and local economies, and—in a few cases—for policies premised upon the practice of eugenics. While few self-described progressives today associate their commitment to egalitarian reforms and democratic improvements with these kinds of practices, the legacy of the elite educational, bureaucratic, and class perspective of American progressive liberal thought sometimes still brings populists or radicals in alignment with conservative movements in order to oppose them.

See also *Communism; Liberalism, Classical; Socialism; Welfare State.*

. . . .   RUSSELL ARBEN FOX

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Proletariat

The term proletariat refers to a political, social, and historical idea used to describe the class of people who do not own any means of production, and who sell their labor power to capitalists—or the *bourgeoisie*—in order to earn enough money to provide for their families' immediate material needs. Although the term itself predates the work of the German communist Karl Marx, communists and socialists have used it predominantly since Marx's time to describe the industrial working class in modern capitalism.

Proletarians' lack of productive property requires them to sell their labor power in the marketplace to the capitalists who control the means of production. While Marxists recognize that proletarians have existed throughout much of human history under different modes of production, it is only under modern capitalism that the proletariat emerges as the main *productive class* in society; their labor creates the foundation for all social wealth.

According to Marxist theory, the bourgeoisie's exploitation of the proletariat's labor power is the source of the profit, or *surplus value*, capitalists earn. In this sense, the bourgeoisie is a parasitic class that adds nothing to social production itself and lives off the labor of the proletariat. The proletariat's position as both a productive and an exploited class gives it a special historical role to play in leading humanity beyond the divisions of class society and toward a new socialist or communist future. Because the bourgeoisie has no choice but to exploit the proletariat in order to maintain its profits, the proletariat is necessarily in an antagonistic opposition to capitalist society itself. The proletariat is thus a revolutionary class with a material interest in transcending capitalism. The proletariat's role as a productive class means that it has no incentive in developing new exploitive class relationships to its own benefit and therefore is in a unique position of being able to lead humanity toward the classless society of the future.

The historical accuracy of the Marxist conception of the proletariat and its historical mission remains the subject of intense controversy and dispute among social scientists. Most historians recognize that during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an organized workers movement led by unions, socialists, and communists did constitute the most important challenge to capitalist society. Moreover, in the early twentieth century, spontaneous revolutions led by the working class broke out in several European countries in the aftermath of World War I (1914–1918), leading to the establishment of ostensibly socialist or communist governments in several countries.

However, in most instances, socialist and communist parties led these movements and their precise relationship to the working class remains unclear. Many historians argue that the most important of these revolutions—the Russian Revolution of 1917—was in fact a coup led not by the spontaneous action of workers, but by Vladimir Lenin's Bolshevik Party, an elite group of revolutionaries—many of whom were not proletarians.

More recently, the importance of the proletariat within Marxist theory itself has also been challenged. In the 1960s, German political theorist Herbert Marcuse argued that the proletariat had been recuperated by capitalism's consumer society and was no longer a revolutionary class. More recently, others have argued that capitalist restructuring has led to a decline

A 1920 Soviet poster says "We destroyed our enemy with weapons, we will earn our bread with labor—Comrades, roll up your sleeves for work!" In Marxist theory, the working class, or proletariat, is a revolutionary class with an interest in overcoming capitalism.

SOURCE: The Granger Collection, New York

in importance of the industrial working class and the rise of a new *white-collar proletariat,* who—while still propertyless laborers—have a managerial mentality and are thus unable to distinguish themselves from the capitalists who exploit them.

Still others have claimed that in the new era of global capitalism, the proletariat has been replaced as the proper agent of historical change by a new global class of impoverished and marginalized people who may or may not be proletarians in the sociological sense of the term.

. . . .   MICHAEL F. GRETZ

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Proliferation

See *Arms Control; Arms Race; Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation.*

Pronunciamiento

Pronunciamiento is translated as *pronouncement* or *declaration,* and refers to the military overthrow of a government in Latin America or, historically, Spain. Although it has precedents in seventeenth-century Spain, the model is based largely on rebellions after the restoration of Ferdinand VII in 1813. The concept involves the military's self-proclaimed duty—and in some cases a constitutionally granted right—to intervene in times of crisis in the name of defending the integrity of the nation. It entails a declaration of principles about the deficiencies of the government and the need for military-led salvation.

For Latin American militaries, the term has an important technical meaning because it reflects what they believe to be the "legitimate" nature of what can be very violent actions. By contrast, *coup d'état* and *golpe de estado* suggest an illegal or unjustified change of government. In the minds of officers, the distinction is critical, as it differentiates between honor and venality, rejecting the use of power for selfish and narrow ends. Therefore, public discourse emphasizes the necessary and proper role of the armed forces to reestablish order.

See also *Autogolpe; Coup d'État; Latin American Politics and Society; Military Rule; Revolutions, Comparative.*

. . . .   GREGORY WEEKS

Propaganda

In previous centuries, the verb *to propagate* meant to transmit faith to people who otherwise were seen as "lost" forever; thus, for Catholics—as established in the Catholic *Congregatio de Propaganda fides* in 1622—propaganda was seen as a service given to pagans and tribes who believed in magic and other superstitions. In the twentieth century, in a modern, political sense, propaganda was understood as transmitting convincing messages (i.e., not always true, but not necessarily false) or communicating one single ideology in order to persuade audiences—individuals or groups, political leaders, or the media—and, finally, to influence public opinion. Therefore, propaganda does not necessarily alter reality into a message, but rather organizes facts, images, formulas, testimonies, and reasonings according to a certain ideology or worldview.

In 1948, in the aftermath of World War II (1939–1945), the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information defined *bad propaganda* as information "either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression" (Alleyne, 96). Propaganda did not only exist in religious or political speeches, or in the media; for example, in France in the 1930s there was an *association de propagande pour le vin,* a kind of trade union that

promoted the consumption of French wines in restaurants. And at the time of the 1917 Russian Revolution, the *agit-prop,* which mixed the words *agitation* and *propaganda,* helped the proletariat to express in spontaneous and provocative ways the new political slogans of the day.

Even though propaganda was already used in many countries during World War I (1914–1918), Nazism was seen as the era of propaganda at its worst, though also its most efficient. Even during the prewar years (1933–1939), the Third Reich had a ministry dedicated solely to propaganda, led by Reich minister Joseph Goebbels and, among many collaborators, Reich press chief Otto Dietrich. From 1933, the Third Reich's school system and media, including the whole German film industry, were controlled by the Nazi regime, which produced (among many others) the famous documentary *Triumph of the Will* (1935), directed by popular German actress Leni Riefenstahl (1902–2003). From a technical point of view, her use of camera angles, editing, and collective symbols was innovative in many ways; it contributed to turn Adolf Hitler into a popular hero and suggested that Nazi ideology was deeply rooted in the Germanic traditions, folklore, and people, and therefore was part of a logical, historical continuity. However, dozens of feature films (e.g., Veit Harlan's *Jüd Suss,* in 1942) and many German popular magazines also promoted anti-Semitism and hate propaganda.

While in Paris in 1939, Sergeï Chakotin released an enormous book titled *Le Viol des Foules par la Propagande Politique* (translated the following year into an abridged version, *The Rape of the Masses: The Psychology of Totalitarian Political Propaganda*). Perhaps the most famous book on propaganda, Chakotin's anti-Nazi study analyzed the Hitlerian messages from the mid-1930s, using a behaviorist approach owing much to Ivan Pavlov. Just after its release, the book was banned in France even before the German occupation in 1939, because the French authorities did not want to offend the German government. However, Chakotin did not oppose the use of propaganda per se; he even concluded his classic book by advocating for a "good propaganda" that was against all totalitarian regimes but "at the service of the ideal of socialism."

Between 1939 and 1945, wartime propaganda was just about everywhere, including the United States, which produced a variety of movies, documentaries, newsreels, and posters to counter enemy propaganda. Filmmaker John Ford directed *The Battle of Midway* (1942), about the Japanese attacks on the U.S. military, and Frank Capra produced *The Negro Soldier* (1942) in order to give a positive image of African Americans who served in the U.S. Army. European émigrés like Fritz Lang (*Ministry of Fear,* 1944) and Alfred Hitchcock (*Saboteur,* 1942) directed anti-Nazi films in Hollywood. Countless posters were created in countries that did not directly suffer from war, with messages asking people to remain discreet about their relatives who were serving in the army abroad, reminding the average citizen that "foreign ears could be listening to them."

While living in the United States during World War II, German theoreticians Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno studied the Nazi propaganda and media bias in their classic text *Dialectic of Enlightenment,* which remains the most influential study emerging from the group of scholars known as the Frankfurt school. In an addendum to their book, the sociologists criticized not only propaganda but advertising as well; they were even suspicious of propaganda for freedom. Since the end of World War II, many historians and media experts have studied Nazi propaganda; exhibitions in museums and memorials have analyzed and deconstructed its strategies and acknowledged its influence.

The cold war was another era for academic research on propaganda techniques. Harold D. Lasswell was among the first theoreticians to study propaganda and mass communication. His 1948 formula for considering the origins of any given message, the audience that is targeted, and the ways in which the message is sent—"Who says what, to whom, through which channel, and with which effects?"—is well known. Other sociologists doing research on propaganda were Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert King Merton.

In his classic 1962 book *Propagandes,* French theoretician and historian of propaganda Jacques Ellul explained that propaganda could only be studied and understood in a specific cultural and historical context. This is why most examples of propaganda coming from other countries, different cultures, or previous decades often seem naive or pointless for today's observers.

QUESTIONING THE FEASIBILITY OF "GOOD" PROPAGANDA

After the end of World War II, the term *propaganda* became pejorative and was used as an accusation. For example, in 2007 Canadian scholar Tim Patterson, at Carleton University in Ottawa, accused Davis Guggenheim and Al Gore's 2006 documentary *An Inconvenient Truth* of being propaganda rather than an informative or educational film. The filmmakers championed only one side of the global warming debate, he claimed, and disqualified their opponents by calling them "so-called skeptics." In recent decades, as John Michale documents in his book *Communication and Change* (2004), communication strategies made in Western countries took other names, like *publicity, advertising, public information, public relations campaigns,* or *advocacy*. In itself, hate propaganda is actually forbidden by law in countries such as Canada.

In democratic countries, election campaigns use communication strategies that sometimes seem similar to the old propaganda techniques in order to persuade populations, especially undecided voters. As editors Frank Esser and Barbara Pfetsch illustrate in *Comparing Political Communication* (2004), the use of symbols and positive images for candidates, but also negative images given to opponents—plus assessments of candidates made by credible celebrities—are critical and often efficient.

PROPAGANDA TODAY

Today, and especially since 1948, institutions and governments no longer use the term *propaganda* when communicating with citizens or targeting specific groups. The label *political propaganda* is used instead to target or condemn an opponent's strategy. For example, in the 1980s the Reagan administration accused Canada of implementing political propaganda when

three Canadian documentaries were presented in Washington, D.C. These short films on environmental issues included *If You Love This Planet* (1980), an antinuclear conference directed by Terri Nash; *Acid Rain Requiem or Recovery* (1982), by Seaton Findlay; and *Acid from Heaven* (1982), by George Mully. However, in September 1983 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that this "propaganda" label was unconstitutional.

One question remains regarding instances when a minister or an agency wants to send a "positive" message to help the population or to change bad habits. For example, what if policymakers need to express a vital message that says "don't drink and drive" to teenagers? In those cases, strategists aiming for social change on sensitive issues declare they plan *awareness campaigns* or *awareness-building campaigns*—interestingly, in French-speaking countries officials and politicians call these *campagnes de sensibilisation*.

Another question concerns whether institutions should use propaganda for a "good cause." In his book *Global Lies? Propaganda, the UN, and the World Order* (2003), Mark Alleyne argues that the Department of Public Information of the United Nations constantly used propaganda even after the United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information in 1948. This tied to various subsequent campaigns related to so-called good causes like human rights, AIDS awareness, and the international campaign to free Nelson Mandela.

In recent decades, research has gone beyond propaganda and counterpropaganda. For example, in *Manufacturing Consent* (1988), Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky argue that the United States is a country where propaganda has been replaced by *prop-agenda,* which implies that many political topics are always avoided in the public sphere and in the mainstream media.

Another subtle form of propaganda is *disinformation*; even if this term seems newer or lesser known, this strategy has existed since the works of Chinese author Sun Tzu, who lived sixth century BCE. Disinformation implies the fabrication of a deliberately false message, sometimes with manipulated photographs, in order to propagate false news or misleading information.

In questioning what can save citizens in democracies from being bombarded virtually every day by propaganda-like messages or similar one-sided perspectives, the fact is that living in pluralistic systems allows various opinions to coexist, be challenged, and debated. In theory, propaganda operates in the name of one sole ideology; hence, propaganda is an essential means by which totalitarian regimes legitimize their actions and maintain their existence. Such regimes can use the specter of a common enemy or an eternal opponent to the nation as a constant means to demonize other civilizations or nations and therefore validate their own system. For example, in the twenty-first century, anti-Americanism remains the ideological foundation for propaganda in nondemocratic countries. And, sadly, as French political philosopher Pierre-André Taguieff points out in his book *La Nouvelle Propagande Anti-Juive* (2010), new forms of anti-Semitism and anti-Jewish propaganda have appeared in recent years.

See also *Bourdieu, Pierre; Campaigns; Cartoons, Political; Censorship; Disinformation; Framing and Public Opinion; Ideologies, Political; Internet and Politics; Journalism, Political; Lobbying; Marx, Karl; Media Bias; Public Opinion; Television and Politics.*

. . . . YVES LABERGE

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Property Rights

Property rights are at the foundation of liberal democratic societies and social orders. However, how property rights are justified, and accounts of their limits, are matters of considerable debate. Nevertheless, the protection of property rights is a primary function of the liberal state and forms the basis of liberal freedom. While in liberal theory, property rights are private—that is, rights of individuals to their own property, and to use and exploit it as they will—the centrality of property rights to liberalism stems from historical opposition to the arbitrary power of absolutist forms of government. Property rights can therefore usefully be understood as functioning to impose constraints on political authority and create spheres of private liberty.

The most well-known liberal defense of private property is John Locke's argument in Chapter 5 of his *Second Treatise of Government.* In contrast to theorists before him, most notably Thomas Hobbes, Locke attempts to make the case for the natural right to property. For Hobbes, property rights could not come into being prior to a political authority assigning them. In this sense, property rights are artificial creations or are conventional. Locke's argument focuses on the implication of this view, emphasizing that if the state in fact creates property rights, then there are no good reasons, or constraints, against the state imposing limits on them—thus, according to Locke, limiting the freedom of individuals.

Locke presents an elaborate argument for the development and possibility of natural property rights. His argument hinges on the principle of self-ownership, such that when one mixes one's self-owned labor with an external object, the

ownership extends to that object—through laboring, individuals take resources (most notably land) out of the pool of common ownership and acquire exclusive rights over it. There are initial limits on appropriation, which the introduction of money and improvements in general welfare overcome. In time, when the great bulk of the land is removed from common ownership and the distribution of the earth's resources becomes increasingly unequal, natural property rights grow insecure. From the insecurity and "inconvenience" of all individuals protecting their own property, persons together can consent to create a common authority restricted to protect "life, liberty, and property." While there is debate as to Locke's understanding of the role of the state with respect to the common good, modern libertarians, notably Robert Nozick, defend Locke's view of property rights preceding the state imposing "side-constraints" on the extent of its legitimate authority.

Locke's theory specifically, and liberal property rights in general, have been the subject of diverse and intense criticism. An early and still influential argument against Locke is Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality.* Entrenching initial property distributions as natural rights, according to Rousseau, is a form of institutionalized theft. Appealing to the principle of individual consent cannot legitimatize them, since no rational individual would consent to a system designed to institutionalize one's own deprivation. Notably, Locke leaves the propertyless outside of the consenting process.

Perhaps the most well-known indictment of property rights is that of Karl Marx. Property rights, for Marx, are the foundation of the bourgeoisie's exploitation of the proletariat. With no property of their own, the working class is compelled to sell their labor to property owners. Since labor, according to Marx, is the source of value, to make profit, capitalists necessarily exploit laborers in extracting surplus value. The post-capitalist communist society is thus based on the abolition of private property.

The appeal to liberty and natural rights is not the only type of liberal defense for property rights. Many theorists, including Locke, appeal to the beneficial consequences of a system of property ownership and make broadly utilitarian arguments for it. One of the most well-known examples of this type of argument is found in Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations.* For Smith, a system in which each individual pursues personal interests will produce more socially beneficial results than a system based on common ownership or nonownership. Other arguments for the social efficiency of property rights include Douglass North and Robert Thomas's account in *The Rise of the Western World*, where they attribute this "rise" to the efficiency gains resulting from the development of property rights.

See also *Liberalism, Classical; Locke, John; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques.*

. . . .   NEIL HIBBERT

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Proportionality

In political psychology, proportionality is usually considered as the principle, rule, or value, describing distributive justice within a state or local or regional populace. In this sense, according to proportionality, individual outcomes need to match individual inputs to achieve justice within a system. In making the allocation decision, authorities use distributive rule of proportionality or equity.

The principle of proportionality is a fundamental concept for the European Union (EU), to ensure member states act or provide of themselves to the extent required to fulfill a certain EU objective, but do not exceed this quota as to not upset the balance of proportional inputs and outputs. Also, citizens partly base fairness judgments on the value of proportionality. Individuals perceive a situation as fair when their own ratio of outputs to inputs is the same. Hence, equal ratios lead to a public sense of fairness and satisfaction, whereas unequal ratios lead to sense of unfairness and emotional distress.

More specifically, people with low levels of benefits experience frustration, anger, rage, indignation, or disappointment; people who are overindulged often experience anxiety and guilt. Equity theorists, who assume that the individual sense of proportionality stems from a more general psychological need for cognitive balance, identify the negative emotional reactions as motivators to take corrective actions to restore proportionality. Also, the will to maximize one's personal or own group's material or immaterial benefits stimulates a desire to see the proportionality between contributions and retributions of various individuals or groups.

Applying the rule of proportionality does not easily allocate goods and allow evaluation of the outcomes of the allocation decision. The allocator and the recipients not only have to combine the delivered inputs—such as personal contributions, skills, status, or age—but they also have to compare the inputs and outputs of themselves and their significant others. As a result, several theoretical models have been proposed to describe the combination of information about inputs and outputs. The cognitive algebra model of monotonic relationship between inputs and outputs claims outcomes based on multiple information are best predicted by additively combined inputs, but the magnitudes of the increments are not the same. On the other hand, the linear relationship model predicts that increment in input always leads to the same or higher increment in the outcome. Another method, Jasso's model, ascertains that an evaluation of the fairness of a reward is best described as the difference between the natural logarithm of the actual reward and the just reward. Conversely, according to the affective model of justice reasoning, affect is

not only a by-product of cognitive processes. Negative events such as underreward and overreward—in a smaller degree—prompt emotional reactions that elicit cognitive judgment of fairness.

In Western culture, the principle of proportionality traces to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics.* In Aristotle's argument on political justice, citizens are defined as those "who are free and either proportionally or numerically equal." Today, the idea of proportionality permeates the law in various respects. It applies: in criminal law, with the need of proportion between guilt and punishment; in election law, with equal proportion between the numbers of votes and seats; in tax law, with the need of proportion between the amount of tax and the public services the state offers to society; and in constitutional and administrative law, with proportion between the burden an act of the government creates and the purpose it pursues.

See also *Administrative Law; Aristotle; Constitutional Law; Distributive Justice; European Union; Judgment and Decision Making; Justice and Injustice; Political Psychology.*

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Proportional Representation

Proportional representation was developed in the late eighteenth century at a time when representative democracies were gaining popularity in the midst of the American Revolution (1776–1783) and the French Revolution (1789–1799). Fearing tyranny of the majority, which was a persistent accusation made against representative democracies or republican forms of government, different electoral schemes were considered to ameliorate the dangers posed by this new form of government and to reduce the possibility of tyranny from occurring. Proportional representation, an electoral formula, provides a close correlation between the percentage of votes received for a particular group of candidates, represented by their party, and the percentage of seats they then receive in government for representation.

Proportional representation was first used in Swiss cantons in the 1860s. However, it wasn't until 1899 that it was used in a nationwide election, which occurred in Belgium. Today, the formula used most often in legislative bodies bases the division of seats between different parties on the percentage of

the vote. Most democracies throughout the world use a version of proportional representation in allocating seats in their respective legislative bodies. In fact, plurality voting systems, as evidenced in the United States, are the least frequently used electoral system. However, allocating votes for an executive, as practiced in the United States, is based on a winner-take-all system.

Not all legislative bodies recognize proportional representation as the electoral formula to determine which candidates hold which seats. For instance, the United States does not operate its elections for Congress based on proportional representation. Instead, the United States is bound by the winner-take-all system or first-past-the-post process. Best understood in the U.S. presidential system, the candidate who wins the plurality of the vote in the election for a specific seat, regardless of party, wins that seat. According to election rules, each candidate for president must win electoral votes for each state from their respective parties. The candidate who wins a plurality of the vote in a given state wins all electoral votes regardless of the percentage of the popular vote carried. If the United States practiced proportional representation, a different scenario would occur. For instance, if candidate A wins 53 percent of the popular vote in a given state and candidate B wins 47 percent of the popular vote in the same state, the electoral votes are divided between the two candidates. Candidate A then wins 53 percent of the electoral votes and Candidate B wins 47 percent of the electoral votes. This therefore does not align with a winner-take-all system.

Proportional representation attempts to link the popular vote with the actual distribution of votes or governing seats. As a result of this close link, supporters of proportional representation systems claim that out of all electoral formulas this is one of the most democratic because it considers those voters that are in the minority. Many advocate its use in order to ensure that racial, ethnic, and gender minorities are represented and their voice is heard in elections. Advocates for its adoption in the United States make the case that proportional representation would not only provide fair representation for minorities, but also end the practice of gerrymandering, encourage campaigns that are based on the issues, promote the emergence of third parties, foster greater turnout at the polls, and facilitate the election of more women and racial and ethnic minorities.

The term *proportional representation* is used to more broadly refer to electoral formulas that deviate from winner-take-all systems and ensure the provision of a proportion of seats for the corresponding proportion of votes. Proportional representation can be subdivided into party list (PR/PL) and single transferable vote (PR/STV). Party list refers to lists of candidates for each respective party in which a vote is cast for the party, not the individual candidates. Depending on the proportion of votes received by that party, the party is allocated a corresponding percentage of seats. The party then determines which candidates will occupy the seats they won. The possibility exists that not all candidates on the party list will be allocated a seat. Single transferable vote is similar to party list; however, the use of this system does not depend on the

presence of political parties and voters assume the role of creating the "lists." Voters develop groupings, and their votes correspond to the grouping, not the individual candidates.

See also *First Past the Post; Vote, Transferable and Nontransferable.*

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Prospect Theory

Prospect theory is the most influential behavioral theory of choice in the social sciences. Psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky created it in 1979 when they discovered that how someone thinks about a choice influences one's attitude toward risk. To illustrate, when given a choice between a sure gain of $900 and a 90 percent chance of $1,000, and a choice between a sure loss of $900 or a 90 percent chance of a loss of $1,000, most people take the sure gain of $900 and the 10 percent chance of losing nothing. Since the expected values of the choices are identical, people "should" bet the same way in each gamble. This observation strikes many people as counterintuitive and thus captures the genius of prospect theory: people choose more risk to avoid an outcome they view as a loss, and choose less risk to obtain an outcome they view as a gain. Kahneman won the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics for his work with Tversky, who died in 1996.

No one likes to lose, and in this sense people are all loss averse. But for prospect theorists, loss aversion means that people will assume more risk to avoid an outcome framed as a loss than they will to obtain the identical outcome framed as a gain. For example, people feel differently about a policy that guarantees 90 percent employment than one that guarantees 10 percent unemployment. Framing a policy as a gain (90 percent employment) puts people in a domain of gain and makes them risk averse; framing a policy as a loss (10 percent unemployment) puts people in a domain of loss and makes them willing to accept more risk to avoid that outcome. Identical problems should be viewed identically, but they are not when the framing of a choice puts one in a domain of gain or of loss, which then systematically influences one's choices. People are loss averse because preferences are reference dependent. Rather than use the objective features of a choice as the basis for a decision (e.g., an absolute gain or a final state of employment), people pay attention to changes from some reference point (e.g., a gain or a loss). Because people dislike losing

more than they like to win, they will assume more risk than they would in a different frame to escape that loss. Being in a domain of loss makes people risk acceptant, and this can be a source for either conflict or cooperation.

APPLICATIONS

The political implications of prospect theory are profound. Unlike normative theories such as rational choice that explain how people *should* make decisions, prospect theory describes how people make decisions, which is especially valuable in strategic settings (i.e., where one's best move depends on the other's move). According to prospect theory, policy makers in a domain of loss will accept more risk than they would if they were in a domain of gain. They might escalate a military intervention that is going poorly, gamble on a risky rescue mission, or embrace radical economic reform because they are in a domain of loss. An actor who frames discontinuing action as a loss may assume more risk to continue that action than would an actor who has the capability of action but has not yet started it. For example, compelling a state to surrender its chemical weapons stockpile is harder than deterring a state from developing such weapons.

More generally, risk aversion might account for the relative stability of the international system. If people value what they have more than what they covet, then decision makers would be most likely to accept the risk of war to avoid losing what they have, rather than risk war when they see an opportunity to acquire more. Appropriate strategies of influence depend on whether actors are in a domain of gain or loss. For example, one should use threats against actors seeking gains—because threats increase risk to actors who are averse to risk—and use promises for actors seeking to avoid losses. Identifying predictable biases makes prospect theory a powerful tool for anticipating an individual's behavior as well as the behavior of financial markets.

CONTROVERSIES

Critics focus on three problems with using prospect theory to explain political decisions. First, prospect theory has no theory of frames. Because preferences are reference dependent, empirical applications of prospect theory must identify whether an actor is in a domain of gain or loss. Outside the lab, people create their own frames and this complicates using prospect theory. For example, will a dictator view the development of a nuclear weapon as a newfound gain and thus be risk averse, or will other concerns (e.g., a collapsing economy) keep the dictator in a domain of loss making him risk acceptant? No solution exists to the problem, though political scientists have explored techniques for assessing domain. Some scholars use the status quo as the basis for an actor's reference point: foreign policy setbacks create a domain of loss and a desire for a return to a precrisis status quo.

Second, measuring loss aversion in the field is difficult because it is often unclear whether one is being risk averse or risk acceptant. For example, is invading a country that might have nuclear weapons riskier than not invading that country? Reaching a consensus on these issues can be difficult even

with access to archives. Using an economic definition of risk can address the problem: the more extreme the possible outcomes, the riskier the choice; the more moderate the outcomes, the less risky the choice. Nonetheless, observers will sometimes differ in their assessments of risk and this complicates measuring loss aversion.

Third, psychological experiments cannot capture how people behave in real environments. Markets and international bargaining are too complex, and decision makers are too sophisticated, for such a simple psychological theory. Prospect theorists respond that experts reveal the same biases as do novices, and giving people greater incentives to reason carefully may make them more confident in their responses. However, it does not make them more accurate. Testing hypotheses in the field that have been contradicted in the lab is probably a mistake, but testing hypotheses derived from prospect theory that have been repeatedly confirmed in the lab is normal science. Whether prospect theory reveals how people behave in real settings is an empirical question, which is why political scientists who use prospect theory are committed to detailed empirical case studies.

See also *Rational Choice Theory; Strategic Interest.*

. . . .   JONATHAN MERCER

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Protectionism and Tariffs

Protectionism is a term used to describe action that a national government takes to affect the importation of goods or services in the interest of sheltering domestic producers or service providers from international competition. Traditionally, the most common form of protection has been the tariff, which constitutes a tax levied against imported goods.

PROTECTIONISM AND POLITICS

Protectionism represents an economic conundrum; while economically problematic, once in place, protectionism proves remarkably robust. It has been a staple of economic theory since David Ricardo first articulated the theory of comparative advantage: under most conditions, states will maximize their aggregate wealth if they concentrate exclusively on the production of goods that, according to their allocation of assets (traditionally labor, land, and capital), they are most efficient at producing. This specialization is encouraged through the market principles associated with free trade. Under such conditions of maximum competition, producers have the greatest incentive to produce efficiently, and consumers are afforded the widest array of choice at the most reasonable cost.

However, while free trade tends to maximize a state's aggregate wealth, the elimination of import protection distributes costs and benefits unevenly. The benefits of removing protection are, generally speaking, broad but latent. That is, a large number of consumers—and already-efficient producers—benefit, but these benefits are often marginal to any given individual. By contrast, the costs associated with the removal of import protection tend to be concentrated and manifest. For producers in inefficient sectors of the economy, the reduction or elimination of import protection can be sufficient to shut down industries and cost jobs. Given this asymmetry of costs and benefits, despite the aggregate benefits associated with free trade, democratically elected officials are predicted to gratify the policy demands of an intensely preferential minority over a less preferential majority. Protectionism is also made more robust insofar as advocates of import protection enjoy manifest rhetorical advantages. The economic benefits of free trade are fairly technical and hence engage the imagination of a modest segment of the population. By contrast, the tangible, real-life costs of people losing jobs and factories closing are more readily understood, both intellectually and emotionally.

REASONS FOR PROTECTIONISM

Protectionism is not an inherent bad. In addition to the significant costs borne by individuals who stand to lose profits and jobs, there are other considerations that factor into states' decisions to protect domestic producers. One is the so-called infant industry argument. One of the problems faced by late-industrializing states is that it is difficult for new firms to break into industrial markets. These new firms face larger advertising costs, for example, than do established firms that enjoy more brand recognition. They also face disadvantageous economies of scale, or cost per unit of output. Firms that already enjoy established market shares can generally produce each unit at a lower cost than can firms seeking to enter such markets. As a result, late-industrializing states (e.g., Germany during the third quarter of the nineteenth century) often choose to shelter new "infant" industries from foreign competition until they are mature enough to reasonably compete with more established foreign competitors.

While free trade tends to maximize a state's aggregate wealth, there are often considerations other than wealth maximization that might serve a country's interests. National security is an example. Historically, nations have been loath to create disincentives for agricultural production, even when

they do not have comparative advantage in such production. The economic advantages of shifting production to more efficient sectors and instead importing foodstuffs can render a nation vulnerable to blockade during times of war. The same logic applies to the production of munitions. Nations that rely on foreign countries to produce their armaments run the risk that the supply of munitions, not to mention their capacity to develop state-of-the-art weaponry, could be shut off during times when they are most needed.

TYPES OF PROTECTIONISM: TARIFFS AND NONTARIFF BARRIERS

Tariffs are the most visible form of import protection. Historically, they were used not only to protect domestic producers, but also, particularly before the widespread use of the income tax, as sources of national revenue. During the Progressive Era in the United States, the so-called scientific tariff was the basis of what was known as *fair trade*. Under fair trade, tariff levels are set at a level that equalizes production costs between domestic producers of a given commodity and more efficient foreign producers. While the effect is superficially more just, fair trade undercuts the logic of the theory of comparative advantage.

Countries historically have set differential tariff rates, with the best rates on a particular commodity offered to *most favored nations* (MFN). The MFN principle can operate in one of two ways. Under the *conditional* MFN principle, state A enters into a trade agreement with state B whereby state B is granted state A's lowest tariff on a particular commodity. State A then offers this same MFN rate to noncontracting parties in exchange for the same concessions that state B has granted. Under the *unconditional* MFN principle, however, all states with which state A has entered into a trade agreement are considered most favored nations and are thus granted the MFN rate on all of state A's commodities. As such, each time state A enters into an agreement with one MFN, the MFN rate extends to all of state A's trade partners. A concession to one is a concession to all.

The unconditional MFN principle has been the foundation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since its founding in 1947 as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO operates according to *rounds*—episodic periods of negotiations designed to extend the scope of MFN concessions. The early rounds of the (then) GATT negotiated industrial tariff reductions on a commodity-by-commodity basis. With the Kennedy Round (1964–1967), however, and the introduction of the *Swiss formula*, tariffs reductions were negotiated across the board. During the Tokyo Round (1973–1979), member nations negotiated the reduction of less-visible nontariff barriers; these include import licenses, quotas, voluntary export restrictions, and subsidies.

Until the Uruguay Round (1986–1993), the GATT had been concerned only with industrial commodities. The Uruguay Round and Doha Round (2001–) have been dedicated to reducing protectionism in the contentious agricultural and tertiary (i.e., services) sectors, as well as in commodities, particularly textiles, deemed most advantageous to developing nations,

most of which failed to enjoy the enormous benefits achieved by industrialized nations through the GATT and WTO.

See also *Free Trade; Ricardo, David; World Trade Organization (WTO).*

. . . .   MICHAEL LUSZTIG

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Protestant Political Thought

The Protestant Reformation set in motion a series of largely unintended revolutions, from the sudden transformation of European geopolitics, to the formation of the modern nation-state, as well as the reshaping of families and the ideals of individuality. Martin Luther (1483–1546), a German, and John Calvin (1509–1564), a Frenchman, were the leading figures introducing and spreading Protestant political thought leading to the creation of Protestant churches and Protestant states and societies.

BEGINNINGS OF PROTESTANTISM

The first phase of the Protestant Reformation, beginning with Luther's Ninety-five Theses in 1517, was a widespread Gospel-oriented critique of the Catholic Church doctrine and polity, especially regarding salvation. As civil authorities enlisted in this movement, there developed a magisterial Protestantism, which spearheaded the reform of church doctrines and practices but included religion under the guidance of godly rulers. The initial phase of the Reformation created protonational churches, converting normally recurring political struggles into prolonged internecine religious wars. By the end of the Thirty Years War (1618–1648), the principle *cuius regio, eius religio*—"whose realm, his religion"—was established in which state-building and church-building went hand in hand. Essentially, the religion of the ruler dictated the religion of the ruled. The Thirty Years War, primarily fought in modern day Germany, involved the major European powers of the

sixteenth century and is considered a war between Protestants and Catholics. The result for political thought was paradoxical: as Protestant political leaders became heads of their respective confessional churches, politics increasingly subsumed sacred duties and purposes as the state undertook the spiritual and ethical elevation of its members. The loss of the sacerdotal, or priestly, authority of the church was mirrored in the increase in the moral and tutelary tasks undertaken by governments.

While this early development of a macropolitics of *Protestantism from above* might seem to confirm an increasing secularization of society and the increasing consolidation and authoritarianism of politics, the power of *Protestantism from below* in the churches and local communities tells a different story. Replacing priests and masses were intense religious communities bound together by prayer, sermons, and hymns. The micropolitics flowing from a religion of personal conviction—exemplified by Calvinist Geneva—destabilized many regimes, leading to the independence of the Low Countries from Spain and the rapid rise to power of the Netherlands.

The most prominent example of the power of a new religious and social discipline from below, however, occurred in the mid-seventeenth century with the rise of Puritanism and the English Civil War (1642–1651). In both England and the Netherlands, a "revolution of the saints" forged strong links in religious community between personal and familial discipline and republican citizenship. These revolutionary movements, whether intended or not, set the framework for the development of early modern political thought: the writings of Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf, Hugo Grotius, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau are incomprehensible absent the "disciplinary revolution" of Independency, Calvinism, and pietistic Lutheranism. In addition, colonial New England and the American Revolution (1776–1783) would be even less understood without the context of these movements.

ADAPTING TO MODERN CULTURE
A strong but quite different relationship between Protestantism and political thought was forged in the nineteenth century. Protestantism from below had always had a strong social reform impulse fueled by hopes of millennialism, meaning a paradise on Earth when Christ rules for nearly one thousand years before the anticipated final judgment. Lay-dominated disciplinary consistories in local churches, the formation of orphanages and work houses, the reform of prisons, the establishment of common schools, and reforms in marriage and the family all attested to a Protestant evangelical imperative to fulfill one's calling and to manifest one's inward regeneration. Protestantism from above lodged important ethical tasks in the state.

It was the task of German academic theologians, philosophers, and historians in the nineteenth century to incorporate these dual imperatives into a systematic Protestant theology and biblical interpretation studies. F. C. Baur, Albert Ritschl, Adolf Harnack, and, later, Ernst Troeltsch, sought to integrate religious and secular history in a larger narrative of the progressive revelation of God's spirit. This philosophical history, in which the birth of Protestantism was the signal modern event, tended to make cultural, political, social, and economic life the chief site of God's contemporary revelation. As God's kingdom becomes more clearly revealed, the distinctive role of the church and Christian dogma is progressively displaced. Through moral philosophy and social reform, an increasingly noncreedal Protestantism became the vehicle through which Christian ethics would achieve a world-universal status. On this reading of history, this kind of secularization represents the progressive fulfillment of Christian prophecy and not its denial. Georg W. F. Hegel's philosophy of history stands as the most notable product of this project.

Elsewhere, political philosophers and public moralists quickly adopted these readings of history as a sacred story. In England, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, John Stuart Mill, Mark Pattison, Benjamin Jowett, and Thomas Hill Green incorporated and reworked these ideas into their own historical–philosophical writings, while theologian F. D. Maurice and clergyperson Charles Kingsley, along with novelists like Humphrey Ward and George Eliot, conveyed these same ethical–historical teachings into the homes and churches of the middle classes.

It was in America, however, where political values and Protestant ethical ideals were most closely bonded. Before the Civil War (1861–1865), an evangelical united front spearheaded a series of national moral and social reform programs, most notably the abolition of slavery. After the Civil War, German-trained political economists and historical sociologists infused the new research universities with reform ideas that quickly became allied with Progressive reformers and intellectuals and with the reform projects of a noncreedal social Christianity. The early John Dewey, Jane Addams, Richard Ely, Walter Rauschenbusch, and Lyman Abbott are representative of this fusion.

The legacy of Protestantism for political thought was less a set of new Christian doctrines and more a series of new and often unintended conditions within which modern political thought—and modern society itself—developed. Since Protestantism was hostile to hierarchic priesthoods and claims of sacerdotal authority by church governments, the authority of individuals, families, and governments was enhanced. The individualism inherent in a religion of personal conviction was increasingly augmented with a belief that gathered congregations, voluntarily constituted by the body of believers and protected in their corporate freedom by the state, represented the true ideal of human association. Finally, a covenantal political theology projected an ideal that all true polities achieve their unity and purpose, in this world and at the end of time, through a common dedication to transcendent ends.

See also *Calvin, John; Church and State; Covenant; Evangelicalism; Freedom of Religion; Fundamentalism; Luther, Martin; Pentecostalism; Puritanism; Reformation Political Thought; Religious Persecution.*

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Protest Music

Protest music encompasses many artistic forms, such as poetry, music, or satire with a dose of politics. As a genre, protest music exists in various cultures. Unlike military marches and national anthems, contemporary protest music and songs criticize a state's establishment and propose another social vision.

There are numerous classic examples of protest music in the twentieth century. For instance, in Germany during the 1920s, Kurt Weil and Bertholt Brecht composed many subversive songs, which were appreciated by the socialists. In France, singer and songwriter Léo Ferré always defined himself as an anarchist, and even attacked Spanish dictator Francisco Franco in two songs, "Franco la Muerte" (1964) and "L'Espoir" (1974). In the United States, African American artists expressed their subversive feelings about poverty, life in prisons, and class tensions in the musical blues genre. For example, during the 1950s and 1960s, African American blues artist J. B. Lenoir wrote and recorded topical songs portraying America's engagement in war during the cold war era, such as "Alabama Blues," "Eisenhower Blues," "I'm in Korea," "Korea Blues," and "Everybody Crying About Vietnam."

Earlier, novelist and songwriter Boris Vian helped jazz become popular in France during the 1950s with his subversive songs. His most famous composition was "Le Déserteur" (1954), a strong antiwar song in which a humble man writes to the president, explaining in polite terms that he refuses to go to war. This song was released at a time when France was in conflict in Indochina, later to be called Vietnam. The words of the song refer to how soldiers are victims who lose their wives and souls while on the front. In the conclusion, the lyrics relay that if soldiers want to force the narrator to go to war, they will have to shoot him. The song was banned on the French radio because it was considered demoralizing for soldiers and an insult to the French army. However, Vian created many more antiwar songs, including "Le Petit Commerce" (The Little Commerce), in which a merchant explains he finally made a fortune by selling arms and tanks, but then loses all his friends who were sent

to war. In another ironic song, "La Java des bombes atomiques" (The Java of the A-Bombs), Vian tells the story of an inventor who wants to show his new A-bomb to all presidents of the world, reunites them for a secret meeting, and then throws a little A-bomb on them. After his death in 1959, dozens of Vian's subversive songs were sung by other artists.

Famous U.S. songsters such as Woody Guthrie and Pete Seeger composed protest songs influenced by left-wing, socialist slogans during the 1940s and 1950s. Soul music from the 1960s was also a form of protest, such as James Brown's "Say It Loud—I'm Black and I'm Proud," a funk song recorded in 1968. In Canada in 1973, Félix Leclerc wrote "L'Alouette en colère" (The Angry Lark) to protest the Canadian army, which—under a special War Measures Act during the October crisis in 1970—occupied Montreal and Quebec City, plus a part of the Ile d'Orléans.

Singer and songwriter Bob Dylan is often seen as the epitome of the protest singer, mainly because he succeeded in bringing protest songs to a large audience and indoctrinating his music into mainstream culture. Dylan's songs, "Blowin' in the Wind" (1962), "The Times They Are A-Changin'" (1963), "A Hard Rain's A-Gonna Fall" (1964) are all examples. Beginning in 1965, Dylan transcended from the folk scene and brought his vision to mainstream radio.

Popular music, which was predominantly mainstream Anglo-American music, was a convenient means to bring easy listening protest music to the masses. The Beatles included pacific messages in their songs, such as the antiwar "We Can Work It Out" (1965) released during the Vietnam War (1959–1975), or "All You Need Is Love" (1967), which was the first song performed live and simultaneously broadcasted on television via satellite worldwide. In the United States, music festivals such as Monterey International Pop Festival in 1967 and Woodstock Music and Art Fair in 1969 contributed to broadening pop music's audience beyond the sphere of hippies. Feature films from these two megaconcerts were seen by millions, and still allow the twenty-first century observer to witness the high energy between protest singers and their audience.

Philosophers from the Frankfurt school, a neo-Marxist center, had a strong interest for popular music, jazz, and radio. While they were living in the United States during the mid-1940s, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, two of the school's famous philosophers and sociologists, explained that mass culture does not emerge from the masses; it is rather conceived for massive audiences, produced and distributed as any industrial process. More recently, scholars in cultural studies question the former distinctions between high art and low art in terms of music, and focus on how audiences and individuals can appropriate elements of a specific popular culture into building their own identity. In many contexts, music has become an important part of social identity and systems of fashion.

Ethical dimensions of popular music appeared when cases of copyright infringements emerged. The limit between influence, inspiration, and plagiarism has always been difficult to indicate. For instance, composer George Gershwin could say

he was "inspired" by traditional African American spirituals when he wrote "Summertime," on his classic *Porgy and Bess,* when he in fact copied the melody of "Sometimes I Feel Like A Motherless Child," and merely added new lyrics.

See also *Critical Theory; Music, Political; Protests and Demonstrations.*

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Protests and Demonstrations

Worldwide, protests against a state or a political entity, or in advocacy of a public cause, happen frequently, in a variety of ways, and are usually short-lived. The effectiveness of a protest can be measured and interpreted by a variety of factors, not all dependent on achieving the actual reform or cause the protestors seek, as the amount of support and attention a protest receives could be considered a type of achievement. The initial step for understanding protest is to examine the terms of a protest's mobilization. Three major theories circulate about the concept of a protest's mobilization.

First, cultural theories argue that local culture is vital and that protesters think. One problem with these theories is that numerous relevant cultures exist. Many may affect any given protest action and it is difficult to understand fully more than a few cultures at a time. Second, structural theories posit external causes for mobilization. For Theda Skocpol, the international capitalist pricing system is a prime mobilizer, while for Charles Tilly, maintained industrialization and urbanization lead to protest mobilization. Tilly considered leadership critical, but was otherwise a completely structural theorist because he felt individuals and their thinking was unimportant. Third, and in contrast, Mancur Olson created a rational theory that considers each person as an individual thinker with preferences. Olson's theory focuses on clubs and interest groups, but not on conflict.

Mark Lichbach extended the rational theory to risk and conflict. He agreed with Tilly in believing leadership important, but created dozens of solutions to the mobilization problem and found four distinct categories: (1) market, by lowing costs and increasing benefits; (2) community, by using common knowledge; (3) contract, by making deals with other groups; and (4) hierarchy, by leaders ordering followers to act. In order to mobilize anyone for a successful protest campaign, it is necessary to combine at least two of these groups. Lichbach also incorporated many cultural norms in his theory.

Of these theories of mobilization, the rational one is ascendant. Structural theories ran into two difficulties. First, they could not tell how to bring one person out to protest without bringing all dissidents out at the same time. Second, their concept of political opportunity structure claimed dissidents act only when structural opportunities open. However, researchers found dissidents themselves could create such opportunities, and this lowered the value of the political opportunity structure. The apparent insanity of accepting personal risks challenges the rational theory of protest. Yet, the theory can be tested under risk because most people do not want to be arrested, injured, or killed, and thus find ways to elude or at least to minimize repression. For instance, with the Iranian presidential elections in June 2009, hundreds of thousands of Iranian citizens took to the streets to challenge the election results, claiming electoral fraud in defiance of Iran's militant theocracy. Despite Iran's security crackdown and censorship of the protests, Iranian citizens remained dissuaded from publicly demanding new elections, even after hundreds to thousands of protestors were arrested or killed by Iranian security forces.

Although demonstrations seem to be most frequent, there are many forms of protest. Of the 30,000 recorded protest events in the United Kingdom over a sixteen-year period, demonstrations accounted for 533. Demonstrations are simply the most public forms of protests and therefore receive the most media attention. Demonstrations that remain stationary are called *rallies*; those that move become marches. Typically, demonstrations last less than two hours and occur on workdays, avoiding weekends when free time would be consumed. According to recent studies, Muslim Albanians protest most frequently on Wednesdays, Belgians on Sundays, French on Thursdays, and Germans and British on Saturdays. A well-known coding project in Germany relied on Monday newspapers to collect protest data over the weekends, missing about 72 percent of all protests taking place during the full week.

In the United States, almost all demonstrations are nonviolent; when violence does occur, it stems from riots, especially when police leave the scene. European demonstrations begin calmly, but when they start to unravel, some persons typically organize rock throwing or car burning tactics, as this is an easy means to mobilize a violent protest. Recent, contemporary examples of international demonstrations, which gained considerable amount of media attention, were the 2009 G20 summit protests in London, then Pittsburgh in the United States. International protesters amassed in the thousands seeking increased economic oversight of the participating capitalist powers or proenvironmental reforms. While these demonstrations were to remain peaceful, some protestors did attempt to react violently against security officials.

See also *Assassinations, Political; Civil Disobedience; Labor Strikes; Nonviolence; Olson, Mancur; Political Change; Protest Music; Revolutions, Comparative.*

. . . . RONALD FRANCISCO

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Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph

French philosopher and author Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865) was the first to call his social philosophy *anarchist*. He considered state order to be artificial, contradictory, and ineffective, thereby engendering oppression, poverty, and crime. Furthermore, he believed public and international law, along with the varieties of representative government based upon the principle of individual ownership of productive property, are also false. In his important work *What is Property?* (1840), Proudhon famously proclaimed that "property is theft." With this, he asserted that authority is incapable of serving as a proper basis for constituting social relations, and the citizen must be governed by reason alone.

An opponent of communism, which Proudhon viewed as requiring the subservience of the individual to the collective, he argued for a system of mutualism that allowed for a synthesis of private property—or possession—and collective ownership that would avoid the extremes of each on their own. In the system, workers controlled their specific means of production and exchanged the products of their labor, with exchange values determined by the amount of necessary labor time involved in the production of the products in question. It was not a system of full equality, since the industrious were rewarded more than those who were less ambitious.

In Proudhon's system, social affairs would develop in economic organizations and over time the state would render obsolete. In place of political institutions, Proudhon advocated economic organizations such as cooperatives and "people's banks" as means toward the reorganization of social life. With this, limiting of constraint, the reduction of repressive methods, and the convergence of individual and collective interests creates what Proudhon calls the condition of total liberty, or anarchy; he suggests that it is the only context in which "laws" operate spontaneously without invoking command and control.

In the absence of a governmental state, self-regulating communes would associate in federated networks. Proudhon envisioned Europe as a confederation of federations overcoming national borders. Proudhon's mutualism achieved great popularity among the working classes during the French revolution of 1848, when workers demanded liberal social, political, and economic reforms. In his *General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century* (1851), Proudhon reflects on the lessons of 1848 and presents a defense of revolution as a permanent and ongoing social process—a necessity of social life.

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon advocated economic organizations to reorder social life and create a state of total liberty or anarchy, without political institutions.

SOURCE: The Granger Collection, New York

Proudhon's ideas came to dominate among those members of the French working class who contributed to the foundation of the International Working Men's Association (IWMA). During the workers' revolutionary movement known as the Paris Commune of 1871, the largest political ideological group that participated consisted of Proudhonians. Proudhon's calls for working-class self-liberation through economic organization contributed to the founding of anarcho-syndicalism, or revolutionary unionism, and influenced the autogestion (i.e., workers' self-management) movements of the 1960s and 1970s. His followers founded the main organization of the union movement in France, the *Confédération générale du travail* (General Confederation of Labour—CGT).

Despite his influence on progressive movements, Proudhon espoused a number of reactionary perspectives. He viewed the family as society's primary and most significant socializing agent, the source of moral values and social affections, and a bulwark against modern market values. This view of the family has been criticized for upholding a patriarchal vision of women as suited primarily to home, rather than public life. Proudhon was also deeply anti-Semitic and racist, and he claimed the inferiority of certain races and proposed that Jews be expelled from France, arguing that land belongs to the race that was originally born on it.

See also *Anarchism; French Political Thought; Mutualism; Workers' Rights.*

. . . . JEFFREY SHANTZ

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Psephology

Psephology is the quantitative analysis of elections and balloting. Psephology is Greek for "pebble" and refers to the stones used in ancient Athens to indicate voter preferences. British political scientists and election commentators, R. B. McCallum and Robert McKenzie popularized the term in the 1950s. Psephology uses voting records, polling data, finance records, and other primary data and records to analyze voting patterns and voter preferences. It attempts to explain swings in voter preferences, variations in electoral turnout, and demographic voting trends. Psephology research can be used to explain past or contemporary voting results or to develop predictive theories for future balloting.

Research areas within the field typically concentrate on voter behavior and motivation, and models for future elections. Studies and findings are often used to affirm or challenge existing theories on voting. Political parties, polling firms, and political consultants often employ psephologists. Some psephology studies have been criticized for developing false predictive theories or for creating inaccurate correlations between political, economic, or social conditions and election results. Critics also argue that biases in polling data or study criteria can skew the predictive value of psephology.

See also *Exit Poll; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Political Participation; Polling, History of; Voting Behavior.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Ptolemy of Lucca

Italian historian Ptolemy of Lucca (ca. 1227–1327), also known as Bartholomew of Lucca or Tolomeo of Lucca, was a member of the Dominican order and held several influential positions within the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church. He is the author of *On the Government of Rulers*. Originally, authorship of this treatise was attributed to theologian St. Thomas Aquinas, Ptolemy's teacher and friend, and the work became very influential due, in part, to that misunderstanding.

Consistent with Ptolemy's studies with Aquinas, ancient Greek thinker Aristotle had the most important philosophical influence on Ptolemy, particularly Aristotle's *The Politics*. Aristotle had offered a threefold classification of different kinds of regimes, depending on the number of rulers and whether those rulers governed for the common good or only in their own self-interest. The favorable forms of government were monarchy, aristocracy, and constitutional rule of the many. The corrupted versions of these regimes were tyranny or despotism, oligarchy, and mob dictatorship. But whereas most thinkers of the period accepted Aristotle's classification without much revision, Ptolemy complements it with the addition of different modes of lordship, also borrowed from Aristotle. There are four kinds of lordship: sacerdotal and regal, regal alone, political, and household. In *On the Government of Rulers*, Ptolemy focuses primarily on regal and political forms of rule.

In his discussion of regal rule, Ptolemy tends to equate it with despotism, although his discussion of these matters is at times contradictory. Regal rule is rule of a single ruler or sometimes the rule of the master over the servant. Political rule, on the other hand, is rule by the laws adopted by citizens or their representatives. It may include either direct democratic rule or republican systems of government. Ptolemy's discussion of republicanism, particularly his claim that it is the best form of government for virtuous people, has led some commentators to conclude that he was committed to some form of republican government. However, he also believed in the sinfulness and moral corruption of human beings. In *On the Government of Rulers* he states: "As is clear from what I have said, we should prefer the government of one, which is best, although it may be converted into tyranny, which is worst" (79). He goes so far as to suggest that a certain degree of tyranny is acceptable, since the alternative would allow too much latitude for a person's sinfulness.

Despite exhibiting some sympathy for republican forms of government in certain circumstances, Ptolemy endorsed the claims of papal authority with regard to temporal rule. Included in his arguments is the claim that Jesus Christ bestowed upon his disciple Peter, and subsequent popes, authority in all matters regarding the church. Since the affairs of the church take precedence over temporal issues, church authority on all matters, temporal or divine, is final. However, the assumption here is that the pope must work for the common good. If this is not the case, Ptolemy offers no alternative.

As suggested earlier, Ptolemy's influence on political thought was largely a result of the mistaken belief that Aquinas was the author of *De Regimine.* Ironically, despite his own preference for regal rule, it was his arguments regarding republicanism that would have the greatest influence on other Italian thinkers such as poet Dante Alighieri, political reformer Girolamo Savonarola, and statesman Niccolò Machiavelli. Hence, Ptolemy helped provide a basis for what would eventually become known as civic humanism.

See also *Alighieri, Dante; Aristotle; Civic Humanism; Governance; Italian Political Thought; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Thomas Aquinas.*

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Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy (PD) is a communication process employed by states and nonstate actors to influence a foreign government by influencing its citizens. It is a relatively new field of practice and scholarship. It attracted attention in the previous century with the opening of diplomacy to the media and public opinion, and became a more substantial area during the cold war, which was dominated by the delicate balance of nuclear weapons and the ideological battle for the hearts and minds of peoples around the world. PD became a critical element of national security and foreign policy following the emergence of the information age, the end of the cold war, and the September 11 attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DURING THE COLD WAR

Originally, states used PD in antagonistic relationships in order to achieve long-term results in foreign societies. The assumption was that if public opinion in the target society is persuaded to accept a favorable image of the other side, this will exert pressure on the government to alter existing hostile attitudes and policy. Thus, during the cold war, both the United States and the Soviet Union extensively utilized PD to shape favorable public attitudes around the world toward their respective rival ideologies. They primarily used international broadcasting, international exchanges, and cultural diplomacy.

The United States established radio stations such as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, and Britain used the BBC World Service to provide citizens in communist countries with accurate information about events occurring in their own countries and in the West. The Soviet Union and China used broadcasts in numerous languages to spread their messages around the world.

Cultural diplomacy includes participation in festivals and exhibitions, building and maintaining cultural centers, and teaching a language and organizing musical tours. The purpose is to cultivate admiration, reputation, and good will. Many countries maintain permanent cultural centers in major cities around the world so that citizens can be directly exposed to the cultural world of the state employing cultural diplomacy. Examples include the cultural centers of the British Council, the German Goethe-Institute, and the Chinese Confucius Institutes.

International exchanges refer to programs designed to bring overseas students, faculty, intellectuals, and artists to study or to work in universities and scientific centers. The assumption is that spending time, studying or teaching, will make foreign students and scholars ambassadors of good will for the host state. Examples include the U.S. Fulbright program and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD).

THE NEW PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

At the beginning of this century, scholars and practitioners adopted the term *new public diplomacy* (NPD). First, they wanted to distinguish between the PD of the cold war and the PD of the postwar era. Second, they wished to adjust the classic PD to the opportunities and challenges of the information age. NPD includes the following components: (1) it is pursued by states and nonstate actors; (2) it is based on *soft power*, two-way communication, strategic PD, information management, nation branding, and e-image; (3) it involves domestication of foreign policy; and (4) it deals with both short- and long-term issues. Contrary to popular misunderstanding, the NPD is not propaganda and is not just public relations. It is a communication system designed to create a dialogue with both foes and allies. It requires a capability to effectively use credible information to persuade actors to understand, accept, or support policies and actions.

Contemporary public diplomacy is related to soft power. Power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to yield the outcomes one wants. To achieve these outcomes, an actor may employ *hard power*—that is, military and economic means—or soft power, which entails attraction, seduction and persuasion. Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a nation's values, culture, and policies. It causes people to act through cooperation rather than coercion. The Vatican, many international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) possess only soft power. Critics suggest that only *smart power*—a balanced combination of hard and soft power can yield the best results. PD could be viewed as the wielding of soft power.

While only nations pursued classic public diplomacy, both states and non-state actors conduct the NPD; this includes international organizations, NGOs, multinational corporations, global media networks, terrorist organizations, military alliances, and prominent individuals. Also, classic public diplomacy was one-sided. Messages and information were delivered to the masses, but there was no effort to create a dialogue and listen to the interests and wishes of the messages' recipients. The NPD utilizes two-way communication, a central element in several models of international public relations and public diplomacy, which requires serious listening and suitable responses to messages from other nations.

STRATEGIC PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The NPD is based on strategic communication, which includes scientific measurement of public opinion and persuasion techniques. It also involves the creation and persistent dissemination of clear and consistent themes. *Information management* refers to the means officials use to influence media coverage and framing of major events, leaders, and processes.

A *brand* is best described as a consumer's idea about a product, and public relations and marketing experts believe nations can be branded like products. Branding thus entails giving products and services an emotional dimension with which people can identify. The *brand state* refers to what people around the world think and feel about a nation. This formulation also applies to nonstate actors.

With the Internet now a major arena for information dissemination, almost all states and nonstate actors maintain Web sites to present their history, policies, values, culture, science, and other achievements. The Internet provides actors with ample opportunities to present themselves in a way that can cultivate positive support or attack opponents. By using the Internet for self-promotion, actors pursue cyberpublic diplomacy, and the cumulative effect creates competing e-images. National e-images appear primarily on the official Web sites of presidents; prime ministers; foreign affairs and defense ministries; domestic security agencies; and trade, tourism, and science organizations. NGOs and terrorist organizations have been particularly effective in using the Internet to promote their causes and actions.

In 2001, following the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush employed force but also extensive PD to combat global terrorism. He established new PD agencies, pursued new programs, and allocated substantial budgets. His successor, President Barack Obama, has increased the emphasis on PD and his Cairo speech of June 2009 is an example. In this century, PD is likely to become the major instrument of foreign policy due to the continuing decline of military force as a legitimate instrument to settle international disputes and the continuing increase in the importance of world public opinion.

See also *Diplomacy; Foreign Policy; Political Communication; Public Opinion.*

. . . . EYTAN GILBOA

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Public Domain

Public domain can refer to land that is under the direct control of a government, or to art, literature, music, or other intellectual property that is no longer under copyright restrictions. Public domain includes those territories that belong to the central government and not state or private entities. It typically includes parks, nature reserves, and other common spaces. Although public domain areas are generally considered to exist for the benefit of all citizens, governments may sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of the land to pursue national interests. In the United States, much of the nation's early history involved efforts by the federal government to encourage settlement of public domain areas, especially as America acquired new areas of the West.

Public domain books, paintings, or songs are considered to form the cultural fabric of a society, and are therefore open for use by individuals, groups, or corporations. Copyright laws generally grant people exclusive rights over their creations during their lifetimes, plus fifty-seventy years. Items may be in the public domain through one of several ways, including if they were created prior to the establishment of copyright law, the copyright timeframe has expired, or through the voluntary release by the artist or creator.

See also *Copyright; Property Rights.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Public Enterprises

Public enterprise is used to describe specific corporate entities partially or wholly sponsored by the government. These enterprises may include governmental entities, such as public authorities or special purpose districts, which are distinguished from traditional government agencies by their corporate structure, fee-for-service funding model, or insulation from the traditional government bureaucracy and elected bodies. Entities that bear greater resemblance to traditional for-profit corporations are frequently labeled public enterprises, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which the state typically owns entirely or the government is a stakeholder.

There are, then, essentially two classes of public enterprises. Some public enterprises are government agencies adapted to look and function as for-profit companies. Others represent private firms blended with elements of government. The implications of the mixture—and the salient issues for political scientists—are different for the two classes of public enterprise.

ADOPTING BUSINESS PRINCIPLES

The prospect of running a government as a business has been attractive for bureaucrats and government agencies for years. Promises of enhanced efficiency, reduced corruption, and lessened burden on the public purse have led to the creation of public enterprises to provide a vast array of services. Some of these include housing projects, transportation, infrastructure, medicine, and social services. As such, the most venerable and familiar form of public enterprise of this type is the public authority. As its name suggests, a public authority is endowed with many powers of a state agency and typically charged with building, maintaining, and operating a public facility or infrastructure project, such as a bridge, power plant, or airport. A key feature of a public authority—one that is not common to all public enterprises—is the ability to borrow independently. Typically, public authority issues bonds backed by the expected revenues to be earned, as the public authority

charges users or local municipalities for the amenities they provide. For example, a transit authority sells bonds and repays debt holders with the fares paid by riders.

This arrangement transfers the cost of providing the public good to users of the public good. In some cases, however, government agencies pay the user fees out of general revenue. The perpetual concern with public authorities is their seeming alienation from government or public control or oversight. Often, the concern is elected executives who use public authorities to evade the control of legislatures. Most famously, twentieth-century New York urban planner, Robert Moses, used his dominion over a passel of public authorities to transform the infrastructure of New York. At the U.S. federal level, the Tennessee Valley Authority—established in 1933 to create public works programs in the Midwest and the South to supply jobs—is often criticized for its alleged immunity to political control or government oversight.

PLACING BUSINESS FIRST AND GOVERNMENT SECOND

There are two forms of government agencies performing as business entities, referred to as *government corporations* or *government-sponsored enterprises.* The label government corporation should be nearly synonymous with public enterprise, but this is hardly the case. Rather, many government corporations resemble public authorities with the notable difference they do not borrow through the government. They are run on a fee-for-service basis and generally are self-sustaining, as they carry out activities as varied as generating electricity, financing mortgages, and operating railroads.

With government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), although their origins are the same as government agencies, GSEs are public enterprises that move to the business-with-government features spectrum of public enterprises. These are traded companies, which historically returned significant profit to shareholders, compensated their executives in line with finance industry norms, and functioned largely beyond governmental control. Government agencies regulate GSEs to monitor financial safety and soundness as well as to achieve public mission. In return, GSEs enjoy several advantages; most notably, the implicit guarantee on their debt reduces their borrowing costs.

In 2009, GSEs entered the public consciousness when Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two massive housing finance companies, crumbled. Their collapse prompted a remarkable federal intervention. The failure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac underscored a central public concern with many public enterprises: the public takes a great deal of risk with such organizations and yet does not reap the rewards, albeit financially or enhanced delivery of public goods.

The significant 2009 American investment in private firms—including General Motors; the international insurance giant, American International Group (AIG); and the international financial conglomerate, Citigroup—reintroduced the types of public enterprises in the United States generally associated with socialist regimes. State-owned enterprises (SOEs),

or firms in which governmental agencies hold a significant stake, are well-known throughout the world. Nowhere is concern for the future of state-owned enterprises greater than in China, the largest socialist regime in modern history.

The fear surrounding SOEs is that government participation interferes with the businesses' ability to prosper, with policy imperatives given precedence over profit-driven considerations. In some cases, the public purpose of a SOE is quite explicit, but often corporate executives are under pressure to pursue nonfinancial objectives at the state's behest. There is a related concern that state-owned enterprises quash competition because they are favored over their private competitors. Generally, the concerns associated with SOEs are contrary to the commonly held misgivings regarding government corporations, public authorities, and other government-as-business enterprises, such as lack of state oversight and involvement.

For public enterprises emerging from the business end of the spectrum, then, the public mission of the entity is less certain. In some situations, government participation is seen to connote a corresponding public role, but in other contexts, state-owned enterprises are regarded as businesses that happen to have governmental ownership. More often than not—and this is the case with the government intervention prompted by the financial crisis—there is tremendous ambiguity on this critical point.

See also *Civil Service; Nationalization; Privatization; Public Utilities.*

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Public Good

The idea of the public good, also called the *common good,* refers to those generalizable interests and values that all members of a polity share by the mere fact of being members of that polity, whether particular individuals recognize those interests and values or not. Policies, practices, and actions that support or embody such interests are said to be in the public or the common good. The public good often contrasts with one's private or particular interests—those interests that one chooses for oneself and are not necessarily shared with other citizens or groups.

One common example of the conflict between the public good and individual self-interest is national defense of, or military service to, one's country. Thinkers who subscribe to the theory and practice of the public or common good often argue that although it is in no single person's interest to die in war, it is part of the common good that the polity determines some way to defend itself, including enlisting citizens in military service. Hence, universal military service is often described as a policy that is in the public good, even if many of those subject to it find it inconvenient, endangering, or oppose it. Similarly, one can argue that it is in everyone's interest to breathe unpolluted air that does not endanger one's health, even if few people voluntarily adopt behavior that decreases their contribution to pollution.

CIVIC VIRTUE AND PRIVATE INTEREST

This potential conflict between the public good and individual private or particular interests points to another concept associated with the idea of the public good. *Civic virtue* refers to the willingness of citizens to mold, alter, tailor, revise, or even sacrifice their private interests for the public good. The exercise of civic virtue presupposes that one has an obligation to endorse those policies or laws that benefit the society as a whole, even if they are inconvenient to or in conflict with one's self-interest or even one's well-being.

A classic example from antiquity can be found in Leonidas, one of the kings of Sparta, and the three hundred Spartans who composed his bodyguard. They marched to the pass at Thermopylae to face a Persian army they knew numbered in the tens of thousands. Hence, they knew they marched to certain death. Yet it was a sacrifice they were willing to make in defense of Sparta and Greece as a whole. Similarly, Pat Tillman, an American football player, was willing to forgo a salary of seven million dollars to join the U. S. Army after the attacks of September 11, 2001. He died fighting in Afghanistan, the victim of friendly fire. Less dramatic examples of civic virtue include when people go out of their way to assist those who are victims of national disasters or human actions, even when lending such assistance may be inconvenient or costly. People who contributed to relief efforts of the victims of Hurricane Katrina or the earthquakes in Haiti, expecting no personal reward in return, can be said to exercise civic virtue.

In addition to the fact that the public good and civic virtue are often in tension or conflict with private interests, the notion of the public good can be contrasted with the idea of the public interest. The term *public interest* most commonly refers to those shared interests that citizens have that are determined by the summation of private interests. It is determined simply by calculating which of several private interests is in the majority or plurality. The public interest and the public good may overlap, but this is not a necessary element of either and there may be times when the common good and public interest are at odds with one another.

ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC GOOD

The notion of the public good traces to the pre-Socratics. However, its first systematic discussion takes place in Plato's *The Republic.* Plato argues that for a just society to be created and sustained, it must be ruled by those citizens who have the natural capacity and the appropriate education for moderating their passions with their reason and discovering the transcendental truth of the idea of justice. Plato refers to such citizens as *philosopher-kings*. Being able to control their passions, they are able to distinguish between those things that appear to be good and those that are genuinely good. Most importantly, they are able to distinguish between those policies and practices that appeal to the passions and appetites of the majority of common citizens from those that are genuinely in the public good of the polis as a whole. Plato goes to great lengths to ensure that the education of the philosopher-kings cultivates their control of their passions for just this reason. Moreover, although all their living needs are met, they are to own no possessions, for such ownership may tempt them to consider their own material advantages rather than the good of the polity.

Aristotle similarly argues for the notion of the common or public good, although he rejects Plato's ideal of a univocal, completely undifferentiated conception of the good. Aristotle argues that each form of activity—such as music, warfare, or athletics—issues in its own conception of the good. However, at the pinnacle of all human activities is that conception of the good that has genuine human happiness as its goal. Genuine happiness does not consist of such things as wealth, status, or physical pleasure, each of which makes one dependent on something outside of oneself. Genuine happiness is that which is self-sufficient. This is to be found in fulfilling that function which is distinctively human—reason. To exercise reason well is to exercise it in relation to virtue. Hence, for Aristotle, the human good is realized in the practice of virtue. It follows that politics, concerned with the happiness of all the citizens, is concerned with the cultivation of virtue among citizens. The responsibility of the statesman is to implement those laws that enable people to act with ethical virtue consistent with the requirements of political virtue and justice.

The idea of the public good has also been the focus of much religious political thought, including all variants of Abrahamic religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The version most common in the West, Christianity, received its fullest

expression in the work of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas distinguishes among three kinds of law, human law, natural law, and divine law. Human laws are those promulgated by monarchs. As much as possible, such laws should be consistent with natural law. Natural law consists of those moral imperatives that are discoverable by all human beings, Christian or non-Christian, because of the capacity for reason that God has placed in all people. Divine law is that law which is discoverable only by way of the acceptance of Christianity. As long as the ruler's laws are not a violation of the natural law of God, they are likely to fortify the common good, whether the ruler is Christian or not. Hence, all subjects owe the ruler their allegiance and obedience. If the ruler's laws violate natural law or divine law, citizens may consider deposing the ruler, but only after every other alternative to getting the unjust laws changed has been pursued.

MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF PUBLIC GOOD

In the modern period, the name most commonly associated with the notion of the common good and civic virtue is that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In rejecting the liberal theory of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, Rousseau argues that no just, secure, or free society can be grounded merely in the pursuit of self-interest. Although Rousseau agreed that it is to be expected that people will pursue their self-interest, they must do so only as citizens of a community with a strong notion of the public or common good. That is, the commitment of citizens to the common good must underwrite their own ways of thinking about their particular private interests. Consequently, the two must be able to dovetail.

Rousseau refers to this strong notion of public good as the *general will*. The general will consists of those political decisions that every citizen would will if they had the well-being of the community in mind when they deliberate about politics. Rousseau recognizes that this may not take place in all circumstances. There may be times when the general will contradicts the will of all. In such instances, citizens can be encouraged or coerced into following those laws that are consistent with the general will. It is such a formulation that has been the basis of many liberal criticisms of Rousseau.

A more recent example of the idea of the common good is found in the work of Alexis de Tocqueville. In *Democracy in America* (2007), Tocqueville argued that one of the things that distinguishes American political culture is the prevalence of individualism, the independence of citizens and their pursuit of self-interest. But although Americans pursued their self-interest and were concerned with their material well-being, Tocqueville argued that their practice of individualism was exercised with self-interest *bien entendu,* or self-interest well-understood. By this, Tocqueville meant that Americans tended to see their self-interest tied to the common good of the community. Consequently, the exercise of self-interest was tempered by a sense of civic virtue that took into account the needs, well-being, and sustainability of the community as a whole. So common was this among Americans, Tocqueville argued, that their sense of their civic virtue was virtually natural, constituting what he called *habits of the heart*. These were, in Aristotle's terms, habituated to the practice of virtue.

Drawing in part on Tocqueville's perspective, a number of contemporary scholars have argued that in contrast to previous historical periods, there has been a serious decline in civic engagement, participation and virtue, at least in the United States. Robert Putnam argues that, in the last several decades, American political culture has seen a rise of privatization of work and leisure and a decline in civic engagement in voluntary, community organizations. The result has been a decline in social capital, or the engagement and commitment to social and political networks and organizations that help provide the nongovernmental foundations of democracy. A serious decline in social capital is also a decline in civic engagement that a healthy democracy requires, according to Putnam.

Similarly, in their book *Habits of the Heart,* a title making its debt to Tocqueville clear, Robert Bellah and colleagues argue that the ideas and practices of individualism in the United States have undergone significant change. In the early years of the American colonies, individualism took the form of what the authors call the *biblical* and *republican traditions*. Both embodied the idea that one's economic self-interest had to be tempered by the concern for the well-being of one's fellow citizens, and in the case of the biblical tradition, their spiritual salvation as well. Slowly these early practices of individualism have been replaced by utilitarian and expressivist individualism. Utilitarian individualism calculates self-interest solely in terms of the material benefits to oneself. Expressivist individualism sees self-interest in terms of self-realization or the fulfillment of some deep sense of personal satisfaction. Both utilitarianism and expressivism tend to minimize or even reject the idea that one has obligations to something called the common good that go beyond one's personal preferences.

CRITICISMS

There are several criticisms of the idea of the public good and its reliance on civic virtue and the sacrifice it requires. One of the earliest, most notable criticisms originated with Benjamin Constant. Echoing thinkers such as Montesquieu, Constant argued that a significant change had taken place with the emergence of modernity. He distinguished the *liberty of the ancients* from the *liberty of the moderns*. The former emphasized republican civic virtue and the commitment to participate in the civic and political life of one's political system in support of the public good. The latter emphasized instead the liberty from excessive government obligations and a respect for the individual liberties of citizens. Constant insisted that the liberty of the ancients had become obsolete. The political and social conditions for it no longer existed. Modern society, with its emphasis on commerce and its growth in size, meant republican politics of common good and civic virtue were no longer the basis for civic and political life. Instead, most people would be involved in commercial activities and leave the business of politics to elected representatives.

A second line of criticism argues that there is no way to identify the public good. It is not something that can be defined, as everyone has dramatically different ideas as to what the public good may be. While there may have been some agreement on the idea in simpler times, in modern, pluralistic societies, any attempt to identify a single notion of the public good, or set of policies in the service of the public good, distinguishable from the personal self-interest of individual citizens is impossible.

Yet a third criticism contends that the idea of the public good and the sacrifices required of civic virtue are not only imaginary, but have also been used for purposes of political manipulation, and to the advantage of some at the expense of others. Too often, political and economic elites can escape the sacrifices required of policies alleged to be in the common good while benefiting from the sacrifices imposed on lower classes. For example, much of medieval political thought argued that the hierarchical features of feudal society were required for the common good. But clearly, political and religious elites enjoyed a disproportionate share of the benefits, wealth, power, and status of that society in comparison with other classes, particularly serfs. A more recent example is found in what has become known as the *chickenhawk syndrome*. It is not uncommon that political elites and the economically advantaged advocate wars while evading any military obligation themselves. The burden for fighting war is then foisted upon others— either through the compulsory military service, appeals to the economic advantages of military service for the poor, or through manipulated appeals to patriotism in the name of the public good.

Fourth, the notion of the public good can result in forms of moral coercion and even political persecution. Critics argue that phenomena, such as the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution (1789–1799), Western imperialism, McCarthyism in the United States, and the killing fields of Cambodia, trace to extreme notions of the common good. Political elites, convinced of their infallibility in knowing the common good, feel justified in enforcing the most violent forms of sacrifice, including systematic extermination of recalcitrant populations, in the name of the common good.

Debate around the idea of the public or common good continues today. Liberal individualists continue to argue that the notion of the public good separate from the private interests that people have is elusive at best and dangerous at worst. Communitarians like Amitai Etzioni and Michael Sandel would agree that repressive policies implemented under the auspices of the public good are obviously objectionable and reprehensible. Nonetheless, justice and democratic politics requires an element of properly constituted civic engagement and virtue that invokes a politics of the public good even if no single version of it can ever be completely realized. Moreover, they argue that even those liberal thinkers skeptical of the public good tacitly draw upon such notions in their own arguments. Hence, the debate about the nature of the public good is likely to continue as a necessary part of democratic theory and practice.

See also *Civic Education; Common Goods; Communitarianism; Freedom; General Will; Greek Political Thought, Ancient; Normative Theory; Public Interest Groups; Thomist, Scholastic, and Medieval Political Thought; Tocqueville, Alexis de.*

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Public Interest

See *Public Good; Public Interest Groups.*

Public Interest Groups

The concept of a public interest group has varied operational definitions within the discipline of political science. Broadly defined, public interest groups represent diffuse, generally noneconomic, interests in society. Their primary focus is on representing causes that have no natural constituency, or advocating for people or groups that traditionally have not had a voice in the political process. Public interest groups are formed to counter the traditional lobbying community that focuses on procuring discrete material benefits for its membership.

Public interest groups have assumed a prominent role in the pressure group community since the 1960s. Prior to this time, groups seeking material gain from the political process were the primary forces lobbying government in the United States. Consequently, political scientists traditionally focused their attention on the interplay of interest groups attempting to further their own economic ambitions or agenda. This traditional ecology of lobbying included large organizations that represented business, labor, farmers, and various professions. Each of the groups had a material interest in the outcome of government decision making, and therefore focused their lobbying on gains for their members regardless of the larger social or economic costs to the nation as a whole.

Public interest groups existed prior to the 1960s. However, social movements related to civil rights, anti-Vietnam War (1959–1975) activities, the environment, and women's rights all led to an increased belief that advocacy groups should be formed to provide a counterveiling power to the existing interest group system. Public interest groups emerged to represent what social scientists refer to as *postmaterial* issues. These issues are based on the belief that there is a diminishing return for further economic growth in Western democracies. Consequently, their advocacy focuses on quality of life issues without tangible monetary value such as a clean environment, transparent government, and human rights. Public interest groups have thus added a noneconomic dimension to the materialism of debate among the traditional interest group community.

A great diversity exists in the agendas and ideologies of public interest groups. Some organizations, such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), target a single issue that they believe benefits all of society. Other groups focus on a number of issues within one area of policy, such as the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) with environmental issues. A final class of public interest groups lobbies on behalf of a broad range of issues facing a particular group that has been underrepresented in the political system, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People's (NAACP) advocacy for civil rights and racial equality.

There is a tendency to mistakenly associate public interest groups with a liberal ideology because they often oppose the material interests of conservative forces within society such as business. However, the ecology of public interest groups is very diverse. Many groups advocate for issues that are nonpartisan or nonideological in nature. One example is MADD's support for strict drunk-driving laws. Other groups, such as the National Right to Life Committee and the Christian Coalition advocate for conservative causes such the rights of the unborn and the support of traditional moral values in society.

The concept of public interest groups has been subject to criticism on a number of counts. First, the notion of "the" public interest is nebulous. Given the broad diversity of society and complexity of most public policy issues, it is often difficult to determine what is in the best interests of the public. The trade-off between economic and postmaterial benefits often presents a murky picture of the public good. This leads traditional lobbying groups to claim that policy outcomes advancing their own material benefits are in the public interest. Thus a business organization representing oil interests can argue that the public is best served by drilling for oil in a pristine wilderness because it will keep energy costs down. They present this argument as an alternative "public interest" to the claims of groups representing the environment. Further, even within the public interest community there can be diverging conceptions of the public interest.

The second criticism of public interest groups is that some organizations accept funding from corporations that represent traditional "material" interests. This creates the potential perception that corporations can use the public interest groups as proxies to lobby on behalf of their own material interests against opposing industries.

Finally, skeptics argue that every group, regardless of its claims, represents some type of self-interest rather than a diffuse public good. Consequently, a public interest group focused on providing access to the arts on the basis that cultural enrichment is essential to education can be seen as a front for art lovers who want their hobby to be subsidized by the government. Critics would argue that while the benefit the arts lovers get is not strictly material, it still is in the self-interest of the group's members opposed to a broad public interest.

See also *Interest Groups and Lobbies; Lobbying; Public Good.*

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Public Opinion

Public opinion concerns the views of people taken together, and these views can be about anything. Political scientists are especially interested in what the public thinks about the political system; government policies and performance; and prominent political actors, such as elected officials, candidates, and political parties. Public opinion is of importance in any political system, especially in representative democracies. Not surprisingly, public opinion gained in importance with the rise of the public in political life in the eighteenth century.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was perhaps the most ardent proponent of the public's role, arguing in *The Social Contract* that the *general will* of the people is a necessary guiding force for the state. The famous utilitarian Jeremy Bentham provided a more specific statement on public opinion as a sanction in the modern day. In *Democracy in America,* Alexis de Tocqueville famously documented public opinion's empirical significance during the early years of the United States of America.

However, some have challenged the very existence of public opinion. Walter Lippmann saw a public that was largely uninformed, and argued that because of the sheer flow and increasing complexity of information, the public could neither absorb nor truly understand much of what was happening in the world. Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky offer another critique, maintaining that public opinion is manufactured through political communication. To Pierre Bourdieu, public opinion is a social construct—one that largely rationalizes elite opinion. Scholars who study public opinion routinely grapple with claims such as these about the character and causes of public opinion.

MEASURING PUBLIC OPINION

Measuring public opinion requires technology. In the modern era, polls produce a summary of what people think, yet nonrandom straw polls have been in regular use at least since the early nineteenth century. Thus, even back then, there was information about what the public thought and wanted; however, it was not highly reliable.

The development of random sampling—and its application by Gallup, Crossley, and Roper—changed things in important ways, as it allowed more reliable information about public preferences. The changes were especially pronounced for scholarship, as political scientists were afforded good data, particularly with the establishment of the American National Election Studies (ANES) in 1948. This data provided the basis for statistical inference about populations and relationships at the individual level, and it made the explosion of research on

Public opinion polls comprise the average support of individuals on any number of topics, including political party and candidate approval.

voting behavior, attitudes and opinion possible in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Additional developments in polling technology played a huge role in this new realm. For many years, most major surveys, including the ANES, relied on cluster sampling and face-to-face interviews. With this, the population is divided into groups or geographic areas, and the survey researcher draws a sample of these clusters and then samples randomly from within them. This is particularly useful when surveyors do not have a full list for the entire population. The invention of random digit dialing (RDD) changed things even more so, as interviewing could be done over the telephone. The more recent introduction of Internet polling is having a similar impact.

The developments in technology have provided clear and increasing advantages in cost and speed, making it much easier to conduct polls, as evidenced in the growth of the number of preelection trial-heat polls in presidential election years. Other examples include the National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES), which conducted more than one hundred thousand telephone interviews in 2000, and Knowledge Networks's study of the same election campaign, which involved repeated interviews with twenty-nine thousand individuals via the Internet. These numbers would have been almost inconceivable using face-to-face interviews.

The developments also come with disadvantages, particularly in the representativeness of samples. Not everyone has a telephone, and the number relying solely on a cell phone—which poses special challenges for telephone surveys—is growing. Fewer have access to the Internet and surveyors cannot randomly e-mail. Even among those who do have a landline telephone or Internet access, nonresponse is a problem. Survey organizations and scholars have long relied on weighting devices to help make surveys more representative of the target population. In recent years, more complicated approaches have been used, including propensity scores; however, the extent to which these fixes actually work is the subject of ongoing research.

UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC OPINION

A lot has been learned about public opinion from the many surveys conducted over the years. To being with, and perhaps most importantly, surveys give only limited information about people's true opinions. According to John Zaller and Stanley Feldman, survey responses reflect the relevant considerations that are uppermost in people's minds at the time they are asked. Responses will differ over time, and across individuals at particular points, simply because the samples of considerations themselves vary. In the aggregate, these seemingly random differences should cancel out.

At the same time, public opinion about policy exists on many issues. In their now-classic portrait, *The Rational Public,* Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro depict public preferences as fairly stable over time, particularly in the short run. They also show that public opinion often changes very deliberately, in understandable ways, and that the change is largely parallel

across various subcategories of the American public. There are important differences across people, across levels of education, and across partisan attachment. Page and Shapiro's main point is that people with different preferences tend to move together on particular issues in the same liberal or conservative direction over time, implying that they generally react to new information in the same way. Aspects of economic and national security seem to play an important role and policy does, too—indeed, the public behaves much like a thermostat in many policy domains.

James Stimson's study of a wide range of public opinion data further reveals that public opinions about policy in various domains not only vary predictably, but also are closely connected. Simply, opinions across a range of policy domains tend to move in the same liberal or conservative direction, implying an underlying structure to those preferences, what Stimson termed *policy mood*. However, the movements are not altogether parallel. Opinion in some spending domains shares little in common with opinion in others; instead, it varies independently over time. Perhaps more important, even where it moves together, opinion in the different domains also varies independently to some extent. Public opinion in different policy areas thus contains unique components that are specific to different areas. These differences may matter to politicians, especially in politically salient domains.

See also *Exit Poll; Framing and Public Opinion; General Will; Media Effect; Polling, History of; Social Contract.*

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Public Policy

Public policy is what officials within government choose to do or not to do about public problems—conditions that are perceived to be unacceptable. Government policy makers typically set certain policy goals and objectives, and then identify the tools or means to reach those ends. Debate over public policy choices reflects differing views about the goals or the means or both. Questions center upon whether the government should be involved in a certain policy area or not, and if it is involved, whether it should try to regulate individual and corporate behavior, provide economic subsidies to certain individuals or businesses, redistribute societal resources from one group to another, make information available to the public, provide services directly to citizens, or aim for some combination of such policy tools.

Sometimes, governments decide not to adopt policies because little political consensus exists over what needs to be done. In this case, policy makers may conclude that the problem is best left to citizens and the private marketplace. For years, for example, most governments did little about energy consumption because citizens and policy makers saw no reason to reduce the use of energy, which was plentiful and inexpensive. By the 1990s, however, policy makers around the world began to link high levels of energy use, particularly fossil fuels, to climate change as well as to economic and national security risks. They increasingly came to believe that governments should intervene by setting energy efficiency standards, imposing new energy taxes and fees, and creating carbon dioxide emissions limits and trading schemes, among other actions.

Disagreements over policy goals themselves may involve conflicts over political ideology or social values, evident, for example, in battles over abortion, stem cell research, affirmative action, and immigration reform. David Easton's famous dictum that politics is "the authoritative allocation of values for a society" captures well the connection of public policy to societal values and underscores the importance of asking what governments choose to do about public problems, why they do so, and what effects these actions have on society.

EVOLUTION OF THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY

Political scientists have long studied public policy, but the field changed considerably during the 1970s and continued to evolve in later decades. Particularly within the United

States, it emerged as a subfield of the study of American government and public administration. Today it is far broader in scope, cuts across all fields of the discipline, attracts scholars and students with highly disparate interests, and involves the use of the full range of contemporary methods of investigation and analysis.

Many students of public policy trace the field's origins to work by Harold Dwight Lasswell (1902–1978) and others in the 1920s and 1930s, out of which ideas arose about the promise of policy sciences. This was also a time of considerable change in the study of social sciences in general, where empirical and analytical work began to dominate over the more traditional emphases on history, normative or philosophical ideas, description of government programs, and practical issues of program management.

The policy sciences approach reflected a problem-focused and interdisciplinary view of what governments might do about society's problems—from the diffusion of nuclear weapons to energy use and urban development. Not surprisingly, the new field contributed significantly to the rise of think tanks, such as the RAND Corporation and Brookings Institution, to advise governments on complex issues of public policy. By the early 1970s, the field of policy studies began to grow at a rapid pace. New organizations such as the Policy Studies Organization were founded because, at that time, the field had no natural home within the discipline of political science or the American Political Science Association. New journals, such as *Policy Sciences* and the *Policy Studies Journal,* were launched at this time as well, and new schools of public policy were established at Duke University, the University of Michigan, and Harvard University, among others.

The next three decades were characterized by continued growth in academic public policy programs, the proliferation of policy research organizations, and an increasing volume and diversity of policy studies research. Compilations such as the *Encyclopedia of Policy Studies,* edited by Stuart Nagel and first published in 1983 with a second edition in 1994, and more recently, the *Oxford Handbook of Public Policy,* edited by Michael Moran, Martin Rein, and Robert E. Goodin in 2006, captured the wide range of models, theories, concepts, ideas, and methods found in the burgeoning field, including its comparative and international aspects and its interdisciplinary character. While not unusual for the discipline of political science, this multiplicity of research approaches created major fractures among students of public policy, particularly within academia. They parallel the kinds of conflicts over appropriate approaches, theories, and methods found in most other fields within the discipline.

APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY

It is common to identify three related but distinct emphases within the study of public policy. One stresses analysis of policy processes such as agenda setting, formulation, adoption, and implementation, as well how political, social, and economic forces are linked to them and affect the way policies are developed, proposed, and acted on in government. This policy process approach—essentially study of the politics of policy making—is most often associated with political science and often draws from theories and models common within the discipline to explain policy developments. These include political systems theory, group theory, elite theory, institutional theories, and rational choice or formal theory. Articles reflective of the policy process perspective can be found in most mainstream political science journals but also in law and public policy journals, such as the *Policy Studies Journal.* Most major textbooks in the field continue to use some variation of the policy process approach.

Early work of this kind can be found in studies and texts by Charles Lindblom, Aaron Wildavsky, Theodore Lowi, James Q. Wilson, Charles Jones, Hugh Heclo, Michael Lipsky, John Kingdon, Deborah Stone, Bryan Jones, Frank Baumgartner, Daniel Mazmanian, Paul Sabatier, Hank Jenkins-Smith, and Kenneth Meier, among many others. Often this work drew from theories of the policy-making process and helped to advance understanding of how policy making actually works. Studies by Kingdon, Stone, and Baumgartner and Jones substantially improved knowledge of how public problems and policy alternatives are defined and are affected by political processes, as well as how they emerge or do not emerge onto societal and governmental agendas for action. Work by Jones, Heclo, Lowi, and Wilson clarified how policies are formulated and acted on by policy makers, with particular attention to the role of policy legitimation, the importance of issue networks and interest groups, and variation in policy-making processes attributable to issue characteristics, such as saliency, complexity, and the distribution of perceived costs and benefits in society. Studies of policy implementation by Mazmanian and Sabatier, Lipsky, and Wildavsky; of policy change by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, among others; and of policy and program evaluation by Meier and others identified the key variables that affect these policy processes, led to the development of sophisticated causal models, and stimulated empirical studies that tested hypotheses about these relationships.

Compilations such as Sabatier's *Theories of the Policy Process: Theoretical Lenses on Public Policy*, first published in 1999, testified to the advancement of the field by the late 1990s, and especially to new expectations for development and testing of theories that could explain policy processes. As Sabatier argued, the classic policy process model was clearly not a causal theory or even a very good description of how policy making takes place in the real world. Nevertheless, the model clearly directs attention to certain important political phenomena and policy actors and can highlight the variables that are worthy of study. For example, studies by Kingdon in the 1980s boosted interest in the agenda-setting phase of the policy process, and subsequent work by Baumgartner and Jones, among others, substantially raised the bar of expectations for data collection and analysis to test theories about agenda setting and the dynamics of policy making over time. Similarly, Sabatier's development of the advocacy coalition framework helped to foster empirical studies of policy change.

Another approach to public policy study relies heavily on concepts borrowed from economics and related disciplines and builds on the heritage of policy sciences by focusing on the practice of policy analysis. From this perspective, the key tasks are systematic or scientific assessment of possible policy alternatives in terms of their likely effectiveness, efficiency, and equity, among other criteria. Economists emphasize efficiency, such as achieving the greatest benefits at a given cost or minimizing a certain risk at a reasonable cost. But normative political theorists are equally concerned with criteria such as the extent of government authority in regard to individual rights or questions of justice or equity, such as how the benefits or costs of public policies are distributed across a population. Scholars who employ decision theory are likely to draw from economics, psychology, statistics, and operations research to emphasize decision choices and associated risks and consequences, such as choosing between more and less risky alternatives with varying costs and consequences.

This general approach to the study of public policy is evident in research within political science over the past three decades and can be seen in public policy textbooks in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, such as Gary D. Brewer and Peter deLeon's *The Foundations of Policy Analysis* (1983), Grover Starling's *Strategies for Policy Making* (1988), Carl V. Patton and David S. Sawicki's *Basic Methods of Policy Analysis and Planning* (1993), David L. Weimer and Aidan R. Vining's *Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practices* (2005), and William Dunn's *Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction* (2009). It can be seen as well in pathbreaking work by James March and Johan Olsen in the 1980s that sparked a renewed interest in what might be called institutional policy analysis, which involves asking what difference certain formal and legal aspects of institutions make. Its influence can be found in similar innovations by Elinor and Vincent Ostrom to develop an institutional approach to public policy that could clarify how the choice of certain institutions and rules affect decision making and policy impacts. In 2009, Elinor Ostrom shared the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for this work, particularly both conceptual and empirical research that demonstrated how common property resources can be successfully managed by user associations and not just by centralized government. This heritage is also clear in Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram's intriguing work on policy design, where they suggest that sound policy choices depend on an understanding of the attitudes and motivations of key policy actors, including the "targets" of public policies. These are examples of what some call institutional rational choice frameworks that share a focus on institutional rules, an assumption of rational actors, and the resources and incentives that motivate them.

In all of these instances, the authors illustrate a strong interest in advancing the interdisciplinary study of public policy in addition to making contributions to the development of political science. These scholars often borrow from economics, sociology, psychology, and public administration in an effort to understand policy phenomena, build new theories, and inform empirical studies. Their work is as likely to appear in interdisciplinary public policy journals as in leading journals in political science.

The *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,* for example, publishes articles that reflect the policy analysis approach, as do some journals in public administration and applied economics and sociology, and those devoted to a specific area of public policy such as health care, the environment, energy, welfare, or urban affairs. This kind of work can also be found in the publications of many policy research organizations such as the Brookings Institution, the Urban Institute, Resources for the Future, and the Pew Research Center, as well as in research supported by university policy institutes and government agencies, including hundreds of studies released each year by the Government Accountability Office.

A third common approach to the study of public policy concentrates on the substance of public policy itself, that is, work on health care, education, environmental protection, energy, defense, foreign affairs, and a multitude of other policy fields. Studies of substantive public policy may include a focus on the history of policy development, the specifics of policy goals and means, competing ideas and proposals for policy change, or assessments and evaluation of existing policies and programs. Rather than study policy-making processes or conducting policy analyses, this kind of work tends to examine what policies actually try to do and how successful they are at it, as well as to explore the disagreements nearly always found over the design of current policy and available alternatives. Often, authors of such studies display little interest in using them to build theory or test hypotheses, but the studies nonetheless may be used to illustrate or advance a particular theory, argument, or interpretation.

This third approach is often found among those with training in law, public administration, and public policy or with experience in government. Articles, research monographs, and books reflective of this approach are published by policy research organizations or think tanks; nonprofit organizations and interest groups; and law, public administration, and public policy journals. Some of these are devoted exclusively to the history of public policy such as the *Journal of Policy History.* Most textbooks in the field of public policy include a number of substantive policy chapters, typically ones on economic policy, health care policy, environmental and energy policy, education policy, criminal justice policy, Social Security and welfare policy, and foreign and defense policy.

Among the three approaches, there are often notable differences in the extent to which students of public policy stress scientific goals (e.g., development of testable hypotheses and theories, collection of reliable data, and use of rigorous analytic methods), professional purposes (e.g., using policy analysis or program evaluation to identify strengths and weaknesses of policies), or the advancement of political values (e.g., those often associated with some think tanks, interest groups, and partisan organizations). The first emphasis tends to be found in academic political science departments, the second in public policy schools and think tanks with a strong applied or professional orientation, and the last in organizations with a strong

commitment to particular social and political values. However, the dividing lines are rarely hard and fast. As critics such as Deborah Stone argue, even work that is ostensibly objective or value-free often reflects hidden political values. Also, research produced by policy organizations that are committed to certain values, such as environmental protection, women's rights, or equitable access to health care, can still be rigorous and valuable.

CONTINUING CONTROVERSIES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY STUDIES

The major debates today in the study of public policy are similar to those that have taken place within many other fields of political science over the last several decades. They include the extent to which work should be theoretically grounded, and if so, in what theories or analytic frameworks. They extend to disagreements over the relative strengths and weaknesses of relying on qualitative or quantitative research methods. They also include conflicting ideas about whether the chief purpose of policy studies should be the advancement of knowledge—especially within the discipline—or provision of knowledge to society and policy makers that can foster solutions to public problems. As noted, these are primarily controversies within academia because those who work in public policy research institutes and other kinds of policy organizations are usually not preoccupied with questions of theory and methods. They are more likely to value studies that offer new data or analyses, fresh insights and interpretations, and practical suggestions for policy improvements.

It is likely that the near-term future of policy studies will reflect the current diversity of work. Most scholars will engage in the kind of studies they think are interesting and appeal to the audiences they value. Their professional training, present positions, and expectations about the results shape these choices. Yet, there is a growing consensus that the best scholarly work involves a combination of approaches and methods, such as the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods, and the integration of historical, descriptive, legal, and analytic research. In some subfields such as environmental policy studies, scholars also may try to pull together ideas from a number of pertinent disciplines, such as ecology, economics, sociology, and political science, to offer new insights into the range of variables that contribute to public problems, shape the adoption of policies, or affect policy implementation and success. Similarly, in many policy areas, scholars try to integrate the study of politics and policy analysis to foster a greater sensitivity to the way political contexts can affect the use of policy analysis.

Above all, much work in the field of public policy studies today reflects a keen appreciation of the importance of smart policy design, the institutional and political constraints and opportunities that are likely to be faced during policy making and implementation, and the need for assessment of policy results and adoption of appropriate policy changes. Put otherwise, regarding whether scholars seek to explain the formation, operation, and impact of public policy or to affect these processes, many are likely to draw creatively from the multiplicity

of approaches, methods, and insights that have become available since the 1970s.

One of the most valuable lessons of the past several decades is that much of what is thought known about the performance of political institutions and public policies could be proven wrong over a longer time frame. This is especially likely when social, economic, and political conditions change substantially or abruptly, and thus alter the premises on which current policies are based. One example is climate change and the implications for energy policies. Another is the new threat of international terrorism and the impact on foreign and defense policies. Studies that draw from any of the three perspectives could be valuable. Research on the policy-making process could identify the factors most likely to affect a political system's capacity for successful policy change under such circumstances. Studies in the policy analysis tradition could examine the most promising policy alternatives, perhaps with special attention to qualities of resiliency, or the potential for adaptation as conditions change over time. Substantive policy studies could delve into the details of public policy and help to identify those aspects of enduring social value regardless of altered circumstances.

In more general terms, societies around the world are entering a new and turbulent period. Globalization may dramatically alter economic practices and security. Population growth and economic expansion in developing nations may undercut the capacity of natural resources to meet people's needs. Advances in technology and communications may contribute to the erosion of cultural and religious traditions and threaten social and political stability. All of these trends suggest that there will be no shortage of challenging public problems and policies to study in the years ahead. The evolution of policy studies as a field, and the rich diversity of work within it, means that students of public policy can find abundant frameworks, theories, models, and methods to put to work to improve understanding of the changing world and to devise suitable responses to the problems that now exist or will emerge in the coming decades.

See also *Agenda Setting; Cost-benefit Analysis; Decision Theory, Foundations of; Lasswell, Harold Dwight; Policy Analysis; Policy Evaluation; Policy Innovation; Policy Theory; Public Policy Development.*

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Public Policy Development

There is the story that when asked about the making of American foreign policy, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger reportedly responded, "We don't really make policy, instead we make a series of decisions that eventually become the policy." This anecdote illustrates the difficulties in understanding what policies are, when they emerge, or why. The most important things governments do is make policy. Yet, despite the centrality of those actions to the lives of most Americans, scholars and practitioners are frequently at a loss to explain why governments do what they do, and when they do it—or do not do it. This loss, however, is not for a lack of trying. Over the last several decades, there has been no paucity of theories put forward to account for the birth, life, and death of public policies.

Some theories look at the course of government over long periods of time. Still others seek to explain policy from an intermediate or more immediate time frame. Theories also differ in terms of their specificity. Some, like historian Arthur Schlesinger's cyclical thesis, address the overall thrust of policy—in his case whether governments pursue a public or a private agenda over the course of a century. Other explanations concentrate on a single policy, such as education, welfare, or health care. Then there are those theories that focus on a single aspect of the policy process, such as agenda setting, decision making, implementation, or policy termination. Not surprisingly, there are numerous perspectives on how decisions are made; these include models of rational decision making, bounded rationality, incrementalism, group think, and even a model of decision making described as the garbage can model.

A sampling of theories that have been used to account for policy development can provide a sense of the variety of considerations that drive the development of public policy. While significant examples come from the United States, many of the explanations for these can and have been used to account for the actions of governments elsewhere in the world. Three sets of examples provide these models. The first takes a long-term, historical perspective on policy development; the second looks at the policy process over an intermediate time perspective;

and the third describes and explains policy decisions that occur over relatively short periods of time. In each case, the models of policy development provide important clues to account for a signature feature of U.S. public policy—the tendency toward long-term policy stability interrupted only occasionally by large scale policy change.

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

One useful way to look at how policies develop is to view them from a long-term or historical perspective. The obvious advantage of a historical perspective is that it allows a view of how policies emerge, endure (or not), and evolve over long period of times.

Development of U.S. public policy in the twentieth century is a good example of how a long-term perspective can highlight how "policies of the day" fit more enduring patterns of governance and politics. Historians generally agree that U.S. politics over the period from the late nineteenth through the late twentieth centuries saw three periods of an unusually active federal government—the Progressive Era (1890–1930), the New Deal (1930–1950) and the Great Society (1960–1980). During each era, popular presidents, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, John Kennedy, and Lyndon Baines Johnson, led the nation on a path of substantial public intervention in the social, economic, and political lives of its citizens.

During the Progressive Era, Theodore Roosevelt and other progressives sought to reform government by replacing patronage with merit and appointing professionals rather than elected officials to do the day-to-day administration of government. Other reforms included child safety laws, workplace safety rules, and the adoption of the federal income tax.

During the New Deal period, the nation saw a dramatic increase in the role of the federal government as Franklin Roosevelt sought to end the Great Depression through programs aimed at reforming the financial sector and providing relief to America's farmers and workers. During his first term, America saw the creation of an "alphabet soup" of legislation, new programs, and new agencies including the National Recovery Administration (NRA), the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), the Works Progress Administration (WPA), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Rural Electrification Administration (REA), and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The most important piece of the New Deal was the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935, which provided compensation for the unemployed, pensions for the elderly, and welfare relief for the poor.

The New Frontier and Great Society initiatives of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson expanded the reach of the national government even more by enacting major civil rights legislation, creating Medicare and Medicaid, and waging the War on Poverty.

What is equally striking about each era of government expansion is the push back that almost immediately followed each "burst" of federal energy. In the 1920s, the election of Warren Harding ushered in a "new era" of conservatism that shifted the focus from public to the private sector as the free market

was given free reign in America. During the 1920s America prospered, consumers consumed, and American manufacturing grew dramatically. For its part, the federal government promoted the private sector by lowering taxes, raising tariffs, and scaling back its efforts to regulate the business sector.

A similar resurgence of conservatism and retreat from public activism occurred following the presidencies of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman as the American public turned to a military hero, Dwight Eisenhower, to lead an increasingly conservative nation. As Arthur Schlesinger notes, "In the 1950s as in the 1920s, public purpose receded, private motives predominated. The Eisenhower years provided a needed respite amidst the storms of the twentieth century." More recently, the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 signaled the latest round of conservative backlash as Reagan and others sought to get government "off the backs of the American people" while finding new ways to infuse market principals and mechanisms into the public sector.

To explain this pattern of lurching from the public to the private sector and back again, Schlesinger offers a cyclical thesis to account for these developments. Approximately every thirty years throughout the twentieth century, national policy cycled from periods of intense public action to a retreat to the private sector, only to eventually cycle into a new era of public action. In describing the nation's mood following the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, Schlesinger notes: "After two decades of unrelenting public purpose, the American people were worn out. Their capacity for further response to crisis was spent. They were disenchanted with discipline, sacrifice, and intangible goals. They had had their fill of crusades."

Similar developments occurred toward the end of the New Deal and Johnson's Great Society. The turbulence of the sixties surrounding the Vietnam War (1959–1975), the civil rights movement, and the War on Poverty led to a similar withdrawal from the public sector.

By the later 1970s Americans were once more, as they had been in the 1950s and 1920s, fed up with public action and disenchanted by its consequences. The compass needle now swung toward private interest and the fulfillment of self. However, it did not take much time for subsequent generations to tire of the narrow pursuit of private interests and embrace a new burst of public energy and national goals. Typically, a "detonating" issue prompted the shift, including economic trusts in the 1920s, the depression of the 1930s, and racial injustice in the 1960s. To account for such policy dynamics, Schlesinger maintains that policy cycles are simply the natural order of things.

The roots of this cyclical self-sufficiency doubtless are deep in the natural life of humanity. There is a cyclical pattern in organic nature—in the tides in the season, in night and day, in the systole and diastole of the human heart, and so on. There is also a cyclical basis in the very psychology of modernity. With the acceleration in the rate of social change, humans become creatures characterized by inextinguishable discontent. For Schlesinger, however, the real impetus for change lies with intergenerational conflict. He states, "Each new generation, when it attains power, tends to repudiate the work of the generation it has displaced and to reenact the ideals of its own formative days thirty years before."

INTERMEDIATE PERSPECTIVES

Models of political change that look at development from an intermediate time perspective offer alternative explanations of U.S. public policy development. Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith's *advocacy coalition framework* and Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones's *punctuated equilibrium theory* each acknowledge the propensity for long-term policy stability, but point to different dynamics to account for that tendency in American policy.

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's advocacy coalition framework provides an excellent example of theories that seek to explain policy change and development from a somewhat shorter time frame. The advocacy coalition framework begins with the premise that policies are made and change within relatively stable policy subsystems. Policy subsystems are made up of "those actors from a variety of public and private organizations who are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue, such as air pollution control, and who regularly seek to influence public policy in that domain." Policy actors include those within and outside of governments and include administrative agencies, legislative committees, interest groups, journalists, and scholars from all levels of government—national, subnational, and, increasingly, international. Actors within the policy subsystem are typically organized into two to four competing advocacy coalitions; advocacy coalitions are groups of policy actors who share common policy beliefs and seek public policies that will achieve the group's policy goals. Those policy beliefs are crucial to both holding policy coalitions together and setting their action agendas.

According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, those policy beliefs operate like belief systems and include "value priorities, perceptions of important causal relationships, perceptions of world states (including the magnitude of the problem), and perceptions/assumptions concerning the efficacy of various policy instruments." At the most general level are the *deep core beliefs* that include "basic ontological and normative beliefs, such as the relative valuation of individual freedom versus social equality, which operate across virtually all policy domains." Not surprising, these values and beliefs are the most enduring and resistant to change. At the next level are those *policy core beliefs*, which speak to the coalition's normative and empirical beliefs concerning value priorities (e.g., natural security versus the right to privacy), the causes and magnitude of policy problems, and assumptions about the best policies for addressing those policy problems. At the remaining level are those *secondary aspects* of the coalition's system of beliefs, shared by some but not necessarily all coalition members, concerning things like support for specific policy actions, perceptions of the causes and seriousness of particular problems in various locales, or beliefs concerning the performance of various policy actors.

Armed with fairly unique and conflicting policy beliefs and the group's resources and strategies, advocacy coalitions

compete with one another to enact public policies that achieve their respective policy goals. Given the rigidity of each coalition's fundamental beliefs, it is not surprising that little policy change occurs, particular where the differences between each coalition's fundamental beliefs are substantial. In those instances, the policy brokers—those elected and unelected government officials seeking to mediate the conflict between competing advocacy coalitions—can, at best, reach agreement on relatively incremental changes in policy. As a result, barring major change in the setting in which subsystems operate, policies will remain stable for periods of a decade or more.

According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, major policy change is most likely to occur as a result of large-scale changes in the social, economic, or political environment. Examples in recent decades include the Great Depression in the 1930s or the election of Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. Less frequently, significant policy change can result from *policy-oriented learning*. While fundamental beliefs are rarely changed, there are occasions when experiences and new information lead coalition members to reexamine critical policy beliefs. For example, many environmental groups are more willing today to consider market mechanisms, like cap and trade policies, as a means to regulate pollution. Yet, the fundamental value of protecting the environment and reducing emissions has not changed. Instead, at least some environmentalists have concluded that alternatives to a command-and-control approach to regulation can achieve pollution reductions.

To determine when change induced by policy learning is likely to occur, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue that learning-induced change will take place when the following conditions are met: (1) disagreements between advocacy coalitions are moderate and occur at the policy and secondary levels, not at the level of fundamental normative beliefs; (2) the problem being addressed involves "natural" systems, not political or social systems; and (3) professional norms and "accepted" quantitative data and theory are brought to the discussion.

Baumgartner and Jones offer a second perspective that considers policy change from an intermediate time frame. Like Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith and Schlesinger, Baumgartner and Jones are struck by how "political processes are often driven by a logic of stability and incrementalism, but occasionally they also produce large-scale departures from the past." Their explanation of large-scale changes, punctuated equilibrium theory, focuses on the fragmented nature of America's political system and the process of issue definition and agenda setting. A constitutional framework—one that relies on a separation of powers and federalism to allocate power and responsibility among numerous branches and levels of government—fragments politics and policy in America. Given the size and complexity of a fragmented political system, the normal course of events is for key policy actors to defer to the policy decisions of policy subsystems. These subsystems include relatively small groups of interest groups, legislators, and executive branch officials who share common interests and beliefs within substantive policy areas. The result is that policy subsystems, and the public policies they promote, enjoy a monopoly over policy within their

domain for relatively long periods of time. Consequently, policies change very little.

However, the same institutional fragmentation that promotes policies' monopolies can also help break up those monopolies by moving the discussion of public issues from the microlevel to the macrolevel of U.S. politics. According to Baumgartner and Jones, this likely occurs when issue definitions are changing and receiving greater media and public attention. During periods of policy stasis, policy actors within the subsystem subscribe to a single policy image—the prevailing mix of empirical and normative beliefs that undergird existing policies. The decentralization of U.S. politics can provide competing groups the opportunity to "venue shop" for other forums to gain support for new policy images, and this allows events to challenge the image and proponents of an alternative policy perspective, and often move the issue to the national agenda.

In the 1970s, both civil rights advocates and environmental groups moved the discussion of each of their cases from the state to the national level and were able to mobilize support among members of Congress, the White House, and the Supreme Court. More recently, policy activists have returned to the states for relief. Unable to motivate federal action on global warming, for example, environmentalists successfully lobbied a number of state governments to require reductions in carbon dioxide emissions.

SHORT-TERM PERSPECTIVES

Three models of decision making provide additional insight into how policies develop in general, and why policy in the United States seems to remain stable over long periods of time. These models include *incrementalism, bounded rationality,* and *groupthink*.

The incremental model of decision making is essentially a political model of how policies are made in the United States. Like Baumgartner and Jones and others, proponents of an incremental perspective view U.S. politics as highly fragmented and decentralized. This results from the constitutional provisions of federalism and a separation of powers, and a two-party system that motivates both parties to move to the ideological center to win elections and the plurality of interests that exist in American society. In that setting, policies develop out of the competition and bargaining between competing interests at multiple levels and branches of government. Given the high decision costs of reaching compromises, politics tend to change slowly and only at the margin (i.e., incrementally).

The model of bounded rationality, offered by James March and Herbert Simon, also predicts that policies will typically change slightly—if at all—but for different reasons. According to these scholars, individuals and organizations are limited in their capacity to obtain and analyze the information they need to make truly rational decisions. In a state of bounded rationality, individuals and organizations employ decision-making processes that limit the number of policy alternatives and the amount of consideration given to those alternatives. In normal or routine policy situations, policy makers tend to look at

"old" solutions and decision processes (i.e., standard operating procedures); they limit the search for additional policy options, and analyze options sequentially. They also "satisfice" by selecting the first policy option that meets minimal expectations. While critics argue that limited search ignores the full range of policy options and their potential consequences, advocates of the model maintain that a satisficing approach to policy making is a realistic response to limits on rationality and dramatically reduces the time and costs it takes to make decisions.

Social psychologist Irving Janis developed a model of decision making in which key decision makers are primarily concerned with maintaining group unanimity. The tendency to fall victim to groupthink most likely occurs during crisis periods, and also when policy makers come from similar backgrounds and share basic beliefs, and when they are insulated from outside information and lack a tradition of impartial leadership.

Based on his analysis of several foreign policy failures, including the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Vietnam War, Janis identified eight symptoms of groupthink: (1) an illusion of invulnerability, excessive optimism, and a willingness to take extreme risks; (2) a belief in the group's morality; (3) a tendency to discount information inconsistent with the group's decision; (4) a propensity to stereotype the enemy as either evil or inept, or both; (5) self-censorship; (6) an overestimation of the group's consensus; (7) pressure on members to conform to the group's pervading beliefs; and (8) the emergence of self-appointed "mind guards" to guard against information that challenges the group's position. According to Janis, when a majority of these symptoms are present, decision making is likely to be characterized by the incomplete consideration of goals and alternative courses of action, a failure to consider risks, a tendency to filter information that is inconsistent with the preferred policy, and the lack of a contingency plan. The result is, once again, little policy change and little opportunity for policy learning.

Critics of the George W. Bush administration's decision to go to war in Iraq contend that the president and his advisers were "victims of groupthink" during the course of the war. Critics point to a number of administrative actions as evidence: the selective use of intelligence to make the case that Iraq had stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction and long-standing ties to the group responsible for the attack on the Pentagon and World Trade Center in 2001; the tendency to underestimate the difficulty and expense of the war; and a tendency to divide the nations of the world into "those who are with us and those who are against us."

CONCLUSION

There is no shortage of perspectives on how public polices develop. Taken together, those and other perspectives support a number of conclusions concerning the development of public policy in the United States. First, there is general consensus that policies develop in small steps and endure for relatively long periods of time. Second, that tendency toward stability reflects the fragmented character of the U.S. political system, a pluralism of interests, and an inherent resistance among many Americans to abandon deeply held beliefs that form the basis for public policy. Third, major policy shifts typically require major changes in the larger political, economic, or social system, such as the Great Depression, the racial strife of the 1960s, or the election of Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.

See also *Public Policy; Punctuated Equilibrium.*

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Public-private Dichotomy

The question of public and private is essentially a philosophical one, centered upon the proper scope of the activity of the state. Determining this scope entails studying whether some kinds of human endeavor, whether individual or collective, are private—that is, private in the sense that they are or ought to be protected from, or otherwise unaffected by, the regulations of the legitimate agents of public authority. Stated otherwise, this question examines whether there limits to the appropriate reach of the law and other instruments of state regulation and, if so, what those limits are and how they are justified.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Notions of public and private may have their theoretical roots in the ancient distinction between *oikos*, or household, and *polis*, or city. For example, Aristotle suggested that a certain degree of freedom from the concerns of the oikos was required to be a citizen effectively participating the affairs of the polis, and that this would rule out political participation by certain types or classes. The problem of public and private may also reflect

theological issues in Christianity concerning the relationship between ecclesiastical and temporal powers, as first suggested in the gospel of Matthew and as pursued with special urgency during the Middle Ages. In a rather different vein, it may also reflect the implicit doctrine of the Magna Carta, a fundamentally medieval document that proposed a nascent conception of aristocratic rights; this immunized certain activities of the nobility from the scrutiny of the throne, and provided legal remedies designed to protect those immunities.

The problem of public and private is, nonetheless, a fundamentally modern problem closely connected to the development of liberalism. In his *Letter Concerning Toleration,* John Locke is thought to have described a large and important realm of human and social life—the realm of religious belief and practice that government either cannot or should not regulate. In formulating such an argument, Locke appears to have outlined the basis for conceptualizing a truly private realm that is, or should be, free from state interference. In his *Two Treatises of Government,* Locke proposed a rather different formulation, according to which the government of a family, based on the highly particularized affections of the paternal authority for his offspring, is sharply distinguished from the government of civil society, which involves the application of general legal requirements to people from any kind of particularized identity. Taken together, these arguments seem to propose a strong dichotomy between a private world of belief and personal preference and a public world of order and generalized rules.

MODERN INTERPRETATIONS

Many or most modern political theorists accept some dichotomy of the public and private, hence argue or assume there is or ought to be a category of truly private endeavor that limits the activity of the state. However, the problem of how to characterize this category, and the related problem of where to draw the line between public and private, has proved to be immensely difficult. In part, the issue is terminological. Thus, for example, *private* is often thought denote anything that is not governmental, as in the private enterprise system, and yet much private property is in the form of financial securities that are publicly held and publicly traded. Yet, the larger problem is conceptual, rather than terminological. Specifically, many of the activities widely thought to be typical instances of the private category turn out to be activities toward which no responsible public authority could possibly remain indifferent. Examples of this are physical abuse within the family or fraudulent behavior within business. Scholars must then determine what kind of principle can justify state regulation of certain kinds of behavior within the family, such as preventing violence against children or ensuring children receive medical care, while leaving other kinds alone.

In addressing such questions, some theorists argue for a conception of natural or civil rights. Thus, for example, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits warrantless searches of the "persons, houses, papers and effects" of citizens, seems to suggest a right to privacy, and some jurists and legal scholars use to defend, among other things, abortion rights. On the other hand, the Constitution does not explicitly enumerate a right to privacy, and the nature and range of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment have long been a matter of intense discussion and dispute. Others theorists defend some version of John Stuart Mill's harm principle that asserts the scope of public authority should be limited to circumstances in which one or more individuals are or may be harmed by someone else. Again, though, the questions of how to conceptualize harm and how to distinguish indirect harms from direct harms, prove difficult.

Contemporary discussions of public and private have been profoundly influenced by the writings of Hannah Arendt, who postulated a conception of the public realm as a sphere of truly free action, distinguished from the biologically driven activity of labor and the goal-oriented activity of craft or work. For Arendt, the triumph of the private, or the social, over the public—resulting in fewer opportunities for authentic political engagement—increasingly has characterized modernity. Jürgen Habermas's discussion of a transformation of the public sphere—from an arena of rational discussion and debate to a system of managed, administered thought control—has been equally influential. In addition, the liberalism of John Rawls invokes a conception of a public reason that pursues practical terms of political accommodation and cooperation within complex, highly pluralistic societies. On the other hand, feminist theorists such as Susan Moller Okin insist that "the personal is political" and that the alleged distinction between the public and the domestic is misleading in itself, and harmful in its consequences. However, other theorists argue that if there is a category of private endeavor, this can be only at the sufferance of the authoritative judgment of the state itself.

See also *Arendt, Hannah; Freedom; Locke, John; Privacy Rights; Privatization; Public Good; Rawls, John.*

. . . .   PETER J. STEINBERGER

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Public Utilities

Whether publicly or privately owned, it is the job of a public utility to handle and maintain the operation of a public service. Usually, a public utility has a natural service monopoly. While its own consumers own a publicly owned utility, investors own a privately owned utility. A few examples of public utilities include an electric utility, roads and tollways, public transportation, telecommunication, heat generation and distribution, natural gas distribution, waste disposal, water purification and distribution, and sewage treatment and disposal.

A public water department is regulated to purify and distribute water to the consumers of its given area. To be a public water system, there must be at least fifteen service connections, or an average of at least twenty-five individuals served daily at least sixty days out of the year. In 1805, the first large American city to consider water distribution a municipal responsibility was Philadelphia, born out of a yellow fever epidemic that had to do with an unhealthy water supply. In his will, Benjamin Franklin gave the city one hundred thousand pounds to develop a suitable water supply for the residents and industries of the city. The city waterworks was subsequently created to pump water in from the Schuylkill River into two pumping stations through wooden pipes. One of these pumping stations was on Chestnut Street, while the other was at Centre Square. A watering committee was created and helped in providing stability that made Philadelphia one of the most prosperous cities during the Industrial Revolution. The waterworks served as a model for thirty other cities.

Before electricity was a public utility, it was a very expensive and very difficult business to run. There were a number of different companies offering different services. While some companies offered electricity for homes, others offered it for street lamps or commercial use. To be able to offer service for any of these different areas, an electric company also needed to acquire franchise rights from the local municipality. A few companies, one such ran by Samuel Insull, noticed that the cost of maintaining power plants to create electricity and then to only distribute to a specific sector of the public was unprofitable. It wasn't worth the high investments in the plants to only serve a few. Insull discovered that if he could go above serving specific sectors and actually serve each of them at different times, the price of electricity would be affordable to citizens, and it would be a profitable business. In a move to a public utility, observations at the time determined that one large operating plant would be cheaper than many smaller ones.

Still, the problem of franchise rights lowered investor confidence and thus hindered profit. Many in the industry decided it would be more profitable if, instead of consulting the city council every time, to instead operate through a nonpartisan state agency. Insull subsequently proposed that a state agency regulate prices and standards. The companies favored the idea of attracting more customers, and the customers were pleased to know that the companies were doing what was best for the consumer. In 1916, thirty-three states created these nonpartisan state agencies to regulate the industry. Today, most of these companies are privately owned utilities with a large shareholder investment base.

While often seen as a problem, the monopolization of these industries actually profits the consumer and the company. State agencies must be created in order to accomplish all the goals for any public utility. This is because heavy governmental support is needed when the distributed products become a necessity of living; a middle ground between profit and affordability must therefore be established.

See also *Nationalization; Privatization; Telecommunications Policy.*

. . . .   ARTHUR HOLST

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Pufendorf, Samuel

Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694) was a German jurist and historian, often considered an important forerunner of the German Enlightenment and a significant influence upon British philosopher John Locke. In 1658, while he was the tutor for the family of a Swedish ambassador in Denmark, Pufendorf spent eight months in a Danish prison as a result of hostilities between the two countries. Later, he held professorships at the universities of Heidelberg and Lund and served as the royal Swedish historiographer and the Prussian court historian.

The violence of the Thirty Years War (1618–1648) and the establishment of the Treaty of Westphalia marked Pufendorf's early years. As a result, his political and legal thinking was primarily concerned with the preservation and perpetuation of peaceful and stable states, and the duties of the good citizen in the new nation-state. Toward the end of his career, he moved away from politics, jurisprudence, and international law and devoted himself to studying history.

Despite his extraordinary influence in the seventeenth century, Pufendorf has been largely overlooked by later generations of political theorists and dismissed as a Grotian or a Hobbesian. In fact, his major work of natural law, *De Jure Naturae et Gentium* (1672), and the abridgement which followed it a year later, *On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law* (1673), seek to revise Dutch legal theorist Hugo Grotius's natural law theory in light of English philosopher Thomas Hobbes's methodological and anthropological innovations to arrive at a new jurisprudence appropriate for the political and legal issues confronting the Westphalian world. Pufendorf argued that the law of nations is a part of natural law, not positive law, and that it applies universally to all of humanity, not only to Christian nations. His conception of natural law is essentially voluntarist and positivist; that is, he argued that there is no morality beyond the commands of God and all law proceeds from the will of a superior. In Pufendorf's view, human reason is sufficient only to generate principles of prudence and utility, not binding moral laws.

In contrast to Hobbes, Pufendorf believed that the state of nature was not a state of war, but he saw its peace as insecure. Accordingly, the first and supreme law of nature is the command that humanity be sociable; humans must adopt an attitude consistent with the preservation of social and political life. Pufendorf's voluntaristic understanding of natural law and natural rights results in an authoritarian conception of political power, in which the state is a moral person with the rights,

powers, and will formerly belonging to individuals; in this, Pufendorf anticipates the social contract tradition.

Pufendorf's demarcation argument strengthened his justification of authoritarian political power. He argued that while all law comes ultimately from God, divine, natural, and civil laws are methodologically distinct and apply to different spheres of life. In essence, he sought to separate religion from the state in an effort to overcome the religious conflicts that characterized the Thirty Years War. The desacralization of politics meant that political rulers could no longer be held accountable to moral norms beyond their authority and that religion was relegated to the private sphere. The deconfessionalization of politics was, for Pufendorf, the first step toward an enduring peace in the wake of the Treaty of Westphalia.

See also *Church and State; Grotius, Hugo; Hobbes, Thomas; Natural Law; Natural Rights; Religion and Politics; Social Contract.*

. . . .   KRISTY M. KING

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Punctuated Equilibrium

In *Agendas and Instability in American Politics* (1993), Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones argue that debate on most policy issues remains confined to a small circle of interested players that constitute a policy domain. These players may be in conflict, but the terms of the debate and the outcome of policy decisions remains relatively stable over time, with only small, incremental changes. However, this policy stasis can change dramatically as issues are redefined and highly publicized events cause issues to be placed on the policy agenda. Policy questions then move from the relatively hidden confines of the policy domain to the highly visible locus of presidential or congressional politics. In these venues, the old relationships of the policy domain break down, and a policy is subject to dramatic change, thus leading to a punctuated equilibrium.

Baumgartner and Jones adapted their theory from evolutionary biology. Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge developed the punctuated equilibrium theory as a counter to the Darwinian belief that species evolved slowly over long periods of time. Gould and Eldredge argued that the evolution of most species remained stagnant over long periods of time—equilibrium—and that changes came in drastic bursts—punctuations. Baumgartner and Jones used this model as the basis to explain the evolution of public policy issues in the United States. Like

evolution, policies often were characterized by long periods of stagnancy or incremental change, followed by sudden dramatic shifts.

Punctuated equilibria result when changing policy images push issues that were previously uncontested onto the broad public agenda. Policy images define the ways in which the public conceptualizes an issue. Because of widespread acceptance of the status quo, when people have a positive image of an issue, there is little likelihood that much change will occur. Policy change instead occurs when elites or specialists begin to challenge an accepted policy image based on research, external events, or problems with the implementation of existing policies. They create a negative image that is reinforced and popularized by media attention. Congress is then willing to undertake broad debate on the policy, which may result in substantial change to the status quo, thus creating a punctuated equilibrium.

The punctuated equilibrium model of policy development is an ambitious attempt to synthesize conceptions of policy making to establish an all-encompassing theory of policy change in the United States. Traditionally, variations of elite theory or pluralism have dominated the study of public policy. According to elite theorists, special interests that structure the political system for their own benefit primarily direct public policy. Special interests create policy monopolies that enable them to preserve the status quo by keeping policy making out of the public eye. Consequently, elite theorists argue that radical policy change is an anomaly. Pluralists take the opposite tact, arguing that the system is open to anyone who can mobilize an interest group. Thus substantial policy change can occur at any time.

Baumgartner and Jones's theory has been termed *neopluralism* because it synthesizes elements from both of these broad theories. Their methodology of studying single areas of policy over decades allows them to show that policy is often dominated by special interests within policy monopolies. However, change is also possible when elites or public opinion pressure Congress for a change in the status quo.

See also *Public Policy; Public Policy Development.*

. . . .   J. WESLEY LECKRONE

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Puritanism

Puritanism—a term rarely used by Puritans themselves, but rather by their critics and opponents—originated as a reformist movement within the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century

Church of England. Puritans were English Protestants dissatisfied with the extent of reform in the English church after its break with Rome under Henry VIII. They sought the purging of remaining *Romish* or *popish* residues in the Church (e.g., an Episcopal system overseen by bishops and archbishops, ornate church buildings, and liturgies); emphasized personal piety, devotion, and the experience of personal conversion; and supported an educated ministry.

Drawing on the example of the primitive Christian church as a model for their own times—and understanding the church to be a gathered congregation of *visible saints* not confined to the geographical or parish boundaries of Anglicans or Catholics—Puritans supported a significant degree of congregational autonomy within the structure of a national church. Yet many views held by so-called Puritans (e.g., salvation by faith alone, or providentialism) were not fundamentally different from those held by their Reformed contemporaries, and *Puritan* and *Anglican* did not always denote hard and fast categories in early modern England.

As the seventeenth century progressed, Puritans opposed increasingly assertive Anglican royalism, as in Charles II's *personal rule*—or rule without calling Parliament— between 1629 and 1640, and distrusted Archbishop of Canterbury William Laud's ceremonialism as unacceptably popish. During the civil wars of the 1640s, Puritans generally supported Parliament against the king. With the parliamentary victory, however, the unifying effects of opposition began to wear off, and sects proliferated under the rule of Oliver Cromwell, whose theological leanings were deeply Puritan. After the restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660, and the reestablishment of the Anglican Church, Puritans tended to refer to themselves as *Nonconformists* or *Dissenters* and moved into a more explicitly oppositional role outside the national church structure.

Puritanism played an important role in America as well, and scholars have long noted the significance of the "great migration" from Puritan strongholds in England to New England during the 1630s and 1640s. Reflecting their Anglican roots, Puritans in New England set up a system in which church and commonwealth worked closely to ensure godly behavior and social order; reflecting more specifically Puritan commitments, they sought to maintain congregational autonomy in matters of church discipline and stressed the importance of covenants as the basis of such congregations, and indeed of the political order itself. Though never espousing theocracy—clergy did not hold elective office—American Puritans believed that civil magistrates and covenanted churches should work together to build a godly community in the American wilderness and to suppress vocal religious dissent. Thus they were deeply dismayed to see their English counterparts embracing religious toleration during the English Civil War (1642–1651) and under Cromwell's regime.

Puritanism in America was never short of critics: Anabaptists, Quakers, and other sectarians denounced New England Puritans as merely replicating the coercive church establishments of Europe. Emerging commercial elites also took issue with Puritanism's attempts to control social life and mores, although the relationship between Puritanism and commerce is certainly more nuanced than the strident rhetoric on either side might suggest. In addition, worries about "Indianization" and its effect on the religious foundations of New England life were never far from Puritans's minds.

The importance of Puritanism to American culture and politics has constituted one of the more enduring themes in scholarship about the development of the United States as a national community and an international power. Yet, as many other scholars have pointed out, Puritanism is not the entirety of America, but one among many influences—including those of Southern thinkers, American Catholics, and the importance of the frontier—that have informed and shaped Americans's approach to politics and society.

See also *Religious Minorities; Religious Persecution; U.S. Political Thought.*

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Pye, Lucian

Lucian Pye (1921–2008) was a political scientist known for his work on Chinese politics. Pye was born Bai Luxun in Fenzhou, Shanxi Province, China. After receiving a bachelor of arts in 1943 from Carleton College in Minnesota, he entered the U.S. Marine Corps and became an intelligence officer posted in China. After being discharged, Pye entered graduate school at Yale University, earning a master of arts in 1949 and a doctorate in philosophy in 1951. His dissertation, "The Politics of Tuchinism in North China, 1920–1927: An Aspect of Political and Social Change in Modern China," focused on the warlord system of politics in 1920s China.

In 1949, Pye joined the faculty of Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri, where he remained until 1952. He became

a faculty member at the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1956, and he spent the next thirty-five years there, becoming one of the leading scholars of Chinese and Asian politics.

Pye also was active outside academic institutions. He was a consultant to the Department of State and the National Security Council (NSC) on China and advised presidential candidates John F. Kennedy and Henry M. Jackson. In addition, Pye held leadership positions in a number of organizations. He was a trustee of the Asia Foundation (1963–2004) and a member of the board of directors of the Council on Foreign Relations (1966–1982). He cofounded and served as an acting chair of the National Committee on United States–China Relations and helped set the stage for the 1971 "ping pong diplomacy" visit of the U.S. table tennis team to the People's Republic of China.

Pye was president of the American Political Science Association from 1988 to 1989 and was elected a member of both the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the American Philosophical Society. He was a founding member of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and chaired it from 1963 to 1972. In 1978, he also helped found the International Society of Political Psychology and in 1994, he was awarded the society's Harold D. Lasswell Award.

Pye wrote or edited twenty-five books during his career. During the 1950s and 1960s, he wrote about the political development of less developed countries, focusing on specific political cultures. He believed that political culture had an impact on politics in different nation-states and this helped explain why political systems differed from one another. His approach was significant because, rather than relying on rational models of political behavior, he focused on political culture, personal behavior, and other variables that were not easily quantifiable.

Pye's biography of Mao, *Mao Tse-Tung: The Man in the Leader* (1976), was significant because he used a psychohistorical approach in an effort to understand the Chinese leader. He analyzed the psychological impact of Mao's childhood experiences, including his relationship to his mother. Pye suggested that Mao's feelings that his mother did not give him the attention he deserved made him narcissistic, which could be useful information in considering the rebellious and charismatic leader Mao later became.

In *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (1985), Pye sought to find common characteristics among a number of Asian political cultures, explaining that Asian nation-states, despite significant differences, were all pursuing modernization as a means to move away from their past. In Asia, according to Pye, pursuing change was a common political theme.

See also *Asian Political Thought; Chinese Political Thought; Political Theory.*

. . . .   JEFFREY KRAUS

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Al-Qaida

Al-Qaida (Arabic for "The Base") is defined by the U.S. Department of State as a "Foreign Terrorist Organization." This means that the organization is foreign, engages in terrorist activity or terrorism or retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism, and its terrorist activity or terrorism threatens the security of U.S. nationals or U.S. national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests).

The State Department labels the al-Qaida network, which includes a core al-Qaida organization and numerous confederated extremist groups, the greatest terrorist threat and a threat that will remain for decades. According to the State Department, al-Qaida uses subversion, sabotage, open warfare, and terrorism, and it seeks weapons of mass destruction. It aims to unite Muslims to fight the United States as a means of defeating Israel, overthrowing regimes it deems "non-Islamic," and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries. The eventual goal is the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate throughout the world. The State Department believes the group probably has several thousand extremists and associates worldwide. It maintains moneymaking front businesses, seeks donations from supporters, and illicitly siphons funds from donations made to Muslim charitable organizations.

Al-Qaida was founded by Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1988. Bin Laden was born into a wealthy family in Saudi Arabia in 1957 and appears to have adopted militant Islamist views during his university studies. One of bin Laden's instructors, Abdullah Azzam, viewed the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an attempt by a non-Muslim power to conquer sacred Muslim territory and people. Bin Laden and Azzam went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets and in 1984 established a network of international recruiting and fundraising offices. In 1988, toward the end of the Soviet occupation, there was a power struggle between bin Laden and Azzam, and Azzam was assassinated in November 1989.

The August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait apparently changed bin Laden from a de facto U.S. ally against the Soviets into an enemy of the United States. Bin Laden had returned to Saudi Arabia in 1989 and opposed the stationing of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia following Kuwait's fall. In 1991 he relocated to Sudan, where he hosted and trained al-Qaida militants to fight against the United States and its interests. These militants also received training for al-Qaida operations in the Balkans, Chechnya, Kashmir, and the Philippines. Bin Laden and his close confidant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, apparently believed that the only way to bring Islamic regimes to power was to end the U.S. regional presence.

In 1992 the group claimed responsibility for bombing a hotel in Yemen, and it has been linked to the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. In May 1996, bin Laden was expelled from Sudan and returned to Afghanistan, where he helped the Taliban gain control of the country. Kabul, the capital, was captured in September 1996, and the Taliban imposed their extreme interpretation of Islam on the Afghan people. Al-Qaida was allegedly responsible for the August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The United States in turn launched a missile attack against bin Laden's Afghanistan terrorist training camp. In October 2000, al-Qaida members attacked the USS *Cole* while it was docked in Yemen.

The United States was attacked on its own soil on September 11, 2001, (9/11) in the worst attack to date. On that day, al-Qaida members hijacked and crashed four U.S. commercial jets—two into the World Trade Center towers, one into the Pentagon near Washington, DC, and a fourth into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The attack left nearly three thousand people dead or missing.

Following the Taliban's repeated refusal to expel bin Laden and his group and end its support for international terrorism, the United States and its allies began a military campaign in Afghanistan. This led to the fall of Taliban-occupied Kabul in November 2001. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attack, was captured in Pakistan in 2003 and said at a December 2008 pretrial hearing in Guantanamo Bay that he would plead guilty.

Al-Qaida has remained active since 9/11. Apart from the continued fight against the United States and its allies in Afghanistan and post–Saddam Hussein Iraq, it has been linked to numerous incidents. These include the bombing of a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, in November 2002; bombings in Istanbul, Turkey, in November 2003; bombings in London, England, in July 2005; and the September 2008 attack on the Marriott hotel in Islamabad, Pakistan. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) said in November 2008 that bin Laden was isolated

from the daily operations of al–Qaida and probably was hiding in the tribal area of northwestern Pakistan. As of November 2009 he remained at large.

See also *Terrorism, Financing of; Terrorism, Political; Terrorism, State-sponsored.*

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Q-methodology

Invented by British psychologist William Stephenson in 1935, Q-methodology represents a kind of observer rating that can be used to assess subjective opinions or beliefs about any topic or situation. It is often used in political science in observations of policy issues and decision makers.

In a Q-sort, subjects are asked to rank their impressions of a particular topic, person, or event by indicating how well they think predetermined words or traits describe those things. For example, they might be asked to rank order one hundred descriptive adjectives by how accurately they think the particular word applies to a subject, or they may be asked how much they may agree or disagree with a given set of statements. Oftentimes, a stimulus, such as a video or speech on the subject, might be delivered to observers before they are asked to rank the target. These rankings are then factor analyzed to reveal areas of overlapping subjective points of similarity and difference between subjects. In contrast to conventional factor analysis, which operates on the intervariable correlation matrix, Q-methodology operates on the intersubject correlation matrix.

The goal of this kind of research is to provide a systematic way to combine the idiosyncratic individual responses of observers into an aggregate assessment of individual subjective judgments; this helps researchers understand the nature of preferences, motives, and other phenomenon that can be otherwise difficult to determine. Once this is done, investigators often examine whether these imputed characteristics can predict particular behaviors. Q-methodology can be used in concert with other methods to provide a multimethod investigation of political traits or character.

Several criticisms of this kind of work exist, including claims that many individuals converging in their judgments do not necessarily make these perceptions accurate. This criticism is particularly relevant under modern conditions of impression management and media attention.

See also *Quantitative Analysis.*

. . . . ROSE MCDERMOTT

Qualified Majority Voting

A qualified majority voting system, also known as a supermajority, is a parliamentary rule which requires that legislation or motions obtain a predetermined number of votes beyond a simple majority. Common qualified majority voting numbers range from three-fifths to three-quarters of the legislature; however, the percentage required for a qualified majority varies from issue to issue and from country to country. For instance, in the United States, the Senate may invoke cloture to end a filibuster with a qualified majority of three-fifths of the members present and voting, but to ratify a treaty, the Senate needs a two-thirds majority vote. Both houses of Congress require a two-third majority vote to override a presidential veto. Under the Treaty of Nice, the Council of Europe requires a supermajority of 255 votes or 62 percent in order to pass measures.

The qualified majority voting system was developed as a means to ensure the broadest possible support for the most significant measures considered by legislatures, and to ensure that legislation was not enacted without significant debate and consideration. Critics of qualified majority assert that the system often places unfair obligations on minority groups in the legislature and reinforces majoritarian systems.

See also *Filibuster; Representation and Representative.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Qualitative Analysis

Qualitative analysis refers to the way researchers analyze data collected through methods such as participant observation, case studies, interviews, narratives, and other nonquantitative formats. Qualitative analysis includes three major components: (1) reducing data by narrowing the focus, organizing, and transforming raw data (e.g., field notes) in a meaningful way; (2) displaying data through a detailed narrative about the phenomenon under examination or visuals (or both), such as charts and figures; and (3) drawing and verifying conclusions. In qualitative analysis, conclusions are often drawn early in the data collection process. Such conclusions are not final, but rather are refined continuously during the analysis process.

Two concerns emerge about qualitative analysis and the researcher. The first is researcher bias since the researcher collects the initial data. Second, the conclusions drawn by the researcher need to be verified and then validated. In recent years, researchers using qualitative analysis have received assistance from computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDA) software which helps them with functions such as coding data. In conclusion, qualitative analysis offers researchers an alternate approach to quantitative analysis.

See also *Qualitative Methodologies; Quantitative Analysis.*

. . . . JOSEPH C. SANTORA

Qualitative Methodologies

Case study methods underwent a renaissance over the last decade that encompasses three key developments. First, methodologists have clarified philosophy of science foundations in case study methods, and their comparative advantages vis-à-vis statistical methods. Second, scholars have improved their practical advice on how best to conduct case studies. Third, researchers have institutionalized the teaching and advancement of qualitative methods through a new American Political Science Association section on qualitative methods and an interuniversity Consortium on Qualitative Research Methods.

While qualitative methods encompass many approaches—including ethnography, participant observation, focus groups, and other techniques—new ways of using case studies to develop and test concepts and theories about complex political phenomena include typological theorizing, fuzzy set analysis, and two-level theories. Recent practical advice has also emerged on how to carry out case studies, including how to select cases for study, identify negative cases, execute within-case analysis using process tracing, conduct counterfactual thought experiments, and carry out multimethod research. While recent developments all hold significance, ongoing development of qualitative research methods will continue the welcome trend toward methodological pluralism in the social sciences.

PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES

In 2006, James Mahoney and Gary Goertz identified ten key differences between qualitative and statistical methods. The most fundamental of these have to do with the often implicit assumptions that the two approaches have about *explanation* and *causation*. Mahoney and Goertz argue that a central goal in qualitative research is the historical explanation of individual cases, such as the causes of major wars, financial crises, or transitions to or from democracy. This preoccupation with the *causes of effects* leads to questions such as, "Through what processes and mechanisms did this outcome arise in this case?" In contrast, statistical researchers are more interested in the general *effects of causes* on specified populations. These researchers raise questions such as, "How much, on average,

would a one-unit change in this variable affect the outcomes for this population of cases?"

This difference relates to a deeper philosophy-of-science debate on causal explanation. Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba draw upon probabilistic notions of causality and the metaphor of controlled experiments to define causation in terms of causal effects. In contrast, case study researchers, such as Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, draw upon a scientific realist view of science to argue that causal explanation involves reference to hypothesized causal mechanisms. In this view, causal mechanisms are entities in the world independent of one's mind, which, if they operate as one theorizes, would generate and account for the processes and outcomes one observes.

Either approach faces thorny philosophical and practical questions. Probabilistic ideas of causation and the notion of causal effects have difficulty providing satisfying explanations for individual cases. They also raise perplexing questions about whether the kinds of inherently probabilistic relations found in quantum mechanics are relevant to political life or can be considered causes or explanations. Moreover, earlier attempts to explicate causation in terms of probabilistic relations have had difficulty distinguishing between correlations and causation. Readings of a barometer, for example, correlate with the weather but they do not cause the weather. Yet explanations relying on correlations cannot distinguish whether a barometer qualifies as a cause of weather.

The explanation of cases via reference to causal mechanisms raises difficult issues as well. Are causal mechanisms in some ultimate sense unobservable, and if so, how do they relate to the observations one makes in the world? How can one address the problem of a potentially infinite regress of explaining mechanisms within mechanisms at ever-finer levels of detail, lower levels of analysis, and smaller increments of time? Does explanation via reference to hypothesized causal mechanisms entail a commitment to methodological individualism or the study of politics at the level of the individual, or does it allow for development and testing of macrolevel theories? How do mechanism-based explanations generalize from one context to another?

George and Bennett, in their 2005 book *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences,* address each of these issues regarding causal mechanisms. They argue that hypothesized mechanisms be tested against their observable implications. Although what is observable changes with new instruments of observation, there is always some ultimately unobservable horizon that one would like to study, beyond the current processes. In addition, researchers must make pragmatic and potentially flawed decisions on when to stop pursuing ever-finer levels of explanation. It is possible to err on the side of stopping too soon, when a better explanation is just around the corner, or too late, when the researcher has begun to tell curve-fitting stories. As for macrolevel testing of theories, George and Bennett argue this is possible but that a macrolevel theory is subject to challenge if it can be shown that individuals did not behave as the theory predicts, even

if the theory accurately attains aggregate outcomes. Process tracing is subsequently a key case study method for examining whether hypothesized mechanisms operated within a case as predicted.

Finally, George and Bennett maintain that contingent generalizations—or theoretical statements with specified and often narrow-scope conditions—are typically the most that students of politics can achieve. There are very few nontrivial political science theories that use just a few variables to make broad, detailed, and accurate predictions. These arguments, although still subject to debate, strengthen the philosophical underpinnings of case study methods.

A second set of developments concerns innovations in social science concepts and a turn toward more complex theorizing about politics. Gary Goertz, in *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide* (2005) distinguishes between necessary and sufficient concepts versus family resemblance concepts. In the former, a single variable may be conceptualized as either necessary or sufficient for a theory to hold or an entity to qualify as an instance of a concept. For example, the democratic peace theory posits that the absence of democracy in one of two contending states is a necessary condition for these states to go to war against one another. A family resemblance concept suggests that some combination of a number of substitutable characteristics qualifies an entity to be classified as an instance of a concept. A family resemblance concept of democracy, for example, might define a state as democratic if it has competitive elections plus any three of the four following attributes: viable political parties, an independent judiciary, universal suffrage, or freedom of the press.

In the 2005 article, "Two-level Theories and Fuzzy Set Analysis," Goertz and Mahoney note that many types of two-level theories are possible by combining necessary and sufficient concepts at one level of a theory with family resemblance and substitutable concepts at another. Their analysis of Theda Skocpol's theory of social revolutions, for example, shows that in her two-level theory, both state crisis and agrarian revolt are necessary conditions at one level for a social revolution. At the same time, at a prior level, there are several substitutable conditions that can lead to agrarian revolt and other substitutable conditions that result in a state crisis.

These distinctions among kinds of concepts overlap with several other approaches to complexity. James Mahoney, Erin Kimball, and Kendra Koivu, in "The Logic of Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences" (2009), discuss five kinds of causal relationships invoked in historical explanations: (1) necessary but not sufficient, (2) sufficient but not necessary, (3) necessary and sufficient, (4) insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient (INUS), and (5) sufficient but unnecessary parts of insufficient but necessary (SUIN). The first three are widely familiar, but INUS and SUIN relationships require explanation. In an INUS variable, for example, A is an INUS variable with respect to Y if: A in conjunction with B is sufficient to cause Y, neither A nor B can cause Y by themselves, and other conjunctions like DE can also cause Y. Conversely, the authors illustrate SUIN variables with

democratic peace theory. This theory, again, argues that lack of democracy in one of two contending countries is a necessary condition for war. If any one of several conditions can by itself constitute a lack of democracy—major electoral fraud, authoritarianism, and so on—but none of these conditions is by itself sufficient for war, then each is a SUIN variable with respect to war. Mahoney and colleagues discuss how the careful evaluation of sequences in historical cases can help assess the relative importance of these five kinds of causes in explaining historical cases.

George and Bennett discuss the use of typological theorizing as another approach to complexity. Typological theories provide contingent generalizations on how different combinations of variables interact to produce outcomes. Because typological theories are seldom fully specified for all possible combinations of variables, and because history does not provide natural experiments of all possible combinations, George and Bennett's approach involves careful iteration between deductive theorizing about combinations of variables, or types, and empirical knowledge about extant cases. Using the example of a study on burden sharing in the Gulf War (1990–1991), George and Bennett show how combinations of variables from theories such as balance of threat, collective action, and alliance dependence can explain why countries contributed as they did, or did not, to the U.S. coalition in the Gulf War. This example also illustrates how typological theorizing assists in choosing the most informative cases for study, and how subsequent burden-sharing episodes could be used to further develop contingent generalizations on burden sharing. One challenge of typological theories is that they become combinatorially more complex with each additional variable. George and Bennett, along with Colin Elman in "Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics" (2005), discuss ways to both simplify typological theories and focus on selected subtypes.

Charles Ragin's fuzzy set analysis, presented in his 2000 book *Fuzzy Set Social Science,* constitutes a third approach to complexity. In this method, the analyst assigns fuzzy set scores between 0 and 1.0 for how clearly a case fits as an instance of a concept. A full democracy, for example, might be coded a 1.0, a full autocracy would be 0, and a country that allows elections and eschews electoral fraud but limits the opposition parties' access to media might be a .75. Such fuzzy set scores can be superior to traditional crisp measures when variation does not matter above a certain threshold. For example, democratic peace theory holds that all fully democratic countries refrain from war with one another, and with this theory, for those cases above the threshold of established democracy, it does not matter whether one country is more democratic than another. Ragin elucidates methods for fuzzy set analysis of populations that typically range from about ten to sixty cases. This number of cases is generally too small for traditional statistical analysis and too large for detailed case studies of the full population, so within this range of cases, fuzzy set analysis can have advantages over alternative research designs.

Path dependency is a final form of complexity that case study methodologists have addressed. In a path dependent process, patterns set in a period of contingency become locked in through increasing returns to scale, learning effects, positive or negative externalities, or other mechanisms that make the new outcome strongly self-reinforcing. As Bennett and Elman argue in "Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods: The Example of Path Dependence" (2006), case study methods are well-suited to unraveling the choices made in the contingent period, examining the mechanisms that sustain the new path thereafter, and exploring the instances in which the established equilibrium might have broken down or might yet break down. Many comparative historical analyses, which focus on explaining big and important outcomes over long periods of time, use path dependency models and case study methods of assessing them.

PRACTICAL METHODS IN CASE STUDY RESEARCH

Qualitative methodologists have elaborated on practical means of carrying out case studies as well. John Gerring and Jason Seawright, in *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices* (2007), analyze nine different case selection criteria and their uses, advantages, and disadvantages. In their view, a researcher might select a typical case for study, or a case that is deemed to be representative by some criteria (e.g., having average values on the variables, or a small error term in a statistical study), and study this case in detail to see whether the mechanisms hypothesized to explain population outcomes in a statistical study are actually evident in a typical case. Selection of diverse cases might show how cases at either end of a distribution operate, while study of extreme value cases might show causal mechanisms in sharp relief, though such cases may not be representative of the population. Study of deviant outlier cases, or cases with a large error term in a prior statistical study, might help identify omitted variables, though further analysis is necessary to determine if such variables are relevant only to the outlier case or the population. Study of influential cases—or cases in which removal from the population in a statistical analysis would have the largest effect on the results—can help determine if these cases are truly part of the hypothesized processes relevant to the full population, or are in some sense deviant and need to be either recoded or dropped from statistical analysis of the full population. Study of most likely cases that fail to have the expected outcome, and least likely cases whose outcomes fit a hypothesis even in unpropitious circumstances, can help identify the scope conditions of theories. Comparison of most similar cases—or cases that are similar in all but one independent variable and differ on the dependent variable—and least similar cases—which differ on all but one independent variable and have the same value on the dependent variable—can be strong research designs to assess the roles of the independent variables isolated by each comparison. Finally, pathway cases can each illustrate different paths to similar outcomes when there are alternative paths to the same outcome; this is a condition known as *equifinality*.

Mahoney and Goertz, in "The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Qualitative Research" (2004), note that negative cases, or cases that could have had the outcome of interest but did not, are often neglected in both statistical and case study analysis. Negative cases are often harder to identify, and potentially far more numerous, than cases that are positive on the outcome of interest. It is more difficult to identify situations that could have led to war and countries that might have gone to war, for example, than to identify actual wars. Researchers can err in either of two directions: excluding relevant cases that could have had the outcome of interest but did not, or including irrelevant cases in which the outcome of interest was not possible. Mahoney and Goertz devise a *possibility principle* for identifying cases that could have had the outcome of interest. This principle consists of a rule of inclusion, which would include cases in which at least one independent variable predicts the outcome of interest, and a rule of exclusion, which excludes cases in which at least one variable makes the outcome of interest impossible or nearly so. Researchers can adjust the tightness of their criteria for inclusion or exclusion depending on the theory building or policy consequences of mistakenly including an inappropriate case versus those of mistakenly excluding a relevant case.

Methodologists have also focused on how to do within-case analysis, particularly through the technique of process tracing. Process tracing involves looking within a single case for the observable implications of hypothesized causal mechanisms, or the processes they predict should have been evident in the events leading up to the outcome of the case. Analogous to detective work, process tracing examines the detailed sequences through which outcomes arose. It addresses questions of who knew what, did what, and when, in order to affirm or disconfirm the predictions made by alternative explanations. It proceeds both deductively, from hypothesized observable implications, and inductively, from details in the case that may surprise the researcher and that need to be theorized and tested against additional observable implications within the case or in other cases.

In many respects, the logic of process tracing parallels that of Bayesian inference. Both approaches stress the importance of diverse evidence, of casting the net widely for alternative explanations, of never placing 100 percent confidence in an explanation, and of putting the greatest value on evidence that helps differentiate between competing explanations (i.e., evidence that affirms one explanation while at the same time disconfirming others). Both perspectives indicate that the degrees of freedom problem, which arises in frequentist statistical analysis when the researcher has more parameters to be estimated than cases to study, is not applicable to within-case analysis in which a single piece of evidence might disprove many possible explanations. Whether there is (in)determinacy in distinguishing between alternative explanations of a case depends on the nature of the evidence with respect to the rival explanations, not of the number of cases or pieces of evidence relative to the number of variables. Process tracing can thus enable causal inference even from a single case with many variables, and it

can thereby compensate for the limitations of cross-case comparisons. Process tracing can help test, for example, whether the one independent variable that differs between most similar cases relates to the difference in these cases' outcomes. Process tracing is not a panacea, however, because it is time-consuming, requires lots of information, and may be indeterminate if the right kind of evidence is not available.

Counterfactual analysis can supplement both within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons. Every causal explanatory statement—"Y happened in this way at this time because of X"—implies a counterfactual: "If not X, then not Y in the same way or at the same time." Because researchers cannot run perfect experiments or rerun history, counterfactuals are ultimately untestable. Yet thinking through the counterfactual implications of causal arguments can help check for logical inconsistency in one's own thinking. If researchers do not find a counterfactual claim equally convincing as the logically equivalent causal claim that they are asserting, then they need to fix the inconsistency in their thinking. In their 1996 work *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics,* Philipp Tetlock and Aaron Belkin suggest criteria for good counterfactuals, including clarity, logical consistency, minimizing the rewriting of history necessary to sustain the counterfactual, and projectibility. Projectibility, or ability to get back toward testable implications, is particularly important. Although counterfactuals are ultimately untestable, they may have some degree of testability. For example, one could assess whether actors made contingency plans in case events took a different path, or if powerful actors considered or advocated options other than those that they ultimately chose. Gary Goertz and Jack Levy, in *Explaining War and Peace: Case Studies and Necessary Conditions Counterfactuals* (2007), provide extended analysis of some of the counterfactual arguments that have been made concerning the outbreak of World War I (1914–1918) and the end of the cold war.

Finally, methodologists provide techniques for combining case study methods with statistical and formal analysis within a single research project. Much of the advice on case selection from Gerring and Seawright, for example, requires prior statistical work to identify outlier cases or influential cases before such cases can be selected for within-case analysis or paired case comparisons. Similarly, in the 2005 article "Nested Analysis as a Mixed-method Research Strategy for Comparative Research," Evan Lieberman discusses how statistical analysis and case study analysis can be *nested* into a multimethod research design. The basic premise of multimethod analysis, and one increasingly recognized by methodologists of all kinds, is that every methodological approach has strengths and weaknesses, so combining methods can allow the strengths of one to address the limits of another.

CONCLUSION

Innovations in case study methods have provided them with a more equal basis relative to the decades of refinements in statistical and other methods. This has contributed to a welcome methodological pluralism and to growing interest in multimethod research. However, it has also raised the level of effort required to master best practices in case study methods, or even to become adept enough at these methods to critically read case study research. Still, these emerging trends provide a valuable basis even where methodology is a secondary focus, or for those whose primary methods are not case studies.

See also *Case Studies; Qualitative Analysis; Quantitative Analysis; Validity.*

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Quality of Life

Quality of life (QOL) is a term used by politicians, journalists, and social scientists to distinguish differences in objective and subjective social well-being among individuals and between different units of government. Most often, it is used to measure and compare differences in the satisfaction of fundamental social and psychological needs.

However, most QOL researchers do not try to justify the indicators used to measure differences in life quality. Rather, they often explain their selection on the basis of commonly held standards of economic, social, environmental, health, and political well-being. This is why other researchers and interested parties often contest and dispute their results. Thus, QOL studies usually reflect both a conscious and unconscious mobilization of political and social bias.

Interest in life-quality differences is especially high among Americans and residents of developed countries. Perhaps one reason is the high level of social mobility found in advanced industrial democracies. Each year, approximately 20 percent of all Americans change their place of residence, frequently to different metropolitan areas and states than those in which they formerly lived. Most move for jobs and better salaries. Others move for reasons of climate and health. Still others may seek a new start in life, a more satisfying lifestyle, or residential proximity to family and friends. Whatever the reason, Americans, especially newly arrived immigrants, continue to be a highly mobile people, as evidenced by the growing numbers who have migrated from colder to warmer climates, from metropolitan to nonmetropolitan areas, and more recently, from second and third world countries, to the first world. Public concern over life-quality differences is therefore natural and perhaps inevitable.

For many Americans, the quality of life can be largely defined in terms of their economic welfare (i.e., the bundle of goods and services they command in the free market). Indeed, until the economic recession that began in December 2007, the rising levels of material well-being attained in the United States during the past century greatly reinforced the prevailing faith in democratic capitalism and "the power of economic affluence to elevate the good life in America." (Novak; Campbell, 2) For others who deplore the blatant materialism and rampant individualism of the age, the quality of life is better measured by postmaterialist values including the livability of a community, the humanity of government, the purity of the environment, personal and community health, and the amenities that promote personal growth and development.

Thus, there is a strong subjective component to the way in which many Americans assess the quality of their lives. Ironically, most studies attempting to relate objective life-quality conditions with subjective measures of life satisfaction have found either weak or nonexistent relationships. As John Milton observed in *Paradise Lost,* "The mind is its own place and in itself can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven." Clearly, objective well-being does not necessarily lead to

personal happiness. Nonetheless, studies suggest that richer people tend to be happier, healthier, and live longer.

Quality of life studies also suggest that the overall quality of life in states and communities can be linked to differences in racial composition, economic development, and culture. Using an overall index of life quality developed by Ben-Chieh Liu for 243 small, medium, and large U.S. metropolitan areas, Joel Lieske finds that three indicators explain 65 to 79 percent of the variation. These include percent black, percent high school educated, and an index of political moralism based on Daniel Elazar's cultural typology. These results and others suggest that the overall quality of life is higher in metropolitan areas where residents are less racially and ethically diverse. Second, the results suggest the priority of human development over purely economic development. Third, all things equal, the results indicate that moralistic (participant) cultures do the most to enhance the overall quality of life, individualistic (commercial) cultures do the next most, and traditionalistic (hierarchical) cultures do the least. Overall, the quality of life in U.S. metropolitan areas and the American states depends fundamentally on the quality of the people who inhabit them.

See also *Cultural Policy; Education Policy; Environmental Policy; Health Care Policy; Labor Policy; Poverty; Social Policy; Social Welfare.*

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Quangos

Quangos are quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organizations. The term quango was created in the 1970s to describe public bodies that conduct public functions but are not directly controlled by central government. The purpose of quangos is to allow experts to directly control policy-implementation processes. However, there is no clear and single definition of a quango and it is not unusual that definitions are disputed for political reasons. Quangos range across a vast number of types of bodies and policy areas, from the delivery of health care to managing parks or ensuring the roadworthiness of cars.

Quangos exist in some form in most political systems but with different nomenclatures. For example, in the United Kingdom, they are referred to as nondepartmental public bodies; in the Netherlands, they are independent administrative bodies, in Germany, they are known as federal agencies; and in the United States, they are independent agencies and regulatory commissions.

To some degree, before the development of the modern state, quangolike bodies were often used for delivering public goods. All governments have had quasi-independent systems in some form or another from the East India Company—responsible for governing trade and the economy in India—to the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States—set up as part of Roosevelt's New Deal program to encourage economic development in the region. However, it seems that quasi-autonomous bodies are growing in number and are seen by politicians as an effective way to either provide services or regulate the provision of services.

Quangos are attractive to government because they provide for flexibility in administration. Policy implementation can be devolved to experts or officials in regions who are able to make decisions on the basis of particular circumstances. Moreover, quangos allow experts to decide priorities and processes. The largest quangos in Britain, for example, tend to be health bodies that enable medical professionals and health service managers to make decisions about spending priorities according to their perceptions of the needs in their area. They also allow processes of delivery to operate outside of politically controlled local government. For example, in the 1980s, control over public housing in Britain shifted from local government to a quango, the Housing Corporation. Quangos also allow for governments to shift or avoid the blame for decisions. Politicians can use quangos either to distance themselves from difficult political decisions (i.e., ethical decisions around stem cell research) or to depoliticize certain issues (i.e., the regulation of utility prices such as gas and water).

The growth of quangos has also been linked to the notion of new public management. New public management, concerned with improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector, leads to governments' perception of quangos as a mechanism for delegating decision making to managers and removing it from the hands of politicians and bureaucrats. quangos have also been seen as a way to reduce the size of central government by contracting out services to bodies that are not directly controlled by the central state. New public management also emphasized privatization where possible. However, governments throughout the world have been keen to regulate privatized sectors; as a consequence, privatization has concurrently risen in regulatory bodies. For instance, in the United Kingdom, privatized security has grown significantly. As private security developed, the government established the Security Industry Authority to regulate private companies.

Despite the universal growth of quangos throughout the world, they are frequently subject to criticism. There are two main criticisms of quangos. First, they are seen as being unaccountable. It is often the case that quangos are not open to normal mechanisms of legislative scrutiny. Indeed, in the United States, quangos have sometimes been used to avoid congressional oversight and budget limitations. Therefore, while central government departments have clear and direct lines of accountability to legislatures, in the case of quangos, these can often be obscure and vary from body to body. In addition, quangos spend vast amounts of public funds and often there is a lack of clarity on how, where, and why this money is spent.

The second main criticism of quangos is their frequent association with patronage. Quango chief executives and boards are appointed, and not elected; consequently, there is considerable criticism that politicians use quango positions as rewards for political supporters. However, in most systems, there are rules governing appointments and often posts are unpaid.

Regardless of the problems associated with quangos, they are important mechanisms for delivering public goods and are thus likely to continue long term in most political systems.

See also *Budgeting; Bureaucracy; Regulation and Rulemaking.*

. . . . MARTIN J. SMITH

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Quantitative Analysis

Quantitative analysis in political science entails assigning numbers to observed events in the political world, and then using the rules of mathematics, probability, and statistics to make statements about the world we live in. Quantitative analysis enables not just precise identification of the relationships between events, but also statements about the uncertainty surrounding these relationships. As apparent from the term *event*, this type of analysis relies on some level of abstraction, and is based on the notion that unique events are considered instances of more generic variables. For example, individual transactions can be lumped into *imports*, voters' opinions can be compared based on their responses to survey questions, and violent conflict between two groups in two different places and times can be treated as two instances of "war." With the rapid growth of computing power and development of large-scale data sets over the last sixty years, quantitative analysis has migrated from being the domain of a few scholars working in specific areas (e.g., voter behavior or public opinion) to its current position at the heart of empirical political science in all major subfields.

Quantitative analysis is distinct from formal modeling. Formal models are self-contained exercises designed to identify the consequences of a set of assumptions using the rules of mathematics and formal logic. Formal models and quantitative analysis frequently complement one another and coexist in specific scholarly works. Both use the language of mathematics but only quantitative analysis involves the creation and analysis of numerical data from the observable world.

Quantitative analysis is frequently contrasted with qualitative analysis. While the differences between them often appear obvious, on closer consideration, it becomes harder to distinguish the two. Analysts using both sets of tools often have similar goals. Works considered qualitative commonly report numerical data, while quantitative analysis is useless without substantive interpretation. Items such as words in speeches, while appearing qualitative, are amenable to analysis using advanced graphical and statistical tools. The logic of quantitative research can profitably apply in qualitative settings, while qualitative or historical knowledge can incorporate directly into quantitative analysis, especially in a Bayesian setting: The Bayesian paradigm combines prior beliefs with our newly analyzed data to provide a formal method for knowledge accumulation. Our priors are a function of historical and qualitative information.

MEASUREMENT AND DATA

LEVELS OF MEASUREMENT

Assigning numerical values to observed events can take different levels of precision. Conventionally, these levels are grouped into four categories representing the extent of numerical content implied in numerical measurements. The level of measurement affects the numerical manipulations applicable to statistical modeling choices.

Nominal data contain numeral representing pure names; the actual value assigned has no meaning. For example, a democratic country can be coded with the numeral 1 and a nondemocratic country with a 0, or vice versa. Or, democracies could be coded as 5498 and nondemocracies as -3.14. It makes no difference; what matters is that the numerical values denote difference of kind. For nominal measurement to be useful, the extent of the categorization must be exhaustive—all observations are assigned a value—and mutually exclusive—no observation gets more than one value. In describing a distribution of a nominal variable, only frequencies can be used. It makes no sense, for example, to discuss the "mean of democracy."

Ordinal data measurements convey a sense of magnitude using the ordered nature of numbers, that is, the binary relations of greater than (>) and less than (<). The actual distance between the numbers, however, has no meaning. For example, a survey question may ask respondents whether they agree with a particular statement "a lot," "somewhat," or "not at all." An analyst might code these responses as 2, 1, and 0 respectively. Equally valid, however, is -5, -5.2, and -223. For data measured on this scale, conclusions can be made only that one respondent agrees more than another, and not how much more. The difference between the numbers 2 and 1 is not meaningful. In describing ordinal data, modes, medians, and percentiles can be used but the mean and standard deviation are undefined. Similar to ordinal data, interval data holds meaningful differences between values are meaningful. Equal distances between measurements represent equal intervals. Time is a commonly used interval-level variable.

Ratio data are interval data that also have a meaningful 0 point. In this way, statements such as, "There were twice as many battle deaths in Iraq last year compared to this year," can be made. In other words, researchers can interpret ratios. In describing both ratio and interval data, the full suite of tools is available, including the arithmetic and geometric means, standard deviation, coefficient of variation, and so on.

RELIABILITY, VALIDITY, AND ERROR

All measurement occurs in the presence of error. The tools used for measurement vary in their reliability—the extent to which an instrument gives the same answer under the same conditions—and their validity—the degree to which an instrument returns the true value on average. A related problem is one of bias, since some measurements may be reliable but biased away from the true value. *Selection bias* affects the ability to observe a representative sample of possible outcomes. A canonical example is women's wages: only wages of the women who chose to work are observed, so the estimate of women's wages is therefore likely to be biased.

DATA STRUCTURES

Quantitative data are frequently described by their structure. The simplest is cross-sectional data. These data are simply a collection of observations at a single point in time. For example, survey data from a random sample records the answers of *N* people to *K* questions at the time of the survey. These data are simple in that they are independent samples from a population. More complicated data structures have increasingly complicated dependencies among observations. Longitudinal data measure one unit over time. For example, the U.S. unemployment rate is measured monthly. Clearly, one month's unemployment rate depends on the prior month's rate. Spatial data are data in which the units of study are distributed in space, either as regions or as point processes, for example, whether the level of democracy in one country is affected by the regime type of its neighbors. Dyadic data measure the links between two other units. For example, trade between pairs of countries is dyadic. It seems likely that the trade between the United States and Canada, the United States and Japan, and Canada and Japan might be correlated. Dyadic data, taken together, describes a *network*.

Quite common in some subfields of political science, panel data and time series cross-section (TSCS) both involve the repeated observation of a set of units over time. Panel studies typically observe a large number of units over a small number of intervals (e.g., a survey administered to the same set of respondents each year for three years). TSCS data describe data on a smaller set of units over a longer period, such as the rich Western democracies since World War II (1939–1945). These data structures require the analyst to address both

the longitudinal dependence within subjects and the spatial or network dependence within time periods. TSCS are one type of hierarchical data. Other examples include cities within counties within states or children within schools. Hierarchical models attempt to account for the dependence among observations (e.g., children within the same school).

GOALS OF QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Quantitative data analysis has at least one of four major objectives: description, prediction, theory testing, and causal inference. While not mutually exclusive, the bread-and-butter of quantitative analysis, the regression model, can be deployed in the service of any of these goals.

DESCRIPTION

Description is probably the most common goal of any quantitative analysis. A variable observed repeatedly generates a sample. Description then begins by characterizing the distribution of the observations with easily understood summary statistics such as the range, mode, median, mean, and standard deviation (average deviation from the mean) as well as higher moments. Rarely, however, is an analyst only concerned with a single variable, but more typically cares about the relationship between variables. Correlation is the most basic description of a bivariate relationship. It describes the extent to which bigger values of one variable associate with bigger values of another.

Correlation is only a description of association, not a sufficient condition for a causal relationship. Strong correlations often form the basis of interesting puzzles, such as the strong negative correlation between pairs of democratic countries and the likelihood of war. Comparativists have long attempted to explain the strong positive correlation between the proportionality of the electoral system and the number of political parties in a country.

The most powerful tool in descriptive quantitative analysis lies in the ability to present large quantities of data in compact, intuitive, visual form. Simple scatterplots can present enormous amounts of information efficiently. By creative use of perspective, contour plots, and even color, visual displays can offer insight into the relationships between three and four variables far beyond what summary statistics can provide. Visualization can also describe the outputs from statistical and simulation analysis in understandable ways for audiences who may not have background in the complexities of the models themselves. While visual displays are increasingly common in political science, more rigorous and advanced visualization techniques are a major research frontier.

Because the political world is complex, understanding any relationship usually requires accounting for other factors, and regression is the tool of choice. A simple regression is a procedure for drawing a line through a cloud of points such that the average distance from the line is as small as possible. For example, to describe the relationship between a variable y and x_1 while accounting for the relationship between y and x_2, y could be a voter's level of approval for the American president, x_1 is the voter's age and x_2 is the voter's income. This is an example of what some call *multiple regression*. Such a model might take the form

$$y = a + b_1 x_1 + b_2 x_2 + e$$

In this example, y is referred to as the *dependent variable* or *response,* while x_1 and x_2 are called *independent variables* or *covariates.* The parameters a, b_1, and b_2 are estimates, and e represents random error. Here b_1 describes the relationship between age and approval for the president holding income constant. The values of a, b_1, and b_2 are chosen to make e as small as possible, on average. In general, in order to estimate this model, there must be at least as many observations as parameters to estimate. In this example, we need at least three observations. The difference between the number of observations and the number of parameters is called the *degrees of freedom.* A major strength of regression analysis—and statistical analysis more generally—is the ability to quantify the amount of uncertainty about an estimate of a particular relationship. Discussions of uncertainty ultimately derive from statistical assumptions often couched in terms of standard errors and statistical significance.

Originally developed with ratio-level data in mind, the regression framework extends in numerous ways to accommodate different types of data and for different scientific questions. The generalized linear model (GLM) is among the most widely used amplifications of linear regression. Different assumptions about the data–generating process distinguish one form of the GLM from another. Logit and probit models assume binary nominal responses. Ordered logit and probit assume ordinal response variables. More generally, polytonomous nominal data are often modeled as emerging from a multinomial process. The Poisson and negative binomial models treat the response as integer counts. Political scientists have applied these and other members of the GLM family in a wide range of empirical contexts.

Descriptive statistics and visual displays of data, so widespread in political science, make citation of any particular study unnecessary. Regression analysis is equally as common but analysts usually interpret regression analysis as representing something more than just description (e.g., as a test of a theory). Even if regression is deployed for more aggressive goals, it provides a geometric simplification of a set of relationships between variables.

PREDICTION

A common goal of quantitative analysis is predicting outcomes. Election prediction probably receives the most attention. Political scientists have also spent considerable effort developing predictive models in other areas, such as the onset of war or the collapse of states. Analysts usually derive their predictions from some form of regression model, though other types of quantitative models are used, including dynamical systems and local simulation.

Typically, prediction connotes forecasting (i.e., predicting unrealized future events). Other types of predictive exercises exist, however. In-sample prediction is a way to evaluate a model, helping determine the effectiveness of different models

at predicting the data the analyst used to fit the model. The frequently used R^2 statistic is a summary of in-sample prediction. Out of sample prediction evaluates how well a model for one set of data predicts another set of data not used to estimate the model. In the earlier example, out of sample prediction would involve using estimates of the b derived from one survey to predict someone else's level of presidential approval, given that new person's age and income.

Accurate prediction does not presuppose a true model of the world or even that there is any causal relationship between the predictor variables and the outcome. A correct casual model will give great predictions, but an analyst whose goal is only predictive is purely concerned with identifying the variables that improve the ability to predict accurately. In this way, exercises such as data mining are justified. With prediction, true or parsimonious models are neither necessary nor of paramount importance, while strong and exhaustive correlations do hold significance.

CAUSAL INFERENCE AND THEORY TESTING

Ultimately, science is concerned with identifying and quantifying causal relationships. Causal relationships rely on the notion of *counterfactuals*. For example, what would have been the economic growth rate in Ecuador had it not participated in an International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment program? It is impossible to simultaneously observe Ecuador's economic performance both with and without its experience with the IMF. This problem is known as the fundamental problem of causal inference. To estimate a causal relationship, analysts typically rely on repeated measures. By divorcing the level of the independent variable of interest, or *treatment*, from all other possible confounding variables, one can estimate a causal effect. Randomized treatment is the most effective way this is achieved in practice.

The identification of a causal effect is difficult in political science since researcher-controlled randomized experiments are often impossible. Analysts must therefore be cautious in asserting the existence of a causal relationship. Matching models are one set of quantitative tools recently developed to assist in this exercise. These models pair observations that are as similar as possible along all dimensions, save the variable of interest and then use the differences in outcomes to estimate causal effects. Sandy Gordon and Greg Huber, in their article "The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior," use matching to examine the effect of electoral competition on judges' sentencing behavior. In another article, titled "Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference" Michael Gilligan and Ernest Sergenti use matching to examine the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions.

Theory testing, related to causal inference, frequently allows political scientists to describe a set of plausible causal relationships based on some assumptions and understanding of the political world. The analyst then asserts a series of hypotheses, typically relationships between variables, that the theory would lead analysts to observe. Quantitative analysis permits analysts to describe whether the relationships estimable from available data are consistent with their theoretical expectations.

Analysts do not directly observe or estimate a causal relationship. Rather they assert one and then confront it with data. Analysis consistent with the assertions leads to increased confidence that the theoretical story may describe an actual causal relationship. Thus, political science is largely populated with statements of causal relationships that, while not demonstrated through randomized experimentation, have yet to be convincingly disproven.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS AND THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Quantitative analysis has transformed political science over the last eighty years, expanding the understanding of numerous facets of the world—from public opinion to the relationship between democracy and economic development. But this expansion of knowledge has generated at least as many questions as it answered. As data sets proliferate, researchers will need to pay closer attention to where their data are originating and the incentives for governments, survey respondents, and interest groups in acquiring and reporting truthful values. Vast new sources of political information are soon to be available for quantitative analysis—including Internet traffic patterns, satellite images, and high-precision spatial locations—opening up whole new research frontiers.

See also *Qualitative Analysis; Qualitative Methodologies.*

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Quasi-experiment

Quasi-experimental design refers to situations in which an experimenter can assign treatment conditions but, for certain reasons, is not able to randomize subjects across conditions. Variants on this design include interrupted time series designs, which can either be simple or equivalent types, and non-equivalent control group designs.

Quasi-experiments represent one of a broader range of nonexperimental alternatives to experimental work. They strive to incorporate as much of standard experimental design as possible but, or practical or ethical reasons, fail to achieve full experimental control in one area or another. These kinds of alternatives include correlational work, pseudo-experiments, and quasi-experiments.

In correlational work, researchers observe how variables correlate to each other, as with smoking and lung cancer. However, because it is not ethical to force people to smoke to see if the behavior gives more of them cancer, there is no treatment manipulation; thus experimenters are not able to prove causality. This is because problems exist in determining causal direction, and because spurious associations remain possible. For years, tobacco companies asserted that some third, unknown case made certain people both more likely to smoke and more likely to contract lung cancer, but there was no direct relationship between smoking and cancer. Often, statisticians can correct problems in determining causal direction with a cross-lagged panel design. But it took systematic experimental research in a laboratory to show that exposure to substances in cigarettes caused cancer in lung tissue in a petri dish to prove causality.

Regression-discontinuity designs compare treatment groups between pretests and posttests but use a distinct method of subject assignment. Subjects are placed into groups based on their preintervention score; those above a particular threshold are placed in one group, whereas those below are placed in another. While selection threats to internal validity exist, this method offers the advantage of targeting those most affected by a particular outcome.

According to Elliot Aronson and colleagues in their book *Methods of Research in Social Psychology* (1989), pseudo-experimental design exerts some control over administering manipulations to subjects. However, in this design, there is no control group, so comparisons between conditions remain impossible. Such studies often occur with natural experiments, where a real-life occurrence only makes one measurement

possible. There are three kinds of pseudo-experiments. The first, a one-shot case study design, occurs when investigators can only administer a single posttest, after a given disaster like a fire, hurricane, or earthquake has taken place. The second pseudo-experiment design is known as the one-group pretest–posttest. In this variant, the same group is studied before and after a manipulation, but no comparison control group exists so many threats to internal validity remain. A final kind of pseudo-experiment is the static group comparison design. In this design, two different groups are tested at the same time on the same variable, but because the subjects were not randomized to condition prior to the observations, there is no way to know whether preexisting systematic differences between subjects caused any observable differences between the groups.

Quasi-experimental designs give experimenters more control than either correlational or pseudo-experimental designs, but not as much as a fully controlled experiment. In quasi-experiments, experimenters can assign treatment and control conditions to subjects and collect the dependent measures they desire, but they cannot randomize subjects to condition. The main difference between real and quasi-experiments thus lies in the lack of randomization to condition in the latter design. This often makes quasi-experiments more feasible for real-life studies in field environments where such randomization remains impractical, illegal, or unethical, but this does limit the strength of the causal claim that can be made concerning any findings.

There are two types of quasi-experimental studies. The first is the interrupted time series, which involves a within-subject comparison using the same independent variables on the same group of subjects over time. Dependent measures are taken both before and after the manipulated treatment. Sometimes, measures are simply made after different levels of manipulation have been applied to different groups, as when more of a particular drug may be given to one group than another.

A second type of quasi-experiment is called the non-equivalent control group design. This design takes the form of a between-subjects model to measure the impact of a given independent variable on different groups of subjects. Comparisons of these groups are made at the completion of the study, but these subjects have not been assigned at random to condition, so threats to internal validity remain.

See also *Causation and Correlation; Experimental Design; Field Experiment; Validity.*

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Queer Theory

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Queer theory is a form of postmodern analysis that embraces four basic political claims: sexuality is central to politics; identity is performative; politics are ironic; and popular culture may be politically transformative. Queer theory emerged in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, when scholars from the humanities such as Judith Butler, D. A. Miller, Eve Sedgwick, and Michael Warner laid out the basic claims of queer theory. Subsequently, queer theory was further developed by political scientists such as Lisa Bower, Marla Brettschneider, Susan Burgess, Joe Rollins, and Shane Phalen. It is sometimes also associated with radical political responses to the HIV/AIDS crisis that emerged in the form of organizations such as ACT-UP and Queer Nation.

Queer theorists argue that political meaning and power are typically constituted through a series of oppositional categories, or binaries; these may include heterosexual-homosexual, reason-desire, white-black, man-woman. Since each term is constituted and defined by distinguishing itself from its oppositional pair, the terms are mutually dependent for their meaning. However, these binary terms are asymmetrical. That is, while the legitimacy of the second term in each binary is questioned or suspect, the first term gains default legitimacy, remaining largely unquestioned. In this manner, the binary produces various forms of material inequities such as unequal rights and liberties, privileging those associated with the first term and disadvantaging those associated with the second. Thus, heterosexuals are typically granted rights and liberties, such as the right to marry, that are not accorded to homosexuals.

THEORETICAL COMPONENTS

Queer theory distinguishes itself from other forms of postmodernism by contending that every binary—even those that seemingly have nothing to do with sexuality—will necessarily be inflected with sexuality, enacting what Eve Sedgwick has called "an epistemology of the closet." The lesser, even demonized status of the minor term in each binary leads many associated with it to closet themselves, and those who fear such association may out others in order to imply that themselves are identified with the major term. Thus, status insecure heterosexuals may seek to solidify their own heterosexual identity by gay bashing, by outing "real" homosexuals, or by calling attention to the illicit nature of same-sex marriage. Such moves serve to reveal that heterosexuality needs homosexuality to gain meaning and to maintain a position of superiority; the moves also reveal the material advantages that result.

Queer theorists also claim that identity is fluid and thus performative. Arguing that the meaning of each term in a binary is a product—rather than a precursor—of political contestation,

Gay pride demonstrators hold signs during a 1974 rally in New York City. Queer theorists argue that homosexuals coming out may fail to challenge the existing politics of sex and gender order, a viewpoint in opposition to that held by the LGBT movement in the 1970s and 1980s.

queer theorists claim that meaning is produced in specific communities at particular historical junctures. These communities tend to reproduce themselves and their conceptual systems. Over time, the meaning of their central binaries appear to be given or natural, rather than politically contingent, performances.

Queer theorists are typically quite skeptical about both the possibility and desirability of resolving the problem of sexual identity. In this sense, queer theory challenges the model of identity politics that had grounded lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) studies in the 1970s and 80s, which promoted coming-out as a significant mode of political transformation. In the identity politics model, coming-out is thought to dissolve shame and foster pride not only in individual gays and lesbians, but also in the gay and lesbian community. Coming-out promises to reveal an authentic self, hidden underneath the facade of contemporary heterosexuality.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

In contrast to the identity politics model, which assumes a reconciliation of the problem of identity when the authentic homosexual identity is personally embraced and then publicly integrated into the reformed political order, a queer analysis of sexuality contends that there is no tidy resolution of the problem of sexual identity in this or any other political order. The instability of identity and the persistence of power make stable resolutions of this sort impossible. To come out as a homosexual, one relies on the dependence or entwined nature of these terms and identities, as the action assumes a compulsory heterosexuality from which the newly public homosexual seeks to emerge. Thus, queer theorists argue that coming-out may actually serve to stabilize the politics of the current sex and gender order, as newly out gays may trade one rigid identity for another (e.g., closeted homosexual for out homosexual), unwittingly propping up heterosexuality, which needs homosexuality to continue as a foil in order to maintain a dominant position in the political order. Rather than trying to stabilize identity and political contestation by identifying an authentic self upon which an earnest political struggle may be staked, queer theorists opt to create performances that reveal the irony of the search for the authentic self and the ideal political order. Accordingly, parody and drag are central political strategies of queer theory, as they reveal the irony of the search for the authentic self and tidy political resolutions.

Earnest political struggle to construct a better future, abstracted from a larger more ironic framework, is seen as hopelessly naive at best, and dangerously misguided at worst. While the desire to create a better political order may be irresistible at some level, queer theorists are typically quite sober about the possibility of successfully disrupting the sex and gender order in any sort of permanent way. Rather than either embracing or abandoning earnest political activism, they seek to recast such activity into an ironic parody that more accurately encompasses the contradictions that are inherent to political struggle. The queer parodist commits to working within rather than resolving such contradictions.

As a consequence, queer theory has been concerned with popular culture as a site that might readily accommodate queer performances that reveal the instability of identity, offering alternative narratives that ironically serve to both support and challenge the political status quo. These works offer fresh interpretations of pop culture performances, foregrounding previously overlooked queer narratives that both reflect and evade dominant power, highlighting the centrality, performativity, and irony of the politics of sexuality.

See also *Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights; Gender Issues; Homophobia.*

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Questionnaire

A questionnaire, or survey instrument, is a structured set of questions administered to individuals to obtain information. Frequently used in survey, political behavior, and public opinion research, a questionnaire involves either the direct or indirect solicitation of information from individuals. Questionnaires are used to gauge a respondent's attitudes on a topic, obtain factual information on the individual, or ask respondents to self-report about behaviors or habits. Questionnaires are particularly useful in obtaining data on a population too large for measurement on practical grounds by drawing from a sample of individuals from within that population. While questionnaires differ based on the subject being researched, the purpose of a questionnaire is to ensure that each individual respondent completes a more or less standardized instrument, thereby ensuring both the reliability and the validity of the data obtained.

While a questionnaire can assume several forms, the method of data collection involves a carefully structured or scripted series of questions that may then be presented to individuals in a variety of ways. Some questionnaires are administered by an interviewer. These can be done face-to-face or by telephone via a traditional landline phone or a cellular phone. Questionnaires may also be self-administered. Self-administered questionnaires can be administered electronically (e.g., over the

Internet or by email) or in hard copy (e.g., by mail or placed in drop-off locations for potential respondents to find). Furthermore, a researcher may employ a mixed-mode design, which may incorporate multiple administration methods. The chosen methodology generally relies upon a variety of practical considerations, namely cost, time frame, the nature of the study, and the size and composition of the populations involved.

A questionnaire can either be scientific or nonscientific in nature, a designation frequently contingent upon how it is administered. Scientific questionnaires are generally considered nonexperimental in design, but may be incorporated into some experimental designs. Scientific questionnaires can be classified into one of three general categories: a cross-sectional design, wherein the survey is administered once to a sample; a panel study, which is a type of cross-sectional design in which the same respondents are administered a questionnaire at multiple points in time; or a time-series analysis, which involves a questionnaire administered at multiple points in time, but not necessarily to the same set of respondents. Nonscientific questionnaires do not generally follow any prescribed scientific guidelines—either in terms of composition or administration—and thus the measures cannot be considered accurate or valid and should not be used for scientific research purposes.

Building a questionnaire is a complex task. For a questionnaire to be reliable and to provide valid measures for quantitative analysis, a researcher must fulfill a multitude of methodological obligations simultaneously. Questions can be asked on any topic and in any number of ways, so it is not sufficient simply to write a series of questions and disseminate a questionnaire without first considering several factors. These factors include careful selection of the types of questions that will provide an adequate measure of the phenomenon being researched, the wording of questions, the order of the questions, the careful selection of the sample that will ultimately receive the questionnaire, and the interviewing techniques and survey methods best suited for the administration of the survey instrument.

Ignoring any one of these potential methodological pitfalls can result in invalid or unreliable data. For instance, invalid measures of the phenomenon or phenomena being analyzed may result from failing to control for question wording effects, which may influence a respondent's answer to a question. Invalid measures can also result from question-order effects, as earlier items may affect responses to questions later in the questionnaire. The result in either case is potentially false or misleading information. Furthermore, if the sampling frame chosen is not representative of the population being studied, the results will also be rendered invalid and, therefore, unusable.

See also *Polling, History of; Qualitative Analysis; Reliability and Validity Assessment; Survey Techniques and Design.*

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Question Time

Question time is a section of parliamentary proceedings in which government ministers respond in the parliamentary chamber to questions posed by members of their own party and opposition parties. Members of parliament (MPs) are permitted to submit questions in advance of question time and may ask supplementary questions once they have received a ministerial reply, but all questions must relate to matters for which the answering minister is responsible. The proceedings allow MPs to request information from the government, ask for further inquiries to be made on specific subjects, and call government ministers to account for actions taken by specific departments or for government policy as a whole.

The practice of question time began in the Westminster system as established in the United Kingdom, and it is most commonly found in political systems based on the Westminster model. In the British parliament, for example, each government department has a place in a fortnightly question time rotation. The prime minister has a separate question time, which takes place every Wednesday at noon for thirty minutes. Often, MPs belonging to or supporting the government will use question time to pose questions that allow the answering minister to highlight the positive aspects of government policy or attack criticism from the opposition, while opposition MPs may ask questions designed to critique ministerial actions or government policy within the minister's portfolio.

See also *Parliamentary Government; Prime Minister (Head of Government); Westminster Model.*

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Quotas

The term quota implies allocation, allotment, apportionment, share, or distribution in cases of school admission, jobs, or seats in legislative bodies. Quotas are attained through legal or constitutional devices on the basis of criteria other than merit and qualifications. Highly controversial, yet necessary in representative democracies, quotas give an appropriate weight to the historically exploited, marginalized, unrepresented, or underrepresented sections of society. In particular, quotas aim to empower women or subaltern groups and are based on the premise of promoting group rights versus individual rights or entitlements.

Approximately forty countries have introduced quotas for women in their legislatures. In India, 33 percent of seats are reserved for women in the *Lok Sabha* house of parliament. There is also a quota of 15 percent for the scheduled castes and 7.5 percent for the scheduled tribes. Two seats are reserved for Anglo-Indians in the Lok Sabha, in case they are not adequately represented. Quotas are therefore fixed on the basis of two cardinal principles of representation: (1) *equality of outcome* opposed to the traditional notion of *equality of opportunity,* and (2) the focus on *real equal opportunities* or de facto equality rather than the rhetoric of equality of opportunity in the presence of vast sociocultural, economic, or political barriers.

A significant challenge of the twenty-first century is rapidly expanding diversity, along with stubbornly persistent inequities in terms of status and power based upon caste, race, ethnicity, class, language, citizenship, or region. Affirmative action is promoted as serving the interest of the underprivileged or underrepresented sections of society, on the one hand, and providing legitimacy and justification to them in a democratic polity, on the other. Examples of affirmative action, positive discrimination, reverse discrimination, reservation, or quotas in any nondemocratic system are rare—whether in the past or present.

Reservations or quotas are methods for promoting affirmative action. Different from a reservation or quota, affirmative action remains open-ended and without any fixed number. However, all such devices aim to serve as a corrective to the past sociocultural, governmental, or individual bias against certain individuals, groups, women, or minorities based upon caste, class, creed, or ethnicity. Such disadvantaged groups have often been subjected to unfair, derogatory, or discriminatory treatment for no faults of their own.

PROS AND CONS OF QUOTAS

Some equate the concept of quotas to a social contract between the so-called winners and losers. Quotas may also be considered an outcome of the psychological mechanism toward reciprocal altruism among nonkin. Under this mechanism, people are encouraged to extend certain benefits and services to nonkin with the understanding that the benefactors reciprocate those benefits at some time in future—targeting those groups disadvantaged on the basis of sociocultural status, ethnicity, economics, education, geography, or gender.

The quota has always generated polarizing debate in democracies. Those who defend it argue that it is natural to find some ways and means to provide social justice and economic opportunities to all those who were deprived of the same. The nonbeneficiaries vehemently oppose it in the name of quality and meritocracy. Often referred to as *reverse discrimination,* opponents of the quota find it unfair and undemocratic.

The underlying goals of quotas include the following: compensation to the victims of past discrimination and maltreatment, redistribution of resources and opportunities from the privileged sections of society to those worse off, motivation of people from lower socioeconomic and disadvantaged classes to aspire for better positions in society, better appraisal of students in terms of potentiality and productivity, better access to social capital in terms of useful contacts and networks, and fostering a more legitimate and vital democratic order.

Quotas are a complex issue and need careful treatment, in part because they are a zero-sum game—improvement in the well-being of one group comes only at the cost of another group. Fortunately or unfortunately, the losers never take a backseat but instead actively protest at the earliest opportunity. Paradoxically, quotas can harm the interests of those very people they intend to protect by branding them as inferior or incompetent or both. Quotas may even lead to further polarization or stigmatization, despite the best intentions to the contrary.

The proponents of quotas for women contend that they are the most effective way to provide a better gender balance, circumventing conservative party leadership, offering role models for other women, engaging political parties in finding suitable women candidates, and removing some of the structural barriers that prevent women from being elected. Quotas, proponents argue, put women on the fast track and aim to empower them from above without having a massive following, capacity, or support at the base. However, incremental change in the increase of the number of women from one election to another is seen as a better mechanism of adaptation and assimilation. Since the causes behind adopting quotas as a political policy vary from country to country, their consequences are also likely to vary.

Much depends on how the very concept of representation is interpreted. It may mean representing the total society or it may mean serving the interests of one's electorate. There should be resemblance between the representative body and the citizens at large. According to Melancton Smith, as cited by Herbert Storing in *What the Anti-Federalists Were for: The Political Thought of the Opponents of the Constitution,* "A full and equal representation is that which possesses the same interests, feelings, opinions, and views the people themselves would have were they all assembled." This view legitimates the debate about quotas and reverse discrimination in education, employment, and legislatures. The day when quotas will be no longer necessary may be far away, for as long as inequities prevail, quotas will also remain in some form or other.

See also *Equality and Inequality; Gender and Politics; Gender Quotas; Minority Representation; U.S. Politics and Society: Women, Political Participation of; Women's Representation.*

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Race and Gender

Princeton scholar Cornel West and an American public that in 2008 elected its first African American president know that *race matters.* Although the debate remains regarding the use of the terms *race* and *ethnicity* as constructs to describe differences between and among individuals, it cannot be denied that the outward manifestation of such differences has had an impact on the political and economic treatment of individuals in American society and in other societies in general.

The same holds for gender. Indeed, with the growing consciousness regarding the more than 50 percent of the population participating in the economic and political life of various societies, women need to be treated equitably. Thus, *gender also matters.*

Most Americans believe that in the United States race is no longer a factor because people generally receive what they deserve based on their talents and efforts. However, some consider this a "sincere fiction" because minorities still lag behind in every relevant social indicator, are poorer, earn less, and possess significantly less wealth than whites.

DISCRIMINATION

The focus on race and gender stems from the historical fact that women and minorities have tended to be treated differently and inequitably by the majority white male population in the United States. When the difference in treatment results in unfairness purely from the belief that the minority is inferior due to skin color, then discrimination takes place. When the difference in treatment results in unfairness purely from the belief that the minority is inferior due to gender, then discrimination takes place. Discrimination may be overt (explicit, outwardly expressed) or covert (hidden, implicit). Regardless, society has labeled these actions and feelings as *racism* and *sexism,* respectively.

Racist and sexist actions have impacts on individuals' lives. Skin color stratification or colorism (discrimination based on skin color or tone that implies that discrimination can take place within as well as among racial groups) as well as gender discrimination have tended to determine a person's educational attainment, occupational status, and income.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Movements to overcome racism and sexism have run parallel to each other nationally and internationally. When it comes to the treatment of minorities in the United States, we are reminded often of the legacy of colonialism, the racial oppression during the time of slavery, the legalized discrimination under the Jim Crow era, and the de facto segregation of the civil rights era. The focus of attention on minorities impacted by such discrimination has had a tendency to change—from Native Americans to African Americans to Asian Americans, and now to Arab Americans. But the discrimination against any minority remains nonetheless, regardless of who was the focus of attention.

Women's movements ran along the same lines as the anti-slavery and civil rights movements. They began in Seneca Falls with the Declaration of Sentiments in 1848, when women wanted to gain equal rights in education and work. Women wanted to obtain political equality with the right to vote as well. However, they subsumed that goal in order to help with the abolitionist movement. It would not be until the 1920 ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that American women would earn the right to vote. Even then the exercise of that right would not guarantee equal treatment for women. The feminist movement or the women's liberation movement of the 1960s and 1970s would come at the tail end of the civil rights movement and would try to awaken women to the various areas in their lives where inequity still prevailed—in education, in wages, and in politics. Policies such as affirmative action would not only keep minorities but also women in mind in their implementation goals for equality.

Not until the 1980 elections would the voter turnout gap go in favor of women exercising that right to vote in larger numbers than men. Not until the 1992 elections would women gain numbers in the U.S. House and Senate as well as in offices in the state and local levels. And it would not be until that time that women would obtain greater acceptance and admission into law schools and medical schools. And now, this second decade of the twenty-first century, women still earn only seventy-seven cents to every dollar earned by men.

Despite advancements in better treatment for women and minorities, a backlash would occur starting in the 1980s and continue into the twenty-first century. There are fears that minorities would become the majority in states such as California, Florida, and Texas. And there are fears that women are taking over academic institutions with their increasing numbers in colleges, law schools, and medical schools. Some states and universities have even changed their policies to bar or discourage Asian Americans and women from their programs because there are "too many of them."

IMPLICATIONS

Race and gender are two outward characteristics of an individual that have been the focus of attention of many studies. Knowledge about the racial and gender composition of a society has many implications for determining trends in ideological leaning, political party affiliation, and voting behavior. In the United States the majority white population has a greater tendency to be conservative and to be affiliated with the Republican Party—and, until recently, a greater tendency to vote. Minorities have a greater tendency to be liberal and to be affiliated with the Democratic Party (except for Asian Americans), and have a lower tendency to vote. These trends reinforce the notion that there are intraracial and interracial differences when it comes to making such generalizations. Women, like minorities, have a greater tendency to be liberal and associated with the Democratic Party—and, quite recently, have turned out to vote in larger numbers than men.

When it comes to gender, the general tendency is to lump all women together and treat them as a single entity. It has been shown in the later part of the twentieth century that women of color need to be treated separately and differently if they are to progress. Minority women get the brunt of the burden of race and gender, a "double whammy."

Throughout the world, women and minorities face obstacles for their participation in politics. These barriers exist in prevailing social and economic systems, as well as in existing political structures. In 2007 the rate of female representation at the national level stood at merely 18 percent globally. Although this figure has increased over the years, at the end of the old century and early in the new one, minimal progress has been made, meaning that parity between men and women in national legislatures still remains a distant ideal. Because general women's participation is currently studied most often, it is easier to find data on this aspect than on minority participation and minority women participation.

See also *Critical Race Theory; Feminism, Postcolonial; Identity, Politics of; Intersectionality; Race and Racism; Sexism; U.S. Politics and Society: Minority Interest Groups; Womanism.*

. . . .   CECILIA G. MANRIQUE

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Race and Racism

Race and *racism* are terms with considerable political importance, yet they are more difficult to define than may appear at first blush. Over the past few centuries, the meaning—and manifestation—of both terms has undergone a gradual transformation. Race, initially seen as group-based differences rooted in biology, is now seen by most scholars as a social construction. Some even suggest that it will be impossible to sustain the concept of race much longer. Racism has undergone a similar change, transitioning from overt acts of race-based discrimination to more subtle forms of racial exclusion. For example, political scientists have expanded the definition of racism to include institutionally-based forms of discrimination in which the policies and practices of institutions, rather than the actions of specific individuals, function to maintain—or even exacerbate—racial inequalities. This has led to an era of what some refer to as color-blind racism or racism without racists. In essence, scholars from this tradition argue that racism can now operate on autopilot (i.e., without the active or willful intervention of individuals).

RACE

The meaning of *race* has a storied and politically charged history. At the most basic level, race has traditionally been defined as group-based differences that are rooted in biology, often manifested by skin color (e.g., blacks, whites). This definition of race is to be contrasted with ethnicity, a term used to distinguish between people who come from different cultural backgrounds. That is, race is used to group people together who share a set of physical characteristics, while ethnicity is used to group people together who share a set of cultural practices such as language, religion, and history, to name a few. Oftentimes, however, race and ethnicity co-occur, thereby contributing to the confusion over the distinction made between the two. Nevertheless, because the traditional definition of race focuses on physical characteristics, most historical treatments of the term argue that race is an essential category whose meaning is inherent and unchangeable.

Though some political scientists and philosophers argue that race has manifested itself in one shape or another since the beginning of Western thought, most scholars now agree that the traditional conception of race became a dominant political force among western Europeans during the Enlightenment (i.e., in the eighteenth century). Prior to this, religion was seen as the most salient and politically meaningful social cleavage.

By the Enlightenment, however, an essentialist view of race had gained prominence. Specifically, theorists began proposing that there were distinct biological differences between people of different races. In practice, this ideology was used to separate people of western European ancestry from people of nonwestern European—especially African—ancestry.

The biological view of race was championed by many of the prominent social contract theorists of the Enlightenment. This list included, perhaps most notably, Immanuel Kant. In an essay written in 1775 titled *Of the Different Human Races,* Kant argued that race was an immutable characteristic that played an important role in determining intelligence. The view of race as a biologically determined entity quickly became the dominant mode of thought during this period and was used to justify the emerging slave trade. It also eventually provided the underlying ideology behind the notorious *one-drop rule* in the United States (i.e., that anyone with even a trace of African ancestry was considered to be a *Negro*). Similar essentialist views of race were used to justify discrimination against Irish immigrants during the mid-nineteenth century, as well as Italian and eastern European immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century. Moreover, the biological view of race became an important component of social Darwinism, as many late nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars argued for a laissez-faire approach to social welfare based on the assumed unchangeable causes of inequality (e.g., the supposedly inherent racial differences in ability). In essence, social Darwinists argued that because differences in inequality were based on race (i.e., biology), government or other interventions would be futile.

The view of race as an essential (i.e., biologically-based) distinction has maintained its prominence in popular parlance. In fact, the *Oxford English Dictionary* defines race as "each of the major divisions of humankind, having *distinct physical* characteristics" (emphasis added). Other modern-day examples of the essentialist view of race include Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray's controversial book, *The Bell Curve* (1994). In this book, the authors claim that racial differences in intelligence may be partly due to biology. Though the authors' claims were met with harsh criticism, the concept of race itself continues to be seen by many as an essential—and therefore immutable—social category.

Political science and other academic fields have steadily moved away from an essentialist view of race. Specifically, scholars within the social constructionist tradition argue that race is best conceptualized as the product of social forces rather than inherent biological differences. That is, racial distinctions are believed to be based on an arbitrary set of physical characteristics that, under different social and historical conditions, would manifest themselves in a different set of physical characteristics. In the United States during the 1800s, Irish and Italian immigrants were thought of as being racially distinct from western Europeans. Over time, however, Irish and Italian immigrants began to be incorporated into popular conceptions of whiteness. This suggests that racial boundaries are more fluid than implied by the essentialist view of race.

More direct attacks against the essentialist view of race have come from an unlikely source: namely, the biological sciences. Specifically, recent advances in genetic testing have allowed geneticists to study the human genome in detail. Contrary to what the essentialist view of race would predict, there do not appear to be specific genetic markers that are *unique* to one race. That is, scientists have yet to find a "racial gene" that exists in one race, but not another. As such, it is difficult to sustain the argument that race is determined by biology. This adds considerable weight to the social constructionists' view that the concept of race has no objective biological foundation. Rather, social and historical forces appear to shape the meaning and interpretation of race.

Social constructionists argue that race is created through various racial projects in which the signifiers of race (e.g., skin color) are shaped by the given historical context. Specifically, various sets of physical characteristics are identified and used to differentiate between the "racial" groups in different societies. Over time, these signifiers become entrenched in the ideology of the ruling class and emerge as common sense. That is, race eventually becomes a concept that is taken for granted and seen as intuitive by each society. In essence, social constructionists argue that the physical characteristics used to signify race are not intrinsically linked to the social meaning that becomes attached to them.

There are also alternative views regarding the importance of race within the social constructionist tradition. In particular, some Marxist scholars suggest that, while race is a social construction, it is merely an ideological tool used to further the interests of the ruling class. Specifically, they argue that race has been used to prevent the working class from forming a unified opposition to capitalism. That is, by invoking racial distinctions, members of the ruling class have been able to "divide and conquer" the working class. Theorists within this tradition point to, among other things, the failed efforts of the Communist Party (USA) during the 1920s to unify the working class across race lines. These theorists argue that the privileges conferred upon whiteness provided working-class whites with an incentive to maintain divisions between themselves and working-class African Americans. Despite past failures to unify the working class, many Marxist scholars maintain that racial inequalities will disappear once society reaches a resolution to the question of class differences.

Another alternative to the essentialist view of race posits that *race,* as a term, has lost meaning. That is, given the confluence of factors that often co-occur with race (e.g., ethnicity, social class, religion), some suggest that it would be best to abandon the term and focus on more meaningful social distinctions. Proponents of this view often point to social class and ethnicity as possible alternatives. Others argue that, to move beyond the political baggage associated with race, society must abandon all references to it. Adherents to this perspective claim that society will be able to transition to a postracial society in which racial boundaries disappear only after it abandons the idea of race. This view, however, has been critiqued by some as utopian. That is, critics of this view suggest that society must

first recognize race in order to overcome the historical legacy that has befallen those who are placed in the category of the *racial other*. The intensity of the debate over the importance of race as a social category suggests that race will continue to be a salient and politically meaningful concept well into the twenty-first century.

RACISM

As was the case for race, the definition of *racism* is contested by scholars. While most agree that it has three common elements that can be thought of as necessary conditions, there is disagreement over what beyond these elements is sufficient to qualify as racism. One necessary element is categorically negative feelings toward members of a particular race—feelings of antagonism or prejudice on the basis of race, or the fear of racially different peoples (i.e., xenophobia). A second necessary element is, as a popular online dictionary puts it, the belief "that members of one race are intrinsically superior to members of other races." A third necessary element focuses on the unequal treatment of individuals because of their race, including the practice of racial discrimination, segregation, abusive behavior, or persecution.

Others suggest, however, that to demonstrate racism, one must go beyond prejudice and discrimination. Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton's oft-cited distinction between *individual racism* (individual whites acting against individual blacks) and *institutional racism* (acts by the total white community against the black community) leads them to a purpose-driven definition of *racism*: "the predication of decisions and policies on considerations of race for the purpose of *subordinating* a racial group and maintaining control over that group" (1967). In Phyllis Katz and Dalmas Taylor's (1988) more modest terms, racism represents the cumulative effects of individuals, institutions, and cultures that result in the oppression of ethnic minorities. Andrew Hacker (1992) similarly focuses on effects rather than intent when describing institutional racism in terms of the consequences of biased white institutions that discriminate—sometimes subtly and sometimes blatantly—based on the belief that the *racialized other* is inherently inferior.

This dispersion of definitions of *racism* has led some to believe that the term is overused and perhaps therefore no longer useful. Others argue for limiting its use to the most extreme cases and allowing broader terms like prejudice, discrimination, and xenophobia to cover the more standard occurrences of intergroup conflict. Accordingly, the historian George Frederickson (2002) limits his definition of racism to a particularly extreme set of cases. According to him, racism is much less common than simple prejudice or xenophobia, which are nearly ubiquitous in human societies. To qualify as racism, three additional elements are required. First, racism is based on the belief that the stigmatized group possesses innate and unchangeable characteristics. Second, the goal of racism is to establish a permanent group-based hierarchy. Finally, racism entails an ideology that justifies practices that are used to maintain the racial order.

In Frederickson's view, the earliest anticipation of modern racism was the treatment of Jewish converts to Christianity in late medieval Spain. Enmity toward the newly converted targeted their unchangeable Jewish bloodlines rather than their changeable religious beliefs. Similarly, nineteenth African American slaves were thought to have been victims of "the curse of Ham," which forever poisoned their blood and doomed them to inferiority, even if they converted to Christianity. To German Nazis, Jews also had poisoned blood, which they believed threatened the Aryan race with sexual pollution and impurity.

Important disciplinary differences exist in the definition of racism. Historians and sociologists tend to prefer that racism be defined as having characteristics that extend beyond simple xenophobia. Social psychologists, however, tend to use the term interchangeably with *prejudice*. For example, John Dovidio and Samuel Gaertner's oft-cited collection of the major different versions of racism identified by social psychologists cites nine versions of racism in its index, eight of which refer to individual prejudice in the sense used above (1986).

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF RACISM

The usual sociopsychological approach to racism begins with the cognitive act of categorizing individuals into groups. At the most basic level, the sociologist William Graham Sumner (1906) suggested that people naturally perceive groups as *ingroups* to which the perceiver belongs and *outgroups* composed of individuals categorized differently than the perceiver.

This distinction is alluring but perhaps too simplistic. Any individual belongs to multiple ingroups, whether based on family, nation, race, religion, neighborhood, or a host of other dimensions. Likewise, there are many groups to which any individual does not belong. As social identity theory suggests, research demonstrates that perceptions of ingroups and outgroups are heavily influenced by momentary social contexts. In the context of a war, one's own national identity is salient, as is the national identity of the enemy; this is generally not the case in the context of a trip to the supermarket. Second, there is no simple relationship between evaluations of ingroups and outgroups. Sometimes ingroups are evaluated positively, and the corresponding outgroup, negatively. But sometimes people of all groups, members and nonmembers alike, evaluate a low status group negatively and a high status group positively. And third, all definitions of racism assume that it centers on *race,* which historically has focused on skin color. But race often is confounded with other dimensions of difference between people, such as social class, occupation, ethnicity, religion, and nationality. In Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice,* Shylock was not only a Jew but a loan shark. Race is rarely a clean concept.

Racism requires more than categorization and negative affect toward groups that are perceived as different. It requires a belief system or ideology. The *scientific racialism* that emerged during the nineteenth century is a premier example of such a belief system. This belief postulated a finite number of biologically distinctive races in human societies, of which the

European races, especially northern Europeans, were blessed with the most superior attributes. In the United States, scientific racialism had at least three significant practical consequences. First, it provided an ideological foundation for the postslavery Jim Crow system that emerged after the Civil War (1861–1865). Second, it led to the eugenics movement that urged limiting the reproduction of "inferior" races. Third, it was used in the United States during the 1920s to justify preferential quotas that favored immigration from nations with supposedly superior racial stocks.

CHANGING FORMS OF RACISM

The latter half of the twentieth century led to major changes in human societies' treatment of race, triggered by the extreme anti-Semitism of Nazi Germany. In the United States, old-fashioned or Jim Crow racism was common among whites before World War II (1939–1945). Its core beliefs concerned blacks' alleged inherent intellectual inferiority and was used to support formal racial discrimination and segregation. After World War II, support for such views diminished sharply and, by the end of the century, was almost gone. Support declined earliest among the college-educated and younger whites, findings usually interpreted as reflecting their greater enlightenment. Support eroded more slowly among whites living in the South, presumably because of its long cultural history of formally subordinating African Americans.

Numerous scholars have argued that other forms of racism have since taken the place of Jim Crow racism. Several of these new forms of racism are specific to the political domain: symbolic racism, modern racism, and racial resentment. In Europe, a parallel distinction has been made between blatant prejudice and subtle prejudice. Other forms of racism have been applied to interpersonal relationships, such as aversive racism or ambivalent racism. All these newer forms of racism share the view that whites accept the general principles of racial equality, but continue to harbor negative feelings toward blacks. Both the old and new forms of racism have generally been measured with surveys or other questionnaires, using items such as how much discrimination against blacks the individual believes continues to exist, how strong blacks' work ethics are, and so on. Some controversy exists about how distinctive the *new racism* is from the old racism, however, with some scholars claiming they share common elements (e.g., the stereotype that blacks have a weak work ethic).

The new racism has been described as having a wide variety of effects. In politics, it contributes to opposition to black candidates and to support for white candidates who are thought to be racially biased. It also contributes to opposition to racially targeted liberal policies, such as government-enforced school integration or affirmative action. It also contributes to a wide variety of other conservative attitudes on dimensions that have no manifest link to race, such as party identification or political ideology, or policy preferences concerning welfare, crime, or tax policies. In the interpersonal realm, it contributes to avoidance of minorities when avoidance can be attributed to nonracial factors.

Four contemporary alternatives to the idea of the new racisms should be noted. One is an implicit form of prejudice that is largely automatic, unconscious, and uncontrollable. This has been measured with a variety of indirect techniques that do not involve questionnaires, and so is arguably less prone to social desirability biases. Implicit prejudice may emerge in more unguarded forms of behavior, such as eye contact or nonverbal behavior, whereas the new racisms may be most influential in deliberate behaviors, such as choice of a presidential candidate.

A second alternative challenges the specificity of the new racisms to a single stigmatized racial group such as African Americans. Instead, they may emerge from generalized ethnocentrism involving both antagonism toward a variety of lower-status minority groups and excessive valuation of one's own high-status racial ingroup.

A third alternative challenges the notion of the new racisms on the grounds that they really reflect political conservatism rather than racial antagonism. This point of view has been generally discredited by evidence that the new racisms and their effects, though correlated with ideological conservatism, are only explained by it to a modest degree. There also is evidence that ideological divisions in the United States have themselves increasingly reflected racial attitudes, rather than vice versa.

A final challenge comes from those who believe that the new racisms are a product of dominant racial groups' sense of threat from subordinate groups and their efforts to protect the existing racial hierarchy. Social dominance theory, sense of group position theory, and color-blind racism theory all posit fixed racial hierarchies of power, status, and resources; dominant groups' efforts to protect their privileged positions; and the construction of ideologies that legitimate the hierarchy and deflect attention from its essentially racial nature. For example, the Protestant work ethic asserts that beneficial outcomes should, and do, come primarily to those who work hard and persevere. Because stigmatized racial groups often are alleged to have weak work ethics, their lesser accomplishments are blamed often on their own lack of effort rather than on their race. These theories are also often skeptical of the lower levels of racism expressed by the better educated, as their more tolerant views may merely reflect their superior knowledge of conventional social norms against blatantly racist expressions. Regardless of one's position in this debate, most scholars confer that racism will continue to have a substantial influence on politics in the years to come.

See also *Affirmative Action; Discrimination; Racial Discrimination.*

. . . . DANNY OSBORNE AND DAVID O. SEARS

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Racial Discrimination

Racism is a set of beliefs or behavior regarding the inferiority a particular group of people based on their race, color, ethnicity, or ancestry. Prejudice refers to unfavorable feelings and attitudes toward a particular group based on race, color, or ethnicity. Racial discrimination may or may not stem from prejudiced attitudes because unprejudiced individuals may engage in discriminatory behavior for other motives, such as social pressure, conformity, or economic profit.

From a legal standpoint, there are two types of discrimination: *de jure* (as a matter of law) and *de facto* (as a matter of conduct or practice, not founded on law). De jure discrimination is directly intended and approved by law. Examples of de jure discrimination include the so-called Jim Crow laws that mandated the strict separation of the races in the South, and the *Plessey v. Ferguson* judicial decision that authorized "separate but equal" treatment for blacks and whites. In contrast, de facto discrimination lacks governmental sanction; instead, it originates from the habits, customs, or traditions of a society. De facto racism is caused by social, psychological, or economic conditions. Segregated residential patterns, segregated school districts, and education and wage gaps are illustrations of de facto discrimination. Although these forms of racial discrimination come from vastly different sources, the systematic economic, political, and social disadvantages they generate are similar in nature and severity.

Racial discrimination can be categorized into distinct subtypes: individual discrimination, institutional discrimination, side-effect discrimination, and environmental racism. Individual discrimination occurs when purposeful action on the part of one or a few individuals harms or restricts a member of a subordinate group in some way within a relatively isolated context. Institutional discrimination, on the other hand, occurs when an apparently neutral requirement or standard excludes a great portion of a particular racial group because they cannot comply with the rule or meet the standard. Institutional discrimination is so deeply ingrained in the customs, laws, and cultures of an institution or a sector of society that it generally goes unnoticed. Institutional discrimination is often unintentional. Organizations staffed by unprejudiced individuals can produce racially disparate outcomes if staff members comply with biased operating procedures. Therefore, once racist policies are institutionalized, simple conformity to the organizational standards places certain racial groups at a perpetual disadvantage, regardless of the prejudiced attitudes of individual actors. For example, university admission standards that favor students with high college placement scores disproportionately exclude black applicants who are more likely to attend poorer quality secondary schools.

Side effect discrimination, another form of institutional discrimination, occurs when intentional discrimination in one social system results in unintentional discrimination in another, related system. For example, the common practice of real estate agents *steering* black and Hispanic clients to racially segregated neighborhoods eventually leads to segregation in schools and the workplace. Finally, environmental racism refers to the fact that people of color disproportionately bear the effects of human-induced environmental degradation primarily due to governmental and corporate decisions to dump urban and environmental waste in areas where they reside. Environmental racism is exacerbated by the fact that people of color are least likely and least equipped to resist these efforts. In addition, housing discrimination and economic inequality leave people of color with fewer housing options, which forces them to settle in areas located near toxic waste sites.

Also, race-based differential enforcement of environmental protection rules and regulations are another important component of environmental racism.

Racist processes are very difficult to uncover and document. Therefore, observers are left to infer the presence of racial discrimination when racial disparities are evident. For example, blacks and Hispanics are far more likely to live in poverty than whites. According to the U. S. Census Bureau, the 2007 U.S. poverty rates for blacks (24.9 percent) and Hispanics (21.8 percent) are nearly three times the poverty rate of whites (8.3 percent). Unemployment rates average 4.0 percent for whites, 5.2 percent for Hispanic Americans, and 9.0 percent for blacks (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Statistics, 2007). In addition, there are significant earnings differentials among the races. In 2003, whites earned an average of $46,911 annually, compared to $31,671 for blacks and $35,495 for Hispanics (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005). Although the large gap in life expectancy between blacks and whites has narrowed in recent years, there is still a five-and-a-half-year difference in expected life span between the two groups. In 2001, the overall mortality rate for blacks was 31 percent higher than for whites. Further, blacks are more likely to die of strokes, heart disease, cancer, and HIV than their white peers (National Center for Health Statistics, 2004). Because it is unlikely that these economic and health differences are caused by individual factors, they are generally attributed to direct or indirect racial discrimination.

See also *Discrimination; Jim Crow; Race and Racism.*

. . . . GARDENIA HARRIS

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Radical Feminism

See *Feminism, Radical.*

Radicalism

Radicalism refers to extreme political, social, and cultural ideologies that emphasize fundamental changes in the existing order. Historically, political radical movements have attempted to dramatically remake their contemporary societies seeking widespread reforms impacting the powers and functions of the state. Early American radicalism culminated in the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783), which led to the creation of a new government. Shortly thereafter revolutionary movements began manifesting in Europe, most popularized by the French Revolution (1789–1799). With the French Revolution, the radical ideologies and leaders ushered in liberalism by emphasizing individual rights and liberties and the end of absolute monarchies.

This form of radicalism eventually spurred democratic, abolitionist, and, later, suffragette movements in Europe and the United States. New radical movements in the mid- to late nineteenth century critiqued the economic and social inequities of the period and laid the basis for modern socialism and communism. With the end of the cold war in 1991, new ideologies emerged challenging the growing instances of globalism, in which multilateral state alliances and international cooperation expanded as countries sought to work globally rather than in isolation. Additionally, radicalism can manifest as an inward or outward social focus. For instance, from the Middle Ages to the creation of 1970s communes, some radical groups have sought to achieve their societal reform by withdrawing from the mainstream in order to implement the changes they desire within smaller communities.

See also *Anti- and Alter-globalization Movements; Feminism, Radical; Marxism; Social Movements; Utopias and Politics.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Raison d'État

Raison d'état is a French phrase, loosely translated as "reason for being," often used to describe a state's national interests or goals. Historically, the main raison d'état of any state was protecting one's survival, which theorists and political leaders asserted was best ensured by expanding the power of the state through military territorial conquests or acquisition of greater economic resources. According to some theorists, from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, state survival and security took precedence over political or foreign policy considerations. Writing in the early 1500s, Italian political scientist Niccolò Machiavelli argued that a nation's national interests superseded any moral or ethical constraints on use of aggressive action. Consequently, if state survival was at stake, a government might disregard any international norms or customs to safeguard its nation.

These ideas were exemplified in the seventeenth century when put into practice by the French politician and diplomat Cardinal de Richelieu, whose foreign policy emphasized political realism and power politics. Although a Catholic cardinal, Richelieu developed policies centralizing state powers over the church or dynastic considerations, as well as entered France into practical alliances with Protestant states in effort to preserve France during Europe's continental Thirty Years War (1618–1648). Since the rise of Palestinian terrorism in the 1970s, Israel often has come under international scrutiny by the United Nations, Arab states, and international human rights organizations for its domestic and transnational antiterrorism methods and segregation of the Palestinian population. Given Israel's military superiority to Palestinian terrorists, Israel's military raids into Gaza and the West Bank or international

targeted killings often draw international criticism if Palestinian civilians become collateral damage or international laws are breached. However, Israeli leaders continue to justify their behavior under raison d'etat, as their military use protects their national interests from a demonstrated record of Palestinian-sponsored terrorist activities in Israel.

See also *Nation-state; State, Rights of the; State, The; State, Theories of the; Statecraft.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Rand, Ayn

Ayn Rand (1905–1982) was a Russian-born American novelist and philosopher who founded the philosophic system of objectivism. She defended metaphysical realism (that reality is what it is independent of what human beings think or feel) as the only valid means of human knowledge, ethical egoism (or rational self-interest) as the only proper morality, and

Ayn Rand promoted the philosphy of objectivism and strongly opposed communism and fascism.

SOURCE: AP Images

laissez-faire capitalism as the only moral social system. Her works of fiction, including *The Fountainhead* (1943) and *Atlas Shrugged* (1957), and her works of nonfiction, including *The Virtue of Selfishness* (1964) and *Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal* (1966), inspired a generation of readers who embraced her romantic, heroic conception of human achievement and her political individualism.

Though her political thought was broadly libertarian insofar as it entailed a defense of voluntary social relations and the individual rights to life, liberty, private property, and the pursuit of happiness, Rand was notably critical of libertarian intellectuals who, she argued, disconnected their political commitment to freedom from the wider philosophical and cultural context that it required. As an advocate of limited government—albeit one that, under ideal conditions, would finance its operations through voluntary contributions—Rand also was opposed to social theorists such as the libertarian Murray Rothbard, who had embraced a version of anarchist ideology.

Rand challenged the conventional left-right political spectrum. She had emigrated from the Soviet Union to the United States in 1926 and became a fierce critic of communism. Her first novel, *We the Living* (1936), was semiautobiographical; it detailed the horrors of communist rule. But Rand was equally opposed to fascism and to all variations of statism, including the redistributive welfare state advocated by modern-day liberals. She was firmly committed to laissez-faire capitalism and free markets and opposed all government intervention in the economy. Influenced by the Austrian economics of Ludwig von Mises, Rand argued that government intervention was the root cause of business cycles, monopolies, and social crises. The emergence of a mixed economy, in Rand's view, guaranteed the rule of pressure groups, with each group vying for some special privilege at the expense of others. However, she felt government had no right to dispense privileges to any individual or groups of individuals. For Rand, government's only proper role was in the retaliatory use of force to protect individual rights through such agencies as the police, the armed forces, and the legal courts.

Though Rand's support for capitalism seemed to place her on the right wing of the political spectrum, she was adamantly opposed to modern-day conservatism. An advocate of reason, she was an atheist who criticized attempts to link the defense of capitalism to religion. Moreover, a limited government, Rand maintained, should have no power to regulate peoples' personal life choices. In stipulating that no individual or institution had a right to initiate force against others, Rand defended the right of the individual to engage in all adult consensual activities.

Championing free minds and free markets, Rand saw an inextricable connection between intellectual, political, and economic freedom.

See also *Capitalism and Democracy; Individual and Society; Individualism; Libertarianism.*

. . . . CHRIS MATTHEW SCIABARRA

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Rational Choice Theory

Politics is a particularly difficult science. The classic definitions of politics—the study of who gets what, when and where (Harold Lasswell), the authoritative allocation of values (David Easton), and the legitimate monopoly of violence (Max Weber)—raise more questions than they answer. What is being allocated? Possible answers include money and resources; policies and payoffs; rewards and punishments; material interests, social identities; global ideals; and class, status, and power. How are these things allocated? They may be distributed through institutions and regimes; mechanisms and rules; norms and values; markets, communities, contracts, and hierarchies; force and fraud; and fights, games, and debates. And what is at stake? Equity and efficiency; poverty and development; war and peace; and, more generally, the relation between individual choices and reasons of state are among the outcomes of politics.

Rational choice theory (RCT) first entered political science in the 1950s and early 1960s to address such questions. Anthony Downs's theory of elections (1957), William Riker's theory of political coalitions (1982), and Thomas Schelling's work on deterrence (1960) began modeling the institutions and processes of collective action and collective choice. RCT soon became one of the core research programs in the four fields of political science—American politics, international relations, comparative politics, and political theory. For many hard-working political scientists, it is a philosophy of social science, social theory, and research methodology—a way of thinking and working in the midst of inquiry.

RCT is so successful because it positions itself between the denigration and the glorification of reason. Partly an attempt to contain the empirical and normative relativism of the irrational, RCT seeks the reasons and causes of social phenomena. Yet RCT finds rationality highly imperfect. RCT thus works out the empirical limits of applied reason and problem solving in the concrete institutional life of politics. Moreover, like the poetry of mathematics and the art of abstract reason, RCT exerts a certain aesthetic allure. And, like the attractions of liberalism, many find RCT ethically appealing. In short, RCT's truth, beauty, and justice charm political scientists.

THEMES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

In the dark days of the twentieth century, when science, modernity, and reason resulted in a European civil war that turned into a world war that produced the Holocaust and Hiroshima, three economists and a mathematician returned to the problems of pure reason that drove Enlightenment thinkers. They developed ideas about multiperson decision-making that became the basis of RCT.

Given the first and second fundamental theorems of welfare economics, everyone recognized that there were first best problems of choosing among (Pareto) optimal points and second best problems of having the chance to choose (i.e., reaching the Pareto frontier). How do collectivities choose? *Politics* seems somehow required to supplement *economics.* Economist Kenneth Arrow addressed these basic questions of welfare economics (1963). He unearthed the problems confronting any possible social welfare function applied to resource allocation.

Others recognized the indeterminacies of strategic reasoning in collective choice situations. For example, suppose two or three people agreed on how to divide a fixed resource, and their agreement was executed. Which coalitions would form and how would the resource be divided? Mathematician John von Neumann and economist Oskar Morgenstern (1953) raised general questions in decision theory and game theory. Like Arrow, they unearthed the problems and offered possible solutions.

Still others saw that economics was developing along two separate tracks: econometrics was becoming a statistical science at the same time that theoretical economics was becoming mathematical modeling. What was the connection between the normative and the empirical? Economist Paul Samuelson (1947) showed how comparative statics provided the linkage: if a utility function is maximized and an equilibrium found, exogenous changes could shift the equilibrium. For example, if consumers optimized a utility function, equating marginal benefits and marginal costs, exogenous shifts in price influenced the quantities consumed. Comparative statics thus linked normative optima to observable quantities, allowing mathematical models in economics to fit the positivist cannons of testability and falsifiability. Now that it had an operational mode of proceeding, RCT could become a science.

These disparate concerns became a unified field of inquiry. Pulling together the strands, RCT has grown into the most developed paradigm in political science, influencing all traditional areas of political inquiry. Journals contain numerous articles applying insights from RCT to empirical questions about policy outcomes, political participation, governing institutions, and constitutional choice, as well as to normative questions of equity and efficiency, democracy and justice.

What are RCT's unifying themes? RCT assumes that citizens are rational (i.e., choose their most preferred course of action) and that they interact within an institutional environment (e.g., competitive elections). RCT then uses mathematically formalized models of reasoning to derive implications about collective choices (e.g., public policy). RCT's most basic question is, therefore, how individual preferences are aggregated into equilibrium social outcomes by a decision-making process. Given a choice mechanism, whether consumers and firms allocating resources by market exchange, players choosing

strategies in a game, or citizens voting over a policy issue, what will be the characteristics of the collective outcome? Will an equilibrium exist? If an equilibrium exists, will it be stable? Will it be desirable? Answering these questions is complicated by the fact that voters do not necessarily vote sincerely and people who want public goods do not necessarily demand them openly. People, in other words, often find it in their own best interest to dissemble and strategically reveal their preferences. When studying how decision-making procedures—whether democratic or nondemocratic, political or economic—aggregate individual preferences into social outcomes, RCT cannot assume honest preference revelation.

RCT offers two methodological approaches to studying such problems: game theory and axiomatic theory.

1. **Game Theory.** How are differences in preferences among actors reconciled into equilibrium outcomes? One wants to determine the social outcome that actually results from a set of individual preferences when the preferences are advanced strategically. RCT seeks to discover, for example, how the coordination and distribution of resources emerge given private goods (the neoclassical market) or public goods (economist Mancur Olson's topic). The basic approach in game theory is to determine how one particular collective choice process (e.g., voting or voluntarily participating in some political act), when modeled as a game in some environment (e.g., private goods, public goods), produces an outcome. Game theory thus studies cooperative and conflictual interactions among players, including threats and promises, offers and counteroffers, as well as the use of trickery: ploys and bluffs, commitments and surprises. Because institutions help locate equilibria, changes in institutions produce changes in outcomes.

2. **Axiomatic Theory.** This approach raises normative questions about how differences in preferences among actors should be reconciled by the rules of collective choice. The puzzle is to discover the best choice for society, or equivalently, to locate a collective choice mechanism that maximizes the group's social welfare function. For example, RCT seeks to determine whether one can order social choices for society transitively or to operate on any set of individual preferences and meet certain additional democratic standards. Axiomatic social choice theory thus examines the compatibility of certain ethically appealing standards for choice (i.e., equity and efficiency, liberalism, and Pareto optimality) for all possible collective choice processes. RCT then locates possibilities and impossibilities, which are, of course, affected by institutions and altered when institutions change.

Political scientists typically use game theory and axiomatic theory to understand three types of social choice problems: Collective action, collective choice, and collective institutions.

3. **Collective Action.** Using arguments from microeconomic theory about public goods and game theory about the Prisoner's Dilemma, Mancur Olson (1971) and others showed that, under certain conditions, the equilibrium outcome of voluntary contributions to the general welfare will be Pareto deficient: although everyone would be better off if all contributed, rational people almost never will voluntarily contribute, and hence groups to promote the general welfare almost never will form. People, of course, do display voluntarism and groups do form. The elaboration of the collective action problem therefore involves locating institutional (e.g., political entrepreneurs) and motivational (e.g., altruism) factors that overcome Olson's problem.

4. **Collective Choice.** A second application of social choice theory in political science is the study of how voting procedures produce policy outcomes. Majority voting procedures over three or more alternatives can lack an equilibrium outcome. Majorities may prefer A to B, B to C, and yet C to A, producing a cycle among the three outcomes. The voters' paradox leads to two political consequences. The first is that whoever controls the agenda can determine the outcome and lead the majority decision to any alternative. The second is that voters can affect the outcome by reporting false preferences. The political battle is thus between monopoly agenda setters and strategic voters.

5. **Collective Institutions.** People also choose the formal and informal laws by which they live. Constitutions are written that then dictate voting and taxation regulations. Rules of procedure in legislatures are written that then determine committee systems and the power, for example, of the U.S. Speaker of the House. Moreover, norms guiding contributions to public goods are ultimately established. How can we explain why one set of rules is adopted and another rejected?

The theorems (results) of these inquiries have been puzzles and paradoxes. Three theorems are especially important. Arrow's theorem demonstrates an incompatibility among several ethically appealing desiderata for preference aggregation. Gibbard-Satterwaite's theorem demonstrates that a large class of methods of preference aggregation are subject to strategic preference revelation. And McKelvey's theorem demonstrates that the results of majority rule voting can be wholly cyclic over all possible outcomes. It has been proven formally, in other words, that the same set of individual preferences can be aggregated differently by different collective choice rules, and differently even by the same rule.

Social choice theory, therefore, has revealed a fundamental indeterminacy in how social interactions produce social outcomes. As a result of these discoveries, political scientists have concluded that social outcomes are generally anything but stable and intended equilibrium outcomes of individual choices. The social consequences of individual choices are often unwanted by all. At one point, a general nihilism about taking individual preferences into account in making social decisions took hold; preference revelation and aggregation involve so many potential manipulations and incompatibilities that incoherence and disequilibrium in social outcomes are to be expected. Since then, political scientists have come to recognize that humans acting in society rely on institutions to structure preferences and produce equilibrium outcomes. RCT thus investigates how differences or changes in institutions yield differences or changes in outcomes. However, as indicated above, institutions

themselves are products of social choice, which raises key questions about the origins of institutions.

RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY METHODOLOGY

Although RCT subsumes many interrelated ideas and techniques, it always combines assumptions about individually rational actors with mathematically formalized modes of reasoning to reach conclusions about collective outcomes. RCT thus has a certain way of proceeding, a typical set of practices.

A classic example is the public goods problem. The conditions of individual choice involve self-interest coupled with nonexcludable and nonrival goods. A voluntary exchange institution exists. Mechanisms investigated involve free riding or not wanting to be a sucker. The outcome is noncontribution or reduced contribution. Hence, inefficiency, a suboptimal supply of the public good, and inequity, or exploitation of contributors by noncontributors, results. Unintended and unwanted outputs lead entrepreneurs to propose new institutional arrangements to fix the problem. For example, taxation schemes can facilitate the provision of public goods.

In general, the ideal or quintessential RCT is developed, beginning with a characteristic *problem situation,* as follows:

1. RCT is concerned with complex macrolevel phenomena. Outcomes, collective preferences (such as government policies), or collective actions (such as group actions) animate inquiry.

2. Collective preferences and collective actions are especially worth studying when they are inefficient. Outcome performance varies in space and time, but what catches the eye is wasted resources: poverty and underdevelopment, violence and war, force and fraud, anarchy and lawlessness, theft and plunder, and rent seeking and corruption. Suboptimal outcomes are the distortions and dysfunctions, flaws and failures, of collective choice. RCT addresses such breakdowns of reason.

3. RCT also addresses issues of justice, fairness, and democracy; for example, the sometimes-inequitable distributions of income and government services.

A RCT *explanation* is then constructed as follows.

4. Assume individuals' desires plus beliefs lead to actions. This is Karl Popper's logic of the situation.

5. Assume methodological individualism: macro structure = f(micro interactions). The world is populated by actors, agents, or players with interdependent strategies, beliefs, and resources whose interactions produce outcomes. The question is one of n-person preference summation and choice aggregation. Visible actions produce invisible equilibria embodying complex regularities, both stable and unstable.

6. Assume that interactions among individuals involve decentralized mechanisms and processes yielding spontaneous order and self-organizing complexity. Inefficient or inequitable outcomes thus result from the generic social dilemmas and universal political traps of coordination, cooperation, competition, and conflict. Bare-bones baseline models of the mechanisms

are developed. Rousseau's model of the state of nature, Coase's model of voluntary exchange, Waltz's model of anarchy, Rawls's veil of ignorance, Walras's model of pure exchange, and Arrow's axioms of social choice begin with highly abstract reasoning.

7. Assume that institutions aggregate choices: preferences plus institutions lead to outcomes. Additional models, therefore, must be developed that thicken rationality and thereby explain real-world institutions and outcomes. RCT thus studies markets, communities, contracts, and hierarchies; groups, organizations, teams, coalitions, and networks; norms, rules, regulations, standards of behavior, and (property) rights; and contracts, agreements, bargains, transactions, settlements, and pacts. It studies market institutions such as credit cooperatives, credit bureaus, firms, merchant guilds, and law merchants. RCT also studies nonmarket institutions, such as governments, regimes, and states; democracy, liberalism, and constitutionalism; courts, legislatures, and executives; representation, elections, and voting rules; autocracies, dictatorships, and bureaucracies; and organizations in the international system. In other words, RCT operates at the center of political science.

8. Assume that the institutions themselves are macroequilibrium outcomes of an underlying game of strategy. Because different institutions correspond with different endogenous equilibria, actors try to shape the institutions. Stable or self-enforcing institutions therefore must be endogenous to desires, beliefs, and actions.

9. Given these assumptions—equilibrium rules and institutions that set in motion decentralized mechanisms of choice—the result is outcomes that exhibit fatal problems of aggregation. Intentional action often produces results that are unintended and unwanted, unpredicted and unexpected, and unstable and incoherent. The many paradoxes and antinomies, tragedies and ironies, of choice are the main results of RCT: market failures, bargaining failures, and intertemporal resource allocation failures; and principal-agent problems, commitment problems, and asymmetric information problems. RCT also uncovers the problems of chaos: butterfly effects, the power of initial conditions, and the significance of complexity; the problems of equilibria: multiple equilibria and disequilibria; the problems of path dependence: rigidity, deadlock, and stalemate; and the problems of feedback: complementarities, adaptability, and integration.

Evidence and testing is conducted as follows:

10. RCT compares institutions. The grand problem of the social sciences, from the RCT point of view, is how humanly constructed institutions matter. RCT thus compares the costs and benefits of organizing cooperation (e.g., minimizing post-contract opportunism, restraining self-interest) under different structural arrangements.

11. RCT employs comparative statics exercises to examine causality. It explains observed behavior, the emergence of cooperative, and noncooperative equilibria by finding the conditions of nature and of the underlying rules of the game that make institutions produce particular outcomes.

Finally, new *problem situations* are generated.

12.   The rules of the game are neither constant nor unalterable. Institutions, after all, are the results of choice. Some are created to solve coordination and cooperation problems: efficiency-enhancing institutions are designed to implement collective optimization and mechanisms designed to achieve incentive compatibility. Optimal voting rules, social welfare functions, compensation criteria, and constitutional contracts are in this tradition. For example, RCT might discover that purely instrumental reason, strategic rationality, and unconstrained rational egoism cannot successfully coordinate social and political relations. Taking the perspective of the benevolent planner or political engineer aiming to repair the world, RCT asks the evaluative question: What is to be done? How can actors achieve mutual advantage, joint gains, the public good, successful coordination, and productive exchange? Yet institutions are created also to enhance inequities. The power to construct institutions is the power to forge opportunities and constraints for the players. The possibility of using RCT to enhance the power of some rather than others always exists.

13.   As problems are modeled in a sustained way, RCT learns about political life. It discovers, in particular, the limits of institutional revolution and reform. Uncovering the transition costs of moving along equilibrium paths and the problems of jumping between punctuated equilibria, RCT espouses pragmatism. One recalls Weber: the balance of the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility. One also recalls Hillel: ours is not to complete the task, but we are not to desist from it either.

RCT thus realizes that it is the human-made institutions that embody the most interesting and important paradoxes and puzzles. Institutions fashioned by men and women create problems of myopia, risk aversion, self-interest, materialism, dishonesty, preference falsification, fraud, cheating, promise breaking, credible commitments, uncertainty, lack of information, and transaction/decision costs. For the most part, RCT in political science thus studies how particular institutions produce market failures and political failures: public goods problems, prisoner's dilemma problems, bargaining problems, incentive incompatibilities, and organizational failures. RCT now realizes that institutions often are created to reduce the transaction costs of cooperation, contracts, exchange, and bargains. As the field turns from the operation of institutions to their origins, stabilization, and transformation, the dynamics of real-world institutions move center stage.

See also *Equilibrium and Chaos; Game Theory; Political Theory; Prisoner's Dilemma; Social Choice Theory.*

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Rawls, John

John Rawls (1921–2002) was a major American political philosopher of the twentieth century. His widely read book, *A Theory of Justice,* released in 1971, revived an age-old question: what makes a democratic society just? At a time when empirical research and language analysis dominated Anglo-American political philosophy, Rawls' approach to political inquiry was unabashedly normative or value centered.

Rawls was born on February 21, 1921, in Baltimore, Maryland. He attended Princeton University, where he studied under Norman Malcolm, a former student of influential Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. In 1943 Rawls completed his undergraduate degree in philosophy and enlisted in the U.S. army.

Rawls returned to Princeton in early 1946 on the GI Bill and completed his PhD in philosophy four years later. After serving as a philosophy instructor at Princeton for a year, he received a Fulbright fellowship in 1952 to study at Oxford University. This gave him an opportunity to attend H. L. A. Hart's lectures on legal philosophy and also to participate in a seminar led by Russian-British philosopher Isaiah Berlin and British philosopher Stuart Hampshire. It was then that Rawls' interests turned to the question of how normative principles, such as justice and equality, might be better realized through a carefully designed democratic process of deliberation. In the following years, he published several essays addressing this question, including "Justice as Fairness" in 1958, "Constitutional Liberty" in 1963, and "Distributive Justice: Some Addenda" in 1968. Rawls joined the philosophy department at Harvard in 1962 and remained there until his retirement in 1991.

While at Harvard, Rawls publically denounced the Vietnam War (1959–1975) but complained that if Americans must fight, exempting college students from the draft gave an unfair advantage to wealthy families. It was during this time that he completed the manuscript for *A Theory of Justice.* In the book, Rawls presented in detail his idea of *justice as fairness.* Drawing on the social contract tradition of English philosopher John Locke and Swiss-French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Rawls proposed a hypothetical *original position,* a Rawlsian state of nature, wherein citizens might freely enter into an agreement among themselves. However, to prevent them from favoring their own interests, they were to know nothing about how the choices they made would affect *their* particular case. This *veil of ignorance* would enable all citizens to share one another's fate.

Rawls continued to revise and expound on what his critics called a liberal utopia of pure procedural justice. Rawls was not deterred. In *Political Liberalism* (1996) he explored the relationship between religion and democratic pluralism, showing how citizens who held irreconcilable moral outlooks might still achieve an "overlapping consensus" on political principles. In *The Law of Peoples* (1999), he extended his argument to international relations, insisting that popular government is *educative* in that, by learning more about what others think and want, people also learn more about themselves.

For his scholarly contributions, Rawls was honored with an endowed position of Conant University Professor at Harvard and received a National Humanities Mental of Excellence. After suffering a series of strokes, Rawls died on November 24, 2002, at his home in Lexington, Massachusetts.

See also *Berlin, Isaiah; Locke, John; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; U.S. Political Thought.*

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Realignment, Partisan

A partisan realignment is a shift in the ideological, or partisan, preferences of voters that leads to a transfer of power in government from the majority party to the minority party for a sustained period. These realignments can occur within a single election or take several elections to manifest and often revolve around new issues or political events. The U.S. elections of 1800, 1828, 1860, 1896, and 1932 are often characterized as realigning elections, with recent debates centering on whether the elections of 1964, 1980, and 1994 fit a similar pattern. The 1896 and 1932 realignments in the Northeast were the first to be studied and reported in a seminal article written by political scientist V. O. Key in 1955 in which he identified their characteristics.

A widening of ideological cleavages, which the majority party fails to address while in power, precedes realignment. For example, the rise of the conservative coalition in U.S. politics helped bring the Republican Party into power with Reagan in 1980, and again into the House and Senate in 1994. The same shift in voter preferences wrested power away from the Republicans and placed the New Deal Democrats in the majority at the end of the Great Depression. These transfers of power occur because of building tension in the political system and the inadequacy of the majority party to deliver policies that voters desire.

Following the stock market crash in 1929, the Republicans in Congress and particularly President Herbert Hoover believed that the national economy would soon recover on its own and attributed its demise to the worldwide depression. With no relief by 1932, presidential candidate Franklin D. Roosevelt championed change with his campaign for New Deal policies that would help rescue the public from economic disaster. His policies realigned voters who wanted economic growth and led to a landslide election for Roosevelt and the Democrats in what became known as the Fifth Party or New Deal Party System.

Realignments often have occurred according to a thirty-six-year cycle, leading some to believe that a realignment happened in 1964. Others disagree that such a cycle exists in U.S. electoral politics and contend that the 1964 election shifted party positions only along the issue of race and civil rights and did not lead to a critical realignment. Those who believe that partisan realignments occur in a cyclical pattern argue that there is a weakening of partisan identification before the realigning election. After the realignment, new partisan identifications solidify and are based on new differences on issues. The weakening of partisan identification often is attributed to younger voters who are not as affiliated with the party in power.

Often, before a partisan realignment, a third party emerges that raises concerns about significant issues that the two previous parties did not address. The Populist Party emerged in

1892 to represent the interests of farmers, and in 1924 the Progressive Party introduced issues such as economic progressivism, welfare, and worker's rights. The dominant parties during both eras subsequently consumed the newly created parties' positions. Newly emerging parties can often become large enough to constitute major parties while other parties dissolve.

Partisan identification strengthens before partisan realignment. This leads to polarization of the two parties. These realigning elections are often known to have emotional and symbolic overtones that bring a larger than average number of voters to the polls. The increased turnout brings the minority party to power due to its distance from the other party and its position on issues. To stay in power, the new majority must institute policies or reforms that the previous government failed to achieve.

See also *Freezing of Party Alternatives; Key, V. O., Jr.; Latino Partisanship and Ideological Orientations; Party Identification; Political Parties; Political Party Platform.*

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Realism and Neorealism

Broadly defined, realism is one of the major and most longstanding theoretical traditions in the study of international and foreign affairs. Realists view the world as a naturally conflictual arena in which rational and selfish states compete for the pursuit of their mutually incompatible interests. Power, especially in its military form, is for realists the main ingredient of international politics. On the one hand each state needs power to advance its interests and protect itself in an anarchical and hostile environment—an environment in which war is the rule rather than the exception. On the other hand, power is the key to international order and cooperation: the former can only be structured along the lines of a balance of power or a hegemonic system (or a mixture of the two), while the latter materializes out of fear or imposition rather than trust or altruism.

With their focus on power, conflict, and violence, realists assign a very limited role to those who do not control the means of physical force, like sub-, trans-, or supranational actors. For one thing, the sovereign state is seen as a unitary actor, whose vital interests are unaltered by the groups in power, its leadership, or its domestic institutions. As for international nongovernmental and governmental organizations, they lack the means to impose their preferences and decisions when they are inconsistent with the interests of the states involved. Similarly, the realist worldview relegates factors such as ethics, law, culture, and ideology to a secondary position, from which they can influence politics only to the extent that they do not contrast with the states' attainment of power and security.

The above common tenets of realism coexist with a number of theoretical and methodological differences originating several branches and subdivisions within this broad tradition. The most important of these divisions is between classical realism and neorealism.

CLASSICAL REALISM

Classical realism emerged in the 1930s and developed primarily in the following two decades. It is one of the oldest paradigms in the study of world affairs. In its initial phases, realism represented a reaction to the utopian liberalism that had dominated the discipline of international relations since its birth, right after World War I (1914–1918). Early realists such as Reinhold Niebuhr, Edward Carr, and Hans Morgenthau attacked utopianism on two fronts. First, they criticized the utopianist prescriptive approach to international politics, proposing description and explanation instead. The world, realists argued, should be portrayed as it is rather than as it ought to be.

Second, supported by the crisis of some of the main political products of liberalism, like the open international economic system and the League of Nations, classical realists rejected the interpretation of the world as a harmonious environment in which law, commerce, and social learning would guarantee peace and prosperity. In its place, they propounded a pessimistic analysis of sociopolitical behavior that built on the work of past thinkers, such as Hobbes and Thucydides, to describe the international system as a state of nature writ large—the so-called domestic analogy—in which states, like Hobbesian natural men, are engaged in an endless struggle for power and domination. Far from being an aberration, war is, in this view, just the most obvious expression of the inherent friction in the system. Similarly, peace and security are not the products of integration and institutions but the result of a careful balancing of power (through rearmament or alliances) and policies of national independence.

On neither the methodological nor the theoretical front, however, did classical realism reach radical positions. For one thing, while condemning the naïve normativism of the utopianists, realists never advocated the opposite extreme of a detached scientism. Rather, theirs was a pragmatic approach, which acknowledged the existence of some eternal laws of politics but admitted that human behavior can sometimes deviate from these laws and that policy needs to be corrected when this happens. Their writings, therefore, can be seen as both explanations of the political reality and guides for good statecraft. This dualism is particularly clear in the work of policy-oriented realists such as George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, and Henry Kissinger. In the second place, the interpretation of international politics in terms of power did not imply a total rejection of alternative principles like law, ethics, and ideology. In the classical realist scheme, these factors can and often do operate at the margins of power politics, sometimes mitigating it, sometimes exacerbating it—although never replacing it.

NEOREALISM

Unlike classical realism, neorealism (or structural realism) owes most of its development and success to the work of a single scholar: Kenneth Waltz. In *Man, the State, and War* (1959) and *Theory of International Politics* (1979), Waltz laid the philosophical and theoretical foundations of what would become one of the dominant international relations paradigms in the last decade of the cold war, and remains a popular research program in the early twenty-first century.

Waltz's neorealism departs from classical realism both ontologically and epistemologically. In the first place, while Waltz shares the classical realist understanding of international politics as a sphere of egotism and conflict, he rejects the anthropological pessimism on which this understanding rests. Borrowing from Rousseau and his "stag hunt" episode, Waltz offers an alternative reading of the state of nature in which man is neither good nor bad (or, put differently, can be both) but just rational and in which conflict results from the mutual mistrust that the lack of a central coercive authority generates among rational beings. While sovereignty solves the problem domestically, it reproduces it at the international level. In an anarchic system, Waltz argues, states are concerned primarily with their survival and physical security. However, each step toward the maximization of one state's security (most notably rearmament) produces more insecurity for other states. This permanent clash of interests makes, first, interstate cooperation in the military or in other fields highly unlikely unless this constitutes the lesser evil in security terms (defensive alliances are a case in point). Second, it easily entraps states in a "security dilemma"—whereby the improvement of one state's security ends up creating more tension in the system—that can sometimes spiral out of control to the point of attacking, not to be attacked first.

Although re-elaborated as a means rather than an end in itself, power remains central in the neorealist framework: in its systemic configuration, polarity, power is one of the two crucial structural variables (the other being anarchy) for the explanation of international politics. On the other side of the equation, the balance of power is for Waltz one of the main recurrent outcomes of the international system.

Epistemologically, neorealists usually reject the ambiguities of classical realism in favor of a stricter form of positivism characterized by a complete detachment between the analyst and the object of study (which can neither influence nor be influenced by the analyst), by a quasi-mechanical view of sociopolitical behavior in which the maximization of security is taken as an exogenously given objective and ideational factors have hardly any space and, finally, by a predilection for deductive and universally applicable theories. Nowhere are all these features more manifest than in the more recent rational choice applications of the neorealist paradigm.

See also *Hegemony; International Relations Theory; Liberalism, Classical; Political Theory; Rational Choice Theory; Utopias and Politics.*

. . . .   PIER DOMENICO TORTOLA

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Realpolitik

See *Realism and Neorealism*.

Recall

To remove an elected official from office, an electorate gathers signatures to petition for a referendum. The recall is traceable to Rome in 133 BCE, when Tribune Octabius was removed from office by a vote of the people because he vetoed a Senate bill, and to the Pennsylvania state Constitution of 1776, which in article VI declared the people possessed "a right, at such periods they may think proper, to reduce their public officers to a private station, and supply vacancies by certain and regular elections," but its current form dates to nineteenth-century Switzerland and to Los Angeles in 1903. Eighteen state constitutions and numerous local government charters in the United States authorize voters to employ a recall. Members of the U.S. Congress cannot be recalled.

Elected judges in seven U.S. states cannot be recalled, and the Montana statutory provision stipulates that a government official is not subject to the recall for performing a mandatory duty. A Minnesota statute authorizes county voters to employ the recall only if the charges against an officer are malfeasance or misfeasance. An officer, upon assuming office in the states of California and Washington, becomes subject to recall, but the recall cannot be employed against an officer during the first two months to one year of service. A 1995 British Columbia law authorizes Canadian voters to place on the ballot by petition the question of removing a member of the Legislative Assembly from office between elections. The Korean Assembly in 2005 authorized the recall to remove local government officials. President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela survived a recall election in 2004.

The first step in the process is the filing and publishing or posting of a notice of intent to circulate a petition. Every petition must contain a declaration by the circulator that each signature is a genuine, and petitions must be filed within a stated

number of days after the certifying officer notifies proponents that the wording of the petition is correct. Often the petitioners must gather certified signatures totaling 25 percent of the votes cast for all candidates in the previous general election for a governor or a local official. Kansas requires 40 percent, but California requires only 12 percent for officers other than members of boards of equalization, that address assessments of specialized types of real properties, reviews county assessment levels, and assesses taxes on insurers judges, and state legislators.

Eight states allow an official five days to resign after signatures are certified. A short list of reasons for the recall is included on the ballot, and an official typically can include a short rebuttal. Voters may choose simply to remove the government official or hold an election to replace the official. The most famous recall election resulted in the removal of Governor Gray Davis of California and the election of Arnold Schwarzenegger as his replacement in 2003.

Arguments in favor of the recall include strengthening popular control, overcoming failures of the electoral system, reducing voter alienation, improving voter education, and encouraging removal of constitutional restrictions to, for example, lengthen terms of office. Opponents maintain that the recall restrains innovative officers, discourages potential candidates, increases costs, encourages abuse by special interest groups or the opposition party, and destroys judicial independence. They also note there are alternative removal methods and that voters' accusations often do not warrant removal of an official from office.

See also *Ballot Design; Electoral Rules; Governor; Petition.*

. . . .   JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN

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Reciprocity

Reciprocity is a principle in international relations whereby one actor, or group of actors, grants equal benefits or concessions to another in exchange for the same considerations. Reciprocity is often associated with trade treaties and agreements and the earliest reciprocity accords dealt with the exchange of goods. Most reciprocity treaties deal with the elimination of tariffs or other restrictions on imports. For instance, two states may agree to reduce or eliminate quotas on a specific trade good. These arrangements also may provide for the elimination of trade restrictions on one product or group of goods in exchange for some type of concession in another area. Reciprocity agreements are narrow in that they only extend concessions to the signatory countries and do not involve general or open reductions in trade barriers that benefit all states.

Through the nineteenth century, the United Kingdom and the United States used reciprocity treaties as part of a broad strategy to increase free trade and open new markets in a controlled fashion. The expansion of reciprocity treaties led to the creation of the first customs unions, and later trade blocs, in which trade barriers are eliminated between all member states. Reciprocity also may include the reciprocal exchange of benefits for officials or citizens, including granting alien citizens travel or work rights within a host country. In international relations theory, specifically regime theory, reciprocity is an important component to explain cooperation. Through the work of Robert Axelrod or Stephen Krasner, cooperation can be explored through structural factors such as the "shadow of the future"—the recognition that reciprocal behavior in the present, in one area, can led to future cooperation.

See also *Diplomacy; Trade Diplomacy.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

Redistricting

Redistricting is the process by which election district boundaries are redrawn periodically in conformity with constitutional or statutory mandates. Primarily, redistricting is undertaken to equalize district populations and thereby equalize individual voting power. However, in many cases, the redistricting process is constrained as well by constitutional or statutory requirements to ensure the preservation of representational opportunities for particular political, ethnic, or geographic groups. Insofar as the process entails the reallocation of political power, it is highly contentious.

Redistricting should not be confused with either reapportionment or gerrymandering. Reapportionment refers to the process by which political representation (in terms of the number of legislative seats to which a particular state, province, or region is entitled) is reallocated in accordance with a particular formula. Thus, in the United States, the number of seats in the House of Representatives to which a state is

entitled is recalculated after the decennial census. Gerrymandering refers to the manipulation of the redistricting process for partisan or other discrete political gain. To the extent that the group controlling the redistricting process can draw election district lines in a manner that either helps or harms the representational opportunities of particular political groups, critics may claim that the district lines have been gerrymandered.

Gerrymandering is a special problem in countries where the redistricting process is subject to partisan control. Thus, in the United States, the Constitution grants control of the line-drawing process to states. In most cases, the party or parties controlling the state legislature at the time of the census also control the redistricting process. In contrast, other countries, such as Canada, turn the process over to independent commissions. This practice removes the veneer of partisanship that characterizes the U.S. process.

Because even the most neutral process and statutory principles may have a severely deleterious impact on the representational opportunities of particular political groups, many nations have enacted constitutional or statutory requirements to ensure that minority groups or other political communities of interest are protected. In the United States, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (as amended in 1982) mandates that those who redistrict ensure that particular minority groups have a fair opportunity to elect their candidates of choice. In other countries, such provisions may include requirements that party lists include a certain minimum percentage of women or ethnic candidates, or the creation of special minority electoral districts.

In a few countries, such as Canada and the United States, the redistricting process may be challenged in the courts. However, in most countries, the redistricting process is strictly the province of the elected branches or commissions.

In sum, redistricting remains a contentious issue because it allows a select group of people (e.g., legislators, commissioners) to decide how political power will be allocated. Invariably, the redistricting process breeds controversy because there always will be one or more political actors who believe that the district boundaries have been drawn unfairly.

See also *Legislative Systems; Gerrymandering.*

. . . . MARK RUSH

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Reformation Political Thought

The political thinking of the Protestant Reformation originated with the circulation of German priest and theologian Martin Luther's *Ninety-Five Theses* in 1517 and concluded in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia treaty. The Reformation touched on every aspect of political and social life in Europe. The central issues, however, both theoretical and practical, centered on the nature of civil authority and whether one owed that authority obedience regardless of its actions.

THE LAW AND THE GOSPEL AND THE USES OF THE LAW

The theory of civil authority in the Reformation had its origins in a theological debate over the meaning of law in Christianity. The debate began in the 1520s, when theologians were influenced and emboldened by Luther's views that eternal salvation was attained by faith alone, challenging the rituals, sacraments, and indulgences implemented by the Catholic Church and the pope. A group of theologians in Wittenberg, Germany, argued that the Christian freedom of the New Testament meant a complete release from the very concept of law.

Luther and his fellow reformer, Philip Melanchthon, were convinced that these theologians were mistaken. Luther wrote that while a purely Christian society would have no need of civil authority, this was only in the abstract, because men are Christian more in name than in reality. Thus the gospel alone, with its methods of preaching and exhortation, was insufficient for politics. Law was necessary for organizing and keeping order in human community but also ensuring individual salvation. Luther spoke of the *double use of the law,* meaning an outer use compelling one to be good externally within society; and an inner use, later called the *theological* or *accusatory*, which causes one to seek Christ and his grace for one's failings and weaknesses.

THE TWO KINGDOMS

While there was general agreement among many Reformers that law was necessary, debate over the relationship between Christianity and the state was fierce. In this period, the separation of the authorities of law and gospel, of church and state, was not so much a concern about the liberty of conscience in a pluralistic society, but whether political and ecclesiastical authority could both be exercised in the same way. The distinction between the law and the gospel suggested to Luther that there should be separate sorts of authorities for the preaching of the Word of God and the administration of the state law.

Inspired by the St. Augustine's *City of God,* which discusses the ancient transition and debate surrounding of polytheism versus monotheism, Luther spoke of two kingdoms, especially in his treatise *Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed* (1523). The heavenly kingdom is composed of the faithful, who are motivated to act correctly without

the threat of coercion, while the earthly kingdom is composed of unsaved men, who need civil authority as a remedy for their fallen sinful natures. In so far as all Christians are at once saved and sinners, they are all obligated to the civil authority and encouraged to participate as soldiers and magistrates. Luther stressed the kingdoms should be kept separate. The civil authorities should not try to compel faith and the ecclesiastical authorities should not govern as temporal lords. The earthly kingdom, because it was concerned with man as man, did not need the gospel, but could rely on reason alone in devising and enforcing positive laws. Thus, Luther and Melanchthon deferred frequently to lawyers—especially of the Roman law—on substantive questions of politics.

The Swiss Reformers, who agreed in principle with the Lutherans' view of the two kingdoms, argued for a more active involvement of the ecclesiastical authorities in the prosecution of the moral law. In Zurich, Ulrich Zwingli, a Swiss Reformist leader in the sixteenth century, argued there should be a prophet, a title which he was the first to hold, who was to serve as the biblical prophets and apostles, preaching about positive and moral civil affairs. The great reformer in Geneva, John Calvin, believed divine law could be executed by ecclesiastical authorities as church discipline as long as it did not resort to coercive force, but relied instead on the methods of the gospel—exhortation, admonition, and excommunication.

The theologians of the Radical Reformation, a smaller group of leaders of peasants and some radical Anabaptists, believed moral law was not simply a natural law that could be entrusted to the civil authorities to enact as positive law. Rather they believed divine law as revealed in the Bible was the ultimate source of all law. Essentially, the Radical Reformation rejected all Catholic Church authority and opposed Protestant Reformation civil interpretation of divine law. Today, descendants of these smaller separatists group, include Amish, Mennonites, and Hutterites. However, these ideas led to conflict over whether church taxes were biblical and eventually to the hostilities of the Peasants' War in 1524–1525, in which approximately three hundred thousand peasants in modern-day Austria, Germany, and Switzerland revolted against Holy Roman Emperor Charles V of Spain. The German and Swiss Anabaptists who subscribed to the *Schleitheim Confession of Faith* (1527) believed that it was possible for Christians to live together as a community of the faithful without the law (i.e., magistracies, taxation, or military service). Such views led Melanchthon and other Lutherans to revise their position, arguing civil authority should in fact supervise ecclesiastical affairs and prosecute heresy as well.

THE RIGHT TO RESISTANCE

The majority of German and Swiss Reformers in the sixteenth century believed Christians owed strict obedience to the civil authorities as both the source of positive law and the custodians of the civil use of the law. However, when the Lutheran princes were forced into conflict with the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V to defend their new faith in the 1530s, the strict theory of political obligation began to give way. This led to the articulation of the grounds of resistance to legitimate authority, which over the next hundred years would become the basis of European theories and dissent of popular sovereignty and limited government.

Several arguments were proposed by the lawyers of the Protestant princes in the late 1520s and early 1530s to justify their resistance. They argued, first, on constitutional grounds, that the emperor was accountable by the terms of his election to the inferior magistrates of the empire (i.e., the princes and city officials); second, from a principle of Roman law, that resistance to the emperor could be considered a case of resistance to an unjust judge; finally, on the basis of natural law, that force can be repelled by force. Luther originally only approved of the Roman law argument, but as conditions worsened, he followed Melanchthon in accepting the natural law basis of resistance as well.

CONCLUSIONS

Reformation political thought contributed to the growth of the absolutist state, more commonly known as absolute monarchies, which characterized most of Europe between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. By characterizing civil authority as a monopoly on the use of coercive force and the source of positive law, reformation political thought replaced the alleged injustices and powers of the church with centralized powers of the state, namely the ruling monarch of the time. However, the Reformation did lay the foundation for limited government concepts, through its articulation of what would later become the basis for the separation of church and state. Further, through the development of constitutionalist and natural law arguments, the groundwork was laid for the seventeenth century theories of social contract and popular sovereignty, which shape the modern world.

See also *Absolutism; Authority; Calvin, John; Church and State; Civil Disobedience; Luther, Martin; Natural Law; Protestant Political Thought; Roman Catholic Social Thought; Social Contract.*

. . . . NOAH DAUBER

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Refugees

A refugee, as delineated by the text of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, is an individual or group of individuals, who, due to reasonable fear of being persecuted on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion are outside the country of their nationality and are unable, on the account of such fear, or are unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of their former habitual residence as a result of such events, are unable, or on the account of such fear are unwilling, to return to it.

The term *refugee,* has existed ever since the start of wars, armed conflicts, political upheavals, ethnic intolerance, religious discriminations, and all the human rights abuses that can coerce an individual or group of individuals to leave their homeland and seek asylum in another country where they are protected from the abuses, intolerance, persecutions, or natural disaster that they were evading. Once recognized or granted refugee status by the host nation, a refugee is entitled to basic rights such as emergency medical care and food supplies, and afforded the option of eventual voluntary repatriation, third country resettlement, or local integration in the host nation. The latter option although fairly common is often problematic as many nations have increased their restrictive immigration and citizenship laws or lack the space and resources to accommodate extensive populations of refugees.

The word *refugee* was first recorded in France as *refugie,* in 1573, in the context of granting asylum and assistance to the nonnative Calvinists fleeing persecution from the Spanish rulers of the Low Countries, which encompasses modern Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and parts of northern France and western Germany. Ironically, a century later the word *refugee* was adopted in the English language when French King Louis XIV persecuted the same Calvinists Huguenots in France in 1724 for forty years and they fled to England. The Huguenots were refugees as a consequence of their association to a religious group being targeted by the sovereign authorities of their country, and in peacetime without any provocation on their part. This distinguished them from an aggregate of individuals in flight. Historically, religious refugees proliferated throughout Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, primarily due to emerging popular reformations challenging previous church powers. Major streams include the Muslim Spaniards expelled after the fall of Grenada in 1492, culminating in the deportation of 275,000 people across the Mediterranean to North Africa. In the same year, 150,000 Iberian Jews were forced to leave Spain for refusal to convert to Christianity.

These movements halted toward the mid-seventeenth century, when absolutism surrendered to benevolent despotism.

The eighteenth century gave birth to a new type of refugee flow: political refugees. The revolutionary conflicts of the late eighteenth century were fought in the developing language of political ideology with the intent of advocating and implementing a particular regime. The French Revolution (1789–1799) produced about 129,000 refugees, who refused to take an oath of allegiance to the revolutionary constitution. The American Revolution (1775–1783) created a similar movement, with a conservative number estimating sixty thousand British loyalists who left for Canada or England. The refugee figures from the American Revolution were five times higher than the French Revolution, based on the refugee ratio to total population. The eighteenth century refugees differed from the previous type, since they were displaced because of their political opinion and the threat they carried to the current regime or the ruling government.

The nineteenth and the twentieth centuries gave rise to nationalism and a consolidation of state boundaries, which led to the introduction of immigration laws, passports, and other legal barriers to enter or leave a country. Thus, in the aftermath of World War I (1914–1918), Europe was faced with a great humanitarian crisis due to the restrictive measures systematized on personal movement. The war had considerable consequences for the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires. Thousands of people were displaced and stateless, they could not go home and yet were unable to find sanctuary elsewhere. It was against this background that the League of Nations established the High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR), to assist refugees and successfully negotiate refugee rights, including travel documents, education, and employment. HCR was the first international agency to help define the refugees as a population with rights.

World War II left Europe with an even bigger refugee crisis, as the six years of war between 1939 and 1945 left thirty million people displaced. At the end of the war, eleven million survivors were refugees and in dire need of assistance. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was created in 1951 to assist those refugees and help states carry out their obligations toward providing asylum for these refugees.

The twenty-first century *refugee* definition constitutes the classic definition with an added category of the refugee as a victim. This adds people who are displaced by societal or international violence that is not particularly directed toward them, but makes life difficult for them to remain in their own country. Because so many twenty-first century armed conflicts and ethnic persecutions occur within third world countries, many of today's refugees often seek asylum in neighboring countries of equal or lesser financial straits, creating further economic burdens on themselves and the host nation.

See also *Asylum Rights; Ethnic Cleansing; Humanitarian Intervention; Immigration Policy; Migration; Political Prisoners; Religious Persecution.*

. . . .   FARAH JAN

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Regime

When characterizing a country, we inescapably ask whether it is a democracy or a dictatorship. That is the question of the *political regime*. As gross domestic product (GDP) is for macroeconomics, the political regime has become the master variable for macropolitical analysis. Most big events in the political history of the modern world, including the French Revolution (1789–1799), the rise of Nazism, and the fall of the Soviet Union (1991), involve struggles over democracy and dictatorship. The regime question is a key research topic in political analysis because the selection of the political regime is a central conflict in human affairs: it shapes who has what political rights.

CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF POLITICAL REGIME

The definition of regime types has been a perennial concern in political analysis. Some scholars, following Aristotle, focus on the question *How many rule?* The answers—one, few, or many—originate the classical classification: autocracy, oligarchy, and democracy. Others emphasize the related but distinct question *Who rules?* They may follow Karl Marx in identifying the regime type in terms of the dominant social coalition (e.g., bourgeois democracy or proletarian dictatorship), or the tradition of Italian realism that points to the hegemony of a "political class." Others, following Charles-Louis Montesquieu, emphasize the question of *How do rulers rule?* The key alternative is whether rulers abide by constitutional principles, which differentiates republican from despotic rule. Finally, some scholars focus on the question *Why do the ruled obey the rulers?* For Max Weber, options include fear, tradition, admiration, normative commitment, and rational calculation.

Building on the conceptual insights of the classics of political and social thought, the contemporary literature on regimes has evolved in two directions. One strand refined the classical analytical dimensions, seeking to add nuance to the overarching distinction between dictatorship and democracy. In order to differentiate forms of dictatorship, Juan Linz (2000) introduced the key distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes and called attention to sultanism as a third type of nondemocratic regime. In turn, Arend Lijphart (1999) distinguished among democracies through his contrast between majoritarian and consociational (or consensus) democracy. The richness and fertility of this conceptual work notwithstanding, its limitations from the perspective of scholars who sought to move from conceptualization to explanation were readily apparent.

One problem was that many regime conceptualizations were tailored to the characterization of sets of cases that were of interest to different scholars, which led to the proliferation of regime subtypes, and even variations on subtypes, based on an ad hoc addition of particular conceptual attributes as opposed to general conceptual attributes. Indeed, even the best of this conceptual work focused primarily either on dictatorships or democracies, rather than give the same degree of attention to the two key options simultaneously, and thus did not lend themselves to generalizations. A second problem was that even the more general conceptualizations combined attributes that were intrinsic to the characterization of regimes with other attributes that were probably better understood as possible causes of regimes (e.g., various actor characteristics) or consequences of regimes, making them analytically problematic for the purposes of causal theorizing.

Responding to these shortcomings, researchers interested in explanation largely gravitated to a second strand in the conceptual literature on regimes. This alternative revolved around Robert Dahl's (1971, 1989) definition of democracy as a regime type characterized by competition and participation in the access to power; that is, the election of rulers in contests between two or more parties with universal suffrage. This conceptualization was narrower than the ones offered in other classifications and typologies; Dahl's concept of political regime referred only to the procedures regulating access to top legislative and executive positions in a country or, for short, access to control of the state. But the payoff of this parsimonious conceptualization was important. It offered something the alternative approach did not: a minimum set of shared concepts around which a large community of scholars could converge. Indeed, taking Dahl's elegant conceptualization as a point of reference, regime analysts turned their attention to an explanatory question: why do democratic regimes emerge and endure? And this research generated many rich debates that, as the following section shows, were organized along the lines of various rival explanatory factors.

EXPLANATIONS OF REGIME CHANGE AND STABILITY

Explanations of regime change can be distinguished depending on whether they focus on distant versus proximate causes, structure versus agency, and economic versus political factors. The classic debate in the study of regimes concerns the relationship between economic development and regimes. A founding observation in the study of regime change, and the core claim of modernization theory, is that richer countries are more democratic. The microfoundations of this correlation are still unclear. Critics of modernization theory share an emphasis on the conflicting nature of capitalist development, and see democracy and dictatorship as the reflection of alternative balances of power among social classes, either between the landed upper class and the urban bourgeoisie, or between the bourgeoisie and the working class. A recurrent point of reference in this debate has been Barrington Moore's (1966) thesis that the social origins of democracy can be found in

the transition to commercial agriculture, and that the rise of an urban bourgeoisie is the driving force behind democratization. But the argument that the bourgeoisie is the chief sponsor of democracy has been challenged on various grounds, including Göran Therborn's (1977) argument that none of the great bourgeois revolutions actually established democracy. An alternative thesis, which claims that it is the strength of the working class that actually explains the rise of democracy, has been proposed and, in turn, questioned. Beyond the developed world, the rise of strong military dictatorships in countries undergoing rapid modernization in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, and South Korea) motivated the insight that the relation between development and democracy may be nonmonotonic. The key insight in Guillermo O'Donnell's work (1973) is that the process of industrialization in middle-income, dependent countries gives rise to political tensions that jeopardize the "deepening" of economic development and spur the formation of a coup coalition including business elites, civilian technocrats, and the military.

A second classic debate in the study of regimes concerns the relationship between regimes and the state. This literature focuses on the impact of state formation on democracy and explains different political regimes in terms of alternative resolutions to the struggles involved in the construction of modern state structures; that is, struggles between the state-making elite and regional groups resisting incorporation into a national territory and taxation from a distant political center. A widely shared thesis is that the stronger the resistance state-making elite must overcome in order to build modern state structures, the larger the scope of political rights conceded by state-builders. Yet the specific determinants of the resistance against state-making initiatives are a major focus of contention. Thus, whereas for Charles Tilly (1990) the resistance is a function of the prior social organization of the population that was eventually incorporated into the state's territory (in particular, the level of urbanization), for Thomas Ertman (1997) it depends on the institutional organization of the Medieval representative bodies that preceded the onset of the state-formation process.

Consistent with an emphasis on theories of action, a more recent body of work focuses on proximate factors of regime transformation; namely, the very processes through which political change occurs and the choices made by actors that have a direct impact on these processes. Although originally applied to the analysis of democratic breakdown, this action-centered approach has flourished in concomitance with the Third Wave of democratization. In this approach, democratization is viewed as an open negotiation between moderates within the pro-democratic and authoritarian camps, who in turn are placed in strategic interaction with radical groups within the state and society.

Another body of literature focuses on political institutions, which are seen as intermediate causes: more proximate than capitalist development and state formation, but more distant than the choices of political actors. In fact, political institutions are conventionally regarded as the link between structural forces and political decisions, refracting the former and constraining the latter. The current literature on institutions is largely centered on variations in the institutional setup within the family of democratic regimes (the literature on nondemocratic institutions is considerably less developed), and hence seeks to illuminate the institutional conditions of the stability of democracy, as opposed to the causes of transitions to democracy. Debates in the institutional literature have largely centered on the durability of presidential, parliamentary, and semipresidential democracies, and the suitability of power-sharing arrangements, including federalism, for culturally diverse societies.

Recent research in formal political economy can be viewed as a systematic attempt to integrate structural and strategic explanations of democratization. Like class analysis, this literature views the emergence of democracy as the response of the elite in authoritarian regimes to revolutionary threats from below. The key contribution of this research is the understanding of democratization as an institutional change involving power sharing. In contrast to simple policy concessions, for instance, economic transfers that can be terminated as soon as revolutionaries are demobilized, power-sharing reforms are by their very nature harder to reverse. Democratization thus provides a credible mechanism to avoid costly revolutionary conflict.

In sum, the study of regimes has largely focused on the distinction between democracy and its various authoritarian alternatives, one of the oldest and most enduring distinctions in political theory. It has addressed issues of regime change and durability or, more concretely, regime democratization and dedemocratization. And it has been closely associated with some of the central themes in classical social theory, such as capitalist development and state formation, and some of the most pressing concerns within current political science, such as the attempt to build theories of political institutions and of strategic interaction. Indeed, regime analysts have engaged in wide ranging theorizing with a distinct political edge.

RESEARCH FRONTIERS

Recent assessments of the knowledge on regimes that has been accumulated through the work of regime analysts differ considerably. Some authors offer largely positive assessments of this literature, while others are decidedly more critical. Whatever assessment is correct, a lot of work remains to be done to capitalize on the important research on regimes done over the past five decades.

DELIMITING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

One weakness of the literature is its failure to clearly delimit the dependent variable of concern. One manifestation of this weakness is the tendency to conflate and confuse two different questions: whether a regime is democratic and whether a democracy is stable. Although identified in the 1970s, this problem has crept back into the literature on democratic consolidation and, as a result, theorizing has been hampered by the lack of a clearly specified outcome that requires explaining.

Another manifestation of this weakness is the persistent tendency not to distinguish adequately actors from the rules or procedures that are defining features of political regimes. This problem is readily apparent in explicit definitions of regime that include a reference to features of the actors that gain access to the state, such as the social base and support coalition of rulers, either in addition to or instead of the rules that regulate access to the state. Likewise, this is a problem with typologies of regimes that are based on social characteristics of the ruling personnel, such a being a member of the clergy, the nobility, or the populace, or other characteristics of the rulers, such as a commitment to an ideology. The negative consequences of such conceptualizations are severe. By failing to distinguish clearly between actors, a part of explanations of regimes and rules, the constitutive element of regimes, causal theorizing about regimes is necessarily confused in that a distinction between explanatory and outcome variables is not appropriately introduced.

DISAGGREGATING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

A second weakness of the literature is its failure to disaggregate the dependent variable of concern and to consider the way in which a disaggregated view of the outcome of interest might offer a way beyond the impasse in certain debates. For example, the Dahlian distinction between two regimes dimensions, competition and participation, can help clarify the debate regarding the impact of the bourgeoisie on democracy. Thus, the discrepancy between Moore and Therborn can be disentangled by showing that the bourgeois revolution explains one necessary but not sufficient component of democracy, the competition component, in that bourgeois revolutions led to the development of a peculiar institutional configuration that allows for the peaceful expression of political disagreements. It does not explain, however, the extension of the franchise to allow for the political participation of labor.

Likewise, the introduction of a distinction between competition and consultation can help clarify the debate regarding the impact of state making on democracy. Thus, the discrepancy between Tilly and Ertman can be resolved by showing that Tilly's research goal is the same as Moore's; that is, to account for the competition dimension of democracy; whereas Ertman is concerned with consultation, a third dimension of democracy—implicit in Robert Dahl's definition of democracy—which basically refers to constitutional arrangements of power sharing between the executive branch and collegial bodies of decision making. In short, the literature on regimes would benefit from greater attention to the multiple dimensions of democracy and from an analysis that recognizes that different components of democracy might be explained by different factors.

INTEGRATING CAUSAL THEORIES

Another challenge facing students of regimes concerns the integration of causal theories. As discussed above, explanations focus on distant versus proximate causes, structure versus agency, and economic versus political factors. Moreover, within these families of explanations, a plethora of potential factors are routinely discussed. Some efforts have been made to integrate the considerable variety of explanatory factors. But the literature on regimes has prized more the introduction of new variables than the development of theoretical syntheses, and this emphasis has entailed some serious costs. Indeed, causal models in the statistical literature routinely include a large number of explanatory variables, usually presented as though they constituted wholly unrelated variables, a strategy that rarely leads to strong empirical tests. Thus, efforts to integrate causal theories are likely to lead to the formulation of more testable hypotheses, and even hold the promise of theoretical breakthroughs, and are well worth encouraging.

TESTING CAUSAL HYPOTHESES

Finally, a fourth problem with the literature on regimes concerns the way in which hypotheses have been tested. The study of regimes, for a long time the province of qualitative scholars, has benefited greatly from the recent reliance on quantitative methods. But qualitative and quantitative tests of the hypotheses in this literature have rarely been complimentary. The qualitative literature has largely used dichotomous measures and typologies, while the quantitative literature has used interval measures and indices. And the differences have been large, to the point that qualitative and quantitative scholars have actually used different measures of key dependent variables such as democracy, democratic transition, and democratic consolidation. Moreover, qualitative and quantitative scholars have focused on different explanatory variables. Specifically, while the qualitative literature has placed great emphasis on actors and choices, the quantitative literature has overwhelmingly focused on economic and institutional factors. Thus, the development of empirical tests that adequately draw on qualitative and quantitative methods remains a challenge that regime analysts must address.

THE NORMATIVE STAKES

To conclude, the question *Why do political regimes matter?* merits a few words. This is not a simple issue to resolve. The normative import of variations in regime has usually been discussed in terms of the consequences of different regimes. In particular, a rich literature has developed on the impact of democracy, as opposed to authoritarianism, on economic growth and the respect for human rights. This research has yielded unstable results and thus has not provided a strong basis for arguing about the benefits of democracy. But such a perspective overlooks the most obvious value of a democratic regime: its intrinsic, as opposed to its instrumental, worth.

The intrinsic value of democracy is frequently overlooked because democracy, as a type of regime, consists of a set of procedures. And the tendency to consider procedures as no more than a method or a mean to arrive at an end and hence as "incapable of being an end in itself," as Joseph Schumpeter (1942) argued, has been associated with evaluations of democracy and other regimes in terms of their results. Yet such a perspective errs in counterposing process to substance and hence failing to see, as Dahl has pointed out, that "the democratic process is packed to the full with substantive values" (1989,

164) Indeed, the value of democracy as a regime resides in its provision, in contrast to its various alternatives, of a peaceful way for all adult members of a political community to participate in the making of the decisions they are legally bound to obey. Although democracy might not be considered an absolute value, it can certainly be treated as an end in itself.

See also *Anarchy; Authority; Autocracy; Collapsed and Failed States; Democracy; Democracy and Democratization; International Cooperation; Monarchy; Oligarchy; Patriarchy; Polyarchy; Regime Change; State Formation; Transitional Regimes.*

G ERARDO L. MUNCK AND
. . . . SEBASTIÁN L. MAZZUCA

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Regime Change

A political regime consists of the chief institutions by which the state exercises its authority. Regime change is a fundamental alteration in these institutions. It occurs when there is the wholesale replacement of one set of institutions by another, such as the replacement of communist regimes by democratic regimes in eastern Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Regime change normally involves an existing constitution being repudiated and a new and different constitution adopted.

An alternative use of the term *regime* focuses on processes of interaction between political actors that cut across institutions. This usage is especially common in discussions of international political economy and security. However, this second use of the term creates confusion between clearly identifiable institutional structures and patterns of interaction between groups and categories of people, such as bankers. The term is thus best used to discuss governments and their institutions.

Regimes can come and go while the state remains. The French state is many centuries old but since the French Revolution (1789–1799) it has had more than ten different regimes. Its current regime dates from 1958. A regime does not change when a general election alters the party in control of government. In the United States, this is referred to as a change in administration, for example, from the Bush to the Obama administrations. In a stable undemocratic regime, control of government changes hands through decisions of an elite clique, such as the military *junta* or the central committee of a one-party state.

The reform of a major institution to adapt it to new political circumstances is not a complete regime change. In the People's Republic of China, the communist regime is promoting economic reforms but resisting political reforms that it fears could destroy its one-party regime. Regime change occurred in the Soviet Union when reform initiatives by Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s got out of hand. The introduction of direct election of United States senators by the seventeenth amendment to the constitution in 1913 altered the composition of Congress but did not alter the institutions of the regime set out in the 1789 American Constitution. To describe as a regime change, a shift from one party controlling both the White House and Congress to control of the two institutions being divided between Republicans and Democrats ignores the difference between changes that take place within a constitution and those that involve substituting one constitutional structure for another.

Regimes can take many forms, democratic or undemocratic. These include military rule, personal dictatorships, one-party regimes that use totalitarian ideologies and force to maintain their authority and regimes in which rulers are restrained by the rule of law but are not democratic, such as Singapore today, or Britain and Sweden in the nineteenth century.

The process of regime change can involve an evolutionary change from an undemocratic to a democratic regime, as occurred in northern Europe and Anglo-American countries, or an abrupt change; for example, democratization in Spain following the death of General Franco in 1975. Some European countries have experienced dramatic transitions between democratic and undemocratic regimes. In the twentieth century, Germans have been successively governed by an undemocratic imperial regime; the democratic Weimar Republic; a Nazi regime under Adolf Hitler; by a division between the democratic Federal Republic and a communist regime in East Germany; and since 1990 by a united and democratic Federal Republic. Regime change also can take the form of an alternation between dictatorships, as tends to happen in the Middle East.

Regime change can occur as a consequence of peaceful evolutionary change, a military coup, a quarrel between elites who fall out in a struggle for the succession after the death of a dictator, or as a result of a war of independence, as in the American Revolution (1775–1783), or a civil war. The contemporary map of central and eastern Europe reflects the coexistence of changes in the boundaries of states as well as

of regimes. When the communist regime of the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, its constituent parts broke up into fifteen independent states with different types of regimes, ranging from democracies in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to very undemocratic regimes in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

Changes in the regime of a powerful country has major implications for international security and foreign aid. If the new regime is democratic, this can be prematurely hailed as a gain for greater international stability, while if a new regime is undemocratic, this can cause democratic states to become anxious about its potential for supporting actions disrupting international affairs.

See also *Autogolpe; Collapsed and Failed States; Communism, Fall of, and End of History; Coup d'État; Democracy and Democratization; Political Change; Revolutions, Comparative.*

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Regional Integration, Comparative

Comparative regionalism refers to studies that examine similarities and differences among regional groupings in the global system to understand the underlying causes, processes, and effects of regional integration. Most comparative integration studies apply the frameworks of politics, economics, and law to analyze the context of regionalism and its effects on states and regions as a whole, but sociological studies of regionalism also abound.

Simplified, there are two main waves of comparative regionalist scholarship. The first wave took place in the 1960s and was dominated by neofunctionalist research. While basic neofunctionalist assumptions regarding processes of spillover and supranational entrepreneurship were primarily derived from detailed empirical studies of the major institutions of the European communities (EC), the search for a generalizable explanation of integration led scholars to apply the theory to other regions. Ernst Haas examined integration in the Soviet Bloc, and among Arab states and the Nordic countries, Haas and Philippe Schmitter juxtaposed integration processes in Europe and Latin America, and Joseph Nye (1968, 1971) compared integration in East Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. However, applications of European-derived integration theories outside Europe were rarely productive. Integration in other regions appeared to advance at a far slower pace than

in western Europe. This led scholars to focus on factors that disposed Europe, especially favorably, for integration. Particular features of European integration, such as the fact that all members of the EC were liberal democracies with high levels of industrial and economic development, broadly compatible elite values, and close ties of military alliance, were elevated to necessary background conditions for integration. The formulation of necessary background factors highlighted the theory's limited scope. Neofunctionalism was geared toward explaining integration among a group of advanced liberal industrial economies in a geopolitical context of bipolarity and as such had limited applicability outside western Europe. As a result, by the 1970s, scholars had largely abandoned comparative integration studies in favor of the isolated study of the EC and its institutions.

Comparative regional integration studies have undergone a significant revival in the past fifteen years. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw an upsurge in regionalism on a global scale. New economic groupings, such as APEC, Mercosur, and NAFTA, were born while existing regional groupings, such as the European Union (EU), deepened their institutional infrastructure and expanded their geographic reach. This reinvigoration of regionalism gave rise to a second wave of scholarship dedicated to comparative analysis. While scholarship in the 1960s focused on understanding the contexts that facilitated the creation and subsequent consolidation of regional institutions, the new regionalism agenda concentrates more sharply on both the causes and effects of regionalism and on accounting for variation in institutional structures across regions. Many new regionalism studies have an economic focus, using new trade theories to understand the sources of regionalism. The main emphasis is on the relationship of regionalization to processes of globalization, with some studies depicting regionalization as a defensive or semiprotectionist response to the challenge of growing competitive pressures from global markets, whereas others view regionalism as a stepping-stone to full integration into the global economy. Alternatively, some international relations scholars, such as Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003), concentrate instead on the regionalization of security, reviving the concept of regional security communities to analyze patterns of regionalism.

DEFINING REGIONS AND INTEGRATION

It is a common complaint that the comparative study of regional integration is hampered by a lack of consensus on how to define the fundamentals of comparison. Some regard the term *region* as connoting a geographically circumscribed area, while others focus on the presence of a common culture, language, or shared religion. Yet others hold that shared political institutions and practices define a region. Agreement is equally elusive when it comes to defining *integration*. What does it mean to say that a region is integrating or has been integrated? Does integration refer to the creation of institutions for joint decision-making at the transnational level, to the creation of a transnational economy, or a combination of the two? Must integration involve a change in social attitudes, such as a shift in loyalties away from the nation-state toward the regional level? It is argued that the fact that analysts work with different conceptions of both *region* and *integration* makes it difficult to compare their findings. Yet, as is often the case, such difficulties are easily exaggerated. By and large, researchers can work with different definitions of integration and still draw valuable insights from each other's work in relation to particular dimensions of integration understood as specific kinds of economic, political or social interactions.

COMPARATIVE REGIONALIZATION AND THE EU

Many scholars also worry that despite a revival of comparative studies, the field of regional integration studies remains sharply divided between studies of the EU and regionalism in the rest of the world. This perceived fragmentation is seemingly a product of the longer trajectory and greater depth of integration in Europe compared with elsewhere. Yet, the difficulty of comparing the EU to other regional schemes can be relatively easily overcome by selecting specific dimensions on which to compare cooperation within Europe to cooperation in other regions. By abandoning the goal of universal grand theories of integration, we can focus on developing valid midrange theories based on observations of particular processes and outcomes. As for understanding the overall trajectory of Europe integration, comparative studies also may be facilitated by conceptualizing the EU as an emergent polity rather than as a regional organization. This was the approach favored by Karl Deutsch and his colleagues. They suggested that international political unification could be studied alongside the growth of nation-states. Deutsch and his associates drew specifically on the experiences of multinational empires like the Austro-Hungarian Empire and federal nation-states like Switzerland to analyze integration processes. Other candidates for comparison with the EU include regional trade and currency unions like the German Zollverein or the United Dutch Provinces, which both evolved into single polities, or the United States, which began as a loose confederation but eventually developed into a federation.

See also *European Union; Intergovernmental Relations; International Cooperation; International Organization; International System; Interstate Compacts; Regional Security; Regions and Regional Government; Trade Blocs.*

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Regional Security

Regional security pertains to the theoretical and empirical conceptualization of security from a macroregional perspective. It stems from the idea that regional security has a degree of autonomy from global collective security and from national security strategies. In a globalized world, which accentuates the circulation of people, goods, and ideas and is, moreover, conducive to the permeation of national borders, it is virtually impossible to conceive security uniquely from a national perspective. Thus, by transcending bilateral relations, polities cluster regionally to protect themselves against their common regional threats. Similarly, regional security also is autonomous vis-à-vis global security in the sense that macroregions follow certain patterns that cannot be replicated universally.

Regional security can be illustrated by the geographical diffusion of conflicts and by the formation of zones of peace. In the post–cold war era, the majority of conflicts have a regional component. Several regions of the world are struggling with cross-border ethnic tension, illegal immigration, transnational crime, failed states, civil wars, or deficient management of common water resources. These social (ethnic), political, economic, and military linkages at the regional level that derive from intra- and interstate disputes, therefore, have created specific clusters that are recognized as *regional conflict complexes, regional conflict formations,* or *regional peace and security clusters.*

The opposite also holds. Some regions seem to maintain a long-standing capacity to remove military interstate disputes from the regional political game. The term *zone of peace* has been commonly associated with the long periods of peaceful interchange between democratic countries, which may be portrayed by the attainment of a security community in South America (since 1883), North America (since 1917), or Australasia and western Europe (since 1945).

In the conceptualization of regional security, another key aspect is agency. In this equation one needs to consider the role played by regional and subregional organizations in the maintenance of regional peace and security. According to Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, regional arrangements and agencies have been empowered to handle intraregional conflicts as they offer comparative advantages. First, as the members of an organization share the same cultural background, they are likely to be more in tune with a conflict at hand. Second, personal relationships with the leaders have developed in the past, which results in greater understanding of the situation and may result in fruitful dialogue based

on personal trust. Third, as time is of the essence in a crisis situation, regional organizations could offer a more timely response, compared to bureaucratic global organizations as the United Nations or foreign states. Fourth, as the members of a regional organization are the ones who would suffer more directly the impacts of the conflict, they have a legitimate vital interest at stake in preserving regional stability.

REGIONAL SECURITY THEORY

The phenomenon of regional security has been described and explained by a gamut of different approaches, of which the most prominent are the regional security complex theory (RSCT), the regional orders approach, and the zones of peace approach.

First developed by Barry Buzan, the regional security complex theory is marked by the idea that security is a relational matter based on the (positive or negative) interdependence of units at the regional level. This is the principle that leads to the formation of macroregions of security and paves the way for regions to be objects of analysis in themselves—particular locations where one can find outcomes and sources of explanations. Regional security complexes are defined as "a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another" (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The structure of regional complexes is composed of (1) the arrangement of units and the differentiation among them, (2) the patterns of amity and enmity, and (3) the distribution of power among the principal units. RSCT also introduced a social constructivist approach to understand the process by which issues become securitized. The process of securitization is interpreted as a speech act, by which security issues range from *nonpoliticized* through *politicized* to *securitized.* Security is thereby approached as a *self-referential practice,* in the sense that an issue becomes a security issue as the result of a practice (i.e., the securitization of a threat is the consequence of a perception by a securitization actor and not necessarily the consequence of a real and objective threat).

The second prominent theory of regional security is the regional orders approach. David Lake and Patrick Morgan (1997) introduce the idea of *regional order* as an important paradigm to understand regional security. The authors define a regional security complex as "a set of states continually affected by one or more security externalities that emanate from a distinct geographic area." By introducing the idea of *externality,* they imply that a regional security complex is not contingent to territorial contiguity given that in some cases an externality of a complex has an impact on another country (or vice versa) with which the complex shares no borders. The authors contend, hence, that "geography defines the physical area from which security externalities radiate, not the set of states that may be members of a regional security complex." Lake and Morgan suggest that regional security processes have a life on their own and can refract the impact of the global system. Regional complexes are used by Lake and Morgan as a launching pad to introduce the concept of regional order. Whereas a

regional complex is defined by its patterns of security conceived in terms of externalities, a regional order is characterized by the way in which the states that comprise a regional complex manage their security relations. And the typology put forward by Lake and Morgan includes (1) balance of power, (2) concert of power, (3) multilateral collective security, (4) pluralistic security community, and (5) integration.

Finally, another prevalent way to approach regional security is by conceptualizing the evolution of a region as a *zone of peace*. Arie Kacowitz's work (1998) is devoted to explaining how peace can be maintained at the regional level, sometimes even if this process is not sustained by plural democracies. He sets out his study by defining a zone of peace as

> a discrete geographical region of the world in which a group of states have maintained peaceful relations among themselves for a period of at least thirty years—a generation span—though civil wars, domestic unrest, and violence might still occur within their borders, as well as international conflicts and crisis between them.

An African Union soldier holds the African Union flag in a military camp damaged in an attack in Darfur, Sudan. As a regional organization, the African Union is in a position to respond quickly to crises on the continent and to have better understanding of the conflict.
SOURCE: AP Images

Furthermore, within this definition he differentiates among three different categories of zones of peace in an ascending order of quality and endurance: zones of negative or precarious peace, zones of stable peace, and, finally, pluralistic security communities. To explain the maintenance of regional peace, he assesses the necessary, favorable, and sufficient conditions drawing from a pool of realist/geopolitical and liberal theories: (1) regional hegemony; (2) regional balance of power; (3) common threat by a third party; (4) isolation, irrelevance, and impotence; (4) regional democracy; (5) economic development and prosperity; (6) economic interdependence, integration, and transnational links; (7) normative consensus/common cultural background; and, finally, (8) satisfaction with the territorial status quo.

See also *Cooperative Security; Foreign Policy; International Relations; Regional Integration, Comparative; Women and Security.*

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Regions and Regional Governments

Region usually denotes a territorial unit, with or without political identity, and the corresponding form of government. This is typically an area smaller than the state but larger than the lowest local administrative layer, which in most countries are the municipalities. Within this perspective, there are different types of regions: the homogeneous or uniform region, the polarized region, and the functional region, each defined according to different criteria. In unitary states, these types of region correspond in most cases to an intermediate administrative tier between the state and the lower level of the political and administrative organization, while in federal states it can coincide with the state level or with one of its subdivisions. In all these cases, regions are contained within the same country. However, in the case of the European Union, the concept of transnational or cross-border regions that emerged in recent years has introduced a new type of region into the already complex institutional landscape.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE MEANINGS OF REGION AND REGIONALIZATION

The term *region* is taken here as synonymous with a subnational form of self-government between the central state and the lower tier of local self-government. This tier of public administration between the state and municipalities,

sometimes called *province,* can be traced back at least to the Middle Ages in some parts of Europe. However, it was during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that it acquired its contemporary characteristics and its administrative relevance.

The term *regionalism* also has several meanings. Often it is applied to describe movements associated with the promotion and preservation of a regional identity, as well as nationalist movements whose objective is the separation of a particular region from its host state. It also often refers the process of political and administrative decentralization from the state to the region, a process implemented usually due to a mixture of political, economic, and social reasons specific to each case. The term *regionalism* is used here as synonymous of *regionalization,* and by this is meant the process of political and administrative decentralization from the state to the intermediate tier of subnational self-government.

DECONCENTRATION AND DECENTRALIZATION

Region in the sense of subnational administrative or political tier has a long tradition in both unitary and federal states. There are two forms that can define the relationship with the central state: it can be a form of deconcentration or a form of decentralization, with the later characterized by more extensive administrative autonomy. In both cases, the adoption of a regional tier is one alternative for addressing sociogeographical and political diversity inside the country.

In the deconcentration case, when the region is just one level within the vertical organization of the state, a form of peripheral state administration, central government retains the most important keys in the decision-making process and in public resource allocation but the regional boards may make decisions on less important issues, making government services locally accessible. This process is called administrative deconcentration. In some countries, the creation of this form of region is followed by the institutionalization of a regional tier of self-government. When a regional self-government tier is created and elections are held for its boards, the tier often will retain the geographical area and most of the previous professional and administrative structures. In other cases, the regional tier of self-government was introduced with no relation to previous forms of administrative deconcentration. In both cases, there are substantial differences between countries and over time, either in the competences assigned to the region, in the level of public expenditure made by the regional government, or even in the size of the regions.

There is another form of regional self-government that goes beyond administrative decentralization, including also political decentralization, which has been implemented due to specific historical and political conditions, such as in the case of Spain's autonomous regions. This also can occur in response to geographic, economic, social, and cultural characteristics, including historic aspirations for autonomy within the local population, such as in the case of Madeira and Azores in Portugal.

FEATURES AND TRENDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS

Administrative regions have normally an executive (a council, a president, or both) and a deliberative assembly with control powers over the executive as well as the power to issue regulations. In the case of political decentralization, or autonomous regions, the assembly also may possess the power to legislate on issues not pertaining to the sovereign functions of the state, such as justice, foreign affairs, and national defense. The regional assembly normally is elected directly by proportional representation by the citizens of the region, and elects, among its members, the executive council or the president of the region. In practice, however, there are various forms of regional political leadership and each model is influenced by the local political culture, the support that the president or the executive has in the regional assembly, and the demographics of the region, among other factors. Once elected, political and administrative accountability is provided internally by the regional assembly and externally by the press, citizen participation, and ultimately central government inspectorates and the courts. Central authorities would be more likely to judge the legality, rather than the merit, of local political decisions.

The competences of administrative regions are typically defined by the principle of general competence, which means that the administrative region usually is not confined to its specific list of competences, and therefore can execute all other functions deemed to be in the interest of the region by its elected boards. The financial regime of administrative regions is based on its own resources and resources transferred by the state, either in the form of block grants, conditional grants, or a combination thereof. The relative weight of each specific component is another variable that differentiates regional self-government between countries.

Administrative regions have been affected in recent decades by shifts from traditional hierarchical forms of administration to administration through networks of public and private organizations within the same country. This process can weaken political accountability and policy coordination. In other cases this trend was followed also by the development of transborder relations with regions in neighboring countries, such as in the case of European Union in which regions of different countries cooperate under the umbrella of European structural programs. A third major trend affecting regions is the widespread use of information and communication technologies in regional government or regional governance, which allows a transition to administration through electronic communication.

See also *Center-periphery Relations (Federalism); Centralization, Deconcentration, and Decentralization; Devolution; Distribution of Powers (in a Federation); Local Politics; Municipal Government; States' Rights; Subsidiarity.*

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Regression with Categorical Data

In its most basic form, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression describes the linear relationship between a dependent variable and one or more independent variables by fitting a line or plane to a collection of data points. Most introductory treatments of regression analysis use examples with dependent and independent variables measured at the interval level (e.g., income in dollars and years of formal education). But many researchers work with variables measured at the categorical (nominal) level.

OLS regression should not be used if the dependent variable is categorical. In this situation, one cannot assume a linear relationship between the independent and dependent variables. The relationship is likely to be best illustrated by an S-curve rather than a straight line. Even though OLS is remarkably flexible and can be used to estimate some curvilinear relationships, it is not suited to describing relationships involving categorical dependent variables. Researchers should use logistic regression, probit, or another model designed for limited dependent variables.

OLS can accommodate categorical independent variables, such as gender, region, or marital status. This is done through the use of dichotomous dummy variables representing the categories of the independent variable. Standard practice is to code a dummy variable 1 if a case falls into a specific category or 0 if it does not. Gender, for instance, would yield two dummy variables: Female (1 = female, 0 = otherwise) and Male (1 = male, 0 = otherwise). Region might be transformed into four dummy variables: Northeast (1 = Northeast, 0 = otherwise), Midwest (1 = Midwest, 0 = otherwise), South (1 = South, 0 = otherwise), and West (1 = West, 0 = otherwise).

One of the dummy variables must be excluded from the regression analysis to avoid perfect collinearity between the dummy variables. An important rule of thumb is, if the original independent variable has C categories, include C-1 dummy variables in the regression analysis. The excluded dummy variable will serve as a baseline for interpreting the effect of the included dummy variable. The choice of which variable to exclude is primarily substantive rather than statistical; which baseline will provide the most sensible or interesting interpretation of results?

Take as an example a multiple regression analysis examining the influence of education and gender on annual income:

$$\text{Annual Income} = a + b_1 \text{ Education} + b_2 \text{ Male}$$

In this example, the dependent variable, *Annual Income,* can be measured at the interval level in dollars. Similarly, *Education* can be measured at the interval level as years of formal education. Because gender is a categorical variable, it can be represented by a dummy variable for males, where 1 = male, 0 = otherwise (female). Because the dummy variable for females was left out of the equation, female is the excluded, or baseline, category for gender. The coefficient for *Male*—b_2 in the equation above—will show the average difference in income for men (holding education constant) as compared to women. Suppose this regression analysis yielded the following results:

$$\text{Annual Income} = 31,000 + 1,650 \\ \text{Education} + 4,500 \text{ Male}$$

The coefficient of 4,500 for the dummy variable *Male* indicates that, on average, annual income for men exceeds that for women by \$4,500, holding education constant. Had the researcher included *Female* in the equation instead of *Male,* the b_2 coefficient would have been -4,500, showing that, on average, women had an annual income \$4,500 less than men. The specific statement of results is different, but the substantive conclusion about gender differences in income is the same.

See also *Causation and Correlation; Computational Modeling; Linear Model; Logistic Regression; Multilevel Analysis; Parametric Statistical Model; Partial Least Squares; Statistical Analysis.*

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Regulation and Rulemaking

Like many other political concepts, regulation is hard to define, not least because it means different things to different people. The term is employed for a myriad of discursive, theoretical, and analytical purposes that cry out for clarifications. It is also a highly contested term. For the far right, *regulation* is a dirty word representing the heavy hand of authoritarian governments and the creeping body of rules that constrain human or national liberties. For the old left, it is part of the superstructure that serves the interests of the dominant class and frames power relations in seemingly civilized forms. For progressive democrats, it is a public good, a tool to control profit-hungry capitalists and to govern social and ecological risks. For some, regulation is something that is done exclusively by government, a matter of the state and legal enforcement; while for others, regulation is mostly the work of social actors who monitor other actors, including governments. State-centered conceptions of regulation define it with reference to state-made laws, while society-centered analysts and scholars of globalization tend to point to the proliferation of various forms of civil and business-to-business regulation.

COMPETING PERSPECTIVES

For legal scholars, regulation is often a legal instrument, while for sociologists and criminologists it is yet another form of social control. For some it is the amalgamation of all types of laws—primary, secondary, and tertiary legislation—while for others it is confined to secondary legislation. For Chicago school of regulation economists, it is usually a strategic tool used by private and special interests to exploit the majority. Not all economists are alike: for institutional economists, regulation is a constitutive element of the market and is often understood as the mechanism that constitutes property rights or even as a source of competitiveness. The French Regulation school seems to have developed a similar institutional perspective but with a more critical tone and without the functionalist orientation of some Anglo-Saxon economists. While scholars of public administration seem to perceive it with direct and intimate reference to the scope of state authority and formal regulatory organizations, scholars of global governance tend to focus on standards and soft norms. While some seem to think of the rise of regulation as yet another indication of the advance of neoliberalism and the retreat of the welfare state, others tend to see it at as a neomercantilist instrument for market expansion, high modernism, and social engineering. In European parlance, for most of the twentieth century regulation was synonymous with government intervention and, indeed, with all the efforts of the state, by whatever means, to control and guide economy and society. This rather broad meaning of the term seems to have faded, and scholars now make efforts to distinguish rulemaking from other tools of governance, and indeed from other types of policy instrument, such as taxation, subsidies, redistribution, and public ownership.

Regulation not only is a distinct type of policy but also entails identifiable forms and patterns of political conflict that differ from the patterns that are regularly associated with redistribution and distribution. In addition, while other types of policy such as distribution and redistribution are about relatively visible transfers and direct allocation of resources, regulation only indirectly shapes the distribution of costs in society. Government budgets include (relatively) visible and clear estimations of the overall costs of distribution and redistribution but hardly any of the cost of regulation (with the exception of the administrative costs of regulation—costs of fact finding, monitoring, and implementation). The most significant costs of regulation are compliance costs, which are borne not by the government budget but mostly by the regulated parties. The wide distribution of these costs and their embeddedness in the regulatees' budgets make their impact, effects, and net benefits less visible and therefore less transparent to the attentive public.

For some, regulation is a risky business that is prone to failure, but for others the business of regulation is the business of risk minimization. Some contend that regulation comprises mostly rulemaking while others extend it to include rule monitoring and rule enforcement. For some, regulations are about the rules and functions of the administrative agency after the act of delegation; for others, as already observed, regulation includes every kind of rule, including primary legislation and even social and professional norms. The extensive literature on regulation in the United States and the extensive attention paid to regulation could have resulted in a consensual definition of regulation. Yet this is not the case. The American Administrative Procedure Act defines the term *rule* but not the term *regulation,* and what it defines as rule is confined to the scope of the act itself.

ROLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

One important aspect of any discussion of the different connotations and characteristics of regulation is the intimate relations between regulation and the existence of an administrative agency. Rulemaking and rulemaking agencies are closely connected. An emphasis on the workings, characteristics, failures, and merits of regulation by administrative agencies is prevalent in the literature on regulation. Thus, one of the most widely cited definitions of *regulation* suggests that regulation is a "sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by the community." Not only does this definition include an explicit reference to public agency, but it also stresses the sustained and focused nature of regulation. Regulation involves a continuous action of monitoring, assessment, and refinement of rules rather than ad hoc operation. Implicit in this definition is also the expectation that *ex ante* rules will be the dominant form of regulatory control. The definition is less apt in the sense that it fails to recognize that many, perhaps very important, regulations are not exercised by public agencies but by a wide variety of executive organs. It excludes business-to-business regulation as well as civil regulation and unnecessarily limits regulation to those actions that are valued by the community.

The regulatory agency is a nondepartmental organization that is involved mainly with rulemaking but that also may be responsible for fact finding, monitoring, adjudication, and enforcement. It is autonomous in the sense that it can shape its own preferences, and the extent of its autonomy varies with both its administrative capacities and its ability to enforce its rules. The autonomy of the agency is constituted by the act of its establishment as a separate organization and by the allocation of a policy space where the agency is expected to operate in order to meet its functions and responsibilities. Note that rulemaking, fact-findings, monitoring, adjudication, and enforcement capacities are usually the characteristics of regulatory agencies. While regulatory agencies are not new, their growth and proliferation is the outstanding feature of the emergence and consolidation of the regulatory state. Regulatory agencies originated in various boards, ad hoc committees, and other premodern organizational entities that during the twentieth century became the pillars of the modern administrative state. Regulatory agencies became a distinctive feature of the American administrative state in the early twentieth century. What other countries often nationalized, the United States regulated. Indeed, the history of the American administrative state is also the history of the establishment of regulatory agencies. Yet, while the number of regulatory agencies

in the United States has not grown since the mid-1970s, such agencies have become popular elsewhere in the world. A recent survey of the establishment of regulatory agencies across sixteen different sectors in sixty-three countries from the 1920s through 2007 reveals that it is possible to find an autonomous regulatory agency in about 73 percent of the possible sector–country units that were surveyed. The number of regulatory agencies rose sharply in the 1990s, partly in connection with privatization policies but also in fields and places where privatization had little effect. The rate of establishment increased dramatically, from fewer than five new autonomous agencies per year from the 1960s to the 1980s, to more than twenty agencies per year from the 1990s to 2002 (rising to almost forty agencies per year between 1994 and 1996).

The expansion in the number of regulatory agencies, and arguably also in the scope of regulation and of the policy capacities of these agencies, has been manifest since the 1990s in the popularity of the notion of the regulatory state. In its most straightforward form, as defined by Christopher Hood and colleagues' in *Regulation inside Government,* (1999), the term *regulatory state* "suggests [that] modern states are placing more emphasis on the use of authority, rules and standard-setting, partially displacing an earlier emphasis on public ownership, public subsidies, and directly provided services." Three elements are especially useful in characterizing the regulatory state. First, bureaucratic functions of regulation are being separated from service delivery. Second, the regulatory functions of government are being separated from policy-making functions and, thus, the regulators are being placed at arm's length from their political masters. In this way, regulatory agencies became the citadels that fortify the autonomous and influential role of the regulocrats in the policy process. We are witnessing the strengthening of the regulators at the expense of politicians on the one hand and of the managerial elite on the other. Third, and as a result of the first two elements, regulation and rulemaking emerge as a distinct stage in the policy-making process. Accordingly, regulation is emerging as a distinct profession and administrative identity. Professional affiliation to global networks of experts becomes a major source of innovations, world views, accountability, and legitimacy.

FROM THE REGULATORY STATE TO REGULATORY CAPITALISM

The focus on the administrative elements in the study of regulation might be less useful for scholars who emphasize the limits of "hard law" and who are aware of the importance of social norms and other forms of "soft law" in the governance of societies and economies. A wider definition of regulation that captures regulation as soft law would suggest that regulation encompasses "all mechanisms of social control" including unintentional and nonstate processes. Indeed, as pointed out by Robert Baldwin and colleagues (1998), it extends "to mechanisms which are not the products of state activity, nor part of any institutional arrangement, such as the development of social norms and the effects of markets in modifying behavior." Thus, a notion of intentionality about

the development of norms has been dropped from this definition of regulation, and anything producing effects on behavior may be considered regulatory. In addition, a wide range of activities that may involve legal or quasi-legal norms, but without mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement, might also come within the definition. This definition connects widely with the research agenda on governance, *the new governance,* and the *new regulatory state,* where elements of steering and plural forms of regulation are emphasized in the effort to capture the plurality of interests and sources of control around issues, problems, and institutions. This rather wide definition of regulation also allows us to *decenter* regulation from the state and even from well-recognized forms of self-regulation. Decentered approaches to regulation emphasize complexity, fragmentation, interdependencies, and government failures, and suggest the limits of the distinctions between the public and the private and between the global and the national.

Scholars of regulatory systems often point to the growth in the number of civil and business actors that invest in regulation and accordingly also in the growth of civil and business-to-business regulatory institutions and instruments. At the same time there are indications of the transformation of the politics of interest groups and nongovernmental organizations. Civil actors are often associated with advocacy (e.g., lobbying) and service provision (e.g., replacing the state in the provision of welfare), but in our areas of study they also produce, monitor, and enforce regulation. The concept of *civil regulation* aims to capture this evolving feature of civil politics. The term refers to the institutionalization of voluntary global and national forms of regulation through the creation of private (nonstate) forms of regulation intended to govern markets and firms. Civil regulations attempt to embed international markets and firms in a normative order that prescribes responsible business conduct. It includes old and traditional forms of self-regulation but goes beyond it to include regulatory techniques such as third-party accreditation and certification, gatekeeping strategies, metaregulation, enforced self-regulation, self-regulation, and leagues tables. *Business-to-business regulation* is another form of a nonstate source of regulation. Here the growth of regulation is driven by the ability of some businesses (most often big business) to set standards for other businesses (most often smaller). One relevant example is the ability of big supermarket chains to set standards of food manufacturing, processing, and marketing all over the world.

The narrow definition of regulation and the broader one are coming together in the literature of regulatory capitalism in order to denote a global order that is characterized by the simultaneous growth of plural forms of regulation. It also denotes the growth in scope, importance, and impact of regulation at the national and global levels and the growing investments of political actors in regulation in general and regulatory strategies in particular. It suggests that regulation and rulemaking are the major instruments in the expansion of global governance. The notion of regulatory capitalism takes regulation theory analysis beyond national boundaries (hence, beyond the notion of the regulatory state) and beyond formal

state-centered rulemaking (therefore toward civil regulation and decentered analysis of regulatory systems). It also denotes a world where regulation is increasingly a hybrid of different systems of control; étatist regulation coevolves with civil regulation; national regulation expands with international and global regulation; private regulation coevolves and expands with public regulation; voluntary regulations expand with coercive ones; and the market itself is used or mobilized as a regulatory mechanism.

See also *Administrative State; Bureaucracy; Deregulation; Rulemaking.*

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Reich, Wilhelm

Wilhelm Reich (1897–1957), an Austrian American psychoanalyst, stands as one of the most controversial and groundbreaking figures in psychology. A collaborator with Sigmund Freud during the 1920s, Reich would later combine Freudian psychoanalysis and study of the individual personality with a Marxist sociopolitical analysis of social relations. His greatest contributions to political studies are his works *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* (1933) and *The Sexual Revolution* (1936).

For Reich, the character of child rearing was closely related to social organization and the political development of social institutions. His works, in particular *The Mass Psychology of Fascism,* linked authoritarian character structures to authoritarian institutions in society. Sexual repression was a key feature of authoritarian child rearing and instilled within the child not only an obedience to authority, but also an incapacity to freely express oneself against authority. The key task of education, as for psychotherapy, is sexual liberation and the abolition of the patriarchal family structure that represses sexuality. Reich argued for the economic self-determination of women and called for availability of contraceptives, abortion, and divorce.

For Reich, the solution to social and personal problems is something akin to anarchism. In his view, it is possible for people to overcome what he identifies as the irrationalism of government and institutional politics and establish what he calls "work-democracy." This would usher in a society free of authoritarian institutions, including the state and the patriarchal family, as people establish self-regulating character structures. In his view, social relationships would develop from economic organizing in which workers create and control their workplaces and working relations. Thus, social relations would be built on a radical vision of workers' democracy.

Reich was controversial within leftist circles for his assertion that authoritarian relations could even overtake socialist or communist projects where moral codes and child-rearing practices and education did not free people's character structures. Thus, as Reich explains in *The Sexual Revolution,* the promise of the 1917 Russian Revolution's early years was never realized, in part because of its failure to follow through on the revolutionary experiments in education and the radical revision

of morality expressed initially. The result was an authoritarian system that maintained repressive practices in the context of Stalinism. Reich's identification of soviet authoritarianism as "Red Fascism," highlighting its shared repressive character with rightist fascism, led to his expulsion from Germany's Communist Party.

In *The Mass Psychology of Fascism,* Reich tries to answer why workers supported parties whose leadership opposed their interests as workers. The working-class support for fascism was found in working-class identification with the character structure of the middle classes (the farmers, bureaucrats, and small business people who initially supported and stood to gain from fascism) as changing work relations, such as shorter working hours and increased incomes, led to worker identification with the middle class and its typical family structures that were becoming the norm or ideal.

The emphasis on revolutionary social transformation in his work represents a significant break from, and repudiation of, the conservative acceptance of social relations in much of psychology. Strikes and protests were not expressions of irrationalism as some psychology suggested. The question of social psychology concerning why the majority of workers do not strike could contribute to Marxist analyses of social change.

See also *Fascism; Mass Political Behavior; Political Psychology; Stalinism.*

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Relative Power

Power is normally thought of in terms of the absolute capacity of an individual, institution, or state. But power is also the capacity of A to get B to do what B would otherwise not do of its own choosing. In power relations, the capacity of one entity must be considered relative to the capacity of another entity or entities vis-à-vis that outcome. Such a concept of *relative power* has relevance regarding the capability of a state to ensure its security and carry out its foreign policy objectives.

The term *relative* denotes a comparison that can be either a *signed difference* or a *ratio* of the things compared. The measures are far from congruent in meaning, and both are essential for understanding power. A signed difference indicates the gap between two levels, as in balance of power calculations. A dyadic ratio of the two levels is sometimes used as a measure of relative power. But these dyadic measures do not capture the complexity of power relationships involving three or more actors, a complexity that international relations theorists have encapsulated in the notion of *systems structure.* At any given time, a state's relative power is its percent share of systemic power—that is, the ratio of its absolute power over the absolute power of all the states in the system under consideration.

How is power to be measured? Relative power is sometimes used to describe a situation in which not all but some capacities of actors can be brought to bear on a specific situation to elicit a desired outcome. Do we focus on capabilities or on outcomes? Do we use perceptions of power or empirical indexes of power? We would like the capabilities to correspond to expected outcomes, and perceptions of power to correspond to the empirical measures.

The power of the state is in large part drawn from the underlying material indicators of national capability such as armed forces size, population size, GDP, military spending, and per-capita wealth, with issues of national unity, national will, and ideology added as qualifications. Also, the long-term foundation of power, its latent resource base that changes only incrementally, must be kept analytically distinct from short-term actualized power that may accelerate during war time.

Factor analysis reveals that state power has two dimensions—size and wealth—measured across the entire spectrum of military and economic indicators. Natural experiments reveal that experts can rank states according to perceptions of power with a very high level of agreement. These subjective perceptions of power are stable across cultures and are highly correlated with national capability.

Over long time periods, state relative power follows a cycle of rise and decline, of varying amplitude and periodicity, which traces the state's evolution as a major power. Germany passed through an entire cycle, from rise to peak to decline, in less than a century. The United States rose gradually, during an interval of more than 150 years, to its peak in relative power. China is on the rising side of its relative power cycle.

Because governments respond to utilities of foreign policy objective using only a fraction of the power at their disposal in any circumstance (such as a foreign intervention), the analyst should not expect a close correlation between underlying indicators of relative power and foreign policy outcomes. No easy and direct relationship exists between relative power and the foreign policy purposes to which that power may be put.

See also *Power Cycle Theory; Systems Structure.*

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Relativism

Relativism refers to any doctrine holding that concepts and beliefs are relative to conditions and thus not universally valid. Relativists usually argue that because one's cultural or historical context determines one's core beliefs, universal knowledge is impossible to discover. This argument moves from *descriptive* relativism, or the factual account of different ethical, metaphysical, and epistemological claims held in the world, to *normative* relativism, the doctrine that such claims are correct *only* in relation to a given nonobjective conceptual framework. Absolute normative relativism is, however, difficult to defend, as it suffers from self-referential incoherence, for its claims are inherently relative. Accordingly, relativism's proponents tend to allow for universal knowledge in some domains, such as in medicine, while denying it in others, such as in ethics. Although critics rightly charge that relativism renders any critical standpoint problematic, the fact of human difference allows for some degree of relativism. Most would accept, for example, that taste in cuisine is culturally relative, but the question is more fraught when it concerns morality. Alternative views of relativism are offered by historicists, pragmatists anthropologists, and sociological theorists. These perspectives, among others, form the foundation of contemporary methodological discussion, as does the stronger relativism of the postmodern scholars.

See also *Consequentialism; Constructivism; Decisionism; Ethics, Political; Essentialism; Historicism; Normative Theory; Pragmatism; Universalism.*

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Reliability

Reliability is the degree to which a measure of a theoretical concept has variable errors. The measure is reliable if measuring the same concept several times produces the same results in each instance. A measure is assumed to contain a fixed part and a variable part. The spread of each part, the variance of a fixed component and the variance of a variable component, and their ratio are used to assess how reliable a measure is. If the ratio of the variance of a fixed part to the variance of a variable part of the same measure is close to zero, then the measure is considered unreliable. This is the case when the variable error is very large. If the ratio of the variance of a fixed part to the variance of a variable part of the same measure is close to one, then the measure is a reliable one. This is the case when the variable error is small. Reliability cannot be computed precisely due to impossibility of the calculation of variances and needs to be estimated. There are four approaches to estimate reliability: interobserver, test–retest, parallel-forms, and internal consistency (split-half, average interitem correlation, and average item-total correlation).

See also *Reliability and Validity Assessment; Statistical Analysis; Validity.*

. . . . TATIANA VASHCHILKO

Reliability and Validity Assessment

In social science research, the terms *reliability* and *validity* refer to the accuracy of measurement. Inaccurate measurements may lead to erroneous or artificial conclusions or inferences.

RELIABILITY

Reliability refers to consistency and uniformity of measurements across multiple administrations of the same instrument. More simply, there should exist some measure of equivalence and consistency in repeated observations of the same phenomenon. Thus, the more consistent the results across repeated measures, the higher the level of reliability. Conversely, the less consistent the results across repeated measures, the lower the level of reliability. Reliability cannot be computed precisely because of the impossibility of the calculation of variances and needs to be estimated.

RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT

In political science, there are four primary methods for assessing the reliability of empirical measurements: the test–retest, alternative-form, split-halves, and internal consistency methods.

The *test-retest method*, or retest method, involves administering the same test of the same phenomenon to the same sample at two different times. If the measurements of both tests are consistent, the measure has high reliability. This method is not without its limitations. Some phenomena, for instance, are measurable only at one particular time, rendering the test-retest method impossible to conduct. Additionally, the test-retest method may suggest unreliable measurements

not because the measure itself is unreliable, but because the phenomenon being studied may have changed in the interval between the two tests, often times as a result of reactivity, or the actual act of testing, which may itself inspire a change in the phenomenon.

The *alternative-form method* is similar in principle to the test-retest method; however, a different mode of test is administered to measure the phenomenon at the second instance. Thus, two parallel but different measures are used instead of measuring the phenomenon using the same measure at each instance. Using two different measures reduces the risk of reactivity. As with the test-retest method, there is risk that the phenomenon itself may change between tests, artificially deflating the perceived reliability of measurements. Furthermore, the alternative-form method poses a unique challenge in that the tests need to be different yet parallel to yield comparable results.

The *split-halves method* affords the researcher the ability to conduct two measures of the same phenomenon at the same time, eliminating the risk of reactivity or the phenomenon itself changing over time. The researcher groups the items being measured into equivalent halves and administers the same test to each and then compares the results. If the results are consistent, the measurements demonstrate a high level of reliability. The split-halves method has its limitations, particularly as there are multiple possibilities as to how the items in each test can be grouped into halves. If the two halves are not identical, there is a high likelihood that the two tests may result in a different measurement on the basis of the halves being nonequivalent.

Finally, reliability can be assessed using the *internal consistency method*. This method, like the split-halves method, allows the researcher to measure a phenomenon at a single point in time. Moreover, like the alternative-form method, internal consistency is based on different measures of the same phenomenon; however, this method measures consistency and correlations among multiple similar items on the same test, thereby eliminating the need to administer two different tests or to split the items being measured into two groups. Therefore, it is implicit that similar items measuring the same phenomenon be included in a single test. If similar measures produce similar scores or illustrate a strong correlation, the measures demonstrate high internal consistency and are highly reliable.

VALIDITY

Validity refers to how well an instrument actually measures what it is designed to measure, or the degree to which a measurement procedure captures a theoretical concept being measured. A measuring instrument that measures what it purports to measure is said to be *valid*. Conversely, an instrument that does not measure what it is designed to measure is said to be *invalid*. However, it is important to note that an instrument may be valid for measuring one particular type of phenomenon but be completely invalid for measuring another. Therefore, when assessing the validity of a given measure, a researcher does not evaluate the measuring instrument itself, but the measuring instrument in relation to its ultimate purpose

TYPES OF VALIDITY AND VALIDITY ASSESSMENT

Disciplines define validity in different terms. In political science, there are four fundamental types of validity. The first is known as *face validity,* which refers to how well an instrument appears on its face to measure the phenomenon it purports to measure. When there is reason to question the correlation between a measuring instrument and the phenomenon it is designed to measure, an instrument lacks face validity. As such, when an instrument seems not to be relevant to the phenomenon it is measuring, or if there is a weak link between the measure and the concept that is being researched, the measure lacks face validity. Therefore, the assessment of face validity is a product of a researcher's deductive reasoning and judgment based on the appearance that a given measure is valid.

Content validity is similar to face validity in that it predicates individual judgment, but it is often more difficult to assess, as it evaluates the extent to which an instrument adequately measures all aspects of a given concept or domain. As a result, the assessment of content validity necessitates the identification of all facets of a phenomenon and then determines the extent to which a measurement reflects and measures each facet. This is particularly difficult when the phenomenon in question is complex or multidimensional, as an instrument is only content valid when it measures all aspects of a given domain. However, if all aspects of a phenomenon are not sufficiently or adequately defined and enumerated, a measure cannot be content valid.

The third type of validity is *construct validity,* the degree to which a measure of a variable corresponds to the theoretical framework of a concept. An instrument is considered to be construct valid when it corresponds to the measure of a related concept. To determine construct validity, a researcher must first identify a potential relationship between two concepts, establish a measure for each, then examine the strength of the relationship between the pair. If the relationship is significant, a measure is construct valid. If no relationship is determined, the measure lacks construct validity, as at least one or the measures must not accurately reflect or measure the phenomenon.

The fourth way to assess validity is known as *interitem association*. It relies on using multiple measures of the same concept to determine validity. Similar to the internal consistency method, it evaluates the reliability of a measure by using more than one measure of a concept within a single measurement instrument. A consistency within outcomes demonstrates the validity of the overall measurement instrument.

See also *Inference; Interview Techniques; Measurement Theory; Questionnaire; Reliability; Resampling Methods; Statistical Analysis; Validity.*

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Religion, Freedom of

See *Freedom of Religion.*

Religion and Politics

Religion and politics are concepts that designate two different and interdependent subsystems of society. Although the concepts are separated analytically, the relationship between religion and politics is characterized by interdependence. A definition of religion widely accepted among social scientists is provided by Peter Berger (1967, 1999), who defines religion as a "set of beliefs that connects the individual to a community, and in turn to a sense of being or purpose that transcends the individual and the mundane." The concept of politics denominates the regulative power to make collectively binding decisions, allocate resources, and solve social problems.

SECULARIZATION AND SECULARISM
The relationship between religion and politics experienced a systematic restructuring in the context of the early modern secularization processes, which led to the emergence of the modern secular state. While the past century has seen a myriad of often contradictory usages of the concept of secularization, most social scientists today agree, at a minimum, on the historical-descriptive conception of secularization as denominating the process of *differentiation* of the secular spheres (e.g., state, law, economy, science, administration) from religious institutions and norms (e.g., the transfer of persons, things, meanings) from ecclesiastical or religious to civil or lay use, possession, or control. This conception is also closest to the etymological origin of the term. Other conceptions of secularization are of teleological nature, as used, for instance, in Berger who prognosticated a worldwide decline in the relevance of religious beliefs in social and political life with increasing societal modernization and rationalization. This conception of secularization has been refuted most prominently in the discipline of the sociology of religion, which has shown that declining levels of religiosity in the twentieth century were a phenomenon confined to Europe and thus a global exception rather than the rule. Contrary to prognoses about the "end of religion" in the twentieth century, a worldwide resurgence of private and public religion has taken place.

A third conception of secularization denominates the privatization of religion—the relegation of religious norms,

Archbishop Desmond Tutu, left, visits with African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela shortly after Mandela's 1990 release from prison in South Africa. Political and religious figures often interact with one another to serve their causes.

SOURCE: Corbis

practices, and beliefs to the private realm. John Rawls postulated that religion be taken "off the agenda" in liberal democratic politics and, in his 1993 work *Political Liberalism,* asserted that secularization as privatization is a requirement to the liberal democratic state. The Rawlsian postulate has been rejected by recent democratic theory, and Rawls himself moderated his position in a later journal article. A decisive revision of the Rawlsian postulate was undertaken by Alfred Stepan's (2001) concept of the *twin tolerations* between religion and the state. Stepan posits that democratic politics requires the separation of religious and political authority, but beyond this allows for a variety of arrangements of cooperation and accommodation between the two spheres. Democracy needs the twin tolerations, defined as mutually respected spheres of autonomy between religion and the state, "freedom for democratically elected governments, and freedom for religious organizations in civil and political society," but does not require secularity in the sense of a strict institutional separation of state and religion.

Secularism commonly refers to the division of the religious and political spheres in modern society, and therefore, contrary to secularization, to a condition rather than a process. At times, secularism denotes "an ideology or set of beliefs that advocates the marginalization of religion from other spheres of life."

RELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICS AND RELIGION IN THE CONTEMPORARY STATE

STATE REGULATION OF RELIGION

Contemporary states exhibit great variation in the formal relationships between religion and politics. Some level of interweavement of religion and politics in the modern state is the rule, while a strict institutional separation between the two is the exception. Most states entertain complex relationships between religion and politics, in that they, for instance, allow for religious instruction in public schools, provide public subsidies for private religious schools, recognize religious holidays as state holidays, provide welfare through (or in partnership with) religious institutions, grant tax breaks to religious organizations, allocate to religious institutions and authorities time in public broadcasting, and maintain or subsidize buildings and venues used or owned by religious institutions. These arrangements are prevalent in most societies, irrespective of the majority religion—they can be found around the world, whether the majority religion is Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Christian, or otherwise. Some states even recognize an official state religion; this is the case among long-standing democracies such as Denmark, Finland, Greece, Norway, and the United Kingdom, as well as nondemocratic regimes, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Within the great variance of religion-state relationships, it is useful to identify some archetypes. At one extreme of the continuum of institutional religion-state relations stands strict separation of religion and state, such as is *de jure* in the United States. Since 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court interprets the Establishment Clause as constituting a "wall of separation" between religion and state. At the other extreme of the continuum stand regimes that highly regulate religion, such as theocratic and atheist regimes. The Islamic Republic of Iran presents an example wherein religious and political authority is merged, the legal system purports to be Islamic, conversion away from Islam is punishable by death, and religious institutions (e.g., mosques, seminaries, religious schools) are highly regulated by the state. Albania between 1967 and 1989 is an example of an atheist regime, where all religions, religious organizations, and religious practice were prohibited; religious schools were closed, religious authorities persecuted. Between these extremes of strict separation on the one hand and high regulation of religion by the state on the other are several archetypes that present mixed systems.

The state is the principal authority structuring relations between religion and politics. Because state policies aim at the allocation of goods and resources as well as the solution of social conflicts, they also tend to involve some regulation of religious affairs. This is done through constitutional provisions and legislation. Because nondemocratic regimes tend to regulate society and societal affairs more intensively than democratic regimes do, this also applies to religion: nondemocratic regimes often exhibit higher levels of regulation of religion than democracies do. Due to requirements of certain rights standards in democratic politics in the realm of civil rights, human rights, and religious freedom, there are limits with regard to how much democratic regimes can regulate religion before violating or undermining their democratic foundations. Too much regulation of religion necessarily involves the violation of human or civil rights (for instance, tying citizenship to a particular religious affiliation; recognizing only certain religions and not others; limiting the rights of certain religions to organize, practice, and assemble).

Jonathan Fox (2007) has classified countries around the world with regard to the level of separation between religion and state. In its first round, Fox's Religion and State Dataset comprised five main indicators that measure the relations between state and religion (RAS) in 175 countries for the years 1990 until 2002: (1) formal establishment or nonestablishment of religion in the state, (2) regulation of the majority religion, (3) regulation of minority religions, (4) religious elements in general legislation, and (5) enforcement levels. The five indicators in turn consist of numerous subindicators. A composite score that comprises all five dimensions ranges from 0 (the lowest score, given to the United States) to 77 (the highest score, given to Saudi Arabia). RAS ranges in most democracies between 0 and 35. Long-standing democracies show great variation in the extent to which the state regulates religion: from the near absence of regulation (i.e., strict formal separation) in Australia, South Korea, and the United States to high levels in Finland or Greece. Generally, it can be observed that Christian-Orthodox states tend to exhibit higher levels of state regulation of religion than is the case in Catholic or Protestant countries. Muslim-majority countries showcase great variance in the level of regulation, between Senegal (3), Albania (8), Mali (17), Lebanon (22), and Iran (66).

Apart from the relationship between politics and religion elucidated above, religion plays a political role in contemporary states through two formal institutions: religious law and religious political parties.

RELIGIOUS LAW

Most states outside the Christian-majority world, but even several Catholic and Christian-Orthodox countries, uphold sizable bodies of religious laws and statutes. This is the case most prominently in the realm of personal status law, where issues of marriage, divorce, and custody are regulated according to positivized religious norms (for instance, in India; Israel; most Muslim-majority states except for Turkey, Albania, and the former CIS states; as well as Catholic-majority states like Ireland and Italy; and Christian-Orthodox countries like Armenia, Georgia, and Greece). Beyond personal status law, matters such as inheritance and common-law trusts are often regulated by religious law. Religious law is usually promulgated by the state or a state-instituted body of religious

authorities who are granted a mandate over the delineation of religious law.

The existence of religious law brings to light the continuing tensions that exist between liberal notions of citizenship that do not differentiate between citizens based on religion, language, or ethnicity, and the demands that religious norms continue to exert on adherents. Some of the questions related to religious law provoke the most heated normative debates. Controversies usually revolve around the extent of religious jurisdiction; which body is authorized to positivize and reform religious law; the composition of this body; the methodology of deriving religious law and the sources of law; the training and appointment of those adjudicating on the basis of religion; and ways in which national law, including religious law, can be brought in line with international human rights conventions that states have signed and ratified.

RELIGIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES

The second institution through which religion may exert a major impact on politics of the contemporary state are religious political parties, which range from Christian parties in Catholic countries, to the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India, Jewish Orthodox parties in Israel, and Islamic parties in countries of the Muslim world. The prohibition of religious parties in democracies as, for instance, in Mali, Portugal, Senegal, and elsewhere is problematic from the perspective of democratic theory. Political parties are a constitutive element of democratic systems because of their intermediary functions of representation and aggregation of interests in processes of political decision-making. Liberal notions of democracy posit that any societal group must have the right to found and run a political party and represent their interests in politics. Not the ethos of a political party is decisive for democratization but its conformity with constitutional provisions and democratic norms, behavior, and attitudes. Constraints on political parties ought only be imposed after a party, by its actions, is proven to have violated democracy.

RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY

While most democratic theorists will agree that the values of democracy and human rights derive from extrareligious sources, democracies rely on the existence of a certain ethos for citizens to obey laws and rulers to prioritize the public good over individual pursuits. It is here that religion can play an important role. In the words of Abdolkarim Soroush, "Democracy cannot prosper without commitment to moral precepts. It is here that the great debt of democracy to religion is revealed: Religions, as bulwarks of morality, can serve as the best guarantors of democracy" (2000). While democracies need to be neutral toward worldviews, including religious views, they do rely on certain sources of morality, for which religion may be a source as well as constitutional and republican values.

Whereas the first two waves of democracy were predominantly Protestant waves, the third wave (post-1974) is often referred to as the "Catholic wave and the fourth wave

(post-1989) has involved numerous Orthodox-Christian and non-Christian majority countries with Buddhist, Confucian, and Muslim backgrounds. While the question of the compatibility of democracy with certain religions occupied a great deal of scholarship until recently, the fourth wave has given empirical credence to the argument that all religions are multivocal and can be reconciled with democratic values and human rights, if and where local religious intellectuals succeed in generating arguments within their own religious traditions supportive of such values. In turn, given the interdependent relationship between religion and politics, religious beliefs and practices evolve within the context of sociopolitical institutions. That is, the political regime type can significantly shape religious beliefs and practices in the medium to long term.

RECENT TRENDS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH ON RELIGION AND POLITICS

The interest for the role of religion in politics and society dramatically increased in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Methodologically, empirical-analytical and institutionalist approaches have since been dominant in the study of religion in comparative politics. In more sociological accounts, the religious economy approach has been popular, which treats religious organizations as firms competing in a religious market to increase or maintain their adherents. Research agendas focus on the function, collective actions, and political significance of religious actors, religious movements, religious authorities, and religious political parties in domestic and international politics.

Three research programs are particularly salient in the literature on religion and politics:

1. *The relationship between religion, religious actors, movements, and institutions on the one hand, and the state on the other, and the impact of this relationship on a number of issues: regime stability, development, and rights standards.* Of particular interest is the extent to which state regulation limits religious freedom, how state regulation of religion impacts regime stability and erosion, and how the provision of welfare by religious authorities affects the quality of citizenship and, in turn, regime stability.

2. *The transnational character of religion.* Religion increasingly crosses national boundaries and exerts an impact as a transnational phenomenon on domestic politics. For a long time, the Catholic Church functioned as the largest transnational religious organization, which until today with very few exceptions controls clerical appointments and finances across the world from its center in the Holy See and enjoys the status of a sovereign entity in international law. Besides the Catholic Church, numerous Protestant, Islamic, Jewish, and Hindu movements have begun to catch the attention of political scientists as transnational actors. Research in this area focuses on the effects of the charitable nature of transnational religious movements, as well as violent and terrorist religious activism.

3. *Religion as an independent variable in peace and conflict studies.* Studies concentrate on the question of whether religion and religious actors contribute to the emergence, continuity, or management and solution of conflict. The results of these studies show that (a) religion lends itself to the political instrumentalization for the mobilization and polarization of conflicting parties (examples reach from post-Hussein Iraq to conflict on the Molukkas in late 1990s to Darfur), but also (b) religious authorities can function as powerful managers and mediators in violent conflicts (as happened in apartheid South Africa, post–genocide Rwanda, and post-independence East Timor).

See also *Buddhist Political Thought; Church and State; Civil Religion; Clericalism; Concordat; Confucian Political Thought; Culture Wars; Evangelicalism; Faith-based Initiative; Fundamentalism; Hindu Political Thought; Islamic Political Thought; Jewish Political Thought; Laicite; Orthodoxy in Political Thought; Papacy; Pentecostalism; Protestant Political Thought; Puritanism; Religion and Politics; Religious Minorities; Religious Parties; Religious Persecution; Roman Catholic Social Thought; State Church; Theocracy.*

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Religious Minorities

In 1843, Karl Marx announced, "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people." And it seemed that a little more than one hundred years later, many Westerners had kicked their religious habits. Shortly after Marx, God's obituary writer Friedrich Nietzsche famously stated that God was dead and that we had killed Him, and by the 1960s, religion was indeed supposed to be dead. In 1967, Martin E. Marty (2004) suggested that spirituality as a topic of public discourse had been abandoned in that decade; however, religion turned out to be the great vanishing act of the twentieth century, reappearing in a flood of intolerance. The past two decades have seen a dramatic resurgence in religious interest, and religious minorities have been at the center.

RELIGIOUS FRAGMENTATION

For most of the twentieth century, the principal interest in religious minorities was as a sociological group deserving of particular rights, but of little interest to politics other than that, and an array of international, regional, and national declarations and laws were introduced to protect their rights. Gradually accepting its marginalization in relation to the state, Western Christianity relinquished most of its political functions to the state and loosened hold on the status of national religion, while religious minorities increasingly demanded recognition.

This move to a religious level playing field had the dual benefits of recognizing emerging minority rights while neutralizing religious influence on the national political scene, or so it seemed. Jonathan Fox (2008) argues that religious discrimination has, in fact, increased since 1990, and he offers six major reasons: policies of domestic protection from external influence, religion seen as challenging the state, perception of religious movements as dangerous, religion already linked to national identity, existence of a symbiotic relationship between religion and state, and state religion itself creating discrimination against competitors.

Religious resurgence has fragmented majority religions into minority groups from within and led to the emergence of new religions. Some religious minorities are dismissed universally as a cult, and new religions are frequently ridiculed or discriminated against. They can be perceived as dangerous cults like the Branch Davidians and Aum Shinrikyo, as harmful like

the Unification Church or Scientology, and as disruptive like Islam fundamentalism. Other religions, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons, are treated as borderline sects. Religious discrimination also may overlap with ethnic discrimination, such as in the case of Jews and Sikhs, and create further problems of classification.

VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

This has played out differently around the globe, and William James' phrase "the varieties of religious experience" is more apt than ever. Samuel Huntingdon (1993) argues that religious resurgence is a response to urbanization and massive social changes in the twentieth century. As people feel more alienated, religion provides meaning and identity. In the Western consumer culture, it has come back as consumer choice, and as the major political blocs of communism fell, religion filled the void. The religious wars of old gave way in the late twentieth century to new forms of religious terrorism and ethnic cleansing. States also have agonized over more subtle issues like the role of religious dress in schools and in public.

Islam is at the forefront of this debate. The watershed Iranian Revolution (1979) marked the rise of a more globally visible Islam, becoming politically important because of its impact on Arab politics where it is dominant and a concern where it is a minority, particularly in the West. The 9/11 attacks, other acts of extremism, "hate speeches," the Danish cartoon controversy, and the killing of a Dutch filmmaker have highlighted the tensions in liberal policies of multiculturalism and tolerance. Yet, Islam today is not just about fundamentalism, for there has been a general revitalization of the faith. In the areas of immigration, education, and use of Islamic law there has been a desire of Islamic minorities to hold onto their faith in non-Islamic cultures. Many Muslims reject secularism and want to promote Islamic non-Western values and identity, eschewing hierarchy while balancing transnational and local ideas.

Christianity remains the world's largest religion, but continually splinters into minorities largely because of liberal and conservative differences on theological and cultural matters. The most significant today is evangelical Pentecostalism, which is growing exponentially in Africa, Asia, and South America to the point of shifting the center of Christian gravity. Hence, in Central and Latin America, evangelicals have challenged hitherto Roman Catholic dominance and become an important political influence promoting conservative and laissez-faire ideals, while conservative Anglicans in America have sought communion with dissenting African bishops over issues like homosexuality.

A SEARCH FOR TOLERANCE

The secularization thesis that wealthy societies would repudiate religion as people found their comfort, or opiate, elsewhere, no longer prevails. Perceiving a failure of secularism and liberal democracy, religious minorities have challenged both political and religious orthodoxy. Religious minorities challenge the Western universalist model of religion as a private sphere where all religions are merely different spiritual paths. The problem is that religions make truth claims that often conflict with liberal ideals, cultural trends, and other faiths, and that stray from the parameters acceptable to liberal tolerance. For instance, debates with feminism, sexual ethics, animal rights and ecology bring religious minorities and liberal values into conflict over other rights, such as the role of women in religious life, abortion, ritual slaughter, and stewardship of the earth's resources.

It is increasingly recognized that identifying an individual or group purely according to religious identity begs gross oversimplification. People belong to gender, class, nation, and various other identifiers, wherein they may hold as much in common as they have in religious difference. It is also an oversimplification to assume there is a singular faith, for each faith is multifaceted. In this spirit, some religionists react by generating interfaith dialog and understanding, arguably the converse of twentieth century relativism. By working together, even agreeing to disagree, they believe tension and conflict can ultimately be transformed into harmony. Religions represent different truth claims, but they are also a human search for ultimate meaning. Thinkers and policy makers who thought we would grow out of it ignored this very core of religion, but the general resurgence of religion and the burgeoning of religious minorities demand a new search for tolerance in the early twenty-first century.

See also *Abortion and Politics; Church and State; Civil Religion; Confessional Parties; Freedom of Religion; Islamic Political Thought; Religion and Democracy; Religion and Politics; Religious Parties; Religious Persecution; Religious Right; Terrorism, Political.*

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Religious Parties

Religious or confessional parties are political formations that promote religious ideas, symbols, policies, and goals. Whereas religious parties make religion central to their activity, other parties use religion and religious symbols to gain additional electoral support, without making religion their main concern. Their social base is represented by the religious group whose interests they represent, but often their sympathizers include religiously neutral or inactive individuals.

In the past century, religious parties have emerged in democracies and nondemocracies alike. The historical context of anticlericalism, the political role of the clergy, the minority or majority status of the religion, and the structure of the political and party systems have contributed to their appearance. Religious parties are differentiated not so much by the form of government in which they operate as by the religion they advocate for and the role they envision for religion in society.

CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS PARTIES

Christian religious parties originated in the nineteenth century. In his 1891 encyclical *Rerum novarum,* Pope Leo XIII advocated the creation of Catholic popular organizations, a call heeded by Catholics in Europe and Latin America. In time, Catholic organizations turned into parties seeking to determine their countries' political agendas. Christian Democrat parties have played important political roles after World War II (1939–1945). While European Christian Democrats advocate center-right policies, Latin American Christian Democrats are center-left in orientation.

In western Europe, Christian Democratic parties emerged in countries where Catholics constituted a large part of the population, but secular forces (Belgium and Italy) and Protestant ones (the Netherlands) challenged the Catholic influence on social and educational policy. In Italy and Germany, Christian Democrats represented the mainstream social–conservative political forces tied to the dominant Catholic Church; in Sweden, they surged as a center-right force linked to the minority evangelical Free Churches. While the proportion of Catholics in western Europe remains high, few of them are practicing, thus leaving room for the mobilization of liberal or socialist secular political forces. In eastern Europe, Christian Democratic parties appeared as a result of renewed religiosity. While in the 1990s Christian Democrats briefly formed the government in Romania and Bulgaria, they could not retain the support of societies that believed that religion should be separate from politics. Though present in other postcommunist countries, Christian Democrats have played no significant political role.

In Latin America, Christian Democrats embrace a liberation theology agenda, rising against formations that challenge the place of religion in society and advocating a capitalist economy. Among the strongest is the Chilean Christian Democrat Party, which supports a strong national government and legislative proposals that bridge communism and capitalism. In other countries, Christian Democrats have embraced statism and have abandoned their roots in Catholic social thought.

JEWISH AND ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS PARTIES

In Israel, religious parties have aimed to establish a Jewish state governed by the Jewish religious code, the *halacha.* These parties consider the Jewish colonization of Greater Israel (Eretz Israel) legitimate and oppose the creation of a Palestinian state. Religious parties registered their greatest success in the 1999 elections, when together they won 21 percent of Knesset seats. The oldest party, Agoudat Israel, was created as an ultraorthodox Ashkenazi party to advocate strict observance of religious law. Its successor, the Sephardic Torah Guardians (Shas), advocates Jewish colonization of the occupied territories. Until its dissolution in 2008, the National Religious Party (Mafdal) supported all government coalitions, occupying the Ministry of Interior and Religion and initiating most religious legislation in Israel.

Islamic religious parties have gained prominence in reaction to U.S. policies in the Middle East. U.S. intervention has radicalized some Muslims in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Palestine, and Turkey. The rise of political Islam has been most marked in the countries most closely linked to the United States. In Iraq, the Da'wa and the Islamic Mission Party represent the southern Shiite community. In 2002, a right-wing coalition of Pakistani religious parties (the Muttahida Majlis Amal) won parliamentary representation and formed ultraconservative and pro-Islamist provincial governments in two provinces bordering Afghanistan. In Egypt, the nominally banned Muslim Brotherhood became the official opposition in 2005. The poor often feel that religious parties represent justice, integrity, and equitable resource distribution, hence the strong showing of Hamas in Palestine, the dramatic rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the electoral triumph of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey.

The persistence of religious parties baffles researchers. The increased secularization of European societies should drastically reduce the social basis of Christian Democratic parties, while the rise of Islamic parties following the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan should diminish these parties' support once the foreign intervention is over. Despite expectations, Christian Democrats have registered tremendous success and have showed resilience in secular and democratic Europe, discarding their initial principles and objectives to become secular forces governing secular societies. Similarly, voters continue to support parties that advocate a greater role for Islam in the political and social life of Middle Eastern countries.

Despite worries that they oppose tolerance and pluralism, moderate religious parties can coexist with democracy. The institutional context, electoral politics, party unity, party rules and leadership, and political learning explain why religious parties become moderate or radical (extremist), regardless of the religion to which they adhere. This observation is important because moderate religious parties may contribute to democratic stability, but the extremist ones can undermine liberal

democracy. As studies on religious parties in secular Israel and Turkey demonstrate, religious parties do not emerge as a religious liberal alternative to authoritarian secular nationalist ideologies, despite their capacity to expand the boundaries of political discourse. In emerging democracies, by contrast, the rise of religious parties is more worrisome. When radical religious parties win critical elections in emerging democracies, they can stall and even reverse democratization by imposing theocratic authoritarian institutions.

See also *Church and State; Islamic Political Thought; Jewish Political Thought; Protestant Political Thought; Roman Catholic Social Thought.*

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Religious Persecution

Religious persecution can be broadly defined as an action that either obstructs or inhibits religious practice or that seeks to impose particular religious or antireligious norms. Students of religious persecution disagree about what constitutes persecution; some scholars consider any adversity caused due to religious belief to be persecution, while others have suggested more stringent criteria of bodily harm, displacement, or death. Either the state or a particular religious or social community may serve as the primary agent of persecution. In cases where subnational groups engage in persecution, the national government may either be complicit in the activity or unable to stop it.

The most extreme form of persecution consists of a direct campaign against either a particular religious group or against all persons who do not belong to a dominate faith position in a territorial area. Either through genocide, forced migration, or forced conversion, such campaigns attempt to eliminate the targeted religion(s) from a particular area. The Spanish Inquisition by Catholic monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabella, against Muslims, Jews, and nonconformists, is one of history's best known examples.

More commonly, persecution undermines religious freedom rather than directly assaulting it. In many cases the state's regulatory power imposes burdensome restrictions that inhibit the ability of adherents to practice their religion; for example, by consistently refusing to allow the construction of places of worship. In other instances, the state may deny benefits, services or opportunities to the targeted group. The state also may restrict freedom by compelling its citizens to follow a specific set of norms, such as the explicit prohibition of the religious attire of a part of the population or the requirement that all residents of a state conform to religious standards of the majority.

Powerful substate actors also engage in religious persecution. In some cases, the state tacitly allows or encourages social or religious communities to carry out persecution. A state might formally provide for religious freedom, but allow a dominant social community to informally exclude other religious communities from opportunities such as employment, or allow a campaign of intimidation by failing to sanction acts such as the destruction of places of worship. Substate persecution is also a common feature in weak or failing states. In these instances, persecution frequently takes on a violent character and often is linked with ethnic or regional conflict. One example is Lashkar Jihad's assault on Christians in Indonesia's Maluku Islands.

The principle of religious freedom as a human right is enshrined in Article 18 of the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and again in the binding International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified in 1977. These conventions guarantee all persons equality of treatment regardless of religious beliefs or the lack of such beliefs, and freedom of exercise in matters of conscience except when this causes a specific conflict with social order. A variety of theories have been advanced to account for the development of the acknowledged right to religious freedom, and the classification of denial of such rights as persecution. One widely held theory credits a rise of Enlightenment liberalism and mass identification with a national state, along with a corresponding decrease of the importance of religion to identity. Other scholars have challenged this explanation, contending that a form of rational-choice theory in which individual states allow religious freedom when the benefit to the state outweighs the cost provides a better explanation.

Despite the assertion of freedom of religion as a human right, governments still claim to legitimately enforce laws that restrict some aspects of religious practice. The most common justification comes from balancing a right to religious freedom against other functions of the state. In such instances the state contends that some other fundamental interest of the state trumps its population's right to religious freedom. Controversy persists regarding which restrictions are legitimate exercises of state authority, particularly when a state possesses an explicitly secular or religious identity.

Much attention has been focused on religious persecution in countries that incorporate *sharia* law into their legal systems. Enforcement of provisions prohibiting Muslims from leaving Islam has been particularly scrutinized. Consistent with an understanding that allows fundamental state interests preference over religious liberty, many states in the Islamic world made reservations to Article 18 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, agreeing to follow the article only insomuch as it is consistent with their interpretation of sharia. Religious constituencies in the United States have called for these restrictions on religious freedom to be officially opposed as religious persecution in U.S. foreign policy.

Religious persecution is officially condemned both by the United Nations and by many of the world's most influential nations. However, despite the fact that religious persecution is criticized as a violation of fundamental human rights, active opposition to persecution is routinely evaluated against both other foreign policy goals and against what can be realistically achieved by such opposition. Citizens of strong states who experience religious persecution frequently have little remedy in practice.

See also *Balkans; Church and State; Freedom of Conscience; Freedom of Religion; Human Rights; Religion and Politics; Religious Minorities.*

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Religious Right

The *religious right* refers to the political movement of Christian conservatives, most of whom are evangelical Protestants, which began in the United States in the 1970s, gathered momentum in the 1980s, and became institutionalized in the 1990s. Some supporters actually see the term *religious right* as derogatory, preferring instead the appellation *profamily movement.* The religious right is best classified as a social movement, although many of its social movement organizations are well-established interest groups. The movement is perhaps most noteworthy for the significant extent to which it has mobilized grassroots activism at the state and local levels, especially in recent years. Although the religious right has not brought about large numbers of substantial, transforming policy victories, the movement has had great success in affecting electoral outcomes from the top of the ballot to the bottom. The roots of this success lie in the religious right's thoroughgoing partisan realignment of millions of evangelical Protestant voters. At least three-quarters of all evangelicals are Republicans.

RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS

From a religious perspective, evangelical Protestants are distinctive in three major ways. First, they take the conservative view that scripture is the revealed word of God. Second, they emphasize the "born-again" experience, in which Jesus Christ

is intentionally accepted as one's personal savior. Third, they engage in evangelism, which means that they actively seek to convert others to Christianity. They constitute 25 to 30 percent of the U.S. population, and their numbers have grown steadily since the 1970s.

The religious right's political and social agendas traditionally have been rooted in an overriding desire to preserve a traditional, nuclear, heterosexual model of family. The movement's opposition to abortion and gay rights is well known and rooted in a worldview that rejects nontraditional interpretations of gender roles, family structure, and sexual morality. Certain factions of the movement also emphasize education policy (including advocacy of home schooling and the battle over biology and sex education curricula in public schools), religion's place in the public square (by supporting school prayer and other public expressions of Christian faith), and obscenity in the media.

THE EARLY YEARS

Evangelicals first attracted attention as a political force in 1980 when they voted in large numbers for Ronald Reagan. Their intense and sudden mobilization in that election year marked a sharp departure from a long-standing evangelical tradition of political avoidance. For generations, evangelical Protestant leaders had argued that politics was a dirty and sinful forum; Christians, they felt, were better served by avoiding politics. Events of the 1960s and 1970s, however, caused a sea change in evangelical opinions about the propriety of political participation. Many evangelicals felt threatened by the sweeping social changes of the 1960s. They lamented the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions decreeing school prayer unconstitutional and abortion constitutional. There was also great disappointment in evangelical circles with the presidency of Jimmy Carter, a professed born-again Christian and Sunday school teacher. During the 1970s, evangelical leaders began to conclude that their political views were not being represented by what they viewed as an increasingly secular American government.

Evangelical Baptist minister and religious broadcaster Jerry Falwell noticed this sense of unease and responded to it by founding the Moral Majority, an interest group designed to represent religiously and politically conservative Americans. Along with several smaller interest groups, the Moral Majority mobilized millions of evangelicals to vote for Reagan in 1980 and attracted substantial attention (first from the media, later from scholars) to itself and its high-profile leader. For example, Falwell was listed among the ten "Most Admired Men in America" in *Good Housekeeping* magazine several times in the 1980s. As the decade wore on, however, the religious right began to lose some of its energy. Several evangelical religious broadcasters became embroiled in various sexual and financial scandals in the late 1980s, and despite its great visibility, the Moral Majority had won few victories on Capitol Hill. Falwell disbanded the Moral Majority in 1989.

THE CHRISTIAN COALITION

A new leader emerged in 1988 to lead the religious right into the next decade, however: Rev. Marion "Pat" Robertson. A

Yale-educated lawyer and religious broadcaster, Robertson made a surprisingly strong run for the 1988 Republican presidential nomination (he came in second in the Iowa Caucuses, ahead of George H. W. Bush). His presidential bid ultimately failed, but Robertson used the momentum his campaign had generated to launch a new interest group to represent the religious right—the Christian Coalition. Robertson's organization went on to become one of the most powerful lobbies in Washington in the 1990s. Its lobbying tactics were much more refined than those of the Moral Majority. It also solidified evangelical voters' commitment to the Republican Party and its candidates, in large part because of the voting guides it published and distributed in evangelical churches across the United States. The Christian Coalition is a shadow of its former self. It has endured many changes in leadership, a dramatic falloff in membership and fund-raising, and a messy (and ultimately unsuccessful) battle with the Internal Revenue Service, which accused the organization of illegal electioneering because its voter guides almost always scored Republican candidates favorably and Democratic candidates unfavorably.

Despite the decline of the Christian Coalition, the religious right remains alive and well as a force in American politics. Its strength lies not in one visible national-level organization but in its sophisticated networks of evangelical (and, increasingly, traditional Catholic) activists at the state and local levels. Many conservative Christians have been elected to school boards, city and county government posts, and state legislatures. Conservative Christian activists also hold enormous sway over many state- and local-level Republican Party organizations. The primary strategy of the Bush-Cheney reelection campaign in 2004 focused on mobilizing so-called values voters, a code word for conservative Christians, in battleground states. The religious right displays little of the Moral Majority's political inexperience. Instead, conservative Christians are savvy participants in the American political process.

See also *Evangelicalism; Protestant Political Thought; Religion and Politics; Religious Parties.*

. . . . LAURA OLSON

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Rendition

See *Interstate Rendition.*

Renner, Karl

Karl Renner (1870–1950) was an Austrian socialist who was the chancellor of the Austrian Republic from 1918 to 1920 and president of the Second Republic from 1945 to 1950. During his first term he signed successive peace treaties yielding Austrian territory to Czechoslovakia and Italy. In 1919 he was summoned by the Entente to sign the Treaty of Saint-Germain, which concluded World War I (1914–1918). The treaty contained a clause prohibiting Austria's union with Germany. As Renner supported the annexation of Austria by Germany, he thereupon resigned. Even after losing his office, Renner advocated Austria's entry into the League of Nations. He became leader of the Social Democratic Party's right wing in the 1920s and was president of the lower house of parliament from 1930 to 1933, a period that also witnessed the rise of the Nazis in Germany. In 1938 he supported Adolph Hitler's Anschluss, the political union of Germany and Austria.

Upon Germany's defeat in World War II (1939–1945) and the occupation of Vienna by the Soviets in 1945, Renner formed a provisional government under Soviet auspices and became the first chancellor of the Second Republic.

Renner wrote the *Osterreichs Erneuerung* in three volumes in 1916 and his memoirs, *An der Wende Zweier Zeiten,* in 1946. With his classic work on jurisprudence, *Rechts-Institute des Privatrechts und ihre soziale funktion* (1929), he became one of the founders of the discipline of sociology of law. As an authority on private and public rights, he applied Marxist theory to command economy and the role of the new middle class. Renner was a preeminent statesman-scholar who played a major role in preserving Austrian national identity after two world wars.

See also *German Political Thought.*

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Rent-seeking

Rent-seeking, broadly conceived, is the allocation of resources by people or organizations in the pursuit of rents created by the government. The conceptual framework of rent-seeking emphasizes the net welfare loss to society because of intervention failure. An increased economic and financial regulatory role of the government is blamed for encouraging and rewarding unproductive activities, such as lobbying for protection, competing for import licensing, and persuading legislators to enact barriers to domestic entry, to allocate income to the target interest groups.

The term *rent-seeking* was coined in the 1970s, a time of academic and intellectual reassessment of prevailing Keynesian

economics, which allows for an economic regulatory role for the government. With the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, free market or laissez-faire economic literature, emanating primarily from the Chicago school of economics and its prominent scholar Milton Friedman, advocated for a limited role for government in economic affairs. Monopoly and monopoly-inducing legislations were perceived as the antithesis of competition and free market activities. The prevailing literature at the time cited primarily the net welfare loss to society because of diverting resources from production through lobbying, or what was later termed as *rent-seeking*.

Gordon Tullock (1967) first explored the implication of rent-seeking behavior on conventional welfare as a result of tariffs, monopoly, and theft within the tradition of positive economic analysis and public choice theory. Ann Krueger (1974) officially coined the term *rent-seeking* and focused on government interventions in developing countries with respect to quantitative restrictions on international trade. Richard Posner (1975) went a step further and contended that there is a higher social cost from public regulation than there is from private monopoly. Jagdish Bhagwati (1982) tried to expand the term to include a synthesis of market-distorting activities, including rent-seeking as a subcategory. Rent-seeking also has been cited as a possible explanation for the reported increase in government expenditure as a percentage of GNP between 1960 and the 1990s.

Two of the most cited examples of rent-seeking relate to lobbying activities of dairy farmers and the automobile industry in the United States. Lobbying activities by dairy farmers include milk price support and other agricultural policies that are ultimately taken up by the consumer through higher costs. U.S. import restrictions on automobiles support the stakeholders and workers of the automobile industry while disadvantaging the consumer. Gordon Tullock (1993, 2005) cited the lack of information, ignorance, romanticizing of farm life in the American psyche, and the patriotic ideologies that weaken voter resistance to such legislations as possible explanations for the continuation of lobbying and other rent-seeking activities of both industries.

See also *Corruption, Political; Economic Systems, Comparative; Farm Lobby; Institutionalism, Comparative; Laissez-faire; Nontariff Barriers to Trade; Protectionism and Tariffs.*

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Reparations

Reparations are a long-standing legal, moral, and cultural concept that has, in recent years, attracted considerable attention from human rights advocates, political leaders, survivors of atrocities, and researchers.

DEFINING REPARATIONS

Scholarship on reparations, or redress, has struggled to address widespread confusion and disagreement over the meaning of key terms of debate. Given the notoriety of the punitive extraction of monetary reparations from Germany under the Treaty of Versailles, the term *reparations* often is equated with forced financial compensation. However, under international law, as reflected in the United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, *reparations* is an umbrella term covering five different types of redress: restitution, compensation, satisfaction, rehabilitation, and guarantees of nonrepetition of the offense. Restitution has traditionally been viewed as the preferred form of redress where attempts are made to restore the conditions that existed prior to a violation, such as by returning lost land or artifacts. Compensation entails monetary payment for material or moral injuries, and satisfaction attempts to redress moral injuries through a range of potential mechanisms, including truth commissions, public commemorations, and apologies. While rehabilitation involves delivering assistance, such as medical and social services, as a form of redress, guarantees of nonrepetition may entail institutional and legal reforms designed to prevent future violations.

In contrast to this legalistic approach, some scholars underscore the deep roots the idea of reparations has in different cultural traditions and ethical and religious frameworks. Some contend that the legal tools of remedy are "all different levels of acknowledgement . . . by perpetrators for the need to amend past injustices," and define reparations as the "entire spectrum of attempts to rectify historical injustices.'" (Barkan 2001, xviii, xix).

LEGAL FOUNDATIONS

It is a basic maxim of law that harms should be redressed, and every legal system requires that this obligation be met in some form. The right to a remedy may be considered a secondary right that follows from a breach of primary rights, such as the right not to be tortured. The 1928 Permanent Court of International Justice *Chorzów Factory* decision established the basic remedial norms for violations of international law. The ruling stated that "reparation must, so far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation that would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed" (PCIJ 1928; Shelton 2002, 835).

International law has historically focused on reparations as a tool to remedy wrongs between states, a perspective reflected in the International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility. Yet, depending on the actors involved and

the relevant legal and political frameworks, reparations claims may be made by and against a range of actors, including individuals, ethnic or community groups, states, corporations, and international organizations.

Most contemporary reparations campaigns attempt to secure reparations for individuals, often in large groups, from states that have violated human rights. The individual's right to redress under international law evolved out of the post–World War II (1939–1945) human rights regime and is reflected in agreements like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, respect for the individual's right to redress has been limited by a lack of effective and accessible enforcement mechanisms at the international level and often at the domestic level.

THE MODERN REPARATIONS MOVEMENT

Despite the absence in many cases of effective and accessible judicial mechanisms, various survivor groups have, in recent decades, met with notable success in generating public support for their reparations campaigns and creating pressure for politically mediated solutions to their claims. The negotiation of a compensation agreement in 1952 through which West Germany provided redress to both the state of Israel and individual Holocaust survivors often is identified as the first major example of a modern reparations process. However, the emergent reparations movement mostly stagnated until the 1990s when Holocaust survivors filed class action suits in U.S. courts against three leading Swiss banks for their complicity in the Holocaust. Although ultimately resolved out of court, this campaign prompted renewed interest in the rectification of historical injustices and propelled various complex reparation claims onto national and international political agendas, including the cases of Korean women sexually enslaved by the Japanese Imperial Army in World War II, Japanese Americans interned during World War II, and the abuse of indigenous peoples in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. Long-standing debates on reparations for slavery were reignited in the United States, while South Africa struggled to come to terms with and redress the legacies of apartheid.

The past two decades also witnessed the development of new types of institutions intended to redress historical injustices, including truth and reconciliation commissions, internationally supported compensation commissions, and property restitution commissions designed to facilitate the return of real property to displaced persons. This period also saw the development of more community-oriented, collective approaches to redress. While reparations advocates and scholars initially focused predominantly on cases involving affluent Western democracies, the reparations movement has broadened to include a stronger focus on cases in the global South, solidifying the connection between reparations politics and transitional justice.

THEORETICAL DEBATES

Among other issues, theoretical debates on reparations have focused on the contention that "struggles over recognition are displacing struggles over redistribution" (James 2004, 884). Related scholarship probes the possibility that the reparations movement represents what Torpey (2006) calls a "juridification of politics" and an inevitably backward-looking perspective that detracts liberal attention from the pursuit of a more just society for the future.

See also *Affirmative Action; Ethnic Cleansing; Genocide; Holocaust; Human Rights; Justice and Injustice; Slavery; War Crimes.*

. . . .   MEGAN BRADLEY

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Representation, Descriptive

See *Descriptive Representation*.

Representation and Representative

Representation is one of the more vexing, even mysterious, concepts in politics. How can a political system make present that which is not present? To many political thinkers it is an impossibility. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for one, simply believed that "the instant a people chooses representatives, it is no longer free; it no longer exists." And, yet, the idea of providing a coherent understanding of representation is one of the central endeavors of modern thought and appears to be absolutely essential in our judgment of the legitimacy of modern,

representative democracy. Indeed, without a proper appreciation of representation it is hard to see how any government can be considered a democracy. Of course, the idea of representation and the importance of someone or something standing for something else exists in the political practices of many types of regimes.

REPRESENTATION: TWO DIMENSIONS

The concept of representation is a complex one; however, there are two fundamental ways in which we employ the idea. First, what is being represented—an individual, a district, or the nation itself? Thus, a president or monarch can stand for the nation, or a flag symbolize a country, and a U.S. senator represent a state. Second, representation is judged on whether it is authorized or it is typical. Thus, certain people are authorized to act on behalf of others—a lawyer is authorized to represent a client and a congressman legally represents constituents. In this way, someone or group of people consent to the representation. However, we can ask also if something or someone can be representative because it is typical of or has the same traits of some other group. For instance, we can ask if a legislature reflects the entire population with regard to race, ethnicity, or gender. Of course, it is an open question as to what characteristics should be regarded as needing representing when evaluating how representative something is. In the case of typical representation, the judgment is about institutions because we must ask what is typical of bodies and not individuals. Furthermore, this form of representation as typical may not require the consent or involvement of those who are represented.

THE REPRESENTATIVE: DELEGATE OR TRUSTEE

It is often said that the ancients had no clear notion of representation, and the first major political theorist to wrestle directly with the idea was Thomas Hobbes. His thoughts on representation highlight many of the key ideas and problems associated with the concept ever since. If one person can represent another person, or group, what is the exact relationship between the representative and those he represents? What does the appointment of the representative entail—what is he or she authorized to do. The classic formulation is that representatives are either delegates or trustees. By delegate we mean someone who is delegated to present the political beliefs or ideas of the represented group. Whatever the representative's personal belief is matters not; what is of prime importance is that the person should reflect the views of those being represented. The trustee model departs sharply from delegate mode. The most famous and eloquent proponent of the trustee model is that of Edmund Burke, who argued that representatives are chosen for their judgment and wisdom. Furthermore, Burke argued that in whatever body representatives gather (e.g., parliament, congress), deliberation must take place. Because that is the case, the collective reflections and considerations of that body must not be compromised by the parochial interests that may be well represented by the delegate model.

Yet, this simple dichotomy is only partially helpful. The task of a representative in the delegate model is severely constrained by the practical question of knowing what the constituents actual want. Is there any good way to know what it is that they believe? Do the constituents have all the facts, have they reflected on those facts, and can they even appreciate the collective deliberations undertaken in the hearings, committee meetings, and constant debate that occur in legislatures? Furthermore, even if one could know what the majority of one's constituents believe, what of the minority? In what sense are they represented? Have they lost representation if the representative votes against their desires? Such questions seem to push us to some notion of representatives as trustees. After all, we know that the average citizen has only limited interest in and knowledge of the day-to-day world of politicians. If that is the case, whatever we may say is the correct understanding of representatives, they function as trustees at least some of the time.

Finally, as an empirical question, research has shown that representatives balance these two ideals in their actions. What then becomes of paramount importance is how representatives are held accountable for their actions—which would lead us to consider the issue of elections or the reappointment process however defined. Hence, from this perspective, representation is vital to our understanding of the health of political regimes and their overall legitimacy.

REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION

In considering this broader question of the health and legitimacy of the political system, representation directs us to think about what would be a good representation of the people and what would be misrepresentation of the constituents. In some sense, if the selection process is fair, then misrepresentation is impossible—the representative has the legal office and what that person does is binding, and constituents' only recourse would be at the reappointment moment. Yet, to many, this seems wrong. There is the notion, at least in democracies, that the people are sovereign at all times. If that is the case then regardless of the time, whatever the actions of the representative may be, they are continually subject to the judgment of the people. For only the people have the authority to act. If this is so, the issue of accountability is paramount for representative democracy. Indeed, the failure of a representative to act correctly can be subject to continual evaluation, and, despite the recourse to elections, clear violations of the duty of the representative can lead to a recall or even, if need be, rebellious acts. In an increasingly complex and diverse world, the quality and opportunity for input from the citizens is vital. The effort to find new and effective ways to enlist voting and participation is essential in making democracy work. Thus, in recent years, various political entities (e.g., states, localities) have experimented with voting through the mail or via the Internet. If these ways are not successful, Rousseau's original challenge to the very idea of representation will stand as an indictment of modern democracy.

See also *Representative Democracy; Representative Systems.*

. . . . JOSEPH ROMANCE

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Representative Democracy

The term *representative democracy* was coined in France and America in the age of constitutional revolutions; its implementation as a form of government began at the local level—township government in New England and, after 1789, municipal government in Paris.

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BEGINNING

Since the beginning, representative democracy was perceived as peculiarly modern and either prized as an alternative to democracy or criticized as mockery of the government by the people. Although we do not know for sure who first spoke of representative democracy, the Marquis d'Argenson, a foreign minister under Louis XV, was among the first who described the characteristics of this form of government and judged them favorably. As he wrote in his *Considérations sur le gouvernement ancien et present de la France* (1765):

> False democracy soon collapses into anarchy. It is government of the multitude; such is a people in revolt, insolently scorning law and reason. Its tyrannical despotism is obvious from the violence of its movements and the uncertainty of its deliberations. In *true democracy,* one acts through deputies, who are authorized by election; the mission of those elected by the people and the authority that such officials carry constitute the public power.

Like d'Argenson, Gabriel Bonnot de Mably and Alexander Hamilton used the term *representative democracy* (in 1766 and 1777 respectively) as a corrective of "pure" or "absolute" or "monstrous" democracy. A very different perspective can be found in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *The Social Contract* (1762). Indeed, although Rousseau did not deem democracy a good form of government, he excluded categorically that representative government was legitimate: this made him the inspirer of a theory of participatory democracy as opposite to representative democracy.

Rousseau derived this view from a juristic conception of sovereignty that had in Jean Bodin its most authoritative interpreter in modern Europe. According to Bodin, whose goal was to conceptualize the absolute power of the monarch, because the will is the source of sovereignty and cannot be represented, for the sovereign to preserve supreme power, delegates or procurators must not have an autonomous will or become "representatives." Drawing on this conception, Rousseau concluded that either the elected are delegates with imperative mandate or they are representatives with no mandate at all: but the former only entailed a legitimate form of indirect political autonomy because it did not deprive the people of their sovereign will. Rousseau reached surprisingly similar conclusions as le Baron de Montesquieu, the mentor of liberal representative government, who merged self-government (sovereignty) and direct government (democracy) and created a firm opposition between representation and democracy. Montesquieu's formulation has became paradigmatic of those theorists who deemed representative democracy an oxymoron: a government is democratic if "the people as a body have sovereign power" and if "the people alone . . . make laws" (10, 1989). England was a model of good (i.e., moderate) government because it was constitutional and electoral; that is to say, neither absolute nor direct or pure (wherein it was clear that democracy was both).

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

Yet another important distinction emerged in the eighteenth century between representative *government* and representative *democracy*. Although both terms were sometimes used synonymously, the more perceptive political leaders were aware of the semantic difference between the two. Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès and the authors of *The Federalist Papers* used the term *representative government* instead of *representative democracy* because they perceived representation as a welcome strategy to disentangle the principle of legitimacy by popular consent from people's direct participation. Sieyès brought Rousseau's perspective into the representative context and perfected the metamorphosis of the citizen into the elector and the sovereign-people into the sovereign-nation, which was given unity and voice by the elected assembly. *Federalist No.* 63 argued that representation made possible "the total exclusion of the people, in their collective capacity" from any share in the power of making laws and concluded that this contributed in making modern republic more secure than the ancient ones.

Both the axioms held by the Federalists and Sieyès and those held by Montesquieu became canonical, and the adoption of universal suffrage in the twentieth century did not alter the perception of the undemocratic nature of a system whose basic arrangements have remained the same since its inception, when it was a government of notables elected by few privileged voters. Along this line, contemporary political theorists have defined modern democracy a *government by discussion* in which voting for representatives (rarely on issues) is the only direct power to which adult citizens are always entitled. But, as Benjamin Constant observed in 1814, it is paradoxical to call it democratic, for the only moment the citizens decide directly is when they delegate their lawmaking power. Consequently, the function of elections, Giovanni Sartori wrote in 1965, is "not to make a democracy more democratic, but to make democracy possible. Once we admit the need for elections, we minimize democracy for we realize that the system cannot be operated by the *demos* itself" (108). Thus whether the government of the moderns is democratic depends on how elites are selected and how their selectable characteristics are formed. The extent to which representation is democratic relies on

the extent to which these characteristics are not associated with inborn qualities but can be *de jure* acquired by all. Joseph Schumpeter's classical formulation was the best rendering of representative government: what makes it democratic is only the equal right and possibility citizens have to elect and be elected, to dismiss and be dismissed.

Unlike these scholars, the main theorists of representative democracy, Thomas Paine, François Brissot, and le Marquis de Condorcet (to be followed by John Stuart Mill in mid-nineteenth century), agreed that state institutions should be organized to facilitate the coexistence of representation and participation. They interpreted representation not as the opposite of direct rule but as an enrichment of democracy. According to Paine, only two forms of government met the criterion of legitimacy by consent: democracy in its *simple* form and democracy in its *representative* form. Following in the footsteps of the authors of *The Federalist Papers,* Paine used the word *republic* to denote the latter. But unlike them, he did not interpret it as a strategy of popular exclusion. As he stated in 1792, it is wholly inaccurate to see representation as a mere remedy for the implementation of popular sovereignty in a large territory. In fact, representation *allows* popular sovereignty to exist and to operate in a legal and social space composed of individuals who have the same rights and who are not defined by their social status or communitarian membership regardless the size of the state. For Paine, Athens proved by default that if Athenian democracy had a turbulent and unstable life, it was because it did not have institutional means to cope with the effects of individual freedom. Indeed, without the unifying work of representation, Athenian democracy *lacked* the capacity of transforming the plurality of interests and views held by its free and equal citizens into a unitary process of decision that was able to protect the general interest from direct interference by factions and classes. Hence, Paine concluded that "Athens, by representation, would have surpassed her own democracy" (2000, 180).

Contemporary democratic theory endorses Paine's reading. Indeed, representation now engages democracy scholars more directly, a change from the traditional defense of representative institutions by the Schumpeterian theorists of the circulation of elites and electoral democracy against the proponents of "participatory" or "strong" democracy. George Kateb (1981) has recently argued that the institution of representation is the source of the "moral distinctiveness" of modern democracy, and even the sign of its superiority over direct democracy. Even more radical is David Plotke's argument that in a representative democracy "the opposite of representation is not participation" (1997, 19), but exclusion from representation. Rather than being inimical to participation, Iris Marion Young has suggested, "political representation is both necessary and desirable," while the "elevation of direct democracy to the apex," as the only "real" democracy, "is mistaken" (1997, 352). Thus whereas theorists of electoral government from Sieyès, Schumpeter, Robert Dahl, Sartori, and Bernard Manin have identified democracy with the right to vote for representatives and the right to free speech and association by which means

citizens contribute in the making of the government by discussion, theories in the tradition of Condorcet, Paine, and Mill have proposed instead we stretch the meaning of representation and see it as a political process and an essential component of democracy. Hence, Hanna Fenichel Pitkin has argued that it is paramount that we understand government is representative "not by demonstrating its control over its subjects but just the reverse, by demonstrating that its subjects have control over what it does" (Pitkin 1984, 232).

PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION

This brief historical excursus shows that the term *representative democracy* conveys the complexity, richness, and uniqueness of the political order of the moderns, an original synthesis of two distinct and, in certain respects, alternative political traditions. *Democracy,* a Greek word with no Latin equivalent, stands for direct rule ("making things done") by the people. *Representation*, a Latin word with no Greek equivalent, entails a delegated action on the part of some on behalf of someone else. As a mixture of these two components, in its standard meaning representative democracy has four main features: (1) the sovereignty of the people expressed in the electoral appointment of the representatives; (2) representation as a free mandate relation; (3) electoral mechanisms to ensure some measure of responsiveness to the people by representatives who speak and act in their name; and (4) universal franchise, which grounds representation on an important element of political equality. The central element of this standard account is that constituencies are formally defined by territory, not economic or corporate interests or cultural identities, an aspect that belongs to democracy since Cleasthenes' reform of Athens's demes in sixth century BCE. This basic formal equality in the distribution of the voting power among adult citizens gives the mark of authorization and legitimacy to a government that relies on consent.

Because representative democracy is first and foremost the name of a form of government, reference to people's sovereignty and authorization is essential, not accessory. Electoral representation is thus crucial in expressing the will of the people, even if the claims of elected officials to act in the name of the people unavoidably become an object of contestation by citizens. This tension is at the core of representation and also accounts for the complexity of representative democracy. Representation is the locus of the dynamics that keep the political process in motion and activates the communication between state institutions and society. Thus, although political representation starts with elections, because it starts with the equal distribution of the power of voting, a merely electoral rendering of representative democracy does not exhaust the meaning of representation and democracy. Nor does it exclude the possibility of a different approach and also different institutional solutions. Far from a homogenous category, representative government can be best described as a complex and pluralistic family whose democratic wing is not the exclusive property of those who argue for participation against representation and its representative wing is not the exclusive property of those

who identify it with the electoral selection of an elite against participation. To better capture this complexity, the meaning of *representation* has to be revisited.

POLITICAL UNITY, PLURALISM, AND LIBERTY

Representation emerged in the Middle Ages within the juristic tradition. Scipione Maffei, writing in 1736, maintained that representation was practiced in the Roman Empire as a means that unified its large territory by a federative system in which communities ruled themselves on issues pertaining to the government of their localities, while submitting to the central power on issues of military defense and taxation. Yet notwithstanding Maffei's perspicacious link between federalism and representation, it was in the Middle Ages that the rule of the contract (of representation) was fully inscribed in public law. Representation was born in a confrontational environment within Christianity and between secular and religious powers. Its origins are to be found in the context of the medieval church and the relationship of power between localities and the emperor, and between the nobles and the king. Representation was thus born as an institution of power's containment and control, and moreover as a means of unifying a large and diverse population. In synthesis, unification (of the multitude) and subjection (to the decisions made by chosen delegates) merged in the institution of representation. These two aspects presumed an active involvement of both partners because the representative, who was sometime called *procurator* and *commissary,* was supposed to speak or act for a specific group of people, who endowed that person with the power of representing their interests in front of an authority that was recognized as superior. When a given community delegated some members to be represented before the court of the king or the pope, with powers to bind those who appointed them, there lay the origins of representation. Then the technique was transferred to other contexts and used for other purposes.

The origins of representation account for its mix of private (*Vertretung* or legal representation in court) and political (*Repräsentation* or representation in government) elements. On the one hand, representation conveys the idea of somebody being authorized to act or speak for somebody (the Latin word *re-presentare* means to make something manifest or present). On the other hand, it conveys the idea of the representative forming a unitary will that did not exist before. From this dual nature another duality arises—namely the fact that representation has both a passive character and an active one. In the juristic tradition to which the modern conception of sovereignty as authorized will belongs, the representative is unavoidably related to the represented not only because of the dependence on the latter's designation or choice but also because the representative is under the inspection or monitoring surveillance of the represented.

Representation designates a relation of *interdependence* that brings to the fore a novel kind of liberty, one that does not need to be associated with the agent's direct action or presence in the place where decisions are made, as was the case in ancient democracy. The sources of representation's richness and fault rest precisely in its complex relation to political autonomy. No one else could render this tension better than Immanuel Kant, who was not only the philosopher who categorically defined the concept of freedom as exit from tutelage or autonomy, but also the political theorist who declared representation an essential condition for constitutional government. Kant was aware that representation made autonomous persons (citizens) trust someone else to act on their behalf, more or less like individuals, such as children, women, servants, and aliens, who were declared in need of tutelage by the civil authority. Not surprisingly, critics of representative democracy have turned precisely to direct presence as the unavoidable condition of political autonomy when they wanted to stress the ambiguous nature of this form of government.

A DIARCHY OF WILL AND JUDGMENT

Thus the term *representative democracy* does not entail an oxymoron, on condition that political autonomy is apprehended beyond the intermittent and discrete series of electoral instants that the conception of sovereignty as the authorizing *will* entails and located in the *continuum* of informal power (influence) and formal power (voting) that the open public sphere creates and recreates. To paraphrase Augustine Cochin, the public sphere is not inhabited by isolated electors, and representative democracy is not a consenting "crowd of inorganic voters"; political parties and movements are the means citizens create to give their political interests and beliefs a presence in politics and make their influence effective and persistent through time. The strength and social rootedness of these political associations signal the strength of democratic representation.

Representative democracy is the name of a government that starts with elections but develops beyond them. It opens up a domain of participation that, although informal and not authoritative, can deeply influence the political direction of the country. In democratic politics, representation is not "acting in the place of somebody," but more precisely, is a *political relation* of sympathetic similarity or communication with those in the place of whom the representatives pass laws (from here citizens' quest that representatives' choices should enjoy representativity or be in a reflective adhesion with citizens' opinions comes). The development of this kind of reflective sympathy (which is the foundation of the advocacy aspect of representation) is revealed by the statute that regulates how the representatives vote in the assembly: except in clearly specified cases (which pertain to decrees, not laws), the voting record must be made public. Electors need to know what the representatives do and say and how they vote in the assembly because they need to compare representatives' judgment to their own judgment. It is thus appropriate to describe representative democracy as form of popular government that rests on a *diarchy* of will and judgment and an endogenous tension between institutionalized power and extrainstitutionalized power, or between representative institutions and citizens' participation.

See also *Democracy; Representation and Representative; Representative Systems.*

. . . .   NADIA URBINATI

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Representative Systems

Extant democracies are based on representation: decisions are taken by politicians, elected and regularly controlled by citizens. In this process, political parties play a crucial role. They build up the alternative political projects among which citizens choose in elections. By doing this, parties both aggregate and reflect some of the different interests in conflict that can be found in any given society; for instance, among territories, social classes, ethnic groups, or religious denominations. In spite of the growing literature on the crisis of parties, democracy and representation cannot be understood without them.

HOW SOCIAL CONFLICTS CONDITION REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEMS

Political parties reflect social conflicts between groups with different interests or values. However, not all interests in conflict are equally represented in all contexts. Certain issues, such as class or language, may be the fundamental axes along which party systems are structured in some cases, but not in others. Which conflicts have become predominant cleavages that have shaped the structure of the party system?

A social conflict becomes a cleavage when it fulfills three conditions. Firstly, it involves a social division that separates groups with different characteristics, such as ethnic origin, language, religion, or occupation. Second, the people separated by this division are conscious of their collective identity and share certain common values, culture, or ideologies as members of their respective groups. Finally, a cleavage has also an organizational dimension: the groups separated by the cleavage, with a common identity or culture, tend to form their own organizations such as trade unions, parties, or other associations to defend their interests.

Social cleavages are thus based on social differences that result from historical processes, but also are politically constructed, reinforced, or smoothed down by political entrepreneurs, parties, and other organizations.

In their seminal work on party systems, Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) distinguished four main cleavage lines that are at the origin of contemporary political alignments in the early years of western European democracies. Two of them—center versus periphery, state versus church—are the result of the process of creation of nation-states in the modern age, triggered in France, while the other two—rural versus urban, workers versus employers—appear as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution that started a few centuries later in Britain.

The center-periphery cleavage appeared as the result of the conflict between the national elites wanting to standardize laws, markets, and cultures within the state borders, and the communities, normally situated in the periphery, wanting to preserve their autonomy. This resistance to centralization ended up in cases of independence (such as Ireland from the United Kingdom) or absorption of the minorities by the center in more successful processes of nation-building (such as the French). In many other cases the tension between the dominant center and the ethnic and linguistic minorities was

translated into the party system, such as for instance in Spain or Belgium, with party systems that include regionalist or nationalist parties.

The state-church cleavage opposed the centralizing and mobilizing nation-state to the traditional privileges of the church, particularly concerning education, a fundamental tool for standardization. In some countries, such as for instance the Netherlands, the churches (Catholic and Protestant) managed to create vertical networks of associations, including religious parties, to ensure maximum loyalty from their faithful citizens.

The Industrial Revolution shifted conflict toward economic issues, once there was already a certain degree of national consolidation. The growth of trade and industrial production introduced tensions between primary producers in the countryside and merchants and entrepreneurs in the cities. In the Nordic countries, this conflict overlapped with the center-periphery opposing conservative-agrarian and liberal-radical parties.

Finally, conflicts in the labor market between workers and employer were reflected in all western European party systems with the appearance of socialist parties defending working-class interests. In the Scandinavian countries and the United Kingdom, these parties were soon integrated into the system, while in Germany and southern Europe, socialist movements were repressed and did not become fully integrated until the end of World War II (1939–1945).

This scheme can broadly be applied to the United States and to other democracies. In the United States, for instance, the tension between the North and the South can be considered a form of center-periphery cleavage, the religious cleavage opposes Protestants to other denominations, and there is also a noteworthy rural-urban distinction. But there is also a significant difference: no party in the United States can be considered a working-class party, as we find in most western European countries. This responds to several characteristics of the American political system: workers were enfranchised much earlier in the United States than in Europe, the system was more open to better education and social mobility, there were very large amounts of religious and ethnic heterogeneity within urban workers as well as among the very large rural population, and the prevailing political culture opposed high government intervention.

Thus, although we can find some common patterns, countries differ in the way social differences become cleavages and structure the party system. Depending on different patterns of historical alliances among actors, some conflicts became dividing lines across parties and others did not. In some cases social cleavages encapsulate segments of society (producing pillarization or *verzuilling*). In some others social differences within parties are as important as those between parties. But whether reflecting closed cleavages or not, once they become established in a fully enfranchised electorate, parties are political organizations that tend to stay and are difficult to change. This means that to a large extent and in spite of the social changes that have occurred in the past years, extant parties are those that were in existence a few decades ago, reflecting a freezing of party alternatives.

Postindustrialized societies of the early twenty-first century are, however, very different to those in the mid-twentieth century. The expansion of the welfare state has smoothed class differences, education has expanded throughout society, and mass media have assumed many of the functions that parties used to perform. It should come to no surprise, therefore, that traditional social divisions (particularly class) and long-term attitudes such as party identification are becoming less important in explaining vote choice. Although the empirical evidence is mixed, other aspects related to the political context, such as issue positions, candidate evaluations, or evaluations of government economic performance, could be becoming more relevant. According to some authors, the political agenda now includes postmaterialist concerns such as environmental protection, alternative lifestyles, participation, self realization, or minority rights. These issues have in some occasions been accommodated into the old parties (like in the United States) or produced new parties (like the environmental parties in France or Germany). New extreme right parties have appeared also in some places as a reaction to the new left. Parties have experienced change particularly in their organization, in their relationship with both civil society and the state, evolving from the mass party, to the catch all and the cartel party. However, new parties based on new social conflicts have not replaced most of the traditional parties born from the old classic conflicts of class, religion, and territory.

HOW INSTITUTIONS CONDITION REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEMS

Democracies are organized in a variety of ways. They differ widely in a number of institutional features that condition the way representation works and the role of parties. In some contexts parties are the crucial actors, while in others individual representatives have a more important part. In some countries the institutional setting leaves room for the representation of many different parties, while in others there are high thresholds of access that only the largest ones can overcome. Some institutional features also condition the extent to which members of parliaments are a biased or a representative sample of the electorate in terms of attitudes and social characteristics.

Presidential and parliamentary systems, for instance, have very different expectations considering the role parties should play. To start with, the very personalistic nature of presidential elections reduces the weight of parties. Particularly in the United States, candidates are not party leaders, but self-promoted individuals with large fund-raising abilities. It is presidential candidates, and not so much parties, that articulate broad government policies. Moreover, in presidential systems, parties are not necessary for government stability. Presidents do not need the support of congress to stay in office, and thus representatives belonging to the president's party may eventually vote against the president without bringing about a government crisis. This means representatives may feel freer to defend the interests of their local constituency. This may be good, but also can bring about a number of less heartening

consequences: a fragmented legislature defending particularistic constituency interests in detriment of broader policy considerations and lack of cohesion and ideological commitment.

In parliamentary systems, on the contrary, government stability depends on stable parliamentary majorities, which can only be secured by party discipline. In these systems, parties are the key actors both in parliamentary elections and in parliaments. Party discipline is a standard feature of European parliamentarism. While sometimes considered as a limitation to a representative mandate and to the ability of members of parliament to represent the interests of their constituency when they contradict the party line, it is also a means to guarantee party cohesion and government stability.

The electoral system is another fundamental institutional feature that can reinforce these differences in representation across systems. The electoral system may play an important role in structuring the behavior of representatives in cases where there is a difference between party policy positions and the interests of local districts.

Single-member districts were the first used, at the early stages of democratization, before suffrage was extended to the whole population, mass parties appeared, and party discipline became a common feature of parliamentary democracy. In this electoral system (currently still used in countries like France, the United Kingdom, or the United States), territorial representation is central. Representatives are very visible to their local constituents and thus may find it useful to pay close attention to the interests of their electoral districts if they seek reelection. This also may happen in other electoral systems where candidates must compete among themselves, such as the Irish or the Finnish.

On the contrary, in some proportional electoral systems (for instance, those of Spain or Portugal), citizens can only choose among closed party lists, usually made by the parties' apparatus themselves. In this case, the chances of a representative being (re)elected depends largely on being located in a top position in those lists, and thus on the party decision. The representative has then many incentives to follow the party guidelines and less to cultivate a close link to the territorial constituency. The degree of personalization in the electoral system, which depends on the type of district and on the ballot design, thus influences the style of representation. The stronger linkage between the representative and her territorial constituency is actually one of the arguments in favor of single-member districts (although not entirely undisputed).

However, single-member districts have other consequences for representation. Only the winner can take the (single) seat in each district. This means that smaller parties—unless they have their electoral support concentrated in a few districts were they can win a plurality or a majority—are strongly underrepresented in parliament, if they manage to get any representation at all. Electoral systems thus not only affect the behavior of representatives, but also who actually gets representation. Small parties are better represented in systems with proportional representation and large districts. There is thus a close relationship between the proportionality of the electoral system (mainly a consequence of district magnitude) and the number of political parties that obtain seats in parliament. This is important because a larger number of parties is usually considered to provide a wider choice for citizens, and a better representation of voters' heterogeneity. It also partially explains why the American parties are large, broad, and loose coalitions of very heterogeneous voters. They reflect the decentralized structure of the state as well as the closure of the electoral system: no third party has managed to overcome the high electoral threshold of the American electoral system at the federal level.

Beyond effects on party representation, scholars have argued also that women and minorities of any kind are better represented in systems with high levels of proportionality. This refers to the descriptive notion of the concept of representation, as stated by Hanna Pitkin (1972), according to which the representatives are expected to be similar to the population they represent in terms of attitudes and social attributes. Although many authors tend to disregard descriptive representation as problematic (arguing, for instance, that what is important is the accountability of the representative), others acknowledge its importance in certain circumstances, like when interests are not clearly articulated before the election takes place, or in contexts of deep distrust.

Encompassing several institutional features Arend Lijphart (1999) has distinguished between majoritarian or Westminster democracies and consociational democracies. In the Westminster model of democracy, representation is articulated as to produce a majority in parliament, which would support a single-party government during (hopefully) a whole legislature. Thus there is a single relevant house in a centralized state, with a majority produced by a plurality or majoritarian electoral system. The party system is then likely to be structured around two main alternatives that change from government to opposition depending on how well they perform (like in the United Kingdom).

This system would not be applicable to plural or segmented societies, deeply divided by a number of social cleavages, usually class, religion, or language (such as Belgium, the Netherlands, or Switzerland) where there is no clearly identifiable majority. This is why consociational democracies are organized over the proportional representation of all relevant minorities in parliament, in government, and in all relevant institutions. Other relevant features of this pattern of democracy are a decentralized state, a veto right for minorities, and political elites that tend to cooperate rather than compete. Lijphart has explored the consequences of these two models, coming to the conclusion that consociational democracies outperform majoritarian systems on measures of political equality, women representation, and proximity between voter preferences and government policies, but other authors contend that minority interests are actually better served under majority rule.

THE LINKAGE BETWEEN CITIZENS, REPRESENTATIVES, AND PARTIES

When talking about representative systems, it seems reasonable to inquire how well citizen interests are represented, or in

other words, to what extent the views of the representatives reflect those of the citizens they represent. This is, however, a tricky question for several reasons. In the first place, it would be difficult to argue that citizens have independent, exogenous attitudes; on the contrary, these often are shaped by the parties and representatives themselves. For instance, issue positions and candidate evaluations are to a large extent the result of party identification. Secondly, even a perfect match between citizens and representatives' characteristics and issue positions would not mean we have the best possible substantive representation, nor that citizens are actually controlling their representatives. It is not clear which should be considered the relevant issues, and in any case *being* or *thinking* is not the same as *doing*. One should consider what the representative actually does for the represented, and whether the representative is responsive and accountable to voters.

Still, citizen-elite agreement or correspondence, though difficult to analyze because of scarce data, have become a standard for judging the quality of representative systems. There are several ways of analyzing this relationship. Some authors have analyzed the *dyadic* correspondence between the constituency opinion and their representative behavior. This makes sense in single-member district electoral systems, in which each constituency elects a single representative. However, citizens also can be represented in parliament by representatives elected in other constituencies, so the distribution of elite attitudes can also be compared to the distribution of citizens' views in what is called *collective* correspondence. Where representatives are elected by parties rather than by voters, and parties behave in blocs within parliament, as in most European democracies, what is more interesting is the comparison between voters and party positions. The empirical analyses of these questions, certainly impossible to summarize here, have found that the degree of congruence between citizens and their representatives, whether individual legislators or parties, depends on many different factors: the policy domain, the attitudes of representatives, and the institutional and political characteristics of the context and of the parties themselves.

Interest representation in a political system depends on a combination of historical, socioeconomic, and institutional factors. Early social conflicts are reflected in party systems, that although have evolved reflecting social change, still mirror pervasive old-politics cleavages. Institutional variables such as the relationship between the executive and the legislature (presidentialism versus parliamentarism), the electoral system (plurality versus proportional), or the pattern of democracy (majoritarian versus consociational) have also a fundamental influence both on who gets elected (and thus who gets represented) and how representation works. The correspondence between citizens' and representatives' attitudes varies accordingly.

See also *Consociational Democracy; Descriptive Representation; Party Systems, Comparative; Political Parties; Representation and Representative; Representative Democracy; Westminster Model.*

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Reproductive Rights

Reproductive rights are a diverse set of political instruments invoked by individuals, governments, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and other parties to address the social, political, and legal constraints on people's ability to exercise control over their sexual and reproductive lives. Reproductive rights are controversial and rigorously contested worldwide for their tight connection with gender and sexual freedoms and rights. They are highly stratified by geography, race, class, and other social categories productive of inequalities and disparities. At the heart of reproductive rights are questions of power concerning individual choice and decision making; individual versus social and cultural equity, norms, needs, and wants; social health and well-being versus disease models; access to knowledge and information; and broader understandings of gender equality, sexual health, and social determinants of health and well-being. In some cases violations of reproductive rights coincide with violations of ethical codes of medical practice or research involving human subjects.

Substantively, reproductive rights include a broad set of policy and legal issues including: the right to legal, safe, and affordable birth control and abortion services; the right to access quality reproductive and maternal health care, including (in)fertility services; the right to education, information, and other conditions that enable maximum self-determination and protection from sexual coercion and violence, sexually transmitted infections, and coerced sterilization, abortion, and contraception; as well as protection from gender-based practices such as female, as well as male, genital cutting practices.

In the context of U.S. women's movements prior to the legalization of abortion in 1973, reproductive rights were largely focused on the rights of women to have ultimate decision-making power over their reproductive capacity through birth control and abortion services and in some cases through the prevention of coercive sterilization policies. After the Supreme Court decision *Roe v. Wade* (1973) struck down state laws prohibiting abortion, reproductive rights became narrowly associated with the abortion issue that divided many facets of U.S. political life into opposed camps—either in support of or against legalized abortion (*prochoice* or *prolife*). Yet, even abortion opponents generally support some rights that fall within the broader umbrella of reproductive rights.

At the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) held in Cairo, Egypt, in 1994, a transnational network of feminists questioned the dichotomy between rights and needs, and between the individual and social. Concretely, feminists active in the ICPD proposed policy to foster the "enabling conditions" intrinsic to rights, but refused to rank needs as somehow more fundamental than rights. Owing to an unprecedented level of feminist engagement, the ICPD Programme of Action codified reproductive rights not only as "the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing, and timing of their children and to have the information and means to do so," but also as "the right to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health,"

and, the "right to make decisions concerning reproduction free of discrimination, coercion and violence, as expressed in human rights documents" (United Nations ICPD 1994, Article 7). Other international feminist alliances questioned this political strategy to reform international population policy instruments by adding a more comprehensive definition of reproductive rights. These groups asserted that any policy ultimately aimed at reducing human numbers might well compromise an agenda to protect and ensure human rights and needs.

Echoing a human rights perspective, recent women of color theorizations have put forth the concept reproductive justice as an alternative to reproductive rights. The concept addresses the limits of an *individual choice* paradigm that effaces the social context that often constrains the choices of women depending on their race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, age, and immigration status. It further suggests that integrating the idea of social justice in the politics of reproduction is a necessary prerequisite to addressing reproductive oppression defined as "the control and exploitation of women's bodies, sexuality and reproduction as an effective strategy of controlling women and communities, particularly those of color" (ACRJ 2005; SisterSong 2006). One main impetus behind this approach is to counter a perceived narrowing of reproductive rights from the sole issue of abortion in the agenda of mainstream U.S. reproductive rights organizations.

See also *Abortion and Politics; Culture Wars; Feminism, Postcolonial; Gender and Politics; Human Development Index; Women's Movement, Comparative; Women's Rights.*

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Republic

Cicero defines *res publica* as *res populi*—the thing of the people. *Republic* signifies the public thing or public good or interest, referring to a political community. A republic is

a commonwealth in which the commonweal of the whole people is paramount to that of a section, faction, or elite group. The rule of law is an important element in republican government and replaces dependence on the political authority of an emperor or king. Sovereignty resides in the people, not in a monarch. Distinguished from a democracy in which the people rule directly, a republic is democratic indirectly through representative government. Order, moderation, reason, and restraint are the benefits to be achieved by a republic through the rule of law. The key distinction between a democracy and a republic is that a democracy is ruled by an unlimited majority; whereas, in a republic the majority is limited by a constitution. Thus, in a democracy the minority has no protection against what Alexis de Tocqueville called the *tyranny of the majority.* In a republic, the constitution limits the powers of majoritarian democracy by separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and protection of individual rights of minorities. While all people are equal under the law, the emphasis is on social pluralism, not uniform equality as may be the object of a direct democracy.

After rejecting kingship, the Romans established the Roman Republic, which had a mixed constitution balancing monarchy (consuls), aristocracy (Senate), and democracy (people). Even though the Roman Republic was not an Athenian democracy, no act of the consuls or Senate could be legitimate without popular support. Further, the people (adult males with property) had the constitutional rights to vote on legislation, elect political and military officials, and serve as a collective judge in popular courts. Political virtues, such as honor, glory, military power, and public sacrifice, were fundamental to the concept of the Roman Republic.

To secure the common good, a republic requires an institutional legal framework that mitigates destructive self-interested factions. Thus, James Madison's focus in *Federalist Paper* no. 10 (1787) is to control the "effects" of factions because the "cause" of factions—human nature—cannot be changed. Madison, an American politician, philosopher, and president, believed that a republic offered the cure for the "mischiefs of faction," something a democracy could not accomplish. An extended republic of representation can control the effects of factions by an offsetting interaction between parties and interests so that ambition can counter ambition, preventing the rise of an omnipotent majority.

Also, in *Federalist Paper* no. 39 (1788), Madison asserts that the ratification of the U.S. Constitution must be a *national* act ("We the People") because its primary objective is the commonweal of the people. Madison describes the U.S. Constitution as a compound republic, both national and federal. The nation as a whole and the individual states share power. Because political power is derived from both federal and national sources, federalism is a key political principle. Originally, the U. S. Senate was elected by state legislatures, who prior to the Civil War (1861–1865) were predominant. This federal aspect was eliminated by the Seventeenth Amendment (1913) shifting the elective power from the states to the people. Still, the limit of political power remains federal: the Tenth Amendment provides that all constitutional power not delegated to the national

government is reserved by the states or the people. Also, Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution guarantees every state a republican form of government, not a democracy. It establishes a mixed government, with separation of powers and checks and balances; popular sovereignty; the rule of law; and civil rights. The U.S. republic is democratic, but not a democracy. As such, the first ten amendments to the Constitution, known as the Bill of Rights, ensure that minority interests are protected from majoritarian supremacy.

Throughout history, republics have differed widely in democratic substance and form. Plato's *Republic* (360 BCE), an ideal conception of justice as hierarchical class orders in society, could not be described as democratic, nor could Aristotle's democracy, which he considered a defective form of constitution, serving the self-interest of the impoverished masses. Other notable republics in history, such as the Israelite Commonwealth, San Marino (the oldest extant republic), Icelandic Republic, Swiss Republic, Dutch Republic, South African Republic, English Commonwealth, French Republic, Italian Republic, and USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) are not the same. For example, the USSR and the South African Republic were not democratic states.

Public participation and moral virtue provide the foundation for a republic. St. Augustine believed that without justice there could be no commonwealth, and there could be no justice without divine law. Cicero relied on natural law to provide unalterable norms as the basis for legislation, whereas Machiavelli thought republican virtue had a more secular nature. In any case, loyalty and adherence to the state or public realm and the willingness to participate, contribute, and sacrifice for the common good is the spirit of a republic. The "friend of the people," Publius, a founder of the Roman Republic, inspired Hamilton, Madison, and Jay to use his name as author for *The Federalist Papers,* the eighty-five essays that provide the theoretical basis for the founding of the U.S. republic.

See also *Democracy; Federalist Papers; Madison, James; Monarchy; State Formation; State, The; State, Varieties of.*

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Republicanism

Republicanism is an ancient tradition of political thought that has enjoyed a robust revival in recent years. At its heart is the conviction that government is a public matter to be directed

by self-governing citizens, not the domain of one ruler or small set of rulers. Dictionaries try to convey this point by defining a republic as a political system governed by elected representatives, including an elected executive officer, rather than by a monarch. Indeed, republicanism is often defined simply as opposition to monarchy.

The standard definition is misleading, however, in that it mistakes common associations for identifying characteristics. To be sure, republicans usually favor representative government and oppose monarchy, but they need not do either. The classical republican thinkers, such as Polybius and Cicero, had no clear conception of representative government, and there is nothing to prevent a republican from advocating a form of government that includes a substantial measure of direct democracy. Nor are republicans necessarily hostile to monarchy. Their objection is to unrestrained or absolute rule, whether by one person or many. This makes them hostile to absolute monarchies but not necessarily to constitutional ones. Above all, republicans want self-government under the rule of law, as the origin of the word *republic* itself indicates.

CLASSICAL REPUBLICANISM

Republic derives from the Latin *res publica,* the public thing or business. In some ways, though, *republic* stands between the older Greek term *politeia* (polity) and the newer English term *commonweal* (or *commonwealth*). In every case the emphasis is on government in the public interest, as when Aristotle defined *polity* as rule by the many in the interests of the whole city-state. To ensure that those who governed would promote the common good, the many, or the people, had to have a significant share of political power. But people also had to be restrained lest they turn the government into a democracy—that is, government in the class interest of the poor and propertyless. To secure this restraint, republican thinkers recommended the cultivation of civic virtue and a mixed constitution.

Cultivating civic virtue was a matter of fostering the proper disposition in the citizenry, a category that did not include women, slaves, or resident aliens. Civic virtue had to be cultivated because the tendency toward corruption, or putting one's private interest first, was so strong. The passions that corrupt citizens—especially avarice, ambition, and the love of luxury—had to be blunted or turned to the public benefit. The virtuous citizen thus would be one who lived simply, respected the rule of law, and identified his own good with that of the body politic. Citizens of this kind will have some sense of the public good or commonweal; in other words, and their business will be to govern themselves with an eye to that good rather than their private interests. In Cicero's words, "the commonwealth [*res publica*] is the concern of a people, but a people is not any group of men assembled in any way, but an assemblage of some size associated with one another through agreement on law and community of interest" (1998, 18).

Some scholars distinguish between the Athenian and the Roman schools of republicanism, with the former stressing the importance of public-spirited political participation and the latter the value of independence or freedom under law, as captured in the enduring claim that a republic is the empire of laws, not of men. Allowing for such differences of emphasis should not, however, obscure the classical republicans' agreement on the importance of the mixed or balanced government. According to this idea, developed by the Greek Polybius while a hostage in Rome, the best government is one that mixes rule by one person, the few, and the many because this mixture staves off corruption through a checks-and-balances process that makes it difficult for any element to acquire enough power to dominate the body politic.

REPUBLICANISM REVIVED

Many political thinkers of the Middle Ages and modern era drew on and extended the republican tradition, among them Niccolò Machiavelli, James Harrington, the Baron de Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and the men who drafted a constitution that guaranteed every one of the United States "a republican form of government" (Article 4, Section 4). With the rise of liberalism, socialism, and the other modern ideologies, however, republicanism faded into the background. The increasing popularity of democracy also tended to eclipse republicanism, as the transition of the United States' first political party from *Republican* to *Democratic-Republican* to simply *Democratic* indicates. In the second half of the twentieth century, though, a significant revival of interest in republicanism began.

Historians took the lead in this revival, but political philosophers such as Hannah Arendt also played an important part. The biggest boost probably came from J. G. A. Pocock's *The Machiavellian Moment* (1975), which combines Arendt's praise of political activity with the historian's interest in what Pocock called "the Atlantic republican tradition."

By the end of the twentieth century, the republican revival was in full swing, with four themes predominating in neorepublican thought. First is an emphasis on equality that adds a belief in the equal moral worth of persons to the classical emphasis on the political equality of citizens. Second is the continuing commitment to self-government. Philip Pettit (1997) and Quentin Skinner (1998) have been particularly important in this regard because both call for a return to the republican (or "neoroman" in Skinner's terms) conception of freedom as the absence of domination. Moreover, citizens free from domination may govern themselves in a deliberative fashion, which is the third neorepublican theme. As Cass Sunstein says, "republicans will attempt to design political institutions that promote discussion and debate among the citizenry; they will be hostile to systems that promote lawmaking as 'deals' or bargains among self-interested private groups" (1988, 1549). Finally, many neorepublicans share an abiding interest in civic virtue, without which debate and deliberation will be little more than a diversion from the "real" politics of bargaining for personal advantage.

The new republicans also face challenges, most notably the complaints that their theory is too nostalgic to meet the demands of an age of globalization or to shake off the biases implicit in the classical ideal of the citizen as a property-owning, arms-bearing man. Neorepublicans are responding to these challenges, however, and the value of their revival no

doubt will be judged in large part by the persuasiveness of their responses.

See also *Democracy; Ideologies, Political.*

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Republicanism, Classical

Classical republicanism is a political and philosophical orientation that emphasizes a notion of freedom opposed to that under which slaves operate—namely, that of having a master, of being owned or dominated by another. It is an orientation that draws heavily on the Roman idea of the *res publica,* the "public interest" that many Roman thinkers argued had to be collectively and actively attended to if human beings were to safeguard their lives and communities from tyrannical actions.

BETWEEN INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMUNITARIANISM

While identifying and attending to the public or common interest involves a level of moral education and civic virtue, the effort to prevent domination typically requires the advancement of certain key political priorities and policies. These include the rule of law, the balanced involvement of different social and economic classes in government, the strong resistance to favoritism and corruption, and the prevention of the "professionalization" of political life through elections or rotations among political authorities. This classical republican way of viewing freedom is, in some ways, highly communitarian in that it accepts that human flourishing requires some sort of membership or communal order and that the freedom sought is one that is premised on the existence of or need for such collective arrangements. However, classical republicanism also may be seen as involving a different orientation from that usually associated with either liberal or communitarian arguments. Nondomination is not the same thing as noninterference, which suggests that individual freedom is always in tension with any kind of law, nor the same as self-mastery, which suggests that individual freedom is a matter of aligning one's capabilities with larger or more general goals. It may be that classical republicanism suggests an alternative to the individualist/modern/negative versus communitarian/ancient/positive scheme that, in different ways, both Benjamin Constant and Isaiah Berlin made central to their political theories and that has been prevalent in much Western political philosophy since the nineteenth century.

ORIGINS

Many scholars claim that classical republicanism has had a clear—or at least easily discernable—intellectual lineage, moving from the patriotic and agrarian writings of Roman thinkers, leaders, and landowners, through the humanist revival in Florence and other cities during the Italian Renaissance. It then continued into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries via the writings of James Harrington, Algernon Sidney, and so-called commonwealthmen such as John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon. However, others have suggested that modern usages of the label *classical republicanism,* like *civic humanism,* are at least partly products of historiographic reconstruction rather than actual history, with several distinct historical bodies of thought being assembled to suggest a single coherent perspective on freedom, community, virtue, economics, and citizenship. Aside from this debate, the classical republican label is commonly used to express a distinct approach toward various political goals.

In the United States, classical republicanism has had a much more specific and identifiable history, in that several early leaders of both the American Revolution (1775–1783) and America's national government strongly identified with various classical republican ideas, such as civic virtue, land ownership, social and economic independence, the cyclically recurring threat of faction and corruption, and the necessity of making certain that all citizens stand equal before the law. It must be noted that the egalitarian aims of classical republican thought did not necessarily include liberal or individualistic notions of social or economic equality; the key point was that no person ought to be subject to arbitrary treatment or be dominated by forces in response to which they have no appeal or recourse. The ideal of freedom as nondominion does not mandate that all be able to equally resist any action by the state or society in their personal lives or choices, but rather than any such action be aligned with the common interest, or the *res publica*. As we are all, ideally, to be understood as equal members of the community, laws that serve the interests of all would presumably not stigmatize certain sections of the whole, discriminate in unprincipled ways, or take the form of an arbitrary, dominating

force. This particular orientation underlines the U.S. Constitution's various countermajoritarian elements, such the separation of powers, the Electoral College, and the guarantee of certain rights. While these and other elements of the American founding can be explained in classical liberal, social contract terms, there is an undercurrent of republicanism to them that has emerged in the historical scholarship of recent decades as an important explanatory insight into the motivations of early American leaders. The aim of these devotees to classical republicanism was to make certain that the power exercised by the national government could always be contested by those who would challenge it as not supporting the good of the nation.

CONCLUSION

However, the distinction between populist and republican appreciations of government is a contested one. Some classical republicanism scholars suggest that the pursuit of the common good must be connected to citizens' active involvement in public life. If not, then citizens will not have the breadth of experiences necessary for them to learn what truly common goods entail, and private interests and arbitrary discriminations likely will creep back into the operations of government. On the other hand, other scholars argue that this participatory, even democratic, interpretation of republicanism partakes of a neo-Athenian reading of the republican legacy. The argument over to what extent popular democratic action, including organized majorities, should play in the development of civic virtue and the protection of republican freedom is central to the question of how classical republicanism may be ultimately related to classical liberal and communitarian ideas.

See also *Arendt, Hannah; Berlin, Isaiah; Civic Humanism; Communitarianism; Freedom; Liberalism, Classical; Republic; Republicanism; Roman Political Thought.*

. . . . RUSSELL ARBEN FOX

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Resampling Methods

Resampling methods encompass a wide variety of techniques that use empirical data, as opposed to distributional assumptions, to estimate uncertainty about parameter estimates in a statistical model. Bootstrapping and jackknifing are used when parametric measures are difficult to compute or unreliable, but

should be used with caution in small samples. Cross-validation is used to prevent overfitting of the data.

Most bootstrapping routines take random, repeated samples with replacement from the original data and can be performed with no assumption of an underlying distribution. Similar to bootstrapping, jackknifing routines systematically omit the ith observation of the sample where $i = 1, \ldots, n,$ creating n resampled datasets. In both cases, the statistic of interest is calculated for each resampled dataset, then aggregated to obtain the quantity of interest and its estimated variance. Simple nonparametric bootstrapping should be used with caution for incomplete data, small samples, and samples with substantial numbers of outliers and shouldn't be used with nonindependent cases. Variants of the bootstrap ameliorate these issues and are commonly used in these cases.

Lastly, cross-validation splits the data sample into k parts. The model is estimated systematically on all subsets with one part excluded in each estimation to be used in the validation of the model. This method can help prevent overfitting a model based on chance occurrences contained within a given dataset.

See also *Qualitative Analysis; Reliability and Validity Assessment; Statistical Analysis; Time-series Analysis.*

. . . . DAVID CIUK AND KURT PYLE

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Research Design

Research design is the process of creating a scientific plan for answering research questions through sampling, measurement, and analysis. It is the formal and creative process of comparing competing theories and making inferences to yield discoveries about the world. The hallmark of social-scientific research design is a rigorous attention to inference, sampling, and measurement.

Political science research aims to make inferences regarding subjects of political interest and does so based on empirical observation. These inferences may be a mixture of the descriptive (for example, what is the rate of voting among all U.S. adults living in poverty?), predictive (for example, will the turnout rate increase if the government institutes an election day holiday?), and explanatory (for example, what are the fundamental determinants of turnout in the United States?). In each case, a correct and effective research design requires careful attention to issues of controls, sampling, and measurement.

In classic experimental research design, a sample is drawn from a population; an attribute is measured for each individual in that sample; a treatment is then applied to a randomly selected subgroup of that sample; and the attribute is remeasured and compared to the attribute level of those not

treated (the "control" group). Experimental design provides insurance against numerous threats to inference, such as confounding variables, endogeneity, and self-selection.

QUASI-EXPERIMENTS AND CAUSAL INFERENCE

Political science research designs are rarely true experiments, because political events and political behavior are often impossible to fit into this mold. Although some political science theories can be tested through laboratory or field experiments, most political science research is quasi-experimental or observational. In quasi-experiments (also known as "natural" experiments), the researcher measures the attributes of a sample, some of which have received a "treatment" and some of which have not. The control group is not randomly assigned, and in many cases, there is no pre-measurement of those "treated." Observational studies examine attributes of a single sample before and after a test without a control group. For example, a natural experiment might analyze the changes in voter turnout in cities after changes in registration requirements have been instituted. Unfortunately, a relationship between treatment and attribute change in such designs is not a strong basis for inferring causality: the relationship could be created by a confounding variable; not included in the model (perhaps a separate attribute, like scandal, determined both turnout and whether a political subdivision adopted the law); by selection biases (those cities that chose to adopt reform could be systematically different with respect to peoples' voting behavior from those that did not adopt reform); or could even have the opposite direction (perhaps those cities in which voters were already mobilizing and were ready to turn out were also driven to change their registration requirements).

SAMPLING

Sampling is an important aspect of all research designs. Good research design draws from a sampling frame that is a good match with the population of interest, aims to obtain a sample that is sufficiently variable in the levels of treatments that effects could be detected, and avoids selecting cases based on values of the explanatory variable bias (unless the intent is the tracing or disconfirmation of a covering theory).

In social science, it is rarely possible to directly measure the properties in which there is the most interest. Instead, scholars are forced to measure concepts of interest, such as "poverty," through such indirect measures as per-capita income. An indirect measure is judged by its reliability and validity. Reliability is stability over repeated measures, and validity is how well the measure equates with the underlying concept.

Choosing the size of the sample is a critical part of the research design, and there is often a trade-off between small and large samples. Small sample designs (sometimes known as "case studies"), in which a single case or a small number of cases is examined in great detail, make it difficult to apply formal statistical inference. It is usually impossible to draw broad inferences from individual cases; however, it may be possible to disconfirm explanatory or predictive theories that were hypothesized to have applied through examination of case history and the

tracing of the causal processes that run through a case. The thick descriptions that can emerge from case studies also can be useful in generating other hypotheses. Large samples allow the use of strong methods of statistical inference, but such samples can make it more difficult for researchers to construct valid measurements (since these need to be applied across a wider domain of cases) and to maintain causal homogeneity.

THE QUESTION OF "SCIENCE" IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

A good research design attempts to answer a research question that is both important in the world and offers some purchase for current social scientific methods and theory to yield insight. These are fundamentally gray areas, and "'interesting" is value-laden term, especially in the social sciences. An interesting question may shed light on an important policy issue, test a widely contested (or widely accepted) theory, or posit an explanation of an anomaly—something that is not explained by current theory or even seems inexplicable. Tractability is determined by a variety of factors, including the availability of data, available research resources, physical law, and the state of statistical methods. Still, there remains a core of questions and methods generally considered interesting and tractable.

In practice, the process of research design in political science is both iterative and creative, as Henry E. Brady and David Collier (2004) note. It is rare that researchers start with a crisply defined theoretical question, develop measures of the variables of interest from first principles, go into the world and collects data in one fell swoop, and emerge with compelling results. Instead, they may start with a vague question, immerse themselves in the details of the cases relevant to this question, and use these details to generate new theories and new questions. They might start with one set of measures and find, when they attempt to apply these measures to the world, that they are unreliable or flawed. They may attempt one method of sampling but, on examination of the sample, find that it is unbalanced or non-random.

Nevertheless, problem selection, and research design in general, occur within a scientific framework. This framework emphasizes testing competing theories based on evidence gathered from the world, is always open to the possibility that new data will require the updating of theories and conclusion, and insists on transparency on how data is collected and analyzed.

See also *Causal Inference; Computational Modeling; Experimental Design; Field Experiment; Heuristics; Interview Techniques; Quasi-experiment; Reliability and Validity Assessment; Resampling Method; Survey Research; Survey Techniques and Design.*

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Reserved Seat

Reserved seats are positions within legislative systems that are allocated to specific groups. Reserved seating arrangements are typically the result of constitutional or other political concessions whereby seats are granted to disadvantaged groups to ensure representation in elected bodies. For instance, in the Croatian House of Representatives, five of the 140 seats are reserved for ethnic minorities, including one each for Serbian, Hungarian, and Italian minorities; one seat shared by the Czech and Slovak minorities; and one shared by the Austrian, German, Ruthenian, Ukrainian, and Jewish minorities. Other countries reserve seats for women. In Uganda, one seat from each of the countries electoral districts is reserved for women candidates, while Bangladesh reserves thirty seats for women legislators and Tanzania, fifteen. Many countries, including Italy and Portugal, have reserved seats for their citizens living abroad. Critics of reserved seats argue that the system undermines democracy by granting certain groups additional influence in the voting process. They also assert that reserved seat arrangements are simply quota systems that actually prevent the election of more minority candidates by concentrating office-seekers from those groups in the reserved seat contests.

See also *Minority Representation; Women's Representation.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Responsibility

Stemming from the Latin *spondeo-respondeo,* meaning to promise to answer, the concept of responsibility is strongly related to the condition of moral *imputability* of an actor in relation to the actor's deeds or omissions, as described by Mariana Oshana in 2001, with regard to the foundations of moral agency. Aristotle argues that moral responsibility regards praise or blame on the basis of individual actions and dispositional traits, when the capacity for decision is ascertained. On the other side, social sciences have tried to anchor the question of responsibility to a given institutional context and to the processes of an agent's role. In this view responsibility has been reserved primarily for actions occurring in the scope of interpersonal relationships, considering that behavioral expectations and obligations accompany any particular status. Yet, although often the focus remains concentrated on the individual agent, other modern interpretations of responsibility are not only connected to the debate on individual duties and free will. Indeed the concept of responsibility also has been analyzed with reference to the processes of delegating authority to an individual representative or to a collective body.

The use of responsibility as a political concept is relatively recent. Strongly related with the development of representative democracy, it was compared for the first time in *The Federalist Papers* (1788), where it was associated by Alexander Hamilton with the idea of government, in expressions such as *responsible government* or *responsibility of government.* The American Founders used the term *responsibility* as a synonymous with *accountability,* implying "mechanisms for the active monitoring of public officials and the means for enforcing public expectations," as noted by theorist Joseph Bessette (2001, 39). Maintaining such meaning, responsibility has become a key concept of liberal theory. In a constitutional regime, government is controlled by citizens and acts with a constant reference to such oversight.

Yet a different interpretation of responsibility has accompanied the spread of democratic institutions: governors could be responsible also taking care "that the results are correct and good for many. Such responsibility is the most interesting kind because it goes beyond questions of accountability and obligation in any simple meaning," as argued by Mark Blitz (1998). Edmund Burke provided the base of the modern prohibition of the imperative mandate for elected members of parliament in his speech to electors of Bristol. This view protects the autonomy of representatives, who have to act with reference to a general will. He stated that "parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interest each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates. But Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole" (Burke 1968, 115). Along the same line, when considering the practical application of responsibility, a protagonist of French Revolution (1789–1799), abbé Joseph Sieyès, provided the most explicit formulation of the opposition between the will of nation and special interests, expressing skepticism that representative actors could be accountable to citizens.

The main dilemma of modern representation can be identified in divergent concepts of responsibility. As noted by Hanna Pitkin (1967), the difficult definition of the concept of responsibility resides essentially in its twofold nature: it may express the product of a concrete fiduciary relationship as well as a propensity to act in accordance with the evolving general will. Responsibility represents one of the most important challenges for democracy, concerning the difficult balance between the necessity to make political agents responsive to citizens and the need to give actors autonomy to make decisions in the interests of collective.

See also *General Will; Political Agents; Public Good; Representative Democracy.*

. . . . FORTUNATO MUSELLA

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Reverse Discrimination

Whole classes of people within their own states have historically been marginalized, treated as second-class citizens, or even enslaved—as in the United States. Rectifying past wrongs inevitably brings accusations of *reverse discrimination,* a charge in the United States leveled against public and private remedies to undo the remnants and relics of past officially sanctioned racial segregation and discrimination. The landmark case of *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) declared unconstitutional public schools racially segregated by law (*de jure,* as opposed to *de facto*). After years of resistance to judicial desegregation orders following *Brown,* the Supreme Court defined *desegregation* as *integration* of previously segregated school systems, which began the contentious process of busing schoolchildren into and out of the mostly black and mostly white residential areas to achieve racially integrated public school systems. Underlying the judicial decree was an assumption supported by considerable evidence that but for long-standing official segregation policies, public school systems and residential neighborhoods would have been naturally more racially integrated. Education was only one facet of entrenched racial inequity in the United States. *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) had launched the *separate but equal* doctrine that permitted segregation and embedded in the American social order legalized racism and its appalling consequences that might have been eliminated much sooner had the court ruled differently. Instead, in law, medicine, education, and industry few African Americans were included, and much of the black community had been forced to lag far behind as the rest of the nation developed. America, of course, is not unique.

Remedies in the United States came at first by judicial decree, and Congress followed by successfully passing historic and comprehensive legislation (the Civil Rights Act of 1964) that prohibited discrimination in education and the workplace based on classifications such as race, religion, national origin, and gender. Stopping discrimination was one thing, but correcting past inequities through *affirmative action* spawned controversy and sharp political divisions. Critics complained that this was *reverse discrimination* against innocent whites. However, doing nothing except terminating discrimination kept generations of once excluded sectors of American society stages behind white men on nearly every measure of social achievement. On the other hand, given limited resources and opportunities, affirmative action to correct past wrongs could disadvantage a current generation of whites—especially men—who bore no responsibility for the official unfairness that had preceded them. Hence the social, political, and legal dilemma still in search of an equitable resolution, with decision makers treading a thin line between affirmative action and reverse discrimination.

For more than thirty years, the Supreme Court has interpreted both the Equal Protection Clause and the Civil Rights Act many times to guide decision makers on how lawfully to confront this dilemma, but the justices have been as divided as everyone else. In two major admissions cases in 2003 from the University of Michigan regarding law school and undergraduate admissions, the court, deeply split, indicated that raw quotas, or using race as a decisive or automatic factor, violates the principle of equality. Michigan's undergraduate admissions program had assigned fixed points to minority applicants, and this was unconstitutional. The law school process survived because race was just one general factor in what the university claimed was a complex, individualized review process designed to obtain a critical mass of diversity among the student body.

In 2009, an equally divided court invalidated New Haven, Connecticut's, refusal to certify test results it had given to the city's firefighters. The test and the city's promotion rules yielded results such that none of the eight blacks who had taken the test (three of whom had passed) would have been promoted. The city's decision was based on fear of a lawsuit under the *disparate-treatment* provision of the Civil Rights Act that established grounds for legal challenge of hiring and promotion standards in the workplace. The court ruled that because the city's own hearings produced no strong evidence of a disparate-impact violation, New Haven could not ignore the test "solely on the racial disparity in the results."

Unintentional discriminatory effects or impact are not the legal responsibility of government. In fact, if decision makers tried to adjust the scales or to reset standards to benefit minorities at the expense of whites, government risks violating the principles of equality enshrined in both the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and the Civil Rights Act. Although a great deal of progress has been made in the second half of the twentieth century, the legal, social, and political problems of inequities regarding gender and race (as well as other classifications) still linger. As the personnel of the judiciary changes, so will its attempts to resolve these problems.

See also *Affirmative Action; Discrimination; Equality and Inequality; Gender Quotas; Quotas; Reparations; Segregation and Desegregation.*

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Revisionism

Revisionism can refer to broad movements within the study of history that seek to reinterpret the past or to one of a series of ideological movements within Marxism. Revisionist historians have challenged accepted narratives of past events in order to overcome subjectivity and to account for newly discovered, or long hidden, sources. For instance, in the post–World War I (1914–1918) era, historians produced a range of new works that questioned the traditional interpretations of the causes of the war. Revisionism also can be a form of propaganda, used by states to rewrite the past. In Marxism, revisionism initially referred to the work of theorists such as Eduard Bernstein who argued that Marx's predictions concerning the imminent collapse of capitalism were incorrect. According to Bernstein, this made revolution impossible, but capitalism could be overcome through a gradual process of political and economic reform. Orthodox Marxists, including Vladimir Lenin, rejected Bernstein's contentions, and revisionism acquired a negative connotation. It became a pejorative term to describe any movement within Marxism that challenged traditional orthodoxy. In addition, Maoists charged the Soviets with revisionism following the death of Joseph Stalin. However, revisionist movements in the late 1950s evolved into the new left in the United States and western Europe.

See also *Bernstein, Eduard; Marxism; New Left.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Revolutions, Comparative

Revolutions are rapid changes in the institutions of government, carried out by noninstitutional means and usually with the support of popular groups mobilized for demonstrations, local revolts, guerilla warfare, civil war, mass strikes, or other revolutionary actions. Until the 1960s, revolutions were viewed as major turning points in history, ending traditional systems of government and ushering in modern political organization. However, the proliferation of revolutionary movements and rapid shifts in governments throughout the twentieth century led to a more open and ambiguous view. Revolutions—even "great social revolutions" such as the French Revolution (1789–1799) and the Russian Revolution (1917)—are now seen as bringing a mixture of change and continuity.

COMPARATIVE REVOLUTIONS: CLASSIFICATION BY GOALS AND PROCESSES

Although all revolutions bring a relatively sudden change in authority structures, the causes, processes, and outcomes of revolutions have differed greatly throughout history. Scholars, therefore, have developed a variety of classifications of different kinds of revolutions to aid comparison and highlight differences.

Constitutional revolutions sought to replace traditional monarchies or empires with republics bound by newly written rules that would limit state power, end the privileges of hereditary elites, and confer rights and responsibilities on citizens. Major examples include the American Revolution (1775–1783); the French Revolution; the revolutions of 1848 in France, Germany, and Austria; the Iranian Revolution of 1905; the Chinese Republican Revolution (1911); and the Turkish Revolution of 1919.

Anticolonial revolutions aimed to end rule by foreign countries, drawing on nationalist identities to inspire resistance and the foundation of new institutions of local self-rule.

In many cases, nationalist traditions were in fact newly developed by elites, and in some cases, self-rule became rule by local elites rather than citizen-based democracy. Major examples include the Latin American revolutions (1808–1828), the Vietnamese (1954) and Algerian (1962) revolutions, the Indian Independence movement (1949), and the Mozambique and Angolan revolutions (1974).

Fascist revolutions also drew on nationalist traditions but used them to mobilize mass support for the replacement of weak monarchies or republics with authoritarian regimes. Major examples include Italy (1921) and Germany (1933).

Communist revolutions, inspired by the historical theories of Karl Marx, intended to overturn existing regimes and replace them with one-party states that abolished private property. Although the communist regimes were one-party dictatorships, they labeled themselves "democracies" or "republics," as they destroyed the prior economic and political elites while claiming to represent workers and peasants. Major examples include those in Russia, China (1949), and Cuba (1959).

Antidictatorial revolutions, provoked by the excessive corruption or depredations of modernizing dictators, endeavored to create new regimes based on constitutions or populist one-party states. Major examples include Mexico (1911), the Philippines (1976), Nicaragua (1979), and Iran (1979).

Some revolutions combined these features; thus, the Vietnamese revolution was anticolonial and communist. Other revolutions were distinctive and fit none of these categories; for example the South African antiapartheid revolution (1994), in which a native ethnic majority wrested power from a ruling minority of foreign descent.

The past several decades have seen the emergence of yet another kind of revolution, the *people power* or *color* revolutions—so termed because popular demonstrations toppled dictators or communist regimes not by mass violence, but by rallying huge crowds around symbols of national unity and popular opposition, which were mainly colored symbols such as yellow or orange ribbons (the Philippines in 1976 and Ukraine in 2004) or flowers (Georgia's "rose revolution" in 2003 and Kyrgyzstan's "tulip revolution" in 2005). Other examples include the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia (1989) and the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon (2005).

COMPARING REVOLUTIONS BY OUTCOMES

The outcomes of revolutions vary greatly. In some cases, revolutionaries start with, and maintain, relatively moderate and focused goals of political change. Examples include the American Revolution, the Latin American revolutions, and the Philippines Revolution (1996). These revolutions mainly opened up political competition and did little to change the economies of these countries. Such cases often are called *liberal* or *moderate* revolutions.

By contrast, in other cases revolutionaries came to embrace a more radical program of economic and social transformation—whether through internal or external struggles to defend their revolutionary program or through ideological inspiration. In the French, Russian, Chinese, Cambodian, and a number of other revolutions, revolutionary leaders sought to fully transform society's elite structure, to radically accelerate social mobility, and to replace the foundations of economic organization through extensive state seizures of property. Such cases often are called *radical* or *great social* revolutions.

The political character of the regimes that result from revolutions also varies. In some cases, revolutionary leaders have been genuinely committed to achieving democracy and have guided their new regimes to that goal. Examples include the United States, South Africa, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Philippines. In other cases, revolutionary leaders placed a higher value on staying in power or maintaining the revolutionary regime in the face of powerful threats; in these cases, revolutionary regimes swiftly moved toward one-party or personal dictatorships. Examples include France, the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, Mexico, and Algeria. In some cases, the revolutionary outcomes remained mixed and unclear for some time, as with Russia's anticommunist revolution of 1981 (first moving toward, then away from democracy) or Nicaragua's Sandinista Revolution of 1979 (first moving away, then toward, democracy).

Sometimes revolutionary efforts to take power are suppressed but only after they shock society substantially. In such cases, scholars speak of *unsuccessful* revolutions, such as the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the revolutions of 1848 in Prussia and Austria-Hungary.

In sum, revolutions vary widely by their goals, their processes, and their outcomes. One of the key challenges in the comparative study of revolutions is to account for patterns of similarity and difference and to identify complexes of causal factors or trajectories that lead revolutions to assume certain forms or bring particular outcomes.

So far, however, the comparative politics of revolutions has not progressed much beyond classification and typologies. Scholars have been more concerned to explain why revolutions occur at all, rather than why they have taken specific forms or generated certain results in various places. Even the classifications and typologies above are frequently challenged as new forms of revolutions develop.

See also *Communism; Fascism; Political Change; Protests and Demonstrations; Regime Change.*

. . . . JACK A. GOLDSTONE

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Rhetoric

Rhetoric is the study and art of public speaking and communication. The Greeks developed the main techniques of rhetoric that would be used well into the twentieth-first century. Beginning with the Sophists, rhetoric emphasized the ability to persuade audiences and stressed the importance of style over substance. Rhetoric was initially one of the cornerstones of education, along with grammar and logic, and it was a critical component of political life. Rhetoricians such as the Roman politician Cicero built careers on their ability to sway the public through speech. The three main branches of classical rhetoric were: *deliberative,* designed to persuade or dissuade; *judicial,* meant to either indict or defend; and *epideictic,* which was ceremonial in nature and used to celebrate or denigrate.

Rhetoric fell out of favor as an academic discipline in the nineteenth century, but was revived at the beginning of the twentieth century with the rise of a new group of theorists to include scholars such as Kenneth Burke and the expansion of media, especially, initially radio and recorded sound, as a means to spread political ideas and persuade the public to support or oppose politicians, parties, or policies. In this period, the neo-Aristotelian critique of classical criticism emerged. This model was the first developed method to critique various forms of communication and had its roots in Aristotle's teachings and emphasized an analysis of the communicator, not the actual communications. By the middle of the twentieth century, a new period of rhetoric had developed that expanded past the political arena to include art, literature, television, and a variety of other media. For instance, Burke discussed rhetoric as a form of communication that uses particular symbolic expressions to persuade a targeted audience, political or otherwise. Meanwhile, new stylistic elements related to more practical fields of inquiry such as economics and traditional scientific thought, became increasingly accepted, especially with the rise of the new media (such as television or digital exchanges) and information outlets, leading to greater influence on political decision-making models.

See also *Cicero, Marcus Tullius; Political Communication; Spin.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Ricardo, David

David Ricardo (1772–1823) was an influential British political economist. Born in London to wealthy Jewish immigrants from Holland, his formal schooling ended early in his teenage years. Ricardo began working in his father's stockbroking firm at age fourteen, which enabled him to start his own business career. In his late twenties, he read Scottish political economist

Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), which precipitated his interest in studying economic principles. He married a Quaker girl, Priscilla Ann Willkinson, at age twenty-one and became a Unitarian. As Sephardic Jews, his family had sincere religious commitments and disowned their son as a result of the marriage outside the faith. Ricardo pursued an independent career as a stockbroker, making a fortune for himself in the stock market, and prospered in nearly every endeavor in which he engaged himself. He retired at age forty-two with a fortune of approximately £1 million and established himself as a land proprietor.

In 1819 Ricardo was elected to a seat in the English House of Commons, where he served until illness forced his retirement. In Parliament, he advocated free trade among nations and the repeal of the Corn Laws, which limited the import of corn in an effort to protect English landholders. His prediction of the damaging effects of protectionism was ignored by Parliament during his lifetime, but it was regarded eventually by England and numerous other modern nations as a valid one.

Ricardo was one of the first economists to understand the benefit of free trade among nations even if one was more efficient in all production than the other. He famously illustrated that even if Portugal could manufacture cloth and wine more efficiently than England could, it was still beneficial for England to manufacture cloth and Portugal to manufacture wine provided there was unrestricted trade with each other.

Ricardo's first work, *The High Price of Bullion* (1810), which was originally published in the *Morning Chronicle,* was the development of arguments explaining the increase of the price of gold as paper money depreciated. Through participation in this controversy, Ricardo became friends with economist Thomas Robert Malthus. Although Ricardo affirmed Malthus' principles of population growth, the two disagreed concerning the causes and nature of gluts (oversupply) and recessions. Ricardo affirmed Say's Law that supply will call forth its own demand, but Malthus argued that gluts resulted from unequal production and consumption by the wealthy, resulting in higher levels of saving. Ricardo also opposed Malthus' support of the Corn Laws. In his *Essay on Profits* (1815), Ricardo argued that the Corn Laws increased the income of landowners at the expense of the consumers and workers. Ricardo advocated the principle of comparative advantage, which still governs as a fundamental law of economics. His labor theory of value was articulated in his *The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (1817), which greatly influenced German philosopher Karl Marx. Ricardo's economic thought advanced the heritage of classical economists.

See also *Free Trade; Marx, Karl; Political Economy; Smith, Adam.*

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Right

The left–right dichotomy is a conceptual tool to describe and classify political parties, actors, ideologies, attitudes, and specific policies along a spectrum. Historically, the terms *left* and *right* refer to the seating positions in the National Assembly, during the French Revolution (1789–1799), of pro- and anti-Ancien Régime members. They became part of the mainstream political language in the nineteenth century and are still used to describe opposed political affiliations—notwithstanding debates on the contemporary relevance of the dyad.

Positions on a left–right axis are relative and not absolute. The right is not monolithic and one can distinguish between extreme, moderate, or center rights. The substantive content of the term *right* varies according to the political, social, cultural, or historical contexts, which explains that several disputed criteria have been put forward to differentiate the right from the left.

Very often the right has been defined as more in favor of status quo, of individual (as opposed to collective) rights and responsibilities, of limited government or social interventions in the economy, and of the acceptance of inequalities construed as (largely) natural as well as socially necessary. In contemporary political discourse, right often refers to variants of conservatism, fascism, libertarianism, and (neo)liberalism.

See also *Conservatism; Fascism; Ideologies, Political; Libertarianism.*

. . . . GEOFFROY MATAGNE

Rights of the State

See *State, Rights of the.*

Right to Die

The right to die tends to be a controversial issue around the world. Proponents of the right to die generally support the right of the terminally ill to end their own lives through assisted suicides and believe that life should not be prolonged when there is no chance of recovery. Many patients and families now routinely choose hospice care as an alternative to indefinite periods on life support. The focus of such care is on making patients and families comfortable without sustaining life by artificial means. Critics reject the notion that the right to die exists, contending that assisting or hastening death in any fashion is outright murder.

In 1968 a group of American physicians defined death as the end of human life when the heart and lungs cease to operate.

The term *brain dead* has since been used to describe patients who suffered irreversible brain damage, including the cessation of involuntary functions like heartbeat, such that they could only be kept alive through artificial means. A reexamination of when death occurs had been necessitated by advancing medical technology that allowed physicians to prolong life through the aggressive use of antibiotics, respirators, feeding tubes, and organ transplants.

According to the American Hospital Association, death occurs in three out of every four cases when terminally ill patients have been removed from life support. With prior consent of the patient or by permission of families, doctors can harvest vital organs to be transplanted into various patients or used in training facilities. Each country deals with the right to die in its own way, and positions range from that taken by the Netherlands, which accepts the right to die with equanimity, to Japan where a refusal to accept the scientific concept of brain dead prevents doctors from harvesting organs for major transplants.

SWITZERLAND AND THE NETHERLANDS

Some countries lack specific bans on assisted suicide, but Switzerland was the first country to legalize the practice in the 1940s. This permissiveness came under scrutiny in 2009, as an increasing number of foreigners (especially British, French, and German citizens) came to Switzerland to end their lives, a practice known as *suicide tourism*. The practice of suicide tourism was also controversial in the United Kingdom, as lawmakers debated whether to prosecute family members or friends who aid those travelling abroad to end their lives, or whether to recognize the right to die in the United Kingdom. Divergence in laws concerning the right to die among countries of the European Union promises to perpetuate controversy. In 2002, the European Court of Human Rights rejected the argument of a British woman, Diane Pretty, that the British law against assisted suicide violated her fundamental rights. As of 2010, the European Court of Human Rights had yet to reconsider this ruling.

Also, in 2002, the Netherlands became the second country to legalize assisted suicide and now has more than two thousand people choose to end their lives each year. The practice is legal only when a patient with an incurable illness or who is in unbearable pain that cannot be alleviated by other methods freely and persistently asks for assistance in dying. The decision must be agreed to by at least two physicians (one of whom is independent), and a committee has to be set up to monitor the case. If these guidelines are not followed, physicians may be prosecuted for murder. Belgium followed the Netherlands in 2002, but other countries have been slow to follow their lead.

UNITED STATES

The issue of assisted suicides has proved controversial in the United States, where the right to die is decided on a state-by-state basis and faces vigorous opposition in the *prolife* movement rooted in antiabortion activism among Christian conservatives. The right to die debate has been heated in the United States since 1976 when the parents of Karen Ann Quinlan, 22, who was declared brain dead after a drug overdose, asked and received permission to remove her from a respirator. The decision was challenged, and Quinlan lived several years in a vegetative state after the respirator was removed. The debate heated up again in 1990 when the Supreme Court entered the arena. In *Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health* (497 U.S. 261), the court held that competent individuals have a "liberty interest" based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to refuse medical treatment. Nevertheless, the justices decided that if no "clear and convincing evidence" of the right to die exists, the compelling interest of the state in sustaining life takes precedence.

This practice received international attention in the late 1980s and 1990s when Dr. Jack Kevorkian, dubbed "Dr. Death" by the media, helped more than one hundred terminally ill patients end their own lives (one case led to an eight-year prison sentence for second-degree murder). Meanwhile, in 1997, Oregon became the first U.S. state to legalize assisted suicide, followed by neighboring Washington in 2006. In 2010, the Montana Supreme Court issued a ruling protecting doctors from prosecution for assisted suicide, but falling short of recognizing a constitutional right to die.

The most recent controversial right to die case in the United States involved Terri Schiavo of Florida, who went into a coma in 1990 at the age of twenty-six after experiencing cardiac arrest. Doctors determined that she existed only in a vegetative state, but she was kept alive through a feeding tube. In 2003, Schiavo's husband Michael asked that her tube be removed, in keeping with what he believed would have been his wife's wishes. Her parents challenged the decision, disputing her diagnosis backed by their own doctors, and set off a round of battles that involved the Florida governor and legislature and eventually President George W. Bush (the brother of Florida's governor) and the U.S. Congress. On four separate occasions, the Supreme Court refused to hear the case. Despite the controversy, Schiavo's tube was ultimately removed in 2005, and she died two weeks later. Autopsy reports revealed that it would have been medically impossible for Schiavo to recover. The Schiavo case is a good example of the connection between U.S. Christian conservative opposition to abortion and rejection of a right to die—her parents, Roman Catholics, received spiritual counsel from Fr. Frank Pavone, the leader of Priests for Life, an organization of Catholic clergy opposed to abortion, euthanasia, and assisted suicide.

See also *Abortion and Politics; Bioethics and Politics; Disability Rights; European Politics and Society; European Union; Religious Right; Right to Life.*

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Right to Life

The right to life is a concept from international human rights law, suggesting that all people are entitled to live and that, under most circumstances, human beings should not end a life. It is included in a number of international human rights treaties and documents, most notably in Article 3 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which is the foundation for international human rights law. The right to life is given primacy in the document and, therefore, resulting law; in fact, it is the first enumerated right (part of "life, liberty, and security of person"), with the two articles that precede it only necessary for establishing the basis of common rights for all. The right to life subsequently has been included in Article 2 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 6 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 4 of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, Article 4 of the 1981 African Charter on Human and People's Rights, and a number of other international agreements and conventions.

Although the concept entered human rights law after World War II (1939–1945), the idea of a fundamental right to life can be traced back to earlier documents, such as the American Declaration of Independence, which claimed the right of all men to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Even the Magna Carta demanded that "No Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned . . . or any other wise destroyed . . . but by lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land," prohibiting at least the arbitrary taking of a life. Still, the earlier document suggested that the laws in place grant the right to life, while the Declaration matches the understanding of the UDHR and subsequent documents in that the right to life is somehow more fundamental, originating in the inherent worthiness of a human being or backed by the teachings of a deity.

As with many other human rights, the crux of many debates about the right to life is the extent to which it applies. Is the right to life a negative liberty, not to be killed arbitrarily, especially by the state, or does it require positive action to protect life? Those who view the right as a protection from arbitrary treatment often invoke it at the international level to decry or defend against abuses of human rights by autocratic governments, including the use of torture, disappearance, and war. Those who see a positive mandate may refer to the right to life in demanding international humanitarian efforts to alleviate suffering from natural disasters and human malfeasance, from earthquakes to famine to flooding.

Demonstrators at a pro-life rally speak out against abortion. The concept of the right to life has been adopted in discussions of social issues such as abortion, euthanasia, and capital punishment.

In Western democracies, particularly the United States, the concept of the right to life has been adopted by those concerned about social issues, especially in reference to abortion. Opponents of abortion often claim that an unborn fetus is a human life that requires state-sanctioned protection; indeed, one of the major American opponents of abortion is the National Right to Life Committee, an advocacy group with more than three thousand chapters. The right to life also has been invoked to oppose euthanasia, most famously in the case of Terri Schiavo, a brain-damaged Florida woman whose husband wished to cut off artificial life support systems in 2005. Conservatives unsuccessfully demanded that her right to life be protected by continuing to employ artificial means.

However, right to life discourse is not confined to the American right-wing. Catholics the world over use the term to oppose not only abortion, but also capital punishment; their claims have theological basis in a number of papal documents from Vatican II to more recent encyclical letters. (While again suggesting that the right to life is more fundamental than any earthly law, the church makes it clear that even the state is never sanctioned to take life.) By contrast, others invoke the right to life to defend women from unsafe medical procedures or oppressive cultural practices.

In general, the right to life is considered an important signpost of the overall shift of international law toward personal security and protection of the individual, rather than national security and protection of the state. It remains an important rallying point and justification for advocates of a number of international and national rights causes stemming from a host of political perspectives.

See also *Abortion and Politics; Human Rights; Magna Carta; Natural Law; Natural Rights; Reproductive Rights; Right to Die; Universal Declaration of Human Rights.*

. . . .   RICHARD J. MEAGHER

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Riker, William

William H. Riker (1920–1993) was an influential twentieth-century American political theorist who developed methods for applying mathematical reasoning to the study of politics. After receiving his PhD from Harvard, Riker began his teaching career at Lawrence College in Wisconsin, right in the middle of the mid-century behavioral revolution in political science. He took a less-traveled path and sought something different from the statistical truths and behavioral reality that were popular in the day—something more fundamental and foundational.

Riker did not, as did his behavioralist contemporaries, think of individuals in political life as bundles of demographic characteristics, sociological connections, or psychological predispositions, but rather as goal-oriented, purposeful actors. Individuals, for him, were rational; they had an innate capacity to assess alternatives in terms of preferences, to organize their beliefs about the likelihood of various events occurring, and to combine preference and belief in a logical manner. If preferences are represented by a utility function, and beliefs by subjective probabilities, then rationality entails maximizing behavior—choosing the alternative with the highest expected utility. For Riker, the rationality hypothesis provided the firm foundation on which to understand human behavior in general. To understand political behavior in particular, his instinct was to imbed rational individuals in institutional settings—in committees, legislatures, courts, bureaucracies, parties, electoral situations, even revolutionary groups. He called the study of politics from this perspective positive political theory (to distinguish it from normative political theory). Through his teaching and writing, he created a new school of thought that, half a century later, remained part of the mainstream of political science and one of the essential building blocks of modern political economy.

Of the nearly one hundred papers he wrote, the two most often cited are "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting" (Riker and Ordeshook 1968) and "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions" (1980). He is perhaps best known, however, for four books: *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (1962), *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Maintenance* (1964), *Introduction to Positive Political Theory* (1972), and *Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice* (1982). The first characterizes all that we think of as political as consisting of the forming of coalitions, where rational individuals engage in this activity in order to win. The volume on federalism, significant when it first appeared, had a renaissance at the end of the twentieth century when, with the fall of communism, federal experiments in nation-building accelerated. *Introduction to Positive Political Theory* was essentially the very first textbook of political theory, transforming important parts of political science from civics and wisdom to science. *Liberalism against Populism* demonstrated how an axiomatized logic of political choice could shed light on many of the philosophical issues at the foundation of democratic theory. Together, this corpus became the exemplar for how to do political science.

Riker's crowning achievement was to institutionalize rational choice approaches to politics into a political science curriculum at the University of Rochester in New York. He came to Rochester in 1962 as its chair and created a PhD program in political science shortly thereafter. By the time of his death three decades later, Rochester had produced more than one hundred PhDs and had become a brand name.

See also *Federalism; Political Science, History of; Political Theory.*

. . . .   KENNETH A. SHEPSLE

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Rogue States

The concept of rogue states first emerged as a key analytical category for Western policy makers and academics in the early 1980s. Although the term itself predates this period, the climax and conclusion of the cold war era witnessed a surge of interest in rogues, particularly within the United States. As former president Bill Clinton said in 1996, this interest was borne out of a widespread belief that the certainty and stability of a bipolar international system had been replaced with a far messier world of unpredictable and disparate threats: "Our struggle at the end of the cold war is to deal with these new perils—the rogue states like Iran and Iraq" (cited in Hoyt 2000, 300). With the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, further accentuating this sense of uncertainty, Clinton's successor President George W. Bush located rogue states at the very center of his administration's security strategy: "We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends" (National Security Strategy 2002, 14).

DEFINING AND IDENTIFYING ROGUE STATES

Prior to being at the heart of U.S. security policy, the term *rogue state* referred to patterns of domestic repression by states of their own citizens. Typically, it is reserved to describe states posing—or perceived to be posing—a direct threat to regional or international security. For scholars and policy makers alike, three criteria in particular warrant the use of this label: A state can be considered a rogue for facilitating, sponsoring, or actively engaging in international terrorism. In the United States, the State Department's annual *Patterns of Global Terrorism* reports have been central to identifying states that meet this criterion. A state also can be deemed a rogue for developing or actively pursuing weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—specifically chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons—and their delivery systems. Finally, and more controversially, the term also is applied frequently to states perceived to be acting in defiance of the international community's established laws, rules, norms, and conventions.

Although there has been some variation in the states designated rogues within contemporary political discourse, a small number have retained their positions of prominence. North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, three members of the "axis of evil," have consistently been identified as the most dangerous rogue states. Cuba, Libya, Syria, and Sudan also have been assigned this label by Western political elites, albeit less frequently.

Due to the unconventional nature of the threat posed by rogue states, efforts to counter them have overwhelmingly concentrated on coercive and militaristic security policies. The Clinton and Bush administrations pursued aggressive containment strategies for confronting rogue states, exemplified in the latter's prolonged pursuit of a national missile defense program, despite continued opposition from critics. More controversially, the existence of rogues has been used to justify preemptive or preventative military action against nonimminent threats—a policy that became the cornerstone of the so-called Bush Doctrine after the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

The continued centrality afforded rogue states by the security and foreign policy-making elites of Western states has provoked considerable opposition. Critics have argued that the concept is employed with such inconsistency that it is rendered worthless. Although frequently designated a rogue, Cuba, for example, fails to meet any of the above criteria. At the same time, Israel is almost never discussed under this label, particularly within the United States. These critics argue that the United States itself is the dominant rogue state. A related line of criticism suggests that this concept is applied in a politically selective manner as a powerful rhetorical strategy for condemning or demonizing enemies of the United States and its allies. Other critics maintain that the threat posed by these actors is considerably exaggerated; rogues are no more antagonistic or likely to resort to force than other states because they lack the infrastructure, as in the case of Libya, or because militarily strong neighbors constrain them, as in the case of North Korea.

Finally, and most important, critics have argued also that designating a state as rogue leads to unfortunate, even pernicious, political consequences. With coercive measures such as economic sanctions and military invasions the preferred strategy for confronting these actors, the use of this label frequently results in missed opportunities for improved relations, dialogue, and an end to direct or indirect violence.

See also *Corruption and Other Political Pathologies.*

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Rokkan, Stein

Stein Rokkan (1921–1979), professor of comparative politics at the University of Bergen, Norway, was one of the world's leading social scientists. His life work produced a gigantic "historical fresco" of political development in Europe universally acknowledged as being fundamental to the study of the formation of nation-states and the birth of democracy. Rokkan's theoretical contribution, combined with his indefatigable organization of data archives and scholarly networks and his pioneering promotion of computerized research techniques, make him a "classic" of comparative politics.

Rokkan's working method consisted of constantly rewriting his pieces and completing them through new data and theories. The continuous evolution that characterizes his thought led to the fragmentation of his writings into a myriad of publications, in which previous conclusions are taken up critically. Rokkan never wrote a systematic and integrated volume. In fact, his intellectual endeavors were never intended as final products. Yet his work is extremely coherent. This unity stems from his concern with two basic phenomena.

The first of these phenomena is the formation of nation-states. Rokkan's models explain the emergence of the territorial and centralized states controlling peripheries and borders. He was interested in differences of timing between states that formed late in the nineteenth century in the *city-belt* in the middle of Europe, and old states in the territories surrounding it. His models also describe the building of nations, with the standardization of religion and language. Again, he was interested in variation, the goal being to explain why peripheral identities survived in some countries but not in others.

The second phenomenon Rokkan was concerned with was the development of mass democracy. His models reconstruct the paths from absolutism toward democracy (through *thresholds*) and how oppositions organize. His most famous model is that of four *cleavages* (class, state-church, center-periphery, rural–urban), caused by the national and industrial revolutions of the nineteenth century, which were expressed in political parties that stabilized in the twentieth century (the *freezing hypothesis*). Rokkan's work is characterized by parsimonious modeling of historical processes, political structures, and causal links. Text is accompanied by numerous figures that Rokkan considered useful for model-building.

Rokkan's intellectual achievements are matched by his entrepreneurial role in organizing international social science. He was secretary of the International Political Science Association (IPSA)/International Sociological Association (ISA) Committee on Political Sociology (1960–1979) and president of UNESCO's International Social Science Council (ISSC) Committee on Comparative Research (1973–1977). He was also IPSA's president (1970–1973) and ISA's vice president and chair (1966–1976). He cofounded the European Consortium for Political Research, of which he was the first chair (1970–1976). In Scandinavia, he was chair of the Nordic Political Science Association and helped to create the journal *Scandinavian Political Studies.* Rokkan also founded the Department of Comparative Politics at the University of Bergen.

Convinced of the potential of both the behavioral and computer revolutions in the social sciences, Rokkan became the leader of the archival movement for the organization of permanent infrastructures for the collection, dissemination, and classroom use of "ecological" (micro and macro) data produced by collaborative and cumulative research. He organized the Conferences on Data Archives in 1963 and 1964, helped to build the Committee of European Social Science Data Services, and edited *European Political Data.*

Rokkan was fluent in several languages and traveled ceaselessly for conferences and research purposes. His stature is witnessed worldwide by recognitions in his honor, including lectures, prizes, and chairs named after him. Most importantly, his models have remained a constant source of inspiration for later generations and are employed to interpret democratization throughout the world as well as the process of European integration.

See also *Computational Modeling; Democracy and Democratization; Democratic Theory; Political Theory.*

. . . .   DANIELE CARAMANI

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Roll-call Analysis

Roll-call analysis could be defined as the use of quantitative or qualitative research methods to understand the decision-making process behind a legislator's vote; the reasons and rationale behind that vote; and the implications and consequences of

the vote. Roll-call studies can use single roll calls or aggregated data, depending on the researcher objectives. Roll calls may be analyzed for a variety of reasons, including forecasting roll calls and identifying trends inside the legislature, monitoring interests, and keeping track of legislators' records and party cohesion. The idea is that when a representative votes on the floor, that vote represents the end of a decision process. Therefore, voting on the floor is the expression of a choice that can be measured and used by political scientists. Roll-call analysis might be the most-used method to analyze legislative behavior because votes are available in most of legislatures at national, state, or city levels. Besides, it is possible to compare the same legislator—or party—across different periods or subjects, and many others levels of analysis. It is also possible to contextualize the vote to try to understand it better. Roll-call analysis can use simple methodologies such as coding individual votes and comparing them within a political party, or extremely complex methodologies that use factorial analysis, simulations, and mathematical models.

See also *Qualitative Methodologies; Quantitative Analysis.*

. . . . MARCIO A. CARVALHO

Roll Off

Roll off is a form of incomplete voting participation. In modern elections, voters rarely are offered only one electoral position on a ballot. If a voter participates in the top-of-the-ballot election and does not vote in other elections on the ballot, participation is not complete. This failure to complete a ballot is referred as voter roll off.

The existence of voter roll off has important consequences. The most significant consequence of voter roll off is its impact on voter turnout rates. While the turnouts in the US. off-year congressional elections can be as low as 35 percent, and turnout in local elections around 25 percent, voter roll off may further reduce the level of political participation in elections farther down the ballot. The phenomenon of roll off can be attributed to lack of certain election skills, information, or resources. For example, certain ballot formats more than others confuse or "fatigue" voters, and therefore cause some voters to cease casting a ballot. Some voters refrain from casting a ballot when they lack information about a particular election or public office. Roll off also may be caused by a lack of interest in politics, minimal concern with public issues, a sense that activity makes no difference, and no consciousness of membership in a group with shared political interests.

See also *Turnout; Voting Behavior.*

. . . . BAODONG LIU

Roman Catholic Social Thought

Catholic social thought is a systematic Christian reflection on the social order. Neither Jesus nor the early church sought the cooperative agency of the state, sharply delineating the two realms. Seeking to strip politics and the state of divine pretensions, the church, under Pope Gelasius I, in 494, formalized the doctrine that there were two authorities, ecclesiastical and civil, each legitimate in its own realm.

CLASSICAL FORMULATIONS: AUGUSTINE AND AQUINAS

In *De civitate Dei,* Saint Augustine articulated what would be the defining Christian attitude toward politics. Until the end of time, there are two cities, the heavenly and earthly, the former comprised of those who love God, the latter by those who love themselves and the world without reference to God. Political life is always the mingling of the two. Coupled with Augustine's conviction that the majority is unconverted, Augustine's views of politics are rooted in the grim realism that human beings, weakened by original and actual sin, can only attain a very limited justice in this world. Willed by God as a necessary, partial remedy for human sinfulness, the state's role is largely coercive and punitive, limiting sin but unable to treat the roots of the disorder in the human soul. Although incorporating essential Christian insights into the human condition, Augustine's theology ran the risk of promoting an unduly negative view of the state's role.

Saint Thomas Aquinas is generally regarded as providing the needed corrective that renewed the Augustinian tradition through reappropriating the best of the Aristotelian corpus. Government's functions are not limited to the remedy of human deficiency, but include the essentially positive functions of choosing the means to and material requirements of the common good, and securing justice. He underlined the case for Christian support of constitutional government by affirming Aristotle's preference for a mixed regime, claiming that Scripture supported the ideal as well. Aquinas' theory of law would become Catholic patrimony, particularly in his classic statement on natural law, a law imbedded in human nature, discernible by reason, by which we can attain a sure knowledge of fundamental and universal moral principles; these properly condition and limit all human, political law.

MODERN FORMULATIONS: NATURAL RIGHTS AND PAPAL ENCYCLICALS

In the sixteenth century, Spanish Thomists in particular would develop two of the most influential doctrines for the subsequent development of Western political thought: popular sovereignty and natural rights. Jesuit scholastics, Francisco Suárez and Robert Bellarmine in particular, developed the former in the process of rejecting the divine right of kings, denying the proposition that God directly chose either political rulers or regimes. Historian Brian Tierney (1997) has shown how Francisco Vittoria and Bartolomé de Las Casas played equally fundamental roles in arguing the case for universal natural rights in the process of defending the rights of native peoples at the time of the colonization of the Americas.

Pope Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* (1891) begins the systematic exposition of Catholic social teaching as an authoritative and comprehensive body of doctrine. This landmark papal encyclical was a response to both the perceived injustices

against the working class as a result of the Industrial Revolution and the challenge of Marxism. It has been followed by a number of others, as well as documents released by groups of Catholic bishops that interpret and apply its principles in local settings. Perhaps the most significant of these was The Second General Conference of Latin American Bishops, held in Medellín, Colombia, in 1968. In rather stark and prophetic language, the bishops condemned poverty in Latin America as an inhuman scourge resulting from institutionalized injustice, calling for profound economic and political reform. Catholic political engagement increased significantly in the subsequent two decades. In addition, the Catholic bishops in the United States emerged as serious participants in debates over war and peace (*The Challenge of Peace,* 1983), the economy (*Economic Justice for All,* 1986), and in the promotion of national health care (provided it avoids government funding of abortion).

The teaching is comprehensive of the social order. The most fundamental principle is the sanctity of human life from conception to natural death, exemplified by John Paul II's 1995 encyclical *Evangelium Vitae,* which translates into an abolitionist approach to abortion, embryonic stem cell research, euthanasia, as well as a severely circumscribed support of the death penalty, limiting it to cases when a given society would have no reliable alternative way of protecting itself from violent criminals. This document provided a comprehensive explanation of the Vatican's efforts at the UN Conference at Cairo (1994) and elsewhere to reject the inclusion of abortion and the other named practices from the generally recognized list of universal human rights. Related to this is the insistence on the family as the most essential social institution and a rejection of same-sex marriage and divorce.

Philosophically, the church has insisted on the essential complimentarity of the principles of autonomy and solidarity, resisting both individualism and collectivism. The church came to insist on the valid rights of conscience, particularly in religious matters, a development highlighted by the landmark document *Dignitatis Humanae* (1965), despite the objections of a small percentage of the world's bishops who continued their preference for a "confessional state." In addition to the clear embrace of religious freedom, the church came to recognize a broad list of human rights as a legitimate outgrowth of its long-standing commitments to natural law, as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Catholic social teaching rejects moral relativism, in which it sees the negation of the objective moral order, which alone can properly support a universal philosophy of human rights.

TEACHING ON THE STATE: OPTION FOR THE POOR AND SUBSIDIARITY

Concerning the state, Catholic social teaching has defined a position that avoids ideological characterization. On the one hand, it strongly condemned Marxism, defending in principle the rights of private ownership and economic initiative. On the other hand, from *Rerum Novarum* (1891) through *Caritas in Veritate* (2009), the church has consistently condemned laissez-faire capitalism for its violations of human dignity, particularly with respect to the exploitation of workers. Moreover, it defends the rights of the state to intervene to protect the rights of workers to living wages and to organize collectively. The insistence that social policy reflect a "fundamental option for the poor" has become increasingly a central theme. In Latin America, from the late 1960s into the 1980s, a movement called *liberation theology* emerged, which placed considerable focus on this "fundamental option for the poor" in promoting social and political change as a constitutive dimension of the Gospel. Some theorists and practitioners adopted Marxist analysis and praxis to some degree, which led to two clarifications by the Vatican insisting on the religious, moral, and epistemological division between Marxism and Christianity, while affirming the pursuit of social justice (*Libertatis Nuntius* in 1984, *Libertatis conscientia* in 1986).

Nevertheless, one of the most distinctive features of the teaching is the principle of subsidiarity, which forbids higher associations (such as federal or state government) from taking away the legitimate functions of lower associations (such as a local level of government or the family). For example, if a family or local community can resolve issues pertinent to them, higher levels of government should not intervene. The principle does not, however, forbid government intervention when the order of justice demands the realization of conditions that lower forms of association are unable to bring about.

Rooted in subsidiarity, Catholic social teaching has, on the one hand, been sympathetic to the arguments that the social assistance state runs the risk of creating a demeaning clientelism among the disenfranchised. On the other hand, the most recent contribution to the social magisterium, *Caritas in Veritate,* clearly contends that in the context of the globalized economy, the proper role of the state in the promotion of social justice in the future most likely will be an expanded one. On economic matters, the person-centered approach insists on the priority of labor (the personal factor) over capital. The entire social order, the church insists, must serve the person, and never the other way around. The depth and breadth of the teaching permit scholars with leanings both left and right to work within the developing tradition. Some interpret subsidiarity as a generalized skepticism to an expanding state; others are more generally accommodating of a more European, social democratic approach. The church strongly resists nativist immigration, insisting that human dignity accompanies the person wherever he or she may go. Finally, the church recognizes the importance of being stewards of creation.

See also *Liberation Theology; Maritain, Jacques; Natural Law; Thomas Aquinas; Thomist, Scholastic, and Medieval Political Thought.*

. . . .   THOMAS R. ROURKE

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Roman Political Thought

Roman political thought is characterized by the influence of moral philosophy and individual ethics on theorizing political questions. This is due, in large part, to the centrality of Epicurean and Stoic philosophy, both of which primarily focus on individual well-being and on the moral status of the individual in the universe, more so than in the polis. The result is a separation of moral philosophy and political philosophy that were strongly linked in the ancient Greek tradition, which makes deeper connections between questions of the good person and the good citizen.

EPICUREANISM AND STOICISM

Nevertheless, Epicureanism and Stoicism differ on the value of politics and whether the wise person should engage in politics and public life. Epicureanism advocates a rejection of the inherent dangers of public life and political participation for individual happiness, suggesting instead withdrawal, going unnoticed, and quietism. Rather than a condition of a moral life, politics in the Epicurean view is theorized instrumentally, as a means to achieve physical security, but will work against the happiness of those who chose to participate. As a result of advocating the private life, Epicureans are criticized for enjoying the advantages of political life, such as security, without contributing to it.

Roman Stoic philosophers, such as Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, and Aurelius, while advancing a doctrine of individual well-being, argue against the private life of mind and withdrawal from political life, and hold instead that we have duties to serve others and that the wise person should participate politically. Humans are theorized as naturally social and thus drawn toward the performance of public duties. As social beings, we cannot be purely self-interested but have the capacity for altruism. Politics itself depends on such capacity because the moral standing of individuals is thought to be required for a stable and just social order, especially wise and virtuous leadership. Damaging self-interested motivation is due to the corrupting influence of improperly ordered institutions, suggesting interdependence between institutions and individual motivation.

VIEWS OF THE ROMAN ELITE

Cicero argues that the primary threat to political stability is the moral corruption of political elites, especially personal ambition. Cicero was critical of the ruling classes getting involved in commerce, which he thought sets their self-interest against the common interest. The requirements of empire necessitated full commitment, patriotism, and public virtue as the source of personal status and reputation. The functional goal was to integrate personal ambition with patriotic virtue and to conflate the pursuit of common and personal goods. As such, Cicero's diagnosis of the decay of the republic was blamed not on the limits of its institutions in adapting to changing political reality and scope, but on the decline of the virtue of its leadership.

Seneca, writing one hundred years after Cicero in the post-Republic era, suggests that political stability and social cohesion do not result from conventional matters of political theory, such as well-ordered constitutions and balanced, inclusive legislation, but on the individual ethics and virtues of rulers. According to Seneca, the gods select kings, and though not themselves divine, have similar powers over their nations. However, this status imposes significant obligations on leaders to act toward their subjects with justice and clemency. Good rulers must cultivate virtue in their subjects to strengthen society, by choosing clemency over cruelty, overlooking injuries to self, and ensuring that harms incurred by subjects are punished. Seneca is largely unconcerned with modes of selection, constitutional balance or legitimacy questions—the powers of king are not bound by the law, nor are they shared. The distinction between kings and tyrants is not found in constitutional types or their relationships to the constitution but in their behavior and their virtue. The power of kings is not externally constrained, but the role of the ruler itself demarcates duties, much like all social roles.

ATTRIBUTES OF ROMAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

A further prominent virtue required of political leadership in Roman political thought is rhetorical ability. According to Cicero, the best orator is a statesman, functioning in the assembly and the courts, and using the power of rhetoric to uphold the republic. The function of rhetoric is to win goodwill and move the emotions. Theorizing rhetoric as a political virtue raises potential conflict between philosophical discourse and political discourse. Whereas philosophical persuasion is directed at the intellect, oratory aims for the passions. This is thought to be justified and necessary because

political leaders must persuade those who have underdeveloped intellects. Political stability is furthered by deliberation, debate, and persuasion, as Cicero theorized the function of the Roman Senate, compared with reliance on force, bribery, and patronage.

In addition to able and virtuous practitioners of politics, Roman political thinkers, particularly during the republic, emphasized the importance of a well-ordered constitution and institutions to political stability, and attributed Rome's success to its republican constitution. Cicero thought the Roman constitution was perfect and the realization of Greek political ideals, particularly Aristotle's polity. According to Cicero, all pure types of constitutions, including monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies, are inherently unstable because they exclude portions of society from political participation. Mixed or republican constitutions, however, are stable because they are based on equality and inclusion, giving social classes no reason to strive for constitutional change. Institutionalizing social conflict makes the constitutional regime the site of contestation rather that its object.

The Greek historian Polybius also attributes Rome's stability and imperial success to its superior constitution and institutions. Mixed and inclusive government is more stable than pure forms because it acquires the consent and approval of the governed, rather than ruling out of fear. Republican constitutions also limit the security of rulers and their absolute control, which diminishes the likelihood of corruption. The interdependence that is created by constitutionally established cooperation promotes unity and equilibrium among social classes and protects the constitution from corrupted and ambitious individuals.

Roman Stoics also developed a cosmopolitan view of the universe as a polis, replete with obligations to humanity, equality grounded in rationality, and a natural law. While goodness requires serving other human beings, particular or local obligations to Rome are defended within the cosmic city as the best way to realize universal obligations. Despite the defense of local obligations, Cicero argues for a universal and natural conception of justice, against a conventional, relative, and thus open-ended view. Justice, like all virtues, is good in itself and should be pursued for its own sake.

See also *Augustine of Hippo; Cicero, Marcus Tullius; Freedom; Greek Political Thought, Ancient; Italian Political Thought; Republicanism, Classical; Rhetoric.*

. . . .   NEIL HIBBERT

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Rorty, Richard

A leading philosopher of his time, American Richard Rorty (1931–2007) challenged the foundations of modern Western philosophy. His work is most often linked with American pragmatism—that is, to the work of such individuals as Charles Sanders Pierce, William James, John Dewey, Wilfred Sellars, W. O. Quine, Donald Davidson, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin Heidegger, and Jacques Derrida. His challenges to widely accepted aspects of philosophy both garnered a large audience outside the discipline and were met with widespread criticism within it.

Beginning in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979) and continuing throughout his career (perhaps most clearly in *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth* [1991]), Rorty criticized the epistemological tradition of modern philosophy. This tradition stated that under the right conditions subjects were said to accurately "mirror" reality. However, Rorty argued that having any such accurate representations of reality would entail some specifically epistemological process between subjects and objects for which a coherent philosophical account would be needed, and such an account, he asserted, continued to prove elusive.

Influenced by Darwinian naturalism, late nineteenth– and early twentieth–century pragmatism provided the seeds for an alternative approach. Instead of characterizing the relations between people and the things in their environment in representational terms, they could be characterized as practical "habits for action," the latter being understood as causal and behavioral capacities, or virtual instruments. If what were taken to be representations of reality were re-described as habits for action, and if the processes of "acculturation" involved in habit acquisition were taken seriously, then a shift beyond the traditional epistemologically based paradigm would begin. What is called truth would no longer have anything to do with a subject's representations of reality (because such representations would no longer be entertained). Rather, truth would be a term of endorsement or caution with respect to the effectiveness of the habits for action by which subjects are acculturated. Of course, representationalism has been privileged by the great tradition of Western philosophy, a tradition outside of which it remains difficult to think for most. Nevertheless, as rich as the tradition has been, Rorty recommended shifting the paradigm, because it seems to have failed to provide the required coherent account of a mediating epistemological process.

Rorty's view entails the centrality of acculturation, but individuals' acculturation precedes them, he argues, there is no independent—that is, cultureless—access to some "essential" reality "out there" by means of which acculturation may be assessed or grounded. The beliefs held by individuals are thoroughly "contingent." Nevertheless, their activities and conversation are both enabled by and address the beliefs in the midst of which individuals find themselves. If conversation becomes more inclusive—if the beliefs of new interlocutors are woven into it—it will become more open and democratic, increasing the scope of ethical and political "solidarity." Here lies Rorty's

reformist and inclusive liberalism, detailed in *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (1989). Although no beliefs whatsoever may be assessed objectively (that is, standing outside one's acculturation), what has resulted are sets of beliefs by means of which, and about which, individuals converse, and which they may revise. Rorty recommends that the open conversation about and revision of habits for action be taken seriously, while the countless unsuccessful attempts to ground them in putative foundations or essences be abandoned. Thus the liberal "ironist" engages in an "anti-foundationalist" or "anti-essentialist" "cultural politics."

See also *Decisionism; Empiricism; Essentialism; Freedom; Language Policy; Language and Politics; Liberal Theory; Political Philosophy; Politics; Postmodernism; Pragmatism; Relativism.*

. . . .   JOHN DUNCAN

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Rothbard, Murray N.

Murray N. Rothbard (1926–1995) was a twentieth-century political economist and social theorist in the modern libertarian tradition. The author of more than twenty-five books and thousands of articles, he constructed a libertarian politics that drew from neo-Aristotelian realism, Lockean natural rights theory, individualist anarchism, the Austrian school of economics, and new left revisionist history. He advocated a version of anarchism known as anarchocapitalism, in which all goods and services, including defense and judiciary, are provided by free markets.

In *The Ethics of Liberty* (1982), Rothbard begins with Aristotelian principles of natural law, placing central priority on the individual as a rational, acting being. For Rothbard, the axiom at the base of all politics is the principle of self-ownership: individuals own their own bodies and the products of their labors. By appropriating the material objects of nature and mixing their labor with the land, people justly acquire property based on first use, as well as title transfer, whether through free exchange, gift, or inheritance. In Rothbard's view, individual rights are founded on a nonaggression principle: no one has the right to initiate the use or threat of physical violence against others or their justly acquired property. Every individual retains the right of self-defense.

Throughout history, Rothbard argues, the state has systematically violated individual rights by imposing a monopoly on the use of force within a given geographical area. In such works as *For a New Liberty* (1973), Rothbard views the free market and the state as polar opposites. The free market is synonymous with individual freedom, mutual benefit, harmony, and peace, while the state is synonymous with coercion, exploitation, class conflict, and war. Whereas markets promote efficiency, rational economic calculation, and production, states are necessarily parasitic, inefficient, and destructive. Rothbard envisions a future libertarian society in which the nonaggression principle is enshrined in a Libertarian Law Code, regulating the activities of voluntarily financed competitive defense and judicial agencies.

This anarchocapitalist perspective drew from the works of individualist anarchists such as Lysander Spooner, Benjamin Tucker, and Albert Jay Nock. However, the most important influence on Rothbard's thought was the work of his mentor, the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises. Rothbard's works in political economy, such as *Man, Economy, and State* (1962) and *Power and Market* (1970), extend the principles of Misesian theory, examining state intervention as the root cause of business cycles, inflation, unemployment, monopolies, war, and imperialism. Rothbard maintained that no government action was neutral and that state intervention created class (or caste) conflict by enriching certain groups at the expense of others.

Drawing from the work of new left revisionist historians such as Gabriel Kolko, William Appleman Williams, and James Weinstein, Rothbard focused on the monopoly of the state over the money supply, which structurally privileged banks and their capital-intensive beneficiaries. He advocated the end of central banking and the imposition of a strict 100 percent gold reserve requirement on all banks to prevent what he characterized as legalized counterfeiting and its deleterious consequences. His ideal society is one that celebrates the free and voluntary exchange of goods, services, and ideas.

See also *Anarchism; Economic Systems, Comparative; Libertarianism; Political Theory.*

. . . .   CHRIS MATTHEW SCIABARRA

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Rotten Boroughs

Rotten boroughs is primarily an English term used to describe electoral districts with very small populations. Initially the phrase applied to English districts in the late seventeenth century, but today, the term typically refers to the dominant political party within a district, which likely remains uncontested due to their popular constituency support. Prior to nineteenth century electoral reforms, the aristocracy in England used these constituencies to maintain influence in the House of Commons where the less-populated rural districts

balanced the growing urban areas. With small populations, the local aristocracy manipulated electoral processes by generally choosing the given candidate(s). Consequently, these boroughs were said to be in the pocket of the local gentry, and were also referred to as *pocket boroughs.*

By the 1830s, there were at least 140 rotten boroughs among the 658 electoral members in the British House of Commons, including some fifty boroughs with less than fifty eligible voters. One borough, Gatton, had two voters, while Old Sarum had no eligible voters, but regularly sent two members to the House. In 1832, The Great Reform Acts eliminated the most egregious of the rotten boroughs, and the 1867 Reform Act consolidated many of the remaining boroughs with small populations, but it was not until 1884 that district lines were adjusted so that British populations were roughly equal and given proportionate representation. The rotten boroughs in England inspired other democratic systems to enact legislation to ensure roughly equal voting populations in electoral wards.

See also *Districting; Electoral Reform; Marginal District; Proportional Representation; Redistricting.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) was a French political and social thinker recognized as making major contributions to social contract and democratic theory through his writings, such as the *Social Contract* (1762). Rousseau's works are credited also with being a major influence on the French Revolution (1789–1799), as well as education, gender, and literary theories, and they served as inspiration for many subsequent political theorists.

Rousseau was born in Geneva, Switzerland. His mother died soon after giving birth to him, and his father fled the city when Jean-Jacques was ten. All three of these events would dominate Rousseau's biography and writings. His citizenship in Geneva and his admiration for the city affected his views on the political community, and his 1755 *Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men*—known as the *Second Discourse*—was dedicated to its citizens. Scholars theorize that the early death of his mother and the abandonment by his father pushed Rousseau into relationships with older women who served often as patrons for his work and affected his views on gender.

Rousseau's importance in political theory derives from a collection of writings that situate him within the social contract theory tradition of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and subsequently Immanuel Kant and John Rawls. Rousseau's first major work, *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*—the *First Discourse*—was a 1750 essay that initially thrust him into the French literary limelight. The essay questioned whether progress in knowledge had led to human perfection and the improvement of civilization. Rousseau was skeptical of this progress, suggesting human nature had been corrupted by society.

The idea of a more primitive yet noble and uncorrupted human nature that predated society dominated Rousseau's *Second Discourse.* It sought to explain the sources of human inequality. Rejecting beliefs that political and social distinctions were natural, Rousseau instead saw them as conventional. Appealing to a distant time that predated the construction of social institutions, he saw a natural savage who lived an unreflective but uncorrupted solitary life in a state of nature. The lure into society, and eventually into inequality, in the *Second Discourse* is the result of the invention both of private property and the trick of a few seeking to convince all that joining a political community would be to their advantage.

This theme of society, at least as then constituted, corrupting humanity continues in Rousseau's *The Social Contract,* which inquires whether any political society can be just, fair, and legitimate by opening with the claim that "Man is born free, and he is everywhere in chains." The purpose of this book was to forge a theory of government that preserves individual freedom. Rousseau appears to find an answer in constructing a small homogeneous political community where individuals align their political will with that of the general will. Individuals thus give up nature for moral freedom, creating a political community they will for themselves.

Besides exploring the limits of legitimate political authority, much of Rousseau's work also can be seen as an examination of human alienation and societal roles. In his posthumous *Reveries of a Solitary Walker* (1782) he ponders the question of self-identity and consciousness by asking "What am I?" In *Emile* (1762) he examines the appropriate means of educating men to be citizens and women to be wives.

Rousseau's discussions of human nature, alienation, property, gender, and political authority influenced writers as diverse as Mary Wollstonecraft, Edmund Burke, Karl Marx, Immanuel Kant, George Hegel, and Sigmund Freud. Finally, his writings questioned the legitimacy of the French monarchy, helping to forge the ideological weapons that would drive the French Revolution.

See also *Burke, Edmund; Freedom; French Political Thought; Hegel, Georg W. F.; Hobbes, Thomas; Individual and Society; Kant, Immanuel; Locke, John; Marx, Karl; Social Order; Wollstonecraft, Mary.*

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Roy, Manabendra Nath

Manabendra Nath Roy (1887–1954), popularly known as M. N. Roy, was a Bengali Indian revolutionary, philosopher, political theorist, activist, and exponent of the philosophy of radical humanism. Born as Narendra Nath Bhattacharya, he became a militant nationalist at the age of twenty and was jailed thrice before the age of twenty-three for actions against the British colonial government in India. He adopted the name of Manabendra Nath Roy as an alias to escape arrest by the authorities.

In 1915 Roy left for Japan and China in search of arms and support, traveling under various names and disguises, until he reached Mexico, where he founded the Communist Party in that country. At the invitation of Russian political leader and revolutionary Vladimir Lenin, Roy left for Moscow. In the newly formed Soviet Union, he became a major figure in the communist organization Comintern as an expert on colonial nations and as a major theorist in Marxism. After Lenin's death, Roy fell out of favor with new Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and fled to India.

In India Roy was arrested by the British authorities and jailed for six years. While incarcerated he wrote manuscripts in which he examined the causes for the degeneration of Marxism into Stalinism. He blamed German philosopher Karl Marx's collectivism and materialism for the betrayal of social-ist ideals in the Soviet Union. He tried to explore a way to synthesize liberalism and Marxism on the one hand and mate-rialism and idealism on the other to create what he called *radical humanism*. Parts of these prison manuscripts have been published in such works as *Fascism* (1938), *The Historical Role of Islam* (1939), *Materialism* (1940), and *Science and Philosophy* (1947).

Roy continued to refine his ideas in *Beyond Communism to Humanism* (1946) and *Reason, Romanticism, and Revolution* (1952). He attacked both individualism and collectivism and advocated instead a cooperative democracy or a loosely struc-tured polity of self-governing units in the model of Switzer-land, with the rights of recall and referenda serving to temper state aggrandizement. It would be sustained by a cooperative economy that was neither capitalistic nor communist but communal. To achieve such a just society, Roy called for a cultural revolution that would instill love of freedom, equality, and mutual respect among the masses. He dismissed political parties as front organizations for special interests and favored small bands of radical democrats who would serve as leaven for transforming society. In line with this thinking, Roy dis-banded the Radical Democratic Party he had set up in 1941 and invested all his energies thereafter on the Indian Renais-sance Institute, which functioned more as a think tank. It did not survive Roy's death in 1954.

See also *Communism; Lenin, Vladimir Ilich; Marx, Karl; Marx-ism; Radicalism; Stalinism.*

. . . .   GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN

Radical activist Manabendra Nath Roy became a major Marxist theorist and advocated for a communal, cooperative economy.

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Rulemaking

Rulemaking is the process by which executive branch agencies write regulations that have the force of law. Rules include everything from requiring public corporations to notify shareholders that proxy voting materials are available on the Internet in a manner prescribed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, to specification by the Environmental Protection Agency of concentrations of pollutants in drinking water that require corrective action by local agencies. Agency authority to make rules comes from acts of Congress, and the process of rulemaking is governed by an extensive body of statutes (the watershed is the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946) and court cases. Though they are sometimes described as merely "filling up the gaps" in acts of Congress, agency rules can mark important substantive changes in policy and

implicitly pick among competing social interests or values. Rulemaking significantly expands the reach of the federal government; no area of federal policy making is untouched by rulemaking.

LEGITIMACY QUESTIONS

Because agency personnel are not elected, rulemaking as substantive policy choice by agencies raises important issues of democratic legitimacy. Because rulemaking is a quasi-legislative function vested in executive agencies, it raises potential challenges to separation of powers. Thus, while rulemaking can be partly justified on the basis of agency expertise on substantive policy matters, the democratic and constitutional issues it presents raise agency accountability in rulemaking to paramount importance. All three constitutional branches of government possess formidable tools to hold agencies accountable, if they choose to use them.

Courts have been committed to close review of agency rules from the earliest days of federal regulation. Agency rules can be challenged in court on numerous grounds—e.g., that the agency's decisions are arbitrary and capricious; that its interpretation of the statute granting rulemaking authority is either inconsistent with the clear meaning of the statute, if such is apparent, or, if the clear meaning is not apparent, not reasonable; that the statute delegating the authority is an open-ended delegation of Congress's power to make law; that the agency did not follow appropriate procedures in making rules; or that the rule is not justified by substantial evidence. On top of statutes governing rulemaking procedures, federal courts have established a large body of precedents and tests to resolve these issues in extensive review of specific agency rules every year. Courts also implicitly influence rules through control of *standing,* the determination of who has the right to sue federal agencies due to adverse effects of rules.

PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE

The president also has several formal channels to influence agency rulemaking. First, though statutes empowering agencies to make rules usually delegate that power to department or agency personnel, not the president, it has been apparent since 1835 (when President Andrew Jackson fired his Treasury secretary for declining to use his statutory authority as the president desired) that presidents can fire executive branch appointees based on disagreements with their use of discretionary authority granted by Congress. Second, a less disruptive channel of presidential control is regulatory review. This authority was asserted by President Ronald Reagan in Executive Order 12291 (after assertions on a more limited scale by President Richard Nixon), and requires agencies to clear "major rules" with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) before they become effective—effectively a screening device for the president. Subsequent presidents have reaffirmed or expanded OMB review. These potent formal tools of presidential management apply to rulemaking in cabinet departments and their agencies, not to independent regulatory commissions. Presidents cannot fire appointees in independent commissions due to mere policy disagreements, and presidents have not attempted to assert regulatory review authority over their regulations.

CONGRESSIONAL RULEMAKING

Congress also has several tools, formal and informal, to influence agency rulemaking. First, the Congressional Review Act (CRA) imposes a sixty-day waiting period before rules become effective; during this period either house of Congress can pass a Joint Resolution of Disapproval (JRD) of the rule, which if passed by the other house and signed by the president nullifies the rule and prevents the agency from issuing any substantially similar rule in the future. The important points in the CRA are the waiting period and the fact that the JRD cannot be filibustered in the Senate. The CRA was most prominently invoked to nullify a major rule on ergonomic safety in the workplace by the Department of Labor. The ergonomics rule, the result of more than ten years of work by the department, was passed in the waning days of the Clinton administration; the waiting period overlapped with President George W. Bush's term, thus giving the Republican Congress a more sympathetic president when it passed the JRD. (In earlier decades Congress could choose to require prior approval by Congress before rules took effect—a practice called *legislative veto*—but the Supreme Court ruled this unconstitutional in 1983. The CRA was passed to reclaim some of this authority for Congress while meeting the Supreme Court's objection.)

Additionally, through repeated interaction with agencies, control over budgets and statutory authority, and giving favored interest groups privileged access to agency proceedings, Congress has several channels to control or at least influence the content of agency rules, when and if it is unified enough to send clear messages to agencies. However, because Congress requires majorities or supermajorities in two chambers to take formal action, internal disagreements within Congress can de facto increase the discretion agencies have to forge their own course of action, which McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1987) have dubbed *agency drift*.

Because rulemaking can profoundly affect public policy, at times each constitutional branch does take enough interest to wield its tools of influence. Scholars have found measurable influence over the content of agency decisions by Congress, the president, and courts. The question of who "controls" rulemaking in the bureaucracy is too simplistic to be meaningful, but it is clear that several actors have the means and, given rulemaking's importance, the incentive to influence the content of rules.

See also *Administrative Law; Budgeting; Bureaucracy; Inspector General; Oversight; Regulation and Rulemaking; Rules of Order.*

. . . . SEAN GAILMARD

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Rule of Law

The rule of law initially seems a simple and straightforward idea, concisely articulated by Aristotle in his view that the laws, not men, should rule in a well-ordered polity. This aspirational prescription for good government unites thinking about the rule of law from the ancient Greeks down to contemporary theorists. Though men and women do, of course, wield public power, the rule of law represents a normative standard by which all legal subjects can evaluate and challenge official public action. Because the concept stands for the supremacy of law over unconstrained political power, a commitment to the rule of law guarantees that public officials are both authorized and bound by law in the exercise of their functions and powers. In a legal system governed by the rule of law, all persons in the polity will possess formal equality, ensuring that elected officials and high-ranking members of the executive branch of government will be held legally accountable like any other person.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW

In ancient and medieval thought, the concept of the rule of law imperfectly regulated the power of the sovereign through obligations embedded in positive law—such as the Magna Carta—as well as obligations believed to be part of natural or religious law. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the rule of law shifted its meaning to signify political resistance against any form of unconstrained political power in the state, no matter its source or institutional location. In English constitutional law, the political struggle focused on the capacious prerogative power of the monarch. During this period, the idea of the rule of law as a restraint on sovereign power solidified, contributing to the demise of absolute monarchy as a legitimate form of government in the West.

The rule of law typically implies a form of constitutionalism, but does not dictate type or content. It is related to the concept of the *Rechtsstaat*—the state of law—in the German tradition of constitutionalism. Both concepts, despite different histories, contain similar principles. The *Rechtsstaat* arguably offers less of a distinction from the notion of rule *by* law, where law is viewed as a malleable instrument of state power such that government simply acts through laws it creates, but without being affected by constraining principles. In Anglo-North American legal systems, rule of law principles and values formed part of the common law, and later achieved formal constitutional status in written documents such as the U.S. Constitution.

The introduction touched on three predominant themes that run through the political history of the rule of law, each possessing a proximate cluster of meanings: the rule of law, not men; formal legality; and, government limited by law. These three themes attest to its central function of imposing effective legal restraints on political power. Nevertheless, many legal and political theories consider the rule of law an important, but, following Jeremy Waldron's characterization (2002), "essentially contested concept" because of fundamental disagreements about its content and its scope. Before discussing these theoretical debates, this entry analyzes several of the less controversial features of the rule of law: the legal core, the necessary institutional arrangements, and broad sociocultural orientations.

THE LEGAL DIMENSION AS A FORMAL CONCEPTION OF THE RULE OF LAW

In legal theory, the rule of law commonly entails a set of legal procedures and forms that regulate and legitimize statutes, judgments from courts of law, and administrative decisions. Rules, principles, and enacting processes must be in place for law to be considered valid. In this way, the rule of law acts as a metalegal principle organizing a subsidiary set of standards that generate legal validity and contribute to political legitimacy because legal subjects judge the lawmaking capacity and resulting laws as worthy of respect. Without such respect, compliance with the law can only ever be partial.

In many theories of the rule of law, a legal system must aim for a set of formal characteristics that are public and that can guide the conduct of all legal subjects. A common set of principles has evolved over time and includes those enunciated by Lon Fuller (1969) and Joseph Raz (1979): publicity, nonretroactivity, clarity, generality, consistency, stability, capability of being obeyed, and declared rules constraining the administration of law as well as the discretion of public officials. Despite overlapping agreement on many of the principles, substantial disagreement exists concerning their respective content, importance, and scope.

The presumed virtue of these formal requirements rests on the belief that they permit individuals to predict legal responses to their behavior by state officials, thereby avoiding sanctions and enabling them to take into account relevant legal duties, as well as to benefit from a circumscribed range of rights, liberties, and freedoms. Such a presumption is especially important for criminal law. People also can interact with each other secure in the knowledge that they are aware which rules likely will apply to their behavior should a dispute arise between them. Because prior knowledge is not universally true for all legal subjects, this claim is not empirical. Instead, its validity rests on the ability of the law as a normative order to align with background political moralities as well as with other coexisting normative systems (e.g., custom, etiquette, workplace, religious or business norms and interactions) in order to be maximally effective. Individuals can also rely on a certain determinacy in the application of law such that like cases will be treated alike. In this minimalist form, the rule of law can be equated with legal formalism because adherence to the rule of

law does not mean that the resulting laws are substantively just, only that their form and manner of promulgation are valid and meet the minimum legal conditions considered essential for the realization of procedural justice. Because formal characteristics are in the service of predictability, clarity, and stability, they also contribute the idea of the rule of law as a distinctive mode of social ordering that potentially generates a moderate form of politics.

The legal dimension provides the fundamental basis for a narrower conception of the rule of law—one that possesses minimal content. The political theory buttressing this minimal conception promotes the rule of law as a system of public norms addressed to legal subjects who are considered rational beings and who will comply with the impartial administration of these rules. The legal values informing the resulting procedural standards will meet what John Rawls (1999) terms "justice as regularity" as a component of justice as fairness.

THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF THE RULE OF LAW AND ITS RELATIVE AUTONOMY FROM POLITICS

The relative autonomy of law from politics is a central requirement of the rule of law. Though it is impossible to isolate law from politics completely, a complex institutional structure helps guarantee impartiality and fairness in legal processes. One way of thinking about this relative autonomy is through the idea of the separation of powers as a fundamental constitutional principle. Here, sovereign public power is divided and housed within three different branches of government, each with its own function and staff: the executive, the judiciary, and the legislature. In reality, these three branches of government experience overlap, particularly the potential dominance of the executive in Westminster systems of government. In parliamentary systems, the executive branch exerts considerable influence in appointing judges as well as in controlling the legislative agenda during a majority government. In the U.S. system of government, Congress, the judiciary, and the president are in principle co-equal branches of the federal government. Nevertheless, even in the American presidential system, the executive branch possesses significant powers, and the president plays a strong executive role.

One important institutional outcome of the rule of law is the commitment to impartial, public, and independent tribunals charged with resolving disputes between individuals, as well as among the state and affected groups and individuals. The rule of law therefore supports the principle of judicial independence and the right to a fair hearing before a tribunal—a tribunal that includes both a court of law as well as an administrative body. General principles of due process, and specific principles such as *habeas corpus,* are fundamental to the endorsement of institutional processes as independent and impartial. Judges in Western judiciaries usually benefit from certain constitutional guarantees of protection, such as security of tenure, financial security, and administrative independence.

Contrary to the views of prominent Victorian constitutional theorist, Albert Venn Dicey (1996), the expansion of

administrative agencies, concurrent with the growth of the modern welfare state, has not resulted in the end of the rule of law. The scope of discretionary decision-making delegated to agencies, and the functioning of their internal procedures, have both come to be constrained by a combination of statutory and judicial requirements. Judicial oversight through the common law remains a key rule of law guarantor of accountability in the regulatory state.

With the recent global trend towards constitution-making, the rule of law has informed the creation of written constitutions, specialized constitutional courts, and an overarching rights discourse usually realized in a bill of rights. One significant consequence of a written constitution that guarantees individual and/or group rights, however, is the concomitant institutional reallocation of public power. In such a constitutional state, the judiciary receives the power to review and strike down or invalidate legislation that offends the constitution in terms of individual rights, division of powers, or other types of content requirement. In older conceptions of the rule of law in public law, the courts were conceived primarily as overseers of the arbitrary actions of executive and administrative actors. Judicial review places legislatures under scrutiny. Depending on the theorist, such a change either represents the triumph of rights and the rule of law or the demise of democracy and a balanced constitutional state. Some commentators characterize the new institutional arrangement as the rule of judges, instead of the rule of law, since there appears to be little in the way of obvious and effective constraints on judicial discretion and arbitrariness in judicial approaches to the interpretation of law. In countries with written constitutions, debates about constitutional balance and judicial activism remain contentious.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF THE RULE OF LAW AS A SHARED ORIENTATION WITHIN A POLITICAL COMMUNITY

Sociological and historical approaches to the rule of law emphasize its contingent social and cultural dimensions. The sociological dimension is far too broad and heterogeneous for this entry to cover; therefore two key aspects will be highlighted: the role of the legal profession and a rule of law culture.

Historically, lawyers have played important roles in legal, economic, and political liberalization in the West. Lawyers argued for parliamentary liberties in the English revolutions (1640–1660, 1688), worked on constitution-making in the American Revolution (1775–1783), and fought for political freedoms in the French Revolution (1789–1799). And, though often conservative and devoted to the maintenance of its professional status, an independent bar may provide a center of resistance to authoritarian rule as well as indirectly promote political pluralism. The recent lawyers' movement in Pakistan challenging interference in the judiciary by General Pervez Musharraf's regime remains a potent example. Nevertheless, it is problematic to suggest that lawyers and legal associations can

automatically be assumed to be liberal democrats or republican defenders of the common good, images made famous by figures like the fictional lawyer Atticus Finch. Lawyers can be antistatist or prostate, independent or deeply bound to commercial interests, democratic or elitist, self-interested or devoted to the public good.

Despite the fact that the nature of the legal profession has varied greatly over time and between common law and civil law countries, the development of a specialized class of persons charged with the authority to interpret the law on behalf of clients or on behalf of the public represents a significant achievement. Though these legal officials do perform varying functions, the rule of law is premised on institutional arrangements and agents making the law real, contestable, effective, and accessible to those affected by it. Lawyers will ideally act on behalf of their private clients or governments. Judges ideally will act according to their particular institutional role morality that demands that they enforce rules impartially, without corruption, and showing no bias or favoritism to any individual, whether or not the individual is a private litigant or a state official.

Different countries also adhere to the sociological dimension in varying degrees. Universal access to justice as a right, for example, is unevenly distributed and legal services in many countries remain out of the reach of the average citizen (though it is sometimes available through programs such as legal aid). States are also not uniform in their commitment to effective remedies nor are legal officials such as the police consistent in enforcing laws. Lawyers may advise minimal compliance with existing rules or they may encourage litigation to improve the legal position of their more affluent clients. Judges may adhere to the text of written law to the exclusion of the intent of law, justice, mercy, or reasonableness.

It is clear that the rule of law cannot exist unless it is embraced by the populace as an important political-legal ideal. When it is widely shared, the rule of law possesses a resiliency in the face of government intransigence or perceptions that the law is unfair because it reflects particular societal interests. Societies emerging from authoritarian regimes may not possess or fully develop this orientation because citizens fear and distrust state law and legal officials. For similar reasons, countries where the legal rules and the legal system have been transplanted may also see the rule of law as a threat or a sham, ensuring that only a weak form will develop. These functional and legitimacy problems attest to the importance of creating a rule of law culture or culture of legalism in government and throughout civil society, but one that does not take the legalism as the primary value to be realized at the expense of other important considerations.

THE POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE RULE OF LAW

The rule of law has withstood many criticisms as an unrealistic pipe dream and a hegemonic sham. Early twentieth-century legal realists emphasized the subjective nature of judging that undermined the autonomy of law from politics.

Legal realists argued that behind every determination in law lay ideological commitments, only some of which were made explicit. Such commitments appeared natural and self-evident in judicial decision-making, but were actually the result of judges' personal attitudes or values. Deconstructionist critiques of the rule of law denied the possibility of determinacy of meaning, jurisprudential coherence, justice as fairness, and noncontradiction. Marxists critiques suggested that the rule of law conceals and legitimizes political domination by a ruling economic class. Finally, Foucauldean-derived critiques argued that the rule of law is simply one mode of power among many in society.

Internal disagreements among rule of law theorists are also robust. As alluded to previously, conceptions of the rule of law can be placed on a continuum ranging from "thin" to "thick" depending on the preferred set of values (Tamanaha 2004, 91–92). In contrast to the minimal version of the rule of law that has been presented thus far and which generally imposes only procedural requirements, thicker accounts of the rule of law remain contentious because they each demand differing substantive requirements in essential content. Libertarians, such as Friedrich von Hayek (1978), argue for the necessity of certain individual rights—property, contract, security, privacy—as a core. Liberal theories emphasize individual rights, but also normative concerns regarding human dignity and maximum inclusion. Ronald Dworkin's (1985) "rights conception" of the rule of law relies on the view that citizens have pre-existing moral and political rights that are positively recognized in society's "rule book" and that individuals can demand to have enforced by judges. Other theorists, such as Trevor Allen (2001) and Jürgen Habermas (1999), argue that the rule of law is inextricably linked with certain institutional arrangements that go beyond formal legality to include individual rights and democracy. Republican theories consider the concept of the rule of law as a means to renounce domination and unconstrained power as a basis of rule. In contrast to the idea of freedom as noninterference that constitutes the basis of liberal and libertarian conceptions of liberty, republicanism relies on a conception of legal freedom as nondomination. The thickest versions of the rule of law require the recognition of social and economic rights in order to advance substantive equality as part of a theory of distributive justice or to redress historic injustice. They may also require the enforcement of human rights as integral to a rule of law order.

Finally, the tragedy of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, has revived a much older conceptual debate regarding the possibility and desirability of limiting sovereign power, the modern sovereign being a president or a parliament. From Aquinas to Hobbes to Schmitt, political theorists have conceptually questioned the ability of the rule of law to bind the sovereign when it is the sovereign who declares the laws. When a sovereign declares states of emergency, imposes martial law, is guided by secret laws, or creates ad hoc military courts, the rule of law is both put to the test and put at risk because discretionary power within the executive branch of government can become unconstrained and unaccountable. With respect

to current states of emergency, disagreements center on the question of whether legal or political modes of constraint and accountability are preferable and effective.

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF THE RULE OF LAW

The rule of law has participated in globalization historically through colonialism and currently in a variety of international development and human rights initiatives. Historically, the rule of law cannot be disentangled from the colonial project engaged in by Western powers, though these powers did not adhere to even the thinnest conception of the rule of law, as lawyers and judges often served colonial rule by giving lip service to the ideal and validated law as an instrument of subjugation. Though the rule of law did bring some benefits to colonized countries, it was nevertheless part of imposed rule by rich nations on poor nations and on indigenous peoples. On the other hand, lawyers like Mohandas Gandhi played key roles in resistance movements against colonialism, often in the very name of the rule of law.

In current forms of globalization, two versions of the rule of law circulate. The first is a market view advanced by multilateral lenders like International Monetary Fund (IMF) and development banks like the World Bank that embraced neoliberalism in the 1990s. This conception of the rule of law rests on the belief that a reciprocal relationship exists between a framework of effective and predictable legal rules and rights and well-functioning markets. Market-based approaches prioritize the protection of property rights, freedom and enforcement of contracts, and low levels of regulation as key components of the rule of law. Practical measures have focused on legal reform (e.g., bankruptcy laws), anticorruption measures, and judicial training. Critics of the market-based view suggest that this understanding of the rule of law mistakenly privileges a minimal state in developed and developing countries and does not place effective constraints on the power of government and market actors. In response to internal and external critiques, the literature has recently turned to new institutionalism to supplement the earlier focus on the rule of law as a specific set of legal practices that can be unproblematically uprooted from their Western context and transplanted into new environments.

A second approach also imbues the rule of law with substantive content. The human rights view, often advanced by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and a variety of social movements, not only requires legal restraints on state action—including prohibitions against torture and extrajudicial killings—but often also demands a set of positive rights such as rights to democratic government and participation, the regulation of harmful conduct in both the public and private spheres, and the alleviation of substantive inequality. The institutional program envisioned here requires a more interventionist state guaranteeing comprehensive social and economic rights and restructuring social relations in order to further political equality. In contrast to the market-based approach that concentrates on private law relations, the human rights conception focuses on public law relations and the role of the state. Critics suggest that these approaches underestimate the costs and trade-offs necessary for the implementation of social and economic rights and pay insufficient attention to the beneficial role of the market. Lastly, a too substantive version of the rule of law may downplay its role in the mediation of social relations in a complex, pluralistic society.

THE RULE OF LAW AS A COMPLEX, QUALIFIED GOOD

English Marxist historian E. P. Thompson famously defended the rule of law as "a cultural achievement of universal significance" because it could place effective curbs on power and also regulate and reconcile societal conflicts, sometimes in favor of the less advantaged (1975: 265). He more controversially celebrated the rule of law as an "unqualified human good." (267). Nevertheless, and as Joseph Raz (1979) cautions, it is perhaps better to conceive of the rule of law as a qualified human good, but a good nonetheless since government by the rule of law is preferable to one based on rule by law. The rule of law is distinguishable from a variety of other highly valued goods including democracy, human rights, dignity, liberalism, and substantive equality. Yet democracy, human rights, and constitutionalism cannot exist without the rule of law and are intricately related to the concept. A political community committed to the rule of law will therefore go some distance towards realizing equality, liberty, and fundamental respect for all persons. The rule of law has great worth as an ideal, but it is also a pivotal means to realizing other important ends.

See also *Accountability; Administrative Law; Bill of Rights; Common Law; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Democracy; Deontology; Due Process; Executive, The; Freedom; Judicial Activism; Judicial Restraint; Judicial Review; Judiciary; Jurisprudence and Legal Theory; Legal Profession; Legislature-court Relations; Liberal Democracy; Liberal Theory; Natural Law; Oversight; Republicanism; Rulemaking; Sources of Law; State, Theories of the.*

. . . .   MARY LISTON

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Rules of Order

Rules of order are standardized procedural rules adopted by any deliberative body or assembly. Constitutions, bylaws, and rules of order are the general documents used to govern and define deliberative bodies. The purpose of rules of order is the regulation of the day-to-day conduct of debate. Bylaws and constitutions generally deal with who can be a member of a body, how the members are chosen, and the subjects that the deliberative body can address. Rules of order address who can make a motion before the body, how the motion should be made and handled, and how many votes are needed for specific motions to pass.

Rules of order, bylaws, and constitutions are distinguished also by the ease with which they can be changed. Constitutions typically take months or years to change. Bylaws usually take at least two regular meetings to change. Both almost always require notifying the entire membership of the deliberative body about the proposed change well before meeting to decide the change and formally publishing the changes. However, rules of order can be changed either permanently or temporarily during a meeting; the change simply requires the approval of the people present. Just as there are different types

of constitutions and bylaws, there are different types of rules of order as well.

The purpose of rules of order is to enable the deliberative body to handle business as efficiently as possible. This holds true no matter the rules of order employed. All deliberative bodies—from the U. S. Senate and House of Representatives to corporate boards of directors and executive committees to elementary school parent-teacher organizations and Boy Scout troops—have a limited amount of time to handle necessary business. When people argue about whether a decision of the chair is appropriate, decision making is prolonged.

In the United States, the most common form is *Robert's Rules of Order.* This form gets its name from Henry Robert, who authored the first version in 1876. A number of companies publish his rules, which remain basically the same. The standardization makes it easy for a group to adopt *Robert's Rules of Order* when it does not have the resources or need to develop its own.

At the U.S. state legislature level, individualized rules of order are the norm. Unlike most organizations using rules of order, government legislatures operate continuously to handle what are regular situations for them but are uncommon for other bodies. State legislatures tend to rely on *Mason's Manual of Legislative Procedure* (1935) as their guide. The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives have their own rules of order that date back to Thomas Jefferson.

French-speaking areas of the world rely on the *Code Morin* (1938). In Canada, *Bourinot's Rules of Order* (1884) and *Robert's Rules of Order* are both used. Most countries of the English parliamentary tradition use rules of order based on those of Westminster and the British Parliament. The person responsible for ensuring proper use of the rules is the *parliamentarian*. The National Association of Parliamentarians or the American Institute of Parliamentarians concern themselves with parliamentary procedure.

See also *Parliamentary Discipline; Regulation and Rulemaking; Rulemaking.*

. . . . DAVID B. CONKLIN

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Run-off

Run-off electoral systems use two rounds of voting to select a single winner. The first round eliminates some of the candidates, while the second round chooses between the remaining candidates. Run-off elections are commonly used to elect presidents. Indeed, with the adoption of run-off systems by many South American and eastern European countries since 1980, most countries with directly elected presidents now use some kind of run-off electoral system. Run-off elections are used also in legislative and local elections in places such as France and Louisiana.

The most common form of run-off elections has the first round eliminate all but the top two vote-getters, who then compete in the second round (unless one candidate gets more than 50 percent of the votes in the first round). There are variations, however. For example, in Argentina if any candidate gets 45 percent of the vote in the first round, or 40 percent with a 10 percent margin of victory over their nearest competitor, that candidate is elected without a second round.

It is possible to replace the two rounds of elections by having voters indicate their first and second choices on their ballot paper, and then automatically transferring the votes of voters whose preferred candidate is eliminated in the first round. This is known as alternative vote, preferential vote or, in the United States, instant run-off elections. This method is used in legislative elections in Australia and in municipal elections in a number of countries.

A related electoral system is sequential elimination, in which multiple rounds of voting eliminate the lowest vote-getter in each round. This is commonly used to elect party leaders in legislatures.

The advantages claimed for run-off elections over simple plurality elections are that the results have more legitimacy because a majority has voted for the winning candidate, and that it is less likely that an extremist candidate will be elected with only narrow support because of a split opposition. Both of these claims are only partially true. While the run-off winner must win a majority of votes in the run-off, a majority may prefer some (or even all) of the candidates eliminated in the first round to the eventual winner. Even when there is a candidate clearly preferred by a majority, also known as a Condorcet winner, run-off elections will not necessarily elect the candidate. Indeed simulations suggest that run-off elections often will not select the preferred representative, although run-off elections seem to do better in this regard than simple plurality, as noted by political scientist Samuel Merrill in 1984.

It is also not the case that run-off elections necessarily will choose moderate candidates. It is possible for all the moderate candidates to be eliminated in the first round, and for the voters to be forced to choose between two relatively polarized candidates in the second round. Simulations suggest this outcome is likely, although once again plurality elections seem to produce more extreme outcomes, as observed by Anthony McGann and colleagues in 2002.

It has been observed since Maurice Duverger's analysis of political parties in 1954 that plurality elections tend to reduce the number of serious candidates to two. There is no reason to expect run-off systems to have this effect, although systems that allow first round victory with less than 50 percent may promote some consolidation. Empirically it appears that run-off presidential elections are associated with a higher effective number of candidates than plurality elections, as argued by Matthew Shugart and Rein Taagepera in 1994. This is consistent with the hypothesis that plurality elections create incentives for candidate consolidation, although some, including the analysts Karen Remmer (2008) and Stephen Callender (2009), have suggested that the causation runs the other way. Others such as Matthew Shugart and John Carey (1992) prefer plurality elections for electing presidents in order to reduce the number of candidates and eliminate extremists, while others would consider increasing the choice available to voters a reason for preferring run-off elections.

Run-off electoral systems are not monotonic—it is possible that winning extra votes can harm a candidate. For example, if French President Jacques Chirac had won 195,000 extra first round votes in 2002 at the expense of Jean-Marie Le Pen (the Front National candidate), Le Pen would not have made the run-off, and Chirac would have faced a far harder challenge in the second round. In 1996, Dominique Lepelley and colleagues estimated that the probability of such situations is small but potentially influential.

See also *Alternate Delegate; By(e)-election; Duverger's Law; Electoral Reform; First Past the Post; Impossibility Theorem; Preferential Voting; Winner-Take-All.*

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British philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) made significant contributions to mathematical logic and analytic philosophy. He also wrote many widely read books and essays on education, history, political theory, and religion. Russell defined philosophy as a "no-man's-land" between, on the one side, the moral certainty of theology and, on the other, the skepticism of a scientific outlook. Much of his life was devoted to antiwar activism.

Russell was born on May 18, 1872, in Wales. His grandfather, Lord John Russell (former prime minister), and grandmother, Lady Russell, became Bertrand's legal guardians after the death of his parents. He attended Trinity College in Cambridge where he studied mathematics and coauthored *Principia Mathematica* (1910–1913) with mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead. While establishing his academic reputation, Russell unsuccessfully stood for Parliament in 1907 as the first candidate of the National Union of Women's Suffrage Society.

With the onset of World War I (1914–1918), Russell left Cambridge to join the No Conscription Fellowship and participated in their propaganda campaign against the war effort. He was fined one hundred pounds, dismissed from his lectureship at Trinity, and served five months in Brixton Prison for his antiwar activities. After the war, Russell's lecture tours and freelance writing established his credentials as a liberal critic and iconoclast. His treatise *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism* (1920) offended radicals, while his book *Why I Am Not a Christian* (1927) received condemnation from conservatives. In *Marriage and Morals* (1929), he aroused controversy by proposing trial marriages and suggesting that infidelity should not necessarily be grounds for divorce. Religious leaders interpreted the book as sanctioning adultery and, in 1940, after a public outcry against Russell, his appointment to the City College of New York was retracted.

Russell, however, was never a steadfast pacifist. After witnessing the ruthlessness of fascist and communist dictators, he recognized the limitations of nonresistance. He believed that World War II (1939–1945) was justified but considered the allied Soviet government worse than German dictator Adolf Hitler's. Notwithstanding his contentious political views, Russell writings continued to be popular. His *A History of Western Philosophy* (1945) became a best seller on both sides of the Atlantic.

By the late 1940s, however, Russell's antinuclear war activism overshadowed his philosophical writings. In 1950, on the occasion of receiving the Nobel Prize for Literature, he spoke out against the development of atomic and bacterial weapons. His famous "Man's Peril" broadcast on the BBC, condemning the Bikini H-Bomb tests, became the basis for the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. Scientists from both communist and noncommunist countries signed the manifesto, urging the curtailment of nuclear weapons proliferation. Russell also organized the Pugwash conference of international scientists to discuss weapons development and helped organized the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. During the 1960s, he participated in antinuclear demonstrations and spent a week in prison for inciting public civil disobedience. Although he feared an impending nuclear disaster, Russell never lost hope. "I am convinced," he wrote in his 1969 *Autobiography of Bertrand Russell,* "that intelligence, patience, and eloquence can, sooner or later, lead the human race out of self-imposed tortures provided it does not exterminate itself meanwhile." He died on February 2, 1970, at his home in Northern Wales.

See also *Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation; Pacifism and Conscientious Objection.*

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Russian Political Thought

Russian political thought, like Russian society, has been undergoing a wrenching transition since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The old verities that had been inculcated in three generations of Soviet citizens had collapsed. This was a crisis for the rulers, ordinary people, and intellectuals. They found themselves entering a new world, one laced with threats and uncertainty.

Moreover, the Soviet collapse was not the first cataclysm to hit Russian society in the twentieth century. The tsarist regime also had experienced a revolutionary breakdown, triggering years of civil war, famine, and pestilence. The collectivization of the 1930s and the near-defeat at the hands of the Nazis in 1941 were equally traumatic. Few societies had experienced so many severe tests in the course of living memory, raising doubts about the philosophical and practical bases for the very existence of Russia. Intellectuals had to come up with some explanations for why their society kept experiencing such shocks. Why did the Soviet system collapse? Why were such radical economic reforms launched in 1992? Will Russia ever enjoy a normal, peaceful, and stable existence?

In the 1990s, Russian political thinkers faced two choices, neither particularly attractive. One approach was to declare the "end of history" and embrace the values and principles of the developed West. Then, their task would be to try to customize liberal ideas to the post-Soviet context—to somehow make them work in Russia or to explain why they would not work. In this case, there would not be such a thing as Russian political thought per se; it would just be a branch of universal (i.e., Western) rationality.

A second approach was to look back into history to search for something that was distinctively Russian. The whole Soviet experience was a protracted attempt to catch up with the West using imported versions of Western ideas, from Marxism to Fordism. One has to go back to the tsarist period

Russian author Alexander Solzhenitsyn spent eight years in a Russian forced labor camp as punishment for anti-Soviet writings before his release in 1953.

SOURCE: Getty Images

to find something authentically Russian. But could that rich nineteenth-century tradition of Russian political thought be revived and reapplied to post-Soviet Russia?

In the 1990s Western observers focused on the first school, hoping that the moment had come when liberalism would triumph in Russia. They have tended to downplay the search for an authentically Russian political world view. Few Western academics have published on Russian political thought since 1991. (One exception is Axel Kaehne: *Political and Social Thought in Post-communist Russia,* 2007). In most Western studies of Russian in transition, it seems as if Russia has political culture and political values, but not political thought.

THE SOVIET LEGACY

For seven decades, the Soviet state was committed to a massive program of indoctrination in the official ideology of Marxism–Leninism and scientific communism. These principles were drummed into all citizens—in the schools, army, workplace, and mass media. Over time, this became a complex conceptual framework, and in the hands of sophisticated practitioners, some interesting ideas could be discussed,

typically in small-circulation publications using arcane language. Western political concepts were forbidden from circulation. Pre-Soviet Russian thought was either suppressed or skewed to fit into the official Soviet version of Russian historical evolution. Some Soviet intellectuals and reform-minded officials were strongly influenced by developments in eastern Europe, such as the consumer-friendly "goulash communism" of Janos Kadar in Hungary, the 1968 Prague Spring, and the Solidarity workers' movement in Poland.

A small number of intellectuals openly condemned Soviet ideology, and paid the price in imprisonment and exile. These *dissidents* attracted a lot of attention in the West, but censorship limited their public visibility inside the Soviet Union. Some of them embraced Western liberal values, such as the essayist Andrei Amalrik and the famed scientist Andrei Sakharov. Others, notably author Alexander Solzhenitsyn, turned back to traditional Russian spiritual values. This division echoes a long-standing debate among Russian intellectuals, who divided in the nineteenth century into Westernizers, who advocated the rapid assimilation of Western values of individual freedom and limited government, and Slavophiles, who argued for the uniqueness of Russian civilization and the need to chart an independent path to the evolution of Russian institutions. Beneath the radar screen of the official ideology, ordinary Russians developed their own private set of values based on friends and family and retreated from the realm of public politics.

Soviet ideology did slowly evolve over time, embracing new slogans in the 1960s such as *developed socialism*—the idea that the Soviet Union had entered a new intermediate stage and was not yet ready for full communism, the endpoint of human history according to Karl Marx. But it was not until Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 that the Communist Party made a serious effort at structural reform. Gorbachev's program of restructuring (in Russian, *perestroika*) included economic reforms, a new approach to political thinking, and a new foreign policy. Gorbachev promoted reconciliation with the West, proclaiming a universality of human values. Domestically, he encouraged citizens to criticize state officials through a new policy of openness (or *glasnost*) in the media. However, Gorbachev's reforms undermined the monolithic unity of Soviet ideology and triggered a process of political and economic unraveling that led to the state's collapse in 1991.

THE BIRTH OF A NEW RUSSIA

During the brief years of *perestroika* and *glasnost,* political debate flourished. The dull conformity of the official communist ideology gave way to a bewildering array of political views. The opposition ideologies were rather amorphous and poorly defined; each was more a moral stance than a political program. Three major groups emerged during the *perestroika* years and persisted through the 1990s. Liberal democrats favored the extension of press freedom, democratic elections, and protection of individual rights. Communists wanted the preservation or restoration of the Soviet Union's political and economic institutions as they had existed prior to Gorbachev, including social guarantees for workers, pensioners, and other

vulnerable groups. Nationalists rejected both the liberals' efforts to import Western ideas and the Communists' desire (as they saw it) to subordinate the Russian nation to a radical, secular, internationalist agenda.

These three groups had sharply differing attitudes toward the collapse of the Soviet Union. The liberals more or less accepted it as inevitable, in that the old regime was no longer sustainable. The Communists blamed Gorbachev's reforms for destabilizing an otherwise viable system. Most of the nationalists thought a common state could have been preserved, but not under Communist leadership.

In the 1990s, Westerners typically sorted the political actors in Russia into two categories—reformers and reactionaries, with reform understood uncritically to mean movement toward a Western-style liberal democracy and market economy, such as Swedish social democracy or Anglo-American neoliberalism. Gorbachev failed in his effort to build a coalition for change, largely because he was trying to hold together the multiethnic Soviet Union. His successor in the Kremlin, Russian Federation president Boris Yeltsin, was more successful. Yeltsin faced down the August 1991 coup by Soviet hard-liners at the head of a coalition of liberal democrats and moderate nationalists.

However, Yeltsin's subsequent embrace of so-called shock therapy caused a split in the ranks of the prodemocracy coalition. Most of the nationalists and even many liberals blamed the reforms for the economic chaos the country experienced in 1992. The anti-Yeltsin opposition controlled the parliament until October 1993, when Yeltsin dissolved the legislature by force. Yeltsin's decision to attack Chechnya in December 1994 alienated many of the remaining liberals, and the ham-fisted way in which the war was fought further angered the Communists and nationalists.

Most of the political elites who rallied behind Yeltsin were simple pragmatists who recognized that he had won the struggle for state power; they did not have any political philosophy to speak of. Those officials were typified by the former gas industry executive Viktor Chernomyrdin, who served as Yeltsin's prime minister from 1992 to 1998. His cynical observation, "We hoped for something better and ended up with the usual," captured the disillusion of the Yeltsin years. Political philosopher Aleksei Kara-Murza even argued that the shift from ideology to pragmatism was a major achievement for Russia and a necessary component of social modernization.

The main opposition force was Gennadii Zyuganov's Communist Party. They did not really have a clear alternative program, defining themselves by what they were against rather than what they were for. They opposed the present and in favor of the past. In the 1990s, they became the main defenders of parliamentarism because it gave them the opportunity to criticize Yeltsin without being responsible for coming up with policies of their own. Zyuganov did not radically redefine communist philosophy, for example, by moving toward social democracy. His main innovation was to introduce nationalist symbols and rhetoric.

The nationalists (or, as they style themselves, the "patriots") were the group that seemed to have the greatest potential to fill the ideological vacuum of postcommunism—as evidenced by Vladimir Zhirinovsky's surprise victory in the December 1993 parliamentary election. A country that had lost its empire and seen its economy shrink by one-third seemed to be fertile soil for politicians raising the specter of national betrayal. After Zhirinovsky's electoral success, both Democrats and Communists swung in the nationalist direction. Note that the rationale for Yeltsin's invasion of Chechnya was the defense of Russia's "territorial integrity."

In the 1990s, the political discourse was sharply polarized: Communists versus Democrats, patriots versus traitors who have sold out to the West. The issues were presented as Manichaean alternatives: the choice was between right and wrong, good and evil. Politics was seen as a Darwinian struggle for power in which the winner took all, including the head of the opponent. Yeltsin himself deployed such tactics in his narrowly won presidential race in 1996, claiming that his Communist opponents wanted to turn the clock back to the Stalin years.

The Yeltsin team never really came up with a new political formula to replace the anticommunist theme of the early 1990s. One of the challenges was that liberal state formation seemed to presuppose the existence of a nation-state. Russia had been an empire, then an internationalist project, but never a nation-state. Yeltsin toyed with the resurrection of the "Russian Idea": a quest to pin down the essence of Russian civilization. (There was even a national competition launched for the best essay on the topic in 1998.) But Yeltsin's rule was indelibly associated with a cynical fire sale of Russia's assets to insider cronies, so his half-hearted efforts to orchestrate a new sense of Russian national identity failed to materialize. And the fact that one in five citizens of the Russian Federation were not ethnic Russians (and many of them were Muslims) constrained the Kremlin's ability to formulate a new ethnically exclusive identity for Russia.

One issue that did unite all the disparate political currents in the 1990s was a belief in the importance of Russia as a factor in European and world history. Liberals, Communists, and nationalists alike regretted Russia's descent into a new "time of troubles" (referring to a period of chaos in the early 1600s) and were confident that Russia could and should regain the great power status that it had enjoyed for the previous two hundred years. They just disagreed about how this could be done. However, the consensus on the idea of Russia as a great power provided the unifying theme for the political order constructed by Yeltsin's successor, Vladimir Putin.

THE PUTIN REGIME

After Vladimir Putin became president in 2000, there was something like a return to the ideological orthodoxy of Soviet times. Political debate was pushed out of the mass media, especially television, while opposing views were banished to the fringes of political life.

Putin's political philosophy was an eclectic mixture of elements from the three prevailing political philosophies. For liberals, he offered a commitment to the market economy and rule of law and a surprising ability to forge close personal ties

with Western leaders. For the Communists, he offered nostalgia for the Soviet past while recognizing that it was *past* and could not be recovered. He brought back the Soviet national anthem (with new words), created new youth organizations that resembled the Young Pioneers and Komsomol, and reintroduced military training in schools. For the nationalists, he offered a vigorous assertion of Russian national interests, at first against the rebel Chechens and then against perceived Russian enemies in Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine. He was more willing than Yeltsin to address his fellow Russians using the ethnic term *Russkii,* as opposed to the ethnically neutral term, *Rossiiskii.*

What was holding together this bricolage of rival traditions was the person of Putin himself. The Russian people seemed happy to delegate to him whatever power he needed to implement policies that somehow balanced these various political elements. Putin portrayed himself as a man of action not of words, and he expressed skepticism about the need for political ideology in general. He did not write, or pretend to write, any ideological tracts. Just before his election in 2000 he issued a book, *From the First Person,* in the form of an extended interview with two journalists. Biographical in focus, it did not lay out a political philosophy; it was more a personal narrative about surviving the collapse of just such a political ideology. As president, Putin excelled at thinking on his feet, firing off pithy one-liners to inquisitive journalists or giving thorough, fact-based answers to callers during marathon live television phone-ins. More often than not, in his longer formal speeches, he tended to invoke or mimic mainstream Western ideas—modernization, the rule of law, democracy, and civil society. These words were not always matched by his actions in office.

Some members of the presidential apparatus under Putin did try to generate new ideological concepts to legitimate his rule and to give the Kremlin a vocabulary with which to engage outside powers. However, no coherent body of ideas had emerged by the time Putin left the presidency in 2008. One concept that surfaced during Putin's first term was that of *managed democracy.* This meant that democratic institutions were the norm, but they could not be trusted to behave responsibly without some direction from the state. This was not a new idea; in the 1960s, Indonesian president Suharto had devised a *guided democracy.* But Putin himself did not use the phrase, and no one seemed quite clear what it meant.

A more serious effort was made to promote *sovereign democracy,* the brainchild of the Kremlin's chief ideologue, Vladislav Surkov. Surkov launched the idea in a February 2006 speech to United Russia party functionaries. A state has to be independent of foreign influence before it can truly function as a democracy; hence, the West should stop trying to tell Russia how to run its internal affairs. Democracy is the most reasonable form of government, and this rationality must be encapsulated in a cohesive ruling elite. The role of elections is not to pick leaders but to demonstrate the unity of the governors and the governed. This approach certainly has an intellectual pedigree, drawing on a conservative, antiliberal tradition of Continental thinkers such as François Guizot and Carl Schmitt. Putin's

selective approach to the rule of law aptly fits Schmitt's notion of the "state of emergency"; that is, in moments of crisis the sovereign must be prepared to act outside the law. But in practice, *sovereign democracy* is a wooly term, and as a practical matter, Russia's sovereignty was no longer under threat. Putin's chosen successor as president, Dmitrii Medvedev, explicitly stated that he did not see the need for any hyphenated versions of democracy. But the idea of sovereign democracy lives on; it even has its own website. It is the official ideology of Nashi, a Putin youth movement created in 2005 in the aftermath of the pro-Western, youth-led Orange Revolution (2004–2005) in Ukraine.

The most serious intellectual currents are variations on the theme of Russia's historical uniqueness as a state bridging Europe and Asia with a tradition of strong centralized power. Russian thought is strongly dichotomous, structured around bipolar opposites: East versus West, Europe versus Asia, weak society versus strong state. The mainstream of such analysis is well represented by the liberal academics Yuri Pivovarov and Alexander Akhiezer. Pivovarov traces the evolution of what he calls the *Russian System* of a single power center from the Mongols through the tsars. The actual exercise of power takes place through personal networks, hidden from view and not captured by formal constitutional rules. This pattern reproduces itself in all three twentieth-century regimes—Soviet communism, Yeltsin democracy, and Putin authoritarianism. Russia never will assimilate to the European model. Akhiezer sees the core of the problem more in the specific features of Russian society, which is still rooted in quasi-mystical concepts of tradition and community (*sobornost*). The role of the state is to express society's essential unity—an impossible task. As a result, society oscillates between angry rejection and hopeful worship of the state. Russian thinkers do not take social diversity as a starting assumption: the differentiation that comes with modernization is a challenge and a threat. The writings of the nationalist émigré Ivan Ilyin enjoyed a revival during the Putin years. He stressed the need for moral unity between the ruler and ruled.

The most eccentric wing of political writing is that represented by the Eurasianists, who have revived a philosophical school that grew up among Russian émigrés in the 1920s. Their most influential thinker was Lev Gumilev. Post-soviet Eurasianists seem to have a mass readership; whether their views have any impact on actual government policy is another story. The Eurasianists believe that Russia is a distinctive civilization that arose out of the nomadic tribes of the Eurasian steppe, with a life force superior to the sedentary civilizations of Europe and Asia. Russia's history is indissolubly connected to both continents, but Russia never will be accepted as a full member of either continental club. Nor should it want to be. Rather ironically, contemporary Eurasianists, such as Alexander Dugin, draw heavily on the geopolitical theories of the nineteenth-century British strategist Halford Mackinder, who focused on the Eurasian "heartland" as the key to world domination. Also, the Eurasianists' defense of Russian statehood is driven by their hostility toward the military preeminence enjoyed by the United States in the post–cold war world.

So Eurasianism is not a hermetically Russian invention; it is rooted in emulation and envy of the Western powers.

The few remaining liberals have moved to the fringes of the Russian political scene. Former prime minister Yegor Gaidar wrote an ambitious book, *The State and Evolution,* in which he tried to justify his actions as prime minister in 1992 as an attempt to create a property-owning class who could provide a check on the bureaucratic state. Others, such as philosopher Boris Kapustin, have given up on the modernist project altogether. With the crash of the Soviet model, Russia has leapt straight into a postmodern condition. Kapustin defines the central elements of postmodern politics as "ironic detachment, fluid coalitions and temporary issue-oriented alliances, ideological pastiche, [and] the affirmation of local customs and practices at the expense of vast projects" (2000). Similarly, Mikhail Epstein argues that in postatheist Russia the return of spirituality will not lead to a revival of organized religion, but to a personalized, "minimalist religion." Russia's search for an ideational basis for its political system, whether it remains authoritarian or evolves in a more democratic direction, is still very much a work in progress.

See also *Asian Political Thought; Communism; Communism, Fall of, and End of History; European Political Thought; Glasnost; Perestroika; Politics, Comparative; Soviet Union, Former.*

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Sabine, George Holland

A professor of philosophy at Cornell University from 1931 until his retirement in 1948, George Holland Sabine (1880–1961) was a highly regarded American historian of political ideas. His *A History of Political Theory* was required reading in political theory courses during the 1940s and 1950s, influencing generations of scholars and their students.

Sabine was born in Dayton, Ohio, on December 7, 1880. He entered Cornell University as an undergraduate in 1899, earning his AB degree in 1903 and a PhD in 1906. His academic career began at Stanford University, where he lectured in philosophy. From 1914 to 1931, he taught philosophy at the universities of Missouri and Ohio State. He then returned to Cornell, where he was the Susan Linn Sage Professor of Philosophy, a title he held until retiring. While at Cornell, he also served as dean of the graduate school from 1940 to 1944 and was vice president of the university from 1943 to 1946.

The first edition of Sabine's *A History of Political Theory* appeared in 1937, and it was published worldwide in several languages. He organized the work around theories of the state, covering thinkers and movements from the ancient Greek city-state to the modern nation-state. He continued to revise editions of his book in light of new secondary material and the unfolding of historical events, including the emergence of fascism in Italy, national socialism in Germany, and communism in Russia. Toward the end of his life, Sabine expanded the chapters on German philosopher Karl Marx to distinguish between democratic socialism and Leninist Marxism. His last published article, appearing in the July 1961 issue of *Philosophical Review,* examined the ethics of Bolshevism.

Sabine's writings on Marxism, moreover, revealed his capacity as a scholar to be open, even receptive, to political ideas and convictions contrary to his own. However, this did not mean for Sabine, as it did for Marxists scholars, that all political theorists are ideologues, speaking on behalf of their party, class, or social group. While it is true that political theories provide standards against which behaviors and institutions can be judged, it is also true that they too can be judged. For example, any "clear-headed theory of politics," Sabine wrote in his preface to *A History of Political Theory,* must not confuse statements of reason, fact, and value.

In the end, it was not Marx, but Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume who inspired Sabine's historical and analytical approach to his subject. Consequently, Sabine refused to read into the historical record of political theory any single, metaphysical truth or end point. He was convinced, on the one hand, that, as he stated in *A History of Political Theory,* "no man can stand apart for the values and the convictions of the culture in which he was reared." But, on the other, he was "also convinced that there is in intelligence and good will a power of discrimination and of intellectual honesty that is not wholly limited either by nationality or by social class." Sabine identified this conviction with the tradition of liberalism and concluded that this tradition provides the most likely prospect for social and political improvement through nonviolent means.

After having received many honorary degrees, Sabine died on January 19, 1961.

See also *Hume, David; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Political Theory.*

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Sacrificial Lamb Candidacy

In democratic systems, a *sacrificial lamb candidacy* is an office-seeker chosen by a party to contest an election even if there is little or no likelihood of success. Sacrificial lambs are chosen for a variety of reasons. In some cases, a party may put forward a sacrificial lamb to blunt the appeal of an opposition candidate who has an aspiration for higher office. Sacrifice candidates also can force rival political parties to expend resources and therefore dilute their ability to support candidates in more closely contested elections. Sacrificial lambs may be put forward in an effort to give candidates experience and prepare them for future political campaigns. The sacrificial strategy further gives parties an ability to nominate candidates for office in an effort to attract voters from groups

not normally aligned with that party or to launch attacks that might be considered too risky for a mainstream candidate. For instance, in 2004, the U.S. Republican Party nominated former diplomat and African American party member Alan Keys to oppose Barack Obama in the Illinois senatorial election, with the expectation that Keys could criticize Obama more sharply than other Republicans without provoking a backlash or prompting charges of racism. The Republican Party also hoped Keys would diminish Obama's popularity ahead of an expected presidential run in 2008.

See also *Campaigns; Candidate Selection; Representative Systems.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Said, Edward

The radical literary views and persuasive style of the Palestinian American Edward W. Said (1935–2003) rapidly promoted him to one of the most prominent and influential cultural critics of the twentieth century. Said was born in Jerusalem and studied in Cairo, Egypt; Northfield Mount Hermon in Massachusetts (1953); Princeton (BA, 1957); and Harvard (MA, 1960; PhD 1964). His doctoral dissertation in English Literature was titled "The Letters and the Shorter Fiction of Joseph Conrad" and was published as *Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography* in 1966. Conrad would continue to figure prominently in Said's later writings and had a resoundingly deep-seated effect on the development of his cultural philosophy.

Arguably, Said's most provocative work was *Orientalism* (1979). In that seminal text, Said eloquently proved along literary lines how the West had structurally defined itself in terms of an *occidental other* (refers to the mirror image of the occident—i.e., the orient—that helps the occident know itself) through the domination, subordination, seduction, and subduction of the Middle East. *Orientalism* resulted in a spate of intense criticism and high praise for illuminating literary approaches to colonialism and postcolonial politics in the tradition of Tunisian novelist and sociologist Albert Memmi and French psychiatrist and revolutionary writer Frantz Fanon. Said widened and deepened their intellectual scope with his vast comprehension of social history, literary criticism, political theory, and cultural theory. Said addressed the many limitations of *Orientalism* later in his *Culture and Imperialism* (1993). One of these limitations involved the nature of indigenous resistance and the importance of the colonized natives' interpretation of the colonizer.

Said was prophetic when he warned in 1986 that the excessive ultranationalist tendencies sweeping America would lead to a false sense of American invulnerability, a sense that indeed was shattered by the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001. He was caught between nominalism and realism. He was also a Palestinian, an Arab, and a Christian who was raised in a Muslim-dominant region but schooled in two conservative American universities. In *Covering Islam: How the Media and Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World* (1981) he criticized the media-produced misconceptions about Islam. His *The World, the Text, and the Critic* (1986) illustrated the importance of critical distance and heteronormative formations of dominant cultures brought forth by Conrad and Hungarian Marxist philosopher Gyorgy Lukács through the poststructuralism of Jacques Derrida, the founder of deconstruction, and French philosopher Michel Foucault's postmodernism.

Throughout his life, Said's scholarly publications, newspaper articles, and public interviews directly challenged predominant intellectual norms embedded in the political economy of the modern Western psyche. He influenced generations of young scholars from a wide range of academic disciplines across the world. As America's strongest proponent for Palestine, he simultaneously criticized and exonerated the problematic leadership of the Palestinian cause. He spoke at more than one hundred universities and institutions and published ten single-authored books that included method in criticism and political activism. Among his many academic accolades and international prizes, he was given the Lionel Trilling Award in 1976 for *Beginnings* (1975) and an endowed chair at Columbia University.

Said's deep sense of moral and political dislocation arose out of his upbringing, his preponderant brilliance, and his unfortunate and prolonged battle with sickness until death. His powerful influence over future generations of Old World critics and New World scholars represents an appropriate epitaph to the legacy of a great thinker and profound intellectual. He died on September 25, 2003, in New York City.

See also *Foucault, Michel Paul; Lukács, Gyorgy; Political Culture.*

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Saint-Simon, Claude-Henri

Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) was a French social reformer. Though still influenced by the aspect of Enlightenment thought that placed emphasis on philosophical inquiries, Saint-Simon also envisioned the usefulness of empirical studies and social science. While Saint-Simon's disciple, Auguste Comte, became known as the founder of sociology, it was, strictly speaking, not Comte but Saint-Simon who laid some of the foundations that enabled "positive science" and sociology to emerge.

Saint-Simon was born in Paris, France, into an aristocratic family. At seventeen he joined the French army and fought in the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783). He lost his personal fortune in the French Revolution (1789–1799) and

became a financial speculator and engineer. Only later in life did he turn to scholarly pursuits.

In addition to his influence on Comte, Saint-Simon's ideas are present in the writing of other diverse thinkers such as German philosopher Karl Marx, French social scientist Émile Durkheim, and German sociologist Max Weber. With Comte, Saint-Simon shared a belief in progress and the conviction that the study of society and human development deserved to be a discipline separate from philosophy and natural science. Moreover, he believed the direction of history, as well as of social change, can be understood and scientifically examined. Saint-Simon's *law of three stages,* fully developed later by Comte, outlined the idea of identifiable intellectual progress, moving from theologically oriented understanding to metaphysical thought and ultimately to scientific explanations. Obviously, the deterministic nature of such development was overstated, as was Saint-Simon's positivistic faith in the ability to discover laws underlying human behavior. Nevertheless, the idea of progress and the validity of empirical study are still shared by many contemporary scholars and social scientists. Saint-Simon also anticipated Durkheim's concept of *collective conscious,* and, in correctly interpreting the declining role of religion in state affairs, he anticipated some of Weber's and Durkheim's ideas on the secularization of the West. Saint-Simon's philosophy of history is one that sees history as a continuing progress toward greater socialization.

Saint-Simon's political writings are best considered with an understanding of his philosophy. He argued for the appropriation of hereditary wealth by a strong government that had an active role in the political, economic, and social life of society, but did not go as far with this concept as Marx and later Marxists. Although both argued for the appropriation of the means of production, Saint-Simon did not seek to put industrialists and capitalists under tutelage—on the contrary, they, together with scientists, could in his view become the new elites. His idea of the individual also differed from that of Marx. Whereas the latter saw in the individual the personification of alienation, denied freedom unless liberated by true consciousness, Saint-Simon's idea of the individual was more modern (liberal). Saint-Simon believed a person was endowed with both reason and the ability to become an autonomously acting individual. Both Saint-Simon and Marx believed in the desirability of a classless society and both, albeit to different degree, saw in the working classes a vehicle for social change. Saint-Simon's notion of *terrestrial morality* advocated the elimination of (unfair) privilege, a redistribution of class arrangements, a greater role for the state, and the institutionalization of equal opportunity.

Saint-Simon's dream of a secular and rationally guided morality is evident in his 1825 work, *The New Christianity,* written just prior to his death. In it he sought to remind believers of the "true spirit of Christianity" and criticized Catholics, Protestants, Jews, kings, ordinary people, philosophers, revolutionaries, and especially theologians. Saint-Simon believed that, simply put, faith and science have led to the deterioration of human morals—though it is not Christian values per se that failed, but those humans who interpreted, preached, and practiced them. What he called for, then, was not a reform of humanity's religion(s), but a new religion of, by, and for humanity.

See also *Comte, Auguste; French Political Thought; Marxism; Socialism; Weber, Max.*

. . . .   VOLKER K. FRANK

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Sanctions and Embargoes

The terms *sanctions* and *embargo* describe two particular kinds of economic penalties applied from one country (or a group of countries) on another one with a double purpose: to punish the latter by depriving it of essential goods and to force it to conform to the will of the former. Although they represent two different forms of economic coercion, these concepts are currently considered almost synonymous.

Sanctions can be applied for a variety of reasons, including altering the target's behavior, removing leadership or bringing about regime change, and sending "messages" to other international actors. Sanctions can be imposed to avoid war or to signal the sender's intention to escalate to more forceful forms of influence. Domestically, sanctions can be aimed to appease a constituency that demands some course of action but does not fully support war. In this case, sanctions constitute an *expressive* activity, a release of internal tension directed primarily at a domestic or international audience without other ends. Finally, the use of specific sanctions does not imply that the sender wants to achieve only one objective. Various purposes are usually being met. During the oil embargo in 1973, for example, the main sender, Saudi Arabia, had three goals: the Israeli retreat from the Palestinian territories, to relaunch Saudi leadership in the Arab world, and to solidify the domestic consensus for the monarchy in the country.

The use of sanctions as a tool of influence has a longstanding tradition. The continental blockade of the Napoleonic wars and the cotton embargo during the American Civil War (1861–1865) are just two of the most notable examples in which economic sanctions were used to achieve political gains. However, it was only after the First World War (1914–1918) that economic sanctions became a major tool of influence in a policy maker's hands. Both in the founding treaties of the League of Nations and the United Nations (UN), economic sanctions have been identified as key instruments in maintaining peace and order. Article 16 of the League of Nations established the automatic and total imposition of economic sanctions against any country committing an act of war against another state.

Similarly, the UN Security Council can impose mandatory sanctions under Articles 39 and 41 of Chapter VII of the

Activists oppose United Nations sanctions against Iraq in 2002. Critics of sanctions and embargoes argue that the measures harm regular citizens more than they do regime leaders.

SOURCE: AP Images

while the civilian population suffered terrible hardship due to the sanctions. According to UN agencies, the destruction of Iraq's civilian infrastructure during the Gulf War (1990–1991), and the inability of Iraq and the UN Security Council to agree on a humanitarian exception to the sanctions, caused the death of more than five hundred thousand children under the age of five.

To contain the devastating humanitarian impact on the target population, scholars and policy makers have tried in recent years to develop new forms of sanctions customized to maximize the target regime's costs of noncompliance while minimizing the target population's suffering. Known as *smart sanctions,* they do not target the country as a whole. Rather, they identify and target only those groups of individuals that really detain decisional power in the target country. Examples include freezing the assets of selected people, imposing limited embargos on certain goods (such as oil, weapons, or diamonds), and restricting the travel opportunities for individuals and refusing visas. However, because smart sanctions by themselves may not always succeed in inducing early compliance of the target, usually they are integrated with other tools of influence.

In summary, it is difficult to give a definitive evaluation on the effectiveness of sanctions. If sanctions have proved to be unsuccessful in many cases in which they were employed in the past, this does not diminish the fact that they may be more useful in the future. First, sanctions' efficiency should be measured based on the possible solutions available to the policy maker in a given situation. It would be misleading to talk about costs and benefits in using economic coercion, if no other solution is available. Second, sanctions have proved to be successful when multilateral and proportional to the goal to be achieved. If these conditions are not met, the employment of sanctions could weaken their effectiveness and undermine the sender's credibility.

See also *Foreign Policy; Trade Diplomacy; United Nations (UN).*

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UN Charter. Article 39 states that the Security Council "shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security." Article 41 authorizes the Security Council to call on members to apply nonviolent sanctions against offenders. The United States is also a major employer of economic sanctions. During the twentieth century, the United States imposed economic sanctions more than 110 times. In 1998 alone, the United States imposed sanctions on twenty-six target countries.

Although the application of economic sanctions is growing (from 1991 to 1994 the UN Security Council imposed mandatory sanctions eight times, compared to only twice between 1945 and 1990), sanctions have never fully satisfied statesmen and policy analysts in their effectiveness. The reasons for this are manifold. First, sanctions seem unable to achieve their declared targets. In a study made by Gary Hufbauer and colleagues (1990), sanctions appeared to be successful in only 34 percent of the cases where employed. Second, sanctions are slow in achieving their goals. Time affords the target the opportunity to adjust, to find new suppliers, and to mobilize public opinion, with the effect of jeopardizing sanctions' effectiveness. Third, sanctions are sometimes more costly for the sender than for the target, especially when the sender must compensate domestic companies and neighboring countries for their lost revenues caused by the disruption of their trading routes with the target. Finally, in many cases sanctions do not work on authoritarian regimes.

Sanctions may actually produce consequences directly opposite to those intended by the sender. In the case of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, sanctions strengthened his regime,

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Sandinismo

Sandinismo was the ideology of the revolutionary Sandinista movement in Nicaragua. The movement was named after Augusto César Sandino, a nationalist figure who opposed the U.S. military occupation of Nicaragua in the late 1920s and 1930s. Its main ideological tenets were developed by Carlos Fonseca Amador, Silvio Mayorga, and Tomás Borge Martínez, who cofounded the Sandinista National Liberation Front in 1962. Sandinismo incorporated many of the ideals of other leftist revolutionary movements in Latin America and was influenced by Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, and Mao Zedong. Sandinismo emphasized the need to create a socialist state, but broke with traditional Marxist ideology by asserting that the armed struggle to overthrow capitalism should begin among rural populations (as had been the case in Cuba). In addition, the movement's leaders accepted the utility of forming alliances with middle-class and upper-class groups in their struggle against the pro-U.S. regime of Anatastasio Somoza Debayle. After the Sandinistas took power in 1979, they implemented land redistribution and other social reforms, but efforts to develop a socialist economy led to hyperinflation and a lengthy economic downturn, magnified by corruption. They were defeated in 1990 in the country's first contemporary, open elections, although the Sandinistas recast themselves as social democrats and won the balloting in 2006.

See also *Latin American Politics and Society; Nationalism; National Socialism.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Sartre, Jean-Paul

The central and most prolific figure of French phenomenology and existentialism, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) made significant contributions to philosophy, literature, political analysis, drama, and biography. A critic of bourgeois conformism, oppression, and capitalism, he was the lifelong companion of French author and feminist Simone de Beauvoir and an internationally recognized public intellectual. During the cold war, he was very critical of France and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, and, without quite joining the fold, became a "fellow traveler" of the Communist Party, a position that drew him into public debates and alliances with other prominent French intellectuals, such as author Albert Camus, philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and psychiatrist and revolutionary writer Frantz Fanon.

As a young man, though many of his colleagues were engaged in left-wing politics, Sartre worked on a modest "opposition aesthetics" that championed the individual who was aware of, and broke free from, the essentially ungrounded order of bourgeois society. Starting from his readings of German philosophers

French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre and writer Simone de Beauvoir (on sofa) meet with Argentine revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara (right) in 1960. Sartre merged elements of Marxism and existentialism.

SOURCE: The Granger Collection, New York

Friedrich Nietzsche and Edmund Husserl, Sartre developed accounts of the world as fundamentally ungrounded (following Nietzsche) and of consciousness as free awareness (following Hursserl), which he wove together in the novel *Nausea* (1938), a classic of existentialist literature.

In *Being and Nothingness* (1943), Sartre argued that the human is essentially a freedom-to-be-something. Uncomfortably stretched between freedom and thinghood, people deceive themselves by pretending to either pole in "bad faith." For example, to avoid feeling that his identity is pegged, a man might keep his options open, never commit to a specific role in life, and so pretend to an unlimited freedom. However, by not attempting to be anything, he squanders his freedom by failing to make a significant choice of his life. Alternatively, he might throw myself into a role and believe he is a kind of thing, such as an academic, but then because academics are not activists for example, he would not believe the possibilities of activism were his own, which would be false. Again, his freedom would be lost to him. Bourgeois life is a swamp of bad faith in which people neither face these truths of existence nor take responsibility for the choices they make. If an individual does face his freedom-to-be-something, if he takes responsibility for his life, he will realize that he is "nothing but what he makes of himself." This radical account of human agency amounts to a philosophical humanism in which individuals are and ought to be fully responsible for their lives.

Increasingly from the 1940s onward, Sartre mobilized his words as weapons to fight oppression, making of himself a politically engaged champion of freedom. For some four decades, in polemical essays, in the press, and on the streets, Sartre wrote and spoke out in support of such groups as the Jews, the colonized Algerians, the victims of French and American imperialism in Vietnam, the proletariat, and the students of the 1968 uprisings in France.

In *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1960), Sartre wove together existentialism and Marxism. According to German social and political philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, humans make their history through their practices, but their practices, rather than being unlimited, are significantly conditioned by dominant social relations, a view with which Sartre came to agree. However, Sartre argued further that the social relations themselves may be traced back to past practices that have become unintentional or inert patterns that continue to have inertial effects—the "practico-inert." By reducing the conditioning limits of human practices to the practices of past humans, Sartre generated a Marxism in which the making of human history was entirely in the hands of humans in the final analysis—that is, a Marxism compatible with the philosophical humanism of his own existentialism.

Challenges to Sartre's philosophical humanism inaugurated in part the postmodern tradition of the late twentieth century.

See also *Camus, Albert; Engels, Friedrich; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Merleau-Ponty, Maurice; Nietzsche, Friedrich.*

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Satire, Political

Political satire uses sarcasm and or humor to point out the foibles, incompetence, or corruption of political leaders and government actions. One of the earliest political satirists known to history is Aristophanes, who wrote many theatrical comedies that satirized ancient Athenian politics.

Political satire has become much more common in modern civilization, because of literacy growth; technological advances in forms of entertainment like television, film, and the Internet; and expansion of free speech and free press rights in many countries. Such forms of satire can flourish under governments that tolerate freedom of expression, while under authoritarian regimes, poking fun at political leaders and their policies can result in imprisonment or even death.

In the United States, the federal Supreme Court upheld constitutional protections for political satire in the somewhat unusual case of *Flynt v. Falwell,* 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Pornography publisher Larry Flynt printed a parody in his magazine that created a fictional and crude account of the first sexual experience of Jerry Falwell, a well-known conservative political activist and evangelist preacher on American television. Falwell sued Flynt for libel and was awarded $150,000 by a jury for emotional distress, but the Supreme Court unanimously overturned the jury decision by stating that no one would believe the parody was true and that public figures must get used to the possibility of ridicule.

CARTOONS, ESSAYS, LITERATURE

Jonathan Swift became a well-known English-language political satirist in the eighteenth century for his works like *Gulliver's Travels,* while Voltaire's *Candide* gained great popularity and controversy in mid-eighteenth century France. Political satire also became a form of commentary on British rule in colonial America, one of the most prominent authors being Benjamin Franklin for works like "Rules by Which a Great Empire May Be Reduced to a Small One."

Political satire became more popular among the majority of people, many who were illiterate in the nineteenth century, through political cartoons. The term *gerrymander* became famous when a political cartoonist in Boston added a salamander's feet and head to a map of an oddly shaped legislative district in Massachusetts drawn to benefit the party of Governor Elbridge Gerry in 1812. Thomas Nast became famous in the second half of the ninth century for his political cartoons in *Harper's Weekly,* in which he created the symbols of the elephant for Republicans and the donkey for Democrats. Nast also published a series of cartoons critical of New York City's Boss Tweed, head of the Tammany Hall political machine, who eventually went to prison.

In nineteenth-century France, Honoré Daumier's caricatures of King Louis-Philippe at one point led to the artist's imprisonment, and Victor Hugo published *Les Châtiments,* a collection of poetry that contained strident satire of the reign of Napoleon III. In the twentieth century, novels like George Orwell's *Animal Farm* and Joseph Heller's *Catch-22,* as well as H. L. Mencken's newspaper columns, continued a rich English-language tradition of political satire. Political cartoons remain common in newspapers, while Garry Trudeau's *Doonesbury* became a well-known satire of contemporary American politics in comic strip form. The magazines *Private Eye* and *Le Canard enchaîné,* from the United Kingdom and France, respectively, remain known for their satirical articles and cartoons.

TELEVISION, FILM, INTERNET

One of the twentieth century's most famous and politically significant political satires was presented on film in 1940, with Charlie Chaplin's *The Great Dictator,* a critique on the rise of Hitler in Germany. Later, 1964's *Dr. Strangelove* satirized the cold war, while Woody Allen's 1971 film *Bananas* satirized Latin American dictatorships. In 1997, *Wag the Dog* was released, a dark comedy about the creation of a fake war to distract the public from an American president's sex scandal. Michael Moore has made a series of documentaries in which he satirizes American political policies on gun control, health care, and the 2003 war in Iraq.

Television also has become a very popular medium for political satire in American shows such as *The Simpsons,* which includes a buffoonish Mayor Quimby character and frequently pokes fun at mass public ignorance on political issues, and *South*

Park, which has satirized American views on immigration, abortion, censorship, and environmentalism. The weekly program *Saturday Night Live* frequently contains satirical skits and impressions of political leaders that can have an impact on public attitudes, such as skits poking fun at 2008's Republican vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, *The Daily Show* and *The Colbert Report,* both political satire programs, became especially popular among American young adults.

British television programs also poke fun at politicians, perhaps most memorably in the *Spitting Image* puppet show of the 1980s and 1990s, whose portrayals of Ronald and Nancy Reagan were used in a music video of the song "Land of Confusion" by the band Genesis in 1986. In Canada, the CBC network has, for many years, presented political satire shows like *Royal Canadian Air Farce*, *This Hour Has 22 Minutes,* and *The Rick Mercer Report,* with each of the shows featuring frequent appearances by leading national politicians of the day. *Le Bébête Show* and *Les Guignols de l'info,* similar to *Spitting Image,* have used puppets to satirize French political leaders. Japanese comedian Hikari Ota began a weekly program in 2005 in which he pretends to be a Japanese prime minister who proposes preposterous policies.

Widespread Internet access, starting in the late twentieth century, also led to an exponential increase in political satire, as websites such as YouTube make themselves available to anyone in many countries, though most of the satire produced in this way has not attracted much attention. Organized political satire websites, though, have had more of a following and occasionally gained attention from other media. The Onion website contains a large number of humorous fictional news articles and videos about politics. JibJab.com gained a lot of attention for the satirical video it posted during the 2004 American presidential election, in which George W. Bush and John Kerry sing along together to the folk song "This Land Is Your Land."

If Internet access continues to spread, if electricity reaches more communities around the world, and if more countries adopt policies that tolerate the freedom to criticize political leaders, then the amount of satirical content produced about politics is likely to grow in the twenty-first century.

See also *Cartoons, Political; Humor, Political; Journalism, Political; Montesquieu, Charles-Louis; Novel, Political; Poetry and Politics; Protest Music; Swift, Jonathan; Utopias and Politics.*

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Satyagraha

Satyagraha translates from Hindi as "zeal for truth." The term is an Indian political philosophy developed by prominent Indian politician and spiritual leader Mohandas Gandhi during the 1920s, which emphasized nonviolence to overcome political repression. Gandhi rejected political violence and instead drew on traditional indigenous forms of protest as part of the Indian nationalist movement to end British occupation of India. Satyagraha emphasizes the search for truth and the concurrent effort to convert political opponents to the righteousness of one's cause rather than coerce or force one's goals on an opponent. Unlike conventional armed struggles, the ultimate goal is a cooperative solution in which the opposing party does not perceive itself to be the loser of the struggle, nor is the opposition harmed.

Gandhi argued that nonviolence was part of human nature and violence was an aberration. Satyagraha was both a political and personal philosophy that aimed to improve an individual's life. Gandhi initially promulgated Satyagraha in an address in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 1906 as a part of an opposition movement to the racial policies of the British colony toward Indian immigrants. Satyagraha later formed the core of the Indian independence movement and employed tactics such as boycotts. Gandhi's philosophy would influence later nonviolent movements, including the 1960s civil rights movement in the United States and in South Africa under Nelson Mandela protesting apartheid in the 1950s and 1960s.

See also *Apartheid; Caste System; Gandhism; Hindu Political Thought; Nonviolence.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Scandals and Blame Management, Political

Political scandals are pervasive events that span across nations, capture media and public attention, have no party division, and exclude no level of office. Scandals are mediated events that can involve presentations of corrupt acts. Although some scholars treat corruption and scandal as identical, they are not the same phenomenon. Joseph Nye provides the most quoted definition of corruption as the "behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique), pecuniary, or status

gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence" (1967, 419). While all corrupt acts can become scandals, not all scandals involve corrupt acts. As Suzanne Garment notes (1991), a scandal is not an event that is intrinsically evil or corrupt. Rather, it is an event that shocks and upsets the public. For example, sexual infidelity is considered a scandal although it does not involve corruption. Publicity is the second element of scandals that distinguishes them from corruption. Of all those behaviors that conflict with society's moral standards, it is only the publicized ones that constitute scandals. John Thompson (2000) notes that *scandals* are interpretations of immoral acts defined through the media, elites, and public discourse. A scandal is as much related to the nature of the act as it is to the publicity that it receives. Corruption does not need an audience while scandals cannot exist without one. And while corruption is measured by the seriousness of the act itself, a scandal's impact is assessed by the seriousness of the damages inflicted on political actors.

With the above in mind, a scandal can be defined as the information about an act that is considered immoral or shocking, made available to a large audience, which results in a loss or injury of reputation to the actor(s) involved. Scandals are further classified on the basis of the nature of the act, and the most frequent categories appearing in the literature are campaign violations, bribery, moral violations, and abuses of congressional prerogatives. Other classifications refer to the level of scandal activity; that is, whether the act is individual or institutional. According to Dennis Thompson, a scandal is institutional when "the gain a member receives is political rather than personal, the service the member provides is procedurally improper, and the connection between the gain and the service has a tendency to damage the legislature or the democratic process" (1995, 7). In the event of an institutional scandal, illegal conduct performed by an individual implicates the institution that person is associated with and undermines its reputation. Scandals are also classified on the basis of whether the scandal act is of high or low severity, ranging from "grand" to "petty," and whether it is traditional or modern. Traditional scandals would include patronage and improper influence, while money laundering through electronic means would be a modern scandal.

CASE STUDIES, SURVEYS, AND EXPERIMENTAL EXPLORATIONS OF POLITICAL SCANDALS

Systematic research on political scandals employs a variety of methodologies to understand their impact on voting behavior. Case studies show that the degree of scandal damage depends on its details. Ethical misconduct and moral charges are the most damaging and can harm severely or even irreversibly damage political careers, while campaign violations, bribery, abuse of congressional prerogatives, and relation with others involved in misdeeds leave only minor scars on the actors' public profiles. Research on institutional scandals indicates that when blame can be shifted to endemic characteristics of the institution, it is diffused. The institution absorbs the negative impact of the scandal and the culpability of the individual member is discounted. In the case of individual scandals, as for instance bribery in return for a political favor, the blame does not involve the institution and its implications on the individual are more severe. In a public opinion survey, John Peters and Susan Welch (1978) found that the type of office the accused official occupies generates responsibilities and perceptions of these responsibilities shape scandal impact. The public allows executive office holders greater latitude to act and exercise a more independent style of political leadership compared with legislators. For that reason, public officials and the public react differently to explanations of corrupt behavior provided by legislators than to explanations provided by executives (e.g., mayors, governors, and presidents). The public is more forgiving of an executive's misbehaviors compared to legislators' misbehaviors. For the same reasons, judges are held to higher standards than are legislators.

Several scholars place emphasis on elements of the scandal publicity, such as the scandal frame and whether it is situated in the public or private sphere. As Paul Heywood notes (1997), when the act has an effect on the performance of public duty, it is considered "public," and its implications are serious. However, activities driven by personal, "private" ends are considered to be outside the public sphere, lying outside the boundaries of public concern. The timing of the publicity also determines scandal impact. The further away a scandal breaks from an election, the more negligible its effect, because scandal impact deteriorates over time as novelty wears off. Scandal duration is also important. The longer a scandal stays on the public agenda, the more serious its implications, because its salience can shift voters' opinions.

Experimental and survey evidence shows that character perceptions of those scandalized also determine scandal impact. According to Richard Fenno (1978), what a political actor gives off as a person has implications for accountability, because the public has the tendency to forgive people they know. Carol Funk (1996) and Tereza Capelos (2001) show that favorable political reputations centered around competence and qualification skills often operate as a protective shield, moderating the effect of a scandal. On the other hand, perceptions of integrity do not offer much cushion of support as they consistently plummet after a scandal. Also interesting is the finding that in the absence of reputation, scandal impact is more pronounced. The public evaluates unfamiliar political actors more harshly than politicians about whom they know something. Party identification is also shown to have a significant effect. As the literature on motivated reasoning suggests, party affiliation generates a feeling of identification. In the context of a scandal, partisan affiliation provides resistance to negative information that suppresses negative reactions and blame attribution. Issue agreement operates in a similar fashion. Public support for corrupt office holders is likely to continue among voters with strong policy preferences for the positions of the office holder, according to the findings of an experiment by Barry Rundquist, Gerald Strom, and John Peters (1977). Experimental studies also show that men and

women are not evaluated in a uniform fashion in the context of a scandal. Leonie Huddy and Tereza Capelos (2002) find that female candidates enjoy a higher chance of survival due to gender stereotypes related to inferences of honesty.

BLAME MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTS

Scandal effects are manageable because political actors strive to maintain the approval of those to whom they are accountable. Kathleen McGraw (1991) explains that in their effort to shape citizens' perceptions, politicians provide accounts, public explanations of their behavior. McGraw offers a fourfold typology of accounts: (1) Excuses deny some or any measure of responsibility of the offensive act in an attempt to weaken the causal link between the actor and the outcome. (2) Denials deny that the event in question occurred. (3) Justifications attempt to reframe the outcome, denying some or any measure of offensiveness in the act while admitting responsibility. (4) Concessions acknowledge the occurrence of the negative event with explicit or implicit assumption of responsibility, expression of regret, or offer of restitution.

Providing public accounts is a critical tactic that requires skill. McGraw provides evidence that the political loss can even be turned into political gain, if the reframing of the consequences of the act is successful. Serious offenses are associated with concessions, denials, and justifications, while seniority and high public support lower the likelihood of offering an explanation. Social-psychological literature also predicts a preference of concessions among female politicians and politicians of the ruling party, while politicians of the opposition use more excuses, assigning blame to the ones in power.

Despite the blame management efforts of those who find themselves caught in the web of public accountability, political transgressions stigmatize many political careers. Interestingly, in some cases the account can fall short of remedying the wrongdoing, creating unanticipated new problems. The cost for political actors translates to decreasing electoral margins, electoral defeat, resignation, or early retirement. In presidential systems, scandals are negatively related to electoral support for the party in control of the presidency. In parliamentary systems, they have implications for prime ministerial evaluations, following the decision to fire or protect scandal-implicated ministers. Scandals can erode trust and confidence in political institutions and the democratic system in general. The revelation that political actors abuse their power injects waves of public anger and encourages the rise of political cynicism and public disengagement. Political scandals are not only bad, however. They can be good when they expose abuses, promote public scrutiny toward openness in government, and stimulate debate about moral standards and political humility. Active citizens and accountable political leaders can mean gains for democratic politics.

See also *Corruption, Political.*

. . . .   TEREZA CAPELOS

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Schattschneider, Elmer E.

Elmer Eric (E. E.) Schattschneider (1892–1971) was an American political scientist who wrote about political parties.

Schattschneider was born in Bethany, Minnesota. He earned his bachelor's degree from the University of Wisconsin in 1915. He then worked for the Young Men's Christian Association from 1916 to 1918 and joined the U.S. Navy in 1918. After leaving the military at the end of World War I (1914–1918), Schattschneider taught at the senior high school in Butler, Pennsylvania, from 1919 to 1926. He then entered the University of Pittsburgh and was awarded his master's degree in 1927. In 1935 he received his doctorate from Columbia University.

Schattschneider taught at Columbia (1927–1930), the New Jersey College for Women (1928–1930), and Wesleyan University (1930–1960). After his retirement, he continued to teach as a professor emeritus of government at Wesleyan until 1970. He also was a visiting professor at Syracuse University (1949–1950), where he supervised visiting German students.

Schattschneider was active in public service. He served on the Connecticut City Council of Middletown (1938–1940), as a member of the Connecticut State Board of Mediation and Arbitration (1940–1946), as a "visiting expert" in Germany for the U.S. Army of Occupation (1949), as chair of the Governor's Commission on Community Adjustment Problems (1951), and as a member of the Old Saybrook (Connecticut) Charter Study Commission (1967–1968).

Schattschneider was vice president (1953–1954) and president (1956–1957) of the American Political Science Association. In 1949 he chaired the association's Committee on Political Parties, which published "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System" in 1950.

Schattschneider's books include *Party Government* (1942), *Equilibrium and Change in American Politics* (1958), *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America* (1960), *Political Parties and Democracy* (1964), and *Two Hundred Million Americans in Search of a Government* (1969). *The Semisovereign People* is significant because Schattschneider wrote about the transformation of American politics from a set of regional political systems to a truly national political one.

Schattschneider's work on parties and interest groups made him influential in political science. His observation in *Party Government* that, because people are torn between their interests, there can never be 100 percent mobilization of an interest helped frame the understanding of the workings of interest groups in American politics. In the same work he writes that "A political party is first of all an organized attempt to get power. *Power* is here defined as control of the government. That is the objective of party organization. The fact that the party aims at control of the government as a whole distinguishes it from pressure groups" (2004, 35) A few lines later he adds that "Since control of a government is one of the most important things imaginable, it follows that a real party is one of the most significant organizations in society."

See also *Interest Groups and Lobbies; Party Organization; Political Theory; U.S. Political Thought.*

. . . .   JEFFREY KRAUS

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Schmitt, Carl

Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) was a German political theorist and law professor. His theories favored strong executive authority to maintain order during time of crisis.

Schmitt, a Roman Catholic, was born in Plettenberg, Westphalia. He studied law and passed his state examinations in 1915. A year later he volunteered for the German Army. After World War I (1914–1918), Schmitt taught law at a number of German universities, including the University of Griefswald (1921–1922), the University of Bonn (1922–1926), the Handelschochschule (1926–1932), and the University of Cologne (1932–1933). He finally joined the University of Berlin faculty in 1933.

Schmitt was a legal advisor to German chancellor Kurt von Schleicher in the chancellor's efforts to block a seizure of power by the Nazis or Communists. However, Schmitt joined the Nazi Party in 1933, where he captured the attention of Hermann Göring, one of the party's leaders and was appointed president of the Union of National-Socialist Jurists. Schmitt assumed a number of other leadership roles in the legal profession in Germany and used them to provide legal justification of the National Socialist regime and the persecution of Jews. He defended the Nazi regime's murder of political opponents on the so-called Night of the Long Knives in 1934. In October 1936, Schmitt demanded that all publications by Jewish scientists be designated with a symbol. At the 1936 conference that he organized on Judaism and jurisprudence, he demanded that German law be cleansed of what he called the "Jewish spirit."

Schmitt's influence would be short-lived. In December 1936, *Das schwarze Korps,* a Shutzstaffel (SS) publication, accused him of being an opportunist and cited his earlier criticism of Nazi racial theories. Schmitt then was stripped of his leadership roles but was allowed to keep his position at Berlin through Göring's intercession on his behalf.

Schmitt was captured by the American army in August 1945 and was interrogated on at least four occasions by the American Military Government and the Nuremberg prosecutors. However, he was never prosecuted, and he eventually returned to his birthplace of Plettenberg, where he would continue to write.

Schmitt's writings tended to support executive power. According to him, unanticipated and sudden changes in political situations cause instability in any system based on the rule of law. In his essay "Die Diktatur" ("On Dictatorship"), which was published in 1921, he examined the constitution of the new Weimar Republic. Schmitt viewed the emergency powers granted to the president as a strength of the document, contending that the weakness of parliamentary democracy was its deliberative nature. He believed that for government

to be effective, it must be decisive. In subsequent works, Schmitt continued his criticism of liberal democracy. In *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* (1923), he contends that liberal democracy, which is justified by the notion that policies are the product of rational discussion, is actually a process where decisions are made by political party leaders who are more concerned about good politics than good policy.

In *The Concept of the Political* (1927) Schmitt contends that politics is different than other aspects of life because, "The political is the most intense and extreme antagonism." He suggested that, in politics, the annihilation of one's adversary is acceptable if necessary.

Schmitt's work has influenced both European conservatives and those on the far left who find his rejection of liberalism and support of strong executive power attractive.

See also *German Political Thought; Liberal Democracy; Political Theory.*

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Schumacher, Ernst Friedrich

Ernst Friedrich (Fritz) Schumacher (1911–1977) was an environmental, or Buddhist, economist best known for his influential book *Small Is Beautiful: Economics As If People Mattered* (1973). Influenced by the Austrian philosopher Leopold Kohr, he argued for small-scale economies, social and ecological justice, and nonviolence.

Schumacher was born in Bonn, Germany, to an academic family and studied first at Oxford University in Britain as a Rhodes Scholar and then at Columbia University in New York. In 1934 he returned to Germany but fled in 1936 with his new wife to escape Nazism, settling in Britain.

After becoming a British citizen in 1946, Schumacher was sent to Germany as part of the British Control Commission to work on the economic reconstruction of Germany following World War II (1939–1945), and he began around this time to think about the idea of *appropriateness* in terms of economic scale and patterns of ownership. The idea of appropriateness has since become a key theme in environmental economics.

In 1949 Schumacher became chief economic advisor to the British Coal Board, a post he held for twenty years. He argued that coal rather than oil should supply the greater part of the world's energy needs and voiced concerns about the depletion of fossil fuels. He was active in the British Soil Association from this time as well, an interest that developed as a consequence of a family move to a house with a large garden in Surrey; Schumacher became an enthusiastic advocate of organic gardening.

In 1955 Schumacher travelled to Burma as an economic consultant but later said that he felt Burma could teach the West a great deal about economics. Impressed by the lack of materialism he observed in the Burmese people, he was committed to the idea that economics conceptualized purely in terms of providing for material needs was insufficient; economic activity also must be fulfilling for people in sustainable ways. His celebrated 1966 essay "Buddhist Economics" expanded on this theme and outlined his thesis that the most rational economic policy was production from local resources for local needs.

Schumacher's ideas found practical expression in the Intermediate Technology Development Group (later known as Practical Action), which he founded in 1966 to work on economic development within people's cultural context development, thereby respecting cultural differences and promoting the principle of appropriateness in technological and economic development.

Schumacher died in Switzerland in 1977. In addition to *Small Is Beautiful,* he wrote only one other book, *A Guide for the Perplexed,* published posthumously in 1977. Both titles have been widely read around the world. He also made regular contributions to the magazine *Resurgence;* a selection of these essays was collected in the 1997 publication *This I Believe.* In 1980 the E F Schumacher Society was founded in Britain to continue Schumacher's work, and it grew to include branches in several countries.

See also *Economic Policy Formulation; Environmental Policy.*

. . . . KERRI WOODS

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Schumpeter, Joseph Alois

Economist Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950) was born in Austria-Hungary. After the death of his manufacturer father, his mother married a retired army officer with an aristocratic title. Schumpeter was thus able to attend an exclusive Viennese school and then the University of Vienna, where he studied with both neoclassical and historically minded economists. After World War I (1914–1918), despite sympathies with the defunct monarchy, he served briefly as finance minister in an Austrian government led by social democrats. Following the emergence of almost-inevitable conflicts, Schumpeter went into banking and then eventually returned to scholarly life. In

1932 he accepted a position at Harvard, where he sealed his reputation among English and American social scientists.

Schumpeter made his mark on political science with his conception of democracy as method. Contrary to what he termed the *classical doctrine,* he insisted that democracy was no more than an institutional arrangement or a political method that allowed elite politicians to engage in electoral competition for decision-making power. For many political scientists, this conception had several attractive features. It seemed to banish normative elements and made it easy to distinguish democratic governments. It was congenial to the predominant mood of researchers who downplayed the political sophistication of ordinary citizens. And it posited as the driving force of politics the hard-headed competition of elite politicians, which produced substantive law and policy as mere "byproducts." The conception, however, soon attracted critics, who argued that it devalued participation, deprived the term *democracy* of its critical power, and inappropriately treated contingent observations about voters as evidence of inalterable human psychology.

Schumpeter elaborated his conception of democracy in *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (1942), a work focused on what he perceived as the historical tendencies leading toward the demise of capitalism. The significance of this fact has not always been appreciated. Democratic theory could be, for Schumpeter, only a part of a broad science of social development. As an economist, he greatly admired neoclassical models, which focused on systematic relationships between economic quantities and on the tendency toward equilibrium. But as early as 1911, he expressed dissatisfaction with the implicit neoclassical assumption that the equilibrating capitalist system contained within it no drive toward change. Early on, Schumpeter posited entrepreneurial innovation as an internal source of disruption, constantly remaking the economy—a process he later summed up as *creative destruction*. As his thought developed, he also began to stress that the capitalist system was surrounded by an institutional framework he termed the *capitalist order.* A fully articulated theory of capitalist development required an economic sociology that could elucidate this framework and the tendencies toward change embodied in it. As an economic sociologist, Schumpeter argued that the entrepreneurial function would likely disappear, crucially weakening the capitalist order. He also argued that democratic ideologies were part of a broad cultural challenge to the capitalist order—even while elsewhere arguing that the democratic method was a form of elite rule under which the economy was protected from popular interference.

See also *Democratic Theory; Political Theory.*

. . . . JOHN MEDEARIS

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Science, Technology, and Politics

The advent of a methodical, experimental, organized, publically funded and honored, and technologically oriented science has introduced deep transformations in politics. Where this science has been institutionalized and its fruits available—in Europe, North America, Australia, and much of Asia—it has enabled wealth and leisure, as well as generally improved living conditions. Indeed, the tremendous inequality in living conditions and military might between nations where this science and its fruits are known, and those where they are unknown, is arguably the basis for classifying the world into developed, developing, and underdeveloped countries. In large part because of its practical efficacy, the scientific account of nature that underlies this power has tended to spread along with its technological fruits, replacing or forcing the modification of traditional beliefs about the nonhuman whole, and thus about humanity, law, and duty.

Moreover, in progressively expanding human power over nature and thus the limits of possible action, technological science has the capacity to change expectations of the state and the conduct of politics. Thus, while commonly seen simply as an instrument of those who develop and use it, technological science also can effect change in people's beliefs and alter their relationship to each other and to their political community. Political science has been slow to take account of this dynamic and dialectical relationship between politics and technological science, but the prominence of pressing policy questions involving science and technology have forced it onto the agenda of all branches of the discipline.

CLASSICAL CRITICISMS OF ART AND SCIENCE

In Europe, where modern technological science emerged, however, the inquiry to uncover the unchanging character of the nonhuman whole (or nature), which was originally called *physiology* or *philosophy,* and the practical and productive arts, the totality of which we now call *technology,* were originally distinct enterprises, both of which were viewed with suspicion, if not hostility, from the vantage point of politics or the health of the political community. In the Hebrew Bible, the questionable nature of the arts is indicated by their origin—the founders of metallurgy, tools, and instruments come from the cursed descendants of Cain—and shows itself in the tension between the arts and law or man's duty to God. Thus, in the Babel story, the invention of the art of masonry tempts man to undertake the prideful project of making a name for himself through the building of a united and universal city.

A mushroom cloud from an atomic bomb looms over Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945. Government investment in science in during the world wars contributed to the development of the atomic bomb and, by extension, Allied victory in World War II.

SOURCE: Corbis

As for science, Plato has preserved for us the anecdote of Thales, who, while stargazing, fell into a well, at which sight a witty Thracian maid quipped that Thales was so eager to know the heavens that he forgot the things at his feet. Sharper still is Aristophanes' critique of the scientific enterprise in his comedy *Clouds,* where a buffoonish Socrates is shown engaged in a variety of inane inquiries into nature, apparently oblivious or indifferent to Athens' plight in the Peloponnesian war, and complicit in the corruption of the youth of Athens, encouraging doubt about the being of the gods of the city and thus undermining the authority of its laws. The single-minded quest for the truth about nature leads to an irresponsible and dangerous forgetfulness about politics and the demands of practical life.

The founders of political philosophy and political science recognize the questionable nature of the philosopher's place in the community and share the skepticism about the arts, if albeit for different reasons. Both in Plato's *Republic* and his *Laws,* philosophy is restricted to a very select class of individuals. Regarding the arts, in his *Politics,* Aristotle directly considers a proposal, attributed to Hippodamus, to encourage useful innovation and argues against it on the grounds that it will encourage innovation in law, which is dangerous. Though he later acknowledges the city's need to attend to developments in the military arts in particular, lest its rivals become too powerful, even this recognition does not persuade the philosopher to adopt a general policy of encouraging innovation.

Nor was the marriage of science and the arts simply unknown to the ancients, as the wondrous machines of Hero of Alexandria and Plutarch's portrait of Archimedes indicate, but these examples make clear the separation and rank order of importance assigned to the arts on the one hand and science or philosophy on the other. Simplifying and generalizing, we can say that while the usefulness, even the necessity, of pursuing certain avenues of technological innovation, particularly in the military arts, was recognized and accepted, the systematic encouragement of scientific and technical innovation was never pursued, both out of fear of the revolutionary potential of all innovation and an aristocratic scorn for concern with means and the merely necessary. Science or philosophy, insisting on its essentially theoretical character, is accepted or rejected by the political community as a leisure activity, perhaps beautiful, but effectively useless.

THE BACONIAN REVOLUTION TO THE BOMB

A twofold transformation in this relationship is thus the precondition of the politically institutionalized technological science with which we are familiar. Science must rescind or at least qualify its essentially theoretical character, show itself to be practically useful, and the political skepticism toward innovation must be overcome. With respect to the former of these, many scholars argue that late medieval Christianity played a crucial part, forcing a qualification of the classical defense of science or philosophy and breaking down the aristocratic ethos and its high-minded contempt for the productive arts. Thus in the medieval period one sees a flowering of technical innovation and figures like Roger Bacon, monk, philosopher, and mechanic.

The first systematic effort to think through and work for the unification of natural philosophy, or science, and the arts, with a view to fundamentally resetting the relationship of natural philosophy, or science, and politics occurs in the thought of Englishman Francis Bacon around the turn of the seventeenth century. Bacon's project was twofold: to provide the foundational argument for a methodical, experimental, and practically oriented science, which as such, would yield works and not mere words or understanding; and second, to advocate the institutionalization of this science. Unlike classical science, the new natural science was a large and collaborative venture, therefore requiring not only tolerance or freedom, but funding, honor, and support. In exchange for these, Bacon and his successors promise to the state useful knowledge and extraordinary new powers. In essentials, the terms of this "social contract between science and society" remain the same in the early twenty-first century. The guiding vision for this project can be glimpsed in Bacon's *New Atlantis,* which tells of the discovery by a ship of Europeans of the utopian

island of Bensalem, where institutionalized science contributes to securing maximum political happiness.

Bacon's writings and the *New Atlantis* in particular were of crucial importance to the founding of the Royal Society and so to the great age of English science that culminated in Sir Isaac Newton's *Principia*. The Royal Society is among the first scientific establishments supported not only out of aristocratic largess, but for the goods that it promises to generate. Anglo-Irish satirist Jonathan Swift produced a hilarious lampooning of the society and its science in the third voyage of *Gulliver's Travels,* which suggests the society's early failure to make good on this promise but may be taken also as an implicit acknowledgment of its growing prominence.

By the late eighteenth century, Bacon and French philosopher and mathematician René Descartes were revered or condemned as the architects of the "scientific" aspect of the Enlightenment project to rationalize and meliorate human life. Taken together, science, liberal government, and commerce would bring comfort and prosperity, as well as chase religion into the private realm, freeing politics from its authority. This Enlightenment project of science, technology, and a new kind of politics in the service of human liberty is clearly visible in the patent clause of the U.S. Constitution, empowering Congress, "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."

Over the course of the nineteenth century, scientific and technological progress proceeded at a remarkable pace in Europe and the United States. While the extent to which scientific inquiry is prerequisite to technological development remains somewhat controversial, both in this period and in general, in some clear and famous cases (the lightning rod and the telegraph, for instance), developments in science clearly precede and make possible important technological innovations. Moreover, this *linear model,* as it is sometimes called, was surely the prevailing understanding of the relationship between science and technology through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. *Basic* or *pure* science precedes and makes possible *applied* science and technology.

During the nineteenth century, the university became the primary home of the *scientist* (a label coined in the 1830s and controversial through the end of the nineteenth century), while applied science and engineering found a home in the corporation. Outside of agriculture, the geological and oceanic surveys, and some limited ventures in the realm of public health, however, the state kept or was kept at a distance from both basic science and engineering.

This distance of the state from science and engineering was decisively changed by the two world wars. The advent and use of chemical weapons in the First World War (1914–1918) is among the first clear indications of a new relationship of interdependence between technological science and the state; science was enlisted and mobilized to serve the ends of the state, a movement that culminated with the development of the atomic bomb. No event in the history of modern natural science makes so clear its potentially decisive practical power; no event so immediately alters its relationship

to politics. Many saw (and see) the advent of the bomb and the possibility of nuclear annihilation as disclosing the dangerous hubris of the Baconian project to master nature, as well as confirming the concerns of critics of technology from Rousseau on. But for those in power, faced with deciding what is to be done, the main question henceforth was how this science can best be harnessed and directed to the benefit of the state and humanity generally. And so, following the Second World War (1939–1945), every industrialized nation undertook a programmatic reevaluation of their capacities for scientific and technological innovation. Perhaps the most famous and influential of these reports was Vannevar Bush's "Science—The Endless Frontier." With the development of "the bomb" a number of essential features of the relationship between modern science and politics are brought to the fore and with them, questions and controversies that remain unresolved to this day. They are customarily, if imperfectly, categorized as matters of policy for science and technology and of science and technology for policy.

AFTER THE BOMB: POLICY FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

To begin with the crudest and most obvious considerations, the development of the bomb reveals the importance, if not the necessity, of funding science, even or perhaps especially the most abstract branches of science. Estimates vary, but according to Don K. Price (1962), at the turn of the twentieth century, total federal support for research and development (R&D) in the United States was on the order of ten million dollars; by 1930 it was still less than one hundred million dollars, and by the end of the Second World War, one billion dollars. According to the National Science Foundation report for fiscal year 2008, federal R&D support totaled 116 billion dollars. Such huge investment, however, gives rise to controversy. What is the role of the state as opposed to industry in funding research, and how much of a say does the funding public get in how its money is distributed? The prevailing understanding of the workings of science suggests that state funding is necessary, particularly for capital-intensive projects and early-stage research and that no-strings-attached funding distributed by scientists with a view to the scientific merits of proposed inquiries is the surest path to progress.

Still, the public justification of funding for science is primarily in terms of practical use or consequence. Even apparent exceptions—space exploration and supercolliders—are undertaken for the global prestige or recognition, as symbols of preeminence calculated to have political effect. When governments are forced to choose between constructing a new supercollider and the biomedically relevant human genome project, the project with the clearer practical benefit is likely to prevail. Because public benefit remains the only legitimate ground for public funding, scientists have an interest in encouraging belief in the fruitfulness of basic research. As Daniel Greenberg (1999) has pointed out, from a scientist's point of view, there is scarcely any problem facing the nation to which the answer is not more funding for science.

A related question is the relative efficacy of directed versus undirected scientific research. Given that the public funds

science largely, though perhaps not exclusively, with a view to the technological benefits it receives from the science, it has an interest in maximizing its investment. Again, the case of the bomb is a helpful entry to the problem. Many, including Vannevar Bush (1960), interpret the development of the bomb as a confirmation of the importance of undirected funding of basic science. Both because science itself resists being managed from without and because the ultimate implications or consequences of a particular line of research cannot be predicted in advance, but those consequences are undeniably of great consequence, the state must fund generously and broadly, turning over authority for distributing the funding to the scientists themselves, the only ones in a position to know what to do with it.

On the other hand, the bomb was the outcome of the most aggressive project of government-directed research in human history, the Manhattan Project. It can be plausibly argued that, far from demonstrating the utility of basic research, the bomb is proof of the fruitfulness, even the necessity, of direct government supervision and guidance of research. Indeed, the Manhattan Project and the moon landing have become proverbial examples of what focused effort and big spending can accomplish. Daniel Sarewitz (1996) has provocatively and persuasively argued in favor of abandoning the "myths" of the infinite benefit of unfettered research, which he sees as obstacles to clear thinking about policy for science and technology.

The bomb makes clear that scientific and technical talent and ability are vital resources to be jealously guarded and cultivated. The massive exodus of theoretical physicists from Nazi Germany was a crucial factor in the success of the Manhattan Project and the health of physics in the United States after the war. Similarly, in the aftermath of the launch of Sputnik, there was a sudden concern about whether the United States was training enough scientists and engineers. At the same time, because there is no necessary connection between being a good scientist and being a good citizen, states become concerned about scientists sharing secrets, spying, and defecting. The newly discovered dependence of the state on the integrity and devotion of its scientists exposes those scientists to heightened scrutiny, which is in tension with the freedom from oversight and political interference taken to be crucial to scientific progress.

The internationalism of the scientific community is thus a factor in policy for science. On the one hand, the existence of a meaningful international community of scientists makes possible action on a global level, as suggested by the cases of nuclear testing and arms control during the cold war and the current efforts of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. On the other hand, the transnational character of science opens the possibility of scientists simply moving from one state to another to avoid justifiable regulation or supervision and thus stands in the way both of state-level as well as global policy for science and technology.

Another uncontroversial implication of the development of the atomic bomb is the need for supervision and regulation of certain potentially dangerous or morally questionable avenues of scientific and technological development. But by whom, and according to what criteria? Again, on the one hand, only the technically and scientifically expert are competent to distinguish real dangers or concerns from the merely fanciful, but on the other hand, how can interested parties be trusted with judgment in their own case? Moreover, certain of the most uncontroversial limits to scientific and technological research—the prohibition of experimentation on unwitting human subjects, for instance—have nothing to do with scientific expertise and indeed rest on bases external to the science itself. Here, as with the case of funding, the scientific impulse seems clearly in tension with the demand for regulation. No consensus has emerged on how such disputes should be resolved and policy made, as the ongoing debate about the funding and regulation of research on human embryonic stem cells indicates. This picture is further complicated when looked at comparatively, for particular states with distinct histories handle the same policy questions very differently, raising the question of which approach is best. To generalize, while the need has been clear for more than half a century, developing institutions, national or international, capable of regulating science and technology remains very much a work in progress, and a dispositional openness to technological innovation leads to the acceptance of an increasingly problematic "wait and see" approach to regulation.

AFTER THE BOMB: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR POLICY

The second half of the twentieth century also sees the proliferation of science and technology in policy. With the advent of an evolutionary view of nature and the corollary notion of species interdependence, humanity is forced to look at choices and actions in terms of potential consequences for nature as a whole and even the future of nature as a whole. As Hans Jonas observed (1984), practice has become more far-reaching and total than ever before. The discovery of the environment as an object of concern, together with the explosion of new products and processes with potential impacts on human health to consider, has the consequence that science-and-technology expertise and advice is suddenly indispensible to policy making. Yet, as this expertise involves the prediction of future consequences in extraordinarily complex systems, the uncertainty of such advice seems unavoidable. Moreover, even in the absence of deep uncertainty, scientific expertise seldom, if ever, compels a particular political choice. Policy makers and citizens turn to experts, but they tend to ask more of experts than they can deliver.

This problem has two grave consequences: the politicization of science and technocracy. The politicization of science names the use of science to rhetorically defend or rationalize a policy choice and the involvement of scientists in the political process such that they come to been seen as partisans rather than the disinterested seekers they need to be to justify appealing to their authority. Technocracy names the capture of decision-making authority by the technically and scientifically expert and therewith a loss of democratic self-government. It has become customary to speak of the task of maintaining the separation between science and politics requisite to avoiding

these twin dangers as "boundary-work," though more recent studies of science and technology in policy have tended to show that successfully enacting policy often entails blurring and crossing these boundaries; for instance, when scientific advisors sympathetic to the position of regulators tailor their recommendations accordingly. Thus, what works and what accords with our opinions of the proper relationship between science and policy appear to be at odds, and, as Peter Weingart has observed (1999), despite widespread awareness of this situation, the pattern tends to repeat itself.

Simultaneously, states turn to innovators and technicians to help with the management of problems and dangers. There are limits, however, to the capacity of technology to solve the problems generated by science and technology. Proliferation and testing of nuclear weapons continues despite improvements in detection. Recycling does not undo damage done by the original production and use. Worse yet, the belief or hope in the possibility of innovating problems away discourages undertaking the more difficult effort of making burdensome regulatory policy.

Finally, the introduction of science and technology to existing political institutions often can give rise to further problems and complications. This challenge is perhaps clearest in considering science-and-technology issues in the legal system, where decisions about what constitutes sound science must be made by nonscientists and where the capacities of technological innovations (e.g., DNA testing or MRI scans) must be assessed and judged by nontechnicians. Again here the tension between democratic norms and science-and-technology expertise strain our institutions, often forcing their modification.

CONCLUSION

The incorporation of the findings of historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science and technology into political science remains a work in progress, and science-and-technology policy remains a relatively underdeveloped subfield despite the growing importance and centrality of policy questions involving science and technology at both the national and international levels. What is clear is that the relationship between science, technology, and politics is a dynamic one, with each element exerting influence on the other two, and that this relationship cannot be taken for granted or presumed to function automatically for the good. Its management is thus a task, a particularly important task, of politics and a fruitful area of study for political science.

See also *Arms Control; Arms Race; Civil-military Relations; Climate Change Conferences, United Nations; Cold War; Development, Economic; Education Policy, Higher; Environmental Policy; Environmental Political Theory; Intellectual Property Rights; Kyoto Protocol; Science Policy.*

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Science Policy

Science policy refers to that aspect of public policy that addresses funding, regulation, and organization of science and technology. Nations support scientific endeavors for a number of reasons, such as economic growth and military or security interests. While facets of scientific inquiry have been supported by governments throughout history, it was not until the interwar period that science policy materialized as a distinct policy area.

The Soviet Union led activist government science believing that science and technology were key to industrialization and modernization. The Soviets supported science with public funds, promoted the profession as a branch of civil service, required that research be targeted toward the social and economic goals of the state, and made science education available broadly. By the mid-1930s, the Soviet Union was spending about 0.8 percent of its national income on scientific research, compared to 0.1 percent by the United Kingdom.

Scientific institutions and societies in the United Kingdom historically eschewed involvement in government and politics as the ideal of pure, disinterested science reigned. Rethinking of the role that science may have in mitigating the deep social crises of the interwar period and the impending Second World War (1939–1945) led to changes in the relationship between government and science with increased funding and coordination of research into military-relevant technologies.

The United States lagged behind the United Kingdom in developing a wartime alliance between science and the military, but by 1939 advances in understanding the potential destructive power of atomic power triggered the establishment

of the governmental Advisory Committee on Uranium, which ultimately led to the Manhattan Project to develop the first atomic bomb. The project ushered in the era of "Big Science" and involved the mobilization of an unprecedented number of scientists; coordinated activities around multidisciplinary projects for military purposes; and brought together industry, academia, and the government.

Governments in most, if not all, industrialized countries became actively involved in funding and coordinating scientific research following World War II, establishing or substantially increasing funding for science councils, national laboratories, and research institutes. Most of the investment at the time was in mission-specific areas that included military research, agricultural productivity, and atomic energy, with the goals and criteria set by the relevant government funding agencies. On the other hand, the scientific community set goals of basic research and assured quality through the peer-review process.

ASCENDANCE AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF U.S. SCIENCE POLICY

The 1957 launch of the Soviet spy satellite, Sputnik, accelerated investment in science and engineering, particularly in the United States, with increases in research and development spending averaging 15 percent, achieving technological supremacy by the mid-1960s. The ascendance of science led to new bureaucracies, expanded legislative committee jurisdictions, and the growth of existing science-oriented organizations. The National Science Foundation was established in 1950 as the federal agency to support fundamental research in all scientific and engineering disciplines. President Kennedy established the Office of Science and Technology in 1961 in response to the space race. In 1976 it was renamed Office of Science and Technology Policy, and its mandate was broadened beyond space to advise the president on the effects of science and technology in domestic and international arenas.

In the legislature, the Senate Standing Committee of Aeronautical and Space Sciences was formed in 1958, then folded into the Commerce Committee in 1977. Similarly, the House of Representatives established the Committee on Science and Aeronautics in 1958, which has undergone a number of name changes and is presently the Committee on Science and Technology. Broadly speaking, these committees have full or partial oversight of agencies such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Department of Energy, and other science-dependent bureaucracies.

Interacting within these political arenas are powerful science organizations such as the National Academies of Science, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, as well as a number of university and industry lobbyists. The effects these groups have on science policy range from congressional earmarking of projects (funding or prioritizing science outside of the peer-review process) to advocating for more robust peer-review processing in government funding decisions.

INTERNATIONAL DRIVERS AND TRENDS IN SCIENCE POLICY

International organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization played important roles in reporting on and shaping science policy in both developed and developing countries. Today there are science-based bureaucracies in all developed and most developing countries. In the early 1960s, both organizations set explicit guidelines and goals for member governments to establish scientific advisory bodies, as well as recommendations to support scientific and technological research. In its 1963 report, *Science, Economic Growth, and Government Policy,* the OECD made an explicit link between science and the economy, arguing that higher education and research were long-term investments to stimulate economic growth.

Sociopolitical changes in the late 1960s had profound effects on science policy. Environmental, feminist, antiwar, and student movements questioned decision making and called for more public participation. The result was a broadening of the scope of science policy to reflect emerging societal concerns including environmental issues, reproductive technology and birth control, and the conversion of military research and development to civilian applications. A second OECD report, *Science, Growth, and Society: A New Perspective* (1971), shed uncritical optimism of scientific development, emphasized social and environmental contexts of technological change, and argued for more active citizen engagement in science policy development and consequences.

The 1980s saw a shift toward investing in more commercially oriented innovation policies as a response to the economic ascendance of Japan and the East Asian newly industrializing countries—Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. In these countries, science policy was integrated into industrial policy. A 1981 OECD report emphasized stronger relationships between universities and industry and focused on industrial innovation. In the following decade, OECD countries increased funding for materials sciences, information technology, and biotechnology and shifted their science policy orientation to commercial innovation.

In the 1990s the OECD continued to focus on innovation policies, but its framework of analysis included "innovation as interaction" and highlighted that states needed to develop capacity not only to develop their own innovations, but also to develop the capacity to adopt technology developed in other countries.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN BIG SCIENCE

While science and technology policies for economic growth and military applications maintain a nationalist perspective the 1990s and 2000s saw an unprecedented degree of international cooperation in Big Science projects that pertain to mapping the human genome and climate science. The estimated

US$3 billion Human Genome Project actively engaged industry, research scientists, and the medical community around the globe. Major contributors to the project included the China, France, Germany, India, Japan, and the United States. Completed in 2003, the project catalyzed the biotechnology industry with transfers of technology to the private sector. It also spurred a host of ethical, legal, and social concerns such as who owns and controls genetic information, are genetically modified foods safe for humans and the environment, and how and should fetal genetic testing be used? These complex social and ethical issues have led to politically charged debate that has integrated into science policy in many countries.

Climate change science is arguably the largest and most international project in the history of science. While countries fund climate science through specialized agencies, universities, and institutes, as well as private sector investment in understanding causes, risks, and developing mitigation and adaptation strategies, the Intergovernmental Program on Climate Change (IPCC) has emerged as the most authoritative source of information and policy decisions for climate science. The IPCC Panel is composed of government appointed representatives and neither conducts its own research nor monitors climate itself. Rather, the lead authors of IPCC reports assess available information from peer reviewed, published scientific literature. In 2007 the IPCC shared the Nobel Peace Prize with Al Gore.

See also *Climate Change Conference, United Nations; Disaster Relief; Environmental Policy; Food Policy; Intellectual Property Rights; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Science, Technology, and Politics; United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).*

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Scottish Enlightenment

The Scottish Enlightenment was one of the most fruitful intellectual movements in eighteenth-century Europe. David Hume, Adam Smith, and about a dozen other significant thinkers revolutionized modern ideas of human cognition and sentiment, as well as political and economic philosophy. "At a time when we have lost our Princes, our Parliaments, our independent Government, even the Presence of our chief nobility . . . , speak a very corrupt Dialect of the Tongue which we make use of," wrote David Hume in 1757, "is it not strange . . . that, in these circumstances, we shou'd really be the People most distinguish'd for Literature in Europe?"

SCOTLAND'S UNIQUE EDGE

Centered chiefly in Edinburgh and in Glasgow, socializing in circles such as the Select Society and the Poker Club, Scottish thinkers created not merely a school of thought but a complex hub of debate and inquiry into history, science, moral, and political philosophy. This hub of accomplishment, dubbed "a hotbed of genius" by Tobias Smollett's Humphrey Clinker, can be partially understood against the background of Scotland's unique historical circumstances.

Scotland joined England in a Union of Parliaments in 1707, giving up a long tradition of independence. At first, post-Union discontent peaked into several Jacobite uprisings in support of exile Stuart contenders to the British throne, most significantly the failed attempt at power seizure led by Charles Edward Stuart. His defeat in Culloden in 1745 terminated the era of struggle, but even earlier, many Scots, especially Lowlanders, preferred to remain partners to England and share its economic prosperity and imperial ambitions. The traditional Highlands clan society was a waning world of ancient valor and communal values that became the object of cultural nostalgia and a theoretical challenge for philosophers of modernization.

Scottish thinkers thus faced the problem of an identity for Scotland within the assimilated structure. They witnessed the consequences of modern commerce and industry, which were transforming landscape and society. By mid-century, parts of Scotland experienced unprecedented growth in manufacture and trade. The Church of Scotland lost its grip on the imagination of a new generation. Educated Scots looked to London for cultural inspiration, but others, notably Hume and Smith, reached toward the new Enlightenment discourse being created in Paris and elsewhere. At home, they favored the philosophy of political liberty loosely associated with Whiggism, the political outgrowth of the Glorious Revolution (1688), rather than the continental-style absolute monarchy linked with the Stuarts. Fascinated by progress, the Scottish Enlightenment displayed a powerful future orientation.

MAJOR THINKERS AND IDEAS

Roughly between 1739, the publication date of Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature,* and the 1790s, a generation of thinkers set out to create a new understanding of modernity based on good laws, peaceful commerce, and social refinement. Inspired by its unique crossroads between English civility and Gaelic tradition, and drawing on its long-standing contacts with the European continent, Scotland created a distinct voice within the European Enlightenment.

Influenced by earlier theorists of natural law, such as Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, by travel and ethnographic literature, and by the French philosophers Charles-Louis Montesquieu and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Scottish thinkers saw human history as divided into socioeconomic stages of

development leading from primitive man to refined modernity. Scotland's entry into a union with England could be seen in the context of civil and economic advance. The Highlands presented these sophisticated Lowlands thinkers with a handy model of traditional society, a mirror image to urban and urbane modernity.

Sharing the French spirit of rational investigation, the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers focused more closely on aspects of economic modernity and on a new and sophisticated grasp of interplay between individual interests, market forces, and forms of government. Put concisely, the unique Scottish contribution to European Enlightenment discourse is most visible in investigations into sentiment and "common sense" and in the innovative philosophy of political economy associated mainly with Hume and Smith.

Francis Hutcheson, professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow, is considered a founding father of the Scottish Enlightenment. His analysis of human virtue and benevolence led him to oppose the Thomas Hobbes theory of human nature by stipulating a realm of "moral sense" that underlies men's ethical judgments. Pleasure, he wrote, is effected by virtue, and "that Action is best, which procures the greatest Happiness for the greatest numbers."

Hume set out to challenge Hutcheson by applying Isaac Newton's scientific method to epistemology, moral philosophy, aesthetics, politics, and history. His "science of man" was purportedly based on experience and observation alone. The *Treatise* broached a new philosophical skepticism and a pioneering discussion of causation, induction, and human knowledge, which creatively provoked Immanuel Kant and inspired many other philosophers of the mind. The *Essays, Moral and Political* (1741–1742 with later additions), *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748), and *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751) based morality on human psychology, particularly on sentiments, drawing on man's love of pleasure and aversion to pain. Hume's *History of Great Britain* (1754–1762) set an agenda for the Scottish inquiry into the rise of modernity in general. His political theory advocated trust in modern monarchies, when able to safeguard rule of law, civil liberty, and freedom of trade. Hume's essays "Of Superstition and Religion" and "Of Miracles," and the posthumously published *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (1779), offered a powerful philosophical basis for both skepticism and atheism.

Thomas Reid was the most important voice of the "common sense" school that also included James Beattie, George Campbell, and Dugald Stewart. Opposing Hume's empiricism, these thinkers identified principles of cognition common to all mankind and exempt of rational proof. Reid's inquiries into sensation, language, and free will are of interest to philosophers today.

An important group of thinkers turned to the history of mankind or of social groupings. Among them were Henry Home, Lord Kames, William Robertson, Adam Ferguson, and John Millar. They attempted to create categories for understanding the material, social, and economic progress and "division of ranks." Ferguson's *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767) has recently aroused renewed interest as a republican-minded

exploration of man's primeval communal nature as a standing challenge to civilized, commercial modern society.

Adam Smith's engagement with the Scottish subject matter resulted in two important works: *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), which analyzed the independence of men's moral judgments, and *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776), which established the modern science of political economy. Following Hume and differing from Ferguson, Smith stipulated a market-based society based on modern manufacture and trade, vouchsafed by strong laws and civil refinement.

The Scottish Enlightenment thinkers enjoyed a particularly close-knit version of the famed eighteenth-century sociability. Intricately interconnected through correspondence and intellectual interplay, many of them gathered in such Edinburgh groupings as the Select Society and the Poker Club (intended to poke interest in a cherished but failed cause, the establishment of a Scottish militia). These circles included prominent scientists, including William Cullen and Joseph Black, and literati such as James Boswell and James MacPherson.

The Scottish Enlightenment's impact on future generations of philosophers was profound and lasting. Francois-Marie Voltaire lauded his Scottish contemporaries. Ferguson was influential among German Enlightenment philosophers and romanticists, culminating in Georg W. F. Hegel. Smith made his impact on continental political economy throughout the nineteenth century. Since his initial stamp on Kant, Hume's impact on Western philosophy has been constant. Significantly, since the 1970s, interest in the Scottish Enlightenment has grown among political thinkers and social commentators, fascinated by parallels between its early-modern tension fields and our late-modern concerns.

See also *British Political Thought; French Political Thought; German Political Thought.*

. . . .   FANIA OZ-SALZBERGER

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Secession

Secession can be defined as the establishment of sovereignty over a territory that once belonged to a larger political entity. *Secessionism* is the pursuit of sovereign status for that territory. *Separatism,* in turn, denotes the broader pursuit of increased independence for the territory—up to and including secession. The majority of secessionist movements are based on presumed ethnic differences between the seceding region and the larger state entity.

THE MORALITY OF SECESSION

Because secession usually involves unilateral breakup of the state, legal scholars and political theorists have outlined conditions under which secessionism might be a justified course of action under prevailing international norms and existing legal practice. Here, the most important debate is between remedial rights and primary rights advocates. *Remedial rights arguments* hold that ethnic groups that have suffered massive repression by the center may be entitled to independent statehood if the violations were so severe that reconciliation within the existing state framework is no longer deemed viable. *Primary rights arguments,* on the other hand, hold that groups might have a right to secede whether or not they suffered repression from the government. Within the primary rights camp, *ascriptive theorists* hold that when there are significant ethnic differences between the group and the majority population, or when the group has a long-standing claim to sovereignty, it has a natural right to secede. In contrast, *plebiscitary rights theorists* hold that when a majority of residents in a given territory desire to separate from the state, they have the right to do so, regardless of whether they have a history of ill treatment or even shared ascriptive traits.

THEORIES OF SECESSIONISM

By now, the literature on the causes of secession is considerable and may be divided into several broad theoretical frameworks. Essentialist arguments hold that ethnic identities trump other identities such as class and gender in modern political organization. In this formulation, secessionist movements are a function of significant ethnic differences between the minority and majority (measured in terms of race, custom, appearance, language, beliefs, or religion). The argument follows that any strongly differentiated group quite naturally will desire control over its political destiny in the modern era.

Secessionist claims are therefore a straightforward reflection of group desires for political independence. Consequently, secessionist conflicts cannot be resolved without granting the group some degree of sovereignty.

Institutionalist theories of secession hold that quasi-state structures such as regional autonomy, veto power, or local tax authority predispose ethnic groups to separatism. Much of this scholarship employs constructivist logic in arguing that national institutions (regardless of their original function) effectively create national groups, which ultimately mobilize for secession once the opportunity arises. The former Soviet republics provide a striking illustration of this phenomenon. The Soviet Union gave its union republics national constitutions, communist parties, academies of sciences, and national flags; the republics even had the rights to secede and conclude bilateral treaties with foreign countries. Though these structures had no functional value under centralized Kremlin rule, Ronald Suny (1994) demonstrates that these institutions served to construct salient republican identities around which groups mobilized for national independence when the Soviet state began to implode.

Political economy theories hold that secessionism is the outcome of economic differences between the seceding region and the state center. There are two separate and seemingly opposing predictions concerning secessionism in this literature. Proponents of advanced region secessionism predict that wealthy regions will attempt to secede in order to avoid taxation by the poorer center (e.g., Slovenia, Croatia, and the Katanga region of Congo). In contrast, backward region secessionism predicts that poor regions will seek independence in response to exploitation by the wealthier center in conjunction with limited access to state economic, cultural, or social institutions (e.g., Slovakia and Ireland).

Although not explicitly a theory of secession, the ethnic security dilemma holds that ethnic groups mobilize in response to the security vacuum brought about by state collapse. Barry Posen (1993) argues that regime change in multiethnic states creates an internal security dilemma by reproducing the condition of international anarchy on the substate level. In the absence of central authority, individuals will mobilize along the default cleavage of ethnicity. Where ethnic populations are intermingled, groups have a significant first-strike advantage; this creates an incentive for both groups to strike preemptively, increasing the likelihood of ethnic war. Under these conditions, an ethnic group may pursue secession (or territorial separation) as a means of increasing its physical security.

Credible commitment theories of secessionism build on this logic, predicting that a group will fight for secession when the center or majority cannot commit to protecting its well-being in the future. For example, Barry Weingast (1998) argues that the Southern states attempted to secede from antebellum America when the sectional balance in the Senate tipped in favor of the "free" states. Once the South lost its legislative veto, the Northern states could no longer credibly commit to protecting the Southern slave economy. This led the Southern states to attempt secession. Both security dilemma and commitment arguments rest on the assumption that secessionism is primarily driven by minority fears of victimization.

Ethnic bargaining theories challenge this view by focusing instead on opportunities for mobilization in the context of minority-state bargaining. Rupen Cetinyan (2002) argues that secessionist threats serve mainly as a bargaining tool for minorities to extract concessions from the center. When minorities have internal sources of strength (such as territorial concentration) and external sources of power (such as patronage from an external lobby actor), then the minority is more likely to escalate its demands of secession to obtain greater side-payments from the government.

The ongoing debate over the causes of secessionism has real-world implications, as our prevailing understandings of such conflicts inform the interventions that are designed to solve them. Essentialist theories prescribe a degree of autonomy for seceding groups on the assumption that they will continue to fight until their desires for self-determination are met. In contrast, institutionalist theories recommend against autonomy, which is believed to serve as a stepping stone to eventual secession. Security dilemma and commitment theories argue for external security guarantees so that seceding minorities will feel safe enough to reintegrate into the state. Ethnic bargaining theories suggest instead that third-party intervention may paradoxically encourage groups to secede, prolonging the conflict and provoking a majority backlash. Thus, the prescribed solutions to such conflicts depend very much on one's understanding of their causes.

See also *Sovereignty; Wars of Independence.*

. . . .   ERIN K. JENNE

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Secularism

The term *secularism* is most commonly associated with the Age of Enlightenment in the late seventeenth and eighteenth century. Secularism maintains that knowledge should be derived from the human capacity for reason rather than in revealed religion (i.e., scripture). Scientifically, secularism proposes the world is governed by natural processes and mechanical laws rather than the embodiment of divine meaning. Further, secular thought legitimizes the workings of the political system based on human decisions and reason rather than influenced by or dictated from divine right or clerical members. Hence, secularism often is related to or equated with similar philosophies, including humanism, naturalism, and the separation of state and religion. Ironically, the term *secular* has early Christian roots, deriving from the Latin *saeculum,* meaning century or age. Originally, *saeculum* referred to the period of profane time between the biblical fall out of Eden and the second coming of Christ, focusing on those affairs specific to mundane, this-worldly existence, but understood in relation to a supramundane divine meaning.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, various theories of the secularization of society emerged in the work of European thinkers such as August Comte, Émile Durkheim, Karl Marx, and most importantly Max Weber. Weber argued that the development of the modern world was defined by the spread of capitalism and the new forms of rationalization and technology accompanying it. These new forms of technology gradually replaced religious and magical forms of thinking in economic, social, and political practices. Although some specifics of Weber's secularization thesis were subject to criticism, the connection between modernity and secularism mirrored the declining influence of religion in economics and politics in the twentieth century.

FORMS OF SECULARISM

Despite the common use of the term to describe some Western societies, secularism has taken several different forms. Communist states, such as China or North Korea, commonly adopt secular policies, in which the government does not recognize an official religion, nor do they allow religion to interfere with state politics or differentiate their citizens based on religious identification. Aside from communism, many secular states, including Brazil, India, Japan, Mexico, or Turkey, do not formally acknowledge a state religion, but do not obstruct the practice of religion or advocate atheism. Populations within secular states can boast a majority religion or exhibit significant religious diversity.

In respect to Western societies, for example, although the United Kingdom has an official state religion, it is largely seen as a secular political system. On the other hand, the U.S. Constitution prohibits any religious test to hold office, but it is a country in which a substantial majority of citizens profess their religious beliefs and in which religious slogans often adorn public buildings. The form secularism takes in France is called *laicite*, meaning the exclusion of religious symbolism, including the display of religious articles by citizens, from the public sphere.

In his seminal work on secularism, Charles Taylor (2007) argues that we need to distinguish among three different meanings of secularity. The first refers to the idea that religion is largely absent, either withdrawn or expelled, from public spaces and spheres of common activity (e.g., politics, economics, professional, cultural, among others). This is a contrast to earlier centuries when religion permeated every aspect of common life. The second meaning refers to the declining numbers of people practicing religion or subscribing to religious belief in Western nations. The third, and most important, form of secularity refers to the belief that God is only one of a number of possibilities for understanding our moral, political, and spiritual situation. In this latter sense of the term, the very understanding of the world and the conditions of our common human experience are devoid of sacred or religious foundations. Taylor argues that it is this latter sense of secularity that best describes the modern world and provides the context for the postsecular age, one in which dialogue between theistic and nontheistic thinkers can take place.

CONTEMPORARY SECULARISM AND CHALLENGES

By the turn of the century, a number of developments emerged to challenge the various versions of secularism and the secularization thesis. First, some Western nations, notably the United States, have seen a rise in fundamentalist religious movements become politically influential. In other Western nations, such as France and United Kingdom, the presence of immigrant religious communities from former colonies has challenged the practices of secularism. Moreover, the number of people throughout the world practicing traditional religions, particularly in poor, developing countries, has continued to grow. This resilience and growth of religion poses new challenges to ideas about the relationship between modernization and religion.

Second, a number of people have argued that modern secular politics is itself rooted in or draws on the religious ideas and traditions in ways secularists do not fully recognize. This argument goes beyond the claim that the ideas of classical religious thinkers continue to be important. Rather, according to Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, the question that is raised is, "To what extent does modern secular thought and political practice depend upon religious tradition for its legitimization?" (2006).

A third line of argument, one sometimes related to the second, raises the question of the extent to which the seeds of disenchantment of the world and the rise of secularization are to be found in religion itself. Specifically, thinkers such as Marcel Gauchet (1997) argue that secularization is the fruit of a long, slow process begun in the Axial Age (800–200 BCE) with the movement of the sacred to other-worldly locations. Fourth, there has been an increased focus on the relationship between secularism as a defining quality of modernity and non-Western religions, specifically Hinduism and Islam.

Perhaps most importantly, several thinkers representing diverse perspectives have argued that the West is entering a postsecular age. In undermining the prospects of any single grand narrative concerning human society, including any single secular version, secularism has ironically opened up the possibility of what Gianni Vattimo and David Caputo (2007) refer to as the death of the death of God, or a return of religious searching or a dialogue between theists and nontheists.

See also *Culture Wars; Freedom of Religion; Laicite; Religion and Politics; Religious Minorities; Religious Persecution.*

. . . . MICHAEL T. GIBBONS

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Secular Realignment

The concept of realignment has been very prominent in the study of American electoral politics over the past fifty years. There are multiple definitions of *realignment,* exhibiting a good deal of variation. However, most agree that realignment involves fundamental and large-scale changes in the party system, usually including changes to both the primary line (or lines) of cleavage and to party coalitions.

By far the most important figure in thinking about realignment is V. O. Key Jr., and it would not be inappropriate to claim that the near obsession with the idea of realignment within the subfield of American electoral politics over the past half-century can be traced to Key's writings on the subject. Indeed, scholarly interest in the concept of realignment has spread far beyond the American context to the study of systems other than the United States. In his writings, Key offered two very different types of realignment. The first type, outlined in his seminal 1955 article, is *critical realignment*. Critical realignment is large-scale change that happens abruptly in one or two election cycles. The results produced by this massive change then persist for a number of years in a state of relative stability. In Key's words, critical realignments produce change that is "sharp and durable."

Key's idea of critical realignment has shaped the study of American politics like few other ideas. Indeed, as Everett Carll Ladd and Charles Hadley state, "It truly is a case of Key sneezing and political science catching a cold." However, Key significantly modified his thinking on the concept of realignment shortly after his original piece. In 1959, he offered another type of realignment, one that was much different than its critical cousin. This other type, of course, is *secular realignment*.

Like critical realignment, secular realignment results in change in the party system. But how change comes about is very different. Two elements are central to understanding the concept of secular realignment—time and group partisanship. At its most basic level, secular realignment is the gradual shifting in the patterns of partisan support by certain groups of voters over the course of a number of election cycles. It is useful to quote Key at length:

> A secular shift in party attachment may be regarded as a movement of the members of a population category from party to party that extends over several presidential elections and appears to be independent of the peculiar factors influencing the vote at individual elections. The category of persons . . . becomes either more or less homogenous in its partisan attachment. A variety of factors operates over time either to solidify the group or erode the ties that unite it politically. (199)

For many years, scholars focused heavily on critical realignment, while secular realignment was largely ignored. Indeed, many works that are now regarded as classics in the study of American politics—Burnham (1970), Campbell et al. (1960), Schattschneider (1960), and Sundquist (1983), to name but a few—elevated the idea of critical realignment to default status as *the* way to understand and explain political change in the American context. But, before long, critics were punching holes in the explanation of change offered by critical realignment, and exposing numerous weakness in the theory overall—Carmines and Stimson (1989), Fiorina (1981), Ladd (1991), and Ladd with Hadley (1975). Indeed, David Mayhew's trenchant critique (2002) calls into question the very utility of the critical realignment concept.

The idea of secular realignment, on the other hand, has fared much better in recent years. As scholars are increasingly pointing out, American politics since the 1950s seems to fit the framework of secular realignment pretty well. As John Petrocik (1981) notes, understanding election outcomes in the United States means understanding the voting patterns of various social groups, and in most cases those patterns develop and evolve over time. Despite their assertions to the contrary, the issue evolution model that Edward Carmines and James Stimson use to explain how the issues of race fundamentally altered American politics beginning in the 1960s closely resembles Key's secular realignment. The same can be said of how cultural issues have affected the American political landscape over the same period.

Most would agree that the United States has not witnessed a critical realignment for quite some time. Yet it is inescapable that group partisan loyalties have changed, new issues have moved to the forefront of American political debate, and the American party system has changed. Key's concept of secular realignment—where "processes operate inexorably, and almost imperceptibly, election after election, to form new party alignments and to build new party groupings"— offers one reasonable mechanism for understanding America's recent political past.

See also *Critical Realignment Theory; Realignment, Partisan.*

. . . .   MARK D. BREWER

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Sedition

Sedition defined in most judicial contexts (as specific countries' laws do vary) is any action, speech, or writing that seeks to undermine a government by a person or group from inside the territory of that government's authority. Often these laws are passed during times of war when threats to a government's authority are a paramount concern to the rulers, but they also have been passed and enforced to eliminate political opponents and quell dissent. It is important to note that the associated offense of treason is similar to sedition in that both are seen as threats to the existent governmental authority; however, treason involves working directly with a government's foreign enemies, and sedition is working for an overthrow from the inside. Of course, these legal boundaries are often not as clear when governments are threatened, and police, prosecutors, and judges blur lines that are clearer during more reasonable times.

So why have governments instituted sedition laws? The simple answer is that they want to protect their power. Inherent to most forms of government is the desire to protect against political forces that are interested in challenging the legitimacy of the present ruling structure. For most of recorded history, governments chose to use direct physical force to prevent dissatisfied persons from speaking out against their governments and rallying others to their causes. So, for example, Roman citizens who thought the emperor was not giving enough grain to the plebs certainly could have walked into the forum and said as much to anyone that would listen. However, it is likely that that person would end up with not much life left to live. Yet, as brutal as rulers have been in the past to those individuals interested in challenging their governments, today's ruling governments often use different means of silencing dissent.

As mentioned, governments have passed many sedition laws during times of crisis as a legal structure for squashing domestic dissent when the country is involved in a conflict with a foreign enemy. Two examples from the United States are relevant to this point. The first comes from the period of World War I (1914–1918) when the United States passed the Sedition Act of 1918 to stamp out dissent among critics of U.S. policy. Many social and political critics of the Wilson administration were prosecuted for their public statements.

Another example is that of a nurse who worked at a veterans hospital in New Mexico. In 2005, Laura Berg criticized the Bush administration's foreign policy in a public letter, and she was investigated by her superiors for possible seditious actions. The investigation was ended after press reports emerged, and it was clear that she was protected by her first amendment right to free speech.

Each of these instances indicate a common thread among most attempts to administer sedition laws in democracies—the difficulty of balancing the right to free speech and the protection of the state from domestic insurrection. This issue is not problematic in overtly totalitarian and authoritarian states, but in countries that claim to allow citizens to express themselves without fear of suppression, retribution, and violence, it is much more difficult to manage. What often happens in such democratic societies is that they revert to authoritarian means of maintaining their power at the time that such action is deemed necessary, and then they may apologize later for such actions after the crisis has long since passed. Governments tend to err on the side of protecting the state from overthrow rather than on the side of protecting free speech that may lead to political revolution and the overturning of the previous political order.

Many countries have similar histories with the problem of sedition. With recent attention turning to antiterrorism in countries around the world, many governments have struggled to achieve the balance of protecting their present political order with a commitment to hearing from all political parties. As history has demonstrated, antiterrorism is but the latest context for this continuing effort to find a political equilibrium between a democratic, responsive government and constant political turmoil.

See also *Freedom of Speech.*

. . . . AARON COOLEY

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Segregation and Desegregation

Though people are naturally inclined to live near others with similar characteristics, for a power or authority to mandate that condition as a tool of discrimination amounts to *segregation*. Segregation results from ignorance, intolerance, and inaction from those who could change the situation. Though many countries separate segments of their population by specific traits, this entry is concerned with how segregation of races occurred in the United States and why that condition changed over time.

AFTER THE CIVIL WAR: RECONSTRUCTION'S PROMISE UNFULFILLED

Following the Civil War (1861–1865), Congress led by a Republican majority passed a plethora of legislation intended to help the transition to freedom for blacks. The Thirteenth Amendment, which outlawed slavery, was successfully proposed by Congress and ratified in 1865 by the states in a single year. That same year, the Freedmen's Bureau was created to furnish food, fuel, and clothing to those who suffered previous servitude. In 1866, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, which conferred citizenship on blacks. The Fourteenth Amendment was proposed by Congress in 1866 to ensure citizenship to those of color; it took two years for the states to ratify that amendment. Congress passed the Reconstruction Act of 1867, which set the terms for the readmittance of Southern states to the Union. One of the latter terms was the requirement of "Negro suffrage" in revised state constitutions, a right successfully gained through ratification of the

Fifteenth Amendment in 1870. In the last major national legislation addressing minority rights during Reconstruction, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 mandated equal access to public accommodations among people of all races.

However, the aforementioned progress in civil rights was mitigated by racist policies within states. For example, a series of "black codes" were enacted that forbade blacks to own property or to give testimony in court in certain instances. Among the most severe of the discriminatory policies against blacks were laws permitting imprisonment for lack of employment. Various methods of preventing black voting rights were employed, including grandfather clauses, poll taxes, literacy tests, white-only primaries, and at-large elections. As if these were not enough, hate groups like the Ku Klux Klan formed to intimidate and frighten minorities. Ultimately, racism turned into murder in stark numbers, with an average of more than 180 blacks lynched annually during the 1890s alone.

PLESSY RULING AND INSTITUTIONALIZED SEGREGATION

Supreme Court rulings dealing with civil rights that were handed down in the last quarter of the nineteenth century were not supportive of progressive civil rights for minorities. In fact, they had the impact of legalizing separation between whites and blacks in the United States. In its 1878 ruling in *Hall v. DeCuir,* a unanimous court struck down Louisiana's law banning racial discrimination by common carriers. Four years later, the court struck down federal laws seeking to punish crimes like murder and assault. The 1883 decision, referred to as Civil Rights Cases, actually declared the 1875 Civil Rights Act unconstitutional. In that ruling, the court held that Congress may legislate on civil rights only if a state passes a discriminatory law and that the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause is silent on racial discrimination by private citizens.

By 1890, most southern states had developed segregated facilities. In that year, Louisiana passed the Separate Car Act, which required separate cars on railroads for blacks and whites. Through a coordinated series of actions, a group of New Orleans citizens challenged the law. After failing at the state court level, they appealed to the Supreme Court. In a seven to one decision, the court upheld the constitutionality of the Louisiana law, basing its ruling on the concept of "separate but equal." The result was institutionalized segregation in most areas of American life for the next half-century. Perhaps one area where this pattern was most apparent is with minority representation in Congress. From 1865 to 1900, twenty-two blacks were elected to Congress. However, that number dwindled to zero in 1900 to 1929 and totaled only seven from 1900 through 1966.

DESTROYING THE "SEPARATE BUT EQUAL" MYTH

Segregation occurred in all areas of American life during the first half of the twentieth century. One area where separate facilities were not equal between the races was in education. Founded in 1909, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) began a coordinated campaign in the 1930s to discredit the "separate but equal" doctrine. In two cases three years apart, the NAACP succeeded in getting the University of Maryland (1935) and the University of Missouri (1938) to admit blacks to their law schools. In a 1947 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Virginia's separate accommodations for blacks and whites on interstate buses were unconstitutional.

As the legal attack against "separate but equal" continued, American society began to recognize the insidiousness of segregation. In 1947, Jackie Robinson became the first African American to play major league baseball. In 1948, President Harry Truman signed an executive order that ended segregation in the U.S. military.

As the 1950s began, a series of court rulings finally broke the back of segregation. Two U.S. Supreme Court rulings in 1950 forced the University of Texas Law School and the University of Oklahoma's doctoral program in education to admit African American students for the first time. After exhausting state appeals, supporters of equal education in Kansas, Delaware, Virginia, and South Carolina filed an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. The court combined the appeals and titled the case *Brown v. Board of Education*.

On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the "separate but equal" doctrine as applied to education was unconstitutional, thus explicitly overturning the *Plessy v. Ferguson* precedent. A year later, in a case titled *Brown v. Board of Education II*, the court unanimously directed school desegregation to proceed with "all deliberate speed." Court-ordered busing, use of National Guard troops, and federal lawsuits were among the tools used to ensure integration orders.

The unanimous rulings in *Brown v. Board of Education* had many positive results. First, they hastened desegregation of education and subsequently of many other areas. In a series of per curium decisions between 1955 and 1958, the Supreme Court invalidated segregation at state parks, beaches, bathhouses, golf courses, and public transportation. Second, the *Brown* rulings gave impetus to the civil rights movement and to mass action by advocates of equality, as the Montgomery bus boycott was initiated the same year that *Brown II* was decided. Third, the *Brown* rulings stimulated landmark federal legislation, which culminated with the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.

See also *Caste System; Civil Rights Movement; Dhimmi; Discrimination; Jim Crow; NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund; Race and Racism; Racial Discrimination; U.S. Politics and Society: African American Political Participation; U.S. Politics and Society: African American Social Movements; White Supremacy.*

. . . . SAMUEL B. HOFF

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Select Committee

Select or *special committees* are temporary committees in the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate that primarily hold hearings and bring attention to emerging issues. Typically, these panels do not have the power to send legislation to the chamber for a vote. Instead they study, investigate, and make recommendations. A few select committees continue from Congress to Congress, but most are established by House or Senate resolution to work temporarily and disband when they complete their appointed task.

Originally, Congress convened temporary committees to consider individual bills. By the 1820s, however, standing committees replaced this function, and select committees began serving the functions they have today.

Usually smaller than their permanent counterparts, select committees supplement the existing committee system. Membership on select committees does not affect other assignments, so legislators can serve without losing coveted positions on permanent panels. Select committees usually focus on a particular hot-button issue or an investigation, a characteristic that often draws media attention and attracts publicity for the panel's members. Titles of high-profile select committees are sometimes abbreviated in news coverage, usually taking on the name of the panel's chair.

Examples include the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities that investigated Watergate (often called the Ervin Committee) and the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming created in 2007.

See also *Standing Committee.*

. . . . AMY E. BLACK

Selectorate

The *selectorate* is the body that selects a political party's candidate or candidates for a general election. The selectorate decides which individuals will become official candidates, while the *electorate* chooses among those designated to determine who wins the general election. The number of people who constitute the selectorate and the inclusiveness of the selectorate vary widely. For example, in *candidate selection* processes for public office, the selectorate can range from a single party leader, who personally designates candidates, to the electorate as a whole in the case of open *primaries*. In between these extremes lies a range of selectorates, including a few party leaders, a larger group of selected or elected party representatives, or all active party members. Inclusive selectorates include the open primaries in some U.S. states, in which all registered voters, regardless of political party affiliation, can participate in the selection of candidates. This contrasts with more exclusive selectorates, common in many long-standing European democracies, where the party organizations, such as party leadership bodies or conventions of selected party activists, choose the candidates. Legal statutes in some countries, such as in the United States, regulate the composition of the selectorate, but more often political party rules, procedures, and norms determine the selectorate.

See also *Candidate Recruitment; Candidate Selection; Primaries; White Primary.*

. . . . BONNIE N. FIELD

Self-determination

Self-determination is a legal or philosophical principle that embodies the right of peoples or nations to choose how they live their collective lives and structure their communities based on their own norms, laws, and cultures. It is the fundamental human right to control or affect one's choices, life, and destiny. According to S. James Anaya (1993), five fundamental characteristics are embodied in self-determination: freedom from discrimination; respect for cultural integrity; social welfare and development; lands and natural resources; and self-government.

External self-determination involves independent statehood, including recognition as a nation under international law, provided that the nation in question has a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capability of entering into relations with other states. *Internal self-determination* includes those rights that support and preserve cultural difference, economic self-sufficiency, and political autonomy, including self-government and various forms of democratic, political, and representative rights. The latter is limited to self-determination *within* states and thus does not require attempts at secession or absolute political independence. However, there is still the potential for conflict in areas of overlapping jurisdictional authority, especially in the context of substate national groups who seek to achieve self-determination.

See also *Autonomy; Democracy; Freedom; Nation; Sovereignty.*

. . . . JENNIFER E. DALTON

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Self-government

Concerning public life, *self-government* is the capacity for a group of people or administrative unit to govern themselves on matters of their jurisdiction without direct interference from other authorities or sources of power. In contemporary societies, *self rule* or *home rule* mainly refers to the wishes of subnational communities to take responsibility on powers that directly affect them, and arguably to improve democratic accountability. The quest for a greater political say in the running of public affairs may impel the communities concerned to claim self-determination and eventual independence, as the decolonization process after World War II (1939–1945) illustrates.

The politics of territorial accommodation seeks to recognize the aspirations of regions and ethnoterritorial entities within larger national states to self-government. Political decentralization is regarded as a response to an expressed desire for self-government on the part of subnational communities. In such cases, political autonomy is thus a means of generating renewed legitimacy and quelling challenges to the state's territorial integrity. Administrative and political decentralization also may have a functional goal from the subnational perspective. Arguments for greater involvement in political decision making by local and regional layers of government concern the maximization of available information for policy makers and a better "tailoring" of public policies according to local needs and citizens' expectations.

See also *Centralization, Deconcentration, and Decentralization; Decolonization; Regions and Regional Governments.*

. . . . LUIS MORENO

Semi-presidential System

Semi-presidential government systems were first defined in contemporary academia by the contributions of Maurice Duverger (1974, 1978, 1980), which were dedicated to the French Fifth Republic. Duverger identified a "dual authority structure, [. . .] a diarchy between a president who is head of state, and a prime minister who heads the government," as described by Giovanni Sartori in 1994. Indeed, as the most relevant variation on the theme of presidential regimes, semi-presidentialism may be defined by three basic features: a president who is popularly elected; the office of the president has *de jure* and *de facto* considerable constitutional authority; and there exists also a prime minister and cabinet, subject to the confidence of the assembly majority.

Consequently, actual working patterns in semi-presidential systems are directly dependent upon the presence or absence of political congruence between the president and parliamentary majority. It can be conceived also as an "alternation of phases" that depends on the contingent political composition of the assembly. In fact, in such systems of government, an elected president who is supported by a cohesive and disciplined majority in parliament will acquire predominance in governmental decision-making. On the contrary, when the opposite case occurs, and the two heads of government are an expression of rival parties, the way is paved for periods of so-called cohabitation. As a result, divergent majorities grant the prime minister a primary role in most legislative arenas, with the general exception of foreign policy.

Despite its complex constitutional architecture, a diffusion of semi-presidential models has proliferated recently, especially in new democracies. According to Matthew Shugart's observations in 2007, twelve of fourteen countries among the postcommunist states that are now democracies are semi-presidential in some form. An additional twelve African cases also can be classified as semi-presidential. Only countries in the Americas seem to privilege pure presidentialism.

In Western countries the prestige of the semi-presidential constitutional model is increasing. The mixed regime format is not universally accepted, however, with scholars such as Juan Linz arguing that "in view of some of the experiences with this type of system it seems dubious to argue that in and by itself it can generate democratic stability" (1994, 55).

The debate on the best form of government is still unsettled. Academic controversy over ideal institutional formats for government has been shaped by the lack of agreement on classificatory criteria and by the varied forms of semi-presidentialism. Matthew Shugart and John Carey in 1992 proposed a further division of the concept into *premier-presidential* and *president-parliamentary* subtypes: Under *premier-presidentialism,* the prime minister and cabinet are exclusively accountable to the parliamentary majority, while under *president-parliamentarism,* the prime minister and cabinet are accountable to both the president and parliamentary majority. Other approaches are more dynamic in that the three most diffused forms of representative government—parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential—are not viewed as mutually exclusive categories. Among adherents of this perspective, Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb (2005) have provided a flexible analytical framework for the study of varieties among and within semi-presidentialisms.

See also *Cohabitation; Constitutional Systems, Comparative; Dual Executive; Presidencialismo.*

. . . . FORTUNATO MUSELLA

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Sentencing Policy

Government response to crime is usually reactive and cyclical. When crime rates increase, responses become more punitive in nature. When crime rates stabilize or decrease, responses become more lenient. Public opinion also influences how

government responds. When victimization rates climb, pressure on lawmakers to "do something" prompts swift action. In liberal democracies, the failure of lawmakers to act quickly to assuage public fear often results in electoral defeat. In some jurisdictions in the United States, citizens have taken matters into their own hands by passing more punitive sentencing laws through the ballot initiative process.

SENTENCES PROMOTING REHABILITATION

In the early twentieth century, advances in psychology, sociology, and the medical sciences prompted social scientists to theorize that perhaps with the right course of treatment, criminal tendencies could be effectively "cured." Accordingly, sentencing policy was revised to emphasize prevention and treatment rather than punishment. Corporal punishment was banned, capital punishment became increasingly rare, and prisons were refashioned as treatment centers rather than places of punishment. Moreover, sentencing laws were altered to expand judicial discretion over the sentencing process. To facilitate effective treatment, judges would base offenders' sentences on their rehabilitation potential rather than the severity of their crimes. Lawmakers also created a system of probation and parole that facilitated individualized treatment plans.

Although many penal systems still emphasize rehabilitation as a sentencing goal, evaluative research in the United States revealed flaws with rehabilitation-only sentencing. First, in many jurisdictions, treatment plans were found to be ineffective at reducing recidivism rates of participants. U.S. government reports revealed that half of the nation's offenders committed new crimes shortly after completing their sentences. Second, academic studies found that judicial discretion led to inequities in sentencing. Often, judges would base their sentences on offenders' demographic characteristics, such as race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status instead of the seriousness of the behavior of offenders. This led many lawmakers to conclude that rehabilitation-oriented policies produced disparate and unjust sentences.

SENTENCES PROMOTING DESERVEDNESS, DETERRENCE, AND INCAPACITATION

As a result of these findings, nearly all of the states in the United States have reformed their penal systems to reflect more traditional penal philosophies of deservedness, deterrence, and incapacitation. Lawmakers replaced indeterminate sentencing laws that gave judges the ability to craft individual sentences with determinate provisions grounded in the principle of deservedness or *just deserts.* Accordingly, criminal sentences are now gradated according to the seriousness of the offense. Yet, not all offenders receive prison sentences. Probation allows first-time nonviolent offenders to remain in the community while under the supervision of the court, and alternative sentences, such as mandatory community service and victim restitution, give judges additional options with nonviolent offenders who pose no discernable public safety

threat. For more serious transgressions, however, offenders are typically sentenced to fixed periods of imprisonment that increase in proportion to the severity of their crimes.

Although just-deserts reforms eliminated some of the sentencing inequalities found in rehabilitation-oriented systems, continuing increases in crime and victimization rates have led lawmakers to adopt utilitarian-based sentences that promote deterrence and incapacitation. Deterrence is based on the premise that people are rational actors and, thus, will behave in a way that maximizes their benefits and minimizes their costs. When the rewards of wrongdoing are high and the cost of crime is low, people are more likely to offend. By increasing the severity of sentences, the cost of crime is thought to exceed the overall value of wrongdoing; consequently, would-be offenders are deterred from breaking the law. Furthermore, lawmakers use deterrence theory to justify specific sentence increases for those who commit crimes with a firearm, those who target children, and those who habitually recidivate.

Additionally, lawmakers have used lengthy prison sentences to incapacitate high-risk offenders. Academic research showing that a small percentage of high-rate offenders commit more than half of all crimes allowed lawmakers to justify policies targeting "career criminals." "Three-strike" laws became popular in the United States in the mid-1990s, and although these policies often are critiqued as being too severe, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently upheld their legality. Recently, other nations have explored similar policies to deal with persistent, high-rate offenders.

In this new penal scheme, judicial discretion has been reduced dramatically; in some cases, it has been eliminated altogether. Mandatory sentences, which are popular with policy makers and citizens alike, restrict the ability of judges to moderate criminal sentences for certain types of crimes. Many mandatory sentencing laws target sex offenders, subjecting them to lengthy periods of imprisonment. Even with longer sentences, recidivism rates remain high, and recent policy innovations, such as satellite monitoring, registration requirements, and residential restrictions, have sought to extend governmental oversight after parole periods have been successfully completed.

See also *Antitrust Policy; Crime Policy; Justice and Injustice; Noncombatant Prisoners; Organized Crime and Mafia; Police Powers; Political Prisoners; Social Order; War Crimes.*

. . . . JENNIFER E. WALSH

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Separation of Powers

See *Checks and Balances; Constitutions and Constitutionalism*.

Sexism

Sexism is discrimination, domination, and oppression based on sex. Both men and women can experience sexism, but sexism against women is more pervasive. The word *sexism* is commonly associated with assumptions about female physical and psychological inferiority and weakness, and male superiority and strength. Sexism can refer to individual attitudes and actions or to sex-based prejudices institutionalized in social structures. Institutionalized sexism often is referred to as *patriarchy.* In varying degrees around the world, sexism against women is evidenced by gender wage gaps, devaluation of women's labor, occupational segregation, violence against women, women's under-representation in positions of political power, women's limited access to education, limitations on reproductive freedom, and unequal legal protections. Referring to sexism as a form of domination and oppression implies a serious problem that needs to be addressed with widespread social change. Referring to sexism as a form of discrimination implies that sexism is a less serious problem that can be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Sexism is a manifestation of social hierarchy based on sex. Sexism is therefore related to other social hierarchies based on categories such as race, ethnicity, and class.

See also *Gender and Politics; Patriarchy; U.S. Politics and Society: Women, Political Participation of; Women, Violence against.*

. . . . CARLY HAYDEN FOSTER

Sex Workers and Trafficking

Human trafficking involves the recruitment, transportation, and harboring of human beings by means of coercion and abduction, primarily for the purposes of sexual exploitation or prostitution. Human trafficking appears to have the strongest detrimental effect on those who are already marginalized: Women and children from impoverished countries. Like the trafficking of other illicit goods, the trafficking of humans is primarily controlled and operated by organized crime groups working at the transnational level.

While many women and children are trafficked for purposes of prostitution, some also are trafficked to be workers in industries such as construction, farming, textiles, or mining. Because these trafficked individuals usually have illegally entered a given country, they are not provided with the same rights that legal immigrants are. This allows those who purchase their services

A student walks past a poster warning women against prostitution and human trafficking. Many women and children are trafficked to provide sexual services, victims of a growing problem around the world.

to avoid paying appropriate wages and to ignore health and safety requirements.

SEX TRAFFICKING

Sex trafficking is one of the most common forms of human trafficking. Beyond prostitution, victims of sex trafficking also may be forced into pornography, sex tourism, the strip trade, the mail-order bride trade, escort services, and other forms of sex work. *Sex work* is, by definition, more than just prostitution; it is any form of work that involves sexual services.

Individuals become victims of sex trafficking through either voluntary or involuntary means. Individuals might voluntarily agree to illegally immigrate to another country in search of a better life for themselves and their families when faced with harsh conditions of war or poverty in their homeland. Once they have been illegally smuggled into a country, the traffickers may exploit the precarious position the illegal immigrants are faced with because they cannot find other sources of income. Or, through forms of coercion such as threats of physical harm or family humiliation, the traffickers might force the illegal immigrants into sex work. In either case, the traffickers draw on the precarious position the illegal immigrants are left in, with little opportunity to make a consistent income and no access to legal services for fear of their own incrimination.

Many women and children also become victims of sex trafficking through involuntary means. In this sense, individuals have not chosen to illegally immigrate, but rather, have been forced to do so. This commonly occurs through debt bondage, whereby an individual or family secures a black market loan through an organized crime group and cannot pay it back at the high rate of interest that is required. To clear the loan, such individuals must offer themselves, spouses, or children in

exchange for the repayment of the debt. Through this, individuals become enslaved as property of the traffickers and can then be smuggled into other countries and forced to work as strippers, escorts, or prostitutes.

GEOGRAPHIC LOCALE

Sex trafficking is known to affect virtually every country in the world. However, the victims of sex trafficking appear to come primarily from impoverished regions of Asia, the former Soviet Union, eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa. The flow of human trafficking appears to be from these impoverished places toward more industrialized regions of the world such as North America, western Europe, and Australia. Once smuggled into these regions, victims of sex trafficking tend to be concentrated in large cities, tourist areas, or near military bases where the demand for sex services appears to be the highest.

It is also common for victims of sex trafficking to be smuggled into regions of the world where the laws surrounding prostitution, or the enforcement of these laws, are not perceived as very harsh, such as Brazil, Thailand, and Amsterdam in the Netherlands. These locations, not restricted to the few listed above, become known as sex tourism destinations. Sex tourism involves the deliberate travel to a destination for the purpose procuring sexual services that are likely not available within one's own country.

CHILD SEX TOURISM

An increasingly common form of sex tourism is child sex tourism. As with sex tourism in general, child sex tourism thrives in regions of the world where legal restrictions surrounding prostitution are underdeveloped and underenforced. Children often are taken from their families in reparation of debts, as a misguided favor to families in extreme financial struggle, or due to the loss of parents through war or the AIDS epidemic. Once separated from their families, the children are then forced into prostitution and pornography as their only means of survival.

In response to human and sex trafficking, many countries have adopted policies and laws to make it increasingly difficult for women and children to be illegally smuggled into countries, as well as restrictions for people traveling to other countries for the purposes of sex tourism. For instance, it is now illegal in the United States for individuals to travel to other countries to engage in child sex tourism; such individuals can be prosecuted in the United States for their actions outside of the country. It is, however, exceedingly difficult to prove that individuals are traveling for these purposes, and thus, few prosecutions have ever been successful.

See also *Children's Rights; Women and Security; Women, Violence against.*

. . . . CURTIS FOGEL

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Shadow Cabinet

The *shadow cabinet* is an alternative slate of would-be government ministers from the main opposition parties in certain Westminster parliamentary systems, which are democratic parliamentary systems modeled after the UK Houses of Parliament. Aside from the United Kingdom, other popular examples of shadow cabinets exist in Australia, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Africa, and Thailand. The shadow ministers of the shadow cabinet serve as the designated spokespersons for their opposition party on specific issues, such as defense, foreign policy, or home affairs, endeavoring to undermine the credibility of the official cabinet ministers by presenting rival policies or viewpoints. Individuals in the shadow cabinet use the unofficial posts to gain experience on national issues and areas of interest while making themselves familiar to the public. The members of the shadow cabinet are typically chosen to serve in the official cabinet should their party win the next election and form the government.

The formation of shadow cabinets is unique to each country and to each party. For instance, in the United Kingdom, the Conservative Party leader chooses the members of the shadow cabinet, while in the Labour Party, the members are elected by their fellow party parliamentarians. The shadow cabinet concept originated in the mid-nineteenth century when former UK cabinet ministers adopted the practice of continuing to meet after their party lost their majority in Parliament. The former cabinet ministers held consultations on party strategy and policy and served as the nucleus of the opposition.

See also *Cabinets and Cabinet Formation; Opposition Politics.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Sharia

Sharia, which literally means "path to a watering place," is the Islamic law based on the principles in the Quran and sunnah that were systematized in 100 to 200 A.H. (700–800 CE) into a legal framework regulating the public and private life of people living under Islamic rule. *Fiqh* (understanding) is the science of Islamic law developed from such sources. Based on the Quran's eighty or so lawmaking verses, sharia's compendia (collected juridical commentaries) embody the legal needs of early Islamic rule and gave rise to five sharia schools (four

Sunni, one Shia), each possessing textual authority in matters of law.

Unlike other legal systems, the scope of sharia is very wide. As the expression of God's will, not only does it organize interpersonal relations among Muslims (e.g., family, inheritance, sexuality) and their relationship to the state (e.g., penal law, foreign policy, jihad), but it also defines their relationship to God and informs their conscience by creating five levels of approved activities: forbidden (*haram*), blameworthy (*makruh*), permissible (*mubah*), praiseworthy (*mustahab*) and mandatory (*wajib*).

As sharia developed, legal scholars discussed the relative merit of reason as an exegetical tool for interpreting Islam's sources with Sunni schools restricting its role more than the Shia school did. Once consolidated, the early process of interpretation gave way to rigidly scholastic legal doctrines based on seemingly infallible source materials and precedents set by classical jurists.

Islamic civilization began to wane in the sixteenth century in response to Western economic and technological superiority. In some Muslim regions in central Asia, North Africa, and the Near East, Western law was imposed following European conquests. Elsewhere in the Ottoman and Persian Empires, attempts were made to modernize the local legal systems by incorporating secular Western elements.

Although Islamic legal theory allows no law but God's, early Islamic rulers had to make concessions to practical needs and the legal customs of the lands they conquered. As such they adopted secular administrative rules (*Qanun*). Although theoretically still subject to examination by religious scholars (*ulema*), they were rarely challenged because the latter often depended on secular rulers for positions. Hence, when secular modernization began in places like Turkey in the 1830s and Persia in the 1850s, it swept the Islamic world.

Nevertheless, a confluence of developments, including decolonization, the conflict in Palestine, and political repression and oil wealth in Arab states, nurtured their grievances, enabling Islamist supporters of sharia to assert themselves in the 1970s. Some took power, as in the case of Iran, while others were co-opted, as in Sudan and Pakistan. In all cases, proponents of sharia tried to re-Islamize the laws of Muslim nations. Although sharia is an international issue and is now sometimes referred to by diaspora communities in the West, the battle for its implementation primarily involves Muslims in Muslim-majority states challenging their more moderate coreligionists, with whom they often share the same urban middle-class background.

See also *Islamic Political Thought; Jihad; Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism; Women in Islamic Nations.*

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Shklar, Judith N.

Judith Nisse Shklar (1928–1992), the first female president of the American Political Science Association (1989) and president of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy (1982), was a leading twentieth-century political theorist and faculty member in the Harvard University Department of Government. Author or editor of eleven books and numerous essays and reviews, Shklar played an important role in the reinvigoration of political theory during the second half of the twentieth century, and more particularly in the articulation of a skeptical version of liberal theory that she called the "liberalism of fear."

Shklar was born in Riga, Latvia, on September 24, 1928, and her family relocated to Canada during World War II (1939–1945), traversing a circuitous route from Riga to Montreal by way of Sweden and Japan that Shklar recounted with grim humor in her autobiographical essay "A Life of Learning" (1996). She received her BA (1949) and MA (1950) degrees from McGill University and her PhD from Harvard (1955), where she taught from 1956 until her death in September 1992.

Shklar wrote that she became interested in political theory to help her make sense of the experiences of the twentieth century. Her work consistently sought a psychologically realistic and robust liberalism that could combat the human propensity for cruelty and vice that she had witnessed in Europe during the war years. Shklar's liberalism of fear was shorn of abstract and ahistorical justifications such as natural rights or rational choice theory. Drawing especially on the thought of French intellectual Michel de Montaigne and French political philosopher Charles-Louis Montesquieu, her approach emphasized the prevention of cruelty rather than the securing of extensive schemes of individual rights. As she claimed in "A Life of Learning," "skepticism, autonomy and legal security for the individual, freedom and the discipline of scientific inquiry . . . are our best hope for a less brutal and irrational world." Such a quest, for Shklar, required not only a clear understanding of the attractions (psychological, moral, political) that cruelty had always held for humans, but also a commitment to historical memory and to listening to the experiences of those who had experienced victimization and injustice.

Shklar's corpus addressed an impressive range of historical, philosophical, and political questions. In addition to articulating and defending her own brand of liberal theory and practice, she authored extensive treatments of Montesquieu, French political and social thinker Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and German philosopher Georg Hegel; a penetrating exploration of political and legal thinking that used the Nuremberg and

Tokyo trials to reflect on the relationship between law, politics, and morals; a compelling revisitation of the conceptual and political foundations of injustice; and two volumes that take up questions of American citizenship, politics, and political thought.

See also *Hegel, Georg W. F.; Liberal Theory; Montaigne, Michel de; Montesquieu, Charles-Louis; Political Theory; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques.*

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Sidgwick, Henry

Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) was a British utilitarian philosopher. His version of utilitarianism, presented in the 1874 *The Methods of Ethics,* built on and amended the work of fellow Victorian philosopher and political theorist John Stuart Mill. The next generation of British thinkers found the sheer moral sincerity of their predecessors an easy target. In his 2004 *Henry Sidgwick, Eye of the Universe: An Intellectual Biography,* Bart Schultz quotes economist John Maynard Keynes as saying that Sidgwick "never did anything but wonder whether Christianity was true and prove it wasn't and hope that it was" (4). It is perhaps fairer to say that Sidgwick was born into a turbulent era of increasing doubt and, like Mill before him, responded to these challenges with both passion and hard thought.

Sidgwick's inner existence was marked by struggle and change, but outwardly he led a quiet life that was spent for the most part within the academy. The greatest drama of this scholarly life was his resignation of his post as a fellow at Trinity College in 1869. He had come to believe that biblical scripture could not stand up to modern scientific scrutiny, and he decided he could no longer endorse the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, acceptance of which was required of the fellows of Cambridge. He nevertheless remained at Cambridge in a specially created position. Two years later, partly due to Sidgwick's resignation, British parliament voted to abolish the religious requirement, and Sidgwick was reinstalled in his position as fellow.

Sidgwick attempted to strengthen utilitarianism as the most promising secular alternative to the eroding religious morality. His most distinctive contributions were methological and metaethical. These innovations are contained in Sidgwick's greatest work, *The Methods of Ethics.* According to Sidgwick, ethics studies what an individual ought to do. A *method of ethics* is a comprehensive, internally consistent standard of moral behavior that answers this question. By definition, one cannot rationally employ more than one method. However, Sidgwick states that the average person does not consciously employ a single method to guide his moral decision-making. Instead, he uses multiple commonsense maxims as guides. Ordinary practical reasoning, thus characterized, is limited and conflicted. Despite its limitations, Sidgwick asserts that this is the place to begin moral philosophy. By critically examining commonsense reasoning, one eventually can uncover what methods do exist.

At first, Sidgwick argues that all genuine methods of ethics belong to one of three categories: egoism, utilitarianism, or intuitionism. The category of egoism consists of the method that directs the agent to pursue his own happiness. This utilitarian method is to act so as to maximize the happiness of humanity as a whole. The third category of intuitionism contains more than one method. Each settles on right actions based on clear moral intuitions. Later in the *Methods of Ethics,* however, Sidgwick complicates this initial classification by stating that utilitarianism and hedonism also each rest on a basic moral intuition. Here he evades a criticism made of John Stuart Mill. Mill's proof of the principle of utility in *Utilitarianism* (1861) was widely viewed as unsuccessful because it argued from a positive fact to a normative principle. By deriving utilitarianism from the moral intuition of "rational benevolence," Sidgwick avoids this particular criticism.

Sidgwick divides ethical questions about political life into two groups. The first set of questions concerns the proper relationship between the individual agent and his political environment. This set includes traditional questions about individual political obligation and belong to ethics proper, according to Sidgwick's definition of it. The second set of questions inquires into the ideal society. Sidgwick calls the discipline that addresses these questions *politics.* He asserts that ethics and politics are related but distinct disciplines. He examines politics, as understood by him, in both his 1883 work *The Principles of Political Economy,* and in his 1891 work *The Elements of Politics.* In these texts, he employs a utilitarian standard, discussing the details of a government whose arrangements maximize the happiness of the community. His contributions to the study of political economy, focusing on socialist interventions into a market system, are especially distinguished.

The immediately following generation of British philosophers tended to denigrate Sidgwick even as they borrowed from him; G. E. Moore is a prominent example. In the second half of the twentieth century, the political philosophy of John Rawls reintroduced Sidgwick to political theorists. An opponent of utilitarianism, Rawls nonetheless championed

Sidgwick as a rigorous thinker and adopted some aspects of his methodology. Since then, the literature on Sidgwick has continued to grow.

See also *British Political Thought; Mill, John Stuart; Rawls, John; Utilitarianism.*

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Sidney, Algernon

Algernon Sidney (1623–1683) was a prominent English statesman and political author during his country's civil war period.

Sidney was born into a prominent family and benefited from a comprehensive liberal education, which was augmented by his father's contacts with philosophers like Hugo Grotius. However, Sidney did not immediately turn to scholarship. He fought for Parliament in the English Civil War (1642–1651) and was then elected to the Long Parliament in 1646. However, he was a foe of influential English soldier and statesman Oliver Cromwell and spent most of the 1650s in political retirement. After the Restoration, Sidney went into voluntary exile.

Sidney's many legal and extralegal attempts to restore the republic culminated in what is known as the Rye House Plot of 1683, a conspiracy that sought to assassinate or overthrow England's King Charles II. The plot failed and Sidney was arrested on charges of treason. He was convicted in a trial infamous for its many violations of legal procedure. Most notably, the prosecution could only produce one of the two required witnesses and used some seized pages of Sidney's *Discourses Concerning Government* (posthumously published in 1698) as the second "witness." Sidney was executed in 1683.

The *Discourses* are not primarily a call to sedition; in fact, the work was composed around the same time as British philosopher John Locke's *Treatises* and is also an attack against English political theorist Sir Robert Filmer. Sidney found Filmer's patriarchalism repugnant and felt it flew in the face of "that universal liberty which God hath given to mankind." Instead he emphasized the human capacity for self-rule and judgment and followed republicans like Florence's Niccolò Machiavelli in asserting a connection between liberty secured through laws and the prosperity of a nation. Sidney placed ultimate authority in the universal law of the common good and rejected Filmer's contention that man is naturally suited to monarchy, suggesting instead,

following the Aristotelian tradition, that mixed and popular governments were generally superior. Sidney also embraced the Machiavellian idea that the best government had to be prepared for war. These sections of the treatise, as well as Sidney's more explicit commendation of revolution, give the *Discourses* a more aggressive tone than Locke's work and, by most accounts, reflect the pugnacious nature of their author.

A manuscript of Sidney's other major work, the *Court Maxims* (1996), was discovered in the 1970s. The *Maxims* are a series of dialogues that amplify the basic principles of the English republican movement. Some critics argue that the piece was propagandistic, while others see it as an "uncompromising text" and an attempt to rally renewed support for the English Parliament against the royalists.

In terms of contemporary scholarship, Sidney is placed in the republican tradition by some authors, whereas others tend to ally him more with natural rights theorists. According to history scholar Caroline Robbins, Sidney's writings and the perceived injustice of his trial made him a hero among the "commonwealthsmen" of the eighteenth century, and he was also an important influence on the American founders.

See also *British Political Thought; Filmer, Sir Robert; Locke, John; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Monarchy; Republicanism.*

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Sieyès, Emmanuel–Joseph

Emmanuel–Joseph Sieyès (1748–1836), better known as the Abbé Sieyès, is the writer of the key text of the French Revolution (1789–1799), *What Is the Third Estate?* (1789). An ungifted orator, Sieyès nonetheless led the fight for radical reform in the name of the French people's national sovereignty, calling for the dissolution of the entire French social and political system, including the Estates General that would meet in 1789 after Parisians stormed the Bastille, a medieval fortress serving as a state prison. Later Sieyès laid the ground for French military leader Napoleon Bonaparte's coup d'état of 1799.

Born into a large family in Fréjus, France, Sieyès acceded to his parents' wishes and spent his youth preparing for the priesthood. In his ten years at a Parisian seminary, he was far more likely to be found studying British political philosopher John Locke, French political scholar Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and writings on political economy than the scholastic writers pushed upon him by his tutors. Sieyès nevertheless entered

the priesthood in 1773. While moving up the church hierarchy, he was named a representative in the Provincial Assembly of Orléans, where he took up the plight of the poor with increased urgency as France's economy faltered in the 1880s. Sieyès made few friends and was ill at ease, in fact, with his social inferiors in the Third Estate (those not members of the nobility or clergy). Tired of the intransigency of the French social order and his inability to effect any change, he made plans to emigrate to America, but these plans were interrupted by the explosion of open political debate in 1788. Sieyès soon made his mark with the publication of two revolutionary pamphlets, but it was his third that pushed him to the front of events in 1789. In *What Is the Third Estate?* he upended the notion of the "nation" as it was thought hitherto in France. Sieyès argued that the Third Estate, rather than the upper classes or the monarchy, was the true French nation upon whose backs the other orders of society rested. The nation should be empowered through the only legitimate form of government, which was for Sieyès a representative legislature. He called for the disbanding of the Estates General, arguing that because the Third Estate represented the whole of the French nation, it could, on its own, form a national assembly, which is exactly what occurred on June 17, 1789. The National Assembly, by Sieyès's account, would represent the interests of "passive citizens," such as the nobility and the poor, who would play no "active" role in political power.

Outflanked by those who called for the destruction of the aristocracy, Sieyès would soon lose political power, returning to prominence only at the end of the Reign of Terror (1793–1794), a period marked by conflicts between rival political groups and mass executions of those opposed to the revolution. After the republican coup of 1797, Sieyès was for a time the president of the Council of Five Hundred, the lower house of the French legislature. In 1799 he became convinced of a need for a strong executive to balance the ineffective councils. Turning to Napoleon to strike the blow necessary to change the constitution, Sieyès inadvertently helped end all hope of a republican government. His power under Napoleon was marginal, and later Sieyès was exiled to Belgium as a regicide upon the return of the monarchy in 1815. He returned to France in 1830, dying six years later, his legacy forever tied to the revolution and the widespread aspiration for national sovereignty his writings helped unleash.

See also *French Political Thought; Representative Systems; Revolutions, Comparative.*

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Simon, Herbert Alexander

Herbert Alexander Simon (1916–2001) was an American psychologist and economist. His research focused on decision making and its implications for social institutions.

Simon, the son of German-Jewish immigrants, was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He attended public school and entered the University of Chicago in 1933 on a full scholarship, earning a BA in 1936 in political science (he majored in political science because he did not wish to take accounting, which was required of economics majors at the university). After graduating from Chicago, he went to work as a researcher for the International City Managers Association (1936–1939) and then moved to the Bureau of the Public Administration at the University of California-Berkeley (1939–1942). In 1942 he joined the political science department at the Illinois Institute of Technology, teaching there until 1949 and serving as department chair from 1946 to 1949. In 1943 he won his doctorate in political science from the University of Chicago. At Chicago, he studied under Harold Lasswell and Charles Edward Merriam.

In 1949 Simon joined the faculty of the Carnegie Institute of Technology (since 1967 the Carnegie Mellon University) and would remain there for the rest of his academic career. At Carnegie, he was Professor of Administration (1949–1967) and the Richard King Mellon University Professor of Computer Science and Psychology (1967–2001).

Simon made contributions to a number of fields. He was an early proponent of computer artificial intelligence, creating with computer scientist Allen Newell what they called a "thinking machine" in 1955. In economics, Simon argued that the theory of *economic man,* which contends that individuals make rational economic decisions that maximize personal benefits, failed to account for the uncertainty of human action. His research on decision making by business executives, published in *Administrative Behavior* (1947), led him to conclude that business leaders failed to maximize profits because they made decisions without assessing all information and long-term effects. He argued that the complexities of the modern world meant that individuals could not process or even obtain all the information they needed to make decisions. Instead, they try to make decisions that are merely good enough. He called this approach *bounded rationality.* Instead of economic man, Simon suggested that *administrative man* attempts to find courses of action that are satisfactory. His work also had an influence on the study of decision making in the public sector. In psychology, he was a leader of the cognitive revolution in the 1960s as scientists began using computer models to study human thought processes.

In 1978 Simon won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. In the citation, the Swedish Academy of Sciences proclaimed that "modern business economics and administrative research are largely based on Simon's ideas." He also won the A.M. Turing Award for his work in computer

science (1975), the National Medal of Science (1986), and the American Psychological Association's award for outstanding lifetime contributions to the field (1993).

See also *Economic Theories of the State; Lasswell, Harold Dwight; Merriam, Charles E.; Political Theory.*

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Simulation

Simulations comprise a methodology that can assist researchers investigating the interplay between multiple *agents* and a simulated *environment*. Both individual agents and their synthesized environment are artificial.

Simulated agents imitate the natural appearances or behaviors that are important to a researcher. The programmed characteristics of agents include rules, goals, and allowed adaptations within the environment. Similarly, the programmed environment includes any variations and constraints important to a researcher.

In political science, simulations add value in two ways. First, *confirmatory simulations* can test theories by contrasting predictions with observations of actual phenomena.

Second, *exploratory simulations* can extend existing knowledge by observing simulated results obtained from past data or known relationships between agents and their environment. When simulating phenomena, a researcher must balance between parsimony and fidelity. Increased simulation fidelity often is associated with increased complexity. Simulations should focus on high fidelity specific to the important elements of a research investigation.

Simulations serve as explanatory and predictive tools for political scientists, benefiting both theoretical and policy-related inquiries. Confirmatory simulations can (1) define individual agent goals and compare emergent, group-level behaviors against empirical observations or (2) define group-level goals and compare emergent, individual behaviors against empirical observations. Exploratory simulations can employ knowledge of past data, agent behaviors, group goals, or environmental constraints to make predictions regarding future interventions or policies.

See also *Experimental Design.*

. . . . DAVID A. BRAY

Simultaneous Equation Modeling

Simultaneous equation models (SEMs) are useful for testing hypotheses involving complex causal ordering, which are common to research questions in political science and public policy. SEM examples include instrumental variables, two-stage least squares, and seemingly unrelated regression models.

A classic example of complex causal ordering is the impact of policing on crime rates. A larger police force may indeed lead to a reduction in crime. However, a reverse causal order is equally plausible; for example, an increase in the crime rate may lead to the hiring of more police. Another example is the estimation of campaign contributions (*X*; predictor) on votes received (*Y*; outcome). In this case, both campaign contributions and votes may be influenced by how voters feel about the challenger, essentially both *X* and *Y* are effected by yet another variable. When a predictor is a function of other variables in the system, it is not truly independent or *exogenous*. We refer to these dependent variables as *endogenous* and they are problematic because they are likely to be correlated with the error term. *Ordinary least squares (OLS)* regression will produce a biased estimator unless we untangle the system of equations. However, simultaneous equation models remove the bias that would result from an OLS approach.

A common SEM technique employs an instrumental variable with *two-stage least squares (2SLS)*. This involves isolating the variation in the endogenous variable that is problematic (correlated with the error) from the part of the variation that is not problematic (uncorrelated with the error). In the first stage of the process, *X* is decomposed to obtain the component that can be predicted by an instrument and the problematic component. Then the predicted value of *X* from the stage 1 regression is used to estimate the effect on *Y*.

Consider the example of the impact of policing on crime rates given above. Some researchers have pointed out police forces tend to increase in election years; since election years are predetermined (exogenous) they may be the source of a good instrument. Applying a 2SLS, in stage 1 we would isolate the police force new hires that can be predicted by the election cycle, which we assume are uncorrelated with the error. In stage 2 we would use the predicted values of *Y* (police) from the first stage regression to estimate the effect on crime. To specify:

$$\textit{Stage 1: } \text{police}_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{ election}_i + \infty_i$$
$$\textit{Stage 2: } \text{crime}_i = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{ police-hat}_i + \nu_i$$

As is probably evident by now, the challenge with 2SLS is finding a good instrument, a variable that is correlated with the endogenous regressor but not correlated with the error term. The good news is that most basic econometric textbooks discuss statistical tests for instrument validity and the

logic behind them. Popular statistical software packages are also indispensable tools for analyses.

See also *Bayesian Analysis; Computational Modeling; Correlation; Inference; Linear Model; Logistic Regression; Parametric Statistical Model; Partial Least Squares; Quantitative Analysis; Regression with Categorical Data; Reliability and Validity Assessment; Statistical Analysis; Time-series Analysis.*

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Singer, J. David

J. (Joel) David Singer (1925–2009) was one of the foremost scholars of world politics of the twentieth century. His creation of the Correlates of War Project was instrumental in shifting the study of international relations from the reliance on historical analyses toward the use of quantitative or scientific research methodologies.

Born in Brooklyn on December 7, 1925, Singer grew up with what he later admitted was a rather romanticized view of war. German anti-Semitism and anti-Japanese propaganda contributed to his decision to enlist in the U.S. Navy on December 7, 1942 (a year after Pearl Harbor). Though he left the service in 1946, he returned for a second tour of duty during the Korean War (1950–1953). Thereafter, he resumed graduate studies at New York University, earning his doctorate in 1956. Singer then began his teaching career with a two-year stint at Vassar College.

At this stage in his career, Singer considered himself to be a "policy wonk, but a public dove." He focused on deterrence policy, but challenged the prevailing positions concerning nuclear disarmament, as in his testimony before Senator

Hubert Humphrey's subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations in 1956. He subsequently spent a yearlong Ford Fellowship at Harvard University, where he met conflict resolution expert Kenneth Boulding, who successfully persuaded Singer to come to the University of Michigan.

In 1959, Singer spent a year at the Naval War College, where he completed *Deterrence, Arms Control, and Disarmament,* which several publishers rejected due to its dovish stance. Singer then returned to the University of Michigan with positions at the Mental Health Research Institute and later the political science department. Singer's policy work had convinced him of the need for a more rigorous and scientific study of world politics, and, with the support of Karl Deutsch, he created the Correlates of War Project (COW) in 1963 with the hope of understanding war so that it could be ended and prevented. Singer also continued his activities as a public dove, speaking out against the cold war and the Vietnam War (1959–1975) and becoming involved in the Caucus for a New Political Science, which promoted a more activist and critical role for those in academia.

The Correlates of War Project has become one of the longest-running and most influential research projects in world politics. The project launched a quantitative study of war, and Singer, along with project historian Melvin Small, published two groundbreaking analyses of war: *The Wages of War, 1816–1965* in 1972 and *Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 1816–1980* in 1982. The project has continued to expand, gathering data on a number of elements that are related to war, including system membership, capabilities, alliances, diplomatic ties, intergovernmental organizations, and conflict short of war (militarized interstate disputes). Its impact is seen not only in the numerous books and articles that Singer published individually and with COW colleagues, but also in the plethora of other data-gathering projects that COW has spawned. In recognition of his contributions, Singer was elected president of the Peace Research Society (International) and president of the International Studies Association.

See also *International Relations Theory; Peace; Quantitative Analysis.*

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Skinner, Burrhus Frederic

Burrhus Frederic (B. F.) Skinner (1904–1990) received notoriety for his work in behavioral psychology. In *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (1971), he claimed that human beings are shaped by their environmental conditions. The soul, free will, or "autonomous man," he insisted, does not exist except in outdated theories of philosophy, politics, and religion, and if freedom or democratic principles require the support of such theories, so much the worse for them. To reject a scientifically "designed culture" meant surrendering society's future to political leaders who use crude, unscientific methods of behavioral control for their own selfish purposes. Although critics charged that his "science of social engineering" robbed human beings of both their dignity and rationality, Skinner never abandoned his belief in the saving powers of a behavioral science.

Skinner was born in the small Pennsylvania railroad town of Susquehanna on March 20, 1904. He attended Hamilton College, a small liberal arts school in New York. The poet Robert Frost read Skinner's unpublished work and encouraged him to become a writer. However, Skinner decided to abandon a literary career, having been drawn to modern philosophy and psychology through the writings of Bertrand Russell, John B. Watson, and H. G. Wells. Skinner enrolled in the psychology department at Harvard University, completing his master's degree in 1930 and his doctorate a year later.

Skinner spent most of his academic career at Harvard. There he conducted laboratory experiments using rats and pigeons to test his theories on behavioral control. He developed the *Skinner Box* that taught pigeons to play ping-pong by rewarding them with food. He thought that the same principles of environmental conditioning could be applied to human beings. His Skinner Box later became confused with his invention in the 1940s of the "baby box"—or, as he called it, the "baby tender"—designed to provide a safe, air-regulated sleeping box for infants. Some viewed his baby box as cold and inhuman, while others thought it was ingenious. It provided the kind of environmental control that Skinner envisioned for improving society in general, although the techniques when applied to adult behavior would be more subtle and complex.

To create a world free of overpopulation, pollution, the threat of nuclear war, and social strife, Skinner continued defending the development and use of behavioral technology. In his utopian novel, *Walden Two* (1948), he described a tightly organized, peaceful community where envy, jealousy, laziness, and other human vices had ceased to exist because the social environment no longer rewarded such behavior. As Frazier, the fictional designer explains, "a constant experimental attitude towards everything," whether it's child rearing, work, or the creative use of leisure, ensures that everyone is industrious, content, and cooperative. Many psychologists and nonpsychologists considered Skinner's utopian vision naïve, if not dangerous. Although he recognized the dangers of science being misused, Skinner never doubted the social benefits of behavioral control undertaken by scientifically trained men of good will.

Skinner retired from Harvard University in 1974 and was honored for his work by the American Psychological Association just prior to his death on August 18, 1990.

See also *Political Philosophy.*

. . . . RAMONA JUNE GREY

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Slavery

The practice of slavery has occurred in many civilizations throughout human history and was caused by social stratification, economic factors, and high population density. Perhaps most noteworthy of places it occurred were ancient Egypt, China, India, Greece, and the Roman Empire. During the Roman Empire alone, it is estimated that one hundred million people were captured or sold as slaves.

Slavery developed in many ways, including as a means of repaying debts, as punishment for crime, as treatment of prisoners of war, and due to child abandonment. But the trading of slaves for what would be intended as cheap labor is what led to its popularity in North America.

SLAVERY'S RISE AND DECLINE IN AMERICA

Slavery began in the American colonies with the first black indentured servants sent to Jamestown, Virginia, in 1619. Transatlantic slave trade began in 1637, and by 1641, colonies under British rule began to sanction slavery by law.

During the 1700s, slavery expanded significantly in the American colonies and states. Major slave revolts occurred in New York in 1712 and in South Carolina in 1739. Though some blacks who fought for the Americans in the revolution against England were freed, the number of those who were enslaved far outnumbered them. Just as Massachusetts became the first state to ban slavery in 1780, the Articles of Confederation, which established the first national government, contained no legal recognition of slavery.

Despite the efforts of abolitionist groups and laws such as the 1787 Northwest Ordinance, which banned slavery in the territories of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, the U.S. Constitution legalized slavery in at least three ways without specifically mentioning the practice. For one, each slave counted as three-fifths of a person for the purpose of determining a state's taxation and representation. Second, the importation of slaves was permitted to occur until 1808. Third,

slaves were included in criminal extradition provisions so as to protect the property rights of slaveholders.

According to the 1790 census, there were approximately 757,000 blacks in the United States, of whom 92 percent, or 697,000, were still enslaved. The number of those enslaved increased to 1.2 million in 1810, 2.0 million in 1830, 3.2 million in 1850, and just under four million in 1860.

The plantation system and its reliance on manual labor received a boom in 1793 with the invention of the cotton gin by Eli Whitney. Previously, tobacco and rice had been the most profitable items to grow among states in the South, but with the cotton gin, cotton production reached forty million pounds (eighteen million kilograms) in 1800, and the output would double in each of the following decades. Cotton became among the chief exports of the United States in first half of the nineteenth century.

In 1793, Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Act, which required the federal government to assist in the return of runaway slaves. In 1808, Congress officially banned the importation of slaves from abroad. However, that action resulted in a concomitant increase of domestic slave trade.

Because Congress was balanced between slave and free states, the acquisition of new states precipitated debate over the their status. The War of 1812 verified the viability of the United States and led to expansion of the west and south, and seven states joined the Union between 1812 and 1821. In the Missouri Compromise of 1820, it was agreed that Maine would enter the Union as free state and Missouri as a slave state, with slavery prohibited in the balance of the Louisiana Territory.

After the war between Mexico and the United States, the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo was signed in 1848. This treaty recognized the Rio Grande as the southern boundary of the United States; ceded parts of present-day Colorado, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and California; and exchanged monetary payments for claims. The takeover of the aforementioned territory, combined with the discovery of gold in California, hastened the need to determine the status of newly admitted states, of which there were five between 1845 and 1850. In the Compromise of 1850, California was admitted as a free state and Texas's status was changed to a slave state. This law also abolished the slave trade in the District of Columbia, guaranteed popular sovereignty in New Mexico and Utah, and strengthened fugitive slave law features. Four years later, the Kansas-Nebraska Act repealed the Missouri Compromise of 1820 by permitting popular sovereignty on slavery in areas comprising the unorganized Louisiana Territory.

Judicial rulings during the antebellum period supported the continuation of slavery, and an 1842 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act. In the 1857 *Dred Scott v. Sanford* ruling, the Supreme Court held that Congress did not have the authority to ban slavery in the states and that slaves were property rather than citizens.

Opposition to slavery during the 1800s took many forms. Major slave revolts occurred in 1822, 1831, and 1859. Legislation like the 1846 Wilmot Proviso opposed the expansion of slavery. Antislavery literature such as 1852's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* proved enormously beneficial to the abolitionist cause.

THE CIVIL WAR AND THE GLOBAL LEGACY OF SLAVERY

After the election of Republican candidate Abraham Lincoln in 1860, seven southern states seceded from the United States; four others followed shortly thereafter. These states established the Confederate States of America, which supported slavery and which declared war on the United States. After several versions were proposed, the Lincoln administration issued the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863, freeing those enslaved in rebel states. The Union prevailed in a war that killed six hundred thousand Americans in both the North and South. In rapid succession, three constitutional amendments were ratified: the Thirteenth Amendment, which outlawed slavery; the Fourteenth Amendment, which provided citizenship to those in previous servitude; and the Fifteenth Amendment, which furnished the right to vote to males who were previously enslaved. It would take another century before full citizenship and voting rights were enjoyed by African Americans in the United States.

Just as the eradication of slavery in most of the British Empire pursuant to an 1833 law may have impacted the direction of American slavery, so the result of the Civil War (1861–1865) influenced the practice of slavery for the rest of the nineteenth century. For instance, Portugal stopped slavery in its African colonies in 1869; slavery was abolished in Puerto Rico in 1873 and in Cuba in 1886; and Brazil and Korea ceased slavery in 1888 and 1894, respectively. The last nation to eliminate slavery during the twentieth century was Mauritania in 1981. Though illegal as a practice, slavery continues in many countries.

See also *Citizenship; Human Rights; Migration; Race and Racism; Racial Discrimination; Segregation and Desegregation; Sex Workers and Trafficking; U.S. Politics and Society: African American Political Participation; U.S. Politics and Society: African American Social Movements.*

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Small–*n* and Case Study

Small–*n* and case studies are two methods of qualitative research used in political science and other social sciences. Small–*n* studies (with *n* referring to the number of subjects or cases in a study) are the opposite of large–*N* quantitative projects that involve significant amounts of data or observations.

Central to small-*n* studies is the idea that by only using a limited number of subjects or cases, a researcher can develop a much more detailed and nuanced set of information. Consequently, researchers may be better able to identify casual relationships, such as *if A, then B.* One major problem of small-*n* studies is their limited ability to account for all variables that led to a particular outcome.

A case study is a comprehensive analysis of an individual, group, model, or historical period (small-n studies can be case studies). Case studies do not necessarily seek to develop broad general theories, but instead present casual relationships that exist under a specific set of circumstances that may or may not be replicable elsewhere. Some case studies, generally known as *deviant* or *extreme,* seek to explain why some cases do not conform to expected norms, while others, known as *paradigmatic* do allow researchers to develop generalizations about cause and effect.

See also *Case Studies; Qualitative Analysis; Qualitative Methodologies.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Smith, Adam

Known as the father of classical economics, Scottish economist and rhetorician Adam Smith (1723–1790) was one of the two leading lights of the Scottish Enlightenment. The other was his close friend, David Hume. Smith is best remembered today for his groundbreaking work, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,* published in 1776, the same year the American colonies declared their independence from Britain.

Wealth of Nations was written as a criticism of mercantilism, the predominant economic thought of the day. Government policy under mercantilism was based on the theory that governments benefited from advancing the interests of capitalists through protective laws and tariffs. Smith, however, declared that the interests of nations were best served by allowing the market to seek its own equilibrium. Although Smith used the term *invisible hand* only three times, he is best remembered for this description of the foundation of classical economic theory. Specialization was also a major element of Smith's theory, and he argued that both the market and government benefited from more productive workers who earned higher wages.

As a professor of logic, metaphysics, rhetoric, literature, and moral philosophy (including economics, ethics, theology, and law) at the University of Glasgow, Smith honed the ideas that were articulated in his works. In 1759 he published *The Theory of Moral Sentiments,* receiving accolades from noted writers and thinkers. Smith used *Moral Sentiments* as a vehicle for examining human nature, concluding that morals allow human beings to live together peacefully. He identified self-control, prudence, justice, and beneficence (sympathy) as the four guiding virtues for humankind. A number of scholars have criticized Smith for perceived inconsistencies in *Wealth of Nations* and *Moral Sentiments.* This so-called Adam Smith Problem is based on the notion that Smith's views on self-interest in the former are incompatible with his views of sympathy in the latter.

In 1766 Smith compiled his university lectures into *Lectures on Jurisprudence,* presenting his views on justice, the history of law and government, legal authority, and taxes. That same year, he spent time at the British Coffee House in London, interacting with noted British writers. Smith also met Benjamin Franklin, who read an early draft of *Wealth of Nations.* Smith was ultimately responsible for the decline of mercantilism and for the rise of classical economics in Europe. He was read widely in the United States, and, in addition to Franklin, his supporters included statesmen John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and James Monroe.

Before Smith's death in 1790, he asked his literary executors to burn all unfinished works, which included a revised edition of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* and a history of literature and philosophy. *Essays on Philosophical Subjects,* covering a range of topics, was published in 1796. During the worldwide depression of the 1930s and World War II (1939–1945), the influence of Smith's economic theories declined. However, they were restored to favor in the 1980s by conservative economists such as Milton Friedman of the Chicago School of Economics and were instrumental in the development of government policies under President Ronald Reagan in the United States and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain.

See also *Economic Systems, Comparative; Mercantilism; Scottish Enlightenment.*

. . . . ELIZABETH RHOLETTER PURDY

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Social and Political Cognition

Social cognition is the study of how people make sense of other people and themselves. As an area of study, social cognition relates directly to the study of attitudes, persuasion, stereotyping, and small group behavior. *Political cognition,* a subset of social cognition, is the study of how people make sense of the political world.

Political cognition research arose out of discontent with attitudinal studies of political behavior in the 1970s. Early studies in political cognition made wide use of schema theory (a schema can be thought of as a mental structure that

represents some aspect of the world). One widely adopted schematic model of political cognition argued that people made sense of the political world by using pyramidal classification systems in which "big picture" ideas, such as liberalism or conservatism, were most influential in the evaluation of a political object, while "smaller" ideas, such as general feelings toward a group, candidate, or policy, refined attitudes. Further, this research argued that one could operate with several schemas that were not tightly connected. The nature of the stimulus object could direct an individual to use one schema or another in order to make sense of the object.

As the body of research grew, scholars were forced to move beyond schema theory in order to make meaningful advances in our understanding of social and political cognition. Memory-based models and online models of political cognition grew to popularity because of their ability to account for irregularities in individuals' expressed attitudes. Memory-based models posit that, when asked to express an opinion, individuals scan their memory banks for relevant information, then integrate the given information to form an opinion. Because people cannot possibly remember all relevant pieces of information, a theory developed that argued people sampled only relevant information. Opinions seem inconsistent to the extent that different pieces of information are salient, and sampled, at different times.

Online models, unlike memory-based models, argue that people do not remember each piece of information. Rather, people evaluate a given piece of information as it pertains to a political object, decide whether it supports or opposes their current opinions, and update their opinions accordingly. Upon updating their tally, people may then forget specifics regarding processed information. Online models allow for both opinion change and for meaningful opinions to exist even though it may be the case that people cannot explicate why they feel the way they do about a given topic.

It is not clear which type of model, online or memory-based, provides the most accurate description of how people think about politics. On one hand, research suggests that political sophisticates tend to engage in online processing while those with less political sophistication tend to use memory-based processing. Further, it may be the case that people use different methods of processing information to analyze different political objects. For example, studies indicate people use online processing for candidate evaluation and memory-based processing for survey response.

Recent research considers the impact of values, elite behavior, institutions, social identities, and social networks on political cognition. While it is clear that research has made considerable strides in understanding peoples' thought processes, there is still much to be discovered.

See also *Cognitive Theory and Politics; Framing and Public Opinion; Ideologies, Political; Neuroscience and Politics; Political Attitudes and Behavior; Public Opinion; Survey Techniques and Design.*

. . . .   DAVID CIUK AND KURT PYLE

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Social Capital

Why do some communities function well, while others do not? The concept of social capital recently flourished in political and social sciences, because it provides an explanation for prosperous and democratic social development.

The definition of social capital is somewhat ambiguous, but an accepted definition is that it is the connections among individuals, the social networks and norms of reciprocity and trust that arise from them. It is sometimes referred to as the glue that holds society together and related to social cohesion in general. We might ask: Why use the term *capital*? It is used frequently in social science to refer to properties that can be reproduced or augmented and represent an investment of some kind. Hence, social capital, like financial capital or human capital, represents a resource, in this case one held by social groups or within social networks. Social capital offers access to resources and valued collective outcomes that would be unattainable or too costly for individuals to access. An example would be that of blood donation, whereby individuals freely donate their blood, which then becomes a collective asset for the community.

The three main proponents of the term bring us slightly different definitions and functions of social capital. Pierre Bourdieu (1986) argued that social capital was a resource that people could draw on in their social networks. He identified a range of capitals (cultural, symbolic, economic) that formed part of an individual's resources. However, he was concerned with how these resources were used to maintain systems of inequality and exclusion rather than to promote the public good.

James Coleman (1988), on the other hand, used social capital to explain why some children were less likely to drop out of school—the relationship between human and social capital. In his analysis, public participation and social networks reinforced social norms of achievement in families and communities.

Robert Putnam and colleagues (1993) carried out the most comprehensive survey of social capital, using the term to explain the differences in development between northern and southern Italy. He argued that it was the tradition of civic associations in northern Italy that had helped it become more democratic and prosperous than the south. Putnam (2000) went on to apply these ideas to the United States, arguing that social capital had declined in that country due to generational

changes, increased labor force participation, passive entertainment such as watching TV, and urban sprawl.

COMPONENTS

The components of social capital that emerge from these different perspectives include social resources provided through civic participation, social networks, and the social trust that is built up from these activities. Civic participation is measured often in terms of membership and participation in voluntary associations, although this does not entirely capture social capital. For example, public engagement can take place without joining associations. It is easy enough to simply subscribe to an association, but Putnam, for example, argues that social capital can only be built by face-to-face activity, so subscriptions are not enough.

Social networks are more difficult to measure, but Nan Lin (2001) assesses the role of social networks in building social capital. He argues that they are based on ongoing reciprocal relationships that can be used by individuals to promote their own goals and that they help to secure reputations. Like economic capital, they can form a basis of exchange and reciprocity. They also can form a source of economic capital in situations where people cannot turn to banks (for example, in migrant communities). However, this individualistic and instrumental view of social networks is contested by those who argue that the reason that social capital leads to good social relationships is because they are based on altruistic ties of friendship or contribution to the community, which is in itself a social resource.

Social networks operate in different ways, and some have argued that loose social networks are more useful than tight social networks for getting a job, for example. This has lead Putnam to identify two types of social capital: *bridging* social capital that links disparate social groups and *bonding* social capital based on dense and close ties among smaller groups. Woolcock (1998) has introduced the idea of *linking* social capital, which brings together social groups not normally in touch with each other, such as across religious divides. While bridging social capital can be good for creating social cohesion, bonding social capital helps to build up the dense networks of trust and reciprocity. However, it has the danger of becoming exclusionary and monopolizing resources, as in the example of mafia-type organizations based on strong internal loyalty. Too much bonding social capital also can be destructive for social development.

Trust is both an outcome and a component of social capital because without trust, social networks cannot operate. While trust may be seen in a purely personal dimension, social capital is measured often in terms of *social trust* with people responding to the question as to whether other people can generally be trusted. High trust societies tend to be high in social capital because economic and political institutions are based on shared norms.

THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

Has social capital recently declined? Putnam (2000) marshals impressive evidence that it has declined in the United States and that this poses a threat to the development of American society. In Europe it is possible that social capital may have declined due to the ongoing shrinkage in trade union and church membership as well as for similar reasons as in the United States. However, recent empirical analysis suggests that membership of civic associations has remained stable in Europe (even if it remains low in southern and eastern Europe) and that social trust has actually increased in recent decades. Social networks are thriving in some countries, especially those with strong welfare states, but take different forms in different regions. For example, in southern Europe family networks may be more important as a source of social cohesion than in the north.

Many have argued that in the era of electronic communications and the *network society,* people are less inclined to join organizations in the traditional way or to meet their friends face-to-face. Instead there has been an explosion of electronic networking activities as well as electronic mobilization, for example, through support of various causes, calls for participation, or petitions. Electronic communications have collapsed the space between the public and their leaders, as well as created new arenas for public debate. Therefore, the nature of social capital has changed also, but there is no agreement as to whether electronic communications have actually replaced the kinds of social capital described earlier.

Social capital is seen has having many benefits for the society, and various researchers have claimed that it is associated with economic growth, more democracy, less crime, better health, better educational performance, getting a job, and a better welfare state. For this reason it has been of great interest to policy makers, and the World Bank has been a champion of the promotion of social capital in international development. Other international organizations and national and local governments have applied these ideas in a variety of ways. Social capital is seen as a tool for building a well-functioning community.

See also *Communitarianism; Community; Network Society.*

. . . .   CLAIRE WALLACE

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Social Choice Theory

Social choice theory is as old as ancient Greek times. Social decisions, involving "diverse interests" and "concerns," were explored by Aristotle and Kautilya around the fourth century BCE. It grew into a systematic theory around the time of the French Revolution (1789–1799). The intellectual climate during the European Enlightenment provided the necessary boost to the "reasoned construction of social order." The subject of social choice was pioneered by the French mathematicians in the late eighteenth century, such as J. C. Borda (1781) and Marquis de Condorcet (1785). Some of the early social choice theorists were also the "intellectual leaders" of the French Revolution, as observed by Amartya Sen in 1998.

Social choice refers to judgments about the society, such as social welfare, public interest, or aggregate poverty, in view of available diversity of preferences, concerns, and predicaments of different individualizers within a society. It became popular in the context of welfare economics. It focused more on distributional justice than on utilitarianism. Social choice theory has broad relevance, including judgment about the well-being of the society as a whole; measurement of aggregate poverty; rights and liberties of persons; and social valuation of public goods, such as the natural environment.

The discipline of social choice was revived in the twentieth century by Kenneth J. Arrow. His book *Social Choice and Individual Values* (1951) became very popular for his "impossible theorem." Arrow argued that even the mild conditions of reasonableness could be satisfied on the basis of social choice theory. To him, only dictatorship could deal with the inconsistencies involved, sacrificing "participatory decisions in politics" and "by being insensitive to heterogeneous interests of a diverse population" in welfare economics. In the eighteenth century, it was believed that social appraisals, welfare economic calculations, or evaluative statistics could only be "arbitrary" or "irremediably despotic" (Sen 1998, 181). Arrow's impossibility theorem drew a major response and had a devastating effect on welfare economics as a discipline.

AS A NEGATION OF UTILITARIANISM

Traditional welfare economics was developed by utilitarian economists, such as Francis T. Edgeworth, Alfred Marshall, and Arthur C. Pigou. Their approach was different from vote-oriented social choice theory and garnered inspiration from the philosopher Jeremy Bentham. Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill pioneered the utilitarian theory based on judgments about the social interests by "aggregating the personal interests of different individuals in the form of their respective utilities" (Sen 1998, 182).

Bentham's concern was more with the "total utility" of the community. Utilitarianism served as the backbone of welfare economics, pursuing maximum benefit for the collective whole, irrespective of individual gains or losses. He neglected distributional issues and came under criticism by authors such as John Rawls (1971) and Lionel Robbins (1938). They found the logic of utilitarian welfare defective and without any scientific basis. While Rawls rejected it on the basis of lack of concern for social justice, Robbins rejected it on the grounds that there could be "no common denominator of feelings" (636). From the 1940s onward, the focus shifted to Pareto efficiency (optimum gains). Arrow had demonstrated that Pareto efficiency, "nondictatorship," and "social choice with a complete ordering" could not be achieved simultaneously. Nor could a purely mathematical or formal approach be relied upon.

Contemporary social choice must deal with real-world problems and cannot ignore any conceivable cluster of individual preferences. Some preferences are bound to result in inconsistencies and incoherence in social decisions. When one prefers increasing one's own share without bothering about others, then the majority rule is bound to be "inconsistent." Voting may be considered as a viable choice for general elections, referendums, or committee decisions, but it may not reflect actual choice due to manipulation by the leaders, political parties, or media. It cannot help in arriving at some aggregative index of social welfare (Sen 1998).

There can be two obvious reasons. Voting requires active participation, and the opinion of someone who decides not to participate may not get any representation in social decisions. Additionally, even if one decides to participate in the voting process, there is no direct method of getting interpersonal comparisons on the basis of voting data. Because we cannot arrive at any meaningful interpersonal comparisons on the basis of choices made through voting, it is necessary to reject the consensus arrived at through voting systems in laying the foundation of a constructive social choice theory.

IN ECONOMIC THEORY

Economic theory draws on law and philosophy in evaluating rational decision-making. In economics, the focus is usually on maximization of utility, whereas under law an opinion may be based on shared understanding without any comprehensible reasons for which a shared understanding would lead to a shared preference. The same applies to majority voting behavior. The individual members of the decisive majority need not share the same reasons for voting or making social choices in a particular way. It is like saying that one wants to buy a white car because it is a sports car or just because it is a white car and vice versa.

According to Richard McKelvey (1976), an individual may make choices on the basis of one decisive dimension, making it difficult to organize rationally the different or plural dimensions of social choice. Two parties might form a coalition and say, "given a sports car, we would like to have it black." An

alternative pairing can form another coalition and say, "given that it is white, we would like to have a sports car." Hence coalitions can stick to generic preferences without any stable or rational basis. Much remains unresolved, yet we find adherence to common understanding of doing a thing in a particular way. It makes it rational for players to achieve certain shared goals. Such shared understanding comes through effective communication, accessibility, and intersubjectivity. Public reason can lead to collective action and social choices, though not necessarily on utilitarian basis.

As such, interpersonal comparisons of utility cannot really help in making interpersonal comparisons of social choices. We may find variations in terms of personal heterogeneities, environmental diversities, and variations in social climate or differences in terms of relative deprivation. It is not enough to know how many people are below the poverty line for the purposes of making social choice. It is also important to understand how deprivation is shared and distributed among the poor (Sen 1998). The same logic applies to gender-based inequality and deprivation of women in traditionally unequal societies. It is not enough to have liberty; it is important to make it effective.

See also *Bentham, Jeremy; Equality and Inequality; Human Development Index; McKelvey, Richard; Pareto, Vilfredo; Rational Choice Theory; Rawls, John; Voting Cycles and Arrow's Paradox.*

. . . .   ASHA GUPTA

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Social Conservatism

Social conservatism is an ideological perspective on how individuals in free societies ought to respond to matters having to do with moral beliefs or behavior, cultural traditions, religious institutions, or patterns of social interaction generally. It involves the desire to see older norms and assumptions regarding all of these matters to be preserved. Hence, social conservative thinkers either oppose or are cautious about individual innovations in personal habits and preferences, marriage and family arrangements, civic rituals and customs, religious observances, and so forth.

In general, social conservatism reflects the concerns advanced by Edmund Burke, as well as other late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century writers who confronted modern revolutionary or democratic movements and transformations, and warned against or tried to moderate the changes being wrought by them. Their arguments were that society is not a social contract between individuals, but rather an organism, a living culture with a specific history and specific classes and customs that must be acknowledged; that social accomplishments depend on maintaining a foundation of traditions from which the members of society draw their inspiration and connection to the past and the future; and that a healthy society is one with both stability and continuity, which only widely accepted, shared, and promoted public values and practices can provide. These ideological beliefs form the traditional core of most socially conservative movements and parties around the world. However, many social conservatives today, while agreeing with these basic insights, have come to premise their ideological perspective on much more explicitly religious (generally Western Christian) doctrines than was the case with Burke and other "traditional conservatives." So thorough has been the merging of the cultural concerns felt by many Protestants and Catholics with the language of traditional conservatism in the United States that the label *Christian right* often has come to be used interchangeably with social conservatism itself.

Social conservatism in this sense is therefore a much stronger force in the United States than in other North American or western European countries, as the United States is by most measures a heavily Christian country, with high rates of religious affiliation and a frequent reliance on and a broad acceptance of religious rhetoric and arguments in political discourse. (The prevalence of this particular Americanized image of social conservatism around the world often leads various parties and movements that otherwise agree with certain principles of traditional conservatism, especially those associated with the ideas conveyed through the mostly secular Counter-Enlightenment tradition of Justus Möser or Joseph de Maistre, to eschew the label *social conservative* entirely.) This kind of social conservatism has been a growing presence in American politics and policy debates since the early 1970s, with the controversy over abortion rights, which exploded following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in *Roe v. Wade* in 1973 to legalize abortion across the nation, often identified as the real beginning of the contemporary Christian conservative movement. But the ideology of social conservatism has been influential elsewhere as well. Contests over norms and laws regulating or permitting pornography, Sunday commerce restrictions, no-fault divorce, sex education in public schools, access to birth control, state-sponsored gambling, public funding of controversial or arguably offensive works of speech or art, homosexual behavior, and most recently homosexual marriages, have all been arenas in which social conservative thinkers, activists, and voters have been a major influence.

While initially many of these concerns had been seen as the sole and narrow concerns of various evangelical or fundamentalist Protestant sects, through the 1980s and 1990s they became important concerns for many conservative Catholic thinkers and voters as well. The merging of many evangelical and Catholic Christians into one socially conservative cultural and political movement (predominantly but not solely in the United States) had a large impact on not only party allegiances, but also on how the language and ideas of traditional conservatism have been adapted and used to advance various causes. For example, for many years in the United States. both Catholic and "social gospel" Protestant thinkers had seen—in different ways—their moral priorities as requiring an emphasis on progressive or communitarian responses to the problems facing their adherents. In this, American Christians often tended to follow European Christian socialist or democratic patterns (the Catholic church in Europe has long combined socially conservative perspectives on moral and civic matters with a support for social justice in economics). But in recent decades the secularization of American society has, for many believers, pushed those concerns aside in favor of a focus on conserving specific moral or religious norms and practices that often are grounded on common Christian beliefs shared across denominational lines. This synthesis, sometimes called *theoconservatism,* has had some influence on conservative parties and movements elsewhere around the globe, but for the most part this particular mix of concerns under the label of social conservatism remains an American phenomenon.

Social conservatism has had an ambiguous intellectual relationship with the development of *neoconservatism* in the United States. While some of the "new conservative" thinking that emerged alongside critiques of the social changes and egalitarian policies of the 1960s and 1970s did turn to social conservative ideas to buttress their arguments about the need for cultural standards and stability, not all did, with the result that the neoconservative intellectual camp remains divided between those who are doubtful of the religious tone of much social conservatism and those who embrace populist religious conservatism as a part of the neoconservative project.

See also *Abortion and Politics; Conservatism; Conservative Parties; Family Values; Neoconservatism; New Conservatism; Religious Right.*

. . . .   RUSSELL ARBEN FOX

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Social Contract

The *social contract* is an agreement between the people and government, according to which rulers agree to rule justly and the people to obey. The idea is most familiar from works of the great contract theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. But it has received considerable recent attention because of the work of John Rawls. In conjunction with the closely related idea of the consent of the governed, the social contract indicates popular control over government. As the people have agreed to it, they may view the contract as broken if government behaves unacceptably.

HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT

The social contract has a long history. Perhaps the earliest extant version is found in Book II of Plato's *Republic.* Plato's spokesman, Glaucon, argues that rules of justice arose from an agreement. People agreed not to take advantage of others, in exchange for not being taken advantage of themselves. However, this particular agreement established rules of justice, rather than political authorities to enforce them.

The contract developed into something approaching its classic form in the course of medieval struggles to place limits on royal authorities. A recognizable contract was expressed by Manegold of Lautenbach, a Saxon monk, in the late eleventh century, during the Investiture Controversy. Manengold argued that, if we would fire a swineherd who did not take proper care of our pigs, the same should hold with a ruler who did not take care of his charges. Arguments for limited authority were developed in the church by "conciliar" theorists, who claimed that authority in the church was held by the members generally (in different forms) and delegated to church officials on a conditional basis. Implications of this view were realized during the Great Schism of the Church, in the late fourteenth century, as two and later three competing popes contended for power. The Council of Constance (1414–1418), summoned to address the crisis, declared the authority of the council over that of the pope and resolved the problem of competing popes. Even though the conciliar position was beaten back in subsequent years, conciliar ideas were developed by later thinkers, who readily transferred them to secular bodies. An especially clear expression is the *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos,* written in 1579 to justify resistance against the French monarchy. Arguments based on contracts between the king and the people were central to this and numerous other similar treatises

During the political turmoil of seventeenth-century England, Hobbes performed the impressive feat of using a contract argument to establish absolute government. Hobbes argued that the state of nature is a horrific condition, "a war of all against all" that is only remedied by the establishment of absolute government. To do so, people enter into an agreement that is literally unconditional, not a contract, but rather a grant of power by each individual to the ruler. In exchange for peace, they accept the inviolable authority of government.

The traditional contract doctrine, limiting governmental power, received classic expression in Locke's *Second Treatise of*

Government. Living under natural law that they enforce themselves in a generally peaceful state of nature, people come into conflict because of their self-interested natures, and so recognize the need for an impartial umpire. They leave the state of nature in two stages, through two agreements, forming first a community and then government. Although Locke does not refer to the crucial second agreement as a contract—he uses the language of "trust"—when its terms are violated, people have the right to resist.

The contract takes a radically democratic turn in Rousseau's *Social Contract.* In his *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality,* Rousseau depicts natural man as little different from an ape, but happy and morally innocent. The movement into society corrupts man, a condition that can be largely reversed in a properly organized society. The remedy is the new contract Rousseau presents in *The Social Contract.* People give up all their rights to the community, receiving in return rights to vote on all laws. For Rousseau, only the terms of this particular contract can render government legitimate. The only legitimate form is direct democracy, in which the people rule themselves, with their votes determining the "general will."

The historicity of a Lockean contract was sharply criticized by David Hume, in his essay, "Of the Original Contract." Although he agrees with what he views as Locke's fundamental claim concerning the limited nature of political power, Hume rejects an actual historical contract. There is no record of one, and people have no recollection of entering into one. Hume argues for limited government on grounds of social utility, without the fictions of an original state of nature or social contract. Government is necessary for the good of society. But if it ceases to be useful, it loses its rationale and so also its authority. Because of the enormous costs of changing governments, revolution can be justified only if governments become egregiously tyrannical. But in essence, this is what Locke too had held.

Hume's arguments did considerable damage to the idea of an actual social contract, which had always been vulnerable on historical grounds. Although theorists had used it as an analytical device, they tended to be ambiguous in regard to its historical existence. Accordingly, Immanuel Kant made an important contribution, in viewing the contract as purely hypothetical, rather than an historical occurrence. Kant argues that government is limited by the terms of a hypothetical agreement, which the united people could accept.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Contract arguments were revived by John Rawls. In his monumental *A Theory of Justice* (1971), Rawls self-consciously places himself in the contract tradition. He argues that appropriate principles of justice are the product of an agreement between representative individuals in an artificial choice situation, the "original position." The representative individuals are placed behind a "veil of ignorance," which deprives them of knowledge of their personal attributes—age, race, level of talents, and so on—and so prevents them from choosing principles that would advantage themselves at the expense of other people. With Rawls and other recent

thinkers who argue along similar lines, the contract is not only a purely analytical device, but is used to identify appropriate moral principles, rather than to constitute a limit on legitimate political authority.

See also *Consent of the Governed; General Will; Hobbes, Thomas; Locke, John; Rawls, John; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; State of Nature.*

. . . .   GEORGE KLOSKO

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Social Darwinism

Social Darwinism is the theory that human societies obey the same process of natural selection that Charles Darwin identified in the natural world. Applying the idea of "the survival of the fittest" to society, politics, and economics, social Darwinists argue that the wealthy or strong succeed under conditions of fair competition because they are better adapted to their environments, and that the poor or weak therefore have no legitimate claim to government protection. Social Darwinism was especially popular in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, although the term itself was typically used by its opponents rather than its advocates. While it had strong proponents on both sides of the Atlantic—most notably, Herbert Spencer and Walter Bagehot in England and Edward L. Youmans and William Graham Sumner in America—it was particularly influential in America where it was used to justify laissez-faire economics during the Gilded Age.

Despite the name, social Darwinism is most closely associated with the work of Herbert Spencer, who coined the phrase "survival of the fittest" nine years before the publication of Darwin's *The Origin of Species* (1859). Charles Darwin's own remarks on the application of his theory to human society are infrequent and tentative, although he was influenced by Thomas Malthus's argument that population growth was ultimately limited by food supply and that a struggle for existence naturally resulted whenever the former outstripped the latter. Herbert Spencer developed the social implications that many assumed were implicit in evolutionary biology and attempted to build the principles of evolution into coherent theory encompassing biology, psychology, sociology, and ethics. The popular association of this theory with Charles Darwin, however, gave it a veneer of scientific validity that masked its significant diversions from Darwin's theory. While Darwin's theory of natural selection was based on empirical

observation, the social Darwinism of Spencer and others was largely deductive and unquestioningly grounded its ethical and normative conclusions in claims about nature. Thus, although Darwinian evolution suggests that a particular characteristic or species flourishes simply because it is better adapted to a particular environment, social Darwinists understood *fittest* to mean *best* in a sense that reflected their preexisting normative commitments.

Social Darwinism was most commonly linked to conservative arguments justifying laissez-faire capitalism and minimal conceptions of the state. Social Darwinists argued that the accumulation of wealth demonstrated successful adaptation to the laws of economic competition and that assistance to the poor only preserved those who lacked the industriousness, intelligence, and self-control to succeed on their own. Therefore, efforts at social reform and state intervention in the economy (through poor laws, social reform programs, business regulation, and the like) violated natural economic laws and interfered with the progress of society by protecting its least successful members. Drawing on Darwin's observations, thinkers like Francis Galton argued that intelligence and mental qualities were heritable in the same way as physical characteristics; laws and institutions that preserved "inferior" individuals, he cautioned, ran the risk of degrading human populations. Applied to the genetic makeup of human populations, social Darwinist arguments could thus be used to justify eugenics and "social hygiene" programs. Similar arguments explaining competition between, rather than within, societies and wedded to assumptions of western cultural and biological supremacy were used to justify imperialism and colonialism.

Despite its initial appeal, critiques of social Darwinism developed early. One line of criticism questioned its scientific basis and emphasized its non-Darwinian features. Social Darwinists, for example, tended to conflate individuals and species as the primary unit of analysis, overlooked Darwin's insistence that adaptation could occur through cooperation as well as competition, and wrongly equated evolution with progress. Another line of criticism questioned the conclusions that social Darwinists drew from the "struggle for existence" in human society. Reform Darwinists like Henry George and Lester Ward insisted that the laws discovered through the social sciences, like the laws discovered through the physical sciences, allowed humans to shape rather than be mastered by their conditions. Because natural selection made no normative assumptions about the particular environment within which the process of adaptation occurred, Reform Darwinists argued that social and political institutions could restructure environments in ways that would facilitate human happiness.

The popularity of social Darwinism declined throughout the twentieth century as new conceptions of the scope and responsibilities of the state developed, and as knowledge of biology and culture increased. However, many see a revival of social Darwinist thought in the development of sociobiology since the mid-1970s.

See also *Biology and Political Science; Class and Politics; Social Policy; Social Welfare; Sociobiology and Politics.*

. . . .   MATTHEW VOORHEES

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Social Democracy

Social democracy as a political movement is intimately connected to the rise of modern industrial capitalism and the emergence of the industrial proletariat. This new social class of wage earners stood free from earlier forms of feudal allegiances and responsibilities, and social democracy can be seen as a response to the social needs and the political ambitions of this new industrial working class. In comparison to the earlier feudal and guild-based economic system, industrial capitalism implied that most workers faced a number of risks for which there were no organized remedies.

One of the first major organizational forms of social democracy was the First International, which was formed by British and French workers in London in 1864. One prominent reason behind the establishment of the First International was to hinder British employers in importing French labor to break strikes and thereby lower wages. Already here we see one of the major themes of social democratic ideology and politics, namely to protect the rights of trade unions by promoting solidarity among workers. The First International, in which Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels played important roles, organized several conferences, but it was formally dissolved in 1876 due to internal divisions between factions such as anarchists and revolutionary Marxists. It was followed by the Second International, which was created by European socialist parties in 1899 and dissolved in 1916 due to its failure to prevent national member parties, especially the Austrian and German social democratic parties, from taking a stand in the First World War (1914–1918). The outbreak of World War I was generally seen as a major defeat for the social democratic movement. By arguing that class solidarity was more important than nationalism, leading social democrats in Europe had tried to cool down nationalist fevers, and they made promises at various conferences to do whatever they could to stop the war. This came to an end in 1914 when the Austrian Social Democratic Party, then the strongest party in the Austrian Parliament, and a majority of the Social Democratic members of parliament (MPs) in the German parliament decided to support their governments' war efforts.

THE REVISIONIST DEBATE

The date and place of the birth of modern social democracy as a political ideology can be set to the years between 1896 and 1898 and took place within the German Social Democratic Party. The initiator was Eduard Bernstein, a leading member of the party and one of its foremost theorists. Bernstein had been collaborating with both Karl Marx and especially Friedrich Engels in London and was the editor of one of the German Social Democratic Party's main publications. In a series of articles published in 1896 (later published as a book titled *The Preconditions for Socialism*), Bernstein came to question a number of the central canonical ideas of Marx and Engels and this created an intense debate (i.e., the revisionist debate) within the German Social Democratic Party. Bernstein denied the absolute (zero-sum) character of the conflict between the industrial proletariat and the capitalist class. He criticized Marx's theory about the increasing concentration of capital and the prediction of a rapid collapse of capitalism. He also argued against the scientific nature of the Marxist theory and instead introduced a more idealistic notion of politics based on Immanuel Kant's theories. As a result, Bernstein argued that the party should abandon its revolutionary "all-or-nothing" strategy and pursue a more pragmatic, piecemeal reformist type of politics to improve the situation for the working class. Most importantly, Bernstein was opposed to all forms of violent insurgency, and he argued that the party should work through parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, and union-led bargaining with the various employers' federations.

Bernstein's new ideas sparked an intense debate. He had spent a number of years in exile in London and had come to appreciate the liberal character of the British society. Consequently, he reconceptualized socialist theory as the logical extension of the principles of liberal democracy. His opponents were mostly orthodox Marxists such as Karl Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg, and Clara Zetkin. It must be emphasized that the German Social Democratic Party at this time was seen as the strongest and theoretically most advanced socialist party. In an election held in 1890, it won a stunning victory and become the largest political party in Germany.

What is of special importance in this debate is the character of the arguments. Bernstein's line of reasoning was not only grounded in ideological terms but also rested on a number of empirical observations that he backed up with a wealth of statistics and other data. The main thrust of his argument was that because there had been no sign of a breakdown of the capitalist economy, no tendency of the proletariat to become the majority of the population, no pauperization of the working class, and not many indications of an increasing revolutionary class consciousness within the labor movement, the Social Democrats should abandon their revolutionary strategy and instead opt for negotiations and compromises with the power holders in the capitalist society. Moreover, Bernstein argued that in its political practice, the German Social Democratic Party had already commenced on this strategy, not least in local politics and in the strategy used by the labour unions. According to Bernstein, what he asked for was merely that the official Marxist revolutionary party ideology should be adjusted to the party's political practice. The way forward, according to Bernstein, was not to strive for the establishment of a socialist state through a political revolution, but to strengthen the working-class movements' organizational resources in order to gradually improve workers' living and working conditions.

The counter arguments produced primarily by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Kautsky were very different from Bernstein's empiricist reasoning. Instead of challenging Bernstein's description of the political and social situation in Germany by presenting a different set of facts, they chose to rely almost entirely on Marx's general theory. Luxemburg did recognize that especially the trade unions had to use a piecemeal strategy to get workers to join and economically support the unions and the party. However, the main motive for supporting the gradualist strategy that the unions advocated was, according to Luxemburg, not to improve workers' living conditions. Instead, Luxemburg argued that the very nature of the capitalist society would prove that such a reformist strategy was doomed to fail and that the result would be that "the proletariat becomes convinced of the impossibility of accomplishing a fundamental social change through such activity and arrives at the understanding that the conquest of power is unavoidable" (Luxemburg 1972). The question Luxemburg could not deal with was, of course, what would happen if the piecemeal strategy pursued by the unions succeeded. The problem she and the other orthodox Marxists could not answer was why workers should continue to support the unions if these could not produce results that would improve workers' conditions. This is the point at which we find the logic of modern social democracy. The piecemeal strategy implies that it has to produce results and that the leaders who produce such results have to defend them in front of their members. Otherwise workers have no incentive to support the labor unions, which traditionally have been the organizational backbone of social democratic parties. This has created a self-referential political logic in which the constant production of piecemeal results confirms the ongoing success of the reformist strategy.

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY VERSUS ORTHODOX MARXISM

The departure from orthodox Marxism was based on four ideas that later became the defining principles for modern social democracy. The first is the support for parliamentary democracy, civil liberties, and the rule of law not only as (in Marxism) a means to reach the socialist goal, but also as political ideals in their own right. The second is the gradualist approach to political change that implies a focus on negotiations, coalitions, and social compromises. The third is the willingness to adjust the political means to new realities instead of relying on a "grand theory." The fourth is the abandonment of seeing the socialist society as a fixed goal in favor of strengthening the labor movements' organizational capacity. "The final goal is nothing, the movement is everything" is a statement

often attributed to Bernstein. In some European countries (e.g., Austria, Denmark, Germany, Norway, and Sweden), the focus on such organizational measures in the years following World War II (1939–1945) eventually resulted in a huge set of social democratic organizations that covered most needs in life, including activities for young children, sport, leisure, culture, and funeral societies.

While formally staying within the Marxist orthodoxy, the German Social Democratic Party accepted Bernstein's "revisionism" as a legitimate minority view and in practice came to act much according to Bernstein's ideas. The outbreak of the 1917 revolution in Russia and the Bolsheviks' seizure of power by nondemocratic means created an unbridgeable gulf in the socialist movement between social democracy and communism. From the late 1920s, the communist parties in Europe (on Stalin's order) chose the class-against-class strategy and accused the social democratic parties in western Europe of collaborating with the class enemy and labelled them *social fascists.* This split in the socialist movement was one of the reasons for the successes of fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany, because it made it impossible to form a broad democratic alliance by center-left forces. In addition, as Sheri Berman has argued (1998, 2006), the relative strength of Marxist orthodoxy in the German Social Democratic Party hindered it from developing a politically viable strategy against the economic depression in the 1930s. The situation was the opposite for the Scandinavian Social Democratic parties, and they were able to develop Keynesian types of strategies that became the source for electoral success during the 1930s and led them to become dominant political parties in their respective countries.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

On a global scale, social democracy of today is a major international political force. The Socialist International has about 150 member (or associated) parties in 110 countries, of which many are electorally successful and quite a few control the government. Currently social democrats rule in, for example, Australia, Brazil, Greece, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Longer periods of social democratic government power have taken place in Sweden between 1932 and 1976, in West Germany from 1969 to 1982, in Norway between 1945 and 1965, in Australia from 1983 to 1996, and in the United Kingdom from 1997 to the present. In addition, several social democratic parties have produced a number of political leaders with an international standing; for instance, Tony Blair, Willy Brandt, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Francois Mitterand, and Olof Palme. The ideology of such a broad movement is by nature diffuse. At a very general level, contemporary social democratic ideology can be understood as a combination of "negative" and "positive" rights. On the one hand, social democracy is liberal in the sense that the respect for individual freedom, parliamentary democracy, and the rule of law is central. On the other hand, social democracy strongly favors governments' obligation

to provide citizens with a number of "positive rights" in the form of social services and social insurance systems that either have a very broad coverage or are mandatory. In this focus on social rights, social democracy differs not only from free-market liberal ideology, but also from various forms of conservatism in this emphasis on equality. Individuals should be entitled to resources that make it possible for them to, if they so wish, break away from traditionally established forms of life, regardless if they are based on social class, gender roles, religion, ethnicity, or culture.

The main thrust of social democracy today is that market-based economic prosperity and international economic competitiveness are fully compatible with an encompassing, publicly provided system of social insurances and social services, the latter often including huge investments in education and health care. Social democracy has therefore during the last decades been in conflict with the neoliberal economic agenda that argues that public spending hampers economic growth and individual responsibility. In addition, many social democratic parties, especially those in the Nordic countries, have been pushing for increased gender equality through policies such as subsidized day care, equal pay, and generous publicly funded support for parental leave. Lately, issues concerning environmental protection and minority or immigrant rights have been added to the social democratic agenda.

Concerning the market economy (or capitalism), European social democracy came to abandon its anticapitalist rhetoric during the 1940s and 1950s. Keynesianism had provided social democracy with policy measures to intervene in the capitalist economic system so as to avoid the type of dramatic crisis that hit the world economy in the early 1930s. However, following the idea of positive rights, social democratic ideology does not embrace an unregulated market economy. On the contrary, the view of markets is pragmatic, which often has resulted in an extensive set of policies for regulating markets and for ameliorating class-based economic and social inequalities. In political economy research, such systems have been labelled *social market economies,* and they have been contrasted to *liberal market economies.* The impact of social democratic parties during the post–World War II period has been particularly strong in Austria, the Nordic countries, and the United Kingdom and to some extent also in Australia, Germany (i.e., the former West Germany), the Netherlands, and New Zealand.

The Socialist International and many national social democratic parties have been important in promoting democratization; for example, in southern Europe (Greece, Portugal, and Spain) in the 1970s, as well as in many third world countries. The Party of European Socialists is today the second strongest party group in the European Parliament, with 217 MPs (out of a total of 785). From a global perspective, it seems as if the center of social democracy during the past fifteen years has shifted from northern Europe to Latin America, where a number of countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Costa Rica) are led by social democratic governments.

MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS

Social democracy is closely connected to the establishment of encompassing systems of social insurance and social services also known as the *welfare state.* The general idea is that such systems should not be limited to the poor, but that they should be either universal or cover broad segments of the population, including the middle class. The idea is an outcome of the principle of *social solidarity* and based on an ideology that governments should provide citizens with a number of "basic resources." Such policies have become widely popular and often are supported by other political parties as well. In many ways, modern social democracy can be understood as an ideology that is tuned to the notion of finding a middle way between neoliberal capitalism and heavy-handed statism. While its neoliberal opponents often have warned that such a system may require taxes at such high levels that the economy would suffer, this has generally not been born out by the facts. Empirical research about the relation between high levels of taxation and public spending on social services and social insurance systems, on the one hand, and international economic competitiveness, on the other hand, tend to speak in favor of the social democratic project. There are various reasons for this counterintuitive outcome. One is probably the investment in human capital. Another reason is that, because of problems with asymmetric information, markets are usually less efficient than governments in terms of handling the demand for social insurances. Recent research tends to indicate that this holds not only for developed Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries but also for developing countries.

UNSOLVED PROBLEMS AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

The main unresolved problem for the social democratic project is that Bernstein's idea that socialism could be reached by a gradualist parliamentary approach is nowhere to be seen. The Socialist International recognizes this in its current program and states that it has no blueprint or clear vision of what socialism (or *economic democracy*) may look like. Nationalization of major industries, which was high on the agenda in many European countries during the 1950s and 1960s, did not produce the results many had hoped for. Even though social democratic parties have been supporting increased union rights such as systems of codetermination within companies, few would say that this can be seen as economic democracy. Moreover, labor unions have not been supportive of systems wherein workers would be the owners of companies because this would minimize the need for unions. One of the most ambitious plans for economic democracy was launched by the Swedish Social Democrats during the 1980s. The system, known as *wage-earner funds,* forced companies to pay a certain amount of their profits into union-controlled funds that would then be invested in companies and thus, through such a system of ownership, wield economic power. After an unusually intense political debate that lasted for more than a decade, the system was, in a scaled-down version, introduced by the Swedish Social Democrats

in 1983, but it was abolished by a center-right government in 1992. This ideological defeat led the Swedish Social Democrats to abandon this version of economic democracy during their twelve years of rule from 1994 to 2006. Interestingly enough, one reason behind this ideological defeat was that the unions could not muster political support among its own members for this variant of economic democracy.

Another problem for the future is the development of main political cleavages. Social democracy has been closely connected to the traditional left-right class-based political division that follows the logic of industrial capitalism. It is not clear how the social democratic ideology will handle new types of cleavage structures based on, for example, problems related to immigration, globalization, environmental protection, and various forms of identity politics.

See also *Marxist Parties; Socialism; Social Security; Social Welfare; Third Way and Social Democracy.*

. . . . BO ROTHSTEIN

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Social Engineering

In a broad sense, any social change brought through deliberate efforts by government (i.e., all laws and policies) that have the effect of changing behavior and characteristics of a society can be labeled *social engineering.* In its standard usages, the term has rather a negative connotation. The development of modern communications technology, administration, technical and managerial resources, and the media provided the tools through which social engineering could be carried out. Relevant for the modern history of the concept is Karl Popper's distinction between *piecemeal* and *utopian* or *holistic* social engineering, or what we would call the difference between reformist and revolutionary solutions. For Popper (1971), the former is the only form of social engineering that can be rationally justified—one that is small-scale, incremental, and continuously amended in the light of experience and aimed at reducing human suffering. In political discourse, the term is generally used in three different contexts.

1. *Ideologically based policies and techniques aimed at a radical change in the makeup of a society.* Typical examples are totalitarian political systems, which usually engage in visions and pursuit of grandiose social engineering schemes that more often than not involve the thorough remaking of the population, with the goal of creating the desired or "perfect" society. In the 1930s, in Nazi Germany, the idea of the pure Aryan *bermench* was to be achieved by using selective methods of human reproduction and eugenics. In the 1920s, the revolutionary government of the Soviet Union embarked on a project aimed at remaking class structure to obtain the so-called classless society by eliminating the "exploiting classes" and to create the New Soviet man. Other similar examples are the Chinese Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution programs (in the 1950s and 1960s) and the Khmer Rouge's genocidal plan of deurbanization of Cambodia (1970s).

2. *Accusation against any policy or theory that advocates changes from above in the characteristics of a society.* It is employed often by the political right as a charge against those who propose to use legislation and policy to change existing social relationships (e.g., between genders or ethnic groups), even if no violence and brainwashing are involved. (Also, political conservatives in the United States have accused their opponents of social engineering because of their promotion of political correctness, insofar as it may change social attitudes by defining "acceptable" and "unacceptable" behavior or language.)

3. *A practical approach or science to solve various problems in the society.* Interestingly, social engineering has been an

official field of study at the Tokyo Institute of Technology since 1966. According to the institute's official website, the discipline has the goal "to solve various problems in the society through practical approaches."

At the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries, the idea of social engineering influenced the political thinking and policies in many countries. In the United Kingdom, the Fabian Society tried to establish an association for social engineering, especially to reform social conditions of the working class. In the United States, the idea for a time attracted many intellectuals, including Charles Beard, John Dewey, and Walter Lippmann, and inspired the establishment of such institutions as the Institute for Governmental Research (1916) later the Brookings Institution; the New School for Social Research (1919); and others.

Many critics of social engineering argue that in a democratic polity, it is assumed that society, and especially its founding elements, the citizens, are already evolving independently. They direct and determine government and politics through elective representatives and would resist attempts for radical programs for societal change.

See also *Conservatism; Education Policy; Political Change; Political Correctness; Radicalism; Revolutions, Comparative; Social Policy; Totalitarianism.*

. . . .   JIRI S. MELICH

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Socialism

Socialism was the most influential secular movement of the twentieth century, worldwide. It was a political ideology (or world view), a wide and divided political movement, and a socioeconomic model tried and developed on a large scale. Weakened in the current twenty-first century, it is still a significant political current, particularly in Europe and Latin America.

A CONFLUENCE OF CURRENTS

Socialism became a public social movement in western Europe of the 1840s, but it grew out of the radical Enlightenment and the leftist currents of the French Revolution (1789–1799). Jean-Jacques Rousseau was a key precursor as an egalitarian and as an icon of the Jacobins and the left wing of the French Revolution. Several currents of thought converged in nineteenth-century socialism.

There were the radical traditions of the Enlightenment, egalitarianism, rationalism, and discrete materialistic atheism. There were the far left activists of the French Revolution, whose legacy was carried forward by postrevolutionary

Delegates of the French Socialist Party stand below a banner reading "Socialist Party, member of the French section of the International Working Men's Association—Workers of the World Unite." Karl Marx was a leading figure in the first International Working Men's Association, or the First International, in 1864.

SOURCE: Getty

activists like François-Noël Babeuf, Filippo Buonarroti, and Auguste Blanqui into the embryonic French labor movement of the 1830s and 1840s. There was the sociological analysis of Henri de Saint-Simon and his followers, heralding the arrival of a postrevolutionary industrial society with a new constellation of classes and social forces. There was the enlightened employer Robert Owen, with ideas of producers' cooperatives, inspiring one of the major French "utopian socialists," Eugène Cabet, who was exiled to Britain in the 1830s. There were the new, postfeudal conceptions of labor, incorporated into French Revolution ideas of citizenship by one of its most influential thinkers, Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, and there were the Ricardian socialists of Britain, developing David Ricardo's early-nineteenth-century political economy into a critique of capitalism.

Socialist ideas of equality, association, cooperation, and mutualism began coming together in radical labor movements, largely by skilled workers and artisans of France and England in the early 1840s. By 1842, it had become the topic of a major academic analysis by a German scholar, Lorenz von Stein, in his *Socialism and Social Movement*. They came to the forefront, if not to victory, in the Europeanwide national democratic revolution of 1848. The German League of the Just, a diasporic association of left-wing artisans, commissioned Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels to write a program for them. It became the most famous political pamphlet ever—the *Communist Manifesto.*

As a modern political ideology, socialism was a rival of liberalism, as well as of traditional popular deference to royals

or religion. Its most distinctive values were solidarity—which in its collective identification differs radically from charity or compassion—and equality. Both may be seen as manifestations of collectivism. This was a collectivism mainly deriving from workers' experiences, with little means to defend their interests as individuals in the face of merchants, factory owners, master craftsmen, landowners, the propertied, and the generally well-heeled. In the socialist value system, individual freedom is located within parameters of collective responsibility.

Socialism stands for the rights of labor against those of property. Socialism also drew on the modern idea of democracy, which came to the fore, if more in rhetoric than in reality, during the radical phase of the French Revolution. The socialist labor movement became the major international force of universal suffrage and democracy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in the period when there were severe restrictions and fraudulent manipulations of civic political rights everywhere.

Most socialist currents affirmed the modern world of industry, mobility, exchange, science, and rationalism. This modernism was particularly pronounced in Marxism and in Latin European socialism of republican and anticlerical roots, while at the same time condemning capitalism as an exploitation of modern possibilities as well as of human labor.

But there were also currents inspired by dissident Christianity, often in Britain and then usually coming out of left liberal politics and a romantic anti-industrialism. Socialist communitarianism has always had several entrances. It could even be hijacked by nationalist tendencies. This was a particular risk in Germany, with its strong statist and romantic traditions. What became Nazism started out as an extreme nationalist alternative to the internationalist socialist labor movement, the German National Socialist Workers' Party.

AN INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT

Socialism developed into a large, well-organized political movement from the last quarter of the nineteenth century, beginning on the European continent. The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), founded in 1875, soon became the largest socialist party and a leading international source of inspiration. In Britain, labor politics and trade unionism developed without separation from the liberal party until the end of World War I (1914–1918), while around the turn of the century, labor became governing parties in the White Dominions of Australia and New Zealand.

Socialism was an international ideology and an international movement. In 1864 the First International, the International Working-Men's Association, was formed, with Karl Marx as the leading figure on its general council. Polarized between anarchist followers of Bakunin and Marxian socialists, it remained small and ineffective. In the conservative repression after the popular uprising in France, the Paris Commune of 1871, the headquarters of the First International were moved to New York, where it soon petered out. A new beginning was the forming of the Second International in Paris in 1889, as an unofficial part of the Centenary of the Revolution. Up to 1914, the regular congresses of the Second International were

the major events of international socialism. It was overwhelmingly Eurocentric, though American, Australian, and Japanese delegates occasionally attended. Important extra-European socialist parties—the very European Labor transplants in Australia and New Zealand excepted—were first created by the communists of China, India (though a small minority), Indonesia, and Vietnam.

World War I split the International, with most parties siding with its own warring nation. An even more bitter split was caused by the Bolshevik Revolution (1917) in Russia. The Bolsheviks were the core of the antinationalist minority of the International, and now their reckless one-party revolution (the Mensheviks was another Russian socialist party of the International) led to a deep, lasting divide of international socialism, between revolutionary communism, which set up its own Third Communist International, and democratic socialism or social democracy.

The Comintern was dissolved in 1943, for reasons of Soviet geopolitics, although there remained de facto an international communist movement, aligned with the Soviet Union. The noncommunists were divided between the world wars, but in 1951 the Socialist International was reconstituted. It was reinvigorated during the presidency of Willy Brandt, in 1976 to 1992, who as a major statesman (former chancellor of West Germany), gave it a high profile and pushed it throughout the third world. The Socialist International is still active and organizes conferences and seminars all over the world but has become too heterogeneous to be a very important global player. It currently has 115 parties as full members, a few countries having two or three. Its membership is strong in Europe—east, including postcommunist parties outside Russia, and west—and in Africa, Latin America, and Oceania, but weak in Asia and Brazil.

Socialism has always had particular difficulty in setting roots in North America, in the United States in particular. The German social scientist Werner Sombart devoted a short book in 1906 to the question, *Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?* The term *socialism* then meant as a mass movement, like in continental Europe. Sombart's analysis is fairly complex, referring both to the established two-party system and to socioeconomic factors, such as high average wages, less visible everyday class differences, and opportunities for social mobility—while unexpectedly concluding that the factors that until now have prevented socialist development in United States are about to disappear.

While many factors certainly contributed, latter-day historians have tended to put strong emphasis on the establishment of a mass two-party system well before the rise of the socialist movement. In Britain, which at the time when Sombart wrote did not have much of a socialist movement either, the party system was shaken by the horrendous casualties of the world wars, aided by the war-related split of the liberals. The late and much less costly American entry into the war could sustain an enthusiastic nationalism, while shattering the pacifist Socialist Party.

What the classical socialist movement was striving for was a new socioeconomic order, socialist as opposed to capitalist.

There was no blueprint for it, since the utopian communities outlined in the first decades of the nineteenth century had been left behind. Marxism was explicitly dismissive of a concrete program for what was seen as something going to evolve, on an international scale, out of the contradictions and class struggles of capitalism. But there was wide agreement that a socialist society would include public ownership of the industrial means of production and of banks and major trading enterprises. About land there was a lively internal debate and no agreement on household ownership or collective organization. Ample room was usually given to cooperatives of various kinds, which the European labor developed extensively and in varied forms: consumer cooperatives, mutual insurance funds, and, less often, producers' cooperatives.

BUILDING SOCIALISM

Before the end of World War II (1939–1945), democratic socialists never got a political chance to transform the socioeconomic order, albeit Scandinavian social democracy got into office on a platform of alleviating the Depression, providing employment and support for the most vulnerable, but with no majority of their own before the war.

What they could do in a number of places was to develop *municipal socialism,* not only in many European cities but also, occasionally, in the United States, such as in Milwaukee. The most ambitious and successful example was Vienna, under social democratic control from the end of World War I until a reactionary coup in Austria in 1934. An extensive housing program, with lots of collective services (kindergartens, schools, libraries, and other collective leisure space), was at the centre of *Red Vienna* and inspired socialists all over western and central Europe.

In the Soviet Union, the communists embarked upon a huge experimental undertaking, without precedent even in theory, to "build socialism in one country." The enterprise was seen as a struggle for survival of a poor country ravaged by the world war and by subsequent civil wars and foreign military interventions. It entailed a brutal collectivization of agriculture to pay for a frantic industrialization under state ownership, and a centrally planned economy, driven more by political targeting and mobilization than by economic calculation. The human costs were enormous, largely because of tenacious peasant resistance, with which the Bolsheviks brooked no compromise. However, the contrast of the spectacular industrial growth of a planned economy in the midst of the global depression made a huge impact far outside communist circles. Most important was probably its impact of the generation of anticolonialist nationalists who were to lead their independent countries after World War II. Soviet socialism emerged as a major model of national development. It also seemed to have passed a crucial test in the war when, unlike Russia in World War I, the Soviet Union was not crushed by the formidable German war machine and in the end was victorious.

A planned economy with full control over finance and investment and state-led industrialization was a widely popular

development model, guiding not only new communist-ruled countries in Asia and Europe, but also in Burma, India, Indonesia, and somewhat later revolutionized Arab countries such as Algeria, Egypt, and Syria. A "socialist pattern of society" was the official goal of independent India. It was adopted by African liberation movements, which tried to implement them after independence. The latter even set out to collectivize agriculture, something the Asian noncommunists avoided. In Latin America there had been some interest in the Soviet economic development, but before the Cuban Revolution (1959) it never went far in economic practice.

The first results could very well be taken as promising. Communist eastern Europe was catching up economically with long richer western Europe, and also in terms of education and life expectancy, while refraining from repeating the Soviet brutality of the 1930s. After a century of economic stagnation, both Communist China and democratic socialist India started to develop, economically as well as with respect to health and education.

Most postwar European social democracies still had no full political mandate. But the British and the Norwegian Labor Parties did began what they intended as a socialist transformation, the Norwegians by starting a system of sophisticated macroeconomic planning, the British by nationalizing a good part of what was called the "commanding heights" of the industrial economy: the coal and steel industry and transport. The 1970s to early 1980s saw bold social democratic attempts at socialist change. In Sweden the strong unions developed a plan for so-called wage-earners' funds, financed out of corporate profits and controlled by trade union representatives, which would gradually become the main owners of the big business corporations. The plan was reluctantly accepted by the social democratic leadership, but when they returned to office, the political momentum, in the face of stiff right-wing opposition, had been lost. The French Union of the Left, led by the socialists but also including the Communist Party, came to power in 1981 on a program of rupture with capitalism. It took the form of a series of important industrial and bank nationalizations. But the attempt soon became bogged down in the international economic crisis of the early 1980s, and the government beat a retreat to liberal policies.

In December 1949, one of the world's most renowned economists of the first half of the century, the heterodoxly conservative Austro-American Joseph Schumpeter delivered an address before the American Economic Association, titled *The March into Socialism*. His argument was that capitalism was destroying itself and was most likely to be superseded by *centralist socialism*. The very success of business and capitalism was about to make the "civilization of inequality and family fortune" sustaining them pass away.

Schumpeter's prospect drew on a special argument about family enterprise, but was part of a very broad public opinion at the time. Forty years later, in 1989, not only maverick conservatives but also many socialists and communists, as well as others in between, would regard the *centralist socialist order* as bankrupt. What links the two different assessments was the

unexpected, historically unprecedented economic growth in the decades after World War II.

It seems that what the socialist economy could achieve, provided there were enough skilled and dedicated organizers to run it (which was often lacking in Africa), was what has been called *extensive development*, mobilizing idle resources and providing basic social needs. But in a world of rapid economic advance, socialism faced problems in developing innovations—outside of strategic political goals, such as the Soviets beating the United States in the first rounds of the space race—and in providing large volumes of discretionary consumption to wide varieties of taste. From the late 1960s, communist eastern Europe began to fall behind western Europe again.

There is also the vulnerability of an alternative economy in a competing, hostile world, something the French Mitterand government soon had to take notice of, and which has guided European social democracy to caution and gradualism. The South African ANC in power has found it easier to promote a black capitalist class than to construct a socialist economy as a base of urgently needed social development.

PROSPECTS

Socialism is little likely to regain its extraordinary influence from the second third of the twentieth century, although it is not unimaginable, and it remains an important part of twentieth-first century politics. The Soviet chapter is closed, but the Chinese government retains at least a rhetorical commitment to socialism, which might conceivably be turned into something more tangible. There remains unsettled the question of how capitalism and socialism should be defined and their boundaries delimited, entailing new possibilities of identity and opposition. Issues of how much public or private ownership, how much public regulation, how many social entitlements, and how many private markets are still central controversial issues. State ownership, public planning, and public regulation have played a very different role in the recent economic success of East Asia than they have done in the United Kingdom and the United States. Generous social entitlements are part of the open, competitive economies of northern Europe, while deemed to be incompatible with international competitiveness in other parts of the world. The financial crisis of that began in 2008 and the increasing urgency to get climate change under control have pushed those issues of socio-economic order into the political spotlight.

Socialism as an ideology has lost its development model and its visible horizon of a rupture with capitalism, which has diminished its appeal. But its core values of solidarity, equality, and collective responsibility are still widely used as critiques of the current world.

As a political movement, democratic socialism is a significant force of the new century, in a wide if neither universal nor coherent Socialist International, and as the second (in size) political grouping of the European Parliament. Communist parties are still ruling China, Cuba, and Vietnam, claiming socialist aspirations, and new powerful socialist movements have recently emerged in parts of Latin America.

See also *Communism; Communism, Fall of, and End of History; Marxist Parties; Social Democracy.*

. . . . GÖRAN THERBORN

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Socialist Parties

See *Marxist Parties.*

Socialist Transition

In classical Marxist theory, the transition to socialism is the period between the overthrow of capitalism and the achievement of communism. Although there is a sketch in Marx's writings of what communism will look like, the institutional and social features of the socialist transition were not comprehensively outlined by Marx or his successors. According to Marx, communism, which also is called the second or higher stage of socialism, will be achieved when there is an end to social alienation. An end to alienation would be achieved when there are no social differences—which are created by economic inequality—and human beings enjoy mastery over themselves and nature. When this condition is achieved, there no longer will be any need for the political management of social division, and consequently, the state will wither away and political conflict will cease.

The socialist transition is, in the revolutionary tradition, the stage before this higher stage of socialism is reached. Coming as it does between the end of capitalism and the achievement of communism, it contains some elements of both. However, Marx did not specify how elements of communism and the capitalist past were to be reconciled and the latter transformed, and he did not work though how his ideas on the political organization of socialist transition might fit with his ideas about economic management. Indeed, Marx's analysis of socialist transition was coincidental. His main description of the economic nature of the transition came in a polemic, the *Critique of the Gotha Programme,* against opponents in the German Social Democratic Party, and his main description of the political form of transition came in an extended piece of political journalism on the 1870 Paris Commune uprising, *The Civil War in France.*

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF TRANSITION

Economically, Marx simply noted that the first stage of socialism would see a continuation of unequal rewards for work. This, Marx argued, was necessary because socialism would still bear the "birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it has emerged." Only later, when distinctions between different forms of labor had been eradicated and work had become an activity through which people expressed themselves, rather than a means of survival, would differentials in reward be ended and distribution take the form of "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs."

Politically, Marx saw the socialist transition as being governed by a *dictatorship of the proletariat,* and the Paris Commune of 1870 was an example of this dictatorship. The commune was a democratic reflection of a unified and indivisible proletarian political consciousness for Marx. There were no differences between politicians and workers, and workers were politically active and could recall deputies to the commune who did not reflect the popular will. The commune represented a unified proletariat, and there was no meaningful difference between the commune as an institution and the proletariat as a class. Lenin copied this vision of socialist democracy under the dictatorship of the proletariat in his *The State and Revolution,* in which he described the soviets of the Russian revolution as a version of the Paris Commune. It was not a vision that recognized pluralism or dissent; such things would not exist because of the proletariat's unity. This unity would ensure that the state, as an autonomous force of class repression, would begin to wither away as soon as the socialist transition began.

Marx's failure to devote much time to a theory of socialist transition was not accidental. Underlying what he wrote on the subject was the assumption that the time between the collapse of capitalism and the achievement of the higher stage of socialism would be fairly brief. The demise of capitalism would occur only when it had fulfilled its historical mission and developed a high level of material wealth and a unified proletariat with a pronounced socialist consciousness. Socialism would thus emerge when the time was ripe for it so that the organization of the transition from the lower to higher stages would be minimal. As a dominant and unified socialist class, the proletariat would not require a large political organization, and economic productivity would be high so there would be no need for an extensive state role to ensure the economic abundance on which communism would rest.

No communist party took power in Marx's ideal circumstances; indeed, most of them took power where the proletariat were a minority and the economy was underdeveloped. Therefore, communists came to power where there were no supports for socialist development. Engels had warned of the disasters that this would bring: The "worst thing that can befall a leader of an extreme party is to be compelled to take over a government in an epoch when the movement is not yet ripe for the domination of the class which he represents . . . .

Whoever puts himself in this awkward position is irrevocably lost" (1966). The result was that an already antipluralist conception of popular democracy became even more hostile of and repressive toward political and social difference as communist parties consolidated their control as representatives of the missing proletariat and forced economic modernization to try to create the material circumstances necessary for socialism. As they did this, they created more stages of socialist transition to mark their "progress." These new stages of socialist transition sought to excuse the state's continued existence and vaunt the moral superiority of socialism over liberal democracy. They also were used by communist states to distinguish themselves from rivals within the socialist camp. Hence the USSR proclaimed it had built *developed socialism* before the rest of the socialist camp, while China proclaimed it could leap ahead of the USSR when it split from its sphere of influence in the early 1960s. In the end, the theory of socialist transition became an instrument of foreign policy and a device used by dictatorial rulers to legitimate themselves.

See also *Communism; Dictatorship of the Proletariat; Leninism; Marxism; Socialism; Soviet Union, Former; Withering Away of the State.*

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Socialization, Political

Political socialization is the process by which individuals develop a relationship to the political world and acquire the knowledge, beliefs, values, and behaviors conducive to citizenship. Through socialization, people gain a sense of belonging to a society and community and are inducted into the political culture of their nation. Socialization helps people assimilate to their political system by conveying the principles and actions that make them good citizens. In the United States, the sense of being an American, which encompasses belonging to a unique nation where people share a belief in democratic ideals, is passed on through the political socialization process.

Political socialization is responsible for the transmission of political culture across generations. Political culture is "a system of attitudes, values, and knowledge that is widely shared within a society" (Inglehart 1990, 18). Common understandings about the customs, traditions, folklore, and heroes associated with a given societal community, as well as the nature and operation of government, are passed on through the political socialization process.

EVOLUTION OF THE FIELD

The intellectual origins of political socialization research are rooted in studies of civic education. In the early 1900s, Graham Wallas made the connection between childhood education and citizenship, highlighting the psychological dimensions of political behavior. The work of Charles Merriam and his colleagues in the 1930s advanced the field and established a focus on childhood citizenship training as a means of maintaining stable democratic political systems. Formal civics instruction was considered a vital mechanism for the development of democratic citizens who would be loyal to the state and obedient to legitimate authorities and who would recognize their political obligations, such as serving in the military, especially in times of political stress.

Political socialization scholarship flourished during the behavioral period in political science where the emphasis was placed on objective investigations into political behavior as opposed to normative instructions for the making of good citizens. From the 1950s through the 1980s, large-scale studies were conducted, scores of publications were produced, and college courses on socialization were offered routinely. The term *political socialization* came into vogue in the 1950s with the publication of Herbert Hyman's synthesis of the extant scholarship related to preadult political learning. Research in the behavioral tradition sought to explain how people acquired political norms, identities, and orientations, including attitudes toward the political system, trust in government institutions, and sense of political efficacy. Scholars were invested heavily in exploring voting as the primary commitment of citizenship. Much attention was devoted to studying the development of partisan preferences that often were passed on generationally from parent to child.

By the 1990s, the field of political socialization had entered a period of stagnation, as some of the core assumptions underpinning the enterprise were called into question. Critics argued that socialization research tacitly promoted indoctrination to a particular type of citizenship that was largely passive and acquiesced to state authority. The focus on childhood as the primary locus of political learning was challenged, especially as young people who had not reached voting age could not fully participate in politics and government. Further, studies concentrated on how political orientations were passed from adults to children through a limited number of agencies, especially the family, school, and peer group. Decades of empirical research indicated that political socialization via these agencies was more limited than expected. The methodological approaches employed, which largely consisted of survey research, also were questioned for being incapable of adequately exploring as complex a phenomenon as political socialization.

More recently, the field of political socialization has been revitalized by both returning to its roots in civic education and expanding the scope of inquiry. Scholars seeking explanations for the lack of political interest and engagement among young people, especially low levels of voter turnout, are reexamining the political learning process. Studies of civic education and political engagement have proliferated along with prescriptions

for improving classroom education, service learning, and extra-curricular interventions. In addition, socialization research has begun more expansive investigations into the role of a larger set of agencies, including the media, digital technologies, the military, and religious institutions. Also, scholars have been looking more carefully into the process of political socialization that undergirds the creation of specific political generations.

THE POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS

Fred Greenstein describes the socialization process as, "Political learning, formal and informal, deliberate and unplanned, at every stage of the life cycle, including not only explicit political learning, but also nominally nonpolitical learning of politically relevant social attitudes" (1965, 10). While some aspects of political socialization are structured, such as classroom civics classes, socialization is largely a haphazard process. There is no standard set of goals and practices for socializing agents, such as parents, teachers, friends, and mass media, to follow, except perhaps for a vague textbook notion of the ideal citizen who keeps informed about politics and votes regularly. Although people can play an active role in their own political development, political socialization scholarship largely assumes a one-way process from agent to subject. Further, the context within which individual experiences take place is consequential for political socialization and differs based on family and social situation, school environment, religious orientations, military service, and other situational factors. Thus, the process of political socialization can be represented by the following model: who (subjects) learns what (political orientations) from whom (agents) under what circumstances with what effects (12).

Identifying the point in the life course that is most consequential for political socialization has been a source of ongoing debate. The political socialization of children and adolescents has been the subject of the majority of research. The early theoretical justification for the focus on youth was based on persistence theories, in particular the primacy and structuring principles, which assume that childhood learning is robust and carries over to significantly shape adult political orientations. Scholars maintained that early learning provides a foundation for future political thinking and action. Studies indicate that the development of a political identity begins in the preschool years as children realize that they belong to a particular town and eventually that they are part of a larger nation. Young children tend to personalize their relationship with government and to idealize political figures, such as police officers and the president, who is seen as a "benevolent leader." The level of idealization differs from one era to the next; children today have a somewhat less positive view of political actors than in the past due in part to parents and the mass media conveying more negative messages about politicians. As children and adolescents gain greater exposure to and experience with public officials, they grow more skeptical about them. Young people gradually develop attitudes toward the political system as a whole. Patriotic values are reinforced through rituals, such as singing the "Star Spangled Banner" as tribute to the nation's military at sporting events. As children mature, they become increasingly sophisticated about their place in the political world and their potential for involvement. They learn to relate abstract concepts, such as the requirements of democracy and majority rule, to the right to vote when they come of age.

The primacy and structuring principles are difficult to validate empirically, and their basic premises have been challenged. Alternative models posit that recent political learning is most relevant because it is fresh in the subjects' mind and more readily applicable to current situations. Researchers contend that politics become meaningful when people approach adulthood and can participate fully, especially by voting in elections. They contend that people are most politically impressionable during the period from high school through the mid-twenties because their political orientations are not yet completely formed. Older adolescents and young adults have greater opportunities to become actively involved by joining organizations advocating for a cause and volunteering in the community, and they may perceive that they have a greater personal stake in the political system.

Lifelong learning models examine stages of political development throughout the life course and present a more comprehensive approach to understanding socialization. A landmark study initiated by Theodore Newcomb tracked women who attended Bennington College in the 1930s over the course of fifty years. Newcomb discovered that the political attitudes of the Bennington women shifted based on their associations with particular reference groups. Many of the young women had grown up in well-off, conservative families, and became more liberal at the progressive college. A good number of them maintained these liberal beliefs throughout their lives, while others returned to their conservative roots after school.

Scholars studying adults note that milestone events in people's lives, such as attending college, taking a job, getting married, starting a family, and retiring from the workforce, can influence political socialization, especially when personal priorities shift and reference groups change. This type of transition is illustrated by 1960s student protestors who developed a strong distrust of government officials. The political orientations of some of the most strident activists changed after they entered the job market and started families. Some became public officials, lawyers, and business executives—the very types of people they had opposed. People who have been politically inactive their entire lives can become motivated to participate as senior citizens when they find themselves in need of health care and other benefits and have more time for involvement.

AGENTS OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

Political orientations are learned through interactions with agents of socialization, such as the family, school, peer group, and mass media. Agents convey cognitive, affective, and behavioral political orientations to subjects. The cognitive dimension of political learning represents people's knowledge and understanding of the political world and how it works. Once people have foundational knowledge of government and

politics, they are more likely to become active. The affective dimension reflects people's feelings about political symbols, objects, myths, and personalities and is related to attitudes like patriotism and trust in government. Finally, the behavioral dimension concerns people learning to take part actively in politics or by abstaining from involvement.

During the heyday of political socialization scholarship in the 1950s through the 1980s, studies focused heavily on the socializing effects of the family, school, and peer group that were considered primary agencies. Scholars assumed that political orientations were conveyed directly through personal, face-to-face interactions with these agencies that held privileged positions in the lives of children. Parents, teachers, and friends could serve as role models for children based on respect, admiration, and even fear. The strong emotional relationships that exist between family members, for example, may compel children to adopt behaviors and attitudes that will please their parents, or conversely, to rebel against them. Nonpolitical norms and values that agents have transmitted to subjects can become politically relevant. Power relationships within the family and school that promote respect for authority, hierarchy, and compliance with rules can translate into support for political leaders and obedience to laws. It is important to note that no single agent is responsible for an individual's entire political learning experience. However, few studies have given more than cursory treatment to exploring the interaction between and joint influence of various agents in the political socialization process.

Early research indentified the family as "[f]oremost among the agencies of socialization into politics" (Hyman 1959, 69) due to its unique position in fulfilling children's basic needs and the strong psychological and physical bonds that exist within the familial hierarchy. The family is perhaps most successful in passing on basic political identities, especially affiliation with the Republican or Democratic parties and ideological leanings. However, this trend is less robust today than it was a quarter-century ago, as more people are politically ambiguous, identifying themselves as partisan independents and politically moderate. There are significant limitations on the family as a socializing agent, especially as politics takes a backseat to issues related to daily life.

Some scholars argue that the school is the most powerful agent of socialization because its designated purpose is to promote learning. Political learning takes place through formal classroom instruction in civics and history classes, ceremonies and rituals such as the flag salute, and extracurricular activities like student government and sports, which can promote cooperation and tolerance for those who are different from oneself. The most basic socializing task of schools is in the area of cognition, especially conveying knowledge about constitutional principles and their implications for citizens' engagement in politics. Students who master these fundamentals feel competent to participate politically. They are more likely to develop the habit of following politics in the media and to become active in community affairs. Studies consistently reveal that the effectiveness of schools in developing civic orientations is heavily dependent on teacher skills and curriculum innovations.

Students exposed to novel approaches to civic learning, such as classroom lesson plans that are linked directly to service learning programs, are more inclined to engage in political affairs during adulthood. While schools have great potential as agents of political socialization, they are not always successful in teaching even basic facts about government to students. Further, the average amount of classroom time spent on civics-related topics is less than forty-five minutes per week.

The influence of the peer group on the preadult political socialization process has received far less attention by scholars than the family or school. Still, evidence suggests that peers, a group of people who are linked by similar age, common interests, and equal social position, can be important to political development. Young people desire approval and are likely to adopt the attitudes, viewpoints, and behavior patterns of groups to which they belong. Unlike the family and school, which are structured hierarchically with adults exercising authority, the peer group provides a forum for youth to interact with people who are at similar levels of maturity. Peers provide role models for people who are trying to fit in or become popular in a social setting. Peer group influence begins when children reach school age and spend less time at home. Peers are least effective in the cognitive realm of socialization, as discussion of politics and current affairs is often limited and sporadic. Pressures to conform to peer group norms can have a more powerful impact on young people's affective and behavioral political development than parents or teachers, especially if group members are engaged in activities directly related to politics, such as student government or working on a candidate's campaign. Young people may change their political viewpoints to conform to those held by the most vocal members of their peer group rather than face being ostracized. Still, individuals often gravitate toward groups holding beliefs and values similar to their own to minimize conflict and reinforce their personal views.

Other agents, especially mass media, were considered to be of secondary importance to the political socialization process in that they were thought to merely reinforce political learning that had been initiated through primary agents. As the media has become more pervasive and interactive, however, its potential to promote political learning directly has increased. Most people's regular experiences with the political world occur vicariously through the mass media. The media is the primary source of information about government, politics, and current affairs. It establishes linkages among leaders, institutions, and citizens; displays models of civic behavior; and organizes political community. Studies highlight the ubiquity of media use, finding that children and adolescents watch more than six hours of television per day and spend more than thirty-eight hours per week consuming a wide range of media outside of school. They rely more on the media for political guidance than on family members, teachers, or peers. Young people, in particular, increasingly use the Internet to learn about and participate in politics, such as engaging with social media during the 2008 presidential election. Popular media, such as entertainment programs, music, and literature, also can have a significant influence on political socialization.

GROUP DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

People form group identifications based on their position within networks of people sharing similar backgrounds, such as social and economic status, educational level, and racial and ethnic characteristics. Political learning and socialization experiences can differ vastly based on subgroups differences. Group members frequently share political viewpoints, as their political demands are similar.

Certain groups are socialized to a more active role in politics, while others are marginalized. Political learning is more likely to be a priority for people from privileged backgrounds than for those who struggle economically. Historically, men have occupied a more central position in the American political culture than women, who were not granted the right to vote in the Constitution by the founding fathers. While strides have been made to achieve political equality between the sexes, differences in sex-role socialization still exist. Girls more often are socialized to play supporting political roles, such as volunteering in political campaigns, rather than leading roles, such as holding higher level elected office. The result is that fewer women than men seek careers in public office beyond the local level.

GENERATIONS AND SOCIALIZATION

The political socialization of distinct generations of citizens can be shaped by particular political experiences. A political generation is a group of individuals similar in age who share a general set of political learning experiences. Typically, a generation emerges when people in their impressionable years—from late adolescence to early adulthood—are exposed to a significant political or societal upheaval, such as severe economic crisis or a major war, that results in their developing common cultural bonds. While everyone in a political system is influenced by cataclysmic events in some way, younger people, whose political orientations are not well defined, are affected the most as they begin to think seriously about politics.

In the United States, the generation born between 1900 and 1924 was heavily influenced by World War I (1914–1918) and the Great Depression. This generation tended to trust government to solve programs as they perceived that the New Deal programs helped the country recover from the depression. The generation born between 1922 and 1945 experienced World War II (1939–1945) and the 1950s during their impressionable years. They believed that government could get things done, but were less trusting of leaders. The Vietnam War (1959–1975) and the civil rights and women's movement left lasting impressions on the baby boomer generation born between 1946 and 1960. The largest of the generations, this cohort protested against the government establishment in its youth and still distrusts government. Generation Xers, born between 1965 and 1980, came of age during a period without a major war or economic hardship. This generation developed a reputation for being unknowledgeable about and disinterested in politics. The political development of the Millennial Generation, born between 1981 and 2000, has been influenced

by changes in security and surveillance following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as the revolutionary developments in technology and communication.

See also *Civic Education; Group Relations; Human Nature and Politics; Identity, Politics of; Neuroscience and Politics; Political Culture; Political Participation; Political Psychology; Public Opinion; Social and Political Cognition.*

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Social Movements

One of the developments in both global and national political systems since the end of the Second World War (1939–1945) has been the emergence of groups, organizations, and individuals who seek to influence society, the state, and public policies that are directly or indirectly concerned with public interest. Indeed, increasingly, these organizations and individuals have come to occupy significant positions when issues of societal advancement are considered. For example, the emergence of the green movement, whose dynamics have portrayed its transformation from one state to the other, clearly points to the various groups, organizations, and individuals who argue that there is need to ensure sustainable use of resources in the environment.

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Social movements are a wide range of social forces and their organizations that seek to influence society and public policies. They provide some sort of counterweight to the state on serious matters of public interest.

Social movements are organizations, groups of people, and individuals who take collective actions to bring about transformation in society. These groups of people and organizations contrast sharply with those of other groups and organizations, such as political parties and governmental organizations. For example, modern social movements in many countries do not seek to capture state power.

Social movements deal with issues that are deemed important for the advancement of society. These movements could take global and national shapes, but it remains that they are issue-driven. The issue creates the need for formation of organizations, but it also could be the other way around, in which already existing organizations enlist to deal with an issue that has been deemed to be of national or global concern for the interest of affected groups.

Activities of social movement organizations signify existence of civic culture and consciousness associated with broad conceptualization of civil society. Civil society is both a descriptive and normative category in relation to the political process and policy politics of nations.

Social movements are issue-based and tend to be contentious. Although not always in ways that lead directly to violence, their contentious character is because they often lack regular access to formal political process.

They are modern phenomena that evolved from premodern forms of contentious politics over the years to deal with issues around humanity and the political system. In fact, it has evolved from traditionalist models of protest that endorsed use of violence to the use of nonviolent and civilized methods of resisting authorities, seeking social change, or influencing public policy. They are divided into the old and new social movements. The former use strategies such as protests, strikes, and the like to address the state. The labor union, the anti-colonial, or various nationalist organizations that emerged in the nineteenth century represent the old social movement. In contrast, the new social movement, such as the human rights, gender, environmental, peace, and nonviolence, give voice to the frustrations of the educated middle class and professionals. They are concerned with rights, demanding what Mary Kaldor (2003) has described as *radical democracy.* In any case, an important area of difference to note between the old and the new social movement is that whereas the old social movement adopted traditional methods of protests that were often violent, the new social movements are basically nonviolent in their approach to issues.

The point of social movements is that they seek to influence government, public policy, and society in general and specific ways. In many respects, social movements such as the environmental movement seek to achieve goals that are directly related to individual rights to a safe environment. The environment is a public good whose protection does not benefit only a section of the world but does add to life for all peoples, especially within the context of human activities, change in climate, and depletion of the ozone layer.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND SOCIETY

In recent times, collective actions of social movement organizations have had tremendous influence on politics, public policy, and society in general. They are sometimes discussed within the context of civil society.

Emphasis on democracy in recent times requires vibrant and dynamic civil society. Indeed, social movements for most of democracy in the developing and developed countries today are centers of power that relate with the political system in ways that shape both the structure and content of politics. Activities of these movements are remarkable because of the effects they create in public policy, partisan politics, and the general political system. Political leaders often respond by repressing groups such as labor, environment, and others who protest certain policies or business organizations or government policies. For instance, the events of mass protests of labor and other civil society groups in Nigeria in June 2007 over a hike in the price of petroleum products and the sale of government business organizations without following due process led to the repeal of the policies. This has had profound implications for current democracy in that country.

Social movements provide the social capital that is needed for civic engagement with policy makers and governmental institutions in democracies. *Social capital* is simply the characteristics of organizations that help to coordinate and facilitate mutual benefits. One way of measuring social capital is the participation of individuals in the activities of social movement organizations. By participating in such activities, especially when it is about serious issues of public concern, social movements serve as a platform for oversight influence on the state and its power.

They sometimes initiate debates on social problems and may mobilize citizens toward it, a feat that more often than not the regular political machineries such as political parties are unable achieve due to bureaucratic procedures and a generally slow approach to certain issues. Response of the state to social problems is sometimes quicker when public interest and demand have been ignited by the civil society.

More often than not, issues of public importance that have remained out of public view are stirred by social movements, bringing focus to the issues' merit for the purpose of winning governmental attention. The merit of such issues may not be so judged by authorities until some sort of organizing is started by these social movements.

They resist certain policies and programs of government seen to be against the public interest. Success in achieving this depends substantially on the availability of resources for the concerned group. The success of such groups in getting government to change a particular policy or even to adopt a definite measure in the interest of the public depends on the regime type—democratic or dictatorship. For instance, various groups involved in the human rights and environmental movements in the Niger Delta of Nigeria today might count

their successes based on regime type. The military regimes were intolerant of opposition over issues of violation of economic, environmental, and other human rights.

The institutional and associational life of any democracy is important for the success of democracy. Given the nature of democracy, whether in normative or descriptive terms, the emergence and activities of social movement organizations in pursuit of a social goal do have a positive impact in the performance of democracy. Indeed, this is why Western democracies such as the United States are regarded as such. The blossoming of associations in response to issues of governance and development of society is a fundamental signpost that the leaders in the near future will be more conscious of the existence of these groups.

Social movements are issue-based, and this is the more reason to make sure that their emergence and possible contributions to debates on societal issues are not hindered. The experience in many countries of the developing world is that most regimes are antagonistic to social movements. This is worse with military regimes.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND POLITICS

Social movements seek change in society. Achievement of such change depends on strategies. The choice of strategies sometimes also depends on the goals of the movement.

In certain instances, leaders of such movements may directly engage political strategies, such as support for political parties that address the problems that define particular social movements. They may sponsor bills of particular societal concern in the legislative institutions. They may field candidates to seek elective positions. All these and more are direct political strategies that leaders of social movements might use.

The success of social movements in the use of political strategies depends on the social forces at work. For instance, interpretations of the intentions of certain movements might depend on the leaders of such movements. In the case of the Niger Delta of Nigeria, the local environmental movement often is interpreted to mean an ethnic project by members of other ethnic groups in the country. Some actually use partisan political methods to effect change in society. The examples of the global environmental movement in European countries have not been very successful, but it does seem that such movements have supported in specific ways green political parties.

Social movements can serve as the vehicle for engendering the mass attitude needed for the sustenance of democracy where it has been challenged by antidemocracy forces. They also can be instrumental in creating the pro-democracy mass attitude needed for establishment of democracy where denied. These processes involve gradual engagement with the citizens to mobilize them toward antidemocracy forces and create democratic institutions where denied. In the political culture literature social movements and other social groups have been identified as important agents of shaping political attitudes of citizens. Indeed, they are very often highly motivational factors for an otherwise apolitical and apathetic population of people and creation of a mass attitude that is supportive of pro-democracy activist groups.

When discussed within the context of civil society, strong social movements facilitate democracy, although this has been contested in literature for transitional societies. Indeed some have argued that civil society in the contemporary sense is a necessary condition for democracy. This argument makes a lot of sense given the fact no democracy in history has ever emerged or consolidated without a strong civil society. Civil society reflects the emergence of a variety of groups with interests that demand recognition and reflection in the political system.

Civil society faces an empirical challenge of definition, but in terms of relationship to social movement organizations, it may be seen as any group that represents collective interests or the entirety of civic engagements of citizens in a polity that tend to promote associational life. Several arguments have been made for the positive effects of the civil society in society. This has been so essentially because of the functional role that social movement organizations have played in development and democratic accountability. Indeed, studies have shown that social movements and their organizations can challenge state authorities to respect the rights of groups or individuals. For example, in Africa, Asia, and eastern Europe, various organizations came together to sign petitions and organized protests against despotic regimes. In other parts of the world, such as Poland and the Philippines, social movement solidarity played significant roles in dismantling authoritarian structures.

It should be noted, however, that existence of the civil society is not a sufficient guarantee for democracy. To be sure, civil society can exist without democracy. Indeed, some civil societies contain undemocratic elements and need to be democratized. Some are also disruptive of social order.

It seems that civil society plays different roles in societies, although this may vary between the developed and developing countries. Civil society is required for maintenance of the plurality of interests, democratization, and provision of the basis for associational democracy. Appreciation of these roles depends on the perception or conceptualization of civil society. Whether seen as a set of societal conditions, conflict resolution mechanism, or organizations as actors, definite roles are expected from the civil society. For example, understood as organizations as actors, the idea is that ordinary citizens might join together in associations or groups to form a public sphere in order to influence public policy on the basis of what Ezra Vogel (1969) has described as *rational critical discourse.* If seen as a set of social conditions, it will imply how integrated these organizations or groups are in society. When lacking access to the public decision-making process or political system, there might exist a tendency for these groups to be conflictive or violent in their approaches of seeking to affect public policy. When integrated, with a tangible sense of that integration among members of such groups, dialogue, and nonviolent strategies are more likely to be employed in the quest to influence public policy and the social structure in general.

Some governments today are beginning to use social movement organizations for the execution of certain programs. For instance, various nongovernmental organizations are in partnership with the government in Bangladesh, Liberia, Nigeria,

and South Africa, to mention but a few, in the designing and administration of certain government programs. Development nongovernmental organizations have long partnered with these governments in areas such as containment of HIV/AIDS. Some of these organizations also campaign for more human-centered and comprehensive government policies to address the problem.

Many of these organizations have long begun to act internationally. One study suggests that international nongovernmental organizations involved in addressing various issues numbered more than one thousand in the 1950s. By the 1970s, it had grown to five thousand. Recently, by the end of the 1990s, it had risen to well over twenty-six thousand.

See also *Anti- and Alter-globalization Movements; Civil Rights Movement; Civil Society; Collective Action, Theory of; Collective Action and Mobilization; Feminist Movement; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Movements, Comparative; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Social Movements, Comparative; Transnational Movements; U.S. Politics and Society: African American Social Movements; Women's Movement, Comparative.*

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Social Movements, Comparative

Often times, the political sphere's understated preference for the mundane seems to be best understood as a ringing endorsement of routine and formality and a stinging rebuke of conflict and struggle. However, because most political arrangements—outside of anarchic examples—are structured on some sort of hierarchical system of authority, it is almost inevitable that politics will at some point become contentious. If and when political discord occurs, average citizens usually choose to advance their concerns through conventional forms of political participation such as voting or perhaps canvassing for an established political party. Alternately, depending on the issue, political actors may elect to work for political or social change from outside the system by challenging and confronting elites and authorities through forms of collective action to accomplish a common goal or purpose. Still, the concept of collective action in the political realm is much more than a simple cooperative enterprise of political convenience. It is in many respects a political statement that allows organized groups or social movements to change the nature of mainstream political debate by framing it to reflect their own specific interests.

NORMATIVE ORIGINS

Historically speaking, social movements have come to serve as key access points for political activity in societies where minorities, marginalized groups, and otherwise disenfranchised individuals have either been overtly or subtly snubbed by the political sphere. Not surprisingly, because social movements arise from grassroots activities and networking, they are often particularly adept at identifying underused or constricted avenues for political participation in democratic societies whose existence by their own definition depends on guaranteeing their citizenry unencumbered access to the political process. In fact, sociologist Ian Angus goes so far as to suggest that "contemporary democracy relies upon social movements to continue the process of expanding democracy towards rule by all the people" (2001).

Still, social movement theorists would argue that any influence that social movements have wielded over contemporary democracies should be understood as the product of two distinct lineages of social movements: old and new. For some scholars, the French Revolution of 1789 still serves as the high-water mark in the history of collective action, producing tangible conclusions about the nature of group dynamics and political behavior. However by the late nineteenth century, the works of intellectuals Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and eventually Antonio Gramsci began to resonate with workers in industrialized countries in Europe and North America who felt exploited, abandoned, and disenfranchised by the "capitalist state." Eventually, socialism's message of revolution and solidarity led workers to conclude that governments that were unwilling or unable to insulate their economic well-being from the broad reach of unfettered capitalism would face acts of civil disobedience or general work stoppages, which in turn led to more formalized social movement activity with the creation of trade unions and communist parties. Theorists categorize these early forms of collective action as examples of old social movements.

As the end of World War II (1939–1945) ushered in the "grand bargain" of the welfare state for most industrialized countries, both working conditions and economic prospects improved to the point where a large portion of the labor force began to emerge consisting of professionals, civil servants, and

the like who would constitute the middle class. But even though middle-class workers still could not identify with society's elites, they also began to view themselves as politically, culturally, and intellectually distinct from the old social movements of the working class. Although middle-class workers did not entirely abandon their support of trade unions and left-wing political parties, they were much more drawn to forms of collective action that reflected a variety of postmaterialist values that went beyond a class-based economic agenda by encompassing a wide range of moral, cultural, and social crusades. Many of the social movements that formed during this era included civil rights groups, women's movements, antiwar groups, and environmentalists and would become characterized by theorists as new social movements.

Some scholars of late have begun to view the loosely connected collection of social movements involved in various kinds of transnational antiglobalization activism as yet another milestone in the history of collection action, given that it features significant elements of both old and new social movements. For contemporary social movement theorists, this modern coalescence of diverse views and interests may indeed point to the emergence of a new global social movement that has defied traditional forms of categorization thus far.

THEORETICAL TRADITIONS

By the 1960s, with scores of new social movements infiltrating the political spheres of Europe and North America to various degrees of success, the scholarly community began to formally conceptualize this trend through a number of theoretical approaches. Yet, all of the efforts on the part of theorists to produce a reasonably concise account of the motivating factors that shape social movement activity were divided between one school of thought that centered its explanations around ruminations on mobilization and another that emphasized the significance of organizational structures.

While several theorists see collective action as the end result of the mobilization of political actors, early on, both interactionism and functionalism suggested alternate explanations for "value-driven" collective behavior. Advocates of *resource mobilization theory* claim that social movement behavior is entirely contingent on a movement's ability to mobilize its resources, which can either be material—work, money, concrete benefits, services—or nonmaterial—authority, moral engagement, fixed friendship. Finally, some *mobilization* theorists cite the institutional constraints of the political process as a movement's primary motivation for taking advantage of potential political opportunities to affect change.

Unlike mobilization theorists who suggest that social movement activity is best understood as the organized expressions and rational aspirations of political actors, *organizational* theorists have produced an alternate narrative that contends that social movements are primarily concerned with their own organizational survival and thus pursue their agendas by adapting their organizational structures to best respond to the pressures of the political sphere. Some of the organizational theories that emerged from this school include contingency theory, the organizational ecology perspective, and neoinstitutional theory.

See also *Anti- and Alter-globalization Movements; Civil Rights Movement; Civil Society; Collective Action, Theory of; Collective Action and Mobilization; Feminist Movement; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Movements, Comparative; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Social Movements; Transnational Movements; U.S. Politics and Society: African American Social Movements; Women's Movement, Comparative.*

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Social Order

Social order is the result of a common search for cohesion within a given group or society. Some theoreticians believe that social order comes from coercion, while others argue that it is a rational decision made by individuals.

As opposed to the brutal rule of the strongest, French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau explained in his classic book *Le Contrat Social* that in advanced European societies humans agreed to exchange their natural freedom and the possibility to get anything they could see around them with the guarantee of security and the incontestable ownership of what legally belonged to them. In his 1893 thesis on *The Division of Labor in Society,* French sociologist Émile Durkheim stated that social order exists because people need one another and try to agree on some shared moral values; therefore, social solidarity is the result of the need for people to live and work together to reach consensus.

Max Weber analyzed the moment when people begin to agree with a legitimized authority, which is central in citizenship studies, and whenever some people refuse the rules, which is of interest for criminology. In a classic passage in his posthumous book *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology,* Max Weber identifies three ideal types of legitimate domination: rational-legal authority, traditional authority (religious institutions), and charismatic authority (whenever citizens recognize a leader).

If Karl Marx explained the acceptance of the domination of the upper classes as a result of their power and dominant ideologies, it is the neo-Marxist Louis Althusser who

coined the most efficient formula to explain the process. In his famous essay, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus," French philosopher Althusser argued that social order could be maintained only through two levels of control made by the state—either through the dominant ideology or coercion made by the police or the army. Throughout history, various institutions were given a role of protecting social order, such as through a censorship commission.

According to its founder Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, anarchism as a system rejects the actual forms of domination from the state, and cries for another form of order emerging from individuals. In his *Revolt of the Masses,* published in 1930 (only six years before the Spanish Civil War began), Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset wrote that the state represents the biggest danger for people. In the 1960s, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu wrote extensively about how society reproduces itself, and in his book cowritten with Alain Darbel, *La Reproduction,* both authors argue that the habitus was like a second nature that made people accept social order as it is and as impossible to change.

Legitimacy is key to understanding how social order can or cannot be accepted. Studying the phenomena of riots in prisons, British sociologist Eamonn Carrabine (2005) demonstrated that there is more than one level of social order in jails, from the legal authorities but also through inner circles of social stratification among some privileged prisoners who can achieve some kind of control. Institutionized corruption in a given organization or country indicates a point of no–return for a society when authorities, such as political leaders, civil servants, the police, or the army, reach a certain level of organized corruption.

Some classic movies illustrate the limits of social order in situations of rebellion, such as Sergei Eisenstein's *Strike* and *Potemkin,* Fritz Lang's masterpiece *Metropolis,* and Masaki Kobayashi's *Samurai Rebellion.* Perhaps French poet and singer Léo Ferré gave the most efficient definition in 1972: "Disorder is like order, but without power."

See also *Althusser, Louis; Bourdieu, Pierre; Censorship; Ideologies, Political; Internet and Politics; Marx, Karl; Propaganda; Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph; Public Opinion; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques.*

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Social Policy

Social policies can be defined as public interventions affecting the distribution of vital opportunities for citizens and their general well-being. Such a generic definition should acknowledge other public policies, not "social" in *sensu strictu,* which also aim at the improvement of people's living conditions and the advancement of social citizenship rights. Thus, social policies interact with education policies to provide a higher level of formal instruction to citizens, as well as with those policies concerning health promotion, access to housing, or subsidies for income maintenance purposes. In general, public polices concern either the individual (distributive and regulatory) or the society as a whole (constituent and redistributive). Social policies are mainly redistributive as they imply transfers and a balancing of resources and capacities among citizens.

Economic policies dealing with labor market participation are of particular relevance for the covering of citizens' social risks (e.g., disability, old age, personal care, sickness, or unemployment). In a broad sense, the term *social policy* is associated with the development of the welfare state. The latter can be defined as an aggregate of public institutions that provide social policies with the aim of achieving a better quality of life for citizens and to facilitate equal opportunities among them. Social scientists and policy makers would generally agree that a main tenet of social policy development concerns redistribution. However, redistribution, in some cases, produces unintended effects as well-off individuals often profit from their advantageous position according to what is known as the Matthew Principle: "For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath" (Mat. 13:12).

LEVELS OF PROVISION AND WELFARE MIX

Social policies operate on two main levels: (1) those services and benefits for employees (and their family dependents) who make contributions to the social insurance system during their working life or who are entitled to as taxpayers and (2) those noncontributory services and benefits provided by the public administration as social welfare or assistance to those citizens lacking sufficient material resources. However, there is overlap between both levels; in some countries, the social insurance system takes up social welfare responsibilities (e.g., income support for the frail elderly who are not entitled to contributory services or provision of social services to the poor).

Public social policies and social work, in both contributory and social assistance realms, count on the crucial role played by the families and the paramount role played by women's unpaid domestic work. Corporate welfare and voluntary associations also deliver, in some instances, full services and benefits that the public sector does not take on board by their own initiative or by means of contracting-out arrangements. This panoply of services, along with those available in the market, has led in some countries to the emergence of a "welfare mix," in which such interrelationship between the public and the private (both for-profit and nonprofit) is meant to be optimized.

Third-sector organizations, in particular, have been recognized as key partners of public authorities and professional groups in policy making.

The sociopolitical contexts in which social policies develop highly condition the structures of incentives, opportunities, and constraints for their implementation. Indeed, social policies are public interventions affecting spheres of private well-being. Their impacts may be distorted by decisions subject not only to structural considerations but, above all, to cultural traditions and value systems. Social interventions have an historical dimension that correlates with the processes of state formation and nation-building and with the peculiarities of the public administration or the party system in each country. Likewise, the civic cultures, the intellectual traditions, the forms of collective action, or the different degrees of influence and power exerted by groups or interests' coalitions are important factors shaping the type of social policies put in place nationally.

For purposes of comparisons among the various "welfare logics," countries may be grouped as they structure themselves around one particular organizing principle, ideological underpinning, or cultural commonality. Individual empowerment (liberal Anglo-Saxon), public egalitarianism (social-democratic Nordic), institutional partnership (corporatist continental), or familialistic interpenetration (Mediterranean and Latin regions) could be singled out as core tenets of the various worlds of welfare capitalism. Further to this, new supranational social models induced by globalization follow distinct paths in trying to combine both economic growth and social cohesion by means of workfare and welfare.

TARGETING AND UNIVERSALISM

Of high relevance for the provision of governmental social policies is the discussion between targeting and universalism. It has been generally argued that the implementation of public polices should follow strict criteria of selectivity. This was meant to ensure that disadvantaged groups would dispose of a comparative advantage or positive discrimination, and safety nets of social protection would be built in an effective manner. Likewise, it also has been pointed out that selectivity would avoid unwanted appropriation by well-off citizens of public monies and services targeted for the less-favored (Matthew Principle).

Alternatively, universal provision has been preferred as the institutional means to consolidate welfare arrangements for all citizens. From this perspective it has been argued that outcomes of market-based distribution are often more unequal than those of earnings-related social insurance programs. Paradoxically, and once time has elapsed in the long-term, non-targeted universal programs become more redistributive and effective than targeted ones.

The universal model can be highly redistributive, although it is counterintuitive because policy provision should follow the opposing strategy of "benefiting" the rich in order to benefit (in the long-run) the poor. Public opinion and voters' attitudes tend to be uneasy with the counterargument that you should avoid taking away money from the rich to combat poverty by providing policies to the poor. This is particularly evident in situations of cost-containment and financial constraints for the funding of social policies. In such situations, targeted means-testing appears as a better entrenched claim to neutralize attempts of welfare retrenchment. This contention, however, should be qualified in the case of universalistic welfare states where political strength is based on the solidaristic moral logic whereby the rich accept high taxes in order to distribute resources to those who cannot take care of themselves.

See also *Poverty; Social Security; Social Welfare; Third Sector; Welfare State.*

. . . .   LUIS MORENO

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Social Rights

See *Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.*

Social Security

Social security refers to a category of programs that insure individuals and families against the risk of income loss due to contingencies such as old age, disability, or death of the family breadwinner. As a government program, social security entails a set of legal entitlements to payments that allow individuals to smooth consumption over the life cycle with the goal of reducing insecurity and poverty. In most countries, pensions for old age, disability, and survivorship are the largest social security programs, followed by benefits for work injuries and occupational disease, sickness and maternity, family allowances, and unemployment. Although the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognized social security as a basic human right, the International Social Security Association estimates that less than 50 percent of the world's population is covered by some form of social protection.

Social security programs differ greatly around the world in the types of risks they insure and in their generosity and breadth of coverage. All forms of social security, however, share two basic features: universal provision and risk pooling. *Universal provision* means that all members of society are eligible for coverage, while *risk pooling* entails redistribution from the more fortunate (i.e., those members of society facing a lower risk of income loss) toward the more risk-prone (i.e., those who confront a higher chance of poverty due to the loss of earnings). These features distinguish social security from other social protections such as means-tested safety nets, which target a narrow segment of population with conditional benefits, from programs that redistribute income through the tax code, and from social policies that promote self-insurance through individual savings.

Even though some degree of mandatory social insurance is justified by economic theory as a means to increase the allocative efficiency of markets and by social philosophies to promote social justice, there is little common ground on the question of where to draw the line between individual and collective responsibility for income protection. As a result, a recurrent dilemma in social security politics exists over how to divide responsibility for income protection between the state and individual reliance on market institutions. The outcome of these political and economic conflicts is evidenced in the diverse forms that social security programs take around the world, ranging from generous universal and redistributive insurance schemes to mandatory private savings systems. In most nations, moreover, the dividing line between individual and collective responsibilities for income protection has been periodically redrawn in response to shifting demographic and economic landscapes and with changes in the balance of political and economic interests. Although the mid-twentieth century brought a vast expansion of state-sponsored social security programs around the world, by the end of the century more than twenty-five nations had shifted back toward market-based systems of income protection through at least some degree of privatization of social security.

ORIGINS

National compulsory social security programs trace their origins to the private sector, where medieval guilds and mutual-aid societies offered a means for individuals and families to share the risk of income loss and thus to achieve a level of economic security that they could not attain alone. It was rather late in the history of social insurance that governments began to use state authority to extend basic insurance principles to broad segments of society. In France, for instance, there were 1,420 private mutual aid societies providing old age pensions by 1904 when the state first entered this terrain. The relatively late entry of the state into the social insurance business owes in part to the fact that prior to the twentieth century the risk of income loss was not considered a *social* problem. With the process of industrialization, however, wide-scale migration to cities meant that workers could no longer rely on the land, their families, or the local parish for income protection. As workers acquired greater political rights, they began to demand broad protections against the array of new risks associated with wage dependence in an industrial economy.

State sponsorship of social security grew in close connection with processes of economic development around the world. But economic concerns were not the only motive behind state sponsorship of social security; many governments also had political reasons for doing so. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck of Germany, for instance, is said to have established the first national social security program in 1891 to tame labor unrest and limit the growth of socialism among industrial workers. "Whoever has a pension assured to him for his old age," Bismarck famously said, "is more contented and easier to manage than a man who has none." Despite such instrumental and sometimes undemocratic origins, by the mid-twentieth century social security institutions had expanded far beyond the minimally functional level needed either to promote economic development or forestall worker revolt. Social security grew on the force of middle-class demands in democratic societies and with the encouragement of diverse social and political philosophies. Ascendant social democratic parties defended social insurance on universalistic principles of equal citizenship and social worth, while Catholic social doctrine upheld more conservative designs based on a male-breadwinner model; corporatist principles, in turn, supported more stratified social insurance programs, wherein benefits were tied closely to income levels. In the United States, the long-standing resistance to broad government interventions in the economy was diminished by the depth and intensity of the Great Depression, which resulted in broad innovations in financial regulation and social welfare provision. The U.S. Social Security Act of 1935 drew on the principles of universal earned rights, offering wage-related, but redistributive, pension benefits for old age and disability.

Government sponsorship of social security took root in the developing world at the end of the nineteenth century as an instrument of early state-building projects. In Latin America, pensions were offered to veterans of independence wars and to civil servants manning outposts in fledgling states laying claim to territorial sovereignty. Social security programs later were expanded as part of state-led industrialization efforts under populist governments such as Juan Perón in Argentina, Getúlio Vargas in Brazil, and Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico. Social security benefits were typically offered to the urban, formal-sector workers that formed the political bases of these regimes and thus bore the heavy imprint of intersectoral differences in organizational strength and political clout of these workers. In most developing countries, informal sector workers have largely remained excluded from coverage by traditional social security programs.

The decades after the Second World War (1939–1945) brought a rapid diffusion of social security institutions around the world. In the advanced industrial nations, the postwar years were called the "golden age" of the welfare state, as strong macroeconomic growth in the 1950s and 1960s fueled broad political acceptance of government-sponsored social insurance. Social security also laid the foundation for a new social bargain in advanced industrial nations that underpinned the

reestablishment of the liberal international trading order that had collapsed in the interwar years. In this bargain, social benefits were provided as compensation for acceptance of the risk and cost of openness to the international economy.

Declining economic performance in the 1970s, along with rising demographic and fiscal pressures, opened the door to renewed political conflicts over the balance between state and market responsibilities for social security. The first signs of this dispute emerged as early as the mid-1960s, although critics of the welfare state only gained momentum in the 1980s. Neoliberals, as they were called, drew on classical liberal ideas to criticize big government and bureaucracy as inefficient and detrimental to individual freedom and responsibility. They argued that the public sector had become a burden on economic activity and had crowded out private investment; as a remedy, they called for a broadening of market forces in the economic and social realms. The liberalization movement drew strength from the economic downturn that gripped the advanced industrial nations in the 1970s, spurring widespread liberalization of trade and financial transactions, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and the deregulation of a host of economic activities over which the state had taken control in the postwar era.

In the developing world, the debt crisis of the 1980s signaled what many believed to be the failure of state-led industrialization projects and thus the necessity of reducing the state presence in the economic and social realms. Proponents of free markets argued that state-led development projects had not only failed to secure the benefits of growth for most of society, but also that market reforms would reverse the inequalities and sectoral privileges that were created by state intervention. The final decades of the twentieth century thus brought extensive efforts to broaden the role of market forces in society and curtail the state's allocative functions, including in the provision of social security.

Social security institutions thus became the objects of extensive reform efforts around the world in the final decades of the twentieth century. In most cases, such reforms involved adjustments to the contribution or benefit rates of existing social security systems to reduce costs or increase revenue. In other cases, reforms entailed a fundamental restructuring of the means and ends of income protection, such as through privatization. Some degree of social security reform is required periodically to keep pace with changing demographic and economic landscapes. This is because the effect of increasing life expectancy and declining fertility raise the number of retired persons relative to the working populations, obliging governments to finance their greater social security obligations with the income from a smaller working-age population. The looming retirement of large "baby boom" populations thus raised the specter of wide financial imbalances if adjustments were not made to the social security programs in many countries.

Demographic pressures have been particularly acute in the advanced industrial nations, where the United Nations estimates that the share of the population over age sixty-five will rise by 83 percent between 2000 and 2050—from to 14.3

to 26.1 percent of the population. Although elderly populations are relatively smaller in middle-income countries, sharp declines in fertility have brought an even more rapid increase in the age profile of those nations. Indeed, the UN estimates that population over age sixty-five will grow by 188 percent between 2000 and 2050—from an average of 5.1 to 14.7 percent of the population in less-developed nations. Urbanization and informalization of the labor force in poorer nations, moreover, have increased demands for social protection just as the contribution base for such programs has narrowed. The result has been the emergence of wide financial deficits in social security programs around the developing and developed world, and broad calls for shifts in the terms on which social insurance benefits have been provided.

SOCIAL SECURITY PRIVATIZATION

Privatization involves a fundamental revision to the basic elements of risk pooling and universalism in social security. In the latter instance, privatization entails a shift from universal eligibility for state-funded social insurance benefits toward the conditioning of such benefits on criteria such as means testing. In addition, the risk of income loss that is shared broadly within and across generations through social security is transferred to the individual, whose fortune in the marketplace becomes the central, although by no means exclusive, factor determining her level of income protection. In practical terms, social security privatization involves three basic changes to conventional social insurance programs. Even though none of these changes implies or requires the other, they have typically been bundled in political discourse and practice. The first is a shift in the way that old age benefits are determined, from the traditional defined benefit system, wherein the pension benefit formula is prescribed by law (often in relation to earnings and years of work), toward a defined contribution scheme, in which only contribution rates are defined ex ante, while benefits vary according to the individual's contribution history and the return to invested funds. This change tightens the link between contributions and benefits to eliminate most elements of income redistribution in the benefit formula. Privatization also involves a shift away from the method of financing pensions on a pay-as-you-go basis, wherein the payroll contributions of the current labor force are used to finance ongoing pension benefits, toward one in which benefits are funded fully by each worker's own payroll contributions. And finally, pension privatization entails a transfer of responsibility for managing pension funds from the state to private sector firms or occupational schemes. The state, however, retains important regulatory and oversight functions in privatized systems and is also the ultimate guarantor of the private insurance market.

Heralded as a "revolution" in social security, privatization was first adopted at the national level by the military regime of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile, which replaced the country's social insurance pension institution with a system of individual retirement accounts managed by private sector firms. Beginning in 1981, workers entering the labor force in Chile would no longer pay into the national social security

system, but instead contribute to private retirement accounts through which they receive a pension based on their own contributions and the returns to invested funds. Social security privatization diffused rapidly around the world in the quarter-century after the Chilean reform, revealing strong correlations in space and time as privatization in one nation was followed closely by similar reforms in nearby nations. Indeed, since 1990 more than a dozen Latin American countries have passed legislation to replace state-run social insurance programs in various degrees with private savings schemes. Those reformed institutions typically involve a mix of traditional public risk-pooling systems and private individual savings accounts; however, the relative balance between the two components has varied significantly across nations. By the end of 2008, more than seventy-seven million people were affiliated with a private pension fund in Latin America and more than US$2,263 billion in retirement savings was invested in those systems. Outside of Latin America, eastern Europe and central Asia have been the location of the most transformative social security reforms. More than ten countries in that region have implemented some form of privatization, although the political and financial legacies of earlier social insurance programs encouraged the maintenance of a larger state presence in reformed pension systems. By 2008, five of the countries with significant private pension markets (Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Poland, Romania, and Russia) recorded more than thirty-four million workers affiliated with a private pension fund, and more than US$89 billion invested by those funds.

Advocates of social security privatization argue that this reform makes a positive contribution to capital formation and to individual choice and freedom. With equal conviction, opponents of privatization warn of the financial risks that are placed on the shoulders of individuals who must bear the cost of unwise or inappropriate investment choices and of an array of macroeconomic and labor market risks that lay beyond individual control. Experts on both sides of the reform debate agree, however, that restoring the financial and actuarial balance to social security programs may be achieved either by revising the parameters of the existing state-sponsored social insurance program, or through privatization.

As the twenty-first century began, the privatization movement in social security began to show signs of slowing; in countries like Argentina and Chile, governments even began to reverse earlier privatization decisions. In East Asia, where responsibility for social security functions has long resided principally in the private realm, governments such as that of the Republic of Korea have instead begun to expand the public sector role in social insurance. Yet other countries have forged a new path in social insurance by introducing a reform model that establishes individual retirement accounts, but without privatization. Whether this marks the beginning of a new trend is as yet unclear.

Because social security institutions play a significant role in the allocation of income and risk in a society, they are likely to remain subject to political and distributional conflicts. And even though the pressures of ever-shifting demographic and economic landscapes are likely to maintain a place for social security on the reform agenda, the outcome of such reforms efforts will remain far from determined.

See also *Social Welfare; Welfare State.*

. . . . SARAH M. BROOKS

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Social Structure

See *Party and Social Structure.*

Social Welfare

A *social welfare policy* is any policy that improves the welfare of citizens. As a result, a range of programs affecting the health, education, housing, employment, civil rights, and economic conditions of citizens can qualify as a social welfare policy. However, the primary types of social welfare policies are ones

that protect the benefits of those who have contributed to society and ones that provide benefits or services to those who fall below certain income levels. This entry discusses the distinguishing features of these two types of social welfare programs, as well as the main issues surrounding them.

SOCIAL INSURANCE

Social insurance is, perhaps, the most recognizable social welfare policy. These policies aim to maintain the income of citizens who had contributed to society when they are experiencing economic or social distress. For example, Germany enacted a compulsory sickness insurance program for industrial workers in 1883. By the end of World War I (1914–1918), most of western Europe, the United States, and Canada had adopted similar programs. Today, almost every nation has some form of worker's compensation program that provides cash or medical benefits to workers who suffer job-related injuries. Most of these programs are financed by employer contributions and are usually administered through a central financing scheme. In the United States, worker's compensation is implemented at the state level, and it is much more limited in coverage than in many other nations.

Other types of social insurance programs focus on providing cash benefits or medical care to citizens because of other types of economic or social situations, such as retirement, unemployment, sickness, or maternity. The structure, coverage, financing, and administration of these programs vary widely across nations. Some countries (like Japan) implement programs in a very centralized manner using national-level organizations; others (Canada and the United States) rely more heavily on subnational governmental jurisdictions. Some countries (e.g., Sweden) provide fairly generous benefits, while others (like Britain) use more restrictive criteria to determine who is covered and what benefits they receive. There are also a variety of different funding mechanisms and implementation designs in use. For example, Germany relies extensively on taxes from the current workforce to pay for program benefits and services (referred to as *pay-as-you-go* systems), while Japan depends on private pension schemes in which individuals invest independently for their future retirement.

The largest, most expensive, and best known social insurance policy is the old-age pension plan program. In most countries, this program began by providing benefits to those who had made direct contributions into the system. Over the years this program has extended to cover additional groups in society (e.g., widows and children of workers) and the idea of receiving benefits is now widely viewed as a "right" of citizenship in most nations—regardless of previous contributions, earnings, or conditions. This, in turn, has placed greater demands on old-age pension systems to maintain higher benefit levels and services for much larger portions of the population.

SOCIAL ASSISTANCE

Social assistance is the second major type of social welfare policy. Here, benefits are distributed to those who fall below a certain income level or meet specific eligibility criteria (e.g., parents of low-income children or individuals with severe medical problems). Social assistance programs are not designed to maintain the income levels of those who have previously contributed. Instead, they aim to provide a basic level of support (social safety net) to those who could not provide for themselves and their families. Social assistance programs (such as the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program in the United States) are often more controversial than their social insurance counterparts. Those who receive social assistance benefits do not make payments or contributions into the system. Instead, the funding is redistributed from those who can pay to those who are in need of assistance.

THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC VERSUS THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Public institutions play a key role in the development and implementation of contemporary social welfare programs. However, private and nonprofit organizations (e.g., individual families, charity associations, religious groups, community organizations) also have long been involved in the provision of social welfare around the world. The mix of governmental and private sector activity in social welfare policy making has varied across nations and across time. As such, the role of the public sector versus the private sector often is used to identify different reasons for and patterns of national social program development, as well as different types or models of social welfare systems. Government involvement is still an important aspect of contemporary social policy. But many nations have reduced their public sector social welfare commitments (because of demographic shifts, increased citizen demands for services, declining revenues, and general economic problems), encouraging greater participation by the private sector.

OTHER LINGERING QUESTIONS

In addition to the public versus private discussion, there are a number of other lingering questions about contemporary social welfare policies. Is it the responsibility of everyone in society to pay for social welfare services, or should benefits be tied more directly to individual contributions and obligations? Should social welfare services be provided universally, or should they be restricted to those who have the greatest financial need? In sum, what have been the impacts of social welfare policies? Do they actually improve the lives and welfare of citizens?

See also *Social Security; Welfare State.*

SAUNDRA K. SCHNEIDER
. . . .   AND NICCOLE M. PAMPHILIS

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Society and the Individual

See *Individual and Society.*

Sociobiology and Politics

Sociobiology, the synthesis of ethology and population biology, was both hailed and damned when it was first presented systematically in Edward O. Wilson's 1975 pathbreaking volume of the same name. Spurred by Wilson's promise that this emerging new field would lead to the absorption of the social sciences and humanities, a group of political scientists—already intrigued by the promise of rapidly advancing findings in the life sciences—responded to Wilson's challenge by examining connections between the two fields of inquiry. By 1982, one study by Joseph Losco and Donna Baird found that eighty-eight articles and papers had been authored by political scientists exploring the potential contributions of the new synthesis to their own discipline. The majority of these papers were authored by a small core of political scientists, with nine authors accounting for 64 percent of the output. Most of these scholarly works were generated by political theorists exploring epistemological connections between the two fields.

A second census published fourteen years later found that scholarly output connecting sociobiology or its ethological and evolutionary subcomponents to political phenomena climbed by 326 articles and papers between 1981 and 1994. The number of scholars contributing to this pool had increased to eighty-six. However, most of the entries continued to come from a core of about twenty-five researchers. While most of these continued to focus on theoretic and epistemological issues, a growing number of about 20 percent involved some type of empirical application using historical data, measurable ethological observation, game theoretic modeling, or experimentation.

At its core, sociobiology posits the evolution of adaptive behaviors and strategies via inclusive fitness. Accordingly, individuals can achieve reproductive success not only through their own reproductive activities but also by advancing the reproductive fitness of related individuals with whom they share genetic material. This discovery allowed biologists to explain a number of social behaviors, such as reciprocity and altruism, that had previously eluded explication through strict Darwinian individual selection. Inclusive fitness was given a strong boost by the works of W. H. Hamilton in 1964 and Robert Trivers in 1971, among others, who demonstrated robust empirical support through experimentation and observation in the natural world. The evolution of acts like altruism could now be explained by reference to the fitness benefits conferred upon related others. Thus, a warning cry issued by a prairie dog could save a sufficient number of kin to compensate for the loss of its own genes at the hands of a predator alerted by its call. Sociobiologists have shown also that species can alter the sex ratio of their offspring depending on social rank and that levels of parental investment necessary to raise offspring to reproductive age can account for differing mating strategies by males and females, as shown by Robert Trivers and Dan Willard in 1973.

The potential applicability of this paradigm for understanding human behavior led a number of political scientists to utilize sociobiological theory to analyze phenomena like aggression and warfare, as described by J. Van der Dennen and V. Falger in 1990; leadership, covered by James Schubert in 1988; sexual politics, studies by Glendon Schubert in 1991; reciprocity and coalition building, studied by Robert Axelrod in 1986; and authoritarianism, as shown by Albert Somit and Steven Peterson in 1997. Still, most contributors continued to produce works focusing on sociobiology's theoretical insights about human nature, such as Roger Masters' work in 1989, and on theory building, studied by Peter Corning in 1983.

While mainstream biology has accepted many of the Wilson's ideas despite much early criticism, political science has had less success than sister disciplines like anthropology in generating substantive empirical findings of its own with this new paradigm, partly because of differences in the levels of analysis engaged by each discipline. While sociobiology focuses on units of evolutionary time and ultimate causation, most political scientists seek to explain proximate causes of behavior. As a result, political scientists who employ biological approaches today are more likely to focus on factors issuing from such fields as neuroscience.

See also *Bioethics and Politics; Biology and Political Science; Ecological Analysis; Empiricism; Political Ecology.*

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Socrates

Socrates (469–399 BCE) was a classical Greek philosopher whose thought had a profound influence on his field. Little is known about his early and middle years, although according to ancient tradition, he worked as a stonecutter. The fact that he served as a *helot* (heavily armed foot-soldier) in the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE) indicates that during the early years of the war he was roughly middle class, because helots were required to provide their own armor. At some time during this period, Socrates began the mission of moral reform for which he became famous. He passed his time examining and arguing with his fellow Athenians, subjecting them to his *elenchus* ("test" or "refutation") in order to inquire into the moral subjects that interested him and to inspire them to care for virtue and knowledge. Socrates' followers included not only Plato, but Alcibiades and Critias, both of whom later betrayed the Athenian democracy. Possibly because of such notorious connections, in 399 BCE Socrates was accused of impiety and corrupting the young. Different versions of his defense speech are extant. In Plato's *Apology of Socrates* (c. 395), Socrates defiantly defends his entire life, describing himself as a great benefactor to the city—a gadfly, who stings it to keep it awake—and claims that the Athenians would harm themselves in killing him. In spite of—or perhaps to some extent because of—his defense, Socrates was convicted, sentenced to death, and executed.

Exclusively an oral teacher, Socrates himself left no record of his teaching. At some point, however, his followers began to write down his conversations. From this practice arose the *Socratic dialogue* as a literary genre, examples of which survive in works of Plato and Xenophon. Irresolvable conflicts between the main sources of information regarding Socrates have given rise to the *Socratic problem,* an effort to distinguish the actual historical figure from the many depictions of him put forth by varied authors and interpreters. Recent scholars generally place the greatest weight on the depiction of Socrates in Plato's Socratic dialogues, which are consistent with Aristotle's account. The brilliant, ironic personality depicted by Plato embodies the practice of philosophy at its best and most morally serious. In *Phaedo* (1871), Plato describes Socrates as "the best and wisest and most righteous man" then living.

As expressed in Plato's *Apology,* Socrates claimed to be ignorant, but to be superior to other Athenians in recognizing his own ignorance, and so being motivated to seek the moral knowledge he felt he lacked. In spite of this self-description, Socrates held definite moral views, as expressed in the so-called Socratic paradoxes, that virtue is knowledge and all wrongdoing is due to ignorance. Because Socrates also believed that virtue is both necessary and sufficient for happiness, he willingly allowed himself to be executed rather than commit injustice—including escaping from prison to avoid execution.

Although on one occasion Socrates secured a place on the Athenian Council and fought unsuccessfully against a popular measure he viewed as illegal, he generally avoided Athenian politics. Although apparently without a developed political philosophy, he was highly critical of Athenian democracy. He decried the emotional instability of the populace and is depicted by Plato as a vigorous opponent of the Sophists—teachers of the rhetorical arts that political figures used to manipulate the mob. Socrates also objected to the Athenian practice of assigning political office by lot, as this placed government in unqualified hands. Still, he was devoted to Athens, rarely venturing outside its limits, and dedicated his life to improving his fellow citizens. Although his mission was carried on in a private capacity, in Plato's *Gorgias* (c. 385 BCE), Socrates describes himself as the only Athenian who attempted "the true art of statesmanship," because his actions were always aimed at what was best instead of what was most pleasant.

See also *Aristotle; Greek Political Thought, Ancient; Plato; Political Thought, Foundations of; Xenophon.*

. . . .   GEORGE KLOSKO

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Sophists

The *Sophists* were itinerant teachers for hire who taught how to argue effectively and to advance interests in judicial, civic, and business forums in Greece, especially in Athens, largely during the second half of the fifth century BCE. It is clear from the texts of contemporaries that the Sophists played leading roles in articulating important trends that both arose from major Athenian and Greek advances during the period and challenged traditional views and customs. A robust classical democracy was put together in Athens by 458, and after the Greeks repulsed the Persians in 478, for about half a century Athens accumulated what amounted to an empire, making itself the centre of commerce, power, and culture in Greece and the region. The Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta began in 431 and ended with the defeat of Athens in 404, bringing to a close what some have called the Age of the Sophists. The most famous Sophists include Protagoras, Gorgias, and Thrasymachus.

The term *sophist* originally meant possessor of skill or wisdom, but in the fifth century the term also meant strategic cleverness. The ability to advance one's interests in various forums was essential, and the Sophists taught the requisite rhetorical skills. Occasionally they displayed their skills for fees in large public demonstrations in which they might make

weaker arguments defeat stronger ones, for example. In general, students who could afford individual instruction were taught how to use discourse as a means to their ends—how to defeat any suit brought against them in court, for example—as well as complementary intellectual views, often with relativistic implications, which challenged traditional religion and morality. According to the most extreme of their views, the reason why most people are law abiding is that they are weak, whereas a few powerful individuals pursue their own interests according to their natures regardless of social conventions such as law—this is and ought to be the way of the world.

Very little of what individual Sophists taught has come down to us except as reported in the works of others, most notably in the dialogues of Plato, who criticized their views through his favorite character Socrates, modeled on his admired teacher by the same name who lived during the age of the sophists. Socrates often debated leading figures in Athens and showed by argument that the strong and powerful could not defend their views against the criticisms of inconsequential figures such as himself. He attracted an audience and seemed to some to be a Sophist, but the pursuit of knowledge was for him an end in itself, not a means to personal gain.

Reacting against the pre-Socratics—the first philosophers in the Western tradition—whose various attempts to account for "all things" rationally according to underlying natural principles led to so many counterintuitive and mutually inconsistent conclusions, the Sophists turned to apparent political reality and what individuals could accomplish in it. Plato and Aristotle defined themselves against the Sophists to a great degree and developed the deeply universal and antirelativist moral and political philosophies that were to dominate much of the Western intellectual tradition.

See also *Aristotle; Greek Political Thought, Ancient; Plato.*

. . . .   JOHN DUNCAN

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Sorel, Georges

Georges Sorel (1847–1922) was a French social philosopher and political theorist. He was the author of controversial and incendiary works on a range of topics, including the essence of socialism, the decadence of modern society, and the role of violence in politics.

The seeming contradictions in Sorel's life and work are numerous. He was a socialist who repudiated the most influential forms of socialist and Marxist doctrine. He was a radical proponent of the workers' movement who embraced, for a time, certain of the royalist doctrines of ultraconservatives such as French author and critic Charles Maurras. He was admired by Italian dictator Benito Mussolini and other Fascists but also by many on the far left, and he himself admired, again for a time, both Russian revolutionaries and American captains of industry. If his political ideas reflect, above all, the influence of

French philosopher Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's anarchism and mutualism, his later thought owes much to the pragmatism of William James, the American philosopher and psychologist.

Sorel's writings are nonetheless underwritten by a set of fundamental philosophical and moral commitments that give his work a distinctive and highly unified character. Primary among these is an emphasis on the idea of the *heroic.* For Sorel, heroism is a deeply moral quality involving a kind of mysterious and creative pursuit of lofty deeds. It is not an exclusively elitist category. If the protagonists of Homeric epic and the swashbuckling entrepreneurs of American capitalism are, for Sorel, exemplars of the heroic, so too are the warrior/farmers of ancient Athens and the worker revolutionaries of the modern age.

Closely connected to Sorel's emphasis on heroism is a sharp criticism of bourgeois culture. Such a culture represses the heroic impulse in favor of a decadent preoccupation with abstract, intellectualized notions such as the maximization of utility, the inevitability of social progress, distributive justice, and historical materialism. Sorel's critique resonates—and explicitly invokes—German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche's repudiation of middle-class values and French philosopher Henri Bergson's embrace of the élan vital or life force. But Sorel also attacks the laxity of bourgeois morals and insists on a mode of social action that is grounded in a conservative, even puritanical conception of moral virtue that emphasizes traditional family values.

Sorel's political thought endorses socialism, understood, however, not as a theory or program but as a movement of workers. He believed that the social, historical, and economic doctrines of Marxist intellectuals are often irrelevant, even counterproductive. What matters is the spirit of rebellion. That spirit can be activated by the so-called myth of the general strike, that is, the idea of a full-scale workers' rejection of capitalist domination. The importance of the myth depends less on the possibility that a general strike might actually occur than on its function as a source of inspiration and revolutionary zeal. In this context, Sorel offers a qualified defense of violence, conceived as something sharply different from and opposed to the brutal and calculated force of the state and also as something to be invoked less for strategic reasons than for its connection to the heroic virtues. Sorel's emphasis on socialism as a movement involves, as well, a rejection not only of the bourgeois state but also of the state per se. The result is a political doctrine that perhaps most closely resembles the standpoint of anarchosyndicalism.

See also *French Political Thought; Political Philosophy; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph; Socialism.*

. . . .   PETER J. STEINBERGER

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Sources of Law

The sources of law have changed over time. It is not possible to find one single source or form of law in any society. Various streams of authorities flow into the whole of a particular legal tradition. Which sources of law are predominant depends on the nature of the political system and historical legal development.

COMMON–LAW TRADITION

America's tripartite (three-part) government provides three major sources of law: legislative, judicial, and executive. The legislature, or elected representatives of the people, enacts statutes that are enforced by the executive branch. Administrative law and regulations are promulgated by executive agencies to carry out the legislative intent of statutes. The courts—state or federal—interpret statutes, administrative rules and regulations, and other cases to determine the outcome of litigation. As part of America's inherited English common-law tradition, judicial precedent is important. The doctrine of *stare decisis* plays a major role in American jurisprudence. By placing great weight on prior court decisions (*precedent*) at either the state or federal level, the judiciary seeks to provide stability, certainty, and continuity for America's polity. On questions of constitutionality and other particular kinds of cases, federal courts have original jurisdiction. As with those of other modern nation-states, the U.S. Constitution is written and granted supremacy over state law. Issues fundamental to American political society may be adjudicated by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, the importance of the judiciary in America is not universal. In England, parliamentary sovereignty overshadows the role of the courts. Yet, even though legislation has been on the increase since the rise of Parliament after the Glorious Revolution (1688), the common law as originally developed from a combination of German customary law, feudal law, and Roman-canonical law has considerable force and power in shaping the English Commonwealth. Perhaps the fact that the English constitution remains unwritten underscores this historical belief in the common law as an organic source of political authority.

CIVIL–LAW TRADITION

The civil law dates as far back as the Twelve Tables in Rome (450 BCE) and is the predominant legal system in the world. The origin of the common law is dated at 1066 when William the Conqueror won the Battle of Hastings; however, the customs, practices, and traditions of the Anglo-Saxons had been rooted in societal legal norms before this time. In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon common-law tradition, where judge-made law and customary practices of the populace are paramount, and where the law of equity developed giving discretionary power to judges, the civil-law tradition relies on legislative codification. Roman emperor Justinian authorized the Corpus Juris Civilis (Justinian Code), which when completed in 533 served as a source of codified law for later comprehensive statutes, such as the Code Napoléon of 1804.

The canon law of the Roman Catholic Church integrated the Roman legal tradition into its form and substance. The Roman-canonic *jus commune,* which developed in the medieval period, transcended localities, communities, and nations and provided a legal structure for feudalism. Modern nation-states eventually replaced the *jus commune* with legal positivism. A rejection of the *jus commune* on the continent and adoption of nationalistic positive legal systems gave sovereignty to the state that had belonged to the royal rulers under the divine right of king's theory.

In addition to Roman law and church canon law, commercial law developed within the civil-law tradition, forming the basis for international law. The International Court of Justice located at The Hague, Netherlands, has jurisdiction over cases arising under private international law and public international law, such as the United Nations Charter.

The predominant source of law in the civil tradition is statutes—legislative acts pursuant to the sovereign power of the state. Implementation of statutes requires administrative regulations as a second source of law. There is customary law, but it does not hold the same influence as the common law does in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. In civil-law legal systems, the statute has the higher authority over regulations and customs.

DIVISION OF JURISDICTION OF COURTS

The types of courts in a common-law system differ from that of civil law. Typically, in a common-law country, such as the United States and Britain, there is a unified system wherein civil and criminal cases are adjudicated within a hierarchy of laws—the Supreme Court being the highest in the United States. Both civil and criminal procedures apply, depending on the case with constitutional guarantees of right to trial by jury, due process, the right to remain silent, and so on. In common-law systems, there can be administrative courts, as in the United States, which give executive agencies judicial power to decide cases within their statutory authority. Notwithstanding, an appeal to a judicial court is available to the losing party of an administrative hearing. Cases at law and equity are divided along lines of remedies for particular kinds of legal actions. For example, the remedy of specific performance under a contract is available under the law of equity, most likely to be decided by the same court and judges as a cause of action under ordinary law. Whether it is a legal action involving constitutional law, commercial law, civil law, or criminal law and whether it is based on a common-law right, statute, or constitution, the adjudication of a claim follows the course of a unified system. A basic trust in the judiciary and the overlapping, yet separate, powers of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches account for confidence placed in ordinary courts in the United States.

In civil-law countries, separate courts, each with its own hierarchy, is more typical. This corresponds to the stricter separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The ordinary courts in France have various sources: elements of jurisdiction formerly distributed among the civil courts of the *jus commune,* ecclesiastical courts, commercial courts, and the special tribunal created after the French Revolution (1789–1799) to interpret statutes. In addition, there is

a separate, independent system of administrative courts—the Council of State—which has developed what is known as the *droit administratif,* a large body of administrative law determining the rights and duties between the state and its citizens. This law derives its authority from executive power, not the judiciary, consistent with the less influential role judges play in the civil law. Because of the comprehensive codification of law in statutes, legal science and scholarly interpretations have more influence. And, although a Constitutional Council was established in France during the mid-twentieth century, it does not have the power of judicial review that an American court possesses. It serves more of a political than judicial role, as the executive courts of administrative law make the ultimate determination.

Even though common-law and civil-law traditions have fundamental differences in history, development, and attitude toward law, there are unifying sources of law, such as customary, statutory, administrative, judicial, and constitutional, which in various degrees of substance and form function within a polity to achieve order and justice, and ensure the individual rights of its citizenry. The particular characteristics of a judicial system arise from the political philosophy of a society about where to place sovereignty and whether or not it is centralized or divided into a balance of power between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.

See also *Administrative Law; Civil Law; Common Law; Constitutional Law; Law, Comparative; Law and Society; Natural Law; Rule of Law.*

. . . . JOANNE TETLOW

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South (Third World)

The *South*—sometimes referred to as the *global South*—refers to the poorer countries in the international system, which are viewed also as lacking influence over the working of the international system and its institutions and are located in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

While this is not an homogenous group of countries, there is a relatively clear pattern of stratification in the international economic system that separates them from the rich countries of the North, as the following table indicates, using World Bank classifications.

The first, low income, group is firmly within the South; the second and third are largely so (but include Russia and some of the poorer economies of eastern Europe). If we equate the "solid" South with the low and lower-middle groups, then

TABLE 1

	NATIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA	SHARE OF WORLD INCOME	SHARE OF WORLD POPULATION
Low Income	$2,698	9.7%	36.9%
Lower-Middle Income	$7,020	23.9%	34.9%
Upper-Middle Income	$10,817	13.1%	12.4%
High Income	$34,701	53.3%	15.7%

SOURCE: From data in World Bank, *World Development Report 2008* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007). Income in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Terms, 2006.

it contains almost 72 percent of the world's population but accounts for only 33.6 percent of world income.

THE THIRD WORLD IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

In the past, various terms have been used for this group of states. One which gained widespread currency was that of *third world*. This had the advantage of being a systemic concept, differentiating these countries from both the industrial societies of the capitalist *first world* and *second world* states that had adopted the state-socialist model. The logic of this term has been eroded with the disappearance of any coherent socialist bloc; however, its long history and analytic strengths lead many social scientists and political activists to continue to use the expression.

The third world effectively emerged as an international force in the post–World War II (1939–1945) era when a large number of colonial states achieved independence from European rule, joining the group of poorer states that had maintained their formal independence, such as those of Central and South America and China.

The process of decolonization took varied forms in different parts of the world, but in most cases was associated with a new, assertive nationalism that sought both to establish a unifying national political identity for the new states and to claim a significant place for them in the international order. The pioneering role in this process was played by India, which gained independence in 1947 under the leadership of a mass nationalist organization, the Indian National Congress, and a leader, Nehru, from its radical and internationalist wing. In some cases, the emerging national leaderships remained more closely tied to their former colonial masters. This introduced from an early stage a division in the third world between those states committed to assertive political and developmental policies and those prepared to accept a *neocolonial* status of continued subordination. The latter group often was shored up through external support from the former colonial powers in Africa and from the United States in Latin America.

By the mid-1950s radical nationalist currents had taken power in several third world states—in particular in India, Indonesia, and Egypt. An attempt was made to coordinate

their role in the international political system under the banner of *nonalignment*. This doctrine sought to create a space, both domestic and international, between the cold war rivals capitalism and state-socialism. Nonaligned states refused to cast in their lots with either of these camps, claiming the right to adopt distinct positions in international affairs and to pursue national developmental policies that were socialist in some respects (for example, by undertaking land reform, expanding state ownership, and nationalizing some Western business operations) without embracing the full state-socialist model or excluding trade and investment ties with the capitalist states.

In April 1955, representatives of twenty-nine nonaligned governments met at the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, and in 1961, at the Belgrade Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was born as a formal organization. The NAM has lacked sufficient coherence to be a major international force, but it continues in existence, with 118 members as of 2009. It provides a framework for coordination of views between third world states and was responsible for the launch of the proposal for a New International Economic Order in 1973. It also played an initiating role in the creation of the Group of 77 (formed in 1964–1967), which seeks to coordinate third world positions in international economic negotiations. This structure—which as of 2008 has some 130 member states—overlaps closely with the NAM, but its focus on common economic interests has allowed it to become a more coherent force. The Group of 77 provides probably the best political definition of which states belong to the South or the third world in the international system.

THE THIRD WORLD IN SOCIAL SCIENCE THEORY

In the course of the 1950s and 1960s, two predominant paradigms emerged in the social sciences claiming to provide a social scientific understanding and policy prescriptions for the new third world states. One was modernization theory, the most influential approach in the academic mainstream of the North. The thrust of modernization theory was to assign the primary explanation for the backwardness of third world societies to internal forces. It saw the situation of the South as a result of their backwardness with respect to modern social structures that had developed in the North under the impetus of capitalism and industrialization. The challenge facing third world countries was to modernize their social institutions on the model of the developed countries and in its wake would follow economic development, rising income levels, and political democracy. Most modernization theorists felt that the postindependence elites had positive modernization agendas, although they were concerned that these were in danger of being derailed by hostile internal (and sometimes external) forces. A variant of this theory is the concept of *political development,* which accorded the political sphere some autonomy but applied the same modernization framework to it.

A contrary view was taken by the *dependency* school, which became increasingly influential from the 1960s onward. Linked with both Marxist academics and, especially in Latin America, with left-wing nationalist political forces, the dependency approach argued that the structural economic and social factors behind the poverty of third world countries had been created by the way they had been integrated into the international economy since the colonial period. The main source of third world poverty was not a failure to develop, but a particular form of development imposed by Western imperialism. In the memorable phrase of one of the pioneers of dependency theory, Andre Gunder Frank, what the third world suffered from was "the development of underdevelopment." The main cause of third world backwardness was thus external and the solution lay in breaking away from the externally oriented patterns imposed by imperialism and developing more autonomous, indigenous forms of economic activity.

The political conclusions of the dependency school were varied. On the one hand many of its advocates embraced a socialist model of third world development on Cuban or Chinese lines. Others, like the economists associated with the UN Economic Commission for Latin America, took a more reformist approach and promoted an *import substitution industrialization* (ISI) model of economic development that advocated shifting economic activities from primary producing export sectors to home-market based industrialization, with the support of tariff barriers.

Both modernization and dependency theories have been subject to extensive criticism. The modernization approach was seen as ignoring the historical specificity of third world societies and the international context of their development. Dependency theory suffered from the failure of the many attempts by third world countries to pursue ISI-based policies, and their almost universal conversion, under the pressure of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, to a model of export-oriented growth and market liberalization. The ability of some third world economies, in the context of a shift in the international division of labor, to sustain significant industrial development, appeared to refute the original expectations of dependency theory.

However, dependency theory could claim to have captured more accurately the reality of third world societies: a distinct "underdeveloped" economic and social structure, characterized by a small, technologically modern industrial sector alongside a large agrarian and urban informal sector plagued by low levels of productivity and high levels of underemployment. These features look more like a distinct structural pattern, rather than a holdover from some "premodern" past, and this can explain why they have proved so intractable, despite decades of efforts to address underdevelopment.

THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF THIRD WORLD STATES

Much of the contemporary policy debates over the third world and its problems appear to be between descendants of either the modernization or dependency schools. For example, the views of the neoconservative architects of U.S. foreign policy seem firmly within the modernization tradition, while

the perspectives of the new Latin American left owe much to the arguments of the dependency school.

The distinct social structure of underdevelopment has given the South correspondingly distinct patterns of domestic politics. The upper classes of the South have been relatively inchoate, growing out of deeply penetrated societies in which key economic sectors are under foreign ownership, and state and military institutions are heavily dependent on relations with external powers of the North. The key political elites often are based in the state apparatus—the military or the upper echelons of the state bureaucracy. The sort of national class-based political forms that coincided with the emergence of democratic institutions in the North have developed only episodically in the South. In their place two forms of political structures have tended to arise.

On the one hand, there is a form of politics in which power is tightly held by the state elites through military dictatorships or single-party states. Regimes of this type were common in the early postcolonial period, and often they were favored by the major Northern powers (both West and East), who saw them as reliable allies and a disciplined developmental force.

Such authoritarian regimes suffer from serious internal problems but often can hold power for long periods due to effective repression of opposition and the capacity to encapsulate elite aspirations within the regime, as the case of Indonesia illustrates. Inevitably, however, they encounter crises that they do not have the social resources to cope with and collapse under a combination of internal atrophy and social protest.

An alternative pattern is the development of broad, multi-class movements of a populist character built around charismatic leaders. Such movements often developed in the course of anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles, but they also emerge in connection with the collapse of military regimes (especially in Latin America). While frequently espousing a vaguely socialist ideology, such regimes often are based on a set of alliances with traditional dominant groups and on a *machine politics* centered around patron-client relationships with their supporters.

This type of machine politics is inherently volatile and requires a lot of resources to keep the wheels oiled. Both military and populist regimes foster corruption, which generates political resources and rewards elite support for the regime. Populist regimes rarely overcome the limitations of the economies they govern and usually fail to meet the aspirations of their mass base. While they can become quite repressive in the face of serious opposition, they lack the repressive capacity of strictly military regimes and collapse more readily in the face of crises. It is therefore not unusual to see a pattern of military regimes alternating in power with populist forces.

A third tendency that has emerged as a powerful destabilizing force in third world politics is ethnically based nationalism, in which popular mobilizations take place around identities (often quite deliberately constructed by political forces) based on language and religion. Such mobilizations often center on access to state-allocated resources, but they also invoke powerful cultural and historical symbols that make intergroup relations difficult to negotiate and pave the way for brutal encounters. Any external shock to such precariously balanced

political systems can enhance the competition for resources and spark intergroup conflict and the collapse of any form of effective governance. Both military and populist regimes have manipulated ethnically based tensions to reinforce their social base, and this often has been an important factor in starting the process of the ethnicization of politics.

GLOBALIZATION AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE SOUTH

Many of the economies of the South began to change significantly in the late 1970s as the economic structures of the North shifted. A combination of technological change and moves by large transnational firms to restructure their operations on a global level meant that the economies of the North shifted toward a *postindustrial* pattern centered in the service and technology sectors. This created a space for some economies in the South to expand their industrial sectors while remaining oriented toward international markets and produced a group of *newly industrializing countries* such as Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico, South Korea, and Taiwan. The differentiation of the South was further reinforced by the success of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, in forcing a major rise in international oil prices in the 1970s. This both enhanced the incomes of Southern oil exporters and produced new sources of capital that became available through the international financial system to finance development projects in the South.

This period, however, also saw a major rise in the international indebtedness of the South, as lending promoted by Northern financial institutions was directed often to poorly conceived "prestige" projects and distorted by political corruption. The international economic downturn of the 1980s further accentuated the lack of viability of many debt-funded schemes. This culminated in a new set of problems for the South, as high levels of debt service began to consume foreign exchange earnings and negate any benefits derived from international aid.

The most recent phase in the development of the South can be seen as an extension of this new international division of labor in the era of globalization. Two of the most populous states of the South—India and China—previously among the poorest countries in the world, have initiated a major new phase of industrial growth, achieving high and sustained growth rates over a period of several years. While they remain third world societies—plagued by unevenness of development and acute inequalities between urban and rural societies, between high and low technology sectors, and between upper and lower social classes—they are emerging as important players on the international economic scene, both at the state and the corporate level. This increase of economic power is gradually producing an increase in their political weight, but how rapidly this proceeds will depend on their ability to act in cooperation.

THE GLOBAL SOUTH IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The states of the South have at various points in recent history attempted to act as a coherent bloc and influence both

international affairs and economic relations. They hold a substantial majority in the General Assembly of the United Nations, and as a result that body has become a relatively autonomous force, although its influence is limited by the structure of the UN. India is making a bid to become a permanent member of the Security Council, a position already held by China, and if that were to happen the political weight of the South within the UN could be significantly strengthened.

The South has played an important role elsewhere in the UN system, using its leverage in the General Assembly to influence key appointments and to propel some UN agencies, such as the United Nations Committee on Trade and Development, to adopt critical stances with respect to the structure of the international system.

The unequal pattern—in terms of both political power and economic wealth—of North-South relations continues to be a key issue in international affairs. It also has moved from the realm of interstate relations to become an important concern in domestic politics around the world, expressed in forms such as the Make Poverty History campaign, the World Social Forum, and the formation of an influential aid lobby in many Northern states.

These concerns are given force by the data about the position of the South in the international economy. Despite more than four decades of official concern for international poverty and development, inequality in the international system appears to have worsened. Of particular concern is the situation of the very poorest countries in the international system—referred to by the World Bank as the *least developed countries* and sometimes as the *fourth world*. Corresponding to these difficulties are often acute domestic political problems that further undermine the capacity of their governments to address these issues or to make effective use of external assistance. In extreme cases, some of these countries collapse into failed states torn apart by civil strife. Afghanistan, the Congo, Liberia, and Rwanda are among the most prominent examples of this process.

One political force of global significance that has erupted from within the third world is that of radical Islamism. Its roots and dynamics are complex, but they can be seen as having a close connection with the poverty and political instabilities of the third world. Armed Islamism emerged in the 1980s out of the Afghan conflict, where the al-Qaeda network of Osama bin Laden was forged. Subsequently Bin Laden turned to sponsoring terrorist activities directed against the United States, culminating in the attack on the New York World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. As a consequence, Islamist terrorism became a key concern of American foreign policy and a major issue within the international system. Islam as a source of political identity and Islamism as a political program are firmly established within the Muslim world, in several countries as a popular political current within a democratic framework. Whether Islamist terrorism develops further will depend on many factors, in particular the ability of the international system to deal with issues of key symbolic significance to Muslims, such as Palestine (the one international problem on which there is a near consensus among third world states).

Another recent development in the South has been the emergence of radical left governments in several countries of Latin America. Drawing upon left-nationalist critiques of dependence, these new forces arise from political movements that appear to have deeper social roots than the radical populism of the past, although they continue to be marked by some of its traits. This development began in 1998 with the election of Hugo Chávez, a former military officer, as president of Venezuela. It was reinforced in 2003 with the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers Party as president of Brazil (although, in power, he has followed a cautious, reformist course). The subsequent election of radical presidents in Uruguay (2004), Bolivia (2005), and Ecuador (2006), along with the emergence of socialist and left-populist administrations in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina, has produced a new left-wing axis in Latin American politics with a resonance throughout the South. It remains to be seen whether these regimes can sustain their initial objectives and contribute toward the political empowerment of the South.

The future of the South within the international order remains highly uncertain (compounded by yet new issues such as the impact of global climate change) but one thing seems sure—the issue of North-South relations and of global social justice will remain a central one both within international institutions and within the domestic politics of states both North and South.

See also *Globalization; North-South Relations; Third World Debt; United Nations (UN).*

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Sovereignty

Sovereignty is the supreme political authority. The concept forms the basis for the modern international system, and it provides legitimacy to contemporary nation-states and

national governments. At its most basic level, sovereignty is control over people and geographic space. Such control is typically invested in the structures of government, and history was marked by the steady growth in sovereignty by national governments and a concurrent accumulation of centralized power. However, many modern democratic systems are based on the principle of individual sovereignty that in turn entrusts authority to representative governments. Consequently, a distinction has developed between the exercise of sovereignty within either domestic affairs or international relations, and the theoretical or philosophical source of sovereignty. Meanwhile, the growth of nonstate, international actors has eroded the traditional power of the nation-state and redefined some aspects of sovereignty.

SOVEREIGNTY, THE CITIZEN, AND THE STATE

Sovereignty has been manifested in one form or another for most of human history. Rulers and governments have gained both legal and practical control over territory and populations by various means. Within political philosophy, the modern concept of sovereignty was initially developed in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. Aquinas argued that sovereignty resisted with God. The sovereignty exercised by human rulers came from the divine, and it was incumbent upon these leaders to exercise their power in accordance with Christianity. Otherwise, citizens or other states were justified in removing the ruler. This notion of sovereignty formed the basis for the concept of the concept of absolutism. The French philosopher Jean Bodin argued that sovereignty was absolute, and it conferred upon a government unconditional power. His most influential work was *Six Books on the Republic* (1576). He also differentiated between domestic sovereignty and that expressed in the international system. From Bodin's writings, others such as James I argued that monarchs enjoyed complete sovereignty through the principle of the divine right of kings. Other prominent supporters of monarchial sovereignty included Joseph de Maistre.

Englishman Thomas Hobbes agreed that sovereignty was absolute. However, Hobbes contended in his famous work *Leviathan* (1651) that power came not from the divine but from a social contract between the people and the rulers, in which people surrender some portion of their natural rights in exchange for the government maintaining social order and providing for the common defense of its citizenry. Later philosophers such as John Locke expanded on both the importance of natural rights and the role of the social contract in legitimizing domestic sovereignty. Locke contended that governments were granted only enough sovereignty by their people to protect the natural rights of the citizenry. The notion that sovereignty came from the people (popular sovereignty) became one of the main foundations of modern democracy and formed the core of the governmental system of countries such as the United States.

Locke's notion of popular sovereignty contrasted with a later model developed from the philosophy of the French intellectual Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the eighteenth century.

Rousseau asserted that sovereignty was based in the general will of a population (or the common good) and that there was no distinction between the source of sovereignty and its exercise. The general will was consequently the basis for national sovereignty and the means through which state authority was manifested. It was expressed through the structure of government (which Rousseau argued should be a form of direct democracy but was implemented as a representative system). The general will could and would supersede the individual rights of citizens. Under popular sovereignty, power rests with the people, while under the concept of the general will, power rests with the government. An extreme version of the concept of the supremacy of the collective over the individual would later form the core of totalitarian systems, including fascism and communism. Under such systems, the state has total sovereignty over individuals, although the regime bases its authority on the need to promote the public good. For instance, Carl Schmitt advocated that all sovereign governments had the authority to decide when to abrogate the social contract and undertake dictatorial means in order to protect the public interest. Indeed, for Schmitt and some other theorists, the core of sovereignty was a government's ability to establish a *state of exception* to protect the general will from either internal or external threats. Schmitt later defended the sovereignty of totalitarian regimes.

In reaction to the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century, an antisovereignty movement emerged that rejected the domestic authority of states and argued instead for an internationalization of rights. The French philosopher Georges Bataille's concept of antisovereignty influenced successive scholars and philosophers, including Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. In his 1957 book, *Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good,* Bertrand de Jouvenel acknowledged the importance of state sovereignty but criticized the growing power of the nation-state over individual citizens, a theme echoed by Jacques Maritain who argued that sovereignty was an antiquated concept used to oppress citizens.

While many philosophers and scholars concentrated on the internal dimensions of sovereignty, others concentrated on the study of international law and international relations theory as they applied to state sovereignty in the global system. Hugo Grotius is often considered the father of international law. He asserted that natural law, conventions, treaties, and traditions formed constraints on state sovereignty in external matters. His work formed the core of the rationalist (or Grotian) division of international relations that contrasted with the realist (or Hobbesian) emphasis that stressed power and control of resources rather than cooperation in global interactions. Meanwhile, Immanuel Kant developed a political philosophy that emphasized the importance of constitutional republics as a means to constrain expansionist state behaviors and prevent war. The philosopher's writings would be identified as the basis for the Kantian (or revolutionist) view of international relations.

The English school of international relations of the twentieth century was based on these three trains of scholarship but emphasized the Grotian model. Hedley Bull, one of the

leaders of the English school, emphasized the importance of a community of states within the otherwise anarchical system of international affairs. Bull's most influential work was the 1977 book, *The Anarchical Society,* which stressed the importance of mutual recognition as the key to state sovereignty. Within the international society of states, norms and values develop that both guide and constrain state action and provide the boundaries of sovereignty.

The English school, as well as the realist and neorealist schools that emerged from the Hobbesian tradition, emphasizes the centrality of the nation-state as the principle unit in international relations and therefore the main sovereign entity. However, a number of challenges have emerged to the concept of state-centric sovereignty. Neoliberal institutionalism (modified structural realism) emphasized the growing importance of economics and the interplay between trade and traditional notions of military power to assert that nonstate actors increasingly play a role in global affairs and have led to a diffusion of sovereignty. Neoliberal institutionalism is identified with the work of contemporary scholars such as Robert Keohane, including *After Hegemony* (1984), Stephen D. Krasner, and John G. Ruggie. In addition, cosmopolitanism argues for the development of a form of world citizenship in which national sovereignty exists only within the confines of a broad series of universal individual rights.

THE EVOLUTION OF SOVEREIGNTY

For most of human history, sovereignty was vested in a single individual or in small groups within political units. Sovereignty was usually based on power and rested on the martial capabilities of the ruler and ruling class. A wide variety of political organizations consequently emerged, ranging from multiethnic empires to kingdoms to city-states to assorted religious states. Authority was not the domain of the state, but rather the individual. Rulers and dynasties gained varying degrees of authority over disparate lands as a result of wars, treaties, and marriage. As a result, a series of overlapping and complicated political relationships emerged in which rulers often had multiple loyalties. The feudal system of Europe exemplified this pattern. Rulers who exercised absolute power in one land often found themselves the vassal of another leader because of extended holdings. In addition, vassals could be more authoritative and influential than their liege lords. The Duchy of Burgundy was considerably more powerful then the kingdom of France during the late Middle Ages, and the dukes used their resources to emerge as rivals to the French kings. This occurred despite the fact that the dukes of Burgundy were vassals of the French king. Consequently, national borders had little significant meaning and political authority was uneven and divided. The broken geography of Europe, with its series of mountain ranges and rivers, not to mention the water barriers around the British Isles, divided the continent and precluded the rise of a single empire as was the case in China or India. Instead, geography fostered smaller political units that often competed fiercely with one another for primacy.

Sovereignty was even more diffused because of the role and influence of the Catholic Church, which acted as a supranational body with political manifestations in the form of autonomous bishoprics or other church-states. Nonetheless, the church performed an important role in legitimizing the sovereignty of rulers through participation in coronations and other forms of formal recognition of feudal rulers. In return, secular leaders were expected to support the church financially, politically, and militarily.

Of the political organizations of the period, empires could harness significant military and economic resources. However, these entities often could not maintain the loyalty of their citizenry. The central government faced daunting challenges in attempting to maintain order in remote parts of the empire while the core population typically grew to resist the diversion of resources away from the capital region. Empires also could fall into the trap of imperial overstretch and devote too many resources to conquest and therefore erode their competitiveness against challengers. Thus, most multiethnic empires collapsed as a result of external threats or internal dissension. Alternatively, smaller political units such as city-states could command deep loyalty and sacrifice by their citizenry, but they lacked the resources to defend themselves from larger entities. If the city-states expanded, they risked weakening the bonds of loyalty. From the constant strife of the Middle Ages, a new political entity, the nation-state, emerged to redefine notions of sovereignty and the nature of the international political system.

THE NATION-STATE

The modern nation-state combined the resources of the empire with the loyalty and self-identification of the city-state. It had a population that was large enough to project significant military power, yet its people were typically relatively homogenous. It also had the economic resources necessary to keep pace with the rapid advances that accompanied the series of revolutions in military affairs. The end of the Thirty Years War, through the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), marked the rise of the modern nation-state and the decline of both the church and the feudal system.

Post-Westphalian nation-states were different from their predecessors in four main areas. First, sovereignty was vested in a central government that was generally separate and distinct from other social institutions such as the church. The central government developed a monopoly on the exercise of political authority the use of force, both internally and externally. Second, the new nation-states developed a degree of cohesion and unity of identification among the population that was the forerunner of nationalism. This marked an important distinction from the past when loyalty was generally personal and vested in the person of the king or prince. Instead, in nation-states, loyalty came to be directed to the state and its structures of government. Third, nation-states accelerated the rise of the multiclass system and the rise of the middle class. The traditional lord and vassal arrangement was replaced by a complicated and multitiered system in which the growing middle or bourgeoisie class demanded increased political access and power. Fourth, and finally, the nation-state was a coherent geographic entity. Its borders were usually defined by natural

boundaries and homogenous populations with shared cultural, linguistic, and religious values and norms. Sovereignty within the nation-state was exercised over a compact area and governments were granted a degree of legitimacy and authority unmatched in previous political systems since that authenticity came to be generally voluntary (with notable exceptions). This led to the relative stabilization of borders and populations as external actors and governments conferred recognition of the sovereignty of individual governments over their territory and populations.

The sovereignty accorded to the modern state makes it relatively unique in historical terms. Whereas the international system has been typically marked by inequality with hegemons and client states, in the post-Westphalian era, all states have equal sovereignty under international law in spite of differences in size, resources, and military capabilities. This equality may not always exist in practical terms, but it does form the basis for the contemporary international system. Sovereignty is confirmed by the general acceptance that national governments have near exclusive power or jurisdiction over their territory and population. Significantly, that power is reaffirmed by the global community through formal recognition of a specific government's claim to sovereignty. Sovereignty came from the international community, not from divine power or military might.

Modern nation-states combined high degrees of internal and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty is the relationship between the structures of government and civil society. Its basis is the recognition of the legitimacy and authority of the central government against any domestic rivals. Internal sovereignty is marked by almost total monopoly on the use of force within a territory and population. Governments also typically exercise sovereignty over a range of social interactions and structures, including education, a country's legal system, and its economy. Public policy is the domain of government and an expression of state sovereignty and is manifested through the control and redistribution of resources. For instance, taxes are collected and then used to fund public services or build or maintain infrastructure.

External sovereignty is based on recognition by other international actors of a state's territory and authority. Such recognition affirms a state's internal sovereignty as the sole legitimate government over a given area. It also grants governments a number of inherent rights under international law and custom, including the right to declare war, to enter into treaties and conventions, and representation in international organizations. States also set trade policy and control currencies. The Treaty of Westphalia confirmed the primacy of the nation-state as the embodiment of external sovereignty in the global arena, but in the post–World War II (1939–1945) era, a number of challenges to state sovereignty emerged.

CHALLENGES TO STATE SOVEREIGNTY

In the aftermath of World War II, a number of international institutions were created to constrain state behavior and prevent another global conflict. Initially, the authority of these organizations remained dependent on the major powers of the day. For instance, the United Nations (UN) as an institution found itself able to act on global matters only when there was consensus among the great powers. Nonetheless, the UN and a number of smaller and regional organizations were able to take action or put in place policies through which states surrendered some degree of sovereignty in exchange for access to greater public goods, including peace, security, and economic prosperity. The European Coal and Steel Community set the stage for the European Community, which later became the European Union (EU). The EU sought deeper political, economic, social, and security cooperation. It achieved its greatest success in the economic sphere where the member states developed an economic union that led in 1999 to the adoption of a single currency, the euro. Meanwhile, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in 1949 as a collective security organization to prevent another hegemonal bid by Germany and defend against Soviet expansion. Membership in NATO forced states to surrender some degree of external sovereignty and harmonize defense and security policy with other member states. Other regional economic and security organizations were less successful, or at least less far-reaching, but many were able to limit national sovereignty, both on the internal and external levels. One consequence was the emergence of what Richard Rosecrance (1986) described as the *trading state.* Trading states such as Germany or Japan concentrated on economic gains instead of traditional geopolitical power. They were willing to surrender control of security to institutions such as NATO or alliances with the United States and divert resources into economic growth. In their efforts to take advantage of markets, states were willing to harmonize trade regulations in order to make goods, capital, and labor mobile.

The modern, post-Westphalian system has been marked by tension between national sovereignty and that of individual citizens. The tension reached its peak following World War II and the horrors committed during that conflict by regimes against their own citizens. In response, in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was created as a means to ensure that all people were granted basic natural rights. The declaration was followed by the Genocide Convention. The European Convention on Human Rights (1950) imposed a strict series of protocols to protect the rights of citizens. These instruments were used to justify international humanitarian missions, including the use of military force, in order to prevent genocide or protect populations during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. Traditional notions of state sovereignty were judged less important than the international community's responsibility to protect human rights. The creation in 2002 of the International Criminal Court with supranational jurisdiction was another manifestation of this trend.

The growing wealth and power of multinational corporations has further eroded national sovereignty. Corporations such as Microsoft or Exxon-Mobil, which individually have annual earnings that far exceed the gross national products of most countries, have become important actors in international relations and may exert enormous power in dealings

with individual states. By the early 2000s, configurations of sovereignty that emerged in the post–Westphalian era faced a variety of challenges; however, the state remained the main embodiment of domestic and international authority.

See also *Nationalism; Nation-state; State, Rights of the; Transnationalism.*

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Soviet Union, Former

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was founded after the October 1917 Russian Revolution as the world's first socialist state. Led by Vladimir Lenin and the Bolshevik party, the USSR was supposed to be a dictatorship of the proletariat that would facilitate the construction of communism in the Russian empire and globally. The USSR was officially created from the Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Transcaucasian Soviet republics in 1922. After expansion between 1922 and 1945, it contained fifteen republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

THE SOVIET UNION UNDER STALIN

Formally the USSR was a federation, and all republics had equal rights and their own governments. In practice, the republics were subject to the central Soviet government, itself under the direction of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU, as the Bolshevik party was renamed in 1952).

Politically, this system was a dictatorship by the time that the USSR was created. The soviets that were supposed to ensure mass political participation and emancipation and be the titular core of the political system were subjugated to the will of the Bolshevik party during the civil war (1918–1921) that followed the revolution. The concentration of power in the party enabled its General Secretary, Joseph Stalin, to succeed Lenin as the USSR's leader. Stalin aimed to rapidly modernize the USSR, which was supposed to address both the USSR's security fears—as the first communist state, it was surrounded by hostile capitalist powers—and to lay the basis for communist construction in the USSR by transforming its peasant economy. Control of the economy was centralized and economic activity directed by a five-year plan drawn up under the supervision of the central CPSU leadership. Plan implementation became the main work of party and state, which became intertwined and dominated society.

Rapid modernization through central planning was costly to both the Soviet people and the Soviet system. The human cost ran into millions of lives as agriculture was collectivized amid famine and mass deportations. Later, the Stalinist purges saw the repression of further millions as Stalin struggled to control the growing state bureaucracy and direct economic activity. The cost to the system was its bureaucratization and economic inefficiency. Bureaucratization meant that the party elite began to develop some of the characteristics of a class, and the elite became privileged and isolated from the Soviet people whose liberation it was supposed to nurture. Inefficiency grew because bureaucratization and ideological control dulled flexibility and initiative, and this made the economic problems of central planning—waste, poor labor productivity and investment returns—intractable. Stalin's solution was coercion and more demands for high growth. While this worked in the short term, enabling the USSR to build a superpower military machine and expand its power in eastern Europe after World War II (1939–1945), it was not sustainable in the long term.

AFTER STALIN

Stalin's combination of dictatorship, repression, and ideologically inspired economic control created what Western political scientists called a totalitarian system, but this totalitarianism could not outlast Stalin because of its economic inefficiencies and human costs. The cold war, which was partly prompted by the expansion of Soviet power, placed immense strain on the economic system because the USSR spent much more of its far smaller national wealth to compete with the United States and its allies. The USSR began the process of de-Stalinization under Nikita Khrushchev, who condemned Stalin in his Secret Speech at the 1956 20th Party Congress. De-Stalinization consolidated Khrushchev's leadership position but constrained his ability to reform Stalinism because he could not coerce change from the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy grew unwilling to countenance change or lose any of its privileges. Khrushchev's efforts at reform lost him support and alongside policy failures in agriculture and foreign affairs—most notably the 1962 Cuban missile affair—led to his ousting in 1964.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

UNITED STATES

Anadyr

WRANGEL ISLAND

Pevek

Cherskiy

Kolyma

East Siberian Sea

Magadan

Okhotsk

Okha

Sea of Okhotsk

SAKHALIN ISLAND

Amur

Vladivostok

Sea of Japan

JAPAN

NORTH KOREA

SOUTH KOREA

Birobidzhan

Urgal

Tiksi

NEW SIBERIAN ISLANDS

Laptev Sea

Lena

Yakutsk

Aldan

Aldan

Neryungri

Vilyuysk

Vilyuy

Lena

Chita

Lake Baikal

Ulan Ude

Irkutsk

MONGOLIA

SEVERNAYA ZEMLYA

Vilyuy

Lensk

Angara

CHINA

ARCTIC OCEAN

FRANZ JOSEF LAND

Norilsk

Igarka

Yenisey

Lesosibirsk

Novosibirsk

Barnaul

SVALBARD (NORWAY)

Kara Sea

NOVAYA ZEMLYA

Vorkuta

Salekhard

Khanty-Mansiysk

Ob

Omsk

Pavlodar

Astana

Lake Balkhash

Bishkek

Barents Sea

Pechora

Pechora

Tyumen

Tobol

Chelyabinsk

Irtysh

Qyzylorda

Syr Darya

Tashkent

KYRGHIZ S.S.R.

Norwegian Sea

Kotlas

Perm

Ufa

Orenburg

KAZAK S.S.R.

UZBEK S.S.R.

Dushanbe

TAJIK S.S.R.

SWEDEN

FINLAND

St. Petersburg

Konosha

Nizhny Novgorod

Kama

Kazan

Samara

Ural

Oral

Aral Sea

Amu Darya

TURKMEN S.S.R.

Ashgabat

AFGHANISTAN

INDIA

PAKISTAN

NORWAY

DENMARK

ESTONIAN S.S.R.

Tallinn

LATVIAN S.S.R.

Riga

Baltic Sea

Vilnius

LITHUANIAN S.S.R.

Minsk

BELORUSSIAN S.S.R.

★ **Moscow**

Penza

Volga

Don

Volgograd

Rostov-on-Don

Caspian Sea

Baku

AZERBAIJAN S.S.R.

KALININGRAD (R.S.F.S.R.)

POLAND

GERMANY

NETHERLANDS

UNITED KINGDOM

Kyiv

UKRAINIAN S.S.R.

Kharkiv

Donetsk

Chisinau

MOLDAVIAN S.S.R.

Black Sea

GEORGIAN S.S.R.

Tbilisi

Yerevan

ARMENIAN S.S.R.

IRAN

TURKEY

IRAQ

OMAN

HUNGARY

ROMANIA

0 500 Mi

0 500 Km

--- Union Republic boundary (S.S.R.)

The former Soviet Union encompassed land and peoples stretching from Eastern Europe to Asia and the Caucasus.

The new leadership, under Leonid Brezhnev, declared the USSR had entered the stage of developed socialism and would change only incrementally toward communism. This recognized that the USSR was now a modern urban and industrialized society that would no longer grow rapidly, but did not resolve the problems of central planning and bureaucratization. If anything it did the opposite: Brezhnev promised stability to Soviet elites, and they expanded their power and privilege under his rule. Growth in the USSR was secured by oil sales, the price of which was inflated in the 1970s. Oil sales enabled more popular consumption and military spending, but it did not resolve the underlying structural problems of planning. Worse, large parts of the economy were deprived of investment, and the USSR began to fall behind its competitors technologically.

REFORM AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR

Many Soviet leaders recognized the need for reform by the early 1980s. The economy was entering crisis, and the costs of military competition with the West, which grew after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and its rule over eastern Europe could not be sustained. Brezhnev's immediate successors, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, were not in power long enough to effect change.

Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to CPSU General Secretary in 1985 broke the logjam. Gorbachev's aim was to revitalize the Soviet economy by cutting military expenditure, incentivizing the workforce, and cutting back on bureaucratic obstacles to reform. Foreign policy reform, including withdrawal from Afghanistan, relaxation of Soviet control over eastern Europe, and rapprochement with the West, was to facilitate arms cuts. Reform of the CPSU and democratization were supposed to cut bureaucracy and engage the Soviet people in securing change. Gorbachev's foreign policy was successful in reducing international tension, but domestic reform had unintended effects. The CPSU reformed slowly and popular protest, most notably the nationalist movements that developed in the republics as Gorbachev relaxed political controls, weakened central authority. Elections in 1989 to an all-Union parliament and in 1990 to republican parliaments undermined Gorbachev's power, and he was forced to negotiate a new Union treaty in the spring of 1991. This would have changed the nature of the USSR fundamentally. Conservative forces tried to stop the treaty's August 1991 ratification by overthrowing Gorbachev. Their failure demonstrated that authority lay with republican governments, most of which now seceded from the Soviet Union. An agreement among Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia in early December 1991 sealed the USSR's fate, and it was formally abolished on December 26, 1991.

See also *Centrally Planned Economy; Cold War; Communism; Communism, Fall of, and End of History; Lenin, Vladimir Ilich; Leninism; Marxism; Perestroika; Postcommunism; Postcommunist Transformation; Primitive Communism; Russian Political Thought.*

. . . .   NEIL ROBINSON

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Spatial Analysis

Spatial autocorrelation is the clustering of similar or dissimilar behaviors, processes, and events among neighboring observations and is predicted by many theories in the social sciences. Spatial dependence can produce biased and inconsistent parameter estimates or biased standard errors. In contrast to the serial dependence of time series, where the past influences the future but not vice versa, spatial dependence is multidimensional—neighbors influence each other. As a consequence, spatial autocorrelation is modeled via maximum likelihood estimation or instrumental variables models. Geostatistical data and lattice data are two of the principal forms of spatial data. In the case of geostatistical data, the observed data are sample data from a continuous underlying surface and the researcher's principal interest is inferring information for unsampled locations based on the sample data. In the case of lattice data, the continuous underlying surface is partitioned into a finite number of areal units, or polygons, such as countries, states, or localities.

Two principal spatial models are generally used for lattice data. The spatial lag model incorporates spatial autocorrelation via a spatially lagged dependent variable. This model corresponds to a diffusion process in which neighbors influence each other. A spatial error model, in contrast, incorporates spatial dependence via the error term. This model is appropriate if the spatial dependence is produced by variables omitted from the model. Emerging frontiers in spatial analysis include spatial panel data models, spatial probit models, and spatial survival models.

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See also *Qualitative Analysis; Qualitative Methodologies; Quantitative Analysis.*

DAVID DARMOFAL AND
. . . .   JANET BOX-STEFFENSMEIER

Speech, Freedom of

See *Freedom of Speech*.

Spengler, Oswald

Oswald Arnold Gottfried Spengler (1880–1936) was a German philosopher and historian. His most renowned work is the two-volume *The Decline of the West* (1918–1922) in which he breaks with the Hegelian view of history as a rational process of linear progression. Spengler presented a deterministic theoretical model in which civilizations rise and decline in the same way as biological organisms, following an irreversible series of cycles. He believed that Western civilization was heading toward its final eclipse and that it would be followed by the emergence of new African and Asian powers. Although he was in favour of German hegemony in Europe and supported an organic blend of socialism and traditionalist authoritarianism, his relationship with the National Socialist regime was uneasy.

Born at Blankenburg am Hars, Spengler received a classical education and earned his PhD in 1904. The following years of his life were troubled, due to his personal poverty and loneliness and to the complex political situation of the time. The Agadir Crisis (1911), in which Germany deployed a gunboat to the Moroccan port of Agadir, and later Germany's defeat in World War I (1914–1918) increased Spengler's pessimism and convinced him of the inevitability of the decline of European civilization. His works *The Decline* (1918) and *Perspectives of World History* (1922) had wide readerships and placed his theses in the intellectual arena. Spengler was even offered a post at the University of Göttingen, which he declined.

A bitter critic of the Weimar Republic, Spengler made a brief and unsuccessful attempt to participate in active politics. He was approached by the National Socialists, but he objected to their racialist policies and militarist stand, engaging in a public dispute with Nazi ideologist Alfred Rosenberg. Significantly, *The Hour of Decision* (1933), one of the few books critical to the regime published in Germany, was eventually condemned. Spengler died in 1936, having predicted that the fall of the Third Reich would occur in less than a decade. He also anticipated the cold war.

In *The Decline of the West,* which was influenced by German philosophers Johann Gottfried von Herder, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Spengler develops a biological approach to history, explicitly manifested through the four seasons of civilizational cycles: spring (birth), summer (youth), autumn (maturity), and winter (decline). From aristocratic and warrior beginnings, cultures move through a process of urbanization and intellectualization, entering their phase of decay as they embrace political ideologies as democracy, egalitarianism, socialism, or humanitarianism. Money, industrialism, and technology would be the prime factors in cultural decay, as Spengler further explained in *Der Mensch und die Technik* (1931). Even though he defended the idea of incommensurability between cultures, he did suggest that a "comparative morphology of history" was possible, as diverse cultures in different times but parallel "biological stages" displayed similar characteristics. But Spengler denied the scientificity of history, disregarding unilinear or causal explanations.

As a whole, Spengler's views were, and remain, highly controversial. Even though he was vehemently criticized by the emerging neopositivist tradition, his works became very influential during the 1920s and 1930s. However, his conservative views and firm opposition to the Weimar Republic ostracized his philosophical legacy.

See also *European Political Thought; German Political Thought; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Political Culture.*

. . . . JOÁM EVANS PIM

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Spin

Spin can be interpreted historically as a form of information management that seeks to manipulate public opinion through the selective presentation of the news or facts or data. The term itself, however, is understood largely as a modern concept related to contemporary forms of media. Spin can be either positive or negative and may be used to either persuade or dissuade the public. Spin also can be understood as a form of rhetoric or propaganda, especially when government-controlled media present only positive news about the regime and suppress any negative stories. Among the most widely practiced forms of spin is *cherry-picking*—the presentation of only those facts or figures that support one's position. With increases in number and availability of news and information outlets in the late twentieth century to early twenty-first century, spin took a subtle form and involved the use of techniques such as *double-speak*—language that seemed to indicate the opposite of its actual meaning. In addition, political or media entities may package information in a manner that disguises its true meaning or impact. For instance, several positive news items might be released at the same time as negative news in an effort to have the public or the media emphasize the positive features. Another tactic is the release of negative information during periods when there is likely to be less media scrutiny, such as on weekends or holidays.

See also *Framing and Public Opinion; Political Communication; Propaganda.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Spinoza, Baruch

Dutch-Jewish philosopher Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) was one of the most influential proponents of rationalism in the seventeenth century. Spinoza was born in Amsterdam to a Jewish family, but he was accused of heresy and expelled from the Jewish community in 1656. Of his three major works, the *Theologico-political Treatise* (1670), *Ethics* (1677), and the *Political Treatise* (1677), only the first was published during his lifetime. His thought is at the crossroads of often conflicting cultural matrices (Hebraism, Classic and Humanistic philosophy, the Scientific Revolution, and Republicanism), and his originality lies not only in his challenge to early modern philosophy but also in the alternative he proposed to the emerging possessive individualism and Cartesian anthropology. Spinoza seldom discloses his sources, thus it is important to note the tribute he pays to the atomist tradition over the philosophical "trifles" of ancient Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle and the great debt he recognizes to Italian political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli.

Spinoza takes a position within the natural law tradition but also against contractualism. From his original concept of god as substance—impersonal, nonanthropomorphic, and nontranscendental—Spinoza draws the concept of *jus sive potentia* (right as power): Every single existing thing participates in the very same power of substance, and therefore, as he states in *Theologico-political Treatise,* "the right of the individual is coextensive with its determinate power" (*potentia*). According to him, power lies not in potential but only in act. Power is the grounding principle of each thing's *conatus*—the tendency of everything (inanimate objects, as well as animals or men) to preserve its own being.

Because the *conatus* represents the very essence of beings, Spinoza concludes that it is impossible for men to abandon their own natural power and form a state by means of a social contract. He states, "the difference between Hobbes and myself [. . .] consists in this, that I always preserve the natural right in its entirety, and I hold that the sovereign power in a State has right over a subject only in proportion to the excess of its power over that of a subject" (Spinoza 2002, 891).

Spinoza points out that the state has its origin not only in human reason but also in affect, especially indignation. The fundamental right to resist lies at the very heart of the relationship between sovereign and subject. The sovereign doesn't derive his right from a divine authority but is continually exposed to the right and power of the multitude over whom he rules.

While in *Theologico-political Treatise* Spinoza still makes use of the language of social contract, in *Political Treatise* he does not employ this concept and explains the formation of the state only through the constitutive dynamics of the multitude, which he sees as the real sovereign. In fact, the positive role that he gives the multitude is an attack on established political tradition. If for English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes the multitude was the natural, rebellious, and monstrous subject of politics, something to be disciplined and transformed into a people under the legitimate power of a sovereign, for Spinoza it is nothing less than the true sovereign subject, no matter the form of government. As a consequence of this, because the right of the state lies solely in the power of the multitude, for Spinoza, the most "absolute" form of government is democracy.

See also *Aristotle; Democracy; Hobbes, Thomas; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Natural Law; Plato; Social Contract.*

. . . .   FILIPPO DEL LUCCHESE

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Split Ticket Voting

Popularized with the implementation of the Australian ballot after the reforms adopted during the Progressive Era, split ticket voting is now a permanent feature of the American political system. *Split ticket voting* refers to the process of casting votes for more than one party for the different offices on the ballot. Since the 1950s, the prevalence of Americans deliberately splitting their votes in presidential and congressional elections has increased. Split ticket voting differs from *straight party voting* or *straight line voting* in which the electorate votes for candidates of the same party for all the offices on the ballot. Other than American's splitting their vote for strategic reasons, several explanations provide possible justification for split ticket voting. The separate election of legislators and executives as well as the staggered terms that exist for different offices improve the chances that split ticket voting will occur. Also, the American executive and legislative branches are not incorporated into one body, as one finds in a parliamentary system. This allows voters the opportunity to vote for different parties for the various levels of government. The anonymity provided by the Australian ballot provides another possible explanation for the popularity of split ticket voting.

See also *Candidate Selection; Ticket Splitting; Voting Behavior; Voting Procedures.*

. . . .   RICHARD M. YON

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Spoils System

The *spoils system,* also known as *patronage,* is the practice of rewarding political supporters or voters by appointing them to public office or providing them with government contracts or services. Although the phrase typically refers to such

practices in the United States, various forms of the spoils system are common throughout the world. After an election, because all or most appointees of the previous government have their tenures end and typically are removed from office, these vacant positions under the spoils system are typically replaced by loyalists from the new party that has assumed power. In addition, government-sponsored construction projects or other infrastructure measures or services often were awarded to companies who had supported the incoming party. Electoral wards or districts, and even states, benefited from government largesse.

With a spoils system, appointees and contracts are rewarded based on loyalty rather than competence or ability qualifications. Consequently, it fosters inefficiency and waste, and it prevents the development of a professional bureaucracy. However, defenders of the spoils system contend it ensures government posts are filled by those loyal and devoted to the success of the new government. In the United States, the spoils system was not only prevalent but unchecked until reforms such as the Pendleton Civil Service Act of 1883 attempted to legitimize the federal bureaucracy with professionals based on merit versus party loyalists. While the spoils system continues to exist today, due to reforms and federal oversight, this method often is used for senior-level positions, such as political appointees.

See also *Civil Service; Corruption and Other Political Pathologies; Democracy and Corruption; Patronage; Patron-client Networks.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Stages Model of the Policy Process

The stages model of the policy process is a widely used, if sometimes controversial, representation of the various steps that lead to a policy outcome, from definition of a policy problem to development of a solution through implementation and evaluation. Peter DeLeon (1999) traces the model back to Harold Lasswell, the architect of today's policy sciences, but there have been a number of variants since then. The stages model typically depicts policy making as a cyclical process, in which policies move through a regular series of procedural steps. Though a number of scholars have criticized the model, it has influenced a generation of policy studies and remains the preeminent model of policy making for students of political science and public administration.

Most contemporary descriptions of the model include many or all of the following six stages:

1. *Issue Emergence or Problem Definition:* A previously unspecified issue, or an issue normally of private concern, becomes seen as a public problem that is rightly addressed by the action of governmental authorities.
2. *Agenda-setting:* This newly defined policy problem becomes part of the government action agenda. (The first and second stages are combined in many formulations of the model; other variants differentiate among

levels of government agendas, for example, contrasting a broader institutional agenda with a more urgent decisional one.)
3. *Alternative Selection:* One solution to the policy problem is elevated above all others, for reasons both practical and political.
4. *Enactment, Adoption, or Legitimation:* The chosen policy solution takes on the force of law, either through legislation, executive order, court order, or some other mechanism of governmental authority.
5. *Implementation:* The policy solution is actually put into practice; in other words, this stage concerns what happens "on the ground" or "in the field."
6. *Evaluation* or *Analysis:* The policy is evaluated against initial goals, in order to help policy makers continue on their present course or choose a different policy solution.

While most proponents of the model admit that the divisions between stages are loosely delineated, they either imply or explicitly require that policies proceed from first stage to last.

The stages model has been criticized, first on methodological grounds. Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith (1993) have argued that the stages model is not actually a model, because it lacks any idea of the causal mechanisms necessary for theorizing and the testing of hypotheses. Instead, they claim, it is merely a heuristic, no more than a (severely limited) tool for education. Moreover, others have claimed that the model fails on empirical grounds. Because of the representation of policy as moving through discrete steps within a larger process, the stages model implies a sequential description of how policies are formed and implemented. Robert Nakamura (1987) noted that many policies actually are decided in a much more disorderly fashion, so that the stages model excludes some policies and leads us to misunderstand others. Deborah Stone (2001) agreed, decrying the "unrealistic 'production' model, according to which policy is assembled in stages, as if on a conveyer belt."

Still, even if merely a heuristic, the stages model has been defended by DeLeon and others as a useful, if somewhat artificial, representation of the functional aspects of policy making. Indeed, seminal policy studies have been focused on functionally discrete parts of the policy lifespan, including John Kingdon's 1995 award-winning study of agenda-setting and alternative selection, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies,* and Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky's 1973 groundbreaking research on implementation, *Implementation.* By separating out the functional components of the policy process, its defenders claim, the stages model enables scholars to sharply delineate the actors and activities involved in each part, while hopefully not obscuring the connection of each to the policy-making process as a whole.

See also *Agenda Setting; Policy Analysis; Policy Evaluation; Policy Theory.*

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Stalinism

Stalinism refers primarily to the set of policies adopted in the Soviet Union during the leadership of Joseph Stalin (1929–1953). While helping to modernize the country, Stalinism also included political terror and repression, which resulted in millions of deaths and the creation of a totalitarian state. Other communist states such as China and Cuba copied some of his policies and methods. Overcoming the negative legacy of Stalinism would be a major concern of Soviet leaders after Stalin.

In 1917, the Bolshevik (Communist) Party seized power in Russia. Whereas Karl Marx had predicted that the communist revolution would occur in an advanced industrialized state, Russia was overwhelmingly agricultural and had a low standard of economic development. Thus, in addition to solidifying their hold on power, a major preoccupation of early Soviet leaders was to develop the country in order to "build socialism."

Initially, Vladimir Lenin, leader of the Bolshevik Party, adopted a policy of War Communism (1918–1921), which was designed to move Russia rapidly to communism by eliminating private property, establishing state planning, and repressing anti-Bolshevik actors. Realizing this was not a viable strategy, in 1921 Lenin adopted the New Economic Policy (NEP), which was a more gradual move to communism, in which the state would control most of the economy but small-scale private property and market forces would be allowed to exist. The state, while still led by a single party, also would allow more social and cultural freedoms.

Lenin died in 1924, and a struggle for power ensued among his erstwhile allies. Stalin, who in 1922 was named General Secretary of the Communist Party, maneuvered first against Leon Trotsky, who favored a more radical and global approach. Stalin declared that the Soviet Union would build "socialism in one country" and favored the NEP. By the late 1920s, he turned against the NEP, arguing it was too gradual and too procapitalist. By 1929, he had consolidated his power within the party and steered the country onto a new course.

Stalinism had several components. Economically, it harkened back to War Communism, calling for the elimination of private property, state planning of the economy, and rapid industrialization. In order to develop large industrial enterprises such as steel and chemical factories, mines, and power plants, large numbers of peasants were forced off the land and pushed into cities that sprang up all over the country. To pay for the necessary capital equipment and ensure political control over the countryside, all farms were collectivized, meaning that individual farmers lost their property and had to work on large farms owned, in essence, by the state. Prices for grain were set by the state, and surplus grain was exported to earn money for the industrialization program.

These economic aspects were accompanied by repression and political terror. The secret police rooted out real and imaginary enemies. Various groups were targeted: priests, business owners, non-Russian minorities, more wealthy peasants (*kulaks*) and, eventually, even officers in the military and high-ranking party officials. Some of the latter were forced to confess to fictitious conspiracies in well-publicized "show trials." People were encouraged to report any suspicious behavior. Children who reported on their parents were considered model citizens. Ultimately, several million were arrested and sent to harsh labor camps, where they often perished. Many were simply executed. Grain requisition by Soviet authorities led to famine in large parts of the country. The total death toll is unknown, but estimates are as high as twenty million.

To preserve his own support, Stalin also cultivated a cult of personality. He was worshipped as a godlike figure, an infallible ruler. The media were tightly controlled to ensure that only a positive image of Stalin was portrayed. Art and architecture also were used to support Stalin and the construction of communism.

Stalinism did help modernize the country. Economic growth in the energy and industrial sectors was high. Stalinist policies arguably helped create a military–industrial complex that allowed the Soviets to win World War II (1939–1945). By the time of his death, the Soviet Union was a superpower.

The costs, however, were high. Millions had perished. Civil society was completely destroyed. Basic freedoms had been squashed. Economically, the agricultural and consumer sectors fared poorly.

The new leadership realized that Stalinism had to be reformed to be more economically successful and win the support of the people. Nikita Khrushchev (1955–1964) launched de-Stalinization, attacking Stalin's purges of the party leadership and cult of personality for being un-Marxist and un-Leninist. Under Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communist Party continued to adhere to Stalinist principles. Information about Stalin's crimes began to circulate after Mikhail Gorbachev became the Soviet leader in 1985. But even then some segments of the Russian population remained nostalgic for Stalin's "iron hand." Stalinism's relationship to Marxism-Leninism and its role in Russia's historical development remain hotly debated topics.

See also *Collectivization; Lenin, Vladimir Ilich; Leninism; Market Socialism; Marx, Karl; Marxism; Soviet Union, Former; Totalitarianism.*

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Standing Committee

Standing committees are permanent panels with fixed subject-matter jurisdictions created by the rules of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. Almost all legislative proposals introduced in Congress go to standing committees for consideration and possible processing into bills; most proposals never progress further and thus "die" in committee. Committee consideration of a bill usually follows three steps: *public hearings* to gather information, *markups* to review the proposed text and determine the final language, and *reports* to send approved bills to the floor for a vote.

The committee system helps legislators divide labor, address constituent concerns, and develop policy expertise. The party with control of each chamber holds a majority on its committees and selects the committee chairs. Party leaders also control the size, ratio of Republicans to Democrats, and membership of committees. Legislators seek committee assignments based on issues of greatest interest in their state or district, their personal policy goals, and their desire to gain influence.

The first standing committee, the House Committee on Ways and Means, began in the 4th Congress (1795) to review financial legislation. By the 1820s, both the House and Senate relied on standing committees to process legislative proposals. As of the 111th Congress (2009–2010) the House had twenty standing committees with eighty-four subcommittees, and the Senate divided its work between sixteen standing committees and sixty-eight subcommittees.

See also *Deliberation; Legislative Drafting; Ways and Means.*

. . . . AMY E. BLACK

State, Administrative

See *Administrative State.*

State, Economic Theories of the

See *Economic Theories of the State.*

State, Fiscal Crisis of the

The theory of the fiscal crisis of the state developed in response to a widespread consensus of the 1960s that the capitalist state's enhanced, downwardly redistributive economic role was likely to continue. Thus writers like Andrew Shonfield (1965) and Harold Wilensky (1975) could envisage

the continued growth of the welfare state as both integral to the contemporary phase of advanced capitalist development and desirable as a means of reducing inequality and of raising living standards more broadly. Confidence in this scenario fractured as a result of the economic crisis of the early 1970s, when traditional Keynesian remedies appeared no longer to work, and the result was stagflation.

While there had always been a libertarian critique of the Keynesian welfare state, Marxists also were unconvinced of its sustainability. Although they, too, foresaw the likelihood of continued expansion, they saw this not as a further advance on the path toward socialism but instead as a prolongation of crisis. Thus Paul Mattick (1969) could write that Keynesianism "mistakes the postponement of a problem for its disappearance." He, like many other Marxists, including Norman Ginsburg (1979), foresaw the limit of the *mixed economy* as that point where state expenditure finally crowds out private capital accumulation, presaging the famous critique of economic liberals Robert Bacon and Walter Eltis (1976). This was based on the view that taxation drained the surplus and that an ever-decreasing share of the surplus was left available for private investment, thereby further reducing the expected future surplus.

The perceived inadequacy of this treatment of state expenditure led James O'Connor (1973) to formulate an alternative Marxist theory of public finance. Accordingly, the capitalist state has a dual role: that of both facilitating and legitimating capitalist accumulation. Creating the conditions for accumulation might appear easiest if achieved via outright coercion, but this threatens regime legitimacy and ultimately social order. Instead the state must legitimate the system, often via concessions to social groups or classes out with the dominant bloc. This can take the form of ideology, as when policies that benefit the dominant class are titled and rationalized in a suitably positive manner (as contributing to "stability and growth," for example).

Consequent to the facilitation and legitimization of accumulation, state expenditure can be classified as social capital and social expenses. *Social capital* indirectly contributes to accumulation, in that it constitutes an investment that mitigates if not reverses (however temporarily) the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Education, health care, transport infrastructure, and business parks are social investments. Social capital also takes the form of social consumption, which is expenditure that lowers the reproduction costs of labor. Education, health care, and social insurance belong in this category. *Social expenses* relate to the state's legitimization function and encompass welfare expenditure and the costs of the state's repressive and ideological apparatus.

In reality almost all state expenditures relate to the accumulation and legitimization functions, given the state's dual role and contradictory character. Spending on education, for example, comprises social capital in the form of training programs, social consumption in general schooling, and social expenses (for example, security guards).

Given the contemporaneous growth of the monopoly sector and consequent socialization of capitalist production and exchange, the state's role grew accordingly. The fiscal crisis, in

O'Connor's treatment, concerned the financing of the state's activities, because the appropriation of the surplus remained in private hands. The structural gap or fiscal crisis results from the taxpayers' resistance to financing further social capital expenditure. The crisis intensifies owing to the use of state power in favor of particularistic ends. The resulting struggle is resolved (if that) politically, whether through formal elections, lobbying, "corruption," or public campaigning.

O'Connor's work proved more influential in Europe than in the United States, where O'Connor based his study. Subsequent studies by Ian Gough (1979) and Claus Offe (1984) incorporated O'Connor's analytical framework, and, in their respective ways, indirectly anticipated the radical restructuring of the Keynesian welfare state that has taken place since 1980. While O'Connor acknowledges his failure to predict the rise of neoliberalism, the seeds of that rise could be detected in his location of fiscal crisis. Theoretically, his work anticipated much of the later writing on social capital. And while the capitalist state's economic role today is no longer as characterized by downward redistribution, the growth of the state's repressive apparatus, whether in increased military expenditures or in expanding penal incarceration, and the growth of public-private partnerships for the provision of social capital, in addition to other forms of corporate welfare, demonstrates the continued validity and vitality of fiscal crisis theory.

See also *Social Capital; Welfare State.*

. . . .   MICHAEL KEANEY

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State, Functions of the

The way in which the U.S. government is organized (federalism, or federalist system) divides authority between a central government and the fifty state governments. This division provides for great diversity in politics, programs, and policies across the fifty individual states. *Federalism,* as defined by David Rosenbloom and Robert Kravchuck, is "a form of governmental organization that divides political authority between a central government and state or provincial governments" (2005). Although the U.S. Constitution certainly makes the federal government supreme, states are given a great deal of authority and discretion over programs and their citizens. Generally it is true that functions that serve as a benefit to the entire country, such as national security, foreign relations, and currency, are generally handled by the federal government. However, functions that serve a smaller group of individuals and may be impacted by differences in the cultures and needs seen at a smaller scale are generally handled at the lower levels of the American government, particularly the state level.

The Tenth Amendment states, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." Essentially this says that if the Constitution does not specifically give the federal government the power or authority over a policy area, then the states retain that power and authority. This division of powers and authorities coupled with the wide latitude states are given under the U.S. Constitution has created a great amount of diversity in state level approaches to policy areas and problems. In fact, a metaphor coined by Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis in 1932 likened states to "laboratories of democracy." Although variations in specific approaches to social problems and needs exist across the fifty states, several major policy areas are generally viewed as the primary functions of the state: education, social services, justice and protection of people, housing, economic development, and transportation. Of these typical functions, education is the primary function of the states. In fact, states generally fund over half of the public education system. In general, however, within all of these policy realms exists a variety of specific approaches across the states.

In addition to the variation across the states in terms of specific approaches to policies, many states share or delegate responsibility and authority to municipal and county governments. Within the context of the American federalist system, local governments are viewed as entities of their respective states. Dillon's Rule has affirmed that local governments hold only the power that their respective states give to them. Additionally, in some cases, authority, such as is the case with transportation, is shared between the federal, state, and local levels. In addition to specific authorities, states are also often in charge of implementing federal mandates. Generally, mandates are rules or requirements that the federal government forces states to implement and impose on inhabitants of their specific states. These mandates often include environmental controls, educational minimums, and social service provisions.

The division of power in the U.S. federalist system has evolved over the course of history. Alongside the historical evolution of federalism, states' functions and responsibilities have shifted and changed. Federalism often is divided into four distinct eras: dual (layer-cake), cooperative (marble-cake), creative (picket fence), and new (federal retrenchment). During each of these eras the role of the state has changed. With *dual federalism,* separation between the states and the federal government was the primary feature. States were equal and had their own distinct policy realm. States were generally viewed as a separate but equal government entity. The Great Depression ushered in *cooperative federalism,* wherein the

federal government became more powerful and states entered into cooperative agreements with the federal government over policies and programs. The New Deal programs are key examples of the cooperation between states and the federal government during this era. In the creative federalism era, states were forced to implement many more federal government mandates than in previous times. This era was marked by overloaded cooperation and greater federal involvement in the state and local governments' affairs. States were sometimes even being bypassed in policies as the federal government reached down to the local level for implementation of certain programs. Finally, during the new federalism era, a gradual return of states' rights and responsibilities has been seen. During this era a great deal of power and authority has been restored or delegated to the states' domain, with the federal government retreating to its more traditional authorities. With the current globalization trends, the states' role in economic development and public policy likely will become of greater importance in citizens' daily lives, and the variations across the fifty states will hold greater implications for the future.

See also *Federalism; Federalism and Foreign Relations; State, The; State, Varieties of the.*

. . . .   SUSAN MARIE OPP

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State, Rights of the

Following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the nation-states of Europe emerged as the primary actors in international politics. However, both the formal and informal rights and powers of states have been in decline since the middle of the twentieth century, concurrent with the rise of nonstate actors, including international organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union. The traditional rights of the state include sovereignty, independence, self-defense, and equality in the international system.

THE INTERNAL ROOTS OF STATE POWER

State power is based on sovereignty. *Sovereignty,* simply defined, is control over people and geographic space. For an actor to be recognized as having sovereignty, it typically has to have a degree of legitimacy (i.e., it is recognized by other actors as the legal authority) and autonomy (i.e., it is independent, not controlled by another actor). For most of human history, sovereignty often resided with individuals such as a monarch or with supranational organizations such as the Catholic Church.

Westphalia marked a period of transition whereby state sovereignty, as manifested by the power of central governments, superseded that of the monarch or the church.

The emerging nation-states had high levels of both internal and external sovereignty that provided the basis for the domestic and international dimensions of state power. Central to both internal and external sovereignty is the right of existence, also known as *independence.* Freedom from control or undue influence by other actors is the cornerstone of the rights of states. Independence permits the state to choose its own governmental system, interact with other states on a nominally equal basis in the international system and create its own internal laws and policies.

The success of the nation-states resulted initially from their specific internal powers, namely control over the use of force, taxation, and the regulation of civil society. As noted by Max Weber, the state had a recognized monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its borders. This allowed central governments to concentrate power and outlaw or eliminate potential rivals, such as private armies. Control over the use of force allowed states to expand their military capabilities through standing armies and conscription. Meanwhile taxation gave central governments the resources to expand control and reinforce their legitimacy through the development and implementation of social and economic programs. Taxation also reinforced the military capabilities of nation-states and helped fuel the revolution in military affairs through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Independence allowed states to create domestic legal frameworks that regularized trade relationships and customs. Legal systems also helped bolster the legitimacy of the government. These trends, in turn, accelerated the rise of a middle class in areas such as Europe and North America.

EXTERNAL RIGHTS

Independence is also a core tenet of external sovereignty and is manifested in several areas. A central state right, and component of external sovereignty, is self-defense from external attack. The principle is one of the oldest in international law and is enshrined in Article 51 of the 1945 United Nations (UN) Charter. The article recognizes the right of states to engage in individual or collective self-defense, even prior to UN action in response to aggression.

The state right of equality is the basis for international law. As equal actors, states have the right to control their foreign policies, including entering into treaties with other states and international actors. Article 2 of the UN Charter specifically notes the "equality" of states. This right is often questioned by lesser developed states who argue that the more economically and militarily developed nations dominate contemporary international relations.

Efforts to codify the rights of states under international law, such as the failed 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, have been generally unsuccessful with the notable exception of the aforementioned UN Charter, which outlines rights in specific issue-areas (subsequent efforts to expand the definition of rights within the UN have been only

partially successful). Instead, the rise of international organizations and globalization has constrained the rights of states. For instance, after World War II (1939–1945), states such as Germany or Japan were willing to give up a significant degree of control over their external sovereignty, including accepting constraints on their right of self-defense, in exchange for participation in collective defense arrangements with the United States. The political scientist and economist Richard Rosecrance (2000) argues that this permitted these nations to concentrate on economic development and become first trading states and then virtual states that had accepted significant limits on their internal and external sovereignty. Concurrently, the member states of the European Union have surrendered a significant portion of control over their monetary policy to the regional body.

See also *Administrative State; Nation-state; Sovereignty; State Failure; State Formation; State, Functions of the; State, Rights of the; State, The; State, Theories of the; State, Varieties of; Welfare State.*

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State, the

A *state* is a set of institutions and specialized personnel that regulates important aspects of the life of a territorially bounded population and extracts resources from that population through taxation. Its regulations are backed by force if necessary. It is recognized internationally as a state by other similarly constituted states.

There are four elements in this definition: the regulatory character of the state, the coercive aspect of the state apparatus, the extraction of resources from the population, and the role of the state as a unit (in fact, the basic and irreducible unit) in the field of international relations. These four elements can be considered as constants in any explanation of what the state is.

THE STATE AS REGULATOR

The regulation of some aspects of the life of the population living within the territory of the state through laws and norms is a permanent feature of a state's activity. However, the scope of the activities regulated by the state has varied across history. According to Samuel E. Finer (1997), the first apparition of developed states goes back to around 3500 BCE, in Sumer. During the following five millennia, at least until the apparition of the modern form of the state in the nineteenth century, the main activities of the state apparatus were the organization of armies for conquering new territories and

Philosopher Thomas Hobbes authored *Leviathan* in 1651, in which he lauded states for offering the order and protection that make civilization possible.

SOURCE: The Granger Collection, New York

defending from the attacks of other states or groups of warriors, as well as the protection of public order and private property within the territory of the state. These activities of the state roughly correspond to Thomas Hobbes's ideas about its role. As he famously claims in *Leviathan* (1651), in the absence of a state, life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." States provide order and protect private property, making civilization possible. This is not to say that these were the only activities regulated by the premodern state. Some public goods, like roads, canals, or locks, were provided by a range of states that comprise, among others, Imperial China, the Roman Empire, ancient Egypt, or the absolutist states of the modern era. The provision of these goods was sometimes connected to the military necessities of the state: Roman roads are a case in point. The state's interests in the expansion of its tax base (in itself, also a consequence of the search for revenue to finance military establishments) led, among other things, to the involvement of the state in economic activities, as irrigation works in ancient Egypt and China or the creation of state

manufactures in Colbert's France. Actually, through its role as enforcer of private agreements and its protection of property rights, the state has been historically essential to economic growth.

After the Industrial Revolution, and especially after the Second World War (1939–1945), it is much more difficult to say that public order, protection of property rights, and organization for war are the main activities of the state. For one thing, the state, with a much-enhanced capacity to penetrate society, is now in most countries the main provider of welfare. This is an enormous change, given that in premodern states welfare provisions (such as health care, education, or poor-relief) were mainly a question of social capital: It was directly provided by local communities and private associations such as, for example, guilds.

Although the capacity of state's penetration in society has varied through time, it is a constant that the state provides norms and regulations that make social cooperation and economic exchanges possible, at least in societies with large populations. Even though in small communities cooperation seems possible even in the absence of state institutions, in large societies the presence of a state that enforces private agreements is essential to social cooperation. Not all authors agree with that. Most of the literature on social capital, for example, claims that trust is the key for social cooperation and consider the state, at best, as unnecessary for cooperation or, at worst, as a destroyer of trust relations, and, therefore, inimical to social cooperation. There are, however, good reasons to claim that in large societies, the absence of state norms and regulations make cooperation, and even trust, unfeasible. Without institutions that enforce private agreements, untrustworthy people will be better off systematically than trusters, and, as a consequence, trust and cooperation will disappear. The resulting situation would be similar to Hobbes's state of nature, where war of everyone against everyone prevails. Indeed, modern social science has consistently demonstrated that relatively weak states without the capacity to enforce public order are the best predictors of civil war onset and revolutions. Therefore, the absence of state's norms and regulations make social cooperation and social peace unfeasible in large societies. However, this does not necessarily amount to say that state's norms and regulations are neutral in the sense of favoring the interests of all groups in society.

Historically, regulations of the state apparatus backed by coercion have favored some social groups above others and have allowed the free organization of certain social interests, while at the same time forcefully repressing the organization of other social groups. Indeed, which interests are being served by the state's norms and regulations has been one of the most controversial issues in the analyses of the state. The three traditions that can claim to have developed a theory of the state—pluralism, Marxism, and what has been called the *statist approach*—have different views about it. According to pluralists, the state is an arena in which different social groups negotiate. None of these social groups has power enough to control the state. The ruler is usually seen as a neutral arbiter between competing interests. This view has been much amended by subsequent neopluralist writers, recognizing that in the real world some interests have more leverage than others in the state's policy agenda. The opposite position to the pluralists is that of the Marxists. There are various versions of Karl Marx's theory of the state. In the *Communist Manifesto* (1848), the state is portrayed as an agency in the hands of the economically dominant class. This is also roughly Vladimir Lenin's idea in *The State and Revolution* (1917). In posterior writings, however, Marx discussed the possibility of state's autonomy with respect to class interests. One way for the state to develop an autonomous position, according to Marx, is to play a "divide and conquer" strategy between two opposed classes, for example, the bourgeoisie and the feudal class in the European absolutist states. Another way for the state to gain autonomy is to rest on a class numerically majoritarian but devoid of class consciousness, as the French small land-owners described in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon* (1852). Recent Marxists' theories about the state have fluctuated between instrumentalist views and further exploration of the idea of the state's autonomy.

This idea is also central in another stream of studies of the state that tried to "bring the state back in" during the 1980s. These authors generally claimed that the state should be treated as an agent with its own interests and preferences, independent from those of elites and social classes, and that, under certain circumstances, the state can achieve autonomy from society to carry out those interests and preferences. Certainly, the state can have preferences and interests of its own, although it would be more accurate to consider them the interests and preferences of the rulers and the people who occupy positions in the state apparatus, instead of the interests of "the state" as such. This is the approach followed by studies of the state from a rational choice perspective, as those of Douglass North (1981), Margaret Levi (1988), and Barbara Geddes (1994). From a rational choice approach, it can be claimed that rulers certainly have their own interests and preferences: They can be portrayed as revenue maximizers or as maximizers of their probability of remaining in office. However, they do so subjected to constraints. In Levi's view, these constraints are constituted by their relative bargaining power vis-à-vis social agents and by how much they value future payoffs. Insights from the Marxist theory of the state also could be inserted into this rational choice framework, in the sense that to remain in office or to maximize revenue, the ruler is subjected to the constraints imposed by the necessity to ensure future investment by private capitalists. This imposes a limit on what state agents can regulate. This theory of the structural dependence of the state on capital has been sophisticatedly analyzed by Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein (1988).

THE STATE AND COERCION

States' norms and regulations are backed, if necessary, by force. This leads us to the second characteristic of the state: its coercive nature. It is one of the main elements of Max

Weber's famous definition of the state: "a compulsory political organization with continuous operations will be called a 'state' insofar as its administrative staff upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order" (1978). In this definition there are two characteristics of coercion that vary in time and are, therefore, problematic in any general definition of the state: the state's monopoly of force and its legitimacy. It can be argued that both are aspirations of the state, given that the monopoly of force as well as its legitimacy both make the rulers' policies easier to attain by increasing cooperation with rulers' decisions. However, this aspiration, in many cases, falls short of the state's realities.

In premodern states, private violence was pervasive, in the form of banditry or private resolution of feuds. It is notorious, for example, that in the Roman Empire, away from the imperial roads guarded by soldiers, lawlessness and violence prevailed. This must have been the case in most polities until the extension in the modern state of what Michael Mann (1988) calls the state's "infrastructural power," its capacity to penetrate civil society to a point close to the monopoly of the use of force. Legitimacy must have been also variable through history. One possible explanation of this variation can be the type of political regime. Some contemporary analyses of revolutions and rebellions claim that the openness of the political system increases the state's legitimacy and therefore decreases the likelihood of revolutions. Therefore, we should expect more legitimacy in democratic regimes than in what Finer calls "palace" and "nobility" polities, where the decision-making process is exclusively in the hands of a relatively small elite. The prevalence of certain ideological frameworks in a society also can have an impact on the state's legitimacy. Nationalism is a good example. The idea that the population of the state forms a community of feeling that shares common interests as a nation should have a positive effect on the legitimacy of the state that claims to represent that nation. Indeed, nationalism has been actively promoted by the state from the nineteenth century onward, through the creation of national symbols as well as public education in a national language and a national culture. However, modern democratic regimes and nation-states are quite recent nineteenth-century phenomena, and during the previous five millennia (and indeed also during the past two centuries) states have existed that were neither democracies nor nations. What is clear is that although coercion is a characteristic of all states, its monopoly and its sources of legitimacy have varied through time.

The coercive nature of the state is directed inside and outside the state's boundaries. Within the state's boundaries, violence is applied to enforce norms and regulations and, historically, to protect private property and eliminate internal threats to the ruler in terms of dissent, rebellions, or terrorism. The intensity of the violence applied by the state to eliminate internal threats to the ruler has varied across time and space, depending on a range of variables, including the infrastructural power of the state, the type of political regime, and the size of the threat to the rulers' position. The lack of infrastructural power severely limits the options available to rulers to cope with threats to their rule. Given that a ruler lacks information about where these possible threats are, violence in these cases will be either minimal but brutal (compensating the lack of accuracy in identifying potential culprits with the severity of the punishment), as in many premodern states whose penal codes included extremely cruel forms of punishment, or indiscriminate. In the Chinese empires, for example, the difficulties in the monitoring of corruption of public officers were partly compensated by extremely severe punishments. The type of political regime frequently is related also to the degree of violence applied by the state. A well-proven fact in modern political science is that democracies apply lower levels of violence than authoritarian regimes. This has to do with the formal checks that democratic regimes impose on the ruler, including electoral accountability and the presence of institutional veto points. Finally, another determinant of the variation in the levels of violence applied by the state is the importance of the threat toward the rulers' position: Higher threats usually will be followed by higher levels of violence by the state.

All the previous discussion about coercion applied by the state to people within its boundaries does not mean that ruling is based just on violence. It is true that in *The Prince* (1532), Niccolò Machiavelli claimed that, for a ruler, it is better to be feared than to be loved. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that Machiavelli was discussing how a new prince can consolidate power. Old dynasties, Machiavelli also claims, have other forms of legitimacy that make the use of extreme violence less necessary. In modern democratic states, that is precisely the case: Ruling is usually based more on consent than on coercion. This does not mean that coercion is absent in democratic regimes. Democracies also apply violence toward dissent, especially during national emergencies such as wars and terrorist threats, but, more importantly, the enforcement of the state's norms and regulations rests always in coercion as the last resort.

Violence also is applied by the state outside its boundaries. Indeed, during most of its existence, the main activity of the state has been the organization for war. Actually, there is a scholarly consensus in claiming that war was decisive for the creation of the modern state in Europe between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries. The territorial state triumphed because of its superior organization for war. Wars were the necessary incentive for rulers in sixteenth-century Europe to improve the state apparatus, its centralization, its capacity to extract resources both from peasants and from the new urban wealth created by commerce and trade. The political landscape at the end of the Middle Ages in Europe was highly fragmented, containing about one hundred or so polities. Four hundred years later the number of political units has been reduced to about thirty states. War has been the driving force that made some states survive and others, like Burgundy, to perish. The particular type of regime adopted by the state (absolutism, like Bourbon France and Habsburg Spain, or constitutionalism, like Britain and Poland, for example) depended also on other variables like, according to Thomas Ertman (1997), the

presence in Britain, Hungary, Poland, and Scandinavia of participatory patterns of local government and their absence in Germany and Latin Europe. These participatory institutions blocked the way to absolutist forms of government.

However, it has to be stressed that this model of state-building based on war is circumscribed to the European state system, and it is difficult to export to other continents. Although the model of the modern state is European, state-building has followed different avenues in other places. In Africa, for example, contemporary states are a product of the process of decolonization from the European empires, not of interstate wars. Indeed, although African states have been plagued with civil wars, interstate wars have been much less frequent and the boundaries of states have remained remarkably stable since decolonization. However, it is also the case that the African pattern of state-building has frequently led to failed states or, in any case, to very weak states dependent for their income to a large extent on foreign aid. The great difference of the environment in which European states developed is that, while from sixteenth to nineteenth-century Europe the international system of states punished weak states even to the point of allowing them to disappear, in the modern international system weak states are legitimized and protected. This is one of the reasons for the subsistence of weak states such as those of sub-Saharan Africa.

THE STATE AS A COLLECTOR OF TAXES

States have to extract resources from society to finance their activities. This is another characteristic of the state: It extracts resources from the population through taxes. It is in exchange of these resources that the state provides laws and regulations, social peace, and public goods such as roads and education. All these things make civilization possible. However, as North noted, there is frequently a contradiction between the action of the state as an extractor of resources and as a provider of laws, regulations, and public goods. Historically, most rulers have tended to maximize their revenues at the cost of providing inefficient laws and regulations. This means that they extract more resources than it is needed to guarantee law, order, and provision of public goods, but also that they design property rights and regulations that promote their interests but not the general interest of sustained growth. This tension between maximization of the rulers' revenue and creation of the necessary framework for the economy to flourish is the reason why most states, although indispensable for economic growth, have been unable to guarantee vibrant economies. In any case, the extraction of resources from society is at the very core of what a state is. It implies at least the development of a minimal amount of infrastructural power and the employment by the ruler of specialized personnel, a bureaucracy. This bureaucracy reached its full development in the modern state, where, according to Weber, administrative personnel are hierarchically organized and selected on the basis of technical qualifications, and each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal sense. Nevertheless, although not as rationally organized as in the modern state, bureaucracies have been a permanent characteristic of the state from the scribes in ancient Egypt onward, and in certain premodern states, as imperial China, it reached a remarkable degree of sophistication. The intimate connection between the organization of a bureaucratic structure and the collection of taxes is seen in the case of certain African states. In many cases, the failure of the state in Africa to develop a proper administrative apparatus is due to the fact that rulers have alternative sources of revenue—as for example, income from exports of raw materials and mineral concessions—and, therefore, they do not need to build elaborate bureaucracies to enforce taxes on the population.

THE STATE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Another characteristic of the state is that it is the most important unit in the system of international relations. This means that states are recognized as such in the international arena by other states. This is a notorious feature of the state since the apparition of the modern state in Europe. Absolutist states in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries developed an increasingly sophisticated diplomacy that included permanent embassies in other countries. Indeed, recognition of states by other states through treaties and temporal embassies seems to have been a feature of the state since its very apparition, with remarkable early examples such as the peace treaty between Egypt and the Hittite king at the end of the second millennium BCE. It can be argued that the insertion of a state in the international system of states has had an increasingly important effect on the probability of a state's survival. While in previous centuries the weakness of the state and its inability to wage war, as we noted before, led in most of the cases to its destruction at the hands of more powerful states (as the fate of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century illustrates), in the contemporary world weak states have a good chance of survival through the fact of being recognized as legitimate states by the international community, as is the case in many African states.

See also *International Relations; State Formation; State, Functions of the; State, Theories of the; State, Varieties of; Taxation; War Powers.*

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State, Theories of the

Theories of the state have focused primarily on the determinants of the formation of state policy secondarily on the consequences of policies and have barely addressed the issue of the implementation of state policy. Although particular theoretical arguments about the state are numerous, most can be grouped into five general schools of thought or traditions: pluralism, elite theory, Marxism, state-centered theory, and public choice theory. This entry defines these theories of the state and discusses their arguments about the causes and consequences of state policies.

PLURALISM AND ELITE THEORY

Pluralist theory argues that power is widely diffused in democratic states, and, as a result of that, state policies reflect the interests of the majority of the population. In its most simple form, the main actors competing to shape state policies are interest groups attempting to influence politicians. These interest groups, formed to aggregate and give voice to the interests of various subgroups of the population on particular issues, all have different amounts and types of power. The state is viewed not as an actor in its own right but simply as a neutral "referee" in the contest between competing interest groups, so policy outcomes are a function of which interest group or coalition of interest groups has the most power. The power of interest groups is mainly a function of the extent to which the public supports them, leading pluralists to the sanguine conclusion that democratic systems usually produce policies that reflect the interests of the majority of the population. Neopluralist arguments expand the theory by looking at the importance of institutional structures, class power, and the independent interests of state actors.

Power elite theory argues that the pluralist view ignores the main underlying determinants of state policy by focusing only on competing interest groups. A great deal of power is exercised prior to interest group competition, by the structure of institutions and by the formation of preferences. Elite theory suggests that institutional structure prevents some interest groups from forming and limits the power of others. For example, things like poll taxes, literacy tests, and all-white democratic primaries in the South limited the political power and organizational capacity of poor and minority groups in the United States. Furthermore, elites control important media outlets that limit the information and distort the values of groups with interests opposed by the elite. As a result of their ability to construct institutions and shape preferences in ways that favor them, a unified power elite composed of top officials in economic, political, and military organizations is able to limit the extent of explicit conflict and shape state policy in their interests.

MARXISM

Marxist theory argues that class power and the structure of modes of production determine the nature of state policy. The instrumentalist variant claims that dominant classes directly control the state by monopolizing the most important positions within the state apparatus. Democratic states are thus not the neutral referees of pluralist theory, but the state is an instrument in the hands of capitalist classes. Structural Marxists argue that such direct control and agency is not necessary to ensure that democratic states act in the interests of capitalist classes—the functional requisites of capitalist modes of production compel policies in the interests of capitalists regardless of the class origins or preferences of state officials. For example, the tax base of the state depends on the private investment decisions of capitalists, so if one state pursues anticapitalist policies, capitalists will move to another state.

STATE-CENTERED THEORY

State-centered theories do not see state actors either as neutral referees or as completely controlled by elites or dominant classes, but as potentially autonomous actors with their own interests and often with the power to act on those interests. State policies therefore often reflect the institutional structure of the state and the interests of actors running the state. As a result, one of the main consequences of state policies when the state has high autonomy is to increase the size, power, and independence of the state itself. One of their most important contributions has been in explaining the origins of revolutions. In contrast to earlier accounts that looked for causal factors outside the state, such as changes in class power or in ideologies, state-centered theorists argue that the most important cause was the weakening of the state itself, usually a result of military defeats.

PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY

Public choice theory applies economic models to democratic politics. Its main contribution is optimal location theory. Beginning with the assumption that politicians choose their

policy platforms to maximize the probability of winning elections, Anthony Downs (1957) developed elegant models predicting the optimal location of political parties (the policy platform that maximizes votes) in issue spaces (continua of voters' opinions on an issue). For presidential, winner-take-all systems like the United States, it yields several interesting predictions: (1) there will be only two viable political parties, and third-party bids generally will fail; (2) both parties will locate as close as possible to the middle of the ideological spectrum, trying to attract the "median voter," so the differences between them will be minimal; and (3) redistributive government policies will be especially influenced by and relatively beneficial for the median voter—in economic policies, the voter with roughly the median income. Political systems based on proportional representation will have the opposite characteristics: They produce multiple political parties spanning the ideological spectrum, increasing the choices available to voters but decreasing the stability of system (the latter is due to both the shorter tenure of governing coalitions and the wider swings in state policies when the ruling coalition changes).

Theories of the state are not static, but are constantly evolving in response to new data and changing intellectual trends. The main current trend is toward increasing complexity. Contemporary theories of the state are developing much more nuanced and synthetic models of the formation and consequences of state policy. Whether these more complicated theories will gain more in terms of explanatory power than they lose in precision and parsimony remains to be seen.

See also *Elite Theory; Marxism; Pluralism; State, The; State Formation; State, Varieties of the.*

. . . .   EDGAR KISER

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State, Varieties of the

Max Weber defined the *state* as the human community that, within a defined territory (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of force* for itself. This definition focuses on the function of the state ascribing territory as its only inherent characteristic. On the topics of the use of force, Weber argues that, though force is not the normal or sole means available to a state, without the ability to use force, a state would cease to exist. He suggests there are three pure types of legitimacy: custom (based on time immemorial), gift of grace (i.e., charisma), and legal statute. Weber explains that these pure types are rarely found but more often there exist complex variations, transitional forms, and combinations of these types. This widely accepted definition has continually met criticism as Weber's definition focuses on the functions of the state rather than its identifiable characteristics.

In the 1950s to 1960s, the concept of state was subsumed in sociological analyses that focused on society at large. The state, sociologist Edwards Shils argued, was one (though arguably very important) organization within a broader array of organizations existing at the center of society. Shils understood the center to be the elites, values, beliefs, and institutions that act as the modernizing force within a given society. This modernizing center must struggle for change against a traditional periphery.

By the 1970s and 1980s, however, the center-periphery model had lost influence, as critics of Shils pointed to the birth of "new nations" in the third world that were not following the Western path toward modernization. Theda Skocpol reintroduces the state as an autonomous (and not simply central) actor in "Bringing the State Back In" (1985). She argues that states are not simply organizations controlling territories but rather they are braced at the "intersection between domestic sociopolitical orders and transnational relations within which they must maneuver for survival and advantage in relation to other states." Thus, states must be viewed as organizations maneuvering to consolidate power domestically and maneuvering to survive internationally.

Joel Migdal argues that the state as an independent actor may provide a simple theoretical concept, but it lacks applicability. Instead, Migdal returns to the concept of the state as a central organization that battles among social organizations to gain social control both domestically and internationally. He argues that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in western Europe the state began to directly challenge other forms of social organization and proved the most effective domestically in improving existing tax-collecting mechanisms and expanding its courts, as well as defending itself internationally with a large standing army.

In his 2001 work, *State in Society,* Migdal has posited a more dynamic definition of the state than Weber's. The state, Migdal suggests, "is a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of a people bounded in that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts." He argues that the two parts of a state, its image and its practices, could either be reinforcing or mutually destructive.

Migdal's definition is not only a two-level analysis of the state but the two levels are paradoxical in nature. The image of a state, Migdal argues, presents a view of the state as a "clearly bounded, unified organization that can be spoken of in a singular term." In contrast, a given states' practices are executed

by "a heap of loosely connected parts or fragments, frequently with ill-defined boundaries between" them and responsible for promoting conflicting sets of rules from one another and from the accepted rule of law. Though this definition lacks simplicity, Migdal warns that theories that do not capture the paradoxical nature of the state "end up either overidealizing its ability to turn rhetoric into effective policy or dismissing it as a grab-bag of every-man-out-for-himself, corrupt officials." From this conception, Migdal moves to an analysis of state society relations, or the relations of the state with its component societal interests.

Countries vary in their state-society relations, specifically in the ability of the state to achieve social control within society. States that have effectively gained social control are considered authoritarian or strong. Russia is an example of an authoritarian state that exercises almost complete control within its own society. Many European and Asian countries have strong states that have not gained complete control over society but are nonetheless effective in regulating and limiting it. Other countries have weak states. The United States, for example, has a weak, "checked-and-balanced" government. Many developing counties are considered too weak in that they have such little social control that they cannot govern or carry out effective public policies.

See also *State, Functions of the; State, The; State, Theories of the.*

. . . .   HOWARD J. WIARDA AND LEAH CARMICHAEL

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State Capacity

State capacity concerns the ability of the state to make and implement its decisions. State capacity became more central in social science debates due to recent increases in the incidence of societal conflicts and phenomena relating to state failure and weakness. The concept is also central in the debates on globalization and its impact on the nation-state's internal capacities to design and effectively implement policies. State capacity appears to be a useful tool in describing the state as worldwide institution, exhibiting significant variations in form and performance.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE STATE CAPACITY

State capacity is expanding and transforming as the state diversifies its functions and significantly increases its turnover of personnel, money, and regulation. State transformation has two distinct parallel histories of modernization and diffusion. The modernization of the state had two main directions: cultural homogenization and the containment of resources (capital, labor, and technology) inside well-defined state boundaries. The state gained its core functions and instruments as known today in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The process included the separation of the ruler and traditional elites from the state institutions, bureaucracy, and infrastructure growth; army strengthening; and the establishment of comprehensive internal security and juridical structures (police, courts, and prisons). If under the pressure of major conflicts, the early-modern state privileged the security institutions and services, it later extended its role in organizing the majority of societal spheres. The majority of states participated in the twentieth century in two world wars that required a massive mobilization and projection of available resources. During this century the state concluded its control over individuals, groups, and organizations, especially in the totalitarian and authoritarian states. The history of diffusion parallels the modernization process. The ideological and institutional template of the European state provided inspiration for the majority of aspirants to statehood and independence. The historical development of the European state has proven to be very specific and difficult to reproduce in other contexts.

TYPES OF STATE CAPACITY

The dimensions of state capacity largely fall in two distinct categories: constitutive and infrastructural. *Constitutive capacity* describes the ability of the modern state to mobilize individuals, groups, and social institutions and co-opt them into the governmental process. The variables describing the constitutive capacity are segmental, organizational, identity, and state form and regime.

The *segmental variable* refers to the extent to which the society is divided along specific lines and the extent to which the segments participate to the organization of the state and the implementation of its policies. The divisions could be ethnic, religious, linguistic, or socioeconomic. Deep segmentation and restriction from participation together can produce open state contestation. The *organizational variable* refers to the extent to which social institutions cooperate with the state. The societies can have different levels of organizational development. Institutions such as markets, churches, unions, and political parties are indispensable to the functioning of the state. Where the institutions are strong and distinct, state action can be significantly enhanced or inhibited.

The *identity variable* refers to the extent to which individuals primarily identify themselves through citizenship and nationality. States where the cross-cutting identities were too weak have sometimes experienced political instability. The *state form and regime variable* refers to the variation in vertical

organization of authority and the way the political institutions (constitutions, legislative-executive relations, and party and electoral systems) manage public participation and decision making. Federal and confederal designs and the special representation of minority groups in representative and executive institutions have been used as instruments for mitigating conflicts and preservation of statehood.

The *infrastructural capacity* describes the ability of the state to expand its institutional network, to penetrate and control territories and organize societal relations. The variables describing infrastructural capacity are territorial, economic, bureaucratic, and functional.

The *territorial variable* refers to the extent a state effectively controls its entire territory. The lack of control is defined as the permanent absence of state agents and institutions (police, army, courts) in a given area. The effective control is related to the level of contestation and violence and is the precondition for the operation of the other infrastructural variables. The economic variable refers to state's ability to extract and make use of the resources within a territory. In time this capacity has increased even though significant spheres are escaping state control and monitoring. Most governments struggle to control criminal financial activities such as smuggling, drug trafficking, and other types of transnational crime. The ability to use public resources in a transparent, equitable, and efficient way is also important.

The *bureaucratic variable* refers to the extent to which the state administratively penetrates its own territory. If for the purpose of controlling the territory and extracting its resources the institutions were of a security and fiscal type, the penetration is carried out by a variety of institutions that support governing and administration at all levels. It includes complex bureaucracies organized vertically (central, regional, local) and horizontally (agencies). The *functional variable* of state capacity refers to the ability to provide public services such as health, education, social assistance, transport, and environmental protection. This activity places the state in societal context and highly influences the level of support for the state and its political regime.

The two types of capacities are intertwined. High levels of constitutive capacity could reduce the need for infrastructural expansion and help the state better fund and offer public services. High levels of infrastructural capacity could facilitate the development of constitutive capacity through the provision of services such as education or social assistance. By contrast, low levels of constitutive capacity permit infrastructural excess, especially in authoritarian states.

STATE WEAKNESS AND FAILURE

All types of states have difficulties in performing, given demanding societal and international pressures. While formally protected by international norms and institutions, weak and failed states have experienced serious internal conflict, chronic poverty, and institutional decay. Their profile became especially salient in the early 1990s when countries like Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Liberia, and Afghanistan experienced structural crises. In a capacity-centered definition of state weakness, it is useful to make a distinction between the countries that are lacking a polity and central political authority (*failed states*) and those experiencing a serious lack of institutional and economic performance (*weak states*). The key feature of a failed state is the absence of a functional and recognized political center capable of making and implementing decisions. The political institutions, to the extent that they exist or function, are captured by particular groups and used against competing groups or society in general. Weak states are not contested to the extent of having their existence threatened, yet they have serious difficulties in securing the support of individuals and groups. Their limitations are mainly infrastructural as they usually have to govern large territories and a significant number of individuals.

GLOBALIZATION AND STATE CAPACITY

Recent debates question the ability of states to preserve their authority and functions given the increase of global flows of information, resources, and people. It is increasingly difficult for modern states to manage and steer the economic activity or to protect individuals from new threats such as ecological degradation and new forms of terrorism. By managing significant resources and mobilizing significant numbers of individuals, businesses, civil society, and other groups are asserting their increased role in social organization. Even though states are not the only influential social actors, their explicitly assigned tasks—territorial control, monopoly on the use of violence, and enforcement of decisions—remain largely undisputed. However, these tasks are differentially managed depending on their own internal management and available resources and, thus, yield variable levels of effectiveness and legitimacy.

See also *Collapsed and Failed States; Globalization; State, The; State Failure.*

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State Capitalism

State capitalism is a term applied to national political economies in the postwar period that were characterized by a strongly interventionist state. France until the early 1980s was the ideal-typical model of state capitalism. The *developmental state* as found in Korea and Taiwan is another variant of state capitalism. Even Italy, in particular the "first Italy" of large firms and nationalized enterprises with highly unionized workforces, approximated the model, albeit the weakest case of state capitalism.

STATE CAPITALISM IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD

In the postwar period, state capitalism, or *statism,* was ordinarily contrasted with two other patterns of economic management, liberalism and corporatism, or market capitalism and managed capitalism. Typically, in state capitalism, the interventionist state organizes cooperation among autonomous economic actors and directs their economic activities. In *market capitalism,* the liberal state allows economic actors to operate autonomously and to decide for themselves on the direction of their economic activity, whereas in *managed capitalism,* the enabling state encourages economic actors to operate cooperatively and to coordinate the direction of their activities with one another and the state.

Moreover, in state capitalism, the state tends to organize the business relationship. Interfirm relations are mediated by the state, as opposed to the distant, competitive interfirm relations of market capitalism or the close network-based interfirm relations of managed capitalism. Industry-finance relations are similarly state-mediated. Industry is more dependent for financing upon the state than the banks (as in managed capitalism) or the markets (in market capitalism). The state in state capitalism therefore takes a more medium-term view than long-term emphasis on firm value of managed capitalism or the short-term focus on profits per se of market capitalism. The state also tends to direct business investment, with the state influencing business development through planning, industrial policy, or state-owned enterprises. It often picks winners and losers rather than only arbitrating among economic actors or facilitating their activities. Government relations with labor also tend to be state-controlled. Wage bargaining is largely determined by the state, which seeks to impose its decisions on fragmented unions and business, while labor-management relations are mostly adversarial.

Among European countries, France, until the 1980s, was the ideal-typical state capitalist country, with the *dirigiste,* or directive, state predominating through its leadership of business activity and its control over labor. Italy, by comparison, fell far short of the ideal, as a kind of failed state capitalism in which the state could not control the unions or provide leadership to business. In both, however, the state, whether playing an enhancing role, as in France, or a hindering role, as in Italy, contrasted greatly with the role the state played in British market capitalism, with its liberal, hands-off approach to business, or in German managed capitalism, with its enabling, facilitating approach to business and labor coordination.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF STATE CAPITALISM

Since the early 1980s, however, under the pressures of globalization and regional integration, state capitalist countries have transformed their economic management systems. Whereas both market or managed capitalist countries could adapt their models to the new environment, state capitalist countries found their model particularly ill-adapted and in need of change. In an increasingly complex and competitive environment, the state could no longer ensure economic growth or firm stability because it could no longer substitute for the market effectively, direct industry efficiently, or coordinate industrial relations successfully. In an increasingly tight budgetary context, moreover, the state could no longer afford to disregard firm profitability or underwrite industry investment as it had in the past.

As a result, the state in state capitalist countries engineered its own retreat, dismantling state power and control through the turn to monetarism in macroeconomic policy, the liberalization of the financial markets, the deregulation of business activity, and the privatization of nationalized firms. The state gave up its organizing role along with its financing of business, leaving firms to chart their own strategies and to arrange their

Grafitti in London, England, protests government interference in the economy during the 2009 economic crisis. State capitalism is characterized by a strongly interventionist state, as occurred in the postwar period of the 1940s and 1950s.

SOURCE: Corbis

own financing from the capital markets. And yet, the state continues to exercise leadership, albeit in a more indirect and often supply-side way. It may do this through the informal relationships among state-trained business elites; through state supply-side support of industry, through social policies; where the state has redirected its most interventionist efforts; and through labor market policies.

With regard to labor, the state has reformed either through decentralization or better coordination of the labor markets. Whereas the French state abandoned its control of wage bargaining, leaving labor relations almost as highly decentralized as in Britain today, the Italian state recentralized bargaining through a state-led kind of corporatism, as has Spain. The resulting industrial relations systems, however, are less fully market-reliant than in market capitalist countries and less stably coordinated than in managed capitalist countries. The state still plays a larger role in France, whether to liberalize or "moralize" the labor markets, while in Italy, politics gets in the way: Left-leaning governments negotiate social pacts that right-leaning ones can't or won't.

As a result of such transformations, there is now some question as to whether formerly state capitalist countries are a separate category of capitalism. Theorists who see convergence to a single neoliberal model as a result of globalization as well as those who posit continued divergence into two varieties of capitalism, liberal market economies and coordinated market economies, deny poststate capitalist countries any distinctive categorization. But the countries that the latter theorists leave out of their binary division of capitalism, which represent a nonvariety of capitalism they call *mixed-market economies,* are for the most part formerly state capitalist or developmental states. And these countries remain distinctive not only for the greater role left to the state but also for their logic of adjustment. In this third variety of *state-influenced market economies,* the state continues to intervene more, and differently, for better or worse, than in liberal or coordinated market economies. Although adjustment is firm-led in those domains where business now exercises autonomy—in business strategy, investment, production, and wage-bargaining—it is state-driven in those domains where neither business nor labor can exercise leadership—in labor rules, pension systems, and the like—or where the state sees a need to reshape the general economic environment to promote competitiveness. A number of scholars also have identified this greater state role as at the core of a third variety of capitalism or a distinguishing factor in one of an even greater number of varieties of capitalism.

THE FUTURE OF STATE CAPITALISM

But what can we say about the 2008 responses to the financial crisis, when states across advanced industrialized countries intervening massively, even to the point of nationalizing financial institutions? The new interventionism of states everywhere raises a question about whether all countries are state capitalist now, as well as about whether the differences among varieties of capitalism are still relevant, because all states intervened in similarly aggressive ways to stabilize the financial markets.

A closer look at the kinds of actions taken, together with the accompanying ideas and legitimating discourse, makes it clear that differentiation remains not only among countries that fit different varieties of capitalism but even among countries within the same variety. The starkest contrast is between the liberal market economies of the United Kingdom and the United States. The latter hesitated to take action, allowed a major investment bank to fail before intervening, experienced a political revolt against "financial socialism," and backed into taking equity stakes only once the United Kingdom had shown the way. The United Kingdom was better able to take the initiative than the United States not only because of political ideologies related to the party in power (Britain's New Labour versus the Bush White House) but also because of deeper historical differences in attitudes toward the state (with much greater legitimacy in the United Kingdom for a strong state in a limited domain). The French state-influenced market economy went further than either the United States or the United Kingdom, leading on eurozone coordination, proposing multilateral global intervention, and engaging in much greater internal intervention (reined in by the EU Commission). In the case of the German coordinated market economy, it is interesting to note that although the state also intervened, it was slower and more cautious initially than other major European member-states, a result not only of its kind of capitalism but also of collective memories about the inflationary dangers of deficit spending.

Countries that were formerly state capitalist, in short, were often faster in intervening. But the reasons may not only be related to historical patterns and memories but also to institutional arrangements and state capacity. Federal states, in which reaching agreement to intervene is often more complicated, were slower to respond to the crisis—the cases of the United States and Germany—than unitary states, whether in Britain, France, the Netherlands, or Sweden. State capacity to intervene, however, is another factor, which may help explain why formerly state capitalist Italy did not respond much, despite its own great economic difficulties.

Finally, it is important to note that whatever the intervention, this was far from the state capitalism of the past. All states resisted nationalization where possible, moved to nationalization only as a last resort, and committed themselves to reprivatizing as quickly as possible. The same could be said for state aid, which was seen as a short-term measure, to be paid back as quickly as possible—in the European Union under the watchful eye of the Competition Directorate-General. State capitalism, in short, has no future. But the state will continue to play an important role in capitalism, and some states more than others, in particular if they were historically state capitalist.

See also *Economic Development, State-led; French Political Thought; Nationalization.*

. . . . VIVIEN A. SCHMIDT

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State Church

A *state church* is a religious organization that receives official endorsement or significant financial subsidization from a government within a society. Official endorsement implies a legal statement to the effect that a specific denomination is the preferred faith of a government to the exclusion or significant limitation of all others. This may mean that other churches are not allowed to exist or proselytize within a nation or that the official state church receives significant legal, economic, or social advantages not available to alternative faiths. The heads of state churches are often appointed by state officials, and the salary of clergy are paid from public funds. In some cases, secular leaders claim to have say over official church policy and doctrine.

There are numerous reasons why governments prefer to maintain state churches and why religious leaders often yield to control of the state. From the vantage point of secular political authorities, state churches may lend religious legitimacy to secular rulers, making religious citizens more likely to comply with government policies. Political leaders often find it attractive to regulate tightly an institution that controls the creation and propagation of social values, norms, and beliefs. On the other side, leaders of a state church usually welcome the financial support of governments. In the absence of state tax support, religious organizations typically rely on voluntary contributions from parishioners. Additionally, state churches frequently enjoy protection from religious competitors as governments often will limit proselytizing activity of nonofficial churches via restrictions on property ownership, access to media, or outright bans on minority faiths.

Throughout history, state churches have been the norm. In early civilizations, shamans or priests would either be among tribal leaders or part of the ruling councils. This was common across many cultures of the world. Early Judaic history is replete with examples of state leadership being coterminous with religious leadership (e.g., King David). Christianity began its history as a minority religion under the Roman Empire, which heavily subsidized numerous pagan temples. In 313, Emperor Constantine issued the Edict of Milan that provided the Christian Church with funding equal to paganism. Though this edict did not technically make Christianity the official state church, the increasingly hierarchical nature of Christianity combined with a rapid drop in financial support for paganism quickly gave Christianity that status. The gradual split of Eastern Orthodox Christianity from the Roman Catholic Church did not affect the state church status of Christianity in the Byzantine Empire. Orthodox churches in Greece, Russia, and other parts of Eastern Europe became officially established in the Middle Ages. Through agreements with the Vatican, the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies made the Catholic Church the official state church in Iberia and Latin America. While the Protestant Reformation in the early 1500s represented a reaction to corruption within the Catholic Church and was in part motivated by the church's close affiliation with secular authorities, Protestant churches often were converted into state churches by various kings. State churches remained popular in the colonial British Americas even though religious dissenters had sought freedom from religious persecution by the Church of England. The Massachusetts Bay Puritans established their own religious organization as the state church in their colony. The Church of England retained official status and funding in the southern American colonies.

In Europe, a number of Protestant nations still maintain official state churches. Some nations such as Belgium and Germany provide special status and funding for multiple denominations, thus showing it is possible to maintain two or more state churches within a society. In recent years, Norway and Sweden have made movements toward disestablishing their state churches, although each church still receives significant public funding. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian government under Boris Yeltsin created an open religious marketplace where all churches received similar treatment. By 1997, however, the Russian Duma declared the Russian Orthodox Church to be the official state church and gave three other groups—Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism—privileged status.

The term *state church* typically refers to Christian societies, although the general concept of state control over religious organizations can be applied to societies with other faith traditions. In most nations with a Muslim majority, Islam is considered the state religion, wherein official sanction is given to the general faith tradition without an endorsement of any specific hierarchical leadership or institution. Many

governments (e.g., Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia) provide substantial funding for state-favored mosques, clergy, and religious schools, but there are still Islamic clergy and mosques that exist outside of the strict control of the state. Turkey has been officially considered a secular state since 1923, although its government maintains ownership of and strict control over numerous mosques, giving these mosques a quasi-official status as state "religious institutions."

See also *Church and State; Clericalism; Islamic Political Thought; Laicite; Papacy; Religion and Politics; Religious Parties; Theocracy.*

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State Compliance with International Law

One of the major questions in the research on international institutions, as stated by Robert Keohane (1984), has been "why governments, seeking to promote their own interests, ever comply with the rules of international regimes when they view these rules as in conflict with . . . their myopic self-interest." While realists argue that states simply do not comply if the costs of a rule are too high, rational institutionalists point to the role of international regimes and organizations, whose monitoring, sanctioning, and adjudication mechanisms increase the costs of noncompliance. In contrast to these enforcement approaches, management theories assume that noncompliance is involuntary and results from a lack of resources and, therefore, focus on capacity-building and rule specification. Finally, social constructivists stress legitimacy, socialization, and norm internalization through processes of social learning and persuasion as mechanisms explaining compliance behavior. These three approaches provide different explanations for why states comply. They have paid less attention to the question of why some states are worse compliers than others. Their explanatory power is even more limited when it comes to understanding why the same state complies less with certain international laws than with others.

THEORIES OF STATE COMPLIANCE: POWER, CAPACITY, AND LEGITIMACY

To explain why there is substantial variation between states compliance with international law, country-based explanations are necessary. Compliance theories, such as enforcement, management, and legitimacy approaches, primarily focus on institutional design (monitoring and sanctioning, capacity-building and adjudication, and socialization). Consequently, they have largely been used to account for variation in compliance across international institutions. However, all three approaches can be reformulated in a way to account for country-based explanatory factors, such as power (enforcement), capacity (management), and the acceptance of international rules and institutions (legitimacy).

Enforcement approaches assume that states choose to violate international norms and rules because they are not willing to bear the costs of compliance that result even from technical and narrow legal acts. From this rationalist perspective, noncompliance can only be prevented by increasing the costs of noncompliance. Establishing institutionalized monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms can alter the strategic cost-benefit calculations of states. The likelihood of being detected and punished increases the anticipated costs of noncompliance. However, state power can significantly mitigate the extent to which states are affected by and sensitive to compliance costs.

States are more sensitive to reputation and material costs imposed by others if they have less political or economic power and are more dependent on future goodwill and cooperation than are other states. Powerful states, in contrast, can afford to be more resistant to external pressures because they have more alternatives to cooperation with a particular partner and can more easily pay for reputation or material damages. At the same time, powerful states can use their economic and political resources to shape international laws according to their preferences, thereby reducing the costs of compliance. Their assertiveness should render powerful states, such as the United States or China, better compliers, while their power of recalcitrance would expect exactly the opposite. Power-based approaches are less indeterminate when it comes to predicting the compliance behavior of small and weak states, which have neither the power to shape international laws nor to resist compliance.

Unlike the enforcement approach, the management school assumes that noncompliance is involuntary. Even if states are willing to fully act in accordance with international law, they are prevented from doing so if the preconditions that enable states to comply are absent. The literature has identified three sources of such involuntary noncompliance: lacking or insufficient state capacities, ambiguous definitions of norms, and inadequate timetables within which compliance has to be achieved. Only state capacities can account for interstate variation, because the other variables are rule-specific.

The concept of state capacity is not used uniformly in the literature, and its operationalization differs significantly. Resource-centered approaches define capacity as a state's ability

to act (i.e., the sum of its legal authority and financial, military, and human resources). Neoinstitutionalist approaches, in contrast, argue that the domestic institutional structure influences the degree of a state's capacity to act and its autonomy to make decisions. Thereby, domestic veto players come to the fore, blocking the implementation of international rules because of the costs they have to (co-)bear. A large number of veto players reduces the capacity of a state to make the necessary changes to the status quo for the implementation of costly rules. Irrespective of the operationalization, states with low capacities are expected to be bad compliers.

Social constructivist approaches, finally, draw on the logic of appropriateness to explain state compliance with international law. They assume that states are socialized into the norms and rules of international institutions. They comply out of a normative belief that an international rule or institution ought to be obeyed rather than because it suits their instrumental self-interests. This sense of moral obligation is a function of the legitimacy of the rules themselves or their sources. Legitimacy can be generated in several ways. In order to explain interstate variation, country variables, such as the national rule of law culture and domestic support for the rule-setting institution, are of particular relevance.

Legal sociological studies refer to the relation between national legal cultures and states' inclinations to comply with national norms. Legal cultures comprise three elements: the characteristics of legal awareness, general attitudes toward the supremacy of law, and general attitudes toward the judicial system and its values. In this perspective, the degree of compliance correlates with the extent to which rule addressees accept the legitimacy of the rule of law and consider compliance with legal norms as demanded by a domestic logic of appropriateness. The acceptance of a rule and the subsequent inclination to comply with it result from the diffuse support for lawmaking as a legitimate means to ensuring political order in a community. Consequently, even costly rules will be complied with principally. While this argument was developed for compliance with domestic laws, it should apply also to international rules because they also constitute law. Yet, rules are not only complied with because laws ought to be obeyed, but because the rules are set by institutions, which enjoy a high degree of support. Thus, social constructivist approaches would expect states to comply with international laws if their rule of law culture is strong or their domestic support for the international institution issuing the law is high.

TOWARD AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH

The three compliance approaches, which dominate the international relations literature, treat power, capacity, and legitimacy as alternative or competing explanations of variation in state compliance with international law. Yet, there are good empirical and theoretical reasons to combine them. Empirical studies have shown that combination of management and enforcement instruments is an effective

way to restore compliance. On the theoretical level, some of the explanatory variables are causally connected, so that they condition their respective effects on compliance. For instance, enforcement and management approaches can interact, because differences in capacity affect the cost sensitivity of states concerning compliance decisions. While powerful states can afford to resist enforcement pressures by international institutions or other states, those with high capacities will less frequently choose to infringe on international law than their less resourceful and inefficient counterparts because they have the capacity to comply. And indeed, research on compliance with European law shows that states with high capacities but little power, such as Denmark, comply much better than powerful countries with limited capacities (e.g., Italy).

FROM INTERSTATE TO INTRASTATE COMPLIANCE

While the international relations literature provides a fairly good account for why some states comply less than others, explanations are less adequate as to why the same state violates some international laws more frequently than others. First, compliance theories are rather state-centric and focus on country-based variables, such as power, capacity, and legitimacy. They neglect that those variables can vary within states (e.g., across different policy areas). Second, most studies explore state compliance with one particular international regime, such as human rights, environmental protection, or trade. Comparisons of different international regimes are rare. As a result, policy-related explanations as developed in the early implementation literature, such as issue salience, redistributive consequences, or policy style, have not received much attention. Variation in state compliance with different bodies of international law is at best explained with reference to institutional design (e.g., varying degrees of obligation, delegation, and precision).

See also *International Law; International Norms; International Organization.*

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Statecraft

Simply put, *statecraft* is the art of conducting state affairs, which may be either domestic or foreign. Statecraft is generally defined in two ways. The first definition views statecraft as the science of government that focuses on the institutions and instruments of power. The second is that it is the application of political understanding as the art of governing or ruling. This definition points to the skills used to apply power to political goals.

Statecraft is associated with statesmanship, skillful management, and effective leadership of public affairs to achieve political goals. It requires the definition of policy goals, the use of sound political judgment to select the means for achieving these goals, and valid arguments for the state's actions that will persuade people to follow. When statecraft is skillfully conducted, the affairs of state are achieved at acceptable costs; however, poorly conducted statecraft fails to achieve its goals. Failure in statecraft can be very expensive, causing numerous deaths, the destruction of property, or the death of the regime and its leaders.

The political skills used in statecraft are numerous and include everything from the ruler's voice and demeanor to the ability to effectively enlist and lead others. The development, acquisition and exercise of power toward specifically defined goals are an essential part of statecraft.

Statecraft has been the subject of literary works produced in ancient China, ancient Greece and elsewhere. Aristotle discusses the arts of power in *Politics,* Plutarch describes statecraft in "Precepts of Statecraft," and Niccolò Machiavelli's *The Prince* offers advice on how to rule effectively even if moral principles are violated. Desiderius Erasmus's *The Education of a Christian Prince* seeks to teach the young prince how to rule effectively without losing his soul.

MODERN EXERCISE OF STATECRAFT

Since the advent of modern diplomacy, statecraft often has been associated with diplomacy. However, it is more than diplomacy, which practices the arts of peace, especially negotiations, because statecraft also involves the use of military power to achieve its goals. It is conducted not only through diplomacy, but also through psychological, economic, and military channels. Regardless of the channels it uses, effective statecraft must be formulated and conducted through intelligence. The work of intelligence agents and agencies that produce quality intelligence products or the safeguarding of state secrets by counterintelligence agencies is vital to good statecraft.

Defensive statecraft is more than applying force—military organizations create communities that are complex instruments for use in statecraft. To be effective, military statecraft must use psychology and any other means possible to defeat an enemy before a shot is fired. Simply displaying the military might of a nation on holidays or naval voyages creates images that make others respectful of the power of the state.

Economic statecraft is similar to foreign economic policy but is distinguished from it by the fact that economic statecraft seeks to achieve goals that may or may not be economic, and in the modern world, these goals are focused on trade. Closely related to economic statecraft is *financial statecraft.* Since the development of a global economy, the flows of trade, securities, and money have made it an important state interest to exercise some supervision of banks and other markets. Control of gold and silver mines or trade sources was an ancient concern that now has its modern counterpart in financial statecraft.

The psychological element in statecraft is extremely important. Power is exercised by an ego to gain compliance from an alter ego whether singular or collective. If the ego uses persuasion, effective willing compliance can be gained from the alter ego. However, if not, the threat of force or of unwholesome consequences also can be effective in gaining compliance. To gain psychological perceptions evoking awe in their alter egos, kings and other rulers have manipulated symbols to create an image of power that is spiritual as well as material. In the age of mass media, statecraft uses *stagecraft* to create the image of the ruler held by the masses or by alter egos.

Part of the psychological aspects of statecraft is viewed as *soulcraft,* the power of a state to shape the moral beliefs, political attitudes, and practices of its people. Laws against racial or other forms of discrimination can be used along with other means of power to shape the character of nations or their people.

See also *Diplomacy; Foreign Policy; Power; Public Diplomacy.*

. . . .   ANDREW J. WASKEY

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State Failure

Since the end of the cold war, scholars and policy makers have become increasingly concerned about state failure. The focus began in the U.S. policy community in the 1990s when the primary concern was forecasting changes of government and humanitarian crises. After al-Qaeda's 2001 attacks in the United States, the focus shifted to preventing terrorism. Since then, both measures of state failure and arguments about its importance have flourished.

Analysts do not agree on a single definition of state failure. Instead, there are different concepts of state failure, numerous indicators of failure, and various lists of states that have failed and are likely to fail. Thus, there is also a lively debate about whether states have been properly classified and what causes states to fail.

CONCEPTS OF STATE FAILURE

Analysts have advanced two concepts of state failure: absence of state authority and lack of legitimacy. To understand and evaluate these differences, one must begin by defining the state. The most widely accepted definition of the state was proposed by German sociologist Max Weber. According to Weber, a state is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. But scholars disagree about what this definition means and how to determine whether an entity is a successful state.

According to realists, the essence of a state is its monopoly of the use of force. For them, a state is an entity that has the last word on foreign and domestic policy in a territory. A state may not always be authoritative, but it is more authoritative than any other actor in a territory. Should this cease to be the case, the state has died, whether through conquest, union, revolution, disintegration, or collapse. Any of these means of death could be considered state failure.

Historically, realists have primarily been interested in state failure because of its effects on great-power relations. For them, conquest could signal the expansion of a great power, revolution could precipitate new alliances, and collapse could create power vacuums into which other states are drawn. Since the end of the cold war, realists have become more interested in intrinsic aspects of state failure because of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which demonstrated that even great powers can fail to survive, and the terrorist attacks of 2001, which demonstrated that the collapse of a weak state like Afghanistan can create security problems for a powerful state even in the absence of rivals. Seminal works in the realist vein include William Zartman's edited volume on collapsed states in Africa and Anthony Vinci's 2008 article exploring the nature of anarchy in collapsed states.

For liberals and constructivists, a state must have more than a monopoly of force over territory. A state must have legitimacy. For some scholars, this means a state must be chosen or at least accepted by its subjects either because it benefits them or because its principles accord with theirs. For other scholars, legitimacy means that a state must be recognized by its peers. In recent years, these ideas have come together in the concept of states' *responsibility to protect,* which asserts that states must respect the human rights of people within their borders and that when they fail to do so, it is the responsibility of other states to intervene.

INDICATORS AND LISTS OF STATE FAILURE

Each of these concepts of state failure can be operationalized to yield a list of states that have failed or could fail. Because concepts of state failure differ, the measures and lists vary greatly.

For realists, weak states are most likely to fail. Weak states lack the military, economic, and political capabilities needed to cultivate domestic sovereignty and deter other states from attacking and conquering them in particular technological eras. To evaluate state vulnerability to failure, realists rank states according to their material capabilities. The most comprehensive list of this type is the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities data set. Realists also explore the effects of relative power in differentiating states that die from those that survive.

By contrast, liberals and constructivists measure and rank states in terms of domestic and international legitimacy. Analysts who emphasize domestic legitimacy focus on public opinion polls and standards of living, and those interested in international legitimacy rank states according to compliance with purported international norms. In practice, the two concepts of legitimacy often are combined. For example, the Failed State Index (FSI) published annually by *Foreign Policy* and Fund for Peace measures states on twelve dimensions, including the availability of food and compliance with norms of transparency and accountability.

DEBATES ABOUT STATE FAILURE

Debates about state failure relate to whether states have been properly classified and why some states succeed while others fail. These questions have both methodological and political strands.

The methodological debate centers on the technique of developing an index by amalgamating individual variables. This makes it difficult to know which variables are associated with which outcomes. In addition, there is the problem of

determining whether statistical correlations reveal causes or effects. These problems are especially acute for analysts who combine indicators of authority and legitimacy. For example, although states that score poorly on the FSI indicators are considered unstable, nine of the ten most "critical" countries in 2009 were in the top ten the previous year. Moreover, the top twenty included North Korea and Zimbabwe, neither of which has experienced political crises usually associated with state failure, such as conquest, union, revolution, disintegration, or collapse.

The politics of the state failure discourse are highly charged. At stake is the question of who should determine which states are failing. In 1992, the United Nations Development Program dropped a measure of human freedom in its Human Development Index because developing countries argued it was culturally biased and would deter donors from providing development aid. The notion of state failure has been criticized and advanced as an effort to legitimize neocolonial intervention by powerful states. Why states fail is also contested. Explanations range from predatory rulers to international power politics.

See also *Collapsed and Failed States; Great Power; Human Development Index; International Norms; International System; Legitimacy; State, The.*

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State Formation

Inheritor of the ancient Greek concept of *politeia* (polity), the state in Europe emerged gradually, to varying degrees and in response to various dynamics, from around the twelfth century until the end of the eighteenth century. More concretely, the period of 1485 to 1789 saw the building of most modern European nation-states. According to social scientist Stein Rokkan, the second phase of nation-building, the subsequent processes of mass politics, and the construction of the welfare state completed with early state formation the main four-phase process of political development in contemporary Europe.

The development of the modern state as a national state, or *nation-state,* gave rise to the idea that the territorial boundaries of the polity also represent the boundaries of a nation or a people. The concept of nation is implicit in many of the characteristics of the state, including its territorial boundedness and the status of citizenship conferred on its members. The emotional force of nationhood, and the solidarity and mutual belonging it engenders, also serve political purposes. The idea that the state represents a people sharing a common identity and a set of civic values enhances its legitimacy, fosters citizens' participation in the democratic process, and underpins much of the discourse used to justify public policy-making and governmental action.

According to Max Weber, the modern state embodies the legal order of a given territory and exercises the monopoly of the legitimate use of force. As a political system (*politischer Verband*), the state has traditionally been regarded as an organization structured in a hierarchical manner aiming at maintaining civic order in a defined territorial context. Its rational-legal legitimacy is greatly dependent on the effective enforcement of the rule of the law to all inhabitants within a territorially delimited area. This was meant to be achieved by depersonalizing state authority from that of the rulers and by implementing abstract rights and duties not based on historical prerogatives and privileges.

As a result of diverse historical developments of state formation, two broad models can be identified: (1) *unitary,* in which (a) sovereign political power is undivided and rests on an organic core of governmental responsibilities and (b) executive, legislative, and judiciary operate on a state basis with some delegation of administrative functions to subnational agencies or bodies and (2) *plural* (or compound), in which (a) territorial power is distributed by consent among the different layers of government and (b) central, meso, and local government can implement policies according to their own jurisdictions. In general terms, the unitary-plural typology finds expression in two corresponding systems of government: *centralized,* where the *loci* of decision making are concentrated in one core, and

decentralized, with a dispersion of power throughout distinct layers of government.

Among the various influential schools of social thought, functional diffusionism has persistently conveyed the idea that internal territorial differences within states would disappear with the extension of liberal democracy and industrial capitalism. Accordingly, the processes of periphery migrations into the urbanized core areas would eliminate the old local ascribing identities in favor of new associative links of a functional nature. The refutation of these theoretical assumptions by historical events has given way to new approaches, among which neoinstitutionalism underlines the role of state institutions in shaping the preferences and objectives of social actors in their decision-making processes. It is argued also that, as a consequence of state formation, institutions highly condition the outcomes of such political decisions with the establishment of the game rules of power and influence.

At the turn of the millennium, the modern state is challenged from above by the forces of globalization of the world economy, the mobility of people and capital, and the rise of many international institutions. Globalization has meant a transfer of authority and power from the nation-states to the markets. The very patterns of economic competition are to comply with the new rules of global markets and the strategies of transnational corporations. From below, the reassertion of territorial minorities demanding increased autonomy has put further stress on sovereign states, and in some cases they defy the state with the option of "exit" rather than that of "voice." The state also is challenged internally by the advance of individualized social relations and by a declining confidence in and engagement with the formal political process. All things considered, the state continues to be a central concept in the study of politics and a major actor in the power relations at the international level.

See also *Globalization; Nation-state; Sovereignty; Transnationalism.*

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State Formation, European

Institutions possessing features now identified with statehood began to emerge in many European societies during the investiture controversies of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. These controversies led to an increasingly strict separation between secular and religious authority, and in so doing they consolidated centralized political institutions as societal actors charged with a body of increasingly differentiated public functions. European states were essentially constituted by their antithesis to the local and devolved powers of feudal society, and once they had begun to emerge as distinctively public orders they were constantly exposed to the threat of privatistic disaggregation; that is, the threat of a refeudalization of public offices resulting from the anticentralist ambitions of the nobility. In consequence, the form that states assumed in different national, cultural and geographical settings was largely determined by the strategies that actors within the state employed to counteract the threat of refeudalization and the conjuncture between the integrity of statehood and the relative strength of the late-feudal elites that distinguished particular societies. The process of state-led defeudalization was extremely tortuous, and the modern state did not approach completion until the eighteenth century. Only the most centralized European societies possessed fully evolved states by the nineteenth century.

THE EMERGENCE OF EUROPEAN STATES

In their first emergence, European states usually assumed a legal-constitutional order, and their effective expansion of centralized territorial power normally depended on their ability to construct concessionary arrangements to co-opt the support of the baronial class or nobility. Among the earliest European states, the Kingdom of León assumed a rudimentary representative constitution in 1188, Capetian France had a basic parliamentary apparatus before 1300, the Magna Carta was introduced in England in 1215, the Holy Roman Empire obtained a formal electoral system and enshrined electoral privileges in 1356, and the major northern Italian cities also acquired extensive quasi-constitutional statutes through the later thirteenth century. Of fundamental significance in this process is the fact that modern states are defined by their need for regular taxes; that is, they cannot consistently raise revenue from feudal tenures, and in consequence they cannot rely on personal levies to sustain their military operations. To raise taxes and conduct warfare, then, modern states require mechanisms that enable them to penetrate society and to obtain approval for their fiscal imperatives. The states that managed to stabilize themselves in the Middle Ages normally deployed a system of quasi-delegatory representation to solve this problem. This allowed states to address and placate powerful interests outside the state, to harden their foundations in society, and—crucially—consensually to regularize their sources of revenue.

In the second stage of their formation, European states widely adopted a more repressive attitude to the corporate elites that they assimilated, and they began to devise means for evading the need for noble consent in questions of fiscal legislation. In early modernity, many more centralized states began to promote rigidly ordered patterns of rule. They were less

inclined to recognize time-honored local freedoms and more intent on absorbing privileged classes into their own inner structure, usually in the civil service or military organizations. The key example of this tendency is the Spanish state, which under the Catholic monarchs after 1474 began to limit the competences of assemblies and to levy taxes in more peremptory style. Other examples are the Italian city states; by 1400 only Florence and Venice retained elements of their original communal constitutions. This process was subsequently emulated in France, and after 1600 the French monarchy gradually developed a centralized civil service, attacked the powers of the nobility, and began to pass fiscal laws with limited negotiation. This tendency was not universal, however, and throughout this period most central European societies, which were marked by very low levels of state integration, witnessed a reinforcement of their representative structures. In the sixteenth century, Bavaria, Brandenburg, the hereditary Habsburg territories (later Austria), and Württemberg were marked by an effective condominium between regents and regional assemblies (*Landstände*). The same is true of Poland. It was only toward the end of the seventeenth century that many German-speaking states began to copy more concentrated methods of state-building. The move toward more prerogative governance was normally unsuccessful in states that had already reached a condition of consensual integration. England's collapse into civil war in the 1630s and 1640s can be seen as an example of a relatively solidified state order that resisted transformation into an apparatus of personalistic rule. Experiments with absolutistic patterns of state-building thus tended to occur in societies characterized by moderate levels of centralized statehood; societies marked either by a high or a low degree of state integrity rarely converted to absolutism.

CONSTITUTIONS

The resistance to the reprivatization of state power through the nobility was also the dominant force in the most intense period of European state-building: the constitutional revolutions between 1789 and 1848. At this time, states adopted constitutions specifically to eradicate the remaining seigneurial powers of the nobility; to place state authority on generalized legal foundations; and to ensure that state power could be disseminated easily and regularly across unified territories, now constructed as *nations.* Most modern constitutions did not immediately succeed in liberating the state from noble influence. In Spain, the 1812 constitution marked only the beginning of this process, and in many German states it was not complete until the early twentieth century. Generally, however, throughout the nineteenth century national constitution writing was used as a technique for the elaboration of cohesively integrated states. The strongest European states also usually began to develop proto-democratic foundations in the middle decades of the nineteenth-century, and this further intensified their integrity.

The legacy of these variations in the process of European state-building remained pervasive through the twentieth century. The fact that some European states succumbed to fascist governance in the earlier twentieth century is directly linked to earlier conjunctures between state executives and private societal actors. Those states that had obtained a high level of state integration at an early historical stage tended to be most resistant to fascism.

See also *Nation-state; State Formation; State, The; States' Rights.*

. . . .   CHRIS THORNHILL

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State-led Economic Development

See *Economic Development, State-led.*

Stateless Nation

A definition of a *stateless nation* included several elements, such as a sharing by the inhabitants of a self-perceived common culture and history, an attachment to a particular territory within a larger state, and a desire for home rule and eventual independence, as noted by Montserrat Guibernau (1999). In broad terms, a stateless nation can be referred to as a minority nation that has secured or aims to achieve a degree of institutional autonomy or independence within a plural or multinational state, and that concurs or coexists with a majority nation or other regions or ethnoterritorial groups.

As a relational construct, the stateless nation is a category put forward mainly by the ideology of minority or stateless nationalism, which usually develops within plural states and is associated with demands for self-government (it also can affect two or more neighboring states, as the Basque or Kurdish cases illustrate). Demands for political power can range from a

degree of home rule to the formation of a new independent state. This type of stateless nationalism often has been made synonymous with that of regionalism. Indeed, both share three important elements in most of their manifestations: (1) a collective identity and consciousness of community belonging, (2) a center-periphery conflict, and (3) an existence of social mobilization and political organization for the achievement of their objectives. However, the upsurge of stateless nationalism during the second half of the twentieth century in countries such as the Basque Country, Catalonia, Corsica, Flanders, Quebec, Scotland, or Wales has come to reassert their preunion identities by means of political mobilization for the achievement of political power. This trend was observed by Michael Keating (1996), John Loughlin (2001), and David McCrone (1992).

In advanced industrial countries, some region states have become natural economic zones and the source of economic prosperity, as observed by Kenichi Ohmae (1993). Regions may share many features with stateless nations although the former do not necessarily aim at the creation of a new state on its own. Some stateless nations can be regarded as successful "region states" that may qualify also as stateless nations. In fact, with their efficient economies, such "region states" can pursue their own strategic interests without major disruption from central government interference and taking advantage of supranational intergovernmental relations (e.g., European Union). For such stateless nations, the processes of bottom-up supranationalization and top-down devolution of powers have allowed a considerable extension of a type of *cosmopolitan localism,* as pointed out by Luis Moreno (1999). This is reflected in both societal interests, which are aimed at developing a sense of local community and at participating simultaneously in the international context, allowing in such a process a growing adjustment between the particular and the general. *Cosmopolitan localism* concerns medium-sized polities without the framework of a state, such as Catalonia, Flanders, or Quebec.

In general terms, the revival of ethnoterritorial political movements in the Western world has coincided with an increasing challenge to the centralist model of the unitary state. Devolution and federalization have sought to articulate a response to the *stimuli* of the diversity of society. This plurality comprises cultural and ethnic groups with differences of language, history, and traditions, which also can be reflected in the party system. Minority or stateless nations aim at achieving greater degrees of home rule and political power based, among other factors, on the variable manifestation of a duality in citizens' self-identification. As noted by Luis Moreno (2006), the more the ethnoterritorial identity prevails on modern state-national identity, the higher the demands for political autonomy. Conversely, the more characterized the state-national identity is, the less likely it would be for ethnoterritorial conflicts to appear. At the extreme, complete absence of one of the two elements of dual identity would lead to a sociopolitical fracture, and demands for self-government are to take the form of independence and eventual secession. In other words, when citizens in a substate community identify themselves in an exclusive manner, the institutional outcome of such antagonism will tend to be exclusive as well.

Asymmetrical constitutional arrangements can provide a means of accommodating plural claims within multinational states. The emerging European polity can be regarded as a model for a postsovereign order in which legal pluralism and constitutional diversity can accommodate multiple nationality claims, including those region states or stateless nations with aspirations for greater self-government or self-determination.

See also *Basque Separatism; Cosmopolitanism; Nation; Nationalism; Nationality; Nation-state; Self-determination; Self-government; State Formation.*

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State of Nature

The *state of nature* is a condition without government, generally used in social contract theory to justify political authority. The device assumed greatest importance in the works of the great contract theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But it has a long history, both before and after that period. Descriptions of man's purported natural condition differ in important ways (e.g., on whether circumstances were peaceful or ridden with conflict). Such variations are used to justify different moral and political conclusions.

Mythical accounts of a prepolitical (and presocial) Golden Age are common in ancient Greek and Latin literature; e.g., in Plato's *Protagoras* (c. 390–380 BCE) and Cicero's *On Invention* (84 BCE). Classical arguments blended well with Judaeo-Christian accounts of the Garden of Eden and subsequent Fall to support the medieval notion that the state arose as a remedy for sin.

During the late medieval and early modern periods, claims that political power originated from a prepolitical, natural condition generally supported limitations on political power. Thomas Hobbes was highly original in using a contract argument to establish absolute government. At the heart of Hobbes's theory is a horrific picture of the state of nature as a

"war of all against all." To escape such horrors, people would consent to absolute political authority. Although Hobbes employed the state of nature for largely analytical purposes, he also believed in its historical accuracy. Evidence is provided by "savage people" in America, whom Hobbes viewed as living in a "brutish manner," and conflict between states in the international arena. Hobbes's view of international relations taking place in a state of nature has been enormously influential in international relations theory.

In the state of nature described by John Locke in his *Second Treatise of Government* (1689), people live under the law of nature, which, in the absence of government, they enforce themselves. People also possess property rights, use money, and have something of a developed economy. Locke's view that rights, including property rights, exist in the state of nature was central to the development of subsequent theories of rights. When conflict breaks out in the state of nature, people recognize the need for impartial authority and move from the state of nature in two stages, forming first a community and then government. When government violates the agreement according to which it was established, people are justified in rising in revolution.

Influenced by anthropological and zoological discoveries, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* (1754) depicts natural man as little different than an ape: solitary, with limited reasoning capacity, but also content and morally innocent. Man becomes corrupt only through a gradual process of moving into society, and the contract through which government originates is a clever fraud perpetrated by the rich upon the poor. Rousseau's political theory aspires to recapture as much primordial natural purity as possible through the new social contract described in *The Social Contract* (1762).

By the end of the eighteenth century, the social contract and, along with it, the state of nature were widely criticized on historical grounds. But contract theory was revived by John Rawls in *A Theory of Justice* (1971). Rawls argues that appropriate principles of justice are those that would be agreed upon under fair conditions. The state of nature reappears in his theory as the *original position*. To prevent people from choosing principles that would advantage themselves, they are placed behind a *veil of ignorance* and so deprived of knowledge of their personal attributes, such as age, religion, race, or wealth. With Rawls and other recent thinkers who argue along similar lines, the state of nature (original position) loses all historical pretense. It is solely an analytical device to help identify appropriate moral principles.

See also *Hobbes, Thomas; Locke, John; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; Social Contract.*

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State of the Union

Article II, Section 3, of the U.S. Constitution specifies that the president "shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the state of the union and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." President George Washington delivered, in person to Congress, the first State of the Union address on January 8, 1790. However, the nation's third president, Thomas Jefferson, discontinued the practice and instead submitted his State of the Union in writing to Congress. This tradition remained for more than 100 years until President Woodrow Wilson reestablished the practice of delivering the address in person to Congress. The Constitution does not specify how often or when the address should be given. However, precedent has established it as an annual address to Congress. The State of the Union informs Congress as to the condition of the nation and provides the president with the opportunity to lay forth legislative goals and priorities to the Congress. With the advent of radio and television, the State of the Union allows the president to speak directly to the American people and seek their support as well.

See also *Checks and Balances; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Executive, The.*

. . . .   RICHARD M. YON

State Repression

State repression represents the use of coercive power upon social groups and individuals by state institutions in a given territory. More specifically, it denotes policies of modern states and regimes to forcefully integrate, assimilate, or eliminate ethnically, religiously, or ideologically distinct groups engaged in resisting or contesting existing political orders. State repression involves a relationship of authority between state institutions and those subject to their rule, either within a nation-state or an imperial/colonial order. It entails organized violence on the part of the state through its own institutions or nonstate agents targeting specific groups and individuals.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF STATE REPRESSION
State repression has been associated with the historical process of state-building, nation-building, and regime formation associated with modernity. These processes helped the institutionalization of state power and its targeting of organizations and institutions posing real or imaginary threats to the political order. As the capacity of states to act and deploy resources advanced during modernity, state repression engendered a severely asymmetric relationship between states and their contenders. The historical targets of state repression were initially nobility and local authorities resisting centralized rule within

the state and those social groups (peasantry, workers, ethnic or religious groups) who were resisting specific economic and political orders. State repression, at different scales and using different instruments, is associated historically both with democracies and dictatorships. It became more visible and extensive in the latter, but it was not absent from democracies either. Democratic regimes have institutionalized rules that limit the use of government violence against individuals and groups. Despite the existence of these rules, in fragmented or unequal societies, authorities commonly use violence to preserve order. In most national states, social relations are pacified even though in many cases organized opposition still exists.

COMPARING STATE REPRESSION

State repression is a less emphasized historical process, much of the attention in social sciences being directed toward the building and maintenance of legitimacy and consensus around political order and toward the existence and success of protest and various revolutionary movements. Two main approaches emerge as dominant in its study: The first tends to associate state repression with particular dysfunctional regimes and socioeconomic structures and relations, heralding repression as a modern but illegitimate state behavior, while the second associates repression with the governing process across all types of states and regimes, including democratic ones, depicting repression as a neutral instrument to be used by state elites.

Ted Gurr (1986) shows that the reasons for state elites to engage in state repression depend largely on existing political cultures and traditions but also on structural characteristics of the societies and international context. If the societies are fragmented and experience shortages of resources, there is a significant potential for contestation and, subsequently, for state repression. State repression is especially violent against marginal groups that are economically and politically deprived. In countries where states are centralized and powerful in relation to society, repression is a particularly common policy phenomenon. If the societies are deeply segmented and the political institutions are weak, then the state tends to be more violent and aimed at physical destruction rather than submission or cooption. If one state is either protected or ignored by powerful actors in international politics, it is more likely to use repressive policies.

As a common modern phenomenon, state repression refers to a wide spectrum of state actions in very diverse temporal and geographical contexts. State repression can be compared by analysing its intentions, agents, and instruments.

The intentions behind state repression significantly differ across time and space. The state can attempt to coerce the leaders of distinct groups into accepting the political order, thus eliminating its radical or armed sections, as in the Basque, Irish, and black movement in United States cases. It also can try blocking access to power by repressing distinct majorities, as is the case of South African black movements (1948–1994), or by eliminating ideologically opposed insurgencies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In other cases, the state can aim at physical elimination of a particular group, more commonly known as genocide, as it was with the case of the extermination of the Jewish population during Nazi rule in Germany and occupation of Europe (1938–1945) or the elimination of Tutsi ethnics by the politically dominant Hutu group (1994) in central Africa. In combating separatist movements, the aim of the repression is a combination of physical elimination and group submission, as in the former Yugoslavia (Bosnian war and the repression of ethnic Albanians). Ideologically based state repression also can be aimed at elimination of specific social groups, as in Cambodian repression of urban and bourgeois elite (1975–1979). Imperial or colonial repression is also violent and tends to share both of the above aims. This is exemplified by the case Turkish repression of ethnic Armenian (1914–1918) or the French repression of independence movements in Algeria (1954–1962) and Cameroon (1955–1960). In the British dominions that eventually became independent, the indigenous populations were constantly repressed to the extent that they were threatened to the point of near extinction, most notably in North America and South Africa.

State repression can be carried on by a multitude of actors. In the majority of cases, state institutions (army, police, and intelligence services) are directly involved in organizing the violence. However, in numerous instances violence is produced by organizations and groups (militias, paramilitaries, vigilantes) sponsored, protected, or tolerated by the states' institutions. These groups and organizations usually share similar ethnic, religious, and ideological background with the ruling class and have convergent economic and political interests. The type of institutions and agents involved in repression also depend on the type of contention a state has to face. Historically, states tended to replace armies with police and intelligence organizations and state institutions with nonstate actors. Yet examples of army involvement and army-led repression are still present, as in Myanmar (2007). Communist regimes developed extensive intelligence organizations directly under the control of top political leadership whose role was to ensure the lack of opposition in society and ideological conformity in the state and party apparatus. The several Soviet purges during the rule of Joseph Stalin would not have been possible without perfectly organized and loyal secret police. The rising engagement of nonstate actors in carrying out state repression is explained by the state and its regime's attempt to avoid responsibility and blame for their policies. In Rwanda much of the violence against Tutsis was carried on by Hutu militias informally supported by the regime. In Argentina and other Latin American states, right-wing organizations carried out most of the violent actions against opposition with the protection of the state institutions.

State repression is carried through a multitude of strategies ranging from surveillance and intimidation to exile, imprisonment, and assassination. In the case of collective protest and armed resistance, states use military technology and tactics against contending groups. Other methods include forced displacement, detention, and labor and collective punishment missions (death squads). In genocide situations, the states use starvation and collective elimination (death camps) against targeted groups. In the majority of cases, the state uses a mixture

of methods. One characteristic of state repression is the asymmetry of power and resources, between the contenders. The states have vast institutions and resources whereas the opposition groups tend to lack the organizational, economic, and military capacity to resist them. This asymmetry explains the high number of victims of state repression, which in many cases is carried on without any restrictions or organized opposition. The asymmetry of resources is most evident in the examples of state repression provided by Germany in Europe (1938–1945) or by the Iraqi repression of the Kurdish population through the use of chemical weapons (1990).

State repression is a recurrent process in modern politics, often associated with major regime changes and economic crises. All states and regimes lacking legitimacy are faced with the overpowering temptation to choose this strategy instead of engaging in complicated and costly political and economic reforms. State repression can occur also in democracies, especially when the state is supported by a majority and used against a minority. The counterterrorist policy of both authoritarian and democratic regimes show that the latter can use disproportionately violent means against individuals and groups. Thus, the potential for elites to use the state institutions and their resources to create and maintain particular political and economic orders in a coercive and violent manner remain high.

See also *Anti-Semitism; Apartheid; Ethnic Cleansing; Genocide; Holocaust; Sedition.*

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States, Rogue

See *Rogue States.*

States, Size of

States vary in size, from Russia's seventeen million square kilometers (27.4 million square miles) and China's 1.3 billion people to Nauru's twenty-one square kilometers (thirteen square miles) and ten thousand people. The puzzles of why there is so much variation and whether there is a generalizable explanation for state size are important ones, because the answers could shed light on why the world looks the way it does today and also explain ongoing changes such as the growth of the European Union or the potential dissolution of Canada, Iraq, or Russia.

Alesina and Spolaore (2003) develop a general explanation for state size starting with two premises: States produce local public goods, and citizens have tastes for different kinds of public goods. Local public goods, like defense and market regulations, can be supplied at a lower cost per citizen as the number of citizens increases. Differing tastes, however, are a source of inefficiency for ever-larger states, because citizens with different preferences for how the economy should be regulated or how defense should be provided will end up getting a kind of government very different than the one they would ideally prefer, giving them an incentive to break off and start their own states.

Several conclusions follow from the formal model. When the risk of war is low, states will be smaller because there will be less of a gain from common defense. Likewise, if the world trading system is generally open, states will be smaller because they no longer need to provide a large common market internally. Democracies will be smaller than autocracies, because citizens in a democratic periphery will vote to secede when they would be better off supplying a public good that suits their tastes, while citizens in an autocratic periphery will be coerced into staying. Those states that are larger will tend to be homogenous, indicating similar preferences over a large population. These conclusions generally match the experience of the 1990s, when smaller states emerged after the end of the Soviet Union and the further opening of world markets.

Similar arguments include ones that emphasize trade routes and state administration. David Friedman (1977) observes that multiple states along a single trade route will overtax the route in a tragedy of the commons, while multiple states along parallel trade routes will undertax them in a race to the bottom; evidence from early modern Europe suggests that states will therefore grow to encompass an entire network of routes. David Lake and Angela O'Mahony (2004) also posit that states will be larger when they require valuable fixed investments such as railroads.

An alternate approach emphasizes identity rather than political economy. Alexander Wendt (2003) argues that states, like people, seek to be acknowledged as members of a community. Being admitted into a club not only confers status but also serves as a marker that validates a state as being a member of an in-group. States seeking acknowledgment by peers continue to formalize their relationships until, eventually, they federate. This argument, which does not posit an upper limit on state size and so cannot account for dissolutions, has not been empirically tested, and its final conclusion—an eventual, inevitable world government—has not been realized.

Some empirical evidence suggests that states form in response to considerations of scale economies as well as homogeneity, and by some measures scale economies (such as presence of railroad networks) are related to the average

size of new countries over time. A historical survey of federations suggests that the need for common defense may have been behind decisions by some states to voluntarily unify, but no such surveys have included control groups. Other empirical studies have failed to find clear evidence that size matters, because small countries seem no worse off on average than large countries, by a variety of economic and social measures. Furthermore, there is little cross-national evidence that the theorized efficiencies to a particular size are felt by leaders or decision makers who then take action to bring their states to the optimal size.

A challenge for theories of state size is that these theories often have difficulty accounting for why states adjust their borders when they could, or as an alternative, achieve the benefits of scale in some other way. States needing to pool their resources for common defense or market gains can simply form alliances or customs unions, or coerce partners into cooperating with them. Some scholars speculate that integration and dissolution may be driven as much by commitment problems as by underlying interests in size. At the very least, however, size of states studies such as Alesina and Spolaore set important necessary conditions for theories of why states take the shapes they do.

See also *State Formation; State, The.*

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States' Rights

The American political doctrine of states' rights has its roots in the struggles of the American colonies with the British Crown and its agents. Rallying to the cry "no taxation without representation," the colonies assembled at the Second Continental Congress virtually as an assembly of ambassadors from the colonies and declared themselves to be free and independent states through the Declaration of Independence. Their sovereign statehood was affected on the battlefields of the Revolutionary War (1775–1783).

After the revolution, the original thirteen states joined in a national government that was designed to be weak in order to protect them from a home-grown tyrant. The Articles of Confederation government created a national government that had no executive or judiciary except in the form of several committees of the Articles of Confederation Congress. The Congress, composed of the "states in Congress assembled," was weak, requiring almost all decisions to be unanimous. The states were explicitly described as sovereign.

The weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation government quickly became apparent. Calls for its amendment to strengthen the national government were heeded after the excitement generated by Shays' Rebellion (1786–1787). The Constitution that emerged from the Federal Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in September of 1787 was sent to the states to be ratified by conventions in the several states (Article VII). The small states quickly ratified the Constitution; however, it would not have been ratified in the New York Convention if the supporters (Federalists) had not agreed to make a bill of rights the first priority of the new government. The Anti-Federalists championed the retention of power by the states as rights.

THE TENTH AMENDMENT

The Bill of Rights was proposed by the new government and ratified as amendments by the states by 1791. The rights listed in the Bill of Rights are mostly personal civil liberties of the people; however, the Tenth Amendment stated that, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

The Constitution granted specific powers to the central (federal) government. These are limited in scope and purpose. Through the Tenth Amendment, the autonomous nature of the states is also recognized. However, the Supreme Court through its assumption of the power of judicial review has stated that it is merely a truism.

States' rights became an issue in George Washington's administration. Alexander Hamilton and other Federalists sought to strengthen the federal government. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson opposed the creation of a federal bank, which was supported by Hamilton. Opposition was stated in terms of states' rights.

In 1798 the John Adams administration adopted the Alien and Sedition Acts. Opposition was led by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. They respectively authored the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. The resolutions opposed the power of the federal government with state power, arguing that the states were closer to the people, a claim still popular from colonial opposition to British abuse of power. Therefore, the states could "interpose" themselves to shield the people from abuse by the federal government. Moreover, the states had the right to "nullify" abusive laws to protect the people or the rights of the states.

The victory of Jefferson in the election of 1800 ended the developing states' rights conflict. However, the efforts of the

federal government to prevent a conflict with Great Britain in the years prior to the War of 1812 and during the war itself were opposed by states in New England. Secession was being considered when the war ended with Andrew Jackson's victory at the Battle of New Orleans.

LIMITS TO THE TENTH AMENDMENT

In 1819 states' rights doctrines fueled attempts to destroy the United States Bank in the case of *McCulloch v. Maryland*. Two issues presented themselves: Does the federal government have the right to create a bank (an entity not named in the expressly delegated powers of Article I) and does Maryland have the right to tax the bank. Chief Justice John Marshall's decision was a loss for states' rights because it affirmed the doctrine of implied powers while denying states the right to tax federal agencies. Implied powers often have been used by the federal government to accomplish its goals at the expense of the interests of individual states.

During the Jackson administration, South Carolina passed an act of nullification against federal tariffs. Jackson declared the law treasonous; however, a compromise was adopted by Congress. Among the states' rights arguments developed were those of John C. Calhoun in his *Disquisition on Government* (1851). He argued that the federal system was a compact between the states. Opponents favored viewing the Constitution as an act of the American people, an historically inaccurate claim because North Carolina and Rhode Island entered the union as virtually foreign countries.

The greatest test of the doctrine of states' rights came in 1861 with the secession of the eleven states of the Confederacy. In 1869 the Supreme Court was called on to decide the issue of the lawfulness of their secession and stated that the federal system was "an indissolvable union composed of indestructible states."

STATES' RIGHTS SINCE WORLD WAR II

States' rights arguments were popular in the southern United States during the years of slavery and racial segregation. In the election of 1948, many Southern Democrats broke away from the Democrat Party to form the States' Rights Democratic Party (Dixiecrats). In the name of states' rights, the faction tried to maintain Jim Crow laws and practices. It won thirty-nine electoral votes but did not survive politically after Harry Truman won the election.

States' rights arguments were expressed often during the decades of the Great Depression, World War II (1939–1945), and the cold war when federal power expanded enormously. Legally and politically, these arguments were of little avail as the federal government used its power, including eminent domain, to construct the Tennessee Valley Authority's dams, create military installations, and other actions opposed by the states and local citizens. However, the end of the cold war and the growing practice of unfunded federal mandates fueled opposition to its power.

The Supreme Court has generally decided cases so that federal power has increased, often at what is perceived to be the states' expense. However, on many occasions, it has decided in favor of the states. The Rehnquist Court decided against the federal government and in favor of the right of South Carolina to prohibit gambling ships in its ports as an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. Other states' rights cases of the Rehnquist Court included *Kimel v. Florida* (2000), which rejected the clear intent of Congress to abrogate state authority in matters of age discrimination. In *United States v. Morrison* (2000), the court again limited federal civil remedies in favor of the states.

States' rights arguments were again being espoused during the first year of the Barack Obama administration. The doctrine is used by those opposed to the central government. Opposition historically was regional; however, by 2010, opposition was increasingly ideological. The passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act of 2010 produced law suits by the attorney generals of over a dozen states to stop provisions mandating state financed Medicaid health care as a violation of the Tenth Amendment. At the same time, some states were moving to legalize the sale of marijuana, homosexual marriage, euthanasia, and other issues in opposition to federal law.

See also *Articles of Confederation; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Federalism.*

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Statistical Analysis

Statistical analysis is concerned with ways of analyzing quantitative data using statistical methods. Data used in statistical analysis may come from a variety of sources, such as standardized surveys, content analysis of the media, standardized observation, experiments and quasi-experiments, censuses, official statistics, or election results. The two major elements of statistical analysis are description and inference. Statistical inference is either classical or Bayesian.

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Descriptive statistics are used to summarize and explore data using measures that are more easily understood even by an inexperienced observer. For instance, a complete listing of all data points (e.g., a long list of political candidates favored by respondents in a poll) is substituted by a few numbers (e.g., a frequency distribution of the most popular candidates, or a modal candidate, or something similar). These summary descriptions, called descriptive statistics, are more meaningful for most purposes than a complete listing of the data, which

may be enormous. (A survey may interview a few thousand respondents and record several dozen or even hundreds of responses.) The major challenge of descriptive statistics is to choose such data reduction techniques that will represent the data succinctly and adequately without distorting or losing too much of the existing information.

The most frequently used descriptive statistics are the mean, the median (and other percentiles), the mode, the range of values, the standard deviation, the variance, and the interquartile range. Graphical representation is a very useful and efficient way to describe data. Histograms, stem-and-leaf plots, pie charts, scatter plots, and box plots are perhaps the most commonly used graphs.

STATISTICAL INFERENCE

Statistical inference makes predictions and generalizations based on the data. Data may, for instance, represent a sample drawn from a larger population (e.g., a sample of voters chosen from all participants in a poll, or a sample of administrative units taken from a larger universe of such units). Samples are routinely taken to reduce cost and increase flexibility of data collection, yet the ultimate goal is always to learn about the population. Classical statistical inference consists of methods that use information based on a sample from a population (sample statistics) to make predictions about the parameters of that population. Bayesian inference differs from classical inference in that it blends sample characteristics and some prior knowledge to make predictions.

Inferential statistics are of two basic types: parametric and nonparametric. *Parametric statistics* is a branch of statistical inference that makes assumptions about the underlying mathematical distributional form of variables. *Nonparametric* statistics does not make such assumptions. Some statisticians claim that the use of parametric statistics is hardly ever defensible in the social sciences, yet they continue to be employed frequently. Nevertheless, nonparametric approaches represent a major growth area in political science, perhaps as a reaction to the nature of the data that political scientists may gather.

Statistical inference offers two types of predictions about population parameters. It produces point estimates and interval estimates. A *point estimate* is the single best guess of what the (unknown) population parameter might be. An *interval estimate* consists of a range of numbers around the point estimate in which the parameter is believed to be. An interval estimate helps express the accuracy of the point estimate.

Statistical inference is used also for the purpose of statistical hypotheses testing (i.e., to carry out significance tests). Significance tests tell us if (and with what level of certainty) something observed in the sample (such as an association between two variables) may be generalized to the population. There are a large number of concrete significance tests. The choice of the most appropriate test is guided by the nature of the data. There are tests for means, proportions, variances, correlations, and so on. There are tests for one-, two-, and multiple-sample studies. There are also tests for nominal, ordinal, and interval variables. The chi-square test is a well-known example of a significance test.

Statistical inference requires a clear definition of the population to which the inference is applied. It also requires detailed knowledge of the sampling procedure. Statistical inference may be rather difficult (or even impossible) for some sampling techniques. While many sampling procedures are in use in the social sciences, statistical inference is possible only if data come from a probability sample (a simple random sample, a stratified random sample, a clustered random sample, or a systematic random sample). Nonprobability samples (such as volunteer samples, convenience samples, purposive samples, quota samples, or snowball samples) require adjustments.

Deviations from the probability sample requirement are quite common in political science. Researchers may, for instance, employ a coincidence sample consisting of all countries included in some publicly available database. Scholars also may have data on all relevant cases (e.g., on all states in the United States or on all EU countries). Then no sampling procedure has been involved in producing the data. Classical statistical inference is often criticized or abandoned in these situations. Bayesian inference is nevertheless possible and provides an alternative that is becoming increasingly popular. Yet another advantage of Bayesian inference involves the use of prior beliefs about parameters—for example, knowledge of historical election results may help us make predictions about future elections.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

All social science disciplines have been placing more and more emphasis on quantitative methods in recent decades. There are several reasons for this. First, research itself has taken on a more quantitative orientation. This is evident in published works as well as in the training of social scientists. Second, the computer revolution has made more quantitative data easily available. Survey data, for instance, are now routinely deposited in online data archives that often also offer rudimentary tools for online data analysis.

Finally, developments of computers and software applications make statistical methods faster, cheaper, more flexible, and more easily available than ever before. Whereas statistical analysis of quantitative data is the mainstream of empirical social science, it exists along with other respected methodological approaches such as interviews, participant observation, comparative historical methodology, the study of documents, ethnomethodology, and conversation analysis. There also exist established techniques to investigate qualitative information (text, picture, video) produced by these methodologies.

See also *Bayesian Analysis; Computational Modeling; Correlation; Inference; Linear Model; Logistic Regression; Parametric Statistical Model; Partial Least Squares; Quantitative Analysis; Regression with Categorical Data; Reliability and Validity Assessment; Time-series Analysis.*

. . . .   MARTIN KREIDL

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Stokes, Donald

Donald E. Stokes (1927–1997) was an American political scientist who was a specialist in public opinion research. He was known for his studies of voting behavior in the United States and Great Britain.

Stokes was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He received a bachelor's degree from Princeton University in 1951 and earned his doctorate from Yale University in 1958.

He was on the faculty at the University of Michigan from 1958 to 1974. During that time, he served as chair of the political science department (1970–1971) and dean of the university's graduate school (1971–1974). He then moved to Princeton as dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs in 1974. He left the deanship in 1992 but remained the Class of 1943 University Professor of Politics and Public Affairs at Princeton until his death. He also taught as an associate member at Nuffield College, Oxford, and as a visiting professor at the University of the West Indies and the Australian National University.

Stokes' book, *Political Change in Britain* (1969), written with David Butler, received the Woodrow Wilson Prize from the American Political Science Association, awarded to the year's best book on political science. Using the behavioral approach to election studies, they found that political generation (the era in which one was born) and "duration of partisanship" predict party identification; that is, the longer that one has identified with a political party, the more likely that person is to vote for that party. They also found that party identification, initially transmitted by one's parents, may change under the impact of historic events. Stokes was also the coauthor of two other books on American and British voting behavior: *The American Voter* (1960) and *Elections and the Political Order* (1966). A second edition of *Political Change in Britain* was published in 1974. He and David Butler originated the British General Election Studies in 1964 and Stokes continued to direct them until 1970. Stokes, with Donald Aitkin and Michael Kahan, conducted the Australian National Political Attitudes Studies (1967, 1969). In later years, Stokes' interests turned to the science policies of the federal government and the relationship between basic and applied science. He was principal author of *The Federal Investment in Knowledge of Social Problems* (1978), and *Pasteur's Quadrant: Basic Science and Technological Innovation* (1997) was published posthumously.

Stokes was a Senior Fulbright Scholar to Great Britain, a Fellow for the Social Science Research Council, a Fellow of the Guggenheim Foundation, a visiting research fellow at the Royal Institute for International Affairs, and a fellow for the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Stokes died from acute leukemia on January 26, 1997, in Philadelphia.

See also *Political Science, History of; Voting Behavior.*

. . . .   JEFFREY KRAUS

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Stolper–Samuelson Theorem

As presented in the original 1941 article by Walter Stolper and Paul Samuelson, the theorem postulates that the imposition of an import tariff by a small nation leads to an increase in the real income of the scarce production factor of that nation and to a reduction in the real income of the abundant factor. Factor abundance depends thereby on the relative endowments of the production factors (e.g., capital to labor ratio) in one country compared to the other. However, in the literature the theorem is usually understood as referring more generally to the linkages between international trade, goods prices, and factor prices. It is one of the cornerstones of the Heckscher–Ohlin model as presented by Bertil Ohlin in 1933, which is the central model in neoclassical theory of international trade.

The theorem essentially explains the linkages between changes in the relative prices of goods caused by trade policy interventions, on the one hand, and changes in the absolute income levels of the different production factors, on the other. These linkages between prices and remunerations depend on the factor intensities of the goods. The theorem is based on the assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, including homogeneous goods and production factors, general equilibrium, interindustry factor mobility, international factor immobility, and full employment (before and after a trade policy intervention). In the case of an imposition of an import tariff, it has been demonstrated that the increase of the income of the scarce factor exceeds the price changes of *both* goods and that, therefore, the postulated income effect is independent from the consumption pattern of the owners of the factor. In other words, changes in the relative prices of goods cause even greater effects on the income distribution of the trading nation.

The Rybczynski theorem, as published by Tadeusz Rybczynski in 1955, is the counterpart of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, linking factor quantities to goods quantities. The Rybczynski theorem postulates that an increase in the

endowment of one production factor in a nation leads to an absolute increase in the production of the good intensive in that factor and to an absolute reduction in the production of the other good.

From a political economy point of view, the relevance of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem lies in the fact that it helps to identify winners and losers of trade liberalization or protectionist policies. For example, if we consider a developing country with a relative abundance of land and unskilled labor (and a relative scarcity of capital and skilled labor) with an initial set of protectionist policies in place, the theorem predicts that trade liberalizing policies will be supported by the land owners and trade unions because of the expected effects on their respective real incomes. The opposite would apply in the case of a "developed" country characterized by a relative abundance of skilled labor and capital. The theorem contributes thus also to an understanding of the relationships between trade openness, or economic globalization, and the international and within-country distribution of incomes.

Although the prescriptions of the theorem may seem plausible, altering underlying assumptions might lead to different conclusions. If, for example, there is imperfect within-country factor mobility like in the specific factors model, as posited in the work of Ronald Jones in 1971, Wolfgang Mayer in 1974, and J. Peter Neary in 1978, interests may be organized—in support or against certain trade policy measures—by industries or regions, rather than in the traditional way as implied by the theorem.

See also *Free Trade; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem; Nontariff Barriers to Trade; North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); Trade Blocs; Trade Diplomacy; World Trade Organization (WTO).*

. . . .   PHILIPPE DE LOMBAERDE

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Strategic Interest

Strategic interest is, by definition, a highly contextual notion reflecting the preferences of the actors involved in politics or in policy. Simply put, a strategic interest implies the preference or a set of preferences that are considered crucial by a specific actor. An actor's interests will define its actions.

Strategic interests will prescribe its behavior. Yet, as this definition makes it clear, each actor has different interests and values differently each option to fulfill its goals therefore emphasizing different key enablers for its policy.

Scholars of international relations have developed analytic tools to model strategic interactions. *Game theory* is a branch of mathematics concerned with predicting bargaining outcomes. It assumes that actors are rational and that they perform cost-benefit analyses. The different games capture the fundamental dynamics of various bargaining situations. The results of the analyses depend on the preferences that actors are assumed to have about outcomes. Preferences ultimately depend on the identification of the actor's strategic interests.

The identification of strategic interests is at the core of theories of negotiations, conflict resolution, foreign policy, and coercion. A successful bargaining process implies knowledge of what the other party treasures and what scares it. This provides a range of interests that, when combined with ours, describes a zone where a possible agreement can be met by both parties. Strategic interests are those interests beyond which no agreement can be found. Alternatively, the identification of the enemy's strategic interest and its denial also allows coercing it into an agreement or capitulation.

In theories of international relations, interests are considered by the materialists as coming from the power structure of the international system. For the realists the distribution of material capabilities defines a state's interests. For the neorealists, the ultimate strategic interest is survival; for the classical realists, it is power. For the latter, strategic interests are those that allow power projection or deny others the ability to do so. These can be territories, allies, or technology. For sociological approaches, interests come from ideas and cultural contexts. Also, interests are not limited to states but can stem from domestic groups or be influenced by international actors. Strategic interests are here conceived as those that are essential for the maintenance of the actor's values. The major limitation of these two approaches is that they are one-sided. Not only do they assume that interests are determined unilaterally by power or norms but they are also mutually exclusive.

The relationship among interests, identity, and power is best conceived as reflexive, each feeding back one upon the other. Adopting this understanding implies that strategic interests can evolve with time and that a dynamic approach to the analysis of strategic interest must be adopted. This can be done by adopting a two-level game of analysis. This concept was coined by Robert Putnam (1988), and it implies that state's strategic interests are the result of both the domestic and the international environment. A state must make a cost-benefit analysis that ultimately depends on the maximization of its utility at the domestic and international level.

See also *Cost-benefit Analysis; Game Theory; International Relations.*

. . . .   JEAN-MARC RICKLI

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Strategic Voting

Strategic voting (also referred to as *tactical voting*) describes the decision-making process of individuals who fail to express their true preferences at the ballot box in order to prevent their least preferred candidate from winning an election. It assumes that individuals maintain a level of knowledge about others' voting preferences and a candidate's probability of winning. This type of voter behavior is often studied in primary elections and first-past-the-post electoral systems where only one candidate can secure the party's nomination or has the opportunity to take office. It is thought that such situations force voters to examine the viability of their preferred candidate's electoral success and vote in a way that maximizes their individual preferences while minimizing the potential for their least preferred candidate to achieve electoral success. Most models of strategic voting incorporate rational choice theory to explain if such tactical voting behavior exists, how it works, and when it is employed in the electoral process. Tactical voting is difficult to observe and measure because it requires both the knowledge of genuine voter preferences as well as the actual voting behavior. While survey research provides empirical evidence for the latter, the former is often unknown. For these reasons, scholars of voting behavior disagree about the presence, impact, and extent of strategic voting.

See also *Rational Choice Theory; Survey Research; Tactical Voting.*

. . . . ABIGAILE MARGUERITE VANHORN

Strategy, Military

Strategy is the art of utilizing military power or its threat to achieve political objectives. War can be analyzed at four different levels. At the political level, sometimes called *grand strategy,* a state's political goals—which ultimately aims at guaranteeing its survival—are defined as well as the means—which extend beyond the military dimension—for pursuing them. The strategic level then translates the political ends into military objectives. The operational level attains the military goals by the conduct of military campaigns and operations. Finally, the tactical level describes how battles and engagements are to be conducted.

FIRST GENERATION: CLASSICS

Strategy does not evolve in a vacuum. It is influenced by political, social, economic, and technological context. Throughout history different generations of strategic thinking can be delineated. The first generation is the classics. Sun Tzu's *The*

Art of War is one of the most influential texts on strategy and was written around 500 BCE. Its main argument is that the purpose of the art of war is not to win victories but to achieve military objectives by the least costly means. This must be done by targeting the adversary's will and morale. For Niccolò Machiavelli, war is inevitable because the major goal of policy makers (as stated in 1532's *The Prince*) is to conquer and to maintain power. Strategy must therefore aim at defeating the adversary as quickly as possible through decisive battles. Carl von Clausewitz is probably the most often quoted strategic thinker, not the least because he famously acknowledged that war is the continuation of politics by other means. He also made the distinction between absolute and limited wars and often was misinterpreted—not the least by the German general staff prior and during World War I (1914–1918)—for arguing for the former. He thus became known as the apostle of total war. For Clausewitz, the use of force should be aimed at destroying the enemy's center of gravity. The Swiss general Antoine-Henri de Jomini defined much of the vocabulary of contemporary strategic through principles such as *decisive points* or *interior lines.* Jomini's focus on the importance of the logistics has had a strong influence on American strategic culture.

SECOND GENERATION: BY SEA AND BY AIR

The second generation covers the nonterrestrial dimension of strategy: maritime and air power strategies. Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that state's power depended on its ability to coercively control sea lanes and maritime commerce (command of the sea). Sir Julian Corbett saw the merits of naval power in its ability to project forces ashore via amphibious operations and to keep war limited. Giulio Douhet and William Billy Mitchel extrapolated from the experience of the First World War and argued that strategic bombing in the future was likely to be so effective that the need for armies and navies would strongly be reduced. For Douhet, air power would have the most important impact by targeting civilian populations in cities, while Hugh Trenchard, Alexander de Seversky, and the Air Corps Tactical School argued for destroying the industrial centers of the enemy.

THIRD GENERATION: DISLOCATION

The third generation, called the *indirect school of thought*, revived the ideas of Sun Tzu that aimed at the dislocation of the adversary rather than its physical destruction. Basil Liddell Hart and John Fuller focused on the technology developed in the First World War for restoring mobility and achieving decisive effects on the battlefield. Liddell Hart's *indirect approach* argued for using deception and maneuvers supported by tanks with close air support to induce a state of strategic paralysis. The German *blitzkrieg* and the Russian concept of *deep battle* built on these assumptions. A second group of strategists theorized *peoples' wars* and irregular warfare. Mao Zedong's *On Guerrilla Warfare* (1937) argued for avoiding costly pitched battles by securing the support of the people through a sustained campaign to win hearts and minds. Che Guevara

developed ideas for guerrilla actions by an insurgent vanguard to foster revolutions while Carlos Marighella suggested urban guerrilla could achieve the same goal. As a reaction to these revolutionary thinkers, counterinsurgency theorists such as Robert Thompson or David Galula argued for securing the support of the population and undermining the legitimacy of the insurgents. These approaches have recently impacted American strategic thinking.

FOURTH GENERATION: NUCLEAR

The fourth generation, developed during the cold war, addressed the problem of nuclear strategy. Unlike previous generations, these strategists did not come from the military but from academia, and include Thomas Schelling, an economist, Albert Wohlstetter, a mathematician, and Herman Kahn, a physicist. They used game theory and developed models to prevent and deter the use of nuclear weapons. Their key contribution was to emphasize the use of threats rather than actual violence to achieve political objectives. It follows that deterrence relied on the idea of securing a second strike capability so as to guarantee the threat of retaliations.

FIFTH GENERATION: GLOBALIZATION

The fifth generation, developed after the cold war, addresses the challenges of globalization. The 1991 Gulf War ushered for some a "revolution in military affairs." Developments in technology, notably the fusion of standoff firepower and networked information technologies, made it possible to overcome Clausewitzian fog and friction thereby increasing operational effectiveness by striking at an adversary's center of gravity. John Warden III's depiction of the enemy as a system of concentric rings, together with John Boyd's recommendations of getting inside the enemy's decision cycle (OODA loop), provided a renewed interest in the strategic use of air power through the conduct of effects-based operations. In reaction to this technological and U.S.-centered approach, asymmetric strategies were developed. They sought to avoid direct military confrontations through economic or network warfare, the exploitation of international law or morale, and even terrorism. Terrorism since 9/11 has been at the center of strategic thought.

Though some strategists have tried to impose enduring rules and principles, the character of strategy remains fluid and reflects the dimension of the time, while the nature of strategy is fixed. Strategy is about the use of military power or its threat to deny the adversary's strategic goals. Thus strategy can affect the opponent's capability and will—and hence convince it to accept a political outcome that is acceptable to both parties.

See also *Arms Race; Asymmetric Wars; Military-industrial Complex; Nuclear Club; Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation; Wars of Independence.*

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Strauss, Leo

Leo Strauss (1899–1973) was a German twentieth-century political philosopher whose writings continue to echo through present-day debates on modernity and its prospects. Lamenting the onslaught by liberal relativism on tradition, customs, and moral principle, Strauss emphasized the message of ancient political philosophy as a remedy for the wastefulness and nihilism characteristic of the modern era. His work pitting modern reason against spiritual revelation has compelled many contemporary political philosophers and scholars to examine the role of classical political society in the nature of the state and to reevaluate the path to the "good life" prized by thinkers such as ancient Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle.

Strauss was born in Hesse, Germany, in September 1899. Growing up Jewish in Weimer Germany, he struggled with the fraught status of his religion in a society that vilified it. He immersed himself at a young age in the philosophy of another Jewish thinker, Baruch Spinoza, while also grappling with the atheism espoused in the philosophy of fellow German theorists Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. Not satisfied with modernity's supposed refutation of orthodoxy, Strauss, in his formative years at the Gymnasium Philippinum and the University of Hamburg, abandoned his political Zionism for the Islamic Aristotelianism of Muslim philosopher Abu Nasr al-Farabi.

This point marked the transition for Strauss toward the philosophic way of life understood in the Platonic sense. Defending the tradition of ancient philosophy against radical historicism and modern claims to natural rights, Strauss began to wrestle with what he would later articulate to be the conflict between "Jerusalem and Athens": the tension between the

revelation of biblical truths and the primacy of reason for the Greeks. Motivating his research was the belief that he had been unlucky enough to be born in a period of civic decline where man's path to the truth—indeed, his understanding of his permanent place outside of his temporal existence—was inhibited by modern superficiality. Strauss saw the need to return to classical philosophy's message of knowledge that transcended its place in Greek society and conveyed a message of truth for all generations.

Strauss led a mostly itinerant life while in Europe until the late 1930s when he moved to the United States with his wife, Miriam Bernsohn. After teaching a number of years in New York City, he spent the bulk of his academic career at the University of Chicago, where he lectured for twenty years on political philosophy prior to two brief stints at Claremont McKenna College and St. John's College. During this period he produced a number of critical commentaries, including *What Is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies* (1959) and *Liberalism, Ancient and Modern* (1968). His pupils included a number of prominent future intellectuals, such as philosopher Allen Bloom and political author Harry Jaffa, as well as former deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz. Many of his followers and former students credit him today for his novel impact on how political philosophy should be read and studied in the modern era. He died in October 1973 of pneumonia.

See also *German Political Thought; Greek Political Thought, Ancient; Heidegger, Martin; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Plato; Political Philosophy; Religion and Politics; Spinoza, Baruch.*

. . . .   CLYDE RAY

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Straussianism

Leo Strauss was born and educated in Germany. Fleeing from the Nazis in the early 1930s, he emigrated first to England and then to the United States. He was a professor of political philosophy at the New School for Social Research until Robert Maynard Hutchins brought him to the University of Chicago in 1948.

More than most thinkers of the twentieth century, Leo Strauss polarized his audience. One was either for him or against him, influenced by him or repelled by him. Thus has arisen the phenomenon, nearly unique among the twentieth century's academic thinkers, of a recognized group of followers, called *Straussians.* Where and when the label arose, and what exactly it means, are uncertain. It seems originally to have been a label invented by the opponents of Strauss and applied to individuals who had studied with or were manifestly influenced by him.

Over time, and somewhat reluctantly, the label has been accepted by many if not all of those to whom it has been applied.

The label was originally proposed in a spirit of enmity because it was intended to suggest, at the extreme, something like a cult, or, more moderately, a group with a unified set of views, views that were decidedly not those of mainstream academics in the fields of political science or philosophy. It was meant, in other words, to designate an "unorthodox orthodoxy."

That original attribution of unity of outlook has since given way to recognition that little such unity exists. The so-called Straussians have broken into different, sometimes warring, camps and to a discerning eye embody much less unity of viewpoint than, say, rational choice theorists or international relations realists in political science.

Indeed, it is now a question, as it always was, whether there is any real content to the label *Straussian.* Contrary to what is often said, those who have followed Strauss are far from single-minded in what they take from him, except perhaps for some threshold or methodological commitments: that philosophy is important; that political philosophy is a viable enterprise; that philosophic texts must be read in a particularly attentive manner; that the distinction between ancients and moderns means something, although what it means is not clear or universally agreed upon. To this list of common characteristics must be added a self-conscious orientation toward, but by no means comprehensive agreement with, Strauss himself. A Straussian then is one who works to a degree that cannot be entirely specified within a framework of Strauss's questions and chief concepts, and, if the scholar in question is concerned with textual studies, deploys Strauss's methods of close reading.

According to these very loose criteria, the number of Straussians is quite large and the studies they pursue extremely diverse and varied in character. The large number and the diversity of subject matter make it quite impossible to canvass or catalogue the universe of Straussians, but there are several major lines of cleavage discernable among them. These lines of cleavage often are characterized in terms of East Coast and West Coast, and even Midwest, Straussians. This classification serves some rough and ready purposes, but it is probably more revealing to identify the actual substantive disagreements. Straussians disagree, for example, on how to read Plato's *Phaedrus* or how to understand Locke. They disagree over whether the U.S. Supreme Court is a good or bad political institution. More significant, however, are a series of disagreements that are closer to the core of Strauss's own thinking. These disagreements arise as a result of certain puzzles in Strauss's thinking concerning the status of religion, the status of morality, and the status of modern liberal democracy.

What is perhaps most striking at the end of the day is how diverse the Straussians are. Strauss himself worried that schools were dangerous things for philosophy for they were breeding grounds for dogmatism. Among the Straussians it would be fair to say that intellectual vigor and disagreement are more apparent than hardening of the intellectual arteries. This result is largely the outcome of Strauss's way of presenting

his thought. To the chagrin of the professionals, he left much unsaid and thus left ambiguities and puzzles. His aim was not to transform the world, but to understand it, and to encourage the young, the ones he called "the puppies of the race," toward philosophy. The vibrant disagreements among the Straussians are testimony to the degree to which he succeeded in not inspiring a set of dogmas and orthodoxies that would strait-jacket those who follow him.

See also *Aristotle; Greek Political Thought, Ancient; Strauss, Leo.*

. . . . CATHERINE AND MICHAEL ZUCKERT

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Strikes, Labor

See *Labor Strikes.*

Structural Adjustment Program (IMF)

Structural adjustment programs are conditional loan programs that have been provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other donors to developing countries with the goal of addressing underlying problems in national economies that cause persistent balance-of-payments problems. Structural adjustment loans are programmatic in nature and do not finance specific projects but rather support policy reform. Conditions attached to the loans specify the reforms that the IMF expects governments to implement. The IMF and the World Bank widely used these programs in the 1980s and 1990s but then replaced structural adjustment lending with poverty reduction lending in the late 1990s.

THE ORIGINS OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LENDING

The oil shock of 1979 and 1980 and the subsequent recession in the industrial world led to increasing costs of imports and decreasing earnings from exports for many developing countries, resulting ultimately in significant balance-of-payments difficulties. In 1980, the World Bank introduced the *structural adjustment loan* to help developing countries reduce their current account deficits and undertake policy reforms that presumably would lead to better underlying macroeconomic fundamentals.

The IMF traditionally used *stand-by arrangements* to help countries address short-term balance-of-payment problems, but these agreements were not designed to address recur-ring problems. In 1974, the IMF began using the *extended fund facility (EFF)* to respond to medium-term balance-of-payments problems requiring economic policy adjustment. Use of the EFF increased markedly during the first half of the 1980s and represented the majority of fund activity between 1981 and 1983. In 1986, the IMF introduced the *structural adjustment facility (SAF).* SAF loans were available to low-income member countries and featured reduced interest rates. In 1987, one-third of new programs were structural adjustment programs; the proportion increased to one-half in 1988. In 1987, the IMF introduced the *extended structural adjustment facility (ESAF),* which aimed to support "especially vigorous" medium-term adjustment programs and relied on extensive conditionality. In 1989, combined structural adjustment lending represented 38 percent of the value and 65 percent of the number of total active IMF programs. From 1987 to 1999, structural adjustment programs accounted for more than 50 percent of all ongoing IMF programs, although because of their smaller size, they amounted to only 18 percent of ongoing IMF commitments.

GOALS OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

As observed by the academic Tony Killick in 1998, the IMF's structural adjustment programs typically aimed to accomplish three types of policy change: to increase the role of markets and private enterprise relative to the public sector; to improve the efficiency of the public sector; and to mobilize new domestic resources. Common conditions in structural adjustment loans included the reduction or elimination of agricultural or petroleum subsidies and price controls; the privatization of public enterprises; the reduction of government expenditures; trade liberalization; and reform of the financial sector. These market liberalizing policies came to be known as the *Washington Consensus*.

PROBLEMS WITH STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

The specific content of reform programs was supposed to be negotiated between the IMF and the aid-receiving country. However, critics of structural adjustment viewed the reform conditions as too uniform across countries and critiqued the IMF for failing to consider the distributional consequences of the policies. In particular, structural adjustment reforms often left the urban sector worse off, making the policies politically difficult to implement.

Countries that entered structural adjustment programs tended not to graduate from them. Following a first structural adjustment loan, there was an 80 percent chance that a country would enter an additional program; following six structural adjustment loans, the probability of an additional loan remained 80 percent. Over a dozen developing countries spent more than two-thirds of the 1980s and 1990s in an IMF structural adjustment program.

Yet countries in structural adjustment programs did not show improvement in their budget deficits, current account deficits, inflation rates or other macroeconomic indicators. In

general, countries in IMF programs appear not to have experienced as much economic growth as they would have in the absence of the IMF program. Recognizing the problems with structural adjustment programs, in 1999, the IMF transformed the ESAF into the *poverty reduction and growth facility*. This instrument puts increased importance on government participation in the design of the program and on both poverty reduction and growth-oriented outcomes, although some critics see it simply as continued structural adjustment lending.

See also *Globalization and Development; International Monetary Fund (IMF).*

. . . .   MATTHEW S. WINTERS

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Structural Equations Model (SEM)

A *structural equations model* is a representation of a set of relationships among constructs and between those constructs (or latent variables) and their indicators (or observed variables). The first component is the *measurement model,* which is constituted by the relationships between latent variables (or constructs) and their respective indicators. In contrast to linear regression, which assumes no-measurement error, *structural equations modeling (SEM)* can model this type of error, and it can be analyzed. The second component is the *structural model,* which constitutes the set of relationships among latent variables (similar to relationships in linear regression). SEM, which is a second-generation statistical technique, allows for the opportunity to simultaneously test the measurement and structural models (see Figure 1).

Two of the main SEM techniques are covariance-based SEM and partial least squares. Covariance-based SEM, as implemented in LISREL, AMOS, or EQS software, minimizes the differences between the observed and calculated values in the covariance matrix. A formal specification of a structural equations model is given by the following three equations (Bollen, 1989):

$$\eta = B\eta + \Gamma\xi + \zeta \text{ (structural equation for latent variable model)}$$

FIGURE 1: A GENERIC EXAMPLE OF A STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS MODEL

$$x = \Lambda_x\xi + \delta \text{ (measurement model—exogenous variables)}$$

$$y = \Lambda_y\eta + \varepsilon \text{ (measurement model—endogenous variables)}$$

Where:

η = latent endogenous variables

ξ = latent exogenous variables

ζ = latent errors in equation

B = coefficient matrix for latent endogenous variables

Γ = coefficient matrix for latent exogenous variables

y = observed indicators of η

x = observed indicators of ξ

ε = measurement errors for y

δ = measurement errors for x

Λ_y = coefficients relating y to η

Λ_x = coefficients relating x to ξ

A *latent variable* is a construct not observable or measured directly, but is indirectly measured through observable variables (indicators). The relationships among constructs are sometimes referred to as *paths,* and the use of path diagrams to graphically depict SEM models is a common practice. In addition, one of the advantages of SEM is the possibility of assessing both direct and indirect effects among constructs.

The adequacy of a covariance-based SEM model can be assessed in two important ways. There are several overall model fit measures, which evaluate the plausibility of the model as a good representation of the actual covariance values that exist among the variables. Some examples are chi-square, adjusted goodness of fit index, goodness of fit index, and normed fit index. Also some specific measures can assess the structural and measurement models. For the measurement model, the size and statistical significance of loadings are the most important ones. For the structural model, the size and statistical significance of path coefficients and the size of the coefficients of determination (R-squares) should be examined.

See also *Partial Least Squares; Qualitative Analysis; Qualitative Methodologies; Quantitative Analysis.*

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Structuralism

Structuralism is a theoretical and methodological perspective, often combined with functionalism, and employed in the social sciences. At the foundation of the perspective is the assumption that society is a system with distinct parts interlinked and positions determined by the overall structure itself. Generally, linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1959) is credited as the first structuralist, but the method and the perspective soon spread to sociology, anthropology, psychology, and then literature and even architecture.

ORIGINS AND SPREAD

In the social sciences, the theory began with the argument that meaning itself was structurally embedded in activities as diverse as preparing food to highly ritualized dances. That is, symbols themselves are organized into systems that permeate the actions, attitudes, and physical organization of a group. The goal would be to uncover the deep structural meanings of each symbol through ethnographic analysis, including such practices as objective observation, interview, and perhaps even participant observation. Thus, modes of behavior often taken for granted by those participating in them are actually indicative of latent structures that provide meanings unobtainable by the outsider.

Taking from the linguists, social scientists often have asserted the importance of binaries for organizing social life. Believing that the mind itself is dichotomized, innate distinctions between night-day or male-female manifest themselves in the actual ways humans divide their own world, the classifications they derive, the taboos the create, and the rituals they employ. Others, such as anthropologist Mary Douglas (1970) have gone so far as to argue that certain ubiquitous features of human societies must be derived from sharing the same neuroanatomy. For instance, the color red signifying danger becomes embedded in the structure of society through stop signs and warning lights or signs.

Take for instance anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss's work on kinship (1969). The question asked by many anthropologists is what function did kinship have for early hunter-gatherer groups; moreover, what was the structural meaning behind exogamous kinship systems. The answers to this question had been relatively diverse ranging from a method of preventing incest to the classic women-as-property claim. Levi-Strauss argued it was actually a deeply embedded practice signifying the groups who considered themselves kin, even if fictively. Labeling his theory *alliance theory,* he saw the bride exchange that was often not a direct, reciprocal exchange as a deeply embedded practice signifying relationships, obligations, and expectations between two or more groups of people that were otherwise tacit to both the participants and the surface observer.

In sociology, structuralism was pervasive among the functionalists coming from the Parsonsian school and, to a lesser extent Robert Merton. Talcott Parsons constructed a grand social theory that was meant to incorporate all social phenomena within its proper place in the larger social structure. Dividing the social world into four dominant structures—analogized in his famous fourfold box within a box—Parsons assumed that every society, once large enough, would divide up the four most important tasks by creating four discrete structural entities. One structure would serve to set and mobilize others to meet societal goals; one interacted with the environment and worked to adapt the society to changes in the environment; one sought to integrate the disparate social units into a socially stable whole; and the other created, perpetuated, and disseminated a cultural pattern that generated a degree of conformity across society. While a static fourfold construction ensued, Parsons did not imply that there were truly just four structures, but that social phenomena fell into one category or the other—the economy was typically the system uniting the society with the environment while the polity is typically the structure concerned with goal attainment. Niklas Luhmann, a student of Parsons, was perhaps the last great structuralist in the social sciences positing a theory that organized society into three systems: the social system, the organizational system, and the interaction system. Each system was linked through symbolic systems that coordinated the flow of input and output across boundaries.

POSTSTRUCTURALISM

Over the course of the past forty years, structuralism has been relegated to an increasingly minor role in most disciplines. On the one hand, it was never able to satisfyingly defend itself against the critique that it ignored social change and was ahistorical. Structuralism, by definition, examines the unchanging elements coordinating meaning for a group of people, not the dynamics that drive these elements to change or reconfigure them. On the other, structuralism became a victim of the sociocultural context of the 1960s and 1970s, when tumult, feelings of change, and strong agent-based movements dominated the political, academic, and social scenes. Many aspiring social scientists and scholars in the humanities called into question the conservativism and determinism of structuralists, preferring new perspectives like poststructuralism, deconstructionism, and postmodernism. Pierre Bourdieu, in particular, argued that some structures were *structured,* while others were *structuring*—put another way, some structures were constraining while others were

better understood as processes that meant outcomes were not already determined. Structuralists tend to be deterministic in their theories of action, which they see as tightly constrained by structures embedded within the actor through the process of socialization. Conversely, the 1960s brought a wave of agent-based sentiment that argued that humans were being oversocialized by structuralism and that, in fact, humans, human nature, and society were much more malleable than structuralists conceded.

See also *Essentialism; Functionalism; Language and Politics; Political Sociology; Postmodernism.*

. . . .   SETH ABRUTYN

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Student Politics

Student politics is a term encompassing a broad range of student behavior. It generally refers to collective student activity that aims at effecting political or social change. Most student movements and organizations falling under this heading, therefore, look "outward" at the political and social environment beyond the campus. But campus-directed activity aiming at university reform, like the influential 1918 student movement in Argentina, also may be included insofar as it is seen as having broader implications within the social and political context. While it's most significant historical manifestations have been leftist, student politics can be informed by any variety of political ideologies. It also can take place at any level of schooling, though postsecondary student politics has generally been most effectual and has received by far the most scholarly attention.

Scholars have pointed to numerous factors accounting for the propensity of students to engage in political activity, including the higher prevalence of idealism among youth; the critical atmosphere of the university and frequently liberal views of faculty; the generally permissive campus culture; the geographical concentration of individuals with similar interests and motivations; the tendency for universities around the world to be located in politically significant cities; and the free time afforded students, especially by schools based on the European model. Politically engaged students are more likely to come from affluent, educated backgrounds and are disproportionately concentrated in the humanities and social sciences. Scholars like Lewis Feuer (1969) have offered psychological explanations for student activism as well, though Feuer's theory of an oedipal "generational conflict" has found limited reception within the scholarly community.

However prominent it may appear at times, student politics is almost always a minority phenomenon, generally involving only a small segment of the student body, and tends to be concentrated in large, quality schools. The relatively limited prevalence of political engagement within the student body may be explained in part by other aspects of student life that are less conducive to sustained political activity. High student turnover and fluctuating student interests make it difficult to build durable student organizations, and universities with demanding examination schedules—like those in the United States—leave students little time for extracurricular endeavors. Additionally, a wide variety of apolitical extracurricular offerings—again more typical of the United States than the rest of the world—also may absorb a substantial amount of students' time and energy.

Scholarly interest in student politics was largely stimulated by the emergence of radical student activism in the 1960s in the United States and other Western democracies, notably the heavy involvement of students in the civil rights movement through the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the 1964 Berkeley Free Speech Movement, and the French student protests of May 1968. The roots of modern student politics go back much further, however. The first politically significant student organizations arose in Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century, particularly in the German *Burschenschaften,* and students played a significant role in the 1848 political upheavals in Germany and elsewhere.

With few exceptions and thanks in large part to state repression, however, student activity in the West had limited impact until the 1960s. The same was not true in other parts of the world, where the European university model had been introduced through imperialism. In European countries, student politics has historically played a much more prominent and influential role on the national stage. Thanks to the often extensive contributions of students during independence struggles, as in countries like Burma, India, Kenya, and Vietnam, student politics was entrenched as an important part of the political scene; after independence there, students played a key role in modernization. Consequently, students tend to garner more respect in these countries, which increases the likely effectiveness of their activities and compels the government to take them seriously. The impact of student actions has occasionally been huge—for instance, toppling the government of Adnan Menderes in Turkey and forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi in Japan in the 1960s,

and causing major political disruption in Burma and South Korea in the late 1980s, to name only a few examples.

Many scholars have commented on the decline of student activism since the 1960s, particularly in the West, though the perception of this trend may be influenced by fluctuating coverage in the mainstream media. A notable resurgence, however, was stimulated by the growth and significant achievements of international antiapartheid campaigns focusing on campus divestment in 1984 and 1985. Several factors may, however, have made it difficult for students to undertake the campaigns of old. In the United States, the large-scale struggles for civil rights and against the Vietnam War (1959–1975) during the height of student activism have given way to a "new localism," favoring small-scale and pragmatic campaigns that are less combative tactically and often tied to the interests of particular groups. Multiculturalism and postmodernism have become major forces on campuses, and under their influence student organizations have split into smaller and smaller pieces, with more targeted (and thus smaller) membership. Certain issues like antisweatshop activism, however, may provide new opportunities for broad-based campaigns. Internationally, student movements have become harder to situate ideologically, finding a middle ground between capitalism and communism in China and eastern Europe and allying themselves with religious fundamentalism in parts of the Islamic world.

See also *Academic Freedom; Collective Action and Mobilization; Political Participation.*

. . . . BENJAMIN J. PAULI

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Subaltern Politics

Subaltern politics refers to the political activity of subaltern social groups (i.e., the political activity of subordinated and marginalized social groups). The concept originated in the work of the Italian socialist and political theorist, Antonio Gramsci, who developed the concept to describe, categorize, and analyze the activity and conditions of social groups that lack relative political power with respect to ruling social groups. Since the publication of some of Gramsci's writings on subaltern groups in English in the 1971, there has been growing interest in subaltern themes across the humanities and social sciences. The most notable achievement in this regard is the publication series *Subaltern Studies,* which has developed subaltern studies into a recognizable mode of analysis and scholarship.

ANTONIO GRAMSCI AND THE CONCEPT OF SUBALTERN SOCIAL GROUPS

While incarcerated by Mussolini's fascist regime, Gramsci undertook a massive study of Italian political history, culture, and society, which he recorded in what are known as his *prison notebooks.* Out of his twenty-nine prison notebooks, Gramsci devoted a single notebook, Notebook 25, to the analysis of subaltern groups, which he titled "On the Margins of History: The History of Subaltern Social Groups." Gramsci perceived that the history of subaltern groups was largely unwritten or was "on the margins of history." Gramsci's notes on subaltern groups mainly address issues specific to Italian history, such as the slaves of ancient Rome, various religious groups, women, different races, the *popolani* (common people) and *popolo* (people) of the medieval communes, the bourgeoisie prior to the Italian Risorgimento, and workers and peasants in the early twentieth century.

In Gramsci's view, spontaneity characterized modern Italian subaltern politics, largely because the subordinate masses engaged in rebellions, revolts, uprisings, and brigandage in response to their unacceptable conditions but were incapable of permanently transforming their circumstances. To overcome their subordination, Gramsci argued that it was necessary for subaltern groups to achieve political autonomy from dominant social groups in a struggle for hegemony (i.e., to struggle for intellectual, moral, and political leadership). In Gramsci's conception of hegemony, dominant or ruling social groups maintain political power through coercion and accommodation, in which dominant social groups suppress the political ascent of subaltern groups or attempt to incorporate their demands into dominant political formations. A contributing factor, in this regard, is the formation and articulation of dominant ideology and culture. If dominant intellectuals portray subaltern groups as backward, inferior, abnormal, or psychologically mad, and subaltern groups accept those views, the root causes of subalternity become obscured, ignored, or hidden from history. This in turn negatively affects the capacities of subaltern groups to address the core aspects of their subordination. Thus, Gramsci argued that spontaneity was inadequate for subaltern politics and that the struggle for hegemony required organization, planning, and the cultivation of critical consciousness.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUBALTERN STUDIES

Prior to the 1980s, subaltern politics received relatively little intellectual focus. The notable exception to this generalization is the work of the British historians Eric Hobsbawm (1965) and Edward P. Thompson (1966). Although they did not directly rely on the concept of subaltern politics, their works examine "history from below" by focusing on the political agency of subordinated social groups. Ranajit Guha and the small group of English and Indian historians who founded the publication series *Subaltern Studies* are largely responsible for introducing the themes of subaltern politics into current intellectual discussions. In 1982, the *Subaltern Studies* editorial collective published its first volume of the series, which was devoted to writings on South Asian history and society. Guha acted as the principal editor of the series from 1982 to 1988 and edited the first six volumes, and to date, the editorial collective has published twelve volumes. In addition, Oxford University Press published *Selected Subaltern Studies* (1988), which includes a selection of the seminal essays from the series and a preface by Edward Said, and Minnesota University Press published *A Subaltern Studies Reader, 1986–1995* (1997), which includes some of the most influential essays from the series.

The initial focus of *Subaltern Studies* drew from Gramsci's work in attempt to reclaim the politics of the people in South Asian history, which elitist historiography tended to ignore. In the preface to *Subaltern Studies I,* Guha states that the aim of the series "is to promote a systematic and informed discussion of subaltern themes in the field of South Asian studies, and thus help to rectify the elitist bias characteristic of much research and academic work in this particular area." According to Guha, "The word 'subaltern' in the title stands for the meaning as given in the *Concise Oxford Dictionary,* that is, 'of inferior rank,'" and the term is used "as a name for the general attribute of subordination in South Asian society whether this is expressed in terms of class, caste, age, gender, and office or in any other way." However, in contrast to the Gramscian notion, Guha works from the basic assumption that subaltern politics operate in an "autonomous domain" that exists independently from elite politics. This contradiction was pointed out by Suneet Chopra (1982), which prompted a discussion that highlighted the differences between Gramsci's conception of subaltern politics and the understanding developed by *Subaltern Studies.* David Arnold, a member of the *Subaltern Studies* editorial collective, provided further context to the discussion by examining the application of Gramsci's ideas to the study of the Indian peasantry (1984).

"CAN THE SUBALTERN SPEAK?"

In her article "Can the Subaltern Speak?" Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak provides one of the most influential essays on subaltern studies published to date. Spivak considers Guha's approach to rewriting Indian colonial history from a subaltern perspective "essentialist and taxonomic," because it defines the subaltern "as a difference from the elite" and requires one to not only know the consciousness of subaltern groups but also requires one to represent that consciousness. This is illustrated in the fact that the subalternists rely on British, nationalist, and colonialist records to research and validate their work. Spivak reinforces Gramsci's position by maintaining that subaltern groups leave little or no traces of their existence within elite, colonial documents, and if the subaltern are represented at all, they are represented as the "other" within dominant, elite ideology. It is in this sense that the subaltern cannot speak, according to Spivak, because representations of the subaltern are embedded within dominant discourse, which does not present the subaltern's perspective.

Despite its criticisms, *Subaltern Studies* has largely achieved its goal of reclaiming the "politics of the people" from the confines of elitist and nationalist historiography. The hundreds of books and articles that drew on *Subaltern Studies* made a significant impact in the 1990s, and its influence reached beyond India and South Asia. Its focus on nonelite, subaltern history encouraged the founding of the Latin America Subaltern Studies Group in 1993 and the analysis of subaltern history in Africa, Ireland, the Middle East, and the United States. Today the term *subaltern studies* no longer refers exclusively to the publication series launched by Guha but encompasses a recognizable mode of investigation in cultural studies, literature, sociology, anthropology, and history that focuses on marginalized members of society and often is linked closely with postcolonial studies.

See also *Colonialism; Ethnocentrism; Gramsci, Antonio.*

. . . . MARCUS E. GREEN

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Subnational Governments

See *Regions and Regional Governments.*

Subnational Legislatures

See *Regions and Regional Governments.*

Subsidiarity

Subsidiarity is the principle that policy making should be taken at the lowest capable level of government. The term gained political prominence in the 1990s when it became a central operating principle of the European Union (EU). It was cited in the Treaty on European Union (1992) to clarify the policy-making balance between the EU and its member states.

The term originated in Catholic social thought. It was cited in the 1931 Papal Encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno,* which suggested that higher organizations should restrict their activities to those that individuals, families, and smaller social units do not have the capacity to undertake. Politically, proponents have traced the meaning of and justification for subsidiarity to Aristotle and Alexis de Tocqueville. It is defended on the grounds that people have a right to self-determination and that they can better hold officials accountable at lower levels of government.

Subsidiarity became an important concept within the EU as a result of the rapid shift of power from member states to the EU. While integration efforts were initially an elite-driven process focused on removing barriers to trade, over time the EU has moved into social and political policy areas, raising public awareness. Moreover, under the 1986 Single European Act, the member states moved from unanimous voting to qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers on a number of issues, which meant that individual states could no longer veto legislation. This led to talk of a democratic deficit and to fears that citizens would lose their ability to influence decision making and preserve their cultural diversity.

Under the Treaty on European Union, the member states agreed to widen further the competence of the community and the scope for qualified majority voting. To reassure the public and some member countries, the EU explicitly incorporated the principle of subsidiarity into the treaty. The preamble of the treaty states that decisions will be taken "as closely as possible to the citizen, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity." Article 3b of the treaty explains that under this principle, in any areas that do not fall within its exclusive competence, the European community should take action, "only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community." Subsidiarity affects areas in which the EU and member states have concurrent competence, including health, consumer protection, culture, and education.

The Treaty on European Union was initially rejected by Danish voters in a 1992 referendum and was nearly defeated by French voters. This led the European Council to underscore the importance of subsidiarity in its annual summit in Edinburgh in December 1992. In a protocol on subsidiarity that was later incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, the council agreed that subsidiarity was binding on all of the community's institutions and could be adjudicated in the European Court of Justice. After passage of the Treaty on European Union, the European Commission reviewed, amended, and repealed some legislation in light of the subsidiarity principle.

While closely linked to ideas of federalism, subsidiarity is less an institutional arrangement than a set of procedures. It requires discussion of whether the powers that do not fall exclusively into the competence of the EU should be exercised by the commission or by member states. As such, it is a political decision. The term has generated considerable debate. Some view it as a means of protecting the sovereignty of national states and regions. Others argue that it interferes with the ability of the EU to integrate further and achieve its policy goals. Still others argue that it could lead to important powers being logically transferred to the EU as these could be more effectively dealt with at the supranational level. Analysts are divided on its usefulness. Some suggest that its definition is too vague, while others see it as crucial to the legitimacy of the EU. Much of its usefulness will depend on the future willingness of the European Court of Justice to limit the policy-making scope of EU institutions, something it has generally not done.

See also *European Union; Federalism.*

. . . .   PAMELA CAMERRA-ROWE

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Suffrage

See *Voting Rights and Suffrage; Women's Suffrage.*

Summit Diplomacy

Serial summitry has become a regular part of the contemporary diplomatic global landscape. It is a measure of the significance that summit diplomacy has acquired in the early twenty-first century that, according to Gideon Rachman, "the formation of the G20 group of world leaders is likely to be the most lasting institutional consequence of the global financial meltdown of 2008" (2009). As a biannual forum for cooperation and consultation among the heads of state and finance ministers of nineteen nations plus the European Union on matters pertaining to economic global governance, the G20 best highlights the relevance of summit diplomacy in the twenty-first century.

Although the term *summit diplomacy* was originally coined by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1950, as he called for another cold war talk with the Soviet Union at the highest level, summits date back to the Middle Ages. Summits have historically been reserved for meetings between heads of state or governments. Although summitry declined from the Renaissance until the nineteenth century during the Age of Classical Diplomacy, conference diplomacy underwent a revival in the early twentieth century, most notably with the conclusion of World War I in 1919, when leaders of Germany agreed to a peace negotiation with leaders of France, United Kingdom, and the United States in Versailles, France.

There has been debate as to whether the Munich meetings between British Prime Minister Joseph Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler in 1938 or the 1945 Yalta meeting between the Big Three—Churchill, U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Soviet Union Premier Joseph Stalin—contributed or detracted from the standing of summits as a form of effective diplomacy. Because neither summit attained the intended goals, for a time these summits were criticized as poor examples of twentieth-century summit diplomacy. Yet, during the cold war, summits between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union became important, especially to deflect international tensions during the nuclear age. As U.S. President John F. Kennedy put it in 1959, "it is far better to meet at the summit than at the brink."

Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century, ease of international travel coupled with growth of multilateralism and an increasing role of public opinion in international affairs have all contributed to the popularity of summits as a regular foreign policy tool. U.S. President Richard Nixon from 1969 to 1974 participated in more summits than President Roosevelt did in his twelve years in the White House (1932–1945).

However, summits have been known to elicit controversy. Many professional diplomats are critical of them. Former U.S. Under Secretary of State George W. Ball summarized the case against summits, arguing heads of state or government are vain; do not know policy details; and are far too willing to accommodate the desires of their foreign counterparts, sometimes to the detriment of the national interest.

Despite the frustration of professional diplomats, there is a reason why summits have proliferated. This is not just due to the desire of political leaders to bask in the reflected glory of their counterparts; too much international travel can easily become a handicap with national electorates. Globalization and complex economic interdependence have led to increased levels of diplomatic activity. Few areas now escape international scrutiny, and global challenges like climate change, international financial stability, transnational terrorism, or the illegal drug trade demand collective action. As the December 2009 Climate Change Summit in Copenhagen showed, it is difficult enough to get countries to agree to commit to significant domestic policy changes for the sake of global public goods *with* the participation of heads of state government, let alone without them. The notion that routine diplomatic processes are good and swift enough to address many global public policy issues misses both the significance and urgency of these modern global challenges; traditional diplomacy may downplay or procrastinate on taking action on global challenges requiring the attention of heads of state. Most states understand the political message a government can deliver by opting not to participate in global or regional summits or by sending junior representatives.

One reason the 2008–2009 Great Recession did not become another Great Depression was due to the quick and concerted action formulated by the heads of state participating in the G20 summit in London in April 2009. Summits are flexible, versatile instruments that concentrate the minds of top policy makers and can get a lot of business done if well-prepared and well-managed. While summits alone do not necessarily produce immediate changes, they can defuse crises, establish global reforms, implement regulatory measures to eventually alleviate future problems, and fortify new or existing global alliances. Summits can lead states to adhere and respond to international standards. Thus, summits likely will remain a popular diplomatic tool.

See also *Climate Change Conferences, United Nations; Diplomacy; G7/G8 and G20; Globalization; Kyoto Protocol; Public Diplomacy.*

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William Graham Sumner (1840–1910) was a prominent American sociologist and a vocal advocate of laissez-faire capitalism, anti-imperialism, and the futility of social reform. His academic works and popular essays contributed significantly to the influence of social Darwinism on American political and economic thought in the late nineteenth century.

Born in Paterson, New Jersey, Sumner grew up in Hartford, Connecticut, in a working-class English immigrant family. After graduating from Yale in 1863, where he studied political economy, Sumner continued his education in history and language at the universities of Geneva and Göttingen and in theology at Oxford University. Sumner was ordained in the Episcopalian Church in 1867 but left the ministry in 1872 to become a professor of political and social sciences at Yale University, a position he held until shortly before his death in 1910.

Sumner sought to join the social Darwinism of English philosopher Herbert Spencer with the assumptions underlying political liberalism, classical economics, and the Protestant work ethic in order to justify and naturalize the economic inequalities that developed in America after the Civil War (1861–1865). Sumner's political thought rests on a view of society comprised of individuals competing against nature for economic survival. The accumulation of capital provides individuals with a competitive advantage and is instrumental in the advance of civilization. Because accumulation requires intelligence and self-denial, wealth is the result of successful adaptation to economic competition, and poverty a natural result of individual failure. Hostile to philosophical speculation, Sumner denied the existence of natural rights, arguing instead that the individual had only the right to use his powers for his own welfare and to securely enjoy that which he had earned. As characterized by Sumner, this right is also a duty, because by failing to look after oneself, one's welfare becomes the responsibility of others. Thus for Sumner, the doctrine of liberty is contained in the command "mind your own business."

The natural laws of competition and natural selection led Sumner to a minimal conception of the state. To him, government institutions are essential to maintaining civil liberty, but must be limited to ensuring equal opportunities for economic competition and to providing freedom for labor and security for earnings. If it is to protect the rights of citizens, Sumner argued, government cannot become the vehicle of class-based claims. In this respect, both plutocrats and social reformers are guilty of illegitimately using the state to gain an unfair advantage in the competition over material resources. For this reason Sumner was equally opposed to welfare programs, protective tariffs, and government contracts or "jobbery," all of which interfere with the laws of free economic competition, and by extension, with the progress of society. Moreover, government interference rewards those who cannot succeed on their own and ultimately penalizes the "forgotten man," who works hard, accumulates what capital he can, and whose earnings are inevitably used to fund various class-based legislative schemes.

Although a politically and economically conservative thinker, Sumner falls solidly within the American liberal tradition; while his sociological thought emphasizes the importance of mores and folkways, he nonetheless insisted in his political work that freely chosen contracts rather than tradition or custom are the only source social obligations. Like social Darwinism generally, the influence of Sumner's political and economic ideas gradually faded as the progressive movement began to yield social reforms.

See also *Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; Individual and Society; Social Darwinism.*

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Supreme Court

Courts of "last resort," or "supreme" courts, derive from the idea that law, rather than politics or standing in a community, is the basis for the authority of government. The U.S. Supreme Court is an expression of this belief, as are similar courts worldwide, including those in Canada and South Africa. This institutional structure is particularly evident in political systems based on a written constitution. Systems in which courts are supreme—in the sense that they are the "last word" on the country's constitution—are often distinguished from parliamentary systems, such as the one found in the United Kingdom. In these systems, the parliament is the ultimate arbiter of political questions. Canada is somewhat of a unique case—it has been shifting from the parliamentary model to the model of a supreme court with its "repatriation" of the constitution of the United Kingdom.

The U.S. Supreme Court is an appellate court alone at the top of the judicial process in the United States. It has authority not only over the federal courts but also over the state courts. The Court is the final venue of appeal for the enormous number of cases generated in the United States. A rough estimate of the number of these cases would be approximately ten million per year. Of these, approximately three hundred thousand are appealed to the higher courts in the states and in the federal system. About five thousand of these eventually reach the

Supreme Court, but the justices actually choose fewer than one hundred cases on which to comment extensively. There are many theories about why certain cases are chosen and others are not, although it is clear that the cases have to be of interest to the justices and usually of some general significance.

Some have been joked that the Supreme Court is not final because it is infallible, but that it is infallible because it is final. Certainly, given its final say in legal matters, the Court has come to be viewed as special. When Americans are serious about a dispute, they say they are going to take the case "all the way to the Supreme Court." Because the Supreme Court is the last official word on the U.S. Constitution, short of a constitutional change through formal amendment, it deserves careful attention. However, the Court addresses relatively few cases, meaning that individuals must turn to a variety of other less visible sources of constitutional law for precedence and answers.

FUNCTIONS

The Supreme Court can be distinguished from other courts by several unique, specific functions. Most courts are primarily engaged in the resolution of conflict, but the Supreme Court is known to make policy and is, therefore, a source of constitutional law. In this sense, the "Constitution," understood to be the basis for U.S. law, is not primarily a historical document and series of amendments, but rather the product of judicial choices that construct the ongoing meaning and significance of the original document. The justices transform the law while applying it in individual cases.

As part of two legal systems, the federal and the state, the Supreme Court is the court of last resort. The justices are appointed by the president, and they are paid from the National Treasury. They serve as long as they exhibit good behavior, which in practice has meant tenure for life, and a decision to retire from this institution becomes a policy decision of some significance. The selection process is political, and a nominee's political party activity may influence the appointment decision. The president does not always get his first choice to fill a vacancy, however. This was the case in 2005 for President George W. Bush, whose first nominee to replace retiring justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Harriet Miers, withdrew amid controversy over her qualifications. This failed nomination was followed by the successful nomination of a more experienced jurist, Samuel Alito.

The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in addition to original jurisdiction in "cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party" (U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 2). Congress sets the basic regulations and makes changes in the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Although direct limitation of the Court in substantive areas is difficult, in the early 1980s there were as many as thirty bills pending in each legislative session that sought to limit the Court's authority. Up until the 1920s, the justices had little discretion in the cases they took. Since then, they have been able to choose from among the thousands of appeals that come to them. This gives the justices the opportunity to influence the Court's docket (calendar) and to take a more active role in setting its agenda than courts usually have. In addition, statements in judicial opinions and occasional public statements by the justices may stimulate appeals by indicating judicial predispositions to decide particular issues. For example, the exclusionary rule, which prohibits the use of illegally obtained evidence, has been the subject of criticism by members of the Supreme Court since the 1970s. Challenges to the rule have been looked on favorably, although it has not been eliminated.

The Supreme Court's role in interpreting and applying constitutional law is a focus for debates over the meaning of the Constitution. In the twentieth century the Court realigned its political orientation more than once. As part of the struggle over New Deal reforms in the 1930s, a conservative Court was transformed by political appointments and pressure from President Franklin Roosevelt. This transformation was expanded in 1953 with the advent of the Warren Court and its dramatic decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* a year later, which signaled a shift in the federal/state relationship in regard to racial and other forms of discrimination. By the end of the century, the Court was experiencing a slow shift back to the right that began with President Richard Nixon's appointment of four justices. With President Ronald Reagan's appointment of Justice O'Connor and the subsequent elevation of Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and William Rehnquist, the Court took on a solid conservative caste. The evolution to moderate or liberal positions by justices such as David Souter and John Paul Stevens and the appointments of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Beyer by President Bill Clinton created a political mix again and a decisional turbulence that is likely to last for some time. Many recent appointments have simply continued past political arrangements. William Rehnquist was replaced by his former clerk, John G. Roberts Jr. in 2005. President Barack Obama appointed Sonia Sotomayor to replace Souter and nominated Elena Kagan to replace Stevens in 2010. The appointments of Sotomayor and Kagan (if confirmed) are not likely to change the overall political dynamic because they are replacing older justices who anchored the "liberal" wing of the Court.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

The distinctive feature of the Supreme Court's power is judicial review. This refers to judges applying the Constitution to ordinary law made by the executive or Congress or in the states. The practice of judicial review gives great weight to these judicial interpretations of the Constitution. In this sense, the convention in America has been to equate judicial review with judicial supremacy, the idea that the Supreme Court has the final word on the Constitution. The two practices will be distinguished here to highlight recent debates in constitutional interpretation.

The classic statement of judicial review is in *Marbury v. Madison* (1803). The case involved the status of judicial appointments in the last days of John Adams's administration. After President Adams was defeated by Thomas Jefferson, the

lame duck Congress, dominated by members of Adams's Federalist Party, created a number of new judgeships. The measure was hastily signed by the president, and some of the appointment papers were not delivered before Jefferson took office. One of the designees, William Marbury, sued in federal court to have James Madison, secretary of state in the new administration, deliver the papers. The case reached the Supreme Court, where newly appointed Federalist justice, John Marshall, presided. Marshall had been secretary of state during the Adams administration and by present standards of judicial conduct should have recused himself, that is, declined to hear the case because of a conflict of interest. Instead, Marshall took the opportunity to offer a sweeping claim for the power of judges to void those acts of Congress that conflict with the Constitution. His argument drew from Article III, specifically, "the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction." By Marshall's analysis, Congress could only add to the appellate, not the original jurisdiction of the Court.

Marshall went on to ask, rhetorically, "If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect?" His answer to this question is what has made the case a touchstone of American constitutional law. Marshall held, "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Therefore, while the Court had ruled that Marbury was entitled to his commission, Marshall was saying that it was the Supreme Court that determined what was or wasn't a constitutional law—and a law that gave the Supreme Court the power to rule on the case in the first place was against the U.S. Constitution. As a result, the Supreme Court did not have the power to make Madison give Marbury his commission.

That same year Congress shut the Court down for a year by changing the date of its sessions. This may have been to keep it from ruling on the validity of the repeal of the Federalist Judiciary Act of 1801. The debate surfaced again in 1832 in President Andrew Jackson's veto of a bill to re-charter the country's national bank, even after the Supreme Court had ruled in 1819 that the bank was constitutional. Jackson offered as a basis for his veto the proposition that the legislation was unconstitutional. Calling "mere precedent a dangerous source of authority," he referred to opposition in various branches of the state legislatures as well as his own (Jackson, "Veto of Legislation Chartering the Bank of the United States, 1832" in *American legal history: cases and materials.* 161)

Similar commentary is evident in Abraham Lincoln's First Inaugural Address in 1861 and in Franklin Roosevelt's Speech on Reorganizing the Judiciary in 1937. Each speaks to the right of the chief executive to contribute to constitutional interpretation. Lincoln, like Jackson, engaged with the Court and the people in a discussion of the meaning of constitutional law. Roosevelt's plan for a more youthful and sensitive Supreme Court included putting one new justice on the Court for every one who reaches the age of 70 and was seen as heavily partisan. In fact, though he demurred from referring to this as "court packing," that is the term by which it has come to be known.

These efforts by eminent U.S. presidents are often forgotten in the Court's own argument as to its authority. Culminating in *Cooper v. Aaron* in 1958, the justices of the Supreme Court and many commentators came to accept a "judicial supremacy." Yet, it is hard to look at the abortion controversy in the United States since 1973 and believe the Court is the last word on the Constitution in every case. This issue has been taken up by such scholars as Walter Murphy, Louis Fisher, and Susan Burgess. While conventional wisdom places the Supreme Court at the apex of constitutional interpretation, the work being done by these scholars, as well as tension between the Supreme Court and other political branches, continues to raise questions about the nature of the Supreme Court's claim as final arbiter.

It has long been held that, as judges in a democracy, the justice of the Supreme Court in the United States maintain or lessen that body's authority depending on how its judgment is perceived. One way judgment is assessed is in terms of whether the Court is responsive to the times in which it lives. Another is the special commentary by professional students of the Court. When these tendencies are in line, the authority of the Court is secure; when they fall into conflict or become misaligned that authority may be jeopardized.

INSTITUTIONAL IDEOLOGIES

Supreme courts in democracies face the challenge of justifying their role in politics. This is done through institutional rules or norms and interpretive frameworks. Rules include the expectation that cases be brought to the court, that is, the justices not seek business. In some countries, supreme court justices serve in advisory capacities on boards and commissions. In the United States this is rare. One exception was the commission investigating the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, which was chaired by Chief Justice Earl Warren. The perception that justices are the recipients of questions rather than generating them is important. One of the key features of the controversial decision in *Bush v. Gore*, which determined the outcome of the 2000 U.S. presidential election, was that the Supreme Court was considered the "end of the line" and its judgment was necessary to avoid a "constitutional crisis."

Interpretive frameworks are also important for establishing the legitimacy of judicial holdings, particularly in controversial cases. One justification for change is the idea that the U.S. Constitution is a "living document," and it is necessary for the justices of the Supreme Court to intervene and keep it up to date. Decisions based on this philosophy are associated with the "Due Process Revolution" of the 1960s, wherein the Supreme Court established the reach of the Bill of Rights and its promise of legal counsel and protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Another idea is that the justices simply

apply the text of the Constitution to the cases at hand as the original Founders would. That is, that they do not add anything to bring the Constitution up to date. Many scholars and legal professionals point to cases that developed a legal right to privacy as being in violation of this idea because the word privacy is not in the text of the Constitution.

THE FUTURE

Some social scientists and legal historians have turned away from the pronouncements of the Supreme Court and that of the other appellate courts, characterizing these holdings as atypical and unrepresentative of legal activity in the United States. For example, a generation ago Morton Horwitz considered constitutional law to be "episodic" and "buttressed by a rhetorical tradition that is often an unreliable guide to . . . legal change in America." (1977: xii). Due at least in part to this criticism of excessive attention given to appellate courts, there has been more attention to other things in recent years. This includes attention to the law in action, to the political behavior of judges, to the rulings of intermediate courts and local trial courts, and to the impact of judicial decisions in the community. The turn from the study of appellate courts among social scientists began as a healthy reaction to the perhaps excessive attention to appellate decisions in the law schools but may have led to the belief that there was little reason to study high courts at all.

For social scientists, there are many reasons to study the Supreme Court. The tradition of commentary on the Constitution is, among other things, an excellent guide to national ideology. Although appellate court opinions are not representative of the mass of legal or even judicial activity, these opinions are authoritative attempts to relate legal concepts to changing social and political conditions. And, if they are opinions of the Supreme Court, they get a great deal of attention. The resulting commentary attempts to reconcile contemporary issues and values with tradition. By revealing what the government thinks about itself, the opinions of the Supreme Court constitute a running commentary on fundamental political concepts. From this body of discourse, the student can observe change and/or continuity and examine the judicial contribution to the structure of U.S. Politics.

. . . .   JOHN BRIGHAM

See also *Adjudication; Amicus Curiae; Civil Law; Constitutional Courts; Due Process; Equal Protection; Judicial Activism; Judicial Behavior; Judicial Independence; Judicial Philosophy and Decision-Making; Judicial Restraint; Judicial Review; Judicial Selection and Nomination; Judicial Supremacy; Judiciary; Jurisprudence and Legal Theory; Law, Comparative ; Legal Realism; Precedent; Rule of Law; Sources of Law; Supreme Court; Trial Courts; Universal Jurisdiction*

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Surveillance

In its simplest form, *surveillance* refers to gathering information through watching people. This is counter to *forensics,* which consists of gathering information by examining clues left in a given location. In practice, surveillance is significantly more complicated. Historically, surveillance has been a direct process of watching people, as exemplified by a police stakeout. As technology and science has increased, the concept of surveillance has expanded to include activities that were never previously part of surveillance. In addition to traditional surveillance there is now citizen surveillance, military surveillance, "unofficial" surveillance, and Internet surveillance. In addition to these new areas of surveillance, computer technologies are being developed to aid in the surveillance process as well.

Citizen surveillance is simply surveillance by citizens rather than by agents of a government. This can take a number of forms, ranging from individuals coming together to employ surveillance to gain something to citizens within a society working against each other. An example of individual citizens working together is the typical neighborhood crime watch. In a *crime watch,* the citizens of an area receive special training and organization techniques to guard their neighborhood against criminals. This is generally considered a positive form of citizen surveillance. At the other end of the spectrum are totalitarian governments. One technique that totalitarian

governments employ for maintaining power is to encourage each citizen to watch other citizens and to report any suspicious activities. This technique often is accomplished using fear of an enemy and uses the citizens against each other.

Military surveillance is undertaken by combat forces. This often occurs in countries considered hostile by the military. However, it also can be used against the citizens of the country itself. Military surveillance often incorporates formal military intelligence services, spy agencies, and newer technologies. The newer technologies included in military surveillance include special aircraft and boats, satellites, and custom-made camera technologies.

In the course of normal operations, many businesses and institutions in the United States and other countries gather information about their customers. The surveillance conducted in these situations employs similar methods to those used by government and law enforcement agencies but not similar to military surveillance methods. All of these records are available to government agencies under the right conditions. In some countries, prerequisite legal processes are required, and in other countries the government simply asks for the information.

Finally, there is the newest form of surveillance, *Internet surveillance.* All of the unofficial surveillance that exists outside of the Internet also exists on the Internet. However, the surveillance on the Internet can be easier to obtain because of the ease of observation and of acquisition of observation conducted by others. Also, anything in electronic format is retained for a much longer period than paper records. Information posted to the World Wide Web or transmitted as e-mail tends to remain even longer. There is at least one project that is attempting to archive the entire Web, meaning that anything posted would exist indefinitely. One big difference between the other forms of surveillance and Internet surveillance is that it is often possible for individual citizens to acquire this surveillance legally, with some exceptions.

Computers have not only changed surveillance by increasing the length of time that records are retained and by enabling the Internet, they also have transformed the process through their ability to analyze data. The U.S. government is currently working on developing face recognition software to assist in antiterrorism activities. This software would enable public security cameras to recognize known terrorists and criminals and alert police to the current local of that individual. Computers are also capable of looking for patterns in data, and that has been used by government agencies.

It is possible to reduce the amount of surveillance being gathered on an individual. For example, using cash instead of a credit or debit card reduces the surveillance because there is now no electronic record of the money transfer, just of the purchase itself. The link between the purchase and the purchaser has disappeared. Several organizations advocate a reduction in surveillance both inside and outside the United States, including political parties. Currently countersurveillance activism ranges from companies selling products designed to block traffic cameras to public calls to reduce security cameras installations across Great Britain.

See also *Cybersecurity; Homeland Security; Intelligence Services.*

. . . .   DAVID B. CONKLIN

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Survey Research

Survey research is one of the most important and most frequent types of quantitative social science research. In a typical survey, a researcher selects a sample of units of interest (e.g., individuals, households, families, political candidates, formal organizations) from a defined population and then collects information from them using a standardized interviewing technique, usually a written questionnaire. Surveys typically produce data amenable to computer-based statistical analysis. Both sampling and standardized interviewing are common in many research designs such as experiments, observation, and ethnography, but it is the combination of the two that gives surveys their unique character and popularity.

Sampling of the units from the population can be carried out using either probability or nonprobability sampling techniques. The choice of a specific sampling procedure usually depends on considerations of the characteristics of the target population, anticipated cost, and intended use of the data.

Surveys may consist of one or several waves of interviewing. The simplest surveys are *cross-sectional,* in which data are collected at one point in time only. Longitudinal designs are less common, but tend to be more powerful. *Longitudinal* designs consist either of repeated administration of the same (or a very similar) questionnaire to a series of samples drawn from the same population (e.g., periodic public opinion polls), or of repeated interviewing of the same sample (fixed-sample panel study).

The questionnaire can be completed face-to-face, by telephone, over the Internet, via e-mail, or standard surface mail. Sometimes questionnaires are administered to groups of respondents (such as school classes) to reduce the cost of interviewing. Individual self-administered questionnaires

(most recently also in the form of audio computer-assisted self-interviewing) are usually applied to investigate sensitive topics (e.g., drug use, sexual harassment) that respondents might find unsuitable for direct interpersonal communication with the interviewer. Various interviewing modes may be combined within one survey to reduce cost, increase representativity, encourage cooperation, enhance the sense of confidentiality, or effectively reach members of the target population.

Surveys are not amenable to the study of any research question. They require that the target population be clearly defined, usually with reference to a few, simple geographic or demographic categories. Surveys also assume that most respondents know and are able and willing to supply the information necessary to complete the questionnaire. Finally, surveys produce numerical data, which limits the range of subsequent analytical procedures. Survey data are suitable to describe and model selected population characteristics or to answer a narrow set of research questions.

The transparency and accountability of sample surveys makes them exceptionally attractive for both policy research and theoretical research. Survey procedures can be made visible and accessible to other parties and tend to be more easily replicable than other research designs. A key disadvantage of surveys is that standardized questionnaires constrain investigation into phenomena and analytical strategies anticipated by the researcher at the start of fieldwork. Surveys often are criticized for their limited validity, because numerical variables may not represent social reality accurately. Surveys also provide an appearance of objectivity and scientific purpose and can thus be subjected to political manipulation as well as other misuses.

See also *Quantitative Analysis; Resampling Methods; Statistical Analysis; Survey Techniques and Design.*

. . . . MARTIN KREIDL

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Survey Techniques and Design

Survey data are collected in a variety of ways: face to face, self-administered, telephone, mail, and the Internet. Each has its own strengths and limitations. The choice of method begins by understanding how the final data will be used and how the responding population would most like to reply and how they can be reached. The approach considers time, money, and personnel. Understanding this allows a researcher to choose a method best suited to the task.

The most successful data collection efforts combine methods, so that respondents can participate in ways most comfortable to themselves. Research methods should provide:

- A standard method for contacting informants
- A standard method of administering the survey
- Repeated attempts to make contact with informants
- An appropriate data collection period
- A standard set of questions and response options
- Neutral word choice in all materials
- Training and oversight for data collection personnel
- Protection of informant confidentiality
- Protection of any data files from loss, theft, or damage
- Respect for the dignity of each individual.

There is plenty of knowledge about the willingness of various groups to cooperate by in-person, mail, phone, and Internet methods. For example, Elizabeth Tighe and colleagues looked at Jewish respondents, Jo Lindsay looked specifically at challenges of reaching young adults, and D. A. Ashe and colleagues report on challenges of getting physician cooperation. The mode will affect some responses, and some methods are not available to all potential respondents. Moreover, the mode will affect administration costs, which for most survey projects is limited. Researchers should familiarize themselves with research literature and the intended respondent population's access to the Internet or phones before deciding which combination of methods will work best. Testing can help anticipate how the mode of data collection will affect responses and cooperation.

Before choosing a method, it is important to understand the population of interest. Researchers should consider this when deciding how to administer a survey to senior citizens or children. Research involving physicians indicates that when given a choice, they are more likely to respond by mail than other forms.

MAIL
Don Dillman's *total design method* is standard procedure (2000). This method involves:

- An advance letter introducing the study
- A second mailing containing the survey
- A reminder postcard or phone call
- A final version of the survey mailed in a special package, like overnight express
- A token of appreciation, such as a cash incentive
- A postage-paid return envelope.

When possible, mailings should be addressed to a particular person. Word processors can personalize materials. A cover letter should discuss the nature of the survey and sponsorship, assure confidentiality, and suggest a deadline. It is good practice to provide a way to contact the research team. Mail is helpful in surveying businesses or other institutions. There is a risk

that mail may be opened by someone other than the intended respondent. Phone follow-through helps ensure delivery. The primary costs of a mail survey are postage (or express service) and printing, especially in color. The overall costs of a mail survey depend on the number of pages to be printed and delivered, the number of attempts to reach a respondent, the amount of data to enter, and whether the researcher is willing to use premium delivery services. Optical scanning systems can reduce costs associated with data entry, while limiting the nature of data collected. Usually data scanning will require bubble sheets, while clerks can key enter longer alphanumeric responses.

IN PERSON

In-person interviewing is effective in covering very sensitive subject matter and for surveys that may last more than thirty minutes. In-person interviewing ensures that the correct respondent is interviewed, allows interaction with respondent, and allows the interviewer to code some observations without having to ask. In-person interviews suffer fewer skipped questions or broken interviews. This method reduces data-entry errors, as trained staff enters most information into a laptop computer. Skilled interviewers can collect bio-specimens, abstract records, perform assessments, or conduct air or water sampling at the time of an interview. Modern computer devices allow for playing of recordings, so that respondents can hear sensitive questions without feeling embarrassed in front of an interviewer.

It is labor intensive and can easily cost more than $750 per complete interview. Consider the costs of travel, wages, intensity of interviewer training, duration of interviews, and the number of visits to each respondent to get a completion. Costs can be controlled by interviewing at busy locations (train stations or shopping malls). If considering this type of *intercept interview,* the loss of statistical precision should be weighed.

TELEPHONE

Computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) has been in wide practice since the 1980s. This method is inexpensive for general-public surveys. Costs are determined by complexity of programming and the number of attempts that will be made to each sample member. Additional costs are associated with sampling. More sophisticated firms can generate their own random-digit dial lists. Others purchase lists from a vendor who generates the numbers and usually tries to eliminate cell numbers or unwanted numbers, such as business numbers for residential surveys.

The benefit of CATI is that it is easy to program complex skip patterns for tailored follow-up questioning and to program error checks. It allows for constant staff monitoring. Because telephone use is widespread, coverage error in most cases is small. CATI technology also can be enhanced with automated voice and touch-tone response features to help minimize respondents' nervousness about answering sensitive questions. Because answers in CATI are entered straight into a database, researchers have almost instant results.

With the proliferation of telemarketing phone banks (which sometimes take contract work for low-budget survey firms), CATI surveys have suffered dropping response rates. State and federal *do not call* (DNC) lists have reduced unwanted solicitation, while making exceptions for research. There is little evidence that DNCs improved response rates.

CATI surveys run into other barriers. Some sample vendors do not screen unwanted phone numbers (i.e., disconnected lines, data lines). Caller ID and answering devices make it difficult to contact respondents who screen calls. Researchers should think about coverage and the precise unit of analysis for CATI surveys of the general population and then decide whether inclusion of cell numbers is appropriate.

INTERNET

Like CATI, Internet surveys allow for programmed skip commands, errors-checking for illogical or missed answers, and quick access to analyzable of data. Graphics and hyperlinks can be added. Voice programs can be used to speak questions. The risks of Internet interviewing include hackers, fraudulent entries, and data interception. Vendors like Survey Monkey make Web-based survey research relatively cheap for researchers who want an "off-the-shelf" survey. This type of interviewing is useful only when the population of interest is computer literate, when the researcher does not need the upfront work such as developing and pretesting questions tailored to specific research needs, or when the researcher is willing to give up a lot of control of the day-to-day activities of monitoring and supervising the research activities. Some associations have good e-mail lists, but generally e-mail samples should be treated with greater caution than random-digit telephone samples. Invitations to participate may be delivered by mail with log-on instructions. The costs of Web-enabled surveys are about the same as other programmed data systems. There will be maintenance costs. Also, Web researchers should be aware of security features that can add to the protection of data and respondent the confidentiality, avoid the spread of viruses and the like, but also affect overall Web survey costs.

TRACKING AND DISPOSITION

The status of each case should be monitored so the case can be coded as completed, as a refusal, ineligible, or given other codes that help the research team. This allows for appropriate follow-up or termination of data collection on individual cases. At the end of the data collection period, each case should be given a final disposition as complete, incomplete, ineligible, or the like. From this, a transparent coding classification and response rate should be reported. The American Association for Public Opinion Research provides samples of disposition rules and calculating response rates.

TESTING

Testing involves surveying a small number of respondents prior to the full data collection. Testing helps identify errors in questionnaire design, delivery mode, and problems with the sample. Testing helps predict the number of bad addresses

or phone numbers in a sample. Testing is particularly helpful when there is a risk that respondents will be hard to find or might have difficulty with the questionnaire. Field tests generally run all survey procedures on a small subsample of the survey population. In some cases respondents are contacted to discuss their experience with the staff. Quality control measures before going live identify nonworking phone numbers, duplicate cases, and bad addresses and can help locate respondents who relocated.

See also *Interview Techniques.*

. . . . SEAN O. HOGAN

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Swift, Jonathan

Jonathan Swift (1667–1745) was a prolific eighteenth-century European satirist whose work took aim at many targets: the English government, the slave trade, the Whig party, and organized religion, just to name a prominent few. While his *Gulliver's Travels* (1726) and *A Modest Proposal* (1729) stand as his most famous works, his output as a whole reveals a keen mind and biting wit, one that spared no ridicule on the follies of political life past and present. Choosing to remain anonymous during the publication of many of his polemics, Swift eventually came to enjoy worldwide familiarity and acclaim as one of the leading (and most humorous) political writers of his day.

Swift was born in Dublin, Ireland, to Abigail Erick, months after her husband Jonathan's death. The details of Smith's early childhood are somewhat obscure. At some point, he came under the guardianship of his uncle, who paid his way to Kilkenny College in Ireland. Swift eventually ended up graduating from Trinity College, Dublin, in 1686 and departed Ireland for England as a consequence of the turmoil of the Glorious Revolution (1688). In England, Swift reunited with his departed mother and worked in various diplomatic positions for the government. Along the way, he earned a master's degree from Oxford and became a priest in the Church of Ireland. In 1704 he published *The Battle of the Books* and *A Tale of the Tub.* The political overtones to his early work were coincident with his involvement in English political life. A fierce critic of the Whig administration, Swift wrote and spoke out for Tory causes, temporarily earning him an informal advisory role when the latter party rose to power in 1710.

With the accession of George I to the throne in 1714, Swift left London for Ireland, where he penned a number of essays ridiculing the affluent and those indifferent to the plight of the poor. It was also at this time that Swift began perhaps his most famous work, *Gulliver's Travels.* A parody of the political life of England that highlights the complexity of man's nature, the book chronicles the escapades of Gulliver, an English wanderlust who accidentally voyages through four mysterious, often-comical lands. First published in 1726, it was widely read and praised throughout Europe for its nuanced balance between fiction and reality. As the book was published anonymously due to its sensitive subject matter, Swift had to enjoy the commendation privately.

While Swift left his greatest mark on English literature, his contribution to political philosophy is not insignificant. While many of his writings engaged contemporary social injustices, he also addressed the divisions between ancient and modern thought, ridiculed the ancient Greek philosopher Plato's faith in temporal happiness, and wrote skeptically of the human spirit's fulfillment in modern science. To the end, he displayed a humor and inspiration in his writing that continues to resonate with the world as much as it did during his lifetime. He died following declining health on October 19, 1745, in Dublin.

See also *Plato; Satire, Political.*

. . . . CLYDE RAY

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Syndicalism

Syndicalism refers to revolutionary unionism and represents a range of perspectives that view the economic organizations of the working class and workers' control of industry as the basis of revolutionary social transformations. Syndicalism has influenced diverse movements and perspectives that take the collective self-organization and direct action of the working class both at the point of production and within working-class communities as the basis not only for overcoming capitalism but for organizing a new, egalitarian society. While tracing its origins to the trade union movements of the nineteenth century (the term *syndicalism* coming from the French word for unionism, *syndicalisme*), it has come to signify a radical or revolutionary approach to labor organizing that seeks to overthrow the wage relationship, capitalists, and class society rather than collectively bargain workers' place within the wage relationship.

Historic anarchosyndicalist campaigns have provided significant evidence that class struggles entail more than battles over corporatist concerns carried out at the level of the

factory. Syndicalist movements have displayed attitudes of hostility toward the bureaucratic control of work, concerns over local specificity, and techniques of spontaneous militancy and direct action. Syndicalist struggles have, in different instances and over varied terrain, been articulated to engage the broader manifestations of domination and control. French revolutionary syndicalism placed an emphasis on radical democracy. Within syndicalism one can discern such themes as consensus formation, participation of equals, decentralization, and autonomy as an alternative to the bureaucratic and professionalized organization of mainstream trade unions. Rather than bargaining instruments, syndicalists view alternative unions as organizations that might contest capital on a revolutionary basis.

SYNDICALIST PERSPECTIVES

Syndicalist theories of capitalist power place emphasis on an alternative revolutionary worldview emerging out of working-class experiences and offering a challenge to bourgeois morality. Fernand Pelloutier, an important syndicalist theorist whose works influenced Georges Sorel, argues that ideas rather than economic processes are the motive force in bringing about revolutionary transformation. Pelloutier vigorously attempted to come to terms with the problem of cultural domination as a basis for capitalist power. Reconstituting social relations, in Pelloutier's view, becomes possible when workers begin developing revolutionary identities, through self-preparation and self-education, as the means for combatting capitalist culture. Thus, syndicalists have characteristically looked to labor unrest as an agency of social regeneration whereby workers challenge the cultural hegemony of class domination (e.g., deference to authority, acceptance of capitalist superiority, and dependence upon elites). Unlike versions of authoritarian communism, such as some variants of Marxism and Leninism that syndicalists challenged, syndicalism understood the transformation of power not in terms of the replacement of one intellectual elite by another but as a process of diffusion, spreading power out into the workers' own organizations. This displacement of power would originate in industry, as an egalitarian problematic, when workers came to question the status of their bosses. Toward that end syndicalist movements have emphasized *life* and *action* against the severity of capitalist labor processes and corresponding cultural manifestations.

It might be argued that, far from being economistic, syndicalist movements are best understood as countercultural in character, more similar to contemporary new social movements than to movements of the traditional left. Syndicalist themes such as autonomy, antihierarchy, and diffusion of power have echoes in sentiments of the new movements. This similarity is reflected not only in the syndicalist emphasis on novel tactics such as direct action, consumer boycotts, or slowdowns. It also finds expression in the extreme contempt shown by syndicalists for the dominant radical traditions of its day, exemplified by Marxism and state socialism, and in syndicalist efforts to divorce activists from those traditions.

Syndicalist unions, as opposed to bureaucratic unions, sought the organization of workers from the bottom up. Their strategies rejected large strike funds, negotiations, written contracts and the supposed autonomy of trades. Actions took the form of guerilla tactics, including sabotage, slowdowns, planned inefficiency, and passive resistance.

Perhaps the strongest and certainly the most enduring variant of syndicalism developed within anarchist movements in Spain and much of Latin America. *Anarchosyndicalism* viewed the revolutionary self-organization of workers in radical opposition to capital, outside of not only union bureaucracies but outside of mainstream union frameworks themselves, limited as they were by collective bargaining over workers' contracts as the means by which an anarchist society might be realized. Anarchosyndicalism reached its highest level of popular involvement in Spain in the early decades of the twentieth century. The Confederation Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) played a major part in the Spanish Revolution (1936) and the resistance to the fascist regime of General Francisco Franco during the 1930s. The CNT was especially active in Barcelona during the revolution, running industries and providing social services in the region while organizing the armed resistance to fascist forces on the front lines.

Syndicalism also developed powerful movements in North America, most notably the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW, or Wobblies) which was active in Canada, Mexico, and the United States, especially in the early 1900s, and the One Big Union, which organized the Winnipeg General Strike in 1919. Destroyed almost completely by the Red Scare of 1919, the IWW has enjoyed something of a resurgence in the twenty-first century, especially among precarious workers in service industries often unorganized by the declining mainstream industrial unions. IWW perspectives with regard to capital emphasize workers' abilities and encourage the self-determination of workers and the importance of self-directed initiatives against capital. The IWW asserts that workers must organize themselves to fight employers directly. The symbolic unity of the working class and its break from capital is stressed in the single qualification for Wobbly membership. The only restriction to membership in the IWW is that no employer can be a member.

REVOLUTIONARY SYNDICALISM

A primarily intellectual version of syndicalism was developed by the social theorist Georges Sorel in the 1910s and 1920s in France. Despite the academic attention it has received, Sorel's theoretical syndicalism is only one intellectual expression of syndicalism and has had an ambiguous relationship to actual syndicalist movements in France and elsewhere. Revolutionary syndicalism, as this variant was known, saw working-class direct action as the basis for a new society based on values of heroism and sacrifice, which stood counter to the apathy and social degeneracy of bourgeois society. Syndicalism, and worker direct action, stood also as a refutation of the rule of society by bureaucratic and technocratic professionals. For Sorel the general strike was most important not as a practical

approach to labor organizing but rather as a "revolutionary myth" that served to rouse the fighting spirits of the working class and provided them with an image of the power of their unity in struggle. The vitality of the general strike was not so much material as ideological.

Syndicalism has enjoyed a resurgence recently in many parts of the world as workers seek an alternative to mainstream unions that seem unwilling to fight against multinational corporations. Many workers, including younger workers and workers in small workplaces that often are overlooked by mainstream unions, have turned to syndicalist organizing.

See also *Labor Strikes; Labor Unions; Workers' Rights.*

. . . . JEFFREY SHANTZ

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Systems Analysis

Systems analysis is the actual application of different variants of systems theory to the inquiry into sociopolitical reality. Systems theory itself is based on the analogy of social phenomena and biological organisms, and it was one of three main approaches in the 1950s to the study of politics, besides behavioral and political culture studies. Systems analysis inquires into the structures and functions of systems. Analyses based on general systems theory emphasize the organizational structures of different systems, while those rooted in cybernetic systems theories focus on regulation and feedback processes based on communication. Systems analyses following the theory of political systems, such as *The Political System* by the academic David Easton, address the question through which processes of organization, differentiation, communication, and regulation a political system is able to transform societal demands arising on the input side into outputs that themselves can generate support and therefore can guarantee the survival of the political system. Politics is conceived of as "the authoritative allocation of social values," seen as the primary function of the political system. From the late 1960s, systems theory was increasingly criticized for its apparent focus on supraindividual rather than individual-level phenomena and for its preference for persistence of patterns over change.

See also *Biology and Political Science; Sociobiology and Politics.*

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Systems Structure

Neither the concept of system nor that of structure is original or unique to political science, yet each is a core concept in the field. The notion of the international system is crucial to the study of diplomatic history since the work of the historian Leopold von Ranke in the 1800s. In international relations, the system—normally divided into a central system of leading states and regional subsystems—is composed of states, organizations, and nongovernmental actors (NGOs), with the bulk of the power residing in the states.

Structure in international relations underlies the type of international system present in an historical interval. Britain, Russia, France, Prussia-Germany, and Austria principally composed the nineteenth-century balance of power system. The United States and the Soviet Union featured in the bipolar system (1945–1989). In a more controversial claim regarding the present system, unipolarity is sometimes equated with hegemony.

Neorealists argue that the number of leading states, the relative power of those states, the presence of ideological difference, the nature of balance or equilibrium among these states, and the perceived "rules of the game" are the irreducible minimum characteristics that determine systems structure. Liberals, neoconservatives, and constructivists would add that the domestic political identity of states is crucial, and in particular whether they are democracies.

An important legacy of neorealism is the view of the system as a structure of dynamically interrelated parts. Systems structure was defined by Stanley Hoffman (1968) as the "distribution and hierarchy of power," or equivalently by Kenneth Waltz (1979) as the "distribution of capabilities across the units," operationalized as percentage share of systemic power. According to David Dessler (1989), systems structure places bounds (constraints) on international political opportunity and behavior.

Another legacy of neorealist thought is the view that the type of systems structure determines the degree of world order. In an influential article in 1964, Waltz argued that bipolarity was for structural reasons more stable than multipolarity and, in a remarkable prophecy, that the international system would remain bipolar at least until the end of the twentieth century.

But does international system type determine the degree of stability? Where does unipolarity fit in this interpretation? First, there are serious limits on the degree to which hierarchy exists within the system, especially regarding the capacity to maintain order and to encourage progress from the top of the international system.

Second, perhaps the causal relationship between structure and world order does not operate through type of international system, with one type of system being more stable than another. Rather, the causal relationship to world order may operate through change in structure across time (*see* Systems Transformation). Movement from one type of international system to another may be the true source of structural impact on world order.

Third, as John Mearsheimer has argued (2001) and as many liberals as well as conservatives also claim, hegemony does not now exist, nor has ever existed, internal to the central system. Soviet hegemony existed in Eastern Europe. Other actors have imposed hegemony in regional terms, but never within the central international system, which remains decentralized. Hence, the structural equation between unipolarity (which does exist) and hegemony (which does not) is deceptive and false.

See also *Balance of Power; Bandwagoning; Hegemony; International Relations Doctrines of Power; International System; Power Cycle Theory; Power Sharing; Power Transition Theory; Realism and Neorealism; Systems Analysis; Systems Transformation.*

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Systems Transformation

The thesis that systems transformation is a structural discontinuity caused by major war has been at the heart of much international relations theory. For classical realists, an international system is created by conflicts and destroyed by conflicts. Hegemonic stability, power transition, and long cycle theories identify major war as the vehicle whereby a new systemic hierarchy is born.

In all of these theories, each system possesses the identity and regime preferences of the reigning hegemon, the state with the greatest power. For Robert Gilpin (1981), systems transformation occurs when the dominant state is surpassed in power by a challenger, causing the declining hegemon to strike out at the challenger in massive warfare. The challenger is defeated, but the hegemon is replaced by a third power that enjoyed an increase in power as a result of the war. A new system is born. A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler (1980) describe the same process involving pairs of states at the top of the system as a power transition, but argue that the challenger uses force to displace the hegemon. For George Modelski (1978) and William Thompson (1988), global war became a mechanism to resolve policy-leadership disputes in the fifteenth century. Systems transformation occurs when the dominant maritime, trading state defeats a large continental power, enabling

another maritime state to become the new global leader. Each of these theories holds that systems transformation involves violent confrontations between two principal powers at the top of the system vying for systemic leadership: war causes systems transformation.

Power cycle theory, developed by Charles Doran (1991), argues that causation works in the opposite direction, from structural transformation to trauma of adjustment, to war (*see* Power Cycle Theory). The power relations that will prevail in the new system were created by shifting tides of change within the structure of the system. Based on the assumption of a pluralist, competitive system of several leading states rather than of a dominant hegemon, and of balance among these actors rather than hierarchy, Doran argues that systems transformation results when several leading states experience sudden, unpredicted, high-stakes change on their power cycles in a rather short interval of history. Tension and uncertainty ricochet throughout the system as states confront dramatic alteration of foreign policy expectations. Failure to adjust to systems transformation causes massive warfare. In contrast to the other interpretations, Doran argues that war is not necessary for systems transformation.

History, nonetheless, reveals a very high correlation between systems transformation and war. Since the origin of the modern state system, six systems transformations have occurred. Five of these systems transformations led to warfare that was intense, broadly encompassing, and of huge magnitude: The Thirty Years War (1618–1648), Louis XIV's Wars (1660–1713), Napoleonic Wars (1795–1815), World War I (1914–1918), and World War II (1939–1945). Only the most recent systems transformation, that taking place in 1989 at the close of the cold war, has ended peacefully.

Systems transformations are created by structural undercurrents due to the differential growth of nations. The task of the scholar and the statesperson is to disengage systems transformation from the catastrophic events that in the past have often accompanied it.

See also *Balance of Power; Bandwagoning; Hegemony; International System; Power Cycle Theory; Realism and Neorealism; Systems Analysis; Systems Structure.*

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Tactical Voting

Tactical voting, also known as *strategic voting,* is considered the opposite of *sincere voting.* Tactical voting occurs when voters do not choose their genuinely preferred candidates, but instead vote for their alternative candidates in order to help prevent an undesirable election outcome. In order for voting to be considered tactical, it must meet two conditions. First, a vote must be placed for a candidate other than the preferred choice. Second, the decision to vote strategically must have been reached based on perceptions of the electoral outcome.

There are different types of tactical voting. *Compromising* involves voting for a candidate, or giving a higher ranking to a candidate, other than one's preferred choice. The choice is based on the perception that one's preferred choice will lose anyway, thus resulting in a wasted vote. Compromising often arises in plurality-majority electoral systems. *Burying,* a technique that often happens in Borda count systems, occurs when a voter ranks a candidate even lower than the actual preference, with the purpose of defeating that candidate. The *push-over* technique is used when a voter gives a higher rank to a candidate who is perceived to be easily beatable by the preferred candidate in the next round. This occurs most frequently in run-off elections.

See also *Run-off; Strategic Voting; Voting Behavior.*

. . . . JENNIFER E. DALTON

Talk Radio

Political *talk radio*—programs that emphasize political events, issues, policies, and public affairs—has been a feature of American politics since the 1930s. President Franklin Roosevelt used radio to address the public during economic depression and world war, while Father Charles Coughlin provided an opposing voice. Radio call-in programs, where members of the public can contribute to the on-air discussion, became prevalent in the 1970s. Call-in talk radio emerged as a political force in the late 1980s and continues to provide forum for discourse and debate. Talk radio facilitates interactions between callers moderated by program hosts. Such discussions can also take place on television talk programs, including those on cable channels CNN, MSNBC, and Fox News.

However, television programs that encompass call-in listeners, like *Larry King Live,* can limit audience members to questions for in-studio guests.

A number of factors expedited the development of talk radio as a new political medium. Radio stations experiencing financial difficulties experimented with call-in talk radio as an inexpensive format and found an audience among aging baby boomers whose tastes were shifting away from music. Advances in satellite technology also made talk radio cost-effective on the regional and national level. People were drawn to talk radio to learn about and discuss high-profile legal cases, including the O. J. Simpson trial, and key political events, such as the Gulf War (1990–1991) and the 1992 presidential election.

The talk radio audience has changed markedly over time. Studies conducted in the 1970s and 1980s indicate that call-in talk radio provided a surrogate community for people who were socially isolated, detached from formal institutions, and alienated from politics. The new political talk radio attracts older, male, college-educated listeners with higher socioeconomic status. Whites are only slightly more inclined to listen to talk radio than other racial and ethnic group members. Listeners are likely to identify politically as Republican and conservative. They have a strong sense of civic duty, keep informed about current affairs, vote regularly, and participate in other conventional activities such as attending political meetings and contacting officials. They tend to distrust government and are highly critical of the mainstream press.

Talk radio programs attract sizable audiences. At least fifteen million people tune into talk radio programs every day. Nevertheless, the audience for call-in talk radio has declined somewhat over the past fifteen years. Data from the Pew Research Center 2008 Media Survey indicate that the percentage of the public who identify as regular or sometimes listeners dropped from around 50 percent in the 1990s to 40 percent or less in the new millennium. The decline in listenership corresponds to the rise in online discussion opportunities, which attract people with similar profiles to talk radio listeners.

Talk radio can contribute to political discussion as it combines entertainment and information in a way that inspires some citizens to engage. According to a Pew Research Center study, nearly 60 percent of listeners claim they gain knowledge from talk radio that they attain from no other source. Further,

politicians listen to talk radio, which gives citizens a mechanism for having their opinions heard.

Alternately, talk radio has been criticized for discouraging legitimate political participation by substituting talk for action and for encouraging political discourse that is vitriolic, sensational, and misleading. Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Joseph N. Cappella, in their 2008 book *Echo Chamber,* observe that talk radio contributes to a politically conservative echo chamber, a "bounded, enclosed media space that has the potential to both magnify messages delivered within it and insulate them from rebuttal" (76). Regular listeners to Rush Limbaugh's talk radio program, in particular, become isolated from alternative viewpoints and can become politically polarized. Liberal and Democratic talk radio programs have been less successful than conservative shows in gaining an audience. Air America, which was launched as a progressive talk radio network in 2004, declared bankruptcy and shut down abruptly in January of 2010. Public broadcasting stations, such as NPR and C-SPAN, offer nonpartisan call-in radio programs that address current issues and events, but they reach a limited audience.

Talk radio can influence the political orientations of listeners and callers. They are motivated to tune into shows in order to reinforce and deepen their political beliefs. Audience members often adopt program hosts' views about political leaders, issues, and candidates. They can also shift their views about political candidates and leaders based on the views expressed on air.

See also *Journalism, Political; Media, Political Commentary in the; Media and Politics.*

. . . .   DIANA OWEN

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Tawney, Richard Henry

Richard Henry Tawney (1880–1962) was one of the most influential social critics and reformers of the twentieth century. Born in Calcutta, India, and educated at Balliol College in Oxford, he began his career at Toynbee Hall, a university settlement in East End, London, where he worked as a lecturer for the Workers' Educational Association. He became a reader in economic history at the London School of Economics in 1920 and subsequently became a department chair, a position he held until his retirement in 1949.

A leading socialist, Tawney was the ideologue of the Labour Party, and he served on numerous government bodies under Labour administrations.

Tawney was a Christian and a socialist in an age in which socialism was considered the antithesis of Christianity. He viewed socialism in Christian terms, as a means of extending the kingdom of God on Earth. He believed that every human being is of infinite value, and no expediency can justify the oppression of one by another. One of Tawney's great contributions was his reconceptualization of equality. It was integral to his vision of socialism and it meant the largest possible measure of equality of environment, circumstance, and opportunity. The concept of equality rested on three pillars: (1) all human beings share a common humanity, (2) all human beings must be enabled to make the best of such powers as they possess, and (3) rewards should be linked to social purposes.

Tawney's analysis showed a solid appreciation of the nature of power and its dynamics. He was deeply opposed to centralization and was critical of overcentralization and collectivism as in the Soviet Union. Equally dangerous to Tawney was the fragmentation implicit in capitalism, which he characterized as a juggernaut that sacrificed human ends to the idolatry of material means. He believed that socialism, on the other hand, entailed the cooperation of free and equal citizens generating common purposes.

Tawney further held that a fundamental principle governing the way societies work was function. He argued that rights to property were not basic rights but should be conditional on the obligation to service. Indeed all rights, he wrote, should be conditional and derivative. In a healthy society, people are not owners of rights but trustees for the discharge of functions and instruments of social purposes. A functional or good society is contrasted with an acquisitive society in which production and accumulation become ends in themselves. Function is thus related to purpose and service is participation to further a function.

For Tawney, citizenship was more than membership; it meant relationships among equals resting on consent, accountability, and common humanity. It was the relationship of self-reliant and self-respecting equals in a society where the absolute claims of individuality are respected. Such fellowship could come only under socialism, because capitalist institutions generated acquisitiveness and a loss of social cohesion.

Tawney authored several influential works. In *Acquisitive Society* (1921), he pointed out the corroding influences of materialism and consumerism. In *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (1922), arguably his most important work, he examined the interaction between religion and the Industrial Revolution that led to the birth of capitalism. In *Equality* (1931), he tackled the thorny questions of social equality in circumstances and opportunity. In *Culture and Anarchy* (1932), Tawney advanced the thesis, first put forth by English cultural critic Matthew Arnold, on the nexus between culture and democracy.

Tawney had a lifelong commitment to education. He served as an executive with the Workers' Education Association for forty-two years and was president from 1928 until

1945. He authored key Labour Party documents on education and served on various public bodies. He believed education had a spiritual dimension that helped to shape a democratic social environment.

See also *Human Rights; Religion and Politics; Socialism.*

. . . .   GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN

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Taxation

Taxation is the collection of revenues by the state, on a basis not directly linked to the provision of goods and services in return. The term taxation is not usually applied to the sale of goods and services by the state or state enterprises, from which revenues may be earned through prices, fees, or charges. There is an imprecise boundary between taxation and the so-called individual contributions paid in many systems of social insurance; whether such contributions count as taxation depends on how closely individual future entitlements to benefits relate to individual contribution payments.

In most countries, taxation has increased substantially over the past century, and the level of taxation varies considerably between countries. Among the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, revenues from taxation were 28 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the United States in 2005, and an average of 40 percent of GDP in the European Union.

Taxes are levied by applying a *tax rate,* generally specified in percentage terms, to a *tax base,* the measure of value or quantity subject to taxation. Tax bases employed in most countries include individual income; aggregate business payments of wages and salaries, known as payroll taxes; corporate net income, known as corporate income or profits taxes; and sales by business enterprises, including sales, turnover, and value-added taxes. Many countries also levy taxes on wealth; inheritance; the value of certain classes of assets; or changes in asset values, known as capital gains taxes. Much of tax legislation's complexity arises in achieving a clear and legally enforceable definition of the tax base; the definition of taxable income is, in particular, complicated by the need to prevent straightforward opportunities for tax avoidance—the artificial restructuring of activity so as to reduce tax liability—such as paying income in kind or converting incomes into capital gains. With these complications

in mind, taxation can be analyzed from both a positive and a normative perspective.

THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION

From the positive perspective, tax incidence concerns where the burden of taxation lies. *Formal incidence* lies with whoever is liable, according to the legislation, to pay the tax. Thus, for example, a shopkeeper may be liable to pay sales tax on the value of goods sold. *Effective* or *final incidence* concerns where the burden of taxation is ultimately borne; it may differ from formal incidence if taxes shift through changes in wages, prices, or other economic adjustments. Thus the customer may bear the effective incidence of the sales tax levied on goods sold if the shopkeeper raises prices to reflect the tax. The scope for tax shifting depends on the characteristics of the market. In a competitive market, formal incidence is irrelevant to the determination of effective incidence; altering the legal liability to pay a tax levied on a particular base does not alter where the burden is ultimately felt.

Most countries levy taxes on both individuals and companies. From the perspective of final incidence, all taxes levied on companies are ultimately incident on individuals—as customers, employees, or owners of the taxed companies.

The impact of taxation on behavior affects the incidence of taxes (i.e., large behavioral adjustments tend to be associated with tax shifting) and also affects the economic costs of taxation, in the form of the *distortionary* impact on the labor supply or savings behavior of individuals and on the production and investment decisions of companies. When taxes lead individuals and firms to make production and consumption decisions that would not be chosen in taxation absence, the economic cost of taxation exceeds the revenue raised. The *excess burden* of taxation is the net loss in economic welfare occurring when revenues increase through taxes that affect behavior rather than through a tax that has no distortionary impact on behavior (i.e., a lump-sum "poll tax"). Estimates of excess burden vary widely, but as a rough rule of thumb, taxes in most industrialized countries might have an excess burden of at least thirty cents for each dollar raised, and poorly designed taxes have considerably more than this.

TAX POLICY ISSUES

Normative questions concerning taxation include whether the burden of taxation should be distributed across taxpayers according to *ability to pay* or according to the *benefit principle.* Taxpayer ability to pay might be defined in terms of individual income or individual consumption (as advocated by Thomas Hobbes in *Leviathan*). The benefits taxpayers derive from public services are difficult to measure and probably vary widely. Benefit taxation may be most useful as a guide to tax policy for decentralized jurisdictions, since large departures from the benefit principle could induce substantial taxpayer migration to jurisdictions with a more favorable balance between individual tax payments and spending benefits.

The distributional incidence of taxation (i.e., how taxes relate to household ability to pay) may be assessed on a

current annual basis or a lifetime basis. Taxes with a percentage of income taken in tax increases at higher levels of income are said to have a *progressive* distributional incidence, and taxes with a percentage inversely related to ability to pay are called *regressive.* Income taxes have a greater potential for progressivity than taxes on sales.

Tax policy typically involves a trade-off between equity and efficiency; a higher marginal rate of tax on income (i.e., the additional tax paid when income increases) increases the distributional progressivity of the tax system, but also increases labor market distortions. The economics literature on optimal taxation, beginning with the work of James Mirrlees, considers the structure of taxes that will maximize a social welfare function, giving weight to both efficiency and equity goals. One insight from this literature is the fragility of the case for taxes on the sale of goods and services; if the government is able to levy sophisticated income taxes, taxes on sales make no useful contribution to achieving equity objectives and, in some circumstances, may have higher efficiency costs than equivalent income taxes.

Although tax policy frequently tries to avoid excessive distortionary impacts of taxes on individual and corporate behavior, there has been recent interest in the potential for using taxation to encourage certain types of behavioral change, in particular to encourage individual retirement provision and to discourage environmentally damaging production and consumption activities.

Taxes may be levied at various levels of government. Municipalities and other lower-tier government units frequently employ taxes on real estate, both because the tax base can be unambiguously assigned to an individual jurisdiction and because the tax base is largely immobile. Some other taxes are more complex to operate at a local level, because the tax base cannot easily be assigned to local jurisdictions (e.g., corporate profits may be earned through business activity in many localities). Also, behavioral responses to tax differences across jurisdictions may be more severe, so that jurisdictions are constrained by the tax rates set by their neighbors, and tax policies may compete to attract mobile tax bases. There are differing views whether such tax competition is desirable. Some see tax competition as a desirable constraint on excessive government; others emphasize the potential inefficiency of tax competition through "base stealing." With increasing globalization, issues of tax competition arise between countries as well as between subcentral jurisdictions within a country. Major issues include the tax treatment of the foreign earnings of multinational companies and the use of *transfer pricing* to shift a multinational's profits to low-tax countries.

A relatively underexplored area is the determination of the tax structure—why some countries rely more on certain taxes than on others. Some aspects of tax structure are very durable over time—and tax privileges for certain activities appear much easier to legislate than repeal. In addition, tax policy making in many countries is a highly politicized process, exposed to substantial lobbying and public debate, and differences in the political process may account for some of the differences in tax systems across countries.

See also *Entitlements.*

. . . .   STEPHEN SMITH

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Telecommunications Policy

Telecommunication refers to point-to-point or networked electronic transmissions of information—telegraph, telephone, wireless, and data (i.e., the Internet). Telecommunication networks can use both cable and wireless transmissions, although in the wireless realm telecommunications are still characterized as networked or person-to-person links rather than one-to-many broadcast media. Modern societies depend on reliable and efficient electronic communications to conduct critical economic and social transactions every day. In most countries, however, the genesis of telecommunication networks from early telegraph systems placed their function and regulation within state organizations or state companies associated with postal services. As digital telecommunications, especially telephone and data networks, began to grow and diversify, these systems first became independent of postal administrations and then mostly privatized as new, competitive services, such as mobile telephones, came into use.

Traditional means of distant, point-to-point communications were affected by the movement of written information overland or by sea. From the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, telecommunication networks were nearly all analog systems: Transmissions by either wire or wireless radio were in the form of analog waves. When digital computers were developed and their performance increased so dramatically, the move to convert from analog to digital systems was justified initially by cost savings and versatility. In embedding such computer systems in telecommunication networks, it also became apparent that new, diverse services could be deployed rather quickly and easily. Related technologies, such as digital mobile telephone systems and packet-switched networks, could be easily connected to or overlaid onto existing network infrastructures. The open, generative nature of such digital transmission systems and their associated standards paved the way for competition, as market entry by new firms became much easier, and deregulation in one country created pressures for deregulation in others.

Developing societies traditionally viewed access and use of telecommunications technologies as a way to generate foreign exchange or manage centralized political economic functions. Now many emerging market countries realize that telecommunications liberalization can be a major factor

in accelerating growth, promoting innovation, and ensuring economic diversification. Governments worldwide now view reliable, technologically advanced telecommunications as a national resource for competitiveness and economic security. Due to the ubiquity of integrated digital multimedia resources and recognition that these resources offer a decisive competitive advantage, the stakes of decisions in telecommunications policies have increased. As organizations of all types discover new ways of employing telecommunications to further their objectives and strategies, some scholars observe that advances in telecommunications have transformed power relationships in favor of private organizations over traditional governmental functions.

TRADITIONAL POLICY FRAMEWORKS

Governmental policies—in constitutional, regulatory, and economic contexts—largely shape the design, operation, and diffusion of telecommunication products and services. Telecommunication policy primarily involves issues concerning the transmission facilities of electronic communication. Content issues and related policy concerns, such as freedom of speech, rights to communicate, censorship, and privacy, have not been within the primary jurisdiction of telecommunication regulatory agencies.

Ownership, access, standards, and spectrum management have been the primary areas of telecommunications policy regulation under government monopoly regimes and contemporary regulatory structures. As an outgrowth of government-provided postal services, most governments established agencies or parastatal corporations known as *PTTs (Post, Telegraph, and Telephone)* to provide national telecommunications services and associated telecommunications equipment to their users. PTTs that were organized as state-owned enterprises obtained their capital investment from general government revenues and were typically prohibited from raising capital from commercial sources. In the United States, the 1934 Communications Act established exclusive commercial telecommunications carriers for voice and nonvoice services—AT&T (the Bell System) and Western Union, respectively. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) performed regulatory oversight, including approvals for establishing prices, for interstate rates, and state public utility commissions performed oversight for local services. Under the PTT model, rates were typically established to cover investment and operating costs.

As public utilities, telecommunications operators have had to contend with policy requirements for universal access, or universal service, and its consequent economic burdens. Dense transmission trunks between major urban areas or within densely populated areas are more economical to operate due to high demand and less costly supply. Providing public telecommunications access to rural or thin-route areas is more expensive than acceptable prices would allow. Users in such areas either have inferior coverage or pay higher prices unless regulatory policies enforce rate averaging and subsidies to offer comparable services.

Standards also heavily influence the types of products and services available to users. Requirements imposed by telecommunications policy makers have included prior approvals—known as *type acceptance*—or restrictions on the types of customer-premise equipment that can be connected to public networks, allowable technical interfaces, and service quality (e.g., average network availability).

Radio spectrum management has also been the domain of government regulators. The bands of the electromagnetic spectrum useful for electronic applications include wireless telecommunications, over-the-air broadcasting, satellite communications, and radars. Demands often compete for alternative services, such as frequency bands reserved for television broadcasting versus wireless data networks. Designation and registration of the radio spectrum has been an important policy function of governments and has developed into sophisticated international rules in the International Telecommunication Union for avoiding interference and in allocating frequency bands to their most efficient use.

THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION

With the widespread availability, growing performance, and decreasing costs of computers, telecommunication networks became more heavily automated, digital, and combined with information technologies. Digital networks allowed new providers to demonstrate how easily telecommunications services markets could be entered, diversified, and expanded. These types of technological opportunities subsequently caused a number of governments to reconsider monopoly service models. Customer-premise equipment was first opened to competition, followed by new services such as mobile telephony and most public services. State-owned telecommunication operators were also increasingly privatized, allowing them to compete in domestic and international markets and to raise investment capital in traditional commercial markets. Most countries have privatized their telecommunications services and have opened markets to alternative operators and suppliers.

The introduction of multiple suppliers and operators led quickly to a bifurcation of regulators and operators. To maintain impartiality, policy and regulatory agencies could not be associated with any single operator. These policy agencies also have had to adapt to new challenges created by competitive markets. These include equipment performance standards, interconnection rules among telecommunications operators, allocating spectrum bands among competing operators, achieving universal service, and accelerating the deployment of new services, such as broadband wireless access.

EMERGING POLICY ISSUES

The strenuous efforts in the late 1990s to liberalize telecommunications services, in the context of a global trade regime under the World Trade Organization (WTO), highlight the importance of global telecommunications. Under resulting agreements, about 90 percent of telecommunications services in over seventy countries were opened to competition. Some estimates by the WTO indicate that such liberalization has

added the equivalent of one trillion U.S. dollars to the world's gross domestic product.

Such a generation of wealth and its consequent dependence on the global telecommunications infrastructure lead to new and potentially contentious policy issues—national and global. Developing countries continue to worry about being caught in a *digital divide,* less able to compete in a communications-rich global economy. Other countries are concerned that the rules of global telecommunications governance are not fully institutionalized. Private organizations and individuals have concerns about how the benefits of widespread, affordable, unencumbered communications can continue. Issues affecting the content of communications are also surfacing, including the balancing of countervailing policies, such as privacy and electronic surveillance.

See also *Internet and Politics; Network Society; Public Policy.*

. . . .   ERIC NOVOTNY

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Television and Politics

The arrival of television heralded a new political era. Enthusiasts for the medium predicted that "live" visuals would allow citizens to participate more directly in public decisions. The reality turned out to be more complicated. Though television helped undercut the power of political bosses in selecting political candidates, it also overemphasized telegenic appeal and, as electoral campaigns were increasingly waged via video, the costs of campaigning skyrocketed. The American presidency has been at the epicenter of the political changes brought about by television, and the medium has both enhanced the profile of the office and shaped its directions. At times, the television coverage itself has become the subject of political controversy.

EARLY POLITICAL IMPACT

Estes Kefauver, an undistinguished U.S. senator from Tennessee, was among the first American politicians to explore television's political potential. The 1950 *Kefauver* hearings were intended to impress the prevalence of organized crime on the nation's conscience. In 1950, such televised coverage was still a novelty, as viewers watched a parade of crime bosses deliver carefully rehearsed Fifth Amendment pleas against self-incrimination. The indignation stirred by these appearances did not stir even modest political action, such as writing to congressional representatives, but it helped catapult Kefauver onto the Democratic national stage.

The next major American television event was a series of ticker-tape receptions given by celebrated World War II (1939–1945) General Douglas MacArthur, after his dismissal from the Korean War in 1951 for insubordination. His widely televised triumphal return was interpreted as prologue to a presidential campaign, but trained participant-observers documented that what appeared as an enthusiastic welcome on television did not reflect the dominant mood of the crowds. Managers of video technology had selectively imposed their own structure on the event, a pattern that would be followed in later years. Thus the reality conveyed to television viewers differed from that experienced by in-person participants.

TELEVISION AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY

Television played a major role in 1952 electoral campaigns. With coast-to-coast video available, candidates planned their every move with an eye on the cameras, and the campaign also became the first in which television became the most important source of information for the majority of voters. The first televised debates between presidential candidates were held in 1960 and have become a staple even for lesser offices. They usually attract larger audiences than other campaign events, with a record 81 million following Jimmy Carter versus Ronald Reagan in 1980. A so-called winner has rarely been clearly decided, but performance can be important especially in a close election. In 1960, neophyte presidential candidate John F. Kennedy stood up to renowned debater Richard Nixon, helping to establish his presidential timber and win a slim electoral victory.

The next election in 1964, when incumbent Lyndon B. Johnson ran against Barry Goldwater, raised unfounded fears that computer-based projections by networks in eastern states would dissuade citizens from voting in western states, where

polls remained open. Despite preelection polls projecting a Johnson landslide, people still voted to express their partisan commitment, fulfill their citizen obligations, or to decide local contests. However, the impact of network projections did not fade away. Most notably, in 2000, networks prematurely named Al Gore the winner in Florida, and thereby the nation. Separated by only a few hundred votes, both parties turned to courts to judge the validity of ballots, but also reached out for public support as television reported all their moves, for five weeks, until the Supreme Court finally settled the dispute in favor of George W. Bush.

TELEVISION AND POLITICAL SCANDAL

The age-old phenomenon of political scandal came forcefully to television during Watergate, named for the break-in at the Democratic headquarters during the 1972 electoral campaign. Originally, few believed the president was personally involved, but televised hearings by congressional committees helped to convert the issue into a legal one, regarding what did the president knew and when. After Nixon fired special prosecutor Archibald Cox, Cox brought his case to television viewers and swayed public opinion. The national protest triggered by Nixon's defiance of public demands ultimately led to a televised impeachment debate and his televised resignation in August 1974. With the "whole world watching," Nixon resigned. Since Watergate, Americans have followed a parade of scandals playing out on camera, many with the suffix *gate* attached to the end. The advent of twenty-four hours of news in the last decades of the twentieth century accelerated the development of scandals and of all political news stories.

WAR ON TELEVISION

Television coverage has profoundly changed the politics of war. The brutal images filmed during the American Tet offensive in 1968 during the Vietnam War (1959–1975) undermined public support for the Vietnam War. Critics of the networks charged that a de facto American military victory had been depicted as a defeat, but others responded that, prior to Tet, few camera crews had ventured into danger zones to show casualties. In the Gulf War (1990–1991), commanders assured favorable coverage by organizing reporters into pools and chaperoning them to sites they wished to publicize, showing prisoners of war and burning tanks. Public trust in the military reached an all-time high. The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1991) was even more of a media event. Nightly briefings, carried live, depicted a surgical operation aimed at Saddam Hussein. Over time, television carried more realistic images of this deadly struggle.

Television's capability to focus attention on world events is not confined to war. Pictures of suffering alongside famine, natural disaster, or deadly conflict have evoked humanitarian intervention even when no national interest is at stake. These images may even affect foreign policy. The extent to which international coverage has sometimes driven diplomacy, the significance of a "CNN effect" in particular situations, remains an open question. The airing of images of 1994 genocide in Rwanda, for instance, did little to encourage foreign intervention; in the United States, the images of American soldiers dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993 remained a powerful deterrent from another dangerous "peacekeeping mission."

From the Tet offensive onward, debates have swirled over the decision of major networks to show or not show disturbing images that may inflame ongoing conflicts; for instance, in 2004, CBS chose to show photographs of humiliating torture perpetrated at the U.S. prison camp in Abu Ghraib, Iraq. These same images were broadcast by Arab television stations across the world, who took them as emblematic of Western attitudes. While television makes it possible for the "whole world to watch," the whole world watches the same images through very different lenses, often provided by networks themselves; the same event on BBC news in English may be given a profoundly different significance according to Arab-language broadcasts from al-Jereeza.

See also *Journalism, Political; Media, Political Commentary in the; Media and Politics; Media Bias; Telecommunications Policy.*

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Teratopolitics

The term *terato,* or monster (from Latin *monstrum,* Greek *teras*) in its wider meaning evokes the astonishment produced by an irregular and wonderful phenomenon. In this sense,

neglecting its significance is not only to ignore one philosophical question among others, but rather to miss one of the main philosophical problems. In fact, if philosophy arises from astonishment and wonder (*theorein* and *thaumazein*), as Plato argued, the monster raises questions at the core of the human experience of knowing, with important implications for the understanding of political life.

The discovery by modern anatomy that monsters belong to regular orders and laws of constitution challenges Christian metaphysics, which saw monsters as a free divine creation, used by God to make a kind of revelation to men, as discussed by Augustine of Hippo. In the modern age, the monster becomes the key figure to reflect on norm and anomaly, within both ontological and human order.

The permanence of the metaphor of the monster in Western culture and political thought extends from ancient times to the modern day and shows that the monster has not been domesticated. Rather, the monster continues to produce displacing effects and to redefine the relationship between the normal and the pathological, questioning also order and hierarchies within the universe of political ideas.

For conservative philosophers who seem to envisage order and life as a set of fixed and transcendent laws, the metaphor of monster is employed to blame the "other," to construct deviance and political pathology. The best-known example is Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651), in which Hobbes likens the state to the monster evoked by God in order to silence Job, symbol of rebellion. One can also refer to Edmund Burke's monstrous multitude in his 1790 *Reflections on the Revolution in France* or Francis Bacon's *An Advertisement Touching an Holy War* (1586–1589), which uses Hercules's fight against the many-headed hydra as a metaphor for the necessary extermination of rebels. The metaphor of monster can be used in other ways as well, to denounce and uncover the inhumanity of reality, as Karl Marx does in *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), by employing the Gothic character of the vampire to describe capitalism, or the disturbing banality of monstrosity, as Hannah Arendt does in her 1963 book *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*.

From a theoretical point of view, however, the monster can also leave the realm of metaphor: Removed from the dialectic of deviation and conformity from the norm, the monster becomes an autonomous concept that challenges the idea of norm itself. Such autonomy of the monster can be found in the works of Niccolò Machiavelli; not, as his adversaries claim, in the monstrosity they call Machiavellianism, but in his use in *The Prince* (1513) of Cesare Borgia, supposedly a moral monster, as a new paradigm of political action. Machiavelli sees social conflict as a positive and productive phenomenon that produces good law and prioritizes political and social conflict over the traditionally enshrined values of societal harmony and concord. In the heart of the seventeenth century, Baruch Spinoza is the only philosopher to see Machiavelli as a thinker of freedom. More recently, in his 1969 article "Plato and the Simulacrum," Gilles Deleuze invokes the monstrous character of the simulacrum against the Platonic metaphysics

of the model-copy relation. Contemporary feminist theorists have made powerful use of the monster to analyze anomaly as an active and autonomous insubordination against the male normative model.

See also *Arendt, Hannah; Burke, Edmund; Hobbes, Thomas; Machiavelli, Niccolò; Marx, Karl; Political Attitudes and Behavior; Spinoza, Baruch.*

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Term Limits

Under the Articles of Confederation, the first constitution of the United States, term limits were imposed for representatives. However, in 1787, when the new U.S. Constitution was drafted and debated in Philadelphia, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention decided against any term limit provisions in the Constitution. This thought reversal has provided fodder for a continuous debate ever since.

Term limits are restrictions bound by law that limit an elected official to a specific number of terms for a particular office. Term limits appear at both the federal and state levels. Although absent from the Constitution during the early part of the nation's history, President George Washington set the precedent for an unenforced presidential term limit of two terms. Every president since George Washington through Herbert Hoover recognized the significance of Washington's actions and limited their time in office to two terms. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was the first and only president to be elected to the presidency four times. His actions set forth a movement to legally restrict the president to two terms. In 1951, the United States passed the Twenty-second Amendment, which made it impossible for a president to serve more than two terms. Since its ratification, opponents of the measure, including several presidents, have questioned the constitutionality of the amendment and have voiced their objections to it.

Several state constitutions include provisions for term limits for state governors and state legislators as well. Beginning in

the 1990s, in response to a poor economy and an increasing cynicism toward an unresponsive government, states across the nation became witness to a democratic movement that sought to hold government accountable to the people. Several states introduced referendums and initiatives seeking to limit their elected officials to specific term limits.

Regardless of whether term limits are imposed at the state or federal level, the contentious issue has its share of proponents and opponents. Although term limits have become an integral part of America's political system, opponents stand behind several arguments in seeking its repeal. First, opponents assert that term limits are undemocratic: The very nature of limiting the right of voters to exercise their vote in the manner they choose and selecting the representative of their choice is undemocratic. If constituents prefer to reelect their representative, regardless of how many times the individual has served, democracy provides that right. If term limits are used to ensure that only the most experienced and upstanding hold office, the voters can perform the same task, by voting them out of office, without the need of restrictions. Second, opponents contend that term limits dilute the pool of experienced politicians: By imposing term limits, the pool of candidates is effectively limited to those with little to no elective office experience. As in any job, those with experience and seniority are better able to start exercising their duties on day one without the restrictions of a learning curve. Furthermore, those who perform well, have experience, and are not restricted by term limits can provide their constituents with greater benefits than their first-year colleagues. Third, opponents believe that if term limits are imposed to increase accountability, it actually fosters the opposite: Knowing that an elected official is coming to the end of the term, no incentive exists for them to remain accountable or responsive to the voters, instead they may forsake the voters' interest on behalf of others.

Those who support term limits often argue that term limits provide the opportunity for new people who have fresh ideas and are more innovative to serve in government. Further, term limits eliminate the need for politicians to consider political concerns when making decisions. Since they will not be up for reelection, term limited officials can freely exercise their vote and duties without fear of political reprisal. In addition, supporters contend that term limits reduce the power of incumbency because elected officials are no longer able to use the benefits of their office to ensure their own victory at the expense of a candidate who is less well known or is a financial underdog.

See also *Accountability; Electoral Reform; Electoral Systems; Legislative Systems.*

. . . .   RICHARD M. YON

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Terrorism, Financing of

Terrorism financing, or *reverse money laundering,* is the process of raising and transferring funds, from legitimate or dubious sources, for future criminal activity. Though there are similarities between money laundering and terrorism financing, there are also notable differences. Terrorists will minimize their use of regulated financial industries because of their need for anonymity, or in some cases because they live and operate in states where the financial system is underdeveloped. Sources of terrorism financing may be entirely legitimate, such as money obtained through regular business activities or charitable donations. Terrorists also may use couriers or send money through, often poorly regulated, remittance systems. In addition, there have been reports of cooperation between organized crime groups and terrorist organizations, especially in the drug trade. Terrorists have been known to raise money through the trade in gemstones, and there has been indication that ransom money paid to pirates may have been transferred to terrorist organizations.

The events of September 11, 2001, brought the issue of terrorism financing to the forefront of the political agenda. The international community had, however, already started to address the issue. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in 1999. Shortly after the September 11 attacks, U.S. president George W. Bush launched the war on terror by signing an executive order blocking the assets of listed individuals and terrorist groups. The U.S. Congress then adopted the USA PATRIOT Act; title 3 specifically targets illicit finance. Internationally, the Financial Action Task Force's mandate was expanded to cover both money laundering and terrorism financing. States around the world subsequently amended their legislation on illicit finance to include terrorism financing. Conventional wisdom holds that following the money trail enhances security by allowing authorities to identify and keep track of suspect individuals and of their networks.

The fight against terrorism financing has not been immune to criticism. Committing an act of terror is not necessarily expensive, and there are no guarantees that tackling terrorism financing is actually an effective way to combat terrorism. Scholars also note that financing of terror is ingrained in political and geostrategic struggles, as is the case, for instance, with national liberation movements and state-sponsored terrorism. The identification of terrorists by public authorities, or financial services sector firms, is also subject to mistakes leading to potential abuse. Some critics maintain that the fight against terrorism financing has been used to marginalize minority groups, such as Muslims, and developing states, where terrorists are thought to hide, through increased surveillance of the financial system.

See also *Crime Policy; Post-9/11 Politics; Terrorism, Political.*

. . . .   IAN ROBERGE

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Terrorism, Political

Terrorism involves calculated outrage. It represents the power to hurt in its purest form, to use the classic description of Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling. The concept refers generally to the use or threat of violence to achieve political ends, but terrorism is meant not simply to destroy. It also communicates a message to a watching audience through the shock value of its transmission. The individual victims and physical targets of terrorism are representatives or symbols of larger collectivities—states, nations, communities, social classes, or other categories. The victims are usually defenseless and caught by surprise. They may be ordinary people in public places—shopping at a market, eating in a restaurant, riding a bus, or attending religious services—or they may be national or local leaders singled out for assassination by virtue of their positions. Harming the victims warns all who can see themselves in the victims' place. Most victims of terrorism are civilians, although the line between combatants and non-combatants is often blurry, especially in intense civil conflicts. Potential victims may know that they are at risk because of the community of people they belong to or the entity they represent, but they cannot know when or where the attack will occur or who the perpetrator will be.

The type of violence employed is deliberately shocking. Since the invention of dynamite in the late nineteenth century, terrorists have relied heavily on explosive devices, which have ranged from crude, short-range bombs to airplanes flown into buildings in the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. In the 1980s, the practice of suicide bombing, and thus *suicide terrorism,* developed as governments became more adept at preventing terrorists from leaving bombs in public places. Nevertheless, the bombing of Pan Am 103 in 1988 and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the most deadly attacks against U.S. citizens before 9/11, involved bombs placed in an airplane luggage compartment or left in a vehicle. Bombings are shocking because of their indiscriminate nature and because of the horrible carnage and dramatic visual effects they produce. Bombs have the potential to cause massive casualties, as the 9/11 attacks showed, and many experts fear that terrorism could become catastrophic should its users obtain nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological materials to explode or disperse.

Terrorism can also involve seizing hostages in order to bargain with governments. In the late 1960s, skyjacking; kidnapping diplomats, business executives, and reporters; and taking over public buildings such as embassies became almost commonplace. Terrorists typically demanded the release of prisoners and sometimes ransom or publicity for their cause.

A terrorist attack in New York City and Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001, ended in the destruction of the two towers of the World Trade Center, damage to the Pentagon, and the loss of thousands of lives.

SOURCE: U.S. Navy—Digital version copy/Science Faction/Corbis

Terrorism is usually associated with nonstate actors—small groups who oppose the authority of the state. It is classically referred to as a "weapon of the weak," for those who lack the military forces or supporters to compel their adversaries to comply with their wishes. However, not everyone would exclude states as actors, and states have intervened directly through their own agents (e.g., Libya and Pan Am 103) or have assisted proxies (e.g., Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon). Whether instigated by nonstates or states, the organization of terrorism is clandestine. The perpetrators conceal themselves and try to remain anonymous. The secrecy of the planning contrasts sharply with the spectacular resulting violence. The invisible becomes visible in one shocking moment.

Most terrorism is domestic, involving perpetrators, victims, and targets (i.e., those whom the act is designed to influence rather than harm directly) from the same country. Its users can include revolutionaries struggling to overthrow governments, nationalists, or ethnic minorities who want independence or secession, single-issue groups, or right-wing defenders of the status quo. In the 1980s, the term *religious terrorism* gained prominence in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution and the establishment of Hezbollah in Lebanon. With the emergence of al-Qaida and associated jihadist movements during the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan, religious terrorism came to be associated with Sunni Islam, although there have been violent offshoots of all major religions. The desire to replace a secular regime with a religious one may be a variant of the same revolutionary drive that leads the followers of political ideologies to want to create a new constitutional order along the lines of principles they see as just.

International terrorism was recognized as a distinct type of terrorism in the 1970s. Victims, targets, and perpetrators were

of different nationalities, or the act was committed outside the boundaries of the territory in dispute. The attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics, when the Palestinian Black September organization assaulted Israeli athletes in Germany, represents this type of terrorism. In the 1970s and 1980s, Western governments, particularly that of the United States, were often targeted abroad through hijackings and kidnappings. Thus, for many years, the U.S. Department of State and the Rand Corporation tracked incidents of international, not domestic, terrorism.

CAUSES OF TERRORISM

The causes of terrorism lie at the individual, group, and environmental levels. Most students of terrorism would agree that a group or organization is the key agent behind campaigns of terrorism.

The idea that there are specific personality traits that determine or even predict an individual's propensity to engage in terrorism has largely been abandoned, along with the proposition that there is a terrorist psychopathology. Most "terrorists," even suicide terrorists who regard themselves as martyrs to a cause, seem to be distressingly normal. Instead, attention focuses on the social psychology of group dynamics. Identification with the group and the cause, the cohesiveness produced by danger and stress, conformity and peer pressure, and the small size of most groups influence individual and group behavior. Through belonging to the group, individuals overcome moral inhibitions against violence. Over time, groups may come to exist primarily in order to maintain themselves, rather than to accomplish a remote and elusive political objective.

It is extremely difficult to link terrorism directly to environmental conditions such as poverty, lack of democracy, or the pressures and frustrations associated with globalization. For one thing, those who engage in terrorism are few, while those who experience such conditions are many. In addition, the evidence is contradictory. Repression of nonviolent political dissent would logically cause terrorism, but democracies may attract terrorism because they do not exercise the level of social surveillance that would prohibit the formation of conspiracies, are target rich, and have a high media presence that guarantees publicity. Democracies provide opportunity, while repressive regimes provide motivation. In terms of links between economic conditions and terrorism, most members of terrorist organizations, especially the leaders, are not from the most disadvantaged sectors of their societies, although they often claim to act in the name of the dispossessed and may be genuinely committed to them.

A focus on groups as the primary unit of analysis usually assumes that terrorist organizations interact strategically with friends and adversaries. For groups seeking political change, the government is typically their main opponent, but they also engage in rivalries with other like-minded groups and hostilities with opposing groups (e.g., for revolutionary groups, paramilitaries supporting the government). They also seek popular support for their cause. Thus, terrorism is a deliberate

means to an end. It may intend to provoke a government into overreacting, coerce it into agreeing to concessions, arouse popular enthusiasm and demonstrate power, "spoil" peace processes, or simply attract international attention to local grievances that would otherwise be ignored. Terrorism does not require much in the way of material resources, nor does it necessitate the mobilization of large numbers of people, so it is a relatively economical choice. It may also be a way groups operating in a competitive environment distinguish themselves from their rivals.

Concentrating on the group raises questions about the possibility of establishing a typology of terrorist organizations. Most typologies classify groups in terms of their ideological orientation: left-wing, right-wing, nationalist, religious, or mixed. Overlapping categories muddy distinctions. The Palestinian Hamas, for example, could be defined as both nationalist and religious. It is also difficult to say which other traits or characteristics might be correlated with differences among goals. Religious terrorism may be more lethal and more indiscriminate than secular terrorism. Apocalyptic ends may encourage disdain for the number of casualties or degree of precision in targeting because pleasing an earthly constituency is perhaps irrelevant.

After the 9/11 attacks, some claimed that terrorism had been radically and fundamentally changed, that a new terrorism replaced the terrorism of the past. The so-called old terrorists, such as the Irish Republican Army, were presumed to be rational calculators with whom governments could bargain, whereas the new religious terrorists, such as al-Qaida, sought only destruction. But secular terrorists may not necessarily be more reasonable or casualty averse.

Another dimension to consider is the structure of the organization, in particular whether it is hierarchical or flatly networked. The development of al-Qaida after 9/11 may indicate that the classical centralized-cell structures of underground movements have been replaced by decentralized, even disconnected, and diffuse networks composed largely of local volunteers. The bombings in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 by small groups who appeared to be al-Qaida sympathizers may indicate such a development. If this is the case, individual motivations may become more important to terrorism, and studies of radicalization and deradicalization processes, especially in Western European Muslim diasporas, are critical. However, many groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, remain centralized and hierarchical with social service wings. Such welfare activities are most often associated with religiously oriented groups. A certain paradox emerges: Religious groups may be the most lethal to their adversaries and the most humanitarian to their constituents.

ENDING TERRORISM

Interest in the aspect of terrorism ending is much more recent than inquiry into its causes. How governments respond to terrorism is only part of the picture. The use of military force, actually rare, rarely succeeds in defeating terrorism; military force is too blunt an instrument for such a shadowy, adaptive,

and versatile adversary. More fine-tuned police and intelligence work is usually the key to arresting or killing enough members of an organization to cripple its operations. However, if terrorist organizations can continue to replenish their ranks through recruitment, then violence may not end. If the government's response to terrorism only creates more incentives for resistance, then it can be self-defeating. Furthermore, terrorism that crosses national boundaries cannot be contained exclusively through local security initiatives. Dealing with extended terrorist networks like al-Qaida and its cohort requires extensive international cooperation and coordination of security measures.

In some circumstances, groups abandon terrorism to enter the political process as legitimate players. The organization remains intact and viable, but its strategy shifts. This option may be associated with new, not necessarily immediately taken, opportunities for participation or resolution of civil conflicts in negotiated settlements that promote power sharing. The Irish Republican Army took many years to agree to enter politics through the implementation of the 1998 Good Friday accords. In Spain, Basque Fatherland and Liberty increased its violence when Spain transitioned to democracy in the 1970s. In Colombia in the 1980s, government overtures led April 19 Movement to become a political party, but the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia continued its violent opposition and became extensively involved with the drug trade.

Suppressing terrorism through the judicious use of security countermeasures and opening political alternatives are not incompatible government responses. In fact, both may be necessary. The first policy makes terrorism too costly to continue, while the second heightens the rewards of participation. If terrorist organizations are instrumental, they will weigh costs and benefits accordingly.

Another path for terrorism's decline lies in the potential for groups to self-destruct or implode on their own. Sometimes the ideas they espouse have so little popular appeal that the cause dies with the group's members. This may be most characteristic of very small groups. An organization's activities may also alienate the constituency whose allegiance they seek. For example, the Red Brigade's 1978 kidnapping and murder of Italy's Christian Democratic Party leader Aldo Moro marked the beginning of their decline. As noted earlier, internal dissolution may proceed in tandem with government suppression.

Some government efforts to end terrorism stress the decisions of the individual rather than those of the group. Governments can offer amnesty and social reinsertion. Policies such as Italy's *pentiti,* or repentance, initiative, which offered shorter prison terms to members of violent organizations who confessed, seemed effective in drawing members away from their groups. Post-9/11 deradicalization programs aimed at individual disengagement operate in Muslim countries such as Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.

9/11 AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM

Before September 11, 2001, terrorism was generally not considered a serious enough threat to warrant inclusion on the national or international security agenda. Certainly since the 1960s terrorism had troubled domestic order in many states, including Western liberal democracies, but it was typically an internal problem that did not threaten the stability or integrity of the state. The suffering and destruction caused by sporadic terrorist incidents was painful but minor in the grand scheme of casualty-producing events. After the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subways in 1995, concern mounted over the prospect of weapons of mass destruction, but terrorism was still not a priority. Israel's intense experience with terrorism after the 1967 war and its consequent permanent war footing were exceptions. No other state felt as vulnerable or reacted as strongly to terrorism. For Israel, military retaliation became almost a requirement of counterterrorist policy.

Just as terrorism was not a major concern for most governments, it was not deemed significant to the study of international relations and foreign policy even after the cold war ended. Terrorism by small nonstate actors seemed peripheral to the structure of the international system and the big issues of war and peace among nations. Genocide, civil war, and humanitarian intervention seemed much more important than terrorism.

It is impossible to exaggerate the worldwide effects of al-Qaida's 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Terrorism sprang to the top of the national agenda of the world's remaining superpower; the United States immediately declared a global war on terror. In its pursuit, the United States invaded and occupied Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Intelligence and domestic security institutions were revamped, old agencies were merged, and new agencies were created in the most radical bureaucratic restructuring since the end of World War II (1939–1945).

America's allies supported the invasion of Afghanistan. Before the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban regime had refused to turn over al-Qaida despite increasing international pressure, and it remained obdurate even after 9/11. Most of the world, however, including the United Nations, did not approve of the invasion of Iraq, which the United States claimed was necessary because Saddam Hussein was close to acquiring nuclear weapons that he might pass on to al-Qaida. By invading Iraq, the United States sacrificed much of the sympathy and good will it had gained in the aftermath of 9/11. The transformation of U.S. goals for the global war on terror from eradicating terrorism to spreading democracy and ending tyranny around the world seemed to many to be an example of hubris and overreaching, although President George W. Bush claimed that U.S. policy was idealistic in its ends and realist in its means. The Obama administration took a more moderate approach to counterterrorism policy but continued the struggle to destroy al-Qaida.

The 9/11 attacks and subsequent al-Qaida–linked events around the world also focused scholarly attention on al-Qaida, its allies, subsidiaries, and the cause they espouse—the expulsion of "crusaders and Jews" from Muslim countries and the establishment of a pure form of Islamic law in these states. Analysis of *jihadi* or *Salafist* (puritanical) thought and practice has surged.

See also *Crime Policy; Jihad; Al-Qaida; Militias; Terrorism, State-sponsored; Weapons of Mass Destruction.*

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Terrorism, State-sponsored

Despite profound concerns over the growing lethality of terrorist acts committed by independent nonstate actors, far greater acts of destruction are possible when states assist terrorists. Indeed, many perceive that the most daunting threat facing society today is state assistance in terrorist acquisition of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD)—for example, a nuclear weapon.

A precise definition of state-sponsored terrorism is elusive because a universally accepted definition of terrorism does not exist. Nevertheless, most definitions of state-sponsored terrorism incorporate four features:

1. An action employing the deliberate use of violence or the threat of violence.
2. An action targeting noncombatants directly and indirectly. The former are the immediate victims of the act; the latter is the larger audience that the action is designed to intimidate, threaten, or coerce.
3. An action directly undertaken by a nonstate actor. While such a group is linked to and may be influenced by a state(s), it possesses a leadership and decision-making body that is separate from any state.
4. An action supported, in some fashion, by a state. Support can come in the form of financial backing, supplies, logistics, networking opportunities, intelligence sharing, training, diplomatic protections, physical basing of terrorists, or safe havens.

States have a long history of employing irregular forces to destabilize and intimidate their opponents. The primary advantage of using these forces is that they provide state officials with the ability to deny involvement in violent actions against their opponents. Some states have pursued the sponsorship of terrorism as a cheaper alternative to conventional armed forces. Weaker states also have used clandestine backing of nonstate actors as a weapon against opponents who possess stronger military and political power. When viewed through contemporary portrayals of *terrorism*—a term that only came into use in the last eighteenth century—some of these historical episodes fulfill many of today's definitions of state-sponsored terrorism. Russia's assistance to Slavic revolutionary groups in the eighteenth century is frequently portrayed as an antecedent to what is commonly referred to today as *state-sponsored terrorism*. The peak era of state-sponsored terrorism was the cold war, during which both superpowers—the Soviet Union and the United States—engaged in sponsorship of what many perceive to be terrorism. The former, along with some of its satellite states, most notably East Germany, funded, trained, and equipped terrorists active in Europe and the Middle East. In the 1970s, the United States financed right-wing terrorist paramilitary units in Chile as they sought to remove its leader from office. Similarly, in the 1980s, the United States offered extensive support to the Nicaraguan Contras who battled in opposition to the Sandinista regime. Most experts agree that some of the Contras's actions are best defined as terrorism.

Following the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, state support of terrorism became more circumspect. However, important exceptions to this trend existed. Most important was the ruling Taliban government that allowed al-Qaida to base itself in Afghanistan from 1996 until late 2001 when both were ejected by U.S. military forces. Moreover, states such as Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and Syria were accused of using violent proxies to pursue their goals on occasion throughout the 1990s and into the twenty-first century.

Western nations in 2010 continue to direct their concerns with state-sponsored terrorism toward Iran and Syria. Both of these states are thought to offer Hezbollah—a Shia Islamist organization based in Lebanon—financial support and weapons. Suspicions that Iran's nuclear power program belies its true intent of fabricating nuclear weapons have led to concerns over its sponsorship of Hezbollah as well. Thus, despite

an overall decline in state sponsorship of terrorism, apprehensions today primarily revolve around terrorist acquisition of a state-supplied WMD.

State sponsorship of terrorism has had a large impact on international security. It has been used to topple governments and weaken states. In the twenty-first century, fears that states would assist their terrorist clients in obtaining WMD have fueled U.S. governmental action designed to change governing regimes, most notably in Iraq in 2003.

See also *Asymmetric Wars; Collapsed and Failed States; Insurrection and Insurgency; International Criminal Court; Militias; Nonstate Actors; Terrorism, Financing of; Terrorism, Political.*

. . . .   CHARLES P. BLAIR

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Thatcherism

Thatcherism, a term popularized in the 1980s, was initially used by political opponents of British prime minister Margaret Thatcher to derisively refer to the political philosophy, doctrine, and programs she introduced to the country from 1979 until 1990, when she resigned from office. The intent was to stigmatize Thatcher's programs, which her political enemies felt she advocated with great force and which they ultimately believed would lead to failure. Thatcher's supporters, however, took the term and made it their own, elevating it from a derisive term used by opponents to a positive reflection of the prime minster and her policies.

While no universal definition exists for Thatcherism, it is a term widely used by academics, politicians, and the press to identify what took place during Thatcher's tenure as prime minister. Numerous explanations have been offered to define the term, and several key features consistently appear in the different definitions proposed. Among them are a fiscal policy that promotes low inflation and a tight control on money supply, and a labor policy that favors privatization and limitations on labor movements, including trade unions.

Some argue that the principles of Thatcherism are nothing new and existed before Margaret Thatcher gave advent to the term. Regardless of how Thatcherism is understood as a phenomenon, it is clear that it had lasting effects on the United Kingdom.

It has been suggested that Margaret Thatcher may have alienated many of her own, the conservatives in Great Britain, with her brash and iron-fisted will to pursue what she saw as the true conservative doctrine, even if it clashed with conventionally held conservative doctrine. Not only did she clash with conservatives in her own party, but she also alienated progressives. Nonetheless, Thatcher ushered in several changes when she became prime minister, including raising interest rates to control inflation in a time of recession, attacking trade unions, and privatizing public transportation and social housing.

In many respects, Thatcherism was a conservative economic philosophy that was led by the market and reduced government intervention. Thatcher focused her energy on government reform, stating, "I was determined . . . to begin work on long-term reform of government itself. If we were to channel more of the nation's talent into wealth-creating private business, this would inevitably mean reducing employment in the public sector." In many respects she considered the civil service a "necessary evil" that needed to be downsized.

Thatcherism transformed the composition of the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, reoriented the responsibilities of the civil service, and provided an interpretation or understanding of individualism and the capacity of human beings. It advocated well-known ideas such as the value of free trade, the benefits of lower taxes, the importance of patriotism, and support for individual responsibility (e.g., hard work, personal responsibility, forethought, and frugality). Thatcherism's focus on the individual fostered the idea of self-worth and individual entrepreneurship rather than a reliance on government. Moreover, Thatcherism sought to centralize power in the hands of the prime minister and reduce the influence of trade unions. Thatcherism increased the United Kingdom's international prestige and involvement and was widely accepted both in the United States and in other democracies around the world as an opponent of unbridled state growth.

In order to understand the legacy of Thatcherism, it is important to separate Margaret Thatcher from Thatcherism because each has endured quite different fortunes. Thatcher proved to be a far more successful and enduring figure in British politics even after her party lost control of Parliament and turned it over to the newly reformed Labour Party. If one analyzes the specific programs attempted by Thatcherism, it has a mixed and short-lived record. For instance, efforts to reduce the tax burden on British citizens failed to realize the long-term goals envisioned by Thatcher and her supporters. In 1996, the percentage of annual income devoted to taxation was higher than its 1979 levels. Nonetheless, Thatcherism provided a new orientation to government and individual responsibility that has lived on in the United Kingdom and reverberated beyond its shores.

See also *British Political Thought; Conservatism; Fiscal Conservatism; Fiscal Policy; Labor Policy; Labor Unions.*

. . . .   RICHARD M. YON

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Theater, Political

The term *political theater* refers to two separate but related ideas. The first is the idea of politics *through* theater: the use of theater as a vehicle for the expression of political action. The second is the metaphor of politics *as* theater: a resemblance of political action to the character of dramatic events enacted upon a stage. Both ideas date back to the emergence of theater itself in the ancient world, and both continue to inform contemporary political life.

POLITICS THROUGH THEATER

Theater, from its earliest incarnations, has had a decidedly political character. In ancient Athens, theater served as the centerpiece of an annual festival that was civic as well as religious in character—politics and religion not being so neatly separated in the ancient world as they are today. The tragedies and comedies presented at these festivals, at least the small fraction of them that have survived to the present day, typically addressed current political issues directly (e.g., Aeschylus's *The Persians* and Aristophanes's *Lysistrata*) and through myth (Aesschylus's *Oresteia* and Euripides's *The Trojan Women*). The potential disruptive effect of these dramas, and their centrality to the moral education of Athenian society, led Plato to famously feel obliged to banish these artists from his ideal city for fear of their corruptive effect on the character of the young.

The intervening centuries have seen powerful and compelling instances of political theater in this first sense, with its most profound political insights often accompanying its heights of artistic achievement. William Shakespeare's revision of the available dramatic genres to encompass the history play as well as the historical tragedy produced some of the most incisive studies of political action in all of literature. Henrik Ibsen's great dramas of psychological realism also included some of his era's most important political explorations, from *A Doll's House* to *An Enemy of the People.* The dramatic works of George Bernard Shaw and of Bertolt Brecht, though sometimes criticized for their didacticism, explicitly engaged in political argument through the ideologically laden monologues of their protagonists as well as the complex social situations they confronted. Great dramas of the mid-twentieth century, such as Arthur Miller's *All My Sons, Death of a Salesman,* and *The Crucible,* and of the late twentieth century, such as David Mamet's *Glengarry Glen Ross* and *Oleanna,* were notable for the way their political messages were integral to their artistic aims without overpowering them.

THEATER AS METAPHOR FOR POLITICS

More subtle, yet perhaps also more significant, is political theater in the second sense, as a metaphor for the nature of political life. One part of the metaphor involves the idea of *roles* and *character.* The claim that character matters centrally in representative government, particularly the American presidency, has been so widely repeated as to establish a resilient cliché. But this idea in turn draws on the notion that political actors are enacting roles separate from their own private selves, entailing their own internally justified standards of evaluation. This metaphor goes back to Cicero and the ancient rhetoricians, who frequently described the public official through the metaphor of someone enacting a role on a stage, as a way of emphasizing the importance of context and circumstance in the moral evaluation of political action—a metaphor widely repeated in the Renaissance by writers such as Erasmus, Thomas More, Montaigne, and Shakespeare. Martin Luther based his argument that Christians were entitled to exercise power and coercion in public life on an analogy to the theory of roles. Thomas Hobbes likewise argued that the state was the authorized representative of its citizens in the same sense that a playwright was the author of the deeds of the actor whose role he creates. More recently, Arthur Applbaum has criticized role-based moralities, arguing for sharp limits to the kinds of moral permissions that such arguments can provide.

Another element of the metaphor that has drawn attention particularly among political theorists is the idea of political life as an arena of tragedy and conflict. The roots of this aspect of the metaphor are several. One origin can be found in Hannah Arendt's account of action and the agonistic political theories it helped to inspire. Arendt's action, the central value of her political theory, bears a close resemblance to theatrical action: Its significance lies in the visibility of its memorable deeds to a public of appreciative spectators. Yet the unpredictability and irreversibility of such action places the possibility of tragedy at the center of public life. This tendency is exacerbated when combined with another important element of contemporary political thought, the value pluralism associated with such thinkers as Isaiah Berlin and Bernard Williams. For these theorists, society's deepest value commitments—to liberty and equality, justice and charity, utility and moral integrity—may simply be incompatible with one another, and tragedy, specifically the account of it offered by G. W. F. Hegel, captures artistically this core fact about the human moral experience. J. Peter Euben and Martha Nussbaum are two figures who have combined elements of these strains of contemporary political thought to offer an account of politics in which the idea of tragedy plays a conspicuous and important role. Of course, the idea that the deep value conflicts of tragedy may find their fullest expression in actual politics has come to be a theme of contemporary drama as well. It finds a striking illustration in playwright David Hare's 2004 work *Stuff Happens,* a dramatic rendering of the George W. Bush administration's march to war in Iraq in which most of the dialogue merely replicates statements actually made by President Bush and his advisers publicly during the run-up to the war.

STAGECRAFT

The most influential and widely appreciated aspect of the metaphor has been its implicit comparison of political action to the manipulative or deceptive aspects of stagecraft.

Political scientists frequently refer to leaders as political *actors* and to the public as the *audience* those actors are trying to sway. Almost half a century ago, historian Daniel Boorstin identified the emerging phenomenon of what he called pseudo-events: staged occurrences, such as campaign rallies, that existed for no other purpose than to be reported.

Today, pseudo-events in this sense make up the sizable majority of all the activities we collectively designate as constituting a political "campaign." Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas may have gathered a crowd for the purpose of trying to persuade their fellow citizens, but at one of today's rallies, politicians instead contrive to stage-manage a noisy, enthusiastic, and vacuous pageant solely to produce suitable footage for the free media coverage for which the "rally" provides the nominal excuse. Reports abound of presidential candidates planting the audience with scripted questioners, and even the startling case in which U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administrators were caught staging an entire press conference—with FEMA staffers masquerading, by implication at least, as journalists—no longer falls outside the realm of believability. As a telling a sign of the times, the fact that a leading political columnist for *The New York Times,* Frank Rich, trained for the role by serving for many years as that newspaper's drama critic—the two roles are no longer so cleanly separable as they once might have been.

There is no doubt that we now treat the spheres of politics and entertainment as, if not interchangeable, then at least closely intertwined, with the skills gained in entertainment permitting actors such as Ronald Reagan and Arnold Schwarzenegger to transition seamlessly from one arena to the other. And there can be little doubt that this has proven Murray Edelman largely correct in viewing contemporary public life as being as much as anything else the task of "constructing the political spectacle." Whether this trend will prove to be entirely a negative for democratic politics, or whether some of the positive aspects of the theatrical metaphor can be tapped to balance against the negative ones, is a question yet to be resolved.

See also *Arendt, Hannah; Berlin, Isaiah; Greek Democracy, Classical; Hegel, Georg W. F.; Luther, Martin; Montaigne, Michel de; More, Sir Thomas; Politics, Literature, and Film.*

. . . .   JOHN M. PARRISH

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Theocracy

Theocracy includes forms of government claiming to be governed by God or by gods, usually through human lieutenants, or by the revealed law of God. Secular skeptics use the term derisively; however, theocracy has been very widespread as a political system. Political science has thus developed only a limited vocabulary for describing the many types of theocratic regimes. Most political systems have been based on tribal groups, kingdoms, city-states, or empires—many theocratic. Legitimacy of a theocracy is based on the faithful enforcement of divine rule. When the Chinese emperor lost the mandate of heaven, the regime was ripe for dynastic change. A similar idea operated among the Mayan Indians.

Titus Flavius Josephus (Joseph ben Matthias, ca. 37–100 CE) coined the term *theocracy* in his work *Against Apion.* In responding to a severe critic of the Jews, he replied that some may have their aristocracy or monarchy, but the Jews had their theocracy. The term implicitly demonstrates the inadequacy of Aristotle's six forms of government, which were based on the study of one hundred fifty Greek city-states, not all the regimes in history.

Often theocratic systems have been headed by a *living god* or by the representatives of a divine being, or they have been strongly influenced by religious leaders. *Divine rulers* have included the Inca in South America and the emperor of Japan, living gods descended from the sun god or goddess. In other theocratic systems, the divine ruler has been a lieutenant of the divine—a charismatic leader, king, priest, or other religious functionary.

Charismatic leaders such as Moses or Joshua of the Hebrew Bible, and others who exhibited great spiritual power in other systems, were viewed as divine agents but were not necessarily considered divine. The power or the spirit of the divine, signified by the successful exercise of power, legitimated their actions.

European monarchs usually claimed a divine right to rule. Arguments made by divine-right political theorists justified earlier ideas of kingship. Sir Robert Filmer (1589–1653) argued in his book, *Patriarchia* (1680), that the king was the father of the country. To disobey the king was to disobey the Judeo-Christian commandment to obey one's father and mother and, thus, merit the death penalty. In the United Kingdom, divine right was still the official doctrine in 1953 when Queen Elizabeth II was crowned by "the grace of God," not by the will of the people.

Rule by priests, or *hierocracy,* has occurred in a number of places. The Jesuits operated hierocracies in Paraguay, among

other places. Judah was ruled after the war of the Maccabees (167–160 BCE) as a priestly theocracy.

The revealed divine law, or *theos nomos,* is the legitimating authority in theonomic regimes. Ministers or devout laymen, such as John Calvin (1509–1564), a pastoral leader of Geneva, have often headed regimes described as theocracies. Calvin used his superior knowledge of the Bible to create a Christian city-state. William Penn's Pennsylvania and the Puritan colonies were similarly theonomic *bibleocracies.*

In the twentieth century, theocracies have existed in a number of places. The emperor of Japan did not renounce his claims of divine rule but merely ceased to appeal to them. There have been hints in recent decades that the claims could be renewed. The Wahhabis imposed Islamic theocracy on Saudi Arabia before the kingdom's founding by King Abdul Aziz al-Saud in 1932. Pakistan was created to be a Muslim theonomy in 1947. In the early 1950s, the Tibetan Buddhist theocracy led by the Dalai Lama was driven out of Tibet. In 1979, the theocratic leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini forced the shah out of Iran and reinstituted the *shariah,* or Islamic law.

See also *Church and State; Religion and Politics.*

. . . . ANDREW J. WASKEY

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Think Tanks

A *think tank* is a nonprofit, independent, public policy research institute. This very broad definition encompasses diverse organizations in terms of resources, personnel, and specialization. However, they all apply a model of expertise—using social science methods of inquiry to study public issues in order to give policy insights and advice to government and lawmakers and to educate the general public.

Originally, think tanks resembled "universities without students" (Weaver 1989). They employ experts with strong academic backgrounds and seek to convey an image of neutrality by following higher education norms of scientific rigorousness and objectivity. Over time, the work of think tanks has become more politicized, and some of them have tried to market their ideas through sophisticated advocacy strategies. The think tank model of expertise can now be encountered worldwide.

In the United States, think tanks are generally registered as 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations, which grants them exemption from federal income tax and allows them to collect tax-deductible donations. This generous status can be a double-edged sword: Helping them gain access to funds was instrumental to their development. However, it also restricted their actions because it forbade them from conducting political campaign activities to influence elections and prevented

them from dedicating a substantial part of their activity to lobbying.

Some aspects of the U.S. political system are believed to have contributed to the emergence and growth of think tanks. Political features credited for the dynamism of the think tank in the United States include: a fiscal status favorable for securing financing for their operations, the openness of the country's legislative process, the expansion of the federal government and government contracts for research opportunities, the weakness of political parties agenda-setting capabilities, and the need for readily available government positions.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The establishment of independent research institutes in the United States links closely with the professionalization of social sciences and traces back to the turn of the twentieth century. At a time when state bureaucracy was growing, independent research organizations were founded with the progressive idea that scientific analysis was the best way to promote efficiency in government. The Institute for Government Research (IGR), chartered in 1916, was one of the first organizations to produce this type of independent expertise for advancing governmental reform. Under the auspices of its chairman, Frank Goodnow, and its first director, William Willoughby, both renowned political scientists, the IGR was particularly influential in the establishment of an annual federal budget. In 1927, the IGR became the Brookings Institution.

Several progressive or liberal organizations followed suit in the first half of the twentieth century. In 1943, a group of businessmen, disgruntled by the New Deal and what they perceived as a liberal consensus, establish the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) to promote conservative principals under the same model of scholarly policy analysis and public education that Brookings had developed.

After World War II (1939–1945), the RAND Corporation—formerly a branch of Douglas Aircraft that provided research for the U.S. Air Force—gained its autonomy and popularized the term *think tank,* which the military had coined. RAND was the first organization that derived almost all its revenues from government contracts. From its original focus on defense strategies in response to the cold war, RAND expanded—on account of a substantial budget—to pursue a very broad range of research. Among its many accomplishments, the organization is credited with major breakthroughs in game theory. The Urban Institute, created in 1968 by the administration of U.S. president Lyndon Johnson to provide expert evaluation of the Great Society programs, is another organization whose research is primarily contracted by U.S. government agencies.

The 1960s and 1970s witnessed the rise of new think tanks that criticized the more neutral approach of their predecessors and decided to more forcefully assert their ideological standpoints. Founded in 1963 by two former members of the Kennedy administration who disapproved of the foreign policy pursued by the government, the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) defends left-wing policy analysis, seeking to combine

with social activism. During the 1960s, IPS was particularly engaged in the civil rights movement and opposition to the Vietnam War (1959–1975).

Edwin Feulner and Paul Weyrich established the Heritage Foundation in 1973 to promote conservative ideas in more activist ways than AEI. Heritage brought a new "think tank culture" based on aggressive marketing of proposals that started what was described as a "war of ideas." Heritage asserted its influence in 1980 when it provided the newly elected President Reagan with its *Mandate for Leadership,* a study containing two thousand recommendations for furthering a conservative agenda. During the 1980s and 1990s, fueled by generous conservative foundations, conservative and libertarian think tanks like the Cato Institute flourished.

The Center for American Progress (CAP), created in 2003, is considered the liberal answer to the Heritage Foundation. Its funding came from a group of wealthy liberals headed by George Soros, who attributed part of the success conservatives enjoyed at the time to their strong presence in the think tank world. In order to advocate its ideals, CAP joined forces with a 501(c)(4) organization to gain more leeway for active lobbying.

ROLE AND INFLUENCE

Think tanks' direct impact on policy making is difficult to gauge. They are credited not only with a direct, measurable effect on specific decisions, but also with shaping what is known as the climate of the opinion, or the decision-making environment.

The role of think tanks is controversial because their involvement within the policy elite demonstrates the intricate relationship between knowledge and power. While some critics have denounced them as discourse conveyors for the dominant political and economic players, others praise them for helping democratize developing countries.

The intense politicization of some think tanks might be detrimental to the credibility and influence of research institutes because it damages their reputation for objective expertise. Nonetheless, a worldwide boom in think tanks has accompanied their increasing advocacy.

See also *Advocacy Groups; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs).*

. . . . BENOIT F. MONANGE

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Third–Party Intervention

Third-party intervention can be defined as the coercive or cooperative intercession of an external actor into the affairs of a sovereign state in order to influence the outcome of an internal conflict. Third parties are nonparticipants in the primary conflict and may be individuals, state governments, international organizations, or regional associations; they may be *unilateral,* consisting of one main actor, or *multilateral,* consisting of multiple actors. The interventions themselves can be classified according to the role they play in managing the conflict. Thus, *conflict prevention* aims to resolve internal tensions before they lead to violence, *conflict resolution* is designed to persuade the combatants to halt an ongoing conflict, and *postconflict reconstruction* seeks to consolidate a newly brokered settlement in order to prevent the reemergence of hostilities. These interventions can take place simultaneously or consecutively, involving one or more third parties working separately or in concert.

In undertaking the intervention itself, third parties can choose between *cooperative* instruments, which require the agreement of the principal combatants, and *coercive* instruments, which do not require the consent of the combatants. The former includes technical and legal assistance; the provision of mediation or arbitration services; and "carrots" such as aid, loan guarantees, and membership in valued organizations. There is growing scholarly interest in the effectiveness of such incentives—sometimes called *political conditionality*—in inducing governments to adopt prominority policies, thereby reducing the risk of internal conflict. Third parties may also help to *socialize* governments into adopting the policies that promote interethnic peace.

In coercive interventions, powerful third parties use "sticks" to influence the outcome of the conflict. Rather than merely denying benefits such as European Union membership, trade preferences, or economic assistance, coercive instruments work by imposing costs on target governments until they adopt the desired behavior. These instruments include economic sanctions, logistical or financial support to one side of the conflict, and outright military intervention. Cooperative instruments are widely believed to be more desirable for conflict prevention, whereas coercive instruments are generally reserved for conflict resolution and postconflict reconstruction.

Much has been written about the motives of third-party interventions. A classic realist or instrumentalist prediction is that states intervene when intervention serves their economic

or security interests. Another possibility is that politicians intervene when they expect to achieve success, thereby scoring an easy political victory. A domestic politics explanation holds that states intervene in conflicts when there are perceived ethnic ties between an important domestic constituency in the intervening state and one side of the conflict. This *ethnic ties* argument has also been used to explain the intervention of a state on the side of its ethnic brethren in a bid to "rescue" them when they face a repressive ethnic majority. However, quantitative analysis has shown that homeland states are no more likely to intervene on behalf of their coethnics when they are repressed than when they are not. Ethnic conflict in one state may also weaken state structures to the point that it invites outside intervention by states seeking to profit from internal struggles. Interestingly, states facing their own conflicts are actually more likely to act aggressively than they are to be victimized.

A relatively new field of research concerns the determinants of successful intervention. Some scholars contend that helping the stronger side to win is the surest and fastest way to end violent conflict. However, others believe that third parties can best reduce the level of carnage by intervening against the perpetrators of atrocities—generally the more powerful side. There is also some debate over the role of third-party bias in intervention success. Some argue that interveners with a significant stake in the outcome of a conflict might be better able to commit to enforcing a peace settlement, at which point both parties feel safe enough to disarm. But others disagree, arguing that both parties must believe that the intervener does not have a stake in the conflict; otherwise, they cannot trust that the terms of the agreement will be enforced. This usually requires credible external security guarantees to both sides of the conflict. Data analysis shows that long-lasting peacekeeping institutions, such as demilitarized zones and dispute resolution commissions, tend to decrease the level of uncertainty for both parties and enhance the durability of peace settlements.

See also *Conflict Resolution; Cooperative Security.*

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Third Sector

The term *third sector* refers to a set of social relations' organizations and networks distinct from the public and the market sector, as well as from private households and neighborhoods. Voluntary activities carried out in public in an organized form, with self-governed structures for societal instead of profit goals, characterize a positive definition of the third sector. However, many third sector organizations also rely on paid staff.

Charity, philanthropy, and voluntary help have a long standing tradition in the third sector, but a self-consciousness of such relations as a distinct sector only emerged in the early 1970s. Reports of the Filer Commission in the United States or the Wolfenden Committee in England triggered a new perspective on the diverse set of activities and stressed common features of organizations outside government and business enterprise. Related overlapping and competing notions refer to the *nonprofit sector* emphasis on private provision of services devoid of the profit motive; some include the nongovernmental sector, which sets third sector apart from governmental services and stresses advocacy of groups of citizens; while other notions refer to the *voluntary sector,* which puts emphasis on the type of resources provided by these organizations. Other related concepts are the *independent,* the *intermediate,* or the *civic sector.* These concepts share interest in the emergence from, or an orientation toward, civil society. Typical organizational forms for active citizens are associations and foundations. While the American understanding stresses the nondistribution constraint on profits, and therefore excludes mutuals and cooperatives, the European understanding centers upon a limitation of returns and includes limited self-serving economic activities and social enterprises.

SIGNIFICANCE AND POLICY

The third sector has gained attention of policy makers because of assumed positive effects on welfare, democracy, economy, and community integration. The provision of welfare services by third sector organizations promises closeness to people's needs and, by mobilizing third-party resources of time and money, disburdens governments of establishing public agencies. As a vehicle of self-organization and interest representation, the sector contributes to the development of civic skills and democratic participation. Further, the third sector influences economics in producing services and providing employment and meaning in times of decreasing full employment. Finally, it fosters community integration by creating bonds and social capital among citizens through shared activities.

Many countries have initiated third sector policies, with the goal to regulate activities and enhance its role. These policies include legal measures (e.g., nonprofit and tax law); financial measures (e.g., funding schemes and tax exemption); symbolic activities including speeches and public recognition for civic engagement (e.g., certificates and medals) and the provision of information as well as organizational measures such as the creation of supportive agencies or the reorganization of ministerial portfolios and governmental bodies.

RESEARCH

The establishment of networking and research institutions, such as the International Society for Third Sector Research, indicate increased significance for the third sector. Next to research on conceptual issues and microlevel studies of single organizations, efforts to produce a comparative overview of the third sector have advanced the knowledge on scope and crucial factors that shape third sectors in different countries. Research on third sector policy is a new field searching for a common framework.

Critical issues for research are particularism and accountability of third sector organizations; co-optation, dependence, and distortion of missions through governmental funding, contracting, and commercialization as well as their threatened civic character due to bureaucratization and professionalization.

Insight into limitations of the concept has grown over decades of research. Great internal diversity—human services, sports, culture, professional organizations—together with substantial similarities across sectoral boundaries in certain fields (e.g., commonalities between public, commercial, and nonprofit hospitals) have raised doubts whether form of ownership is central at all. The concept of the third sector suggests clear-cut distinctions, while in reality, blurred boundaries and hybrid forms of organization work in an intermediate sphere among the governmental, the market, and the household sectors.

See also *Civic Humanism; Civil Society.*

. . . .   PETER HILGER

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Third Way and Social Democracy

The Third Way can be best described as an alternative to the old left and right. Today, it focuses on what can be considered "the four *E*s": education, ecology, ethics, and economics. As a political construct, the true meaning of the Third Way remains vague. It can imply an alternative to both capitalism and socialism; a middle way; or an alignment of new and heterodox ideas, such as the state as an enabler and not a direct provider of goods and services.

The term emerged at the end of the nineteenth century around Pope Pius XII. More recently, this expression conveys the ideas beyond the left or the right. It allows one to do certain things without bothering to find out about the "first way" or "second way." Unlike socialism, it does not aim to end the predominance of the capitalist system, nor does it aim to replace it entirely. Instead, it aims to reform the capitalist system democratically through state regulation and ameliorating some of the injustices inherent in the market economy. Many consider the Third Way as the modern version of social democracy or democratic socialism that became popular in international politics in the late twentieth century.

Though it is difficult to demarcate social democracy clearly from democratic socialism, some view the emergence of social democracy as a shift from capitalism toward the left, and democratic socialism as a shift from Marxism toward the right. Most parties with leftist leanings, faith in democratic means, and strong base in the working class can be described as social democrats. The social democrats and labor parties advocate the socialist option through democratic means in all aspects of life: political, social, and economic. The cardinal principles of social democracy have been (1) freedom from discrimination and freedom from dependence, (2) economic and sociocultural equality and social justice, and (3) solidarity in the sense of compassion for the victims of injustice and inequality (e.g., the Socialist International's Declaration of Principles).

CARDINAL PRINCIPLES

The Third Way now focuses on efforts to find a new interpretation of social democracy or democratic socialism to increase relevance in the globally integrated economy and knowledge-based and technology-driven societies. This was necessitated

by factors including growing individuation, inequities, social fragmentation, political apathy, rising consumerism, political violence, environmental degradation, private corruption by public authorities, alienation, and retreat of the welfare state. New interpretations require not a deterministic economy or polity but what is known as the *freedom to maneuver*. The Third Way emphasizes the role of the civic society, family, and communitarian values. Some believe that it can also have an adverse effect on the state's autonomy.

It is not surprising that most social democratic parties have shifted their emphasis from social justice to human rights and cleaner environment. Whereas the issue of equity and social justice are primarily economic and distributive, those of green environment, peace, gender issues, and human rights are primarily political and nondistributive. The modern social democrats also tend to support multiculturalism, secularism, multilateralism, civil rights, and civil freedoms. Most of the social democrats have also broadened their objectives to include some of the liberal, neoliberal, and even conservative values. For instance, Purshottam Trikamdas, one of the democratic socialists from India holds: "Socialism is a living faith, not a dogma. It can be achieved only by a process of trial and error. It cannot be something given once for all."

THE LEGACY

Many of the policies espoused by the social democrats in early twentieth century are now practiced in most of the advanced industrialized countries, such as nationalization, subsidized education, and health care. Sweden remains the prime example of social democracy under the leadership of Olof Palme. Norway, too, flourishes as a social democratic nation. Some of the Canadian provinces, such as Saskatchewan, British Columbia, Manitoba, and Nova Scotia, are closer to modern version of the Third Way mould of social democracy.

The Third Way implies moving away from some of the traditional elements of social democracy by supporting partial privatization of public sector enterprises and services and reductions in the regulations of the market. Those advocating this perspective include Bob Hawke, Paul Keating, Kevin Rudd in Australia; Tony Blair and Gordon Brown in the United Kingdom; Gerhard Schröder in Germany; Jens Stoltenberg in Norway; Göran Persson in Sweden; David Lange, Roger Douglas in New Zealand; Wim Kok in the Netherlands; and Ricardo Lagos in Chile.

The Third Way involves the pragmatic adaptation of social democracy to the realities of the modern world. It was difficult for most of the social democratic parties to survive on the basis of postwar Bretton Woods consensus in the wake of rising consumerism and middle-class aspirations. In the United Kingdom, for example, the Labour Party was rejected four times consecutively between 1979 and 1992. Tony Blair and his supporters had to disassociate from the strong democratic socialists incarnations of their parties to fight the emergence of neoliberalism in the form of Thatcherism and Reaganomics. Many social democrats tolerated economic disparities as inevitable. Many other countries, without the tradition of social democracy, such as the United States, still have certain regulatory programs, such as Medicare, welfare, and environmental protection.

Surprisingly, both the right and the left criticized the social democrats. The right criticized them for restricting individual freedoms, regulating the market at the cost of economic efficiency, and promoting wider choice as a result of budget deficits and taxing the middle class more as the rich resorted to what some called "tax evasion through sophisticated accounting." The left criticized the social democrats for being an obstacle to radical reforms. For instance, Tony Blair (UK), Gerhard Schröder (Germany), and Göran Persson (Sweden) were criticized for violating the principles of social justice and equity by implementing privatization of the welfare state and deregulation of the economy. Nevertheless, the social democrats succeeded in raising the living standards of the masses, increasing social mobility, enhancing the powers of the workers and the consumers, stabilizing the economy by providing social security, and eliminating extreme poverty.

See also *Social Democracy.*

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Third World Debt

Since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, some consider the expression *third world* out-of-date. It was used in the past to describe countries that did not belong to the Soviet bloc or to the Western European and U.S. capitalist bloc. These countries are now called *emerging markets, developing countries,* or *emerging democracies,* the latter a term also used for former communist countries. The poorest nations are often called countries in transition.

Most of these countries have external debt, which according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the United Nations Development Program, grew fourfold from 1980 to 2000. Interest on the debt increased from $75.4 billion to $317.2 billion, an average increase of 13 to 15 percent. Data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) show that the total external debt of emerging market and developing countries reached $2.93 trillion in 2004. The IMF estimates that, for 2007 and 2008, the total external debt for these countries will reach $3.5 and $3.8 trillion, respectively. These two figures correspond to an average of 25 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP).

The more optimistic analyst could see the IMF numbers for the emerging countries as promising, because the external debt as a percentage of GDP decreased from 33 percent

in 2004 to 24 percent in 2008. However, the IMF includes countries that face very different situations in the same group. For example, countries such as China, India, Mexico, Brazil, and Russia—which are rapidly engaging in the international markets as important game players—are grouped with Sudan, Togo, Chad, and Uganda—countries that face serious political, economic, and social problems.

Recently, developing countries' private debt has increased more than their public debt. Globalization allows capital to flow easily from one country to the other, thus facilitating indebtedness from trade more quickly than loans from other governments or international organizations. As a consequence, in addition to external debt, most developing countries have very high domestic debt; they owe high interest and commissions to creditors. As a result, the gap between rich and poor widens.

The public resources retained to pay debt vary according to how a developing country's government manages its foreign debt. Debt prevents governments from investing in basic and strategic infrastructure such as education, health, sanitation, roads, and ports that spur private enterprise and speed development. The United Nations Children's Fund estimates that in 2007, thirteen children died every day as a result of third world public debt. Private debt may also be an impediment, because governments frequently embrace or endorse it, or give companies discounts or privileges.

Some developing countries, such Argentina, which paid its debt, and Brazil have been struggling hard to relieve themselves of their external debt. The work groups formed by the Bank for International Settlements, the IMF, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the World Bank consider the *external vulnerability* of a country to judge the importance of a country's indebtedness. If a country regularly pays the price of its debt (i.e., interests and other additional costs) without incurring new debt, it has *sustainable indebtedness.* The work group also monitors the performance of the twenty-two poorest countries in the world by developing devices and policies that may lead them to sustainable indebtedness, if not to long-term sustainability.

See also *Emerging Democracies; Foreign Policy; Globalization; International Monetary Fund (IMF).*

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Thomas Aquinas

Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225–1274) was an Italian Christian philosopher and theologian. Born into wealth and possessing royal connections, he became a Dominican friar after his father died, to the displeasure of his family. After studying in Naples and Paris, he became a respected teacher in Paris. He also taught in Rome and established a Dominican house of studies in Naples. He had an "experience" during a church mass at the end of his life that caused him to believe his work was insignificant, and he ceased to write after completing over sixty works. Aquinas was canonized by Pope John XXII on July 18, 1323. His political thought can be found in his *Summa Theologiae* (1947), Peter Lombard's *Sentences* (1484), commentaries on philosopher Aristotle's *Ethics* (2001) and *Politics* (1962), and a treatise by Giles of Rome titled *De Regimine Principum* (2008).

Until Aquinas brought Aristotle from Islam back into Western intellectual discourse, Western thought had relied on the Bible, principles put forth by Christian theologian Augustine of Hippo and ancient Greek philosopher Plato, and Neoplatonism. The church had banned Aristotle as contradictory to Christian teaching, but Aquinas synthesized the two and proposed there was no fundamental incompatibility between them. Aquinas assumed a Christian metaphysic and that the world is governed by divine providence and natural law, whereby the rational person participates in the divine purpose by obeying the natural law even when denying God. The role Aquinas gives natural law has attracted great interest in political theory.

A sophisticated analysis of virtue is core to Aquinas's thinking. Self-preservation and pursuit of God's knowledge direct human actions, with the goal of life being happiness ultimately found in God in the afterlife. Virtue is the disposition to do the right thing for the right reason, Aquinas contended, and the cultivation of virtue is the primary political end.

The political writings of Aquinas have been variously interpreted as absolutist, monarchist, republican, and mixed constitutionalist. Aquinas argued humanity needs social organization, which in contemporary times means the state. As a complete community in which members are also members of the church, the state must promote the common good. Aquinas portrays political life as natural to humanity, with government as the supreme person or body with power limited by jurisdiction, the common good, and the church. Church leaders have no jurisdiction over secular matters and the state has no right to direct religious affairs, unless the peace and justice of the state is wronged. Aquinas saw kingship as the best form of government, though the people should participate to avoid tyranny. The ruler must promote unity and peace, best achieved by one rather than many. Aquinas thus preserves the participatory nature of the Greek polis and the unity of rule found in the medieval kingdom.

Aquinas believed people are morally obliged to obey just laws and disobey unjust laws. State-authorized morally wrong acts are void and have no effect, suggesting grounds for forcible resistance, including a private right to kill the tyrant as a form of self-defense. An enduring element of Aquinas's thought is the just war theory. War is a just means to achieving peace, not as a virtue in itself but as an end. A just war must satisfy the three criteria of having the sovereign's authority, a

just cause, and a right intention. Aquinas also examined justice in its distributive and commutative forms and offered thoughts on economic justice, including the just wage.

Aquinas is often passed over in political study, as scholars skip from Aristotle to the Enlightenment; however, he has deeply influenced political thought, especially Catholic social thought, and the Christian Democratic parties of Europe and Latin America. His enduring contribution may be his rejection of an Augustinian tendency to treat government as a result of the fall—the doctrine that humanity became bound by sin through Adam and separated from God, offering a *via medea* (middle way) between conservative religious suspicion of rationalism and radical suspicion of divinity.

See also *Aristotle; Church and State; Just War Theory; Natural Law; Religion and Politics; Thomist, Scholastic, and Medieval Political Thought.*

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Thomist, Scholastic, and Medieval Political Thought

Between 1100 and 1400, the rudiments of a distinctively European approach to political theory, based on ancient Greco-Roman and Christian sources, and also the Arab and Jewish traditions, emerged in the writings of Latin authors. These texts framed the development of political ideas that remained influential well into the modern period of Western European history.

KINGSHIP

During the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, little direct familiarity with the main political philosophies of pagan antiquity existed: The works of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero were for the most part unavailable. Thinkers were thus compelled to cobble together the few known sources of classical political thought with the teachings of the Bible and of church fathers, such as Augustine, in order to invent a new approach to understanding government and public affairs appropriate to the emerging forms of territorial centralization and urbanization. Roman law doctrines, such as the teaching that the ruler was *legibus solutuis* (a law unto himself), were combined with Christian views about the divine origins of natural and human law to create a vision of governmental office as responsible to and limited by the common good, yet simultaneously answerable to no earthly power. Monarchy was assumed to be the only legitimate form of rulership; the king and his mirror image, the tyrant, were seen to be agents

of God. What distinguished them were the moral and spiritual orientations of their respective wills: The king personally acknowledged a binding duty to submit to law and to serve the welfare of his subjects; the tyrant rejected justice and mercy in favor of self-will and personal aggrandizement.

The English churchman John of Salisbury (ca. 1115–1180) exemplified this trend in his book, the *Policraticus.* John proposed an extended analogy between the political community and the natural human body that included all of the main elements of medieval society, including the king, the nobility, the royal servants (i.e., judges and tax collectors), soldiers, and peasants and artisans. When a good ruler governed, the body politic was ordained toward virtue and salvation as well as earthly well-being. However, when a tyrant came to power, vice and impiety reigned. Although John held that the tyrant's government reflected God's punishment of wicked mankind, he also countenanced the legitimacy of the killing of tyrannical rulers by their subjects under certain specified conditions.

THE ARISTOTELIAN REVIVAL

During the middle of the thirteenth century, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics* were translated into Latin and soon circulated widely throughout Europe. Within a few years, Aristotle's works had become the official textbooks for the study of political questions, albeit often supplemented by the commentaries of Arab philosophers, such as Avicenna and Averroes, and the writings of Jewish thinkers, especially Moses Maimonides. The rise of university education and a formal scholastic curriculum facilitated this transition. Thereafter, the political theorists of the Latin Middle Ages acknowledged Aristotle as the supreme authority on political life and governance, even when they ultimately disagreed with his conclusions.

Specifically, Aristotle's reappearance occasioned two important advances. First, his writings systematized the intellectual status of political science and related topics. Politics was henceforth conceived to be the "master science of the good," facilitating the practical fulfillment of human virtue and happiness by specifying the laws and systems of rule that promoted the greatest earthly felicity of human beings. In contrast to the lessons of St. Augustine, government came to be viewed as a positive force in temporal life, both because it educated people in the virtues and because it could serve and protect the Christian Church.

Second, Aristotle's works reopened the "constitutional" question about the nature of the best regime. A central theme of *Politics* concerned whether and under which conditions one form of just government—kingship, aristocracy, or polity (i.e., a mixed constitution)—might be preferable. Scholastic authors fiercely debated this issue. Some of them, such as Giles of Rome (ca. 1243–1316) and John of Paris (ca. 1240–1306), held that kingship was best suited to pursue the ends of political life because it was the most "natural" form of rule, or because it had a long history or a divine inspiration that justified its legitimacy. Others—such as St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), in his major treatise, the

Summa Theologiae, and Ptolemy of Lucca (ca. 1236–1327)—advocated a mixed, republican, regime as the preferable system of government. Some authors, like Dante (1265–1321) and Engelbert of Admont (ca. 1250–1331), even employed Aristotelian arguments to favor the rule of a universal empire. These differing views were always defended on the grounds that each was most consonant with the teachings of Aristotle and thus confirmed by his authority.

POLITICAL APPLICATIONS

Scholastic political theory during the later Middle Ages was by no means confined to dry and arcane academic debate devoted to uncovering the "real" doctrine of Aristotle. Many political treatises were devoted to taking sides in the deep disputes between the church and the earthly powers, as well as within the church itself, that roiled the period. For example, prominent teachers associated with the University of Paris wrote numerous tracts favoring or opposing the claims of the French king Philip IV to tax the property of the church without the permission of the pope. Likewise, the conflict between the Franciscan order and the papacy concerning the question of "spiritual poverty" led authors to apply scholastic lessons to the constitution of the church, especially in regard to the powers enjoyed by the pope.

The most famous late medieval example of scholastic engagement with the affairs of church and earthly government is probably the *Defensor pacis* (Defender of the Peace), written by Marsilius of Padua (ca. 1275–1343), finished in 1324. Using the language of Aristotle's *Politics,* Marsilius produced an extensive defense of the autonomy of temporal communities from the control or interference of the church with regard to the creation of law and the appointment of rulers. Moreover, he argued that the ultimate authority in ecclesiastical matters was a general council representing the entire body of Christian faithful, thus directly attacking and undercutting the claim of papal supremacy.

See also *Aristotle; Greek Political Thought, Ancient; Maritain, Jacques; Political Thought, Foundations of; Roman Political Thought; Thomas Aquinas.*

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Thoreau, Henry David

Henry David Thoreau (1817–1862) remains politically salient due to his essays "A Plea for Captain John Brown," "Slavery in Massachusetts," "The Last Days of John Brown," and his energetic defense of "Civil Disobedience." He also derived significant notoriety from his writings on nature and his relationship with the transcendentalist movement, especially the poet Ralph Waldo Emerson. As Emerson noted in his eulogy, however, Thoreau aimed "at a more comprehensive calling, the art of living well" (53). Like Socrates, Thoreau lived the "examined life," most especially in his famous autobiographical reflections *Walden* (1854).

"Civil Disobedience" (1849) has had an enduring legacy; for instance, Mahatma Gandhi stated simply that "it left a deep impression upon me" (71). In it, Thoreau articulated the first theoretical argument for a form of resistance to oppression and tyranny that did not depend upon force of arms. Thoreau was not a Gandhi or a Martin Luther King Jr., though he did spend a night in jail for refusing to pay a tax out of protest for the U.S. invasion of Mexico as well as slavery. In fact, Thoreau's critique of the state is reminiscent of the anarchist tradition; it is more a general opposition to tyranny than a simple opposition to slavery or war.

Thoreau believed that there were two ways to judge human laws, either by expediency or by individual conscience. By expediency, Thoreau meant a simple majority of the electorate. Thoreau made it clear that, for him, individual consciousness meant far more than legislations, which regularly made men "the agents of injustice." These two different judgments—by expediency or by conscience—lead either to obedience or to disobedience. Thoreau, in *Walden and Civil Disobedience,* writes that "if [the injustice] is of such a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another, then, I say, break the law" (396).

From Thoreau's viewpoint, true power stems from the willing cooperation of people: "If *one* honest man, in this State of Massachusetts, *ceasing to hold slaves,* were actually to withdraw from this copartnership, and be locked up in the county jail therefore, it would be the abolition of slavery in America" (397).

Though Gandhi and other practitioners of nonviolent resistance to oppression have admired Thoreau for this sentiment, Thoreau's increasing antislavery activism led him to endorse violent resistance as well. Thoreau praised abolitionist John Brown, the leader of the unsuccessful raid on Harper's Ferry, Virginia (1859) as quoted in Milton Meltzer's *Thoreau: People, Principles, and Politics,* "like the best of those who stood at Concord Bridge . . . only he was firmer and higher-principled. . . ." (115). Thoreau wholeheartedly embraced Brown's attempt to use of violence to end slavery in the United States, but he died in 1862, before Abraham

Lincoln's 1863 Emancipation Proclamation and before the end of the bloody U.S. Civil War (1861–1865) brought to the end of slavery throughout the country.

See also *Anarchism; Civil Disobedience; Freedom of Conscience.*

. . . . AMENTAHRU WAHLRAB

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Threat Perception

Threat perception in international politics is an enduringly important problem that has been somewhat slighted in recent years, in part because cold war rivalries tended to reduce uncertainty about the source of threat. By the end of the twentieth century, however, changes in the international environment—such as the end of the cold war itself, the demise of bipolarity, and the rise of nonstate sources of danger—made the question of how to identify threats increasingly pressing.

Traditionally, threat perception has been linked to national security and defined in terms of the capabilities and intentions of a potential adversary state; these can be further subdivided into such factors as the military balance, geographical proximity, and past and current behavior. A classic statement of the traditional view of threat perception was set down by Eyre Crowe of the British Foreign Office in his 1907 memorandum on British relations with Germany and France:

> History shows that the danger threatening the independence of this or that nation has generally arisen, at least in part, out of the momentary predominance of a neighbouring State at once militarily powerful, economically efficient, and ambitious to extend its frontiers or spread its influence. The danger being directly proportionate to the degree of its power and efficiency, and to the spontaneity or "inevitableness" of its ambitions.

Those who studied threat perception in the twentieth century, for the most part, adhered to this traditional model, while also developing many of the concepts that emerged in later work. Klaus Knorr, for example, pointed out that despite a common belief that it is relatively easy to perceive threats accurately, there are, in fact, numerous obstacles to doing so. For one thing, information about possible dangers may be unreliable, owing to its ambiguity or to deliberate attempts to deceive. For another, such information is likely to be interpreted by individuals according to what they already believe. Taking a different approach, Raymond Cohen stressed the importance for the perception of threat of a state's realization that another state had somehow broken the "rules of the game" of international politics. That is, for Cohen, the violation of a norm serves as a catalyst of threat perception in the sense that such behavior is linked to the expectation of future aggressiveness.

Subsequently, the traditional model of threat perception has received at least one serious challenge, as well as a spirited defense. Neorealists, led by Kenneth Waltz, focused exclusively on capability, holding that it is by far the most reliable indicator of threat and denying the need to be concerned with intentions at all. Given the anarchic structure of the international system, states must assume that those who can do harm, will. This assumption is, of course, likely to reinforce the preexisting tendency of decision makers to engage in worst-case analysis. In contrast to this view, Stephen Walt, while acknowledging the importance of offensive capabilities, theorized that states pay special attention to the aggressiveness of potential opponents, thus focusing the discussion once again on the "crucial role" of intent.

More recently, psychological approaches have contributed a number of insights to the understanding of threat perception. These approaches emphasize the role of the personalities of decision makers and their beliefs, including the cognitive and motivated biases that influence how threat is or is not perceived. In decision theory, threat perception can also be analyzed as part of the general area of problem diagnosis.

With respect to the various psychological biases affecting threat perception, the most compelling cognitive factor is, as Robert Jervis has stressed, the tendency of people's expectations to color their perceptions. Thus, "the decision maker who thinks that the other side is probably hostile will see ambiguous information as confirming this image, whereas the same information about a country thought to be friendly would be taken more benignly" (Jervis 1985, 18). This type of belief can have many different origins. One of the most important is the impact of international history, especially lessons drawn from a country's most recent war. Motivated biases may be determined by "the needs of decision makers and their states" (25). Domestic politics is often thought to be the source of this type of motivated bias.

While traditional sources of threat persist, recent developments, particularly the rise of terrorism and nonstate sources of threat that often have no discernible political goals, have made threat perception more difficult to analyze. The recent interdisciplinary interest in studying threat perception is, therefore, a welcome development.

See also *Decision Theory, Foundations of; Nonstate Actors; Terrorism, Political; Terrorism, State-sponsored.*

. . . . BARBARA FARNHAM

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Thucydides

Thucydides, son of Olorus (ca. 460–400 BCE), was a Greek author and historian. In spite of the renown of his *History of the Peloponnesian War* (1629), relatively little is known about him. The best available information, then, comes from his work in *History.* Rough evidence of his date of birth is provided by his remark that he lived through the entire war, which lasted from 431 to 404 BCE, "being of an age to understand what was happening." The apparent defensiveness expressed suggests that, although mature, he was relatively young when the war began and so probably less than thirty years old. Thucydides reports that he lived through the entire war, witnessing the final defeat of Athens in 404 BCE. However, *History* covers events only up until 411 BCE, and the final book, Book 8, is incomplete, which suggests that Thucydides died soon after the war ended. In his work, Thucydides reports owning gold mines in Thrace, and this fact, along with his election as general, suggests an upper-class background.

History of the Peloponnesian War has a strong claim to being the first extant "scientific" history. Thucydides corrects factual errors of his predecessors and takes pride in the care he took to assess his sources for accuracy. He also moves away from divine explanations of the events he witnessed, for example, attributing the outbreak of the war to "the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta."

An outstanding feature of *History* is Thucydides's use of speeches to reflect the thinking of the war's participants. The juxtaposition of the political leaders' reasoning and the relevant events produced powerful literary effects. In describing his method of reporting speeches, Thucydides says that, while he attempted to keep "as closely as possible to the general sense of the words that were actually used," he also made the speakers say "what, in my opinion, was called for by each situation." The clear conflict between these two remarks raises difficult issues of interpretation, although the language of all the speeches is clearly Thucydides's own. Many of the speeches have achieved independent renown. These include the Book 2 celebration of Athens in the funeral speech delivered by Athenian statesman and general Pericles, and the so-called Melian dialogue, in which unnamed Athenian envoys invoke brutal power politics to persuade representatives of Melos to surrender to Athens. According to the Athenians, "The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept." Views along these lines, expressed by numerous figures in *History,* have given Thucydides a claim to be a founder of political realism.

Aside from invaluable, detailed information on the Peloponnesian War and surrounding events, *History of the Peloponnesian War* provides a bitingly critical account of Athenian democracy. The Athenian population is depicted as highly emotional and inconsistent, easily swayed by self-interested orators. According to Thucydides, the power and success of Athens was due to the restraining influence of Pericles. Although the city was nominally a democracy, "Power was really in the hands of the first citizen." In spite of Thucydides's claims of objectivity, a strong case can be made that he shaped his account of the war to reflect badly on Athens's extreme democracy, as opposed to the kind of moderate oligarchy he claimed to favor.

See also Greek Democracy, Classical; Greek Political Thought, Ancient.

. . . .   GEORGE KLOSKO

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Tiananmen Square

Spread across an open space of 4,736,120 square feet (440,000 square meters) in Beijing, Tiananmen Square is the world's largest urban plaza. To its north is the Tiananmen, Gate of Heavenly Peace, which was originally built in the 1420s as the southern gateway to the Imperial City. With the end of imperial rule in 1911, the space quickly became a revolutionary symbol when university students gathered to protest against the Versailles Treaty on May 4, 1919. Mao Zedong formally proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the square on October 1, 1949. Since that time, Tiananmen Square has become the showcase of communist power with the construction of monumental structures both in and around the square while retaining its legacy as the site for popular protests.

These contradictory roles exploded in 1989 when university students launched the largest grassroots protest in the history of the PRC. From April 15 to June 4, these students, later joined by workers, demanded political reform, including an end to rampant corruption. The movement was put down abruptly when the army was called in to disperse the crowd by force. The final death toll was never confirmed, with estimates ranging from the Chinese government's estimate of two hundred to three thousand by other independent sources. To this day, the 1989 Tiananmen protest remains a tightly censored subject in China.

See also Protests and Demonstrations; Student Politics.

. . . .   THERESA M. LEE

Ticket Splitting

Ticket splitting results when voters cast their ballots for candidates from different parties during a single election. There are two main forms of ticket splitting. *Vertical ticket splitting* occurs when a voter chooses candidates from different parties for office at various levels of government. For instance, a voter may support the candidate of one party at the national level, but a candidate from a rival party at the local or regional level. *Horizontal ticket splitting* occurs when voters endorse different candidates for similar offices. For example, a voter in a mixed-member system might endorse one party in the proportional list and a candidate from another party in the constituency race. Ticket splitting is generally a manifestation of weak party affiliations and is more common when individual parties have divisions or policy disputes. However, it may also reflect differences in the appeal of individual candidates. In the two-party system in the United States, vertical ticket splitting is common with voters often supporting one party in Congress, but the other party in presidential contests. Some scholars suggest that ticket splitting is often a deliberate voting strategy designed to achieve or maintain a balance in government.

See also *Party Identification; Voting Behavior.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Time–series Analysis

Time-series data are repeated, regularly spaced measurements over time. *Time-series analysis* is designed to leverage the longitudinal information contained in such data and involves examining questions about the effect of interventions on the data series and relationships among series. A starting point for time-series analysis is the characterization of the data-generating process (DGP). Determining whether the DGP is stationary, fractionally integrated, or integrated is an important first step. If a series is stationary, there is no systematic change in the mean or variance, and no strict periodic variations. Because most probability theory on time series is concerned with the case of a stationary series, analysis typically requires turning a nonstationary time series into a stationary one. An integrated or fractionally integrated series can be made stationary by differencing or fractionally differencing. Fractional integration provides a flexible characterization of the DGP by relaxing knife-edged distinctions between stationary and nonstationary series. Differencing to obtain a stationary series—or fractionally differencing with more precision— avoids spurious regression problems.

Error correction models are a common time-series approach and allow analysts to discuss both short- and long-term relationships among series. Vector autoregression is also popular, in particular due to its handling of endogeneity; it is less restrictive than structural equation techniques, as it does not impose exogeneity assumptions. Finally, generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic models are prominent, and can be used to account for heteroskedasticity or volatility in a series.

See also *Quantitative Analysis.*

JANET BOX-STEFFENSMEIER
. . . . AND ANAND E. SOKHEY

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Tocqueville, Alexis de

Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) was a French philosopher trained in law, political philosophy, and history. His *Democracy in America,* first published in 1835, provided an incisive look into the character of America. Differentiating the American system from European systems, Tocqueville discerned in the American people a strong ethic of industry coupled with the tempering influence of religion and community. Tocqueville's keen observations and thorough documentation of the idiosyncrasies of the country established him as one of America's foremost political theorists.

Tocqueville was born into a well-bred family in Paris on July 29, 1805. His parents were both descendents of European nobility, and he enjoyed the trappings of aristocratic wealth in the form of private tutors and frequent traveling before enrolling in the College Royal in Metz at the age of sixteen. Over the course of the next several years, he studied philosophy, history, theology, and law. After obtaining a law degree, he gained a junior position on the Versailles court of law, serving as a deputy judge. He was soon sent to America to study the country's penitentiary system. With the July Revolution of 1830, in which French king Charles X abdicated power, Tocqueville became apprehensive about France's drift toward democracy. He, therefore, became highly interested in learning how America checked its own democratic excesses, gleaning from its government lessons for France's own development.

Arriving in America with his former classmate and fellow magistrate, Gustave de Beaumont, Tocqueville spent a total of nine weeks traveling around the country researching and recording the intricacies of American government at the height of the Jacksonian era. Observing the role of the federal government and local governments working in concert, Tocqueville also was able to see the significance of religion at the local level in bestowing the community's necessary balance to counteract the materialism so constituent of the modern commercial society.

The first of two volumes of *Democracy in America* was published in 1835 to widespread acclaim. In it, Tocqueville outlined in cool, detached prose the political makeup of America, often playing it against the monarchies and fragile aristocracies in Europe. *Democracy in America* paints the picture of a functioning republic that checks the tyranny of the democratic majority through the institutions of local government aided by distant, independent-minded federal legislators who weigh the rights of all the citizenry. The second volume, released in 1840, analyzed democracy and social equality in more general terms and drew a more subdued public reaction.

Following the release of the two volumes, Tocqueville returned to France, serving in the French Academy and the Constituent Assembly following the French Revolution of 1848. He continued to emphasize the importance of the role of religion in society and denounced French military expansionism. Exiled from politics following Louis-Napoleon's coup, Tocqueville spent the last few years of his life writing a history of the follies of the French Revolution. He died of tuberculosis in Cannes on April 16, 1859.

See also: *French Political Thought; Political Economy; Politics, Comparative; Religion and Politics.*

. . . .   CLYDE RAY

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Toleration

Toleration—derived from the Latin verb *tolerare,* menaing to endure, to bear with—refers to "a deliberate choice not to interfere with conduct which is disapproved" (Horton and Nicholson 1992, 2). The term is generally used to describe the actions of both individuals and governments, and an extensive scholarly literature has explored the attitudinal structures, personal characteristics, and developmental influences that lead people to tolerate, to combine a negative judgment about something with a conscious decision not to interfere with or suppress it. Historians of political thought have explored the emergence of arguments and policies that either support or oppose policies of toleration, while empirical studies have focused on the shifting boundaries of the tolerable and intolerable, along with the dynamics that lead to the suppression of civil and political rights for members of unpopular minorities.

Toleration is a largely negative and minimal term; that is, it refers to the *absence* of something—coercion or punishment—and thus falls somewhere between persecution on the one hand and full liberty and equality on the other. Yet, this minimalist term has historically represented a crucial step in the protracted struggle for more expansive political rights. Tolerationist politics seeks to carve out a protected social space for unpopular groups, acknowledging the reality of diversity and disagreement within society; in this sense, a minimal term like toleration may require extensive government action to safeguard unpopular minorities. Reasons for tolerating vary widely and may include prudential, strategic, or instrumental considerations; religious convictions about the importance of free assent in matters of faith; weariness of the social costs of continued persecution; theories of epistemological skepticism or relativism; or philosophical commitments to autonomy as a fundamental value.

ORIGINS OF TOLERATION

Historically, toleration debates have most often been associated with matters of religion and have addressed the rights of marginalized or minority religious groups to worship undisturbed or persecuted. Scholars often trace the roots of toleration, especially in the liberal tradition, to the wars of religion in early modern Europe and to seventeenth-century England, where religious issues were intimately connected with the political disputes that led to the beheading of one king, Charles I, and the abdication of another, James II. Certainly, tolerationist systems of various sorts had existed in prior times and places: under the Roman Empire; in the Ottoman millet system, where religious communities received a measure of autonomy to order their own affairs; and in the work of medieval thinkers who envisioned adherents of diverse religions peacefully coexisting. But sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe saw two important and relatively simultaneous developments: the coalescence of a host of philosophical, political, psychological, theological, and economic arguments in favor of religious toleration and the political-military victory of protolerationist forces and, thus, the implementation of a measure of toleration in England, in France under the Edict of Nantes, and in other places across the continent.

Liberal theory has built its philosophical and political system on the primacy of toleration as a blueprint for addressing socially divisive phenomena. John Locke's *Letter Concerning Toleration* (1690) is generally considered the most prominent liberal defense of religious toleration, yet the importance of Locke's formulation lies not in its originality, but in the way that Locke digested over a century's worth of tolerationist arguments, and in the influence his work had on Jefferson and others in the American context. Indeed, Locke was just one of many important sixteenth- and seventeenth-century figures (e.g., Montaigne, Bayle, Spinoza, Milton, and Castellio) who contributed to the spread of tolerationist ideas in Europe. In the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* (1859) broadened this defense of free religion and speech into a theory that championed the rights of individuals to act on their deepest beliefs in all matters that did not result in direct harm to others.

The liberal constitutionalist tradition, which owes such a debt to Lockean and Millian thought, places toleration at its cornerstone, a fundamental element of legitimate government:

In the words of David A. J. Richards, toleration lies "at the very moral heart of the dignity of constitutional law" (1986). John Rawls self-consciously styled his political liberalism on the model of Locke and claimed that his system "completes and extends" the struggle for toleration that began in early modern Europe (154). But questions of toleration extend beyond religion into other areas of social and political life, wherever unpopular or controversial groups face a hostile environment and stand in need of protection from state interference or menacing by their enemies. Over time, tolerationist arguments have been employed in attempts to protect groups marginalized on account of gender, sexual orientation, unpopular political views, and race.

CRITICISM OF TOLERATION

At the same time, the concept of toleration has not been without its detractors. Critical theorists have objected to the fact that "tolerance" of differences leaves in place powerful social disparities that remain uncontested because of its focus on the maximization of individual choice. Postmodern theorists and those seeking a more positive celebration of difference often criticize toleration as insufficient, grudging, and unsuitable for the complete respect of difference. Toleration, in this view, grants permission for difference but does not praise or affirm it.

Such critiques possess a degree of truth—even its defenders often admit that toleration is an "old-fashioned ideal" (Gray 1995, 27)—yet toleration's benefits should not be overlooked, such as the cessation of violence and persecution between groups with long histories of violence and the extension of basic political and institutional protections to unpopular groups. Toleration, according to this view, represents a necessary though not always sufficient political achievement. Surely the tolerationist ideal recognizes that political theory and practice involve the gradual, often halting, and always contested extension of civil and political rights, and the tradition of toleration continues to play a central role in the ongoing struggle for human freedom and dignity.

See also *Constitutional Democracy; Liberal Theory; Locke, John; Mill, John Stuart.*

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Tolstoy, Leo

Leo (Lev) N. Tolstoy (1828–1910) was one of the world's greatest novelists and exercised great social influence in his native Russia. In addition to fiction, his writings touched upon politics, religion, history, and philosophy, and he also lobbied for social and political reforms in Russia.

Tolstoy was born in Yasnaya Polyana, south of Moscow, into a family of the Russian nobility. His parents died when he was a child, and he was brought up by relatives. In 1844 he started his studies at Kazan University, but he dropped out, eventually joining the army in 1851.

Tolstoy began his literary career in the 1850s, and his first stories were based on his military experiences in the Caucasus region and in the Crimean War (1853–1856). Afterward, he traveled in Europe but returned to Yasnaya Polyana, where he started a school for peasant children. With the exception of a brief period in the 1860s, Tolstoy did not move in Russian literary circles, which were dominated by Western-oriented progressives. Tolstoy, in contrast, put his faith in the Russian peasantry.

His most famous work, *War and Peace,* appeared between 1865 and 1869. It is centered on Russia's experience during the Napoleonic invasion and includes over five hundred characters, including French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte and Russia's tsar Alexander I. Considered an exemplar of realistic fiction, the novel celebrated Russian traditions and the common citizen while advancing the idea that history cannot be shaped by even the most powerful leaders. Instead, Tolstoy suggests that all is predetermined and that humans only believe they have free will. Tolstoy's other epic work is *Anna Karenina*

(1873–1877), a critique of the life of the gentry and a reflection on the quest to give meaning to life. He produced numerous other novels and short stories, many of which, such as *The Death of Ivan Ilyich* (1886) and *Master and Man* (1895), stress the virtues of the Russian peasant and how individuals must assume a social responsibility beyond themselves.

In his later life, Tolstoy's writings acquired a more explicitly philosophical, social, and religious orientation. He acquired a worldwide reputation as a great moral thinker, adopting pacifism; Christian anarchism, for which he was excommunicated by the Russian Orthodox Church; and utopian communism. He committed himself to the belief that, as quoted in the 1978 Edmonds translation of *War and Peace,* "The one thing necessary, in life as in art, is to tell the truth." He ran afoul of the tsarist authorities for his political and moral views, and some of his publications were banned. Despite having over a dozen children, he railed against the institution of marriage, and in 1884 he left Yasnaya Polyana with the idea that he would become a poor, celibate peasant. His religious beliefs, gathered in such works as *A Confession* (1884) and *The Kingdom of God Is within You* (1894), sought to turn to the moral teachings of Jesus, emphasizing compassion toward others and rejecting the authority of the church insofar as it was linked to an oppressive state. His estate became a place of pilgrimage for many who admired him, and he gained great moral authority. His writings on pacifism and the example of his life would influence American civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. and Indian pacifist Mahatma Gandhi. Tolstoy died of pneumonia in 1910 while following his urge to become a poor, wandering ascetic.

See also *Pacifism and Conscientious Objection; Religion and Politics; Russian Political Thought.*

. . . . PAUL JAMES KUBICEK

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Torture

The United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment defines *torture* as

> any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of

having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.

Torture may be physical or psychological and is unique from other forms of punishment in its severity. While torture is almost universally condemned by civilized nations and societies as a barbaric practice, it continues to be used and its effectiveness debated.

Throughout history, torture has been used against prisoners of war, slaves, foreigners, and even citizens. The ancient Egyptians and Greeks tortured prisoners of war, though historical records show that the Greeks rarely did the same to free citizens. The torture of citizens was not generally used during ancient Rome's early period either, except for the crime of treason, but starting with the reigns of Tiberius and Caligula, the torture of citizens, slaves, and foreigners became more frequent. Despite the early Christian resistance to it under Roman rule, torture was institutionalized by the Catholic Church in medieval times through the infamous Inquisition. Torture became legitimized in many European nations in the twelfth century, but reform movements in the eighteenth century resulting from the work of such notable intellectuals as the French philosopher and writer Voltaire and the Italian criminologist Cesare Beccaria, who wrote *On Crimes and Punishments* (1764), culminated in the general abolition of torture. The practice, however, continued to endure. In the twentieth century, torture was an official tool of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. More recently, the United States came under criticism for the torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Despite its continued use, torture is prohibited by numerous national and international laws and treaties. The primary international treaty against torture is the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to which the United States is a signatory. The United States further prohibits torture as a criminal act under the Torture Act of 2000; yet an August 2002 Department of Justice memo noted that the torture of terrorist suspects abroad "may be justified" in the global war on terror.

DEFINING TORTURE

Since the scandals of Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib prison, and extraordinary rendition in the United States, politicians, academics, and the law have failed to adequately define torture. Throughout the 1990s and since the millennium, numerous definitions of torture have been advanced, including memos by advisers to President George W. Bush that provided a limited definition of torture, allowing physical and psychological abuse of persons just short of death. United States law, in the Torture Act of 2000, defines torture as "an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict serve physical or mental pain or suffering

(other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or control."

The problem with this definition and that of the United Nations (UN) convention is that they do not state what specific acts constitute torture. For example, the George W. Bush administration employed waterboarding, which simulates drowning, as a lawful interrogation technique even though most authorities consider it a form of torture. Indeed, at the end of World War II (1939–1945) Japanese military officers were executed for employing waterboarding, and U.S. military personnel, prior to the Bush administration, have been court-martialed for using it.

Some of the more well-known methods of torture include the rack, where a person is strapped to a table and tied to wheels at both ends, whereupon the victim is stretched until the joints dislocate; the strappado, where a person's arms are tied behind the back and then the victim is tied to a rope through a pulley attached to the ceiling until the shoulders dislocate; the ripping out of finger and toenails; the burning of flesh and blinding with hot irons; the attachment and activation of electric cables to a person's genitalia; and the deprivation of food, water, and sleep. Some authorities try to justify torture as a gradation of the harms caused. Even the UN convention and U.S. law recognizes that torture involves serious or severe harm and not minor incidental injuries, such as bruising, to lawful punishments.

DEBATE AND JUSTIFICATIONS

In the early twenty-first century, the debate concerning the propriety of torture centers upon whether it is justified in the face of modern threats such as terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction. Some uphold that torture is justified to prevent possible terrorist attacks. The primary justification for this position is the balancing of the harms done to a few people subject to torture against the potential harm to hundreds or thousands from a conventional weapons attack or a nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological attack. Most, but not all, authorities and laws hold the position that torture is never justified. Some critics claim that a person subjected to torture may confess to anything to make the torture stop, making the confessions unreliable.

Another major issue is that of extraordinary rendition, in which a nation where torture is prohibited transfers its prisoners for interrogation to other countries that do permit torture. Though the practice is illegal under the UN convention as well as under U.S. law, extraordinary rendition was allowed under the administration of Bill Clinton and increased dramatically under President George W. Bush, when more than one hundred foreign nationals were transferred to countries such as Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and Afghanistan for interrogation. The practice continued early in the administration of President Barack Obama.

While the United States is often used as an example, it is not unique in its use of torture against suspects. Many nations around the world today, from the Americas to Asia, violate regional and international laws as they engage in torture of both foreigners and citizens. Among them are Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, China, and North Korea.

See also *Corruption and Other Political Pathologies; Interstate Rendition; Justice and Injustice.*

. . . . WM. C. PLOUFFE JR.

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Totalitarianism

Totalitarianism is an ideal that, in practice, applies to any regime that promotes total control of a people in pursuit of the ideological goals of the leadership. Totalitarian rulers seek control through the elimination or co-optation of independent business groups, labor unions, religious bodies, educational institutions, and challengers to the regime, such as legislators from competing political parties or an independent judiciary.

Totalitarianism is a twentieth-century phenomenon. Notable totalitarian regimes include Italy under Benito Mussolini (1922–1943), Germany under Adolph Hitler (1933–1945), and the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin (1922–1953). Mussolini applied the term to his own regime, and Hannah Arendt (1951) used it to show parallels between Nazi Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union.

Origins of the concept may be traced to Aristotle's normative distinction in *Politics* between good and bad forms of government. However, the characteristics of this distinction also yield empirical attributes. Good governments were those ruled in the public interest—of all those governed. All classes were represented, and law was supreme. Bad governments were administered in the private interest of the ruler or ruling class, and the will of the ruler was supreme.

Aristotle identified six major forms of government, two of which involved the rule of many: *polity,* the good form, and its bad counterpart, *democracy.* In the seventeenth century, polity began its evolution into constitutional democracy, which is democratic because voters choose representatives in competitive elections and constitutional because government power is limited and the rights of individuals and groups are protected by law. A metaideology of the center, it includes liberalism, conservatism, and democratic socialism. Aristotle's notion of democracy developed into what Jacob L. Talmon (1952) termed *totalitarian democracy,* a metaideology of the extremes that includes orthodox communism on the left and fascism on the right. It arose to secure goals that constitutional democracy

could not: the articulation of the true will of all the people, which is expressed in utopian economic and social goals, rather than the "merely formal" political and legal goals of constitutional democracy. A totalitarian democracy is democratic because its governments claim to rule in the real interest of many, even while barring competitive elections, and it is totalitarian because an elite minority, which allows no rights against the regime's interests, controls government.

Some key characteristics of totalitarian democracy are

1. An ideology that promises a final solution to the problems of modernity by instituting a radical and revolutionary new order. It promotes a messianic civil religion that projects a utopian future of a united and happy multitude, based on the total reshaping of people and society. It also evinces relentless hostility to constitutional democracy in any of its permutations. Individual freedoms, rule of law, and open and competitive elections are anathema; ideology requires conformity, atomization of the masses, and unlimited regulation of everyday behavior.

2. A monopoly of violence, including control of the military and a terror system centered on secret police organizations that engage in widespread surveillance and punishment of suspected opponents.

3. State cooptation and control—collaboratively if possible, violently if necessary—of the economy, including raw materials and finished goods, business, and labor.

4. An elite one-party system tasked to staff the state's bureaucracy.

5. State monopoly of information and communication to promote propaganda in support of the regime and to minimize vocal opposition.

6. A charismatic, almost divine leader as the focus of a cult of invincibility, designed to make the leader invulnerable to opposition or criticism.

7. Imperialist conquest as necessary to achieve utopian goals.

Totalitarianism of the right, or fascism, differs significantly from orthodox communism of the left. The right limits citizenship to males of one nation, race, or religion. It is reactionary, maintaining a traditional class structure, permanent ruling elite, and mythic past. It permits regulated private ownership and enterprise.

Totalitarianism of the left is universalist and revolutionary. It looks to the future, and all are welcome to join the crusade, regardless of race, religion, or gender. Major goals include the abolition of private property, religion, and classes in favor of the full economic and social equality of all members. In the society of the future, the state will disappear along with its oppressive, coercive organs, which are merely temporary means to a utopian end.

See also *Communism; Constitutional Democracy; Ideologies, Political; Stalinism.*

. . . .   DONALD G. TANNENBAUM

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Town Hall Meeting

The town hall in New England is the setting for a meeting that is a traditional celebration of community and an egalitarian legislative assembly of voters who make all town policy decisions. This type of meeting stands sharply in contrast to the staged gatherings some American politicians loosely call "a town hall meeting," but at which no decisions are made.

The equivalent of a genuine town hall meeting is traceable to the age of Pericles in the city-state of Athens in the fifth century BCE and the canton of Appenzell Landsgemeinde in Switzerland in 1378. In 1630, a *folkmoot,* an assemblage of freemen, governed emerging towns in the Puritan-founded Massachusetts Bay Colony without authorization of the colony's governing body, which within five years recognized them by directing named towns to initiate specific actions.

PROCEDURES

The elected board of selectpersons issues the warrant for the annual meeting typically held in the spring or for a special town meeting. The annual meeting warrant contains articles relating to the election of town officers and business matters, and voters may place articles in the warrant by petition. In many towns, a civic group hosts a meeting before the formal town meeting to discuss the warrant and to answer questions.

The elected moderator presides in an impartial and orderly manner to ensure voters understand warrant articles. Many warrant articles are routine, but others may be exceptionally controversial and necessitate an adjourned session or sessions to reach a decision on each. The amount of authority exercisable by a town hall meeting varies: Vermont grants the least functional discretionary authority, and Maine grants the broadest such authority.

ADAPTATIONS AND DECLINE OF TOWN HALL MEETINGS

Population growth led Boston to abandon the meeting in favor of a mayor and city council in 1822. Other large Massachusetts towns followed Boston's lead until 1915, when the

General Court authorized a *representative town meeting (RTM)* conducted in the same manner as an open town meeting with one exception: Only elected representatives could vote. Currently, thirty-nine Massachusetts towns, six Connecticut towns, and one Vermont town have an RTM; Sanford, Maine adopted an RTM with partial authority.

Direct democracy still continues to function in each New England state. Massachusetts, for instance, has 262 towns with an open town meeting. However, voter participation has declined sharply except in the smallest towns. For example, by 1996, the average attendance at sixty New Hampshire town meetings was only 20 percent, with small towns (population below five hundred) having the highest turnout (38 percent).

Several factors have produced the decline in town hall debate and decision making. The population has become more mobile with an influx of citizens from cities and other regions of the country lacking experience with town meetings. In some cases, town officers fail to provide adequate explanations and information, compounding the integration of this new population. More options for entertainment can also distract interest from town meetings.

REFERENDUM MEETINGS

Disturbed by the falling attendance, a number of towns have begun providing child and elder care, expediting the processing of noncontroversial articles, and improving the efficiency of meetings through tighter moderating. Vermont was the first state to allow some towns to experiment with a form called *referendum meeting (RM),* held before voters cast a secret ballot on the articles in the warrant, while New Hampshire was the first state to offer all towns the option of instituting an RM. While the RM is held prior to the referendum and allows voters to raise questions, discuss warrant articles, and amend them, in the sixty-three New Hampshire towns and seventy-five school districts that have adopted it, attendance averages 3.5 percent, with town officers and committee members constituting 75 to 90 percent of the attendees. RMs have not spread beyond Vermont and New Hampshire.

CONCLUSION

Referendum town hall decisions, in theory, should have more legitimacy than ones made by a primary assembly in which a very small percentage of the voters participate. New Hampshire data reveal, however, average voter turnout at the polls varies from 27 to 30 percent. In fact, majority decisions could be made by an average of 15 to 16 percent of the voters.

The act of referendum decision making, in itself, has destroyed deliberate democracy, even though the designers included a preliminary deliberative session in an attempt to preserve this conventional feature of town meetings. The accountability of elected officers to the voters is a key tenet of democratic theory. Deliberative democracy facilitates the ability of voters to hold elected officers accountable through a face-to-face town meeting, questioning and criticisms of officers' respective actions and inactions. The popular sentiment toward the scrutinizing role of the town meeting is lost when it is replaced by another decision-making mechanism.

See also *Direct Democracy; Greek Democracy, Classical.*

. . . .   JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN

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Town Planning, Urban

See *Urban Land Use and Town Planning.*

Trade Blocs

A *trade bloc* is an intergovernmental agreement that brings together a group of countries with the purpose of obtaining mutual economic benefits in international trade. Benefits subsequently result from the reduction or removal of trade tariffs and barriers within member countries. Although most trading blocs are currently immersed in regional integration processes and institutions, there are also nonregional relationships, which tend to be bilateral as well as interregional.

In the 1930s, a wave of regionalism led to the formation of trade blocs in response to the detrimental effects of the Great Depression and the disintegration of the gold standard on the world economy. Another wave of trade bloc formation took place during the 1950s and 1960s with developing countries adopting industrialization strategies based on import substitution. Trade blocs permitted these countries to pursue self-sufficiency by creating regional economies of scale. Also during this period, European countries established the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the European Economic Community in 1957. More recently, since the 1990s, there has been a surge of regional integration initiatives that prioritized market deregulation and privatization of state-controlled sectors; this aligns with the prevailing ideological imperatives of neoliberal globalization.

DIFFERENT FORMS OF TRADE BLOCS

Trade blocs take many forms, depending on the degree of incremental integration among the participating countries.

FREE TRADE ZONE OR FREE TRADE AREA

A group of countries that agree to set tariff preferences for trade with one another, covering most of their traded goods and services, constitute a free trade zone or area. Member countries retain sovereignty over the determination of their

respective trade policies vis-à-vis nonmember countries. Trade disputes and restrictions, which often occur between members, are resolved in dispute resolution mechanisms to which members have previously subscribed in the trade agreement. Local content laws are introduced these areas to prevent nonmember countries from initially exporting to a member country with a low external tariff, with the goal being to send the exports on to a member country that has a higher external tariff. Local content provisions require that a certain percentage of the value of the product must be sourced locally within the free trade area not to be subject to import duties.

Some of the more well-known free trade areas include the recently created ASEAN-China, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Economic Community of West African States, and others. A U.S.-proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was never created due to stiff opposition from governments and broad sectors of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) countries—Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

CUSTOMS UNION

In addition to a liberalized intrabloc trade, a customs union adopts a common external tariff structure to act as a common trade barrier toward nonmembers. Restrictions apply to the type of tariff protection that this kind of trade bloc can have. According to the principle of nondiscriminatory trade policies under Article 24 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the level of common external tariff can be no higher than an average of previously existing tariffs of the member countries; otherwise, the group must offer compensation to adversely affected nonmember countries.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) exemplifies a currently functional customs union. Other examples include the Southern African Customs Union, MERCOSUR, Arab Customs Union, Andean Community, Caribbean Community, Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), among others.

COMMON MARKET

In addition to the requirements of custom unions, common markets also include the free movement of factors of production: labor and capital. The 1957 Treaty of Rome that created the European Economic Community ultimately aimed to create of a common market—a goal that was substantially achieved by the early 1990s in Western Europe, known as the European Community.

ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION

An economic and monetary union represents a step higher in the regional integration pathway. The defining feature of economic and monetary unions is the harmonization of tax and currency policies of its members. The most well-known modern case is the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union with the adoption of the euro as a single currency and a European Central Bank.

POLITICAL UNION

Political union represents the ultimate form of economic integration. An example of such a union is the former Soviet Union, though the best-known political union is the United States. The establishment of a European Parliament is a first step on the road toward the formation of a European political union, but whether a full political union will form remains an open question. Likewise, the Union of South American Nations, comprising MERCOSUR and CAN members, is moving toward a constitution of a South American political union encompassing trade, security, and political issues.

IMPLICATIONS FOR WORLD TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

The proliferation of trade blocs raised various key issues for scholars. First, there is the question of the relation between trade blocs and the multilateral trade system. The issue centers upon whether trade blocs constitute stumbling blocks or stepping stones to multilateral trade liberalization. Advocates of worldwide free trade generally oppose trading blocs. They believe trade blocs encourage regional trade at the expense of weakening the multilateral trade system. The formation of trade blocs, therefore, sets incentives for other countries to seek membership in order to offset the costs of trade diversion affecting nonmembers. In this sense, trade blocs have been said to trigger a domino effect.

However, supporters see trade blocs as a means to advance the trade liberalization agenda in contexts when multilateral negotiations of trade liberalization from GATT and World Trade Organization are often slow and even stagnated. With a small number of countries, it is easier to exchange concessions and also to agree on effective enforcement mechanisms. Thus, according to this view, even if trade blocs may divert trade flows, they likewise enable trade liberalization to continue moving forward.

A second key issue is the concern about trade blocs contribution to the generation of welfare equitably distributed among the blocs members and economic sectors. This is particularly important in North-South agreements where trade integration involve countries with different levels of socioeconomic development. This problem affects the case of NAFTA, the failed FTAA project, and the Economic Partnership Agreements sponsored by the EU, among others. Critics argue that trade integration accentuates existing asymmetries in levels of development and power if it does not address inequalities through adequate policies and institutions. This applies to market-led models of integration that relegate the social and environmental impacts of trade and investments to lesser importance. Rather than advancing democratic, equitable, and sustainable development, trade blocs can also formalize a regional governance framework to grant citizen rights to transnational corporations, while reducing democratic accountability. South-South initiatives are not exempt from this development challenge. In particular, blocs like MERCOSUR and the proposed trilateral free trade agreement among India,

South Africa, and Brazil have the potential both to overcome as well as to reinforce interbloc asymmetries and inequalities.

See also *Free Trade; Nontariff Barriers to Trade; North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); Trade Diplomacy; World Trade Organization (WTO).*

. . . .   MARCELO SAGUIER

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Trade Coalitions

See *Trade Blocs.*

Trade Diplomacy

As a field of study, *international political economy* seeks to understand the politics of international trade, finance, and monetary relations. *Trade diplomacy,* as one aspect of trade politics, relates to the process of trade negotiation between states and the influence of domestic and international actors on that process. According to Nicholas Bayne and Stephen Woolcock, trade diplomacy is concerned with process and "the negotiation of trade agreements in bilateral, regional, or multilateral contexts." The study of trade diplomacy thus primarily focuses on how the processes of international trade negotiation affect trade relations.

Scholars of international political economy who study trade diplomacy generally adopt a state-centered approach to highlight domestic politics and the strategies states pursue in negotiating trade. In his text *International Political Economy: Interests and Institutions in the Global Economy,* Thomas Oatley advances the utility of a state-centered approach by describing how national policy makers develop trade and finance policies both in response to and independently from the narrow, self-interested concerns of domestic groups. Trade diplomacy therefore involves the interests of autonomous states, state-society relations, and interstate relations. Trade diplomacy also includes state relations with regional and international trade bodies.

The tools of trade diplomacy lean heavily on the assumption of mutual cooperation between states, but can also include certain coercive measures. Informal negotiations, policy coordination, trade coalitions, and formal agreements dominate trade diplomacy, yet disputes can produce trade discord and the use of formal sanctions and trade embargos. The asymmetry of economic and political power between larger trading states and smaller ones lends the former much greater latitude to use such tools for their advantage over the latter. However, coercive measures involving trade policy are not always effective in producing the desired outcomes of larger trading states; these raise ethical questions about innocent victims who suffer under trade sanctions.

The basic strategies of trade diplomacy center on the real and perceived merits of bilateral, regional, and multilateral diplomacy. Most states generally engage in all three strategies in search of trade advantage in a competitive environment of global trade. Bilateral trade diplomacy affords greater opportunity for trading partners to achieve mutual agreement but can be costly in terms of time, effort, and diplomatic resources, especially for smaller trading states. Regional and multilateral trade arrangements rationalize the diplomatic process of trade negotiation but demand greater compromise among multiple partners, increase pressure from affected domestic interests, and result in difficult and lengthy negotiations. When they are institutionalized, regional and multilateral trade associations can facilitate more efficient trade diplomacy. Written into many regional and multilateral agreements, for example, are standardized principles and rules such as nondiscrimination between members, reciprocity in negotiations, and safeguard provisions to protect national interests.

Since the early post–World War II (1939–1945) period and the creation of the Bretton Woods system of global economic management, most states have sought participation in multilateral trade management as a means to rationalize trade diplomacy. Trade management initiatives such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development originated as forums to forge international agreement, but evolved over time into robust institutions with missions, rules, and agendas of their own. Expanding democracy and economic globalization have since led to a proliferation of political actors involved in trade diplomacy. Policy makers and state representatives wield the authority to formalize negotiations and sign agreements, but interest groups, multinational corporations, and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) increasingly influence the positions of state diplomats in trade negotiations.

The 1995 creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), formed from GATT, represents the most ambitious attempt to rationalize multilateral trade diplomacy. Its 153 members agree to abide by standardized rules of trade and

the decisions of supranational dispute-settlement bodies when those rules are violated. Since its creation, many states, interest groups, and NGOs have come to view the WTO as a formidable independent actor because of its power to shape international trade and define the limits of state sovereignty. Calls for greater transparency in trade diplomacy have followed. Recent frustration with the WTO system, the entrenched positions of state coalitions, and the failure of the Doha Development Agenda have produced increased disillusionment with multilateralism. A trend of increasing bilateral and regional trade diplomacy now characterizes trade diplomacy, with over 250 regional trade agreements existing alongside an ever-expanding number of bilateral trade agreements.

See also *Foreign Policy; Free Trade; International Relations.*

. . . .   ROBERT DAYLEY

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Trade Policy

See *Free Trade* and *Trade Diplomacy.*

Tradition

The term *tradition* has a significant history of usage in the field of political science and particularly in the subfield of political theory. There are, however, to two quite different uses of the term, which are sometimes reflected in dictionary definitions. The root of the term is the Latin *traditio* that refers to an act of handing over, and *traditum* connoting the thing transmitted or handed down from the past to the present. For example, *traditio* in Roman law was a method of transferring ownership of property.

The primary contemporary meaning of tradition can be labeled *indigenous,* and is a reference to an inherited pattern of thought and action, such as a religious practice, which involves concrete instances of the handing down of information, beliefs, and customs by word of mouth or by example from one generation to another. For example, in Christianity, and particular in Roman Catholicism, church authority is based on what is termed the *sacred tradition,* and many political and social practices ranging from Fourth of July celebrations in the U.S. to forms of political campaigning worldwide reflect this concept of tradition.

There is, however, a secondary and more general sense of tradition labeled *analytical,* involving scholars and other commentators specifying, according to their own criteria, general aspects of cultural continuity. This can apply to social attitudes, customs, and institutions or to characteristic manners, methods, and styles of behavior. When Louis Hartz wrote his influential work on *Liberal Tradition in America* (1955), he was not speaking about a consciously embraced and self-ascribed tradition, but instead about what he believed he had identified as persistent characteristics of American thought and social relations. Often when historians, social scientists, and political philosophers and political theorists write about something such as the Western tradition of political thought or about American political thought, they select iconic authors and texts among which they claim to perceive certain family resemblances.

The indigenous and analytical senses of tradition are, however, often mistakenly, and sometimes purposively, conflated. Although Hartz, for example, was at times clear about the fact that he was describing a liberal tradition from the external perspective of the historian, he often implied that what he was depicting was an actual historically indigenous pattern of thought—one that had been consciously and intentionally passed from generation to generation.

CONNOTATIONS OF TRADITION

The concept of tradition often carries either a positive or negative normative valence. In some cases, it is viewed as a conservative source of authority with varying degrees of acceptance regarding development and change. Edmund Burke defended this sense of tradition in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790), while, as in the case of the Enlightenment, the idea of progress often entailed the rejection of traditional authority and institutions. Edward Shils's *Tradition* (1981) was also a defense of tradition in the face of modern attitudes and particularly those he saw as characteristic of contemporary social science. In the social sciences, the term *traditional society* often neutrally contrasts with industrial, urbanized, capitalist modern society. The term is applied to a wide range of nonmodern societies, as varied as tribal groups on the one hand, and medieval European states on the other. It is also sometimes employed as a judgmental term, often implying negative traits associated with being backward and nonscientific. However, it is also occasionally valorized and associated with close-knit social units and communal values.

TRADITION IN POLITICAL THEORY

The issue of what constitutes a tradition has been most salient in the study of the history of political theory. The texts constituting the classic canon were incorporated during the mid-nineteenth century into the emerging field of political science as a historico-philosophical narrative of the progressive development of Western political thought. This narrative, inspired by German philosophy, provided a provenance both for American democratic political institutions and for the discipline of political science. Despite a fundamental shift, after the turn of the century, in the discipline's images of both

democratic theory and science, there was, until the middle of the twentieth century, no significant challenge to the symbiotic relationship between political science and the subfield of political theory.

This relationship was subsequently disrupted by two distinct intellectual movements. On one hand, the rise of behavioral political science, however, led to the depreciation of what came to be referred to as *traditional political theory* by political scientists who were intent on emulating what they believed were the methods of natural science. On the other hand, by this point, the image of what had become known as the *tradition of Western political thought,* which George Sabine celebrated in his 1937 *A History of Political Theory,* as a story of the triumph of liberal democracy, had been significantly altered by émigré scholars such as Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, and Hannah Arendt, as well as by others such as Sheldon Wolin. These scholars transformed the narrative into a story of the crisis and decline of both liberalism and political science. The study of the *great tradition,* from Plato to Marx, became devoted to an account of how the tradition had gone wrong and to the recovery of past truth.

By the 1970s, significant questions were being raised, from various perspectives—by a number of scholars such as Quentin Skinner, J. G. A. Pocock, and John G. Gunnell—as to whether the idea of the tradition, when viewed as progress or declination, was anything more than the retrospective imposition of rhetorical philosophical myths. These normative constructs, it was argued, distorted the meaning of both texts and contexts and neglected to recognize actual historical traditions of political thought.

CONCLUSION

Subsequent scholarship in the history of political thought has contributed significantly to more sophisticated debates and analyses regarding the nature of historical and textual interpretation; it has also contributed to the production of more credible histories of indigenous traditions of political thought and action. Although this has led to a better understanding of the concept of tradition and the difference between indigenous and analytical concepts, the problem of conflating the two has hardly been resolved in neither the literature of political theory nor political science in general. The different concepts to which tradition is attached remain open to considerable scholarly critical analysis and further clarification.

See also *Conservatism; Political Science, History of; Political Theory.*

. . . . JOHN G. GUNNELL

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Trafficking

See *Sex Workers and Trafficking.*

Tragedy of the Commons

Garrett Hardin popularized the term *tragedy of the commons* to denote a consequence of the population problem. Drawing on the work of William Forster Lloyd, Hardin describes a scenario in which an unregulated "commons" fosters decisions by individuals about its use that are designed to maximize each member's own short-term utility. The resulting actions are inevitably to the detriment of the collective interest, and the dynamic is presented to rebut the idea that an "invisible hand" guides individual decisions in the best interests of society.

This dilemma is most evident in decisions affecting shared resources such as the oceans and the food supply, while pollution is an example of the phenomenon in reverse. Hardin suggests that the solution lies, not in an "appeal to conscience," but in "mutual coercion mutually agreed upon." Economists, political philosophers, game theoreticians, and environmentalists continue to grapple with the problem, exploring regulatory means ranging from privatization to state control. Alternatively, a consideration of human behavior as being motivated by more than self-interest calls the inevitability of this "tragedy" into question. Empirical research by Elinor Ostrom and others in support of this more hopeful position uncovers examples of situations where communal arrangements regulate public behavior without government intervention.

See also *Common Goods.*

. . . . JOEL PARKER

Transferable Vote

See *Vote, Transferable and Nontransferable.*

Transgender Movement

See *Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Movements, Comparative.*

Transgender Politics

See *Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Politics.*

Transition, Democratic

See *Democratic Transition.*

Transitional Justice

Transitional justice includes approaches societies undertake to reckon with legacies of widespread and systematic human rights abuse, mass atrocity, genocide, or civil war as they move

from a period of violent conflict or oppression toward peace, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for individual and collective rights. Often used synonymously with *reckoning with the past, politics of memory,* or *decommunization,* transitional justice became an increasingly important field of inquiry in the 1990s after a growing number of countries shed dictatorship as part of the third wave of democratization. Its etymology is unclear, but the phrase is understood to refer to the interplay between political transition and justice. *Transition* could be a regime change from repressive rule to democratic rule or a major political transformation from conflict and instability to peace and stability. *Justice* refers to the broad range of methods through which perpetrators of human rights abuses are prosecuted or vetted, victims obtain compensation and the chance to heal from the past, and societies reconcile by overcoming distrust and division. Transitional justice occurs mostly in new democracies that reexamine their recent past, but sometimes consolidated democracies feel the need to come to terms with abuses in their more distant past (e.g., slavery in the United States, the Holocaust in Western Europe).

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE APPROACHES AND METHODS

Transitional justice approaches can be judicial or nonjudicial in nature and can vary widely in scope, purpose, and effectiveness. First, former dictators, secret political police agents, guards, and militia members may be prosecuted in national or international courts of law. The trials of Slobodan Milosevic, Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu, Saddam Hussein, and the Berlin wall border guards who killed East Germans seeking to escape into West Germany, as well as the Nuremberg trials, are such examples. Trials might not result in conviction, can be flawed procedurally, and are seen as more or less legitimate. Second, lustrations allow postcommunist governments to deny former top communist officials and secret political police agents the right to be elected or nominated to public office for determined periods of time. By 2006, most Eastern European countries had adopted lustration laws, although the vetting process, resulting in job loss, was bitterly criticized for infringing a basic political right. Third, truth commissions can be established by presidents, governments, parliaments, political formations, or the international community to investigate the activity of past dictatorial governments, past political regimes, or specific historical periods of widespread repression. Commissions usually end their work by releasing a final report establishing the truth about the past, compiling victims' testimonials and oral histories, and naming—or not naming—the victimizers. Since the 1970s, more than twenty-five countries in Latin America (including Chile, Argentina, and El Salvador), Asia (Nepal and Sri Lanka), Africa (South Africa, Morocco, and Chad), and Europe (Germany and Romania) have set up such truth commissions.

Besides these three main approaches, there are other reparatory methods to reckon with the past. Local community courts of justice, or *gacaca,* were established in the wake of the 1994 Rwandan genocide to make the punishment of perpetrators faster and less expensive. Rehabilitation aims to reintegrate former political prisoners into the larger society and symbolically recognize their plight. Monetary and non-monetary compensation can help victims and their families cover health care costs related to political persecution or the education of children disadvantaged by the loss of their parents. Access to the secret archives compiled by the communist intelligence services has allowed victims to see the secret records, while effectively curtailing surveillance of former dissidents and forcing the retirement of secret full-time officers and part-time informers. The restitution of property and assets abusively confiscated by former regimes can also bring a measure of justice to owners seeking to recover private dwellings, land, businesses, artwork, or bank accounts.

The transformation of former prisons into commemorative museums, the organization of itinerant or permanent exhibitions, and the rewriting of the school history textbooks can all help societies reconstruct the geography of terror and educate the public about the particularities of each repression moment. On a symbolic level, the national and official commemoration of both repression and opposition episodes keeps the memory alive and helps to prevent future atrocities. Last but not least, the change in names of localities, streets, schools, and public institutions can also heal the wounds of a repressive past.

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY

It is argued that new democracies engage in transitional justice because they seek to achieve justice for their citizens and to bring closure for victims; to establish civic trust and enhance social capital; to rewrite the historical record more truthfully; to renew the political elite and to marginalize public officials involved in human rights abuses; to reform their police, army, and secret police structures; to root out corruption and misuse of state resources; to show the international community willingness to break with an abusive past; to contribute to social reconstruction; to reconcile people and communities; to educate the national and international public; and to prevent future abuses. Thus, democratizing societies demand the halting, the investigation, and the prevention of human rights abuses through state-led systematic and often comprehensive transitional justice programs. Usually a combination of methods works best when trying to address the multiple legacies of trauma, but even in the most fortunate cases, the process is long, expensive, and tortuous, requiring sustained political will, committed popular acceptance, and a favorable international context.

Not all postauthoritarian countries have prosecuted and punished: A select few have chosen to forgive and forget. While sometimes the serious challenges faced by societies emerging from conflict and repression and their unique cultural and historical contexts have served as excuses for inaction, other times countries were unable to engage in transitional justice even if they wished to do so. Political conditions in postauthoritarian Spain and Mozambique prevented those countries

from reckoning with their past in the years immediately following democratization. Failure of transitional justice does not always indicate public apathy toward the subject or public unwillingness to find out the truth about the past and to prosecute offenders.

See also *Autocracy; Reparations.*

. . . .   LAVINIA STAN

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Transitional Regimes

During the mid-1970s, the *third wave of democratization,* a phrase coined by American political scientist Samuel Huntington, started in Western Europe; subsequently, it swept through Latin America and postcommunist Europe, including republics of the former Soviet Union. Many countries affected by this wave displayed democratic features, such as regular elections and civil liberties. Some retained characteristics associated with authoritarian regimes, such as a weak civil society, lack of government accountability, or absence of the rule of law. Others were never able to democratize and returned to authoritarianism. To capture the fluidity of political systems affected by the third wave, a new term—*transitional regime*—was invented. It became the central concept in *transitology*—an extensive body of literature that grapples with the question of why some countries democratize successfully and others do not.

DEFINING TRANSITIONAL REGIMES

In their 1986 book *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies,* Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, leading scholars of democratization, defined transition as "the interval between one political regime and another" (2). Transitions start when authoritarian regimes begin to disintegrate, and they end when some kind of democracy is created, when a country returns to authoritarian rule, or a revolution starts. After the fall of communism, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan defined *democratic transition* as the time when "sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government," when free and competitive elections take place, and when the government is capable of developing new policies (3). Most "transitologists" accept the minimalist definition of democracy implied in Linz and Stepan's work. However, the condition when "some kind" of democracy is created is only the beginning of a democratic transition. Successful transitional regimes achieve democratic consolidation.

For democratic consolidations to occur, democracy has to become "the only game in town." Linz and Stepan argued that consolidated democracies are distinct from other regimes because, when democracies are "consolidated," all important political and social actors acknowledge the legitimacy of the regime and do not try to secede from it. Using the established rules and procedures resolves domestic conflicts, and the majority of the public accepts the institutions of the state as the most appropriate way to govern collective life. Throughout the territory of the state, governmental and nongovernmental forces agree to solve conflict within the laws of the state.

MAJOR PERSPECTIVES

The literature on democratic transitions suggests that there is no one universally applicable formula to predict how a transitional regime becomes a consolidated democracy. At least two important processes take place simultaneously in transitional regimes: changes in political structures and economic changes. These complex processes are intertwined. Overall, the literature on democratic transitions suggests that economic development is a sufficient rather than a necessary condition for successful democratic transitions. According to Adam Przeworski and colleagues, the higher the level of economic development, the more likely a democratic regime is to survive. The risk that a transitional democracy will not survive increases ten times if the economy contracts in two consecutive years. It is also important to create strong state institutions and a vibrant civil society that will hold the government accountable to the voters.

The rich and diverse literature on democratization and economic development incorporates two main perspectives. The first, called *modernization,* focuses on the socioeconomic structures that shape the choices made by democratizing societies. For example, Yi Feng and Paul J. Zak argue that per capita income, the distribution of wealth, education, and preferences for political rights and civil liberties are crucial variables affecting the outcomes of democratic transitions.

The alternative perspective focuses on the preferences and interactions among political agents and tries to explain their individual choices. From this viewpoint, decisions made by the elites and cooperation between different factions are especially important and can impact socioeconomic structures. For example, in 1990, a group of Russian economists linked to Gorbachev and Yeltsin tried to develop solutions to the no-longer functioning Soviet economy. Their cooperation produced a 239-page document called "Transition to the Market" as well as a draft legislative package that argued for a speedy introduction of privatization and other laissez-faire reforms. Although Gorbachev and Yeltsin initially supported the document, Gorbachev's retreat from the program affected the dynamics of democratic transition and the scale of economic reform.

PREDICTING A SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION

Drawing on a comprehensive survey of the former communist countries, in *How Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation*

of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia, Anders Åslund concluded that radical economic reform might produce better and more durable results than slow reform (i.e., transition from central planning to laissez-faire capitalism). In addition, radical economic reform is likely to contribute to establishing strong democratic institutions. In *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation,* Linz and Stepan identified five supporting arenas necessary for consolidation of a democratic regime: a lively civil society (an entity with interest groups that are relatively independent from the state); a political society (where fight for political power is pursued according to legitimate principles, and actors such as political parties respect those rules); the rule of law; a bureaucracy to ensure the functioning of the state; and an economic society (a state-mediated market economy).

Studies of transitional regimes have identified other important variables that affect transition. These variables include the legacy of the past, since nondemocratic experiences in the past critically affect the path that a democratizing state takes; political leadership; and the scope of the agenda to be addressed by transition. Michael McFaul hypothesized that the wider the scope of the agenda for change, the less likely a new democratic regime is to emerge. It is extremely difficult to manage multiple complex transitions, such as the shape of emerging political institutions and the type of economic regime, at the same time. Successful transitions tend to focus simultaneously on a few problems, such as the shape of political institutions.

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

A significant number of works explore the role of outsiders in the processes associated with democratic transitions. During the mid-1990s, when the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization considered expansion to the former communist countries of Eastern and East Central Europe, the so-called *geostrategic hypothesis* was put forward. This hypothesis—developed by Geoffrey Pridham, Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price, and others—suggested that in order to consolidate democracies within transitional regimes, a secure environment should be established to ensure democratic development. It was argued that a supportive geostrategic environment was a crucial variable explaining why some transitional regimes turn into consolidated democracies and others do not.

Numerous case studies exploring the impact of the EU on policies of applicant countries were conducted. According to Francis Fukuyama, the ability of the EU to make candidate countries incorporate democratic norms through membership criteria was described as "perhaps the most successful exercise of soft power in the world today" (84–86). However, attempts to promote democratization have come under scrutiny. After expansion in 2004 and 2007, the EU was not able to develop a successful strategy to deal with transitional regimes in its new neighborhood. Even the success of the EU in the new member states has been questioned—the elites may have adopted democratic norms to please outsiders for strategic reasons, without fully implementing the recommended reforms. There is an emerging consensus that successful democratization efforts should focus on local ownership and local participation.

CONCLUSION

Transitology is criticized for comparing transitional regimes in different cultural contexts with the state model associated with Western democracies. Social and cultural reality in countries undergoing political change may be too complex to be captured by elegant theories of transition. According to Thomas Carothers, when applied in practice, the assumptions about transitional regimes (e.g., an expectation to move toward democratization through certain stages) implicit in transitology are especially problematic. However, there is at least one important insight offered by numerous studies of transitional regimes: State building is crucial for democratic transitions, and it cannot be achieved without the willing involvement of local actors.

See also *Democracy and Democratization; Democratic Transition; Politics, Comparative; Transitology.*

. . . . DOVILE BUDRYTE

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Transitology

Transitology is the study of the systemic change process from authoritarian regimes to democracies or to postauthoritarian regimes. Since the late 1970s, after the wave of political transitions swept Greece, Spain, and Portugal and similar changes subsequently occurred in South America, ambitious transitology literature on Latin America and southern Europe focused on generic scenarios of regime change in these two areas. The transitologists have made use of insights originally developed by Robert Dahl, Juan Linz, Dunkwart Rustow, Robert Putnam, and other theorists of democratization. Since the early 1990s, they increasingly began to compare transitions in Latin American and southern European regions with political changes in postcommunist Eastern Europe during the period between 1989 and 1991. By highlighting apparent similarities between these two kinds of transition, such works attempted to provide heuristic models for the study of interaction among political, economic, and social forces in various stages of the transition process in Eastern Europe.

Opponents of transitology argue that there are significant qualitative differences between the transitions in Latin America and southern Europe and that in Eastern Europe. These scholars describe the transition process in Eastern Europe as unique. In other words, they believe that other transitions generate irrelevant evidence for determining explanations of the events in the late-communist and postcommunist Eastern Europe.

See also *European Politics and Society; Latin American Politics and Society; Postcommunist Transformation.*

. . . .   JIRI S. MELICH

Transnationalism

The turn of the twenty-first century has been met with a marked growth in economic, social, and political links among people, places, and institutions crossing nation-state borders and, indeed, spanning the world. Described as transnationalism, such patterns of sustained cross-border relationships, exchange, affiliations, and social activity have developed on various scales. Although people certainly maintained long-distance social networks, economic ties, and political loyalties in earlier periods, recent advances—not least a lowering of costs—in technology, telecommunications, and transportation have allowed expansion, intensification, and acceleration of such connections across large geographic and political spaces. It is not a coincidence that since the 1990s, the growth of social scientific concern with transnationalism has paralleled the growth of interest in globalization. Transnational ties, institutions, and social groups represent outcomes of globalization.

Interactions between national governments (e.g., formal agreements, conflicts, diplomatic relations), or the permanent transfer of people, goods, or other items from one nation-state context to another are still best described as international. Transnational realities can be distinguished as sustained social links and ongoing exchanges among nonstate actors based across national borders. This term thus emphasizes ties that function across nation-states and the borders, laws, institutional frameworks, and identity narratives they represent. The collective attributes of such connections, their processes of formation and maintenance, and their broader implications are referred to broadly as *transnationalism*.

Although the boom in transnationalism studies commenced in the 1990s, a significant precursor was Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's (1971) edited volume *Transnational Relations and World Politics.* The book's contributors probed a set of transnational activities surrounding numerous kinds of border-crossing contacts, coalitions, and interactions that are not controlled by organs of government. As a whole, the volume importantly questioned a prevailing state-centric view of international relations. It emphasized the importance of global interactions—defined as movements of information, money, objects, and people across borders—and their impacts on interstate politics.

By the first decade of the twenty-first century, there was a massive proliferation of literature concerning transnationalism. Social scientists speak of a variety of types of social formation as transnational (e.g., varieties found in contributions to the journal *Global Networks: A Journal of Transnational Affairs*). These include dispersed social groups or communities (ethnic diasporas, religious congregations, social networks, families, migration networks); patterns of economic organization (e.g., capital flows, trade routes, commodity chains, modes of corporation organization and management); political structures (e.g., intergovernmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, modalities of citizenship, political and social movements); global networks of law breaking and law enforcement (e.g., worldwide terrorist networks, organized crime syndicates, police initiatives); the so-called transnational capitalist class (e.g., corporate executives, state bureaucrats, professionals); and globalized occupational groups (e.g., domestic workers, seafarers, sex workers).

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the study of social movements represents one field that some say particularly "went transnational." Transnational social movements themselves are nothing especially new. However, in recent years, there a globalization of social movement activities entails a widening repertoire of techniques for mobilizing support

and waging campaigns. The transnational repertoire includes networking activities over long distances, enhancing possibilities for pooling resources, intensifying processes of coalition building, and empowering people "at the base" by connecting them directly to people "at the top." Social scientists' interest in transnational social movements focuses mainly on activist networks that connect a range of actors sharing common values, discourse, and information.

Within business studies and the sociology of organizations, researchers are currently keen on studying transnational corporate structures and management styles, business networks, supplier commodity chains, production networks, and innovative networks.

Perhaps the foremost field of transnational studies, however, is migration. A shift has occurred from a preexisting, rather one-way, paradigm that largely focused on the ways migrants moved and adapted to new societies. Beginning in the early 1990s, migration studies now mean that scholars across sociology, anthropology, geography, economics, and political science place considerable emphasis on the ways migrants not only move and adapt, but maintain ties of various kinds to their communities of origin (e.g., families, villages, or nation-states).

Among many social theorists, questions remain regarding the superficiality of contemporary transnational linkages and whether they are simply accelerated versions of what already existed, or whether these are truly transformative forms and processes, affecting basic modes of identity maintenance, social organization, and political processes.

See also *Globalism; Globalization; Immigration, Politics of; Mexican Immigration; Migration; Transnational Movements; Transnational Voting.*

. . . . STEVEN VERTOVEC

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Transnational Movements

A decade ago, the term *transnational movements* would have seemed an oxymoron because the social movement was considered the quintessential accompaniment to the development of the national state. The rise of movements coincided with the rise of the national state; they grew up under institutional umbrellas such as elections and courts, and national states offered the opportunities and posed the threats around which they mobilized. As late as the mid-1990s, national politics focused on the concept of political opportunity structure in the social movement canon. Yet by the turn of the century, books with titles like *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics* (1997) by Jackie Smith and colleagues, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink's *Activists Beyond Borders* (1998), Donatella della Porta and colleagues' *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* (1999), and John Boli and George Thomas's *Constructing World Culture* (1999) were making their appearance because of changes in international politics, academia, and activism.

Globalization—or the belief in it—was the first change. When people can board an airplane or open their computers and engage in collective action with others from elsewhere in the world, then the reality of transnational activism becomes a real possibility. Second, some observers and many activists extended the term *social movement* to a wide range of cross-border phenomena that would have gone by more prosaic names in previous eras: transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international advocacy campaigns, the diffusion of claims from one country to another, the representation of domestic interests in international institutions, and even the framing of domestic conflicts in "global" terms. Third, by the late 1990s, the domestic social movement politics of the 1960s and 1970s had become institutionalized. Dramatic events like the Chiapas insurgency in 1994 drew attention from the pedestrian world of domestic politics to more exciting conflicts elsewhere. These trends culminated in the series of social forums that began in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 2001, which inspired many regional forums in the half-decade that followed. Finally, despite the resurgence of hegemonic interstate politics in the wake of the 9/11 and the World Trade Center bombing, there has been a rise in *internationalization*—defined as increased contacts among nonstate actors, links between governmental actors below the level of foreign policy makers, and a slow but steady increase in the adjudication of conflicts through international tribunals. Internationalization provides targets for contesting neoliberal international policies and makes "activism beyond borders" easier to mount and sustain.

SUCCESSFUL TRANSNATIONAL CAMPAIGNS
Since the mid-1990s, globalization and neoliberalism have become the foci of many activists and students of transnational contention. Although spectacular transnational events like the much-vaunted "battle of Seattle" target global neoliberalism, the most successful transnational campaigns are, for example, in the campaign against antipersonnel landmines, the struggle against HIV/AIDS in Africa, and the growth of international jurisdiction over war criminals and human rights abusers. Highly focused campaign coalitions like these appear to be far

more successful than the more sweeping demands for "global justice" on the part of activists who seek the reversal of globalization.

Campaigns in narrower sectors of transnational activism are more successful, first, because of the difficulty that global justice protesters have in locating globalization in a single, accessible target. Second, campaigners in more specialized fields can find significant state allies. Third, while antiglobalization protesters find only targets in the international arena (e.g., the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization), campaigners with more focused goals—against HIV/AIDS, for the environment, and against war and torture—find both opposition and support among international institutions.

The campaign to end the production and use of landmines in the 1990s illustrates all three factors: The target was clear and precise; a coalition of like-minded states worked closely with an international coalition of NGOs. Also, international institutions, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations, supported the campaign and lent it legitimacy. In fact, had it not been for a change in strategy on the part of the ICRC and the leading role of medium-sized states like Canada, Belgium, and France in favor of the treaty, the campaign would probably have failed.

TRANSNATIONAL CONTENTION

Relations between NGO "insiders" and social movement "outsiders" are an issue. Some argue that NGOs are, by definition, part of the institutional world of foundations, governments, and international institutions and are thus incapable of mounting effective challenges; others argue that social movements gain advantages from forming coalitions with NGOs that allow them to play on both sides of the institutional frontier. There are also long-term effects of external intervention on domestic activists after their international allies depart. While some NGOs and social movements claim a universal mission to struggle against wrongs, in practice, most of them choose their targets for intervention in the light of strategic goals and resource constraints. How violent forms of transnational activism relate to "good" global movements, which scholars studied in the late 1990s, is also of concern.

A final issue, and the broadest, is whether the growth of transnational activism reflects only the growing resources and inclination of domestic actors to move outward, or whether it reveals a more fundamental shift from a world of distinct domestic and international spheres to a fusion of domestic and international action. In the former case, transnational activism would not be fundamentally different from past transnational campaigns, such those against slavery and poison gas. In the latter, transnational activism may one day lead to the creation of a global civil society.

See also *Civil Society; Globalization; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); Transnationalism.*

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Transnational Voting

Transnational voting is the extension of traditional territorial enfranchisement, or suffrage, beyond national borders. It is typically considered an adaptation of the traditional voting system to global circumstances characterized by overlapping sociopolitical interactions.

The life of individuals is, for the most part, limited to domestic sociopolitical interaction. As a result, the focus of political arrangements has been on institutions with a similarly limited, national scope. Global transformations now alter the traditional boundaries of sociopolitical interaction, affecting almost all aspects of citizens' lives. State-only democracy has consequently come under increasing pressure for its incapacity to guarantee individual and collective autonomy when facing transnational issues related, for instance, to security or the environment. Challenged by increasing international interdependence, the principle of democratic congruence between rulers and ruled demands an extension of the traditional institutional arrangements to a more inclusive system. In order to avoid the democratic deficit, which characterizes

international affairs—known as *transnational exclusion*—an extension of democratic institutional arrangements to the global level is needed. The voting mechanism is key within such arrangements.

Extending the traditional method of voting to the transnational and global levels entails redrawing national constituencies to include further layers of regional, transnational, and global voting, thus envisaging new forms of transnational citizenship. Cosmopolitanism, according to which individuals are primarily members of humankind rather than of a specific nation or group, is the most prominent theory backing the extension of democratic principles. According to cosmopolitanism, the scope of justice should be universal because no discrimination is justified when considering the ultimate entitlement of all citizens to individually control their own destiny. Humanity is thus considered as a single ethical community, as belonging to a single polity. Rather than eliminating national allegiance, cosmopolitanism would only imply the addition of further international and transnational political rights toward more participatory institutional arrangements.

In the realm of transnational voting, there are debates about three main issues of cosmopolitanism: how to draw the constituencies, who the actors are, and which voting techniques to use. There are two approaches to follow for the delimitation of jurisdictional boundaries. *Global stakeholder democracy* would allow the bottom-up creation of jurisdictional boundaries that include, in any electoral jurisdiction, all those individuals whose interests are significantly affected by a specific interaction, regardless of their nationality. *Global federal democracy* would conversely include all individuals, regardless of their specific interest, in an overarching institution that would then have legitimacy to draw, top down, the jurisdictional boundaries in the lower levels.

Two principal proposals are advanced for the typologies of actors. While some argue for the inclusion of individuals only, others would extend the political enfranchisement (possibly with consultative status only) to collective actors such as multinational corporations or international nongovernmental organizations. Finally, as far as voting techniques go, more technologically sophisticated electronic voting sometimes replaces traditional ballot voting; this arguably overcomes some of the practical difficulties of transnational elections.

Transnational voting is contested, however, by a number of scholars from realism to communitarianism and liberal internationalism. While based on different norms, these positions share the view that voting cannot be extended to the transnational domain. There would be insurmountable technical problems, loosening of the social bonds essential to any political community, or a drift toward an authoritarian regime dominated by supranational powerful elites.

Within the European Union, citizens are granted political entitlements that transcend their national allegiances. Among these entitlements, the enfranchisement for the election of the European Parliament constitutes the clearest case of transnational voting. European citizens are currently entitled to vote for their local councils, their regional authorities, their national parliaments, and the European Parliament. Thus, they have political voice at several levels of political action. Migrants also vote transnationally, although they do not vote for a transnational constituency. They are entitled to vote in their countries of origin—possibly by mail—and in their countries of residence, though often limited to local or administrative elections (approximately forty countries now allow for local enfranchisement of migrants). Both the case of European citizens and of migrants allow a more inclusive and less parochial discussion about a number of political issues, especially in relation to multiculturalism.

See also *Electronic Voting; European Union; Globalization; Transnationalism.*

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Transparency

Transparency in the field of government is the ability of constituents to gain access to the facts, figures, documents, decisions, and other aspects of their government. Its meaning in this political context is, then, a derivative of its meaning in more common parlance—to see through an object. However, the definition in the context of politics has a deeper significance to the ways in which people are able to understand, participate, and control their country's government.

Of course, political entities have sought to limit transparency for most of the history of government. From the politically minded writers in ancient Greece to the works of Niccolò Machiavelli, political commentators have known that controlling information is central to maintaining political power. Therefore, the monarchs of Europe and similar rulers around the globe did not make it a priority to explain the mechanics of the state apparatus to their subjects; they did not need to maintain any sense of popularity, as they usually ruled through fear and brutal, violent oppression.

As more democratic forms of government arose after the American Revolution (1776–1783) and also after the French Revolution (1789–1799), transparency entered the political discourse as a priority for governments and citizens. The three branches of government in the United States, for example, were designed as a system that had checks and balances of power that support the principle of transparency. In this case, the legislative branch has oversight over the executive branch's actions. Therefore, transparency increases because each branch

must be willing to show each other and the public how it is working. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule.

Another element of transparency in modern politics is the role of the press. From the first pamphleteers to the most recent cable news shows and Internet outlets, journalists have played a role in fighting for increased access to public officials and their public policy decisions. Many countries have passed freedom of information legislation giving the public and journalists access to certain documents that the government would not normally make available. These laws have been instrumental in increasing the transparency of governmental actions and the motivations of elected and appointed officials.

The exception to transparency comes from a government's desire to still protect its power through the restriction of information to the public. In this modern era of greater transparency, governments around the world have used several means to cloud the political waters surrounding access to government documents. These strategies can include any one or combination of the following techniques: claiming to have lost the documents people are seeking; burying interested document seekers with tens of thousands of pages of documents unrelated to ones requested; stating that the documents are classified for some type of national security purpose; or claiming that the documents are beyond the reach of the transparency principle, by asserting executive privilege in the United States or hiding behind an official secrets law in other parts of the world. Of course, to most politically engaged citizens, these types of actions are seen transparently for what they likely really are—politicians still simply trying to protect their power by not allowing the public to know their actions while in office.

See also *Accountability; Freedom of Information; Oversight.*

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Trial Courts

Trial courts are legal forums where disputes between litigants, known as *cases,* are subject to a resolution by judge and jury through the process of a trial. With only a few exceptions, all cases are heard first in a trial court. Trial procedures vary substantially according to the type of legal system—common law, civil law, or religious law—in which the case is heard. In Anglo-American states that follow the common-law tradition, a trial typically involves a review of physical evidence and oral testimony, persuasive statements by the participating attorneys, and final resolution of the dispute by the judge or jury. Thus, the function of a *trial court* is to allow governmental determination of a legal conflict through the process of a trial. A trial court can be contrasted with an *appellate court,* which is the higher level court that reviews the findings of the lower tribunal through the process known as an *appeal.* An appellate court can reverse or alter the decision of the trial court or order additional hearings.

ADVERSARIAL VERSUS INQUISITORIAL MODELS

There are two general types of trial systems and trial courts found in the world, although there is substantial variation within those classes. The first system is known as the *adversarial model,* and it is most commonly used in Anglo-American states and former English colonies. The second trial system is the *inquisitorial model,* and it is most commonly found in continental European countries, as well as in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

The Anglo-American adversarial system of trial procedure can best be described as lawyer-centered, while the European inquisitorial system can be portrayed as judge-centered. In the adversarial system, the attorneys for the parties select the witnesses and conduct the questioning of those witnesses, while the single trial judge acts as a neutral, and usually silent, referee; The jury, in felony criminal cases and some noncriminal matters, ultimately resolves the dispute. The adversarial process presumes that the truth in a disputed matter will be revealed most efficiently through a quasi competition between the parties, or adversaries. Thus, a trial in the adversarial system can resemble a battle, and indeed, the origins of the common-law jury trial can be traced to the ancient English ordeal by battle.

The European inquisitorial trial system, by contrast, relies upon a judge to control the proceedings, call and question the witnesses, and also make the ultimate determination as to guilt or innocence. As such, the role of the lawyer in the inquisitorial adjudicatory system greatly diminishes, in comparison to the adversarial trial system. The entire process is not confrontational as is the accusatorial system, but instead resembles an investigatory proceeding.

Although the inquisitorial system of trial varies considerably in practice around the world—as does the adversarial system—there are certain general differences between the two models. Most crucially, the role of attorneys significantly lessens in inquisitorial systems and the influence of the judge correspondingly increases. In most inquisitorial trial courts, there are no opening statements by counsel at the beginning of the trial. Rather, the presiding judge outlines the major legal issues and facts of the case. Furthermore, the judge may call certain witnesses if the witnesses have been identified by the parties, whereas, in adversarial trial courts, the witnesses are always decided by the attorneys.

Most importantly, the judge in inquisitorial systems is the primary person who asks questions of the witnesses during the trial, not the attorneys. The attorneys in an inquisitorial trial court do have the right to ask questions of the witnesses after the judge concludes questioning, but this inquiry is usually limited, because witness interrogation at trial is considered primarily the court's responsibility. Furthermore, there

A trial is held in 1735, New York. The adversarial model of the trial court system is found in Anglo-American states and former English colonies and is lawyer-centered.

is generally no right to cross-examination of witnesses by counsel in inquisitorial trial systems.

Another major difference between the two systems is that there is usually no jury in inquisitorial trial courts. However, there may be citizen participation in the form of lay judges in some countries. For example, in Germany, two lay judges with "full powers of interrogation, deliberation, voting, and sentencing" accompany the presiding judge at the lower-level court (Reichel 2005, 262).

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF EACH MODEL

Scholars have criticized the adversarial trial system on a number of grounds. First, trials under the inquisitorial system are almost always shorter in length than those in adversarial trial courts; this is because the judge in an inquisitorial trial court controls the questioning of witnesses and because there is typically no cross-examination. Also, advocates of the inquisitorial process claim that this system produces far more reliable evidentiary results, that is, that the inquisitorial trial system does a better job at uncovering truth.

The reasons for this are several. The judge—who should be unbiased—controls the primary questioning of witnesses, rather than partisan attorneys and advocates. Furthermore, because the judge or judges determines guilt or innocence in inquisitorial trial courts, the biases and inherent limitations of juries may be avoided. Finally, supporters of the inquisitorial system note that this system's trial process depends less upon the skill of the attorneys involved in the case. That is, litigants with superior resources who can afford to hire a legal "dream team" would not be advantaged in inquisitorial trial courts, because these procedures are not as lawyer driven. In summary, advocates for the inquisitorial trial process contend that this system is not only more efficient, but also more reliable and superior at providing justice.

However, the inquisitorial trial model has been subject to several critiques from scholars. The first criticism is that the inquisitorial model places too much power in the hands of a single judge, who may be subject to certain biases. Furthermore, proponents of the adversarial trial system maintain that the adversarial process better protects minority interests because of the egalitarian nature of the trial jury, which may serve as a superior limitation upon any bias inherent in the judge or other governmental legal actors. In addition, it is possible that the nature of the adversarial trial system creates incentives for attorneys to serve their clients more aggressively than lawyers in inquisitorial systems, perhaps by working harder to discover evidence or flaws in the opposing counsel's case.

In conclusion, there has been a greater tendency in recent years for each of the two trial systems to adopt some features usually found in the other model. To be sure, the influence of the Anglo-American adversarial system has likely had a greater influence on inquisitorial courts than the reverse. A number of inquisitorial courts have adopted a limited jury system in certain types of cases, and a tendency for greater questioning

of witnesses by counsel has been observed in some inquisitorial trial courts. In the Anglo-American world, a more inquisitorial approach is being used in some courts. One example of this is the quasi-inquisitorial adjudicative process used by the new drug courts in some jurisdictions. Overall, it appears likely that the influence of each of these models will continue to exert a hybridizing effect on trial courts throughout the world as the process of legal globalization continues.

See Also *Administrative Courts; Common Law.*

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Trotsky, Leon

Leon (Lev) Trotsky (1879–1940) was a major Russian Marxist figure and key actor in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 that brought communism to Russia. Although sometimes described as Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin's most capable lieutenant, Trotsky found himself politically isolated after Lenin's death in 1924, was forced to flee Russia, and was eventually killed by agents of Lenin's successor, Joseph Stalin, in Mexico in 1940.

Trotsky was born in southern Ukraine as Lev Davidovich Bronshtein. He was drawn to Marxism as a teenager, joined a socialist organization in 1896, and was arrested in 1898 for his activities. He was exiled to Siberia, but escaped in 1902 using a forged passport with the name Trotsky, the head jailer of the Odessa prison.

Trotsky fled to Europe, meeting Lenin and other Russian Marxists in London and collaborating with them on various activities. In 1903, when Lenin formed the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Democratic Social Labor Party, Trotsky joined with the rival Mensheviks. In 1905, Trotsky returned to Russia,

organizing the first revolutionary council in St. Petersburg. He was arrested and exiled but again escaped, fleeing to Europe, where he worked as a journalist. In 1914, he condemned World War I (1914–1918) and led the internationalist wing of the Mensheviks.

Trotsky gained renown as a gifted Marxist thinker, orator, and political organizer. His major intellectual innovations were the ideas of uneven development and permanent revolution. By uneven development, he meant that capitalism in less developed countries evolved differently than in the developing West. In poorer states, the working class would emerge as a more powerful force than the local bourgeoisie, creating the possibility for these areas to skip stages in social and economic development. This idea influenced Lenin, who argued for an immediate communist revolution in Russia. Permanent revolution referred to the fact that a successful revolutionary movement in a poorer country, such as Russia, would require socialist revolutions in more developed states in order for the movement in the poorer state to succeed. Later, in the 1920s, this idea served as the ideological basis for the schism with Stalin, who advocated "socialism in one country."

Trotsky returned to Russia in 1917, after the tsar was overthrown. He became head of the Petrograd (St. Petersburg) Soviet, a council that represented workers and competed with the Russian provisional government for power. He joined the Bolsheviks in July 1917. Lenin admired Trotsky for his political and intellectual abilities, and Trotsky supported the Bolshevik seizure of power in November 1917. Afterward, Trotsky served as commissar for foreign affairs and commander of the Red (Bolshevik) Army, which successful defeated its enemies in the Russian Civil War (1917–1923).

After his death, Stalin and Trotsky were the leading figures to succeed Lenin. Stalin, however, had promoted his allies within the Communist (Bolshevik) Party, and Trotsky's ideas of permanent revolution were dismissed as impractical and unpatriotic. Trotsky's Left Opposition faction tried to mobilize the Russian workers, but this failed, demonstrating that he was no longer a charismatic mass leader. His influence began to decline, and Stalin removed him as head of the Red Army. Trotsky was expelled from the party in 1927; exiled from the Soviet Union in 1929; and later accused of plotting, from abroad, actions against Stalin and the Soviet state. He became one of Stalin's harshest critics, producing works such as *Permanent Revolution* (1930), *The History of the Russian Revolution* (3 vols, 1931–1933) and *Revolution Betrayed* (1937). He founded the Fourth Socialist International in 1938 and was assassinated in Mexico in 1940.

Trotskyite parties in the West defended his legacy and professed to offer an alternative to Soviet-style communism, but they never gained political power.

See also *Lenin, Vladimir Ilich; Leninism; Bolshevsm; Communism; Menshevism; Russian Political Thought; Stalinism.*

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Trust and Credibility

The issue of trust gained greater attention with the culturalist turn of sociology, when soft variables and intangibles began to receive more attention. Central for social interaction, trust reduces complexity and therefore facilitates human capacity to act.

Trust is relational in nature—at least one participant in a trust relationship believes that individual interests are being considered. Mutual interdependence and the knowledge of reciprocal trustworthiness act as building blocks for a trust relation. *Credibility,* built through a patterns and perceived notions of someone's previous actions, can also lead to trust. The more someone follows up on words or promises, the greater credibility this person gains for future action. While credibility is based at least on some past action, trust may not have to be.

Trust is vested in people and their actions or capacities, not in objects or natural events. It evolves, especially, with one's future lack of control or uncertainty surrounding human-created events. Trust is defined in different ways: *Anticipatory trust* means that people consider others' interests when acting. *Responsive trust* implies the expectation of a positive response when trust is placed in others. *Evocative trust* signifies acting on the belief that trust is reciprocal.

Trusting others involves risk—others may not act according to expectations and adverse effects can occur. Trust usually targets individuals with whom one has direct contact and is often established along lines of gender, age, race, ethnicity, religion, or wealth. Trust may also emerge with social groups and social roles (e.g., mother, friend, priest, doctor of medicine) and also through organizations and institutions. At the most abstract, trust can be put in the qualities of a particular social system or a regime. These categories can mix and affect one another—personal trust can thus promote increased positional or institutional trust.

It is easier to build distrust than trust, and repairing the damage of a single instance of misplaced trust, or reestablishing trust, requires much more effort. A distinction exists between distrust and lack of trust, as distrust can also be protective and still allow for some cooperation.

Humans estimate the trustworthiness of others before placing trust in them, basing the estimate on reputation, or past behavior; performance, or present behavior and results; and appearance, or external features that do or do not express trustworthiness—especially personality, identity, and status. Relationships, familiarity, and visibility are also important factors. In addition, the external setting of an action influences trust, such as the degree of accountability or one's precommitments.

Structural conditions conducive to building trust are (1) a normative order for society, which increases incentives for a positive conduct conducive to trust; (2) stability of the social order, which creates reference points for social conduct and feelings of security; (3) transparency of the social order and operational rules, which induces feelings of predictability and assurance; (4) familiarity of surroundings, which builds certainty and comfort; and (5) accountability of people and institutions, which serves as insurance for backup options.

When stakes and uncertainty are high and trustworthiness cannot be estimated, some organizational or institutional mechanisms can enable trust. Yet, trust can also develop when uncertainty decreases, for example via repeated interaction.

See also *Group Cohesion; Social Contract.*

. . . . SYBILLE REINKE DE BUITRAGO

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Trusteeship System

The *trusteeship system* was a direct continuation of the previously mandated system, developed under the authority of the League of Nations. Under this system, the formerly mandated countries continued to assist the mandated territories in building their capacity to support statehood and sovereignty. The Charter of United Nations stated that trusteeship "will promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence." Along with the mandated territories, the new system incorporated territories detached from the defeated states of World War II (1939–1945) and territories offered voluntarily by their administrators. Along with the existing mandated countries, the United States became a trust country for the territories administered by Japan, and Italy became a trust country for Somaliland, administered previously by the United Kingdom.

The original mandate system affected a substantive change in the dominant colonial practices; however, its resurrection under the new system was problematic. In the aftermath of World War II, the norms of self-government and independence were becoming dominant in international politics. The newly independent countries constantly pressured the United Nations (UN) to implement trusteeship arrangements and for a fast transition toward the trusted territories' independence. The trusteeship system differed from the mandate system in several respects. The UN abandoned the distinction between territories based on their level of institutional development and added a democratic element—the "freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned"—to the criteria for capable self-government. The UN also placed a greater emphasis on human rights protection and in some cases assumed direct responsibility for the trust territories.

The trusteeship arrangements were coordinated through the United Nations Trusteeship Council, made up of equal numbers of representatives from trust countries and nontrust countries. Compared with the previous mandate system, the UN more closely scrutinized the trusteeship arrangements, and the council was more influential and active than the Permanent Mandates Commission that had predated it, accepting petitions from the trust territories and organizing regular monitoring missions.

All the trust territories eventually became independent, either in their own right or as part of a newly created state: British Togoland gained independence as part of Ghana (1957), Somaliland as part of the newly formed Somalia (1957), French Togoland as Togo (1960), and French Cameroon as Cameroon (1960). British Cameroon was split into two parts, which joined Nigeria and Cameroon, respectively (1961). Tanganyika gained independence in 1961 and later united with Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania (1964). Ruanda-Urundi split and formed the separate states Rwanda and Burundi (1962). Western Samoa gained independence as Samoa (1962), Nauru became an independent state (1975), and New Guinea gained independence as Papua New Guinea (1975). The Pacific islands (Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Northern Marianas Islands) became fully self-governing countries in free association with the United States (1990). Palau was the last territory to gain independence in 1994, thus ending the United Nations trusteeship system.

The impact that the trusteeship system had on the stability and development of the trusted territories is unclear. Following the end of the system, many states experienced significant tensions, conflict, and economic degradation. While the UN Trusteeship Council was left without an agenda, the basic principles set out in the UN Charter remain relevant. They are still used in various intervention and reconstruction settings and considered a feasible option in dealing with failed states.

See also *League of Nations; United Nations (UN).*

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Turnout

The term *voter turnout* is often used in inconsistent ways to describe and account for the act, the qualities, the causes, and the significance of voter participation in democratic elections. Nineteenth-century journalistic accounts employed the term to recognize the presence of voters on election day or to describe the apparent capacities of political parties, groups, and candidates to mobilize their supporters in a particular election. Political scientists in the 1920s and 1930s ascribed additional evaluative meanings to the phenomena of voting once they began to collect and analyze election data more systematically with newly adopted quantitative techniques.

Today, the media and academics offer measurements of electoral participation, or voter turnout, to explain election results and indicate, in statistical terms, the relative presence of democratic conditions; yet this familiar term continues to reflect essential elements of its past and, thus, its definition remains contested. As a result, many who regularly employ the term incompletely acknowledge or understand the limitations and biases of various definitions.

VOTER TURNOUT IN EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY POLITICAL SCIENCE

An overview of the history of voter turnout can clarify how the term's usage reflects several developments within the discipline of political science. The first development occurred in the 1920s at the University of Chicago, where political scientists Charles Merriam and Harold Gosnell broke from the discipline's conventional legal-historical approach to initiate a new way to study voting. In 1924, they published their survey-based findings on the conditions effecting nonvoting behaviors within the eligible electorate. In several subsequent works, Gosnell followed others who concluded that voters were vanishing from active participation in elections, and he completed a novel experimental test designed to measure the positive effect of direct mail solicitations on *getting out the vote,* a common term for voter turnout even today. In 1930, Gosnell also authored *Why Europe Votes,* which included his analysis of voting in several European nations. Others subsequently extended the new field opened by Merriam and Gosnell, adopting increasingly sophisticated quantitative and survey-based methods aimed at accounting for relative differences in voter participation and addressing questions of why and how individuals or groups vote in particular elections.

New survey-based research programs on voting and elections emerged at Columbia University and the University of Michigan in the 1940s. These paralleled an increase in the use of polling techniques by private groups, the media, and political parties and candidates interested in winning elections. Not surprisingly given the immediacy of the data collected, almost all voter behavior and electoral studies completed during the 1940s and 1950s lacked a longer term comparative historical perspective. This deficiency was barely noticed because these research programs yielded new and robust insights concerning the contextual and psychological conditions closely associated with observed voting behaviors and aggregate electoral results. In particular, political scientists discovered that higher levels of education, income, socioeconomic status, age, and partisanship correlate strongly with higher rates of electoral participation—a set of findings that have been confirmed repeatedly ever since.

Before the establishment of the Columbia and Michigan research programs, there were several noteworthy efforts to compile historical data sets of election results; these were then analyzed for absolute and relative changes in voting and the electorate. In *Voting Behavior in the United States* (1935), Charles H. Titus's time-series analysis of voting from 1880 to 1932 led him to reject the so-called *vanishing voter thesis,* establishing it as an artifact of a limited temporal horizon and the biased definition of voter turnout when measured as a ratio of voters to the eligible electorate. Titus, moreover, extended his historical perspective to include the identification of what he referred to as the "rhythmic patterns" of voting behavior and partisan alignment across time. In the 1940s and 1950s, Titus's correction of the vanishing voter thesis was forgotten under the burgeoning survey-based voter behavior literature and several other studies of the relationship between voting and democracy—all of which the discipline and the public found more compelling. For example, Hermens concluded in 1941 that electoral democracy facilitated Hitler's rise to power; Schumpeter, in 1947, concluded that elites, not voters, controlled large-scale democracies; and in 1957 Downs formally demonstrated that it was irrational for any individual to vote given the improbability of casting the decisive vote for a winning candidate.

APPROACHES IN THE LATE TWENTIETH AND EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURIES

In the wake of these disciplinary developments, the *American Political Science Review* published Walter Dean Burnham's "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe" in 1965. This article reshaped the discourse on voter turnout in three significant ways. First, Burnham's work effectively rehistoricized the study of U.S. elections by compiling a new set of voting turnout ratios across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Burnham concluded that voting in the nineteenth century regularly reached 80 to 90 percent of the eligible electorate before declining dramatically throughout the twentieth century—a trend that others observed in subsequent U.S. elections and in other electoral democracies. Second, Burnham's thesis explicitly associated these voter turnout statistics with the systemic characteristics of the American political order; in particular, he identified the long-term turnout decline as an indicator of the conversion of a once populist American democracy into a broad-based oligarchy captured by the interests of industrial capitalism. Third, Burnham's data and conclusions about declining voter turnout contradicted the central findings of the survey-based voter behavior literature, which expected higher rates of participation given twentieth-century socioeconomic advances in the U.S. population. In 1978, Richard A. Brody famously identified this contradiction as the "puzzle of participation."

Contemporary political science research continues to employ quantitative methods, survey-based data, and cross-national perspectives to analyze the composition and behavior of the electorate in recent elections. A significant portion of this work also focuses on solving the puzzling combination of historically declining rates of voting with other findings that suggest the opposite should be occurring. Most studies accept the modern vanishing voter thesis first advanced by Burnham in 1965, explaining the turnout decline with quantitative analyses of new electoral data or newly emphasized individual and contextual variables. Others, however, contest the voter decline thesis in part or altogether, proposing alternative measurements, normative grounds, or explanations of the history and significance of voter participation in democratic elections.

See also *Compulsory Voting; Voter Registration Drive; Voting Behavior; Voting Procedures.*

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Tyranny, Classical

In modern society, a *tyranny* is often defined as a political system in which one or a few persons hold power, opposed to a *democracy,* where many share power. The two most common representations of modern tyranny are Nazi Germany and the communist Soviet Union. Historically, tyranny has been present in human society at least since the beginning of recorded history and likely well before. Western ideas concerning classical tyranny were first formed in ancient Greece and tyranny, as it is understood in the modern world, was not necessarily evil.

CLASSICAL GREECE: ATHENS AND SPARTA

Generally, the classical period in Greece lasted from approximately 500 to 323 BCE, with the death of Alexander the Great. During this period, Athens, Sparta, Thebes and finally, Alexander's Macedonia alternately ruled Greece.

Prior to the classical period, Athens was ruled under a tyranny. The Greek *tyrannos* began as a term for a military leader and subsequently meant a ruler who took power neither by heredity nor by constitutional authority, but typically by military power. In approximately 510 BCE, the Athenian tyranny was overthrown with the help of King Cleomenes I of Sparta. Athens and Sparta then warred with each other, whereupon the Athenians instituted what is now called a democracy. The period that ensued is commonly called Greece's golden age. Other city-states also adopted democracy as a form of government, though Sparta did not. Athens and Sparta fought as allies in several conflicts before they once again warred with one another. Sparta achieved victory in 404 BCE and established control over Athens—ending its democracy—and the rest of Greece. Fighting continued and power shifted several times over the following years, and Alexander the Great held sole power until his death in 323 BCE. The classical understanding of tyranny extends from this period in ancient Greek history.

TYRANTS IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY

Greece spent much of its existence under the rule of tyrants, even though conventional wisdom applauds the Greek city-states for the development of democracy. Prior to Greece's classical period, a single ruler usually ruled Greek city-states; in Athens this system was called an *archon*. Over time, the city-states became oligarchical aristocracies with occasional rule by powerful figures who imposed their own wills upon the people. This is the quintessential example of a tyrant in classical politics. However, this did not mean that a "tyrant" was necessarily undesirable, as some tyrants used their power for the good of the people. The great ancient Greek philosophers, however, revolutionized the understanding of the word for subsequent millennia.

Plato (427–347 BCE) advocated, in his later work *The Republic,* a society and political system that mandated three very strict classes: the merchant class, the military class, and the philosopher-kings. The philosopher-kings obtained their position by merit along with their intellectual and philosophical abilities. Plato considered them the best-equipped people to discern truth and, thus, to rule justly. Plato's philosopher-king might be considered a *benevolent tyranny,* in the modern sense, as one or a few persons held power. However, under Plato's system, the philosopher-kings would not be tyrants in the classical sense, as they would take power in accord with the political system and still rule according to the law. For Plato, the true tyrant would be the ruler who ruled by whim and personal desire, as military tyrants tend to do, and not according to truth, which should be reflected by the law.

Plato's pupil Aristotle (384–322 BCE), in his *Politics,* expounded on the virtues of government. For Aristotle, one of the worst forms of government was unrestrained democracy. An unrestrained democracy was a society that held no firm values or principles. The desires of the mob held sway. Truth was not one of the goals of a democracy thus understood. For it was from such a democracy that a tyrant, who would pander to the whims of the public, would arise. For Aristotle, an aristocracy was a much more stable and better form of government and more prone to produce a society ruled by virtue and moderation.

CONCLUSION

These classical philosophical reflections on tyranny helped give the term, originally neutral, the strong pejorative sense it still carries today. Both Plato and Aristotle emphasized that the virtuous ruler ruled by law and for the good of the people and tried to distinguish their enlightened philosopher-kings or aristocrats from classical Greek tyrants. Modern proponents of democracy, however, have often attached that same negative connotation—originally given to a ruler who acts according to whims, not the truth—to any politics in which power is concentrated in the hands of a single person or a small group of persons.

The assumption made by the proponents of democracy is that, as Lord Acton famously said, "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." In other words, if a few people have power, they will inevitably use it to their advantage, and not for the common good. Yet, at the same time, political theorists have worried throughout the modern era that democracy itself can, paradoxically, become a kind of tyranny if the masses vote according to their whims and preferences and not according to the common good. Aristotle's perceptive analysis of the transition from pure democracy to tyranny remains relevant, even to the most iconic of modern

tyrannies—including Nazi Germany, which began through the democratic election of the National Socialist Party.

See also *Anti-democratic Thought; Democratic Theory; Greek Democracy, Classical; Republicanism, Classical; Tyranny of the Majority and Minority Rights.*

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Tyranny of the Majority and Minority Rights

In his *On Liberty,* John Stuart Mill separates concerns about the tyranny of the majority into two distinct challenges for democracy. The first of these can be considered an institutional problem. According to Mill, even in a system of majority rule, governance might still reflect the abuses associated with individual tyrants. There is nothing inherent in majority rule, Mill argues, that prevents unjust outcomes. The second challenge, raised first in Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* and further developed by Mill, can be considered a cultural problem. This problem refers to a distinct form of despotism created by the culture of self-government.

Mill outlines these two problems as follows:

> [The] tyranny of the majority is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard. . . . Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant—society collectively, over the separate individuals who compose it—its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself.

Since the publication of *On Liberty,* the institutional problem and cultural problem have served as central dilemmas in liberal and democratic political theory. Political theorists Melissa Schwartzberg aptly labels the institutional problem one of "democratic autophagy," declaring that democratic rule might possibly consume itself by allowing despotism to result from majoritarian procedures. The transformation of Weimar Germany, which had democratic institutions, into Nazi Germany dramatically illustrates this possibility.

THE INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM

Three common responses to the institutional problem are prominent in the literature of contemporary democratic theory. First, precondition theorists distance the idea of democracy from that of majority rule. Because majority rule itself is not enough to ensure self-rule, the very definition of democracy must include some precautions against majority tyranny. For example, John Hart Ely argues that "democracy reinforcing" rights, or rights that are preconditions of democracy, should be secured by nonmajoritarian means. In particular, Ely contends that courts should invoke judicial review to overturn majoritarian legislation that threatens these most basic rights. Another advocate of precondition theory is Alexander Mieklejohn, who argued that free speech was a precondition to self-government. Precondition theorists thus attempt to resolve the problem of majority tyranny by defining democracy so that it denotes certain rights that protect individuals from majoritarian abuses.

In contrast to precondition theorists, pure proceduralist theorists have concede the tyranny of the majority as a risk that must be born by those who seek self-government. Jeremy Waldron postulates that majority rule is the only appropriate response to the justification of coercion. According to Waldron, majority rule is the only way to respect citizens' equal capacity to decide for themselves how to make coercive law. For Waldorn, nothing inherent in democracy guarantees just outcomes, and this obstacle is a natural burden inextricable from self-rule.

A final set of democratic theorists attempt to resolve the problem of majority tyranny by resisting the tendency in the literature to define democracy exclusively in procedural rhetoric. In *Democratic Rights: The Substance of Self Government,* Corey Brettschneider asserts that democratic governments endeavor to respect the status of citizens as rulers. While such values require rights of participation, they also require substantive constraints concerning what qualifies as a democratic outcome. In *Freedom's Law,* Ronald Dworkin also responds to the problem of majority tyranny by distinguishing democracy from majority rule.

THE CULTURAL PROBLEM

Distinct from the institutional issues that descend from the tyranny of the majority, Mill raises concerns about the potential tyranny of democratic culture. He draws from observations about self-government espoused by Alexis de Tocqueville

in his *Democracy in America*. Mill worried that social norms might themselves become abusive even when democratic states were not institutionally tyrannical. For instance, even when all individuals are guaranteed freedom of expression, majorities might use social techniques, such as shunning, to suppress unpopular opinions.

One conundrum in Mill's reasoning lies in resolving what to do when cultural norms oppose the foundational values of democratic institutions. For instance, Mill maintains that law should not ban polygamy, but that citizens should oppose polygamy because of its inegalatarain nature. Thus the question remains as to how the populace could oppose polygamy without ensnaring their democratic society in the cultural trap of majority tyranny. One solution is that reasoning and persuasion advance intrinsic values that do not risk tyranny. Unlike shunning, an active attempt by citizens to persuade their country to forfeit an illiberal practice does not amount to tyranny for while persuasive, reason itself is not coercive.

In sum, the tyranny of the majority raises two fundamental concerns regarding democratic political theory. The institutional problem centers on the possibility that majorities will have the ability to violate rights. In response, democratic theorists attempt to theorize democracy in a way that guarantees protection of rights. The cultural problem, in contrast, focuses on the tendency of democratic culture to socially coerce minorities. The problem here concerns how democracies can balance the need to promote democratic values without citizens engaging in social coercion.

See also *Democracy; Mill, John Stuart.*

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U.S. Political Thought

U.S. political thought encompasses different moral–political traditions largely organized around three different theories of politics: liberalism, republicanism, and ascription. Liberalism is a theory of the individual and the individual's right to private property and liberty, with liberty defined as an equal right to be free from the harm of others. Republicanism, a theory of social relations and institutions, conceives of political liberty not only in individual terms, but emphasizes individuals operating within institutions—systems of property, the economy, social relations, and so on—and therefore takes a broader view of political life. Ascriptive ideas emphasize the political, social, or cultural primacy of one group over others based upon racial, economic, ethnic, and gendered categories. These three theories are distinct analytically, but in actual American history have been combined and reformulated in various ways. U.S. political thought can thus be deciphered through the intermixing of these different traditions.

ORIGINS IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

At its origin, U.S. political thought was most immediately formed by trends in English political thought developed during the seventeenth century. These ideas were themselves the product of the rich currents of Western political thought running back to ancient Greece and the republican era of Rome. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution and the political thinkers who created the American political project were therefore deeply connected to many of the core ideas in Western political philosophy. At that time, the most active ideas were the dual themes of liberalism and republicanism. In many ways, the development of U.S. political thought can be seen as an oscillation and recombination of different aspects of liberalism and republicanism and the ways they have confronted ascriptive impulses in American society.

RENAISSANCE REPUBLICANISM

At the heart of U.S. political thought is the creation of a society free from the forms of feudal domination and privilege that characterized European society. This impulse originated in England during the seventeenth century with the evolution of antimonarchical sentiment. In addition, this perspective was a product of political ideas inherited from the Italian Renaissance, particularly the rebirth of political liberty and

The Federalist Papers, first published at the end of the eighteenth century, had great influence on U.S. political thought. They detailed the philosophy and motivation for the new American system of government, though that philosophy was not without debate.

SOURCE: The Granger Collection, New York

its centrality to the purpose of politics. Whereas the Middle Ages had relied on a Thomistic conception of politics that emphasized order and stability as the primary function of political institutions, the newer ideas generated out of Italy emphasized political liberty and human freedom as the central purpose of political life.

The rebirth of the notion of republican government in England during the seventeenth century had profound

1697

consequences for the politics of the time. Thinkers such as James Harrington in his *Commonwealth of Oceana,* John Milton's *Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* and his pamphlet "Readie and Easie Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth," along with Algernon Sidney's *Discourses concerning Government* among many others, put forth the radical idea that a free society can only occur if all forms of domination and servitude are removed from the relations between political subjects. For these thinkers, the notion of a commonwealth (the English word for the Latin term *republic*) meant that human freedom must contest the anachronistic notion of the monarchical state and feudal institutions. Also inherent in these ideas was for politics to become a form of civil association to promote political liberty.

REFORMATION LIBERALISM

The notion of human liberty was not a singular product of the force of republicanism inherited from Italy and classical sources; the theological impact of the Reformation on political thought was equally important. Reformation theology placed a primary emphasis on the notion that humans are born in a state of freedom. Martin Luther's notion of Christian liberty maintained that humans were born free, in the image of God himself. As a result, John Locke would compose his *Second Treatise of Government* along the lines of human's natural state of liberty. Whereas the republican thinkers of the first half of the seventeenth century were concerned with the problem of how to reshape the relations between political subjects, Lockean liberalism rethought the notion of liberty around the individual. Humankind, born free in a state of nature, would have to obey "no superior power on earth," in Locke's words. The idea was simple: since one is born free and possesses natural law, by which Locke defined the tendency inherent in human beings to not harm other persons, one's natural state is one of peace, goodness, and liberty. Locke had already made a clear case against monarchy in his *First Treatise of Government,* where he argued against the legitimacy of monarchy and the theory of the divine right of kings. However, it was in his liberal theory of property that Locke had, and still has, the most enduring impact on American thinkers.

Both liberalism and republicanism made a serious impact on what is most distinctive in U.S. political thought—yet it is liberalism that has had a very high degree of influence. For Locke, it was through the notion of work, or labor*,* that one can possess property—he termed this a natural right to property, with property constituting anything with which one mixes one's labor. The labor theory of property was central for the political liberal: if an individual could secure personal liberty through property—in the sense that no one would have the right to invade, interfere, or take from what rightly belong to that person—then the liberty of the individual is secure. Eighteenth-century American thinkers saw this as a crucial means to challenge feudal forms of privilege and order, since feudalism was based on the appropriation of one person's labor for the benefit of another. In this respect, the central problem of U.S. political thought has been the confrontation of the theoretical notion of equality with its actual presence in society. Equality of talents and ability were seen as distributed by nature, not institutions; as a result, a republic made of laws protecting each from the harm of the other was seen as the most important means to protect a liberal society, a theme very distinctively evident in *The Federalist Papers.*

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: JEFFERSONIANS VERSUS FEDERALISTS

The project of eighteenth-century U.S. political thought was therefore the creation and maintenance of a liberal republic: to forge political institutions that would protect against tyranny and still allow personal freedom within civil society. These ideas, however, were abstract in nature and became problematic as the nature of economic life changed over time. This is initially apparent in the contest between the Jeffersonians and the Federalists. Thomas Jefferson saw modern economic life as an assault against the moral fabric that supported any republic. The agrarian republic envisioned by Jefferson and his followers therefore viewed the emergence of urbanization and economic development as anathema to America's republican civilization. Alexander Hamilton's idea was that developing modern forms of industry—and the emerging forms of banking and finance needed to support it—would allow human beings to develop a strong and prosperous society.

This disagreement worsened during the first half of the nineteenth century. As Jeffersonian republicanism began to lose out to emerging capitalist interests, industrialism and a new concentration of wealth began to form. Using the language and concepts of liberal republicanism, a radical critique of this new inequality evolved within an emerging workers' movement. Writers such as Langton Byllesby, Thomas Skidmore, Theophilus Fisk, Stephen Simpson, William Gouge, and many others began to argue that the emerging corporations endangered working people's ability to act as equals with others. Now, with the wage system, they argued, working people would be reduced to servitude. As their ability to maintain their economic autonomy was robbed from them, they saw their liberty eroding alongside it. This discourse was cut off with the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865), and the resulting triumph of the industrial transformation of the U.S. economy, but it showed how liberal and republican themes were important in combating the interests of a small, but wealthy, minority. These ideas also gave impetus to the labor movements of the late nineteenth century as well.

NINETEENTH CENTURY: SOCIAL DARWINISM VERSUS SOCIAL REFORMERS

Just as there was a reaction to the emergence of industrial and capitalist society, there were also new arguments attempting to legitimate it. Social Darwinism emerged in the decades after the Civil War while the industrial system ascended. Thinkers such as William Graham Sumner—the most articulate

theorist of this doctrine—argued that social outcomes were the result of certain natural inequalities in skill, intelligence, creativity, and so on. As a result, the industrial order of the late nineteenth century, one characterized by massive economic inequality, was not to be critiqued from a moral point of view. It was not only that it reflected the real differences between people, it was also legitimated from a liberal point of view: people who work harder and better ought to accrue greater rewards. This was a certainly a selective reading of the liberal doctrine, yet it illustrates how liberal ideas could also legitimate inequalities between people and classes.

Social reformers soon felt the economic and social inequalities, and the social disruption, caused by the impact of urbanization, immigration, and industrialization during the end of the nineteenth century. Throughout the nineteenth century, the prevailing philosophy of government held by elites was a kind of laissez-faire liberalism: the state was to resist interference in civil society and, more specifically, economic life. A perceived sense of social breakdown and crisis resulted, with responses including Edward Bellamy's deeply influential novel *Looking Backward*. Books like this put forth a new vision of political engineering and social cohesion that animated many of the next generation's reformers. This new generation of social scientists and social thinkers—many of them educated in the German university system—began to see things differently. For these thinkers, the American state had to become more involved in social affairs and public life, bringing about an acute departure from the classical liberal ideas toward a reworking of republican themes.

The emergence of what became known as the Progressive movement held that expansion of the state was necessary, both in terms of its size and scope as well as a transformation of its function. This turn was the result of the resurgence of, and renewed emphasis on, republican themes, which were being turned against utilitarian and classical liberal ideas. In books such as Herbert Croly's *The Promise of American Life* and Walter Weyl's *The New Democracy,* the vision of a more integrated society with collective efforts of all citizens ought to replace what they saw as the outmoded laissez-faire model. These views were in sharp contrast to the radicals of their time—such as Bill Haywood from the International Workers of the World (IWW), socialists, and Marxists—who argued that capitalism alone was the cause for the crisis. Instead, they asserted that a more regulated industrial society could redistribute social surplus and legislate to protect the rights of working people that ought to be protected from the harms inherent in the industrial system. Thinkers such as John Dewey, in his book *The Public and Its Problems,* extended these insights, which argued that the public needs protection from the consequences—intended and unintended—of a complex industrial society. George Herbert Mead, and other representatives of what came to be known as pragmatism, argued that the concept of the individual was not separable from society as a whole, since each individual was intersubjectively related to the social world. These shifts in social theory began to reflect and aid a modern reworking of republican themes and led, in time, to the New Deal and the modern welfare state.

NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES: LIBERALISM VERSUS SLAVERY AND WHITE SUPREMACY

Economic forms of inequality were not the only forms of social life assailed by liberal ideas. Ascriptive theories of political life have had an equally deep impact on the development of U.S. political thought. From the start, the idea that equality existed as an idea, but only for a select few, was problematic for American society. A key element in ascriptive theories of society is the emphasis on an inherent inequality between certain groups or classes in society. As a result of this inherent inequality, a hierarchical status system emerges and becomes rationalized and defended. However, as liberalism and republicanism came to permeate more of U.S. society, ascriptive ideas about social relations and political power were increasingly challenged. This problem emerged most forcefully around the institution of slavery in the nineteenth century. Writers such as John C. Calhoun argued for a natural hierarchy between classes, justifying the institution of slavery in the process.

Liberal political ideas, more significantly, combated ascriptive notions of separateness, difference, and hierarchy. Religious concepts were important in raising a radical consciousness to slavery, with John Brown's radical abolitionism the result of a religious conviction easily seen as fanatical. Yet, religious ideas about slavery could go either way: denouncing the institution as inhumane or supporting it as part of the hierarchy of nature. Slavery became problematized most effectively in liberal politics since a response was workable through political, rather than merely moral, means.

Evident as far back as the Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858, Lincoln argued against Douglas's claim for states' right to choose whether or not to be a slave state—specifically with respect to Nebraska and Kansas. Lincoln argued that black slaves, although perhaps not racially equal to whites, still deserved to keep what they labored for with their own hands, invoking a liberal natural right to property theory. Indeed, liberalism became a most effective language against the inequalities of race and gender, but republicanism also emerged as an attempt to create equality between blacks and whites. During Reconstruction, members of the Radical Republicans, such as Thaddeus Stevens, argued that plantation owners' land ought to be seized by the North and their properties divided and distributed among newly liberated blacks. This argument failed, and the South once again saw the rise of ascriptive notions of race manifest in Jim Crow laws.

Debates about the paths to freedom for blacks emerged around this time. W. E. B. DuBois, in his book *The Soul of Black Folk,* argued that liberation could be obtained through cultural enlightenment. He advocated for a "talented tenth" to serve as an educated elite able to promote the interests of the black population more broadly. Booker T. Washington, on the other hand, argued that adopting craft skills and an ethic

of thrift in economic life would give blacks social parity with whites; they could then advocate for further freedoms. However, it was not until the civil rights movement in the 1960s when figures such as Martin Luther King Jr. once again used liberalism to counter these ascriptive ideas about race.

The women's movement adopted a similar strategy, also arguing for equal rights under the banner of liberalism. During the Progressive Era, women's suffrage was granted along with a series of other popular democratic reforms (e.g., the direct election of senators). Yet this period also saw the emergence of tribal politics, in terms of populism and a new form of reaction against immigrants. But in each case, the victory of the rights for the disenfranchised was won through liberal arguments that emphasized equal rights along with toleration and acceptance of difference.

TWENTIETH CENTURY: RISE OF NEOLIBERALISM

After World War II (1939–1945), a new phase in U.S. political thought emerged. The defeat of fascism in Europe and the new bipolar relation between the United States and the Soviet Union influenced a shift toward pluralism and deepened democratic theory. Thinkers such as John Rawls in his *Theory of Justice* and Robert Dahl in *Polyarchy* forged a new understanding of liberalism and pluralistic conceptions of democracy. Their ideas signaled a new hegemony of a liberal idea emphasizing individual rights and the notion of fairness and a dispersion of power as essential to maintaining a democratic society. This current in democratic theory also attempts to merge certain aspects of liberalism and republicanism, since both try to show that individual liberty is also in some way bound with public and institutional responsibilities for the maintenance of individual rights and opportunities. These are axioms of democratic theory and remain the most robust attributes of contemporary U.S. political thought.

See also *Dewey, John; Federalism; Liberal Theory; Locke, John; Progressivism; Republicanism, Classical.*

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U.S. Politics and Society: African American Political Participation

Political participation is defined as an "activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action—either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies" (McKenzie). This includes activities such as voting, campaigning, contacting a government official, and protests. Examined from multiple angles, differences in participation include economic status, education, gender, and race. Basic texts on political participation agree that wealthy or well-educated Americans are much more likely to participate in political activities than low-income and not well-educated citizens; thus, socioeconomic factors have been indicators of political participation among African Americans.

From the antebellum period to the civil rights movement of the mid-1960s, American political and social institutions subordinated African Americans and largely excluded them from the formal processes of political participation and policy development. Consequently, African Americans sought political enfranchisement through various strategies and tactics such as violent revolt, mass protest, and accommodation. Their activism and vigilance, coupled with the civil rights movement, ultimately led to the influx of African American elected officials such as Carl Stokes of Cleveland, the first African American mayor of a major city, and political administrators such as Patricia Harris, the first deputy mayor of New York City and cabinet secretary in the Carter administration. While African Americans have historically been politically active—from the Reconstruction period to the election of Barack Obama—the challenge is to translate political participation to active participation in public policy development.

INCREASED PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION

Both the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 contributed to much progress in African American political participation. While the Fifteenth Amendment granted African American men the right to vote, discriminatory measures such as the poll tax and literacy tests kept African American political participation limited. The 1965 Voting Rights Act banned discriminatory tests or devices to restrict voting and provided federal oversight of voting changes in the covered jurisdictions.

A 1982 analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data on registration and voting by African Americans from 1964 to 1980 reflects the positive influence of these changes on political participation. After the passage of the act, the number of registered African American voters increased more than 50 percent. Of African Americans and whites participating in presidential elections since 1980, African Americans living in the South are the only demographic reporting an increased level of participation between 1964 and 1980.

The number of elected African American officeholders increased tenfold from 150 in 1965 to 9,101 in 2001. This does not mean, however, that African Americans have achieved equal access to elective office. Fredrick C. Harris's 2008 *Survey on Race, Politics, and Society* indicates that, in three types of political activities—working for a party or political candidate, trying to persuade others to vote for or against a candidate, or contributing money to a campaign—African Americans participated at greater or at equal rates with whites and Hispanics during the 2008 campaign period. African Americans are twice as likely to have worked for a political candidate (14 percent) than whites (7 percent) and Hispanics (7 percent). Both blacks and whites have tried to persuade others to vote at roughly the same rates, 39 percent and 38 percent respectively. During the 2008 presidential campaign, African Americans contributed money to campaigns at a greater rate than other groups: 31 percent of African Americans report giving money to a candidate compared to 21 percent of whites—a difference of ten percentage points. During the same period, 16 percent of Hispanics reported contributing to a political campaign. The candidacy of Barack Obama as the first African American presidential nominee of a major political party accounts for high rates of political participation—over 95 percent of the African American electorate voted for Barack Obama over John McCain. Significantly, Michael Steele, former lieutenant governor of Maryland, was elected the first African American leader of the Republican Party. For the first time in American history, African Americans led the two major political parties.

EXAMINING THE DATA

Much of the research explaining the rise in African American participation began in the 1960s. In the 2006 book *Countervailing Forces in African-American Civic Activism, 1973–1994,* political scientists Fredrick C. Harris, Valeria Sinclair-Chapman, and Brian McKenzie present the first longitudinal study assessing African American political participation during the post–civil rights era, describing black political power and economic distress in African American communities as having a tug-of-war effect on grassroots activism. Their findings indicate that the political activism of African Americans since the 1970s illustrates how black political power succeeded in encouraging blacks to become part of the political mainstream, but has not been enough to sustain grassroots activism over the decades. Negative economic forces such as unemployment, inflation, and the growing income gap between poor and affluent blacks have undermined grassroots participation in black communities

since the activist 1960s. Wilbur Scott and Alan Acock's 1979 study on socioeconomic status, unemployment, and political participation indicates that lower-income individuals are less committed to voting, feel less efficacious, are less interested in politics, and are less politically active than persons of higher status regardless of employment status.

Sociologist Anthony Orum suggested, in his 1966 comparison of National Opinion Research Center (NORC) survey data of low-income African Americans in inner-city Detroit and low-income whites in inner-city Chicago, that the relationship between social class and organizational participation is not as strong for African Americans. Lower-income African Americans are far more likely than their white counterparts to belong to organizations, particularly those with political and religious affiliations. Orum indicates that low-income African Americans are more likely to join associations and actively participate than their white counterparts whose "joiners" seek membership but remain inactive members. Orum also suggests the rise of the civil rights movement and the proliferation of social action organizations such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the Urban League are the motivating factors.

Examining individual-level data on African American political participation from 1980 to 1994, Matthew Platt reports that African Americans are more politically active when they face some external threat, have greater access to policy makers, and possess stronger social networks. In general terms, political participation among lower-income African Americans suffers during times of high inflation and unemployment, as their attention focuses more on economic survival than political activism. While the increasing number of African American elected officials helps, to some degree, in offsetting declines in African American activism during tough economic times, it has little impact on the African American poor. Thus, for the most marginal population in African American communities, there are even greater barriers to having their political voices heard than middle-class and upper middle-class African Americans who are educated and are part of social networks.

THE AFRICAN AMERICAN CHURCH

The study of African American political participation requires consideration of the role of the African American church, a prominent institution in the civil rights movement and considered an integral social, religious, and political fixture in the African American community. Political scientist Katherine Tate's 1991 analysis of the African American voter turnout in 1984 and 1988 presidential elections revealed that variables such as socioeconomic status cannot fully account for African American turnout variations; instead, involvement in African American churches elicited a stronger and more positive effect on political participation, indicating that church membership and involvement are integral in mobilizing African Americans. Tate showed the consistent positive effect of politically active African American churches

on African American participation through organizational resources, such as grassroots networks, that provide an arena for mobilization efforts (e.g., voter registration drives).

African American churches provide both cognitive-emotional resources that give churchgoers a greater incentive to participate and organizational resources that ease the mobilization process. For instance, internal religiosity, as expressed through church attendance and involvement, promotes a greater interest in morally charged political issues. All of the research on African American churches since the 1960s has underscored the institution as an essential part of mobilizing African Americans.

African American participation in U.S. electoral politics as voters, candidates, and office holders is at an all-time high. African American political participation is now similar to their mainstream counterparts. In the final analysis, however, socioeconomic status is still a driving force of political participation.

See also *Civil Rights Movement; U.S. Politics and Society: African American Social Movements; U.S. Politics and Society: Latino Participation; U.S. Politics and Society: Minority Interest Groups; U.S. Politics and Society: Women, Political Participation of.*

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U.S. Politics and Society: African American Social Movements

In the early twentieth century, African American social movements emerged in response to the nineteenth-century conditions—de jure segregation, disfranchisement, lynching, and widespread poverty—in black communities in the North and South. In the late nineteenth century, African American journalist Ida Bell Wells-Barnett both nationalized and internationalized the antilynching movement, while the black women's club movement, exemplified by the National Association of Colored Women (1896), built schools, settlement houses, and other needed community institutions. In 1909, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Urban League (NUL) expanded the antilynching campaign and the social welfare work initiated late in the previous century.

The experience of World War I (1914–1918), both at home and abroad, radicalized African American social movements. This radicalism, effectuated in part by black disenchantment with the leadership styles of both Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. Dubois, was known as the new Negro movement. Its most notable leader was Jamaica's Marcus Mosiah Garvey. Garvey advanced the idea of black pride and the slogan "Africa for Africans," attracting the attention of oppressed blacks worldwide. Although these earlier movements produced minor victories, they established a national network of organizations and raised blacks' racial and political consciousness, which would play a significant role in civil and human rights and anticolonial struggles during the 1930s and 1940s.

During the Great Depression and World War II (1939–1945) eras, organizations like the NAACP and NUL united with the Communist Party to challenge American racism and imperialism abroad. In the 1930s, in cities like Chicago, New York, and Cleveland, blacks started campaigns against discriminatory hiring practices to force white proprietors in black neighborhoods to employ black workers. These campaigns reflected a shift from the courts to the streets, from civil suits to civil disobedience. In 1937, Paul Robeson, W. E. B. Dubois, Max Yergan, and Alphaeus Hunton Jr. founded the Council of African Affairs, the most significant anticolonial organization in the United States. In 1941, civil rights activist A. Philip Randolph used the threat of a march on Washington, D.C. to pressure President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to issue Executive Order 8802, banning discrimination in defense industries and creating the Fair Employment Act.

In the postwar era, the Northern civil rights movement fought for legislation directed at police brutality, fair employment, and housing practices. In New York City, black activists lobbied for fair housing and employment practices as well as criminal justice reform and a law to end police brutality. U.S.–cold war imperatives, however, subdued the anticolonial and leftist politics of the civil rights movements. In 1950, the U.S.

State Department revoked Robeson's passport after he refused to sign an affidavit concerning his past membership in the Communist Party.

In the cold war era, the United States attempted to refashion its image from a nation that lynched black people to one that protected their civil rights. In the eyes of newly independent African, Asian, and Latin American nations, U.S. racism tarnished its global image. To improve this, the U.S. government filed an amicus brief in support of the NAACP's position that segregated public education was inherently unequal in the historic *Brown v. Board of Education* of 1954. This was further improved as the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations became more open to working with the Southern civil rights movement.

Voter registration and desegregation campaigns by local people and organizations like the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and others in Montgomery, Birmingham, and Selma, Alabama, and especially the freedom summer of 1964, not only mobilized local and national support for blacks' rights but also broadcast the severity of racial violence in the United States to the world. By 1964, with the strong support of President Lyndon B. Johnson, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act and a year later, the Voting Rights Act of 1965. But despite momentum gained in the South, conditions in the North worsened. In the 1960s, black Northerners were still as prey to police brutality, and racism in the labor market, as they were two decades before. In response to this situation, the Black Panther Party was formed in 1966 to promote black self-defense and political action. The broader black power movement voiced African Americans's sense of political and economic powerlessness at the local level, despite the passage of national civil rights legislation.

In the post–civil rights era, the need for local empowerment encouraged blacks, especially women, to participate in organizations that address issues often neglected by national civil rights organizations. During the late 1960s and 1970s, black women led local branches of the National Welfare Rights Organization in the fight for cost of living–adjusted stipends for welfare recipients, while in 2006 black women of Biloxi, Mississippi founded Coastal Women for Change, which aids neighborhoods devastated and people dislocated by Hurricane Katrina. The aggregate of these local and national social movements have bore fruit. The African American community celebrated a major milestone in 2009 with the inauguration of Barack H. Obama, who began his career as a community organizer in Chicago. Notwithstanding this achievement, African American activists have found it difficult to attack entrenched poverty and the resegregation of public schools.

See also *NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund; Racial Discrimination; U.S. Politics and Society: African American Political Participation; U.S. Politics and Society: Minority Interest Groups.*

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U.S. Politics and Society: Latino Political Participation

For quite some time, the discussion of Latinos in the United States has focused primarily on their rapid population growth and recent residential location in nontraditional areas of the country. Now over 45 million strong, Latinos constitute more than 15 percent of the total U.S. population, and the population of sixteen states includes at least one-half million Latinos. The early and prolonged presidential politics of 2008 also brought notice to the role of Latinos' electoral political participation. Thus, four aspects are significant for political scientists: (1) Latinos' levels of electoral participation (i.e., registration and turnout) and contributing factors, (2) partisan affiliation and preferences, (3) the political engagement among the foreign-born segment of the Latino community, and (4) political mobilization.

THE GAINING LATINO ELECTORATE

In an earlier epoch of Latino politics, a descriptive saying was "if they vote, they count." In essence, relatively low levels of voter registration and turnout have characterized the predominant pattern of Latino electoral participation. At the same time, phenomenal growth is having an impact in the electoral arena. More noticeably, the current presidential nomination process has resulted in extensive direct or targeted efforts by presidential campaigns to attract Latino voters.

Latino immigrants head to an immigration rally bearing both Mexican and U.S. flags. Though foreign-born Latinos in the United States are considered to be uninvolved in domestic politics, research in the early twenty-first century indicates their political involvement is on par with native-born Latinos.

SOURCE: AP Photo/Bob Child

More attention is now given to this segment of the electorate for a number of reasons. Latinos reside in the larger electoral college states. Second, their proportion of the electorate is still small (in 2006, approximately 7 percent), yet their rate of share of the total electorate is growing faster than any other population segment. Third, the Latino electorate shows signs of greater interest and attention to politics, saliency of policy concerns, and keener interests in evaluating political parties and candidates. Fourth, Latinos' numbers as naturalized citizens are increasing.

Latino communities have been undervalued as an electoral base because of their more youthful population and higher percentage of foreign-born noncitizens. In 2006, 61 percent of Latinos were ineligible to register to vote: 34 percent were under the age of 18, and 26 percent were noncitizens. This compares to 24 percent and 35 percent respectively for ineligible Anglo-American and African American voters. Recently, levels of naturalization among foreign-born Latinos, especially

Mexicans, have risen. In addition to established factors of acculturation, English language proficiency, gains in educational attainment, more years in the United States, and accumulation of socioeconomic equity, the increase of anti-immigrant referenda and federal and state legislation have served as external "stimuli" for many immigrants to pursue naturalization as what some consider a defensive strategy.

PARTY AFFILIATION AND SUPPORT

Conventional wisdom says that most Latinos are Democrats, but that they have weaker party affiliation than other Democratic identifiers. The extant literature notes that the role of parental socialization, political orientations (e.g., trust in government, efficacy, etc.), public policy preferences and issues, along with retrospective political and economic evaluations, are key determinants of party preferences. However, factors such as national origin background, presence of panethnic identity, generational status in the United States, and English language proficiency are important additions. Demographically, with more females than males, being older, and, to a more limited degree, level of educational attainment correlate with being a Democrat. Ironically, social conservative appeals by the Republican Party, and emphasis on less government, contrasts from Latinos' support of a greater role for government. Ideologically, Latinos display moderate to liberal positions, but policy positions vary across economic, social, and foreign policy issue areas. For example, on the policy issues of immigration, education, and the economy, Latinos take a more liberal and governmental supportive stance. On the other hand, Latinos who identify themselves as Republicans exhibit higher levels of trust in government, and identify themselves as Americans more so than their Latino Democratic counterparts. Finally, the current partisan trend indicating an increase among Americans who call themselves Independents is evident among Latinos, being truer for younger Latinos.

Since the 2000 elections, more discussion about the higher level of Latino support for George W. Bush indicates a possible partisan shift. His campaign themes of traditional values—faith, hard work, family, socioeconomic mobility, and social conservatism are pillars of the Republican Party's appeals to Latinos. Yet, the gains of the 2000 national elections seem short-lived. Since 2002, there has been an eight to eleven percentage point shift of Latinos toward the Democratic Party. Contributing factors were the decline of President Bush's evaluations, anti-immigrant policies, and rhetoric by Republican leadership, favorable views for expanded government to solve problems, limited efforts by Republican Party leadership to invest in a Latino strategy, and lower salience of family values as a key determinant in candidate and political party choices. Finally, Latinos' assessment of which party is most responsive to their concerns is almost a ratio of five to one in favor of the Democratic Party—44 percent compared to 8 percent. At the same time, another 41 percent indicate no difference in either party's responsiveness.

IMMIGRANTS AND NONELECTORAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

For the most part, Latino immigrants have been viewed as economic migrants, seeking a better life in America, with the possibility of making their new country their permanent home, or perhaps returning to their home country with their economic successes. Either viewed as apolitical or civically isolated, the lack of citizenship status for Latino immigrants was considered synonymous for being politically removed from the U.S. political system. Yet both historically and in recent times, Latino immigrants have been involved in U.S. organizational and civic life. From mutual aid societies, labor organizations, neighborhood associations, and educational advocacy efforts, the political life of Latino immigrants has been evident in the nonelectoral arenas of U.S. politics. Individual factors such as greater English language proficiency, higher educational levels, being female, being older, higher income levels, and migration to the United States for better opportunities enhance a more politically active immigrant segment. The external negative climate directed toward undocumented Latinos has also activated their involvement in collective activities.

The recent vocal mood of anti-immigrant sentiments and policies has activated even more visible immigrant political behaviors. Significantly, the "hostile environment" toward foreigners, undocumented immigrants, and Latinos has resulted in a heightened political awareness and activism for both foreign-born and native-born Latinos. The extant research reinforces the view that all Latinos have lower levels of nonelectoral participation in comparison to non-Latinos. Native-born Latinos are seen as more engaged than their foreign-born counterparts, but recent works by Matt Barreto and Jose Munoz, along with Alejandro Portes and colleagues, document at least comparable levels of nonelectoral participation for all Latino subgroups. In addition, many scholars of Latino politics strongly suggest that a more complete characterization of Latinos' political domains must include nonelectoral arenas.

MOBILIZATION

The trend of greater political awareness and activism has carried over into electoral politics for those who can vote, and has been spurred by mobilization efforts of Latino-based organizations, labor unions, and, to a lesser extent, political parties and campaigns. The more effective mobilization efforts include direct contact, mobilizers of similar ethnic and cultural background, and effective use of Spanish and English media. During the 2008 presidential primaries, record numbers of Latinos registered and voted in state primaries. Latinos' share of the primary electorate has increased dramatically as well as increased attention to politics. This pattern carried over in the November general elections with Latinos highest turnout and proportion of the electorate. Nationally, 67 percent of Latinos voted for Democrat Barack Obama while only 31 percent voted for Republican John McCain.

Historically, Latino political participation has been lower compared to that of other groups. Yet since the mid-1990s, demographic growth, increased organizational involvement in political matters, clarity of issue priorities, an external negative political climate, and growing attention and targeting by organizations have contributed to an upward slope of Latino political involvement. The policy and partisan impact is still in the process of defining how successful support of partisan candidates and public policies can encourage a closer reflection of the policy preferences of most Latinos. That is, the impact of heightened political engagement in terms of affecting policy agendas and outputs remains to be seen. That success would include continued gains in the number of Latino representatives, greater political access, and greater influence in the policy-making process.

See also *Latino Politics; Minority Representation.*

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U.S. Politics and Society: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Political Identity

One of the most prominent civil rights movements of the last four decades has been the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender movement, in part due to the influence of other successful civil rights movements and in part as a response to the political environment that explicitly marginalized gays and lesbians. The study of gay and lesbian political identity has included analysis of gay rights as a social movement, simultaneously creating a group identity while engaging in political activity. Scholars have examined the ways the movement has adapted strategies to changing political environments that have required not only challenging governmental policies but also challenging public opinion about sexual orientation and gender identity. Like many social movements, the pursuit of simultaneously political and cultural rights has also produced an internal struggle over the nature of the group's identity, its political interests, and the inclusiveness of the group.

COMING OUT: THE EARLY YEARS OF THE MOVEMENT

The roots of gay and lesbian politics can be found in the early twentieth-century social clubs, like the Mattachine Society and Daughters of Bilitis, founded to provide a safe space for individuals interested in same-sex relationships. Since gay and lesbian relationships were considered socially unacceptable and were often criminalized, self-identifying as a sexual minority was itself a political act. Most early gay and lesbian organizations were located in metropolitan areas, and while white professionals dominated many of these social and political organizations, areas such as Harlem also had a thriving gay and lesbian subculture. In the 1950s, local, state, and federal lawmakers increasingly targeted gay and lesbian populations with antisodomy statutes, and the Eisenhower administration expelled suspected gay and lesbian employees in the federal workforce and military.

The social movements of the 1960s profoundly influenced the organization of gay and lesbian politics. For example, the feminist movement had an ambivalent relationship with lesbian politics, caused by fears that association with lesbians would delegitimize the feminist cause and others arguing for a connection between gender equity and gay rights. The alliance between lesbians and feminists marked a divide within the movement between the priorities and interests of gay men and lesbian women. Gay liberationists, inspired by the sexual revolution of the 1960s, encouraged members to "come out" to make sexual minorities less stigmatized.

The 1970s saw an increase in activism, including the election of the first openly gay public officials and the decriminalization of same-sex sexual activity in many places, but also generated backlash. Much of the opposition was religious in nature, setting up a primary opposition between religious groups, mostly the Christian right, and the gay rights movement.

THE MOVEMENT MATURES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF GAY RIGHTS

In the 1980s, the AIDS crisis precipitated a dramatic transformation of gay and lesbian politics both in terms of focus and strategy. HIV/AIDS forced the movement to focus less on sexual freedom and more on health care, research funding, and policy. Gay rights organizations—from the Gay Men's Health Crisis (GMHC) and AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP) to the Human Rights Commission (HRC) and the Lambda Legal Defense Fund—faced significant obstacles in a government reluctant to invest in an illness that was seen as primarily impacting an unpopular minority. In spite of the negative response, the AIDS crisis helped transform gay rights into a major civil rights issue in the United States as the emergent political organizations, especially the HRC and Lambda Legal, developed a coherent national strategy of legislative and legal challenges, and the Democratic Party adopted a more gay-friendly platform. The AIDS crisis also highlighted legal inequalities in areas such as access to health care and end-of-life decision making. On the social front, an increasing number of public figures came out of the closet to make gays and lesbians more visible.

The 1980s also saw growing rifts in terms of gay identity and group interests. The AIDS crisis highlighted the public health concern of primarily gay males, reinforcing a general feeling of exclusion voiced by women and minorities in the movement. Amongst activists themselves significant differences developed over the strategy and direction of the movement. ACT-UP had splintered off from the Gay Men's Health Crisis over a belief that the GMHC was too conciliatory and insufficiently radical, a split that would be reiterated in later struggles. Many felt the AIDS crisis had made the movement too focused on "normalizing" the image of gays and lesbians and assimilation into mainstream society, leaving behind the goals of sexual freedom and societal transformation. These differences also manifested in differences over the inclusion of transgendered persons in the movement. While the gay rights movement had always been identified with challenges to gender norms, the distinct concerns of the transgendered communities surfaced with some ambivalence within the gay and lesbian community over whether the embrace of transgender rights would interfere with public acceptance of gay rights.

A NATIONAL MOVEMENT: THE PROMISE AND PITFALLS OF THE GAY 90s

During the 90s, the gay rights movement saw some successes in passing state and local antidiscrimination laws and had their first major national success with *Romer v. Evans* in 1995, striking down a state initiative in Colorado that would have forbidden local measures protecting gays and lesbians. Nevertheless, gay activists were disappointed by

President Bill Clinton, who professed support of gay rights but nevertheless adopted the "don't ask, don't tell" policy in the military, under which gays and lesbians could serve only at the price of silence about their orientation. Further, legal backlash, led by conservative Christians, grew against same-sex marriage. Gay questions also received greater attention on the cultural stage with the increasing visibility of gays and lesbians in popular culture.

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender studies (LGBT) gained a foothold in academia with the first research center opening at the City University of New York (CUNY) in 1991 and the proliferation of academic research on LGBT populations during this time. Again, the expansion of the movement was met with resistance and concern over the development of gay and lesbian identity. Concerns remained over what was seen as an increasing assimilationist agenda amongst mainstream gay rights organizations that, in arguing for equal rights, emphasized gays and lesbians were a part of mainstream society, rather than making a case for changing society.

These rifts perpetuated into the first part of the twenty-first century, as same-sex marriage became the dominant item on the gay rights agenda, and some proponents argued for same-sex marriage as equivalent to the "normal" institution of marriage while others critiqued it precisely because it adopted an already oppressive paradigm. Others felt the focus on marriage distracted from other political goals such as antidiscrimination or hate crimes legislation.

LESBIAN, GAY, TRANSGENDER, AND BISEXUAL IDENTITY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

The evolution of LGBT political identity has been of interest to political scientists for several reasons. The first is an examination of social movement strategy and evolution. As with any movement, LGBT political action has required a response to the political environment, in this case responding to the cultural politics of the twentieth century that placed gay rights alongside abortion, gender equity, and sexual expression as key debates in social policy. The gay rights movement has also responded to the institutional specificity of the U.S. political arena, having to develop strategies that were geographically specific, finding the greatest success in coastal and urban areas, and appealing to state and local governments as well as the federal government. Specific events such as the AIDS crisis have profoundly shaped the movement's goals and identity. The movement has, at different times, had to respond to political reaction to their successes, most notably reactions within the religious right. As with other social movements, gay rights activists have often found greater success as a political minority appealing to the courts rather than legislative or direct channels. The movement also demonstrates, however, that reliance on legal strategies can also make the movement highly dependent upon professionalized experts, moving away from grassroots and direct action.

Finally, LGBT politics also demonstrates that so-called identity politics are not premised upon a fixed political identity determined by difference from the mainstream. This identity may change over time, as the AIDS crisis prompted a shift from liberationist strategies to policy-oriented public health concerns, placing gay men at the center of the struggle. The identity may also be created by tensions and debate within the movement itself over its own identity, as demonstrated by the growing consideration of transgender issues and debates over the exclusion of women and minority from the movement.

See also *Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Movements, Comparative; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Politics; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender U.S. Legal Questions.*

. . . .   CLAIRE E. RASMUSSEN

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U.S. Politics and Society: Minority Interest Groups

Interest groups representing racial and ethnic minorities are central to civil rights politics. Minority interest groups have mainly pursued a strategy of sponsoring litigation because the federal courts are insulated from electoral politics. Despite the prominence of the litigation strategy, evidence suggests that litigation is not necessarily successful, and minority interest groups have adopted other strategies, such as organizing protests and lobbying government officials.

LITIGATION

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) is the quintessential minority interest group. Although minority interest groups can be traced back to abolitionist organizations, the NAACP, which W. E. B. Dubois and white civil rights activists formed in 1909, is the first modern group that sought continually to press the federal government to secure access to equal education, end employment discrimination, and establish universal suffrage. From its outset, the NAACP's national headquarters has set policy goals and directed strategy, and local branches address local discrimination issues and implement the national headquarters' strategies. Although the NAACP employed typical interest group tactics, such as protesting, lobbying, and mobilizing supporters, it initially focused on litigation to rectify racial discrimination because NAACP leaders recognized that the public and elected branches of government did not support their goals. However, this political disadvantage could be neutralized in the countermajoritarian federal courts, where success depends on skillful legal argument, not political support. In other words, the NAACP's litigation campaign was not a legal aid mission; instead the national leaders carefully and strategically sought and litigated cases that were winnable and would have important civil rights ramifications. For example, the NAACP sponsored litigation of cases that ended the white primary elections (*Nixon v. Herndon,* 1927 and *Smith v. Allwright,* 1944) and racially discriminatory real estate contracts (*Shelley v. Kraemer,* 1948).

During the early 1940s, the legal arm of the NAACP—the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF)—officially severed ties with the NAACP in order to focus solely on using litigation to end segregated education. The LDF illustrated that the legal standard of "separate but equal" was unworkable because states that segregated did not provide for genuinely equal education. After undermining the separate-but-equal standard, the LDF expanded its attack on segregation by arguing the landmark *Brown v. Board of Education* case in 1954. Using a creative mixture of cutting-edge legal argument and social science evidence, the LDF convinced a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court that state-sponsored segregation was contrary to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision did not by itself end segregation, it is undoubtedly one of the most important events in civil rights history, and the LDF's victory

set the model for using litigation as a means to improve civil rights for racial and ethnic minorities. The LDF has continued to litigate to advance civil rights in voting, criminal law, education, employment, and public accommodations.

Based on the LDF's success, other racial and ethnic minority groups have employed a litigation strategy to improve the civil rights of the people they represent. The Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) argues cases on behalf of Latinos in order to influence policies concerning education and employment discrimination, immigration, and voting rights; the Native American Rights Fund (NARF) litigates civil rights issues for American Indians, such as protecting tribal identity and resources, ending discrimination against Indians, and negotiating with the federal and state governments on behalf of tribes and individuals; and the Asian American Justice Center (AAJC) argues cases concerning Asian American civil rights issues of discrimination and immigration.

NONLITIGATION ACTIVITIES

Despite its prominence, litigation is not the only method that minority interest groups employ. Despite some landmark litigation successes, such as *Brown v. Board of Education,* the evidence is mixed on whether litigation is an effective tactic. Comprehensive studies of minority group litigation demonstrate that groups, such as the LDF, are not necessarily likely to increase the chance of favorable court decisions, especially since the 1980s, as the ideology of federal judges has become more conservative hence less receptive to the goals of minority interest groups.

As litigation has become less prevalent, minority interest groups have employed alternative methods of ending discrimination. Some organizations, such as the National Urban League, are social service agencies that provide economic and educational assistance, but many of these groups have expanded their activities to include sponsoring litigation, organizing protests, and researching public policy issues. Other organizations focus on lobbying elected officials and bureaucrats, organizing public protests, or mobilizing grassroots members. After the NAACP and LDF split into separate groups, the NAACP focused more on public protests against discrimination and lobbying public officials to enact and implement policies to end discrimination. Furthermore, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), which was headed by Martin Luther King Jr., organized boycotts, marches, and sit-ins during the 1960s. The SCLC continues to advocate for human rights both in the United States and abroad. The League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) employs a variety of tactics, such as litigating, protesting, providing economic and education assistance, and lobbying public officials to fight discrimination committed against Mexican Americans. There are a variety of groups that have lobbied public officials on behalf of Asian-American nationalities. For example, in the 1980s, the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) convinced Congress and President Reagan to pass a law apologizing and compensating for the internment of American citizens of Japanese

descent during World War II (1939–1945). In addition to each individual tribal government advocating on behalf of their members, pantribal groups, such as the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), have lobbied Congress and educated the public concerning political and economic discrimination against American Indians. Finally, some groups, such as the Black Panther Party, shunned the approaches of the more traditional groups, instead focusing on provision of economic opportunities and a more confrontational approach against the government.

In conclusion, minority interest groups have played a central role in advancing civil rights, even if they do not always accomplish their goals. Traditionally, minority interest groups relied on litigation to bring about social change, but other methods, such as protesting, providing economic and education assistance, lobbying, and mobilizing voters, have also been useful to establish policies on behalf of racial and ethnic minority groups.

See also *Equality and Inequality; Minority Representation; NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund.*

. . . .   STEVEN TAUBER

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U.S. Politics and Society: Women, Political Participation of

Women comprise more than 50 percent of the U.S. population, but their political integration as voters, activists, and elected officials is a relatively new phenomenon. Not until 1920 did the Nineteenth Amendment extend voting rights to women, and not until 2008 did a woman—Hillary Clinton—win a presidential primary. When assessing women's political participation, therefore, it is important to examine not only current levels of women's political activism, but also the circumstances under which they have come to enter the political sphere, and differences in participation at the mass and elite levels.

WOMEN'S EMERGENCE IN U.S. POLITICS

Women's political exclusion, as well as their eventual participation, can be linked to their family roles. Throughout U.S. history, a clear division of labor has characterized household and family arrangements. Traditionally, men worked outside the home and, therefore, served in a more "public" role; women occupied a more "private" role, as the caretakers of the home and family. This gendered division of labor historically resulted in men's entry into, and dominance of, the public world of politics, and women's almost total absence from the political sphere.

As early as the women's suffrage revival in 1890, though, women began to rely on their distinct roles in this private sphere to justify their entry into politics. Government corruption and party machines dominated late nineteenth-century politics. Susan B. Anthony and advocates of women's suffrage argued that women possessed the characteristics needed to take the corruption out of politics. Women's exclusion from politics meant that they lacked party loyalty or relationships with party bosses. In addition, the characteristics that women's roles in their families demanded—benevolence, morality, selflessness, and industry—could serve the public interest. The suffrage movement's affiliation with the temperance movement also highlighted women's traditional roles as strengths. Because women bore witness to the trouble that liquor wrought in the private sphere, they were well-suited to encourage its prohibition. Women's adherence to these roles also served as an impetus for their involvement in the moral reform, antislavery, and women's rights movements.

By the 1960s, the relationship between traditional family roles and women's equality and political integration became more tenuous. Political activists, such as Betty Friedan, and scholars, such as Carole Pateman and Susan Okin, focused on dismantling the gendered conceptual framework of private and public spheres. They noted that men were not independent; their public sphere entry and success relied on women's familial care. Advocates of women's rights, therefore, argued that the private realm of women's lives must be made part of the public discourse. These efforts aimed to break down the dichotomy and integrate private-sphere issues, such as childcare and domestic abuse, into public-sphere policy debates. Over time, women's issues, often championed by female legislators, have gained prominence in national political discourse and debate.

MASS PARTICIPATION: WOMEN'S LEVELS OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM

In general, despite their relatively late entry into politics, women are as active as their male counterparts. Women outnumber men among registered voters, and in every presidential election since 1980 and every congressional election

since 1986, women have voted in equal or higher proportions than men. In 2008, for example, 66 percent of eligible women turned out to vote in the presidential election, compared to 62 percent of men. Furthermore, women sign petitions, attend public meetings and rallies, and write to elected government officials at rates similar to those of men.

Two noteworthy gender differences in political participation, however, merit acknowledgment. First, women are less likely than men to contribute money to campaigns. In the presidential election of 2008, women made up 44 percent of Democrat Barack Obama's donor base and 28 percent of Republican John McCain's donor base. Second, women are more likely than men to participate on behalf of Democratic candidates. Since 1980, women have been at least four percentage points more likely than men to favor Democratic presidential candidates. The largest gender gap was in 1996, when 54 percent of women, compared to 43 percent of men, voted for Democrat Bill Clinton. Compared to 49 percent of men, 56 percent of women cast a vote for Barack Obama in 2008.

For both women and men, the central predictors of whether a citizen participates politically are levels of education, income, and politically relevant civic skills. The differences in women's and men's political activism, therefore, tend to result from disparities in the factors that facilitate participation and not from their sex.

ELITE PARTICIPATION: WOMEN'S PRESENCE IN U.S. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

By 2010, it was difficult not to see women in U.S. politics on television, in the newspaper, or on the Internet. Nancy Pelosi, a Democrat from California, was the Speaker of the House, and former U.S. senator Hillary Clinton served as secretary of state. Also, former Alaska governor Sarah Palin, the first female Republican vice presidential nominee in 2008, remained in the news. Prior to 1978, no woman whose career was not linked to the death of her spouse ever served in the U.S. Senate. As of 2010, seventeen women served in the Senate and seventy-five occupied positions in the House of Representatives. The 1992 "year of the woman" elections, alone, produced a 70 percent increase in the number of women serving in the U.S. Congress.

Undoubtedly, an evolution toward the social acceptance of women running for office occurred in the last half of the twentieth century. However, women remained underrepresented in U.S. political institutions in the early twenty-first century, especially given their levels of participation at the mass level. When the 111th Congress convened in January 2009, 83 percent of its members were men. Large gender disparities are also evident at the state and local levels, where more than three-quarters of statewide elected officials and state legislators are men. Men occupied the governor's mansion in forty-four of the fifty states, and ran city hall in ninety of the one hundred largest cities across the country. The low numbers of women in politics are particularly glaring when placed in context. Whereas the 1980s saw steady increases in

the percentage of women seeking elected office, and the early 1990s experienced a rather dramatic surge, the last several election cycles represent a plateau.

Women's numeric underrepresentation in U.S. politics raises grave concerns over the quality of democratic governance. More women in positions of political power confer a greater sense of political legitimacy to the government, simply because it better reflects the gender breakdown of the national population. The inclusion of women in electoral and legislative processes also increases the likelihood that policy debate and deliberation includes women's views and experiences.

See also *Gender and Politics; Women Legislators; Women's Representation.*

. . . . JENNIFER L. LAWLESS

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Ummah

In Arabic, *ummah* means community. In modern usage, ummah sometimes serves as the equivalent of the English word *nation*. But in Islamic religiopolitical thought (in which case it tends not to be translated) ummah refers to the worldwide body of Muslims, and according to Islamic doctrine, this body is supposed to be united under one Islamic government headed by a *caliph*. Although the ideal of political unity flies in the face of division in practice into rival Muslim states beginning early in Islamic history, the notion of one ummah that transcends sectarian, racial, tribal, ethnic, and political divisions persists and inspires pan-Islamic movements and, more generally, a broad identification with other Muslims when they are seen

as victims of aggression from non-Muslims (e.g., Palestine, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq). Although during much of the twentieth century, the notion of one ummah seemed to be superseded by separate ethnic nationalisms (e.g., Arab, Turkish, etc.) or by loyalty to countries such as Egypt or Syria, there has been a recent resurgence of identification with the Islamic ummah. This has inspired some observers, notably Samuel P. Huntington, to foresee the emergence of a world in which the ummah increasingly acts as a unit in relations with other civilizations or *supertribes,* such as the West and Orthodox Christianity.

See also *Islamic Political Thought; Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism.*

. . . . GLENN E. PERRY

Unamuno, Miguel de

Miguel de Unamuno y Jugo (1864–1936) was a Basque academic, writer, and philosopher. Even though both his political and philosophical views were subject to radical changes during his lifetime, he is considered a key representative both of European existentialist philosophy and the Spanish cultural and literary movement known as the generation of 1898, which heavily criticized the corrupt system of government imposed during the Restoration period (1874–1931).

Unamuno was born in Bilbao, Spain, in 1864 and witnessed the siege of the city during the Third Carlist War (1872–1876). Soon after completing his studies in Madrid, where he briefly transitioned from Catholic traditionalism to socialism, he joined the University of Salamanca as a professor. In 1901, Unamuno became rector of the university, the first of a series of academic appointments from which he would be subsequently removed due to his political and intellectual positions. He remained in exile during most of Primo de Rivera's military dictatorship (1923–1930) and was briefly engaged in active politics during the first years of the Second Spanish Republic (1931–1939). After being once again appointed a rector, he was elected to parliament as part of the socialist-republican coalition but soon came to despise Republican politics.

Initially, Unamuno welcomed the nationalist uprising led by General Francisco Franco in 1936, which he saw as a continuation of the Spanish "regeneration" movement to bring back the "pure values" and "Christian civilization." However, weeks after the beginning of the conflict, Unamuno once again witnessed the horrors of repression and revenge as friends, colleagues, and students were systematically executed. After an argument with Fascist general Millán Astray during the opening session of the 1936 to 1937 academic year in Salamanca, in which Unamuno publicly withdrew his support for the nationalists, he was again dismissed and placed under house arrest, dying weeks later, on December 31, 1936.

After his temporary support for socialism, Unamuno moved away from rationalist views. In *The Tragic Sense of Life* (1913) he developed the concept of *intrahistory,* which was based on orality and personal experiences of common people instead of prevailing official historiography. Under the influence of Danish intellectual Søren Kierkegaard, Unamuno sought to understand agony and anxiety as forms of struggle in each individual's search for faith, and, similar to other existentialist thinkers, he disregarded systematic or academic philosophy as misleading in the absurd quest for abstract rational knowledge. In spite of his religiosity, conflicts with the Catholic Church were frequent. Significantly, both *The Tragic Sense of Life* (1913) and *The Agony of Christianity* (1925) were banned by the church until the 1960s.

Even though Unamuno's essays reflect much of his thought, most of his writings are fictional, including a vast collection of novels, short stories, poetry, and drama. His political and philosophical views are condensed and can be deciphered through masterpieces such as *The Life of Don Quixote and Sancho* (1967), *Saint Manuel Bueno, Martyr* (1954) or *Abel Sánchez and Other Stories* (1956). In any case, his works had a deep impact not only on Spain's literary and political scene, especially visible through authors as Juan Ramón Jiménez or Antonio Machado, but also in the wider European context, where he was seen as an intellectual reference.

See also *Political Philosophy.*

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Unicameralism and Bicameralism

While legislatures are the most democratic of the institutions of governance, the second chambers of bicameral legislatures are typically less democratic, and thus have been supplanted by the main and newer chambers.

DISTRIBUTION

Historically, some parliaments have been multicameral. Sweden, until 1866, had four chambers, while South Africa recently had three, and Yugoslavia in the 1960s had five. Unicameral legislatures also become bicameral, as have Poland and Indonesia. The number of chambers, and especially the unicameral-bicameral choice, has varied not only among countries, but within a country through time. Of 181 national parliaments in 2000, sixty-nine (38 percent) were bicameral. While federations—in which subunits (states or provinces) have a constitutional status—usually have bicameral legislatures, almost one-third of unitary countries—in which

subunits (prefectures) exist for changing administrative purposes—are also bicameral. In federal systems, second chambers usually represent the component states within the federation, while the first or main chamber represents districts on the basis of population size. The European Union (EU), with the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, created a multinational form of bicameralism though the codecision procedure in policy making between the directly elected European Parliament and the appointive Council of Ministers.

MEMBERSHIP AND SELECTION

The second chamber tends to be smaller than the main chamber, though the British House of Lords is an exception. Most second chambers are in the eleven- to one hundred-member range, while the main chambers may have fifty to two hundred members. Second chambers based upon governmental subunits, such as states, are more fixed in their size than those based on other and more flexible criteria.

Second chambers tend to have restricted qualifications for membership, a residue of the medieval European aristocratic origins of parliaments, and thus are often considered upper chambers. The most common current member restriction is age. The British House of Lords, by contrast, until the end of the twentieth century, retained its aristocratic membership through inheritance. Alternatives to this include the government appointment of all members to the Canadian Senate, and the king's appointment for the Jordanian second chamber.

Other distinctive member selection means for second chambers include indirect election by states or provinces (Argentina), by localities (France and Croatia), functional representation (Slovenia and Ireland), and direct membership from state-level governments (Germany) or from state legislatures (Pakistan).

Direct popular election to the second chamber, now the most common means of selection, occurs in many different variations. In most bicameral systems, both districts and election systems for the two chambers differ from each other. In some, illustrated by Poland and Romania, elections to the two chambers occur on the same day for the same length of term. In others, illustrated by the United States and the Czech Republic, one-third of the members are elected every two years, with each member holding office for a six-year term.

The combination of different selection means, different terms of office, different districts, and different election systems tends to produce different party majorities and different policy views in the two chambers. A related result is that membership in second chambers is often more stable across election periods than in the main chamber.

AUTHORITY AND BARGAINING RELATIONSHIPS

Bicameral systems vary both in the symmetry of authority in the two chambers and in the congruence of their selection systems. In strong bicameral systems, the chambers are symmetrical in power but incongruent in selection means. In weak systems, the chambers are asymmetrical in power, regardless of the congruency of selection.

In federal systems, second chambers are more active and important than in unitary systems, in that the powers of the two chambers tend to be symmetric. The U.S. Senate, however, has exclusive appointment confirmation and treaty ratification functions, while the more restricted German Bundesrat shares jurisdiction with the Bundestag on policies administered by the Laender.

In unitary nations, second chambers have largely become supplemental in function to the main chamber. Their legislative function is limited to propose amendments to, and to delay, bills from the main chamber, often within time constraints. Though usually asymmetric in authority, the main purpose of second chambers in unitary nations is to limit the power of political parties obtained through direct popular elections to the main chamber. A more basic function of second chambers in both unitary and federal systems is to limit the power of government cabinets and chief executives, whether as prime ministers or as presidents. Powerful chief executives, presidents or prime ministers, may form a triangular relationship with the legislature by seeking support from one chamber to counter opposition from the other.

The more important the second chamber, the greater the need to reconcile differences between the two chambers. One common method, the *navette* (France), requires different versions of legislation to shuttle between the two chambers until both accept a common version. A second frequently used method is a joint committee (United States and Germany) between the two chambers, which adopts a common version to be accepted by both chambers. In a third method, employed in asymmetrical legislatures (Britain, Poland, and the Czech Republic), the main chamber can accept amendments from the supplemental chamber or readopt its original version of a bill.

Constitution revision and adoption of constitutional laws (e.g., the election system), by contrast, often require both chambers' approval. In addition, in some systems (e.g., the Czech Republic), the supplemental second chamber cannot be dissolved by either the cabinet or the president. These system-protection provisions make second chambers more important in occasional crises than in the more frequent consideration of ordinary law.

INTERCAMERAL STRUCTURES

Bicameral systems function through distinctive organizational forms. The two chambers can meet together and vote as single bodies, illustrated by the Polish National Assembly in writing a constitution. Norway is distinctive in that the second chamber is a subset of members from the directly elected main chamber. Some have joint bicameral committees, as illustrated by the Joint Standing Committee on Defense of the South African bicameral parliament, or bicameral parliamentary party groups, as in Poland.

Second chambers have become the innovative, almost experimental, part of modern legislatures, especially in new political systems. The wide variety of specific activities goes far beyond the legislative activities of main chambers. The wide

variety of selection procedures likewise greatly diversifies the representational reach and policy views of parliaments. Paradoxically, the more marginal the second chamber, the greater the potential for innovations in both composition and activities of the supplemental chamber.

See also *Lower Chamber; Upper Chamber.*

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Union, State of the

See *State of the Union.*

Unitary Government

The great majority of countries in the world utilize a unitary form of government, in which the central government, by constitutional arrangement, is the exclusive sovereign power: it has the legal authority to create, reorganize, or eliminate subordinate levels of government. In countries that use a unitary structure—for example, the United Kingdom, France, Ukraine, and Sweden—the central, or national, government reigns supreme and any constituent units in the form of subnational governments—such as local authorities—are not sovereign unto themselves and have limited autonomy. Central governments in unitary systems determine what subordinate layers of governance are necessary and to what extent power will be decentralized or devolved to them. Moreover, the central government retains the authority to abrogate the powers it has given to local entities at any time, or ultimately to abolish them.

RATIONALE FOR A UNITARY FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Culture, history, and geography are the most important factors for a country to select a unitary system. The most common way nations came to utilize the unitary form is via a transition from a prior system with a highly centralized structure. Countries that have chosen the unitary form typically have historical experience with monarchical systems of governance, whereby kings, queens, or emperors exercised dominance over the nation's administration. Unitary systems often have been adopted in the former colonies of such countries. This is a logical segue for societies that were first conditioned to embrace a consolidation of power under the divine right of kings or via a centralized imperial administration: unified sovereignty is retained as these polities move toward alternative conceptualizations of governing authority. Thus, a comfort level within the political culture, along with a centralized governmental apparatus previously in place, often work in tandem to motivate adoption or retention of the unitary form.

Other factors affecting the choice among systems include the size of the country's territory and its ethnic or religious homogeneity. Countries that have smaller populations, that are more compact geographically, and that contain within themselves minimal ethnic diversity and religious differentiation (i.e., with greater homogeneity) often choose unitary systems. Unitary countries, then, commonly do not have high levels of cultural or political division to reconcile inside their borders; this is reinforced by unitary states typically having only one-house legislatures, unlike the two-chamber norm in federal states.

More recently, the nations of Eastern Europe that broke away from the dominating shadow of the Soviet Union in the 1990s have opted for unitary systems after independence. Scholars posit that these newly freed nations viewed the old Soviet federal system as one of the leading mechanisms used by Moscow at the center to control the periphery (i.e., the former non-Russian Soviet republics). In this instance, unitary systems were chosen in reaction to specific historical experiences and perceptions of cultural imperialism.

UNITARY VERSUS FEDERAL OR CONFEDERAL SYSTEMS

Unitary systems are inherently more clear-cut and less complicated than alternative systems, and with no large territories to govern or deep ethnocultural divisions to manage, there is no perceived need for more complex constitutional arrangements. Generally speaking, unitary systems offer an unambiguous and readily comprehensible setting out of government authority—with less opportunity for extensive bargaining or power posturing (i.e., fewer veto points) amongst political actors compared to systems with multilevel governance structures.

The two other primary forms of government used by nation-states are federations (i.e., federalism) and confederations. These types are much less common than the unitary system. The essential element that distinguishes them revolves around the relationship between the central government and the other, more localized governmental entities operating within that nation.

Unlike unitary governments, federalism is a constitutional and structural arrangement designed to accommodate both a strong central government and strong subnational governments—in the form of provincial, state, or regional authorities—with sovereignty divided between them. Examples of federal systems are the United States, Australia, Canada, and Mexico. Both levels of government share jurisdiction over the same land and the same people, thus a citizen of the state of California and a citizen of the state of New York are also citizens of the United States in the same way that a citizen of the province of Nova Scotia and a citizen of the province of British Columbia are both citizens of Canada. These four sets of citizens are subject to both the state or provincial law and national law. Both levels of government are sovereign and cannot extinguish the other. Having several formal layers of governance is an essential component found in federal systems,

and in a bona fide federal framework, the ability of the central government to overrule decisions made by local or provincial governments is greatly constrained or nonexistent.

A confederation is a loose union of subnational political units, such as states or provinces that legitimately can be considered in this context as their own separate countries, where they alone are sovereign. The authority of the central government is derived from the member states, which can, at their will, redefine the authority of the central government. Thus, the central government fulfills the role as a simple emissary or representative of the collective will of the constituent members of the confederation. Leading contemporary examples of confederations are Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, and the European Union (EU), although there is ongoing scholarly debate over whether they are more federation than confederation.

There are strong and weak versions of each of these three systems, and at times a highly decentralized unitary government can appear to be almost a federal system, such as Spain, Italy, and France, and a weak federal system, as seen in Austria, can appear to be virtually unitary. As well, in many countries, the relationship and the accompanying distribution of power between the national government and subnational governments are fluid and dynamic, not static—changeability and evolution in these governance connections are not uncommon, especially as they seek optimal ways of administering policies and distributing tax revenues.

EVOLUTION AND CHANGE IN UNITARY GOVERNMENT

In the modern era, unitary states have come to recognize the pragmatic considerations and increased administrative efficacy in decentralizing more governmental authority in terms of both policy making and policy implementation down to the lower, more localized levels. This change to more regionally based governance in unitary systems speaks directly to the ongoing challenges with which modern governments must contend in the twenty-first century.

This shift constitutes one of the major contemporary questions about the choice of system—as countries with unitary systems devolve more power and decision-making authority to lower levels of government, at what point are they no longer unitary and instead de facto federal systems? How does one decide which system, or which of its variants, is optimal for a particular country's circumstances? At the heart of these governance considerations is the necessity of managing disparate local, regional, and national interests. As nations cope with the vagaries of modern social, economic, and political life, they choose an increasing variety of structural means. When central government maintains the authority to ultimately veto and rescind decisions made by lower governmental officials, it can be said to be a unitary system; but the varying degrees and gradations within both unitary and federal systems render the definitional distinctions and empirical differentiation between these two forms murkier.

This trend toward less rather than more differentiation raises several theoretical dilemmas: Is federalism simply a stage in the path to a unitary system? Or the reverse, is a unitary system a step, a phase, leading ultimately to federalism? Moreover, why do some efforts at forming a federal system fail (e.g., the Caribbean Federation and the East African Federation) where others succeed?

Other questions about the optimal governance arrangements animate scholarly discourse. How much power should localities have in blocking important central government decisions? How much adaptive leeway should be placed in a nation's constitution to allow ready evolution and changes in the relationships between the central, regional, and local governments? How does one determine which one of the three methods for a central government to disperse authority away from the center—devolution, decentralization, or deconcentration—is the best course of action for a particular country? With the increasing popularity of the use of regional governments in the crafting of public policies, how much actual decision-making authority should regional actors have to implement or alter these policies after adoption? What is the appropriate filtering role for regional governments as intermediary between the central government and the localities?

The European Union constitutes an ongoing case study for political scientists on these challenging political relationships (e.g., the EU's relationship to its constituent nations and their subconstituent governmental units). Is the EU a federation or a confederation and what does its development imply for the future of unitary governments?

See also *Devolution; European Union; Federalism and Confederation.*

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United Nations

The United Nations (UN) is the general multipurpose world organization and the backbone of the UN system of specialized agencies. Initially envisaged primarily as an instrument for collective security, the UN has served this aim mainly in an indirect manner. Constitutionally and in practice

The United Nations Security Council meets in New York City. The United Nations is a world organization facilitating diplomacy and engaging in peacekeeping operations around the world.

solely an intergovernmental organization and framework for multilateral conference diplomacy, the UN also represents an imaginary surplus as a "world executive," "parliament of man," or "world conscience." Due to the allocation of power mainly at the level of nation-states and the prevalence of tensions between them, the UN is an organization in a state of constant crisis. Only under exceptional circumstances has the UN lived up to the demand of evidently making a difference in world politics. Nevertheless, despite its seeming impotence, the UN has long been the single most important instrument of global governance.

The UN serves as a global discussion forum and clearinghouse, and thereby contributes to the emergence and dissemination of universal values and norms. It functions as a great legitimizer, as a face-saver, and as an important stage for symbolic politics. The UN has significantly smoothed the process of decolonization and facilitated the development of international law, in particular the law of the seas. However, rather than providing solutions to particular conflicts or problems, the merit of the UN is typically to keep controversial issues under lock. To a large extent, the agenda of UN organs consists of items that recur year after year. The various military missions since the establishment of the UN peacekeeping forces

(known as the blue helmets) in 1956 (with a predecessor in 1948) also bear witness to the intricacy of lasting conflict resolution. At the same time, these peacekeeping operations are a significant advancement of the world organization not provided for by the UN Charter. Albeit difficult to assess in relation to other relevant factors, arguably the greatest success of the UN is the nonescalation of the cold war. Since the end of the cold war, the UN has demonstrated an increased ability for action. However, it has been hampered by its lack of thorough institutional adjustment to the changing world order.

HISTORY

In World War II (1939–1945), the term *united nations* was still a synonym for the Allied Powers fighting the Axis Powers (Germany, Italy, Japan). At the UN Conference on International Organization, held in San Francisco in 1945, the UN was given a charter that came into force on October 24, 1945, and thus transformed the organization into an international organization. The forty-nine countries that had declared war on Germany or its collaborators were admitted as founding members of the UN. In addition, a special deal resulted in the Soviet republics Ukraine and Belorussia being given independent member status. This arrangement stemmed from

pronounced distrust among the major Allies coupled with the Soviet government's insistence, motivated by the fear of ending up in complete isolation. In contrast to the widespread myth of a prevailing naïve belief in the future of the world organization in 1945, the expectations in the UN were low key in all quarters from the outset.

A notable element of UN politics is avoiding reference to the UN's predecessor organization, the League of Nations, existing from 1920 to 1939, de jure until 1946. This disregard is a consequence of the League of Nations's failure to prevent World War II and its insufficient provision of congruence of power inside and outside the organization. Nonetheless, the UN, in practically all its basic traits, is a remake of the League of Nations. The only significant difference is that the UN affords the right to veto major decisions to five great powers: the United States, the Soviet Union (Russia since 1991), Great Britain, China (People's Republic of China since 1971), and France. As the five permanent members of the Security Council—the potentially most powerful organ of the UN— these countries enjoy the veto right as well as a number of other privileges. Having cast almost half of all vetoes, the Soviet Union remains the country with most such interventions to date (123 vetoes by 2007). However, since the mid-1960s, the United States has invoked the veto power most extensively (82 vetoes, frequently on draft resolutions concerning Israel). Britain (32 vetoes), France (18 vetoes), and China (6 vetoes) have been more modest in using this instrument.

Because nothing of significance can be done against the will of any of the "permanent five," the UN has had difficulties coming to terms with a substantial reform. Since the end of the cold war, there has been a perceived need to enlarge the Security Council in order to achieve better geographical representation as well as permanent membership of additional major international players such as India, Japan, Brazil, Germany, Italy, and one or two of the larger African countries (with or without the right to veto). These efforts culminated at the sixtieth anniversary session of the UN, from 2005 to 2006, without consensus. Another discussion surrounds the appropriate timing to merge the British and the French seat in the Security Council into a common seat of the European Union (EU). Ultimately, the UN conserves the global power structure considered legitimate in 1945, and there is an increasing tension vis-à-vis the present-day international setting.

LEADERSHIP AND MEMBERSHIP
The historic legacy of the U.S. Senate's defeat of U.S. membership in the League of Nations prompted the U.S. government to use utmost care in designing the UN in a way that would appeal to its home public. In the opening phrase of the UN Charter, "We the peoples of the United Nations," the very name "United Nations" echoes the United States. However, whereas such similarities mirror the tremendous influence the United States has had on the UN from the very beginning, they are misleading in regard to what is de facto solely an intergovernmental character of the UN. In 1946, the headquarters of the UN were established in New York City

(other major UN office sites are Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi, and The Hague). In the early years, the UN was thoroughly dominated by the United States. While developing nations' politics of sheer numbers later challenged this dominance, the United States never ceased to be the hegemonic power at the UN. While certain U.S. politicians and debaters often engage in either "UN bashing" or "UN glorification," they are frequently unaware of the vast influence their own country exerts on the UN by a variety of means. Not least, the U.S. Senate, in practice, acts as an organ exercising parliamentary control over the UN (e.g., irregularities in the oil-for-food program for Iraq).

The admission of new member states to the UN was slow in the first decade due to differences between the Western powers and the Soviet Union, yet the number of members has risen significantly since the mid-1950s. After the Republic of China (Taiwan) lost the Chinese seat to the benefit of the People's Republic of China in 1971 and after the admission of the two German states in 1973, the UN has virtually been a universal organization. In addition, after Switzerland's adhesion to the UN in 2002, no undisputed fully sovereign state remains outside the world organization (with the exception of the borderline case, the Holy See, which remains an observer state). UN membership has always been, and has increasingly become, an essential attribute of sovereign statehood. In 2006, the number of members rose to 192. The only country ever to withdraw (temporarily) from the UN was Indonesia, from 1965 to 1966, as a protest against Malaysia's election to the Security Council.

ORGANS OF THE UN
According to the UN Charter, the principal organs of the UN are the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice. The sixth principal organ, the Trusteeship Council, suspended operations in 1994. Activity ceased after the last remaining UN trust territory, the Palau islands, achieved independence.

Most powerful among UN organs is the Security Council, with its five permanent and ten (six until 1965) elected and regionally representative members—provided that a qualified majority can be mobilized and none of the permanent members cast a veto. The Security Council operates continuously, yet, was in stalemate during the cold war. The only exception in a case involving differences among the great powers was the Korean War (1950–1953); when the decision to intervene in Korea was made, an expedition under the UN flag could be formed due to the Soviet Union's unwise boycott of the Council. In the past two decades, the Security Council has been able to agree on more far-reaching decisions than in earlier years. The first major evidence of this congruence was the Council's authorization of a U.S.-led military coalition deployed to oust Iraq from Kuwait in the Gulf War in 1991. However, as yet, Article 43 of the Charter, which obliges member states to make available armed forces and other facilities to the Security Council, has never been implemented.

Arguably, the General Assembly has been the most relevant UN organ in practice. The General Assembly cannot adopt binding decisions for member states, and it only convenes periodically (annually, usually from mid-September to mid-December). Yet, it is the universal forum of the UN with regard to membership and scope of subject matter; it is a highly relevant stage for symbolic politics, and—despite making some controversial decisions—carries considerable moral weight as a sort of "world opinion." This moral authority is particularly notable when consensus is reached. The General Assembly controls the budget of the UN; reviews the annual reports of the other organs, including the Security Council; and elects their members. In 1950, the General Assembly changed the constitutional order of the UN by way of the Uniting for Peace Resolution and enabled itself to bypass the Security Council, if that council fails to act because of the veto of a permanent member. Despite all this, the term *revitalization*—in prominent use during attempts to reform the General Assembly over the past two decades—suggests a pristine vitality that never existed, apart from the special circumstances of the Korean War. The impression that the General Assembly has lost significance in recent years is accurate only in relative terms: The vitalization of the Security Council, which had earlier been even more paralyzed, after the end of the cold war has not been accompanied by a corresponding upswing of effectiveness of the General Assembly. The work of the General Assembly is organized in the plenary forum and six committees, in all of which each UN member state commands one vote.

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN aims to promote and coordinate international cooperation in the fields of economy, social affairs, culture, education, health, and human rights. After an initial focus on recovery from the devastation of World War II, its main concern has long been to address problems faced by developing countries. Subordinate to the authority of the General Assembly, ECOSOC is composed of fifty-four members (eighteen until 1965, and twenty-seven from 1965–1973) that are elected according to a regionally representative key. Most of ECOSOC's work occurs in various standing committees, functional commissions, and regional commissions. Despite the scope of its mandate, which also comprises the coordination of UN specialized agencies (e.g., International Labor Organization [ILO], World Health Organization [WHO], Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], International Monetary Fund [IMF], and World Bank), ECOSOC's authority in international policy making has been limited. Nonetheless, its committees have done important work in their fields (e.g., the Commission on the Status of Women and, until 2006, the Commission on Human Rights, which was then replaced by the UN Human Rights Council under the General Assembly). ECOSOC is also the UN organ with principal responsibility for liaison with nongovernmental organizations.

A particularly interesting instrument used by ECOSOC to good effect has been world conferences on particular subject matters. The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held 1972 in Stockholm, was a particular landmark in this respect. In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development continued this work, introducing the concept of sustainable development and laying the groundwork for the convening of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (i.e., the Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro. The adoption of the Framework Convention on Climate Change at this conference was the first step toward a global climate change regime, leading to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Ratified by 183 states, but, as yet, not by the United States, this protocol upholds a legally binding commitment for the reduction of greenhouse gases.

The Secretariat of the UN is the administrative organ of the world organization, and the domain for parties known as international civil servants. The Secretariat provides service to the other UN organs, for example, by preparing meetings and draft stipulations or by delivering relevant information; it administers the programs and policies established in other areas of the UN. Moreover, the Secretariat documents the work of the UN; publishes collections of material, reports, and statistics; and is responsible for public relations. Somewhat paradoxically, despite the idea of international civil service, the national background of UN staff members is a delicate and closely monitored issue. According to the UN Charter, the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity are to be applied in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service. However, at the same time, due regard must be paid to recruitment to ensure as wide a geographical representation as possible. In practice, despite the requested impartiality of officeholders, the staffing of the UN Secretariat is subject to the bargaining of governments.

The secretary-general heads the Secretariat, serving as the chief administrative officer and in practice also the highest representative of the UN, and appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council for a five-year, renewable term. Officeholders have been Trygve Lie (1946–1952), Dag Hammarskjöld (1953–1961), Sithu U Thant (1961–1971), Kurt Waldheim (1972–1981), Javier Perez de Cuellar (1982–1992), Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992–1996), Kofi A. Annan (1997–2006), and Ban Ki-moon (since 2007). Compared to the secretary-general of the League of Nations, the UN secretary-general has a more active role, with a provision to bring any matter perceived by the secretary-general as a potential threat to maintaining international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council. This independent role was strengthened under the administration of the first two UN secretary-generals, allowing a far more proactive position than the authors of the UN Charter had intended. The tenure of Dag Hammarskjöld is remembered as one of particularly skillful maneuvering that maximized the influence of the UN and its highest representative. In the UN Congo operations, Hammarskjöld died in the field under circumstances never entirely clarified, thereby becoming a sort of martyr and saint for the UN.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the UN, based in The Hague, Netherlands. The statute of the ICJ is considered an integral part of the UN Charter. Despite its status in the UN, in order to observe the principle of judicial independence, the ICJ acts in its own capacity. It is the direct successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice, which was active in the interwar years. The fifteen judges of the court, no two of whom may be nationals of the same state, are elected independently of one another by the UN Security Council and the General Assembly for tenures of nine years. The judges are to represent the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world. The ICJ's role is twofold: (1) to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted for its review by the states concerned (i.e., contentious cases), and (2) to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred by duly authorized UN organs and specialized agencies. During the period from 1946 to 2007, a total of 111 disputes and 24 requests for advisory opinion have been submitted to the ICJ—humble figures characteristic of the state of international law.

CONCLUSION

It is a truism that the UN is not more than the sum of its members and that it cannot accomplish more than its individual members permit. While this observation aptly explains many of the limitations curtailing the UN ability to act, it fails to realize the added value of the international machinery provided by the UN. The UN, through its international legal status and staff, is more than a permanent or periodically held conference of governments. Its very existence changes the parameters and channels for nation-state action. The discrepancy between the frequently bombastic and deceitful language used in the UN (e.g., recently the talk of the so-called millennium development goals) and humble practical achievements should not obscure its various indispensable attributes: a forum for the global exchange and dissemination of ideas, a context for mutual acquaintance of representatives of the nation-states of the world, and a space for incremental policy making and storage regarding nonsolvable international problems.

See also *International Court of Justice; International Labor Organization; International Organization; League of Nations.*

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United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

In November 1945, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was created in London as a part of the United Nations (UN) system. Headquartered in Paris, France, and with bureaux in cities including New York and Geneva, UNESCO functions as more than just a branch of the UN, or its cultural arm. Since the reintegration of Singapore in 2007, 193 countries are member states of UNESCO.

UNESCO has national branches in most countries, usually labeled as national commissions for UNESCO, resulting in designations such as the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, the Commission Nationale Ivoirienne (Ivory Coast) pour l'UNESCO, the Irish National Commission for UNESCO, and the Estonian National Commission for UNESCO. Each national commission has a director, not to be confused with a country's ambassador at UNESCO's offices in Paris.

The actions of UNESCO are countless and varied in terms of global policies: literacy campaigns in developing countries; museum studies; policy making; copublishing thousands of books, journals, and reports; organizing meetings and conferences; and promoting the protection of heritage, endangered languages, and cultures.

UNESCO's programs and branches also focus on natural, social, and human sciences; peace studies; the promotion of human rights; ethics; communication studies; and environmental education. Every year, UNESCO approves the creation

of research centers and research chairs. French, English, Castilian (Spanish), Russian, Arabic, and Chinese are the official languages of UNESCO; some publications and documents are translated in up to fifty languages.

The spirit of UNESCO is the strong belief that culture, education, cultural relations, tolerance, and dialogue are the most efficient ways to prevent conflicts and wars. As the 1946 UNESCO charter states, "Since wars begin in the minds of men; it is in the minds of men that peace must be constructed." The Declaration of the Governments and the Constitution of UNESCO states:

> A peace based exclusively upon political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which would secure the unanimous, lasting, and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that peace must be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.

The actions of UNESCO are usually diplomatic or symbolic, and therefore can sometimes be limited. Despite many calls for respect and tolerance, UNESCO could not avoid the Taliban regime destruction of the ancient Buddha statues of Bamiyan, from Afghanistan's pre-Islamic era, in March 2001, even though this historical site was protected on the UNESCO World Heritage List.

UNESCO was under the spotlight following the publication of what is known as the MacBride report in 1980. The report proposed a new global policy for the global media, the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). On December 28, 1983, the Reagan administration announced that the United States would withdraw from UNESCO, arguing that the organization was politicized, inefficient, and bureaucratic. The split also stemmed from conflicting perspectives regarding the concept of NWICO brought by the MacBride Commission in its report, *Many Voices, One World: Towards a New, More Just, and More Efficient World Information and Communication Order.* This report was discussed, but it was never adopted by the UNESCO Assembly. After an eighteen-year absence, the United States rejoined UNESCO in 2002; the United Kingdom followed the United States, leaving UNESCO from 1985 to 1997. Singapore did the same from 1985 to 2007.

For educators, academics, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), UNESCO is a web of valuable resources, networking, and contacts in international development, cultural relations, and global affairs.

See also *Cultural Relations; Human Rights; Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs); United Nations (UN).*

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United Nations General Assembly

See *General Assembly, United Nations (UN).*

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

According to the United Nations (UN), the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (i.e., the Declaration) is the foundation of international human rights law—the first universal statement on the basic principles of inalienable human rights and the world's most translated document. It has been influential in other key human rights documents and is part of the International Bill of Human Rights. This bill also includes the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted in 1966) and its two Optional Protocols.

The document that ultimately became the Declaration was taken up at the UN General Assembly's first session in 1946. The draft Declaration on Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms was reviewed and then sent to the Economic and Social Council for reference to the Commission on Human Rights, where it would be considered as part of the process of preparing an international bill of rights. The Commission, in early 1947, authorized the formulation of a preliminary draft for the International Bill of Human Rights. Later, the work was taken over by a formal drafting committee.

The Commission on Human Rights included eighteen members and was chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt. Other members included René Cassin (France), who composed the Declaration's first draft; Charles Malik (Lebanon), who served as committee reporter; Peng Chung Chang (China), vice-chairman of the Commission; and John Humphrey (Canada), director of the UN's human rights division, who prepared the Declaration's blueprint.

The Declaration's first draft was proposed in September 1948 with over fifty member states participating in the final drafting. Member states voted a total of fourteen hundred times on various aspects of the text, with many debates. Some Islamic states objected to the articles on equal marriage rights and on the right to change religious beliefs, while several Western countries criticized the inclusion of economic, social, and cultural rights. On December 10, 1948, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration with eight nations abstaining from the vote but none dissenting.

The Declaration's preamble proclaims the document a common standard of achievement for all. It calls for the promotion of respect for these rights and freedoms and the securing of their universal and effective recognition and observance. Article 1 follows and states, "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood." Under Article 2, everyone is entitled to all the Declaration's rights and freedoms without any distinction.

According to the UN, the Declaration's articles can be divided into three clusters. Articles 3 to 21 constitute the first cluster and outline civil and political rights. The right to life, liberty, and personal security, recognized in Article 3, is followed by political rights and civil liberties, including freedom from slavery, torture, and arbitrary arrest, along with rights to a fair trial, free speech and free movement, and privacy.

The second cluster, Articles 22 to 27, refers to economic, social, and cultural rights. Article 22 is of key importance, granting the right to social security and thus realization of economic, social, and cultural rights indispensable for dignity, and free and full personal development. Five articles elaborate the rights necessary for the enjoyment of the right to social security. These include economic rights related to work, fair remuneration, and leisure; social rights concerning an adequate standard of living for health, well-being, and education; and the right to participate in the community's cultural life.

Finally, Articles 28 to 30 provide a larger protective framework in which all human rights are to be universally enjoyed. Article 28 recognizes the right to a social and international order that enables the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Article 29 acknowledges that, along with rights, human beings have obligations to the community that enable them to develop their individual potential freely and fully. Finally, Article 30 protects the interpretation of the articles from any outside interference contrary to the UN's purposes and principles.

Organizations such as Amnesty International have supported the Declaration but there has also been debate, such as over its compatibility with Islamic law. In 1993, representatives of 171 states adopted the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights. This stated that human rights education, training, and public information were essential for promoting and achieving stable and harmonious relations among communities and for fostering mutual understanding, tolerance, and peace. Following this, the ten-year period beginning on January 1, 1995, was proclaimed the UN Decade for Human Rights Education, with simultaneous creation of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

See also *Human Rights; United States (UN).*

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Universalism

Universalism is a philosophical concept that refers to a set of general moral principles. When political scientists use this concept, they usually place it in relation to political institutions such as democracy, human rights, and public policies. The implication is that, in political science, moral principles of universalism come via connections to political institutions and policies.

In political philosophy, universalism is historically connected to the Enlightenment project that was founded on the idea of universal human rights. Universalism's central historical document is the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen,* adopted during the French Revolution (1789–1799). Based on the philosophical idea of natural law, such rights, including those listed in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, are in this tradition said to be legitimate and valid independent of local cultural, economic, and social conditions. They are to be applied equally to all individuals regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, nationality, cultural belonging, sexual orientation, or class and status. Such universalism can trace to an argument for a pluralist political liberalism, which has resulted in concepts like universal citizenship, universal suffrage, and universal legal rights. By creating such institutions, political universalists want to guarantee that all interests and groups in a society have the same chance to influence public policy. For example, impartially administrated "free and fair elections" in a representative democracy are thought to guarantee legitimacy for the political system thereby avoiding the type of civil conflicts warned against by Thomas Hobbes.

An alternative argument for universal human rights has been to base them upon the belief in a universal human nature, and the requirement to respect the dignity of the human person by guarding or securing one's basic needs; this is accomplished via an equivalent set of universal human rights. In this *natural law* universalism, human needs can be attributed to the existence of a common physiological human condition, such as the needs for food and physical integrity. Other human

needs thought to be universal are grounded in the liberal idea of a universal human self, such as the need for freely expressing ideas, the need for protection from discrimination, the need to be treated with dignity, and the need for freedom of religion.

UNIVERSALISM, INDIVIDUALISM, AND THE RULE OF LAW

Although historically connected to western liberal societies, universalists claim their theory is global in the sense that it applies to all humans and societies, in all times and places. The theory is anticollectivistic, since it starts and ends with the individual as the sole bearer of the universal rights and also as the sole interpreter on how to use these rights. Universalism also connects to the *rule of law* theory, implying that laws should be universally and impartially applied so that like cases are treated alike. The idea of equality before the law and impartial implementation of public policies is central to the political theory that follows from universalism. Universalism also puts restrictions on the construction of laws, regulations, and public policies that have to be formulated so that they are generally applicable to a large set of cases. A law or a rule directed to only one person is anathema to universalism. The universalistic principles pertain not only to national law but to international law as well.

ALTERNATIVES TO UNIVERSALISM

The importance of universalism can best be described when contrasted to three competing ideas. The first is communitarianism, which states that liberal universalism is metaphysically flawed and built on an unrealistic as well as undesirable idea of humans. Communitarians argue that universalism is too individualistic because humans are constitutively linked to the moral worlds and social goals of the communities they belong to. Without this connection, moral theory is void of any practical implications. A second and related criticism has been launched by multiculturalists, who argue that universalism is in fact a particularistic theory since it is historically connected to the capitalist, male-dominated, Judeo-Christian Western liberal tradition; it is thereby not applicable to societies in other cultures or for groups that have been marginalized. Postmodern theorists launch a third criticism, questioning the validity of the Enlightenment project on epistemological as well as ontological grounds. In this line of thought, the idea of the universal "self," as well as universal truths and rights is questioned in favor of a more relativistic notion of these concepts.

UNIVERSALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY

Universalism has also had an influence upon empirical studies of public policies, especially social policies. In rich Western democracies, such policies have either been universal or they have been targeted to specific groups. Universal policies are implemented by general rules that identify the whole or very large segments of the populations. Examples are universal child allowances, universal health care insurance, and universal pensions. Targeted policies rely instead on laws built on principles of means (or needs) tests, where civil servants must decide if the person seeking assistance belongs to the group that the law stipulates and, if so, how much assistance that person is eligible for. The argument for universal systems is that they are less stigmatizing and do not rely on large bureaucracies for implementation. The argument for targeted systems is that with scarce public resources, targeting increases policy efficiency in helping the poor. It is also argued that targeting makes it possible to single out the "deserving" from the "undeserving" poor. Empirical research has produced a counterintuitive result, namely that universal systems are better in producing redistribution of resources than are targeted. The reason seems to be that in targeted systems, the majority have no stake in the policies and will therefore not support them and accept the tax levels that they carry. Policies only for the poor tend to be poorly financed policies.

See also *Communitarianism; Multiculturalism; Postmodernism; Universal Declaration of Human Rights.*

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Universal Jurisdiction

Universal jurisdiction is one of the most problematic and misapplied concepts in international relations. One of the most notable definitional problems with this concept is its relationship to issues of extraterritoriality. Therefore, it is important to recognize, from the outset, that extraterritorial jurisdiction is not synonymous with universal jurisdiction. Instead, universal jurisdiction is one form of extraterritoriality. This becomes apparent when examining the defining conceptualizations of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In international law, there are five bases or fundamental principles of jurisdiction: (1) territoriality, (2) nationality, (3) passive personality, (4) protection principle, and (5) universality. The first four forms of jurisdiction are predicated on some sort of territorial or national link to the prosecuting state. However, universal jurisdiction lacks such limitations, thus making it the most expansive, but also the least employed of these jurisdictional justifications.

EXTRATERRITORIAL AND NOT UNIVERSAL

Once again, extraterritoriality does not necessitate universality. The only defining characteristic of extraterritoriality is that it entails jurisdiction that somehow extends beyond traditional state boundaries. The most widely accepted form of extraterritorial jurisdiction is based on the principle of territoriality. In these cases, the perpetration of a crime must occur within the territory of the prosecuting state. In other words, authority to prosecute is predicated on the location of the defendant's act. International law allows states to regulate the actions of any individual—regardless of nationality—or punish those individuals within its territorial boundaries. For instance, the United States can prosecute any individual who commits an illegal act, as defined by U.S. legal statute, within its territory.

Another widely accepted principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction is the nationality principle. This principle is predicated on a state's right to regulate or punish the actions of its citizens regardless of the location of the offense. For example, if an American citizen commits a crime, according to U.S. legal statute, in a foreign territory, the U.S. government retains the right to prosecute that person in the individual's domestic judicial system. The fundamental justification for this principle concerns the reciprocal obligations and rights that exist between the state and its citizens. The state must protect its citizens when abroad, but the state can also take punitive action when a citizen's conduct harms the interests of the state.

The third jurisdictional principle is the passive personality principle. This principle allows states to protect their citizens, through punitive action, from foreign nationals regardless of the location of the crime. Therefore, if a state's national is a victim of a crime that violates the state's domestic legal statutes, then the state may proceed with an investigation and prosecution of the perpetrator irrespective of where the crime was committed or who committed the crime.

The fourth form of jurisdiction is the protective principle. According to this principle, the state retains the right to protect its security interests abroad. A state may prosecute individuals, regardless of nationality, for acts that the state deems a threat to national security, political independence, or even territorial integrity.

Although all of these forms of jurisdiction are extraterritorial in nature, none of them espouses a right to prosecute for reasons beyond a territorial or national link to the prosecuting state. It is only with the inclusion of universal jurisdiction that extraterritorial principles extend beyond these traditional territorial or nationalistic links to a rationale—one that embodies the idea of *hostis humanis generis* (enemies of humankind).

UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

Universal jurisdiction simply translates to instances in which jurisdiction is universal in nature—regardless of where the crime was committed, by whom the crime was committed, or whom the victim(s) might be. As defined by Kenneth Randall in the *Texas Law Review* (1988):

This principle provides every state with jurisdiction over a limited category of offenses generally recognized as of universal concern, regardless of the situs of the offense and the nationalities of the offender and offended. While the other jurisdictional bases demand direct connections between the prosecuting state and the offense, the universality principle assumes that every state has an interest in exercising jurisdiction to combat egregious offenses that states universally have condemned.

Unlike the other jurisdictional principles, universality does not require any relation to the prosecuting state, only that the crimes committed are considered *hostis humanis generis*. Thus, the nature of prosecution is based solely on the crime itself, and states are entitled, possibly even obligated, to the initiation of legal proceedings regardless of the perpetrators' or victims' nationality, or the location or origin of the crime.

The crimes that may result in the initiation of universal jurisdiction are the most heinous and abhorrent within international law and, therefore, remain limited in number. The most widely accepted list of crimes that may trigger universal jurisdiction includes: piracy, slavery, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and apartheid. Other crimes often included in this list include torture and crimes against peace.

In regards to the initiation of universal jurisdiction proceedings, the primary actor in applying this principle is the state, via its national legal infrastructure. International tribunals, whether they are ad hoc in nature or permanent, tend not to fulfill the basic requirements of universality. Ad hoc tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are predicated on the notion of universality but remain limited in their jurisdictional capacity because they apply to a particular territory. Therefore, these courts may exercise their jurisdiction over universally defined crimes, but the establishing states or institution—the United Nations (UN) Security Council in the case of the ICTY and ICTR—prescribe a territory in which the offense must have occurred. Therefore, there is a territorial limitation to the legal proceedings.

In the case of the recently formed permanent International Criminal Court (ICC), only the UN Security Council can grant the court universal jurisdiction (e.g., the initiation of an investigation in Darfur, Sudan). In all other cases, referred by the prosecutor or state party, certain territorial or nationality preconditions must be met prior to the court exercising its jurisdiction. These preconditions establish the jurisdiction of the court as extraterritorial, not universal.

CASES

One of the most famous cases invoking the principle of universal jurisdiction was the Adolf Eichmann case—although it remains debatable whether this case was predicated on pure universal jurisdiction. To date, the number of universal jurisdiction cases remains limited, but the numbers are growing. Currently, the Canadian government is prosecuting a Rwandan national, Desire Munyaneza, for crimes committed during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Switzerland and France

have also prosecuted individuals for crimes committed during the Rwanda genocide, while Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands have prosecuted individuals for crimes committed during the Yugoslavia conflict.

One of the most prominent cases of universal jurisdiction is Belgium's use of its universal jurisdiction law to prosecute four Rwandan citizens for war crimes committed in the Butare region of Rwanda. Over an eight-week period in the spring of 2001, a Belgian national court sat in judgment over Alphonse Higaniro, Vincent Ntezimana, Sister Gertrude (Consolata Mukangano), and Sister Maria Kisito (Julienne Mukabutera) for crimes committed during the Rwanda genocide. None of the accused were Belgian citizens, none of the victims were Belgian citizens, and none of the crimes were committed on Belgian territory. This truly was a case of universal, not simply extraterritorial, jurisdiction.

See also *International Law.*

. . . .   ERIC K. LEONARD

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Unjust Wars

See *Just War Theory.*

Uno Kozo

Uno Kozo (1899–1977) was the most influential Marxist thinker in Japan in the twentieth century. Born into a mercantile family,

Uno received a degree in economics from the Tokyo Imperial University and joined the Ohara Institute for the Study of Social Problems. During this period, Hajime Kawakami was publishing the journal *Social Problems Study,* which included translations of German philosopher Karl Marx's books. With his introduction to Marxism, Kawakami, who is considered the founder of Marxist economics in Japan, attracted young intellectuals such as Tamizo Kushida, Hyoe Ouchi, Itsuro Sakisaka, and Uno Kozo. Many of these scholars became major figures in the Communist or Socialist Parties, but Uno remained politically uncommitted.

From 1922 to 1924, Uno studied in Europe, primarily in Berlin. Upon his return to Japan, he joined the faculty of Tohoku, one of the seven imperial universities, and then moved to Sendai where he remained for fourteen years. His life's work thereafter was the study of the world capitalist development from a Marxian perspective, drawing a careful distinction between theory and policy. In 1936, Uno published *The Theory of Economic Policy,* in which he outlined his idea that the historical clash of class interests influenced the type of economic policy pursued by a country at any one time. Mercantilism, liberalism, and imperialism were three stages of capitalist development. These three stages, in turn, represented three types of capital: merchant, industrial, and venture capital. While he utilized Marxian terms in his work, Uno continued to dissociate himself from active involvement in the Communist and Socialist Parties. Unlike the Communists, he did not accept that the Japanese economy was semifeudal, and unlike the Socialists he did not hold that it was advanced.

In 1938, Uno's career came to a halt when he was arrested along with others associated with the dissident Marxist Rono-ha School, which had broken away from the Japanese Communist Party in 1927. After two years in jail, Uno was acquitted on appeal but did not return to Tohoku. In 1944, he moved to the Mitsubishi Institute of Economics and after World War II (1939–1945) he edited the institute's journal, *Economic Affairs.* Later he became professor at the University of Tokyo's Institute of Social Science and, from 1949, director of the institute. Although by this time he had broken from orthodox Marxism, Uno returned to the study of Marxian economics, seeking to systematize what he called a pure theory of capitalism. His later books included *The Theory of Value* (1950), *Studies in the Theory of Value* (1952), and his revision of Marx's *Das Kapital* entitled *Principles of Political Economy* (1964). In his *Theory of Economic Policy* (1954), Uno distinguished three stages of Marxist study: (1) the study of the basic principles of capitalism as it developed in Britain, the United States, and Western Europe; (2) the three varieties of capitalism—mercantile capital, industrial capital, and venture capital associated with imperialism; and (3) empirical analysis of specific current economic problems. Uno's three-step approach differed from traditional ones because it was modified to suit Japan's peculiar growth trajectory.

Uno retired from the University of Tokyo in 1958 to become a sociology professor at Hosei University. Many of Uno's students, such as Ouchi Tsutomo and Hiroshi Iwata,

have made substantial contributions to economic theory and the theory of values.

See also *Asian Political Thought; Capitalism and Democracy; Marx, Karl; Marxism.*

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Upper Chamber

In 2007, roughly 40 percent of the world's national-legislature governments had two chambers, otherwise known as a bicameral assembly. The other 60 percent consist of only one chamber, a unicameral assembly. In these bicameral representative institutions, there is a lower chamber, considered the first chamber, and an upper chamber, considered the second chamber. For example, in the United States, the lower chamber is the House of Representatives and the upper chamber is the Senate; in the United Kingdom, the lower is the House of Commons and the upper is the House of Lords; in India, there is the House of the People and the Council of States; and Japan has the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors.

Bicameralism is quite common in countries with larger populations and that have had longer, more established histories of Western-style democratic institutions (e.g., the United States, Canada, India, and Germany), whereas unicameralism more frequently occurs in newer nations with small populations, that have less established experiences of democratic governance (e.g., New Zealand, Denmark, Hungary, Nigeria, and Iran). Interestingly, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a number of the incipient democracies of Eastern and East Central Europe opted for upper chambers in their legislatures (e.g., the Czech Republic, Poland, and Croatia).

In bicameral legislatures, members of the upper chamber usually serve longer terms than those in the lower chamber. To ensure that the upper chamber is not simply a mirror reflection of the lower chamber, methods of member selection between the two chambers commonly differ. Members of the lower chamber take their seats via direct election by the people, and members of the upper chamber are selected by one or more of the following four procedures: direct election, indirect election by regional governments, appointment by the government, and heredity.

The logic behind having an upper chamber, in addition to the first chamber, traces to a state's fundamental decision; differing perspectives on democracy and the best way to achieve democratic goals usually drive this decision. At the heart of this are the two primary democratic considerations of majoritarianism versus protection of minority rights with the accompanying checks and balances. Questions surround whether a democratic system should be predicated on the strong advancement of majority will, or whether there should be empowered protections of the rights and wants of those not in the majority to help ensure tyranny—and unwise decision making—does not occur. Thus, unicameralism advances the majoritarian view of democracy: a second chamber should not hinder a legislative assembly directly elected by the people. With just one chamber, there is no potential hampering or stymieing of the people's will as it is manifested in their representatives' collective decisions.

Proponents of bicameral assembly structures disagree with this rationale. They contend that having an upper chamber provides an important democratic safeguard, as it serves as an effective check and balance inside the legislature. An abiding fear of a latently repressive majority in the lower "people's house" trampling on the minority's rights drives these arguments. The argument is also made that the upper chamber serves as a moderating force with thoughtful deliberation at a premium, and a longer-term, broader, and calmer view on the nation's welfare is given a place in the legislature, away from the more immediate and directly felt popular passions evinced in the lower chamber.

Having an upper chamber in a federal system ensures influence for constituent provincial units of the nation in the legislative process. This consideration was observed in the decision of the Framers of the U.S. Constitution to have the Senate be composed of two senators from each state, no matter the size of the state's population. This worked to assuage the concerns of the small-population states that feared their interests in the lower chamber—where representation is based directly on population—would be inherently overwhelmed by the interests of the large-population states.

There are two general models of bicameralism in the world today: strong and weak. In the strong model, the upper chamber has equal strength and authority with the lower chamber in the legislative process. A prime example of this is how the U.S. Senate plays an important and active part in the formation, development, and passage or thwarting of legislation. In weak bicameralism, the lower chamber clearly dominates lawmaking and the upper chamber plays a subordinate role with a constrained ability to set, shape, or affect the national legislative agenda. The House of Lords in the United Kingdom is a leading example of this form. Weak bicameralism is more frequently seen in the world than is strong bicameralism.

See also *Checks and Balances; Legislative Systems.*

. . . .   STEPHEN R. ROUTH

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Urban Economic Development

Urban economic development denotes either a local government policy field or the level of economic activity in the city. As a public policy field, it is an important component of local government activity in developed—and increasingly also in developing—countries. The main purpose of an urban economic development policy is to build the conditions for local economic growth (e.g., to improve the business climate or increase productivity and competitiveness); to create jobs; and to adapt the urban economy to the regional, national, and global economic dynamics. Local governments get involved in this policy field for a variety of reasons, usually one or more of the following: the tax base of the local government is dependent on the city economic activity; the local government is under pressure from citizens and private enterprises to protect jobs; or the local government is forced to create more attractive conditions for private investors, especially when the city is confronted with the disinvestment strategy of private corporations, be they national or multinational.

The involvement of local governments in the urban economy until World War II (1939–1945) was rather limited due to the prevailing political ideology, which was not in favor of public aid to private enterprises. However, after the war the economic recovery forced local governments to engage in economic development initiatives. In addition, the recessions that cyclically affected the developed economies during the last century also favored the adoption of urban policy measures in support of the local economy. In this process, local governments expanded their portfolio of policy measures and less traditional policy tools were introduced and implemented in the decades following the end of the war. These measures varied from country to country and between cities in the same country. Therefore, the contemporary field of urban economic development policy encompasses different types of policy measures. Some of them have worked well in certain places and periods, while others have not. Policy measures in this field generally fall into one of four main groups: land and infrastructures, tax and financial aid, institutional capacity building, and broad external conditions.

The first group of policy tools for the promotion of urban economic development is associated with the provision of serviced urban land and other infrastructures (e.g., enterprise parks, business incubators, or nurseries) at a reasonable price or rent for the location and relocation of economic activities. It also includes the running of public transport networks to serve the new locations. Traditionally, these measures were implemented to support commercial and industrial activities and to attract new private investors from outside the city, but increasingly they have also been used to reinforce other activities, including tourism, leisure, cultural activities, housing, and urban renewal since these are also key dimensions in an urban competitive economy.

The second group includes tax and financial incentives and has been widely used in urban economic development policies, especially for those activities not attractive for private capital. This form of support includes, for example, tax reductions or tax exemptions during a certain period, interest rate reduction, loan guarantees, and seed capital for talented entrepreneurs that show potential. Tax incentives and financial subsidies are frequently provided according to the number of jobs created and usually give preference to private investments in low-income and distressed neighborhoods or for those that meet certain environmental criteria.

A third category of urban economic development measures normally intends to build local institutional capacity and social capital. This includes, for example, creating special agencies to work closely with all those benefiting from public support, giving them technical assistance in new projects and strategic guidance, or the implementation of partnerships among different levels of government and between public and private entities. Part of these efforts to create institutional capacity in the local economy also include participation in risk capital funds and other financial tools to stimulate investment in the local economy, and the creation of public municipal enterprises to invest in activities important for the local economy. Market research and marketing campaigns, support for the participation in fairs and exhibitions, and professional training for the development of the workforce are other examples of these types of policy measures.

More often than not, a fourth group of indirect measures is associated with less obvious issues that are also vital for urban economic success, such as social services for families, health care, education, security, and public transport. Finally, a local political leadership committed to economic development has also proved to be a key factor for urban economic development, encouraging other public and private stakeholders to become involved.

See also *Economic Development, State-led; Economic Policy Formulation; Urbanization.*

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Urban Housing

Housing has always been a central issue for human welfare, in both rural and urban societies. Nonetheless, for many centuries it was marginally an issue for planners who were more focused on urban infrastructure and public buildings. The situation changed in the second half of the nineteenth century, in part related to the expansion of urban areas as a consequence of industrialization, and the concomitant public conscience over poor housing conditions. This was also a period in which urban housing became an issue for utopian, socialist reformers, philanthropists and for government too, namely through the production of housing for families with limited income. During the entire twentieth century, with the world moving to a predominately urban society, urban housing became a central issue in urban policies; with the need to adapt to the consequences of climate change, it will certainly be even more so in the future.

Some of the pioneer initiatives responsible for current urban housing and public housing policies include efforts of pioneers such as Jean-Baptiste Godin in 1859 with the Familistère de Guise in France, a model of family apartments in communitarian blocks; the influence of the writings of Charles Fourier and his followers in North America, who aimed to combine city and country and new forms of housing; Ebenezer Howard and the single family home, in the 1898 garden city model; and the urban housing for the working class provided by industrialist philanthropists to their workers, on both sides of the Atlantic. After these pioneering experiences, urban housing was built according to different house models. The French hotel, the London row house, the American apartment buildings, the family home of the garden cities, and the apartment block of the Athens Charter are just some of the numerous examples of urban house models in the last century and a half.

During the last two decades of the twentieth century, new approaches reflected housing characteristics of previous periods, under the name of neotraditional architecture, while at the same time, three other major developments are now likely to lead to a different type of future urban housing. These include, first, the development of an inclusive urban housing design more focused on persons with disabilities and the aging urban population, as well as other groups of users with special needs, including the special forms of accommodation for nomads, gypsies and travellers. A second feature entails the development of the digital or intelligent house—a rupture with traditional forms of housing due to information and communication technologies; this includes automation techniques for the security and comfort of the residents (e.g., control of light, climate, doors, windows, multimedia systems, etc.).

A third development relates to the concept of sustainable urban housing and green or bioclimatic architecture, which better uses natural conditions, as well as new materials and renewable energy sources—in new buildings and in-house renovation—and the application of new technologies to reduce energy and water consumption. In this context, the concept of a net-zero carbon home, a home that returns the same amount of power to the general energy network than the power it uses, over a period of time, is now central in any approach to urban housing. In practice, however, the concept of a net-zero carbon home has been used until now with a more pragmatic meaning to produce homes that will not contribute to global warming more than traditional homes, by having, for example, solar panels or wind turbines that produce electricity, among other features. In this sense, it is a label that means essentially reduction of carbon emissions. From the point of view of those who argue that there is enough empirical evidence of climate change and that it is caused by human action, the concept of a net-zero carbon home may prove to be an important contribution for the reduction of global warming, since more than a quarter of carbon emissions come from households. Therefore, in the context of the expected post-Kyoto vision on climate change, proposals in favor of a carbon-positive, digital, and all-inclusive home will probably find enough public and market support to become the twenty-first–century urban housing paradigm.

See also *Climate Change Conferences, United Nations; Urban Economic Development; Urban Inequality and Poverty; Urbanization; Urban Land Use and Town Planning; Urban Migration.*

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Urban Inequality and Poverty

Urban inequality and poverty have been subjects of political inquiry since industrialized societies became primarily urban, and began to exhibit many of the contemporary social and

political dynamics currently seen in the Western world. Ever since the urbanization of the world began in the 1800s, cities have been the centers of political action and protest, often resulting in major social movements. In industrialized countries, contemporary manifestations of these urban political processes were evident in periodic urban unrest in the United States during the late 1960s and early 1990s, as well as more recently in Europe.

Scholarly analysis of urban riots suggests common origins for riots rooted in the politics of inequality and poverty. The 1965 Los Angeles riots came when the fight for civil rights was at its height in the United States, and this incident was seen largely as part of a deep racial divide within the country between blacks and whites. The urban manifestation of this divide highlighted the existence of two societies, separate but unequal and coexisting in close proximity in urban areas across the country. These riots led to a period of federal policy attention to urban inequality focused on poor neighborhoods.

Twenty-seven years later, the Los Angeles riots of 1992 revealed not only the ongoing challenges of these urban inequality and poverty dynamics, but also how the ethnic and social dynamics of cities had shifted. These riots were the result of deep socioeconomic divisions within the metropolitan region in which African Americans were one of several ethnic and racial minorities with vastly different access to resources such as public schools, adequate police protection, and a local job market. The frustration stemming from this unequal access led to unrest exhibiting a distinctly multiethnic character, however, in which Latinos and whites joined African Americans in their protests, often targeting Korean immigrant businesses. Such diversity marked a divergence from 1965, which was primarily seen as an African American and white event.

Racial and ethnic urban riots, however, are not limited to the particularities of American history, and similar dynamics of unequal access to urban resources by ethnic and racial minorities could be seen in France in the early 2000s. The comprehension of why cities are hotbeds of political unrest requires an understanding of the social and economic dynamics inherent to urbanization.

Much of the debate on urban inequality and poverty has centered on the poverty of places as well as people. A racial analysis of poverty in the United States shows high rates of residential segregation for minorities, which has contributed greatly to residential instability, unemployment, and low home equity. Urban populations have been and continue to be segregated along a race-class axis, increasingly creating spatially isolated poverty and unemployment amidst generally prosperous cities. This segregation was the result of officially sanctioned "redlining" practices as well as social dynamics, both of which have played an important role in the creation of what some see as a permanent "underclass." This association between poor neighborhoods and socioeconomic isolation point toward the important intersection of race and place in the understanding of urban inequality and poverty, and the public policies designed to alleviate it that have centered on both people and places.

Residential segregation does more than simply arrange the poor into neighborhoods, however. Studies of the so-called underclass have long argued that the long-term unemployment characteristics of many poor neighborhoods can have effects well beyond the labor market; these can be socially and psychologically debilitating.

The alleviation of urban inequality has been a difficult task because of the spatial nature of urban poverty. The historic pathway out of poverty in industrialized countries has been through the labor market, yet residents of poor neighborhoods face a particular difficulty in accessing jobs. This is due to the persistence of what is known as a spatial mismatch between poor neighborhoods and the growing job market. Since the late 1960s, the spatial mismatch hypothesis has focused on long-term ghetto unemployment and the suburbanizing job market, arguing that residential segregation is a fundamental limitation in providing opportunities to the urban poor. Thus, as long as cities remain residentially segregated, it is likely that poverty and inequality—and their political manifestation in urban unrest—will remain one of the defining characteristics of cities in the industrialized world.

See also *Civil Disobedience; Race and Racism; Urbanization.*

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Urbanization

Urbanization is the process of transition from a rural to a more urban society in which a large proportion of the total population lives in cities. This means that urbanization is a process associated with the expansion of the built-up area and also related to the development of a new way of life characterized by social habits different from the rural world. It also goes along with the growth of the secondary and tertiary sectors in the economy.

Whatever the sense—physical or sociological—the definition of what constitutes an urban area differs from country to country, and there is no agreement about a quantitative measure to distinguish an urban area from a rural one. According

to the United Nations (UN), the criteria used by its member states to define what is urban can include the population size and population density; the extension and density of the built-up area; the percentage of nonagricultural economic activities; the administrative status; the existence of certain urban infrastructures, public services, or certain social amenities; or a combination of some of these criteria, which makes comparison between countries a difficult task.

The first human settlements that were densely populated and structured were established several thousand years ago. However, the turning point in the population growth and the respective concentration in urban areas worldwide occurred during the nineteenth century as a result of the profound changes introduced by the Industrial Revolution. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, estimates suggest that only 5 percent of the population lived in cities; this percentage jumped to 50 percent by the middle of the twentieth century in the more developed countries on both sides of the Atlantic. In the less developed countries, a similar trend toward urbanization of the population also took place, although at a slower pace.

The UN world urbanization prospects point to a huge increase in the urbanization of the world population in the near future. From a past in which the urban population grew from 13 percent in 1900 (220 million urban dwellers) to 29 percent in 1950 (732 million) and to 49 percent in 2005 (3.2 billion), the UN forecasts the world can soon expect an increase in the urban population up to 60 percent (4.9 billion) in 2030 and 66 percent (6 billion)—or two-thirds of the total population—in 2050. In 2008, for the first time, urban population represented more than half of the world's population, and this will probably mean the beginning of a new period, which the UN refers to as the *urban millennium*. However, the urbanization level, or the percentage of the total population that live in cities, and the urbanization growth rate vary across the world, reflecting the different development levels of each country. Until recently, the most urbanized countries were in Europe and in North and South America, but, according to the UN, in 2005 it was China and India, followed by the United States, that had the largest numbers of urban dwellers. In the next decades this trend will continue and, according to the UN forecasts, the urbanization of the population will take place mainly in Asia and Africa. Higher natural demographic growth and migration from rural to urban areas will account for 93 percent of this urban growth.

Another trend is the increase in the number of megacities, which are metropolitan areas with ten million or more inhabitants, of which Tokyo, Japan; New York City, United States; Seoul, South Korea; Mexico City, Mexico; Sao Paulo, Brazil; and Mumbai, India, are the six largest metropolises. However, while most of these are located in industrialized countries, according to the UN, the pattern is now changing and the new megacities are located in emerging and less developed countries.

This high concentration of the urban population creates huge social and environmental problems, well identified by national governments and international organizations. The United Nations Millennium Declaration recognized the present tragic situation of around one billion urban poor that live in slums, a problem that, if not properly addressed, is expected to affect three billion persons by 2050. This situation can be further worsened by the impact of climate change on water supplies, air pollution, and natural disasters.

See also *Urban Economic Development; Urban Housing; Urban Inequality and Poverty; Urban Land Use and Town Planning; Urban Migration.*

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Urban Land Use and Town Planning

Town planning, or urban land use, is concerned with the design and development of human settlements. It is a human activity with origins tracing back to antiquity, in Mesopotamia, Greece, Rome, and on up to the Renaissance and the baroque period in Europe. During these periods, major human settlements in these places were planned according to specific principles, using building standards that took into consideration wind direction, sun exposure, soil type, availability and quality of water, and other factors that affect life in urban areas.

ORIGINS OF CONTEMPORARY TOWN PLANNING

The principles and practices of contemporary town planning or urban land use planning, however, began as a reaction to the effects of industrialization and urbanization in the nineteenth century in Europe and North America. As a profession and as a discipline, it has existed for little more than a century, first in Europe where a university degree in civic design was introduced at the University of Liverpool in 1908, and was sponsored by William Lever, the creator of Port Sunlight, and later in North America, with visionaries such as Frederick Law Olmsted Jr. and all those associated with what later became known as the city beautiful movement.

Principles and social experiments carried out in the nineteenth and the early twentieth century were important for the constitution of this new discipline. Among these were the

social utopian ideas and experiments, such as those proposed by Robert Owen in New Lanark at the end of the eighteenth century and New Harmony in the early nineteenth century; Charles Fourier at Falansterium in 1832 and the subsequent initiatives in the United States, such as the suburbs Llewellyn Park and Riverside; Jean-Baptiste Godin at Familistère de Guise in 1859; Étienne Cabet at Icarie in 1840, among many others. At the end of the nineteenth century, geographer and anarchist Peter Kropotkin's ideas—including decentralized organization of production and social life, and the combination of industry and agriculture—influenced, among others, Ebenezer Howard. Howard later adopted the special model in his proposal of the garden city; this became the first urban model to be adopted worldwide in the rising profession of town planning during the first three decades of the twentieth century.

The first constitutive decades of town planning, as a profession and as a discipline, were the cities planned and built in the second half of the nineteenth century by philanthropist industrialists. This included Jean Menier (Noisiel-sur-Marne) in France, and Titus Salt (Saltaire), George Cadbury (Bourneville), and William Lever (Port Sunlight) in the United Kingdom. The works of authors such as Camillo Sitte were also influential in these early years.

Several urban models emerged during the first century of contemporary town planning. The Beaux-Arts movement—associated with the École des Beaux-Arts of Paris and teaching based on the imitation of order, dignity, and harmony—argued that urban renewal together with other policies would make it possible to control the problems associated with urban population growth: beauty would influence social behavior. The Beaux-Arts movement was the main inspiration for town planning at the end of nineteenth century and in the early years of the twentieth century. Its importance also to its influence on architects and landscape architects on the other side of the Atlantic (e.g., Daniel H. Burnham, Charles Robinson, Harlan Kelsey, John Nolen, and Frederick Law Olmsted Jr.) and on the planning movement known as city beautiful. Howard's garden city—first applied by Raymond Unwin and Barry Parker in Letchworth in 1903, and by Louis de Soissons in Welwyn in 1920—was the next influential planning model after the Beaux-Arts movement and was the one that had, for the first time, a real worldwide influence and expression.

THE CIAM MOVEMENT AND RESPONSES

Nonetheless, beauty was about to be substituted by efficiency as the key driver in the town planning profession. A group of architects, including Le Corbusier, met in 1928 in Sarraz, Switzerland, marking the start of the Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne, or CAIM movement, which envisioned that the city should be efficient as a machine. The principles for CAIM were laid down in the Charter of Athens, adopted in the fourth CIAM session, in 1933. The charter of principles became subsequently the reference for town planning in the twentieth century. Differences inside CIAM, which was never a monolithic bloc, between the old

generation and the younger members, eventually led to its end in 1959. Criticism also emerged from outside the movement, from Jane Jacobs in her book *The Rise and Death of American Cities,* among other critics.

These reactions to the CIAM discourse on urbanism led to the development of alternative approaches. The new urbanism movement, in particular, emerged as a paradigm of urban planning that reveals more sensitivity to the environment, green corridors, and urban biodiversity. New urbanism gives priority to pedestrians and places greater importance on mixed-use neighborhoods, the quality of public spaces, and public participation in the planning process. Cultural activities, seen now as the driver of the urban economy, are also emphasized.

CONCLUSION

The history of contemporary urban land use planning contains a narrative of continuities as well as ruptures in the idea of what constitutes the good community and how to achieve it. Contemporary town planning started with proposals that were essentially a reaction against the nineteenth-century city. These proposals, claiming to move people to new planned areas with strong connections to the rural environment, were a vision later substituted by modernism. New approaches in turn replaced modernism, aiming to avoid or to mitigate urban sprawl and environmental degradation of natural areas.

See also *Owen, Robert; Urbanization.*

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Urban Migration

Largely the result of migration from rural areas, urban growth can place tremendous burdens on urban institutions of governance, such as municipal authorities and community organizations, and also on the private sector. Rapid in-migration of new residents can significantly shift local political dynamics by creating new voting blocs, ethnic and cultural affinities, and new labor markets. These dynamics have played a significant role in shaping the politics and settlement patterns of North American cities after World War II (1939–1945), and currently shape the urban politics and settlement patterns of many cities in developing countries.

In the United States, the great migration north by agricultural workers during the 1930s and 1940s was prompted as industrialists in northern Midwest cities applied Fordist manufacturing principles in the car, steel, and other industries. This led to high rates of urban growth in cities like Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee. The migration fueling this growth then spawned the creation of new neighborhoods and settlements in these cities; these subsequently became segregated by race, ethnicity, and other forms of social status, with racial and ethnic tensions emerging as early as the 1950s. During the 1960s, however, North Americans began migrating out of central cities to suburban areas, drawn by affordable suburban housing. They also sought to escape issues such as urban fiscal crises; the redlining of poor, minority, and immigrant urban communities; and a range of other factors pushing for the development of what have become primarily suburban cities.

As suburbanization has become the norm, city centers have taken on an increasingly immigrant character, prompting scholars to focus on how ethnic and immigrant enclaves have come to characterize many North American cities. These immigrant sociophysical spaces have become cemented within host-country hierarchies and have played an important role in sustaining the economic viability of North American central cities. The important economic role that immigrants and immigrant neighborhoods have historically played is that of urban intermediaries for economies and communities, or *ethnic economies*. Scholars have defined such *ethnic enclaves* as important for understanding how immigrants build and retain enduring social ties within the majority culture. While such approaches have historically viewed immigrant neighborhoods as relatively insulated enclaves, there is growing anecdotal evidence that ethnic and immigrant neighborhoods are increasingly nodes of attraction. The existence of well-advertised Koreatowns across the United States, Little Havana in Miami, and Filipinotown in Los Angeles, for example, suggests that immigrant neighborhoods serve quite different functions in a larger urban mosaic of neighborhoods, and identities and created networks have both racial and spatial characteristics. These immigrant neighborhoods have attained an important role in urban government, and are now viewed as markers of cities' attractive forces to rural workers as well as immigrants.

The transition from a primarily agrarian to an urban society, while largely complete in North America, is only just beginning in many developing countries. Comparable processes of industrialization and urban migration are currently underway in many fast-developing countries where job availability in growing urban agglomerations has attracted large numbers of agricultural workers. The appearance of these rural populations in cities reflects more than simply population growth. Increasing population concentration requires the development of expanded sociophysical infrastructure to manage the inevitable conflicts and problems associated with higher density living. Since urban governments in developing countries have rarely been able to keep pace with these new demands for urban services, innovative community-level institutions have become important nonstate actors in governance, providing basic urban goods ranging from clean water supplies to housing. These institutions have taken on important intermediary roles in urban governance and have been forceful advocates for the poor.

This urban transition in developing countries describes societies that have rapidly changed from rural to urban forms of social and physical organization in relatively short time periods that are generally more compressed than those for North America and other industrialized countries. Some suggest that if they follow a similar trajectory to North American cities, their initial growth due to industrialization and consequent in-migration from agrarian regions will lead to residentially segregated neighborhoods, the loss of the industrial job base, and eventually the creation of long-term urban poverty and inequality. For these reasons, progressive urban policy and planning is a growing concern throughout the fast-growing urban centers in the developing world.

See also *Urban Economic Development; Urban Housing; Urban Inequality and Poverty; Urbanization; Urban Land Use and Town Planning.*

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Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism is the philosophical theory that the morally right act or policy is the one that promotes the greatest happiness,

or well-being, counting equally the happiness and unhappiness of each person. In the context of utilitarianism, happiness and well-being may also be synonymous with *utility.*

In its early stages in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, utilitarianism was a radical and progressive approach to social and political thinking. The idea of maximizing well-being was applied to social problems such as ignorance, sickness, and poverty to produce criticisms of the status quo. Consequently, the great British utilitarians, such as Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), argued for reforms in the law, government, education, public health provision, and social welfare. Where the majority is living in poor conditions, utilitarianism can both describe what is wrong and defend proposals for change.

At its core, utilitarianism contains three elements: (1) an account of well-being, happiness, utility, or welfare; (2) a demand that well-being should be maximized; and (3) a requirement of equality, specifically that in the maximizing process, each individual's happiness or well-being should count for one and no more than one. Utilitarianism is therefore a forward-looking philosophy, since it focuses firmly on the consequences of individual acts or of actions undertaken within a particular system of rules or institutions. Act utilitarians claim that morally right actions are those that produce more utility than any other available option. Rule utilitarians, by contrast, think that utility will be maximized in the long run not by evaluating individual acts, but by establishing and upholding a secure set of rules, rights, or institutions and requiring individuals to recognize them.

DEFINING WELL-BEING

Utilitarians initially defended a view of well-being as pleasure and the absence of pain. In Bentham's version, the aim is to produce the highest net amount of pleasure, where no distinction is made between types or sources of pleasure. "Prejudice apart," says Bentham in Book 3 of *Rationale of Reward,* "the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry" (chap. 1). John Stuart Mill suggests a different idea: some pleasures are qualitatively superior to others and it is best to maximize these higher pleasures over their inferior counterparts. Mill believes that it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied, and that which pleasures are higher can be determined by asking a qualified judge (i.e., someone who has experienced both sorts of pleasure).

Given technical problems with measuring mental states and normative problems with the claim that pleasure is identical to the human good, a different account of well-being focuses not on the "state of our minds" but the "state of the world." These are not subjective notions of well-being such as pleasurable or worthwhile mental states, but objective views of well-being, most importantly, the satisfaction of preferences. This view has its own problems, including that (1) people can get what they want without becoming happy, and (2) some preferences—for example, racist preferences—are themselves morally objectionable and so should not be satisfied at all.

MAXIMIZING WELL-BEING

Given some account of well-being, the distinctiveness of utilitarianism lies in its demand to maximize well-being, taking each individual into account equally. It is, therefore, a maximizing form of consequentialism (i.e., the view that consequences alone determine moral rightness). Utilitarianism can apply to a range of practical issues facing individuals and governments. On the question of political obligation, for instance, in *A Fragment on Government,* Bentham holds that subjects should obey "so long as the probable mischiefs of obedience are less than the probable mischiefs of resistance" (56).

Utilitarianism continues to be an influential approach to questions of economic justice, even though utilitarians disagree among themselves. Regarding how income and wealth should be distributed, utilitarians consider the evidence linking various arrangements with different levels of happiness. First, some claim that unrestricted markets are the most efficient way to generate the most happiness for everyone by increasing wealth. Free market efficiency, they argue, leads to productivity, and thus to happiness. On this view, redistribution to the poor is an unjustifiable limit on promoting utility; therefore, the just distribution of income and wealth results from unfettered market exchanges.

Second, defenders of an opposing view argue that money has a "diminishing marginal utility"; that is, a person gets less utility from each additional dollar. They argue that an extra dollar does the most good for the person who has the least. A homeless person benefits hugely from that dollar, but giving or taking a dollar from a billionaire would probably produce little or no effect on the billionaire. Consequently, the way to maximize utility is to redistribute income so that the overall pattern of distribution is roughly equal. Others support a third option: a market economy with a redistributive welfare state. Perhaps this option is likely to produce the most overall happiness, since it recognizes the efficiency and productivity gains of market-generated outcomes while allowing for redistribution that increases overall happiness by providing public goods that markets on their own would fail to generate.

OBJECTIONS TO UTILITARIANISM

Of the many objections to utilitarianism, three stand out. First, it measures the wrong sort of thing; as Amartya Sen has argued, focusing on utility or happiness fails to capture the arguably more basic information about a people's capabilities to function, including receiving adequate nourishment, living in secure surroundings, and developing their skills and talents.

The next two objections identify the flaw in the core utilitarian requirement to maximize utility. To begin with, utilitarianism is too demanding because it asks more than can fairly be required. Utilitarians recommend that happiness should be maximized, but this suggests that people should be spending all their time promoting the greatest happiness, since whatever good they do, it is likely that they can always do more. Next, utilitarianism is too permissive, since it allows individuals to

be treated unjustly, used as mere means to the production of the greatest happiness. It permits treatment of individuals that seems obviously unfair, unjust, or deeply wrong. For example, it is possible that overall happiness, counting everyone for one and no one for more than one, could be maintained by enslaving some identifiable minority of the population. The suffering of these slaves would be more than compensated by the utility gains for the majority of free citizens. According to this scenario, utilitarianism requires slavery. But, so the objection says and as John Rawls points out in *Justice as Fairness,* most people would agree with Abraham Lincoln's claim that "if slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong" (29).

. . . .   CHARLES W. B. JONES

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Utopias and Politics

A utopia describes a positive, but unrealizable, state. In this sense, all positive ideals or images of society that cannot be realized in practice are utopian. In a more restricted and technical sense, utopia designates a literary and political genre devoted to the construction of models of the perfect society.

FORMS OF UTOPIA

The term *utopia* derives from the homonymous book by Thomas More, which appeared in 1516. More coined this neologism to name the ideal society that he depicts in the book, probably consciously playing on the ambivalence of the term. Commonly used by European Renaissance intellectuals, *u-topia* derives from ancient Greek, and it can be a contraction of both *eu-topos* (the good place) and *ou-topos* (the no place). There is still dispute about the right interpretation, but More's *Utopia* allows both meanings: the best place one can possibly conceive is also, at the same time, the "no place" by definition. Irony pervades the entire work, emerging particularly in the names More uses: Amaurot is the city that cannot be seen, and its river is called Anyder, the river without water, and so on. The fact that the meaning of utopia is suspended from the very beginning between the *good place* and the *no place* would have enduring consequences.

Sir Thomas More's Utopia (1516) allows for two definitions of "utopia," as the best place that can possibly be conceived of, as well as "no-place."

Together with the definition of a literary and political genre—the restricted meaning of the term—in time, a broader view appeared. Utopia came to generally mean all that is good but nonexistent or even impossible. According to Karl Mannheim, who provided one of the most authoritative definitions of the term, a state of mind is utopian when it is incongruous with the reality within which it occurs, in the sense that it tends to break the bonds of existing social order. As such, Mannheim counterposes utopias to ideologies: The utopian mentality works in opposition to the status quo and aims at its disintegration. Ideology, on the other hand, even when it does not precisely correspond to the status quo, nevertheless tends toward its preservation because it is congruous with it. In other words, utopias are revolutionary because they tend to burst the boundaries of the existing order, whereas ideologies are always conservative.

The two meanings of the term are the two extremes of a spectrum within which different forms of utopias lie. In the

first sense, there are the works that followed the example of More's *Utopia*. Tommaso Campanella's *City of the Sun* (1602), Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis* (1627), and William Morris's *News from No-where* (1891) are all examples of the utopian genre. Campanella depicts an ideal city built on a pattern of concentric circles, in which citizens live a life devoted to knowledge and piety; Bacon envisages a perfect society, which is run by enlightened scientists, whilst Morris's utopia is an idyllic and rural society run on the basis of Marxist principles. In these works, the description of the ideal society often takes the form of a narrative by a traveler who discovers the land of "utopia," typically an island or a territory separated from other societies.

Parts of this literary genre are also negative utopias such as George Orwell's *1984* (1949). The book describes a disciplinary society: the no place in this case is not the best possibly imagined, but the worst. The society that Orwell depicts represents the dreadful view of a totalitarian future ruled by the Big Brother and has been interpreted in many possible ways—prophecy, allegory, satire, or parody. These kinds of work are at times also called *dystopias* insofar as they subvert the literary mechanisms of traditional utopias, transforming the "good places" into the "bad places"—the Greek *dys* meaning abnormal, faulty, or bad. Some people have also called them *inverted utopias.* Other examples include Franz Kafka's *The Trial* (1925) and Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* (1932).

Next to utopias as a literary genre, also relevant are works that are not part of this genre, but nevertheless contain significant utopian moments. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Social Contract* (1762) or, more recently, Herbert Marcuse's *Eros and Civilisation* (1955) are such examples. Rousseau's *Social Contract* is not strictly speaking a utopia, as it is not the literary narration of the no place and good place. The book aims to set the conditions for the legitimacy of political power, which Rousseau saw in a democratic social contract between citizens who are free and equals. Yet, it contains an important utopian moment insofar as the society resulting from the social contract Rousseau describes is, in many respects, the best society that can possibly be envisaged as civilized human beings. Similarly, Marcuse's *Eros and Civilisation,* which is devoted to a critique of the concept of civilization put forward by Sigmund Freud, contains a significant utopian moment in that he opposes to it a model of society where emancipation from domination is achieved through the liberation of repressed instincts and imagination. Marcuse too envisaged the possibility of a "better place" yet to be realized, and therefore again a no place. To sum up on this point, a work contains utopian elements when it expresses the belief that some (or all) social evils can be eliminated and a good place created.

In this sense, there is great debate as to the extent to which Karl Marx's thought contains utopian elements. On the one hand, perhaps no other author has been as influential as Marx in spreading the belief that social evils can be eliminated and a better society developed. On the other hand, Marx's prospect of a communist society does not derive from mere wishful thinking, but is grounded on a scientific analysis of the historical condition of the proletariat. In their *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1848), Marx and Engels put forward a severe critique of utopian socialists such as Comte de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, and Robert Owen. Having theorized about the emancipation of the proletariat in an epoch when the material conditions for such emancipation were not yet ripe, utopian socialists necessarily failed to identify the economic presuppositions for such a transformation; their social criticism thus remained a mere fantastic picture of future society. To such utopian socialism, in which personal inventiveness takes the place of historical action, Marx and Engels opposed their scientific communism, in which the prospect of a future communist society is the result of a scientific prediction based on the analysis of the economic conditions of the proletariat. In synthesis, Marx and Engels's social criticism contains significant utopian elements, despite the fact that their systems of thought are not in the utopian genre.

Another distinction recently proposed for grouping different forms of utopias is that between major and minor utopias. According to Jay Winter, *major utopias* are those utopias that radically aim at extirpating all social evils from the world and resort to unconditional violence to realize their projects. Stalin and Hitler are examples of such major utopians. Their totalitarian visions and their commitment to the ruthless removal from the world of those malevolent elements blocking the path to a beneficent future, even at the price of extermination, render them major utopians. *Minor utopias* are instead imaginings of liberation on a usually smaller scale, which also sketch out a world very different from the one in which people actually live, but from which not all social conflicts and evils are eradicated. Examples of such minor utopias are the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) or the ecological movements of the 1970s. Minor utopians are therefore people who envisage good places, but with the awareness that they could remain, to a great extent, no places if the price to be paid for their realization is too high.

QUESTIONING THE FUNCTIONS OF UTOPIA BEYOND POLITICS

Utopias perform very important functions within society. The primary function of utopia is to exercise a critique of the status quo. By depicting an ideal of good society, utopias reveal where people do not stand and therefore also how far away societies are from such an ideal. This is very clear in More's *Utopia*. The first part of the book analyzes the evils affecting the society More lived in, and it is only in the second part of the book that the contours of the new land of Utopia are depicted. Although not all utopias make such explicit social criticism, this remains their primary function. Even if utopians do not explicitly make an accurate description of what they consider to be the evils of society, such criticism is implicit in the radical alternative to the existing order that they put forward. Utopias transcend reality, but only apparently departing from it.

Another way to express this is to say that utopias have a regulative function. As *regulative,* the capacity of an idea serves as a guiding ideal for human conduct independently of its content

of reality. Utopias in this sense are not necessarily blueprints for the creation of a radically new society. They are means to measure the good and bad that existing societies contain. The presupposition of such a critique is the conviction that the current state of affairs is modifiable. This can be the result of a belief in the malleable character of human nature (i.e., its perfectibility), or of the idea that the fundamental structures of the social world are subject to the possibility of change.

Within this more general regulative function, further distinctions can be made between *partial utopias* and *global utopias.* Global utopias aim for a radical eradication of all social evils toward the construction of a perfect society in its entirety. The typical example is Plato's description of the perfect society ruled by philosophers in his *Republic.* Partial utopias are instead those depicting societies as an alternative to the existing ones in some limited respects only. An example is ecologist utopias, where it is only the relationship of humans with their natural environment that is criticized and remedied.

Some authors have criticized utopias by arguing that their critique is too radical and that they tend to generate totalitarian modes of domination. According to Karl Popper, for instance, utopias such as Plato's idealized republic endorsed visions of a "closed" society, which anticipates that of modern totalitarian thinkers such as Hegel and Marx and must therefore be repudiated. Utopias can, however, in many ways be defended against their critics. First, the accusation of totalitarianism holds, at best, only for global and major utopias. Partial and minor utopias are by definition alien to any attempt to encapsulate societies in a closed scheme of functioning. But, most important, the majority of utopian thinkers are fully aware that utopias are destined to remain "no places." This is clear not just in the irony of More's neologism, but also in the fact that most utopian thinkers did not even think of trying to enforce their schemes of the perfect society. Even those who have actually tried (or thought of trying) to transform their no places into something real have most often favored means such as education and small-scale experiments. Those who have in actual fact tried to realize them through a violent revolution remain a tiny minority.

Together with their regulative function, utopias also help in developing new ideals. Utopias do not only explain where societies stand, but also reveal new directions that societies may take. Utopias are the result of the work of imagination. They disclose alternative scenarios and, as such, they enrich the sense of human possibility. As Victor Hugo once said, "Today's utopia is tomorrow's reality." The aphorism is usually understood in the sense that utopias can be realized, at least to a certain extent. But this can also be reversed, by saying that "tomorrow's realities are today's utopias." Indeed, most important social conquests such as the abolition of slavery or universal suffrage were all utopias once. In a sense, all ideas that contribute to social progress have to go through a utopian stage, one in which they are still no places.

Notwithstanding the two important functions of utopias—that is, to put forward a critique and disclose new ideals—some authors have questioned the political nature of utopias.

First, they consider imagining a radically alternative society as a flight from politics. They observe, for instance, that utopias are often devoted to depicting societies where politics would become superfluous. In a perfect society such as the one envisaged by Thomas More, there would be no need for politics. Similarly, according to some interpreters, a truly socialist society is a society where politics understood as the domination of one part of society over the rest would no longer exist.

By reading the descriptions of utopian societies, which quite often dwell on almost every detail of social life by describing the tasks of all of its inhabitants, one can get the impression that utopias go beyond politics. This view, however, reflects a very limited conception of both politics and utopias. As illustrated, utopias do not only include works in the literary genre of utopia, but also, more generally, all those that express the belief that the evils of society can be remedied by a better social arrangement. Moreover, the charge of dismissing politics reflects a very limited view of politics, as if the latter can be limited solely to the government and administration by the few over the rest of the society. If, by politics, one more generally understands everything concerning the life of the polity, of living-in-common existence, then there is no need to argue that utopias are apolitical. In this sense, they rather constitute an important and vital part of politics.

THE REAL OR UNREAL PROSPECT OF UTOPIAS

In a sense, utopias—at the same time good places and no places—transcend reality, but do not radically depart from it. Utopias break away from the current state of affairs, but only in order to criticize it. One could therefore even say that they are realistic inasmuch as they reveal where a society is not. By saying how existing societies differ from ideal ones, utopias help explain real conditions in societies, but also point to the possibility to change them.

Of course, utopias can be more or less realistic in this sense. If the literary utopias of the golden age or the paradise lost often have very little grasp on reality, the most significant utopias of modernity have all contributed to the critique of existing societies and the disclosure of new directions for their development. For instance, in the epoch of the French Revolution (1789–1799), many utopias, such as that of a society of free and equal individuals, appeared to a great extent realizable. It was then that ideals such as that of a democratic social contract or form of redistribution (if not abolition) of private property ceased to be perceived as impossible no places.

The degree to which such utopian ideals have been realized in history is a matter of empirical analysis. Inspiring actions and institutions that have been historically acknowledged, some people have directly tried to envision integral utopias. Although this remains a small phenomenon, there are utopias that have inspired the design of experimental communities. These *living utopias* range from religious communities such as the Oneida community in the United States, first formally established in 1848, to the socialist phalanxes inspired by Charles Fourier that were created in France and the United

States in the nineteenth century, to the kibbutz, a form of Jewish settlement that began early in the twentieth century.

Yet, many authors claim that humans live in an epoch of the death of utopia. Despite the fact that the utopian genre is far from vanishing, this only seems to be true of literature and fiction. This is partly due to the high degree of specialization in the social sciences that has rendered global utopias unacceptable to the academic community. Yet according to some interpreters, behind the alleged death of utopias, there are more structural reasons. Marcuse, for instance, observed that the concept of utopia is becoming obsolescent in the contemporary world because any transformation of the technical and natural environment today is a real possibility. On the opposite front are those who consider utopia dead because they see no possibility of a radical alternative to the status quo. In an epoch when many celebrate the end of history, there seems to be no space, but also no need to embark on a journey to the land of utopia. However, the state of societies being far from perfect guarantees that there will always be the possibility and the need for utopias.

See also *Communism; Engels, Friedrich; Marx, Karl; More, Sir Thomas; Socialism.*

. . . . CHIARA BOTTICI

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Validity

Validity is the degree to which a measurement procedure captures a theoretical concept being measured. Validity determines whether one is measuring what one intends to measure. The problems of measurement arise from the nature of social science processes that are complex and, therefore, difficult to delineate unambiguously along numeric dimensions. Assessing three types of validity—content, construct, and criterion—demonstrates what a particular procedure can and cannot do with respect to the quantitative measurement of a theoretical concept.

Content validity is the degree to which a quantitative measure covers the features of a theoretical concept being measured, and nothing relevant to the theoretical concept is omitted. One type of a content validity is sampling validity, which refers to the degree of sufficient accounting for a theoretical concept's characteristics in a quantitative measure.

Construct validity is the degree to which a measure of a variable corresponds to the general theoretical framework of a concept. Criterion validity concerns the relationship between a quantitative measure and an empirical analysis using the measure. This includes predictive validity, reflecting the degree to which the results predicted by the particular numeric measure correspond to the results derived from measuring related variables.

See also *Qualitative Analysis; Qualitative Methodologies; Quantitative Analysis; Reliability and Validity Assessment.*

. . . . TATIANA VASHCHILKO

Veblen, Thorstein

Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929) was a critic and satirist of U.S. economic society and its system of capitalism. An economist, social scientist, and social critic, he sought to apply the idea of evolution to the study of economic institutions in order to develop evolutionary economics. Both Darwinism and social Darwinism were fresh concepts during the period, and he applied them to economics, using them to present economic behavior as deterministic in a similar process to that of human evolution.

Veblen was born July 30, 1857, in Manitowoc County, Wisconsin, to recently immigrated Norwegian parents. He grew up on a farm in a Norwegian farming community in Minnesota. He learned English after he went to school and always spoke it with a thick accent. He graduated from Carleton College in Minnesota, and in 1994, he completed a PhD at Yale University, where William Graham Sumner, the American champion of social Darwinism, directed Veblen's doctoral work.

Unable to find an academic job, Veblen spent the next seven years at home reading. In 1888 he married Ellen Rolfe, the daughter of a wealthy business family. This was a rocky relationship that interrupted his teaching career several times and eventually ended in a divorce.

In 1891 Veblen returned to higher education. He entered Cornell University as a graduate student in order to be educated in something that could gain him employment. At Cornell, he greatly impressed one of his teachers, American economist J. Laurence Laughlin. Veblen subsequently went to the University of Chicago as a fellow in economics when Laughlin became the head of the economics department. Veblen's first book, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899), was written while he was at the university. The book is both scholarly and satirical. In it Veblen criticizes what he believed were the false values of the wealthy upper classes, arguing that they were socially wasteful. His use of phrases such as "conspicuous consumption" and "pecuniary emulation" won him literary fame and a wide audience.

In 1904 Veblen published *The Theory of the Business Enterprise,* which was also written at the University of Chicago. Here, he uses evolutionary analysis to enable criticism of the capitalist system, which he predicted would be eliminated as economic conflict evolved into socialism. He also opposes business finance, which he finds to be irrational, but praises industrial production.

From 1911 until 1918, Veblen taught at the University of Missouri. He published several works during this period, including *The Instinct of Workmanship and the State of the Industrial Arts* (1914), *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution* (1915; a favorite of the Progressives), and *An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of Its Perpetuation* (1917).

The Engineers and the Price System (1921) was a series of articles that were first published in an economic journal, *The Dial,* during 1919. In *Engineers,* Veblen assigns the important task of building a new planned economy—one that would govern a wholesome society—to scientists and engineers.

Veblen died on August 3, 1929, near Menlo California, on the eve of the Great Depression. This period marked the peak of his popularity, when he was most widely read for his understanding of the great economic crisis. His thought was used for reforming capitalism and not for adopting socialism, which he preferred.

See also *Economic Theories of the State; Political Theory.*

. . . .   ANDREW J. WASKEY

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Virtue Theory

Virtue theory refers to theoretical accounts of the concept of virtue and its role in ethics. It addresses such questions as: What is virtue? How is virtue acquired? What is the moral status of virtuous acts? What is a virtuous character? Although related, virtue theory is not the same as virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is the prescriptive stance that gives precedence to the importance of character and the virtues in moral life, often questioning how humans should act and live. Not all virtue theorists are proponents of virtue ethics, and interest in virtue and character are not the exclusive concern of the advocates of virtue ethics.

Most modern discussions of virtue begin with the ancient Greeks, to whom virtue occupied a central place in moral life. The philosopher Aristotle, in particular, reflected at length on the nature of virtue and the importance of moral character, which he regarded as essential conditions of a good human life. In his *Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle links the good life to a state he called *eudaimonia*—usually, if inadequately, translated as happiness. This is a broad conception of human well-being that requires the full development of one's natural capacities. Eudaimonia's proper development depends on the cultivation of excellences of character and intellect, primarily by means of moral education and good habituation that dispose individuals toward virtuous feelings and conduct.

Although virtue ethics served as the dominant form of morality in the West among ancient and medieval philosophers, it was eclipsed in the modern age by conceptions of morality that focus on abstract rules and universal principles applicable in all situations, rather than on the cultivation of moral character and the virtues. The two most important forms of these modern moral theories are consequentialism (particularly utilitarianism), which judges the moral worth of actions based on their effects, and deontology (especially as found in the works of Immanuel Kant), which judges the morality of actions based on their intentions, regardless of their effects. However, virtue theory has enjoyed a resurgence in popularity and interest in the West since the late 1950s, in part as a reaction against these dominant theories of morality. G. E. M.

Anscombe's seminal 1958 essay "Modern Moral Philosophy" is usually credited as the starting point of this renewed interest in virtue theory, primarily because virtue theory emphasizes the role of the moral emotions in ethical life—something both deontology and consequentialism have marginalized. Virtue ethics has also challenged the rule-based approach to ethics typical of its modern rivals, favoring instead the cultivation of good practical judgment to guide agents through complex ethical dilemmas that are not always amendable to the application of abstract moral principles in concrete cases.

This revival of virtue theory has not only stimulated interest in virtue ethics, but has also prompted greater attention to the role of virtue and character within the dominant forms of moral philosophy that have traditionally ignored or marginalized it. For example, Kant's later work, particularly the neglected "Doctrine of Virtue" section of his *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), has recently attracted a great deal of awareness from scholars interested in revising the common perception of Kant as a typical deontologist indifferent to questions of character and virtue. In fact, Kant considered the cultivation of virtue to be an important means of strengthening the individual capacity to perform one's duties. The same interest in the role of the virtues can be found among some contemporary consequentialists, such as Julia Driver, whose outlook is in striking contrast to that of Jeremy Bentham.

In the early twenty-first century, doubts are being raised about the robust conception of character that is usually assumed by virtue theory. Some studies by social psychologists strongly suggest that moral character is not very stable, consistent, or fixed but is actually extremely variable in different situations and highly sensitive to context. If true, then the goal of cultivating strong moral character may be psychologically unrealistic. Also, modern thought tends to be very skeptical about objective theories of the human good, particularly when they are rooted in an essential conception of human nature, as they were for Aristotle. For this reason, modern proponents of virtue theory tend to abandon a single view of the human good in favor of a plurality of conceptions.

See also *Corruption, Political; Ethics, Political.*

. . . .   GRAEME GARRARD

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Voegelin, Eric

Eric Voegelin (1901–1985) was an Austrian American political philosopher and philosopher of history. He is best known for his *New Science of Politics* (1952), in which he characterized modern civilization in terms of the ancient Christian heresy, Gnosticism. In his magnum opus, *Order and History* (1956–1987), Voegelin developed a theory of politics and history meant to understand equivalent experiences across Western and non-Western cultures. He stated his thinking was an act of resistance against "stop-history" ideological systems such as those of Enlightenment intellectuals Georg Hegel and Karl Marx.

An eclectic range of sources inspired Voegelin, including ancient Greek philosopher Plato, German political economist and sociologist Max Weber, medieval mysticism, ancient Egyptian meditations on death, and prehistoric cave paintings. The theory of humanity Voegelin developed over his career consisted of an attempt to understand the wide range of experiences conveyed by these sources. He believed that a political science that failed to understand such sources—or found ways to ignore them—was not genuine science.

Voegelin was born to a Lutheran family in Cologne, Germany, in 1901. In his book *Anamnesis* (1966), he recalls nineteen childhood experiences that opened up his later philosophical reflections. One of these was learning, at the age of five, about the Monk of Heisterbach, who had gotten lost in meditation for one hundred years; to the monk, this only seemed to last a few hours in the afternoon. Voegelin considered this a source of his interest in differing modes of historical time. In *Anamnesis,* he also recalls seeing Halley's comet when he was seven or eight, and the apocalyptic fear it caused his neighbors. This prompted his interest in apocalyptic movements and the paradox of how something so beautiful could also be so fearsome.

Voegelin spent his early career at the University of Vienna, where he received his doctorate under the supervision of legal scholar Hans Kelsen. He also came under the influence of Max Weber and members of the Stefan-George literary and academic circle. His time in Vienna was punctuated by the events of World War II (1939–1945). During this time, he published books and newspaper articles critical of Nazi race ideology as well as his *Political Religions* (1938), which examined the religious nature of revolutionary ideology. These publications prompted the gestapo to seek his arrest in 1938, and he fled from Austria.

Voegelin immigrated to the United States and taught at Louisiana State University between 1942 and 1958. During this time, he published the first three volumes of *Order and History* (1956 and 1957), which covered the ancient Near East, Israel, and Greece. From 1958 to 1969, he directed the Institut für Politische Wissenschaft in Munich, Germany, and attempted to introduce the study of political science as part of the postwar reconstruction of German society. While at the University of Munich, he delivered his controversial lecture series, "Hitler and the Germans," which indicted a wide spectrum of German society for Nazism.

Voegelin returned to the United States in 1969 by joining the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. During that time he published the fourth volume of *Order and History* (1974), along with numerous articles detailing the theory of consciousness he regarded as the basis for a genuinely empirical political science. He died in Palo Alto, California, on January 19, 1985. The fifth volume of *Order and History* was published in 1987, and the University of Missouri Press published the *Collected Works of Eric Voegelin* (thirty-four volumes) between 1990 and 2009.

See also *German Political Thought; Political History, Comparative; Political Philosophy; Political Theory; Weber, Max.*

. . . .   JOHN VON HEYKING

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Voltaire, Francois–Marie

Voltaire (1694–1778) was the pseudonym of Francois-Marie Arouet, a French scholar and satirist. Voltaire was born to a family of some standing, as his father was in government service and his mother came from a line of aristocrats. The Jesuit order guided his early education, with teachings that included the requisite elements of classical language and history. While Voltaire's father had planned a future for him as a lawyer, the rebelliousness that came to characterize Voltaire's writings against government and orthodox religion echoed the same attitude that led him away from the career of his father's choosing.

Voltaire was employed as an aide to a French ambassador for a short time before returning to Paris and actively pursuing his career as a writer. Although he became a popular party guest among the aristocracy, his wit became too biting in several cases, and he was imprisoned in the Bastille and then exiled to England for embarrassing the wrong nobles. This incarceration and treatment was undoubtedly formative in his

political thinking and the urgency he felt toward prison and legal reforms. While residing in Britain, Voltaire gained admiration for the English system of government, and he eventually produced *Philosophical Letters on the English* (1733).

The next period of Voltaire's life was the most productive in terms of literary and other scholarly works. Of particular note were several short stories he penned that are often considered some of the first works of science fiction, such as "Micromegas" (1752) and "Plato's Dream" (1756). The former features a stranger from another planet who attempts to understand odd human customs; the latter has a protagonist who designs the planet Earth and its creatures.

Voltaire also developed his interest in the natural world through his study of English physicist and natural philosopher Isaac Newton's ideas. Voltaire sided with Newton's empirical views over those of German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz on the grounds that Liebniz's optimism—that the existing world was the best one possible because it was designed by an omniscient and benevolent deity—was unwarranted. Voltaire's criticism of Leibniz was further explored in *Candide, or Optimism* (1759). *Candide* has been canonized and is still considered a great book of the Enlightenment period for its satirical pillaring of philosophical optimism and religious orthodoxy. Voltaire remains known for his witticisms, including his most famous, from his 1770 "Epistle (To the Author of the Three Imposters)": "If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him."

Many critics, both contemporaries of Voltaire and present-day scholars, have stated that his work was largely synthetic and simply a patchwork of reiteration of other more innovative thinkers' ideas. Even if this line of attack were true, it is difficult to plausibly deny Voltaire's influence on advancing the causes of freedom and justice as essential elements of the modern liberal democratic state. Further, his writing remains a crucial exemplar of the importance, as well as the costs, of being willing to speak truth to power.

See also *Enlightenment Political Thought; French Political Thought; Political Philosophy.*

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Vote, Transferable and Nontransferable

A vote represents the expression of an individual preference for one or more candidate, or party, selected relative to those candidates and parties not selected. It also is one individual's contribution to the collective choice of who will be elected. Although thresholds, whether effective or statutory, may introduce an element of complexity to expressing one's preference while also contributing to a meaningful collective choice, generally these two aspects of vote mesh without problem in list proportional representation (PR) systems. In the class of electoral systems that focus on candidates rather than parties, however, this often is not the case.

Single member plurality (SMP) elections illustrate the problems that may result when votes are cast for individual candidates rather than for party lists. With SMP, the voter has a single vote to be given to a single candidate; at the end of the election, the candidate with the most votes wins. SMP elections have two consequences often seen as serious negatives: first, in a race with three or more candidates, a candidate may be elected with substantially less than half of the total votes; second, substantial numbers of votes are "wasted" in the sense that had these votes not been cast at all, the result would have been the same.

There are two ways to ameliorate these problems, while retaining the basic principle that each vote is cast for a single candidate. The first is to use a *single nontransferable vote*—single because the voter has only one vote, and nontransferable because it is given absolutely to a single candidate when cast—in multimember districts. The second means is to use a *single transferable vote*—again single because the voter has only one vote, but transferable in that it is effectively cast with instructions concerning for whom it is to be counted, contingent on the distribution of the votes cast by other voters.

SINGLE NONTRANSFERABLE VOTE
SMP is the simplest, or degenerate, case of the single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system in that the nontransferable vote is cast in a single member district. The use of SNTV to identify an electoral system, however, generally is restricted to multimember districts, in which rather than only the one candidate with the most votes being elected, the first M candidates—where M is the number of representatives to be chosen from the particular district—ranked in order of their individual vote totals, are elected. While this increases the likelihood of minority representation (compared to SMP), and therefore is sometimes identified as a semiproportional system, it also increases the importance of strategic behavior both on the part of parties and of voters. In particular, if a party (or any other body that favors the same group of candidates) has too many candidates and thus fragments its vote—or has a candidate who is too popular and wins by a large margin through attracting votes that otherwise would have gone to other candidates of the same party—that party is likely to win fewer seats than it would if the party could manage both the number of its candidates and the distribution of votes among them.

SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE
The first of the negative consequences of SMP could be eliminated, and the second mitigated, if voters knew in advance how their fellow citizens would vote. In that case, voters whose first preference was destined to lose could concentrate their votes on a candidate with a better chance of winning,

until the ultimate winner surpassed the 50 percent threshold. With SMP, there is some expectation that voters will attempt to anticipate the distribution of preferences and vote strategically—deserting parties that are expected to finish in third place or lower to support the less disliked of the two most popular candidates. This, however, requires that the voters can reasonably predict not only of the preferences of other voters, but also of those voters' own strategic decisions. With two-round majority systems, the voters receive a "second chance" to choose between the two candidates who finished first and second in the first round, but there is no assurance that either of those candidates will be particularly popular, only that they are the first choices of more voters than any of the other, potentially numerous, candidates.

Another method is known as the alternative vote (AV) system, also commonly called instant run-off in the United States. In this system, voters cast a vote with instructions concerning for whom it is to be counted contingent on the distribution of the votes cast by other voters. In effect, the voter says, "Count my vote for X, but if X is not going to be elected, then count it for Y, and if neither X nor Y will be elected, then count it for Z." The voter ranks the candidates, and the vote transfers in order of the voter's preference as succeeding candidates are eliminated. The candidates are subsequently ranked according to the number of first preference votes they receive, and then eliminated in reverse order of strength; each eliminated candidate's votes transfer to the next available candidate until one candidate wins one vote more than 50 percent and is therefore declared elected.

With a single transferable vote (STV) more generally, the voter still has a single vote initially given to a single candidate. To be elected, a candidate needs a number of votes equal to the Droop quota, which in an M member district is the smallest integer greater than the number of valid votes divided by M plus one. This is the smallest number of votes that each of M candidates could win while assuring that no other candidate could have as many. In a single member district, the Droop quota would be 50 percent plus one, demonstrating that AV is simply the degenerate case of STV. As with AV, the voter ranks the candidates. If a candidate has more votes than the quota (e.g., if some supporters could have voted for another candidate without imperiling that candidate's election), the surplus votes are transferred to the next available candidate; if no candidate has a surplus, then the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated (as with AV) and those votes are transferred. This process repeats until M candidates have reached the quota, or until only M candidates remain (e.g., in Ireland, where votes can become nontransferable by exhausting the expressed preferences).

According to its early advocates, the advantage of STV over simple plurality systems is that STV minimizes the number of wasted votes. According to its later advocates—emerging after political parties became more prominent—STV also allows roughly proportional representation among parties while retaining voter choice of individuals. If voters rank candidates strictly within a single party and then allow their ballots to become nontransferable, STV would be exactly equivalent to open–list Droop quota largest-remainder PR. (Hence in Ireland, the STV system often is identified as PR–STV, or simply as PR.)

DEGREES OF PROPORTIONALITY

If SNTV can be seen as a generalization from SMP (i.e., the district magnitude is allowed to vary), it can also be considered a special case of the limited vote system in which the number of votes given to each elector is restricted to exactly one. The intention is to facilitate minority representation from multimember districts relative to what would be expected with a block vote system, in which each elector has as many nontransferable votes as there are seats to be filled. Allowing accumulation of these nontransferable votes (i.e., allowing the elector to give more than one vote to a single candidate) also facilitates minority representation. Sometimes identified as semiproportional systems, as with SNTV, the degree of proportionality depends on the capacity of parties to control the behavior both of their candidates and their voters, as well as to anticipate their raw, or undirected, popularity.

See also *Candidate Selection; Droop Quota; Electoral Administration; Representation and Representative; Representative Systems; Voting Procedures.*

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Voter Registration Drive

A voter registration drive is a campaign to register eligible voters. Such efforts are particularly common in countries such as the United States, where there are significant populations of unregistered, eligible voters. Voter registration drives may be nonpartisan or partisan. Since voting is seen both as a basic right of citizenship and a duty, nonpartisan groups routinely seek to register new voters to expand the franchise and elevate voter turnout rates. Partisan groups may also undertake voter registration drives on behalf of parties or individual candidates. These campaigns typically seek to increase voter numbers among specific populations likely to support the group's candidates.

During the 1950s and 1960s in the United States, one aspect of the civil rights movement aimed to register African Americans who had previously been disenfranchised by a series of state laws. For instance, in Mississippi in 1964, only 6.7 percent of eligible African Americans were registered to vote. After successive voter registration drives, that figure rose to 66.5 percent in 1969. Voter registration drives are also common in new democracies as the government and civic society groups endeavor to educate citizens about the importance of voting and political participation.

See also *Campaigns; Constituency Relations; Mobilization, Political; Voting Behavior; Voting Cycles and Arrow's Paradox; Voting Procedures; Voting Rights and Suffrage.*

. . . . TOM LANSFORD

Voting, Compulsory

See *Compulsory Voting.*

Voting Behavior

Voting behavior is the primary determinant of political outcomes in democratic politics, and has been studied extensively in political science literature. It is considered not only an individual act but also a collective phenomenon, since it involves aggregating individual choices into an overall electoral result. The analysis of voting behavior focuses on decisions that include whether to vote or not, whom to vote for, and how to vote. Thus, voters need to consider whether it is worthwhile to vote based on the associated perceived costs and benefits, and their attitudes toward voting. The decision to vote for a specific candidate (or party) usually involves evaluation of candidates on the basis of voters' preferences. Making this evaluation is complex and is influenced by factors such as voters' socioeconomic characteristics and attitudes, candidates' policies, as well as electoral institutions in a polity. Voters also need to determine whether to vote sincerely, by choosing their most preferred candidate, or strategically, by choosing a candidate who is more likely to win so that their vote is not wasted.

SOCIAL CLEAVAGES

S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan observed in the 1960s that once a social cleavage structure was established, it served as a frozen base for electoral competition and voting behavior. The main social cleavage studied in the literature is class, although scholars also acknowledge the influence of religion- and gender-based cleavages on voting behavior. A prominent view in the literature is that voters vote for a party that naturally caters to their class interests. Thus, the working class, which favors redistribution of income, is expected to vote for leftist parties, while the middle class prefers voting for rightist parties. Opponents of this view argue that the importance of class on voting has diminished over the years, leading to class and partisan dealignment. Thus, due to growing affluence, the working class often has reasons

to vote for a rightist government, and similarly, being often employed in the public sector, large sections of the middle class can "unnaturally" support leftist parties. Accordingly, it has been noted that the valence of issues, and not class, has become the principal determinant of voting behavior.

Scholars on the other side of the debate, however, contend that claims of declining social influence on voting behavior are overstated, and that class dealignment is a result of partisan dealignment rather than its cause. While research on the impact of gender on voting is relatively limited, studies have found evidence of a gender gap where women voters are more supportive of leftist parties than men in the United States and Scandinavian countries. The effect of religion on voting, though still relevant, has declined due to a general trend of secularization—especially in Europe—and affluence brought about by economic growth. Although the debate on the effect of social cleavages on voting behavior is sharply polarized, it is difficult to deny that these continue to be an important determinant of voting behavior in democratic elections.

RATIONAL CHOICE EXPLANATIONS

Anthony Downs's rational voter model is an important theory of voting behavior, which finds an "instrumental" basis for voting. However, with instrumental costs of voting (i.e., time and resources) being higher than its instrumental benefits, and the probability of a single vote making a difference to the election outcome being very low, voting becomes an "irrational decision." The reality is that voters do vote in large numbers, and this paradox is explained by rational choice theory by adding an experiential element to voting behavior. Accordingly, voting behavior is also affected by factors such as sense of duty; fear of social stigma for abstention; and general social, political, and moral satisfaction individuals derive from voting.

Spatial models of electoral competition predict voting behavior based on voters' and candidates' ideal points on a two-dimensional policy space. Downs's *proximity model* predicts that voters vote for candidates whose "ideal point" is the closest to theirs, while George Rabinowitz and Stuart Elaine MacDonald's *directional model* predicts that voters also consider candidate's intensity on issues while evaluating candidates. Scholars have also developed mixed spatial models that combine elements of proximity and directional models to improve their predictive power regarding voting behavior and electoral competition. Thus, rational choice theories contribute to understanding incentives faced by voters while deciding to vote or abstain from voting. Furthermore, spatial models of electoral competition provide a framework to understand how voters evaluate candidates' policy positions and choose their preferred candidates. This in turn influences the way parties compete in the electoral arena and frame their policy agenda.

ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND STRATEGIC VOTING

In simple plurality elections, candidates' ability to win drives voter expectations, which encourages strategic voting. However, as Gary Cox demonstrates, when the size of the voting

district is small enough, voters in proportional representation (PR) systems, too, are concerned with the prospects of their preferred candidate being left out of the newly formed legislative body. Furthermore, in PR elections, if voters perceive certain coalitions as more likely to form than others, they might vote strategically for a party other than their most preferred one. Thus, strategic voting can happen both in plurality and PR-based electoral systems, which suggests that voters ultimately focus on the policy consequences of their behavior, and on which parties are likely to have influence on policy outcomes after the election.

OTHER EXPLANATIONS

According to the *resource model*, resources such as time, money, and civic skills facilitate voters' participation in elections. The *mobilization model* complements the resource model and focuses on how parties, interest groups, and candidates mobilize and influence people to vote. Voting behavior can be based on habit; that is, it depends on whether the individual voted in the previous election. Kevin Denny and Orla Doyle point out that persistence in voting behavior is also driven by characteristics such as gender or parental background—observed heterogeneity, unobserved characteristics such as personality traits, or an intrinsic motivation to vote. Authors who write on the topic of party identification (e.g., Morris Fiorna) argue that partisan preferences, based on socialization experience early in life, can lead to stability in voting behavior, although some argue this identification can change based on voters' evaluation of parties' performance. Access to information, including print and electronic media, also affects one's propensity to vote and to support a certain party or candidate. There can also be contextual factors specific to country and election that influence voting behavior and this can cause voter turnout and nature of party competition to vary across countries and elections.

CONCLUSION

The study of voting behavior is an important subfield of political science, and scholars use many different approaches to analyze and explain what affects voting behavior. It is a complex process and has important consequences in terms of political representation and government formation in democratic politics. Voting behavior determines the level of political participation and voter turnout, and can lead to meaningful representation, depending on the extent to which the perceived positions of the parties actually reflect the true policy positions.

See also *Class and Politics; Electoral Systems; Rational Choice Theory; Strategic Voting; Tactical Voting; Turnout.*

. . . . REKHA DIWAKAR

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Voting Cycles and Arrow's Paradox

The idea of democracy closely relates to the method by which group decisions are made and managed. In this sense, democracy relates to the rules that transform individual preferences into a group preference through voting. However, there are considerable differences between individual decisions and group decisions. While individual voters are rational, meaning that they have complete and transitive preferences, the collective choice—the aggregation of individual preferences—could end in intransitive results.

Marie Jean Nicolas Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794), noted the irrationality of collective decisions that can originate from rational individuals. He demonstrated the possibility of an election becoming a paradox in which a corrupt triangle, or voting cycle, could be formed with no winner. For instance, if A beats B, B defeats C, and C beats A, the collective ranking is circular, creating a paradox in which no candidate obtains a clear majority.

For example, three individuals (1, 2, and 3) are deciding on three alternatives (A, B, and C). Their order of preferences is as follows:

Individual 1: A > B > C

Individual 2: B > C > A

Individual 3: C > A > B

Individual 1 prefers alternative A rather than B, B rather than C, and consequently, A rather than C. The same logic applied to the other individuals. For this reason, individuals 1, 2, and 3 are rational. Nonetheless, following Condorcet's rule, as a group decision, any alternative could be the winner. The result is a paradox.

The one candidate who should win is the one who can top each of the others, as was the case in South Korea's 1987 presidential election. Voters chose between several candidates, but none received the majority of the vote (50 percent plus one). Instead, Roh Tae Woo won the election with a plurality of 36.6 percent, more than any other candidate, but far short of a true majority of all votes. Barring a plurality, a voting cycle may be broken by a runoff election.

Condorcet demonstrates that it may become difficult and even impossible to learn the opinion of a group through the vote of individuals. Paradoxical results may be due to the intransitivity of opinions from individuals to groups. It is important to note that intransitivity may occur in the collective decision, but not in the individual decision. Transitivity is an important condition that provides coherence to the individual decision-making process.

In a voting cycle, it is possible that no candidate clearly wins an election. All the combinations of plural voting (i.e., choice among several) or majority voting (i.e., choice among a pair, or successive pairs) may present defects or voting cycles. The voting methods used that result in voting cycles often produce no result or unfair, defective, or corrupt results.

Jean Charles de Borda (1733–1799) suggested the consensus-based voting system to avoid such failure. Supposedly it could avoid voting cycles because it combines plural voting with a double-rating system in which not only the result of the voting is considered but also a rating according to the grade in scale of majority—first, second, and third candidate would have successive less rating besides the voting result. Thus the voter is asked to rank candidates in order of preference and this preference is combined to the rank majority pointed.

Voting cycles were more recently better formulated and analyzed by Kenneth Arrow, 1972 Nobel Prize winner in Economic Sciences. In 1951, Arrow sets five postulates to all democratic regimes: universality, citizen sovereignty, nondictatorship, positive association of social and individual values, and restriction of irrelevant alternatives. The postulates are considered reasonable for collective decision making that takes, as its basis, individual preferences expressed by voting. Arrow's paradox is also called an axiom since, once compliance is achieved with the five postulates, the voting method used becomes irrelevant; any method would work fairly, but none perfectly. In this sense, Arrow also demonstrates that it is impossible to have the majority desire to prevail without breaking at least one of the postulates.

Voting cycles and Arrow's paradox also connect directly to the importance of holding the agenda power in legislatures or other decision-making bodies. In theory, if the person that builds the agenda knows individuals' preferences on different issues, the agenda could be manipulated in order to achieve a winner that might not represent the collective desire.

See also *Collective Action and Mobilization; Condorcet, Marquis de; Impossibility Theorem; Voting Procedures.*

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Voting Machines and Technology

In the age of technology, elections have come a long way from the days of voting for someone in a loud voice—*viva voce.* Paper ballots served their purpose, but as of 1996, only

Mechanical lever machines were used in a 1944 election in New York City. These machines remained popular through the 1960s before new technology phased them out.

SOURCE: Corbis

Modern voting technology relies on electronic voting machines. Touch screens have been used increasingly in the early twenty-first century.

1.7 percent of the registered voters in the United States still made use of them in small communities and rural areas, and for absentee balloting. Ever since the 1990s, several countries—including Australia, Portugal, Spain, and other European countries—engaged in nonlegally binding trials for electronic voting conducted in localities, municipalities, and universities. In 2001, Australia reported that 8.3 percent of the electorate used electronic voting. However, many still do not consider it secure enough for use in all types of elections, especially national or parliamentary elections.

For reasons of convenience, paper ballots have been progressively replaced by punch cards (first introduced in 1964), optical scanners in the 1980s, and touch screens in the 1990s. However, continued research in the United States seeks to provide appropriate methods of voting for those with disabilities, those who do not primarily speak English, and those who do not have a high literacy rate.

In the early twenty-first century, voting machines are commonly used for two main reasons: to provide secrecy and to simplify vote counting. Various types of voting machines exist, including mechanical levers, punch cards, electronic scanners, optical scanners, and direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems that make use of computers and cell phones. The changing technology has sparked ongoing analysis of the positive and negative aspects of relying on the evolving machines and technology for determining an election's outcome.

DEFINITION

Voting machines are the various instruments used to cast a vote and count it. In the modern technological world, a voting machine usually connotes an electronic voting machine (EVM) and implies the electronic means of casting the votes and counting them. Electronic voting technology can include punch cards, optical scan voting systems, and specialized voting kiosks (including self-contained DRE voting systems). It can also involve transmission of ballots and votes via telephones or cell phones, various computer networks, or the Internet.

Polling-place electronic voting, or Internet voting, has taken place in numerous countries, including Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Estonia, the European Union (EU), France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela.

HISTORY OF VOTING METHODS IN THE UNITED STATES

Voting is a democracy's method to determine the will of the people on issues as well as on representation for resolving society's political problems. The U.S. history of ballot

casting, as outlined in Paul McCaffrey's *The United States Election System* (2004), may be said to have started with the use of a quill pen and since evolved to the current use of a touch screen.

In the U.S. colonial days, voting was a matter of assessing shouts and shows of hands to determine a winner. By the time the new nation was born in the 1770s, actual balloting would replace this show of hands or voice votes. Voters wrote out the names of their candidates in long hand, gave their ballots to an election judge, and trusted that their vote was recorded accordingly. In the 1850s, political parties dispersed preprinted lists of candidates to enable even the illiterate to vote. The ballot resembled a train ticket since it came out as a long strip of paper. In 1869, Thomas Edison received a patent for his invention of the voting machine, intended for counting congressional votes. In 1888, Massachusetts printed a ballot at public expense, listing the names of all candidates nominated and their party affiliations. Most states would adopt this landmark improvement within the next eight years.

The first official use of a lever-type voting machine, known then as the Myers automatic booth, occurred in Lockport, New York in 1892. Four years later, these machines were used on a large scale in the city of Rochester, New York, and soon were adopted statewide. By 1930, lever machines had been installed in almost every major city in the United States, and by the 1960s, over half of the nation's votes were cast on these machines. In the 1996 presidential election, mechanical lever machines were used by 20.7 percent of registered voters in the United States. Because these machines are no longer made, computer-based marksense, or DRE systems sometimes referred to as optical scan systems, are emerging as one of several methods for recognizing marks on paper through optical reading techniques. Marksense systems were used by 24.6 percent of registered voters in the United States for the 1996 presidential election, and their use is on the rise.

The punch card ballot was introduced in two counties in Georgia in 1964, and by the 1996 presidential election almost four in ten voters used punch cards to vote. Punch card systems employ a card (or cards) and a small clipboard-sized device for recording votes. Voters, using a supplied device, punch holes in the cards opposite their candidate or ballot-issue choice. After voting, the voter either places the ballot in a ballot box, or the ballot is fed into a computer vote-tabulating device, at the precinct.

Michigan in the 1990s was the first state to switch to optical scanning devices, which have been used for decades in standardized testing. About 25 percent of voters used the technology in the 1996 election. As a result of the storm over the 2000 presidential election results, when Florida's punch card ballots and Palm Beach county's butterfly ballots marred the results, new federal laws in 2002 authorized funding to help states upgrade voting technologies and phase out punch cards and lever machines. Georgia was the first state to use DRE touch screen technology exclusively. In 1996, 7.7 percent of the registered voters in the United States used some type of DRE voting system.

TABLE 1. VOTING TECHNOLOGIES USED IN THE UNITED STATES, 1998

VOTING METHOD	NUMBER OF COUNTIES	VOTER (%)	PRECINCT (%)
Paper ballot	410	1.6	2.9
Lever machine	480	18.6	21.8
Punch card	635	34.3	37.4
Optical scan	1217	27.3	24.7
Touch screen	257	9.1	7.3
Other/mixed	141	9.1	5.9

SOURCE: Eric Fischer, Congressional Research Service, RL30773: *Voting Technologies in the United States,* January 2001, p. 3.

Table 1, from Denis Lancorne's 2006 article "Chad Wars" notes the various voting technologies in use in the United States at the turn of the twenty-first century.

VOTING METHODS AROUND THE WORLD

Some developing countries have been effectively using electronic voting machines for longer than the United States. Brazil prides itself on the reputation of being the first country in the world to have fully electronic elections in all levels since 2002. The chief goal for Brazil's use of EVMs is to make voting as simple and straightforward as using a public phone booth.

Though India first used EVMs in its 1989 elections, it was only in the May 2004 elections that they have been used in all of India's 543 parliamentary constituencies. The Indian electorate is so large that it required 700,000 voting stations, open for five days of voting. The use of electronic voting led to quicker voting and faster tallying of votes with results obtained in hours versus days. Finally, in Estonia, 1.85 percent of voters used electronic voting in the 2005 elections.

INTERNET VOTING

A public network DRE voting system is an election system that uses electronic ballots and transmits vote data from the polling place to another location over a public network. Vote data may be transmitted as individual ballots as they are cast, periodically as batches of ballots throughout the election day, or as one batch at the close of voting. This includes Internet voting as well as telephone voting. Internet voting can use remote locations, voting from any Internet capable computer, or can use traditional polling locations with voting booths consisting of Internet-connected voting systems.

Despite the speed at which the vote can now be cast and counted with the help of such voting machines, there are concerns that a lack of testing, inadequate audit procedures, and insufficient attention given to system or process design with electronic voting leaves elections open to error and fraud, especially when the accuracy, honesty, security, and verifiability of votes cast cannot be guaranteed—as shown by the experience

in the 2000 U.S. presidential elections. There are those who argue further that the cost of the validation processes for software, compiler trust, installation, delivery, as well as the validation of other steps related to electronic voting is complex and expensive. Thus electronic ballots are not guaranteed to be less costly than printed ballots.

In order to ward off such problems, legislation has been introduced in the U.S. Congress appropriating funds to states for EVMs, for precinct audits in federal elections, as well as for mandating some form of voter-verifiable paper audit trail by the year 2012 on any type of voting technology. Verifiable ballots are necessary because no technology is error proof. Computers can and do malfunction. The consensus is that optical scan systems are the most efficient provided they include a *precinct counter*, which tells the voter about possible voting errors such as no recorded vote or too many votes and allows them to correct their mistakes.

THE GROWING USE OF ELECTRONIC VOTING

In the age of electronic voting, it is quite clear that electronic entry devices are replacing paper ballots, punch cards, and lever machines. The most commonly used EVMs in many parts of the world are optical scan, touch screen or DRE machines, and smart cards. In countries such as France and Germany, the EVMs manufactured by different companies such as the Dutch firm Nedap do not print receipts like those in the United States; these have therefore been a source of protest and skepticism. The Estonian e-voting system utilizes an ID card, which serves as a regular and mandatory national identity document as well as a smart card with an integrated electronic chip. It has a state-supported public key infrastructure allowing for both secure remote authentication and legally binding digital signatures that can be used for voting and other purposes.

Despite the direction toward a process beyond the use of paper, according to the World Bank, about 85 percent of electronic voting projects in developing countries have failed in some respect. Likewise, numerous e-voting inconsistencies in developing countries, where governments are often eager to manipulate votes, have only added to the controversy.

See also *Ballot Design; E-governance, E-voting, E-democracy, E-politics; Electoral Systems; Mobilization, Political; Turnout; Voting Behavior; Voting Procedures.*

. . . . CECILIA G. MANRIQUE

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Voting Procedures

Voting is a necessary, yet not sufficient, condition of democratic governance. Voting takes a wide variety of forms—from oral expression of opinions in mass gatherings to electronic recording of preferences in computer terminals. Voting procedures comprise a balloting system as well as a method of determining the winner once the ballots have been cast. The modern theory of voting procedures focuses primarily on the latter component, that is, on the methods of determining the winners.

It is common to distinguish between electoral and voting systems. The former refer to methods applied in determining winners in mass elections, such as parliamentary or presidential ones, while the latter focus on committee, parliament, or group decision-making methods. These may result in the choice of one winner (candidate or policy alternative) or a group of them.

Voting procedures can be classified into three groups: (1) binary, (2) positional, and (3) multistage procedures. Binary procedures are based on pairwise comparisons of alternatives. In some procedures, the comparisons are actually performed according to an agenda. The amendment procedure used in the U.S. Congress is based on a binary procedure. According to a predetermined agenda, the alternatives are voted upon in pairs so that the majority loser in each comparison is eliminated, while the pairwise winner proceeds to the next comparison until all alternatives have been voted upon at least once. Sometimes the binary winner is determined on the basis of reported voter preferences, such as by finding out for each alternative how many others it would defeat in pairwise comparisons if all voters voted according to their reported preferences.

The best-known positional procedure is the one-person-one-vote, or *plurality*, method in which each voter can vote for just one alternative and the winner is the alternative that has been given more votes than any of its competitors. Another example is the *Borda count*, in which each voter indicates a preference ranking and the Borda scores are determined as follows: Assuming that the number of alternatives is K, each voter's first-ranked alternative's points are K minus one, second ranked receives K minus two points, and so on, with the last ranked alternative receiving zero points. The Borda score of an alternative is the sum of points received from all voters. The Borda count winner is the alternative with the largest Borda score. Approval voting can also be viewed as a positional procedure. In this system the voter may give each alternative either one or zero votes. The alternative with the largest vote sum is the winner.

Various runoff methods are examples of multistage procedures. The most widespread is the plurality runoff system, used notably in presidential elections in France, as well as in many

other countries. This system is typically implemented in two rounds of balloting in which each voter may vote for one and only one candidate. If some candidate receives more than 50 percent of votes in the first round, this candidate is elected and no second round of voting occurs. Otherwise, the two candidates with the most votes on the first round compete in the second round, during which voters again vote for only one candidate. The candidate with the most votes on the second round is the winner.

The primary theoretical tool used in analyzing voting procedures is social choice theory. This theory deals with rules assigning best alternatives to any preference profile, such as a set of individual preferences over alternatives. Voting procedures clearly align with these kinds of rules. Social choice theory suggests a number of criteria for evaluating voting procedures. Of these, perhaps the best-known is the Condorcet winner criterion, which requires that an alternative that would defeat all other alternatives in pairwise majority comparisons (i.e., a Condorcet winner alternative) is to be elected whenever such an alternative exists. Many binary methods satisfy this criterion, whereas many positional methods (e.g., plurality, Borda count, and approval voting) do not. On the other hand, the criterion called *consistency* is satisfied by many positional systems, but in general not by binary ones. Consistency criterion is defined for two separate voting bodies considering the same alternatives. If both bodies agree on the chosen alternatives when acting separately, consistency requires that they should also come up with the same chosen alternatives when acting together.

The history of research on voting procedures is relatively long, but not continuous. The earliest analytic and comparative studies appeared in the late eighteenth century, when the fundamental discrepancy between two intuitive ideas of winning was discovered: one emphasizes the success of candidates in pairwise comparisons, and the other pays attention to the positions of candidates in the voters' preference rankings. This discrepancy continues to underlie much of the contemporary debate on virtues of various voting procedures.

See also *Campaigns; Condorcet, Marquis de; Electoral Administration; Electoral Cycles; Electoral Formulas; Electoral Rules; Electoral Systems; Voting Behavior; Voting Cycles and Arrow's Paradox.*

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Voting Rights and Suffrage

The term suffrage is derived from the Latin *suffragium* and the ancient Roman political practice of displaying direct support for a candidate or legislative proposal through one's vote. Voting, however, was formalized first as a public decision–making device in ancient Greek juries and political assemblies in the sixth century BCE. In these political bodies, only citizens were eligible to vote and participate in political deliberations, which then meant that all females, children, foreign-born, and enslaved persons were excluded (estimated to be approximately 85 percent of the population of Athens, the city-state conventionally recognized as the birthplace of democracy). The Roman right to vote was similarly limited and became even more so with the territorial expansion of Roman power as voting occurred only within the city of Rome. Despite these severe restrictions, individuals' regular and direct voting on public matters was a legal and political innovation that distinguished ancient Greek democracies and the Roman Republic from the then-dominant methods of creating political authority based on individual charisma, social custom, and brute force.

These early exemplars of voting as a political practice were abandoned with the advent and eventual collapse of Roman imperial rule, making the revival of regular voting practices in Europe over a millennium later a remarkable political achievement. The idea and practice of voting were not wholly forgotten during this interim period, but they were associated almost exclusively with the selection of new popes, the decisions of church councils, and popular participation in the appointment of local diocesan bishops. By the twelfth century, Catholic religious orders such as the Cistercians and Dominicans regularly elected their leaders independent of secular and other religious authorities. During the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church also developed and employed the ideas of contractualism, the common good, consent, and representation as well as various forms of majority rule voting, use of the secret ballot, and the requirement of procedural regularity in their elections—all direct precursors to modern, secular forms of electoral democracy. Ironically, although the early Catholic Church always aspired to achieve unanimity in its decisions, persistent encroachments by secular powers prompted restricted voting in 1179 for papal elections to its College of Cardinals.

The emergence of representative assemblies throughout Europe from the thirteenth through eighteenth centuries—for example, the various Cortes on the Iberian peninsula, the British parliament, provincial assemblies in France, the Polish Sejm, and the Swedish Riksdag—restored the regular practice of voting on public matters, especially where consent became necessary for monarchical requests for tax revenue. Voting

rights within these national or provincial bodies typically were held by individuals of recognized noble classes or clerical offices, appointed or elected representatives of religious orders, or geographically defined communities. Voting rights in Italian city-republics, by contrast, were restricted to citizens and, for many, required membership in one of the many recognized guilds. Although all of these assemblies relied on the idea of representation to sustain their claims to act legitimately on behalf of their members and societies, only a small fraction of the population possessed the suffrage: at best, 6 percent in the city-republics and typically far less in elections for delegates to the national assemblies. In addition, throughout this time period, voting rights in Europe were rarely extended; in fact, they often became more restrictive and exclusionary. In 1297, for example, the city-republic Venice made the suffrage an exclusively hereditary right; by 1430 only freeholders, defined as those who owned property that yielded an annual profit of at least forty shillings, were permitted to vote in English parliamentary elections.

Whereas commitments to voting rights subsequently waned in most countries in Europe, the English tradition of deriving political consent through locally elected representatives strengthened throughout the seventeenth century, extending into the governmental structures of its new American colonies. Interestingly, in the first colonial election ever held, not only were legal efforts in 1619 to exclude non-English residents from voting in Virginia overturned, but one illegal resident was elected and, after an official inquiry, seated in the colony's first House of Burgesses. In the American colonies, and later the U.S. states, the effects of the freehold requirement also grew less severe due to inflation, the availability of land, and the redefinition of property qualification in less restrictive terms. Moreover, in contrast to the suffrage in Europe, the number of Americans eligible to vote and those voting steadily increased throughout the colonial and early national eras. To be certain, the American electorate remained small by modern standards because individuals often were barred because of their gender, age, enslaved status, religion, race, ethnicity, citizenship, residency, tax payment, literacy, mental competence, criminal conviction, and military service. There were exceptions to these exclusionary standards, including these several noteworthy ones: women, for example, were permitted to vote in New Jersey from 1776 to 1807; several American states never adopted racial or religious restrictions on the suffrage; and in the first half of the nineteenth century, property and wealth requirements for voting were eventually abandoned.

Although often misnamed universal suffrage, popular participation in nineteenth-century U.S. elections set both historical and contemporary benchmarks. In the 1840s, for example, approximately 14 percent of the U.S. population voted in presidential and state elections, whereas less than 5 percent of the British population was eligible, even after the 1832 Reform Act. More important, as French political theorist Alexis de Tocqueville speculated in his political study *Democracy in America,* the general tendency toward universal suffrage continues to gain momentum once started, for not only will excluded groups be energized, but the democratic ideals of equality and consent offer no clear qualifications for remaining exclusions. The United States unquestionably led the expansion of suffrage rights for most of the nineteenth century, although two dozen mostly European nations guaranteed women's suffrage before the United States finally did in 1920. Moreover, the voting rights of African Americans were not fully recognized in the United States until the 1965 Voting Rights Act, nor were those of eighteen- to twenty-year-olds until 1971. The 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights specified that "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government" as "expressed in periodic and genuine elections" and "by universal and equal suffrage," and these rights and freedoms are to be honored "without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status." Today, close to 60 percent of the population in the world resides under some form of electoral democracy, a suggestive but not decisive empirical indicator of the global momentum of Tocqueville's historical speculation.

See also *Civil and Political Rights; Voting Behavior; Voting Machines and Technology; Voting Procedures.*

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Wage Controls

See *Price and Wage Controls.*

War, Distraction Theory of

Commonly referred to as the diversionary theory of war or the "scapegoat" hypothesis, this theory posits a close causal relationship between political elites' domestic political situation and their interest in fostering an external conflict. States that are domestically unstable are more likely to start wars than domestically stable polities. Building on insights developed by Georg Simmel and Lewis Coser on the relationship between in-groups' cohesion and their relationships with out-groups, the distraction theory of war predicts that conflict with out-groups will increase the cohesion of an in-group. External conflict is a means for embattled politicians to maintain their offices while neutralizing their domestic opposition. The incumbents hope that external conflict will allow them to either maintain or restore domestic stability by distracting the public from its grievances and rallying political support to themselves or their political party. The creation of a rally is contingent on political elites' ability to demonstrate their competence in foreign affairs and use the external conflict to shift blame for the nation's problems onto an out-group. Although referred to as a single theory, it subsumes multiple theories and insights that share its logic, including the "rally-'round-the-flag" phenomenon and lateral pressure theory.

See also *Elites, Political.*

. . . . ALBERT B. WOLF

War, Just and Unjust

See *Just War Theory.*

War Crimes

War crimes can be defined as violations of the laws and customs of war entailing individual criminal responsibility directly under international law. From the start of warfare to advent of contemporary humanitarian law, more than 500 cartels, codes of conduct, covenants and other texts to regulate hostilities have been recorded. Wars in the nineteenth century encouraged international attempts to address their horrific consequences. In 1863 an international committee for the relief of military wounded—renamed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1876—was established. Also in 1863, the Lieber Code, the first attempt to codify the existing laws and customs of war, came into force. The following year, the 1864 Geneva Convention aimed to protect wounded and sick soldiers on land during war, and four years later the 1868 Saint Petersburg Declaration prohibited the wartime use of certain projectiles declared contrary to the laws of humanity.

The momentum of international conventions against war crimes continued into the early twentieth century. The 1899 Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II) and 1907 Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) made reference to laws of humanity. A Geneva Convention in 1906 also aimed to protect wounded, sick, and shipwrecked military personnel at sea during war. After World War I (1914–1918), the Treaty of Versailles accused William II of Hohenzollern, the former German emperor, of a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties. However, William II was not put on trial as he had gone into exile in the Netherlands. The treaty referred to prosecuting those accused of violating the laws and customs of war. In 1921 some Germans were tried in Leipzig, Germany, on charges that included the poor treatment of war prisoners. The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and bacteriological weapons, and the 1929 Geneva Convention protected war prisoners as well as strengthening protections for medical personnel in wartime. During Italy's conquest of Abyssinia (1935–1936), the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), and Asian conflicts, the ICRC attempted to help victims.

WORLD WAR II CRIMES

At the end of World War II (1939–1945), the problem of crimes committed during the war was addressed by an international military tribunal established by France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The tribunal defined war crimes as violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations included murder, ill-treatment, or deportation of the civilian population of an occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, and wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages when such devastation was not justified by military necessity.

Trials were conducted in Nuremberg, Germany, from 1945 to 1946, in which sixteen Nazi leaders were found guilty of war crimes. The proceedings of the separate international military tribunal for the Far East were held in Tokyo from 1946 to 1948, wherein twenty-five Japanese war criminals were found guilty of at least one charge (such as conspiring to wage war, waging war, atrocities, and breaching laws of war). Adolf Eichmann, who headed the office administering the extermination of European Jews and other "undesirables," was not captured until 1960. The following year he was tried in Israel and found guilty of charges that included war crimes, for which he was executed in 1962. All of these trials set the stage for a more permanent International Criminal Court.

Meanwhile, the international community saw the aftermath of World War II as a time to revise the Geneva Conventions. The first 1949 Geneva Convention protects wounded and sick soldiers on land during war. The second convention protects wounded, sick, and shipwrecked military personnel at sea during war. War prisoners and conditions of captivity are covered by the third convention, while the fourth convention protects civilians, including those in occupied territory. This marked a change from earlier conventions, which had focused on combatants. Article 3 in the conventions covers noninternational armed conflicts such as civil wars.

POST–WORLD WAR II

Widely publicized and graphic war crimes continued to occur after World War II. Under the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia (1975–1979), up to three million people are believed to have been killed. In 2001 the Cambodian National Assembly created a court to try serious crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge regime. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (ECCC) became fully operational in 2007, and three of the five suspects named in its introductory submission were charged with war crimes. The ECCC covers such crimes as the unlawful treatment of civilians or prisoners of war, attacks on civilian targets, and destruction of educational and religious institutions.

During the 1990s, mass atrocities occurred in Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina. These led to establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993. This was the first war crimes court created by the United Nations, and the first international war crimes tribunal formed since those in Nuremberg and Tokyo after World War II. According to the ICTY Statute, the tribunal has the power to prosecute persons violating the laws or customs of war. Such violations include using poisonous weapons or other weapons designed to cause unnecessary suffering, the wanton destruction of cities or devastation not justified by military necessity, and the plunder of public or private property. By November 2009, the tribunal had indicted 161 persons for serious violations of international humanitarian law.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) entered into force on July 1, 2002, and established the ICC. It is the first permanent international institution with jurisdiction to prosecute individuals responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. In July 2009, 110 countries were states parties to the Rome Statute. These ranged from Japan and the United Kingdom to New Zealand. However, major powers including China, Israel, Russia and the United States were not states parties. For the purpose of this statute, *war crimes* means grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, namely, any of the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: willful killing; torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health; extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile power; willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial; unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement; and taking of hostages. Three states parties to the statute (the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Uganda) have referred crimes on their territories to the ICC. The United Nations Security Council also has referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan.

CONTROVERSY

The wide-ranging and graphic impact of war crimes and their highly emotive nature contribute to the controversy that often surrounds them. The definition itself and interpretation of war crimes is often controversial, with much debate over what constitutes such a crime and the need for prosecution. For instance, Israel has faced demands from some senior UN officials and human rights groups for an international war crimes investigation in Gaza over allegations over the "reckless and indiscriminate" shelling of residential areas. Likewise, the United States has been accused by some of war crimes in Iraq since the 2003 U.S.-led coalition invasion.

Other issues include the failure of the international community to punish some high-profile alleged offenders. This has been highlighted by the concern expressed by the ICTY over Ratko Mladić as of November 2009 continuing to evade justice despite continuous calls for his arrest since indictments were issued in 1995. Charges include violations of the laws or customs of war during the Bosnia and Herzegovina conflict. There has been much debate also over the power held by tribunals, their legal authority and costs, whether they infringe on sovereignty, and the fairness of prosecutions.

See also *Geneva Conventions; Genocide; International Criminal Court (ICC); International Criminal Tribunals; Torture.*

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Warlordism

Warlords are nonstate actors who control people and territory through de facto military rule. The militarized groups that the warlords control are similar to gangs or other domestic illegal organizations. These organizations steal from and engage in illicit economic activity. Warlords tend to operate in weak states, where the government is unable to contest powerful nonstate actors. Warlords can benefit from patronage and illegal trading to clients both inside and outside of the state they inhabit.

A major distinction between warlord rule and the government of a weak state is that the warlord's organization seldom seeks public goods and projects and concentrates on accumulating private wealth. While warlords do make strategic decisions, they do not act on behalf of the general population. Warlord rule is typically highly personalized. The death of a warlord may create a power vacuum, which then results in in-group fighting and domestic political chaos. In some areas controlled by warlords, local groups enforce a patronage structure of the warlord in return for protection and economic stability. However, most warlords do not require the assistance of local populations and prefer to directly control territory. One of the most famous examples of warlord rule is in early twentieth century China, when the Qing dynasty dissolved into a collection of feuding generals. Likewise, early modern Japan was under warlord rule during the relatively stable Edo period (1603–1868). Contemporary states in Africa and South America also have been ruled by warlords. These weakened states can give rise to warlords, such as in Somalia (1991–present), as well as areas in present-day Columbia and Mexico.

Warlords may emerge in any failing political system, and several preconditions help define when a warlord may assume power. Often, warlords fill power vacuums created when other personalized regimes collapse, or when a state begins transforming to a new style of government. Individuals with personal power bases and support by prominent economic leaders may militarize their organizations. A crumbling state apparatus may no longer protect private interests, and opportunistic business leaders may take advantage of this weak state by interfering with or removing either political or economic rivals.

Warlords tend to seize power when a state is in decline or in newly formed states. Warlords may take advantage of weak state structures to build a power base outside of state influence, such as areas of the country where the state's military forces neglect. States, either for social, economic, or strategic reasons, may fail to enforce laws or even exhibit a presence in parts of a state. Here, opportunistic criminals build support and gain de facto political and military rule over a region. Warlords are especially likely to arise when public services are declining and the overall wealth of the people is declining. Warlords then seize control over a region and offer supporters positive rewards or negative incentives for their support. They may take advantage of existing social cleavages and gain the support of one ethnic, religious, or regional group at the expense of other groups.

Some warlords have maintained their rule throughout their lifetime, dying while in control of different territories. Successors can be preappointed lieutenants or relatives. However, another common fate is that their status as a de facto military rule is cut short. Rival militants may kill or exile a warlord to assume control of a territory. Sometimes, warlords are incorporated into a formal central government. Central governments may find incorporating existing warlords is necessary to gain back the state's sovereignty. For instance, coalition governments seeking legitimacy across the state may find it impossible without the warlord's consent.

States may offer incentives for warlords to coordinate their rule in an ad hoc governing council. In such situations, the state pragmatically acknowledges the warlord's legitimacy and may work toward a peaceful state rather than a lawful one. Here, fighting a warlord may lead to an internecine conflict, which results in a weaker state, impoverished people, and, perhaps, more support for the warlord.

See also *Military Rule; Nonstate Actors; Sovereignty.*

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War Powers

War powers, broadly construed, refer to the authorities and responsibilities to initiate, conduct, and terminate hostilities

or other military measures taken to defend and preserve the safety of an organized political territory. They include the authority to begin or initiate military hostilities, the authority to mobilize resources necessary to create wartime military forces, the authority to take measures to prevent or hinder an adversary's ability to operate, command, and conduct operations with armed forces, and the authority to conclude a peace agreement that ends hostilities. The term *war powers* frequently is used in a narrower sense, referring only to the initiation or declaration of war and not its conduct and termination. At other times, the term can be used in the singular, referring broadly to all measures taken by the government to ensure its self-preservation in the face of hostilities. Early in the U.S. Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln famously referenced "calling out the war power of the government," by which he meant taking extraordinary military measures to save the Union.

Because they entail risking the safety and property of its citizens for some common purpose, war powers are among the most sovereign and significant responsibilities of government. War powers have traditionally been considered an extension of a nation's foreign relations and therefore falling within the executive purview. This traditional view is an extension of the British monarch's royal prerogative over matters pertaining to foreign relations and war. War powers also are, among the vast powers of government, viewed as the potentially most dangerous and prone to abuse. The power to wage war against enemies—foreign and domestic—also can be used to overthrow the existing political order for the personal gain of those wielding it. Yet these powers are necessary for modern government to provide for the security of its citizens. Restricting the government's power to wage war could impede a nation's ability to defend itself.

Seeing the power to wage war as necessary but dangerous, constitutional democracies have sought to divide war powers among the different branches of government to mitigate and check against their potential abuse. The most explicit and oft-referenced example is the U.S. Constitution's divided assignment of war powers and responsibilities among the Congress, the president, and the judiciary. Congress constitutionally holds the power to declare war and to raise and support armies. Once the Congress declares war, the president has full responsibility for the conduct of the war as commander-in-chief. The president, moreover, uses a military that the Congress created and continues to fund through legislative acts. The president and the Senate have a role in the treaty-making process, suggesting that both branches must be in some agreement to end a war. The judiciary can review the constitutionality of specific congressional and presidential actions, such as the suspension of *habeas corpus* in wartime, the wartime seizure of private property, military conscription, and the detention of enemy combatants.

However, the extent of the presidential power to initiate hostilities or deploy military forces, short of declaring war, remains a point of serious debate within the United States. Some argue for limited presidential power over military actions because the Constitution subordinates the president's role to Congress. David Gray Adler, for example, suggests that the Constitution "makes Congress the sole and exclusive repository of the ultimate foreign relations powers—the authority to initiate war" (Fisher 2004, 15). The president, therefore, may only use the military once Congress has officially declared war. If an official declaration of war is not issued, Congress would still need to authorize the president to engage in military acts.

Others argue that the president's broad latitude and discretion over foreign relations and national defense should include the use of military force short of full-scale war, in order to achieve the nation's foreign policy goals. They observe that the executive and legislative are equal and independent branches assigned separate but related powers that could overlap or conflict in some circumstances. The Constitution, thus, invites "an open and dynamic struggle" between the president and Congress over war, and foreign affairs more broadly, by assigning each of them broad war-related powers (Yoo 2005, 17–22). A declaration of war is only necessary when mobilizing the entire society for total war. Military engagements on a lesser scale, they hold, are well within the inherent powers of the presidency to conduct foreign relations.

The Framers of the U.S. Constitution did grant some leeway to the president, suggesting that it had the power to "repel sudden attacks" and defend the nation from obvious invasion. Extrapolating broad presidential war powers from this emergency provision, however, only further complicates the boundary between executive and legislative authorities over war, because it is most often the president who would determine if an attack were imminent. Through the Presidential Oath, moreover, the Constitution assigns the president the unique duty to "preserve, protect, and defend," which could serve as an overriding source for extensive presidential powers in wars that pose an existential threat to the United States.

In reaction to the Vietnam War (1959–1975), Congress passed (over President Nixon's veto) the War Powers Resolution, also known as the War Powers Act, in 1973 in an attempt to "insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the president will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities" (United States Code). Though often touted as an attempt by Congress to "reassert" its role, the resolution actually recognizes that the president may introduce military forces into existing or imminent hostility, even in cases where there is no congressional declaration of war. The president is required to report to Congress upon the introduction of forces into hostilities, but they remain in place for up to 60 days (or 90 should the president deem it necessary) before the resolution requires Congress to authorize an extension.

See also *Martial Law; War Termination*.

. . . .   TODD R. LOWERY

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Wars, Asymmetric

See *Asymmetric Wars.*

Wars, Colonial

See *Colonial Wars.*

Wars of Independence

The term *war of independence* is generally used interchangeably with *war of national liberation.* Since the rise of nationalism, wars of independence have become one of the notions that draw the contours of today's world order. The wars of independence started as particular nations' fight against imperial powers and then evolved as wars against colonial or occupational powers.

Even long before the rise of nationalism, wars of independence were fought against imperial and colonial powers. Chronologically, it is possible to argue that the history of the phenomenon of war of independence goes back to earlier periods of history. The first ever war that can be called independence war was the War of Scottish Independence (1296–1357), which was a series of wars fought between the Kingdom of Scotland and the Kingdom of England in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. The first War of Scottish Independence began with England's invasion of Scotland in 1296. At the end of the War of Scottish Independence, Scotland retained its status as an independent nation. Another historically significant war of independence was the American War of Independence (1775–1782), which was the conflict between Britain and its American colonists. The American War of Independence led to the end of European control of both North and South America. In spite of the existence of these earlier examples of wars of independence, the concept found its place in international relations scholarship after the development of nationalism.

According to the Article 1(1) of the first Protocol of 1977, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, wars of national liberation are defined as "peoples . . . fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination" and determine that they should be treated legally, as if they were engaged in an international armed conflict.

Many theories of warfare claim that wars result from the intimate connection between the nation and the state. According to Max Weber (1948), the *state* is a territorial organization exercising legitimate control over its own bounded territory, unchallenged by internal power competition or external intervention. Weber then defines the *nation* as "a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own" and hence "tends to produce a state of its own" (176). The link between the nation and the state is established by the doctrine of *national self-determination,* which has become the major legitimacy of states. National self-determination was the main principle on which political boundaries of eastern Europe and Balkans were determined after the end of World War I (1914–1918). Moreover, self-determination was the principal idea behind the anticolonial movement of the post-1945 period. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the struggle of subject peoples against colonial powers took the form of wars of independence. During this period, different national revolutionary groups engaged in struggle against Western rulers or against indigenous regimes deemed to be dependent on outsiders at the expense of their own populations. The phenomenon of independence wars of the third world against Western domination is geographically, culturally, and ideologically a broad one. The most prominent examples of these are the Chinese revolution, which culminated in the establishment of communist power in 1949; the Vietnamese struggle against the French (and later against the United States); the Algerian War against the French; civil violence in Latin America; and convulsions in southern Africa. All of these struggles were waged by indigenous movements and their external allies in the name of national liberation and independence.

It is this intimate link between nationalism and statehood that triggers wars of independence, because the ideal of the nation-state is never fully achieved. In no historical case have all members of a particular nation gathered within one state's boundaries. On the contrary, many states contain a considerable number of national minorities. The lack of full correlation between the nations and the states frequently gives rise to tensions that can lead to war. Even in the twenty-first century, there are still nations without states whose warriors and militants are fighting for their independence—the Basques, Kurds, Catalans, Palestinians, Timorese, and countless others.

Generally, national minorities who feel dissatisfaction with the existing regime claim self-determination and fight for their separate states. For these national groups, greater emphasis is put on the independent existence of their particular nation. In fact, through the creation of armed wings and leader cadres these national groups have established proto-states. For national minorities the establishment of armed bodies and leadership structures indicate that national liberation is no longer a matter of private sentiment but a serious aspiration.

See also *Colonialism; Imperialism; Nationalism; Nationality; Nation-state.*

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War Termination

War termination is the cessation of any conflict with a minimum of one thousand battlefield casualties per year. Disagreements exist within the literature on war termination over how to identify when a conflict has been terminated as well as the causes of war termination. Various theories of war termination focus on different means of war termination, which range from cease-fires to comprehensive peace settlements.

Theories of war termination seldom conceptualize or explain war termination as the obverse of war initiation for three reasons. First, in contrast to decisions to initiate or join wars, war termination is seldom brought about through unilateral action. Wars are only terminated through unilateral action when one of the participants eliminates the other participant or coalition on the battlefield. In many cases, both sides must cooperate to bring a war to an end. Second, as Fred Charles Iklé argues in *Every War Must End* (2005), the parties seldom consider the cessation of hostilities when contemplating the initiation or actually initiating hostilities. Third, war initiation and war termination do not necessarily share the same causes. Wars may bring about the emergence of new conflicts of interests. After a war has begun it is possible for it to widen or to incorporate issues in addition to those that sparked conflict in the first place. It is also possible that the issues over which the war was initially fought may not necessarily be resolved by the time the conflict is terminated.

Theories of war termination differ over how to identify whether a conflict has been ended. Some theories of war termination conceive of the cessation of hostilities as a discrete event that occurs at a specific time. Other theories of war termination conceptualize the termination of a conflict as a process that includes a series of events that occur over a given time rather than a single event.

Although the levels-of-analysis problem informs disagreements over the causes of war termination, because wars cannot be unilaterally terminated, both first-image and second-image theories of war termination take the form of two-level games. First-image theories emphasize the centrality of individual leaders' personalities and idiosyncrasies, but examine the interaction between leaders' personalities and constraints imposed by the international system. Similarly, second-image theories argue that interactions between second-image and third-image

variables are responsible for states' decisions to prolong or terminate. By contrast, neorealist theories argue that the continuation or termination of wars is due to uncertainty surrounding competitors' capabilities and present (as well as future) intentions, as well as the size of participants' war aims. When the participants in a war possess expansive rather than limited war aims, neorealists argue that wars are more likely to be prolonged because the sides will perceive one another as implacably aggressive. When participants possess limited objectives, absent escalation or war widening, it is likely that the war will be terminated when either side attains its objectives. Participants' possession of limited objectives also makes it possible for both sides to negotiate a settlement rather than prolong the conflict because reaching a bargain over a particular issue is not as injurious as acceding to the demands of an ambitious or imperialistic state.

Theories deriving their content from rational choice approaches do not serve as an addition to the three different types of theories discussed above. Instead, rationalist explanations for war termination have utilized both second-image and third-image variables. For example, H. E. Goemans (2000) accounts for war termination through the creation of a theory that fuses rational choice and regime type, while other rationalist explanations for war termination combine theories of bargaining with neorealist emphases on power shifts.

War termination may come about as the result of the destruction of one of the side's forces, a cease-fire, or a comprehensive peace settlement. Cease-fires are agreements to stop fighting but do not necessarily involve resolving the conflict(s) responsible for compelling states to fight, while comprehensive peace settlements attempt to resolve the underlying conflicts responsible for war.

See also *Conflict Resolution; Peace.*

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Washington, Booker T.

The most powerful African American leader of his time, Booker T. Washington (1856–1915) preached and practiced a gospel of economic self-uplift. In an era when southern states were disenfranchising blacks and rolling back the civil rights they had won during Reconstruction, he encouraged African Americans to suspend the quest for social and political equality and focus instead on economic development.

Booker T. Washington, a former slave, contributed to the creation of the Tuskegee Institute as an institution of African American higher learning.

SOURCE: AP Images

Born into slavery in Franklin County, Virginia, in 1856, Washington worked in the salt furnaces and coal mines of West Virginia after Emancipation (1863). After hearing of the recently established Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute for black freedmen, he journeyed five hundred miles to enroll. Graduating in 1875, Washington so impressed Hampton's faculty that, in 1881, the school's principal recommended him to Alabama authorities to head the newly established Negro Normal School in Tuskegee. Washington held his first classes there in a dilapidated shanty, but over the course of two decades he gradually built the Negro Normal School into the Tuskegee Institute, a world-famous institution of African American higher learning that, by 1900, boasted sixty-six buildings, eighty-six faculty members, and a half-million-dollar endowment.

Tuskegee became a platform for Washington to advocate industrial education as the most promising avenue of African American self-uplift. Rather than pursue a classical curriculum, students at Tuskegee mastered basic subjects and developed the virtues of thrift, self-discipline, and industry through vocational study. Washington promoted the Tuskegee model on speaking tours throughout the 1880s and early 1890s, but it was his 1895 Atlanta Exposition Address that catapulted him to national prominence. In that address, he called on the South to increase educational and economic opportunities for African Americans with the understanding that blacks would henceforward refrain from seeking social equality and challenging white political supremacy. "It is at the bottom of life we must begin, and not at the top," Washington said, "In all things that are purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet, one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress" (Washington 2003, 143). Applauding his proposed "compromise," white society recognized Washington thereafter as the leading spokesman for his race.

Washington published his autobiography, *Up from Slavery,* in 1901, cementing his reputation as an African American exemplar of America's rags-to-riches possibilities. Philanthropists showered Tuskegee and allied institutions with large donations, and presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft solicited Washington's advice on race relations. Many of Washington's African American contemporaries, however, lamented his acquiescence to social inequality and second-class citizenship. Some regarded him as a self-interested political boss who used his widespread power and influence to enhance his own position and stifle dissent. The disclosure of Washington's personal papers since his death, however, has allowed scholars to arrive at a more nuanced view of Washington—as a trickster figure who ingeniously navigated the landscape of racial

segregation in the United States to maximize African American opportunity. The discovery that Washington secretly financed legal challenges to early-twentieth-century efforts to strip black citizens in Louisiana and Alabama of the vote attests to the fact that Washington was more sympathetic to the African American quest for political equality than his public statements suggested. Behind the mask of accommodation lurked a politically subversive spirit. Washington died of nervous exhaustion and arteriosclerosis in 1915.

See also *Civil Rights Movement; Race and Racism; Racial Discrimination.*

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Ways and Means

Ways and Means is the name of a committee in the U.S. House of Representatives. The House Ways and Means Committee is the oldest standing committee in the U.S. Congress and is arguably the most powerful. This committee was first established in 1789 as an ad hoc committee directed at reviewing the revenue needs of the federal government. According to Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution, "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives. . . ." This constitutional requirement is a primary reason for the importance and significance of this particular committee. Essentially, this committee has jurisdiction over all issues involving the raising of revenue including, but not limited to, taxation, bonds, international trade, and tariffs. Furthermore, this committee also has jurisdiction, among other things, over the Social Security program, Medicare, Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), unemployment benefits, child support enforcement, and child welfare and adoption assistance. The House Ways and Means Committee currently has six subcommittees: Trade, Oversight, Health, Social Security, Income Security and Family Support, and Select Revenue Measures. Many state governments also have ways and means committees within the state legislatures that perform a variety of revenue-related tasks.

See also *Social Security; Taxation.*

. . . . SUSAN MARIE OPP

Weapons of Mass Destruction

The term *weapons of mass destruction* (WMD) is often used to refer to nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons as a group. Yet there is no widely accepted scholarly or legal definition of WMD. Even the independent, international Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission did not define the term in its final (2006) report. In recent years, a number of scholars have abandoned the term because it glosses over important differences among these weapons. While it is vital to understand the differences among nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, it is also important to retain the analytic concept of WMD. Otherwise it would be easy to overlook the potentially similar military and political effects of nuclear and biological weapons.

WMD AS AN ANALYTIC CATEGORY

The concept of WMD allows scholars to abstract from the attributes of particular weapons to consider three broad categories of weapons: conventional or *relative* weapons, which fight other weapons; unconventional weapons, which target entire populations or geographic areas; and *absolute* weapons, which, regardless of how targeted, have destructive effects that cannot be limited by offensive or defensive military strategies or operations. Only the latter are WMD.

WHICH WEAPONS ARE WMD?

According to military strategist Bernard Brodie (who coined the term), an absolute weapon has "enormous destructive potency" that "concentrate[s] . . . violence in terms of time" (1946, 28–29). Today most scholars agree that the lethality, survivability, and deliverability of nuclear weapons make them absolute weapons. They further agree that, of the other weapons often classified as WMD, biological weapons are the most likely to have mass effects. Chemical and radiological weapons are more limited in their effects and thus best not considered WMD.

Nuclear weapons are clearly WMD. According to physicist Richard L. Garwin, a hypothetical one kiloton (kt) nuclear device exploded at ground-level in Manhattan would kill approximately 210,000 people "mostly from prompt radiation within a week or so. Of these, 30,000 would have died from the blast earlier, and about 100,000 from burns" (2002). The uranium bomb exploded by the United States over the Japanese city of Hiroshima in 1945 was thirteen kiloton; according to the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (1946), that bomb killed 30 percent of the city's population of 245,000 and seriously injured another 30 percent. Contemporary U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons are approximately 150 kt.

Radiological weapons, or "dirty bombs," use conventional explosives instead of nuclear chain reactions to disperse radiological material. Because their blast is limited, the main effect of radiological weapons is to increase the long-term death rate from cancer. As a result, such weapons have little coun-

terforce utility. Yet this does not make them absolute weapons. Radiological weapons are much less lethal than nuclear weapons. According to Garwin, after "a hypothetical attack on Munich with one kilogram of plutonium dispersed by high explosives . . . 120 people would die of cancer after 40 years or so. . . . For a lifetime of exposure in the contaminated area, an additional 1% of the population would die from cancer" (2002).

Chemical weapons disperse substances such as mustard gas (a blister agent), phosgene (a choking agent), and sarin (a nerve agent) to kill or incapacitate soldiers and civilians. Although such weapons can be deadly to individuals, their effects on populations are far from absolute for two reasons. First, it is difficult to control the dispersion of chemicals in air and water, which are the vehicles most likely to affect large populations. Second, authorities can protect populations by monitoring air and water, advising people to wear masks and protective suits, administering antidotes, and evacuating affected areas. The fundamental difference between chemical and nuclear weapons that makes these defenses possible is the concentration of lethality in time. As Thomas L. McNaugher explains, "there is no defense against nuclear blast. . . . In sharp contrast, . . . to the extent that chemicals spread their destruction relatively slowly rather than instantly," it is possible to warn and evacuate "at least part of the target population" (1990, 31).

The limitations of chemical weapons were apparent in the 1995 sarin attacks on five Tokyo trains by the Aum Shinrikyo religious sect. Although the group had experience with aerosols, it chose to drop and puncture bags of liquid sarin, which limited exposure to those within evaporation range. As Jonathan B. Tucker explains, this "caused mass disruption but limited fatalities: twelve people died, fewer than would have been killed by an explosive device" (2000, 6).

Biological weapons use living organisms such as bacteria and viruses to kill or incapacitate target populations. Infectious biological agents such as anthrax have the same limitations as chemical weapons: it is hard to control their distribution and possible to protect people from exposure. Contagious biological agents are more potentially absolute in their effects, especially those such as glanders (Burkholderia mallei) for which there are no vaccines. To have mass effects, these agents must be kept alive in great numbers, dispersed widely, and allowed to incubate in unsuspecting populations. According to Garwin, high-efficiency air filters can reduce exposure by a factor of one hundred, and maintaining positive indoor air pressure can reduce it by a factor of one thousand. Yet, because contagious biological agents are difficult to detect, can be engineered to be drug-resistant, and can mutate and multiply, biological weapons have more potential than chemical or radiological weapons to act as WMD. Unlike nuclear weapons, biological weapons would not have immediate effects. But if a disease gained momentum, it could concentrate destruction in ways that could not be mitigated. Thus, as Susan B. Martin (2002) explains, biological weapons may have some of the same military and political effects as nuclear weapons.

MILITARY AND POLITICAL EFFECTS OF WMD

According to Brodie and other deterrence theorists, absolute weapons have revolutionary military and political effects. In particular, they make innovation and superiority in numbers and quality of weapons meaningless. Moreover, they transform the purpose of strategy from winning wars to averting them. According to Brodie, since the advent of nuclear weapons, militaries have "almost no . . . useful purpose" other than developing second-strike capabilities so potential aggressors will fear retaliation (1946, 76).

Scholars and policy makers who question the strength of deterrence fall into two camps. First, there are those like former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara who disagree with the distinction between conventional and absolute weapons and argue that offensive and defensive strategies remain viable. Second, there are those who agree with the distinction but worry that deterrence is weak. For Hans Blix and the other members of the WMD Commission, WMD designates a class of weapons that should be eliminated or controlled because, if used, their effects would be devastating.

See also *Arms Control; Deterrence; Nuclear Club; Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation.*

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Webb, Sidney, and Beatrice Potter

Sidney Webb (1859–1947) and Beatrice Webb (1858–1943) were British social reformers and founding members of the Fabian Society, with which their names are inextricably linked. They came from disparate backgrounds but married in 1892 and began a celebrated fifty-year partnership.

Sidney's father was a radical who had worked for British philosopher and economist John Stuart Mill. In 1865, at the age of sixteen, Sidney became a clerk for the city of London, educating himself by attending evening classes. He took an external law degree and was called to the bar in 1885. He was a professor of public administration at the London School of Economics from 1912 to 1927.

Martha Beatrice Potter was born to wealth and privilege. Though not formally educated, she had a desire for knowledge and an intelligence that was aided by her friendship with English philosopher Herbert Spencer. Influenced by Spencer's individualism, she adopted many humanist ideas.

Once Sidney and Beatrice were married, he resigned from the Colonial Office. Beatrice's private income permitted them to work on a series of books, of which the first was *The History of Trade Unionism* (1894). It was followed by *Industrial Democracy* (1897) and a monumental series of volumes in the *History of the English Local Government* (1906–1929). Beatrice was a member of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law from 1905 to 1909, and she and Sidney also authored the commission's minority report on the elimination of poverty. This report influenced successive British governments in their social policies.

Sidney played a central role in the formation of the Labour Party, serving on its executive board from 1912 to 1925. He wrote both its constitution and its manifesto, *Labour and the New Social Order,* in 1918. He was a Labour member of Parliament from 1922 to 1929, president of the Board of Trade in 1924, Dominions Secretary from 1929 to 1930, and Colonial Secretary from 1929 to 1931. He was created Baron Passfield in 1929.

The Webbs believed the best way to improve politics was to combine popular control and administrative efficiency. They maintained the ideal method to achieve these twin goals was through education, depending on the inevitability of change in human societies to transform the social order. This was the mission of the Fabian Society, which the Webbs were instrumental in founding and to which they dedicated much of their later life. As a Progressive member of the London County Council and as chair of the council's Technical Education Board, Sidney created the London school system that became the national model until 1944. He also helped to design the comprehensive plan for the University of London and founded the London

School of Economics and Political Science, which remained in the early twentieth century as one of the premier institutions in the United Kingdom. The Webbs also founded the influential journal, *The New Statesman,* in 1913.

The Webbs were reformers, not agitators, and they made only one significant foray into public controversy. Destitution—often compounded by sickness, unemployment, and old age—had been the main problem confronting Victorian society, and the Poor Law System had virtually broken down in addressing this issue. The Webbs' minority report to the Royal Commission on the Poor Law had made radical recommendations that were struck down by David Lloyd George, at that point president of the Board of Trade, despite the Webbs' vigorous opposition. It was not until 1945 under the postwar Labour government that many of the Webbs' recommendations were implemented.

The Webbs cowrote *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain* (1920) and *The Decay of Capitalist Civilization* (1923). Beatrice also wrote her autobiography, *My Apprenticeship* (1926), based on the diary she had kept from childhood. The Webbs' last years were clouded by their adulation of Stalinism, although the Soviet system was the very antithesis of everything for which they had always stood. After a conducted tour of the Soviet Union in 1934, the Webbs published *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?* in 1935, even as Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin was forcing millions of peasants into poverty.

Although the Webbs' endorsement of Stalinism was a sad postscript to a life guided by idealism, they left a solid legacy in the Labour Party, the London School of Economics, and the *New Statesman,* all of which continue to flourish in the early twenty-first century. Only the Fabian Society had ceased to exist. In 1947 the ashes of Sidney and Beatrice were interred in Westminster Abbey.

Together, the Webbs wrote more than one hundred books. In addition to those previously noted, they wrote *The Co-operative Movement in Great Britain* (1891*), The History of Trade Unionism* (1894), *Industrial Democracy* (1897), *The Manor and the Borough* (1908), *The Break-up of the Poor Law* (1909), *The English Poor Law Policy* (1910), *Works Manager Today* (1917), *The Consumer's Cooperative Movement* (1921), and *Methods of Social Study* (1932). Sidney authored alone *Facts for Socialists* (1887), *Problems of Modern Industry* (1887), *The Restoration of Trade Union Conditions* (1917*),* and *Grants in Aid: A Criticism and a Proposal* (1911). Beatrice wrote *Cooperative Movement in Great Britain* (1891), *Wages of Men and Women: Should They Be Equal?* (1919), and *Our Partnership* (1948).

See also *Social Order; Stalinism.*

. . . .   GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN

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Weber, Max

Max Weber (1864–1921) was a German historian, political economist, and sociologist. Educated at the University of Berlin, he taught at the universities of Freiburg (1894–1895), Heidelberg (1896–1899), Vienna (1918), and Munich (1919–1921). He also worked for many prolific years as an independent scholar, a mode of life that he chose after experiencing six years of mental difficulties and scholarly paralysis from 1897 to 1903. Weber also played an active role in German politics, including participating in the peace treaty negotiations at Versailles and in the drafting of the Weimar constitution.

Although Weber is justly remembered as one of the founders of twentieth-century positivistic social science, he himself was wary of using the method of natural science as a model for social science. He denied that the discovery of laws of social behavior is the chief purpose of social science, because such a focus turns attention away from understanding important and sometimes unique phenomena, such as the emergence of capitalism in the West. Similarly, his notion of interpretive (*Verstehen*) sociology was far from purely empiricist approaches. According to Weber, knowledge of the causes of social action requires the establishment of ideal-types that describe rational behavior under specific circumstances. Only by comparing actual actions with actions dictated by the ideal type can one know the true causes (which often include irrational factors) of actual actions.

Nonetheless, Weber is linked with social science positivism because of his treatment of the distinction between facts and values, which has become the foundational premise of positivistic social science. Believing that science cannot resolve the conflict between ultimate values (goals) and knowing that values determine the subjects of social scientific investigation, Weber sought to give an account of an objective social science that was both value-free and yet worthy of being chosen as a vocation. Despite his profound personal commitment to social science, however, this activity became problematic for him because he was aware that human reason cannot establish the superiority of the scientific outlook over the religious outlook. Accordingly his discussions of the methodology of social science have a tragic pathos that is missing in his positivistic followers.

Weber's most influential empirical work is his 1905 essay "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism," in which he traces the origin of the spirit of capitalism (the moral view that gave rise to capitalism) to an interpretation of French theologian John Calvin's teaching, which maintained that worldly success is a sign of salvation. After completing this work, Weber turned to the study of the religions of China, India, and ancient Judaism in order to understand why they did not foster the spirit of capitalism. His study of religion as a whole was somewhat at odds with the prevailing spirit of social science positivism as well as Marxism, because it ascribed causal efficacy to religious ideas and because he refused to understand the secular order that these ideas unintentionally created as a change for the better.

See also *Calvin, John; Empiricism; German Political Thought; Positive Theory.*

. . . . NASSER BEHNEGAR

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Weighted Vote Systems

Weighted vote systems are systems of decision making by taking a vote in which the principle of equality of the vote (i.e., the principle of "one man, one vote, one value") is not observed. Instead, electors are divided into groups that are differentiated in the voting process. This can be the case with regard to the raw number of votes electors from different groups can cast (narrower definition of weighted voting) or the seat-elector ratio for the respective group (wider definition). The weight differentiation can be implemented according to certain prespecified criteria characterizing electors, such as region, property, tax burden, religion, sex, social status, or education. As a consequence, in weighted or asymmetric voting systems, electors from the different subsets by definition will have a differential impact on electoral outcomes simply by virtue of their belonging to one or the other of the groups into which they are divided. Depending on their design (i.e., whether individual citizens or whether representatives are endowed with different weights), such systems can be designed to implement or undermine the equality of citizens in the voting process.

Historically, several of the constitutional monarchies in the nineteenth century, as well as the United States before 1865, employed some form of weighted voting system. Prussia employed a three-class electoral system from 1849 to 1918 that divided voters into classes according to their annual tax burden. Although voters of different classes had the same raw number of votes, each class de facto elected the same number of representatives to the Prussian state assembly, thus giving each voter in the highest class (4.7 percent of the electorate) considerably higher representation than voters of the lowest class (82.7 percent of the electorate).

In the United States before 1865, voters in those states that allowed slavery indirectly had a higher influence over the presidential and House of Representatives elections than voters in states that had outlawed slavery. Due to the Three-fifths Compromise of 1787, the composition of the House of Representatives and the electoral college provided for

representation of the states on the basis of proportionality to the total population of the United States. This was done without a simultaneous enfranchisement of slaves themselves. Indirectly this had the effect of voters in the southern states electing more representatives per voter, giving them a higher weight in the process, without an increase of the electorate in the South.

In the modern era, examples of political bodies providing for a different raw number of votes include the European Union's Council of Ministers (each country's representative has a different absolute number of votes), the German *Bundesrat* (*Länder* governments have votes weighted by population size in combination with bloc voting), the electoral college in the election of the president of India (in order to ensure parity between the electors from the national parliament and those from the state assemblies, national representatives' votes are weighted, and in another step all electors votes are weighted by a factor on the basis of the size of the respective districts' electorate that they represent), as well as the U.S. electoral college (electors from all but two states currently vote *en bloc* and states have different numbers of electors based on their share in the total U.S. population). Despite these comparatively prominent cases, in more recent times, examples of weighted voting systems being used in national or subnational legislative or other political bodies have become increasingly rare.

See also *Electoral College; Electoral Systems; Voting Procedures.*

. . . .   MALTE PEHL

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Weil, Simone

Simone Weil (1909–1943) was a French social, political, and religious philosopher whose writing continues to influence contemporary social ethics, theology, and political theory.

Born into a nonreligious Jewish family, Simone showed a gift for languages and moral reasoning at an early age. She studied philosophy at the Lycée Henri IV secondary school and the Ecole Normale Supérieure. Weil was influenced by her mentor, Alian (Emile Auguste Chartier), a philosopher who taught the importance of imagination and logic, the close reading of texts, and the avoidance of ideological thinking and the easily summarized argument—all directives that become characteristic of Weil's own written work.

As a university student, Weil became active in French politics and the trade union movement. Although not a communist (in fact, Weil was critical of party organization and materialist explanations of class conflict) she nevertheless drew from German philosopher Karl Marx's radical critique of society. She worked as a provincial school teacher, factory worker, field hand, and journalist. Though she was a pacifist, she experienced the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) first hand, feeling it was necessary to bear witness to the major events of her time. Weil opposed French colonialism and was a Christian mystic who refused baptism on the grounds it would separate her from nonbelievers as well as limit her freedom of thought. She has been described by the literary scholar Leslie Fiedler, in his introduction to Weil's *Waiting for God* (1951), as the "patron saint of outsiders."

Central to Weil's political thought, much of which is gleaned from posthumously published essays, notebooks, and letters, are ideas concerning the importance of suffering, affliction, oppression, and force as independent variables in human history. In her 1934 essay, "Reflections Concerning the Causes of Liberty and Social Oppression," and other writings, she argued, not unlike thinkers Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud before her, that modern civilization is plagued by "disequilibrium" caused by a separation from God and nature, a growing reliance on technology, and a slavish attachment to the "collectivity," be it the "Great Beast" of the state or society itself. Weil argued that progress is an illusion and that the only hope for society was in greater social cooperation and decentralization of authority. In one of her most highly regarded essays "*The Iliad* or the Poem of Force" (1940), Weil argued that Homer's underlying message (not unlike that of the Gospels) is that reconciliation can only be achieved when warring parties recognize the limits of power and the need to empathize with enemies. In *The Need for Roots* (1952), written in anticipation of the end of World War II (1939–1945) and published posthumously, Weil argued for a reawakened spiritual politics based on the cultivation of community, self-denial, compassion, and mutual obligation over rights.

Weil's strength as a political thinker is found in her nuanced reflections on what she referred to as the *metaxu,* or mixed blessings, of the "in-between" institutions of family, home, work, church, and country (as opposed to state) that she believed nourish the roots of civic life; her failure was in not fully coming to terms with the role that public debate, interest group politics, parties, and competitive elections play in the establishment and maintenance of democratic regimes. In that sense, Weil brilliantly confused her longing for grace or "what ought to be the case" in politics, for the harder, more mundane gravity of "what is."

Weil died in a London sanitarium of tuberculosis and heart failure after refusing to eat more food than what she mistakenly believed noncombatants ate under German occupation.

See also *French Political Thought; Human Nature and Politics; Marx, Karl; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Rousseau, John-Jacques.*

. . . .   KENNETH A. BETSALEL

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Welfare Rights

Welfare rights are a modern phenomenon in which citizenship is extended to the social reproduction functions of the state. Premodern social protection was often punitive, removing recipients from mainstream society and citizenship. Welfare rights secure entitlement as a matter of citizenship and are constitutive of the welfare state. The major welfare rights are in the areas of basic income, health, pensions, and so forth, while the extent of goods and services that are distributed as a matter of entitlement rights varies across the welfare states.

Welfare rights are often attributed to the democratization of social reproduction, whereby the disadvantaged classes demand more fair forms of treatment and entitlement. Perhaps the most well-known statement of welfare rights is that of T. H. Marshall, a twentieth-century British sociologist who addressed the question of the impact of citizenship on social inequality (Marshall referred to welfare rights as social rights). Modern citizenship, he argues, unfolded in a three-stage process: it began with the eighteenth-century civil rights revolution, was furthered by the nineteenth-century extension of the political rights, and was completed in the twentieth-century construction of the welfare state and social rights. Marshall argues that in premodern (feudal) times, social protection came at the expense of civil liberty. Spurred by the Industrial Revolution and liberal ideology, civil freedom was connected to self-ownership of labor power and thus the free contracting of labor. With this transformation, Marshall argues that social protection had to reformulate itself in ways consistent with the commodification of labor.

According to Marshall, welfare rights developed to bridge the disconnect between the equality implied by citizenship and the inequality produced by free markets. However, welfare rights do not replace market-based incomes or fundamentally alter the class structure of market societies. Welfare rights leave in place inequality of "money incomes" (though it is diminished by progressive taxation) while equalizing "real incomes"—the basket of social goods individuals are entitled to regardless of market income. Welfare rights thus alter individuals' experience of market-based (class) inequality. Marshall, then, was optimistic of the capacity of welfare rights to solve the problem of legitimation posed by class inequality to states that are legitimated by equal citizenship.

Social democratic political reformers used the strategy of universal welfare rights to create a sense of social solidarity among citizens and democratic majorities behind the welfare state. Delivering equal goods and services to all citizens, regardless of income and means, diminishes the political importance of class position while strengthening ties and loyalties to the state. As such, a primary political function of welfare rights is to diminish the salience of class position in political interest formation by extending social entitlement to the middle class. By creating shared interests and bases for political mobilization around social entitlement, welfare rights function as "power resources" for the stability and further expansion of the welfare state.

Welfare rights are not, however, a purely social democratic creation. Elites of all political persuasions have extended welfare rights in nation-building and state-building efforts. A well-cited example of conservative-led efforts to legitimize the central state through the extension of welfare rights is Otto von Bismarck's effort to combat class-fragmentation, head off socialism, and secure working-class interests to the German state. Welfare rights also have been used by nation-building elites to work against other divisions such as territorial and cultural fragmentation. Welfare rights thus have the dualistic character of at times being "won" or acquired by citizens and at others imposed onto them.

It is suggested by many that it is inappropriate to conflate social entitlement and obligations with citizenship. Positive welfare "rights," it is argued, differ in type from negative civil and political rights, as they are conditional on production levels and the revenue-raising capacity of the state, and so require prior productive duties. The ongoing politics of welfare state reform are characterized by the rise of conditionality on social entitlement, as expressed in the Third-Way slogan of "no rights without responsibilities" and seen in workfare policy reforms. Despite the politics and rhetoric of retrenchment, it is universal policies, those distributed as a matter of citizenship right, that have proven to be most stable by constructing cross-class solidarities behind them.

In addition to emerging in the context of the nation-state, welfare rights also have developed as part of the formation of international human rights law. For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) includes rights to certain standards of living (housing, food access), opportunity resources (education, employment), and economic freedoms (collective bargaining, workplace safety). Such welfare-related human rights have become part of international law through treaties such as the European Social Charter (1961); the United Nations' International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966); and the Protocol of San Salvador amendment to the American Convention on Human Rights (1988). Like in the nation-state, international welfare rights function both as formal entitlements and aspirational goals modeled on progressive implementation, thereby addressing the issue of state capacity.

See also *Social Welfare; Welfare State.*

. . . .   NEIL HIBBERT

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Welfare State

The welfare state was an essentially European invention that spread and developed in the states of western Europe and some of their New World offshoots. What is today known as the welfare state, *Sozialstaat, l'état providence,* or *folkhemmet* was most aptly described by historian Asa Briggs in a 1961 article as a state

> in which organized power is deliberately used . . . in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at least three directions—first, by guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum income . . . ; second, by narrowing the extent of insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet certain "social contingencies" (for example, sickness, old age and unemployment) . . . ; and third, by ensuring that all citizens . . . are offered the best standards available in relation to a certain agreed range of social services." (228)

ORIGINS OF THE WELFARE STATE

The Western concept of the welfare state emerged during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when European societies were undergoing fundamental social, economic, and political changes—what historian Karl Polanyi called the "Great Transformation" in his groundbreaking 1944 book of the same title. Industrialization, the rise of capitalism, urbanization, and population growth had undermined the traditional forms of welfare provision offered by family networks, feudal ties, guilds, municipalities, and churches, creating a new class of disenfranchised poor. At the same time, the formation of nation-states, secularization of governance, and spread of mass democracy was creating an institutional framework for political articulation of social needs, and the gains in productivity resulting from industrialization provided the resources to meet them. This transformation was occurring in similar fashion throughout western Europe and parts of the New World, but the political responses to it, and the moral incentives for providing welfare and coping with what came to be known as *die soziale Frage* (the social question), varied widely.

There was remarkable diversity in the national trajectories of welfare state building and resultant social policy constellations. In the authoritarian European monarchies that pioneered social security legislation in the 1880s, social programs were imposed from the top down, while in the democracies of Switzerland and the New World, they emerged from the bottom up. Policy goals, types of institutions and financing mechanisms, program types and administration, the blends of public and private provision, and the use of cash transfers, social services, and regulatory policies all differ dramatically between nations. These multifarious manifestations of the welfare state are part of the varied legacy of state and nation building: of specific political contexts and cultures—particularly with respect to public trust, or lack thereof, in the state's capacity to solve problems; of differing patterns of social cleavage based on class, ethnicity, or religion; and of different constellations of political and social actors and institutions.

When the first welfare states emerged in the nineteenth century, many social scientists, most notably the German economist Adolph Wagner in 1893, considered the phenomenon to be the direct fallout of industrialization and its accordant social and economic changes. According to Wagner's Law, public expenditure in industrial economies was bound to consume ever larger portions of the gross national product, and this is exactly what happened over the course of the twentieth century. In the nineteenth century, the lion's share of most national budgets went to military expenditures, and social programs just barely registered their presence. In 1890, for example, military expenditures in the industrialized countries comprised an average of 25 percent of total public expenditure, whereas social expenditures were only 4 percent. But by the beginning of the twenty-first century these warfare versus welfare spending priorities had been turned upside down. Among the countries of the developed world in the year 2000, the average spent on the military had shrunk to 4 percent, whereas that spent on social programs had increased to 40 percent of total public expenditure.

Wagner's Law and the economic and social theories that built on it in the 1950s and 1960s were what social scientists call *functionalist* arguments in that they presumed social policy was driven exclusively by structural changes in the economy and society. According to such theories, welfare state expansion should have been a steady process that followed similar trajectories in all industrialized countries. In fact, however, expansion occurred in a sporadic manner, with spurts of growth and stagnation, while national welfare states came in a plethora of different sizes and shapes. In 2005, for example, U.S. public expenditure was only 15.9 percent of gross domestic product as compared to Sweden's 29.4 percent. Modern theories of the welfare state account for these temporal and national idiosyncrasies by focusing on political determinants such as the partisan complexion of government, political institutions, and international influences. According to social scientist Walter Korpi's Power Resources Theory, for example, the ways that labor parties and unions put their organizational capacities to use was a deciding factor in determining the trajectory of welfare state development. However, as historian Peter Baldwin (1990) has noted, no single configuration of socioeconomic variables or group of actors can fully explain the development of the welfare state. "Industrialization, free trade, capitalism, modernization, socialism, the working class,

civil servants, corporatism, reformers, Catholicism, war—rare is the variable that has not been invoked to explain some aspect of [welfare state] development" (36–37).

In most countries, the welfare state's first big growth spurt occurred between the two world wars. With the establishment of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1919, the first efforts to internationalize some aspects of social policy went into effect. The collapse of the central powers monarchies in World War I (1914–1918) and the subsequent democratization of Europe meant that huge new segments of society had a voice in government. Unions and parties representing laborers gained access to the corridors of power, and parties based on Christian social doctrines rose to the fore. In most countries, the Great Depression (1929–1939) put an end to this first phase of welfare state expansion, but in the United States and Scandinavia it actually provided an impetus to development. In the United States, where the postwar period saw relatively little welfare state development, the Great Depression unleashed the first major wave of expansion, what political scientists refer to as "welfare state takeoff."

POST–WORLD WAR II DEVELOPMENT

World War II (1939–1945) and the subsequent drive to establish an internationally sanctioned world order to ensure peace and security had a major impact on welfare state development. European welfare states experienced their second massive growth spurt during the so-called *trentes glorieuses,* from 1945 to 1974. The ruling paradigm during this period was that increased economic integration and trade among European nations would forestall future conflicts, but European integration was a gradual process, and this second wave of welfare state expansion, which was episodic, took place in economies that were still relatively closed. Companies could not relocate beyond national borders to avoid taxation, nor was it easy for workers to migrate abroad in search of better wages. Solidarity was a requisite component of such economies, and governments of all partisan complexions took advantage of the opportunity to impose redistribution. The war had paved the way for public support of the Keynesian economic model, which had been developed during the depression. With whole societies in need of rebuilding, it was easy to justify high taxes and public expenditures if they promoted high employment and cared for the disabled and destitute. The idea that capitalist economies required government intrusion in economic and social affairs to manage demand and stabilize business cycles was widely accepted. Exceptionally high rates of postwar economic growth and a relatively even balance of power between labor unions and business interests tended to mitigate conflict over the distribution of wealth. The period has, in retrospect, been described as the "golden age" of welfare state development. Existing social programs were extended to cover new groups of beneficiaries, such as peasants or the self-employed, entirely new social welfare schemes were adopted, and there was a general increase in social benefits throughout the developed world.

Even as nations became wealthier and welfare states expanded, the national differences in social expenditure levels and institutional patterns persisted and new ones developed. Various attempts have been made to classify the different types of welfare state, but sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen's 1990 typology has proved the most useful. He defined three ideal types of welfare that encompass the full range of actual welfare states, what he calls three "worlds of welfare." These worlds are distinguished by the impacts that a given social insurance arrangement has on *decommodification:* that is, the extent to which survival and well-being are independent of an individual's labor market participation; its impact on *stratification,* meaning the amount of economic class division within a society; and who is responsible for welfare provision, whether the state, the market, or the family (see table 1). The distinctions between these three regimes, which are associated also with different systems of production and education, can be traced to the history of welfare state building, most notably to how effective the labor movement was at building cross-class coalitions (Korpi's Power Resources Theory) and to the manner in which the Catholic Church's social welfare system was or was not incorporated.

CRITIQUES AND CHALLENGES

In the early 1980s, welfare capitalism began to falter and the golden age came to an end. The international political economy had undergone a fundamental transformation, beginning in the early 1970s with the collapse of the Bretton Woods financial system and the economic slowdown that the oil-price crises had triggered. Deteriorating economic performance and governments' failure to cope with stagflation led to mounting public skepticism about the state's role in social and economic affairs. The welfare state came under fire from all directions. Criticism came from across the political spectrum, but the biggest challenge came from proponents of neoliberalism and a new, morally engaged conservatism. They viewed high cash transfer rates as a distortion of the labor market that discouraged business investment and inhibited economic growth. From this perspective, the best way to deal with the new international economy was to "roll back the state" to its core functions. As neoliberal parties gained and wielded power in the 1980s, deregulation, the internationalization of capital markets, and escalating trade liberalization became the norm. The 1990s were characterized by the emergence of a truly global economy that included the Single European Market and European Monetary Union.

In Europe the deepening of integration imposed constraints on fiscal and monetary policy that precluded Keynesian macroeconomic programs at the national level. It also meant that national welfare states lost a degree of sovereignty and became embedded in an emerging multilevel social policy regime. More generally, economic globalization created more competition between nation-states for footloose capital and investments, which depended in part on low labor costs and intensified pressures on national social standards. Enhanced exit options for capital made taxation and redistribution more

TABLE 1: THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM ACCORDING TO GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN

	TYPE OF WELFARE STATE REGIME		
	LIBERAL	**CONSERVATIVE (CORPORATIST)**	**SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC**
Dominant values in society	Individualism, self-responsibility, voluntarism	Paternalism, status, hierarchy, corporatism	Universalism, solidarity, equality
Access to social security system via	Indigence	Employment, or marriage to employee (co-insurance)	Citizenship, residence
Type of program	Means-tested, private insurance and occupational benefits	Varies by occupation, and mandatory social insurance	Single comprehensive program (e.g., national insurance, National Health Service)
Predominant mode of financing	Taxes	Earmarked social security contributions	Taxes
Type of benefits offered	Low cash transfers aimed at alleviating poverty	High cash transfers heavily dependent on income and occupational status	Highly redistributive cash transfers, comprehensive social services, active labor market policy
Programs run by	State, private carriers	Social partners, state	State, unions
Decommodification	Low	Medium	High
Stratification	High; polarized, with meager public programs for the poor at one end, and occupational and private provision for the middle and upper classes	High due to occupational differences and the close association between salary and cash benefits	Low
Strong reliance in welfare production on	Market	Family	State
Examples	Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States	France, Germany, Italy	Denmark, Norway, Sweden

difficult to implement and created an asymmetric balance of power between labor organizations and business interests.

In addition to the external challenges posed by the emergence of the global economy, mature welfare states also have been confronted by a number of internal domestic challenges that are related to societal modernization and the transition from industrial to postindustrial economies. Service sector productivity is generally lower than industrial sector productivity. This means that the service sector generates lower rates of economic growth and smaller wage increases, both of which have negative feedback effects on public revenues. Private service sector jobs also tend to be less well-compensated than industrial jobs. Gains in employment in the private service sector can only be achieved by generating higher inequality, unless the public sector exercises a compensatory function. Some scholars have diagnosed these problems as the "trilemma of the service economy," which they characterize as a trade-off between employment growth, income equality, and sound state finances.

Competing in the global economy requires a flexible labor force that can be upsized, downsized, and transformed by retraining or replacements as demand changes and competitive advantages shift away from established industries. This need, as

well as greater labor market participation by women, has led to the proliferation of part-time, temporary, and fixed-term jobs. The welfare state was not designed to accommodate these alternative forms of labor, which can be expected, in the long-run, to produce large numbers of elderly poor. The increase in the number of women in the labor market also has decreased the capacity of families to provide welfare, as women who stayed at home were traditionally responsible for the care of children, elders, and the infirm. An increase in the numbers of single-parent households has had similar effects. At the same time, the erosion of traditional family forms and changes in male and female contributions have generated new social risks and needs, placing new demands on social care. Single parents and families with many children, for example, now comprise a significant percentage of the poor.

The two other potential challenges to national welfare states are demographic. Life expectancies have increased dramatically over the past decades, while fertility rates have declined. The result is an aging population and increased demand for the most expensive welfare state programs—pensions, health, and long-term care—that will require greater expenditures in the future. Scholars such as Alberto Alesina and Edward L. Glaeser also expect the increasing ethnic heterogeneity in European

societies to pose problems for social-democratic and conservative welfare states. They maintain that these welfare states are based on a set of common values and political community, and that increasing ethnic heterogeneity will undermine this solidarity and make legitimation of redistribution impossible to achieve, pushing continental Europe toward American-style liberal social policy. Many scholars, however, disagree with this assessment.

RECENT REFORM TRENDS

National welfare state regimes have exhibited varying degrees of vulnerability and resistance to the problems and challenges that have plagued them since the 1980s, and they have followed quite different pathways to accommodate them. Nevertheless, there have been common trends in welfare state restructuring that stretch across the different types of regimes.

None of the established national welfare states were completely dismantled—popular support of the welfare state made it impossible to achieve legitimation for such measures—but retrenchment was common, with widespread reductions in benefits. Ironically, benefit cutbacks were outpaced by increasing expenditures due to rising unemployment, aging populations, and the emergence of new social risks. In almost all Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations since 1980, public and private social expenditures have increased. But while public social spending levels in the different types of welfare state regimes have converged over time, levels of private social expenditure have not. Furthermore, reductions in benefits have been asymmetrical, among programs within regimes, as well as among regimes, and in some areas benefits were increased or expanded. Since the mid-1990s, for example, most Western welfare states have attempted to increase employment rates and recognize the role of the family in welfare provision. There has been a general expansion of family policy, with a focus on paid parental leave programs, more social services for children, and the use of cash transfers and tax breaks for families with children.

With respect to old age pensions, there has been a general shift toward multipillar pension schemes. As attempts were made to decrease state liability for supporting aging populations, the reliance on private pension schemes increased. Most health reforms focused on cost containment. Here there was a curious tendency to cope with the inefficiencies of the established health care system by borrowing components from foreign systems: state-run health care systems introduced competition in the form of "quasi-markets," social insurance systems encouraged competition between insurance carriers, and liberal health care regimes in the United States and Switzerland allowed for more state involvement. Labor market policies generally shifted away from passive support toward active and activation policies aimed at integrating the unemployed into the labor market, and at generally reducing welfare dependency. Worker training programs, wage subsidies, and job placement services for the unemployed have been greatly expanded. Typical coercive components of these policies include cutbacks in cash benefits, stricter conditions for

benefit eligibility, shorter benefit duration for the able-bodied unemployed, and weaker employment protection and working time regulations.

These common trends in welfare state restructuring have led to some blurring of regime types, but the demarcation lines with respect to modes of financing, personal coverage, and benefit generosity persist much as they had during the postwar golden age. If we take into account the various private forms of provision and the impact of different tax systems, we see that major divides between contemporary welfare state regimes persist, determined not by their net amount of social spending, but rather, by differences in structure and institutional make-up. International comparisons of income distribution, poverty, and inequality make this readily apparent. While the distribution of market incomes has developed almost in parallel across OECD countries, the OECD showed for the early 2000s that inequality in *disposable* incomes was reduced by 40 percent in Sweden and only 5 percent in Korea—these were the two extremes. The impact of the particular mix of public and private benefit provision, for example, is readily apparent in a cross-national comparison. Poverty and inequality are significantly lower in Nordic and Bismarckian welfare states, where public provision is dominant, than in most liberal welfare states, where markets play a greater role. Indeed, Gøsta Esping-Andersen's three worlds of welfare capitalism are clearly reflected in the OECD's 2008 Gini-coeffcients of three representative countries: 0.38 for the United States, as the liberal welfare state; 0.30 for Germany, as the conservative one, and only 0.23 for social democratic Sweden.

See also *Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; Health Care Policy; Industrial Democracy; International Labor Organization (ILO); International Political Economy; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Political Economy; Public Good; Social Welfare; Socialism.*

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STEPHAN LEIBFRIED, HERBERT OBINGER,
EDITH OBINGER-GINDULIS,
. . . . AND MELIKE WULFGRAMM

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West, Decline of the

A pessimistic book translated into many languages, *The Decline of the West* was a two-volume essay published by German philosopher Oswald Spengler between 1918 and 1922, though the first chapters ("Form and Actuality," or "Gestalt und Wirklichkeit") in the first volume were certainly written around 1906. The second volume, *Perspectives of World-History* (*Welthistorische Perspektiven*), was written only after the end of World War I (1914–1918). In *The Decline of the West,* Spengler argued that Western civilization was entering into a cycle

of decay, which was collateral to the decline of the classical culture. Spengler mainly used a comparative method and often referred to other societies, especially ancient Rome, insisting on the importance of economics. Spengler's formulas can sometimes be seen as an inspiration for postmodern thought; for example, he wrote in his introduction that "There are no eternal truths." English-speaking readers should be aware that *The Decline of the West* was published in abridged versions as well. Although less important, Spengler's following book, *Man and Technics: A Contribution to a Philosophy of Life* (1932), was shorter and kept a similar pessimism regarding progress.

If he was influenced by Goethe and Friedrich Nietzsche, Spengler himself was a major influence for philosophers like Siegfried Kracauer and expressionist writers like Georg Trakl. Half a century after Spengler, Manfred Fleischer borrowed his famous title and added a question mark for his own book *The Decline of the West?* (1970).

Today, the expression of a hypothetical "decline of the West" has been reused in various contexts to refer to decadence or the end of an era. During recent decades, more than one hundred books had a title beginning with the expression "The end of. . . ." With a title similar to Spengler's, the Canadian movie *The Decline of the American Empire* (1987), directed by Denys Arcand, was a huge success worldwide and was celebrated at the Cannes Film Festival.

See also *Nietzsche, Friedrich; Spengler, Oswald.*

. . . . YVES LABERGE

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Westminster Model

The Westminster model of democracy refers to the British system of government in which executive power is derived from and is accountable to the legislative power. This model of democracy is closely associated with the United Kingdom, and elements of it have been present in the political systems of Canada, India, Israel, and New Zealand. The Westminster model also was popular in the first postcolonial decade (the 1960s) in the African independent states.

The term *Westminster model* was coined by Arend Lijphart in his work *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (1984) as a contrast to consensus democracy, where he uses it interchangeably with the term *majoritarian democracy.* According to Lijphart's definition, "the essence of Westminster democracy is majority rule, e.g., government by the majority and in accordance with the majority's wishes comes closer to the democratic ideal than government by and responsive to a minority" (4). Describing the Westminster model of democracy, Lijphart distinguishes nine basic interrelated elements and he illustrates them with features from the British political system, particularly as it operated in the period from 1945 to 1970. These elements are: a concentration of executive power

(e.g., one-party cabinets or bare-majority cabinets); a fusion of power and cabinet dominance; an asymmetrical bicameralism (one body of representatives has far more power than the other); a two-party system; a one-dimensional party system; a plurality system of elections; a unitary and centralized government; an unwritten constitution and parliamentary sovereignty; and an exclusively representative democracy.

Acknowledging that his majoritarian model is drawn from British and New Zealand examples, Lijphart emphasizes the possibility "to derive all of the characteristics of the majoritarian model logically from the principle of concentrating as much political power as possible in the hands of the majority" (207). That is why this model could be described as a *rational* one, a political system that can be constructed from an actual system; e.g., the British one. Taken to its logical extreme, the majoritarian (Westminster) model would include each of the following characteristics: minimal winning or one-party cabinets supported by a strong and cohesive legislative majority; a unitary and centralized government; a unicameral parliament; and a two-party system with one-issue dimension politics dividing the party in power and its opposition. The electoral system that maximizes this concentration of power in the hands of the one party is plurality method voting. Constitutional flexibility is very important too; e.g., Lijphart stresses the importance of an unwritten constitution (211–213).

Lijphart also argues that the model could be understood as a *prescriptive* one, because it includes "a set of basic choices that have to be made by democratic constitutional engineers in countries that attempt to introduce or strengthen a democratic regime" (209). Accepting this interpretation, a major deviation from the majoritarian model in Britain and New Zealand has to do with the fact that neither is a completely homogenous society (e.g., the political influence of regional and national parties like the Scottish national party and Plaid Cymru in the United Kingdom, or the Maori movement in New Zealand). According to Lijphart, the third way to understand the Westminster model is *empirically,* as all "logically coherent elements of majoritarian model should be found together in the real world" (211).

The Westminster model was widely admired in the immediate postwar years as an example of what a liberal polity should be, and in the 1950s and 1960s this model migrated to the ex-colonies in Africa and Asia, where it seemed for many the very touchstone of democracy. Many African politicians in the beginning of the 1960s believed that they could use the majoritarian model for building newly independent governments on the foundation of Western ideas. As Vernon Bogdanor pointed out in an interdisciplinary introduction to British constitutionalism in 2003, for nationalist entrepreneurs such as Kwame Nkrumah in West Africa, "the 'Westminster model' fitted this outlook, since it represented their only idea as to how a political kingdom might be organised; as a slogan, it also helped to deflect any danger that they might be fobbed off with something less than untrammelled independence."

Nevertheless, Lijphart's definition of Westminster democracy is suitable only for homogenous societies, none of which can be found in postcolonial African countries. That is why many political and social scientists—such as James B. Christoph—criticize these tendencies, arguing that a "true" majoritarian model should incorporate not only parliamentary democracy as practiced at Westminster but embody the Western political worldview in general, whose specifics cannot be transferred to other societies.

See also *African Political Thought; African Politics and Society; British Political Thought; Parliamentary Democracy; Parliamentary Government.*

. . . .   BLANKA RÍCHOVÁ

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Wheare, Kenneth C.

Kenneth Clinton Wheare (1907–1979) was an Australian-born political scientist who spent his career in Great Britain and for most of his adult life was associated with Oxford University. He is best known for his work on the English constitution and on federalism.

Wheare received a bachelor of arts (honors) in Greek and philosophy from the University of Melbourne. He was selected as a Rhodes Scholar (1929) and studied at Oriel College of Oxford University, earning a "first class" baccalaureate degree in philosophy, politics, and economics (1932). He won a masters (1935) and a doctor of letters degree (1957) from Oxford.

Wheare's professional association with Oxford began immediately after he completed his final examinations in 1932, when he was offered a position as a tutor in politics. The many positions he subsequently held there included Gladstone Professorship of Government and Public Administration at All Soul's College, rector of Exeter College, vice chancellor of the university from 1964 to 1966 (the first Australian to hold the post), and a Fellow of All Soul's College (1973–1979).

From 1967 to 1971, Wheare was president of the British Academy. In 1972 he was appointed chancellor of the University of Liverpool. He also served as an academic advisor to the Interim Committee of the Australian National University (1949) and chaired the Rhodes Trust (1962–1969). He was appointed a member of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George (CMG) in 1953 and was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1966.

Wheare was an adviser to political leaders on constitutions, notably working with the National Convention of Newfoundland from 1946 to 1947. The convention was established to decide the future of the British colony, which since 1934

had been governed by a British-appointed government commission. He was also an advisor to the Central African Federation from 1951 to 1953. Wheare believed that new constitutions came about because people wanted to make a "clean break" with the institutions that had governed them in the past.

Wheare was one of the leading experts on the English constitution. His first book, *The Statute of Westminster* (1933), explained how the statute granted the dominions legislative equality with the Parliament in Great Britain. His subsequent works discussed the evolution of the colonies into independent states. He also analyzed the workings of the British government, describing it as a "parliamentary bureaucracy."

Wheare was also a leading authority on federalism. His book *Federal Government* (1946) went through four editions. According to Wheare, federal states were regimes where each level of government had its own sphere of authority, and one of the principal challenges was to ensure coordination rather than conflict between the national and subnational levels of government.

See also *British Political Thought; Constitutions and Constitutionalism; Federalism.*

. . . .   JEFFREY KRAUS

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Whip

Whips are the members of the party leadership in legislatures who are charged to organize members to vote and to enforce party discipline. The term originated in the British Parliament from the phrase "whipper in," a hunting assistant who was charged with keeping the dog pack together. In both the U.S. Congress and Westminster systems, there is usually a chief whip for each party (known in the United States as either the Majority or Minority Whip) and a varying number of assistant or deputy whips. The main responsibility for whips is to ensure that members in the legislature are present and support the party during critical votes. Whips are responsible for providing the leadership of their party with realistic estimates on support or opposition for measures. In the U.S. system, whips may recommend the removal of a member from a prized committee or leadership position, but in general have far less power to punish or cajole than do their counterparts in parliamentary systems. For instance, in the British Parliament, whips have the power to expel members from the party, although not from

Parliament itself. In the Westminster system, whips also serve as the initial point of contact for negotiations between the parties on legislative matters.

See also *Parliamentary Discipline; Westminster Model.*

. . . .   TOM LANSFORD

White, Leonard D.

Leonard D. White (1891–1958) is recognized as the founder of the academic discipline of American public administration. A native of Acton, Massachusetts, he was a professor at the University of Chicago and a civil servant who held several positions in different levels of government. He received a baccalaureate degree from Dartmouth College in 1914, a master's degree from Dartmouth in 1915, and a PhD from the University of Chicago in 1921. He also had honorary degrees conferred upon him from Dartmouth (a DLitt in 1946) and Princeton University (an LLD in 1952). White also had the honor of having the Commander of the Order of Leopold II from Belgium bestowed upon him in 1948. White received the Woodrow Wilson Award from the American Political Science Association in 1948 for *The Federalists* (1948) and the Bancroft Prize of Columbia University in 1955 for *The Jacksonians* (1954).

White's academic career began at Clark University in Massachusetts, where he was instructor of government from 1915 to 1918. He then served as an assistant professor of political science at Dartmouth College from 1918 to 1920. White then joined the University of Chicago in 1920 as an associate professor of political science. He was promoted to full professor, ultimately holding the Ernest DeWitt Burton Distinguished Professorship in public administration until his retirement in 1956 and then serving as an emeritus faculty in political science until his death in 1958. White also served as chair of the Political Science Department at Chicago from 1940 to 1948. He was very active in university governance.

In addition to his substantive contribution to the University of Chicago during his long tenure there, White had tremendous impact in the founding of the academic discipline of public administration in the United States. In 1926 he authored *An Introduction to the Study of Public Administration,* which was the first textbook published in the field. He was the founding editor of the *Public Administration Review.* He served as the president of the American Society for Public Administration from 1947 to 1948 and as president of the American Political Science Association from 1943 to 1944. The Leonard D. White Award presented by the American Political Science Association for the outstanding doctoral dissertation in the field of public administration is named in his honor.

White also was active in government administration, and he served as a U.S. civil service commissioner during the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration. White also contributed to *Trends in Public Administration* (1933) for President Herbert Hoover's Research Committee on Social Trends.

In his 1965 article "Leonard D. White and the Study of Public Administration," Herbert J. Storing wrote of White that he was "concerned with a fundamental contradiction that lay and still lies at the heart of the study of public administration, and that in the work of his later years he provided his best advice on the approach to that study" (38). This maxim calls for attention to the founding and use of the historical method for understanding administrative organization and its values, to what White termed the *art of administration*. White defined four major *assumptions* about public administration: that it is a single process and substantially uniform; that it should start from the base of management rather than the foundation of law; that it is still primarily an art yet has a significant tendency toward science; and that administration continues to be the heart of the problem of modern government. As Storing remarked, "These assumptions are still perhaps the best concise statement of the foundations of the discipline."

White's contributions endure as seminal works to the field of public administration and continue as central works in public management, organization theory, and administrative history. His work on administrative history and the historical development of government organization from its founding principles makes him indispensable to students of public administration and policy.

See also *Organization Theory; Public Policy.*

. . . . MICHAEL W. HAIL

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White Primary

The White Primary was used in some southern states to prevent black citizens from voting. Shortly after Reconstruction ended in 1877, the Democratic Party, which was largely controlled by white citizens, regained dominance of state and local offices throughout the South. Many members of the Democratic Party in Texas decided to exclude all nonwhite citizens from voting in the Democratic Party's primaries, as at this time, most of the elected offices in Texas were held by candidates from the Democratic Party. This practice, known as a White Primary, effectively excluded black citizens from voting in the Democratic Party's primary. A series of court cases eliminated the Democratic Party's ability to exclude citizens from voting based on color.

In 1923, the Texas State Legislature enacted a law requiring all voters in the Democratic primary to be white. In 1944, the U.S. Supreme Court in *Smith v. Allwright* invalidated the law as violating a black citizen's right to vote in a primary election, as guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment.

See also *Jim Crow; Primaries; White Supremacy.*

. . . . JAMES NEWMAN

White Supremacy

White supremacy is actualized white racism. Its core tenets include a belief in inherent racial inequality, white superiority, antipathy toward people of color, and a willingness to maintain it through legal and, if necessary, extralegal means. It includes, but cannot be reduced to, prejudicial attitudes and ethnocentric preferences because it is deeply embedded in the social structures, economic institutions, public policies, and ideologies that perpetuate white authority in all spheres of social, economic, and political life. According to Joe Feagin and Hernán Vera, white supremacy in the United States can be defined as "the socially organized set of attitudes, ideas, and practices that deny African Americans and other people of color the dignity, opportunities, freedoms, and rewards that

Members of the Ku Klux Klan promote white supremacy and the racial inferiority of people of color.

SOURCE: Corbis

this nation offers white Americans" (1995, 7). While people of color may hold prejudicial or antipathetic attitudes toward white people or other people of color, this is distinct from white supremacy.

Historically, white supremacy has several sources. European exploration and colonialism reflected views that Native Americans were uncivilized heathens. Some Enlightenment philosophers posited that Europeans alone possessed the necessary capacity of reason in contrast to Africans, indigenous peoples of the New World, and Asians who were ruled by caprice or custom. Scientists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such as Carolus Linneaus, explained human variation with typologies that invariably placed Europeans at the pinnacle of intelligence and beauty, with Africans, Asians, and Native Americans representing lines of "degradation" from this ideal. In the late 1800s, pseudo-scientific definitions of race and intelligence were offered by Samuel Morton and Paul Broca, who ranked races on the basis of brain size and facial features. And Christianity in the United States justified both the enslavement of Africans, based on the Curse of Ham and belief that slavery would Christianize Africans, and the expulsion of Native Americans from their land on the basis of "manifest destiny."

White supremacy can take an overt, direct, and substantive form, such as slavery and Jim Crow–era *de jure* racial segregation in the United States, "White Australia" policies, apartheid in South Africa, and the ideology of Aryan supremacy that led to the Holocaust in Nazi Germany. These policies were official doctrines of the state and were institutionalized through culture, policies, and laws, and rested on assumptions of the biological, genetic, or cultural inferiority of the various groups that were to be subjugated or eliminated. While such policies have been officially changed and these assumptions rejected, there remain avowed white supremacists who are proudly racist and willing to engage in violence (e.g., hate crimes, lynching) on the assumption that their government is sympathetic to and infiltrated by people of color and their allies.

White supremacy also can take a covert, indirect, and procedural form that may be harder to expose, such as de facto racial inequalities and institutionalized discrimination that persist in the United States even after landmark civil rights legislation ended legal segregation. Although overt racism has been repudiated by most, as is evident in the decline of overtly expressed prejudice measured in surveys, white supremacy persists in latent assumptions of the allegedly inherent character flaws (e.g., "laziness" and "criminal propensities") that are used to explain and justify racial inequalities in an era of color-blind laws and equal opportunity. Further, some scholars suggest that equating white supremacy with violent racists such as skinheads ignores how it is covertly and deeply embedded in cultural, economic, and political practices to the point that it assigns "white privilege" to all white people, even those who do not consider themselves racist. Whiteness as a racial identity thus becomes racial privilege and allocates social and material resources such as the best education, access to housing, and employment to white people that when accumulated and transferred to future generations reinforces itself over time.

White supremacy can be found on multiple levels. On a personal level it includes racist acts by individuals ranging from discriminatory hiring to hate crimes perpetuated by members of white supremacist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan or neo-Nazis in the United States and Europe. On a sociocultural level it includes racist ideologies and beliefs that are expressed and perpetuated in religion, popular culture, and the news media. Lawrence Blum states that on an institutional level, white supremacy includes the "racial inferiorizing or antipathy perpetrated by specific social institutions such as schools, corporations, hospitals, or the criminal justice system as a totality" (9). Depending on the level, it can be counteracted through litigation, legislation, consciousness-raising, debunking pseudo-scientific racial hierarchies, moral arguments for the oneness and equality of humanity, and economic programs aimed at alleviating the systematic disadvantages and barriers against which people of color struggle in white dominated societies.

See also *Race and Racism; Racial Discrimination.*

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Wildavsky, Aaron

Aaron Wildavsky (1930–1993) was an American political scientist who spent the majority of his career teaching at the University of California at Berkley. The son of Jewish immigrants, he attended public schools in Brooklyn, New York, through his childhood. After his graduation from Brooklyn College, where he became interested in politics, Wildavsky joined the military to serve in the Korean War (1950–1953). After the war, he attended Yale University and attained his doctorate. He began his teaching life at Oberlin College and at the age of sixty-two joined Berkeley as a professor there until his death in 1993.

In addition to teaching, Wildavsky also had a deep appreciation for writing. He wrote or cowrote at least forty books, 204 articles and book chapters, seventeen newspaper articles, and numerous other essays and reports. Other accomplishments include serving as chair of Berkley's Department of Political Science, founding its Graduate School of Public Policy, and serving as president of the American Political Science Association. Wildavsky also won several awards in his field, among

them the Charles E. Merriam Award, the Paul F. Lazarsfeld Award, and the Harold Lasswell Award.

Having written or cowritten nine books and forty articles on the topic of fiscal policy and budgeting, including *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (1964), Wildavsky is considered one of the biggest contributors to the subject. In *Politics,* he writes about the basics of budgeting and explains power politics and budgetary culture. He teaches readers how to cooperate to reach a budget that spreads its good and bad aspects fairly to every group involved in the negotiation. He also shows the reasoning behind different moves made by various players in a budgetary negotiation and theorizes that procedural reform could help the process to create better policy.

Another area of study in which Wildavsky broke new ground was policy implementation. In his 1973 book *Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland: or, Why It's Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All,* he writes about the large difference between the hopes and expectations of public policy in Washington, DC, and the actual results in the area where the policy took effect. He focuses on a case in which the federal government had budgeted more than $20 million dollars in Oakland, California, to increase the social calm and create a more stable community. Wildavsky finds that only 10 percent of the $20 million was actually spent. His diagnosis of the problem is that too many government officials had to give the "okay" before any program was implemented. He refers to this as "multiple clearance problems." By avoiding the politics of program creation and focusing on results, Wildavsky improved the study of policy implementation.

See also *Budgeting; Fiscal Policy; Public Policy.*

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William of Ockham

William of Ockham (c. 1285 to c.1347) was a Franciscan friar and philosopher. He was born in the southern English town of Ockham, entered the Franciscan order, and later was educated at Oxford University, although he never received his theology degree. His early career yielded several significant philosophical works, including commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* (1318) and Aristotle's *Physics* (1322–1324), several theological treatises, and a major work on logic, *Summa Logicae* (c. 1323).

The effects of Ockham's philosophical writings on political science are important but indirect, principally because his works are not fully understood or, until recently, were not widely accessible. The term *Ockham's razor,* nonetheless, has remained a conventional reference to the principle of parsimonious theoretical construction reflecting Ockham's work on logic, which advocates against the inclusion of unnecessary assumptions or explanatory components. Ockham's novel philosophical arguments against the real existence and essence of universals, his consistent recognition only of particulars, and his emphasis on the autonomy of voluntaristic will ordered by reason and the common good are reflected in modernist commitments to the ideas of methodological individualism, personal liberty, and coercive minimalism. At the same time, Ockham's metaphysics of particulars and his philosophic-theistic understanding of radical ontological contingency stand in stark contrast to the generalizing intentions and methodologies of modern political and social science. Regularly yet debatably referred to as a nominalist, Ockham argued that human knowledge was based on direct empirical experience of particulars and their attributes, and that observed generalities or group similarities are mental conceptualizations only. In addition, his philosophical deconstruction of public authority opens a pathway for the idea of individual rights, which for Ockham, however, are never divorced from their divine origin, or the individual's responsibilities to the common good and moral accountability.

In 1323 Ockham was summoned to Avignon, France, to defend his theological writings before the papal court of Pope John XXII. The inquiry lasted for several years without any apparent resolution. While in Avignon, Ockham became involved in a controversy concerning recent papal pronouncements against Franciscan practices and views of poverty, a still radical Christian perspective against the right of private property. Ockham rejected the papal arguments as inconsistent with scriptural and previous papal teachings. In 1328 Ockham left Avignon with several Franciscans, including the order's superior general, Michael of Cesena; the specific conditions prompting this departure remain unclear. Ockham and the others were excommunicated for their departure, and they accepted the protection of King Ludwig of Bavaria, who was involved in his own controversy with the pope and others over his disputed 1314 election to the throne of the Holy Roman Empire and his military occupation of Rome in 1328. Ludwig also protected Marsilius of Padua, author of *Defensor pacis* and a vigorous proponent of conciliar over papal authorization of imperial power. Ockham remained under Ludwig's protection for the next twenty years, and his subsequent writings focused almost exclusively on political topics, although they continued to reflect his prior philosophical and theological commitments. In his *Work of Ninety Days* (c. 1332–1334) and a letter to the Franciscan Order at Assisi (1334), Ockham defended

the Franciscan perspective on poverty and systematically identified the errors of the pope's arguments. Over the next thirteen years, he wrote additional treatises and the massive but unfinished *Dialogus* in which he concluded that Pope John XXII and his successors heretically promoted false doctrines, thus disqualifying themselves from the office. Ockham argued for consequentialist ethics for public authorities and a separation and limitation of both papal and secular powers. However, he was not antipapist and he clearly rejected the practice of conciliar and theological majoritarianism, as well as the idea of representation employed by Marsilius of Padua.

See also *Marsilius of Padua; Political Philosophy; Religion and Politics.*

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Williams, Raymond

Raymond Williams (1921–1988) was a literary critic and political commentator whose work had a substantial impact on the political left of the United Kingdom in the years after World War II (1939–1945). Williams excelled in the cloistered academic spaces of Oxford and Cambridge universities, but his work always drew him out of that arena and into the real-world struggles of everyday people. He explored these interests through a diverse set of writings that includes novels, plays, and literary criticism.

Williams was born in Wales to a working-class family. His father worked on the railroads and was a staunch Labour Party supporter. Both of these elements would figure prominently in Williams' later life. He would often remark about his Welsh heritage and its grounding effect on his later accomplishments. Similarly, his Labour roots undoubtedly affected his early political leanings and lifelong dedication to exposing inequality's cultural roots through criticism and literary expression. Williams served in World War II and then returned to Cambridge to complete his education. Subsequently, he taught for a number of years in adult education programs. During this period, he began writing, and he was offered a position at Cambridge where he would remain until retirement.

Williams' prominent volume that captured the attention of academics was *Culture and Society* (1958). In this work, Williams dove into English literary history from the 1700s to the 1900s, examining changes in the concept and meaning of culture. Through the works of British philosopher Edmund Burke, English poet William Blake, and English author George Orwell, Williams fashioned a new way of thinking about the evolution of the term *culture* as well as the social structures it was used to describe. Chief among the reasons for the development and change to the notion of culture was the massive upheaval led by the Industrial Revolution. In 1976, Williams's *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* was published. It was intended to be an appendix to *Culture and Society* but has become a classic text on its own.

Among the many other works of note in Williams' oeuvre, two others are of special note. One is a brief volume on Orwell. This text is important because many casual observers might assume that Williams had special appreciation for Orwell, but this was not the case. Although they held a number of similar ethical and political commitments, the volume is critical of many aspects of Orwell's work. The other key text is *Marxism and Literature* (1977), which spells out Williams's views on the emerging field of cultural studies and delineates his ideas from ones relying on structuralism.

Williams's influence on the politics of the left was apparent during his lifetime, and his importance has only grown since his death. He has been a tremendous influence on literary, social, and political theorists across the globe. The field of cultural studies owes him a huge debt, as do scholars in disciplines such as political science, anthropology, sociology, and law who seek to understand the interconnections between culture, society, and the ever-changing forms of human expression.

See also *British Political Thought; Orwell, George; Political Culture; Political Philosophy.*

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Winner–Take–All

Winner-take-all is an electoral system (used generally in the United States and Canada) in which a winning candidate receives a majority of votes at the general election. The United States inherited the majority election system from Great Britain, where the process for parliamentary elections is termed *first past the post.* Forty-eight of the fifty United States generally receive all of that state's electoral votes (that is, the majority rules at the state level, with the exceptions being Maine and Nebraska). The electors assigned to the candidate who is the winner of the majority of votes in their state are all represented in the Electoral College. The casting of votes against the winning candidate at the state level is negated by the delegation of electoral votes. The

federal principle in presidential elections is a fundamental structure of the U.S. Constitution. All of the national elective offices are based on the federal principle, or elections based on the state, in accordance with the national motto, "e pluribus unum." The federal principle in presidential elections forces candidates to focus attention on smaller states, which may be otherwise ignored, by developing extensive cross-national political coalitions. Consequently, the president of the United States will have the ability to govern because of the ability to develop widespread cross-national support. The notion is to protect the freedoms and prerogatives of the few (as opposed to the many). As former British colonies, Australia and India also utilize majority voting. Continental European countries—in addition to Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—have implemented forms of proportional representation.

See also *Electoral College; Indirect Elections.*

. . . . RON J. BIGALKE JR.

Withering Away of the State

The *withering away of the state* is a concept that places classical Marxism in a differentiating position in socialist political thought from both the statism of other forms of socialism and the antistatism of anarchism.

Marxism views *the state* as an instrument with which one social class maintains its power over other social classes. A socialist revolution therefore requires the destruction of the capitalist state by the working class. However, the working class will need its own state (the "dictatorship of the proletariat") to consolidate its power and move toward a communist society, but such a social order will abolish social classes and thereby undermine the need for a specialized state structure. As a result, the state will progressively "wither away," as expressed by nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Engels in Part 3, Chapter 2, of *Anti-Duhring:*

> The interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not "abolished," *it withers away.*

This concept of a withering away of the state reflects a tension within Engels's and nineteenth-century German philosopher Karl Marx's views between a deep antistatism and a belief that a state structure is needed in the transition from capitalist to communist society. The antistatism view is expressed throughout the philosophers' work, taking its sharpest form in Marx's writings on the French state. The latter view of a necessary state structure emerged whenever they outlined a concrete program for the working class, as in Marx's 1848 *The Communist Manifesto.*

Marx and Engels attempted to resolve this tension: first, by insisting that the existing state had to be destroyed; second, by advocating its replacement by a workers' "semistate" based on the model of the Paris Commune that minimized repressive functions and bureaucracy; and, third, by arguing that even this limited state form would eventually disappear. (This all depended on a major development of the productive forces and the collapse of the division between mental and physical labor—the social foundation of bureaucracy.)

The logic of this approach rests on two problematic assumptions: first, that the state is dominated by its repressive functions (and hence the need for it will decline once social conflict is marginalized); and second, that under socialism public functions can be reduced to "administration" based on rational calculus, without the intrusion of social interests and values. As several contemporary writers have pointed out, this is closer to the views of Engels (and, following him, Russian Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin) than those of Marx, but the issues seem not to have been explored sufficiently during their lifetimes to expose tangible differences.

This attitude toward the state differentiated Marxism sharply from anarchism, which shared Marxism's hostility to the capitalist state. However, anarchists saw the repressive character of the state as inherent by its very nature rather than as a product of its connection to class society. Moreover, they believed that it was possible to move immediately to decentralized and cooperative social institutions once the oppressive state has been overthrown and were highly suspicious of any discussion of creating a postrevolutionary state, suspecting that it would recreate elitist institutions and new forms of exploitation.

Somewhat surprisingly, given the later development of the Soviet Union, Lenin vigorously embraced the concept of the withering away of the state. In his classic 1917 *State and Revolution,* Lenin emphasized the need to "smash" the existing state machine and replace it with a minimally bureaucratic state, also modeled on the Paris Commune. The actual development of the Soviet state followed a very different course, which its leaders justified both by the need for defense against internal and external enemies and the tasks of socialist construction. Lenin however continued to be concerned by the bureaucratization of the state and before his death tried to champion institutions like the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate as a counterweight. Despite the accelerating bureaucratization of Soviet society under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, the issue persisted in Soviet Marxist discourse. As late as 1939, in his "Report to the Eighteenth Party Congress," Stalin found it necessary to argue against the idea that the socialist state should "die away," justifying its role by the "capitalist encirclement" of the Soviet Union and asserting that under such circumstances the state would continue even into mature communism.

See also *Communism; Socialism; State, The.*

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Wittgenstein, Ludwig

Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (1889–1951) was an Austrian philosopher well known for his work in a number of fields including logic, language, and mathematics. He studied engineering at the University of Berlin from 1906 to 1908 and then moved to Manchester, England, where he engaged in aeronautical research. While studying in England, he met British philosopher and logician Lord Bertrand Russell, whose influence led to Wittgenstein's move into the study of mathematical philosophy.

During World War I (1914–1918), Wittgenstein served in the Austrian army. While in the field he wrote *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921). The book describes his picture theory of language in which the words of a language were mental pictures in the mind that actually mirrored the realities of the world. After the war, he came in contact with the Vienna Circle, a group of philosophers whose *logical positivism,* an attempt to reconceptualize empiricism using contemporary scientific advances based on the theory that knowledge comes only from the five senses, was derived from a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's thought.

In 1929 Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge University and became a professor there in 1939. During his tenure at the university, two notebooks, the *Blue Book* and the *Brown Book,* were circulated among students of language. These notebooks expressed radical revisions of Wittgenstein's earlier thought.

Wittgenstein died of cancer on April 29, 1951, at Cambridge. After his death his latest philosophical ideas were published in 1953 in *Philosophical Investigations.* In this work he made unique contributions in the areas of logic and the philosophy of language. Wittgenstein theorized that most philosophical problems are due to linguistic confusions. Communication takes place in "language games" that have their own rules, which means that languages such as French or Hindi have different rules of grammar that are like the differences in the rules of soccer or basketball.

Although Wittgenstein's political views were sympathetic to the communism of the 1930s, politics was not a major focus of his. However, his thought has been used to discuss political issues. For example, human rights cannot be explored or explained using the five senses. Some linguistic philosophers and positivist legal thinkers would, as a consequence, argue that claims to the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are merely expressions of emotions or matters of taste and do not represent anything substantial in reality. However, the failure to defend human rights has often had dreadful consequences throughout history. Rights are claims that people make that have powerful consequences. Duties are correlatives to rights. If there is a right, then someone else has a duty to protect that right. To attribute disputes about rights to the linguistic confusion that sometimes occurs in political issues is, in the view of many political theorists, a failure to understand that rights rest upon God, nature, or human nature and not the use of words.

For analytic philosophy the confusion over the great variety of conflicting meanings for words such as *freedom* (which has more than two hundred meanings), *power, justice,* and *rights* are the result of verbal misunderstandings. However, political theorists believe that there is something permanently substantial at stake in these words because they point to different aspects of the richness of the human experiences of freedom.

See also *Language and Politics.*

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Wittig, Monique

Monique Wittig (1935–2003), a French novelist, philosopher, poet, and activist, made important contributions to feminist and gay and lesbian theory by developing an original approach that she labeled *materialist feminism.* Under this heading, she sought to expose sexual difference as a political division that masquerades as natural and serves to legitimate the subordination of women. Her work called for doing away with categories of sex and engaged in linguistic experimentation designed to undermine the masculinist structure of language itself. Wittig is perhaps most famous for her depiction of lesbianism as a revolutionary project that aims to overcome sexual difference altogether. In one of her most widely read essays, "One Is Not Born a Woman" (1992), she writes, "Lesbianism provides for the moment the only social form in which we can live freely. Lesbian is the only concept I know of which is beyond the categories of sex (man and woman), because the designated subject (lesbian) is *not* a woman, either economically, politically, or ideologically. For what makes a woman is a

specific social relation to a man, a relation we have previously called servitude. . ." (1993, 20).

Born in Alsace, France, in 1935, Wittig moved to Paris in her teens, later studied at the Sorbonne, and eventually received a doctorate from the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Social in 1986. Her first novel, *L'opoponax* (1964), on the experience of childhood, was a critical success and won the prestigious Prix Médicis. Her subsequent fiction, *Les guérillères* (1969), a feminist epic, and *Le Corps Lesbien* (1973), which reimagines the female body from a lesbian perspective, are notable in part for Wittig's efforts to expose and challenge the gendered character of language itself. In *Les guérillères,* for example, Wittig deploys *elles,* a traditionally feminine plural pronoun, as a universal, collective pronoun signifying simply "they."

While living and writing in Paris, Wittig helped to create the Mouvement de Libération des Femmes (MLF). She organized and participated in the August 1970 demonstration that is often cited as the inaugural event for the second wave feminist movement in France. In 1976 she immigrated to the United States where she held a number of university teaching positions. She continued to work in various genres, but focused primarily on producing theoretical essays, written in English, many of which were published first in the journal *Feminist Issues.* A collection of Wittig's most important essays is collected in the volume *The Straight Mind,* published in 1992. She was a professor of Italian, French, and women's studies at the University of Arizona, where she taught for many years until her death in 2003. She was survived by her partner and collaborator, Sande Zeig.

The materialist feminist position Wittig developed in her theoretical writings has been influential in contemporary feminist and queer theory internationally. Reworking Marxism, Wittig argued for the recognition of women as a distinct, oppressed class and called for the abolition of the categories of sex (men and women) as a political project. She believed such a task entailed confronting the social contract—heterosexuality itself—which founds the current order and sanctifies the division of men and women. While there can be no complete escape, there is nonetheless, Wittig suggests, the possibility that we can "renegotiate daily, and term by term, the social contract" (1993, xiii).

See also *Feminism; Feminist Movement; Feminist Political Theory; Gender and Politics; Gender Issues; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Movements, Comparative; Women's Rights; Women's Studies.*

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Wollstonecraft, Mary

Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797) was an eighteenth-century British writer best known for her passionate defense of women's moral and intellectual equality. The author of texts in multiple genres, her most influential work, *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792), argues that women's inferiority to men is not sanctioned by nature but is instead the product of corrupt social institutions and mores, which must be radically reformed. Her critical stance against women's subordination, coupled with her unconventional personal life, make Wollstonecraft a seminal figure in the history of feminist thought.

Born in London into a large, volatile middle-class family, Wollstonecraft left home at the age of nineteen. Although initially employed as a governess, she was determined to support herself as a writer. Her first three books, published in 1787 and 1788—a conduct manual, a novel, and a children's book—all criticized European society for fostering weakness and superficiality in women and insisted on the importance of education in rectifying this tendency. Wollstonecraft also worked as a translator of French and German philosophical texts and as a reviewer and editor for the journal *Analytical Review.* An affair with a married artist ended when his wife rejected Wollstonecraft's suggestion that they form a three-person relationship. In the years that followed, Wollestonecraft wrote her two major works, *A Vindication of the Rights of Men* (1790) and *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman,* as well as a history of the French Revolution (1789–1799) and a narrative of her travels through Scandinavia. In 1792 she moved to France and acquired a new lover, Gilbert Imlay, an American writer with whom she had a daughter out of wedlock. After Imlay left her, Wollstonecraft returned to London and attempted suicide twice in 1795 before becoming involved with William Godwin, the anarchist philosopher. Godwin and Wollstonecraft were married in 1797 after learning she was pregnant, although both had previously criticized marriage. Their short-lived and unusual marriage (they kept separate residences) was by all accounts happy, and Godwin was devastated when Wollstonecraft died at the age of thirty-eight due to complications from childbirth. Their only child would later write the novel *Frankenstein* (1818) under her married name, Mary Shelley.

Although *A Vindication of the Rights of Men,* which attacks Irish philosopher Edmund Burke's defense of hereditary rule by forwarding a doctrine of universal natural rights, remains an important text, it is *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* that articulates the position for which Wollstonecraft is best known. In the work she paints damning portraits of women's

Eighteenth-century British writer Mary Wollstonecraft advanced the idea of women's moral and intellectual equality.

SOURCE: Library of Congress

vanity, passivity, and poorly developed intellect to argue for the alteration of this condition. Contending that women suffer from an "artificial weakness" encouraged by dominant beliefs and habits, Wollstonecraft calls for significant changes in education, politics, and family life so that women may develop their reason, and in turn, their virtue. Although she encourages women to take an interest in political and humanitarian matters and argues for their equal citizenship, she also affirms women's unique roles as mothers. She offers a revolutionary vision of domesticity in which educated, moral, and independent women oversee the care of children and act as "rational companions" to their husbands. She insists, as in all her works, that women, like men, are endowed with the faculty of reason, which can flourish only if existing norms and customs are transformed.

See also *Burke, Edmund; Feminism; Godwin, William; Women's Rights; Women's Studies.*

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Womanism

Womanism is a framework for understanding the matrix of race, class, and gender. This framework explains how groups and individuals experience power and oppression depending on their identity within this matrix, and on their status within the social hierarchy. Womanism uses this concept as a base for advocating social change. Womanism appeals to those interested in gender politics, but who prefer an addition or alternative to feminism. Some have argued that feminism discriminates by focusing on the issues of white women and by its concern with white perspectives. Womanism provides an option for social and political analysis that makes black women and other women of color central. Womanism, feminism, black feminism, and woman of color feminism are all approaches to sociopolitical transformation. They use similar tools of political analysis and share a commitment to confront sexism. Womanism, however, is not a subset of feminism.

The earliest reference to womanism is Alice Walker's 1979 short story, "Coming Apart." Two other authors independently used the term in their writings: Chikwenye Okonjo Ogunyemi, and Clenora Hudson-Weems, whose work is associated with Africana womanism. Africana womanism, like womanism more broadly, is a proposed new vernacular focusing on consensus, compromise, and cooperation, and that brings women of African descent to the center of the discourse. The concept of womanism was popularized by Alice Walker in her book, *In Search of Our Mother's Gardens: Womanist Prose* (1983), and is generally attributed to her. The term, *womanism,* derives from the West Indies and the U.S. southern black folk expression, "You acting womanish" (xi) (i.e., like a woman, or grown, as opposed to girlish or frivolous). According to Alice Walker, a womanist is a responsible, courageous, and audacious "black feminist or feminist of color" (1983, xi). She loves other women sexually or nonsexually, yet is "not a separatist, except periodically for health." A womanist, in Walker's view, loves music, dance, the moon, the spirit, food, and herself. A "womanist is to feminist as purple is to lavender" (xi–xii).

Womanism contains five key components. It is opposed to oppression. It is centered on everyday language, politics, experience, and people. It is not dogmatic or rigidly ideological. It seeks to optimize the welfare of all members of the community. It recognizes that spirituality is a significant and legitimate aspect of human life and political action.

Womanism is global in scope, yet simultaneously uses a grassroots approach to sociopolitical transformation that appreciates the life-enhancing features of ethnic and cultural diversity. Its purpose is antioppressionist social change. Its methods are based on the experiences and problem-solving

approaches of black women and other women of color rather than privileging the highly formalized or centralized techniques of institutionalized politics.

Womanism understands that body, mind, and spirit are interconnected. Progressive change cannot be achieved unless problems in the political, environmental, and spiritual worlds are addressed. The process of womanism is dynamic and fluid. It rejects ideological rigidity and recognizes instead that contradiction is an inherent component of the human condition.

Womanist methods of social and political change may include nonviolent communication, mediation, self-help, and mutual aid. Womanism is interested in seeing individuals and communities flourish. It considers both physical and psychological well being as necessary for achieving social justice.

Womanist issues include war, poverty, violence, education, health care, xenophobia, ageism, and other problems related to identity, power, and experience. There are concerns that womanism contains elements of unacknowledged homophobia, in part, resulting from theological issues and precepts of black Christian faith. Womanism is not, however, necessarily allied with black Christian churches, and a perspective that accepts lesbians and homosexuality is more consistent with the womanist principles of inclusivity.

Examples of groups incorporating womanist principles, methods, and viewpoints include The Underground Railroad, mutual aid societies, and reparations activism in the late 1800s, The Combahee River Collective, the Women of Color Resource Center, and the National Black Women's Health Project (Phillips, 2006).

Some claim that womanism is exclusively by and for black women. Others believe that anyone is free to identify as womanist provided they are committed to eradicating sexism and racial injustice, working toward improving the universal community, and acknowledging that individual standpoints are at least in part derived from ethnicity and culture.

Because womanism considers everyday and spiritual knowledge to be valid sources of information, womanism is sometimes dismissed by academic and political traditions as naïve, misinformed, or eccentric. Womanists understand this dismissiveness as the result of sexism, racism, and classism. Contemporary womanist theory and politics is integrated into work by authors such as Zora Neale Hurston, Paule Marshall, and Toni Morrison, and continues to undergo development and change through the grassroots work exemplified by popular online blogs such as Renee Martin's Womanist Musings, Monica Robert's TransGriot, and Tamara Winfrey Harris' What Tami Said.

See also *Homophobia; Sexism; Women's Studies.*

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Women, Violence Against

Because women are physically weaker than men and because the majority of women around the world live in societies where power resides in the hands of men, females of all ages remain vulnerable to violence. The United Nations estimates that one in every three of the world's women has been beaten or sexually abused. Violence against women (VAW) is a crime that crosses all age, class, racial, ethnic, educational, and national barriers. VAW covers a wide range of practices, including battering, emotional abuse, rape, human trafficking, public beatings, stonings, bride burnings, and forced pregnancies and abortions.

The most notorious forms of violence against women have included female infanticide (particularly in China and India), Chinese foot binding, African female genital mutilation, the virtual enslavement of British women identified as "sinners" by the nineteenth-century Catholic Church in Magdalen laundries and asylums, and the so-called honor killings performed in some Muslim countries. Among some tribes in Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo, the practice of *tro-kosi* has allowed families to provide young girls for use as slaves by fetish priests to atone for offenses committed by family members. If these young girls die in service, families are honor bound to replace them with other young girls.

Women in war-torn areas and refugee camps who do not have access to stable political and social infrastructures are particularly vulnerable to various forms of violence. Women and children make up the majority of casualties in modern-day warfare. Even in the most developed countries, VAW is a major societal problem. For instance, a whole body of literature deals exclusively with the violence among members of the Canadian military.

Since the 1980s, the trafficking of women has increased, spreading from Asia where it was historically acceptable to other parts of the world. This increase has been partially a response to the economic crises and rise in organized crime experienced when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Women from Russia and the Ukraine have been trafficked into Asia, Latin America, and even into parts of western Europe and the United States to be sexually exploited either by choice or because they were lured into believing they were headed toward legitimate jobs.

In response to pressure by women's groups, the European Union became involved in the effort to stop human trafficking in the 1990s. The United Nations adopted a protocol against trafficking in women and children in 2000. That same year,

bipartisan efforts in the United States led to the passage of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act.

According to the United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW), violence against women exacerbates in a wall of silence because of the stigma involved, the lack of access to legal information and power, the inability of governments to protect women through adequate legislation and enforcement, and a shortage of education that provides ways of dealing with the causes and consequences of violence.

The UN commitment to ending violence against women resulted in the 1993 adoption of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, which declared that

> Violence against women is an obstacle to the achievement of the objectives of equality, development and peace. Violence against women both violates and impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. The long-standing failure to protect and promote those rights and freedoms in the case of violence against women is a matter of concern to all States and should be addressed.

In 1993, the European Union (EU) launched a campaign to wipe out VAW, beginning with an acknowledgement by the European Ministerial Conference that violence against women violated the basic human rights of women and interfered with the right to fully participate in the democratic process. The Comprehensive Plan of Action on VAW was initiated in 1997. Today, the EU requires all members to commit to ending violence against women.

In the United States, the attempt to curtail VAW led to the passage of the Violence against Women Act (VAWA) in 1994. The law set federal penalties for interstate stalking and spousal abuse, created the National Domestic Violence Hotline, and increased penalties at the federal level for repeat offenders. The law also earmarked grant money for building and improving battered women shelters, expanding rape crisis intervention, hiring additional police officers, and providing training on rape and domestic violence. In 2000, the Supreme Court overturned the provision of VAWA that allowed victims of VAW to sue their attackers for violation of their civil rights in *United States v. Morrison* (529 U.S. 598).

See also *Human Rights; Patriarchy; Women in Islamic Nations; Women's Rights.*

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Women and Security

The inclusion of women in security studies results from the confluence of several trends in both the study and practice of international relations. Within the academy, there has been a growing realization that disaggregating along gender lines (along with other identities) is analytically useful. In the policy and practice world, security studies in general are expanding from a narrow examination of armed conflicts and elite actors to a more expansive approach. Finally, women have increasingly been participating in international conflicts and peacekeeping efforts at all levels.

By the late 1980s, women's studies and gender issues had a significant presence in the academy with the recognition of "gender as a useful category of analysis," which staked the claim that women and gender are integral to our understanding of social processes and power dynamics. In conflict and security studies, using women as an analytic category has been particularly useful, showing that the treatment of women is valuable as an early warning indicator of potential conflict, revealing that women and children bear disproportionate burdens in conflict itself, recognizing rape as a weapon and crime in war, and so on.

Academic work on women and security has primarily been located within a wider feminist discourse, using the concept of patriarchal systems to critically examine gendered aspects of war and security. By disaggregating gender, this work drew attention to how constructs of masculinity and femininity have been used to legitimize war, as well as the different ways in which war impacts men and women, and it shone a light on gendered aspects of militarization. Using the argument that valuing masculine qualities such as aggression has led to rampant militarization, this literature initially tended to claim that women's inclusion in security concerns will mitigate these trends. Authors on gender and international relations—who variously agree and disagree with this perspective—include Jean Bethke Elshtain, Cynthia Enloe, V. Spike Peterson, Laura Sjoberg, Jill Steans, and J. Ann Tickner.

Concurrently with this academic shift, international organizations were turning their attention to the specific topic of women and security. Traditionally, security studies have focused on what is known as "hard" security: specifically dealing with outright armed conflicts and the threat of the same. However, there has been a recent trend to recognize HIV/AIDS, population growth, the persecution of different identity groups, and environmental degradation as significant security threats. This expansion has included the recognition of the different ways men and women experience and participate in conflict, and how gender is implicated in these nontraditional threats.

Part of this development has been international meetings, resolutions, and agreements that have served to both encourage and compel parties engaged in conflicts to recognize the role of women and the importance of including a gender perspective in conflict transformation processes. Major international agreements include the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979, which set the stage for the fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 (known as Beijing '95). The topic of women, peace, and security is outlined in Chapter 1 of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which specifically calls for the inclusion of women at all levels of conflict resolution and transformation by drawing on the United Nations Charter, and by framing women's inclusion as part of the organization's fundamental mission. Termed *gender mainstreaming,* this concept has been adopted almost universally by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). As stated in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, "it is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women as well as of men an integral part of the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic, and societal spheres." Subsequent to Beijing 95, a large network of IGOs, NGOs, and academics developed to work on women, peace, and security. By October 2000, momentum and pressure had built to the point that United Nations Security Council Resolution finally recognized the specific rights of women in conflict by unanimously adopting resolution 1325. This is one of the major outcomes of the growing awareness of the different ways in which men and women are victimized by and participate in conflict. Impetus for SCR1325 included the war in the former Yugoslavia—in which rape and sexual violence were used as weapons of war (later prosecuted for the first time as war crimes at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia)—and the shifting role of women in the elite levels of conflict negotiation in the conflicts in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Ireland. The ad hoc nature of women's agency and empowerment in these peace processes is evidenced by their exclusion from the 1995 Dayton negotiations despite major lobbying by NGOs, but women played a pivotal role in the Northern Ireland peace negotiations and were centrally involved in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.

Women also have become more involved as participants in conflicts, not least because they are becoming members of the military in growing numbers. An example of this shift is that, as of 2004, women represent approximately 14 percent of the United States armed forces, an increase from 2 percent in 1950. Women have been more involved also in combat and as agents of conflict. As the frontlines of wars become blurred and conflicts increasingly take place in areas inhabited by civilians, women are becoming more involved in the actual fighting, regardless of the policies of individual armies as to whether women should or should not see active combat. Institutional policies in international governmental organizations such as the United Nations now actively call for greater participation in both their police and peacekeeping forces.

There are numerous developments in the field of women and security. One is the slowly increasing number of women teaching in the field of international relations, where they have been traditionally underrepresented. Academically, the lens through which women and security is viewed is changing, as essentialist conceptions of women as peacemakers are no longer the only ones used to analyze both women's impact on security studies and the impact of conflict on women. In addition, as women are increasingly present in leadership positions and in military operations, the future study of women and security likely will focus on these areas. In the policy world, 2008 and 2009 saw the adoption of three new UN Security Council resolutions on women, peace, and security—SCRs 1820, 1888, and 1889—that aimed to better address the specific rights and interests of women in conflict. One element that is not changing, however, is that women, be they civilian bystander or participant in the conflict, continue to bear a disproportionate burden of war as refugees and as targets of widespread sexual violence in conflict areas, while continuing to be excluded from the peace processes that seek to end such conflicts.

See also *Gender Mainstreaming; War Crimes; Women, Violence against.*

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Women in Islamic Nations

Women living in Muslim countries, secular and nonsecular, spread over fifty-seven countries in four continents. These Muslim countries are referred to as *Islamic nations,* meaning the majority of their population is Muslim, although many of these countries have substantial non-Muslim minority populations of varying sizes. Political, economic, legal, and sociocultural dimensions of women's status and rights greatly

vary within and among these countries. This is partly due to a range of interpretations of the Quran and the lack of a single authoritative reading of religious principles and law(s), and partly due to variations in cultural practices.

This area of study is of great importance but also highly controversial, due to tensions between Eurocentric, anti-imperialist, and anti-Western viewpoints. On the one hand, religious practices regarding marriage, adultery, and divorce are often explicitly discriminatory toward women. For instance, men are permitted multiple wives while women are not. Men can divorce their wives while women need their husband's consent. These examples, and many others, lead to the conclusion that *patriarchal fundamentalism* or *fundamentalist patriarchy* institutionalizes unequal division of gendered roles in Muslim societies. Furthermore, women from Islamic nations are presented, especially in the Western media, as powerless and exploited individuals, and are explicitly and intentionally contrasted with their liberated sisters from the West. Both of these approaches disregard women's agency and the growth of Islamic feminism, as well as what Huma Ahmed-Ghosh (2008) calls "hybrid feminism," which brings together different forms of Islamic, secular, and other discourses in a hybridized form to serve women and their lives better. Both approaches also fail to acknowledge the drastic change of the positions of women and lively debate taking place during the final decades of the twentieth century and into the new millennium.

CONTROLLING WOMEN

The "women question" has in many ways been central to resistance to the Western political, economic, and cultural dominance in Islamic countries, as well as among Euro-Muslims in the West. As documented by Anne Phillips (2007), this resistance has been significantly strengthened after the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001 and the Iraq war. Religious extremisms, fuelled by global events, empowered the family, tribe, and the community to dictate Islamic norms, led to an invigorated discussion of women's human rights. Increases in honor killings, blood money, forced marriages, forced veiling, and polygyny are all means of controlling women's sexuality that have been documented in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

To some degree, higher numbers stem from a more regular reporting of the incidents, mainly thanks to the strengthening role of the women's movement in many Islamic countries. Even so, these activities do seem to be on the rise, and the increases are by and large perceived as a backlash to Western *Islamophobia*. For instance, Euro-Turks tend to be targeted by racism and xenophobia in Europe. These migrant populations respond by engaging in the politics of identity, ethnicity, and religiosity, all of which include at their core traditional notions of women's honor. Their reaction is shared by many in Islamic countries who hear of their mistreatment in and by the West. The resurgence of these traditional notions of honor affects the actualization of women's rights in a very negative way.

HETEROGENEITY AMONG ISLAMIC WOMEN

However, although both fundamentalists and Islamophobes present Islam as a homogenous belief system and way of life, especially regarding the rights of women, legal experts and sociologists extensively demonstrate the heterogeneity of women's experience in Islamic countries. Organizations like Women Living under Muslim Laws (WLUML) contend the fact that the more repressive situations in Islamic nations have a cultural rather than religious grounding, thus paving the way for modification and negotiation. Such organizations aim to dispel the notion that religiously based movements are inherently less open to negotiation, modification, or compromise, and internal reforms movements as a possible avenue for egalitarian change.

Similarly, some scholars argue that it is possible for religiously inspired Islamic political movements to become agents of democratization and even of liberalization, especially Islamic and hybrid feminist scholars who insist that secular ideas and institutions must be adapted through a process of internal reform necessary to establish a liberal and democratic system in Muslim societies. On the other hand, secular feminist scholars focus on universal ideas of women's human rights and propose subjecting to open public debate and to political contestation any religious discourses that legitimate patriarchal customs or discriminatory gender practices. The latter group of scholars wishes to establish systematic limits to the autonomy conferred on religious communities based on equality of rights, and to discover what constraints can be legitimately imposed on religions to prevent gender-based discrimination.

Nevertheless, even in countries where strong secular reforms have been implemented, Islam's informal power and its unofficial impact on people are far reaching and complicated. Many people may still opt to settle their disputes on gender relations, such as marriage and divorce, with the aid of religious leaders. In Turkey, for instance, a secular country with a strong women's movement, although it is illegal to conduct a religious marriage before the civil one, some people still avoid the civil ceremony altogether.

See also *Feminism, Postcolonial; Islamic Political Thought; Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism; Women's Movement, Comparative.*

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Women Legislators

The process of granting formal political rights to women, including the right to vote and stand for election, began in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The first self-governing country to introduce unrestricted women's suffrage was New Zealand in 1893. At this time women did not, however, have the right to stand for election—it was not until 1919 that this right was granted to women in New Zealand. In 1906 Finland was the first European country to give women both the right to vote and stand for election.

The introduction of formal political rights for women does not automatically mean the start of a process leading to a high number of women elected into office. The situation in western Europe serves as an example. Most countries in western Europe had introduced formal political rights for women—both the right to vote and stand for election—before the end of the Second World War in 1945. Yet as of late 2009, women made up an average of only 21 percent of legislators in the national parliaments of that region. However, notable variations exist between countries. Recent research points out that conscious acts—from quotas to informal goals for achievements—implemented by actors such as political parties with the specific aim of getting more women elected are important for high numbers. The literature in the field also reveals important interplay between political parties and interest groups such as women's organizations and between these kinds of actors and structures of society. The type of electoral system matters for the number of women elected as does the type of welfare state; proportional representation (PR) systems are, for example, more favourable for women than majoritarian electoral systems.

There is a current global trend to introduce formalized quotas to speed up processes concerning the number of women elected. A common distinction in research is to separate between legal quotas and party quotas. Legal quotas refer to prescriptions written into the constitution of a country or into that country's electoral laws, whereas party quotas refer to prescriptions voluntarily introduced by parties themselves in their own statutes. Quotas also can differ in that prescriptions can refer to a fixed number of seats for women in a legislative body or the occurrence of a certain number of women on election ballots. Investigations show that legal quotas are currently used in forty countries; major political parties in another fifty countries have instituted party quotas.

Finland was mentioned before. Together with Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, Finland represents a group of countries where changes in the number of women elected can be described as incremental; they have come about stepwise over a long time. Already in the 1970s, the average number of women in Nordic parliaments passed 20 percent, and in the early twenty-first century, the average number in that region is 43.2 percent. A contrasting example is then to be found in Rwanda, which represents a "fast-track" model. In 1994 women made up 17.1 percent of the national parliament in Rwanda. As of late 2009, 56.3 percent of Rwanda's legislators were women. Thus, developments in the Nordic countries have been taking place over many decades, whereas the number of women elected in Rwanda more than tripled in only fifteen years.

The contemporary global trend to introduce quotas for the election of women can to a large extent be characterized as a fast-track trend and is most commonly found in Latin America and Africa. The distinction between different models is interesting because in some parts of the world there is, as of the early twenty-first century, a strong divergence between changes in the number of women elected and changes in the status of women in society more generally, and this situation is rather new.

Empirical results demonstrate that an increased proportion of women legislators contribute to strengthening the positions of women's interests in the legislative process. Societies that elect large numbers of women tend to be more gender-equal also in other respects than societies that elect few women. However, so far this research has mostly been based on comparisons between Western democracies. A pending question in comparative research on women legislators is therefore to what extent the impact of women legislators on society and political life at large is conditioned by factors like stability and level of democracy in a country.

See also *African Political Thought; Electoral Quotas; European Politics and Society; Feminism; Gender Gap; Political Participation; U.S. Politics and Society: Women, Political Participation of; Women's Representation; Women's Suffrage.*

. . . .   LENA WÄNGNERUD

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Women's Movement, Comparative

It is useful to both historical and sociological understanding to use the term *feminist* to describe the organizational activities, as well as the intellectual dialogues, of those networks of women that have consciously challenged male hegemony.

EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES

Feminist networks have been international and cosmopolitan in scope. Nineteenth-century feminists made use of different technologies, such as postal mail and steam powered trains and ships, as compared with twentieth and twenty-first technologies of the telephone, electronic mail, Web sites, and air travel. English-based feminist scholar Dale Spender argues that there has "always" been a women's movement—her time frame is the English-speaking world of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. She argues that women's activities have been historically marginalized by the media and the academy. In this she has a commonality with British writer, Virginia Woolf, who wrote passionately about the "puffery" of the male world of the academy and politics that so often ignored the writings of women and mocked the activities of political women such as the suffragists and those early women members of the British Parliament. In that climate a woman speaker, like a woman writer, was a contradiction in terms.

Feminist activism had often been prompted by other causes, such as the antislavery movement in the United States. Feminist networks from the mid-nineteenth until the early twentieth centuries also were organized around "domestic" issues, notably restricting the availability of alcohol, and they generally lobbied the political world of politicians, party leaders, and members of parliament. While the focus was on national governments, the networks and organizations were often international. The Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) was politically active in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States,. The WCTU quickly saw that change would be achieved more quickly if women had the vote: politicians would be forced to listen. Hence, in New Zealand the WCTU in concert with the Women's Franchise League was instrumental in organizing a petition for women's franchise, which resulted in the suffrage of both European and Maori women in 1893. Australian women gained the right to vote and to be nominated for parliament in 1902. However, Aboriginal women were excluded until the 1960s.

EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

Then, as now, women's groups debated important matters of public policy. The WCTU, for example, was not clear whether it was necessary for women themselves to participate in public life as candidates and MPs; flurries of letters were exchanged when feminist Vida Goldstein was nominated by the Women's Party for the Australian Parliament in 1903. She and three others running in the same election are generally credited as being the first women to run for elected national office in the British Empire. Victoria Woodhull was nominated for the U.S. presidency in 1872, before women could vote.

In the United Kingdom and the United States, feminists argued over prostitution and birth control. In the United Kingdom, for example, an innocuous sounding bill, the *Infectious Diseases Bill,* designed to force prostitutes to submit to "health" examinations, split feminists. Some—opposing prostitution—saw it as a move to close the industry; whereas, others saw it as a massive infringement on the common law rights of those individuals.

Much feminist activism in the West was designed to win the vote for women and to allow them to run for elected office. The phase "removing the barriers" was accompanied by strong attempts to change national laws and often to improve international relations. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom was founded in 1915 as a response to the horrors of war and has continued to be active with branches in thirty-seven countries and consultative nongovernmental organization (NGO) status with the United Nations. Once adult women gained the vote—generally after the First World War (1914–1918)—feminist activism was increasingly linked to international peace movements. British writer, and later MP, Vera Brittan, has described her active involvement in issues such as the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) (anti-Franco) and the League of Nations Association, the predecessor of the UN. Feminist activism also focused on equal pay, infant welfare, and antipoverty campaigns.

Most feminist activism was conducted by educated women of European extraction, although the role of African American women in the United States has been described by Mary Hawkesworth, and the role of Maori (indigenous) women in New Zealand discussed by Patricia Grimshaw. The Global Fund for Women—headquartered in the United States and cofounded in 1987 by New Zealander Anne Firth Murray—has an international fourteen-person board.

COLD WAR ERA

The cold war era, which followed the Second World War (1939–1945) and lasted until the 1980s, and which prefigured the emergence of the so-called second wave of feminism, encouraged its citizens to focus on national survival, rather than on internationalism. Western citizens who participated in international peace movements tended to be seen as potential security risks. However, the focus on domestic issues, especially equal pay, and the reform of marriage and divorce laws, continued unabated. The national-feminism of this period was an exception and was already being transformed by the United Nations. Thus began the UN's role as a forum and a promoter of feminist activism. It is impossible to overestimate the UN's role in making women's issues visible, in establishing crucial international congresses, and in promoting new networks of feminism. Jane Bayes and Nayereh Tohidi have examined the activities of religious women around the UN's Fourth World Congress on Women at Beijing in 1995, specifically on sexuality, reproductive health, and women's rights. They found that women adopted a range of approaches

and strategies around issues of sexuality, reproduction, health, and women's rights, and developed interesting new dialogues across traditional religious divisions.

POST–COLD WAR ERA

Globalization, which fully emerged in the post–cold war era, created new types of inequalities between men and women of different races, creeds, and ethnicities, and its responses have resulted in new networks, sometimes linked to UN agencies such as the United Nations Development Program. Key issues have emerged, such as people trafficking, including the sexual trafficking of women and children, that have generated activist and research networks. Globalization has encouraged strong networks across national boundaries, as compared with the previous cold war era. This has been particularly important for those strands of feminism that have conceptualized themselves as international in nature. Whereas historically the peace agenda had constituted an important cosmopolitan theme, debates surrounding development and environmentalism were additional themes in the 1990s. Feminists had historically constructed international dialogues and debates around common issues, and globalization has permitted those discussions to be conducted in real time.

See also *Globalization; U.S. Politics and Society: Women, Political Participation of; Women's Rights; Women's Suffrage.*

. . . .   MARIAN SIMMS

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Women's Representation

Women's representation explores the gendered aspects of representative or parliamentary democracy (as well as other less democratic regime types)—specifically, how the interests and aspirations of women *qua* women are reflected in patterns of public office holding or in public policy outcomes. One primary question within contemporary research concerns the connection between the numbers of women in office and the substance of politics: Does an increase in the number of women elected (or in the governing elite) lead to changes regarding the character of politics or the content of policy? Following in the path suggested by Hanna Pitkin's *The Concept of Representation* (1967), the scholars who address these issues commonly distinguish between a descriptive (quantitative) aspect and a substantive (qualitative) aspect of the representation.

DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION

The focus on women as a group must be understood from the historical context in which women were excluded at some time in the past from national politics on the basis of their sex. In most countries, women now are granted formal political rights; at the same time the world average for women serving in national parliaments is only 19 percent (whereas women make up about half of the world's population). There is only one country in the world where the number of women in the national legislature surpasses the number of men; however, in some countries the gap between the sexes is almost closed. In Rwanda, the number of women in the national parliament is, as of late 2009, 56 percent, and in Sweden it is more than 47 percent. At the other end of the spectrum are well-established democracies like Ireland and the United States, which have rates as low as 13 percent and 17 percent respectively.

Empirical studies of descriptive representation have typically examined either changes in one country over time or variations across countries. A further strand of research has focused on variations across entities within the same political system, such as the number of women elected to powerful positions in different parties or in subnational governments. Previous models more or less regarded an increase in women's representation as a "natural" consequence of changes in society like women's expanded participation in the labor force or in higher education. A growing body of empirical findings challenges that older claim. The new findings suggest that targeted actions (for instance, quotas for women or some other promotion strategy) undertaken by central political actors like political parties are important catalysts for change in descriptive representation.

SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION

On the issue of substantive changes in political patterns or outcomes, there is less consensus about the most fruitful approaches to the study of representation for women. Research on substantive representation is more difficult to operationalize and measure than descriptive research—if for no other reason than there is no monolithic definition of what policies or issues are exclusively "women's issues." Moreover, scholars realize the pitfalls of essentialism—the assumption that women officeholders bring a monolithic set of experiences, values, and ideological dispositions to office, and thus a common agenda. Other political identities (like race), ideologies (partisanship), or experiences may mitigate an affinity for pursuing such an agenda once in office. In addition, the way political power is wielded within institutional settings (the national legislature or the leadership structure of a political party) may dampen incentives

1786 Women's Rights

to pursue such an agenda. Nonetheless, empirical research on women's political representation demonstrates a clear link between office holding by women and action by these women to promote women's interests, however broadly or narrowly these interests are defined.

This link between descriptive representation and substantive representation is complex. The notion that a critical mass of women in office will generate change in political outcomes for women is not universally supported by research. Recent studies in U.S. legislative settings show that a more complex set of factors beyond the head count affect the opportunities for women officeholders to effect change for women. More information is needed about the factors that may hinder women to act as representatives in the ways they might desire after they are elected, as well as the factors that can empower them to effect change.

One clear empirical result is that female members of parliament tend to prioritize issues that also generally are prioritized by female voters (e.g., issues of social policy, policy on the family, care of the elderly, and gender equality). On a more abstract level, these issues reflect policies that, in most contemporary societies, are of importance for securing the autonomy of women in their everyday life. Research in this area also has focused on gender differences regarding political stand-points. The different subfields are directed toward the question of which issues reach the political agenda and the status they are given, or toward the question of what solutions are favoured once an issue is on the table.

On a more abstract level, contemporary research emphasizes that gender is not a fixed category and therefore an analysis of women's representation from a substantive perspective needs to be contextualized in time and space. Analysis of women's representation and definitions of women's interests must take into account that gender is interlinked with other social factors (like age and level of education) and political identities (like race and ethnicity).

See also *Gender Gap; Gender Quotas; U.S. Politics and Society: Women, Political Participation of; Women's Movement, Comparative.*

. . . .   LENA WÄNGNERUD

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Women's Rights

Discussions of women's rights center on three areas: civil, political, and social. Civil rights are necessary for individual freedom that includes personal liberty as opposed to slavery, debt enslavement, or serfdom; freedom of speech, thought, and religion; the right to own property and conclude valid contracts; and the right to justice. Political rights are part of being included in the decision-making process in a democracy, such as voting. Social rights are the rights to a decent standard of living, personal security, and health care, education, and welfare.

Promotion of women's rights is a relatively recent phenomenon. Prior to the 1800s, society generally considered women as inferior to men. Men dominated the *public sphere,* which encompassed the political and economic fields. Women were relegated to the concerns of the *private sphere* of hearth and home and fulfilled the roles of wife and mother. However, due to expansion of economic progress and educational opportunities, women began to carry their private sphere skills and abilities into the public sphere. During the 1800s, women in Britain and the United States began to challenge laws that denied them the right to own their property once they married, launching the movement toward women's rights.

FIRST WAVE FEMINISM

Scholars identify three waves of feminism. The beginning of the first wave is identified as the first women's rights convention in Seneca Falls, New York, in 1848. The convention issued the Declaration of Rights and Sentiments, outlining grievances and setting the agenda for the women's rights movement. Women reformers of that time were concerned about two issues: obtaining the right to vote (suffrage) and attaining equality for all citizens through the abolition of slavery. During this wave, women reformers initially concentrated on abolitionism and then worked toward women's right to vote.

After the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865) concluded and slavery was abolished throughout the country, Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton in 1869 formed the National Woman Suffrage Association. Its primary goal was an amendment to the Constitution. Lucy Stone, Henry Blackwell, and others would form the American Woman Suffrage Association focusing on amendments to individual state constitutions. By 1890 the two organizations merged to form the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), which waged state-by-state campaigns to obtain the right to vote. The Congressional Union, later renamed the National Women's Party, worked for the passage of a federal amendment through picketing the White House and other forms of civil disobedience. In 1919 the federal woman suffrage amendment, originally written by Susan B. Anthony and introduced in Congress in 1878, passed the House of Representatives and the Senate and was sent to the states for ratification. By 1920 the Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, granting women the right to vote, was signed into law.

SECOND WAVE FEMINISM

The second wave of feminism, or *women's liberation,* is considered to have begun in 1963 and lasted through 1980. By the 1960s, women practiced birth control, attended college, and joined the workforce in far greater numbers, but these gains were met by strong social stereotypes from the previous era. In 1963, Betty Friedan published her highly influential book *The Feminine Mystique,* which describes the dissatisfaction felt by middle-class American housewives about the role expected of them by society, especially the drudgery of housework and childbearing. The best-seller galvanized the modern women's rights movement, leading to the founding in 1966 by a group of feminists including Friedan of the National Organization for Women (NOW).

Reformers wanted the same pay as men, equal rights in law, and the freedom to plan their families or not have children at all, but their efforts met with mixed results. On one hand, the U.S. Supreme Court in *Roe v. Wade* (1973) identified a constitutional right to safe and legal abortion within the general right to privacy, overriding the antiabortion laws of many states. On the other hand, the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), proposed to enshrine women's rights explicitly in the Constitution, was not adopted. Originally drafted by Alice Paul in 1923, the ERA was passed by Congress in 1972, but it also required ratification by a minimum of 38 states, a process that closed without the necessary votes in 1982.

THIRD WAVE FEMINISM

The third wave of feminism seems in part a backlash against the "radical" approaches of the 1960s and 1970s. Third wave feminists are more willing to accept differences in experience and even abilities between men and women so long as no one is considered inferior. Third wave feminism includes a growing recognition of the differentiation of women's experience according to race, class, and sexual orientation. The third wave also recognizes the international dimension of feminism and acknowledges the role played by globalization in issues such as female genital mutilation, dowry deaths, and honor killings in certain parts of the world as important issues women face in other cultures.

Nevertheless, the concerns for equality have continued on issue areas such as reproductive rights, sexual harassment and violence, and equality in the workplace, led by NOW, which through the beginning of the twenty-first century was the largest women's rights group in the country seeking to end sexual discrimination, especially in the workplace, through legislative lobbying, litigation, and public demonstrations.

Progress continued in education and professional opportunities. By the end of the twentieth century, women had overtaken men in U.S. college graduation rates. Fields such as medicine, law, and science opened to include more women. At the beginning of the twentieth century about 5 percent of the doctors in the United States were women. As of 2006, over 38 percent of all doctors in the United States were women, and women made up almost 50 percent of the medical student population. An increasing number of women also were

elected to serve in government at the state and national levels, in large part due to EMILY's List (Early Money Is Like Yeast), a financial network for prochoice Democratic women running for national political office founded in 1984. Women elected to positions of state and national power have allowed for more of the issues important to women—such as education, health care, and the environment—to be brought to the forefront of the political agenda.

Despite the progress that has been made in women's rights, challenges continue into the twenty-first century. The concerns of women have focused on economic equality and justice, violence against them, as well as having the ability to make sound and educated sexual choices. Advocates for such issues need to be found in order to bring them to the forefront of the political agenda nationally and internationally.

See also *Feminism; Feminism, Postcolonial; Feminism, Radical.*

. . . .   CECILIA G. MANRIQUE

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Women's Studies

Women's studies is an interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary academic field devoted to topics concerning women, feminism, gender, and politics. The rise of programs in women's studies stems from the acknowledgment that prior to the 1970s formal education was primarily focused on a patriarchal structure that emphasized contributions of men and neglected roles played by women. As women in the second wave of feminism worked toward the women's liberation movement, there was a realization that for women's accomplishments in history, economics, psychology, and so on to be fairly recognized, a major overhaul in the education of students was necessary.

As an academic discipline, women's studies was modeled on the American studies, ethnic studies (such as African American studies), and Chicano studies programs that had arisen shortly before it. The first women's studies program in the United States was established in May 1970 at San Diego State College (now San Diego State University). Throughout the 1970s, many universities and colleges followed suit and created departments and programs in women's studies, including professorships that did not require the sponsorship of other departments. By the late twentieth century, women's studies was formally recognized as an academic institution, and such courses were available at many universities and colleges around the world. A 2007 National Women's Studies Association survey included 576 institutions that offered women's or

gender studies at some level. Currently, there are 678 listed in its online searchable database, with fifteen institutions offering a doctorate in the United States.

The field of women's studies in the twenty-first century seems to have reached a crossroads and there is much talk about the discipline outliving its initial, original purpose of highlighting the historical accomplishments of women. Some claim that because education now focuses equally on the contributions of women and men, there is no need for a separate discipline, while others argue that focusing on women's studies only raised the stigma of antifeminism. As a result, some programs have shifted their attention to the international impact of women's studies, some have gone into an active service learning component to ground graduates in the grass roots, and some have taken advantage of the movement into distance education and online learning.

Regardless of the transition in which women's studies finds itself, many programs have found that they need to be more inclusive not only of men but of those with different sexual orientations and focus more on gay, lesbian, and transgendered issues. As a good compromise, some women's studies departments have refocused themselves as women, gender, and sexuality studies programs. No matter the name, the need to consciously consider the contributions of different members of society and not just the dominant majority has been the key contribution of women's studies programs the world over.

See also *Feminism; Feminist Movement; Gender and Politics; Gender Mainstreaming; Women's Movement, Comparative.*

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Women's Suffrage

Historically, the right of women to vote was limited by patriarchal systems that treated women as the property of their fathers or husbands. Without political voices, women remained dependent financially and socially on males, and issues deemed important to women were often ignored by male decision makers. Adult women in the developed world tend to take the right of suffrage for granted, but this basic right was won only through prolonged battles involving women who challenged the right of males to dominate the political world. In the developing world, many women are still fighting for the right to be recognized as political equals.

Even as eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought and classical liberalism, which introduced the notion of males as rational beings able to govern themselves, grew in popularity, women were generally perceived as too emotional and intellectually inferior to exercise the right of suffrage. The most notable exception to the denial of women as rational beings was found in the writings of Mary Wollstonecraft, the British author of *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792), who contended that women were not inferior by nature but by socialization, which promoted perceptions of female irrationality.

The fight for women's suffrage began in Great Britain, the leading industrial power of the day, in the mid-nineteenth century. Political philosopher and economist, John Stuart Mill, author of *The Subjugation of Women* (1869) and *On Liberty* (1859), was instrumental in a partial reevaluation of women's roles. Mill argued that governments cheated themselves by denying half the population participation in the political process. The first women's suffrage bill was introduced in the British Parliament in 1851. The movement gained momentum over several decades, but it was not until the early twentieth century that it became radical under the leadership of Emmeline Pankhurst and Annie Kenney, who called attention to their cause by orating, marching, heckling, lobbying, burning, and bombing.

In the United States, the early women's movement was strongly allied with the temperance and abolitionist movements. The first formal organization of women's rights arose from the indignation of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, when women were not allowed to take an active role in the World Antislavery Convention in London in 1840. Their outrage led them to hold the first women's rights convention in Seneca Falls, New York, in 1848, where Stanton's introduction of a women's suffrage resolution was considered too controversial by many attendees. The American woman most closely associated with the suffrage movement is Susan B. Anthony, who devoted most of her life to this cause. Like their English counterpart, the American suffrage movement turned radical in the early twentieth century as younger women like Alice Paul took over the reins of leadership.

As European and American families established new colonies and states, they often challenged patriarchal notions of women's roles. Consequently, women in these areas were the first to win political rights. New Zealand granted women's suffrage in 1893, followed by Australia in 1902. The western part of the United States followed this same pattern. For instance, Wyoming, the Equality State, refused to be admitted to the Union if it entailed rescinding women's right to vote.

Before World War I (1914–1918), the only European nations to grant female suffrage were Finland (1906) and Norway (1913). The war proved to be a turning point for women's suffrage in both the United States and Europe as perceptions of women's roles changed in response to participation in the war effort and in industries where women replaced men who had joined the military. In 1918, the Representation of the People

Act granted limited female suffrage in Britain and Canada. In 1920, white women in America won the right to vote with the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. While black males had theoretically been granted suffrage in 1870 with the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, black women and men did not gain the right to vote in much of the American South until 1965 with the passage of the Voting Rights Act.

In 1928, Ecuador became the first country on the South American continent to grant women the right to vote. Three years later, Senegal became the first African nation to grant women's suffrage. The Philippines was the first Asian country to give women the right to vote, in 1937. World War II (1939–1945) served as a turning point for many non-Western nations. Japan and China granted female suffrage in 1945 and 1947 respectively. In colonized nations, independence often precipitated universal suffrage. By the twenty-first century, only Saudi Arabia and Kuwait continued to deny women the right to vote.

See also *Anthony, Susan Brownell; U.S. Politics and Society: Women, Political Participation of; Voting Rights and Suffrage; Wollstonecraft, Mary; Women's Movement, Comparative; Women's Rights.*

. . . . ELIZABETH RHOLETTER PURDY

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Workers' Rights

Workers' rights are the entitlements individuals have in their roles as employees. In most industrialized societies these guarantees protect such things as freedom of association at the workplace, a minimum wage, and a safe and healthy workplace. The primary obligation for protecting these rights rests with employers. Employers also are the most likely violators of workers' rights. The government regulates the employer-employee relationship, adjudicates employee grievances against employers, and implements a remedy if necessary. The status of workers in a country is a bellwether for the status of human rights in general, because it is rare that a government will respect other human rights if it does not respect workers' rights.

Workers' rights are recognized in international human rights agreements such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They are elaborated in more detail in the conventions and recommendations adopted by the International Labour Organization (ILO), the UN agency that is focused on labor issues. These international human rights agreements and the ILO provide lists of rights workers ought to have everywhere in the world. The actual rights workers can exercise with government protection vary from country to country. They can be found in each nation's constitution, statutes, bureaucratic regulations, and judicial opinions.

The ILO was formed in 1919 to promote government protection of the rights of workers all over the world. It is the oldest of all international organizations promoting government respect for human rights. Today, almost all members of the UN are also members of the ILO. The institutions of the ILO produce conventions and recommendations describing the policies member states ought to enact and enforce if they want to protect the basic rights of workers against abuse by employers. The bodies that draft and approve these recommendations comprise representatives of governments (50 percent), employers (25 percent), and workers (25 percent). The goal is to ensure that ILO standards represent meaningful and practicable targets for both more developed and less developed countries. Conventions are designed to be ratified like an international treaty. A ratifying state undertakes certain binding legal obligations. A recommendation does not create legally binding obligations, but provides additional guidelines for national policies. Employers generally favor recommendations. Workers favor conventions. Protocols are partial revisions of conventions. The term *International Labour Code* is used to refer to the whole body of conventions, recommendations, and protocols adopted by the International Labour Conference.

The ILO's 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work requires all ILO members to "respect, to promote and to realize in good faith" five core rights that are considered fundamental workers' rights and should be respected by all governments of the world, rich and poor, even if they have not ratified the relevant ILO conventions. These core worker rights are: freedom of association, the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, the effective abolition of child labor, and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment or occupation.

The United States was a founding member of the ILO and continues to be a member state. However, the United States has ratified few of the ILO conventions, declaring most of them to be within the domain of the states. Only a handful of other nations, such as Brunei and Myanmar, have a poorer record of support for ILO initiatives supporting workers' rights. Moreover, if the rights of American workers are compared with the absolute standards set by the ILO, one finds many areas where protections of workers' rights in the United States do not meet international standards.

See also *Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; International Bill of Rights; Justice and Injustice.*

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World Bank

The term *World Bank* refers to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). The term *World Bank Group* incorporates five closely associated entities working collaboratively to reduce poverty: the World Bank (the IBRD and IDA), the International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.

The IBRD was established in 1944 as the original institution of the World Bank Group. It seeks to reduce poverty in middle-income and creditworthy poorer countries by advocating sustainable development through loans, guarantees, risk management products, and analytical and advisory services. The IBRD is structured like a cooperative owned and operated for the benefit of its 186 member countries. The IDA, established in 1960, strives to reduce poverty through interest-free loans and grants for programs that increase economic growth, reduce inequalities, and improve people's living conditions.

The World Bank was conceived in 1944 primarily to facilitate postwar reconstruction and development. The following year, the IBRD Articles of Agreement became effective upon signature by twenty-eight governments, and formal operations began in 1946. In 1947 the executive directors approved the bank's first loan; this was to France for reconstruction. Since its inception, the World Bank has expanded from a single institution to an associated group of coordinated development institutions. Its mission has evolved to global poverty alleviation, and projects have broadened from focusing on heavy infrastructure investment to include work such as social sector lending projects.

The World Bank compares itself to a cooperative with member countries as shareholders. The shareholders are represented by a board of governors, the ultimate policy makers. As the governors only meet annually, they delegate specific duties to twenty-four executive directors. The five largest shareholders (France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) each appoint an executive director, while other member countries are represented by nineteen executive directors. The World Bank's president is responsible for overall management. By tradition, the president is a U.S. national and is nominated by the United States, the bank's largest shareholder. The president is elected by the board of governors for a five-year, renewable term.

According to Robert B. Zoellick (World Bank president as of November 2009), the World Bank Group's vision is to contribute to inclusive and sustainable globalization. This aims to overcome poverty, enhance growth with care for the environment, and create individual opportunity and hope. Assistance is focused on the poorest countries, fragile states, the Arab world, and middle-income countries. It also seeks to solve global public goods issues and to provide knowledge and learning services.

There has been wide-ranging critique of the World Bank from various sources. This includes critics arguing that the bank reform policies can harm economic development and erode traditional economic structures and values, and a small number of economically powerful countries dominate the bank and promote their own interests. There were major protests against the World Bank during 2002 in Oslo, Norway, and Washington, DC, in 2007. The World Bank has sought to address issues that have encouraged criticism.

See also *Development, Economic.*

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World Economic Forum

See *Davos Conference.*

World Trade Organization (WTO)

From 1948 to 1994, much of the world's trade was governed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). GATT as an international organization was replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, but remains in an updated form the WTO's umbrella treaty for trade in goods. According to the WTO, its overriding objective is to help trade flow smoothly, freely, fairly, and predictably. This involves the WTO administering trade agreements, acting as a forum for trade negotiations; settling trade disputes, reviewing national trade policies, assisting developing countries in trade policy issues, and cooperating with other international organizations. Any state or customs territory with full autonomy in the conduct of its trade policies may join the WTO, but members must agree on the terms. As of July 2008, the WTO had 153 members.

The top level decision-making body is the Ministerial Conference, which meets at least once every two years. Below this is the General Council (normally ambassadors and heads

of delegation in Geneva, Switzerland), which meets several times a year in the Geneva headquarters. The General Council also meets as the Trade Policy Review Body and the Dispute Settlement Body. The Goods Council, Services Council, and Intellectual Property Council report to the General Council. Specialized committees, working groups, and working parties deal with individual agreements and other areas. The WTO Secretariat is headed by a director-general (in November 2009 Pascal Lamy). Its main duties are to supply technical support for the councils and committees and the ministerial conferences, to provide technical assistance for developing countries, to analyze world trade, and to explain WTO affairs to the public and media.

In Doha, Qatar, WTO members in 2001 agreed to undertake a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, the previous round occurring 1986 to 1994 (the Uruguay round). The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) aims to reduce trade barriers and assist developing countries through trade liberalization. The negotiations have been characterized by differences between the United States, the European Union, and developing countries on major issues. These have included agriculture, industrial tariffs and nontariff barriers, services, and trade remedies. As of October 2009. the DDA had yet to be concluded. The WTO in 2009 identified various key issues warranting discussion. These included the WTO and the multilateral trading system's role in addressing the global economic crisis, the Doha round's relevance during the crisis, and the main challenges facing the multilateral trading system after the crisis. Another issue was the impact of the crisis on developing countries, especially those least developed.

There has been critique of the WTO on various grounds, and major protests occurred during the 1999 Ministerial Conference in Seattle, Washington. The WTO itself has identified what it calls common "misunderstandings" regarding its work. These include critics arguing that the WTO dictates to governments what to do; promotes free trade at any costs; ignores development; prioritizes commercial interests over environmental protection; dictates to governments on issues such as food safety and human health and safety; causes unemployment and widens the gap between rich and poor; is the tool of powerful lobbies; and is undemocratic. The WTO also indentifies a common critique that small countries are powerless in the organization and that weaker countries are forced to become members.

See also *European Union; Intellectual Property Rights; Protectionism and Tariffs; Trade Diplomacy.*

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Wright, Quincy

Philip Quincy Wright (1890–1970) was an American political scientist and a pacifist. He is well known for his role in the early development of quantitative and interdisciplinary studies on human conflict and international relations. In spite of his normative and legal foundations, he soon found himself affiliated to Chicago's positivist behavioralist approaches to research, crystallized through his monumental and far-reaching work *A Study of War* (1942). Wright was convinced that the scientific understanding of war was a prerequisite for its complete abolition from human life and focused his efforts on the development of such a program.

Wright was born in Medford, Massachusetts, in 1890, and grew up in a family that always fostered scientific creativity. In 1923 he joined the Department of Social Sciences at the University of Chicago, where he remained for the whole of his academic career. While at the university, he cofounded the first international relations graduate program to be introduced in the United States (1928). He was instrumental in the establishment of the International Political Science Association, becoming its first president (1949–1952), and also served as president of the American Association of University Professors (1944–1946), the American Political Science Association (1948–1949), and the American Society of International Law (1955–1956).

Beyond his academic career, Wright was an advocate for U.S. participation in the League of Nations and was also an active member of the United Nations Association during the cold war. As a fervent opponent of fascism, he supported the Spanish Republic and acted as an adviser to Justice Robert H. Jackson during the Nuremberg trials. He also opposed U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War (1959–1975) from its early stages and openly challenged its legal, political, and moral basis, providing further grounds for the growing antiwar movement.

Wright's *A Study of War* is a vast encyclopaedic effort that combines a large series of statistical data with an in-depth analysis based on such disciplines as anthropology, biology, economics, history, psychology, and geography. His explanatory theory for deadly conflicts is laid out through four levels of analysis: technological, legal/normative, sociopolitical, and biopsychocultural. Following Wright's approach, deadly conflict is more likely to occur when the mechanisms that control human relations at any level, preserving a nonviolent equilibrium, are overloaded and fail to perform. Peace,

defined as a state of "equilibrium among many forces," must be intentionally organized, carefully maintained, and promptly restored if broken. Even thought it did receive criticism for inconsistencies regarding its technological determinism, most scholars agree that more than half a century later *A Study of War* is still a valuable resource and a model for interdisciplinary research.

Wright has been considered a forerunner of peace research, anticipating the health sciences model that identifies war and violence as a preventable disease. Other works by him, such as *Mandates under the League of Nations* (1930) and *The Study of International Relations* (1955), also had a wide readership and were frequently used as standard texts in university curricula. Wright was nominated by Czech political scientist Karl Deutsch and fourteen other colleagues for the Nobel Peace Price in 1970, the year of Wright's death.

See also *Conflict Resolution; International Relations; Peace; U.S. Political Thought*.

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Xenophobia

Xenophobia has come to be defined as the fear of foreigners. Etymologically, *xenophobia* can be broken down into the Greek terms *xenos* (stranger) and *phobos* (fear). In common usage xenophobia refers to a disdain for individuals or groups of persons that are different from oneself. This dislike can range from simple rude comments to much more dangerous forms of intolerance. Therefore, the term can have varying levels of severity in the amount of the fear of the foreign population, as well as in how this fear is manifested in thought and action. Several examples of both state and nonstate manifestations of xenophobia are warranted.

Immigrant groups are often subjected to xenophobic attitudes of existent populations in countries around the world. If a historical view is taken, it can be remembered that during the colonial periods colonists often held xenophobic views of native populations. In each of these cases, individuals and groups frequently associated cultural and ethnic stereotypes with the feared groups. This practice exacerbated cultural misunderstandings and has only served to increase the levels of narrow-mindedness that enter into these groups' interactions in everyday life, as well as in social and political institutions.

Whole societies have experienced times in which xenophobia was ostensibly state governmental policy. Japan from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries is a prime example of this policy. During this period almost all foreigners and foreign influences were removed or banned from the country. While this policy ended in the mid-nineteenth century, it serves as a stark representation of xenophobia as governmental policy.

However, most xenophobia is not expressed through governmental policy. It is usually articulated on a more direct, personal level. An example of this type of xenophobia can be found in the successive waves of immigrants to New York City in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Each new population of immigrants was subject to the xenophobic attitudes of the present inhabitants, many of whom also had immigrated recently and had been subject to xenophobia themselves. This xenophobia expressed itself through epithets, violence, and general discrimination, such as the "Irish need not apply" signs found in many shops.

In more recent times, immigration has continued to be a source of xenophobia. In the United States, for example, many groups have come together to protest illegal immigration, primarily from Latin America. Many observers have noted the xenophobic messages hidden superficially below the surface of the rhetoric in such publications and on such Web sites.

There are also many instances of xenophobia existing within the boundaries of one country, but among different factions, cultural minorities, or regional populations. For example, the Kurds of northern Iraq, as a population, have experienced xenophobic policies from governmental entities as well as a general social climate of xenophobia from other social and religious groups in that country. These exclusionary policies and less formal prejudices, for example, have contributed to the splintering of Iraq.

As countries experience increasing levels of social, political, and economic interdependence, the world is becoming ever more multicultural. This elevated level of interaction among diverse members of different communities may lead to a more tolerant and socially beneficent global population. Many signs indicate that the world is on the march to less xenophobia because of this increased contact and integration. However, many trends point to the unfortunate fact that xenophobia will continue to exist because of increased competition for resources, commerce, and political power.

The relative levels of xenophobia in and among countries are difficult to directly quantify. However, measures that investigate levels of perceived discrimination and the number of hate crimes in a population (although many countries do not yet have adequate tracking systems) can provide transferable evidence of the persistence of xenophobia. For example, a 2008 study by Human Rights First revealed that Finland, Ireland, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States showed moderate to high rises in the overall numbers of hate crimes in 2006 and 2007. Further, evidence of the problem of xenophobia was addressed in conferences sponsored by the United Nations in 2001 and 2009.

The future of xenophobia as a human condition is unlikely to end. This, of course, is a sad report on human relations that people fear what is not directly familiar to themselves and their normal experiences. One can only hope that the future

Demonstrators protest against racism and xenophobia in South Africa after a series of xenophobic attacks in 2008. Xenophobic views create cultural and ethnic stereotypes, misunderstandings, and intolerance that at times lead to violence.

SOURCE: Corbis

will provide increased opportunities for diverse groups and populations to share their cultural traditions in an atmosphere of genuine interest in the other and mutual respect for them and their ways of life.

See also *Anti-Semitism; Colonialism; Ethnic Cleansing; Genocide; Holocaust; Race and Racism; State Repression; White Supremacy; Zionism.*

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Xenophon

A citizen of classical Athens from the *deme* of Erchia, Xenophon (c. 428–354 BCE), son of Gryllus, was a political philosopher and an active participant in the affairs of ancient Hellas. Generally neglected by scholars of politics for many years, Xenophon's writings have been the focus of renewed scholarly attention during the past two generations. This rekindled interest is both driven and justified by the wealth of political insight preserved in his texts.

It is recorded that Xenophon, while a young man, encountered the Greek philosopher Socrates and was persuaded to keep company with him as his pupil, investigating with him what sorts of things led to the nobility and goodness of men. Xenophon's Socratic education was the most formative experience of his life and is the crucial reason why he is significant to scholars of politics. This education inspired Xenophon to write several texts chronicling Socrates' life and activity, texts that complement Plato's account of this first political philosopher and reflect Xenophon's own engagement with Socratic questions.

In *Oeconomicus,* Xenophon presents Socrates' conversation with Ischomachus, a gentleman farmer devoted to the life of civic virtue. Through the speeches of this text—speeches that represent the conversation Socrates had on the day he made his "turn" to study human issues—Xenophon gives an account of the Socratic examination of virtue that reveals marked differences between the philosopher and the citizen. In Xenophon's *Symposium,* Socrates is shown participating in a lighthearted drinking party during which the attendants discuss the serious subject of the concept of goodness. The purpose of the *Apology of Socrates to the Jury,* Xenophon's work based on a portion of Socrates' defense speech at the famous trial at which he stood accused of corrupting youth and dishonoring the ancestral gods, is to account for the reasons why Socrates was seen to be a boastful or arrogant speaker. Finally, in *Memorabilia,* Xenophon recounts a number of his own recollections about the life and deeds of Socrates, recollections that appear random but in fact deal with major themes such as piety, justice, and education. If Plato's dialogues seek to render Socrates in the most pleasing light, then the *Memorabilia* may be said to present him warts and all.

Xenophon the practical statesman emerges in the *Anabasis of Cyrus,* which relates the march of a small group of Hellenic mercenaries from the coast of Asia Minor to the heart of the Persian Empire and then back again to Hellas. After setting out in support of Cyrus the Younger in his quest to usurp power from his brother, the Great King, the troops must make the arduous journey home after Cyrus falls in battle in 401 BCE. It is Xenophon, himself a member of the mercenary force, who provides the leadership necessary to bring his men home safely. Political leadership is the chief theme also of *The Education of Cyrus,* a text about a different Cyrus, the great founder of Persia, on whose life, education, and virtue Xenophon expounds.

See also *Plato; Political Philosophy; Socrates.*

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Yoshino Sakuzo

Yoshino Sakuzo (1878–1933) was a Japanese political thinker and leader of the Taisho democracy movement. He is best known for his formulation of the political theory of *minpon-shugi,* or "politics of the people." Born into a middle-class merchant family, Yoshino was converted to Christianity in high school. During his years as a law student, he joined the Hongo Church, where he came under the influence of Christian socialists Abe Isoo and Naoe Kinoshita. Two years after Yoshino's graduation in 1904, he went to China as a private tutor to the son of Yuan Shikai, a Chinese warlord. Yoshino returned to China in 1909 to become an assistant professor at Tokyo Imperial University. He was in Europe from 1910 to 1913, during which time he came into contact with European intellectuals.

While at Tokyo Imperial University, Yoshino began writing articles on politics in the *Chuo Koron* (*Monthly Review*), calling for the establishment of a constitutional government. In 1918 he founded the *Reimeiki* (Enlightenment Society) and held lectures with another leader of the democratic movement, Oyama Ikuo. They called for the introduction of adult suffrage and a reduction in the constitutional powers of the Upper House of the Diet, the Privy Council, and the military. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 brought challenges to the democratic movement and Yoshino was forced to resign from the university and take a job as an editorial writer for the newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*. However, his articles were censored and he was once again forced to resign. He then founded the *Meiji Bunka Kenkyukai* (Meiji Culture Research Association) and published under its auspices an encyclopedic twenty-four-volume work titled *Meiji Bunka Zenshu* (1929–1930). During this period he worked to create a united front of noncommunist liberal democratic parties.

Arguably Yoshino's most important work was *On the Meaning of Constitutional Government,* which defined his career. Although he was a democrat, his vision of Japanese democracy differed from the European models. While critical of imperial authoritarianism, Yoshino rejected the concept of natural rights as the basis of democracy because the concept was alien to Japanese traditions. Instead, he based his argument on the well-being of the people. According to Yoshino, democracy was based on two fundamental premises: the first, *minshu shugi,* held that sovereignty was vested in the people. The second, *minpon shugi,* held that the welfare of the citizens was the ultimate goal of the state. This reasoning made it unnecessary for the Japanese to accept the theories of European philosophers John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, among others, regarding the philosophical content of democracy; it was enough to borrow the democratic institutions and modify them to the Japanese environment. Even this idea of a constitutional monarchy was a radical one in pre–World War II (1939–1945) Japan. It was only after Japan's humiliating defeat in the war that Yoshino's ideas were validated. Yoshino's collected writings have been published in eight volumes.

See also *Asian Political Thought; Democracy; Democratic Theory; Locke, John; Political Theory; Rousseau, Jean-Jacques.*

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Young, Iris Marion

Iris Marion Young (1949–2006) was a feminist political philosopher and social theorist whose impact on issues of justice, gender, and equality went far beyond traditional academic boundaries. Her work was highly praised by colleagues in philosophy and political science, but she also advanced debates in fields from urban planning and public health to education and law. The consistent exemplary quality in her scholarly writing was the ability to connect often technical and abstract theories of justice to the politics of everyday life.

Young's passion for ideas began early in life and led to her studying philosophy at Queen's College in New York. She continued her education at Pennsylvania State University, receiving her doctorate in 1974. Afterward she taught at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Miami University, and the University of Pittsburgh, before her appointment to teach political science at the University of Chicago.

Many books have contributed to the discussion of justice in political philosophy over the past thirty years, but few have changed the terrain of the debate in the ways that Young's *Justice and the Politics of Difference* did in 1990.

This volume explores the dominant perspectives on justice and critiques them where they fall short. In an attempt to remedy their deficiencies and advance the conversation in a new direction, Young argues for supporting the differences among social groups. Whereas many political theorists would often overlook the complicated parts of social diversity, Young suggests that these differences be understood as an essential component of completing explanations of justice. Further, she demands that a new set of criteria be employed to judge the justness of institutions and the opportunities they provide to adequately address injustices of a system built on biased norms.

From this work, Young's scholarly focus turned again to ideas that have implications in the international realm and on global justice. In *Inclusion and Democracy* (2000), she highlights the ways in which present forms of democracy all too often curtail the freedom of participation of marginalized groups. She maintains this inadequacy of many democratic governments must be addressed to make the process of deliberation and policy making more inclusive to voices that come from nontraditional sources or from outside the dominant political paradigms. One of the most intriguing aspects of her discussion is the need for some type of global democracy to combat the political forces that actively support the oppression of marginalized groups and that prohibit democracies from rectifying the injustices that occur when inclusion is not a political priority.

Many of Young's ideas continued to permeate grassroots activism on issues of social diversity, equality, and human rights in the early twenty-first century, and her determination to advance the cause of justice continued through her works and the students she taught.

See also *Political Philosophy; Political Theory.*

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Zetkin, Clara

Clara Zetkin, born Clara Esner (1857–1933), was an influential German socialist and one of the pioneer feminist activists. Until 1917 she was active in the Social Democratic Party. Thereafter she joined the Independent Social Democratic Party and its far-left wing, the Spartacist League, which later became the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). Zetkin represented the KPD in the Reichstag during the Weimar Republic period from 1920 to 1933.

Zetkin was born in Wiederau, Saxony, to Jewish parents. At the age of twenty-one she met Osip Zetkin, a Russian émigré, and joined his Socialist Workers Party, which evolved into the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 1890. When Chancellor Otto von Bismarck banned socialist activity in Germany, the Zetkins fled first to Zurich, Switzerland, and then to Paris, France, where they played an important role in the formation of the Socialist International group. She also adopted the name of her lover (although they never married), with whom she had two sons. Osip died in 1889 and later Zetkin married Georg Friedrich Zundel.

Zetkin formed an alliance with Marxist theorist and philosopher Rosa Luxemburg and worked with her closely in opposing German political theorist Eduard Bernstein. She was very interested in women's rights and was responsible for launching the Social Democratic Women's Movement in Germany and editing the SPD magazine, *Die Gleichheit* (*Equality*). She was the leading theorist, after German social scientists Friedrich Engels and August Bebel, of the so-called women's question in the international socialist movement before World War I (1914–1918). She started the International Women's Day in 1911 and headed the Women's Office in the SPD. In 1907 she founded the Socialist Women's International organization. During World War I, Zetkin refused to collaborate in war efforts and was arrested several times. Even among socialists she was considered extremely radical. She never wrote a book, but many of her positions were outlined in speeches and articles in the bimonthly magazine *Die Gleichheit*.

During Adolf Hitler's ascent to power, Zetkin was a member of the Reichstag as a representative of the German Communist Party and its Central Committee. She was also a member of the Communist International from 1921 to 1933. In 1925 she was elected president of the German left-wing solidarity organization, Red Aid. After the arson attack on the Reichstag building in 1933, which led Hitler to blame and ban the Communist Party, Zetkin went into exile for the last time to the Soviet Union. She died in Moscow in 1933 and is buried near the Kremlin.

See also *Feminism; Feminism, Radical; Feminist Movement; German Political Thought; Social Democracy; Socialism.*

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Zionism

The term *Zionism* is derived from the Hebrew word *Zion,* an appellation for the city of Jerusalem (and sometimes symbolically the land of Israel) that appears in the Bible and throughout Jewish religious literature. It was coined in 1890 by Jewish publicist Nathan Birnbaum in his journal *Selbstemanzipation.* Rather than a single coherent doctrine or political program, Zionism encompasses a constellation of ideologies and factions, set along a wide political spectrum, with varied tactics and goals. The Jewish national movement came into being in the context of the breakdown of the traditional Jewish community in modern times, the influence of Enlightenment and liberal thought, the tensions of Emancipation in western and central Europe, and the rise of nationalist movements throughout Europe. It has concerned itself theoretically with a rejection of the Jewish Diaspora and the analysis of anti–Semitism, and practically with the revitalization and resettlement of the Jewish nation. In general, Zionism has striven for liberation from persecution, the establishment of a Jewish national home, and the recovery of national dignity and self-esteem.

HISTORICAL LEGACY

Throughout the centuries, Jews maintained a deep connection to the land of Israel. The ingathering of the exiles and

the restoration of Jewish sovereignty had long been central to Judaism's messianic vision, and continual existence of a Jewish community and intermittent small-scale immigration. Emerging in the later decades of the nineteenth century, modern Zionism represented a significant break with traditional Jewish religious values and expectations, rejecting the theological interpretation of Jewish history, the notion of exile as divine decree and attendant withdrawal from political affairs, and the culture of the ghetto.

According to Zionism, the Jews were first and foremost "a people, one people," as Theodore Herzl, the preeminent leader of the Zionist movement, maintained, bound by filial attachments, language, and shared historical memories—though a significant undertaking of the Zionist project was to recover the Jewish language and regain a territory. Zionism rejected the traditional theological account of *galut* (exile) and the justification of Jewish powerlessness. Rather than a tragic yet divinely ordained dispensation, Zionists viewed the exile as an aberrant and perilous condition that needed to be "negated" by human activity in order to normalize the Jewish nation and to be able to determine its destiny.

ANTI-SEMITISM

One of the central elements of Zionist theory was a diagnosis of the nature and persistence of anti-Semitism. In the wake of the Russian pogroms of 1881 and the precarious condition of Emancipation elsewhere in Europe, evidenced by growing anti-Semitic movements in German-speaking countries and the Dreyfus affair in France, some Jewish intellectuals came to believe that the Jews were hated, not on account of their religion, but because of their nationality. Therefore, neither religious reform nor conversion could provide a viable solution to the Jewish question.

Responding to the Russian pogroms of 1881, physician and activist Leon Pinsker argued in his pamphlet *Auto-Emancipation* that anti-Semitism (or Judeophobia) was a mass psychological response to the abnormal situation of the Jews. The Jews, Pinsker claimed, comprised a "ghost nation," foreigners ever dependent on host societies, in perpetual economic competition with the local population. They therefore incurred the fear and hatred of the native population. The solution would be for the Jews to become a normal nation, through concentration in their own territory, though Pinsker doubted that the land of Israel would be suitable for this purpose.

THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT

Theodor Herzl came to a similar conclusion in his epochal 1896 pamphlet *Der Judenstaat* ("The Jewish State"). Herzl maintained that the vast majority of Jews would be unable to assimilate, and would thus always remain an irritant in their respective societies. The solution to this problem would be the relocation of Jews to an underdeveloped territory, the establishment of a Jewish homeland that would serve as a refuge for the surplus Jewish population of Europe. Herzl regarded the plight of the Jews as an international political problem to be dealt with chiefly through diplomacy rather than through small-scale settlement and Jewish philanthropic projects. Herzl hoped to obtain a charter that would grant international recognition to a Jewish territory, and worked to create the infrastructure of a political movement: the establishment of the Zionist Congress, the Jewish Colonial Trust, and an official press.

The political Zionism of Herzl was driven by *Judennot,* the "need of the Jews," and not by cultural concerns. In contrast, *cultural* or *spiritual* Zionism had at its center "the need of Judaism" brought about by the deterioration of traditional Jewish society and collective identity and advocated a cultural renaissance. The "agnostic Rabbi" Ahad Ha-Am ("One of the People," the pen name of Asher Ginzberg) supported the establishment of a "spiritual center" in Palestine from which new cultural products would emanate. Other thinkers engaged in the revitalization of Jewish culture included radicals such as Micah Joseph Berdyczewski, Joseph Hayyim Brenner, and Jacob Klatzkin, who struggled to liberate Jewishness from the religious tradition and the ghetto culture that they believed had stifled its spirit.

Arguably the most practically significant trend was socialist or labor Zionism, which strove to create a "new Jew," grounded in land and labor, and to establish a new Jewish society driven by a humanist faith. Its leading ideologists were the utopian socialist Nachman Syrkin, Ber Borochov, who developed a synthesis of Marxism and Zionism, and A. D. Gordon, whose "religion of labor" was influenced by Leo Tolstoy. Labor Zionism was responsible for the development of the collective (*kibbutz*) movement, and much of the leadership of the Jewish settlement in Palestine and later of the state of Israel came from this group.

While early activities for a reinvigorated settlement in Palestine had rabbinic sanction, the movement for a secular national revival and political activity met with significant resistance from traditional religious quarters. Many Orthodox Jews regarded the Zionist movement as a secular messianic heresy. This opposition found institutional expression in the *Agudah Israel* movement, founded in 1912. A religious Zionist faction, the *Mizrahi,* emerged in 1902, to work alongside the secular groups in the World Zionist Organization. Other religious authorities, such as Rav Abraham Isaac Kook, the Chief Rabbi of Palestine under the British Mandate, saw in the Zionist movement the beginnings of the redemptive process, and therefore advocated an alliance with the secular pioneers.

THE STATE OF ISRAEL

Opponents of Zionism, particularly in the Arab world, have regarded the movement as a Western transplant and have criticized what they regard as an illegal occupation of Arab land and the displacement of a large part of the indigenous population (leading to the Palestinian refugee problem). Opponents consider United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 of 1975, which stated that "Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination" to support their position, and partly as a result, they continue to reject the legitimacy of the Jewish state.

With the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the Zionist movement achieved some of its principal objectives. Yet, the question of the Jewish character of the state and religious authority, the status of the Arab minority, and the relationship to Diaspora Jewry continued to be negotiated in the early twenty-first century. Since the mid-1980s, such tensions have given rise to a "post-Zionist" ideology, claiming that Zionism has fulfilled its ideological mission, encouraging critical revision of the historical narratives regarding the early Zionist settlement of Palestine and the establishment of the state of Israel, and envisioning Israel as a secular, democratic, non-Jewish state.

See also *Arab-Israeli Relations; Jewish Political Thought; Nationalism; Political Theology.*

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INDEX

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Illustrations are denoted by italic page numbers. Main entries are denoted by bold page numbers. Figures and tables are indicated by f and t following page numbers. Alphabetization is letter-by-letter (e.g., "Federalism" precedes "Federal mandates").